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MEXICANS, LABOR, AND STRIFE IN ARIZONA, 1896-1917

BY

MICHAEL E. CASILLAS

B.A., Arizona State University, 1976

THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Arts in History

The University of New Mexico  
Albuquerque, New Mexico

December, 1979

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

By researching and writing upon a topic of this nature, I have incurred a debt of gratitude to numerous people for assisting and encouraging me to develop theories concerning the role and history of Mexican miners during the 1896-1917 period of Arizona history.

A note of appreciation is given my committee of studies which consisted of Dr. Donald Cutter, acting Chairman, as well as Dr. Richard Ellis and Dr. Robert Kern. Upon the tragic illness of my original Chairman, Dr. Manuel Servín, all three accepted the responsibility of guiding me through my program at the University of New Mexico. A special acknowledgement is extended them for assistance and consultation without which this work could not have been completed.

The staff of the Arizona State Library, Arizona Collection, was of special help for allowing me full access to their source material. The aid of Mrs. Susie Sato and Dr. Charles Colley made easier my research endeavors. Christine Marín, coordinator of the Chicano Studies Library, Arizona State University, deserves a large measure of gratitude for allowing me to utilize source material collected by her department.

Encouragement and warranted criticism was given by my graduate colleagues, especially Barron and Broeck Oder, Jack Cargill and Harry Rubinstein, whose assistance facilitated this work. Special mention need be extended my wife, Randall Thomson, and my parents, whose constant moral support kept at bay any vestiges of self-doubt in undertaking this endeavor.

My warmest heartfelt thanks is given to Dr. Manuel Patricio Servín whose initial encouragement, guidance and patience helped to shape my own historical endeavors. My present and future historical aspirations will be imbued with his historical training, devotion to professionalism and quest for scholarly excellence.

Ultimately, special recognition is accorded the miners themselves, whose toils and troubles serve as the basis for this work.

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

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The years between 1890 and 1920 were crucial in the rise of modern organized labor in the United States. During this period, America saw the demise of the Knights of Labor and the subsequent ascent to union supremacy of the American Federation of Labor. As the organized labor movement grew, it reached out to encourage the participation of workers throughout the Rocky Mountain region and the far west. Western laborers, led by hard rock miners, created organizations such as the American Labor Union (ALU), Western Labor Union (WLU), and most notably the Western Federation of Miners (WFM) that represented their particular needs. Not all working men were given the right of union participation, however. While such unions as the WFM steadfastly espoused the rights and equality of workers, they nonetheless barred certain segments of the rank-and-file working class from participation in union matters. Such was the case of Chicano workers in the territory and, later, state of Arizona.

Using both primary and secondary sources, this work attempts to portray the attitudes and obstacles that confronted Mexican workers in their desire to be included in existing unions and to achieve economic parity with their Anglo counterparts. The opening chapters describe the Arizona labor scene and the factors that thwarted Mexicanos early attempts to unionize: racial animosities, management's fear of making any labor concessions to workers--unionized or not, inter-union strife between the

WFM and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and, lastly, various strikes in which Mexican workers made known their discontent.

The middle chapters address themselves to actual examples of labor strife in which Mexicanos not only struggled for union recognition but also sought some measure of respect from the Anglo society that believed these same workers were not capable of embracing the tenets and nuances of AFL unionism or deserving of an equal position in society.

Ultimately Chicanos gained the right to be included within union structures. However, outside forces worked to destroy Arizona unionism, and by 1917, with the deportation of the IWW, management had successfully weakened all workers' organizations to such an extent that both Chicano and Anglo workers found themselves thrown back to the period when management and government had closely aligned themselves to hinder any and all unionization endeavors.

This work traces the rise and fall of union activity in Arizona and, more importantly, tries to shed light on Mexican participation within this cycle. In so doing, it will hopefully illuminate the role that Chicanos played in early Arizona union development during the years 1896-1917--a story that has been sadly neglected by most historians of western labor.

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## INTRODUCTION

There is growing concern among Chicano historians to redefine past roles played by Mexicans in the unfolding history of the Southwest.<sup>1</sup> Two such scholars within the Chicano community, Pedro Castillo and Albert Camarillo, have examined viewpoints which have perpetuated stereotypes concerning the Chicano of the west. In their work entitled Furia y Muerte, the authors explore the importance of Mexican social banditry in retaliating to conditions imposed by Anglo-Americans.<sup>2</sup>

Social banditry takes many varied forms, and manifestation of this phenomenon is not confined to individuals. Social banditry, as defined by the British historian Eric J. Hobsbawm, is a "universal and virtually unchanging. . . protest against oppression and poverty; a cry for vengeance on the oppressors. . . a righting of individual wrongs."<sup>3</sup>

While individuals may speak for a cause, they are, nonetheless, only representatives of a larger body of discontent. This dissatisfaction manifests itself in various forms of resistance or opposition to an already established order. Within this renitence falls labor strikes.

Mexican walkouts, or labor disturbances in general in Arizona during the period 1896-1917, were not merely a means of obtaining higher wages or better working conditions--although these considerations were of vital importance to Mexican miners throughout this twenty-one year span. Rather, Mexican strike activity must be viewed as a symptom of, and a response to, changing laboring classes and social structures in Arizona and the Southwest.

Continued emigration from Mexico to the Arizona territory resulted in Mexican workers becoming the overwhelming majority of the labor force in almost all mining operations. To help assure the continuation of this reality, mining entrepreneurs sought measures to insure that Mexican labor would be available. As a result, enganchadores, or labor contractors, continually encouraged emigration from Mexico to the border states.<sup>4</sup>

Once in Arizona, Mexican miners found themselves in a two class socio-economic relation which they neither condoned nor desired. Despite their lack of experience or an outlet for voicing complaints and knowing that those who did air a grievance would face unemployment, Mexican laborers made known their dissatisfaction with existing conditions by a series of labor strikes. These workers acted in hope of bettering their social, political and economic status within Arizona society.

As a group, the Mexican working class reacted to conditions that were imposed by a managerial elite. This experience is not unique to the mexicano alone. Laboring classes of any country are usually at odds with management over a wide array of subjects. For the purposes of this study, two major points which have always affected the Chicanos' status in the Southwest merit special consideration within the worker/owner relationship: race relations and geographic proximity to Mexico. The former perpetuated and hardened stereotypes concerning the Mexican both as a worker and as a human being; the latter assured mining operators of a large available labor pool.

Arizona was no exception to this rule. The period between 1896 and 1917 is one that witnessed the development of two separate yet intrinsically linked stories. The era witnessed the spectacular rise of mining

from private prospecting endeavors to corporate ownership of Arizona's copper fields, replete with absentee owners and, in some instances, the investment of foreign capital. The second story concerns the rise of organized labor and its subsequent effect on Mexican workers. This thesis is an attempt to illuminate the role played by Mexican workers during this period and to detail obstacles that had to be overcome by this working class in order to achieve economic, working and, to a degree, social equality within Arizona society.

The history of labor-management relations ran full cycle in the territory and later state of Arizona. This tenuous connection saw the introduction of organized labor to combat mine operators who used their ever-growing power to maintain their position as leaders in Arizona's society. With the Bisbee and Jerome deportations of 1917, clear cut victory went to mine owners. When management, with the aid of the militia, annihilated the organized labor movement, workers--Mexicans and Anglos alike, found themselves thrown back to their status of the 1890s when bargaining between employers and employees was non-existent.

Inherent in union-owner discussions were many issues that directly affected this connection. A broad range of factors were associated with the unfolding of Arizona's labor story, but the issue of Mexican miners in the territory was the one constant. Mexican workers were denigrated by both employers and by the representatives of organized labor who sought to use them as pawns in their respective attempts to dominate Arizona's mining enterprises. No history of early Arizona labor is complete without detailing actions of Mexican workers in their efforts to overcome this situation and gain acceptance within recognized unions and economic parity with their Anglo counterparts.

Three unions or parties in particular largely determined the fate of Mexican miners. They were the Western Federation of Miners (WFM), the Partido Liberal Mexicano (Mexican Liberal Party or PLM) and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Each organization had different policies toward unionization which either included or totally denied Mexican participation within the rank-and-file. With three separate organizations representing Arizona's workers came interunion strife. Not unexpectedly, antagonisms among the unions played directly into the hands of mine operators.

Once the mining interests had weakened unionism, there ended a cycle in which Mexican miners had played an instrumental part. Mexicanos, who had been the victims of both organized labor and management, by 1916, had finally won the right to be included in unions; indeed, Mexican workers had assumed the helm in directing union policies in various copper camps in Arizona. Where previous policy had denied Mexican acceptance, by the middle of the second decade of the 1900s union success was dependent upon the fortunate recruitment of these same workers. A year later, however, this victory had already been sapped of much of its meaning. This then, is the story of Mexican workers in Arizona and the problems that confronted them during the years 1896-1917.

<sup>1</sup>To avoid needless repetition, the terms "Mexicans" and "Chicanos" are used synonymously when referring to Spanish-speaking workers of Mexican descent residing in Arizona. When it is necessary for clarification, the exact terminology will be used.

<sup>2</sup>Pedro Castillo and Albert Camarillo, Furia y Muerte: Los Bandidos Chicanos (Los Angeles: Aztlán Publications, 1973), pp. 1-9.

<sup>3</sup>I would like to thank Dr. Robert Kern of the University of New Mexico for introducing me to the works of leading European historians. See, Eric J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 5.

<sup>4</sup>Walter E. Weyl, "Labor Conditions in Mexico," Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, January 1902 (Washington: Department of Commerce, 1902), passim; Victor S. Clark, "Mexican Labor in the United States," Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, #78, September 1908 (Washington: Department of Commerce, 1908), passim. ✓ Source

## CHAPTER I

### THE ARIZONA LABOR MILIEU, 1896-1917

The early history of organized labor in Arizona was dominated by three different unions--the Western Federation of Miners (WFM), the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM or Mexican Liberal Party) and the International Workers of the World (IWW). Each had a different philosophy about the role of the working classes and the position of Mexican labor within those classes. Management, too, developed varying approaches in response to the activities of the unions.

Arizona's first local of the Western Federation of Miners was established at Globe, Arizona, in 1896, as a response to wage cuts experienced by Anglo workers and the employment of Mexicans to replace those who had voiced complaints.<sup>1</sup> The owners of the Old Dominion Mine had experienced fiscal problems, and, hoping to cut costs, started to replace Anglo-Americans with Mexican workers who were paid substantially lower wages than the Anglo norm for the time.<sup>2</sup> This practice became a classic example of labor strife in Arizona with Mexicans and Anglos competing for the same jobs.

The Globe Strike is of the utmost importance in Western and Arizona labor history. It set a pattern for both WFM and AFL policies concerning the Mexican issue--placing the emphasis upon racial rather than social or economic issues. The WFM, by pursuing its anti-Mexican policies, however, won the support of Arizona's Democratic Party.<sup>3</sup>

But the WFM had no intention of limiting its activities to Globe. The Federation attempted to establish a local in the Bisbee-

Warren district closer to the Mexican border. WFM organizing efforts failed because of the close proximity of Mexico where labor could be cheaply and easily obtained.<sup>4</sup> The setback only increased WFM determination to restrict their organizing efforts to English-speaking miners. This WFM approach benefitted mine owners, for it placed two different work forces in competition. Commenting on the state of affairs in Bisbee, the Engineering and Mining Journal, a management weekly, proudly exclaimed that "Bisbee is not unionized and cannot be persuaded into joining the union."<sup>5</sup>

The decision by the WFM to exclude Mexicans from unions derived in part from its experience in the Cananea mining district in Sonora, Mexico, in 1902. The Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, owned by American entrepreneur William Cornell Greene, employed a number of Anglo-Americans.<sup>6</sup> Seeking to unionize the copper camp, Federation organizers antagonized both Mexican workers and Company officials by embracing only the Anglo portion of the work force and asking for four dollars per day pay.<sup>7</sup> Union sympathizers were summarily discharged by the company and replaced by Mexican workers.

This episode served to reinforce anti-Mexican policies. Union organizers returning from Cananea area continued their "hands-off" policy toward Mexican workers. Lingering resentments against Mexican miners caused the WFM to miss a major opportunity to enlist members when it failed to assist striking miners, many of whom were of Mexican origin, in the Clifton-Morenci area in 1903. Because of the large percentage of Mexican workers, Federation president Charles Moyer gave only moral support to the strikers.<sup>8</sup> Had WFM officials tried to penetrate the Clifton-Morenci region and enlist the support of Mexican

workers, union history in Arizona could well have been very different. As it happened, twelve years passed before Federation policy changed and the WFM began cooperating with the Mexican community.

The WFM not only rejected Mexican miners as members but gained legislation directed "against the companies employing Mexican and contract labor."<sup>9</sup> The legislation called for an eight-hour day that, to the delight of union men, restricted mine operators from employing Mexican laborers who generally were working longer hours. Such measures were intended to preserve union wage scales and lessen the possibility of mining interests using Mexicans as scab labor to undercut existing wage rates.

In 1909 union officials won the passage of a Literacy Law. The law stipulated that no person could register as a voter unless he could read a portion of the Constitution and sign his name. According to a contemporary source, the act was "directed against the Mexican population."<sup>10</sup> With Arizona statehood not too distant, the Anglo populace, and more particularly the unions and Democratic Party, found it expedient to reduce the chances of a Mexican minority exerting influence upon the writing of Arizona's constitution. To some, the Literacy Law was enacted for the sole purpose of saving Arizona from the "corruption that would follow. . . the Mexican population which was coming across the border."<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, "the people of Arizona are an educated people" who wanted to "protect the territory from corrupt elections which would result from the importation of ignorant and purchasable Mexicans."<sup>12</sup> The fear of granting Mexicans the vote in the Arizona Territory reflected a widely held belief among Anglo-Americans that Mexico was "peopled with a race

different in origin, language, religion, customs and ideals from the American people."<sup>13</sup>

In keeping with its anti-Mexican policy, the WFM proposed three anti-alien bills at Arizona's Constitutional Convention in late 1910.<sup>14</sup> The desired legislation sought a prohibition of the importation of contract labor, restriction of aliens in public works, and exclusion of non-English speakers from hazardous work. On October 24, 1910, Proposition Ninety-One became the central focus of convention deliberations. The proposed bills read that:

. . .no individual, firm, corporation or association shall employ men in underground or other hazardous occupations who cannot speak the English language, nor. . .employ alien labor to the extent of more than twenty percent of the entire amount of labor employed by such individual, firm, corporation or association.<sup>15</sup>

The bill was initially introduced by a delegate from the Globe district, where, as noted above, the WFM was strongly entrenched and had obtained the signed support of four hundred residents of the town.<sup>16</sup> The resulting controversy centering around this aptly named "Eighty Percent Law," continued to create considerable friction in labor relations as late as 1915.<sup>17</sup>

The influx of Mexican nationals to the Arizona territory and their subsequent employment in mining enterprises was great during the first decade of the 1900s. The Mining and Scientific Press, for example, reported that some sixty percent of Arizona workers were Mexicans and that less than ten percent of them could read, write or speak English.<sup>18</sup> Because of the language barrier, Mexican workers could be taken advantage of in contracts and wages. Mexican miners oftentimes were reported to have "suffered silently from dishonesty. . .of petty foremen who had

sold jobs. . .and in other ways taken advantage of the inarticulate Mexicans."<sup>19</sup>

The years 1911-1917 produced several significant changes in WFM policy in Arizona. Foremost among these was the termination of earlier efforts to exclude Mexicans from labor organizations. Indeed, union officials came to realize that inclusion of Mexicanos was necessary if labor was to present a unified front against management. To implement this policy, one of the top WFM organizers was sent into the Clifton-Morenci district in September 1915 to help increase Federation support.<sup>20</sup> Also, within a year, the WFM changed its official name to the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (IUMMSW) and rewrote its constitution in an effort to ameliorate the concerns of management.<sup>21</sup> Despite this restructuring of WFM policy, management still viewed the organization as a threat to the mine owners of Arizona. After 1917, this "threat" had been eliminated.

The WFM was not the only union active in Arizona during the first decade of the 1900s. If the Federation could be regarded as conservative in its policies toward Mexican laborers, the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM) was revolutionary in comparison. During the years 1906-1909, PLM activities played an integral role in Arizona's labor controversies. The PLM was eventually crushed by the combined efforts of the Mexican and United States governments for pursuing revolutionary goals.<sup>22</sup> As exiled Mexican radicals, the Magonistas (followers of the Flores Magón brothers and leaders of the PLM) worked for the overthrow of Mexican dictator Porfirio Díaz. Part of their actions, however, included propogandizing to Mexican workers in Arizona mining camps. As a party or union, the PLM appealed to the fraternal sense among Mexican workers

in an attempt to create an industrial union.<sup>23</sup>

The PLM sought to enlist members from 1904, when Ricardo Flores Magón and his followers came to the United States, until 1909, when PLM efforts were quashed in Arizona Territory. Although PLM aims were directed against Díaz, special attention was given to labor reforms. Mexican workers in Arizona, with no other outlet with which to make known their desires, were amenable to the PLM's programs.

As PLM efforts in labor organizing increased so did repression of their efforts. Arizona, Mexican and United States government officials worked in conjunction to indict PLM leaders for violating neutrality laws. In March 1909, Ricardo Flores Magón and two of his followers were extradited from Los Angeles to Tombstone, Arizona, for trial where they were found guilty and sentenced to prison for eighteen months. The U.S. prosecuting attorney received a \$500 ring from the Mexican government as a token of gratitude for a job well done.<sup>24</sup>

Like its Mexican constituents who received little, if any, help in trying to better their position in Arizona society, the PLM received little aid from Anglo radicals or organizers of the time. Magón, aware of racism in the Southwest, wrote:

The group in Chicago IWW and WFM does not defend us nor is it for anything other than defending the masters. We are poor Mexicans. We are revolutionaries and our ideals are very advanced; but we are Mexicans. That is our fault. Our skin is not white. . . .<sup>25</sup>

Unlike the WFM, or its successor the IWW, PLM followers received little public assistance. As Magón suggested, the PLM's fault was that it directed its concern to Mexican and not Anglo-American workers in Arizona.

The Industrial Workers of the World was the last group to enter

the Arizona labor picture during the era under examination. Founded in Chicago in January 1905, the IWW represented a wide spectrum of radical action. A unifying force was their general dislike of the American Federation of Labor and Samuel Gompers. The largest union represented at the founding convention was the WFM, represented by William Haywood, Charles Moyer and John O'Neill. But because of the ever-growing militancy of the IWW and the resulting internal divisions, the WFM soon withdrew its support. This resulted in a rift within the union between the varying groups. The followers of Daniel DeLeon, William Trautman and Vincent St. John eventually gained control of the IWW.<sup>26</sup>

In Arizona, the IWW was initially represented by the WFM. As it became evident to all concerned that the two factions were drifting apart, the IWW sought to secure Arizona as its stronghold. By attempting to place trustworthy IWW followers in WFM locals, IWW officials actually succeeded in planting seeds of future labor antagonism between the two groups. This inter-union conflict caused the demise of the labor movement at the end of the First World War.<sup>27</sup>

Internal division among labor unions during the 1906-1908 period, coupled with the activities of the PLM, produced a strong public backlash against unionization. Arizona's copper magnates quickly seized upon the opportunity to institute a series of wage cuts throughout the copper industry.<sup>28</sup> In essence, management's power remained unchallenged from then until the middle of the second decade.

No account of labor relations would be complete without mention of management's position. Unions or labor as a political force exerted a growing influence upon Arizona's society. As it did, labor activities encroached increasingly upon a domain that mine owners assumed was

rightfully theirs. Thus began a series of battles as the antagonists jockeyed for position.

Like labor, the mine owners had their own "unions." Their's were constructed around the concept of protective agencies which appeared throughout the West where there was large-scale mining activity. The protective agencies had been effective in labor disputes in the Rocky Mountains.<sup>29</sup> In Arizona, the agency known as the Maricopa Association, founded in 1898, pledged to combat any workers' combines that should appear. Following this line of defense, the Miner Owners Association of Yavapai County, organized in the early 1900s, sought to protect owners' interests by opposing the eight-hour day.<sup>30</sup>

As unions and strikes became more prevalent, mine owners sought direct approaches to keep recalcitrant workers in line. Arizona Rangers and the state militia were called to quell labor disputes if local forces proved inadequate. The use of federal troops provided another alternative at the disposal of mining interests. The use of armed force to handle workers was a standard technique.<sup>31</sup> Management at all times had at their disposal other tactics that could be employed as conditions warranted in their fight against unions. Foremost among them was the employment of Mexican labor to stop the spread of unionism. Other devices used by mine owners included the use of blacklists, yellow dog contracts and injunctions. The blacklist was a list of miners who had incurred the ire of management. When discharged, a worker out of favor had a difficult time finding work due to the open exchanged of "blacklists" between operators. Yellow dog contracts obliged workers not to join a union after employment. Injunctions were another favorite owner tactic. These were court orders that prohibited any union

organizer from talking to miners.<sup>32</sup>

The greatest tool at the disposal of mine owners was the ability to rally public sentiment in support of management. This tactic was especially beneficial to mine owners during the war years in Arizona. Equating anything detrimental to the war effort, such as slowing copper production, with being unpatriotic, owners easily rationalized the destruction of the labor movement in Arizona. Such sentiments are best observed in the statement of Walter Douglas, Phelps-Dodge president.

Those who are not for us management are against us:  
There can be no half-way ground. . . The strike leaders,  
the strikers and the aiders and abettors and sympathizers  
of these men are getting further and further every day,  
outside the pale of the great mass of citizens of this  
country who place love of home and pride of city and de-  
votion to flag above every consideration. . . An infected  
sore may well become a cancer IF IT IS NOT CUT OUT!<sup>33</sup>

Once the popular mind accepted such a position, management used force to end strikes meant to improve the lot of the workers.

The actions of management can best be seen through the actions of Phelps-Dodge. During the 1890s, Phelps-Dodge virtually controlled all of Arizona's mining enterprises. Historically, mining in Arizona had been done on a relatively small, entrepreneurial level. Eastern based Phelps-Dodge transformed mining into a large scale industrial corporate enterprise. In large part, Phelps-Dodge contributed to the growth of such towns as Bisbee, Douglas and Warren.<sup>34</sup> Seeking to solidify its position within Arizona, Phelps-Dodge created state-wide alliances and continued to pour money into developing other mining districts. After the Jerome and Bisbee deportations of 1917, this corporation thoroughly dominated Arizona's mining industry.<sup>35</sup>

Not content with controlling Arizona mine operations, Phelps-

Dodge president Douglas organized mine owners to combat organized labor. With Douglas as the driving force, an Arizona chapter of the American Mining Congress was formed. A year later, Douglas was named president of the prestigious American Institute of Mining Engineers in 1917. With such publication outlets as the Engineering and Mining Journal and Mining Congress Journal at his disposal, Douglas was able to focus attention of mine management from technical aspects of mining to one which emphasized economic and political matters--including owners' hold over labor.<sup>36</sup>

This, in brief outline, was the labor milieu in Arizona during the years 1896-1917. Mexican workers played out their role against this backdrop. Facing opposition from owners who wanted to concede nothing to labor, organized or not, and refused entry into WFM local during the turbulent first decade of the 1900s, Mexican laborers nonetheless tried to achieve equality in economic and social status. They were not successful until 1916, but by then, the seeds of Arizona's labor destruction had been sown and the power of labor unions would soon be sapped.

It is not possible to understand the historical evolution of Arizona's labor history until the role of Mexican workers is adequately analyzed and documented. Once accomplished, then it is possible to place Arizona union activity alongside other western states and within the overall picture of American labor struggles. Not too surprisingly, historians will record that the issue of Mexican workers and their labor activities were the dominant factors in Arizona's initial labor struggles.

<sup>1</sup>José Torres, "The Globe Strike, 1896," MS, Chicano Studies, Arizona State University, Hayden Library.

<sup>2</sup>Manuel P. Servín and Robert Spude, "Historical Conditions of Early Mexican Labor in the United States: Arizona--A Neglected Story," The Journal of Mexican American History V (1975), p. 49.

<sup>3</sup>Harvey A. Levenstein, Labor Organizations in the United States and Mexico: A History of their Relations, contribution in American History no. 13, series edited by Stanley I. Kutler (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Company, 1971), p. 98. Servín and Spude, "Historical Conditions," p. 50. Journals of the Twenty-Fifth Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Arizona, 1909, pp. 224-30. Arizona Room, Hayden Library, Arizona State University. James H. McClintock, Arizona: The Nation's Youngest Commonwealth Within a Land of Ancient Cultures (Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1916), 8 vols, II, p. 352.

<sup>4</sup>Bisbee Daily Review (Bisbee, Arizona), March 15, 1902.

<sup>5</sup>"Labor Conditions in the Southwest," Engineering and Mining Journal 77 (March 31, 1904), p. 510. Hereafter cited EMJ.

<sup>6</sup>Charles Leland Sonnichsen, Colonel Greene and the Copper Skyrocket: The Spectacular Rise and Fall of William Cornell Greene (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974). This is an excellent study not only in terms of Greene, but also in the problems inherent in any mining industry at this time.

<sup>7</sup>Bisbee Daily Review, May 9, 1902.

<sup>8</sup>EMJ 77 (March 21, 1904), p. 510. Bisbee Daily Review, June 12, 1903. Joseph F. Park, "The 1903 'Mexican Affair' at Clifton," Journal of Arizona History 18 (Summer 1977), p. 142.

<sup>9</sup>McClintock, Arizona, II, p. 352.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 358.

