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Capacitive PCB Security for Active Tamper and Alteration Detection

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**CAPACITIVE PCB SECURITY FOR ACTIVE TAMPER AND
ALTERATION DETECTION**

by

CASEY PETERSEN

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CAPACITIVE PCB SECURITY FOR ACTIVE TAMPER AND ALTERATION DETECTION

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the research presented is to establish the viability of using capacitive based sensors for the purpose of hardware security at the Printed Circuit Board (PCB) level. Capacitive sensors are traditionally used to sense changes to the areas surrounding the sensing pads in applications such as sensing proximity, position, humidity, fluid levels and much more.

The specific sensor used for this research is an inductor-capacitor (LC) based Capacitance-to-Digital Converter. This configuration is virtually immune to EM noise because it is a tank circuit and therefore filters out the noise which, in the past, caused reliability issues with these types of sensors. The research results show that the security system is capable of detecting active tampering as well as sensing extremely small physical alterations made to the PCB, even if those changes occurred when the system was powered down.

In addition to establishing the viability of capacitive based PCB security, we assessed the relationship between the sensing pad sizes and the resolution of the sensing pad. Many factors affect the resolution of the sensing pads, the term resolution meaning how small of a change the pads can detect reliably. These factors include the presence of power and ground planes, floating copper, active shielding, as well as environmental factors such as variations in temperature, humidity, and physical distance to surrounding objects.

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Section I

Introduction

There are many security threats associated with PCBs and the components which populate them. Recent studies have shown a growing number of vulnerabilities for PCBs and the components which populate them, both active and passive. The main categories which PCB security issues fall into are in-field alterations, reverse engineering, and hardware Trojans [2]. These categories are broken down further in Fig. 1. In-field alterations include alterations to the physical PCB components or traces such as rerouting or replacing components as well as peripheral exploration. The current research on methods for detecting in-field alterations at the PCB level is limited. The first paper addressing active protection against PCB tampering in the field at the board level was presented in 2016 [2]. Significant efforts have been devoted to hardware Trojans detection, security at the chip level, and security at the design and manufacturing stages of the PCB; however, there is surprisingly limited research in the categories of active tampering, in-field alterations, and even reverse engineering of PCBs. This paper will address all of these areas of tamper protection.




Fig. 1. PCB Security Issues [2].

Physical tamper detection and in-field alteration protections have previously been limited to a single chip [11], select traces [2], and protected enclosures or envelopes [3], [6]. Paley et al. present a trace monitoring system based on measuring the resistance of the selected lines and comparing that value to a golden-key value previously stored for each trace monitored [2]. Any change to the trace that altered the resistance by 0.25% or more was detectable tampering. This system was not able to detect any tampering outside of the traces monitored and also could be

possibly spoofed by making alterations to the select traces while ensuring their resistance value remained constant.

Protected enclosures and envelopes in the past have had many drawbacks. Battery powered enclosures guarantee security as long as the sensitive data is kept only in volatile memory. Additionally, the BBRAM must continually be supplied with power from the time it is shipped from the factory, [3] and the battery must also be maintained through the lifetime of the product [4]. These battery type enclosures all suffer from the same drawbacks regardless of the enclosure type or detection method [5], [6].

Some approaches based on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are able to eliminate the need for a battery by storing the key intrinsically in the hardware [7], [8]. PUFs rely on the natural and manufacturing variations which are inherent in the hardware to extract a digital fingerprint unique to the specific hardware or chip [9]. There are many uses for PUFs, even offering limited tamper resistance when integrated into different chip designs [10].

Coated ICs [11] and optical PUFs [12] embedded in the IC offer tamper detection on power up but do not mention real time detection. Additionally, since only the chosen IC(s) are protected, the PCB and even IC(s) may still be vulnerable to various side channel attacks. Unless these coatings were adopted as an industry standard, the cost of adding this to a design would be prohibitively expensive. Even the full PCB coverage system presented in [13] and [14] fail to address active tampering.

The goal of the research presented here is to show that nearly any physical alteration to a PCB can be detected reliably with the addition of the proposed capacitive tamper detection system. This is an active system capable of detecting changes that were made to the system when it was powered down or active attempts to alter the system while in operation. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the background on capacitive sensors and sensor selection. Section III will cover the methodology behind the research. Section IV reviews the results, and the design recommendations will be discussed in section V. Concluding thoughts and possible future research is outlined in section VI.

