Remembering New Mexico's War: Service, Sacrifice, Suffering, and the Surrender of Bataan in Wartime New Mexico, 1941-1946

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REMEMBERING NEW MEXICO’S WAR:
SERVICE, SACRIFICE, SUFFERING, AND THE SURRENDER
OF BATAAN IN WARTIME NEW MEXICO, 1941-1946

by

ELENA M. FRIOT

B.A., History, Le Moyne College, 2004
M.A., History, University of Central Arkansas, 2007

DISSERTATION
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
History
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May 2020
DEDICATION

For my family.

For Andy, with whom life is always an adventure.
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REMEMBERING NEW MEXICO’S WAR:
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ABSTRACT

New Mexicans positioned defeat, surrender, and captivity at the center of their narrative of World War II and incorporated the surrender of Bataan into New Mexico’s long history of service, sacrifice, and suffering as part of the United States. During and after the war, they created rituals, spaces, and texts that made the surrender a permanent and defining feature of the state’s social, cultural, and political landscape, which challenges the prevailing victory narrative that tends to dominate public commemorations of the war. Importantly, this dissertation shifts our gaze to investigate how defeat and surrender, and the corresponding experiences of surrendered and captive men, and their families, shaped and gave texture to some Americans’ memories of war. Indeed, victory is largely absent from New Mexico’s public remembrances of World War II. Furthermore, situating New Mexico’s experience with World War II in the larger span of the state’s history enlarges the frameworks at our disposal for better understanding the ways communities’ experiences diverged during the war, and where in time and space those differences are visible.
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INTRODUCTION

“Of Course One Doesn’t Like Remembering Unpleasant Things”:
Uncovering Defeat and Captivity in America’s Memory of World War II

On June 10, 1943, Elda Johns sat down to write a letter to Governor John Dempsey. Outside the sun was shining and a gentle breeze was blowing, but her letter conveyed none of its lightness. The Silver City resident was sending Dempsey a petition “signed by the fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, and sisters of those men on Bataan,” urging him to “do everything in his power” to persuade the State Department to arrange for a prisoner exchange of the men of the 200th Coast Artillery, who had been held captive in Japanese prisoner-of-war camps since the surrender of Bataan in April 1942. Elda’s only son, David, had been nineteen when he left for the Philippines with the rest of the 200th Coast Artillery in the summer of 1941, and she felt his absence keenly. “We feel they are forgotten,” she wrote, and more to the point, “We people of the west and the southwest feel very bitter about that tragedy of Bataan. It is a blot on the history of the United States and will never be forgotten. They called themselves the 3 “B’s,” – no papa, no mama, and no Uncle Sam. No wonder.”1 The petition they sent reflected a sentiment they shared with many New Mexicans about the Roosevelt Administration, its prosecution of the war, and its abandonment of the men on Bataan:

The men who fought for liberty, freedom, justice for all and all that America means. They gave all. They looked for supplies, food, ammunition and reinforcements that never came. Now they are dying . . . They are at the mercy of a nation that knows no mercy . . . These men will not survive. It is beyond human endurance. So, we as citizens of this, the richest, most powerful and greatest of nations want those who are in position to do so, to start negotiations to exchange these men who are prisoners . . . before it is too late and all will die in a Jap prison camp. We feel that they

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1 Elda Johns to Governor Dempsey, June 10, 1943, Governor John J. Dempsey Papers, 1943-1946, Collection 1959-106, series 5, folder 6, New Mexico State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe.
are forgotten. That Japan cannot wait until Germany and Italy are conquered. Then it will be too late and all will be dead. . . . Japan cannot wait.\footnote{Petition, Silver City, New Mexico, June 1, 1943, Dempsey Papers.}