<sup>11</sup>Congressional Record: The Proceedings and Debates of the Sixty-First Congress, second session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910), pp. 8321-32.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>The convention opened October 10, 1910 at Phoenix. See, Joseph F. Park, "The History of Mexican Labor in Arizona During the Territorial Period," (M.A. Thesis, University of Arizona, 1961), p. 269. For a detailed account of the pro-labor factions during this period see, Tru Anthony McGinnis, "The Influence of Organized Labor on the Making of Arizona's Constitution," (M.A. Thesis, University of Arizona, 1930).

<sup>15</sup>Park, "Mexican Labor in Arizona," p. 270. McGinnis, "Influence of Organized Labor," pp. 82, 75.

<sup>16</sup>McGinnis, "Influence of Organized Labor," p. 83.

<sup>17</sup>Arizona Daily Star (Tucson, Arizona), October 16, 1915. Arizona Labor Journal (Phoenix, Arizona), October 14, 1915. The Arizona Anti-Alien act was adopted by the people of Arizona as an initiative measure in November 1914. It was declared unconstitutional by a special court of three federal judges in San Francisco who ruled that "if the state of Arizona could tell an employer it could only hire twenty percent alien then it could just as well tell them to hire one percent or none at all." Miners' Magazine, February 14, 1915. "New Mining Legislation," EMJ 98 (November 14, 1914), p. 890. "The Arizona Alien Labor Law," The Outlook CIX (January 20, 1915), pp. 109-10.

<sup>18</sup>B. W. J. Lauck, "Labor Conditions in Arizona's Smelters," Mining and Scientific Press CIV (February 3, 1912), p. 212.

<sup>19</sup>"A Strike Without Disorder," New Republic V (January 22, 1916), p. 304. John A. Fitch, "Arizona's Embargo on Strike-Breakers," The Survey XXXVI (May 6, 1916), p. 143.

<sup>20</sup>Copper Era (Clifton, Arizona), September 15, 1915. Park, "Mexican Labor in Arizona," p. 278.

<sup>21</sup>Vernon H. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict: Labor Relations in the Nonferrous Metals Industry up to 1930 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950), p. 377. Miners' Magazine, August 6, 1914, April 1917. Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the IWW (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1969), pp. 369-70.

<sup>22</sup>There are a number of monographs, theses and dissertations that deal with various aspects of PLM activity throughout the Southwest. Ward Albro III, "Ricardo Flores Magón and the Liberal Party: An Inquiry into the Origins of the Mexican Revolution of 1910," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Arizona, 1967). Myra Ellen Jenkins, "Ricardo Flores Magón and the Mexican Liberal Party," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1953). Thomas C. Langham, "An Unequal Struggle: The Case of Ricardo Flores Magón and the Mexican Liberals," (M.A. Thesis, San Diego State University, 1975). Juan Gomez-Quinoñes, Sembradores: Ricardo Flores Magón y el Partido Liberal Mexicano, Monograph #5 (Los Angeles: Aztlan Publications, 1973).

<sup>23</sup>Gomez-Quinoñes, Sembradores, pp. 2-3.

<sup>24</sup>Rodolfo Acuña, Occupied America (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1972), p. 156. See also, Lyle C. Brown, "Los Liberales Mexicanos y Su Lucha en y contra de la Dictadura de Porfirio Díaz, 1900-1906," Antología MCC (Mexico DF: Mexico City College Press, 1956), p. 89. Charles C. Cumberland, "Precursors of the Mexican Revolution of 1910," Hispanic American Review 22 (May 1942), p. 345. Charles C. Cumberland, "An Analysis of the Program of the Mexican Liberal Party, 1906," The

Americas 4 (January 1948), pp. 294-301.

<sup>25</sup>Letter from Ricardo Flores Magón to María Talavera, December 6, 1908. Found in Manuel González Ramírez, Epistolario y textos de Ricardo Flores Magón (Mexico DF: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1964), p. 169. I would like to thank Christine Marín of the Chicano Studies section of the Arizona State University campus for kindly allowing me access to her private library. Gomez-Quinoñes, Sembradores, p. 34.

<sup>26</sup>Paul Brissenden, The IWW: A Study of American Syndicalism, 2nd edition (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1920). This is one of the best early works concerning the IWW.

<sup>27</sup>James McBride, "Development of Labor Unions in Arizona Mining, 1884-1919," (M.A. Thesis, Arizona State University, 1974), pp. 96-100. George F. Leaming, "Labor and Copper in Arizona: Origins and Growth," Arizona Review 16 (April 1967), p. 18.

<sup>28</sup>EMJ 84 (December 28, 1907), p. 1232.

<sup>29</sup>Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, pp. 74-77. McBride, "Development of Labor Unions," p. 64.

<sup>30</sup>EMJ 65 (March 1898), p. 320. Miners' Magazine, September 3, 1903.

<sup>31</sup>Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, p. 365. James R. Kluger, The Clifton-Morenci Strike: Labor Difficulty in Arizona, 1915-1916 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970), pp. 45-46.

<sup>32</sup>EMJ 76 (August 8, 1903), p. 211.

<sup>33</sup>Bisbee Daily Review, July 12, 1917. See also, James W. Byrkit, "Walter Douglas and Labor Struggle in Early 20th Century Arizona," Southwest Economy and Society 1 (1976), pp. 14-25.

<sup>34</sup>Dubofsky, We Shall Be All, pp. 22-23.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid. Robert Glass Cleland, A History Of Phelps-Dodge, 1834-1950 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), pp. 107-08. Byrkit, "Walter Douglas," passim.

<sup>36</sup>Byrkit, "Walter Douglas," pp. 19-25.

## CHAPTER II

### VIEWPOINTS OF MEXICAN LABOR

The use of Mexican labor in the western United States is a difficult topic to understand. Because of their availability as a laboring class in various economic enterprises ranging from agriculture to the building of railroads, Mexican workers have greatly influenced the development of mining in the Southwest. The Mexicanos who worked in the mine fields were descended from a class of miners who had their formal apprenticeship under Spanish rule. Generations of Mexican miners had learned and passed on mining techniques and knowledge of copper ore bodies of the Arizona-Sonora zone. This knowledge notwithstanding, Mexican miners continually received lower wages than those obtained by their Anglo counterparts.<sup>1</sup> Over a period of time, discrimination engendered bitterness within the ranks of Mexican workers as they unsuccessfully tried to achieve parity within Anglo society. While no single incident was sufficient to spark a mining strike during the 1896-1917 period, Mexican workers were nonetheless aware of such attitudes of prejudice and took negative opinions into consideration when labor unrest seemed imminent.

In discussing attitudes toward Mexican workers in Arizona during this period, an understanding of factors outside the immediate scope of the copper camps in Arizona is required. One cannot arbitrarily draw a distinction between Mexican workers from the Republic or people of Mexican descent who resided in the Territory; to do so would underestimate the constant effect immigration had upon the Mexican labor force in Arizona. Moreover, mining entrepreneurs themselves did not always make such

distinctions. Being concerned with production and profit and not with how their labor force was viewed, owners did not feel compelled to determine any differences. While Americans viewed Mexican labor (within Mexico) as cheap and lacking in initiative, Anglos sometimes considered Mexican-American labor competent when properly supervised. With the passage of years, however, Americans lumped these laboring classes together. Mine owners benefitted by capitalizing on such viewpoints concerning their labor force and rationalized low wages on this basis. It made little difference if the mining enterprise was American-owned and operated with the consent of the Mexican government in the northern part of the Republic or if the company was situated in Arizona and relied upon a ready-made labor force of recently arrived Mexican workers.

The use of Mexican nationals in Arizona's mining enterprises lent itself to reinforcing cultural biases. Without seeking to explore reasons for such prejudices, it is nonetheless necessary to expose various attitudes that directly affected Mexican labor. Despite contemporary viewpoints, Mexican laborers were neither childlike nor docile. Mexicans not only were aware of the cultural biases leveled against them, they were quite willing to take collective action against employers who sought to reap benefits from discriminatory attitudes. The constant flux of workers to the border area and their subsequent migration to various mining fields within Arizona served a dual purpose. Mining entrepreneurs were provided with a constant labor supply and preconceived stereotypes concerning Mexican workers were reinforced.

Many theories were advanced to explain the series of strikes that occurred in Arizona in the early 1900s. Much credit has been given to immediate bread and butter factors such as better wages and working

conditions as simple causes for the walkouts, but little emphasis has been placed on the long-range causes that played parts in the strikes. Within these last considerations are to be found negative opinions which confronted Mexicans both as workers and as members of society. That derogatory opinions could merit consideration as factors in strikes is significant when it is realized that of the five major strikes which occurred in or near the Territory (1896, 1900, 1903, 1906, 1915) Mexican workers declared and directed all but one and that the fifth resulted in the continued employment of Mexican labor in a predominantly Anglo community.<sup>2</sup>

The earliest and most widely used form of exploitation of Mexican workers was the peonage system. Given the fact that mine owners sought to exploit mineral resources as quickly and cheaply as possible, it is apparent why such an institution as the company store evolved. In many instances, the financial success of a mining enterprise was enhanced by the profitability of its store.<sup>3</sup> Money paid out in wages soon found its way back to the company via the store. To help keep the cost of labor at a minimum, owners adopted the practice of paying Mexican workers the greater part of their wages in cotton and other goods.<sup>4</sup>

Utilization of the company store by employers against their employees is not a story confined to the Mexican miners. One has only to look at the experience of working classes elsewhere to find close parallels. Still, while such an institution proved economically advantageous for the mining enterprise, such methods created resentment among Mexican workers.<sup>5</sup>

It is understandable why Mexican workers tolerated part of their wages being paid in merchandise, food rations and cash. Isolation and scarcity of ready markets made the system a workable one. With the

passage of years, however, this became a standard practice of payment utilized by mine owners toward their employees. Such a system, although initially at least superficially valid, did not allow for a change in the method of payment. As mining camps in Arizona grew in size and the number of markets increased, Mexican miners still found themselves being paid in a manner which had become antiquated.

While most contemporary sources disapproved of the use of peonage, they nonetheless felt that it was necessary for a mining enterprise to be successful. A contemporary mining speculator, Raphael Pumpelly, felt that the substitution of Anglos for peon labor would fail because of the debilitating influence of the climate on Americans. Mexican labor, therefore, was good only when properly supervised, but to render it profitable for owners "the recognition of the traditionary custom of peonage is necessary."<sup>6</sup>

Recognizing peonage as a needed form of labor and accepting the peon as a member of society proved to be two irreconcilable facts. While appreciated for his availability to work under harsh conditions, the peon faced unfavorable social opinions. As a class, the Mexican peon was looked upon as coming from an "ignorant, treacherous, low, degraded, thieving class."<sup>7</sup> The same feeling eventually encompassed Mexicans in general. It made little difference if they were Mexican nationals who had recently arrived in the territory or Mexican-Americans. They were paid the same "Mexican wage," assigned menial tasks with little promise of upward mobility and treated differently than their Anglo counterparts.<sup>8</sup>

A double standard of wages tended to maintain the depressed position of Mexican workers within the peonage system. Working a twelve hour daily

shift, Mexican workers received \$12.50 per month. In contrast, Anglo workmen acquired \$30 to \$40 per month.<sup>9</sup> The lack of economic parity was approved by the Anglo populace who felt that the natural inferiority of Mexicans required their relegation to lower stations in life.<sup>10</sup> The double standard of wages remained intact until around 1916.<sup>11</sup>

Despite the fact that they obtained lower wages in the territory, Mexican trabajadores (workers) continued to emigrate from the Mexican states of Guanajuato, Aguascalientes, Michoacán and Sonora with the hope of improving their economic and social conditions.<sup>12</sup> This coincides with another trend within the overall Arizona mining scene--the transition of mining ventures from small, individually owned operations to mining on a corporate level with absentee owners and foreign investors.

The transition, beginning in the 1870-1890 period, completely changed the internal structure of the mining industry itself.<sup>13</sup> It allowed for and encouraged the accomodation of large numbers of Mexican workers in the border area. Mine owners, realizing that these immigrants possessed traditional knowledge of mining procedures, constantly encouraged recruitment of Mexican miners.<sup>14</sup>

Continued immigration reinforced existing biases. Cultural prejudice, demonstrated as early as the 1850s, was still evident as late as the early 1900s. Evinced by Anglo-Arizonas attempts to restrict Mexicans from citizenship, property rights and various jobs, a two class socio-economic system evolved within the territory by 1900.<sup>15</sup> The evolution of this system, accepted and applauded by Anglo society, proved a constant thorn in the side of Mexican workers. Their status certainly played a role in the Mexican miners' struggle for equality within Arizona.

The series of strikes of the first two decades of the 1900s cannot be understood by a study of bread and butter issues alone. Mexican workers were aware of the stereotype which had evolved concerning their status. These early strikes afforded them an opportunity to lash out against economic, social and racial prejudices and injustices.

Not everyone shared mine owners' enthusiasm for employing large numbers of Mexican workers. Existing unions, such as the Western Federation of Miners, tried to restrict hiring of Mexican workers in Arizona. Federation opposition was due to two main causes: Mexicans were "cheap labor" and threatened any existing union wages; and Mexican workers had been used as strikebreakers and had acquired, therefore, the added stigma of "scab" labor.<sup>16</sup>

The first decade of the 1900s proved a pivotal period for unionism in Arizona, especially for the WFM. The union's "anti-alien" policy affected all workers of Mexican lineage. By playing upon fears that alien Mexican labor would undercut Anglo wages, the WFM tried to unionize various mining camps within Arizona to the exclusion of all Mexican workers.<sup>17</sup> Before long, this general belief extended to all people of Mexican extraction, alien or not.<sup>18</sup>

Fear of alien Mexican labor is symptomatic of a short-sighted policy. Seeking to unionize along the border, the WFM continually met with failure as mine operators simply recruited Mexicans as replacements for American miners who sympathized with the Federation. The use of "scabs" increased antagonism between the two laboring classes.<sup>19</sup>

Stereotypical views continued to evolve concerning Mexican workers. Victor S. Clark, assigned by the federal government to study Mexican labor in the United States offered the following:

The Mexican laborer is unambitious, listless, physically weak, irregular, and indolent. On the other hand, he is docile, patient, usually orderly in camp, fairly intelligent. . . obedient and cheap. . . His strongest point is his willingness to work for low wages.<sup>20</sup>

Few people willingly work for low wages, and it can be concluded that lack of education, coupled with an obvious language barrier, confined Mexicans to the tasks of unskilled workers.

These facts assume a greater importance when considering that owners also preferred Mexican laborers because they could be easily exploited, manipulated or replaced at the discretion of labor bosses or foremen. When viewed as a cheap labor class, it was easier for mine owners to justify low wages by explaining that "they [Mexicans] do not do as much as the white man."<sup>21</sup> Immediate banishment from the district awaited those who voiced grievances to their employers.<sup>22</sup>

Initially, newly arrived Mexican miners might have been content with their salaries in mining camps throughout Arizona. Although the money received by Mexicanos was less than that obtained by Anglos in similar positions, wages were nonetheless higher than the norm in Mexico. The passage of years, however, witnessed the questioning of such a double standard as Mexican miners sought equal pay for equal work.

According to contemporary sources, Mexican peons were also downgraded because they were not responsible enough to merit positions of trust or skill within mining enterprises. Writers seeking to expound on habits of Mexican workers stressed the Indian and Spanish culture that produced the Mexican miner. Stating that Indians knew little of responsibility and that the Spanish culture was characterized by diplomacy, the Mining and Scientific Press concluded that the Mexican was one who diplomatically shirked responsibility.<sup>23</sup> Because of such strange opinions,

Mexican workers were seen as being directed by their emotions and not by their reason. It was felt that as a laboring class, Mexicans had the intellect of children.<sup>24</sup>

Mining journals continually reiterated that successful management of Mexican labor required an awareness that the Mexican miners belonged to a race "whose habits and characteristics are those of a simple minded people. . .who have not learned to act on their own initiative."<sup>25</sup> Above all, managers of mining enterprises continually stressed the need for patience with Mexican employees.

Mine owners' belief in Mexican irresponsibility was predicated upon preconceptions concerning Mexican workers' lack of initiative, unwillingness to save and desire for alcohol.<sup>26</sup> These "attributes" supported the conclusion that Mexican labor, although plentiful, was naturally inferior. American mine operators, both in Mexico and Arizona, were cautioned that it was folly to expect Mexican laborers to deliver either the quality or quantity of work of Anglo workers. "He [the Mexican] does not compare in physique, ambition, judgement, or intelligence with the American."<sup>27</sup>

Territorial newspapers applauded those who "recognized that the American miner or laborer of whatever line, puts into execution of his task far more vitality than does his Mexican competitor."<sup>28</sup> Many times Mexican workers were seen as frightened and poverty-stricken peons who were "afraid to own property other than the serapes and sombreros they carried on their backs and covering their heads" and who could be supplanted by "self-reliant men [non-Mexicans] with money in the bank and an assurance for their future."<sup>29</sup> While allowing that Mexican workers were human, editors of the Engineering and Mining Journal stated that, in general,

"Mexicans have primitive instincts and, for that reason, are savage, cruel and dangerous when aroused. . ."30

Journals and newspapers dwelled upon yet another aspect of Mexican workers. It was generally felt that the Mexican miner could not stand prosperity. "He will often work three or four days, by which time, he will have had enough of work, and the next day when wanted he cannot be found."31

There were those who did caution against unjust and unnecessary comparisons between Anglo and Mexican labor. As early as 1898, Mexican government officials felt that such analogies might prove detrimental to both working classes. It was felt that Mexican laborers should be measured by Mexican standards when considering the different habits of thought and ways of life.<sup>32</sup> Further warnings were forthcoming against

. . .those biased people from this country [the United States] who visit Mexico and remain there only a few days, and return to the United States supposing that they know all about the subject and make incorrect and ungrounded statements about the laboring classes in general.<sup>33</sup>

Management's position remained unchanged.

Mine owners concern about the "uncertainty" of Mexican labor caused introduction of the contract labor system to insure the success of mining operations. Contract labor established a pre-set wage for a particular job. The foreman, or contratista, was in charge of seeing that the job be done in the most economical manner possible. By setting a price on a job, the company could employ workers on a piece-labor basis. This policy was utilized especially against Mexican workers who, it was felt, "should always be given contract, since they are no more conscientious than other laborers when paid by the day."34

To compliment contract labor, mine owners adopted the tarea or

or task system. Men were assigned a quota of work and were through for the day upon its completion. These methods provided Mexican miners little encouragement either to earn extra money or to acquire better positions.<sup>35</sup>

Such methods as contract and tarea were based upon the belief that Mexican labor was economically "inefficient." Contemporary sources, seeking to understand the nature of Mexican workers, concluded that Mexican laborers were generally underfed and that the inefficiency of Mexican workers was due to undernourishment. As a result, many Mexican workers were physically incapable of measuring up to foreign standards.<sup>36</sup> C. H. Grabell's study of health conditions among Mexican miners in the Engineering and Mining Journal asserted that the peon class could not afford to buy necessary amounts of food because of low pay.<sup>37</sup> A vicious cycle developed as undernourished workers, physically capable of only a low output, received less pay, and therefore, could buy less food, which reduced output, and so on.<sup>38</sup>

The reasons for this type of inefficiency are in themselves important but are not entirely germane to this narrative. What merits consideration is that mine owners, viewing their workers as inefficient, sought various other schemes to reduce possible economic loss because of such "unskilled" help. Such measures tended further to estrange their Mexican work force.

One such method utilized along the northern Sonora-Arizona region involved the practice of the boleta, or ticket, system. Miners at the end of a shift received their pay in checks or tokens of denominations ranging from twenty-five centavos to one peso. When miners bought items at the company stores, the amount of purchase was punched out. At the end of each month, any unspent tokens were exchanged for cash, usually

at a 25% discount.<sup>39</sup> Under such conditions, Mexican miners had little hope of saving their earnings, for they were forced to live so close to their actual level of income that any money at month's end was minimal.<sup>40</sup> Mine owners so favored this system that they worked strenuously and successfully against every piece of legislation designed to eradicate the practice.<sup>41</sup>

While the company store affected the entire labor force in varying degrees, the boleto system affected only Mexican workers. If a Mexican miner became disenchanted with the mining company, a lack of ready cash prohibited movement elsewhere. Mexicans resented the boleto so much that when strikes did occur, it was one of the first items which workers tried to abolish.

These are several long-term causes for mining strikes in the Arizona Territory. As Mexican workers migrated from American-owned mining enterprises in the Republic to the Arizona copper fields, they faced the very form of servitude they sought to escape. But during the decade of the 1890s, a working class consciousness formed among workers in Mexico.<sup>42</sup> The idea of workers' solidarity, transported to the northern Sonora-Arizona region, produced a large amount of labor agitation during the 1896-1917 period.

This twenty-one year span is of crucial importance, not only for the development of Arizona's working class but also for the role played by Mexican workers within this movement. While the WFM, PLM and IWW each affected Mexican miners to varying degrees during this period, it was nonetheless Mexicanos who called for and directed the majority of the labor strikes. Mexican miners had run the gauntlet from actual physical removal in Globe (1896) to a major labor victory in Clifton-Morenci

(1916).<sup>43</sup> They did so against prohibitive opinions and legislation which stymied such endeavors. The causes for these Mexican-run strikes would be difficult to reduce to one. Certainly, derogatory opinions displayed toward Mexican miners, lack of avenues to advance socially and economically and methods of payment all played an important part in creating and maintaining the high degree of resentment felt by Mexican workers. More immediate causes such as blacklisting, bribery, refusal of management to hear grievances, and a double standard of wages also played their respective roles in the actual calling of a walkout.<sup>44</sup> In order fully to appreciate Mexican strike activities in the Territory, one must have insights into the social, economic and racial factors which confronted the Mexicano.

<sup>1</sup>Otis E. Young, Western Mining (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), pp. 55-101. Young presents a well written and thought out presentation of mining developments and techniques developed during the Spanish and Mexican periods. Joseph F. Park, "The History of Mexican Labor in Arizona During the Territorial Period," (M. A. thesis, University of Arizona, 1961). Here the author develops the importance of Mexican miners to the development of Arizona's mining industries from 1848 until the turn of the century. Park's work should serve as the basis for any serious study of Arizona's mining history.

<sup>2</sup>Arizona Silver Belt (Globe, Arizona), June 4, 1896; Arizona Daily Citizen (Tuscon, Arizona), February 3, 1900; Bisbee Daily Review (Bisbee, Arizona), June 2, 1903; Mexican Herald (Mexico City), June 5, 1906; Arizona Daily Star (Tuscon, Arizona), September 17, 1915.

<sup>3</sup>Raphael Pumpelly, Across America and Asia 4th ed. revised (New York: Leypoldt and Holt, 1870), p. 32. For a description of the "treacherous" manner of the Mexican worker, see Ibid., pp. 29-30.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>5</sup>Arizona Silver Belt, March 4, 1897; Miguel Velasco Valdés, La prerrevolución y el hombre de la Calle (Mexico: Costa-Amic, 1964), pp. 153-54.

<sup>6</sup>Raphael Pumpelly, "Arizona," Mining and Scientific Press IV (January 18, 1862); Ibid. (January 25, February 1, 8, 1862).

<sup>7</sup>"A Scrap of Frontier History," Overland Monthly XXI (March 1893), p. 266.

<sup>8</sup>William Eugene Brooks to Anna P. Brooks, letter dated January 8, 1905. William Eugene Brooks Collection, Arizona Room, Hayden Library, Arizona State University, Box 1; Folder 2. Brooks served as a paymaster for the mining enterprises in the Clifton-Morenci-Metcalf district in Arizona.

<sup>9</sup>Raphael Pumpelly, Pumpelly's Arizona, edited by Andrew Wallace, (Tuscon: Palo Verde Press, 1965), p. 64; Pumpelly, Across America and Asia, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup>Sylvester Mowry, Arizona and Sonora: The Geography and Resources of the Silver Region of North America (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1864), pp. 94, 175. See also, Walter E. Weyl, "Labor Conditions in Mexico," Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, vol. 34-38, January, 1902 (Washington, Government Printing Press: Department of Commerce, 1902), passim. Weyl gives an excellent account of Mexican labor within Mexico and factors which bear directly on the Mexican work force.

<sup>11</sup>Park, "Mexican Labor in Arizona," p. 245. Hiram C. Hodge, Arizona As It Is, or the Coming Country (Boston: H. O. Houghton and Company, 1877), p. 112. Both Anglo and Mexican workers wages increased between the years 1860-1895. By 1900, however, Mexican wages remained stable while Anglo miners obtained substantial raises.

<sup>12</sup>Victor S. Clark, "Mexican Labor in the United States," Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, vol. 78, September, 1908 (Washington: Department of Commerce, 1908), passim. Clark's study is a follow up report of Weyl's.

<sup>13</sup>"Mines and Mining Companies of Arizona," American Railroad Journal XXXIV (January 5, 1861), pp. 1-2. "The Arizona Copper Mines," Hunter's Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review XXXIV (June 1856), pp. 759-60. Such organizations as the Sonora Exploring and Mining Co. (1856), Santa Rita Silver Mining Co. (1858), Arizona Copper Co. (1864) would give way to such large scale operations as the Shannon Copper Company.

<sup>14</sup>James Colquhoun, The Early History of the Clifton-Morenci District (London: William Clowes and Sons, no date), pp. 35-37. Clark, "Mexican Labor in the United States," pp. 475-76. This is a detailed account of methods utilized in obtaining labor.

