

10-1-2010

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### Recommended Citation

Bartek, James. "The More of Them Are Killed the Better: Racial Identity and Noncombatant Immunity in Civil War New Mexico." *New Mexico Historical Review* 85, 4 (2010). <https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr/vol85/iss4/1>

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## “The More of Them Are Killed the Better”

RACIAL IDENTITY AND NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY IN CIVIL WAR  
NEW MEXICO

*James M. Bartek*

“**E**xcuse my bad writing for I am in a very great hurry,” Texas artilleryman Frank Starr apologized to his father in early October 1861. “It is rumored that we march next Monday—where to I do not know but I suspect towards New Mexico.” Penned with palpable anticipation from Camp Sibley outside San Antonio, Texas, this brief letter presaged a significant expansion of the American Civil War, which most Americans assumed would last no more than a few weeks when the conflict started in April. Stalemated in the East, some Southerners looked to the Southwest for the decisive encounter that would secure the independence of their country, the Confederate States of America. New Mexico Territory, which included all of present-day Arizona, seemed ripe for the taking. The subsequent campaign to expand the Confederate empire, however, did not go unchallenged. Union volunteers blunted the rebel advance at the Battle of Glorieta Pass in March 1862 and eventually secured the territory for the United States.<sup>1</sup>

Unsurprisingly, the conduct, if not overall strategy, of the New Mexico campaign seemed to mirror in large degree the events taking place in the East: Americans fought Americans and makeshift hospitals overflowed with casualties. Historians even retroactively dubbed the single climactic encounter at Glorieta Pass the “Gettysburg of the West.” As in the East, the ethos of “civilized” warfare among the combatants tempered the ferocious fighting:

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Prisoners of war were granted quarter, the wounded were tended, and soldiers often ruminated on the inherent humanity of their enemy. At least in one glaring regard, however, the New Mexico campaign differed drastically from the events unraveling on the other side of the Mississippi River. A policy of military restraint toward civilians, however tenuous, continued to hold sway in the East, at least through 1863. Anglo American soldiers encountering enemy civilians tended to adopt, with important exceptions, relatively mild retributive policies. Despite inflammatory rhetoric demanding that the enemy's country be laid to waste, Union and Confederate soldiers stopped far short of total devastation. In New Mexico and Arizona, however, Union and Rebel troops encountered not Anglo Americans but Hispanic Americans among the civilian population. Both armies, in effect, became occupiers of a "foreign" land, and the multiracial Southwest ultimately exposed the shallowness of Anglo notions toward "civilized" warfare. Uniformly denounced as treacherous "greasers" or "indolent" peons, native New Mexicans fell prey to Northern and Southern volunteers who plundered and destroyed with abandon. Far from pillaging for the sake of pillaging, volunteers were in fact making a profound social statement concerning the values and ideals of mid-nineteenth-century Anglo America.<sup>2</sup>

### The Southwest in 1860

In 1860 the preponderance of U.S. Army regulars were scattered in company-sized detachments throughout the West. Chasing down Indians only occasionally interrupted an otherwise monotonous life of road building, fort construction, and parade drill. The secession crisis demanded soldiers play a much greater role. In response to the rebellion, the federal government transferred a significant number of troops to the East. Some western forts were completely abandoned while others were handed to hastily raised volunteer units. The inevitable confusion left the remaining Union defenders vulnerable. With all eyes fixed on eastern battlefields, federal help would not be forthcoming should a crisis arise.

Some Southerners, Texans especially, deemed New Mexico Territory too great a prize not to exploit. Annexing the territory would bring the South one step closer to becoming a continental nation. With New Mexico secured, so went the conventional wisdom, it was only a matter of time before California threw in its lot with the Confederacy—significant discontent with the federal government among Californians lent plausibility to the scenario—or was conquered in turn. Already stretched thin on the Atlantic Coast, the Union Navy would be hard pressed to blockade Pacific ports effectively, leaving the

South with virtually unfettered access to international trade. The capture of southwestern gold and silver mines would guarantee a steady flow of precious metals at the expense of the Union war effort. Most importantly, significant gains in the Southwest might win the foreign recognition Southern leaders so desperately sought. If the plans seemed grandiose, they at least corresponded with an overall Confederate national strategy of winning independence from the Union. A few ambitious Texans considered the conquest of New Mexico merely the first stage of an even grander design: the creation of a Confederate empire in Latin America.<sup>3</sup>

The philosophy of expansionism was a potent force during the 1850s. As the rancor of sectional politics increased, Texans' historical yearning for territorial aggrandizement neatly coalesced with a more general Southern desire to expand the institution of slavery. For many proponents, expansion seemed the only way to ensure slavery's survival. The drive for the expansion of slavery gained urgency after the election of 1860, which brought to power a Republican administration that advocated immediate containment as a road to eventual abolition. If safeguarding slavery required expansion, federal opposition to slavery's extension required southern secession. In October 1860, the *Weekly Sun* in Vicksburg, Mississippi, insisted, "The Southern States once constituted as an independent Republic, the acquisition of Mexico, Central America, San[to] Domingo, and other West [Indies] Islands would follow as a direct and necessary result." The newspaper's editor concluded that the Gulf of Mexico could be made into a "Southern lake." For Texas nationalists, the prospect of unhindered expansion was equally attractive, although advocates invariably couched the benefits in more provincial terms. "We must have [the northern Mexican states of] Sonora and Chihuahua," declared James Reily, a future officer for a Texas volunteer regiment. "With Sonora and Chihuahua we gain Southern California, and by a railroad to Guaymas render our State of Texas the great highway of nations." The improbability of the success of such schemes did not prevent them from gaining widespread acceptance, and the possible extent of southern power appeared limited only by the imagination. Not by accident, the Knights of the Golden Circle, a secretive organization dedicated to the creation of a slavery empire in Latin America, found its greatest support in Texas.<sup>4</sup>

The desire to expand slavery to the west and south was simply one component of the much larger phenomenon of manifest destiny. Hardly limited to Southerners, the belief that American values and institutions were destined to spread across the North American continent and perhaps the hemisphere had been a driving force since the United States' inception.

Americans touted their country as a paragon of republicanism or democracy and an exemplar of freedom. Other peoples, they assumed, would only benefit from American tutelage. But as might be expected of a country that simultaneously espoused the equality of man and tolerated racial slavery, its philosophy about its continental destiny was rife with tensions and contradictions. Civilizing the savage and enlightening the ignorant too often equated with intolerance, subjugation, or extermination.

Nor would those peoples subjected to American “enlightenment” have much choice in the matter. The United States ruthlessly demonstrated what manifest destiny meant in regard to Mexicans in 1846. Upon seizing all of northern Mexico, Americans determined that uplifting such an “indolent” people might not be possible or even desirable. In 1848, Lorenzo Thomas, a U.S.-Mexico War officer and future Civil War general, surmised, “The people are addicted to gaming, & robbing is common to the mass—men take office here for plunder, so that all have become corrupt, and it is very evident that they are incapable of good government.” He continued: “It is perfectly evident to me that this people are doomed to pass off, and at no distant day. . . . The hardy and nobler northerners are destined . . . to over run [*sic*] this section of North America, even if peace now should be made.” Thomas spoke not of enlightenment but of indefinable extinction. An inferior and feeble “race” (Mexicans in this case) would simply “pass off,” leaving the country in the hands of “hardy” Anglo Americans. Immutably racial flaws made Mexicans incapable of improvement and therefore unworthy of the land they possessed. This rationale, popularized during the Texas Revolution in the mid-1830s, justified an aggressive war for territory in 1846, underpinned racially motivated atrocities against Mexican civilians, and later served as the basis for relegating Mexican Americans to second-class citizenship. Above all, then, manifest destiny stood for racial exploitation and Anglo supremacy.<sup>5</sup>

The hostilities between Texas and Mexico that began in the mid-1830s and those that started between the United States and Mexico a decade later left Anglo Americans with a decidedly negative image of their southern neighbors. The Civil War reinforced that view. Union volunteers, dismissive of native New Mexicans, often treated them more as a hostile population than as American citizens. Hispanic peoples had not “passed off” as predicted but neither had they been fully assimilated into American society. Indeed, for many soldiers, New Mexico appeared much too similar to Old Mexico. Meanwhile, Confederate volunteers, with Texans in the vanguard, clearly meant to assume the mantle of expansionism that had seemingly been cast aside by the United States during the 1850s.<sup>6</sup>