Section II

Background

When selecting a sensor type for the security system, both inductive and capacitive based proximity sensors were considered. Even though we are not sensing proximity, these sensors are best suited to sense physical changes to their immediate surroundings. The benefits of using an inductive sensor is that it has high accuracy for measuring changes, works in various harsh environments, and is virtually immune to noise. The drawbacks of inductive sensors is that they can only detect metals, are less sensitive to changes in the surrounding environment, and they are much harder to implement on a PCB since they require coil traces rather than pads. It is the limited material sensing and implementation difficulties that made capacitive sensors the most appealing option for this application.

Capacitive sensors are capable of sensing any object, can sense smaller changes, and consume less power. The drawbacks to these sensors is their sensitivity to both EM and environmental noise such as changes in temperature and humidity, as well as their limited accuracy for exact measurements; all of which can be easily mitigated.

Since what we desire is a binary decision on whether or not there is or has been tampering, the lack of accuracy is not a concern. We are focused on precision and repeatably rather than determining the exact nature or size of the alteration in question. As for the EM noise issues, we have selected an LC based capacitive sensor which is virtually immune to EM noise unlike capacitive sensors in the past. The environmental noise is the most difficult to deal with.

The 28-bit FDC2214 Capacitance-to-Digital Converter from Texas Instruments is an ideal choice for this sensing application due to the chips superior sensing resolution and noise immunity. The chip uses an LC relaxation oscillator circuit rather than the more traditional RC relaxation oscillator or capacitive dividers used in past capacitive sensors. Since the LC tank circuit is used most often as a noise filter, this circuit is not afflicted by noise sources such as florescent lights unlike the chips predecessors [16]. This EM noise immunity, along with the 28 bit resolution, makes measurements into the subfemto-farad range possible.

Section III

Methodology

A. Noise Mitigation

Capacitive sensors are extremely sensitive to environmental noise such as changes in temperature, humidity, as well as the physical proximity to other objects. A temperature change of a few degrees can yield a capacitive swing in the pico-Farad range, which is extremely significant when we are trying to sense changes on the scale of femto-Farads. There are many ways to filter out this noise and three of those methods are discussed here.

The first method for filtering out environmental noise is the implementation of a simple derivative integration algorithm typically used for proximity sensing [17]. This allows us to sense sudden changes in the environment. Pseudo code for this function can be seen in Fig. 2. If the operation environment is expected to have little to no environmental noise, then this method could prove to be extremely reliable. Other benefits of this method are related to the simplicity. No memory is required to store any data and no calibration is required prior to use other than setting your sensing times for the specific environment. The drawbacks are that you can only sense active tampering, and if any changes are made to a system that is off, then it cannot be detected when powered back up. The second method requires a temperature and humidity sensor. If the swings in temperature and humidity are accurately measured, then these effects can be filtered out and the capacitance on the sensing pad can be considered to be a constant value. The benefits of this method are that any changes to the system can be sensed even if those changes were made when it was powered down. The drawbacks are that the temperature or humidity sensor could be spoofed and active tampering may be possible. Multiple temperature and humidity sensors could be used to increase the difficulty of spoofing without being detected.

The Third and recommended method for filtering out environmental noise requires using multiple sensing pads. This allows for the pads to be compared against one another. The relative capacitance of each pad when compared against each other will tell you if something has been

$X[i-1] = X[0]$
 $I[i-1] = 0$

Loop1:
 $D[i] = X[i] - X[i-1]$
 Is $(ABS(D[i]) \text{ greater than } DT)$?
 true:
 $I[i] = I[i-1] + D[i]$
 else:
 $I[i] = I[i-1]$
 Is $(I[i] \geq IT)$?
 true:
 Object detected
 $I[i-1] = I[i]$
 else:
 Object not detected
 $I[i-1] = I[i] * L$

Parameters

IT = Integration threshold
 DT = Derivative threshold
 L = Leakage factor
 $X[i]$ = Current sample point
 $X[i-1]$ = Previous sample point
 $D[i]$ = Derivative
 $I[i]$ = Integral of derivative
 $I[i-1]$ = Previous integral of derivative

Fig. 2. Pseudo Code For The D-I Algorithm [18]

sensed or not. This could be either multiple pads compared against one another or all of the pads compared against a single calibration pad. Even if these pads are not the same shape and size, their relative capacitance will still drift up or down along a predictable curve in relation to one another. The benefits of this method are that any changes to the system can be sensed even if those changes were made when it was powered down. Additionally, the sensors cannot be easily spoofed and the reliability of the system goes up as more pads are used. The drawback of this method is that a calibration of the system is required and there must be storage space for that calibration data. There are many other well-known methods that could be used for filtering out noise and most of them will require the use of multiple sensing pads. Other methods could reduce the amount of data that is required to be stored and even automate the calibration/learning process but these methods will not be discussed further here.