<sup>15</sup>Park, "Mexican Labor in Arizona," pp. 234-35. Journals of the Twenty-Fifth Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Arizona, 1909, pp. 224-30. Arizona Room, Hayden Library, Arizona State University. Arizona Daily Star, October 16, 1915. Arizona Labor Journal (Phoenix), October 14, 1915. James H. McClintock, Arizona: The Nation's Youngest Commonwealth Within a Land of Ancient Cultures (Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1916), 8 vols., II, p. 358. For an interesting discussion of such cultural biases see, A. B. Brophy, Foundlings on the Frontier (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1972).

<sup>16</sup>Clark, "Mexican Labor in the United States," p. 486.

<sup>17</sup>Arizona Silver Belt, June 4, 1896.

<sup>18</sup>Clark, "Mexican Labor in the United States," p. 513.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 492. Bisbee Daily Review, March 15, 25, 1902.

<sup>20</sup>Clark, "Mexican Labor in the United States," p. 492.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 485-86.

<sup>22</sup>Copper Era (Clifton, Arizona), October 10, 1915.

<sup>23</sup>Mining and Scientific Press, October 17, 1914.

<sup>24</sup>Robert G. Cleland, "Mining Industry of Mexico," July 2, 1921, and Alonzo Crittendon, "Management of Mexican Labor," pp. 13-20, 267-68, in Mining and Scientific Press 123 (August 20, 1921). Both authors discuss problems of the mining industry in Mexico.

<sup>25</sup>Evan Fraser-Campbell, "Management of Mexican Labor," Engineering and Mining Journal 91 (June 3, 1911), p. 1104.

<sup>26</sup>Weyl, "Labor Conditions in Mexico," pp. 12-22.

<sup>27</sup>Allen H. Rogers, "Character and Habits of the Mexican Miner," Engineering and Mining Journal 85 (April 4, 1908), p. 702. Hereafter cited as EMJ.

<sup>28</sup>The Oasis (Nogales, Arizona), June 9, 1906.

<sup>29</sup>Dwight E. Woodbridge, "La Cananea Mining Camp," EMJ 82 (October 6, 1906), p. 623. Valdés, La Prerevolución, p. 153.

<sup>30</sup>EMJ 64 (October 15, 1927), p. 619.

<sup>31</sup>EMJ 65 (November 5, 1910), p. 914.

<sup>32</sup>Matías Romero, Mexico and the United States (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1898), p. 506.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Hugh G. Elwes, "Points about Mexican Labor," EMJ 65 (October 1, 1910), p. 662. Edwin H. Davison, "Labor in Mexican Mines," Mining and Scientific Press 92 (April 14, 1906), p. 260. Valdés, La Prerevolución, pp. 153-54.

<sup>35</sup>W. W. Shelby, "Mexican Contract Labor, Day's Pay and Task," EMJ 114 (September 30, 1922), p. 587. Fred McCoy, "Mexican Labor on Concrete Work," EMJ 92 (September 16, 1911), p. 555.

<sup>36</sup>C. H. Grabell, "Inefficiency and Poor Food of Mexican Miners," EMJ 109 (February 14, 1920), pp. 448-51.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 450.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 451. G. F. Campbell, "The Mexican Peon Problem," EMJ 109 (May 8, 1920), p. 1056.

<sup>39</sup>La Regeneración, June 15, 1906. Albert Bacon Fall Papers, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California. Valdés, La Prerevolución, p. 153.

<sup>40</sup>Edwin H. Davison, "Labor in Mexican Mines," Mining and Scientific Press 92 (April 14, 1906), p. 260.

<sup>41</sup>Arizona Silver Belt, March 4, 1897.

<sup>42</sup>Rodney D. Anderson, Outcasts in Their Own Land: Mexican Industrial Workers, 1906-1911 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976), pp. 17-18.

<sup>43</sup>Arizona Silver Belt, June 4, 1896. Demands were for a "restoration of wages to \$3 for all persons employed in and about the mine; that Mexicans be summarily discharged; that the monthly insurance fee be abolished; that no union man be discharged, and that no one be employed except upon the approval of the union" Copper Era, January 21, 25, 28, 1916.

<sup>44</sup>"A Strike Without Disorder," New Republic V (January 22, 1916), p. 304. B. W. J. Lauck, "Labor Conditions in Arizona's Smelters," Mining and Scientific Press CIV (February 3, 1912), p. 213. John A. Fitch, "Arizona's Embargo on Strike-Breakers," The Survey XXXVI (May 6, 1916), p. 143.

### CHAPTER III

#### EARLY MEXICAN STRIKE ACTIVITY

Students of western labor history, and those specifically interested in Arizona industrial strife, generally concede that the Territory's first significant labor disturbance occurred at Clifton-Morenci in 1903. Vernon H. Jensen supports this belief in his pioneering work, Heritage of Conflict, which chronicles this significant labor outbreak.<sup>1</sup> More and more, however, scholars of Arizona labor struggles are redefining and de-emphasizing 1903 as Arizona's starting point in strike activity. José Torres in his work entitled "The Globe Strike of 1896" exemplifies this trend. It is Torres' belief, and one shared by this writer, that "while somewhat less complex and threatening to life. . .and property" the Globe walkout "did have a permanent and significant impact on the Arizona labor scene."<sup>2</sup>

The Old Dominion mine of Globe had undergone several transfers of ownership before the Lewishon Brothers of New York and the Bigelow interests of Boston merged to control the mining interest in 1895.<sup>3</sup> The Bigelow-Lewishon interests immediately hired Alex D. McLean as manager of the mining company. McLean had previously been connected with the mining interests of the Detroit Copper Company of the Clifton-Morenci district.<sup>4</sup> To assist McLean, the company appointed S. A. Parnell. The two antagonized each other from the start as each sought to establish his authority over the other.

Parnell, hoping to aid the company which was then experiencing financial difficulties, reduced workers' wages from \$3 to \$2.50 per day,

thereby arousing the animosity of his work force. Continuing differences of opinion regarding mine operations resulted in McLean's resignation in April of 1896. Now free to pursue his own policy, Parnell further reduced miner's pay to \$2.25 per shift,<sup>5</sup> providing the catalyst for the labor outbreak that reached a climax late on the night of May 30. Angry employees confronted Parnell in the streets of Globe and demanded a restoration of previous rates.<sup>6</sup> Parnell refused.

The following day, a strikers' committee met once again with Parnell in an effort to reach some sort of agreement. While agreeing to reinstate a \$2.50 per day wage, Parnell adamantly refused to restore the previous \$3.00 scale. Workers declined to accept his gesture. With this impasse, employees determined to create a union and to ask for Western Federation affiliation.<sup>7</sup> As a result, Globe miners union #60 of the WFM was established.

Once agreement to unionize had been reached among striking workers, they broadened their demands to include: 1) restoration of a \$3.00 base pay; 2) abolition of the monthly insurance fee; 3) no discharge of union men; 4) no employment without the approval of the union; and 5) summary discharge of Mexicans.<sup>8</sup>

This last request was a direct result of the use of Mexican workers to replace disgruntled Anglo workers who voiced complaints regarding the fiscal policies of Parnell and McLean. That such a demand was made is indeed a reflection of the community's social attitude. There is no way of determining the residence of these "Mexicans." They may have been living in the copper camp before the strike or may have been brought in from various other mining areas by management to replace American workers when it became evident to Parnell that there would be great dissatisfaction

concerning his reduction of wages. To include such a request is to underscore the one salient factor concerning Mexican workers of this era: Mexican workers were denigrated by both management, which sought always to use this labor pool to entrepreneurial advantage, and by unions, which did not always understand but fully feared any impact Mexicanos might exert on union organizations. Both organized labor and management created alliances in hope that it would insure their supremacy in labor confrontations. Each side used the issue of Mexican labor to enhance its position. In a very real sense, Mexican workers had no say in events which would determine their economic livelihood and social position. Used as a tool by management against organized labor and resented by unions for having been so used, Mexican workers were exploited, denigrated and manipulated by both management and organized labor.

Even though residents of Globe made it clear that they did not favor the use of Mexican nationals as opposed to Mexican-Americans, there nonetheless was a great concern with trying to insure that Globe would remain a "white man's town."<sup>9</sup> A nativist jingoistic attitude engulfed the community so that in reality no distinction was made between "alien" Mexicans and Mexican-Americans. One merchant in Globe stated that "if the white miners were to be displaced by underpaid Mexicans who would trade only with their own people, he may as well burn down his own store and be done with it."<sup>10</sup>

In short, the issue revolved around Anglo residents being able to obtain an acceptable standard of living or if they were to "give way to undesirable aliens who do not. . .speak the English language."<sup>11</sup> This opinion exemplifies Anglo attitudes toward Mexican workers during

this period in general and the strike in particular.

Journals, newspapers and other contemporary sources continually stressed the dichotomy between the two laboring classes. Illustrating the sense of Anglo superiority, The Oasis of Nogales, Arizona, reported that American miners and laborers were far more intelligent than their Mexican counterparts and competitors.<sup>12</sup> A duality existed in Globe in 1896. By exonerating American workers, public sentiment vilified Mexican laborers; by assuring their economic and unionizational success, Anglo miners condemned any possibility of progress for Mexicans, alien or not, who resided in Arizona. Once established, this pattern continued until 1916.

Once local miners agreed to WFM affiliation, negotiations ceased until July. In that month, G. M. Hyams, general manager of the Bigelow interests, went to Globe to speak with miners and leading businessmen. Acquiescing to all but one of the strikers demands, Hyams earnestly sought a quick settlement. Parnell received a reprimand for cutting wages without authority from the home office. The one issue that management refused to consider was the right of non-interference in company hiring.<sup>13</sup>

With the appearance of Hyams came the end to Arizona's first walk-out. Although brief in duration and free of violence, ramifications of the strike were far-reaching. Hoping to insure the success of the WFM local in Globe, and the tenets of Western mining unionism in general, Federation President Edward Boyce journeyed to the camp to increase union membership.<sup>14</sup> The result was the apparent trade-off between management and organized labor. No objection to unionism was made, providing that no interference in hiring practices was forthcoming. Where advancement of the Anglo sector of any work force could be obtained, it was done so

to the detriment of the Mexican worker.

Because of the Globe strike and because of the fear of possible future attacks such as those that had occurred in that community, Mexican workers tended to withdraw into their own enclaves--usually isolated from the main part of the mining town and graphically termed "little Sonoras."<sup>15</sup> When these miners did venture forth, they sought work in predominantly Mexican mining camps which were springing up throughout Arizona. Territorial mining ventures increased substantially during the early part of the twentieth century, and as they did, they openly received Mexican workers to serve as the bulwark of their labor.<sup>16</sup> As operators actively recruited Mexicanos, they continued to pay lower wages to their Mexican employees.<sup>17</sup> Fearing continued retribution, Mexican miners accepted their boletas and their plight silently.<sup>18</sup> The seeds of discontent had been sown, however, and it was not long before Mexicans began to voice their dissatisfaction.

The first instance of Mexicanos lashing back at the political, social, and economic institutions which affected their status within Arizona Territory is found in a strike which occurred in Ray in 1900. Although extremely brief in duration, Mexican miners exploded the myth that they were passive peons who rarely called for, or participated in, strikes.<sup>19</sup> By walking off of his job, the Mexican miner challenged a stereotype which had labelled him backward and inert.<sup>20</sup>

In February 1900, Mexican miners in Ray went on strike when their work shift increased from eight to ten hours. Mine operators refused to increase the basic \$2.00 salary, however, in response, Mexican laborers refused to return to work until their demand for a wage increase to \$3.00 was met.<sup>21</sup> Mine managers simply discharged "unskilled" Mexican laborers

and hired American workers. In essence, mine superintendents felt that if any wage concessions were to be made, then Anglo laborers should be the beneficiaries of such a decision.<sup>22</sup> Although Mexican workers had enough food staples to last two months should the strike be prolonged, they soon realized the futility of their desires and were forced to leave the camp when management started contracting Anglo miners.<sup>23</sup>

While the Ray strike initiated Mexican resistance to treatment by Anglo management, it also pointed out the continuing antagonisms between Mexican and Anglo workers, illustrating the ease of undermining one laboring class with another with the aid and mechanizations at the disposal of management.<sup>24</sup> This acrimony increased Anglo and WFM desires to secure Arizona locals and unionize only the Anglo portion of the workforce. By 1903, the Arizona Labor Federation was formed and allied itself with the American Federation of Labor. Assisting both unions in Arizona was the American Labor Union which, in turn, obtained assistance from WFM headquarters.<sup>25</sup> Technically, while the WFM was opposed to Samuel Gompers' concept of eastern AFL craft unionism, both unions found common ground in Arizona.

The three year period between 1900-1903 remained relatively quiet for Mexican workers as they continued buttressing Arizona's labor force. There was, however, a movement, spearheaded by WFM backing, which sought to undermine the use of Mexican labor. Such efforts resulted in passage of an eight-hour law by the territorial legislature which affected all underground workers. This law, patterned after one used in Wyoming, excluded mill and smelter workers.<sup>26</sup> The omission of mill and smelter laborers is significant. These positions were generally filled by "skilled" Anglo workers who favored Federation unionism. The passage

of the law, although pleasing in itself to union officials, especially gratified its advocates for it prohibited mine owners from recruiting and employing Mexican workers who provided the vast majority of underground workers.<sup>27</sup> WFM officials, not wanting to admit Mexican workers, yet afraid of their impact upon union policies, openly applauded the law.

While passage of the eight-hour law met with organized labor's approval, it drew the ire of management--particularly that of Phelps-Dodge, the leading copper producer in Arizona. By 1903, all major copper areas in the territory (with the exception of Jerome) fell under the control of this corporation.<sup>28</sup>

On June 1, the eight-hour law went into effect with the understanding that wages would remain stable and would not be decreased in response to the reduction of hours. Although most mining interests complied with the law, the Arizona Copper Company and the Detroit Copper Company of the Clifton-Morenci district refused to do so and reduced their wages.<sup>29</sup> Mexican miners not only resented the ulterior motives behind the eight-hour law, but also greatly resented further wage cuts which had more impact upon this laboring class since they received lower salaries than other workers prior to June 1903. As a result of salary reductions, Mexican workers in this district went out on strike.<sup>30</sup>

Contemporary journals such as the Engineering and Mining Journal, feeling that Mexican miners were not capable of running a walkout, hinted that outside agitators, such as WFM organizers, were responsible for this most recent labor disorder.<sup>31</sup> This assumption is not tenable. Closer inspection reveals that other sources mention little, if anything, about Anglo participation in the strike. Already working eight hour shifts for salaries higher than prior to the enactment of the new law, little

could be gained by these workers by striking. With so little Anglo cooperation there is no reason to suspect that Mexican strikers obtained WFM guidance--especially when considering previous Federation policy regarding their fellow workers. Mexican workers comprised some 90% of the strike force with a majority of the remaining 10% consisting of eastern Europeans.<sup>32</sup>

This strike is a testimonial to the desire of Mexican workers to improve their economic and social positions. Facing insurmountable odds and receiving no help from established unions, Mexican workers exhibited a deep-rooted sense of solidarity as their walkout tied up the Clifton-Morenci district. Mexican strikers were aided by mutualistas (mutual aid societies) which served a multitude of purposes for the Spanish-speaking during times of labor calm and strife.<sup>33</sup> Because of the initial success of Mexican organization and solidarity, court injunctions were issued restraining acknowledged strike leaders from urging men to carry on with the strike.<sup>34</sup> Anglo workers who might have help inaugurate the strike, quickly left as the Bisbee Daily Review reported that "these men are taking no part with the Mexicans."<sup>35</sup>

The governor of Arizona, fearing violence, ordered the state militia and the Arizona Rangers to settle the dispute. This force was assisted by five companies of federal troops,<sup>36</sup> and the strike was quickly quelled. Leaders of the walkout were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment at the territorial prison in Yuma.<sup>37</sup>

With the end of the "Mexican affair" came an increased concern over the continued use of large numbers of Mexican workers. There is no reason to suspect that anti-Mexican feelings declined as Joseph Park has suggested, nor is there reason to believe that, because of the

strike, cooperation between Mexican and Anglo workers surfaced where acrimony had previously existed.<sup>38</sup> Although giving verbal support to striking miners, WFM officials did little else to assist them. For their part, Mexican workers, resenting past Federation policies, at no time asked for WFM affiliation.

Realizing the furor created by the walkout and also acknowledging that public sentiment blamed employment of "foreigners" for the strike, management quickly acquiesced to pressure and agreed to reduce the number of Mexican employees.<sup>39</sup> With time, however, this policy was ignored and earlier employment patterns prevailed.

Nineteen hundred three was a watershed year in Arizona labor history. No longer the obeisant or complacent employees management had imagined them to be, Mexican workers showed that they would not readily tolerate double standards or placidly accept conditions that would entrap them in subservient roles. The WFM, which had obtained its initial foothold in Arizona by excluding Mexican miners, did little to alter its original policy regarding this class of miners. Mine owners, while suffering a temporary setback at Globe, had, by 1903, been successful in dealing with malcontented Mexican workers. The triumph had been obtained simply by replacing Mexican labor with Anglos in Ray in 1900 and again in 1903 backed by a contingent of armed personnel.

Mexican miners continued their efforts to improve working and economic conditions. Their endeavors encompassed not only the territory but also the American-owned Cananea Copper Company just south of the border where workers toiled under conditions reminiscent of those in Arizona.

<sup>1</sup>Vernon H. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict: Labor Relations in the Nonferrous Metals Industry up to 1930 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950), p. 356.

<sup>2</sup>José Torres, "The Globe Strike, 1896," MS Chicano Studies, Hayden Library, Arizona State University.

<sup>3</sup>Engineering and Mining Journal 61 (June 6, 1896), p. 539. Hereafter cited EMJ. Ibid., (June 13, 1896), p. 564.

<sup>4</sup>EMJ 61 (June 20, 1896), p. 586.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Arizona Silver Belt (Globe, Arizona), June 4, 1896. EMJ 62 (November 7, 1896), p. 443.

<sup>8</sup>EMJ 61 (June 20, 1896), p. 586.

<sup>9</sup>Joseph F. Park, "The History of Mexican Labor in Arizona During the Territorial Period," (MA Thesis, University of Arizona, 1961), p. 249. Arizona Republic (Phoenix, Arizona), April 18, 1928.

<sup>10</sup>Torres, "The Globe Strike," p. 11. Park, "Mexican Labor in Arizona," p. 249. Arizona Republic, April 18, 1928. Public sentiment in Globe was divided regarding the strike order. Initially supporting this endeavor, merchants soon realized the necessity of continued mine operations for a sound economy, see, Phoenix Daily Herald (Phoenix, Arizona), June 13, 1896.

<sup>11</sup>Arizona Silver Belt, June 11, 1896. Torres, "Globe Strike," p. 14.

<sup>12</sup>The Oasis (Nogales, Arizona), June 9, 1906.

<sup>13</sup>EMJ 62 (July 18, 1896), p. 60.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid. (November 7, 1896), p. 443.

<sup>15</sup>Manuel P. Servín and Robert Spude, "Historical Conditions of Early Mexican Labor in the United States: Arizona--A Neglected Story," The Journal of Mexican American History V (1975), p. 50.

<sup>16</sup>George F. Leaming, "Labor and Copper in Arizona: Origin and Growth," Arizona Review 16 (April 1967), pp. 15-17.

<sup>17</sup>Servín and Spude citing Nathan Oaks Murphy, Report of the Governor of Arizona to the Secretary of the Interior, 1899 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. 98-102. Park, "Mexican Labor in Arizona," p. 245. Victor S. Clark, "Mexican Labor in the United States," Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, vol. 78, September 1908, pp. 475-76.

<sup>18</sup>Arizona Silver Belt, March 4, 1897.

<sup>19</sup>Clark, "Mexican Labor in the United States," p. 429.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 496.

<sup>21</sup>Arizona Daily Citizen (Tuscon, Arizona), February 2, 1900.

<sup>22</sup>Arizona Silver Belt, February 8, 1900.

<sup>23</sup>Arizona Daily Citizen, February 2, 1900.

<sup>24</sup>The fear of allowing Mexican workers into a copper district or union during these turbulent years can also be seen in incidents which occurred in the mining camps of Jerome and Pearce in the early 1900s. In part, this anxiety was compounded by owners who deliberately brought in Mexicans to replace recalcitrant Anglo workers. See, Arizona Daily Citizen, October 30, 1901, Arizona Republican, November 2, 1901, Jerome Mining News (Jerome, Arizona), August 25, 1902 and May 11, 1903.

<sup>25</sup>Leaming, "Labor and Copper in Arizona," p. 17. EMJ 76 (August 8, 1903), p. 326.

<sup>26</sup>EMJ 75 (March 14, 1903), p. 421.

<sup>27</sup>James H. McClintock, Arizona: The Nation's Youngest Commonwealth Within a Land of Ancient Cultures (Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1916), 8 vols., II, p. 352. Park, "Mexican Labor in Arizona," p. 256.

<sup>28</sup>Robert Glass Cleland, A History of Phelps-Dodge, 1834-1950 (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1952) and James W. Byrkit, "Walter Douglas and Labor Struggles in Early 20th Century Arizona," Southwest Economy and Society 1 (1976). Both of these works expertly chronicle Phelps-Dodge activities in Arizona.

<sup>29</sup>EMJ 75 (June 20, 1903), p. 944.

<sup>30</sup>The Tuscon Citizen (Tuscon, Arizona), June 4, 1903.

<sup>31</sup>EMJ 75 (June 20, 1903), p. 944.

<sup>32</sup>Jerome News, June 8, 1903. Tuscon Citizen, June 4, 1903.

<sup>33</sup>Bisbee Daily Review (Bisbee, Arizona) June 3, 1903. El Club Lerdo de Tejada (Douglas), La Sociedad Alianza Hispano-Americana (Tuscon) and La Saragosa were the largest mutualistas. See, Antonio G. Rivera, La Revolución en Sonora (Mexico, D. F., 1969), p. 165.

<sup>34</sup>Arizona Silver Belt, June 18, 1903. Acknowledged strike leaders were Maxmevo Arillo, Abran Salcido, Severo Montez and W. H. Laustaunau.

<sup>35</sup>Bisbee Daily Review, June 5, 1903. Joseph F. Park, "The 1903 'Mexican Affair' at Clifton," Journal of Arizona History 18 (Summer 1977), p. 142.

<sup>36</sup>EMJ 75 (June 20, 1903), p. 944.

<sup>37</sup>Arizona Silver Belt, October 29, 1903. W. H. Laustaunau was fined \$3,000 and served two years at the Territorial Prison at Yuma. Abrán Salcido, Francisco Figourea and Manuel N. Flores were all fined \$1,00 and received two years. Frank Columbo, Frank Saleni, Periano Gaetano and Joe Purpi all were sentenced to two years while Juan B. de la O and Francisco Gonzalez were required to serve one year terms.

<sup>38</sup>Park, "1903 'Mexican Affair' at Clifton," p. 145.

<sup>39</sup>EMJ 75 (June 27, 1903), p. 980.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE CANANEA STRIKE OF 1906

It is necessary to take into consideration labor activity outside of Arizona's borders when chronicling territorial labor history and the impact of Mexicans upon its unfolding. Such is the case with the Cananea strike of 1906.

The Cananea mining strike of 1906 was the first violent attempt by Mexican workers to better their working and economic conditions along the border with Arizona. The copper mining community of Cananea, located in the state of Sonora, Mexico, some fifty miles south of Tombstone, Arizona, was the site of the initial clash of two opposing forces and ideologies: the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, President of Mexico, and the growing discontented factions of intellectuals, students, and laborers. This latter group coalesced into various organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the Díaz regime.

There is no denying that such anti-Díaz factions were responsible for the labor difficulties in Cananea in June 1906. Far more important, however, is the method in which this lockout as well as past and future labor disputes in territorial Arizona were handled. The manner in which the strike was suppressed is indicative of the stranglehold mine owners

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I wish to thank Dr. C. L. Sonnichsen for graciously providing me with monographs which were acquired during his visits to Mexico in pursuit of his own historical research. I also extend my gratitude to Dr. Sonnichsen for encouraging me to postulate new theories concerning the reasons for the strike.

and government officials had over the labor force and of the measures they would take to quell labor militancy.

The Partido Liberal Mexicano (Mexican Liberal Party or PLM) headed by Ricardo Flores Magón, was the anti-Díaz faction most directly concerned with the strike of 1906. The PLM was vocal and physically active in its opposition to Díaz, and became increasingly concerned with organizing Mexican labor. After Cananea, PLM organizers migrated to Arizona mining camps to coordinate labor activities and to carry forth the banner of the PLM. More often than not, the success of future labor disputes in which Mexicans were active in the Southwest would involve organizers who had received their "baptism" in Cananea. To understand any portion of early Arizona labor history requires an understanding of this one incident, for Cananea set the stage for what followed.

The Cananea mining strike of northern Sonora has yet to be satisfactorily explained. American labor historians have paid little attention to this particular strike; Mexican historians, however, have emphasized its importance to the point where those who fell in the struggle are considered precursors of the Mexican Revolution.<sup>1</sup>

On the surface, it is difficult to determine the actual cause of the walkout. It may have been the discrepancy between wages paid to Mexican and American workers. Modern historians argue that the strike resulted from a growing discontent with the Porfirio Díaz regime and its policy of making Mexico a haven for foreign investors. But there appears to be an aspect that is surprisingly overlooked by historians on both sides of the border--namely, the idea of racial prejudice. To pay a laborer less because of race is to invite unnecessary hardships and resentments.

