

University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository

History ETDs

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

4-7-1967

Chinese Communist Minority Relations

Henry G. McCleary

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/hist_etds



Part of the [History Commons](#)

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO LIBRARY

MANUSCRIPT THESES

Unpublished theses submitted for the Master's and Doctor's degrees and deposited in the University of New Mexico Library are open for inspection, but are to be used only with due regard to the rights of the authors. Bibliographical references may be noted, but passages may be copied only with the permission of the authors, and proper credit must be given in subsequent written or published work. Extensive copying or publication of the thesis in whole or in part requires also the consent of the Dean of the Graduate School of the University of New Mexico.

This thesis by Henry G. McCleary
has been used by the following persons, whose signatures attest their acceptance of the above restrictions.

A Library which borrows this thesis for use by its patrons is expected to secure the signature of each user.

NAME AND ADDRESS

DATE

CHINESE COMMUNIST MINORITY RELATIONS

By

Henry G. McCleary

A Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in History

The University of New Mexico

1967

LD
3781
N563M132
cop. 2

This thesis, directed and approved by the candidate's committee, has been accepted by the Graduate Committee of The University of New Mexico in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

CHINESE COMMUNIST MINORITY RELATIONS

TITLE

Henry G. McCleary

CANDIDATE

History

DEPARTMENT

Brian E. O'Neill

DEAN

April 7, 1967

DATE

COMMITTEE

Frank W. Hale

CHAIRMAN

Henry J. Tobias

Max H. Himmelfarb

0425399

INTRODUCTION

The leaders of the People's Republic of China desire that China be a strongly unified polity possessed of a well organized industrial base. The minority peoples are expected to become part of both political and productive societal functions.¹ Minority discontent would be a serious problem because it could threaten the long term plan for total integration of a unified, disciplined and highly industrialized China.²

Marxism's role in China's minority policy is limited because Marx and Engels left their followers little guidance in matters of nationality and nationalism.³ The Western Europe they studied did not pose the problem. The Western orientation among early Social Democratic thinkers like Lenin led their concerns to other matters before 1913. When Stalin wrote his thesis on the minority question, he indicated that national movements were essentially bourgeois.

When Lenin realized the value of the national movement as a weapon for fighting the established order, he employed it to his own ends. Lenin formed an alliance with the nationalist movements in Russia which he explained:

"It is the support of an ally against a given enemy, and the Social Democrats provide this support in order to speed the fall of the common enemy, but they expect nothing for themselves from these temporary allies and concede nothing to them."⁴

¹G. Gjessing, "Chinese Anthropology and New China's Policy Toward Her Minorities," *Acta Sociologica*, II (1956), 45.

²Moslem Unrest in China (New Delhi: Eurasia Publishing House, (1963), p. 58.

³R. Pipes. The Formation of the Soviet Union, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 21.

⁴V. Lenin. Selected Works, II (New York: International Publishers, 1943), p. 327.

Self-determination, an RSDLP tenet since 1898, was emphasized by Lenin after 1913 to attract the aid of national groups. However, he proposed the right, as he said, "as he sponsored the right to divorce, without advocating it."⁵ The same attitude and policy are found in the development of Mao's minority program.

The People's Republic consolidates its authority over the minorities through Party cadres, economics, colonization, the PIA and sinicization. Control and sinicization are major policies aimed at obtaining production from the national minorities, and utilizing their land.

Because of traditional enmity between the Han people and the minority people, the minorities are chary of Han control and tend to resist it. When the Central Government was weak, the minorities asserted autonomy; when it was strong the minorities fell under some form of control. Autonomy is a tradition dear to the minorities. The People's Republic has conceded to this the institution of National Autonomy Areas. With them has come a certain amount of cultural autonomy, encouraged and utilized by the central government. The cultural traits, the habits of speech and religion differentiate the minority member from the Han people rather than obvious racial traits. As assimilation occurs, it is most obvious in the loss of cultural uniqueness by the minority people.

For this study, I have not included Tibet, as its recent inclusion into China precludes careful study of dependable sources.

⁵ Ibid. XVII, p. 328.

I

WHO ARE THE MINORITIES ?

According to a definition of the National Minorities Institute, a minority is a body of people living in a common area, historically formed, with a common language, a common economic life, and a common psychology.⁶ In China's census of 1953, fifty nationalities besides the Han are listed.⁷ They totaled 35,320,350, or 6.06 of China's then 582,503,407 people.⁸ In this census people were listed as having the nationality they claimed.⁹ These 35,000,000 people were found to be numerically important in over fifty per cent of China's land area. According to the authorities, since the government doesn't discriminate, but guarantees the cultural life of the minority groups, people admitted their true ethnic origins.¹⁰ In the light of historical relations between the peoples, the population figure is at best an estimate due to the conditions in obtaining the information. The figure for minorities may be low due to lingering minority fear of minority repression. Table 1 is a listing of the minorities and their population.¹¹

⁶ S. Ghosh, Embers in Cathay (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1961), p. 96.

⁷ H. Wiens, "Some of China's Thirty-five Million Non-Chinese," Royal Asiatic Society, Hong Kong Branch, Journal, II (1962), p. 68.

⁸ S. Chandrasekhar, China's Population Census (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), p. 44.

⁹ Ibid. p. 27.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 45.

¹¹ Wiens, "Some of China's Thirty-five Million Non-Chinese," p. 73.

TABLE 1

1. Chuang.....7,000,000	18. Lisu.....317,000	35. Russian...22,600
2. Uighur.....3,640,000	19. Tuchia.....300,000	36. Kelao.....20,800
3. Hui.....3,559,000	20. Wa.....286,000	37. Sipo.....19,000
4. Yi.....3,280,000	21. She.....210,000	38. Maonan....18,400
5. Tsang.....2,775,000	22. Malay.....200,000	39. Achang....17,700
6. Miao.....2,511,000	23. Tunghsiang.155,000	40. Tadjik....14,400
7. Manchu.....2,418,000	24. Nahsi.....143,000	41. Uzbek.....13,600
8. Mongol.....1,463,000	25. Lahu.....139,000	42. Nu.....12,700
9. Puyi.....1,247,000	26. Shui.....133,000	43. Tarter....6,900
10. Korean.....1,120,000	27. Chingpo....101,000	44. Owenke....6,200
11. Tung.....712,000	28. Kirghiz....70,000	45. Paoan.....4,900
12. Yao.....665,000	29. Tu.....53,200	46. Yuku.....3,800
13. Pai.....567,000	30. Daghur....44,100	47. Penglung..2,900
14. Kazak.....509,000	31. Molao.....43,100	48. Tulung....2,400
15. Hani.....481,000	32. Chiang....35,600	49. Olunchun..2,200
16. Tai.....478,000	33. Pulang....30,600	50. Hoche.....450
17. Li.....360,000	34. Salar.....30,600	

Language, religion, and other cultural manifestations in various combinations serve to distinguish the minorities from the Hans. Many speak Han as a second language. For their part, most Han would accept the minorities as Han if the minorities would adopt Han culture. It is their lack of desire to do this that distinguishes the minorities both in their own eyes and in the eyes of the Han. Cultural introvertedness, plus geographical isolation are major factors contributing to the perseverance of ethnic minorities in China.

The minorities live primarily in border regions. In the Northwest live 6,300,000 members of the minorities represented by the Uighur, Hui, Tibetan, Kazak, Tunghsiang, Mongol, Tu, Tadjik, Manchu, and Salar peoples. The minorities are a fifth of the population of this area.

In the Southwest a fifth of the population are of the combined Tibetan, Yuku, Miao, Hui, Tai, Puyi, Nahsi, and Wa. For Central and South China the minorities Chuang, Miao, Yao, Tsang, Hui, Li, Kelao, Tung, and Maonan comprise only a twentieth of the population.¹²

¹²Wang Shu-Tang, China, Land of Many Nationalities (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955), p. 5.

The many minorities exhibit a broad spectrum of variation. No generalization would be pertinent to all of them. Some, like the Kazak and Kirghiz of the Northwestern frontier, are roving stockmen. Others, like the Yi, Puyi and Tai of the Southwest practice a slash and burn agriculture. Religions vary from Islam to various types of Buddhism to local animistic faiths, and intermixtures between them. It is the function of this study to deal with the overall policies of the Chinese government that deal with the minorities as a whole, and it will not spend much time in dealing with their particular aspects.

II

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT TO 1949

a. The Dynasties

During the dynastic period of Chinese history the Han were primarily interested in a kind of defensive control over the minority peoples. The Chinese developed more interest in the Northwest minorities because from these groups came a long series of challenges in the form of raiders and conquerors. The Han themselves generally lacked prestige in the frontier regions because at the far reaches of their control the Han generally were just able to maintain a power balance with the minorities. Generally, because of poor pay and the hardships entailed, as well as being among alien customs and far from Chinese society, most men of ambition and talent shunned the frontiers. This led to men of lesser quality, men who were in disgrace, being sent to the frontier. These men did little for Han prestige among the minority people as graft, corruption and general guile were rampant.¹³

As early as the Ch'in dynasty of 243 BC we have records of Chinese attempts to control the minorities by a system that can be seen reflected under the present regime. Ch'in Shih Huang Ti commanded that military agricultural colonists be planted among the Yueh.¹⁴ Of the Yueh acknowledgment of Imperial suzerainty was required, but the effect of this was nominal.

¹³ H. Wiens, China's March Toward the Tropics (Hamden: Shoe String Press, 1954), p. 250.

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 132.

More importantly, General Jen Hsia worked out a melding - he took a Yueh wife, and promoted marriages between his soldiers and Yueh, and began the employment of Yueh to rule on local levels. To distant areas he sent gifts and entertainments.¹⁵ These things opened the way to sinicization as Chinese settlers entered the South; artisans were particularly encouraged to settle. More intermarriage occurred, each culture permeated the other, and the Yueh, whose princes were often sent to the Imperial Court for education, were progressing toward eventual assimilation.¹⁶

By the Ming period the two major minority control policies, insofar as policies existed, were the tu-ssu and tun-tien systems. In the tu-ssu, three levels of hereditary titles were bestowed upon minority leaders by the Chinese. Acceptance of the titles signified submission by the minorities. The top grade were those who administered chou and hsien as magistrates. The second grade were local military officials. The third grade were sub-district magistrates, jail wardens, post masters and registrars.¹⁷

Chinese conquerors of areas which might include several chou gained certain feudatory rights and thereby became vassals of the Imperial House. A method of control that they used, and which existed along with the tu-ssu system was the tun tien, or the use of military agricultural colonists. The colonists, often part of the army which pacified the area, maintained about 25% of their members on actual garrison duty while the rest did cultivation. The soldiers were supplied with tools and draught

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 136.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 158.

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 214.

animals and land. Although some soldiers brought Han wives to the frontier, intermarriage was encouraged with the local women.¹⁸ In this fashion the Moslem Arab troops were settled in Sinkiang at the end of the reduction of the Mongols there. The Arabs formed a nucleus for Moslems from Kansu, Shensi and Ninghsia.¹⁹

Although the Chinese have historically felt themselves culturally superior to the minorities, they had no concrete plan to modify minority culture. At some periods various religions suffered as did the Moslems under the Manchus, giving rise to local revolts, but the major causes of revolt would generally come with Chinese attempts at direct political control.²⁰

Manchu minority control continued the use of the tu-ssu and attendant tun-tien systems. Many tu-ssu, by the end of the Manchu had become independent.²¹ As central control waned, military agricultural colonies were often supplemented by various forms of commercial colonization. Investors often found it profitable to move in civilian colonists to develop land. The government acquiesced because this helped insure food supplies for the local troops, and to free more of them for garrison duty. The citizen colonists were generally the unemployed, the impoverished of the cities, but were generally not criminals.²²

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 194.

¹⁹ Ghosh, p. 75.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 63.

²¹ Chi Jen-chang, The Minority Groups of Yunan and Chinese Political Expansion into Southeast Asia (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1956), p. 31.

²² Wiens, China's March...., p. 199.

b. The Republic

Sun Yat-sen and the Nationalists were aware of some minority aspirations, although like the dynasties, the Kuomintang was far more aware of the Northwest minorities than the others. In the 1924 Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang it was stated that "the nationalism of the Kuomintang has a two-fold meaning; the self emancipation of China and the equality of all the nationalities of China. The Kuomintang can state with solemnity that it recognizes the right of self determination of all the national minorities of China, and that it will organize a free and united Chinese Republic as soon as the war against imperialism and war lords is victoriously concluded."²³

To emphasize the multi-national character of the new Republic and to conciliate elements inclined to secede, the leaders of the KMT adopted the flag with five bars that represented the five peoples of China in which they were interested; the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Tibetans, and Moslems. Such a move did not consider most of the Southwestern groups who were really of little importance in Chinese thinking before World War II.²⁴ Even today, under the Communists, the bank notes bear inscriptions in Mongol, Uighur and Tibetan along with Chinese, but still do not represent the many southern minorities.²⁵

Under the Nationalists, minority affairs were, just as always, in the hands of Provincial authorities. However, a research division was

²³ J. DeFrancis, "National and Minority Policies," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, (Sept. 1951), p. 148.

²⁴ C. Hudson, "The Nationalities of China," Far Eastern Affairs, II (1960), p. 157.