B. Experimental Board Design

Four different experimental boards were designed based on a 4x6 inch board size. Copper tape was placed over a 4x6 inch area of fiberglass and then the tape was divided into equal sections of 2, 4, 8 and 16 to be used as the sensing pads. Table I gives breakdown of each board and the corresponding sensing pad size and area.

TABLE I
PCB PAD SIZES

Board	# of Pads	Pad Size (in)	Pad Area (sq in)
<i>A</i>	2	3x4	12
<i>B</i>	4	2x3	6
<i>C</i>	8	1.5x2	3
<i>D</i>	16	1x1.5	1.5

Holes were drilled through the center of each sensing pad and header pins were soldered on through the back of the PCBs. The finished test PCBs in Fig. 3 give a back view of the pads, header pins and substrates. The thickness of materials used is as follows, fiberglass substrate: 25 mills, Copper Tape: 3 mills, Paper: 3 mills. The paper was glued directly to the sensing pads and used as a dielectric to separate the traces from the sensing pads (reference Fig. 4). This thickness of paper was specifically chosen because this is the minimum separation a designer can expect to achieve from most PCB fabrication shops. Traces were placed in three different locations on each PCB directly over the center of a pad, between two pads, and offset by $\frac{3}{4}$ of a pad. This allowed data to be collected for the location of alterations made.




Fig. 3. PCB Prototypes

Section IV

Results and Verification

A. Setup

The four prototype PCBs were altered by adding a feature of equal size to each board along one of the traces as seen in Fig. 4, then recording the change in sensing capacitance. Feature additions were cut out of copper tape and changes ranged from 1x1mm to 10x10mm. For an alteration to be considered 'detected' it had to cause a continued change in the capacitance of 6σ (six standard deviations) or more. This would be an acceptable detection threshold in many applications, but the number of standard deviations as well as confirmation measurements should be adjusted depending on the desired results and application.




Fig. 4. Traces and Alterations

In order to obtain the maximum standard deviation for each pad, 100 readings were obtained over a one-minute period for calibration and then again after an alteration. If a larger standard deviation was recorded at any point, then the maximum standard deviation for that pad size was updated. An additional calibration pad was recorded throughout the sensing process to ensure that the maximum standard deviation was not exceeded during each test.

B. Results

The results from the experiments can be seen in Tab. II, Tab. III and Tab. IV. The tolerances to these alterations are within 0.5 mm each, thus there is some measurement variation which is due to lack of precision. Table II reflects the best-case scenario for sensing changes made to a board; Altering the board in the center of one of the sensing pads is where maximum capacitive coupling takes place and where the greatest change in capacitance will be seen. The values for each test in Table II are generally larger than the two other areas tested on the sensing pad. Keeping with our 6σ sensing convention, the 2-pad configuration is seen to have the least amount of resolution. This is more due to the larger standard deviation than the actual change in capacitance experienced. In fact, the largest pads on board A experienced a 53.7 femtoFarad (fF) change in capacitance for a 1x1mm alteration while the smallest pads on board D only experienced a change of 22.7 fF for the same alteration.

Due to the much larger standard deviation, the change in board A caused by the 1x1mm alteration was only 1.72σ away from the mean while the same alteration in board D caused a

TABLE II
CENTER ALTERATION RESULTS

Board	Alteration Size (mm)	Standard Deviation (σ)	Mean Capacitance Before (pF)	Area =mm ²	Mean Capacitance After (pF)	Capacitance Change (pF)	Change In Standard Deviations (σ)
2-Pad	1x1	0.03119	41.3586	1	41.4123	0.0537	1.72
2-Pad	2x2	0.03119	41.3717	4	41.4642	0.0925	2.97
2-Pad	3x3	0.03119	41.4061	9	41.5027	0.0966	3.10
2-Pad	5x5	0.03119	41.5904	25	41.781	0.1906	6.11
2-Pad	10x10	0.03119	41.6274	25	42.0261	0.3987	12.78
4-Pad	1x1	0.01630	31.631	1	31.6825	0.0515	3.16
4-Pad	2x2	0.01630	31.5964	4	31.7558	0.1594	9.78
4-Pad	3x3	0.01630	31.7583	9	32.8268	1.0685	65.55
8-Pad	1x1	0.00107	31.6686	1	31.6902	0.0216	20.19
8-Pad	2x2	0.00107	31.6709	4	31.728	0.0571	53.36
16-Pad	1x1	0.00089	26.0539	1	26.0766	0.0227	25.51
16-Pad	2x2	0.00089	26.0621	4	26.1155	0.0534	60.00