In the late 1800s, waves of foreign investments infiltrated all levels of Mexican society. This was met with bitter resentment by certain Mexican factions. Among these groups was the Marxist coalition of the Flores Magón brothers. As the guiding spirits of the PLM in Mexico, they faced constant persecution at the hands of Mexican officials. Rather than face imprisonment, the officials of the party emigrated to the United States in the early 1900s. Infuriated with the exploitation of their mother country by foreigners, the PLM's constitution contained several specific points directed toward foreign companies.<sup>2</sup> In addition, the PLM attempted to secure measures to protect Mexican workers. Utilizing their party newspaper, La Regeneración, to popularize demands, the PLM attempted to educate workers to the necessities of unionization and the eight-hour day.<sup>3</sup>

In addition, the PLM recommended specific measures such as abolition of contract labor, prohibition of employment of minors under fourteen years of age, payment of wages in cash, and restriction on the number of foreign workers in any one project.<sup>4</sup> In short, the PLM sought avenues by which Mexican laborers might better their working conditions and obtain positions of greater responsibility.

As Mexican trabajadores migrated from one mine operation to another, they were constantly met with a barrage of discriminatory attitudes. Lacking the necessary machinery to demonstrate their discontent, they suffered in relative solitude. Sitting upon the pedestal of managerial positions, Anglo adventurers constantly judged the Mexican laborer as somewhat less than human. This attitude was largely responsible for the dispute at Cananea. The common workers knew little of

political ideologies but they understood very well when they were treated unequally.

Realizing the dim view Anglo owners had of the Mexican labor force, contemporary Mexican writers sought enlightenment of Americans toward the grave possibilities which might arise.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately, little importance was given to insights offered as the American press obviously deemed it more virtuous to extol the ethics of Protestantism and the Anglo gospel of success.<sup>6</sup>

In order to maintain and rationalize different social stations, American writers constantly portrayed Mexican laborers as personal lackeys of Anglo owners and workers. They wrote that peons were inefficient, unintelligent, untrustworthy and usually subordinate. Such a Mexican was vividly depicted as being "rather turbulent in disposition, given to drinking much of the native liquors and was handy with his knife."<sup>7</sup> Anglo workers commonly asserted that Mexican miners were not as efficient as American miners. Mine owners were cautioned that it was folly to expect of the Mexican either the quality of work or the quantity as compared with the Anglo. Mexicans were described as lacking the physique, ambition, judgement or intelligence of whites.<sup>8</sup> In short, these peons were of a race whose habits and characteristics smacked of a simple-minded people.<sup>9</sup> These attitudes were indicative of those that confronted Mexicanos as they worked in different mining industries throughout Mexico and the Territory of Arizona. Yet, Mexican workers who had chafed in silence at insolent treatment by their employers, now made ready to take matters into their own hands.

The first step necessary in bettering the position of the laborers was organization on a local level. To this end, Enrique Bermúdez pledged

himself. Having unsuccessfully tried to organize Mexican workers in southern Arizona, Bermúdez was run out of the area for libeling the Mexican Vice-Consul at Douglas, Arizona in 1905. After serving a prison sentence for this offense, Bermúdez relocated in Cananea where he founded El Centenario on April 1, 1906. Early editions of this newspaper bitterly attacked the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company and in particular, William Cornell Greene, an American from Tombstone, who was the owner. To assist Mexican workers, Bermúdez founded the Industrial Company of Laborers.<sup>10</sup> Within a few weeks, this union was incorporated by the already existing Unión Liberal Humanidad. This latter union was an affiliate of the PLM, which was headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri at this time. The union was the mechanism through which the Liberal Party dispersed its mandates to members.<sup>11</sup>

Despite their activity, the union officials still lacked sufficient membership to lend force to their movement. Having little experience in unionization endeavors, the average Mexican worker hesitated, despite bad conditions, to place his future in the hands of either organization in Cananea. Within a short time, however, any uncertainties were dissipated as wages fell in Cananea, supposedly due to a directive from Díaz.<sup>12</sup>

Seizing upon this opportunity, the union leaders planned a large celebration for the forthcoming Cinco de Mayo. The festivities would offer the opportune moment to further espouse union ideology. Before the assembly, Esteban Baca Calderón, Secretary of the PLM local, delivered an impassioned speech exhorting his countrymen to stand for their rights.<sup>13</sup>

By May 29, 1906, the Unión Liberal met once again to organize a

protest over the recent reduction of wages. On the following day, Carlos Guerrero, a miner, urged his fellow workers to join the struggle. Calderón spoke once more. He warned his listeners that any protest against the company would be interpreted as an act of insubordination against the government. He concluded: "Think well over what we are about to do; we play a decisive but dangerous role."<sup>14</sup>

Late on the night of May 31, a local employee informed Greene that a walkout had been planned for the near future. Somehow, Dr. Filiberto Barroso, Municipal President of Cananea, had received news of the impending troubles. He spent the better portion of the evening deciding how to stop them. At five o'clock in the morning of June 1, Barroso heard from Justice of the Peace Pablo Rubio that the strike had begun.<sup>15</sup>

Nearly four hundred men blockaded the entrance of one of the local mines. Using neither force nor intimidation, the strikers successfully urged the morning shift to join them in a show of dissatisfaction over their pay cut.<sup>16</sup> In a show of goodwill, the miners agreed to select a committee of delegates to meet with company officials. All present desired that the dispute be quickly and peacefully settled. The miners delegation, headed by Manuel M. Diéguez and Calderón, President and Secretary, respectively, of the local union, agreed to a 10:00 am meeting.<sup>17</sup>

The negotiators met behind closed doors, but the situation became increasingly worse. Both Diéguez and Calderón argued in vain to reduce the Mexicans' work shift to a mandatory eight hours. In this manner, contract labor might be eradicated. The company, seeking to maintain its advantage, declined.<sup>18</sup> The miners committee sought to increase their pay from three pesos (roughly \$1.50) to five dollars a day in American currency and open the lines of promotion for qualified Mexicans.

Other points brought forth by the committee were the removal of certain foremen known for their dislike of Mexicans, and limiting the number of American workers within the Greene operation.<sup>19</sup> All of their efforts proved vain because a short time later the meeting adjourned. The company made no concessions.

Realizing that their hand had been called, the workers marched from their meeting place toward the town of Cananea, closing down all company facilities. As they marched there was "not a single act of violence. . . nor of undiscipline among all those rugged and unkempt workers, with brow darkened by their work."<sup>20</sup> The column proceeded in perfect order toward the lumberyard where a large number of Mexicans worked. The local police escorted the marchers along the way. Meanwhile, the head of the company detective squad, a man known only as Rowen, busily handed out rifles and ammunition to various company employees. The atmosphere became ominous.<sup>21</sup>

Each step the miners took toward the lumberyard only increased the anxiety of lumberyard owner George Metcalf. Metcalf had already determined that nothing was going to interfere with his operation. Orders were given to close the large gates to the yards should the marchers attempt to enter.<sup>22</sup> The strikers drew to within a few feet of the gates. One of the guards panicked and sprayed down the strike leaders with a water hose.<sup>23</sup> The workers first reaction was one of hesitation. A surge of bitterness then swept through the miners, and they rushed toward the offenders.

One's patience tired out, the hatred engendered. . . was a paroxysm of rage, a sudden outburst of madness, a movement brought about by the circumstances, without having given it any previous thought and without any definite views.<sup>24</sup>

The laborers gained entrance to the yard and were met by rifle fire from company employees. The strikers appealed to the police for aid, but the police did nothing. Realizing that no protection would be given them, the workers retaliated with stones. Shortly thereafter a group of strikers rushed the general office building and set it afire. The fire rapidly spread to all parts of the lumberyard, destroying the entire facility and causing losses estimated at \$100,000.<sup>25</sup> More importantly, eight people lost their lives, among them six Mexicans.<sup>26</sup> Philo Freudenthal, a businessman from Bisbee and eyewitness to the event, later reported that a few of the more aggressive men attempted to search him but were reprimanded by their leader who stated "we are not robbers, we only want our rights."<sup>27</sup>

The events having thus unfolded, the strikers determined to march to the Town Hall in order to demand justice for those who had been slain. The city officials had a sound idea of what had occurred at the lumberyard. They had only to glance at the smoke billowing in the distance to know that some mishap had occurred. Immediately the Cananea system of justice sprang into action. As soon as company detective Rowen saw the smoke, he gathered a group of armed men around him. Embarking by automobile and horseback, they set out to round up the perpetrators of the deed. At the corner of Chihuahua and Third streets both parties met whereupon the vigilantes immediately opened fire. Unarmed, the miners answered the shots with shouts and rocks.<sup>28</sup>

Horried by what was happening to their friends, several miners ran for the safety of the municipal building. They pleaded with Judge X Isidoro Castañedo for protection from the Americans. For their efforts, these miners received severe pistol whippings. Castañedo told his men

"if anybody tries to escape, kill him like a dog."<sup>29</sup> A larger group of men likewise demanded arms so that they might defend themselves. They were summarily jailed.<sup>30</sup>

Having no other recourse, the miners broke into pawnshops and took two hundred pistols, some rifles, and ammunition.<sup>31</sup> Plácido Ríos was one of those who forced their way into the stores. His group was fired upon as it emerged from the pawnshop by the Cananea police. Manuel Montijo fell dead, and several others were wounded seriously. As night approached, the Americans retired to safety and withdrew to their sector of town.<sup>32</sup> This temporary lull allowed Felipe Barroso, a Cananea doctor, to recover the bodies of those slain by Rowen and his men.<sup>33</sup>

That night the greatest activity changed from Cananea to Bisbee, some forty miles northeast of the Mexican town. Upon hearing of the labor strife, Captain Tom Rynning of the Arizona Rangers eagerly commandeered a force of American volunteers and led it to the Mexican community of Cananea. Having previously participated in the "Mexican affair" of Clifton, the Rangers fervently anticipated asserting themselves in yet another community service.<sup>34</sup> As the call for volunteers spread through Bisbee, a citizen was overheard to say, "I've got nine bullets in my system that I got in a nigger riot. I wouldn't mind another Mexican one in a cause as good as this."<sup>35</sup>

Back in Cananea, Greene busily provided for transportation of American women and children to Bisbee. When they arrived in the Arizona town at eleven o'clock on the night of June 1, the American press whipped up already existing racial passions by reporting

. . .how the black horde of Mexicans, with the natural stealth of their race, gathered slowly. . .until their numbers

reached those of a mob; how they swarmed through the streets . . . sending up loud shouts with the bravado which characterizes them when they are aware that theirs is the upper hand.<sup>36</sup>

Upon hearing this report, a train was procured and 270 volunteers left for Naco, Arizona, where they arrived at one o'clock in the morning.<sup>37</sup> Within a few hours they were on their way to Cananea.

Shortly before nine am on the morning of June 2, the people of Cananea learned that the governor of the state of Sonora would arrive by special train. They also found out that troops were being sent, presumably to disarm the Americans who had wreaked havoc within the ranks of the strikers. Consequently, people who anxiously awaited the arrival of Governor Rafael Izábal crowded the train depot. With shock and dismay they watched as the governor brought the Arizona Rangers and other Anglo volunteers to aid the Americans. One Mexican contemporary reported that the indignation and anger of the town reached its peak "for it was like they [the Americans] came, like dogs, to defend the house of their master."<sup>38</sup>

That afternoon, Izábal spoke to a congregation of more than 2,000 men. As he spoke there was silence. "You have done things that cannot be countenanced by the Mexican government," he stated, "killing and looting cannot find a place in this camp so long as I am Governor."<sup>39</sup> Hoping to make known their desires, several miners raised the question of wages. For their efforts, more than twenty workers went to jail.<sup>40</sup> Equality then was the central theme, one that the company (with the aid of the Sonoran government) glibly evaded.

That evening, Colonel Emilio Kosterlitzsky and his mounted rural police (rurales) arrived. Their entrance ended the strike. The town

was placed under martial law, and Greene confidently proclaimed, "We are going to have law and order and we are going to have it quick."<sup>41</sup> Monday morning, the miners were forced to return to work. Those who refused to work found themselves pressed into military service.<sup>42</sup> The Arizona press hailed the decisive action taken by the military and urged that similar measures be used for future labor disturbances in the territory.

As the military retaliations became known, the PLM took the opportunity to denounce the ruthless methods employed by their government as well as by Greene. Citing the Mexican Constitution, the party accused Izábal of being a traitor for arriving at the head of an invasion of foreign troops.<sup>43</sup> The Liberal Party justified the strike on the basis that "the humiliations, the abuses. . .of which the Mexicans were victims at Cananea, could not have produced any other result but that of the explosion of anger which occurred. . ."<sup>44</sup>

In response, many Arizona newspapers reiterated their slurs concerning the Mexican laborer. Newspaper editors defended Greene for maintaining a double standard of wages because of the alleged superiority of American workers.<sup>45</sup>

In retrospect, the Cananea Strike of 1906 must be classified as a tactical failure. Certain tangible benefits resulted from the incident, however. The labor disturbance had proven to certain Mexican officials that there was a need for renovation of Mexican mining laws. By August 1908, Olegario Molina, Secretary of Interior (Fomento), introduced legislation that would make it more difficult for foreign investors to acquire mining concessions within twenty leagues (approximately sixty miles) of the border. Legislation was also enacted which required foreign mining

enterprises to re-apply for mineral rights on the border. Molina went on to intimate that it was not difficult to justify the law if it was considered that the frontier of the Mexican republic attracts "large numbers of persons of adventurous spirit and questionable character, such as always infest the frontier states."<sup>46</sup>

The passage of years also revealed to the company and other American-owned enterprises in Mexico the need to place Mexicans in positions of responsibility in an attempt to ward off future confrontations. One immediate effect of the strike was that it gave evidence of mounting discontent within the laboring classes in the Republic. The strike demonstrated to what extent they would be willing to go to achieve their demands.

Another result was the departure of many American workers from the Cananea region after the strike. As they returned to the United States, they brought with them many bitter memories, in particular about Mexican miners.

As these Anglo workers left the district, they set a pattern that did not halt until the next decade. While thirty-six to forty percent of the men employed by the Cananea Copper Company before 1906 were foreign, the strike served the purpose of decreasing this number until the figure was thirteen percent in 1912. As the Anglo workforce declined, money normally used for their salaries was channeled into the wages paid Mexicans. As a result, Mexican wages increased while American wages declined. Since the company continued to base the wage scale of the Mexican on silver and that of the Anglo on gold, the actual levels of income and purchasing power remained essentially unchanged.<sup>47</sup>

In analyzing the strike, it is evident that it was destined to fail because of its lack of proper organization and definite objectives. There is no evidence to support the idea that the strikers expected a long labor dispute. Their credit had not been extended at local stores. In short, the strikers mistakenly believed that the company would readily comply with their demands. The lack of proper organization resulted in the unnecessary deaths and imprisonment of many workers.

The strike must be viewed as an integral part of Mexican and Chicano labor history in the Southwest and, in particular, Arizona. Although the dispute did not radically change opinions regarding Mexican workers, it indicated to mine owners that their labor force would not readily tolerate injustices in wages and working conditions. Judging by the editorials of the period, the strike vividly brought attention to the racial antagonisms that existed in both Sonora and Arizona copper camps.<sup>48</sup> The strike further evinced the degree of unionization efforts within the Mexican communities along the border and in the interior of Arizona. As disenchanted revolutionaries migrated into the Arizona region, their expertise was a most welcome addition to already existing organizations which sought to aid the Spanish-speaking in the various mining communities.

The setback in Cananea served the purpose of galvanizing Mexican workers in Arizona and the border area and increased their determination to attain economic and social equality. Having been denied economic and vocational advancement on four separate occasions, Mexican workers, with the assistance of the PLM, set out upon a hazardous journey.

<sup>1</sup>Antonio G. Rivera, La Revolución en Sonora (Mexico: Privately printed, 1969), p. 20.

<sup>2</sup>Programme of the Liberal Party and Manifest to the Nation, July 1, 1906. Albert Fall Papers, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Matías Romero, Mexico and the United States (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1898), p. 516.

<sup>6</sup>The Engineering and Mining Journal 82 (October 1906), p. 623. Hereafter cited as EMJ.

<sup>7</sup>EMJ 81 (June 1906), p. 1099. Walter E. Weyl, "Labor Conditions in Mexico," Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor vol. 34-38, January 1902 (Washington, Government Printing Press: Department of Commerce, 1902), pp. 88-91. Allen H. Rogers, "Characteristics and Habits of the Mexican Miner," EMJ 85 (April 1908), p. 701.

<sup>8</sup>EMJ 85 (April 1908), p. 702.

<sup>9</sup>Evan Fraser-Campbell, "The Management of Mexican Labor," EMJ 91 (June 1911), pp. 1104-05.

<sup>10</sup>Mexican Herald (Mexico City), June 5, 1906. Bisbee Daily Review (Bisbee, Arizona), June 9, 1906.

<sup>11</sup>Manuel J. Aguirre, Cananea: Las garras del Imperialismo en las entrañas de Mexico (Mexico: Editorial B. Costa-Amic, 1958), p. 55.

<sup>12</sup>La Regeneración, June 15, 1906. Albert Fall Papers.

<sup>13</sup>Aguirre, Cananea, pp. 61-62. Rivera, La Revolución en Sonora, p. 140.

<sup>14</sup>Rivera, La Revolución en Sonora, p. 141.

<sup>15</sup>Douglas Daily International (Douglas, Arizona), June 19, 1906. Felipe Barroso to Señor Juez 2do de Primer Instancia en Cananea (District Judge), June 1, 1906. Reproduced in Manuel Gonzalez Ramírez, La huelga de Cananea (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1956), p. 33.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Rivera, La Revolución en Sonora, p. 142.

<sup>18</sup>Contract labor was a standard practice of the time. By setting a price on a job, the company could employ workers on the basis of piece labor. See, Edwin H. Davison, "Labor in Mexican Mines," Mining and Scientific Press 92 (April 1906), p. 260. Miguel Velasco Valdés, La Pre-revolución y el hombre de la calle (Mexico: Costa-Amic, 1964), pp. 153-54. John Kenneth Turner, Barbarous Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), pp. 181-82.

<sup>19</sup>La Regeneración, June 15, 1906. The point was made with the stipulation that the company dispense with the boleto system. Miners were paid in script which was redeemable only at the company store. In this manner, money paid out through wages would be returned via the company store. If the worker tried to redeem his boleto for cash, it was done at three-quarters of the face value. Miguel Velasco Valdés, La Prerevolución, p. 153.

<sup>20</sup>"Testimonio de Esteban Baca Calderón," Ramírez, La huelga de Cananea, p. 120.

<sup>21</sup>Turner, Barbarous Mexico, p. 183. Samuel Kaplan, Peleamos contra la injusticia; la epopeya de los hermanos Flores Magón 2 vols. (Mexico: Libro Meditadores, 1960), vol 1, p. 190.

<sup>22</sup>Douglas Daily Dispatch (Douglas, Arizona), June 10, 1906. Arizona Daily Star (Tuscon, Arizona), June 3, 1906.

<sup>23</sup>Arizona Daily Star, June 3, 1906.

<sup>24</sup>La Regeneración, July 1 and June 15, 1906.

<sup>25</sup>Tuscon Citizen (Tuscon, Arizona), June 5, 1906.

<sup>26</sup>See, Ramírez, La huelga de Cananea, pp. 21, 95, 120-21. This account varies with that given by the Douglas Daily Dispatch, June 10, 1906, and the Arizona Daily Star, June 3, 1906. Manuel J. Aguirre, Cananea, p. 121.

<sup>27</sup>Douglas Daily Dispatch, June 10, 1906.

<sup>28</sup>Aguirre, Cananea, pp. 122-23. Turner, Barbarous Mexico, p. 183.

<sup>29</sup>La Regeneración, July 1 and 15, 1906.

<sup>30</sup>Ramírez, La huelga de Cananea, p. 122.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>32</sup>Rivera, La Revolución en Sonora, p. 153.

<sup>33</sup> Herbert O. Brayer, "The Cananea Incident," New Mexico Historical Review 13 (1938), p. 398. The author disagrees with Brayer's contention that the strike was a well run labor action. On the contrary, the action taken by the strike leaders was haphazard at best. Not all of the union leaders were aware that a strike had been called until late in the morning of June 1. See, "Testimonio de Placido Ríos," reproduced in Ramírez, La huelga de Cananea, p. 137.

<sup>34</sup> Carl Rathbun, "Keeping the Peace Along the Mexican Border," Harpers Weekly 50 (November 1906), pp. 1632-34.

<sup>35</sup> Bisbee Daily Review, June 2, 1906.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., June 3, 1906.

<sup>38</sup> Ramírez, La huelga de Cananea, p. 127.

<sup>39</sup> Bisbee Daily Review, June 3, 1906.

<sup>40</sup> Ramírez, La huelga de Cananea, p. 127.

<sup>41</sup> Bisbee Daily Review, June 3, 1906. La Regeneración, July 15, 1906.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. Kaplan, Peleamos, vol. I., p. 193. W. W. Bennett, "Citizens Armed Invasion of Mexico," Railroad Magazine 54 (1951), pp. 74-82. University of Arizona (Tucson), Special Collections. Ramírez, La huelga de Cananea, pp. 44-45, 78-81.

<sup>44</sup> La Regeneración, July 15, 1906.

<sup>45</sup> The Oasis (Nogales, Arizona), June 9, 1906.

<sup>46</sup> Mining and Scientific Press 97 (August 1908), pp. 135-36.

<sup>47</sup> EMJ 96 (July 1913), p. 177-78.

<sup>48</sup> Tucson Citizen, June 2, 1906. The Oasis, June 9, 1906.

## CHAPTER V

### THE PARTIDO LIBERAL MEXICANO IN ARIZONA, 1906-1909

The period immediately following the Cananea strike, and indeed, the next three years, were critical for Mexican laborers in the territory. Mexican organizers fled northward and settled in Arizona's mining camps. Mexican workers who were in the territory during the Cananea outbreak openly sympathized with their fellow laborers. PLM advocates and their Mexican sympathizers shared a common objective--attainment of better jobs, salaries and conditions for Mexican workers. For three years, PLM leaders and Mexican miners in Arizona came breathtakingly close to uniting Mexican workers in Arizona and in the northern frontier region of Mexico in opposition to management. This episode, verging on open revolution, shows the degree to which Mexican miners in Arizona would go to obtain their demands.

The years 1906-1909 saw WFM unionization efforts in Bisbee defeated and differences in ideology with the IWW grow larger.<sup>1</sup> As both factions vied for control of Arizona unions, neither group paused to ponder the merits of incorporating Mexican workers into their folds. This lack of concern displayed by both the WFM and IWW, coupled with management's policy of lower wages and vocational positions, increased the desires of Mexican laborers to affiliate themselves with the tenets of PLM unionism. Realizing that all other channels either to join unions or to achieve upward social and economic mobility were closed, Mexican miners in Arizona actively supported the PLM and the Partido ideology.

By May 16, 1909, Mexican revolutionary activities within the

borders of the Territory of Arizona had ended. On that day, Ricardo Flores Magón, Antonio I. Villarreal and Liberado Rivera, leaders of the Partido Liberal, were found guilty of conspiring to lead a military expedition from Arizona against the Republic of Mexico.<sup>2</sup> Since their actions had violated the Neutrality Laws of the United States, the three were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in the territorial prison.<sup>3</sup>

Thus ended the brief and turbulent history of the PLM in Arizona. The PLM began in Mexico as a grass-roots movement aimed at the overthrow of the Porfirio Díaz regime. In the early years of the century, ruthless federal opposition forced the various leaders of the movement to flee to the United States where they regrouped in St. Louis, Missouri. The PLM soon established a series of juntas (affiliates of the main PLM body) throughout the Southwest and continued their campaign against Díaz and the capitalist system which exploited Mexican workers on both sides of the border.<sup>4</sup>

The most important point to be considered is why the PLM, a group with "foreign-oriented" goals, could receive so much support from the Mexican workers in Arizona. The Flores Magón leadership group dedicated itself primarily to the overthrow of Díaz, yet it operated within the United States to achieve its desires. Members of the Partido Liberal must have realized that United States government officials frowned on any covert acts designed to attack a friendly government, especially if this insurrection was to be initiated from southwestern America. The PLM, by nature of its own militancy, also forced American authorities to find and jail leaders of the Partido Liberal. Being open to a possible accusation of abetting the overthrow of a sovereign nation, officials in Washington, D. C. had no recourse but to aid in the maintenance of

the Díaz government in Mexico by stopping PLM activities in the United States.

The workers who supported the PLM no doubt knew that were Díaz to be overthrown, their brethren in Mexico and not themselves would be the recipients of any gains made. Still the PLM received great support. This support was due to two reasons: 1) Mexican workers in the territory could not expect aid from already existing unions such as the WFM and IWW, and 2) the strong possibility that these same Mexican miners would have returned to Mexico if economic and mining conditions had improved there.

Mexican-American historians in particular are now addressing themselves to a redefinition of past and present labor movements within the context of racial and class antagonisms. This trend suggests that labor history, as it pertains to miners of Mexican descent, cannot be fully explained by applying Marxist formulas. On the contrary, the relationship between workers and owners, and between Anglo and Mexican workers, must be understood by an examination of the racial conflicts that produced many of the early labor difficulties along the southern border of the United States. The Flores Magón group, whatever its ultimate goals may have been, was the only viable political and economic union open to Mexican workers in Arizona and the only organization that concerned itself with the needs of these workers during the period 1906-1909.