²⁵ T. Shabad, China's Changing Map (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1956), p. 32.

developed under the Chairman of the Commission for Mongolian Affairs that in its eight sections included sections for western Yunan, Chiu-Chuan, Ke-mu, Hsi-kiang, Chih-shih, Tien Shan, Ho-hsi, Ho Huang, and Sui-yuan. Although these areas were mostly Moslem or Tibetan, some like western Yunan, and the Tien Shan were composed of several minorities. The KMT had at least light contact with the new minorities of Yunan.²⁶ The Communists often claim that Chiang Kai-shek refused to recognize China's multi-national character.²⁷ From the march North in 1927, he was preoccupied with consolidating internal political control. Not impelled by dogma that only a united advance could be pragmatic, the KMT was inclined to do things piecemeal. At any rate, Chiang's concern with minorities was only a real concern during the establishment of the Ili Republic in Sinkiang Province. To mollify the desires of those minorities involved, the KMT offered control of the local government and armed forces, official use of the Uighur language, even in schools, freedom of speech and assembly - all the same basic things offered later by the Communists.²⁸ With the minorities, Chiang really didn't have an opportunity to act. He was forced, by his own weakness to rely on the old minority leaders and to support the status quo in the form of the tu-ssu system. He was never able to appeal to the lower classes to broaden his base of power, and really didn't institute any social changes that affected the minority peoples.²⁹

²⁶ Wiens, China's March...., p. 206.

²⁷ Wang, China, Land of, p. 8.

²⁸ Ghosh, Embers, p. 92.

²⁹ Gjessing, Chinese Antropology ..., p. 47.

Thus the end of the nationalist period in China still saw the tu-ssu system in effect.

The Communists see themselves in some respects as the spiritual inheritors of Sun Yat-sen. In this respect, and with respect to their actual policies, there is illustration of an overall continuity in Chinese minority policy. The Communists use the phrase of the nationalists; "equality of all the nationalities of China," modified to; "Equality among all population groups" to fan minority discontent with the failure of the KMT to implement equality.³⁰ The tu-ssu officials, who had evolved into almost independent war lords by the twentieth century, felt threatened by the Communists and gave some support to the KMT. Their tenuous ties to the KMT often led to their deaths during the period from 1945-1949. However, the utilization of popular local officials by offering them offices in the new system - the roots of the Ming tu-ssu system - is exactly what the Nationalists, and then the Communists were to do. Those tu-ssu who were amenable to the Communists, and locally popular, were given Communist indoctrination, and have become part of the new government.

Though both Communists and Nationalists have spoken of self determination for the minorities, neither really could tolerate a political status for a minority nation that involved independence from China.³¹

³⁰ Wiens, China's March, p. 256.

³¹ Ibid. p. 257.

Before 1956 China was primarily concerned with the molding of the Han people into the society. The minorities were being moved into the various autonomous systems as a preliminary step towards bringing them into the overall framework of New China. From the end of the revolution in 1949, China began to move towards collectivization of its agriculture. Her long range goal of industrialization and economic construction could be achieved only from a secure and expanded agricultural base. Collectivization was the means adopted to obtain this end. In 1953 China began to transfer from stage one mutual aid, and stage two cooperative agriculture to the third step, that of collective farms.³² The minority areas, however, somewhat on the periphery of society, were not to begin the transfer until 1956.

In 1956 the minorities were integrated into the overall plan. They reacted against being collectivized. Their reaction coincided with the "Hundred Flowers" period, and from this time, the minorities felt in ever greater degrees, the effects of the various China-wide periods that are illustrated by slogans like "Hundred Flowers", "Rectification", and the "Great Leap Forward". The Hundred Flowers relaxation allowed a very large amount of minority criticism to appear. The general trend was that forcing the minority peoples into the General Economic Plan was a denial of their autonomous rights.

Rectification by the government of the excesses encountered during Hundred Flowers included the excesses of the minorities. It was at this period that collectivization was pressed upon them. Recalcitrance on their part immediately brought charges of "local nationalism" upon them. Rectification lasted through 1958. A part of the program was collectivization.

³²P. Tang. Communist China Today (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 273.

Collectivization of the minorities meant a rearrangement of their social systems, and began to break down their traditional societies. By the beginning of the Great Leap Forward in 1959, a serious attempt had been made to integrate the minorities into a functional part of the Marxist productive relationships.³³ Specifics of their integration will be discussed in Chapters IV and V.

³³G. Mosely, "China's Fresh Approach to the National Minority Question," The China Quarterly, XXIV (Oct-Dec, 1965), p. 18.

III

THE OFFICIAL STRUCTURE

a. Minority Rights Under the Constitution

Communism treats societies holistically, and is anti-particularist. Its politics traditionally stressed an international applicability. Marx was not very concerned with minorities as such. Insofar as any group insisted on its separatist qualities, inferring that the general socialist philosophy would be inapplicable in its case, Marx would have opposed those minority aspirations.

Early Russian developments in Communism tended to go along with the internationalist theme of applicability developed by Marx. However, Lenin realized that he could utilize minority discontent to weaken the power of the Tsardom. In this light, he proposed that minorities in Russia be allowed to completely separate themselves from the about to be founded socialist state. This tactic won for him at least benevolent neutrality from the minorities in the empire. During the civil war that erupted in Russia just after the revolution, many of the minorities took Lenin at his word and attempted to set up separate states. Although the Finns were successful, for the rest of the minorities, their independent status lasted only so long as it took Russia to consolidate, and to repossess them. For the new state's philosophy, only capitalist elements could wish to live outside the oncoming socialist paradise.

China had Russia as a model for minority policy, a model made somewhat practical because some of the people dealt with were the same -

the Kazak, Kirghiz and other nomadic groups along their common frontier. Russian efforts have been based upon a conflict between the idea of holistic internationalism and realization of national self interest. Insofar as the Russian Revolution owed some of its success to the weariness with the "imperialist" war of 1917, the minorities in Russia were granted at least the form of Republican autonomous states within a Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.³⁴

Mao, Chairman of the Kiangsi Soviet in 1931, and anxious to gain the minorities' support, followed Lenin's example by offering self decision to them. The Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic reflected Russian influence, influence that is rarely noticeable in Chinese minority relations, particularly after 1927. Chinese minorities are smaller and less threatening than Russian. Chinese minorities were less catered to. The Kiangsi Constitution stated:

"The Soviet government of China recognizes the right of the National Minorities of China to self determination and to the formation of an independent state for each National Minority. They may either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own states as they prefer."³⁵

The formation of the Chinese state utilized a tremendous patriotic nationalistic effort to rid the country of the Japanese. The unity of the Chinese people was heavily stressed. The emphasis struck a responsive chord to a people who held that the adoption of culture made one Chinese, not a genetic background, and was thus holistic. In 1945, on his On Coalition Government, Mao stated that "The minorities should be given better treatment, and the right of self-government."³⁶ Nothing is said of a right to secession. Again in the same work Mao referred to the statement

³⁴ Hudson, "The Nationalities," p. 53.

³⁵ R. Khan, Islam in China (Delhi: National Academy, 1963), p. 91.

³⁶ Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works. Vol. IV: 1941-1945. (New York: International Publishers, 1956), p. 281.

on minorities included in the 1924 KMT First National Congress Manifesto when he said,

"The Chinese Communist Party agrees fully with Dr. Sun's policy towards the National Minorities. Communists should actively assist the broad masses of all the national minorities to struggle for the realization of this policy and help them to fight for their political, economic and cultural liberation and to build up their own armies to safeguard the interests of the masses. Their languages written as well as spoken, their customs, traditions and religious beliefs should be tolerated.³⁷

With the end of revolution in 1949 came the First Plenary session of the Peoples Republic of China Political Consultative Conference. Some representatives of the national minorities took part in it.³⁸ The conference was an organ of the central government which was responsible for the Constitution of the People's Republic of China promulgated in 1954. Articles 9, 50, 51, 52 and 53 of Section I are germane to the minority question.

Art. 9 All nationalities within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China shall have equal rights and duties.

Art. 50 All nationalities within the boundaries are equal. They shall oppose imperialism and public enemies in their midst so that the Peoples Republic of China will become a big fraternal and co-operative family comprising all its nationalities. Greater nationalism and local nationalism shall be opposed. Actions involving discrimination, oppression and splitting the unity of the various nationalities shall be prohibited.

Art. 51 Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated, and various kinds of autonomous organs for the different nationalities shall be set up according to the size of the populations and regions. In places where different nationalities live together and in autonomous areas of the national minorities the different nationalities shall each have an appropriate number of representatives in local organs of state power.

Art. 52 All national minorities within the boundaries of the Peoples Republic of China shall have the right to join the Peoples Liberation Army, and to organize local peoples Public Security Forces in accordance with the unified military system of the state.

³⁷ Ibid. p. 301.

³⁸ Wang, China, Land of . . ., p. 12.

Art. 53 All national minorities shall have freedom to develop their spoken and written languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs. The people's government shall assist the broad masses of all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural, and educational construction work.³⁹

The constitution emphasizes the unity and equality of the people of China under the leadership of the People's government. Although forms of autonomy are mentioned, the autonomous areas and the use of minority languages are not indicative of an envisagement of real self determination for separate political entities implied by the word; autonomy. However, it is a rare state that is prepared to have its constituent parts actually divided. Attempts at separation of a political union are generally met with the same action that the United States took to preserve itself in 1861. The People's Republic of China is also unwilling to accept separatist currents among its minorities.

Section III of the Constitution deals with the forms of administration. Art. 53 of Section IV sets up administrative hierarchy - the country being divided into provinces, autonomous chou, and municipalities under the direct control of the People's Congress. Provinces and autonomous regions are divided into counties and municipalities (hsien) and counties are divided into hsiang and villages, any part of which may be an autonomous area under the control of the next higher level. In this system the next higher level of authority may control the next lower. The National Peoples Congress, by Art. 27, Section V may ratify statutes and boundaries of those elements it directly controls which are stated in Section IV.⁴⁰ It does not give the right of appeal to the next higher

³⁹ Lin Shao-chi, Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China - Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1954), pp. 88-89. p. 10.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 80. p. 11.

authority at any echelon. The constitution makes plain that the organ of government responsive both to the minority and the Central Government is the autonomous area. On the 9 of August, 1952 the Central Government promulgated the General Programme of the People's Republic of China for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities. It cites articles 9, 50, 51, 52, and 53 of the yet to be published constitution as its fundamental provisions.

b. The General Program

The General Program is very detailed in its explanation of administration, rights and duties of the autonomous areas. It was promulgated in 1952. A full text of this program is to be found in Appendix I. Autonomous areas are the major organs of central government control over the minorities.

Administratively, there are three kinds of autonomous areas. According to article 4 they are established according to inter group relations, economic level, and historical background of the area.⁴¹

- a) Regions may be an area inhabited by one national minority
- b) Regions may have a predominant minority, and others who likewise shall enjoy regional autonomy.
- c) Regions may join two or more areas under a joint administration.

Article 5 notes that Han people live in some areas. In areas where the number of Hans is large, a democratic coalition government must be established.⁴² This provides the government with a control method, if it needs one, in any area. By colonizing an area with Han colonists the

⁴¹Policy Towards Nationalities of the People's Republic of China (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1953), p. 3.

⁴²Ibid. p. 3.

government may force the establishment of an amenable government at any level. There is some evidence that Han colonization is thus utilized in Sinkiang.

Chapter IV of the program deals with the autonomous rights to be enjoyed in each area. Each region may adopt the language or languages most commonly used in the area for official purposes. Subject to the unified financial control of the state, each area has some financial freedom. However, the economy is to be freely developed "in accordance with the state unified plan". Culture, education and arts of the region may be developed by the region, but I shall discuss this more in separate chapters. Article 22 of this chapter grants a right to organize local security forces under the unified state military system. This is an important right, particularly among the people of Sinkiang.⁴³ One will remember that a Nationalist concession to the Ili Republic contained a similar clause. Self arming has a long tradition in Sinkiang. This right was granted at the opening of the Communist period.

Throughout the program the duties of the minorities are stated. As article 9 of the constitution states, all nationalities within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China have equal rights and duties. The duties are those of mutual respect of language, culture and religion. They are also, as article 17 of the program states "to take the necessary steps to train cadres from the minorities who have a highly developed sense of patriotism and close contact with the minority of their region".⁴⁴ The final article of the program, article 40 plainly states that "the

⁴³Ibid. p. 6.

⁴⁴Ibid. p. 6.

right of interpretation and amendment of this General Program rests with the People's Government".⁴⁵ This is comparable to the right of the United States Supreme Court to final interpretation of American law.

The government of China considers "the basic policy adopted in China to solve the nationalities question is regional autonomy on the basis of national equality within the great, united family of our motherland."⁴⁶ The first autonomous region was established in Inner Mongolia in 1947.⁴⁷ It was headed by Ulanfu, a mongol who joined the party in 1927.⁴⁸ That the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Area was established two years prior to the culmination of the revolution indicates that it was hoped that this would positively influence other minorities toward the Chinese Communists. The present government hopes to make propaganda value of the autonomous areas as is indicated by the continual announcements of their establishment. In 1950 the establishment of an autonomous area in Sikang was announced as the Tibetan Autonomous Region. The government of the region included seven abbots, nine local chiefs, an industrialist, a member of the Tibetan gentry, a Hui, a Yi, and a Uighur.⁴⁹ On paper the minorities seem to be handling their own affairs. The Chairman, Tien Pao, had joined the Red army in 1935, and the Party in 1937. Although a Tibetan, his background closely tied him to the party.⁵⁰

⁴⁵Ibid. p. 13.

⁴⁶Sa Kung-liao, "The Great Success of China's Policy for Nationalities," Peking Review, V (Sept. 28, 1962), p. 9.

⁴⁷Wang, China, Land of, p. 10.

⁴⁸New York Times, Dec. 26, 1950, p. 10.

⁴⁹Ibid. p. 10.

⁵⁰Ibid. p. 10.