change of 25.51σ . The standard deviation of a board can be lowered through the use of active or ground shielding in addition to other methods discussed in section V. With the given threshold set for sensing alterations, board A was capable of sensing changes made over the center of the sensing pads of 5x5mm or larger; Board B was able to sense changes of approximately 2x2 mm or larger, and board C as well as board D were easily able to sense the smallest change of 1x1mm.

It is important to note that the changes made in the experiments chosen are virtually two dimensional. Since the capacitive coupling effect relies on both the distance to an object as well as the surface area of that object, the addition or removal of a three-dimensional object with a similar footprint would cause a greater change in capacitance and therefore be easier to sense.

Table III summarizes the experimental results from an alteration made not directly over the center of a pad, but rather offset by 3/4 of the sensing pad. The results are virtually the same as those found in Tab. II with only a slight reduction in the sensing resolution. A few of the measurements that are slightly above those found in the previous experiments are likely due to a lack of precision and repeatability in the alterations made between the two experiments.

Alterations made to the edge of a pad were the hardest to sense. Table IV shows a reduction in sensing capability by about half when compared with the results from the original experiment. board A was just able to sense a change of 10x10mm, even though the area overlapping the pad was nearly double that of the 5x5mm pad sensed in Tab. II. Board B would be capable of sensing changes just larger than 2x2mm while boards C and D were still able to easily sense the smallest of changes.

TABLE III
3/4 OFFSET ALTERATION RESULTS

Board	Alteration Size (mm)	Standard Deviation (σ)	Mean Capacitance Before (pF)	Area =mm ²	Mean Capacitance After (pF)	Capacitance Change (pF)	Change In Standard Deviations (σ)
2-Pad	1x1	0.03119	41.3817	1	41.4289	0.0472	1.51
2-Pad	2x2	0.03119	41.4112	4	41.4642	0.053	1.70
2-Pad	3x3	0.03119	41.4095	9	41.5018	0.0923	2.96
2-Pad	5x5	0.03119	41.4406	25	41.6254	0.1848	5.92
2-Pad	10x10	0.03119	41.691	25	42.0341	0.3431	11.00
4-Pad	1x1	0.01630	31.8107	1	31.8616	0.0509	3.12
4-Pad	2x2	0.01630	31.9286	4	32.2031	0.2745	16.84
4-Pad	3x3	0.01630	31.7554	9	32.7833	1.0279	63.06
8-Pad	1x1	0.00107	31.4509	1	31.4719	0.021	19.63
8-Pad	2x2	0.00107	31.4111	4	31.47	0.0589	55.05
16-Pad	1x1	0.00089	25.9902	1	26.0092	0.019	21.35
16-Pad	2x2	0.00089	26.0005	4	26.0524	0.0519	58.31

These results were not obtained on an optimal board design or with optimal environmental conditions. An environmental chamber could improve the results received, but they would also be unrealistic for real world applications. With proper PCB design constraints, better results could be obtained, even in the presence of more environmental noise.

TABLE IV
EDGE ALTERATION RESULTS

Board	Alteration Size (mm)	Standard Deviation (σ)	Mean Capacitance Before (pF)	Area =mm ²	Mean Capacitance After (pF)	Capacitance Change (pF)	Change In Standard Deviations (σ)
2-Pad	1x1	0.03119	40.9852	1	41.0054	0.0202	0.65
2-Pad	2x2	0.03119	41.0036	4	41.0471	0.0435	1.39
2-Pad	3x3	0.03119	41.2005	9	41.2639	0.0634	2.03
2-Pad	5x5	0.03119	41.2533	25	41.39	0.1367	4.38
2-Pad	10x10	0.03119	41.307	25	41.5313	0.2243	7.19
4-Pad	1x1	0.01630	31.5693	1	31.5907	0.0214	1.31
4-Pad	2x2	0.01630	31.2788	4	31.3712	0.0924	5.67
4-Pad	3x3	0.01630	31.4538	9	31.9084	0.4546	27.89
8-Pad	1x1	0.00107	31.456	1	31.4691	0.0131	12.24
8-Pad	2x2	0.00107	31.0074	4	31.0372	0.0298	27.85
16-Pad	1x1	0.00089	25.9734	1	25.9859	0.0125	14.04
16-Pad	2x2	0.00089	26.101	4	26.1311	0.0301	33.82