### A Degraded and Indolent Race

Although preoccupied with the rigors of an active campaign, the volunteers who descended on the Southwest in 1861 and 1862 still found ample time to ruminate on the Hispanic people they encountered. Whatever their political, social, or ideological differences, Northern and Southern soldiers found common ground in their estimation of Mexican Americans, looking upon them with condescension or outright contempt. Volunteers scrutinized every aspect of Hispanic culture and often concluded that it was not much of a culture at all. That opinion heavily influenced their subsequent treatment of their Hispanic hosts. California volunteer Eli W. Hazen, for example, managed to dismiss the entire territory of Arizona as a place where “every bush had a thorn, every toad a horn, and every woman was a whore and every man was a lying Gambling horse thief.” Santa Fe, the capital of New Mexico, particularly struck Coloradoan Alonzo F. Ickis as an especially unsavory place. “[F]ound it a poor town of 10,000 Greasers,” he wrote his brother. “The town supports one Presbyterian and two Catholic churches but I do not think they exercise *any good influence* over the people. Santa Fe is one grande (excuse the expression) brothel.” Confederates were no more forgiving. “From the day we left Mesilla all eyes were strained to get a peep at Santa Fe,” wrote a Texan in early 1862. “Imagine our astonishment! Instead of a fine city, a group of mud cabins—instead of neatness and beauty, loathsomeness and filth,—instead of intelligence, the grossest ignorance. What a capital for a great nation.”<sup>7</sup>

Such opinions were widespread, and those who proffered them expressed certainty that the shortcomings they observed had everything to do with a flawed New Mexican character. While Confederate brigadier general Henry H. Sibley outfitted his Army of New Mexico near San Antonio in September 1861, many of his volunteers, especially the East Texans, used the opportunity to explore the historic town. Regardless of its cosmopolitan attractions, Pvt. W. Randolph Howell of the Fourth Texas Mounted Volunteers thought San Antonio suffered from a major drawback: “It has the worst mixed population I have ever seen—Americans, Germans, Mexicans, and any sort of people you want to see.” He continued, “They look like a greatly degraded people, the most of them—The Mexicans especially.” The notion of Mexican degradation—that people of Mexican descent were somehow tainted, corrupted, or impure—was a common pronouncement. The source of that degradation was racial miscegenation. Ovando J. Hollister, a volunteer in the First Colorado Infantry, rather disdainfully hypothesized that New Mexicans represented “a cross between the Spaniard and Indian, though the latter greatly predominates.”<sup>8</sup>

Whatever their racial origins—and soldiers speculated voluminously on this point—Mexicans clearly stood apart from the Anglo race. Custom, culture, religion, language, and especially skin color and physical appearance branded them as different and inferior. “Mexicans,” declared Texan Ebenezer Hanna, “have a certain degree of civilization in their manners and appearance which does not exceed the common class of the half-civilized Indians of the Indian Territory.” Labeling New Mexicans as half-civilized, however, was not meant to explain their condition. The expression merely served as another way to describe their situation, to accentuate and exaggerate the differences between Anglo and Mexican Americans. Coloradoan George Aux made abundantly clear that soldiers considered the chasm virtually unbridgeable. After a white lieutenant of a New Mexican regiment ordered several members of the First Colorado tied to a wagon for killing an ox, Aux declared that inflicting such punishment on American volunteers was unacceptable. “If I had been one that . . . was tied, the Liut would not tied a nother after he had tied me,” he boldly informed his wife. “He is Leut of a Mexican Co[mpany] and he thinks that we ar [sic] all greesers [sic], I think he will soon find out that we ar not greesers but whit [sic] men.”<sup>9</sup>

As some of the previous comments suggest, one of the most enduring and prominent images clouding the Anglo mind in regards to Mexicans was that of the “indolent” Mexican, an obvious counterpoint to the “industrious” American. Accusations of laziness often accompanied a litany of other condemnations, but it seemed a principle cause of Mexican backwardness. Hollister could only attribute the poverty he saw before him to intentional Mexican sloth. “One would almost think they scrimped themselves to save work,” he insisted. “They seem destitute of ambition or enterprise. Laziness is their most marked characteristic.” Yet even the laziest of people require some means of survival, and according to volunteers, the primary vocations of most New Mexicans were gambling, cheating, thievery, or outright banditry. Soldiers contended that ignorance also seemed to be a pervasive problem. For some, it appeared that Mexicans lacked the mental capacity to appreciate fully their own plight—a circumstance often attributed to a domineering and oppressive Catholic Church. To Anglo volunteers, the prevalence of Catholicism among native New Mexicans was another peculiarity that marked them as a lesser people. They derided the Catholic faith witnessed in New Mexico as mere “superstition” and its practitioners as “heathens.”<sup>10</sup>

Regardless of the pervasiveness of the church in Hispanic culture, Anglo soldiers still discerned a great deal of immorality among New Mexicans, an accusation common to racist thought. Sexual promiscuity, in particular, seemed endemic. “This is a decidedly *fast town* by moonlight,” Ickis

complained of Santa Fe. "Licentiousness is deemed a virtue and but few Mexicans are without sexual disease in some form. I believe there are but few but what inherit *disease*." The Anglo charge of moral failings among New Mexicans hardly originated with objective observation but rather stemmed from a Mexican culture that clashed with soldiers' own Victorian sensibilities. As a way to distance themselves further from a half-civilized people, Americans passed moral judgments on what were in fact nonmoral situations (such as public bathing), imputing to Mexicans an immorality and lewdness that bolstered their own sense of virtue. The stereotypical image of the lascivious Mexican woman, a construction of the prudish American mind, became the stuff of legend. That stereotype was at once alluring and repulsive, romantic and erotic.<sup>11</sup>

Despite this ambivalence, or perhaps because of it, encounters between soldiers and local women occurred regularly, according to the soldiers who described them. One Confederate insisted that Texans never "appropriated" a woman without her consent. Union sources, too, admitted to the intimate relationships that developed between soldiers and señoritas. Nevertheless, no matter how cordial or consensual the relationship, soldiers tended to objectify in sexual terms the women whom they encountered. While Coloradoans denounced the entire territory as a "grande brothel," Texans often "appropriated" women as they would a mule. Union and Confederate soldiers who left written records almost always viewed them as objects of sexual revulsion or desire, condemning them as sexual deviants or coveting them as spoils of war.<sup>12</sup>

This attitude produced predictable results. A Unionist native New Mexican noted with despair the rowdy conduct of Confederate colonel John Baylor's men soon after they entered the territory in August 1861 and "hoisted their dirty banner." Although the Texans guaranteed that the citizens would be safe, the New Mexican discovered that the pledge was "granted, in word only, because the same night all of their creatures went around forcing open doors, raping women and girls, and the least they have done to us is plunder us until we have nothing left." His testimony is notable, not least because Baylor's men have heretofore enjoyed a reputation for orderly conduct. Similar charges also arose against both Sibley's Texans and the Union volunteers who expelled them, suggesting a pattern of sexual abuse and violence against New Mexicans. Comparable reports of Confederate and Union forces (excluding guerrilla units) preying on Anglo women were practically nonexistent. Gender norms among Anglo soldiers in the Southwest varied little, particularly in regard to properly conducting themselves toward women, but their behavior was complicated by the issue of race. In the eyes of white troops, not only did

Mexican women flout acceptable behavior with their alleged licentiousness, but their status as the non-Anglo “other” undermined any defenses that their gender might have afforded them. Volunteers, especially Texans, entered New Mexico under the banner of manifest destiny, carrying with them a sense of entitlement to the land and its resources. Many Union and Confederate soldiers viewed the appropriation of Mexican women as their racial prerogative.<sup>13</sup>