1953 brought autonomy for the Hui, Sala, Uighur and Tibetans of Kansu. In Yunan, the Tais and the Chingpo gained autonomy. By 1954 some seventy areas of county size or above were established.⁵¹ In 1955 the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, and 1958 the Ninghsia-Hui joined Inner Mongolia and Kwangsi-Chuang as the four autonomous regions of province size. Tibet had a preparatory committee for autonomy at the same time.⁵² The smallest group to gain autonomy are the Olunchun, whose numbers were 2,200 in the 1953 census.⁵³

Foreigners do get into the autonomous regions, even into Sinkiang. In 1956, Basil Davidson, an English journalist traveled through Sinkiang. To illustrate government at the town council level, he interviewed Niadze Mehmet, chairman of the town council of Turfan, which is an oasis at the east end of the Tien Shan.

We have 70,000 people in Turfan, and they elect an assembly. They are divided into ninety cantons, and each of these elects one representative, so there is a representative in the assembly for every 800 people. Now this assembly meets three times a year, perhaps for five days, or seven days at a time, but every two years it elects a governing committee of thirteen. All these men of the governing committee are paid except two, the one who is the chairman of the agricultural supply and marketing co-operative, and the one who speaks for the Kazaks who keep their herds in the Tien Shan near by and share our government.⁵⁴

Professor Herold Wiens compiled a map of 42 of the minority areas, using CIA records as of 1953.⁵⁵ It excludes Sinkiang, and is by now out

⁵¹Wang, China, Land of, p. 24.

⁵²C. Sarker, "China's Policy Towards Minorities," The World Today, XV (Oct. 1959), p. 411.

⁵³Wang, China, Land of, p. 26.

⁵⁴B. Davidson, Turkestan Alive (London: Jonathan Cape, 1957), p. 101.

⁵⁵Letter from H. J. Wiens, Professor of Geography, dated July 22, 1966.

of date, but it indicates positions of some autonomous areas, and at least hints at the wide-spread areas inhabited by minority people in China. His map, and accompanying key are found in Appendix II.

China's critics abuse the system of autonomous areas as really illusory, since the central government can completely nullify any act of the local governments because the organs of area government are subordinate to the co-ordinating direction of the People's Congress.⁵⁶ It must also be pointed out that the Communist Party is a tightly controlled hierarchy whose major decisions are made at the top, and implemented by subordinate layers of officialdom. Since local officials are generally party members, the Communist Party exercises a real force in all local governments, whether in purely Chinese affairs, or in the affairs of the minorities. Counter arguments point out that the minorities have a real influence at the local level, that the organs of self government at the autonomous area level are made up mainly of minority people.⁵⁷ Critics rebut that the chairmen are "tame" puppets, and that the often present Han vice-chairman is the real power in the area.⁵⁸ In the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, Uighurs are about 68% of the total population, and Han about 17%. Yet Han are only 12% of the regional congress, and 2 out of 6 vice-chairmen are Han. This 33% of vice-chairman position is claimed by the central government to give the Han equal rights.⁵⁹ If the minorities do not have autonomy in the sense of freedom from China, they seem at least to have some representation.

⁵⁶D. Lu, Moslems in China Today (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1964), p. 21.

⁵⁷Wang, China, Land of, p. 27.

⁵⁸Mao Hao, jan, The Imam's Story (Hong Kong: Green Pagoda Press, Ltd. 1960), p. 62.

⁵⁹Sa Kung-liao, "The Great Success", p. 9.

c. Power at the National Level

There claimed to have been more than a hundred Moslem delegates in the National Assembly of 1946.⁶⁰ However, this doesn't include representatives of non-Moslem minorities. The Communists claim that the minorities have absolute political equality which allows them an economic and cultural development tantamount to real equality at a national level.⁶¹ The minorities took part in the National Committee meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference that promulgated the 1954 constitution.⁶²

The electoral law of the People's Republic sets aside 150 seats in the National People's Congress specifically for minorities.⁶³ Their actual number can exceed this. The Congress originally seated over 1200 members.⁶⁴ Although the minority population of China is about 7%, they were 12% of the 1954 congress,⁶⁵ In the 1962 congress minorities were 14.6%,⁶⁶ In the 1965 congress they were 12.27% of 3,040 members.⁶⁷

A few members of the minorities have high national status. Saifuddin, a Sinkiang Uighur, is a vice-chairman of the standing committee of

⁶⁰I. Shung, "Moslems in China," Free China Review, X (April, 1960), p. 15.

⁶¹Wang, China, Land of, p. 29.

⁶²Ibid. p. 12.

⁶³Ghosh, Embers, p. 107.

⁶⁴B. Kahin (ed.), Major Governments of Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 70.

⁶⁵Wang, China, Land of, p. 12.

⁶⁶Sa Kung-liao, "The Great Success" p. 9.

⁶⁷A. Strong, "China's National Congress Meets," Letters From China, XXVI (Jan. 25, 1965), p. 103-104.

the National Congress. Ulanfu, a mongol, is a vice-premier of the state council, and the head of the Commission for Nationalities Affairs.⁶⁸ A chart of the governmental hierarchy is Appendix III.

⁶⁸ Wang Min, "New China's Electoral Policy," Peking Review, VIII (Jan. 8, 1965), p. 18.

IV

CONTROL INFRASTRUCTURE

The autonomous area is an appeal to the historical trend of thought among the minorities for self government. The process of sinicization, also an historical trend, is also still in evidence. As communications allow more throughgoing controls, the process becomes more complete. The control infrastructure permeates the fabric of all Chinese society, as well as the minority areas. It is represented by Party, cadre, colonization, economic and army.

a. Party

In the Chinese Communist Party, direction comes from the top. The theory of democratic centralism developed in Russia to insure Party unity has been modified in China. Instead of "unity-criticism-unity", the Chinese have Stalin like, developed a system dependent on the figure of a main leader.⁶⁹ Insofar as the minorities are concerned, even those in the Party are expected to wholeheartedly carry out top level decisions, which, since minority men are not evident in top Party echelons, must be made by Chinese.

The Party controls China by the "mass line", and "interlocking leadership". The "mass line" is penetration into associations and organizations of the minorities like the China Islamic Federation and organizing its activities. By controlling these minority mass organizations, the

⁶⁹J. Lewis. Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1963), p. 29.

Party is able to extend direct leadership over ostensibly non-Communist activities, and to mobilize them to its own ends.⁷⁰

In Government, the Party and not the governmental hierarchy is the basis of political power. The CPC, by leading the revolution became the directing party of the state organs. It can:

- a) Issue specific directives to the state as to the nature and orientation of its work
- b) Select and promote loyal and competent Party members to work in the organs of the state.⁷¹

Interlocking leadership by which major party figures hold top governmental offices is evident among the minorities. The men chosen have amply demonstrated their adherence to the Central Government. Tien Pao, a Tibetan Communist who is the Chairman of the Sikang Tibetan Autonomous Region joined the Party in 1937 during the difficult years. Ulanfu, a Mongol Party member since 1927 is Vice Premier of the State Council, a Politburo member and Chairman of the Commission for Nationalities Affairs.⁷²

Thus does the Party control the minorities through their members in the Party. The only published figures on minorities in the Party come from Lewis' Leadership in Communist China. He has figures for only three provinces, but they indicate the potential numbers of minority cadres.⁷³

Table II

Provincial Population	Province	Total Party Members	Minority
9,200,000	Inner Mongolia	255,000	39,714
19,390,000	Kwangsi	257,000	97,000
5,640,000	Sinkiang	130,000	62,000

⁷⁰ P. Tang. Communist China Today (New York: Praeger, 1957), p.158.

⁷¹ Lewis, Leadership in China Today, p. 170.

⁷² New York Times, Dec. 27, 1953, p. 13.

⁷³ Lewis, Leadership in China Today, p. 114-115.

It may also be noted that in some minority areas, the Party may pick a popular non-Communist as Chairman of the area. In such instances the Vice Chairman is often a Han, and always a Party member.⁷⁴

b. Cadres

Cadres are an important control feature, in Russia and in China. Cadres work directly for the Party insuring orthodoxy among the masses. They are an intelligence system. They often fix taxes and quotas and allot shares.⁷⁵ "Without a large number of Communist cadres from the National Minorities it is impossible to thoroughly solve the nationalities question and to utterly isolate the national reactionaries".⁷⁶ Cadres are often trained at the Central Academy of the Nationalities in languages, technology and political ideology.⁷⁷ The nationalities cadres are promising young people from among the minorities. Chou En-lai stressed the importance of minority cadres thus in 1951: "Everywhere we should continue to carry out extensively the policy of training cadres from among the national minorities, strengthen the political and ideological education, and acquaint them with the policies of our government so that they can competently deal with their day to day tasks and give proper leadership."⁷⁸

⁷⁴Kao, The Imam's Story, p. 96.

⁷⁵Union Research Institute, Communism in China (Hong Kong: Union Printing Co., 1959), p. 46.

⁷⁶"Cultural Revolution of China's National Minorities," Peking Review, VII (Nov. 20, 1964), p. 37.

⁷⁷Hu Chang-tu, China (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1960), p. 88.

⁷⁸Policy Towards Nationalities, p. 24.

At the outset of the Chinese People's Republic, the Chinese had to use Han cadres with the minorities. Great emphasis was put on their education to make them acceptable to the minority peoples, for their role, particularly in the early stages when the new government was as yet unconsolidated, was largely persuasive. Chou's speech emphasized that the Han cadres should respect the equality of the minorities, and their opinions toward the eradication of the concept of "Great Han Chauvinism". The minorities would then reciprocate and abstain from "narrow nationalism" and follow the example of the Han cadres and more advanced nationalities.

There was evidence that use of Han cadres caused friction, a reason to use minority cadres as soon as they could be trained. Vice-chairman Liu Shao-chi commented in 1954 that some Han cadres, "influenced by the reactionary ruling class of the past", were disrespectful of minority customs, languages, religions and political aspirations.

Some evidence of minority resentment towards the cadre concept appeared. Moslem Imams felt that cadres were doing "penetration work" and interfering with the administration of the Mosques.⁷⁹ The cadres do interfere with the old ways. The conservative Imams could be expected to dislike them. The cadres are committed to social reform, even though through "peaceful consultation". The Party seems to tolerate only limited foot-dragging. In Sinkiang, the Urumchi Daily noted that "the central emphasis on socialist education means that large numbers of resolute cadres must be sent to the countryside to help the basic development of party organizations. Maximum use must be made of the method of tightening the grip on key work in order to further work of a general nature."⁸⁰

⁷⁹Kao, The Imam's Story, p. 72.

⁸⁰Ghosh, Embers in Cathay, p. 162.

c. Colonization

Since 1955, the People's Republic has organized colonization of its less populous areas from the crowded eastern China provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Shanghai, and coastal provinces to the south.⁸¹ Colonization serves three functions. It relieves pressure on the crowded areas, it aids in political control of the colonized areas, and provides a work force to develop resources in sparsely populated areas. The last two functions are particularly evident in border areas like Sinkiang whose proximity to Russia and nuclear development warrants special attention.

The Chinese expansion into new areas has long antecedents. The Chinese have long felt that their cultural superiority over the minorities gave them a kind of noblesse oblige. Tribes that accepted Han culture found themselves assimilated easily into the Chinese social structure. The lack of feelings of biological superiority has led to considerable intermarriage between Han colonizers and the colonized peoples. From the early days of the Tun-Tien system, colonization has allowed the Chinese to dilute and sinicize, and to control the minority populations. It is so today.

It is possible, as the percentage of Han settlers grows in an area, to have them represented at all levels of government. As their numbers grow, their representation may increase. According to article 5 of the General Program for Minorities, democratic coalition governments may be formed when a large number of Han people are in an area. This type of government puts Chinese into positions of local authority. The Government Administrative Council of the Central People's Government on

⁸¹H. Hinton, "Colonization as an Instrument of Chinese Communist Policy," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXIII (Oct. 24, 1957), p. 518.

February 22, 1952, promulgated the following:

"In accordance with the basic spirit of the policy towards nationalities, as laid down in the Common Program of the Chinese People's government, democratic-coalition governments of nationalities may be established in the following areas.

(4) A locality within a National Autonomous Area where the Han inhabitants are exceptionally numerous."⁸²

The Chinese people are often unwilling to leave a familiar environment for a frontier life, and still look to the Chinese culture, rather than the culture of their new homes. By remaining ethnically closer to the central government than to the minority surrounding them, they form a wedge of control in their new area. As they penetrate, by intermarriage and other personal relationships, they are a powerful sinicizing influence. This type of assimilation must be effective. Further, the frontier with Russia has been a source of disagreement since the Russians first pushed into Turkestan. More particularly, Turkestan has recently attracted Russia by its mineral deposits. China's moves to dilute the native population with Han people to control Kazak people of dubious alliance can be partially interpreted as a move to solidify the area against Russian penetration.⁸³

Great numbers of people have been transferred from the overpopulated areas to the meagerly populated frontiers. In 1960 the New York Times noted that 10,000 people were moved from the Hunan Yangtze-Kiang area to Yunan as collective farm labor.⁸⁴ Sinkiang, Kansu, Inner Mongolia, Chinghai, and Tibet, all large minority areas with sparse populations, and a history of unrest were also major target areas. In December of 1958 Peking announced that 2,380,000 people had migrated into the Northwest and that by 1959 another 100,000 settlers had moved into Sinkiang.⁸⁵

⁸³A. Whiting and Sheng Shih-tsai, Sinkiang, Pawn or Pivot? (East Lansing: Michigan U. Press, 1956), p. 79.

⁸⁴New York Times, Jan. 24, 1960, p. 30.

⁸⁵Ghosh, Embers in Cathay, p. 218.