Section V

Discussion

Many factors affect the measurement resolution. These factors include sensing pad sizes, the presence of power and ground planes, floating copper, active shielding, tolerable number of false alarms, as well as the amount of environmental noise present. While the boards design is mostly under the control of the design engineer, the environmental factors may greatly lower the capabilities of the system and be the most difficult to control. The implementation of a shielded container can greatly reduce or even eliminate the effects of environmental noise.

An optimal design for this system, in terms of measurement resolution, would use numerous small sensing pads backed by active shielded planes. These active shielded planes and even the sensing planes could be used as a Faraday cage ground, addition coupling, or other application when not being actively used for sensing board changes. The active shielding works by taking the same signals sent to the sensing pads and puts it through a unity buffer. Active shielding greatly increases the measurement resolution and is frequently used in proximity sensing applications in order to increase the sensing distance.

The sensing pads can either be placed in the dead space on the top and bottom layers of the PCB or on the layers directly below the outer most layers. The sensing pads can be any shape and size but as the size increases the standard deviation of measurements increases as well, resulting in lower resolution. If sensing layers are set into the PCB then the manufacturing notes should request that the first and last dielectric layers of the design be 2-3 mills thick, which is the current industry recommended minimum for most PCB fabrication shops. The materials used in the design are not important in terms of the capacitance readings or measurement resolution. Different materials and thicknesses will just have a different initial capacitive offset.

Removing power and ground planes in a PCB design is rarely recommended, although this may be the second-best choice if active shielding is not possible. The presence of the power and ground planes will reduce the sensitivity of the sensing pads but also reduce the noise. As previously discussed, a reduction in environmental noise means a reduction in the standard deviation. Depending on the operation environment, the addition of passive shielding may even increase the sensing resolution of the system. Additionally, increasing the separation distance between power/ground planes and the sensing pads is recommended. The closer the sensing pad is to a power/ground plane, the lower the measurement resolution will be [18].

To determine what constitutes a positive tamper detection, the system must be calibrated to the operation environment and the number of acceptable false alarms in a given time period must be set. A simple function can be used to determine the maximum standard deviation of the system for a given operating environment. The number of floating average samples, standard deviation samples and calibration run time will depend on the operating environment.

A lab with good climate control may only require a calibration of a few minutes, while some outdoor and other environments may require 24 hours or multiple calibrations. After the maximum standard deviation is set and the maximum percent of acceptable false alarms is determined, then the detection zone can be set. The detection zone is determined by how many standard deviations away from the mean you need to be. The distribution is Gaussian as shown in Fig. 5, thus the likelihood that any given measurement is within 2σ of the predicted mean is approximately 75%, $3\sigma = 89\%$, $4\sigma = 94\%$, $5\sigma = 96\%$, and $6\sigma = 97\%$. Since the maximum standard deviation was used, these percentages will be higher the majority of the time. Multiple confirming measurements will also greatly reduce or eliminate false alarms.




Fig. 5. Capacitive Measurement Distribution

Section IV

Conclusion

We have presented a novel approach for detecting active tampering and in-field alterations to a PCB. We have shown that this system is capable of detecting alterations made to traces on a PCB with an area less than 1 mm. The system requires relatively little overhead in terms of hardware and memory and consumes very little power. The proposed system is capable of detecting nearly every physical in-field alteration as well as inhibit efforts to clone or reverse engineer a PCB.

There is still a significant amount of research that needs to be carried out on this system and questions that need be answered. Future research should focus on implementing the system on existing PCB designs and testing precise and repeatable alterations to the boards. A proper implementation of the system must ensure that the hardware cannot be bypassed or spoofed. Specifics on system design and the effects of different operating environments must be tested to optimize the sensing resolution for each application. The frequency of the sensing circuit and the passive components used with the FDC2214 chip can also have a great impact on the results.

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