A merging of goals and aspirations occurred when PLM leaders and their Mexican followers in Arizona united. The former kept their revolutionary zeal by working for Díaz' downfall while the barreteros (those who worked with shovels and picks in mining enterprises) sought only immediate social and economic betterment. Mexican workers were aware

of their ostracized position and were neither docile nor childlike in their response. While perhaps not giving full thought to the possible ramifications of their actions, the laborers felt that the PLM was the vehicle which could be used to obtain their desires.

The fight against racial discrimination was not the only issue which drew workers to the PLM. Like all political parties and unions, the Partido Liberal Mexicano had a platform which stated its beliefs and goals. On July 1, 1906, the PLM issued a manifesto from St. Louis, Missouri, which proclaimed a desire for numerous reforms as well as opposition to Díaz.<sup>5</sup> Although the immediate desire was to overthrow the Díaz regime, once this was accomplished the PLM would turn its attention to much needed religious, military and social changes in Mexico. Once in office, the PLM hoped to exert its influence on enterprises that utilized large numbers of Mexican workers along the border area and interior of Arizona.

The concern for social changes attracted the average Mexican laborer of Arizona to the junta's cause. The establishment of fair wages, reasonable working conditions and the enactment of an eight hour day were all of crucial importance to Mexican workers.<sup>6</sup> Given the working and living conditions of Mexican miners, the broad-based appeal of the PLM is understandable.

Despite PLM concern to assist Mexican workers, the Partido was not the first Mexican-run organization developed to assist Mexican people in the territory. Facing constant frustration in their struggle for equality, some Mexican workers joined together to form Mutualistas (mutual aid societies) in order to aid workers and their families within a given community. Although independent of one another (the Clifton mutualista, for example, had no connections with the one in Bisbee), they did provide

some of the same services, most notably in the areas of social activities and pensions. The mutualistas remained small in number and were never strong enough to challenge the mining interests. Still, when the PLM began organizing juntas in Arizona, the new associations were oftentimes based on an existing mutualista.<sup>7</sup>

The first connections between the PLM and Mexican workers in Arizona were established by Enrique Bermúdez. Operating in the southern Arizona-northern Sonora region, Bermúdez earnestly strove for the betterment of Mexican laborers on both sides of the border.<sup>8</sup>

Urging Mexicans to break the chains that held them in bondage, Bermúdez founded the newspaper El Azote (The Whip) in Douglas, Arizona in 1905. Because it spread syndicalist ideas to Mexicanos, the paper was shut down by the Mexican government before it reached its first birthday. Bermúdez was sentenced to the Hermosillo prison for the alleged libeling of the Mexican vice-consul in Douglas. Upon his release in 1906, Bermúdez began editing another newspaper in Cananea. The first editions of his El Centenario (The Centennial) bitterly attacked the American-owned Cananea Copper Company, a company which Mexicans found symbolic of the foreign control of the Mexican economy.<sup>9</sup>

Following the strike of June 1906, Bermúdez, an organizer of the various unions in the town and an active participant, quietly left for El Paso.<sup>10</sup> The strike action taken at Cananea illustrated the growing unrest of the alienated classes of southern Arizona and northern Mexico and their readiness to fight for social improvements.<sup>11</sup>

While Bermúdez had been imprisoned in Hermosillo, El Club Lerdo de Tejada was established in Douglas. The club, founded by Lázaro Puente and boasting nearly three hundred members, had intimate connections with activities in Cananea.<sup>12</sup> Abrán Salcido, who had played an active part

in both the Clifton strike of 1903 and the Cananea strike of 1906, participated in this organization's efforts to improve conditions of Mexican workers in Arizona.<sup>13</sup> Seeking a broader constituency, PLM members established Obreros Libres (Free Workers) in Morenci, Arizona on July 3, 1906. This Junta affiliate merged with the already existing mutualista, Saragosa, in order to extend benefits and strengthen worker opposition to the mining company.<sup>14</sup> Fearing possible labor troubles, local authorities and United States secret agents kept the Morenci club under constant surveillance.<sup>15</sup>

As the Junta sought a larger membership, outside forces were working to hasten the downfall of the PLM. United States officials, realizing the movement's broad appeal in both Arizona and Texas, began curbing its activities. It is possible that Arizona officials feared any nascent Mexican labor activities, especially when it is remembered that both WFM and Democratic party efforts sought to restrict Mexican labor during the first decade of the 1900s. Enrique Creel, Mexican ambassador to the United States, accused Ricardo Flores Magón, the voice and guiding spirit of the PLM, of attempting to rouse passions against the Mexican government. Creel urged that Flores Magón and his fellow dissidents be extradited to Mexico to face criminal proceedings. While Secretary of State Elihu Root did not comply with the ambassador's requests, he nonetheless wanted to maintain friendly relations with Mexico and promised to look into the matter. A detail of undercover agents was assigned to gather information so that Junta leaders might be tried for violations of the Neutrality Laws.<sup>16</sup>

Intelligence reports reveal the degree to which United States agencies became involved in the investigation. Establishing headquarters

in El Paso and Los Angeles, federal agents pieced together reports on PLM activities.<sup>17</sup> Letters went out to the governors of California, New Mexico, Arizona and Texas advising them of the dangerous situation.<sup>18</sup> Further to assist the government, Governor Joseph Kibbey of Arizona offered the services of the Arizona Rangers within the territory. American officials, convinced that the Junta was planning a general uprising against Americans in Mexico and along the border, wanted to quell any possibility of such an occurrence.<sup>19</sup>

This belief is not without merit. According to captured PLM correspondence, an expedition against the northern provinces of Mexico was to set out from Arizona. It was not known, however, when this undertaking was to commence. Ricardo Flores Magón kept close links with his followers in Douglas and urged PLM sympathizers clandestinely to transport arms across the border. Entrusted with this task, Tomás Espinosa worked in both Douglas and Cananea to insure PLM success.<sup>20</sup> Fearing that something might go wrong, Flores Magón appointed Abrán Salcido to supervise all Arizona activities.<sup>21</sup> PLM leaders felt that such an undertaking could only be handled by those who had proven their dedication in earlier endeavors. Gabriel Rubio, the PLM's contact with the workers in Cananea, assisted Salcido and preparations were made to launch an attack.<sup>22</sup>

During the month of August, members of the Liberal Club continued to meet and discuss the course of action to be followed by the invading force. The insurgents ultimately decided that they would march from Douglas to Agua Prieta, enlisting Mexican peasants along the way, and ultimately would seize the customshouse. From there the men would turn to Cananea where they would arm themselves with guns and supplies from the tienda de raya or company store.<sup>23</sup> Another aspect of the plan called

for the capture of Nogales, Sonora, with one hundred men, after which they, too, would proceed to Cananea. The customshouse in Douglas, and those at Nogales and Agua Prieta, were of paramount interest for it was believed that they contained substantial revenues which could be used by the party. It seems doubtful that the mining towns had sufficient arms for all the men, but the Junta was quite willing to overlook this possible difficulty and to proceed. There seemed to be a total disregard of what American officials might do to stop PLM efforts.

There is no clear reason for the PLM emphasizing the taking of Cananea. PLM officials at best could only expect to garner munitions for their expeditionary force, and even this was not a certainty. Most of the organizers present during the town's recent strike had been captured and sent to prisons throughout Mexico. PLM followers could not expect much guidance or aid once the town was taken.<sup>24</sup> The Junta did, however, expect to be assisted by Javier Gritemia, a local Yaqui chieftain, who had escaped the wrath of the Mexican government after the strike.<sup>25</sup> Perhaps the St. Louis junta felt that the detachment of rurales which had been left behind following the strike would not be a difficult obstacle to overcome. At any rate, the seizure of Cananea remained an essential part of the overall PLM plan to take over the northern states of Mexico.<sup>26</sup>

By late August, the Liberals had readied themselves for the invasion of Mexico's frontier. Abrán Salcido received disturbing reports that PLM followers in Cananea nearly jumped the gun and opened fire before being told to do so.<sup>27</sup> After restraining his fellows, Salcido turned his attention to when best to call for a general uprising. But this matter was taken out of his hands because a spy had infiltrated the ranks

of the party and betrayed the movement. Trinidad Gómez had been in the employ of Governor Rafael Izabál of Sonora and had informed authorities of the PLM's plans. On September 4, 1906, local officials and Arizona Rangers arrested Salcido and other leaders of the Douglas organization, charging them with violation of the Immigration Laws.<sup>28</sup> Simultaneous arrests occurred in the nearby mining camps of Mowry and Patagonia, Arizona.<sup>29</sup>

The ensuing trial was relatively brief. In order to expedite the proceedings, prosecuting attorney J. L. B. Alexander retained the original charges of violation of immigration laws rather than those of conspiracy. Convicted and delivered to a group of rurales in Nogales, Sonora, for deportation, Leonardo Villareal, Juan García, Rubio Antonio and Joaquín Fuentes calmly met their fate. Transportation to Mexican prisons seemed imminent. Over a thousand people, Mexican and Anglo alike, gathered at the border to see the men into Mexico. A general feeling prevailed that Arizona authorities had delivered condemned men to their executioners.<sup>30</sup> To put American opinions at ease, President Díaz gave assurances that no harm would befall the deportees.<sup>31</sup> Tomás Espinosa, convicted by the United States for violation of neutrality laws, received a two year sentence in the Yuma Territorial Prison.<sup>32</sup> Several other men who had participated in the events regained their freedom because their association with the PLM was deemed minimal. It is plausible, however, that the case against them did not contain substantial proof to have them deported on grounds of violation of neutrality or immigration laws.

In a report concerning Mexican border activities both in Texas and Arizona, Captain William S. Scott of the United States Cavalry stated that citizens and local authorities had conducted themselves in an

admirable manner. He added that the officials in other Junta strongholds would do well to follow the example.<sup>33</sup> J. L. B. Alexander, United States Attorney for Arizona, later stated that these arrests would serve as a lesson to all Mexicans in Arizona who might be inclined to support the Junta.<sup>34</sup>

Despite its setback in Douglas, the PLM did not fold. Praxedes Guerrero continued his recruiting efforts as well as maintaining correspondence with other leaders. Antonio I. Villareal, secretary of the Liberal Party, went to Douglas in hope of maintaining a working relationship with the remaining members in the southern Arizona region. To insure that PLM followers would have arms should an insurrection occur, Villareal himself supervised the smuggling of guns over the border in Nogales. Guerrero left Morenci and spent weeks in the Nogales area drumming up support among the Spanish-speaking in hope of assisting Villareal and the PLM.<sup>35</sup>

The towns of Cananea and Nogales were not the only places of interest to the Mexican Junta. Judging by the amount of correspondence between members of the PLM in Clifton and Morenci and their associates in Del Rio, Texas, it is all too evident that those Arizona towns would have played an important part in any armed uprising occurring in that region of Texas. Charges made by the Mexican vice-consul in El Paso against the Arizona juntas substantiate this fact. Insurgents in the El Paso area also were supplied with dynamite taken from the mines located in Clifton, Metcalf and Morenci.<sup>36</sup>

As a means of further curtailing PLM activity in Arizona, government officials increased their efforts to gather information which would incriminate leaders of the Junta and lead to their trial. The govern-

ments of Mexico and the United States maintained an extremely close relationship in this matter. Correspondence between the two administrations included a suggestion that the Mexican government employ a detective agency within the United States. The Mexican government hired a member of the Furlong Detective Agency of St. Louis and, because of the constant pressure, PLM leaders were forced to move their headquarters to different cities, ultimately relocating in Los Angeles.<sup>37</sup> In addition, the United States government assisted in the operation by maintaining their own secret operatives in Los Angeles, El Paso, Arizona and New Mexico.<sup>38</sup> Elihu Root approved this measure and urged that a discreet inspector be appointed to make a thorough inquiry into the matter.<sup>39</sup>

The manner in which PLM followers were apprehended mattered little to government officials in Mexico or the United States. For example, Manuel Sarabía arrived in the town of Douglas in mid-1907. An experienced printer, Sarabía decided to ply his trade in Douglas. Assuming an alias, he began working in the printing room of one of the town's newspapers. Local officials, having been tipped to Sarabía's true identity and PLM connections, had him arrested by members of the Arizona Rangers. The capture proved illegal because a warrant had not been issued. This led Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, to declare that the Mexican government had secured the arrest on false charges of murder.<sup>40</sup>

On the night of June 1, 1907, a year to the day since the Cananea episode, while Sarabía lay in his cell, American and Mexican officials abducted him. Suppressing his cries for help, the kidnappers choked Sarabía into submission and transported him across the border where a detachment of rurales anxiously awaited the arrival of their guest.

Sarabía was taken to the prison in Hermosillo, Sonora.<sup>41</sup>

This incident caused a considerable uproar in the Douglas community. The Arizona Rangers and their accomplices, including the Mexican vice-consul, Antonio Maza, were immediately placed under arrest for kidnapping. The townspeople, not grasping the full implications of the PLM program, objected strongly to any citizen's being whisked away in the dead of night without due process of law. A town meeting of Douglas residents asked that an investigation into the affair be initiated by President Theodore Roosevelt, Attorney General Joseph Bonaparte and Elihu Root.<sup>42</sup> A campaign launched by Mrs. Mary "Mother" Jones, who later became one of the more famous organizers of the United Mine Workers, raised money to pay attorney's fees.<sup>43</sup> Later it was disclosed that Maza had approached the editor of one of the town's newspapers on the night before the kidnapping and asked that all news pertaining to Sarabía be withheld from the press.<sup>44</sup> Due largely to the intensity of public outcry, Sarabía was returned to Douglas on July 13. This was arranged between Kibbey of the Arizona Rangers and Mexican officials. It was the desire of government officials to keep Sarabía under surveillance with the hope that he would lead them to Ricardo Flores Magón and his immediate followers who, thus far, had eluded government attempts of incarceration.

Embittered by this reverse, William Cornell Greene, owner of the copper mines in Cananea, denounced the decision to return Sarabía as an attempt by local politicians to make political gains by influencing the Mexican vote. He further stated that Sarabía had been responsible for the outbreak of hostilities in Cananea during the previous year. In trying to explain the events surrounding the case, Greene concluded:

These are the facts of the case, and I fail to see how

any complaint can be lodged against the Mexican government, even if authorities did happen on the line the night Manuel Sarabia crossed it. They had a perfect right to arrest him on Mexican soil, even if it was an extraordinary coincidence that they should happen to be at that spot when Sarabia crossed the line from the United States to Mexico.<sup>45</sup>

Although they had failed to incarcerate Sarabia permanently, secret agents of both governments pressed on. On August 23, 1907, they captured Ricardo Flores Magón, Liberado Rivera and Antonio I. Villarreal in Los Angeles. Because the arrest had been made without a warrant, their lawyer insisted that they had been taken into custody illegally.<sup>46</sup> After unsuccessful preliminary attempts to prosecute the trio on counts ranging from murder to violation of immigration laws, the prosecuting attorney decided to try the three for violation of neutrality laws.<sup>47</sup> The Neutrality Laws provided that offenders not be held longer than forty days without formal charges but, at the insistence of the Mexican government, the men were held for ninety days.<sup>48</sup>

Because these men had provided directing spirit and non-resident leadership to the PLM's affiliates in Arizona, authorities decided to extradite the suspects to the territory for trial. Fearing that they might be illegally "extradited" as Sarabia had been, the trio's lawyer sought a written guarantee from President Roosevelt for their safe transport to Arizona.<sup>49</sup>

Escorted to Tombstone, Arizona, by United States government officials, California agents and Arizona territorial officials, the men stood trial. After preliminary hearings in late April 1909, court testimony began on May 14.<sup>50</sup> J. L. B. Alexander, relying heavily upon the captured correspondence between the Flores Magón group and their followers, attempted to prove a conspiracy. William Cleary, the

attorney for the PLM defendants, endeavored, to no avail, to have the court declare a mistrial because of the manner in which his clients had been arrested.<sup>51</sup> Cleary later intimated that his motions failed because the United States was anxious to please President Díaz.<sup>52</sup> The three, after conviction, received sentences of eighteen months in the territorial prison, despite recommendation of leniency by members of the jury.<sup>53</sup>

The court's verdict spelled the end of PLM activities in the area. Although many of their followers would assume positions of responsibility in the forthcoming Mexican Revolution, little could be accomplished by the Liberal Party with Flores Magón, Villareal and Rivera behind bars.

The history of the PLM in Arizona is, at least superficially, one of unrelieved failure. Politically, the party failed in its major goal --the overthrow of Díaz. By subordinating all other more immediately attainable goals, the PLM also failed as a union. Combined with the repressive measures taken by both the Mexican and American governments, these elements destroyed the PLM as an effective organization.

Mexicano workers gambled in joining the Partido during the years 1906-1909. They joined primarily to fight against economic and social discrimination that existed in the territory. Non-acceptance into other established unions coupled with a animosity that had developed between Mexican and Anglo workers drove many Mexican miners to join the PLM in its desperate attempt to help Mexican laborers in Arizona and the Mexican border region. Revolutionary adventuring by the PLM produced a backlash against unions in general and served only further to ostracize Mexicans seeking parity in Anglo society. Even the mutualistas, never very effective, were weakened and, in many cases, destroyed by their

association with the PLM.

Mexican workers did, however, receive some benefits from their connections with the PLM. The workers who had earlier remained silent because of their inferior standing in the community now gave notice that they could and would use armed defiance if normal channels of reform were ever again closed to them. Mexicano leaders continued to gain experience needed to direct future labor disputes.

No standard can fully measure the impact produced on the Mexican communities in Arizona by the PLM. During its brief and troubled life in the territory, the PLM did come close to incorporating Mexican workers in southern Arizona and northern Sonora into a revolutionary force. This achievement alone requires historians to revise their views of the role of Mexican labor in the overall structure of the Liberal Party and more clearly define the extent to which these workers would go in trying to improve their economic, social and political status.

<sup>1</sup>Vernon H. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict: Labor Relations in the Nonferrous Metals Industry up to 1930 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950), pp. 355-63.

<sup>2</sup>Miners' Magazine, June 17, 1909.

<sup>3</sup>Arizona Daily Star (Tuscon, Arizona), May 17, 1909.

<sup>4</sup>Lyle C. Brown, "Los Liberales Mexicanos y Su Lucha en y Contra de la Dictadura de Porfirio Díaz, 1900-1906," Antología MCC (Mexico, DF: Mexico City College Press, 1956), p. 89. Charles C. Cumberland, "Precursors of the Mexican Revolution of 1910," Hispanic American Review 22 (May 1942), p. 345.

<sup>5</sup>Gustavo Casasola, ed., Historia grafica de la revolución (Mexico DF, no date), vol. I, pp. 71-78. Special Collections, Zimmerman Library, University of New Mexico. Myra Ellen Jenkins, "Ricardo Flores Magón and the Mexican Liberal Party," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1953), p. 73. Charles C. Cumberland, "An Analysis of the Program of the Mexican Liberal Party, 1906," The Americas 4 (January 1943), pp. 294-301.

<sup>6</sup>Bisbee Daily Review (Bisbee, Arizona), June 10, 1906.

<sup>7</sup>Enrique Creel (Mexican Ambassador to the United States) to Robert Bacon (Assistant Secretary of State), June 28, 1908, Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, reel 429, file #5028-59, hereafter cited NADSR. El Labrador (Las Cruces, New Mexico), March 20, 1904. Jerome Mining News (Jerome, Arizona), June 8, 1903.

<sup>8</sup>Bisbee Daily Review, June 9, 1906.

<sup>9</sup>Mexican Herald (Mexico City), June 5, 1906. Bisbee Daily Review, June 9, 1906. For a more detailed account of United States economic investment in Mexico during this period, see James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York: Macmillan Company, 1932), pp. 508-12.

<sup>10</sup>For the Mexican version of the strike see, Manuel Gonzalez Ramirez, La huelga de Cananea (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1956), p. 117. Ramirez relies heavily upon the testimony of participants in the strike.

<sup>11</sup>Bisbee Daily Miner (Bisbee, Arizona), July 2, 1906.

<sup>12</sup>Antonio G. Rivera, La Revolución en Sonora (Mexico: privately printed, 1969), p. 20.

<sup>13</sup>Bisbee Daily Review, June 5, 1903. Arizona Silver Belt (Globe, Arizona), October 29, 1903.

<sup>14</sup>Cumberland, "Precursors," p. 347. Creel to Bacon, July 28, 1908, NADSR, reel 429, 5028-59.

<sup>15</sup>A man by the name of Pacheco was used as a spy and was in the employ of the Detroit Copper Company, Miners' Magazine, February 6, 1908. Letter dated August 10, 1908, NADSR 59, reel 429, 5028-94. As activity of the PLM became known, agents in the employ of both governments were utilized in various points across the border.

<sup>16</sup>Creel to Root, March 4, 1907, NADSR 59, reel 429, 5028. United States Attorney, Charles A. Boynton, letter dated April 30, 1907. Ibid., 5028-3.

<sup>17</sup>J. G. Grimes to Boynton, May 13, 1907, Ibid., 5028-18-20.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Carl Rathbun, "Keeping the Peace Along the Mexican Border," Harpers Weekly 50 (November 1906), pp. 1632-34. Daily International American (Douglas, Arizona), September 5, 1906.

<sup>20</sup>Ricardo Flores Magón to Tomás Espinosa, August 2, 1906, National Archives, Department of Justice Record Group 60, file #90755-717-4, hereafter cited NADJR 60.

<sup>21</sup>Abrán Salcido to José B. Treviño, August 2, 1906, Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Douglas Daily International, September 18, 1906.

<sup>23</sup>Ricardo Flores Magón to Gabriel Rubio, July 24, 1906, NADJR 60, 90755-717-4.

<sup>24</sup>Brown, "Los Liberales Mexicanos," pp. 348-49. "Testimonio de Plácido Ríos," taken from Ramírez, La huelga de Cananea, p. 144.

<sup>25</sup>Gabriel Rubio was to reconnoiter the situation in Cananea and distribute leaflets. Ricardo Flores Magón to Rubio, July 27, 1906, NADJR 60, 90755-717-4. At no time were the Liberals to harm Americans or their property. Ricardo Flores Magón to Espinosa, August 2, 1906, Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ricardo Flores Magón and Antonio I. Villareal to Javier Gritemia, August 31, 1906, NADJR, 90755-717-4.

<sup>27</sup>Abrán Salcido to José B. Treviño, August 28, 1906, Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Ethel Dobson, "Mexican Revolutionists in the United States," Miners' Magazine, June 11, 1908. Daily International American, September 4, 1906.

<sup>29</sup>Arizona Daily Star, September 5, 1906. Those arrested in this raid were Carlos Humbert, José B. Treviño and Genaro Villareal.

<sup>30</sup>Daily International American, September 22, October 5, 1906.  
Arizona Daily Star, September 5, 6, 8, 1906.

<sup>31</sup>Arizona Daily Star, September 16, 1906.

<sup>32</sup>United States Attorney J. L. B. Alexander to Attorney General, August 12, 1909, NADJR 60, 90755-717-4.

<sup>33</sup>Scott to Adjutant General, August 26, 1907, NADSR 59, reel 429, 5028-18-20.

<sup>34</sup>Alexander Report, September 10, 1906, NADSR 59, 43718.

<sup>35</sup>Griner to Boynton, May 13, 1907, NADSR 59, reel 429, no number.

<sup>36</sup>Consulate dispatch, August 4, 1908, NADSR 59, reel 429, 5028-79.  
Letter Leocardio B. Treviño to Ramon Treviño, June 24, 1908. Estrada to L. B. Treviño, June 15, 1908. Both letters found in NADSR, reel 429, 5028-54-60.

<sup>37</sup>United States House of Representatives, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 201 Providing for a Joint Committee to Investigate Alleged Persecutions of Mexican Citizens by the Government of Mexico. Hearings held before the Committee on Rules, United States House of Representatives, June 8-14, 1910 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910), pp. 1-9.

<sup>38</sup>Letter dated May 29, 1907, NADSR 59, reel 429, 5028-10. Attorney General George Wickersham to Root, April 26, 1909, Ibid., 5028-179.

<sup>39</sup>Root to Secretary of War, June 8, 1907, Ibid., 5028-10.

<sup>40</sup>Daily International American, July 3, 1907. Letter to President Theodore Roosevelt from Samuel Gompers, June 10, 1910, House Rules Committee, p. 14.

<sup>41</sup>Daily International American, July 12, 1907.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., July 3, 1907. House Rules Committee, p. 14.

<sup>43</sup>House Rules Committee, p. 90. During this time there was another effort by the WFM to unionize the Phelps-Dodge mining interests.

<sup>44</sup>House Rules Committee, p. 30. Arizona Daily Star, July 16, 1907. Daily International American, July 13, 1907. Political Defense League, March 30, 1910, Congressional Record, LXV, pt. 5, 61st Congress, 2nd session, April 21, 1910, O. 5137.

<sup>45</sup>Greene to Bacon, Assistant Secretary of State, July 5, 1907, NADJR 60, 43718. There is correspondence between Greene and a certain "Rowen" who was hired to gather any information on WFM participation in the Cananea strike. Albert Bacon Fall papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, California. Daily International American, October 1, 1906.

<sup>46</sup>Arizona Daily Star, August 24, 1907.

<sup>47</sup>Attorney General Bonaparte to Root, October 26, 1908, NADSR 59, reel 429, 5028-132. Miners' Magazine, February 6, 1908. "Mr. Furlong attested that he Flores Magón was taken without a warrant and Furlong was paid by the Mexican government. The first charge was that of resisting an officer; the next was with murder committed in Mexico and entering the United States on violation of Immigration Laws; the next with libel in Missouri; and the next with murder and robbery in Mexico. They are now being charged with conspiracy to violate the Neutrality Laws."