Under the Tun-tien system, practiced into the KMT period, colonization quite often implied expropriation of arable land. Most colonization efforts heavily stress land reclamation projects. Han settlers are often also industrial workers with some skill, and are taken into developing industries. Their coming into the areas, claims the government, is absolutely essential for the economic advance that new China demands.⁸⁶ Economic development is partially the reason for social change in the minority regions, from the settlement of nomadic peoples to the expropriation of land from the mosques and monasteries. The minorities simply did not have the educational requirements needed for economic development. The tradition of importing a literate Han bureaucracy existed with the Tun-tien system. That economic considerations are involved in colonization is shown by some of the areas colonized. In Mongolia, the Paotow steel producing area has been largely built by imported labor, as have the Lanchow steel developments. The labor for Sinkiang's Manass river agricultural colonization and Karamai oil field development has come from southern China, as has the labor for Manchuria's Heilunkiang "Black Soil" agricultural development.⁸⁷

The people who colonize have been sociologically heterogeneous. Excess population from the cities has been joined by students of middle schools and colleges who are in a kind of Chinese "work-study" program, and even people accused of "rightist tendencies" sent to work off their punishments. A large proportion of the labor has come from the "armies of production". This group originated in the Tun-tien. They are soldiers

⁸⁶ Davidson, Turkestan Alive, p. 234.

⁸⁷ Hinton, Colonization as an, p. 517.

who were in the areas at liberation. They were a transition group who were demobilized by 1955 and remained on the land they had cleared, but began to receive the wages of civilian workers. They had reclaimed about 6,000,000 acres of Sinkiang by 1955.⁸⁸ This military group did much of the communications development, such as the road building and track laying, and has been a major factor in the large scale irrigation work carried out in Sinkiang. Water engineering has freed another 700,000 watered areas to attract the minority farmers into communes.⁸⁹ For the most part, the minorities have not been forced into communes, but considerable subtle pressure has built up both through socialized marketing techniques, and offers to communes of water, tools and various methods of agricultural improvement. Great amounts of land are being reclaimed, and some minority people are being settled thereon. In 1962, the Peking Review claimed some 11,000 acres of reclaimed land in Sinkiang on which minority people were growing grain, cotton, oil bearing crops and sugar beets.

Chou En-lai said this of colonization in 1960:

"All the large areas and rich materials are in the nationality areas; the Han people have only the densely populated areas. Future expansion of industry and trade will take place in these areas. From the national point of view, amalgamation benefits both sides. We must set some example so that the minority nationalities may feel that the Han people are willing to co-operate with them."⁹⁰

d. Economics

Communist China works with singleness of purpose to achieve more state power. One facet of her economic policy is a kind of mercantilism that very heavily stresses self sufficiency. Laboring under the stigma of industrial backwardness, she bends all efforts to overtake nations more

⁹⁰ Khan, Islam in China, p. 130.

advanced than herself. The industrial equality she hopes to achieve will, at least in her own eyes, make her a world power of the first order. To assure movement toward her stated end, China follows two lines of economic action; a comprehensive system of economic planning, and a system of controls over virtually all the economic activities of the country.⁹¹

As workers, the minorities have a role to play in the state plan. Most of them perform as farmers. Some utilization has been made of traditional minority economic pursuits, the nomads are generally involved in stock production, and agriculturists still work with the soil. The way in which they produce, what they produce, and the marketing of it are substantially changed.

The economic period from 1954-57 is based upon the 1954 Constitution, and its attendant Economic Program. Collectivization and elimination of rich peasants were to be carried out. The first Five Year Plan was to be implemented to rapidly industrialize.⁹² The minorities felt this plan somewhat later, inasmuch as consolidation was still not really finished in their areas. With the second Five Year Plan, the minorities found they must comply.

The Plans designate each area's products. Most of the minority areas are involved in food production to support areas where industrialization can be most efficiently carried out. However, in areas like Sinkiang, where natural resources abound, considerable use is made of them. Basically, with the broad sweep of control attempted by the government to insure that its long term gains are carried out, the minority areas are integrated into

⁹¹Tang, Communist China Today, p. 251.

⁹²Yu Yuan-li, The Economy of Communist China (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 12.

the overall Chinese economic system as never before. This has of course resulted in closer surveillance by the central government, and attendant friction with traditionalism among the minorities.

Of course, Communist China relies on ownership of the means of production. Rationalization for this may be taken from Marx's tenet that ownership of the means of production is the key to control of social, political, legal, and intellectual spheres of society. This concept is a convenient rationalization for the seizure and maintenance of economic power by the state "in the name of the people".

More than outright state ownership is afforded the Central Government. Budgetary, financial, and monetary controls are available to the state. Peking uses rigid fiscal and budgetary procedures, nationalized banking and credit, currency and exchange control, and control of domestic and foreign commerce.⁹³ Thus are powerful controls available to the regime for the control of the economic lives of the minorities.

Vast improvements have been made in the minority areas communications system. Camel caravans of the northern frontier have been replaced by strings of trucks. The Sinkiang Lanchow rail line is connected with the heart of China. The improvement of transportation facilities and communications is a major part of the Five Year Plans because it facilitates trade, and also control. According to the government, continued expansion of communications systems such as road, rail and water transport has considerably lowered freight charges, and consequently the prices for goods imported into the minority areas and exported from them with benefit for all.⁹⁴

⁹³ Tang, Communist China Today, p. 254.

⁹⁴ Wang, China, Land of, p. 43.

Agriculture is the main occupation of the majority of China's minorities. The Koreans, Chuang, Malay, Tai and Puyi are rice cultivators. The Mongolians, Tibetans, and Yi mix agriculture and stock raising, and the Kazak, Kirghiz, Tadjik and Yuku are stock men. Direct assistance to minority agriculture comes in the form of land reclamation, construction and repair of irrigation works, technical advice, and capital for emergencies and for new investment.

Land reform has occurred in all groups, from the Yi of Yunnan to the Uighur of Sinkiang. People originally landless often went directly into stage one co-operatives, but they also went through the mutual aid system.⁹⁵ The commune system, both in agriculture and animal husbandry, was introduced into all areas. By 1956 the Kwangsi-Chuang Autonomous Province had 65% of its peasant households in largely voluntary co-operative forms.⁹⁶

In Sinkiang, land reclamation was emphasized. In January of 1966 China Reconstructs noted a plan to add 1,800,000 hectares of new land.⁹⁷ Light industry in the form of 50 new small factories largely manufacturing farm equipment and a tractor repair station emphasized the role of agriculture in Sinkiang. People's Banks to grant loans for agriculture, stock raising, and local handicraft, as well as trade school training for the minorities in stock production and farming techniques all bore witness to this emphasis.⁹⁸ Further, the government has, in settling the nomads, encouraged veterinary medicine, feed raising and large scale herders

⁹⁵ Davidson, Turkestan Alive, p. 168.

⁹⁶ Wang, China, Land of, p. 30.

⁹⁷ A. Husayin, "The New Sinkiang," China Reconstructs, XV (Jan. 1966), p. 30.

⁹⁸ Wang, China, Land of, p. 35.

co-operatives. In the stabilizing process, the Chinese have attempted to halt land feuds.

Economic growth emphasized by the central government has resulted in increased production in the minority areas. Cotton, food grain production, livestock all increased. As higher, more intricate forms of rural organization appeared, it became evident that the educational level of the minorities was insufficient to support logistical needs. Though many members of the minorities were being trained in the various primary schools and institutes, it was often necessary to use Han people as bookkeepers and clerks. This was a problem, for the minorities desired records in their own languages. The Han generally could only write Chinese. In some instance the minority had no written language and if they had one, it often was not sophisticated enough to cope with new terminology. A case in point was the Yi of Yunnan, whose written language was only a memory aid for religious purposes. To the discontent of the minorities, their records were often in the Chinese language, which they did not understand.⁹⁹

Aside from agriculture, some minority people were small traders before the revolution, particularly among the Moslems. They handled the local handicrafts, and animal products such as skins and furs which they traded for manufactured goods from the Chinese. After the revolution, small traders could no longer compete against the large state trade organizations. In most cases, if they did not give up and go into some other work, the small traders were co-operativized and amalgamated into the state trading organizations.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ H. Schwarz, "Communist Language Policies for China's Ethnic Minorities," China Quarterly, XII (Oct.-Dec. 1962), p. 168.

¹⁰⁰ Hu, China, p. 91.

The state trading agencies bought and sold goods, and set up small processing agencies. According to the government, they elicited a fair price policy that encouraged more production. In fact, with lowered transportation costs, the government claimed to be able to stimulate supply by paying higher prices for native goods, and lowering the price of manufactured goods.¹⁰¹ Profit incentive was used among the minorities. Critics of the system claim that the state agencies made wide scale forced purchases at low prices.¹⁰² This seems to have been true only when famine threatened the interior.

The traders of Kashgar seemed all to have entered the co-operative movement by the time of Basil Davidson's trip in 1957. Davidson described an interview with one of them.

"He said that his capital had been valued by himself, but checked by his neighbors. He made it over to the state at a low annual interest. (5%) His monthly income was 100 yuan. At this time a fat sheep cost 20 yuan, a good horse 150."¹⁰³

New economic developments in the minority areas presently point to the growth of industry. Sinkiang in particular illustrates this trend with steel works, textile mills, and petroleum development at Karami. So do the steel works in Paotow in Inner Mongolia and Lanchow in Kansu. The minority peoples are being trained to work in these industries.¹⁰⁴ In the future this will mean considerable change in the lives of the peoples affected. They will be moving from traditional agricultural to industrial jobs, with the attendant need for social change. Each area's industrial

¹⁰¹Wang, China, Land of, p. 40.

¹⁰²Kao, The Imam's Story, p. 63.

¹⁰³Davidson, Turkestan Alive, p. 144.

¹⁰⁴Husayin, "The New Sinkiang," p. 29.

potential is a key to the probable extent of the change; when an area is industrialized it will be considerably urbanized. The minorities will to some extent become an urban proletariat.

e. People's Liberation Army

The PLA has the functions of maintaining internal as well as external security. As such, it has led in pacification of minorities during the early stages of consolidation of Communist China. It was particularly active in Sinkiang and the other border areas where local peoples had some tradition of military independence. This led to a solution to the problem of their support very reminiscent of the Ming Tun tien.

The large numbers of troops in Sinkiang began to take over much of the construction efforts that supported colonization. These "armies of production" described in the section of this chapter dealing with colonization, are often to be found in areas of potential trouble.

"So extensive is this activity that in some respects China might be termed a garrison state, rather than a police state."¹⁰⁵ The presence of almost one hundred thousand troops in Sinkiang - who are there ostensibly to open up virgin lands, to fell timber, and to build a variety of structures is a daily reminder to potential anti-Chinese dissidents of the omnipresence of Peking.

A second function of the PLA stems from its ability to conscript. In 1955 the National People's Congress Standing Committee adopted a conscription law for the entire country.¹⁰⁶ This allowed the drafting of

¹⁰⁵Ward and Macridis (ed.), Modern Political Systems: Asia (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 218.

¹⁰⁶Tang. Communist China Today, p. 344.

large numbers of military age men from the minority areas. This act removed potential troublemakers from their home areas. Although some areas have retained militia units made up of native troops, the militias are fully integrated into the overall control structure of the People's Liberation Army, and controlled thereby.

V

SINICIZATION

Ulanfu, head of the Commission for Nationalities stated: "We Communists hold that nationalities run their own course of genesis, development, decline and death." When they speak Chinese, and their religions fail, they will be indistinguishable from the Han people. There is a trend towards this. It is at once a conscious and an unconscious policy of the Chinese Communists. The People's Republic is interested in a unified socialist society. It is expedient in this process that all the nationalities communicate, and the natural language for this is some universalized form of Chinese. When the nationalities, including the Han are communalized, they all will have lost major portions of their old cultures. Some more than others, perhaps, but all will have changed. Communism will melt with China's ancient social heritage and the minorities will be amalgamated to form a step into the evolution of "New China".

The Chinese are historically culture conscious. It is important to them to be able to say that they are allowing the minorities to maintain their culture. This is absurd. One cannot really introduce modern socialistic practices into cultures that have been based on traditional agriculture, which according to Chinese Communism is the foundation of the society, and not expect a complete social change. The basic societal beliefs, and economic foundations were pressed towards destruction with the coming of the New China. In the same way that American colonists

shattered the societies and culture of the indigenous Indians by stopping ritual warfare and buffalo hunting, sending in missionaries and farm equipment, and destroying their economy, the Chinese Communists have stopped the feuding, subverting the traditional means of economic support, and by sending cadres and technical equipment, caused at least the beginnings of the transformation of the minority societies.

Possibly anticipating the disappearance of their minorities the Chinese have built the Cultural Palace of the National Minorities in Peking. Described as a thirteen story building with cream walls and a blue tile decorated roof which "reminds one of some white stork stretching its wings before soaring into the air",¹⁰⁷ From Photographs, it actually looks like a functional WPA building with oriental decoration. Much of this building is a kind of museum which likes to depict a before and after sequence. Before the coming of the Chinese Communists the culture of the Yi people of Yunnan was built on slavery and we see the materials used in keeping slaves in hand displayed in the museum next to pictures of smiling freed slaves.

The superiority of the new Han culture and the stress on the better life brought by the Chinese Communists is emphasized to the minorities. To assuage minority resentment at the Chinese way of the life they are expected to accept, the Party has tried to show good will by eradicating the old derogatory place names given by earlier Chinese regimes.¹⁰⁸ Names like Lolo, which was a term for the Yi people, and contained the character for

¹⁰⁷ Hsieh Ping-hsin, "Cultural Palace of the Nationalities," Chinese Literature, XI (Nov. 1959), p. 141.