Just as Mexican women appeared to lack some crucial element of femininity, so too did Mexican men seem to be missing an integral component of masculinity. Charges of cowardice and rank opportunism went hand in hand. As early as August 1861, Union colonel Edward R. S. Canby doubted that native New Mexicans would assist their country in defending the territory. One of his majors, William Chapman, complained that they were “more afraid of the Texans than they are of death, and in case of an attack . . . I cannot rely upon them.” Union volunteers who might have expected New Mexican help to repel the Confederate invasion quickly came to the same conclusions. The people simply lacked the fortitude necessary to protect themselves. As a detachment of the First Colorado Volunteers approached one village, Hollister observed panicked residents who could not distinguish whether the impending force represented friend or foe. “We struck the river just below an outlandish Mexican town; whose inhabitants fled, like any other cattle, and hid in the corn,” Hollister recorded with contempt. Confederate soldiers disparaged Hispanic New Mexicans at an even higher pitch. One volunteer, in a letter to a local paper, warned his countrymen against complacency in the coming conflict. “Texans may have easily conquered the Mexican and Savage foe by their dauntless valor, but the case is far different now.” Although the Mexican resistance might be easily brushed aside, conquering New Mexico would require the besting of a much more formidable white American foe. One participant noted, for example, that “our enemy has the same Norman blood—greatly exceeds us in numbers, and will be thoroughly disciplined before giving us battle.”<sup>14</sup>

Treachery, not bravery, represented the flip side to Mexican cowardice. For Union volunteers, *treachery* usually signified nothing more than banditry. For Confederate Texans, who used the term with far more frequency than Union volunteers did, it was a pejorative heavy with historical baggage. The phrase “treacherous Mexican” conjured images not of simple banditry but of past cruelties inflicted by Mexicans upon Texans, including the Alamo, the Goliad massacre, the debacle and torment of the Texas Santa Fe Expedition of 1841, and the Cortina Wars in 1859 and 1861. The image was synonymous with barbarity, inhumanity, and murder, all threats to the very foundations of Anglo Texan civilization.

The symbolism of the Texas Revolution and the specter of Mexican treachery remained powerful motivational forces for Sibley's volunteers. As they gathered in San Antonio, the launching point of the campaign, they acknowledged the historical significance of the place. "[We] pitch our Camp on Alamo Plaza," noted Pvt. William W. Heartsill, "and immediately in front of the old Alamo Church, where Davy Crockett and his brave comrades were inhumanly butchered by the Greasers." The Texas volunteers' discovery of Union authorities in New Mexico recruiting native Hispanics raised their ire to new heights. "We did not care to fight the New Mexicans," one participant insisted, "but they have dared to raise their arms against us. . . . Those who have read the stirring history . . . can easily appreciate the feelings of Texans who find the same men in arms against us. They will call upon their patron saints in piteous tones to save them from the just indignation and vengeance of the "Tejanos." Unlike Union volunteers, Confederate Texans clearly had a score to settle with Nuevomexicanos. Although they did not go into battle crying "Remember the Alamo," they clearly recalled that their ancestors had done so. Vengeance, then, served as a significant force in their actions toward New Mexicans.<sup>15</sup>

Obviously, many Anglo soldiers considered New Mexicans a degenerate people beyond redemption. Not only did they seem culturally and racially inferior, but their existence posed an obstacle to the march of Anglo American progress. "This valley if settled by *white citizens* . . . would be one of the richest Valleys in the world," declared Texan Frank Starr, "but if it remains peopled by this degraded race of Mexicans and Indians, it will forever remain in its present condition." For those soldiers holding such a belief, the next logical step was the dislocation, subjugation, or even eradication of the Mexican American population. At the least sign of resistance, Anglo volunteers could completely dehumanize New Mexicans as "brute beasts" or "treacherous" cowards, transforming even a minor annoyance into a virulent threat. When Coloradoans apprehended a New Mexican who they suspected of spying for Sibley's Confederates, an incredulous Ickis reported: "He is a greaser and 'plays *insane*.' Perhaps stretching his neck would have the desired effect. It would be no sin if he was an insane Mexican for the more of them are killed the better the country is off." Too often, however, what volunteers considered "resistance" was simple survival to New Mexicans. With no profound attachment to the United States and a bitter enmity toward Texas, New Mexicans rightly feared two unsympathetic Anglo armies flowing into the territory, consuming scarce supplies, impressing livestock, and creating the inevitable hardships that always followed in the wake of a military campaign.<sup>16</sup>

### The New Mexico Campaign

When General Sibley petitioned Confederate president Jefferson Davis for permission to undertake the campaign in New Mexico, he predictably put the best possible face on the venture to assuage any doubts his commander-in-chief might hold. Sibley insisted that the federal army was in disarray and that the region was filled with Anglo secessionists who would readily support the Confederate cause. He even suggested that the Hispanic population would gladly contribute provisions and recruits to the southern effort. Furthermore, the conquest of the Southwest could be completed with minimal expense to the Confederate government. The Texas army, Sibley noted, could simply live off the land and the supplies captured from Union forces. The promise of great success with little sacrifice was too good to be true, but it did not prevent Davis from granting Sibley a commission as brigadier general and sanctioning the campaign.<sup>17</sup>

While Sibley trusted that New Mexicans would support the Confederate cause, Union leaders doubted that Hispanics would enthusiastically rally behind the United States. In June 1861, reports of a planned New Mexican uprising specifically against Anglos reached U.S. authorities. Although the rumored date for the rising passed uneventfully, the credence given to such stories betrayed the uncertainty of federal officials. “The Mexican people have no affection for the institutions of the United States,” Canby warned in January 1862. “They have a strong, but hitherto restrained, hatred for the Americans as a race, and there are not wanting persons who . . . have secretly but industriously endeavored to keep alive all the elements of discontent and fan them into flames.” Canby considered Mexicans to be an “ignorant” and “impulsive” people prone to the machinations of Southern sympathizers, but he failed to take into account that a long-standing hatred of Texans far outweighed whatever general ill will they harbored against Americans. Just as Texans bitterly recalled past examples of Mexican treachery, New Mexicans recollected instances of Texan “barbarity.” The Santa Fe and Mier expeditions of 1841 and 1842, in particular, remained effective rallying points. Federal territorial authorities, who urged men to volunteer not out of loyalty to the United States but to protect their families from the dreaded “Tejanos,” used the image of the savage Texan with great success.<sup>18</sup>

Most New Mexicans made no secret of their hatred for Texans, and if Sibley genuinely expected the population to support his cause, he must have been disappointed. Although a few native New Mexicans joined Colonel Baylor’s command early on, some twenty-eight hundred Hispanic men had enlisted in Union regiments by February 1862. Whatever Sibley wished to believe,

the decision of a Southern-sympathizing oligarchy of *ricos* (rich landowners) and Anglos to create a Confederate Territory of Arizona hardly represented the majority will. The failure to recognize that the conquest of New Mexico also required a conquest of hearts and minds was a colossal mistake, one compounded by yet another false assumption: contrary to Sibley's assertion, it would be extraordinarily difficult for an army to live off the land in the arid Southwest. Given the low regard in which most Confederates held New Mexicans, they probably did not possess the wherewithal or patience to convince the Hispanic population of their struggle's righteousness. The Confederates ruthlessly foraging with impunity virtually guaranteed that New Mexicans would fight against them rather than rally around their cause.<sup>19</sup>

Nevertheless, Sibley appeared to start his campaign in the right direction. In December 1861, shortly after his army crossed into New Mexico, he issued and published in English and Spanish a seemingly magnanimous decree to the people of the territory. The Confederate Army of New Mexico, he assured the native population, came not as conquerors but as "liberators" who sought to relieve the people of the "iniquitous exactions" of the U.S. government. Had Confederates acted in the spirit of the proclamation, they might have wooed Hispanic support to their cause. The reality of Confederate policies was closer to occupation than liberation. Although Sibley promised salvation from a "military despotism," Confederate-occupied portions of the territory remained under martial law during his campaign, citizens were forced to swear oaths of loyalty to the Confederacy, and the "iniquitous exactions" of the United States were replaced by Confederate equivalents in the form of confiscations. He pledged to protect private property, but Sibley also made clear that New Mexicans had to make available on the "open market" the forage and supplies necessary to sustain his army and accept payment for the goods in Confederate dollars at "fair prices." He promised stiff penalties for subterfuge: "If destroyed or removed to prevent me from availing myself of them, those who so co-operate with our enemies will be treated accordingly, and must prepare to share their fate." By failing to distinguish between civilians who concealed supplies in order to aid the Union and those who did so to prevent starvation, Sibley turned nearly everyone in the territory against the Confederacy.<sup>20</sup>