Another petition from Artesia’s 200th Club alleged so little had been done for Bataan’s defenders they were “seemingly God’s Forgotten Men.” Elvira Leroux, from Taos, worried the boys were running out of time. “I am very much afraid that if something is not done soon it is going to be too late,” she told him. Zada Meyers of Hobbs reminded Dempsey “our men in uniform are the most important after all,” and “fighting under the banner of an unshakeable faith…they are made of something more than flesh.” She urged officials to stop dilly-dallying and work harder to “get them aid or get them home.” Furthermore, she reminded Dempsey, “There was ‘too little too late once,’ for them—let’s stand by them this time.”\footnote{Beth King to Governor Dempsey, July 8, 1943; Mrs. W.G. Wilkerson to Governor Dempsey, July 23, 1943; Elvira Leroux to Governor Dempsey, June 4, 1943; Zada Bea Meyers to Governor Dempsey, July 21, 1943, Dempsey Papers.} A letter from a grieving mother in Albuquerque captured the agony, anger, and feeling of abandonment that defined the war for many families in New Mexico:

“I was just notified of the death of my son. . . . My son didn’t die for his country, he was murdered. His country deserted him before Bataan fell. The boys in the Philippines were given a rotten deal. How did my son die? That will be on my mind the rest of my life. He was a young boy [who] wanted to live.\footnote{Mrs. Boyle to Governor Dempsey, July 19, 1943, Dempsey Papers.}

The anguish of these “heavy-hearted mothers” is palpable in their letters, and during the war they, their families, and many of their neighbors gave their heartache tangible form when they inscribed their sadness into the land of New Mexico itself.

In this dissertation I argue New Mexicans positioned defeat, surrender, and captivity at the center of their narrative of World War II and incorporated the surrender of Bataan into New Mexico’s long history of service, sacrifice, and suffering as part of the United States.
During and after the war, they created rituals, spaces, and texts that made the surrender a permanent and defining feature of the state’s social, cultural, and political landscape, which challenges the prevailing victory narrative that tends to dominate public commemorations of the war. Importantly, this dissertation shifts our gaze to investigate how defeat and surrender, and the corresponding experiences of surrendered and captive men, and their families, shaped and gave texture to some Americans’ memories of war. Indeed, victory is largely absent from New Mexico’s public remembrances of World War II. Furthermore, situating New Mexico’s experience with World War II in the larger span of the state’s history enlarges the frameworks at our disposal for better understanding the ways communities’ experiences diverged during the war, and where in time and space those differences are visible.

Defeat is not part of America’s grand narrative of World War II. After Congress declared war on Japan in December 1941, President Roosevelt assured the public of its “inevitable triumph,” and they heard him. His administration produced an abundance of patriotic rhetoric assuring the nation it would win the war, and so while war was waged overseas most Americans worried more about postwar economic problems than they did losing to Japan or Germany. As its history demonstrated, “triumphalism was in the American grain.” Early losses in the war were distressing, to be sure, but in “an American culture of victory,” they were merely temporary setbacks. In 1942, however, victory was a long way off. It seemed especially distant for families in New Mexico, whose sons had been in the Philippines since the late summer of 1941 as part of the defensive buildup military planners—and MacArthur himself—believed would increase the distant islands’ odds of

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fending off Japanese aggression. But, as many newspapers and military analysts would later point out, the last-ditch efforts to reinforce the U.S. territory were a case of too little, too late. On December 7, 1941, simultaneous attacks on Malaya, Thailand, Singapore, Guam, Hong Kong, Wake, and the Philippines astounded and confounded the Allies, and decimated their ability to wage anything but limited defensive campaigns.6

The 200th Coast Artillery was the largest National Guard unit in the Philippines when the United States declared war against Japan on December 8, 1941. When Japanese bombers flew over Clark Air Field shortly after the lunch hour, the men of the 200th became “the first land troops of the United States forces in action.”7 They were among the final troops to surrender after the protracted siege of Bataan, and indeed, as a result of their captivity in prisoner of war camps scattered across the Pacific and the conditions that made recovery of the dead challenging and often impossible, were some of the last to return home. Roosevelt had warned Americans they “must be set to face a long war against crafty and powerful bandits” to secure “no result save victory, final and complete.” Because its National Guard unit was already in the Philippines when the Japanese attacked, New Mexico’s war was—both practically and symbolically—markedly longer than that of most of the rest of the country.