¹⁰⁸ Hu, China, p. 92.

dog, have been dropped in favor of Yi.¹⁰⁹

A Peking Review article of November 20, 1964 makes a revealing appraisal of the situation.

"The old culture and arts of the National Minorities contain fine elements, elements that are positive and healthy and reflect the love of the laboring people of the minorities for their motherland and labor; they also contain dross that reflects the ideologies of the slave and serf owner, the landlords and the bourgeoisie. The party demands that all cultural and artistic activities in the minority areas including spare time and cultural activities have a revolutionary ideological content."¹¹⁰

Many of the social customs are changing. Older people often oppose this, but their opposition is usually swept away. The social position of women, which has taken great strides in China is even evident among the Moslem minorities in Sinkiang. Moslem women are going to the adult schools, and learning to read. The younger people in cities like Urumchi can be found at "social dances".¹¹¹

In some instances, there are efforts to revive some of the local art forms and literature, dance, theatre, music and pictorial art. Generally, art forms suffer much from modification to conform to Mao Tse tung's thinking.¹¹² Old heroic tales that are built on blood and thunder, and romantic love tales rarely mention the glories of Communism. What is done is an attempt to adopt the modes of those old art forms to carry the new ideological message.

¹⁰⁹ A. Winington, The Slaves of the Cool Mountains (London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1959), p. 37.

¹¹⁰ "Cultural Revolution of China's National Minorities," Peking Review, VII (Nov. 20, 1964), p. 9.

¹¹¹ Davidson, Turkestan Alive, p. 198.

¹¹² Gjessing, "Chinese Anthropology" p. 46.

In October, 1962, Ku Feng wrote in Nationalities Unity that the basic features of policy in relation to the nationality question should; "continue to complete the socialist transformation of economy within the various nationalities, continue to deepen the socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts, consolidate further the people's democratic dictatorship and streamline the regional autonomy of the minority nationalities, and arouse fully the enthusiasm of the people of all nationalities to build socialism together and fully develop the socialist traditions which are part of the minority cultures."¹¹³

The statement belabors the word socialism and emphasizes singleness of concept. It opposes the unique qualities that separate the minorities from the Han people.

a. Language Reform

The government of New China shows considerable interest in language reform, generally aiming at simplification of the language. The end in mind is a literate population, and a simpler language would be conducive to that end. A major benefit to a largely literate country is more complete communications.

The government perceives a need for communication among the minorities. Very little literacy existed among them in 1949. In fact, some groups had no written language to express their spoken language. The government developed a language program to meet this obvious problem. Three tasks of the program were:

- a) The creation and reform of written languages
- b) Scientific research in the spoken languages
- c) Training of language cadres.¹¹⁴

¹¹³Nationalities Unity, Oct. 1962 cited by David Lu, Moslems in China Today (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1964), pp. 49-50.

¹¹⁴Schwarz, "Communist Language Policies," p. 170.

Teams of people with various degrees of training carried out language research. Some of the work was done by trained sociologists.

Their overall studies of the minorities stressed three points:

- a) Observation of the growth of the new culture promoted by the Party and government, of its reception by the masses, and of its appropriateness to their needs.
- b) Assessment of the old culture and language as a tool, as an expression of the peculiar nature of the minority, and as a possible vehicle for expressing the new ideology.
- c) Survey of the various cultures to infer a law for cultural change for the better interpretation of new policies.¹¹⁵

From those first surveys written languages began to be developed for many of the minorities. Teachers from the minority people were trained in writing them and returned to their respective areas to teach basic literacy skills. In November of 1950, the Central Institute for Nationalities began to train such language cadres.¹¹⁶

In accordance with article three of the Constitution; "All nationalities have freedom to use and foster the growth of their spoken and written languages". Hence, the schools used the new written languages for instruction for at least the first three grades. The government points with pride to the contrast between the present and previous periods when the education of most minorities was in the Han language.¹¹⁷ Some early gains were illustrated by the improvement in the scripts for the Tai and Yi people. The old Yi script was improved to meet modern needs.¹¹⁸ New scripts were developed for the Miao, the Chuang and the Puyi, who had no

¹¹⁵Sarker, "China's Policy Toward Minorities," p. 410.

¹¹⁶Wang, China, Land of, p. 53.

¹¹⁷Ibid. p. 61.

¹¹⁸Winnington, Slaves of the Cool Mountains, p. 51.

writing at all.¹¹⁹ These were early efforts to "promote culture and education in minority areas and raise the socialist consciousness and patriotism of the people", according to Ma Hsueh-liang, a language worker.¹²⁰

A great avalanche of material was aimed at the minority areas. Mongolia and Sinkiang had considerable radio broadcasting in the local languages by 1955. For minorities with written languages, a special publication center was set up in Peking. The works of Mao Tse-tung and other political material made up the bulk of the work. Books on sciences and technology and to a limited extent, literary works were also printed.¹²¹ By 1956 the central government claimed that the task of creating and reforming languages had been universally carried out.¹²² By 1962 the Yunan Nationality Press claimed a million books published, and two presses in Sinkiang published 40,000,000 books in 5 languages under 4,000 titles.¹²³

What began as an attempt to raise literacy underwent changes as the central government revised its goals. The Rectification of 1958 opposed a strenuous demand for more autonomy on the part of minorities who, as a result of the 1957 "Hundred Flowers" campaign, expected a real freedom in the Chinese minority policy. Language reform became modified. The Commission on Nationalities Affairs announced in April of 1958 the feasibility of language alliance, a term for a group's adopting a written

¹¹⁹ Wang, China, Land of, p. 48.

¹²⁰ Schwarz, "Communist Language Policies," p. 123.

¹²¹ Wang, China, Land of, p. 47.

¹²² Schwarz, "Communist Language Policies," p. 172.

¹²³ Fend Wen, "Peiping's Policy Towards China's Ethnic Minorities," Analysis of Current Chinese Problems (Sept. 1964), p. 9.

language developed for another people of similar spoken language.¹²⁴

Unity, which always was a key word, now occurs anew in language pronouncements. This foreshadows the loss of some languages because written languages have not been developed for them. The correct choice of an alphabet and language syntax is not primarily related to the language to be represented, but to the promotion of cultural interflow and further strengthening the unity of the nationalities.¹²⁵

Along the Sino-Soviet frontier considerations of political unity were involved in the choice of a script for groups with language ties on both sides of the border. Originally, the Chinese attempted to introduce the same Cyrillic script to their Kazaks that the Russian Kazaks used. After 1958, and the strained relations between the Russians and the Chinese, the Chinese have been introducing to the Kazaks an alphabet based on latinized Chinese characters.¹²⁶

In 1959 the development of a separate written language for each minority was de-emphasized. If a group knew Chinese, it was "free to adopt Chinese". Minorities were admonished to "grasp the tendency for their spoken and written languages to draw closer to the Chinese Language."¹²⁷ Plans to preserve the purity of their languages were "reactionary" and smacked of "narrow nationalism". The Uighur and Kazak scripts, both Turkish languages, had been based on the Arabic Alphabet. China Reconstructs noted in 1962 that the Arabic alphabet had distinct signs only for consonants. Since vowels played an important part in Uighur and Kazak, said the article,

¹²⁴ Schwarz, "Communist Language Policies," p. 174.

¹²⁵ Ma Hsueh-liang, "New Scripts for China's Minorities," China Reconstructs, XI (Aug. 1962), p. 26.

¹²⁶ Ghosh, Embers in Cathay, p. 166.

¹²⁷ Schwarz, "Communist Language Policies ...," p. 175.

the old scripts could not fully reflect their special characteristics.¹²⁸
By using the Latin alphabet adopted to the Han language, the minority languages could gradually grow close to that of the main nationality, while at the same time expressing their special vowel characteristics.¹²⁹

Resistance to the Sinicization of the language has been strong in Sinkiang among the Moslems. An article in the Urumchi Daily in late 1959 noted that it was "natural that an increasing number of Han words will find their way into the languages of the minorities". One can see some words, particularly technical terms, seeping in. The eventual end is hinted by Siafudin's speech carried in the same Urumchi Daily:

"Therefore, it is reactionary to oppose that process of natural union on the pretext of opposing the assimilation of minority nationalities. Any opposition is in fact an attempt to wreck the unity of the various nationalities."¹³⁰

For the minorities, to begin to use Chinese is to begin to lose their distinctiveness. But with the exception of those who use Arabic, the minorities of China have neither a large body of written culture nor an extensive school system. Since the Chinese cannot provide advanced schooling in the minority languages, this deficiency, then, is a strong argument in favor of the minorities' learning Chinese. In fact, according to one author, the minorities have no instruction in their language past the third grade, or basic literacy.¹³¹ If an education is an aid to advancement in New China, then the minority people who wish to advance through

¹²⁸ Ma Hsueh-liang, "New Scripts", p. 26.

¹²⁹ Ibid. p. 26.

¹³⁰ Chosh, Embers in Cathay, p. 167.

¹³¹ Schwarz, "Communist Language Policies", p. 176.

education will learn Chinese. Through this, they will advance toward sinicization. The Chinese make no secret of the fact that Han, being the dominant language is the natural tongue for intercourse between the varied nationalities.¹³²

b. Education

Education has been a primary mode of Communist penetration into the minority areas. Where feudal leaders remain, education of other social classes has weakened their control, making the minorities dependent on the central government, and hence strengthening the control infrastructure by the central government.

Along with the creation of new scripts for the minorities came the establishment of numerous schools to teach the scripts, new and old. The effect of mass communication upon a people is greater as they become more literate. The People's Republic continually trumpets school construction. In 1957 alone, 23,890 schools were built in minority areas. There were 319,000 minority pupils in middle schools in 1958. Ten colleges and universities employed three hundred teachers from the minorities to teach people from their group. One hundred sixty of these were at Sinkiang University.¹³³ This upper division education, however, was carried out in the Chinese language.

The government attempted to give the majority of the population basic literacy. In Kashgar, Davidson saw even old married women in night school.¹³⁴ He cites figures that in 1949 Sinkiang had nine secondary schools

¹³²Ma Hsueh-liang, "New Scripts," p. 27.

¹³³Feng Wen, "Peiping's Policy Towards China's Ethnic Minorities," p. 8.

¹³⁴Davidson, Turkestan Alive, p. 196.

and 8,000 pupils. In 1956 there were 36,000 in sixty three secondary schools. There were four institutes of higher learning including a medical school at Urumchi which had about 3,500 students of whom most were non-Chinese.¹³⁵

As to what else is taught, and how it is taught, there is very scanty information. The 1958 reaction to the "Hundred Flowers" campaign caused a shift in educational emphasis away from the Russian model, at least in Sinkiang. The sovietized Kazak teachers were pressured to dispense with Russian ties. One such teacher, who escaped to Russia, wrote;

"In 1958 textbooks in which the names of Pushkin and Nebrasov Utemisov were mentioned were removed from all the Kazak schools. I was told to compile a new textbook for the Kazak school which would state that the Kazak people are also Chinese, that they had the same literature and culture and that, consequently, no distinction should be made between Kazak and Chinese territory. I refused, and remembered that the KMT had given me the same order."¹³⁶

This statement from Literaturnia Gazeta, printed in Russia, shows that the Chinese wish to bind the Kazaks more closely to China, for fear that an alliance between Chinese and Russian Kazaks might jeopardize the stability of the Sinkiang border.

By 1959 China had seven colleges in minority areas, and other schools and seminars to train cadres. They had trained some 480,000 minority cadres by 1959. By 1960 Sinkiang had 64,000 minority cadres.¹³⁷ This points up the major reason to give the minorities advanced schooling, namely; political control. The Central Institute for National Minorities

¹³⁵ ibid. p. 74.

¹³⁶ B. Tyshkanbayev, "This is Plain Chauvinism," Literaturnaya Gazeta as cited in "This is Plain Chauvinism," Atlas, VII (Jan. 1964), p. 45.

¹³⁷ Feng Wen, "Peiping's Policy Towards China's Ethnic Minorities," p. 9.

in Peking is largely dedicated to this task. The minority students have courses primarily in politics, and political science. The Han students attend classes on the minority languages.¹³⁸ Through these cadres the government educates the minorities politically. At this institute the minority cadres are trained to become administrators of the various autonomous areas.¹³⁹

The founding of the medical school at Urumchi illustrates one of the central government's major undertakings among the minorities. Visitors like Davidson confirm that Public Health facilities and medical training are vastly expanded since 1949. Much preventive medicine, maternity instruction and clinical treatment have been introduced into the autonomous areas, often in the face of superstitious resistance.¹⁴⁰ A considerable portion of those receiving training in Sinkiang's medical school do not achieve full status as doctors, but will be trained for sanitation, first-aid and mid-wifery, as well as limited pharmacology.

A Public Health institution among the minorities are the mobile health teams that perform operations and treat problems past the abilities of the local medical workers. By 1953 there were only 309 county hospitals in minority areas, and 38 hospitals for the minorities elsewhere.¹⁴¹ Medical workers of minority origin then numbered only about 3,000. Since then there are surely more. The Public Health program is the first the minorities have had. It is also a centralizing aid to the government: The

¹³⁸ Gjessing, "Chinese Anthropology," p. 58.

¹³⁹ Kao, The Imam's Story, p. 60.

¹⁴⁰ Hu, China, p. 94.