From the time they entered the territory, Sibley's men acted as a hostile army in a foreign country. Categorizing New Mexicans as an inferior people helped justify taking food, animals, clothing, and other property. One Union informer thought the Texans resembled a mob more than a disciplined army: "They have acted about El Paso in such a manner as to enrage the whole community against them. All Mexicans are down on them, and they will

find very little sympathy when they return. . . . Blankets, onions, wine, and everything they can lay their hands on they carry off.” Nor was property their sole interest, as the actions of one hapless volunteer killed by enraged citizens demonstrated. “The [authorities] said that [he] had assaulted or insulted a Mexican woman in her house, that she ran out of the house screaming,” reported a doubting comrade. The episode did little to improve relations between Texans and New Mexicans. With great effort, Confederate officers convinced their men not to burn the town in retribution for their compatriot’s murder. The El Paso informer corroborated reports of unruly behavior: “The officers have no control over them, and they do just as they please, and you know what men off a long trip please to do; females neither in nor out of their houses are safe.”<sup>21</sup>

Confederate brigandage in El Paso was but a prelude. Around Mesilla, New Mexico, individual soldiers, enforcing their “fair price,” stole what they needed, grazed their horses in New Mexican wheat fields, and cheated vendors already reluctant to accept Confederate money. Confederate depredations in southern New Mexico put local residents on guard everywhere, and supplying the army turned increasingly difficult for Sibley’s quartermaster and commissary officers. Civilians who initially welcomed the opportunity to sell what little surplus they possessed now shied away, unwilling to have their goods stolen, confiscated, or paid for in worthless scrip. Frustrated Texans, who assumed New Mexicans would provide for them, forcibly quartered themselves in houses of reluctant hosts and coerced village officials into providing basic commodities such as firewood. Many Texans believed—correctly in part—that New Mexicans concealed their goods at the behest of federal authorities, but the more immediate worry of the local population was protecting itself and private property from the ravenous horde of Confederates. William Davidson of the Fourth Texas recalled: “My special duty was to . . . scour the country for food and provisions. . . . The enemy moved everything to eat out of the country and persuaded the Mexicans to hide their corn and wheat and drive their cattle and sheep beyond our reach.” In a period of three days, Davidson managed to secure over one hundred bushels of wheat, two hundred bushels of corn, and several mules. Such excursions continued as the Army of New Mexico wound its way up the Rio Grande Valley. Confederates confiscated goods in excess of three thousand dollars, teams of oxen, and a sizable flock of sheep near Valverde, New Mexico. At Santa Fe, they seized thirty thousand dollars worth of “government property” as residents scrambled to conceal personal possessions.<sup>22</sup>

Yet, hunger constantly plagued Confederate forces no matter how efficiently they foraged. With the loss of their supply train at the Battle

of Glorieta Pass, Confederates faced the unpleasant choice of starving or retreating. In the end, they did both. “Our army cannot be subsisted here,” admitted a Texan following the disaster, “and the enemy has only to wait a few weeks till famine runs us out, to possess the country quietly again.” Sibley’s plan to support his army through foraging proved both impractical and counterproductive. Colonel Baylor remarked that the actions of Sibley’s troops destroyed the “good will” of the people. Other observers agreed. A resident of Mesilla reported, “[T]he Southern soldiers . . . have consumed and destroyed everything, even to the growing crops. The people here are with their eyes open toward the North, in the hope of being relieved from the devastation of these locusts.”<sup>23</sup>

Texans, in turn, blamed “ignorant” New Mexicans for sabotaging the campaign, failing to acknowledge that their own abuses attributed much to the New Mexicans’ passive and active resistance. Starr insisted that New Mexicans “looked upon us with fear, having been told that we had come to revenge the treatment of the *Santa Fe Prisoners* [of 1841]. They will favor the most powerful side, and all the time that we were there they doubted our ability to hold the country, and took every opportunity to keep the enemy well informed of our proceedings and movements.” Sibley, too, was widely censured for the failure; he spent much of the campaign confined to an ambulance—drunk, according to rumors. As the commanding general, Sibley could escape the wrath of his soldiers, but New Mexican civilians could not. “My troops,” he keenly observed, “have manifested a dogged irreconcilable detestation of the Country and the People.”<sup>24</sup>

Ragged and hungry, harried by Union forces, and disgusted with officers and civilians alike, the disillusioned volunteers eventually succumbed to panic, and the Confederate retreat to Mesilla in spring 1862 devolved into a nightmare of deprivation and desperation. The army had stripped the valley of food and supplies during the northern advance, leaving little to sustain them on the return trip. Still, the Texans foraged with zeal. Confederate troops confiscated livestock, wheat, corn, whiskey, tobacco, and even strings of red chile peppers. A resident of Las Lunas, New Mexico, reported that soldiers stole four thousand dollars worth of his property. Toward the end, the army practically dissolved into a mob. An El Paso merchant who observed the withdrawal described its utter defeat and desperation to General Canby: “The Second Regiment [Colonel Thomas Green’s Fifth Texas Mounted Rifles] is scattered in parties of 15 or 20 along the road . . . committing outrages upon the inhabitants they meet [on] the highway. They are almost on the point of starvation. . . . The Mexican population are much enraged against them on account of their rude treatment.” The Army of New Mexico cleaned out

the Mesilla Valley so thoroughly that the merchant feared that famine might stalk the people.<sup>25</sup>

Emboldened by the Confederate defeat and retreat, New Mexicans refused all Confederate scrip and demanded hard currency. Texans' foraging expeditions sometimes led to bloody clashes that aggravated the animosity between Texans and New Mexicans. If volunteers still subscribed to the idea of Mexican "indifference," that belief was rudely dispelled. In April a citizen militia surrounded the camp of a dozen Texans near the village of Los Padillas. Taken by surprise, one of the volunteers dropped his pistols to signal his surrender. The militiamen ignored the gesture and shot him through the chest. In the ensuing firefight, another Texan was killed and one wounded. Word of the encounter enraged the Texans. "We heard this morning that two of our men were killed last night sometime, or this morning, by the citizens . . . and a company was sent back to demolish the town," reported Alfred B. Peticolas of the Fourth Texas Mounted Rifles. "Before they left the place," recounted another, "they [avenging soldiers] sent a few greasers to their father, the devil, in payment for their treachery."<sup>26</sup>

By May, Sibley had fled the territory, leaving his tattered army to fend for itself. For the next several months, the remainder of the volunteers continued to battle with civilians as they made their way to Mesilla and then across the scorching plains of West Texas toward San Antonio. "Instead of fighting Yankees since Sibley left, we have to fight the Mexicans," declared a volunteer. "They refused to let us have transportation, and we went to press them into service, thereby creating a civil war with them." Near the village of Isleta, Texas, a forage party rounded up what cattle they could find and, having nothing to offer in exchange, simply seized them. When a village official threatened to attack if they did not return the livestock promptly, the Texans took cover and prepared for a fight. They shot and killed a civilian rider, whom they surmised was running for help, and later made their escape under the cover of darkness. In early July at Mesilla, a clash between New Mexicans and another foraging party left one officer and six soldiers dead and as many as forty civilians killed or wounded. The fighting had been close and personal, and a Confederate lieutenant allegedly stabbed three civilians with a bowie knife.<sup>27</sup>

Perhaps the most violent confrontation between civilians and soldiers occurred in Socorro, Texas. This tiny village in the far western part of the state unfortunately sat directly in the path of the retreating Confederate army. In mid-June, an officer of the Seventh Texas requisitioned a number of beeves from the citizens and refused to pay when they were delivered. A gunfight followed, leaving several Confederates wounded. The incensed

Texans trained their artillery on the village. "We killed 20 and wounded a great many," wrote one soldier, "besides destroying their church and otherwise damaging the town." Several weeks later, another detachment of foragers visited Socorro, but wise to the ways of the Texans, a mob of some fifty citizens quickly ran them out.<sup>28</sup>

### Union Defense of New Mexico

Although New Mexicans suffered plundering, violence, and some deaths at the hands of their Texan "liberators," they were treated little better by the Union forces. Union officials were unclear about or doubted the loyalty of the New Mexican citizens, particularly wealthy families. Union leaders enacted harsh policies designed to police a suspect population as much as to counter a Confederate invasion. Like General Sibley, Union colonel Canby, and later Col. James H. Carleton, ordered New Mexicans to make draft animals, forage, weapons, and other supplies available for purchase, or they might be seized outright. Men were pressed into service a full year before military conscription became national law. Territorial officials exhorted men to defend their families from the Texans. Scattered evidence suggests the impressment policy was sometimes brutally implemented by Union authorities and widely resented by New Mexicans.