Investigating New Mexico’s long war expands our chronology for understanding how the war affected American communities, and this study builds on the work of historians who have already paid a great deal of attention to the role of the states when it came to fighting

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and winning World War II. Many of their monographs chronicle the ways states marshaled their human and natural resources to build the nation’s arsenal of democracy. Others tangle with the ways the war affected interactions between states’ diverse populations, and focus on issues of race and gender. Still more detail the war’s transformation of urban and suburban spaces. And, a few examine how the vicious racism of the war in Europe reached across the ocean into American towns and cities. Three books in particular—Alex Kershaw’s *Bedford Boys*, Marc Wilson’s *Hero Street, U.S.A.*, and Carlos Harrison’s *The Ghosts of Hero Street*—show us how the violence of war reached into the homes and intimate spaces of home front Americans’ daily lives. The work of these historians tells us the prewar histories, and postwar lives, of America’s communities matter when it comes to measuring the true cost of war. No weapons gouged the nation’s streets or razed its homes, but they inflicted visible

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loss nonetheless—in some towns and homes more than others—and we need to pay attention to the consequences of that destruction.

Importantly, Kershaw, Wilson, and Harrison show us what Marianna Torgovnick means when she observes, “We particularize mass death through our imagination of nations and groups, but most of all through our imagination of families and individuals.” She argues the “cultural memory” of war and conflict “begin[s] by imagining historical disaster in the home.”9 To “particularize” mass death, however, we cannot just count the dead. We have to count the living as well, and the ratio of the dead to the living has served, for some communities, as indices for the magnitude of their devotion to the nation. Kershaw, for example, details the deadly toll D-Day extracted from the town of Bedford, Virginia. The town of 3,000—similar in size to Deming—sent its National Guard battery of thirty-five boys to the beaches of Normandy, where German machine guns felled nineteen of them within minutes. Three of them were killed later in the war. Wilson and Harrison explain how a Mexican American neighborhood—known as “Little Mexico”—in Silvis, a city about 160 miles west of Chicago, renamed one of its streets “Hero Street” because eight of its young men were killed in the war. Three of them were from the same family. Little Mexico’s labors to commemorate its boys exposed the inconsistencies and limitations of the “all in for the duration” rhetoric that left many of the nation’s ethnic groups clamoring for equal recognition of their patriotism in the postwar era. Wilson surmised that though he could not prove it, “I believe it to be true that Hero Street suffered the most combat deaths of any single block in America.” And according to Harrison, he was right. Department of Defense

officials had checked the figures and “determined the families of Second Street in Silvis, Illinois, had sent more of their children to serve in World War II and Korea than residents of any other similarly sized stretch in the country.” Kershaw likewise concluded “no community in the state or in American or indeed in any Allied nation had lost as many sons as Bedford.”10 When their families looked around the living room after supper on a Sunday, they more often saw who was missing, not who was present.

As these authors tell us, the war certainly hit some communities harder than others, and in many instances this was the consequence of the nature of the National Guard, whose soldiers not only came from the same streets and towns and went to the same schools, but generally fought the same battles. Combat historians in the Army Forces Western Pacific Command (AFWESPAC) compiled a four-part narrative of the defense of Bataan, and in it not only egregiously overestimated the number of battlefield casualties in the 200th, but presumed most of the unit came from the same place:

The casualties in the 200th Coast Artillery had been exceedingly heavy almost the whole unit was wiped out. The men of this organization were, with few exceptions, from the town of Deming, New Mexico, or its immediate vicinity. Deming lost more men in World War II than any other community in the United States.

They furthermore contended the massive losses in the 200th convinced the War Department to rewrite its policies regarding soldiers’ home towns and their locations of service:

It was their loss that caused a change in the War Department policy of having units composed entirely of men from one locality. From that time on, no regiment was composed of more than twenty-five percent from one locality, the remaining 75 percent from other States.11

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10 Harrison, 2; Wilson, xiv; Kershaw, 208.
These combat historians’ claims were wildly inaccurate, which is somewhat unforgiveable since they had ample records at their disposal to account for New Mexico’s casualties during the war. Additionally, army historians at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania have no record or institutional documentation that suggests this policy existed. What this excerpt does tell us, however, is that the composition and use of National Guard units during war can sometimes have disastrous consequences for the regiments and their communities, and interrogating their participation in the war can help us more fully account for the ways those places viewed their wartime contributions.¹²