¹⁴¹ Wang, China, Land of, p. 33.

minorities become dependent on the Chinese for training and care. But even as it may lead in some way to the reduction of regional autonomy, the benefit of professional medical care is greater for the minorities than its drawback of creating a tendency to rely on the central government.

c. Religion

Religion and language separate the minorities from the Chinese mainstream more than other cultural features. Religion and language also separate the minorities from each other. In the eyes of the central government they are forces acting against the desired goal of unity. In the case of the Moslems, their religion gives them some degree of unity that is supranational and leads to feelings of kinship with people outside of China. In this sense, it is a force competing with the continually stressed drive towards national unity of China. On the other hand, in the case of Moslems and Buddhists, their co-religionists in countries with whom Peking desires good relations are sensitive to anti-religious policies within China. Therefore, it behooves China to maintain a balance between drive for unity and its need to maintain friendly relations with Communist Parties in Africa and the rest of Asia and the Near East.

To the Marxist religions are subjective phenomena arising out of man's sense of insecurity and destined to vanish when man masters and understands his environment in a Communist society. For religion to persist can mean that the society has not reached Communism. As Marxism is opposed to religions in general, religions in general oppose Marxism.

In light of the idea that religion will disappear as Communism grows, the government could quite safely allow religious freedom in China. In the early days that marked the promulgation of the Constitution and

the Common Program for the Nationalities, freedom of religion was therein guaranteed. Article 88 of the Constitution gives citizens of the People's Republic of China the enjoyment of the freedom of religious belief.¹⁴²

Article 5 of the Common Program grants freedom of thought, speech, public assembly, association, correspondence, domicile and religious belief.

Article 55 of the Common Program guarantees freedom to the minorities to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs.¹⁴³

In general, the government has tried to win over the religious by peaceful persuasion, by manipulation and propaganda. As they become frustrated by the slow process of religious decay, they do attack single religious leaders directly in "struggle meetings" where individual leaders are charged with fraud, with reactionary attitudes and narrow nationalism. The religious institutions were also vulnerable to economic restrictions, and direct accusations of charlatanism. Although religious activity is supposedly tolerated, it really plays no productive part in the growth of New China. As the power of religion wanes, the sense of separate community of its adherents decreases. In this way, a weakening of religion among the minorities hastens the process of sinicization.

As early as 1950, when the Decisions Concerning Differential of Class Status in the Countryside was promulgated by the Administrative Council of the People's Republic, the attitude towards religion was made clear:

"All those people who, for three years immediately prior to the liberation derived the main part of their income from such religious and superstitious professions as those of clergymen, priests, monks, Taoists, lay Taoists, geomancers, fortune tellers and diviners, are to be classified as religious or superstitious practitioners!"¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Ibid. p. 56.

¹⁴³ China Islamic Association (ed.) Moslems in China (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1953), p. 72.

¹⁴⁴ Yang I-fan, Buddhism in China (Hong Kong: The Union Press, 1956), p. 38.

A superstitious profession was defined as "those professions which employ deceitful means to lead people into superstition and thereby cheat them of their belongings".¹⁴⁵ Although the government's stance was anti-religious it was cautious in the beginning.

The 1958 "Rectification", which repudiated the "Hundred Flowers" campaign, brought more serious attacks on religion in the press. Religion's hold on the minorities seemed to have weakened somewhat, and its economic position was becoming very weak. Nonetheless as a characteristic of the feudal pre-Communist society religions were a reminder that the ideal state had not yet been achieved. The government instituted socialist education for the various sects and explained it thus:

"The socialist education imposed by the state on religious circles has as its object to help them to abandon their capitalist political stand and adopt the socialist political stand; they are not asked to abandon their religious belief. But if one does not abandon his bourgeois political stand, and even takes the feudal and bureaucratic stand, then he may utilize religious belief to conduct activities detrimental to the socialist cause. This becomes a political and not a religious problem. In such a case the CCP cannot stand aloof."¹⁴⁶

The pressure continued into 1962. Socialist education became atheist education. The Party and government claimed a responsibility to conduct atheist education among the people in order to "raise their scientific level and enable them to gradually abandon mistaken conceptions and cultivate a correct understanding".¹⁴⁷ Mounting pressure and the realization by the religious leaders that ultimately the Communists planned

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 39.

¹⁴⁶ "Atheist and Theist Can Co-operate Politically and Travel the Road to Socialism," Che Hsueh Yen Chin, Feb. 15, 1958 as quoted in D. Lu Moslems in China Today, p. 18.

¹⁴⁷ Lu, Moslems in China Today, p. 45.

their disappearance caused defensive retrenchments. Several among the Moslem and Buddhist leaders began to counsel non-participation among their followers. By 1963, the periodical, Nationalities Unity, stated:

"The State demands religions conform to the Constitution, be patriotic and law-abiding, support the People's Democratic Dictatorship under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and travel the road to socialism. So long as the religions do not run counter to the socialist cause, the government does not interfere."¹⁴⁸

The major organized religion among the minorities is Islam. Estimates of Moslems in China run as high as ten million. The Hui, Uighurs, Kazak, Kirghiz, Tadjik, Uzbek, Tungshiangs, Salas and Paoans are Moslem groups, which are concentrated in Sinkiang, Kansu, Chinghai, and Ninghsia.¹⁴⁹ The Hui, however, are spread all over China.

The Chinese are interested in maintaining relations with various Moslem groups. They therefore publish some material which purports to depict a general freedom for Islam in China.

Islam is an old feature of Chinese history. It waxed and waned in China as new groups were attracted to it, and repressions checked it. Its last big rise came under the Southern Sung Dynasty (1127-1279) which allowed an influence of Moslems along with an expanded overseas trade.¹⁵⁰ Counter to this, Moslems were repressed during the Manchu Dynasty, and the Dynasty saw large Moslem revolts. It was in hope of a new era that many Moslem leaders were attracted by the principles of Sun Yat-sen and his idea of ethnic equality, as symbolized in the five-barred flag of the

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 17.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 12.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 4.

Republic.¹⁵¹ During the Republic no real change was made in the position of the various Islamic groups. Moslem children, educated in the Mosques prior to 1912, began to enter Chinese schools if they spoke Chinese. The government made some concessions to Islamic tradition. Under the new educational system the majority of the books were furnished by the government and bore the seal of the Chinese Ministry of Education but Moslem families had the privilege of introducing some religious books and curricula into their schools.¹⁵² The Nationalists on Taiwan still cater to Moslem hopes. As late as 1960, a mosque was dedicated in Taipei that claimed donations from Iran, Iraq, Jordan and Turkey.¹⁵³ It was during the days of the KMT that the Koran was first translated into Chinese. It was translated in 1927, attesting to the loss of the old belief that a Koran in any language but Arabic was blasphemy.¹⁵⁴

The Chinese Communist policy towards Islam is determined by three factors.

- a) The view of religion as a sign of feudalism and a tool of imperialism.
- b) The overall end of minority control.
- c) The need to promote interests in Moslem countries.

Burhan is a Moslem leader who supports the Chinese Communists. His speech to the Islamic Association on his accession to the presidency in 1952 stresses the religious freedom China affords the Moslems. He said that the new regime allowed the celebration of three festivals, Id-el-Fitr, Corban and Molid Nabwi. He said the tax on cattle slaughtered for Moslem

¹⁵¹ China Islamic Association, Moslems in China, p. 15.

¹⁵² Khan, Islam in China, p. 34.

¹⁵³ China Islamic Association, Moslems in China, p. 22.

¹⁵⁴ Khan, Islam in China, p. 32.

consumption was abolished, and that all mosques were exempt from taxation. He claimed that the mosques, in accordance with the Agrarian Reform Law, could keep their land if the local populace so desired. He even mentioned that in 1952 the government organized a 14 man Hadj although the mission got no further than Pakistan.¹⁵⁵

Moslems who have left China argue that the China Islamic Association is a control organization. Although it does promote the study of Islam and publishes Moslem classics it also facilitates the general administration of Moslem religious activities by the central government. A critic quotes the Peking People's Daily of August 5, 1962: "The purpose of the China Islamic Association is to love the Fatherland and to assist the People's Government to implement its religious policy".¹⁵⁶ It is under the auspices of this group that such works as Mao Tse-tung's political treatises are translated into Arabic and into various of the Turkic languages. It also supervises the training of cadres to help in the administration of mosques.¹⁵⁷

Under the auspices of the central government the China Islamic Association circulates a Chinese language translation of the Koran. By means of introduction and footnote, the government tries to show that Islam supports some parts of the Communist ideology. The introduction claims that Islam encourages labor, and promotes production. It also notes that an object of Islam is to get rid of all differences and prejudices and to make the various races become one big family.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵China Islamic Association, Moslems in China, p. 52.

¹⁵⁶Lu, Moslems in China Today, p. 28.

¹⁵⁷Kao, The Imam's Story, p. 38.

¹⁵⁸Ghosh, Embers in Cathay, p. 118.

In line with the early conciliatory portion of its approach, the central government published in 1953 a volume entitled Moslems in China. It was an expensively bound volume in high gloss paper containing many color photographs. It was printed in three languages; in Chinese, Arabic and English. The photographs showed posed groups of smiling people quite often dressed in blue suits, but instead of the usual caps, most of the men wore the moslem skull cap. The text extolled the happy life of the Chinese Moslem Minorities.¹⁵⁹ Pilgrimages to Mecca were allowed, and religious festivals were celebrated in some of the major cities.¹⁶⁰ In 1962 a five man hadj reached Mecca, and a four man delegation attended a congress of Moslem scholars in Indonesia in 1963.¹⁶¹

Moslems who leave China, who obviously are inclined to be anti-Chinese, claim repression to exist that directly contradicts the Burhan speech. For instance they claim that Moslems are not allowed their ritual butchery of animals so that if Moslems eat meat, they must violate a religious principal. The case is more difficult in the case of Moslem cadres and army conscripts, who must eat communally.¹⁶² Moslems have been exhorted in the name of production not to fast during Ramadan, and forbidden the ritual slaughter of animals at the end of Ramadan.¹⁶³

The Moslem structure in China is suffering from economic difficulties. The policies of the central government have destroyed the economic surplus

¹⁵⁹ China Islamic Association, Moslems in China, p. 4.

¹⁶⁰ Lu, Moslems in China Today, p. 19.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. p. 29.

¹⁶² Ibid. p. 35.

¹⁶³ Moslem Unrest in China (New Delhi: Eurasia Publishing House, 1963), p. 13.

enjoyed by Moslem traders. Small businessmen have been submerged in socialism, and the individual Moslem, while not penniless, simply does not have money enough to support the Mosques.¹⁶⁴ The question of the mosques retaining their land and economic independence seems to have been answered in the negative. Their huge holdings have been lost. The largest mosque in China, at Hsi-ning, held an amount of land that yielded 400,000 catties of grain per annum. Opponents of the regime claim the grain supported over a thousand students of advanced Moslem studies, and that the entire property was confiscated.¹⁶⁵

Under the Communists, the government does give some money towards the upkeep of religious buildings. In Peking, the major mosque has been completely repaired. In Sinkiang, Davidson noted that, although most religious buildings were in disrepair, there was some evidence of repair being done on the major mosques in the major cities. He noted too that most of the Imams had opposed the new government but that by 1956 they were becoming at least accustomed to it.¹⁶⁶

There is less information on the fate of the Buddhists. Their brethren throughout southeast Asia would seem natural targets for propaganda. What information exists shows that the Communist approach, at first, was rather conciliatory, at least before direct confrontation in Tibet.

The Buddhist Monasteries retained their land for a time after the Reform Law, but like the mosques, lost them by 1956.¹⁶⁷ Though the Tibetan

¹⁶⁴ Lu, Moslems in China Today, p. 34.

¹⁶⁵ Kao, The Imam's Story, p. 37.

¹⁶⁶ Davidson, Turkestan Alive, p. 147.

¹⁶⁷ Yang, Buddhism in China, p. 37.

Monasteries retain some land, their clergy like the Chinese and minority clergies are exposed to thought reform. Clergy are encouraged to learn a profession to enable them to return to worldly life. Some monasteries have begun small industries in conjunction with the government which train monks and nuns to do "useful labor".¹⁶⁸

There exists a Buddhist Federation, organized in 1953, which serves the Buddhists and the government on much the same basis as does the Chinese Islamic Association.¹⁶⁹

As the influence of the various religions wanes, and as the individual languages are diluted, the minorities will become increasingly sinicized. It is probable that among Moslem groups and various Buddhists in Tibet vestiges of the religions will linger, much as has the Russian Orthodox faith in Russia. Religion, however, will only weaken while Communism is strong in China. In this fashion a characteristic that makes minorities unique will weaken.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 53.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 87.

VI

MINORITY OPPOSITION

The unity that the People's Republic of China strives for will come as China is effectively centralized under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party. Centralizing factors are obvious in the foundations of control erected by colonization, economic power and the cadre system, as well as the sinicizing effect of education, language reform and anti-religious campaigns obviously promote centralization.

Each of these centralizing factors weakens the autonomy of the various minorities. The minorities are historically jealous of their autonomy and, therefore, encroachments upon it by the Han people touch a sensitive chord among them. But the Han people are in a period of rising strength. An historical accompaniment to such a period is Han expansion into border areas depriving the inhabitants of autonomy.

The danger posed by minority unrest to modern China is a far weaker one than it has been in the past. One can hardly imagine a minority revolt today of the scope of the Tai Ping revolt, which lasted from 1851-1864 and was led by a Hakka from a small minority living just north of Canton.¹⁷⁰ But the minorities do inhabit almost half of China's territory, primarily the border regions. Particularly to the North, in the province of Sinkiang, in Kansu and in Mongolia and Manchuria, there are people who have family alliances across the political frontier and

¹⁷⁰F. Anderson, The Rebel Emperor (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1959), p. 20.

who inhabit areas that are rich in mineral wealth. Russia has indicated active interest in obtaining Sinkiang's oil, at least until the 1950 Treaty of Friendship. Should she wish to exploit discontent in Sinkiang by supporting a renaissance of the Ili Republic, China could stand to lose an important mineral producing area. Of all the minority areas, Sinkiang is the most receptive to outside encouragement.