<sup>48</sup>Miners' Magazine, June 11, 1908.

<sup>49</sup>Governor Kibbey, letter dated September 28, 1907, NADSR 59, reel 429, 5028-28. Miners' Magazine, June 11, 1908.

<sup>50</sup>Arizona Daily Star, April 20, 26, 28, 30, May 13, 14, 1909.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., May 15, 18, 1909. Miners' Magazine, June 3, 1909. This article found fault in the way the trial was handled 1) the participation of a detective in the employ of the Mexican government and, 2) the Mexican consul taking part in the prosecution of a violation of a United States' law.

<sup>52</sup>House Rules Committee, p. 15-17.

<sup>53</sup>Mexican Herald, May 18, 1909. Miners' Magazine, June 17, 1909. Congressional Record, LXV, pt. 5, 61st Congress, 2nd session, April 21, 1910, p. 5136.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE HIGHWATER MARK: THE CLIFTON-MORENCI STRIKE OF 1915-1916

The end of PLM activities again resulted in the withdrawal of Mexican workers into their "little Sonoras" in their respective mining communities. As had occurred after the Globe strike of 1896, these miners chafed in the dissatisfaction concerning wage and unionizational policies. From their enclaves, Mexican miners watched and waited for another opportunity to assert themselves.

Mexican workers were not the only portion of Arizona's labor force affected during the 1906-1909 period. Western Federation organizers continued efforts to unionize in the Bisbee district in March of 1906.<sup>1</sup> Local merchants, as well as management, wishing to avoid a strike situation, urged miners to avoid any Federation connection. As an incentive for non-unionization, Copper Queen officials quickly raised Anglo workers' pay to \$4.00 per day.<sup>2</sup> Management also employed blacklisting and discrimination in hiring practices against union sympathizers. Owners could quickly utilize importation of Mexican workers should it be necessary to break an Anglo strike.

Throughout Arizona, Mexican and Anglo workers showed signs of dissatisfaction. The Engineering and Mining Journal testified to the recalcitrance of workers by reporting that the mining camps of Globe, Clifton and Jerome were all experiencing interruptions in mining operations. The mining industry in Arizona experienced uniform wage cuts which resulted in isolated strikes on a small scale.<sup>3</sup>

As WFM efforts suffered setbacks along the southern border area

and workers experienced pay cuts throughout the territory, Federation officials also had to contend with the divisive intrusion of the IWW. This intervention centered around IWW organizers influencing WFM locals by enticing Federation members to jump ranks. This struggle weakened Western Federation endeavors in Arizona.<sup>4</sup>

As a means of encouraging union growth and combatting mine management's control, Federation officials formed an alliance with the Democratic party. Having already encouraged union participation to the exclusion of Mexican workers as evinced by the Eight Hour Law of 1903 and attempted passage of the Literacy Law of 1909, Federation leaders continually supported the Democrats to insure the writing of a constitution favorable to progressivism and the tenets of unionism.<sup>5</sup> As a result, George P. Hunt, elected Arizona's first governor in 1912, proved to be labor's friend in future labor disturbances.

While Federation members worked strenuously to solidify a Democratic-labor liason, WFM officials still had to combat IWW encroachment. The Daily Silver Belt reported on IWW activities in Arizona by following the actions of a certain W. C. Pendleton. This "agitator" had gone to Tuscon speaking to and enlisting possible aid from Mexican construction workers in the area. Pendleton was arrested and given the choice of either being jailed or leaving town. He chose the latter.<sup>6</sup>

Seemingly an unimportant event, this brief occurrence of IWW concern for Mexican workers indicated a small but growing desire by both WFM and IWW organizers to use Mexican workers to their advantage. While the WFM had originally sought to alienate Mexican workers, there is evidence that by 1913 Federation organizers employed Mexican organizers to assist in their efforts against the IWW. In that year Julio Mancillas,

an organizer for the WFM and imbued with Spanish socialist ideas, spoke to Mexican workers in Globe.<sup>7</sup> This early Federation desire to entertain incorporation of Mexican workers into unions was due not necessarily to acceptance of Mexicans but rather in response to an inter-union threat posed by the IWW. When coupled with the fact that there existed during the period 1914-1915 a growing concern on the part of organized labor to limit the number of Mexican workers in mining industries, it is easy to see the flexibility of Federation policy when it concerned Mexicanos.<sup>8</sup>

The WFM wielded a double-edged sword. While terming all non-union workers as ingrates and a "menace to the working class and to his fellow men" the Federation willingly pursued a policy that alienated and kept in continual abeyance a large segment of workers, precluding their participation in the union movement.<sup>9</sup>

Mexican miners continued to agitate for better wages and working conditions. Realizing that little tangible aid would be forthcoming from other organizations, Mexican workers in Ray went out on strike in late June 1915. The tie up was complete and took managers of the Ray Consolidated Company by surprise. Because of this, operators contended that strikers were not really interested in wage benefits but were trying to limit copper production and thus hindering their war effort--the selling of copper in Europe to the Allies. By appealing to patriotic sentiments, managers hoped to quell the dispute.<sup>10</sup>

The strike quickly pointed out Mexican-Anglo animosity as the strike force consisted of Mexican workers. Of the 300 Anglo miners present, only ten affiliated with the strike committee. Anglo workers let it be known that they had no grievance and that "the yellow bellies

could do just as they liked," and furthermore, they asserted that "they belonged to the white race and they would not let any inferior race put anything over 'em."<sup>11</sup>

As with the majority of Arizona copper camps, the overwhelming number of workers in Ray were Mexicans. Not only did Anglo workers fear Mexican participation in union matters, they especially resented any possibility of Mexican miners controlling local matters.

While Anglo workers concerned themselves with retaining their positions, Mexican miners thought in terms of the whole work force. They demanded an eight hour day, the end of the contract system, a raise for all workers and the right to organize or affiliate with the Miami Miners Union.<sup>12</sup>

In an effort to stop news reaching outside of the camp, the company stopped all telephone and telegraph communications. José Miranda and C. L. Saludo braved the desert heat and geographic isolation to bring out news of the strike. The walkout lasted two weeks, resulting in a delegation of Anglo miners negotiating with the company. Workers received a 60 cent raise, an eight hour day for all surface workers and the right to affiliate with the WFM local at Miami.<sup>13</sup> For their part, Mexican miners did receive better wages, but provisions concerning surface workers benefitted Anglo employees, as the majority of underground work was performed by Mexicans. Also, contract work was retained in return for workers being allowed to participate in WFM matters in Miami. Also of import is the fact that, even though Mexican miners called for the strike, it was Anglo workers who served as the delegation which settled the dispute. For all their efforts, Mexican miners faced continued

company retribution as various miners were discharged for their parts in initiating the labor strike.<sup>14</sup>

The Ray walkout was not the only instance of labor discontent by Mexican miners in the summer of 1915. While difficulties unfolded in Ray, similar rumblings were felt in Clifton. In late summer of the same year, a strike of major proportions began in that mining town and lasted for the next four and one-half months. A closer look into the background and nature of this decisive strike is necessary.

Articles concerning the development of mining operations in the Clifton area by Anglo-Americans are numerous. Yet, Mexican, and later Mexican-American, miners earned little credit for their instrumental roles in the discovery, development and early processing of the ore body in that area. For example, discovery of the Clifton copper ore can be traced back to Mexican miners who worked the Santa Rita copper mines in Silver City, New Mexico.

One such entrepreneur was Francisco Manuel Elguea, operator of the Silver City mines, who commissioned parties to explore adjacent western areas for possible mining sites.<sup>15</sup> Due to its remote location, this eastern Arizona district remained untapped until a claim was filed on its copper deposit ores in 1872. Preparations to open the mines were made in the following year.<sup>16</sup> In the interim, Henry Lesinsky, a New Mexican merchant who supplied the initial capital for the project, discovered that Mexican miners in the Silver City region possessed traditional knowledge of smelting. Therefore, Lesinsky recruited Mexicans from New Mexico and Mexico to construct and operate the first smelter in Clifton.<sup>17</sup>

By 1877 mining operations had expanded to employ some two to four hundred workers including Anglos, Mexicans, and Chinese. Daily wages

from three to four dollars a shift for Anglo workers, one-half that amount for Mexican workers with Chinese employees receiving even less.<sup>18</sup>

In an effort to increase profits from the copper mining operation, Lesinsky utilized various money saving schemes. For example, after freighting copper east from the mines to the railroad head, ore wagons returned loaded with supplies and provisions for Lesinsky's company stores. To offset possible financial losses, miners received wages in the form of promissory notes exchangeable for merchandise at any company establishment in Clifton or at Lesinsky's store in Silver City.<sup>19</sup> The company made it difficult for employees to purchase goods anywhere other than from its own stores. This practice created a calculated scarcity of cash in the district and forced miners to remain since they lacked sufficient capital to go elsewhere. Furthermore, opportunities for alternative employment did not exist in the area, and mine managers, working for absentee owners, made large profits from the Mexican labor source.<sup>20</sup> Such a situation assumes a greater significance when one realizes that while Arizona's Anglo population increased throughout the territory, Clifton rapidly became known as a Mexican community.<sup>21</sup>

To augment an ever-increasing demand for labor, railroad operators actively recruited Mexican workers from the interior of Mexico. These workers soon became and continued to be the largest contingent within the overall labor force and contributed to mine development and the construction of railroads.<sup>22</sup> Social and economic considerations influenced the dependence upon Mexican labor. Anglo mine owners regarded Mexicans as cheap and replacable at the discretion of labor bosses. Mexican workers could also be replaced by American miners if certain diggings were considered valuable. The owners, however, seldom resorted to this

extreme position because of "the easy adjustment of the Mexican to his true worth." The wages of Mexican workers rarely exceeded two dollars a shift, which consisted of eight to twelve hours. Mine operators justified such low wages by pointing to a supposedly lower output.<sup>23</sup>

The foregoing attitudes toward Mexicans were commonly demonstrated by Anglo-Americans. In a very short period of time, these beliefs evolved into a stereotype which relegated Mexicans, and later Mexican-Americans, to a permanent status of undesirable elements. This phenomenon is best exemplified by the "Foundling Incident" which occurred in Arizona in the early 1900s. Although instructive to any study concerning ethnic conflict in the territory, the incident need not be fully discussed here--past chroniclers have succeeded in this endeavor, most notably A. Blake Brophy in his work entitled Foundlings on the Frontier. Briefly, this affair centered around the adoption of Anglo orphans by Mexican families and the children's subsequent seizure by Anglo vigilanted groups who were strongly motivated by racist attitudes. The case is historically significant because it vividly portrays the blatant religious, economic and cultural prejudices against Mexicans in the mining town of Clifton.<sup>24</sup>

Years of unfulfilled hopes and unrealized dreams confronted Mexican workers in Clifton. These workers watched and participated in strikes and PLM movements in hope of enhancing their position. Mexican miners watched helplessly through the years as their efforts failed and their economic dreams remained an unmet reality. Victor S. Clark, commissioned by the United States government to prepare a study on Mexican labor, eventually concluded that "the Mexicans are very tenacious of their rights . . . their suspicions of the fairness of their employers seem easily aroused and they will quit a job at once if they think they are being

cheated."<sup>25</sup> Mexican workers doubted fairness of their employers and objected to the continued injustice of a double standard of wages. The years of petty abuses, misunderstandings and low wages made miners susceptible to union organization attempts. Realizing that their previous efforts had failed because of a lack of expertise in negotiating, and that economic advancement for the Mexican worker was synonymous with a merging of their interests with those of their Anglo associates, a group of Mexicans asked that an organizer from the WFM be sent to the Clifton district in the summer of 1915.<sup>26</sup>

The WFM, still facing IWW competition, changed its original 1896 Globe stand concerning Mexican workers and sent Guy Miller to the Clifton district in August 1915. One of the Federation's top organizers, Miller seized upon the idea of extending health and burial benefits to existing mutualistas as a means of encouraging union membership.<sup>27</sup> As added incentive, Miller was to secure better wages and working conditions. On August 16, organizing efforts received a further impetus when wages were reduced.<sup>28</sup>

Managers of the Arizona, Shannon and Detroit Copper companies became increasingly alarmed at the ever-growing list of employees who favored WFM affiliation. To stymie this growth, management requested a meeting with their Mexican employees. The managers refused to meet with this delegation when Miller appeared before them as the spokesman for striking miners--Anglo and Mexican alike. After this refusal to negotiate, management tried to discredit WFM efforts by having company men circulate a petition announcing workers' satisfaction with existing conditions and miners' desires to refrain from joining a union. When these measures failed, owners began discharging men who had joined the union or who re-

fused to sign mine managers' petitions.<sup>29</sup>

By September 6, a mass meeting occurred in which guidelines for the impending strike became known.<sup>30</sup> It is here that Miller outlined strike plans, which included presentation of demands to mine owners, consideration of requests, and, if the previous two failed, the calling of a general walkout.<sup>31</sup> Miller further warned that it would be advisable for Mexican workers and their families to stock up on provisions. He also stated that should a strike be forthcoming, "perhaps" the union would come to the aid of the strikers.<sup>32</sup>

The suggestion of possible monetary aid necessitates closer scrutiny. Unknown to others, Miller had enticed Mexican workers to stop working although he knew full well that the Federation treasury, due to other strike activities and constant fighting with the IWW, was in deep financial trouble and would not be able to aid fully the strikers in any forthcoming dispute. Moreover, the impending walkout had not been authorized by the executive board of the WFM.<sup>33</sup> Confronted with a threatening IWW policy and wishing more firmly to entrench WFM efforts, Miller deemed it necessary to unionize the camp at all costs. Mexican miners misplaced their trust and looked to the WFM to improve their economic and social conditions.

On Saturday, September 11, mine managers received letter written by Miller and several leaders of the Mexican miners requesting that a conference be held. The owners refused. At eleven o'clock Saturday night, Mexican miners went on strike.<sup>34</sup>

By Sunday morning, some 5,000 men were idle and, in an effort to maintain order, had voluntarily placed guards to protect company property from damage.<sup>35</sup> Mine managers maintained from the onset that the workers

had used the main issue (wages) to gain popular support for themselves. The managers were convinced that WFM "agitators" had entered the district and persuaded their employees that "past, pleasant relations and present rates of wages should be radically changed."<sup>36</sup> Walter Douglas, general manager of Phelps-Dodge and Company, summarized the managers' position when he stated that "the Western Federation of Miners. . . knowing that the Mexican workmen are easily led and more easily intimidated. . . has exercised its . . . despotic methods to bring suffering upon a formerly happy and contented community."<sup>37</sup> Management insisted that the central issue revolved around whether or not the camp would be controlled by the Federation or if the Clifton District would be a non-union camp.

On September 17, mine owners reiterated their stand against the Federation and repeated management's desire to discuss the situation with Mexican employees. The district corporate entrepreneurs stressed preliminaries that would have to be met if any conference were to be held. These restrictions were designed to "assure mine owners that those who represent the miners have always been present in the area and are not members of the Western Federation of Miners."<sup>38</sup> The miners complied with these instructions by selecting a committee to represent them in the forthcoming negotiations. While no delegates were WFM organizers or officers, all belonged to the recently chartered union.<sup>39</sup>

On September 27, strikers and owners met to discuss demands made by the workers. These consisted of 1) higher wages scales; 2) reinstatement of men who had been discharged for union activity since September 1; 3) the assurance that no discrimination would be shown toward strike leaders; 4) free hospital board to employees and 5) an eight hour work day. Managers refused these demands.<sup>40</sup>

Mine owners contended that the wage question was simply a pretext for the "unionizing of a camp that in the past had never discriminated against any man." To state that there had never been any discrimination is historically untenable. At the time of the strike, the Detroit Copper Company employed Mexican miners at a wage of \$2.73 to \$2.88 per day. Anglo miners, in contrast, received \$3.30 to \$3.70 for the same work. Mexican timbermen (those who place wooden beams for support within mine shafts) earned \$2.88 while their Anglo counterparts obtained anywhere from \$3.56 to \$4.04 per day. Managers argued that mine operations could not continue if wage increases were given to employees. Hence the demand on the part of Mexican miners for \$3.50 base pay for all underground workers, regardless of nationality, went unanswered. The operators foiled Mexican efforts for equal pay for equal work by refusing to admit that they had sufficient funds for such a measure, even though wartime profits were at a record high and copper was selling for almost eighteen cents a pound in September of 1915.<sup>41</sup>

Mexican miners, who quickly took control of the strike and comprised the overwhelming majority of the dissatisfied workers, were willing to subvert the objective of union recognition in return for obtaining equal wages. However, mine owners, who deemed wages a minor issue, wanted the complete and immediate removal of any and all Federation guidance. They arbitrarily refused to continue negotiations until operations resumed on the basis that had prevailed prior to the strike. Once the miners had returned to work, management would negotiate.<sup>42</sup>

Besides the wage question, miners tried to end the water monopoly of the copper companies. Commonly, mine operators deducted a set fee from the miners' monthly wages for water privileges.<sup>43</sup> The company felt

workers should help defray the cost of importing this commodity. A monthly deduction of \$2.20, which ostensibly went toward a company hospital, caused considerable consternation among workers. Another tax was charged if any member of the miner's family utilized medical facilities. Petty bribery, oftentimes required to maintain a job, caused further resentment among the miners. Those workers who complained were immediately discharged, although this graft was in direct violation of existing labor laws.<sup>44</sup>

For both Mexican and Anglo miners, these issues were central to the walkout. For the Mexican barrateros, specifically, the strike presented an opportune moment to last out at prevailing social and economic injustices. These workers simply wanted equal pay for equal work.<sup>45</sup> The strike provided a cataclysmic force and the Federation the necessary guidelines for this wish to become a reality.

Governor George W. P. Hunt went to the district where he hoped to bring both managers and strikers together in negotiations. At a mass meeting held in Clifton on September 30, Hunt praised workers for attempting to better their living, working and economic conditions, but he also stressed the necessity of preserving order. With Lázaro Gutierrez de Lara, a former PLM follower and now a Federation organizer, translating the Governor's speeches, Hunt concluded that "the time will come when the men and women who toil in this district should have justice, and that is all the governor of this state asks for."<sup>46</sup>

Not everyone was as enthusiastic as the partisan strikers about Hunt's speech. Wiley E. Jones, Attorney General of Arizona, stated that "God Almighty is on the side of the workingman in this controversy."

During the course of the labor difficulties, he drastically changed his opinion as he went before the Supreme Court in Washington, DC to argue the necessity of the Eighty Percent Law. This particular piece of legislation sought to restrict the Spanish-speaking element of the labor force in Arizona to twenty percent.<sup>47</sup>

John Christy, Representative of Greenlee County (where Clifton is situated), had been empowered by citizens of the town to seek state intervention. When asked to recall past discussions at the Arizona State Federation Convention at Tucson in October he stated that in a parade held in Clifton "not more than one hundred could speak the English language or read a printed word. They are ignorant of the law, they have been free bred under different social relations, free speech and free actions are unknown in the countries from when they come."<sup>48</sup>

That such a distinguished delegate would make this sort of a statement is evidence that prejudice against Mexicans was common and openly expressed before and during the strike. Christy could have been speaking about the Mexican workers or he might have been referring to miners in general. His second usage, however, left little doubt as to his reference. Furthermore, Christy asserted that the labor dispute occurred in "an un-American district, protected by treaties, officials and laws with and of other countries. Under their skins, these people are really a bunch of barbarians."<sup>49</sup> Such were the sentiments of the Representative from Clifton.

Other people were irritated with Governor Hunt's concern for the striking workers. The editor of the Arizona Daily Star reported that the Governor's efforts to mingle with these miners were a serious mistake. Had Hunt's recent speech been made to American miners, it would

have been understood, but "delivered before foreigners. . .the governor's words were doubtless taken by men to mean that no matter what happened, they would be protected."<sup>50</sup>

Mine managers next tried to encourage support for management by insisting that strikers were utilizing physical intimidation on company men and property. Fearing possible physical retributions, managers fled to El Paso, Texas, where they conveniently refused to negotiate. The miners, feeling that this action was a calculated attempt to incite riot, attempted to bring company officials back to the Clifton district. This too failed. With this setback, any hope of a quick settlement became remote.<sup>51</sup>

Despite managers' protestations to the contrary, the walkout was remarkable for its lack of violence. Contemporary publications such as The Outlook and The Survey candidly remarked on the manner in which the strike was held and commended Hunt and Sheriff James Cash of Clifton for doing everything in their power to insure that no violence would befall the mining district.<sup>52</sup>

While small disagreements did occur during the strike, the evidence overwhelmingly substantiates beliefs that striking miners did everything possible to insure that violence would be avoided. Mine managers, however, do not fare as well when the evidence is carefully weighed. During the time of the strike there were certain unruly acts committed by individuals, without sanction of labor unions, to incite riot or violence. Pedro Michelena, accused of stirring Mexicans against the WFM, was found to have in his possession letters from company representatives offering to pay his expenses while in the district.<sup>53</sup>

A further source of concern of possible violence was the town of Duncan, Arizona--just outside the Clifton district. During the first month of the strike, non-union men, including foremen and lesser company officials, left the striking copper camps for Duncan. Miners in Clifton-Morenci continually felt that this town was a camp of strike-breakers. These miners believed that as soon as there were enough company men, managers would import them into the strike area to resume operations.<sup>54</sup> Governor Hunt, wishing to take the option of calling for Federal assistance to quell the walkout away from the managers, sent troops in early October to insure continuation of a peaceful strike.<sup>55</sup>

While both miners and management eyed each other with suspicion, mediators attempted to get both sides to negotiate. Largely due to Cash's efforts, the mine managers agreed to meet with a committee of their former employees in El Paso if owners were given an opportunity to choose from a list of nominated delegates.<sup>56</sup> Managers wished to scrutinize such a list in order to omit any Federation organizers. Immediately the presidents of the three union locals, Juan Guerra of Clifton, Abrán Rico of Morenci and Carlos Carabajal of Metcalf, met to choose the committee. Miner decided to send a delegation of seven to El Paso which would represent all striking miners.<sup>57</sup> Mine managers, however, claimed that two delegates were WFM officials and a third was a discharged employee.<sup>58</sup>

Mine entrepreneurs next insisted that they would meet only with a handpicked committee of five--only two of which were to be Mexican. This selected committee, comprised of J. S. Hughes, Henry Daly, Theodore Hollingsworth, Rufino García and Adolfo Palacio, earnestly sought a strike settlement beneficial to all.<sup>59</sup> This delegation was instructed to concede all points except a pay raise, minimum wage, guarantee against

discharge for strike activity and the right to affiliate with the Federation. The managers, when learning of this last demand, declared that the committee was so influenced by Western Federation policy that conciliatory efforts were impossible.<sup>60</sup>

Newspapers, supportive of management, hearing of Mexican miners' continued desire for higher wages, lashed out at strikers. "Should wages be increased," reported the Douglas Daily International, "Mexican miners would have to surrender their employment to a more competent class of miners."<sup>61</sup> While not blatantly stating their true feelings, journalists of this newspaper intimated should higher wages be warranted then Anglo workers and not Mexican miners should benefit. Newspaper editorials hinted that Mexican miners should accept their economic lot or face job replacement. J. G. Cooper, purchasing agent of the Arizona Copper Company, stated that if the companies were forced to pay the same wages to Mexicans this might ultimately result "in practically the entire elimination of the Mexican."<sup>62</sup> As was the case in the Ray strike of 1900, management felt that if wage increases were to be forthcoming, then Anglo workers should receive these concessions.

It became apparent that without outside assistance, the strike would continue indefinitely. Certainly the longevity of the walkout was beginning to pinch the wallets of all concerned--miners and management alike. For the workers part, assistance in the form of money and food staples continued to come into Clifton from other mining districts.<sup>63</sup> Nonetheless, with wartime markets readily available, the copper industry of Arizona remained inactive.

On October 7, Hunt requested that Secretary of Labor, William B.

Wilson, investigate the strike. Therefore, Joseph S. Myers and Hyell Davies investigated the Clifton situation and spent some six weeks collecting data.<sup>64</sup> With the aid of Henry Hill and Reese R. Webster (representing the businessmen of the district), and A. V. Dye (representing the managers), the formulation of the Hill-Webster Proposition became the tool by which the strike was settled on January 24. The men returned to work of the 26th of January 1916.<sup>65</sup>

Under the stipulated conditions, the Mexican miners were to give up any ties with the Federation in return for a higher wage scale. This resulted in the renunciation of the Federation on January 11 and the consequent swearing of union allegiance to the Arizona State Federation. Furthermore, no strikers were to be fired except those guilty of violence. Finally, the managers were to meet with their employees after resumption of mining operations to settle any minor disputes as they arose.<sup>66</sup>

Transition from idleness to industry ensued with relatively little difficulty and the company resumed normal operations within a month of acceptance of the Proposition. The strike negated any possible gains for the mining companies, a fact most distressing when one realizes the prosperity of other copper districts during the war years. By mid-February, both managers and miners met to formalize a final agreement. This resulted in a new wage scale, effective March 1, 1916, with a minimum wage of two dollars per shift established.<sup>67</sup> Also adopted was a sliding scale of wages from which miners earnings could be determined depending upon the price of copper. More importantly, the strike marks the first, albeit temporary, victory for Mexican miners in Arizona.