In early January 1862, Ickis noted the conspicuous absence of men from a village in the northern part of the territory. "There are no men in the town," he wrote. "They are skulking over the Mts to keep out of sight of the Territorial pressman who are knabbing [*sic*] every man who is able to carry a musket and into the militia they go." Hispanic men of fighting age were hesitant to leave their families unprotected and reluctant to join the poorly equipped and scantily paid militia. They were commonly branded as cowards, and unwilling recruits frequently clashed with the Union military. One would-be Union recruit recounted his story to Peticolas, who recorded: "They [federals] knocked him down, and he showed us a bayonet wound where they stabbed him trying to force him along anyhow. He told us that there was many a man sick that they had forced into the service, but that no one was allowed to stop or rest on that account, but was forced along by the federals."<sup>29</sup>

These recruiting practices implied that Union officials looked upon New Mexicans as less a people to defend than a resource to exploit. Nowhere was this attitude more apparent than in the widespread foraging by Union troops during the campaign. Suffering from the same subsistence problems that plagued Confederates, Union volunteers gobbled up all the supplies

they could locate. The plundering committed by the Colorado volunteers in particular rivaled the thoroughness of the Texans. When word of their depredations reached Denver, one soldier explained to the *Rocky Mountain News*: “Rumors have probably reached you, with a thousand tongues, of the jay hawking propensities of the members of the Colorado First. . . . Our duty was onward, and onward we marched, seizing all that was necessary to assist us in preventing the traitor’s foot from impressing the soil of New Mexico, and in doing it, though it might inflict individual losses, we believed we were doing our duty.” Ickis admitted frankly in his diary that “the Col 1st are death on chickens and sheep or beef. [T]hey steal all they see along the road. [T]hey stole an *entire store* in Los Notres. [T]here was about \$1000 worth of goods in it.” Their racial conceptions of New Mexicans undoubtedly shaded the reasoning of many Coloradoans. One volunteer stated, “they say if the Mexicans will not fight for their country they must support those who will.” The notion that New Mexicans were cowards, traitors, cheats, and thieves deserving such treatment was a common refrain among Colorado volunteers. Ovando J. Hollister, who helped sack the Pueblo of Sandia, absolved his conscience by declaring that he and his comrades were no worse than the native population. “A man that won’t steal,” he quipped, “has no business in New Mexico.”<sup>30</sup>

The departure of Sibley’s Texans and the arrival of Colonel Carleton and his California column restored a modicum of order to New Mexico Territory. Martial law, however, remained in effect until the end of the war. Citizens forced by Sibley to swear an oath of loyalty to the Confederacy were now compelled to proclaim their allegiance to the Union. The army also confiscated the property of suspected Confederate collaborators, forced men to labor on fortifications without compensation, and ordered citizens to sell their crops to the Union army at the ridiculously low price of three dollars per *fanega* (about one and a half bushels) or risk their confiscation. The policy to concentrate foodstuffs in the hands of the federal military met with much civilian resistance. This backlash prompted one of Carleton’s subordinates to declare all residents found with more than a two-month supply of food stores as enemies of the United States. Rather than comply with the directive, many New Mexicans simply abandoned their lands and carried their surplus crops into Mexico.<sup>31</sup>

All these federal policies were designed to thwart future armed incursions from Texas. Carleton did not intend to tyrannize the population, but he made perfectly clear his willingness to sacrifice native New Mexicans to prevent such a recurrence. He ordered his lieutenants to counter the Texans with a scorched-earth campaign in the event of another invasion. As a last-ditch impediment

to a future Confederate incursion, Carleton also urged New Mexicans to wage a people's war against the Texans. "Remind the Mexicans of how they were robbed before," he exhorted his subordinates, "and animate them . . . with a settled determination to attack the enemy from every cover."<sup>32</sup>

Carleton's vision was an explosive proposition. An inherently blood-thirsty method, irregular warfare became all the more brutal when fanned by racial animosity. The sporadic guerrilla actions at the end of Sibley's New Mexico campaign indicated that a renewed conflict with the Texans was likely to become an extraordinarily bloody affair. Indeed, the excessive and indiscriminate violence engendered by guerrilla war had motivated Northern and Southern leaders alike to condemn the practice, decry guerrillas as "brigands" and "outlaws," and support their summary execution when captured. That Carleton felt justified in calling for partisan action when leaders in similar straits balked at such a drastic measure is not surprising given his reputation for ruthlessness toward national enemies—be they Texans or Indians. Carleton may also have assumed that he was merely sanctioning the inevitable; New Mexicans had already demonstrated their readiness to oppose Confederate depredations. Regardless, his willingness to exploit their passions evidenced a startling disregard for the pyrrhic consequences. That New Mexicans, rather than Anglos, would bear the brunt of Confederate reprisals doubtless made his decision more palatable.<sup>33</sup>

Fortunately for New Mexicans, the high tide of the Confederacy in the Southwest had passed with Sibley's retreat, and the extreme measures advocated by Carleton became unnecessary. New Mexico's strategic importance and an ongoing Indian threat, however, ensured that a large military presence and the problems attending it remained. In August 1862, Maj. Arthur Morrison, an Anglo officer in a New Mexico volunteer regiment, complained of a seemingly regular occurrence at Polvadera, a hamlet situated between Socorro, New Mexico, and Albuquerque. "Government trains passing up and down this route," Morrison complained, "commit depredations on private citizens in turning cattle into their fields and destroying their crops or only subsistence, maltreating animals, occasionally killing one without necessity." Pillaging and foraging by individual soldiers also continued, despite the best efforts of conscientious officers to stop the practice. After 1 January 1863—the day U.S. president Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation took effect—soldiers began to "steal" people, freeing peons from their Hispanic patrons and putting them to work in their camps. The relationship between Union volunteers and Mexican Americans remained uneasy throughout the occupied Southwest. American resentment against "greasers," and Mexican wariness about the intention of *soldados* (soldiers) always held the potential for and sometimes erupted in violence.<sup>34</sup>

### Reprise of Manifest Destiny

The New Mexico Campaign of 1862 generated several significant consequences for the Southwest. The defeat of Sibley's Texans effectively ended the Confederate bid for a transcontinental empire. The influx of Anglo soldiers, particularly Californians and Coloradoans, wrought important cultural and demographic changes in the Southwest. Once considered a national backwater, the territory of New Mexico and future territory of Arizona received a good deal of publicity during the campaigns and battles from late 1861 through summer 1862. Many Union volunteers permanently settled there, and their letters and descriptions of the territory (more generous than those of the beaten Texans) attracted thousands of settlers and contributed to the "Americanization" of Hispanic New Mexico. The most visible result of the campaign was the widespread devastation between Mesilla and Santa Fe and the famine that followed. Magdalen Hayden, mother superior of Loretto Academy in Santa Fe, reported: "Our poor and distant territory has not been spared. The Texans without provocation have sacked and almost ruined the richest portions and have forced the most respectable families to flee from their homes." The war hit Socorro County south of Albuquerque particularly hard. In 1860 it boasted a population of 5,700 residents. Three years later, that number had dropped to less than 3,700. Some villages, whose residents were unable to sustain themselves, virtually disappeared. "The population of this district, until last year, was much larger than at present," noted a Union officer who conducted a census in 1863. "In every town there are houses locked up and their owners having left in search of food."<sup>35</sup>

This devastation occurred rapidly and early in the Civil War. The morality of widespread "foraging" was hotly disputed in early 1862 but by 1864 the zeal with which Confederate and Union soldiers plundered the countryside was legendary. The war escalated for three years before Union major general William T. Sherman could justify his march of destruction through Georgia. New Mexico experienced no comparable grace period; pillage, murder, and destruction came immediately. Although starvation motivated Confederate plundering and violence in the final stages of the campaign, it does not explain their mob-like behavior during their first weeks in Mesilla. Similarly, although hunger may account for why Coloradoans resorted to foraging and looting, it explains neither why they did so with such apparent glee and self-righteousness nor their continuing propensity to run roughshod over New Mexican sensibilities even after the Confederate threat had been blunted. The notoriously poor discipline among volunteers certainly explains some of the unrestrained behavior, but this answer is unsatisfying.