In the early years of consolidation, the minority policy was built around the creation of the autonomous areas, and programs such as the development of written languages for the minorities were instituted. These early programs were conciliatory because the central government needed support. Land reform was instituted cautiously in Sinkiang, because the landlord class of the Uighur, unlike those in the rest of China, did not have the enmity of the people.¹⁷¹ There was opposition from the Moslem religious leaders.¹⁷² Communalization proceeded slowly. When food was short in the famine of 1955, the frontier areas were used for production to support the famine areas. A minor Moslem rebellion erupted in Hotien against sending grain from there to the famine areas. The Moslems there blamed their local commune for letting the grain go.¹⁷³ They also objected to having pigs in their communes and to a loss of authority due to being in communes with Chinese people.¹⁷⁴

Armed resistance to sinicization in Sinkiang centered around the Kazak nomads. Burhan was the Moslem who was most generally the leader in

¹⁷¹Hu, China, p. 91.

¹⁷²Kao, The Imam's Story, p. 84.

¹⁷³Shung, "Moslems in China," p. 18.

¹⁷⁴Khan, Islam in China, p. 110.

Sinkiang at the end of the revolution and he accepted the army of the Communists. Armed Kazak bands who had been the mainstay of the Ili Republic did not follow him; and therefore the Chinese army began to put down their rebellion. Some Kazak were captured and executed in 1951, but many remained at large.¹⁷⁵ Uzman Bator and Yolbaz Khan, both veterans of the Ili Republic, led resistance in the fashion of the romantic bood and saddle heros of central Asia.¹⁷⁶ But by 1953, most of this holdover resistance was dead.¹⁷⁷ Those who could not surrender tried to flee. As late as 1965, the New York Times reported a group of Sinkiang Moslems escaping into Russia.¹⁷⁸ For this, China accused the Russians of subversion among the Sinkiang Kazak people.¹⁷⁹

The short period of relative freedom during the Hundred Flowers period of 1957 raised minority hopes for increased autonomy. Particularly in Sinkiang minority leaders agitated for the establishment of federal republics of the Soviet type.¹⁸⁰ Ulanfu admitted rather early that the rights of the minorities had not been fully realized due to "an attitude of superiority" on the part of some Han people in Sinkiang.¹⁸¹

Criticism of Han people changed by July to Siafudin's warning against the "spread of local nationalism becoming a dangerous tendency among Sinkiang's

¹⁷⁵ Ghosh, Embers in Cathay, p. 146.

¹⁷⁶ Davidson, Turkestan Alive, p. 136.

¹⁷⁷ New York Times, April 8, 1953, p. 6.

¹⁷⁸ New York Times, Jan. 24, 1965, p. 7.

¹⁷⁹ New York Times, Dec. 9, 1965, p. 13.

¹⁸⁰ Ghosh, Embers in Cathay, p. 103.

¹⁸¹ New York Times, July 6, 1957, p. 5.

intelligentsia.¹⁸² By January of 1958, "Rectification", a campaign against "regional nationalism" was in full swing. The Moslem teaching of Arabic in primary schools was said to be an error needing rectification.¹⁸³ The minorities were told to accept Han colonization so they might profit from Han experience.¹⁸⁴ The Chinese press claimed that the minorities were developing capitalist tendencies in seeking regional autonomy.¹⁸⁵ A judge who had likened Communist rule to that of the Japanese in Manchukuo was a flower that faced some 20 public "struggle" sessions.¹⁸⁶ The Kwang Ming Daily noted on April 10, 1958, that "the right of self-determination is not absolute, but must be subject to the basic interests of the proletarian revolution".¹⁸⁷

In Urumchi, the Communist party began to purge itself. The mayor of Urumchi, the president of the local writers union and two other leading citizens lost their jobs in the conflict over local nationalism. Certain minority officials had opposed language reform and the continuing of Han colonization and made attempts to have the People's Liberation Army withdrawn from the area; as a result, they were charged with having slandered the People's Democratic Dictatorship and with having attempted to restore capitalism and feudalism by resisting the collectivization of agriculture.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸² New York Times, Dec. 27, 1957, p. 6.

¹⁸³ New York Times, Jan. 18, 1958, p. 1.

¹⁸⁴ New York Times, Jan. 18, 1958, p. 3.

¹⁸⁵ New York Times, Jan. 19, 1958, p. 58.

¹⁸⁶ New York Times, Jan. 23, 1958, p. 3.

¹⁸⁷ Kwang Ming Daily, April 16, 1958 as quoted in Moslem Unrest in China, p. 59.

¹⁸⁸ New York Times, July 5, 1958, p. 8.

The men were executed.¹⁸⁹ Rectification implied less autonomy.

The government began to emphasize the struggle against local nationalism. In early 1959, it exhorted the Sinkiang Communist Party to struggle against localism and area chauvinism, but made no mention of Han wrongdoing.¹⁹⁰ Middle peasants and religious leaders still resisted. The middle peasant, who really had been a field worker, enjoyed some prestige among the Uighur people. In the face of middle peasant resistance the local party began a thirty to forty day reorganization of the communes, including a drive for socialist education. This effort was calculated to weaken the prestige of the middle peasants who, being still able to hold out against collectivization, thwarted the government's plans.¹⁹¹ The drive was lengthened at least two extra months, and on the fourth of February, 1959 resulted in eight executions of "local Chauvinists" and in removal of a "counter revolutionary" from a government position. By April, five officials and three-hundred "others" were reportedly committed to the manual labor program.¹⁹²

There is resistance among the minority people to the Chinese policies, just as there has been for centuries. Now the Chinese are strong however, and since the Rectification campaign they have felt able to discourage autonomy and emphasize unity. If the minorities resist, they will be overpowered. If they accept the Han they will have benefits in the way of improved material conditions, schools and public health, they will pay the price of decreased regional autonomy. The minorities, in any case, have very little choice.

¹⁸⁹ New York Times, Jan. 20, 1959, p. 5.

¹⁹⁰ New York Times, Jan. 14, 1959, p. 2.

¹⁹¹ Ghosh, Embers in Cathay, p. 160.

¹⁹² New York Times, Feb. 4, 1959, p. 21.

VII

CONCLUSION

With the Communists has come a more thorough going control of minority groups than the Chinese of any previous period of history. Although economics is the basis of Marxism, the philosophy is holistic and therefore is concerned with every aspect of society. The minorities in China are a part of the "productive forces", as are the resources of the land they live on. Rather than a barbaric threat to China's security, the non-Han ethnic groups are now part of the country's wealth as an aspect of productive relations in the Marxist sense. They merit an attention never before paid them.

Unity is a key concept of Communist China. But it must be balanced against minority desires for autonomy, and attendant publicity in foreign countries. In the early days of the People's Republic of China when consolidation was all important, the minorities were lulled by the promises of autonomy and material aid. To a degree the promises have been made good. It is the difference in expectation and reality that has caused some discontent. A large number of autonomous areas have been established, schools built, communications of all types greatly improved, and other material aid has been given. These material improvements have been made on the part of the government in the name of greater unity.

China's holism demands full co-operation from all her peoples. As the unique features of language and custom give the minorities a group loyalty, it conflicts with the broader loyalty desired by the new nation.

Inasmuch as this impedes the building of a strongly unified socialist country, the Communists desire its dissolution. Gradual assimilation is pragmatically better in that it reaches the desired end with the least amount of opposition and is therefore less disruptive of the Marxist productive relations than abrupt dislocation of cultural custom.

Gradual change through "peaceful consultation" has begun to sinicize minority languages, religious practices and social structure. Amalgamation of the minorities is the envisioned result of the drive toward unity.

Control features illustrate a first step in sinicization. With control of the total social structure of the minorities their progress towards sinicization can be directed to meet China's needs. By the control infrastructure which has been permeated into the minority societies, guidance of the minorities toward national ends is facilitated.

New China's policies are not consciously directed against minorities. Rather, their emphasis is a positive desire for greatness which will result from the final success of Communism. The minorities are viewed mechanistically as an element of the master plan: they either fit the plan, or will be shaped to fit. As they advance toward the Party's ends, the minorities join the unified family of China - as they protest a desire for autonomy they are victims of more enforced forms of socialization.

Appendix I

GENERAL PROGRAM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REGIONAL AUTONOMY FOR MINORITIES

Ch. I - General Provisions

Art. 1 : This General Program is drawn up in accordance with the provisions of articles 9, 50, 51, 52 and 53 of the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Art. 2 : Each National Autonomous Area is an integral part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The autonomous organ of each National Autonomous Area is a local government led by the people's government of the next higher level, under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government.

Art. 3 : The common program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference is the general line along which all nationalities of the People's Republic unite in their common struggle at the present stage. In administering the internal affairs of their own nationality, the people in each National Autonomous Area shall advance along this general line.

Ch. II - Autonomous Regions

Art. 4 : In areas where National Minorities are concentrated, the following types of autonomous regions may be established according to the relations obtaining between the nationalities of the locality and to the conditions of local economic development, with due consideration of the historical background.

(1) Autonomous regions established on the basis of an area inhabited by one National Minority.

(2) Autonomous regions established on the basis of an area inhabited by one large National Minority, including certain areas inhabited by other National Minorities with very small populations who, likewise, shall enjoy regional autonomy.

(3) Autonomous regions jointly established on the basis of two or more areas, each inhabited by a different National Minority. Whether a separate National Autonomous Area will be established in each of these areas depends on the actual conditions in the respective areas and on the wishes of the nationalities concerned.

Art. 5 : According to the economic, political, and other requirements of the locality and with due consideration of the historical background, each National Autonomous Area may include some districts, towns or cities inhabited by Hans. In localities within a National Autonomous Area where the Hans are concentrated, no regional autonomy is necessary, but the organs of state power there shall be of the type generally adopted in the rest of the country. However, in localities within a National Autonomous Area where the number of Hans is exceptionally large, a democratic coalition government of nationalities shall be established.

Art. 6 : The boundaries of each National Autonomous Area shall be properly demarcated, in accordance with the provisions of this General Program. If it is not possible properly to demarcate the boundaries of an autonomous region at the time of its establishment, temporary arrangements may be made, pending future readjustment.

Art. 7 : The administrative status of a National Autonomous Area shall correspond to that of a hsiang, district, county, special region or a higher level, depending on the size of its population, its area and other factors.

Art. 8 : In designating a National Autonomous Area the name of the nationality shall be prefixed with the geographical denomination. Exceptions are permitted in special cases.

Art. 9 : In demarcating and readjusting the boundaries of a National Autonomous Area and in deciding its administrative status and its name, proposals shall be brought forward through consultation between the people's government of the next higher level and the representatives of the nationality or nationalities concerned. These proposals shall be submitted to the people's government of the next higher level for approval. In the case of a National Autonomous Area of county level or above, these proposals shall be submitted to the Government Administrative Council of the Central People's Government for ratification. All proposals, approved by the local people's governments of different levels, shall be submitted through successive levels to the Government Administrative Council for registration.

Ch. III - Autonomous Organs

Art. 10 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area is the organ of state power of the people in the region.

Art. 11 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area shall be set up according to the basic principles of democratic centralism and of the system of people's congresses.

Art. 12 : The people's government in a National Autonomous Area shall be composed mainly of members from the nationality or nationalities exercising regional autonomy, with the participation of an appropriate number of members from other National Minorities and the Hans inhabiting the same region.

Art. 13 : The question as to which higher organ the autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area shall be subordinated to shall be determined by the administrative status of the region. Exceptions may be made in special cases.

Ch. IV = Rights to Autonomy

Art. 14 : The actual form which the autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area is to take shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the nationality or nationalities exercising regional autonomy and the wishes of the local leaders who are associated with the people.

Art. 15 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area may adopt the language most commonly used in the region as the chief medium of intercourse in the exercise of its authority. But when the autonomous organ exercises its authority over a nationality to whom this language is unfamiliar the language of the latter nationality shall also be adopted.

Art. 16 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area may adopt the spoken and written language of the nationality or nationalities of the region for developing their culture and education.

Art. 17 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area may take the necessary steps to train cadres from among the nationalities in the region who have a highly developed sense of patriotism and close contact with the local population.

Art. 18 : Internal reforms shall be carried out in a National Autonomous Area in accordance with the wishes of the majority of its people and of the local leaders who are associated with the people.

Art. 19 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area may, subject to the unified financial control of the state, administer the region's finances within a sphere prescribed by the Central People's Government and the local people's government above its level.

Art. 20 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area may freely develop the regional economy in accordance with the unified economic system and plan for economic construction of the state.

Art. 21 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area may take necessary and appropriate steps to develop the culture, education, arts, and health services of the various nationalities inhabiting the region.

Art. 22 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area may organize its own local security force and militia within the unified military system of the state.

Art. 23 : In compliance with the provisions of the laws and decrees of the Central People's Government and the Local People's Government of higher levels, and within the limit of its autonomous jurisdiction, the Autonomous Organ of a National Autonomous Area may draw up special regulations for the region, which shall be submitted for approval to the people's governments of the two next higher levels. Such special regulations, when approved by the local people's governments of higher levels, shall be submitted through successive levels to the Government Administrative Council of the Central People's Government for registration.

Art. 24 : The above enumerated rights autonomy shall in principle, apply to all National Autonomous Areas; the scope of their application shall depend on the administrative status of the National Autonomous Area concerned.