The work of Kershaw, Wilson, and Harrison also provides a useful point of departure for exploring the ways New Mexicans also used the relatively small size of their state as a benchmark for wartime sacrifice. The approximately 1,800 soldiers in the 200ᵗʰ Coast Artillery hailed from over 280 cities, towns, and villages scattered across the state’s vast territory. Some of those communities had fewer than five men in the unit, and some of them had only one or two. If we imagine that it is possible to qualify a community’s contributions to the war by completing some sort of calculus that combines the hard facts of casualty lists with abstract notions of courage, heroism, and sacrifice, we might arrive at what we could call a “golden ratio” of patriotism, whereby the caliber of a community’s contributions to the war equaled the proportion of the number of men it sent into the service, and the number of men it never got back.¹³ New Mexicans found this strategy a useful way to quantify just how

¹² This also raises the question, in general, how the casualty rates of communities with high rates of National Guard enlistment compared to those whose young men volunteered or were drafted into units that drew members from all over the United States. The National Guard has been recognized as having made significant contributions to World War II, but there does not seem to be any sort of literature or historiography that explores the cultural, political, and economic consequences of the Guard’s involvement on their communities or commemorative practices.

¹³ Two quantities are said to be in the golden ratio if their ratio is the same as the ratio of their sum to the larger of the two quantities. Expressed as a formula, a/b = a+b/a.
much they had given to the war effort. Their sense of the depth of their suffering was reinforced in some popular publications, like *Time* and *Collier’s*. In its April 20, 1942 issue, for example, *Time* reported “virtually all of the 2,300 of the New Mexico National Guard had been in the Philippines…in Cleveland, relatives counted the loss of 75 sons…in Maywood and other towns…the loss of a National Guard tank company. Other tankers, 106 of them, had gone to the Islands from…the dairy country of Wisconsin.” Several months later, *Collier’s* featured Deming in its August 29 issue and called it “Bataan Home Town.” It was just like any other town its size in America, the article read, “except for the feeling it gives you to look along the street at its places of business, knowing that practically every one you see has a partner or a son or an employee in the Philippines…one of the first and heaviest blows of this war has fallen on them but they realize more keenly than most people what war means.”\(^{14}\) The *Clovis News-Journal* made a point to note “the story could have substituted Clovis for Deming in every line of its printed page.” Bataan, it insisted, was “OUR tragedy and we all bore our cross in the same way.”\(^{15}\) An editorial in Carlsbad’s *Daily Current-Argus* reflected on the surrender and concluded “here in Carlsbad we are perhaps hit harder than most of the rest of the nation today, because the percentage of boys on Bataan and Corregidor who went from here was higher than in most spots.” In the summer of 1943, one of New Mexico’s representatives, Clinton P. Anderson, somberly boasted to his fellow congressmen, “It is now definitely established that the State of New Mexico had far more men on Bataan in proportion to population than any State in the Union.”\(^{16}\)


\(^{16}\) “Same Thing,” *Daily Current-Argus*, May 7, 1942; Representative Anderson, 78th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 89 pt. 10:7514.
It seems cold to reduce New Mexico’s losses to statistics, but as these examples indicate, many wartime Americans did try to quantify their sacrifices, whether it was in pounds of scrap metal collected, how many road trips they skipped to conserve their rubber tires, or how often they ate vegetables from their victory garden to save their ration stamps. For others the accounting was far more precious. New Mexico’s wartime statistics demonstrate an important way the war made its imprint on the state. Approximately 16.1 million Americans served in uniform during World War II, and 405,000 were either killed or died while wearing those uniforms. With a population of 531,818, New Mexico was one of the least-populated states in the Union. It was also one of the least-densely populated, with an average of four people per square mile; one-fourth of its residents lived in its ten largest cities, the two largest of which were Albuquerque and Santa Fe. Approximately 48,000 New Mexicans either volunteered or were drafted into the Army; with 1,800 men, the 200th Coast Artillery accounted for about four percent of the state’s total. To distinguish deaths from casualties, Army records use the ambiguous phrase “failed to return.” At the end of the war, just over 2,000 New Mexican soldiers failed to return home alive, meaning in proportion to its population, New Mexico had the highest casualty rate out of all the states during World War II. Over one-third of those soldiers had been on Bataan. And, after the Quartermaster Graves Administration Service finished accounting for all of the nation’s war dead on overseas battlefields, over five hundred of the state’s soldiers were still missing.