Soldiers' reactions to the depredations shed some light on the matter. This author has not discovered a soldier—Texan, Coloradoan, or Californian—who expressed even a little regret over the hardships inflicted on New Mexicans. This omission is especially striking when one considers how Sherman's men or Confederate general Robert E. Lee's troops in Pennsylvania often managed to sound sincerely remorseful, although they insisted on the necessity and righteousness of their actions. For example a Confederate officer who entered Pennsylvania determined to avenge the destruction of his own home was incapable of acting on his anger after he came face to face with terrified civilians. "Though I had such severe wrongs and grievances to redress . . . when I got among these people I could not find it in my heart to molest them," he confided. "They looked so dreadfully scared and talked, so humble, that I have invariably endeavored to protect their property." An officer in an Ohio regiment, plainly aware of the devastation caused by the army as it maneuvered toward Atlanta, Georgia, in the summer of 1864, expressed similar sympathies. "I don't see what the people in this country are going to do next winter," he pondered to his wife. "There will not be anything left for them to live upon. . . . I sometimes feel sorry for the poorer class as they were not to blame in bring[ing] on this war. There is more of what is called poor white trash than I had any idea of." The expression of pity assumed that volunteers could empathize with their victims. Empathy required the recognition of some commonality with their victims, a prerequisite that volunteers campaigning in the alien culture of New Mexico were hard-pressed to meet. Hence, while the plight of the Pennsylvania "Dutch" and Georgia's "white trash" evoked genuine concern from the soldiers, starvation among New Mexican "greasers" met only with their indifference.<sup>36</sup>

Just as a common Anglo identity bound the belligerents, common assumptions of New Mexican identity influenced their actions. To understand the implications fully requires viewing the campaign in a wider ideological context. Despite Sibley's reassurances to the people of New Mexico, the invading Texans cared little about "liberating" them from a tyrannical government. The Texans came, as numerous sources attested, to realize their manifest destiny. Union forces, too, cared little about the New Mexicans. They seemed more determined to protect the fruits of their own manifest destiny, realized some thirteen years earlier when the United States first acquired the territory after the war with Mexico. Economic exploitation and Anglo hegemony informed the American philosophy of expansionism. Given these assumptions, historians should not interpret pillaging and excesses carried out by volunteers as acts of desperation or a failure of discipline but as the military application of racial assumptions shared by Anglo Americans in the

mid-nineteenth century. Simply put their sense of entitlement to the land and contempt for its people drove their actions.<sup>37</sup>

The echoes of manifest destiny motivated both Confederate and Union soldiers in the southwestern theater, making it a unique location in the war. That particular mandate for continental expansion had little bearing on common troops elsewhere. Historians have long recognized manifest destiny's racist component, an unpalatable reality of Anglo culture prominently displayed in New Mexico. This tradition of racialism creates space for more general conclusions, especially in relation to the ongoing debate over the "restraint" of the Civil War and the character of the soldiers who comprised the bulk of its armies. The destructive tendencies of the volunteers, some argue, were tempered by a keen sense of morality and justice. Union men discriminated between the "guilty" (wealthy slaveholders) and the "innocent" (yeoman farmers, women, and children), and favored the destruction of public over private property. Such civilities, however, were extended only to members of the same "American" (white) community. Where racial differences came to the fore, restraint evaporated. A recent study, although agreeing with this premise, vigorously asserts that race, not morality, was the determining factor in how soldiers treated civilians. This work further suggests that compared to the abuse suffered by civilians at the hands of Americans in other wars, such as the conflict with Mexico or the Indian wars, much of the violence traditionally assigned to the Civil War has been grossly exaggerated. In many ways, the actions of volunteers in New Mexico support these conclusions.<sup>38</sup>

Although enlightening, a similar comparative approach to the New Mexico campaign also poses special problems. Such a comparison establishes a false dichotomy that tends to obscure as much as it illuminates. To Anglo volunteers, New Mexicans clearly served as the racial "other." Yet, according to treaty laws and the territorial constitution, they were in fact legitimate citizens who theoretically possessed all the rights and privileges of a Boston Brahmin—unlike blacks and Indians. To separate the war in New Mexico from the "greater" conflict in the East or to highlight the violence that soldiers inflicted on Mexican Americans merely to reveal the restraint they exercised toward white Americans is to propagate the same artificial division imposed by the volunteers.<sup>39</sup>

If historians are to address honestly the question of restraint, they must include the New Mexico campaign in any overview of military-civilian relations during the war, and it deserves to occupy a place next to Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania and Sherman's march through Georgia. Rehabilitated from its sideshow status, the campaign's integration into Civil

War historiography makes readily apparent that any claim touting the war's restraint must be seriously qualified. The lofty ideals of liberty and freedom and defense of home and hearth—ideals for which soldiers professed to be fighting—were inextricably bound to oppression, intolerance, and the maintenance of white privilege. The idea that volunteers by and large directed their wrath only toward the “guilty,” limited their destruction of private property, and respected civilians in general and women in particular would surely have come as a revelation to the “liberated” residents of the Mesilla valley.

### Notes

1. Frank Starr to Father, 2 October 1861, Camp Sibley, Texas, in “New Mexico Campaign Letters of Frank Starr,” ed. David B. Gracy, *Texas Military History* 4 (fall 1964): 171.
2. Historians have written a number of excellent works on the New Mexico campaign, although none of them look specifically at the role race played in the contacts between soldiers and civilians. For the campaign, see Martin Hardwick Hall, *Sibley's New Mexico Campaign* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1960); Alvin M. Josephy Jr., *The Civil War in the American West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991); Donald S. Frazier, *Blood and Treasure: Confederate Empire in the Southwest*, Texas A&M University Military History series, no. 41 (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1995); and Flint Whitlock, *Distant Bugles, Distant Drums: The Union Response to the Confederate Invasion of New Mexico* (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2006). Likewise, there are several superb studies of Anglo-Mexican race relations, but few address the issue in the context of the American Civil War. See Martin Hardwick Hall, “Native New Mexican Relations in Confederate Arizona, 1861–1862,” *The Journal of Arizona History* 8 (autumn 1967): 171–78; Mario Barrera, *Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979); Darlis A. Miller, “Hispanos and the Civil War in New Mexico: A Reconsideration,” *New Mexico Historical Review* 54 (April 1979): 105–23; Arnoldo De León, *They Called Them Greasers: Anglo Attitudes toward Mexicans in Texas, 1821–1900* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983); Jerry D. Thompson, *Mexican Texans in the Union Army*, Southwestern Studies, no. 78 (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1986); David Montejano, *Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836–1986* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987); and Tomás Almaguer, *Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Finally, Paul Foss, *A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict during the Mexican-American War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002) is a detailed study of the actions of American volunteers in the U.S.-Mexico War and has significant implications for this investigation.
3. Josephy, *The Civil War in the American West*, 18–19; and T[revanion]. T. Teel, “Sibley's New Mexican Campaign—Its Objects and the Causes of Its Failure,” in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. 2, *North to Antietam*, ed. Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel (New York: T. Yoseloff, 1956), 2:700. Trevanion T. Teel, a Confederate officer in the New Mexico campaign, later insisted that Confederate brigadier general Henry H. Sibley planned to conquer not only California but