Ch. V - Relations between the Nationalities of an Autonomous Region

Art. 25 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Region shall protect the right to national equality of all nationalities in the region; educate the people of different nationalities to respect each other's languages, both spoken and written, customs, traditions and religious beliefs; and prohibit national discrimination and oppression and all acts liable to provoke disputes between nationalities.

Art. 26 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Region shall guarantee to all people in the region irrespective of nationality, freedom of thought, speech, publication, assembly, association, correspondence, person, domicile, change of domicile, religious belief, and the freedom to hold processions and demonstrations, as stipulated in the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and the right to elect and to be elected according to law.

Art. 27 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area shall, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 4 of the general program, help the other National Minorities or minorities concentrated in the region to practice regional autonomy.

Art. 28 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area shall enter into full consultation with representatives of other nationalities living in the region on all problems relative particularly to that nationality.

Art. 29 : The autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area shall educate and guide the people living in the region towards unity and mutual assistance between all nationalities of the country and towards love for the People's Republic of China in which nationalities live together in a spirit of fraternity and co-operation like one big family.

Ch. VI - Principles of Leadership for the People's Governments of Higher Levels

Art. 30 : The people's governments of higher levels shall respect the rights to autonomy of the National Autonomous Areas and help to put them into practice.

Art. 31 : The people's governments of higher levels shall make an adequate appraisal of the special characteristics and actual conditions of each National Autonomous Area at the present stage of development, so that their directives and orders will conform both the general line as laid down in the common program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and to these special characteristics and actual conditions.

Art. 32 : The people's governments of higher levels shall assist the autonomous organs of the National Autonomous Areas in the planned training of cadres from among the nationalities in the area, and assign suitable cadres for work in the autonomous regions according to requirements.

Art. 33 : The people's governments of higher levels shall assist the National Autonomous Areas in their political, economic, cultural, and educational development, as well as in the expansion of health services.

Art. 34 : The people's governments of higher levels shall take appropriate measures to acquaint the people of the National Autonomous Areas with the advanced experiences and conditions about political, economic and cultural development.

Art. 35 : The people's governments of higher levels shall educate and assist the people of all nationalities in observing an attitude of equal, fraternal, unity, and mutual assistance among the nationalities and in overcoming all tendencies to domination by the majority nationality or to narrow nationalism.

Ch. VII - Supplementary Provisions

Art. 36 : Except for areas where regional autonomy is already being practiced preparation for regional autonomy shall be made in all areas throughout the country where National Minorities are concentrated, where the initial stage of revolutionary order has been established, and where regional autonomy is the common desire of all sections of the people. Such preparations shall include the establishment of preparatory organizations, or utilization of existing appropriate organizations, for the convocation of peoples representative conferences and other necessary measures.


Art. 37 : In dealing with the special cases referred to in Art. 8 of this program concerning the designating of a National Autonomous Area and in Art. 13 concerning the subordination of the autonomous organ of a National Autonomous Area to a higher organ, proposals shall be made by the people's government of provincial or greater administrative areas or by the people's government of the autonomous region of a corresponding level, and submitted for approval to the Government Administrative Council of the Central People's Government. Such cases may also be dealt with directly by the Government Administrative Council.

Art. 38 : Measures for the implementation of regional autonomy in districts inhabited by National Minorities within cities populated mainly by Hans shall be separately drawn up by the Government Administrative Council of the Central People's Government, in accordance with the basic spirit of the present General Program.

Art. 39 : This General Program, proposed at the enlarged second session of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs of the Central People's Government shall be put into practice after adoption by the Government Administrative Council of the Central People's Government Council.

Art. 40 : The right of interpretation and amendment of this General Program rests with the Central People's Government.

APPENDIX II



This map and key are from H. Wiens, China's March Toward the Tropics, p. 263.

Appendix II

Administrative Area:

Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region

Hsien Level

1. Orochon Autonomous Banner

Northeast Area

Special district level

Yen-pien Korean Autonomous district

Korean

Hsien- and sub-hsien level

2. Daghur Autonomous Area
3. Weng-niu-t'e (Ongniot) Autonomous Banner
4. Ao-han (Aokhan) Autonomous Banner
5. K'o-la'ch'in (Kharchin) Autonomous Banner
6. K'o-la'ch'in-tso (Kharchin East) Autonomous Banner

Daghur
Mongol
Mongol
Mongol
Mongol

North China Area

Special district level

Yi-k'o-chao (Ikechou) Autonomous League

Wu-lan-ch'a-pu (Ulanhap) Autonomous League

Hsien and sub-hsien level

7. Ta-ch'ang Autonomous Area
8. Kuei-sui Muslim Autonomous Area
9. Hui Autonomous Area

Muslim
Muslim
Muslim

Northwest Area

Special district level

Yü-shu Tibetan Autonomous District

Tibetan

South Kansu Tibetan Autonomous District (to be established)

Tibetan

Hsi-hai-ku Muslim Autonomous District (to be established)

Tibetan

Hsien and sub-hsien level

10. A-la-shan (Alashan) Autonomous Banner
11. O-chi-na (Edjene) Autonomous Banner
12. Su-pei Autonomous Area
13. T'ien-chu Tibetan Autonomous Area
14. Hai-yen Tibetan Autonomous Area
15. Kung-ho Kazak Autonomous Area
16. Tung-hsiang Autonomous Area
17. T'ung-te Autonomous Area

Mongol
Mongol
Mongol
Tibetan
Tibetan
Kazak
Muslim
Tibetan

Southwest Area

Special district level

Sikang Tibetan Autonomous District

Tibetan

Liang-shan Yi Autonomous District

Yi-chia

Northwest Ssu-ch'uan Tibetan Autonomous District

Tibetan

Thai Autonomous District

Thai


Hsien and sub-hsien level

18. P'ing-wu Tibetan Autonomous Area
19. Lu-ting Democratic Coalition Area
20. Hung-mao-ma-ku Yi Autonomous Area
21. Mu-li Tibetan Autonomous Area

Tibetan
Yi-chia,
Tibetan
Yi-chia
Tibetan

22.	Kung-shan Li-su Autonomous Area	Li-su
23.	Pi-chiang Li-su Autonomous Area	Li-su
24.	Lu-ch'uan Democratic Coalition Area	Miao, Yi-chia
25.	Wu-ting Democratic Coalition Area	Yi-chia, Miao
26.	Mi-lo Yi Autonomous Area	Yi-chia
27.	O-shan Autonomous Area	Yi-chia
28.	Hsin-p'ing Democratic Coalition Area	Yi-chia, Thai
29.	Yüan-yang Democratic Coalition Area	Yi-chia, Thai
30.	Lan-ts'ang La-hu Autonomous Area	La-hu
31.	Hui-shui Autonomous Area	Thai
32.	Lu-shan Autonomous Area	Miao
33.	T'ai-chiang Miao Autonomous Area	Miao
34.	Tan-chai Miao Autonomous Area	Miao
<u>Central and South China Area</u>		
Special district level		
	West Hu-nan Miao Autonomous District	Miao
	Hai-nan Li-Miao Autonomous District	Thai, Miao
	West Kuang-hsi Chuang Autonomous District	Thai
Hsien and sub-hsien level		
35.	San-chiang T'ung Autonomous Area	Thai, Miao
36.	Lung-sheng Democratic Coalition Area	Yao
37.	Tung-shan Yao Autonomous Area	Yao
38.	Lien-nan Yao Autonomous Area	Yao
39.	Ta-yao-shan Autonomous Area	Yao
40.	Shin-wan-shan Autonomous Area	Yao
41.	Ta Miao Autonomous Area	Miao
42.	Ling-lin Multinational Autonomous Area	Thai, Miao

Appendix III



This chart from G. Kahin, Major Governments of Asia, p. 77.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Anderson, F.. The Rebel Emperor. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959.
- Chandrasekhar, S.. China's Population Census. Hong Kong: Hong Kong U. Press, 1960.
- China Islamic Association (ed.) Moslems In China. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1953.
- Davidson, B. Turkestan Alive. London: Jonathan Cape, 1957.
- Ghosh, S. Embers in Cathay. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961.
- Hu, Chang-tu. China. New Haven: HRAF Press, 1960.
- Kahin, G. (ed.) Major Governments of Asia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958.
- Kao, Hao-jan. The Imam's Story. Hong Kong: Green Pagoda Press, Ltd., 1960.
- Khan, M. Rafiq. Islam in China. Delhi: National Academy, 1963.
- Lenin, V. Selected Works. II, XVII. New York: International Publishers, 1943.
- Lewis, J. Leadership in Communist China. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963.
- Lin, Yueh-hua. The Lolo of Liang Shan. New Haven: HRAF Press, 1961.
- Liu, Shao-chi. Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China - Constitution of the People's Republic of China. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1954.
- Lu, David. Moslems in China Today. Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1964.
- Mao, Tse-tung. Selected Works. Vol. IV: 1941-1945. New York: International Publishers, 1956.
- Moslem Unrest in China. New Delhi: Eurasia Publishing House, 1963.
- Pipes, R. The Formation of the Soviet Union. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Policy Towards Nationalities of the People's Republic of China. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1953.

Pruden, D., and Steinberg, S. Colonialism Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow. New York: Oxford Book Company, 1956.

Shabad, T. China's Changing Map. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1956.

Tang, P. Communist China Today. New York: F. Praeger, 1957.

Treagear, T. A Geography of China. London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1965.

Union Research Institute. Communism in China. Hong Kong: Union Printing Company, 1959.

Wang, Shu-tang. China, Land of Many Nationalities. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955.

Ward, R. and Macridis, R. (ed.) Modern Political Systems; Asia. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

Whiting, Allan and Sheng Shih-tsai. Sinkiang, Pawn or Pivot? East Lansing: Michigan University Press, 1958.

Wiens, H. China's March Towards the Tropics. Hamden: Shoe String Press, 1954.

Winnington, A. The Slaves of the Cool Mountains. London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1959.

Yang, I-fan. Buddhism in China. Hong Kong: The Union Press, 1956.

Articles and Periodicals

Abaydulla, Husayin. "The New Sinkiang," China Reconstructs, No. 1 (January, 1966), pp. 29-30.

Bukhara, Tyshkanbayeb. "This is Plain Chauvinism," Atlas, VII., No. 1 (January, 1964), pp. 44-46.

Chang, Ch'ung. "The Common Road for Different Nationalities," Current Background, Vol. 580, (May 25, 1959), pp. 33-37.

Chen, Lin-ji. "Minority People's Song and Dance Show Socialist Advance," China Reconstructs, XIV, No. 2 (February, 1965), pp. 7-9.

Constantin, G. "The Hui, A National Minority in the Chinese People's Republic," Studia et Acta Orientalia, I, (1957), pp. 357-58.

"Cultural Revolution of China's National Minorities," Peking Review, VII, No. 49 (November 20, 1964), pp. 47-49.

DeFrancis, J. "National and Minority Policies," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, (September, 1961), pp.146-155.

- "Discontent Among the Minority Races in China," Far Eastern Economic Review, (September 25, 1958), pp. 387-388, 414-415.
- Feng, Wen. "Pieping's Policy Towards China's Ethnic Minorities," Analysis of Current Chinese Problems, (September, 1964), pp. 1-13.
- Gjessing, G. "Chinese Anthropology and New China's Policy Toward Her Minorities," Acta Sociologica, II, (1956), pp. 45-46.
- Hinton, H. "Colonization as an Instrument of Chinese Communist Policy," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXIII, No. 17 (October 24, 1957), pp. 513-522.
- Hsieh, Ping-hsin. "Cultural Palace of the Nationalities," Chinese Literature, No. 11, (November, 1959), pp. 140-145.
- Hudson, G. "The Nationalities of China," Far Eastern Affairs, No. 2 (1960), pp. 151-161.
- Ma, Hsueh-liang. "New Scripts for China's Minorities," China Reconstructs, XI, No. 8 (August, 1962), p. 24.
- McFarquhar, R. "Communist China's First Decade; The Minorities," New Leader, Vol. 42 (June 8, 1959), pp. 17-21.
- Moseley, G. "China's Fresh Approach to the National Minority Question," China Quarterly, XXIV, (October-December, 1965), pp. 15-27.
- Sa Kung-liao, "The Great Success of China's Policy for Nationalities," Peking Review, V, No. 39 (September 28, 1962), pp. 8-12.
- Sarker, O. "China's Policy Toward Minorities," The World Today, XV, No. 10, (October, 1959), p. 408.
- Schwarz, H. "Communist Language Policies for China's Ethnic Minorities," China Quarterly, XII, (October-December, 1962), pp. 168-170.
- Shung, Ibrahim. "Moslem in China," Free China Review, X, (April, 1960), pp. 13-20.
- Strong, Anna. "China's National Congress Meets," Letters From China, XXVI, (January 25, 1965), pp. 103-104.
- Wang, Min. "New China's Electoral System," Peking Review, VIII, No. 2 (January 8, 1965), pp. 17-18.
- Wiens, H. "Some of China's 35,000,000 Non-Chinese," Royal Asiatic Society, Hong Kong Branch, Journal, II, (1962), pp. 54-74.
- Yang Yin. "New Oasis in Sinkiang," Peking Review, V, No. 4 (January 26, 1962), p. 16.

Other Sources

Chi Jen-Chang. The Minority Groups of Yunan and Chinese Political Expansion Into Southeast Asia, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. University Microfilms, Doctoral Dissertation Series, Pub. No. 21,160, 1956. Ann Arbor, Michigan.

New York Times, 1950-1965.

Wiens, H., Letter from H. J. Wiens, Professor of Geography, University of Hawaii, dated July 22, 1966.