It is a general tendency to expound economic advancement for the

Mexican miner being the result of the strike. While this cannot be denied, it must also be remembered that, to the Mexican who participated in the struggle, the walkout presented an opportunity to lash out at the stigma of docility which had heretofore been attached to his culture. This fact should not escape the notice of the reader. By walking out of their jobs, Mexican miners proved to their employers that they would no longer tolerate double standards.

Unionization for Mexican workers had finally become a reality. To help insure and solidify the position, Mexican organizers sought 100% unionization of the copper camps. Personifying this desire for Mexican participation is Lázaro Gutierrez de Lara. Having worked unsuccessfully for organization in Cananea in 1906 and again with the PLM in California and Arizona in 1906-1909, Gutierrez de Lara at last played an instrumental role in assuring Mexican involvement within the tenets of Arizona unionism.<sup>68</sup>

Gutierrez de Lara, a favorite with Mexican workers in the Clifton district, became the liason between the leadership of the WFM and the newly accepted Mexican members. This mining district eventually declared a "closed" camp and discouraged non-union workers from entering the district. Urging unionized Mexicans to stand firm, de Lara emphasized the need for mining companies to stop their assaults on organized labor.<sup>69</sup>

The Clifton strike ushered in the modern period of labor-management relations in Arizona. Within a few months of the settlement, union locals merged with the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.<sup>70</sup> Correspondingly, mining communities witnessed a rash of labor disturbances as union locals exerted more power in determining the welfare of their of their members.<sup>71</sup>

In order to appreciate fully the results of the Clifton walkout, one must understand the facts, opinions and attitudes which confronted Mexicanos as they played out their role in developing this Arizona copper industry. Mexican workers assumed the responsibility of bridging the rift between themselves and Western Federation policy so that laboring classes in general would benefit. For Mexican workers in particular, the Clifton strike marked the first successful step in striking back at social, economic and racial injustices which continue to exist. Lastly, the strike illustrates that the awakening of Mexicans and Chicanos in Arizona has been a long and arduous process, one which has its origins in the pre-World War I era.

<sup>1</sup>George F. Leaming, "Labor and Copper in Arizona: Origin and Growth," Arizona Review 16 (April 1967), p. 18. Vernon H. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict: Labor Relations in the Nonferrous Metals Industry up to 1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), p. 357. Miners' Magazine, April 5, 1906. "Defeat of Unionism at Bisbee," Engineering and Mining Journal (March 24, 1906), pp. 570-71. Hereafter cited EMJ.

<sup>2</sup>Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, p. 358, quoting Bisbee Daily Review (Bisbee, Arizona), March 17, 1907.

<sup>3</sup>EMJ (August 10, 1907), p. 371. Ibid. (December 28, 1907), p. 1232. Leaming, "Labor and Copper," p. 18.

<sup>4</sup>Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, pp. 360-62.

<sup>5</sup>James H. McClintock, Arizona: The Nation's Youngest Commonwealth Within a Land of Ancient Cultures (Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1916), 8 vols., II, p. 352. Journals of the Twenty-fifth Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Arizona, 1909, pp. 224-30. Arizona Room, Hayden Library, Arizona State University.

<sup>6</sup>Daily Silver Belt (Globe, Arizona), April 23, 1914.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., January 14, 1913.

<sup>8</sup>EMJ 98 (November 14, 1914), p. 890. "Anti-Alien Law Thrown Out By U.S. Judges," Miners' Magazine, February 4, 1915. "The Arizona Alien Labor Law," The Outlook CIX (January 20, 1915), pp. 109-10.

<sup>9</sup>"An Ingrate and Menace," Miners' Magazine, February 4, 1915.

<sup>10</sup>"The Strike at Ray, Arizona," Miners' Magazine, August 5, 1915.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid. Arizona Labor Journal July 1, 8, 15, 1915. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, pp. 364-65.

<sup>13</sup>Miners' Magazine, August 5, 1915.

<sup>14</sup>"A Request to Governor Hunt of Arizona," Miners' Magazine, October 7, 1915. Refugio Nejara and M. de J. Minuoz (sic) were forcefully taken from the mine and ordered to leave the company premises. They were discharged on the belief that they were conspiring against the United States.

<sup>15</sup>Arthur F. Wendt, "The Copper Ores of the Southwest," Transactions of the American Institute of Mining Engineers 15 (1886-1887), pp. 25, 39, 40. Mining Life (Silver City, New Mexico), July 5, 13, 19, 1873.

- <sup>16</sup>Arthur L. Walker, "Recollections of Early Day Mining in Arizona," Arizona Historical Review 6 (April 1935), p. 39.
- <sup>17</sup>James Colquhoun, The Early History of the Clifton-Morenci District (London: John Murray, 1924), pp. 35-37, 39.
- <sup>18</sup>Hiram C. Hodge, Arizona As It Is: Or The Coming Country (Boston: H. O. Houghton and Co., 1877), p. 113.
- <sup>19</sup>Walker, "Early Day Mining," p. 40.
- <sup>20</sup>Victor S. Clark, "Mexican Labor in the United States," Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, #78, September 1908 (Washington: Department of Commerce, 1908), p. 438.
- <sup>21</sup>Joseph R. Park, "The History of Mexican Labor in Arizona During The Territorial Period," (M.A. Thesis, University of Arizona, 1961), p. 206.
- <sup>22</sup>Colquhoun, Clifton-Morenci District, pp. 49-50. See also Clark, "Mexican Labor in the United States," for additional information as to the migrational routes taken by Mexican laborers, passim.
- <sup>23</sup>Clark, "Mexican Labor in the United States," pp. 485-86. Walter E. Weyl, "Labor Conditions in Mexico," Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, January 1902 (Washington: Department of Commerce, 1902). Weyl gives a very good description of conditions governing the various laboring classes in Mexico.
- <sup>24</sup>"In the Matter of the Application of the New York Foundling Hospital, a Corporation, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. New York Foundling Hospital, Petitioner, vs. William Norton, in the Custody of John C. Gatti, Respondent," File on the Arizona Supreme Court Docket, no. 209. Arizona Department of Library and Archives, Phoenix, Arizona. Raymond Mulligan, "The Foundling Incident," Arizona and the West 6 (1964), pp. 104-17.
- <sup>25</sup>Clark, "Mexican Labor in the United States," p. 496.
- <sup>26</sup>Copper Era (Clifton, Arizona), September 15, 1915.
- <sup>27</sup>Ibid., September 17, October 29, 1915.
- <sup>28</sup>James R. Kluger, The Clifton-Morenci Strike: Labor Difficulty in Arizona, 1915-1916 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970), p. 27.
- <sup>29</sup>"Arizona Copper Miners Strike," EMJ 100 (October 9, 1915), p. 605.
- <sup>30</sup>Copper Era, September 10, 1915.
- <sup>31</sup>EMJ 100 (October 9, 1915), p. 606.
- <sup>32</sup>Copper Era, September 10, 1915.
- <sup>33</sup>Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, p. 366.

- <sup>34</sup>Arizona Daily Star (Tucson, Arizona), September 17, 1915.
- <sup>35</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>36</sup>Ibid., September 28, 1915. New Republic V (January 22, 1916), pp. 293-304. EMJ 100 (October 9, 1915), p. 606.
- <sup>37</sup>EMJ 100 (October 9, 1915), p. 605.
- <sup>38</sup>Arizona Daily Star, September 22, 1915.
- <sup>39</sup>Ibid. Copper Era, September 24, 1915. Those selected included Juan Guerra, Luis Soto and Florence Navarez of the Arizona Copper Company; Alburn Ruiz, Emilio Truja, Francisco Lozano, Antonio Hernández, and P. M. Vargas of the Detroit Copper Company; Aurelio Valdez, Roberto González, José Uranza, Panteleón Vasquez and Guillermo Vega of the Shannon Copper Company.
- <sup>40</sup>Arizona Daily Star, September 22, 1915.
- <sup>41</sup>EMJ 100 (October 9, 1915), pp. 605-07. Ibid., 101 (January 23, 1916), p. 201.
- <sup>42</sup>EMJ 100 (October 9, 1915), p. 606.
- <sup>43</sup>Arizona Copper Company Ltd. Payroll Records, 1914-1916. University of Arizona, Special Collection, Tucson, Arizona.
- <sup>44</sup>Copper Era, October 15, 1915. "Labor Laws of the United States," United States Department of Labor Statistics, Bulletin #148 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1914), pp. 196-97, 202-03, 209-10. Ibid., Bulletin #203 (1917), pp. 215-16, 371.
- <sup>45</sup>Hugh G. Elwes, "Points About Mexican Labor," EMJ 90 (October 1, 1910), p. 662.
- <sup>46</sup>Copper Era, October 1, 1915.
- <sup>47</sup>Arizona Daily Star, October 16, 1915. Arizona Labor Journal, October 14, 1915.
- <sup>48</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>49</sup>Arizona Daily Star, October 8, 1915.
- <sup>50</sup>Ibid., September 28, 1915. Douglas Daily International, October 12, 1915.
- <sup>51</sup>Copper Era, October 8, 1915. EMJ 100 (October 9, 1915), p. 607.
- <sup>52</sup>The Survey XXXVI (May 6, 1916), p. 143. The Outlook CXII (February 2, 1916), pp. 250-51.

<sup>53</sup>The New Republic V (1916), p. 293. Arizona Daily Star, September 18, 1915.

<sup>54</sup>The Survey XXXVI (May 6, 1916), p. 144.

<sup>55</sup>"The Strike Situation in Arizona," EMJ 100 (October 30, 1915), p. 732.

<sup>56</sup>John A. Fitch, "Arizona's Embargo on Strike-Breakers," The Survey XXXVI (May 6, 1916), p. 144.

<sup>57</sup>Arizona Daily Star, October 19, 1915. Douglas Daily International, October 13, 1915. Tucson Citizen, October 27, 1915. Frank Tarbel, Frank Hocker and Dick Walsh represented the Arizona Copper Company; Amos C. Bean and Norberto Gonzalez the Shannon Copper Company; Abrán Rico the Detroit Copper Company. Mexican miners from Clifton insisted that Guerra be made a delegate-at-large. Kluger, The Clifton-Morenci Strike, p. 58.

<sup>58</sup>Arizona Daily Star, October 12, 1915.

<sup>59</sup>"The Strike Situation in Arizona," EMJ 100 (October 30, 1915), p. 733. Ibid., 100 (November 6, 1915), p. 776.

<sup>60</sup>Kluger, The Clifton-Morenci Strike, p. 59. Arizona Daily Star, October 17, 24, 1915. Douglas Daily International, October 19, 1915.

<sup>61</sup>Douglas Daily International, October 12, 16, 1915. The newspaper took offense at Governor Hunt's speech to Mexican miners by intimating that Hunt "was with them [Mexicans] and that they were just as good as anyone else in this section." EMJ 100 (November 6, 1915), p. 776.

<sup>62</sup>In reply to a direct question, J. G. Cooper, purchasing agent of the Arizona Copper Company said that if the companies were forced to pay the same wages to Mexicans as to Americans, this might result in "practically the entire elimination of the Mexican." Douglas Daily International, October 14, 1915.

<sup>63</sup>EMJ 100 (December 4, 1915), p. 939.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid. 100 (November 6, 1915), p. 776.

<sup>65</sup>Copper Era, January 21, 25, 28, February 4, 11, 1916. Arizona Republican, January 14, 18, 23, 1916. EMJ 101 (January 15, 1916), p. 161. Ibid. 101 (February 5, 1916), p. 278.

<sup>66</sup>Letter from Federal Commissioners of Conciliation to Governor Hunt, February 10, 1916. Special Collections, University of Arizona, Tucson.

<sup>67</sup>EMJ 101 (February 26, 1916), p. 412. EMJ 101 (March 11, 1916), p. 497.

<sup>68</sup>A lawyer by trade, Gutierrez de Lara had been wanted by Mexican authorities since the early 1900s for gaining the ire of William Cornell Greene, owner of the Greene Consolidated Copper Company of Cananea. Having moved to the United States, Gutierrez de Lara worked in conjunction with the PLM in Mexican unionization endeavors. See, United States House of Representatives, Hearings on House Joint Resolution 201 Providing for a Joint Committee to Investigate Alleged Persecutions of Mexican Citizens by the Government of Mexico, Hearings held before the Committee on Rules, June 8-14, 1910 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910). Also, the National Archives, Washington, D. C., Department of Justice, Record Group 60 and Department of State, Record Group 59, contain information on Gutierrez.

<sup>69</sup>EMJ 100 (November 27, 1915), p. 903. Ibid. 101 (May 6, 1916), pp. 833-34. Arizona Daily Star, October 27, 1915. Copper Era, October 1, 1915. Tucson Citizen, October 27, 1915.

<sup>70</sup>Miners' Magazine, December 1916.

<sup>71</sup>Jerome News (Jerome, Arizona), May 25, July 13, 1917. Tucson Citizen, July 7, 1917. Arizona Republican, July 3, 1917.

## CHAPTER VII

### ARIZONA'S LABOR NADIR: THE RESULTS OF IWW INTERVENTION

The months after the Clifton strike witnessed sporadic labor walkouts as miners and management continued to work out differences. Mexican miners, while not belligerent, quickly and adamantly enforced the conditions of the Webster-Hill Proposition. By continued efforts toward union expansion, organized labor soon made this mining district a stronghold of International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (IUMMSW).

Clifton-Morenci signaled a highwater mark for Arizona labor in general and Mexican participation in particular. Never before, and for some twenty years after 1916, were Arizona's mining classes unified behind a popular cause. This is not to suggest that Mexican-Anglo hostility had ended. It is important, however, to state that once Mexicans had demonstrated an ability to embrace the nuances of Arizona unionism, Anglo stereotypes concerning Mexican labor were less in evidence.

It would be naive to believe that there were no inter-union struggles during the second decade of the 1900s. The IUMMSW was racked with dissension as to the true goal of organized labor. Mine managers and the threat posed by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW or Wobblies) proved to be major stumbling blocks of organized labor. Mexican miners, having been caught up in this struggle were themselves divided over which union to favor.

IWW intervention into unionized districts proved to be disastrous. There was no real chance of Wobblly ideology being imposed and the presence

of the IWW only served to undermine IUMMSW efforts to secure a position, which, in comparison to other western mining districts, was precarious. More importantly, IWW influence completely eroded Mexican miners' efforts in union participation. Mine owners, united in opposition to organized labor and smarting from their setback in Clifton, quickly seized upon inter-union strife to render labor helpless by the end of July 1917.

Despite labor's major victory in 1916, all was not well in Arizona. By 1917, further rumblings of discontent could be heard throughout the state. Other mining communities, hoping to make economic and working gains, staged labor walkouts. Ajo, Arizona, was the first of these towns to do so. In January 1917, some one thousand Mexican, Indian and Anglo workers were out on strike and asked for organizational assistance from the IUMMSW. Mexican and Indian workers received wages of \$1.50 to \$2.20 per day. Stating that miners had been denied rights to assemble and that the law was tightly controlled by mine owners, resident workers sought financial aid from outside the mining district. Their efforts were futile. By January 19, some twenty miners were arrested and taken to Tucson to await trial. To insure that no further disturbances would occur, gunmen were imported and sworn in as deputy sheriffs.<sup>1</sup>

While events in Ajo took place, Jerome, Arizona, was also the scene of unrest. Mexican and Anglo workers asked that an organizer of the IUMMSW be sent to the district in November 1916. By January 25, Jim McCluskey of the International Union arrived in the area. A former organizer of the Miami Miner's Union, McCluskey spent a week listening to complaints and grievances of men employed in Jerome.<sup>2</sup> Ordered by Charles Moyer, president of the IUMMSW, to avoid a strike if at all possible, McCluskey concluded in his preliminary report to International

Union headquarters that Jerome had all the attributes of a feudal barony. Furthermore, the United Verde Copper Company controlled all aspects of life in Jerome and would not tolerate anything that could not be manipulated by management.<sup>3</sup>

Originally McCluskey intended only to entertain practicalities involved in establishing a local without issuing a strike order. Management, however, when hearing of the presence of the union organizer, started to discharge employees suspected of harboring thoughts of unionization. One such individual was Czar Rodríguez, who was informed by his shift boss on the night of March 12 that he had been fired for union participation.<sup>4</sup> Hoping to avert a strike and wishing to settle differences amicably, McCluskey wrote to Robert Tally, assistant general manager of mining operations in Jerome, requesting a meeting. While agreeing to such a conference, Tally nonetheless continued to discharge miners.<sup>5</sup>

Management hoped to avoid wage questions and recognition of a union local by stalling for time. More importantly, entrepreneurs encouraged loyal company men to infiltrate local #79 and control inter-union matters. These actions further estranged the majority of Jerome's work force and greatly facilitated union growth. Citing management's discrimination against union sympathizers and its active campaign to control local union matters and arbitrarily refusing to grant minimum wage increases, local miners voted for a strike on May 21.<sup>6</sup> To insure all concerned that this strike was not superficially imposed by IUMSW officials, constant supervision was kept by both company and union men. The final count read 543 union members in favor of a walkout, 25 against.<sup>7</sup>

It is interesting to note that McCluskey, in referring to the strike, mentions that the walkout was started before the United States

entrance into World War I. In his summation of events in Jerome during the months January through July, McCluskey felt management was guilty of hypocrisy in accusing miners of being unpatriotic to America's war effort when in reality, American policy was one of neutrality. Furthermore, pleas of patriotism only avoided the issue of "obtaining justice for the men of the mines."<sup>8</sup>

Local officials immediately set about to bring strike matters to a fruitful victory. Tantamount to union success was the courting of Mexican miners. McCluskey obtained IUMSW approval to bring Mexican organizers from other Arizona districts.<sup>9</sup> Assisting International Union endeavors were Ed Moreno, Pascual Vargas and Juan Carbajal of Clifton.<sup>10</sup>

Courting Mexican support proved to be no easy task as both Moreno and Carbajal found opposition from Mexican officers of the Liga Protectora Latina (LPL). Patterned after mutualistas, La Liga Protectora had fought hard to help the Spanish-speaking in Jerome long before the introduction of unionism to the mining district. Not wishing to see their efforts go for naught, La Liga cautiously watched the initial strike proceedings.<sup>11</sup>

La Liga, and indeed a substantial portion of United Verde's Mexican labor force, did not favor a prolonged walkout. While local #79 of the IUMSW desired a closed shop system and grievance committees, the Liga Protectora desired an increase of wages based on Miami's sliding scale or wages and a promise from United Verde to help reduce living costs in the district.<sup>12</sup>

Following precedents established during the Clifton strike, union men quickly took it upon themselves to protect company property and prevent violence. Predictably, company officials and Jerome

businessmen flooded newspaper editorials with the descriptions of a reign of terror that gripped Jerome.<sup>13</sup>

The situation was not as bad as depicted, but there were nonetheless several unfortunate incidents involving Mexican residents. One resulted in the shooting death of Genaro Mayragoita after a scuffle with union pickets. Another involved strikers physically intimidating an unsympathetic Mexican worker. These actions resulted in officers of the LPL requesting that Governor Thomas Campbell protect Mexican miners who did not favor strike conditions.<sup>14</sup>

International Union officials also had to contend with divisive problems posed by IWW organizers in Arizona. As early as February 1917, IWW members had infiltrated the organized copper camps throughout the state attracting considerable numbers of IUMMSW members. By the eighth of that month, IWW followers claimed formation of a Metal Mine Workers (MMW) local in Jerome.<sup>15</sup> By May, IWW locals found their way into Bisbee and the Globe-Miami district. Frank Little, a prominent IWW organizer, quickly employed Mexican newspapers and organizers to enhance IWW growth in Globe-Miami.<sup>16</sup> When hearing of this development, McCluskey charged eastern corporations with financing IWW activities to create added union dissension, thus weakening union and organized labor goals.<sup>17</sup>

IWW activities played a decisive role in Jerome. When IUMMSW officers called for a strike, MMW-IWW followers sided with management. While wanting a pay scale based on the Miami rate, IWW followers willingly agreed to do away with demands of a union shop contract. Management, wanting to keep Jerome an open camp, agreed to both unions' demands for higher wages but refused all others.<sup>18</sup>

Having both organizations in the same district only complicated

union matters. Rank and file divided over which union, if any, to join. Mexican miners of the area skeptically looked at both and, for the most part, remained within the protective confines of La Liga. Enmity was great and management exploited it to the utmost.

Not content with the existing situation, IWW organizers pushed forth, determined to insure IWW success while undermining the already established International Union local. On July 5, IWW leaders called for another strike.<sup>19</sup> Mexican workers, as well as members of the IUMSW, stated that such a walkout was illegal and harmful to Arizona's labor movement. IWW demands included instituting a six hour day at \$6 per shift. These demands could not realistically be met when the time period and America's involvement in World War I are considered. Mexican miners previously denounced wartime industrial strife as unpatriotic and had reiterated their satisfaction with higher wages recently obtained. IUMSW urged that miners continue working as it was felt that continued industrial warfare would only hurt Arizona unionism.<sup>21</sup>

On the morning of July 10, some two hundred and fifty businessmen and IUMSW followers embarked on a systematic "rounding up" of suspected Wobblies. By nine-thirty am, some one hundred men were marched to jail where a weeding out process began. Company, as well as Miners' Union officials, utilized their respective membership rolls to determine actual IWW followers. Those accused of being IWW members, some sixty-seven in all, quickly found themselves deported to Needles, California.<sup>22</sup>

With this removal of dissent, labor agitation ceased in Jerome's mining district. In a very real sense, this episode of Arizona labor is a microcosm of union history in the state. Jerome's struggles demonstrated the extent of union rivalry and how quickly management would

react in attempts to end labor agitation.<sup>23</sup>

For Mexican employees, this episode is important for various other reasons. Seeking neutrality from both IUMMSW and IWW-MMW factions, Mexican miners wished to resume work once management offered pay raises to conclude initial labor disturbances called by International Union organizers. Mexican miners were not "scabs" for returning to work. They had encouragement and approval of the IUMMSW in this endeavor. La Liga Protectora enabled Mexican miners to withstand union and management interaction while retaining its primary concern for Mexicanos.<sup>24</sup>

Results of the Jerome strike affected Mexican workers in various other forms. With deportations came establishment of a dangerous precedent that could be used in future disputes. In purest synthesis, deportation of IWW members was simply a desire by management and organized labor to rid themselves of a section of a laboring class that proved objectionable to all concerned. All factions participating in removal of Wobblies were nothing more than vigilante groups whose "law of necessity" was formulated after the facts to support their actions.

While no Mexicans were deported for supporting IWW endeavors in Jerome, this method could, and would, be used again. In future years, when management, with federal assistance, wanted to insure jobs for "Americans," Mexicans themselves were deported. This phenomenon not only encompassed Arizona but also the Southwest in general. Entrepreneurs and management, tiring of one element of a laboring class, would simply replace and deport Mexican workers.

This is not to suggest that the deportations of 1917 and Mexican repatriation of the 1930s resulted from similar circumstances. It is, however, necessary to point out that once a precedent was established

and the American populace accepted deportation as "necessary" for the survival of democracy, the rationalization for removal was facilitated. In short, deportation became a tool used by management (and, more recently, by agricultural concerns) against a sector of labor with whom owners were at odds. It is this mentality that condoned mass deportations of Mexicans during the 1930s.<sup>25</sup>

The Globe-Miami district's branch of MMW-IWW, when hearing of the deportations at Jerome, telegraphed Governor Thomas Campbell complaining of such treatment at the hands of a lawless mob. The Arizona Republican, hearing of this correspondence, sensationalized its presentation by reporting that IWW leadership had "threatened" Campbell.<sup>26</sup>

These events in Jerome are not isolated examples of labor strife in Arizona. Concurrent events in the Clifton-Morenci, Globe-Miami, and Bisbee districts show the degree of influence exerted by IWW followers. In Globe, where two IUMSW locals existed, the Wobblies had conducted membership drives, and so it was not uncommon for workers to be card carrying members of both unions.<sup>27</sup>

Joe Cannon, an International organizer in Globe, initially attempted to forestall labor difficulties. However, a continued company policy of firing union men quickly led to confrontation. In late June, Cannon publicly blasted management for weeding out union men and not meeting to listen to grievances. On June 30, a strike vote was taken by IUMSW members. Miners agreed to strike on July 2 by an overwhelming majority of voters. Simultaneously, IWW called for strike activities to commence on July 1.<sup>28</sup>

This action on the part of MMW-IWW followers defies explanation. By striking, IWW policy once again divided organized labor's approach

to unionization. In creating a schism between rank and file, IWW action allowed management to call for and receive federal and state assistance to quell the dispute.

IWW demands were unrealistic in light of the contemporary situation. MMW-IWW requests included abolition of the contract system, a large salary increase, no union discrimination, ending of compulsory physical examinations and having representation on the hospital board. These desires in themselves were realistic; what antagonized management and the general public were IWW demands that all mining companies within Arizona comply with these stipulations.<sup>29</sup> Added to this situation was IWW ideology that the workers of the world were intended to take over the industrial means of production and that these series of strikes were necessary steps in the doctrine of the class struggle. Arizona, like most of the United States at the time, had no sympathy for this doctrine.