- also the northern states of Mexico. See also Frazier, *Blood and Treasure*, 21. For a general study of Southern expansionism, see Robert E. May, *The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, 1854–1861* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973). For a specific example of Texans' territorial ambitions, see A. G. Nicholson to Major De Morse, 23 June 1861, Honey Grove, Texas, in the *Clarksville (Tex.) Standard*, 29 June 1861.
4. *Vicksburg (Miss.) Weekly Sun*, 29 October 1860; James Reily to John H. Reagan, 26 January 1862, Fort Bliss, Texas, in U.S. War Department, *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1897), ser. 1, vol. 50, pt. 1, pp. 825–26 [hereafter OR]; and Roy Sylvan Dunn, "The KGC in Texas, 1860–1861," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 70 (April 1967): 543–73.
  5. Lorenzo Thomas to Friends, 12 January 1848, Mexico City, Mexico, folder 1, box 1, Lorenzo Thomas Collection, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. For race and American expansionism, see Ronald Takaki, *Iron Cages: Race and Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979); Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); and Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
  6. The idea of a Confederate manifest destiny was often made explicit in the South. See *Dallas Herald*, 29 February 1860; and *Clarksville (Tex.) Standard*, 12 May 1862.
  7. *The Civil War in Apacheland: Sergeant George Hand's Diary; California, Arizona, West Texas, New Mexico, 1861–1864*, ed. Neil B. Carmony (Silver City, N.Mex.: High-Lonesome Books, 1996), 113; and De León, *They Called Them Greasers*, 16; Eli W. Hazen, Diary, 26 June 1862, in "The California Column in the Civil War: Hazen's Civil War Diary," ed. Konrad F. Schreier Jr., *The Journal of San Diego History* 26 (spring 1976), <https://www.sandiegohistory.org/journal/76spring/civilwar.htm>; Alonzo Ickis to Brother Thos., 14 May 1862, Camp Mischler, New Mexico, in *Bloody Trails along the Rio Grande: A Day-by-Day Diary of Alonzo Ferdinand Ickis, 1836–1917*, ed. Nolie Mumey (Denver, Colo.: Old West Pub. Company, 1958), 30; and W. H. S., letter to the editor, *Houston Telegraph*, 10 April 1862, reprinted in the *Clarksville (Tex.) Standard*, 14 June 1862.
  8. W. Randolph Howell to Home Folks, 1 September 1861, San Antonio, Texas, in *Westward the Texans: The Civil War Journal of Private William Randolph Howell*, ed. Jerry D. Thompson (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1990), 114; and Ovando J. Hollister, *Colorado Volunteers in New Mexico, 1862*, ed. Richard Harwell (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley and Sons Company, 1962), 245.
  9. Martin H. Hall, ed., "The Journal of Ebenezer Hanna," *Password* 3 (January 1958): 22–23; and George Aux to Wife, 10 May 1862, folder 1, box 1, Civil War Miscellaneous Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
  10. Hollister, *Colorado Volunteers in New Mexico*, 245–47; William A. Bushnell, Diary, 10 November 1865, <http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~steelquist/WmBushnell.html>; Ickis, *Bloody Trails*, 51, 72; Hall, "The Journal of Ebenezer Hanna," 23; *Charles Porter's Account of the Confederate Attempt to Seize Arizona and New Mexico*, ed. Alwyn Barr (Austin, Tex.: Pemberton Press, 1964), 2; and Vidette, letter to the editor, *San Francisco Daily Alta*, 23 July 1862.

11. Ickis, *Bloody Trails*, 62–63; Vidette, letter to the editor, *San Francisco (Calif.) Daily Alta*, 29 June 1862; and Hollister, *Colorado Volunteers in New Mexico*, 211.
12. Walter A. Faulkner, ed., “With Sibley in New Mexico: The Journal of William Henry Smith,” *West Texas Historical Association Year Book* 27 (October 1951): 140; Hall, *Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign*, 56; and Ickis, *Bloody Trails*, 64.
13. Diego Archuleta to Señor Don Lorenzo Labadi, 15 August 1861, Río Bonito, New Mexico, in *When the Texans Came: Missing Records from the Civil War in the Southwest*, ed. John P. Wilson (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001), 159. Several historians have noted that Confederate colonel John Baylor’s men were generally respectful toward New Mexicans, at least in comparison to Sibley’s troops. See Martin H. Hall, “Native Mexican Relations in Confederate Arizona, 1861–1862,” *The Journal of Arizona History* 8 (autumn 1967): 171–78; and Frazier, *Blood and Treasure*, 136. Important studies of gender include Anne Firor Scott, *The Southern Lady: From Pedestal to Politics, 1830–1930* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); Suzanne Lebsack, *The Free Women of Petersburg: Status and Culture in a Southern Town, 1784–1860* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985); Reid Mitchell, “She Devils,” in *The Vacant Chair: The Northern Soldier Leaves Home* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 89–113; and Drew Gilpin Faust, *Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War*, Fred W. Morrison Series in Southern Studies (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). Discussions of Mexican American women as well as their relationship with Anglo Americans can be found in De León, *They Called Them Greasers*; Montejano, *Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas*; Neil Foley, *The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture*, American Crossroads series (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); and Deena J. González, *Refusing the Favor: The Spanish-Mexican Women of Santa Fe, 1820–1880* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
14. Col. Edward Canby to Gen. John C. Frémont, 16 August 1861, Santa Fe, New Mexico, in OR, ser. 1, vol. 4, p. 65; Maj. William Chapman to Col. Edward Canby, 2 August 1861, Fort Union, New Mexico, in *When the Texans Came*, 69; Hollister, *Colorado Volunteers in New Mexico*, 221; Joseph McC. Bell, “The Campaign of New Mexico, 1862,” in *Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, War Papers: Being Papers Read Before the Commandery of the State of Wisconsin, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States*, 4 vols. (1891; repr., Wilmington, N.C.: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1993), 1:54; Cavalry, letter to editor, *Clarksville (Tex.) Standard*, 27 July 1861; and *Charles Porter’s Account*, 13.
15. William W. Heartsill, 8 May 1861, San Antonio, Texas, in *Fourteen Hundred and 91 Days in the Confederate Army: A Journal Kept by W. W. Heartsill for Four Years, One Month, and One Day; Or, Camp Life, Day by Day, of the W. P. Lane Rangers from April 19, 1861, to May 20, 1865*, ed. Bell Irvin Wiley (1876; repr.; Jackson, Tenn.: McCowat-Mercer Press, 1954), 1–2, 11; and *New Orleans (La.) Daily Picayune*, 27 March 1862, quoted in Hall, *Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign*, 57–58. See also Phil Fulcro, “From Albuquerque to Glorieta,” in *Civil War in the Southwest: Recollections of the Sibley Brigade*, ed. Jerry D. Thompson, Canseco-Keck History series, no. 4 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 90; M. L. Sims to Miss Belle Gordon, *Clarksville (Tex.) Standard*, 25 May 1861; Miss Mary B. Breeding to the Academy Guards, *Bellville (Tex.) Countryman*, 5 June 1861; Mrs. E. F. Gibson to Capt. William G. Twitty’s Company of Cook County Volunteers, *Dallas Herald*,

- 14 August 1861; and “Declaration of Causes: February 2, 1861; A Declaration of the Causes which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal Union,” <http://www.tsl.state.tx.us/ref/abouttx/secession/2feb1861.html>. Some of the Texans in Sibley’s army were veterans of the Cortina Wars (or “Cortina Troubles”), which stemmed from racial tensions and land disputes between Anglo and Mexican Texans. Rancher Juan Cortina commanded Mexican Texan irregulars who skirmished at turns with Texan, federal, and Confederate forces.
16. Frank Starr to Dear Father, 12 May 1862, Fort Bliss, Texas, in “New Mexico Campaign Letters of Frank Starr,” 184; and Ickis, *Bloody Trails*, 72.
  17. Josephy, *The Civil War in the American West*, 52–53.
  18. Miller, “Hispanos and the Civil War,” 106–09; and Edward Canby to the Adjutant General of the Army, 13 January 1862, Belen, New Mexico, in OR, ser. 1, vol. 4, pp. 84–85. For the specifics of the Santa Fe and Mier Expeditions of 1841 and 1842, see W. C. Binkely, “New Mexico and the Santa Fe Expedition,” *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 27 (October 1923): 85–107; Sam W. Haynes, *Soldiers of Misfortune: The Somervell and Mier Expeditions* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990); and Gary Clayton Anderson, *The Conquest of Texas: Ethnic Cleansing in the Promised Land, 1820–1875* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), 196–99. For native New Mexican loyalties, see Loomis M. Ganaway, *New Mexico and the Sectional Controversy, 1846–1861* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1944); and Mark J. Stegmaier, “‘An Imaginary Negro in an Impossible Place’?: The Issue of New Mexican Statehood in the Secession Crisis, 1860–1861,” *New Mexico Historical Review* 84 (Spring 2009): 263–90.
  19. Hall, “Native Mexican Relations,” 171–72; and Miller, “Hispanos and the Civil War,” 107.
  20. “Proclamation of Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley, Army of the Confederate States, to the People of New Mexico,” 20 December 1861, in OR, ser. 1, vol. 4, pp. 88–89. Sibley’s proclamation also appeared in the *Mesilla Times* in Spanish and English. “Proclamation of Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley, Army of the Confederate States, to the People of New Mexico,” *Mesilla (N.Mex.) Times*, 15 January 1862.
  21. Unnamed correspondent, 21 February 1862, forwarded by U.S. Consul Richard L. Robertson to General George Wright, 18 April 1862, in OR, ser. 1, vol. 50, pt. 1, pp. 1012–13; and William Davidson, “The March to New Mexico,” in *Civil War in the Southwest*, 15–16.
  22. William Davidson, “From Socorro to Glorieta,” in *Civil War in the Southwest*, 78–79. For additional accounts of Confederate behavior, see *Mesilla (N.Mex.) Times*, 15 January 1862; Don E. Alberts, ed., *Rebels on the Rio Grande: The Civil War Journal of A. B. Peticolas*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), 52, 88; Faulkner, “With Sibley in New Mexico,” 137; Hall, “The Journal of Ebenezer Hanna,” 26; and Mother Magdalen Hayden to Sister, 7 May 1862, Santa Fe, New Mexico, in *Loretto: The Sisters and Their Santa Fe Chapel*, ed. Mary J. Straw Cook, rev. ed. (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 2002), 19–22. See also Frazier, *Blood and Treasure*, 136; and Hall, *Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign*, 56.
  23. W. H. S., letter to the editor, *Houston Telegraph*, 10 April 1862; W. H. S., letter to the editor, *Clarksville (Tex.) Standard*, 14 June 1862; *From Desert to Bayou: The Civil War Journal and Sketches of Morgan Wolfe Merrick*, ed. Jerry D. Thompson (El Paso:

- Texas Western Press, 1991), 31; and Report of 1 June 1862 included in a letter from Gov. Henry Connelly to Gen. Edward Canby, 15 June 1862, in OR, ser. 1, vol. 50, pt. 1, pp. 1140–41.
24. Frank Starr to Dear Father, 12 May 1862, Fort Bliss, Texas, in “New Mexico Campaign Letters of Frank Starr,” 184; and General Sibley to General S. Cooper, 4 May 1862, Fort Bliss, Texas, in *The Civil War in West Texas and New Mexico: The Lost Letterbook of Brigadier General Henry Hopkins Sibley*, ed. John P. Wilson and Jerry Thompson (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 2001), 142.
  25. Miller, “Hispanos and the Civil War,” 56; Report of unnamed correspondent, n.d., included in a letter from Gen. Edward Canby to the Adj. Gen. of the U.S. Army, 21 June 1862, Santa Fe, New Mexico, in OR, ser. 1, vol. 9, p. 678.
  26. Col. William Steele to Insp. Gen. Samuel Cooper, 12 July 1862, El Paso, Texas, in OR, ser. 1, vol. 9, pp. 721–22; Alberts, *Rebels on the Rio Grande*, 103; and Capt. Jerome B. McCown, letter to editor, *Bellville (Tex.) Countryman*, 7 June 1862, quoted in Frazier, *Blood and Treasure*, 241–42.
  27. John A. Kirgan, letter to the editor, *Houston Tri-Weekly Telegraph*, 18 August 1862; and Frazier, *Blood and Treasure*, 281.
  28. Kirgan, letter to the editor; and *San Antonio (Tex.) Semi-Weekly News*, 21 July 1862.
  29. Ickis, *Bloody Trails*, 60; and Alberts, *Rebels on the Rio Grande*, 58.
  30. Union [soldier], letter to the editor, *Denver (Colo.) Rocky Mountain News*, 5 April 1862; Ickis, *Bloody Trails*, 99; and Hollister, *Colorado Volunteers in New Mexico*, 221.
  31. Col. Joseph West to Acting Assistant Adjutant General Benjamin Cutler, 23 September 1862, Mesilla, New Mexico, in OR, ser. 1, vol. 50, pt. 2, pp. 132–33; Col. Joseph West’s General Orders No. 24, 2 December 1862, in OR, ser. 1, vol. 50, pt. 2, p. 239; and Miller, “Hispanos and the Civil War,” 116.
  32. Col. Joseph West to Maj. William McMullen, 27 November 1862, Mesilla, New Mexico, in OR, ser. 1, vol. 50, pt. 2, pp. 232–33; and Gen. James H. Carleton to Col. Joseph West, 18 November 1862, Santa Fe, New Mexico, in OR, ser. 1, vol. 15, pp. 599–601.
  33. For additional information on Gen. James H. Carleton, see Durwood Ball, “Fort Craig, New Mexico, and the Southwest Indian Wars, 1854–1884,” *New Mexico Historical Review* 73 (April 1998): 161–67; and Adam Kane, “James H. Carleton,” in *Soldiers West: Biographies from the Military Frontier*, ed. Paul Andrew Hutton and Durwood Ball, rev. ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009), 122–48.
  34. For an overview of the resulting devastation in the region, see Jerry D. Thompson, “‘Gloom Over Our Fair Land’: Socorro County during the Civil War,” *New Mexico Historical Review* 73 (April 1998): 99–119; Arthur Morrison to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, 1 August 1862, quoted in Thompson, “‘Gloom Over Our Fair Land,’” 106; Carmony, *The Civil War in Apacheland*, 82, 134, 145–46; and J. Ross Browne, “A Tour through Arizona,” *Harper’s New Monthly Magazine*, January 1865, p. 149.
  35. For an account of Californians’ influence on the territory, see Darlis A. Miller, *The California Column in New Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982); and Andrew E. Masich, *The Civil War in Arizona: The Story of the California Volunteers, 1861–1865* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006). Mother Magdalen Hayden to Sister, 7 May 1862, in *Loretto*, 19–22; and Hugh L. Hinds, “Census Report for Fort Craig District N.M.,” April 1863, quoted in Thompson, “‘Gloom Over Our Fair Land,’” 111–12.

36. William Steptoe Christian to My own darling wife, 28 June 1863, in *The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events*, vol. 7, ed. Frank Moore (New York: 1864), 197; and Josiah Dexter Cotton to wife, 5 June 1864, Josiah Dexter Cotton Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
37. Historian Paul Foos makes a similar argument concerning the actions of U.S. volunteers in the U.S.-Mexico War. Foos, *A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair*, 3–11. Conversely, historians Martin H. Hall and Donald S. Frazier mostly attribute troop behavior in the Southwest during the Civil War to a lack of discipline that stemmed from, as Hall describes it, the “individualism that had always characterized the frontier.” Hall, *Sibley’s New Mexico Campaign*, 56; and Frazier, *Blood and Treasure*, 30–31. Although their observations are not entirely inaccurate, it is difficult to believe that echoes of manifest destiny had been completely extinguished among soldiers operating in the same region where the U.S.-Mexico War had occurred just over a decade earlier.
38. See Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861–1865* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Mark E. Neely Jr., *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). For the contours of the debate over “restraint,” see James McPherson, “Was It More Restrained Than You Think?” *The New York Review of Books*, 14 February 2008, pp. 42–44; Michael Fellman, “Down in the Trenches, Smeared with Blood,” *Civil War Times*, April 2009, pp. 30–31; and Mark E. Neely Jr., “Observing the Laws and Customs of War,” *Civil War Times*, April 2009, pp. 32–33.
39. For the citizenship status of native New Mexicans, see the “No. 24: Organic Law for the Territory of New Mexico, Compiled under the Directions of General Kearny,” 22 September 1846, <http://scholarship.rice.edu/jsp/xml/1911/27098/1/aa00303.tei.html>; “Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,” 2 February 1848, Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/tr/hispanic/ghtreaty/>; and John P. Victory, 1897, *Compiled Laws of New Mexico: In Accordance with an Act of the Legislature, Approved March 16th, 1897. . . .* (Santa Fe: New Mexican Printing Company, 1897), 42–43. For a particularly thought-provoking essay on the function of race during the Civil War, see Mark Grimsley, “‘A Very Long Shadow’: Race, Atrocity, and the American Civil War,” in *Black Flag Over Dixie: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War*, ed. Gregory J. W. Urwin (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2004), 231–44.