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19 According to Richard Melzer, a total of 49,549 New Mexicans served in all branches of the Armed Forces during World War II, which means approximately 1,500 served in the Coast Guard, Navy, or Marines, while the rest served in the Army or Army Air Forces. See Richard Melzer, New Mexico: A Celebration of the Land of Enchantment (Layton, UT: Gibbs Smith, 2011): 43.
therefore had not only the highest casualty rate, but the highest rate of missing personnel. Of those five hundred soldiers lost to the earth and the sea, 289, or 51 percent, had served in the 200th. Just over one hundred of those men perished at sea; most of the rest died in prisoner-of-war camps in the Philippines, but their remains are either unrecoverable or unidentifiable.\(^{20}\) Almost one-fifth of the state’s Bataan defenders could not be buried at home in New Mexico. These statistics show us the extent of New Mexico’s wartime losses, and suggest that the intensity with which New Mexicans marked their physical and cultural landscapes during and after the war was largely a way to somehow make those sacrifices visible. Beginning on Washington’s birthday in February 1943, for example, the city of Carlsbad marked its missing men by setting off its fire siren every day at nine o’clock in the morning. The intrusive wail signaled the start of a “pause for prayer,” which organizers offered as a chance for residents to pay “tribute to our heroes, living or dead.”\(^{21}\)

These statistics are especially evident in the ways New Mexicans recorded those names in texts and sites. They turned to a variety of traditional modes of remembrance to account for their war dead, but also found it important to record the names of veterans who survived Bataan and the prisoner of war camps. New Mexico accounted for all of its Bataan soldiers, living or dead, and their names are an essential part of the state’s commemorative practice. During the defense of Bataan and after the surrender, newspapers printed photographs of their local batteries. They regularly listed the names of the men in the 200th—

\(^{20}\) Figures do not include those who served in the Navy, Marines, or Coast Guard, as those figures were maintained separately from the Army and Army Air Forces, and the data is not as complete. The numbers I provide are estimates I calculated from several statistical sources, including the 1940 Census. See also War Department, “World War II Honor List of Dead and Missing: State of New Mexico,” June 1946, especially page 1; Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency, “World War II Report for New Mexico: Unaccounted For,” https://www.dpaa.mil/portals/85/WWIIAccounting/wwii_una_NEW%20MEXICO_20200306.pdf.

especially around holidays dedicate to soldiers, like Memorial Day and Armistice Day—and editors were quick to print news of letters or telegrams from the soldiers or the War Department. As Helen Huntington Smith noted in her story about Deming, many residents viewed those notices as public property, much like they regarded the men themselves. The University of New Mexico’s class of 1943 dedicated its yearbook, *Mirage*, to the “spirits” of the “heroes of freedom’s battlefronts,” and clearly distinguished between their classmates who had been killed in action, those who were missing in action, and those who were “prisoners of the Axis.” They made it a point to identify where the boys were: of the 58 men listed on its tribute page, 44 of them were listed as either missing, or as prisoners on Bataan, Corregidor, or the Philippines. During bond drives it was common for people to buy bonds and dedicate them to individual soldiers, and those patriotic purchases were often advertised in the newspapers. Local businesses, such as the JCPenney in downtown Albuquerque, painted the names on its store windows. In 1943 the *Eddy County News* published a pictorial issue of its newspaper and titled it “Bataan Memorial Edition,” which editors “lovingly dedicated to New Mexico’s Immortal 200th Coast Artillery.” Life stories of men and women from all over Eddy County filled its pages, and some organizations, such as churches, provided lists of their parishioners in the service. One page carried the roster of Eddy County men who served in World War I, thus depicting current soldiers as heirs to a strong legacy of service. And, in 1957, when Secretary of Defense Charlie Wilson disparaged the National Guard, Senator Dennis Chávez insisted the names of every single member of New Mexico’s 200th Coast Artillery be printed in the *Congressional Record*: a small cross next to his name marked each man’s death.22 Those names, which filled three closely printed pages of the