Antipathy toward unionism soon developed. In response to IWW pickets being placed around company property, citizens of Globe formed "loyalty leagues." Vigilante in nature, such organizations operated on the premises of social ostracism and peer pressure. Residents, when asked to join, were told that if they did not enlist, they would be remembered as IWW supporters.<sup>30</sup>

Reinforcing a general dislike of union locals were the methods employed by IWW leaders. Whereas IUMSW officers wished to negotiate in good faith to accomplish union demands, MMW-IWW members used physical force to intimidate resident and worker alike. Furthermore, the IWW threatened to initiate a series of national strikes in both the copper industry and agricultural sectors should their demands not be met.<sup>31</sup>

By July 5, some 7,000 men were out on strike and a settlement

seemed unlikely. Despite managerial and legal attempts to quash this dispute by arresting labor leaders, unrest continued until August. In that month, operations resumed on a small scale. Part time employment remained the norm until October of 1917 when copper production realized full capacity in this district.<sup>32</sup>

The events in Clifton-Morenci vividly portray IWW-IUMMSW dichotomy. While Arizona's other major copper producing camps witnessed IWW labor intervention, Clifton-Morenci significantly lacked such divisions as Mexican miners, the majority of union members within IUMMSW locals, totally dominated strike situations.<sup>33</sup> Mexican workers took this opportunity to ask for wage increases of fifty cents per man regardless of race. This request was intended to keep pace with wartime inflation which had minimized labor gains derived from the settlement of the district's most recent outbreak in 1915-1916.<sup>34</sup>

This particular strike exemplifies setbacks suffered by organized labor and, particularly, Mexicans during the summer of 1917. While Clifton-Morenci was not as distasteful to public feeling as the Jerome or Globe situations, workers were penalized nonetheless. Although no exertion of IWW influence resulted in this district, public sentiment had become tired of protracted labor struggles and, thus, reasonable requests went unanswered. While not physically present, IWW activities undermined Mexican miners attempts to gain better working conditions and higher wages.

The Engineering and Mining Journal reports clearly indicate management's dissatisfaction with striking miners. Also within these articles are disparaging remarks concerning Mexican employees and their use of union strikes as "vacations." Norman Carmichael, general manager of

of the Arizona Copper Company, stated that such strikes appealed to the average Mexican member of any union. Carmichael expressed that "the show of authority. . .the beating up of non-sympathetic fellow employees. . . drumming their defenceless victims out of town, all. . .provided an exciting entertainment for them."<sup>35</sup>

Understandably, Carmichaels's opinions were influenced by his supervisory position and realization that work stoppage reduced revenues. He could have realized, as other correspondents did, that with no IWW provocation, Clifton-Morenci stood as Arizona's only legitimate walkout during World War I. Not too surprisingly, Mexican miners played an instrumental role in this conflict due to previous strike success.

The general manager of the Arizona Copper Company continued his protestations and insisted that Mexican workers were keeping patriotic American employees from working.<sup>36</sup> Not the timid employees that management believed them to be, Mexican miners continued their demands and steadfastly held together despite continued attempts to create internal dissension. This strike kept the Clifton-Morenci district tied up until early November. Miners here again won a moral victory as management conceded minimum wage increases.<sup>37</sup>

While labor unrest found its way into the Jerome, Globe-Miami and Clifton-Morenci districts, results of these strikes pale when compared to the unfolding of events in Bisbee. IWW ideology claimed its largest contingent in this mining camp. Following the policy of "boring from within," IWW activists effectively captured Bisbee's Miners' Union which had been chartered by the International Union. As early as May 1917, IUMSW officers expressed their concern over this matter and requested that Bisbee's charter be revoked.<sup>38</sup>

IWW takeover was facilitated by detective agencies and company men who posed as followers of the Industrial workers. William Holther, employed by the Thiel Detective Agency, successfully kept management abreast of union decisions.<sup>39</sup> Further to aid IWW control over local union matters, IUMMSW officers maintained that management had hired informers to pose as IWW advocates. Mine owners hoped to promote further divisions among union men thereby presenting company officials with a desirable opportunity to rid this community of both unions.<sup>40</sup>

By mid-June, IWW control was complete. On June 24, demands were made known by IWW leaders and, three days later, miners left their jobs.<sup>41</sup> To all concerned, this strike entered the month of July without any major disturbances. Management, aided by friendly editorial support, quickly labelled all strikers as unpatriotic and labor activities as seditious. Other contemporary accounts placed responsibility for union troubles on the "pinheaded half-wits who are employed to manage the mines of this state."<sup>42</sup>

Patience wore thin as this strike dragged on. Feeling that the walkout was not sanctioned by a bona fide union and wishing to rid themselves of a nuisance much in the manner of Jerome's citizens, residents of Bisbee moved into action. On the morning of July 12, a systematic and thorough rounding up of IWW sympathizers occurred in the mining district. By midday, some 1,200 alleged Wobblies were detained on charges of disturbing the peace, vagrancy, and intimidation of miners wishing to work.<sup>43</sup>

Under the heavy escort of citizens from Bisbee and nearby Douglas, those suspected were herded into a baseball park where some 300 heavily armed residents, with the aid of three machine guns, kept these undesira-

bles under observation. To prevent knowledge of their actions from reaching other communities, Phelps-Dodge officials authorized that lines of communication be severed, and Western Union operators readily complied.<sup>44</sup>

Deportation of the radical element soon resulted. Using twenty-four cattle cars, these agitators were first transported to Hermanas and later, to Columbus, New Mexico, where they were detained for several weeks. With deportation completed, Bisbee reported that all was quiet on the night of July 12.<sup>45</sup>

Newspaper editorials applauded these actions taken by local residents and stressed that businessmen in Bisbee proved that they were "red-blooded Americans."<sup>46</sup> Stressing that Arizona had to protect herself from labor activists, the Arizona Republican blamed the federal government for inaction thereby forcing Bisbee citizens into action. Rather than consort with "open treason and sedition," residents felt deportation was expedient and desirable.<sup>47</sup>

It is not the intention of this work to chronicle actual events connected with the Bisbee deportations of 1917. Previous historians<sup>48</sup> have explored this occurrence. For purposes of this study, suffice it to say that 1917 witnessed the defeat of IWW activities in Arizona's copper districts. With their demise, organized labor and the role of Mexican miners within the union structure, also dwindled. Mine managers, with the sympathetic support of Arizona's population, quickly negated any previous concessions to labor and firmly entrenched themselves as a force to be reckoned with in Arizona's economic and political circles.

The story of IWW activity in Arizona is not complete until careful consideration is given Mexican workers and their role in either

aiding or opposing the Industrial Workers of the World. There was no united front insofar as Mexican miners were concerned. Each mining community found itself confronted with problems particular to the area. Mining classes, in turn, faced situations unique to their working and living experiences.

The desires of Mexican workers in Jerome differed from those of the rest of that town's working class. Mexican miners were nonetheless drawn into the IUMSW-IWW confrontation. All organized labor in this area suffered a severe setback with the deportations. By the early part of 1919, any semblance of union organization had completely vanished. In February of that year, IWW activists tried in vain to re-establish a local. It proved an abysmal failure.<sup>49</sup>

Clifton-Morenci differed from Jerome in that Mexican miners tightly controlled strike activities throughout the walkout. Having finally won the right to organize in 1916, Mexicanos did not tolerate IWW interference and took offense at contemporary accounts linking them with IWW ideology.

While no Wobbly organizers were physically present, Mexican miners still suffered. Management and public sentiment erroneously linked concessions to organized labor with acquiescing to IWW demands. Nonetheless, Mexican miners stood firm and wrested rewards, however miniscule, from their long and bitter struggle.

Elsewhere in the state, Mexican workers took an active part in fighting IWW influence. A certain F. R. Velasco spoke exclusively to Mexicanos in the Ajo mining district. Velasco successfully convinced these workers to join loyalty leagues.<sup>50</sup> Such measures demonstrated to management that Mexican miners were patriotic to the war effort and wished

to unionize within the auspices of the IUMMSW--Arizona's legitimate bargaining agent for labor.

Mexican activity in regard to Globe-Miami is more difficult to ascertain. The pride involved when declaring that Globe was a white man's camp in 1896 still persisted in 1917. Contemporary accounts, however, marvelled at Mexican tenacity and loyalty to unionism. Added to this are reports that admit surprise in Mexicanos being able to understand the economic conditions which prompted this rash of labor outbreaks in Arizona during 1917.<sup>51</sup>

Not all Mexicans in Arizona disapproved of IWW activity. There were those who served as organizers for the Wobblies among Arizona's Spanish-speaking. Two such individuals were Joseph Robles and Benito García. Operating in the Bisbee region, these two devoted much time in persuading Mexican miners to join IWW ranks and refrain from working. Their efforts encompassed Cananea where they preached IWW doctrines to workers. Such attempts to unionize were assisted by Francisco Rodríguez who served as secretary of the Mexican section of the IWW.<sup>52</sup>

These endeavors proved futile as Mexican participants were deported. Arrangements were made to transport the dissidents into Sonora by Georges Lelevier, a Mexican Consul.<sup>53</sup> Before departure, the Arizona press claimed that IWW activity in Arizona had been financed by Mexicans who were pro-German.<sup>54</sup>

The Bisbee deportations signalled organized labor's biggest setback in the state's history. The efforts of Mexican workers to gain acceptance within unions and parity with Anglo workers went for naught as unionism itself declined. Because of IWW intervention and subsequent failure, 1917 signals both the nadir of Arizona labor history and the

completion of a cycle in which Mexican miners had played a crucial and central role.

<sup>1</sup>"The Strike at Ajo," Miners' Magazine, January and February 1917.

<sup>2</sup>H. S. McCluskey Papers, Box 2, folder 2. "Statement of Jim McCluskey." Arizona Collection, Hayden Library, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona. Hereafter cited McCluskey Papers.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Affadavit of Czar Rodríguez, March 15, 1917. McCluskey Papers, Box 2, Folder 2. Rodríguez was told in no uncertain terms that he had jeopardized his employment opportunities and was ordered to stay in his room. Juan Gago, the Mexican shift boss, is representative of the fact that not all Mexican workers favored union intervention. There is nothing to suggest that non-union participation was the consensus of the Mexican population of the time.

<sup>5</sup>Letter from McCluskey to Robert E. Tally, Assistant General Manager, February 13, 1917. McCluskey Papers, Box 2, Folder 2. See also Telegram from Robert E. Tally to William Burns, Executive Board member of the International Union of Mine Mill and Smelter Workers, February 9, 1917, ibid.

<sup>6</sup>See statement of McCluskey to Robert E. Tally, ibid. Letter from Charles Clark, owner of the United Verde to William Burns, May 15, 1917, ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Tellers of Jerome Miners Union #79, Statement on strike vote of Monday, May 21, 1917, ibid.

<sup>8</sup>McCluskey's statement, ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ed Moreno came from the Globe-Miami district to insure Mexican participation in Jerome unionism. See, IWW file, McCluskey Papers, portion of a letter, no date, no author. Miners' Magazine, March, 1917. Moreno, a representative of the Arizona Federation of Labor, had recently been acquitted of the shooting death of an IWW organizer who made the mistake of attacking Moreno with a knife while in the Clifton area during the early part of 1917.

<sup>10</sup>Letter from Thomas a French, Secretary Treasurer of the Arizona State Federation of Labor, to McCluskey, May 28, 1917. Morenci File, McCluskey Papers.

<sup>11</sup>Jerome News (Jerome, Arizona), May 25, 1917.

<sup>12</sup>Memo from Charles W. Clark to John McBride, Representative of the United States government, no date. McCluskey Papers, Box2, Folder 2. Jerome News, June 1, 1917. The company agreed to reduce rents, water rates, institute wages based on the Miami scale of wages. Clark, owner of United Verde, refused a closed shop but did agree to union recognition.

<sup>13</sup>Orders to Lieutenants of Pickets, May 26, 1917, McCluskey Papers. Box 2, Folder 2. Copy of petition filed by Jerome businessmen May 30, 1917, to Thomas E. Campbell, Governor of Arizona. Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Jerome News, June 1, 1917.

<sup>15</sup>Letter from George Powell, IUMMSW organizer (Jerome) to McCluskey, February 8, 1917. McCluskey Papers, Labor Relations. Box 2, Folder 3. Miners' Magazine, April 1917.

<sup>16</sup>"IWW Raises Head in Mining Camps," Miners' Magazine, March 1917. Wobblay organizers, not wanting to make the same mistake as their WFM predecessors regarding Mexican workers, supported Mexican causes during the second decade of the 1900s. See, Randall Marjorie Thomson, "The Industrial Workers of the World in Arizona," p. 4, MS, Chicano Studies Collection, Hayden Library, Arizona State University. Carey McWilliams, North from Mexico (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 204.

<sup>17</sup>"IWW Activities in Arizona," Miners' Magazine, March 1917. An IWW organizer, Grover H. Perry, was reported in the Phoenix district at this time with \$35,000 to be used in directing IWW organizing efforts in Arizona. "The One Big Union Wreckers are getting busy in Arizona," Miners' Magazine, April 1917.

<sup>18</sup>George F. Leaming, "Labor and Copper in Arizona; Strife, Change and Decline," Arizona Review 16 (May 1967), pp. 10-11.

<sup>19</sup>Tucson Citizen (Tucson, Arizona), July 6, 1917.

<sup>20</sup>Jerome News, July 2, 1917.

<sup>21</sup>Jerome News, June 1, 1917. Arizona Republican (Phoenix, Arizona), July 7, 1917. John H. Lindquist, "The Jerome Deportation of 1917," Arizona and the West 11 (Autumn 1969), pp. 233-246.

<sup>22</sup>Tucson Citizen, July 10, 11, 16, 1917. Jerome News, July 13, 1917. Lindquist, "Jerome Deportation," pp. 243-44.

<sup>23</sup>Lindquist, "Jerome Deportation," p. 233.

<sup>24</sup>James McBride, "The Liga Protectora Latina," Journal of the West XIV (October 1975), pp. 82-90.

<sup>25</sup>Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929-1939 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974). This is an excellent study dealing with the issue of deportations and subsequent ramifications.

<sup>26</sup>Randall Thomson, "The Industrial Workers of the World," p. 9.

<sup>27</sup>Leaming, "Labor and Copper," p. 11.

<sup>28</sup>Daily Silver Belt, June 27, 28, 29, July 2, 3, 1917. Vernon H. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict: Labor Relations in the Nonferrous Metals Industry up to 1930 (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950), pp. 391-98. Leaming, "Labor and Copper," p. 11. ✓

<sup>29</sup>Arizona Republican, July 1, 1917. Tucson Citizen, July 3, 1917.

<sup>30</sup>Arizona Republican, July 10, 11, 1917.

<sup>31</sup>Tucson Citizen, July 2, 3, 1917. Arizona Republican, July 3, 1917.

<sup>32</sup>"Settlement of the Globe-Miami Strike," Engineering and Mining Journal 104 (October 27, 1917), p. 712, hereafter cited as EMJ. Tucson Citizen, July 13, 17, 1917. Arizona Republican, July 20, August 3, 14, 21, 1917.

<sup>33</sup>Arizona Republican, October 3, 1917.

<sup>34</sup>Tucson Citizen, July 2, 1917.

<sup>35</sup>"Strike Conditions in Arizona," EMJ 104 (June 21, 1917), p. 137. See also "Report of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Arizona State Council of Defense Held at the Office of Governor Hunt, April 17, 1918, For the Purpose of Discussing IWW Movement in Arizona," Labor Relations, Box 2, Folder 3, IWW Material, McCluskey Papers.

<sup>36</sup>Arizona Republican, July 2, 3, 1917.

<sup>37</sup>Arizona Republican, November 1, 1917. "Clifton-Morenci Strike Settled," EMJ 104 (November 10, 1917), p. 831. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, p. 418.

<sup>38</sup>Letter from Thomas A. French to McCluskey, May 28, 1917. French was Secretary Treasurer of the Arizona State Federation of Labor. McCluskey Papers, Morenci File.

<sup>39</sup>"Notice to the Committee Purporting to represent the IWW," May 26, 1917, McCluskey Papers, Box 2, Folder 2. Miners' Magazine, April 1917. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, pp. 400-01.

<sup>40</sup>"Report of the Meeting of Executive Committee of the Arizona State Council of Defense," Box 2, Folder 3, IWW Material.

<sup>41</sup>James McBride, "The Development of Labor Unions in Arizona Mining, 1884-1919," (M.A. thesis, Arizona State University, 1974), pp. 112-13. Demands included 1) abolition of physical examinations, 2) abolition of all bonus and contract work, 3) abolition of the sliding scale of wages, 4) no discrimination against members of any organizations. See, Jensen, Heritage of Conflict, p. 401.

<sup>42</sup>Jerome News, July 6, 1917. Jensen quoting Dunbar's Weekly, July 7, 1917.

<sup>43</sup>Arizona Republican, July 12, 13, 1917.

<sup>44</sup>Tucson Citizen, July 12, 13, 14, 1917.

<sup>45</sup>Arizona Republican, July 12, 1917.

<sup>46</sup>Tucson Citizen, July 13, 1917.

<sup>47</sup>Arizona Republican, July 13, 14, 1917.

<sup>48</sup>See James W. Byrkit, "Life and Labor in Arizona, 1901-1921: With Particular Reference to the Deportations of 1917," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1972). This work should serve as the basis of any serious study concerning deportations. Ronald E. Hester, "The Bisbee Deportation," MS Chicano Studies, Hayden Library, Arizona State University. David Wright, "The Bisbee Deportation," MS Chicano Studies, Arizona State University. John H. Lindquist and James Fraser, "A Sociological Interpretation of the Bisbee Deportation," Pacific Historical Review, 1968, pp. 404-32. San Diego Union (San Diego, California), July 20, 1917. Robert W. Bruere, "Following the Trail of the IWW," The Evening Post, November 17, 24, December 8, 1917.

<sup>49</sup>Telegram Charles Moyer, President of IUMMSW to McCluskey February 13, 1919. Moyer to McCluskey, February 20, 1919. McCluskey Papers, Box 2, Folder 2, and Folder "Moyer to McCluskey, 1918-1921," Arizona Collection. See also letter from Temme, official of Jerome union local to McCluskey, June 6, 1919. Box 2, folder 2, McCluskey Papers.

<sup>50</sup>Jerome News, July 13, 1917.

<sup>51</sup>Miners' Magazine, October 1917.

<sup>52</sup>Tucson Citizen, July 6, 10, 17, 1917. Arizona Republican, July 18, 1917.

<sup>53</sup>Arizona Republican, October 5, 1917.

<sup>54</sup>Tucson Citizen, July 24, 1917. Arizona Republican, August 16, 1917.

## CONCLUSION

IWW intervention and subsequent inter-labor division effectively signalled the end of early Arizona unionism. By 1920 only two locals of the IUMSW remained in the state, and the following two decades witnessed continued erosion of Arizona's labor movement.<sup>1</sup> It was not until 1967 that organized labor was able to present a unified front to management as it had during the years 1916-1917. To be sure, labor disturbances occurred frequently during this interim, but the supremacy of management remained secure.

The years surveyed by this study (1896-1917) are but a small part of the total labor picture of national union development. This period of Arizona history, however, presents an excellent microcosm of factors that affected worker-owner disputes. Class conflict was brought to bear upon the Arizona experience. The antagonism of working classes versus managerial elites was intensified by racial conflicts within the workforce. Hoping to insure its advantage, to increase profits, and to heighten rivalry within their workforce, entrepreneurs constantly sought open immigration policies. Ironically, while the rest of America embraced the various tenets of progressivism, Anglo-Arizonans sought to alienate the majority of the state's mining workers. The animosity toward Mexicanos did not originate in the first two decades of the 1900s. Rather, antagonisms between the two cultures had appeared in the mid 1800s and increased with the proposed joint statehood of Arizona and New Mexico. One has only to look at contemporary reports to substantiate these biases. Mexican strike activities and desires to be included in

union participation fueled these long-standing racial passions.<sup>2</sup>

Labor activities on a national basis in conjunction with the end of World War I produced a backlash against unionism in general. Free speech movements in Spokane; San Diego; Patterson, New Jersey; and Lawrence, Massachusetts, coupled with the earlier Colorado labor wars of the 1890s and the Coeur d'Alene struggles had, by 1917, created a certain amount of distrust within the American society. The American people had tired of protracted labor struggles and there ensued a period of welfare capitalism.<sup>3</sup> This tended to detract from the necessity and impetus to unionize.

But this was in America. To maintain a better perspective of this subject matter, it is necessary to take into account events in Mexico that might have affected Mexicans throughout the Southwest. This same twenty-one year span (1896-1917) witnessed many labor outbreaks throughout the Republic. The Cananea strike of 1906 was only one of many strikes which disturbed the Pax Porfiriana. Río Blanco, Puebla and La Hormiga are all examples of major labor disputes during the first decade of the twentieth century.<sup>4</sup> In essence, this period of unrest served to radicalize the Mexican laboring classes and concepts of unionism and workingmen's solidarity were in turn transported to the Southwest as these workers emigrated. Once having found employment in Arizona's copper fields, these same workers proved less obeisant than their employers hoped for. Having undergone their initial baptism of fire in the Republic, many Mexican leaders continued organizing their countrymen on the other side of the border.

That such ideas could originate and be transported from Mexico is in itself a source of future study that needs to be pursued. For too

long, historians have centered their attention on the growth and appeal of early labor unions (WFM and IWW) on east-west terms. By concentrating their studies on the importance of organizers from eastern or northern European descent, Paul F. Brissenden and Melvyn Dubofsky have extolled the organizational skills of these immigrants. By applauding the efforts of this class of worker, historians have precluded any possibility of indigenous laborers (Mexicans) independently developing or already sharing similar ideological traits. To ignore the role of the Mexican workers or organizers is to negate any influence that this class had on the unfolding of the West's labor history.

For nineteen years, Mexican miners walked a thin and narrow line toward their goal of unionization. Encouraged by mine owners to emigrate from Mexico to Arizona but resented by the majority of Anglo society for having done so, Mexicanos adroitly survived the double-edged sword that threatened their survival as a laboring class. Having been excluded from union participation in 1896 in Globe, these same workers tried on several occasions to make known their demands and win concessions from management. Such efforts were to no avail. Having no other avenue by which to voice their grievances, Mexican miners affiliated with the PLM in hope of obtaining some degree of parity with Anglo workers. These endeavors also failed.

With the passage of time, cooperation among the various elements within the laboring classes proved the only way in which any concessions from management could be obtained. The brief period from 1915-1917 marked the highwater of Arizona unionism. This era also paved the way for the decline of organized labor. Management, behind the energy of Walter Douglas, procured for itself a position of final authority that

remained intact for several decades.

The sudden change of fortunes of organized labor proved a bitter blow to the aspirations of Mexican miners. Having finally won the right to organize in the Clifton-Morenci strike of 1915-1916, Mexican workers had labored to insure union growth in the districts which they dominated. Anxious to show that they were capable of embracing and understanding the nuances of unionism, this same class produced leaders who quickly demonstrated their organizational skills and assumed positions of leadership and responsibility within the auspices of the International Union. Wanting to prove their sincerity in adopting the tenets of organized labor, Mexican miners for the most part left the protective confines of mutualistas. Once unionism itself declined, the Mexican populace was not able to reconstruct newer lodges of Obreros Libres or La Saragosa to help the Spanish-speaking in their mining communities.

No longer having a viable organization to make known their complaints, Mexican workers, much as in the aftermath of the Ray and Morenci strikes of 1900 and 1903, withdrew into their enclaves and, for the most part, kept to themselves for the next several decades. Although labor agitation continued,<sup>5</sup> Mexicanos did not participate to the degree that had been the norm during the 1896-1917 period, due primarily to the threat of blacklisting and possible repatriation to Mexico during the 1930s.

The period 1896-1917 is critical in understanding not only the role of organized labor, but also the effect and impact Mexican miners had upon its unfolding within Arizona history. Important economic, social and union goals had been achieved by Mexicanos prior to the fateful summer of 1917. By the end of that year, their loss was almost complete.

This turnabout was so demoralizing that some 4,000 miners of one district of the state notified and petitioned the Mexican government that they were returning to their homeland.<sup>6</sup> Plácido Ríos, an organizer of the PLM in the Cananea area poetically prophecized the nadir of Mexicano attempts in unionization when, referring to the 1906 strike, stated:

"In reality, it was a heroic deed that I would repeat again because more than myself, she [his mother] suffered. She was the one who truly suffered."<sup>7</sup> In reality, it was the Mexican people as a whole who suffered.

<sup>1</sup>Vernon H. Jensen, Heritage of Conflict: Labor Relations in the Nonferrous Metals Industry up to 1930 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950), p. 454.

<sup>2</sup>Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the Sixty-First Congress, second session, pp. 1-40. "Protest Against Union of Arizona with New Mexico, February 12, 1906." Arizona Room, Hayden Library, Arizona State University.

<sup>3</sup>Excellent accounts are to be found in Laissez-Faire and the General Welfare State by Sidney Fine (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1976) and Toil and Trouble by A. H. Raskin (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1971).

<sup>4</sup>Rodney D. Anderson, Outcasts in Their Own Land: Mexican Industrial Workers, 1906-1911 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976), passim.

<sup>5</sup>Labor strikes were to occur at Bisbee in 1935; Bisbee, Douglas and Morenci in 1946; Ray, Hayden, Miami and Inspiration in 1954; Ray, Hayden, Bisbee, Douglas, Morenci, Superior and San Manuel in 1959. See George F. Leaming, "Labor and Copper in Arizona: Decline and Merger," Arizona Review 16 (August 1967)p. 7. Also consult the guide to the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers at the Western Historical Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.

<sup>6</sup>"Mexican Miners Going Back Home," The Survey 39 (October 27, 1917), pp. 97-98.

<sup>7</sup>Manuel Gonzalez Ramírez, La huelga de Cananea (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1956), p. 144.

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