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22 University of New Mexico, “The Mirage, 1943,” (1943), [http://digitalrepository.unm.edu/unm_yearbooks/58](http://digitalrepository.unm.edu/unm_yearbooks/58); “Carlsbad Pictorial: Bataan Memorial Edition,” *Eddy County News*, December 1943; The issue was also
Record, were used to prove not just the integrity of the National Guard in times of national crisis, but to numerically account for the extent of New Mexico’s sacrifices in World War II. The names of these men therefore represented their “private bod[ies] and public bod[ies],” and their inscription in both private and public spaces shows how New Mexicans use “the memories of the specific episode,” that is, the surrender of Bataan and the loss of so many of their men, to offer “a moment for reflection…on war…on present events and on the reasons they have been brought about.”

New Mexico’s story of war is one that is marked by trauma, but also by defeat. Scholars, particularly those who write about World War I, have dealt at length with the cultural trauma of war and the ways societies remember and commemorate it—or try to forget it—and are responsible for producing much of the language and frameworks we use to talk about the memory of war. We also have a fairly extensive bibliography of monographs on the legacies of defeat in countries like Germany and Japan, for whom defeat upended military, political, cultural, social, and economic structures. In the United States, however, we have looked less to our defeats than we have to our victories to appraise the human and

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structural consequences of war. Historians have produced a rich literature on the way Americans have remembered their wars, but when it comes to World War II few have engaged with the war’s traumatic detritus, even fewer with its moments of defeat. Indeed, America’s institutional memory of war privileges victory over defeat, a problem permanently stamped on the National Mall in the form of the National World War II Memorial—a white monolith carefully positioned to distract visitors from monuments to its more ambiguously concluded conflicts. This dissertation fills that gap. John Bodnar gestures to this lapse in The Good War in American Memory, and notes that Americans’ efforts to understand and represent the war produced “a cluttered story in which virtue was forced to share cultural and political space with streams of doubt, cynicism, and regret.” He argues citizens had varied responses to the chaos and suffering of war, and they developed commemorative strategies to match. He also points to the postwar lives of New Mexico’s soldiers to remind us many soldiers (and their families) suffered greatly, and struggled in the postwar era to deal with the psychological and physical remnants of their years at war. He nevertheless frames his discussion of Americans’ memory of war against the backdrop of victory. “Winning,” he contends, “provided more support for the value of sacrifice and loss and the project of healing wartime ruptures,” and “tended to reinforce a “classical” sense of sacrifice in which

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the dying and suffering, especially of men, was viewed as noble and heroic.” Indeed, he says, by the end of the twentieth century “the sweet sounds of valor ultimately eclipsed the painful cries of loss.”

Final Allied victory muted the personal, political, and cultural significance of surrender and defeat as defining ordeals for some Americans. During World War II far fewer American soldiers surrendered than did soldiers from other combatant nations. Between 1941 and 1945, approximately 140,000 American soldiers—less than one percent of the nation’s sixteen million men in uniform—were taken prisoner. Compared to its Allies, the U.S. had one of the lowest rates of capture and internment. In fact, the U.S. Army detained over three times as many Axis prisoners in camps scattered throughout the continental United States.

A U.S. soldier on the front lines was thus more likely to take a prisoner than to become one himself. Ninety-nine percent of American soldiers and their families were thus unfamiliar with the traumatic and prolonged aftermath of surrender and captivity. Furthermore, we have relied largely on POWs’ own accounts, whether in the form of diaries, memoirs, or interviews, to tell us about what happened after America surrendered at Bataan and Corregidor. Though they are valuable sources for the historical record, these captivity narratives are by nature generally limited to the physiological and psychological

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27 Niall Ferguson compiled a table of figures showing rates of mobilization and captivity for both Allied and Axis powers during World War II. The only Allied nation with a captivity rate lower than the United States was Canada. The highest was Poland, with fifty-three percent of its soldiers taken prisoner. Of the major Allies, almost three percent of British forces and just over sixteen percent of Russian forces were captured. Thirty-two percent of French servicemen were imprisoned. Of all the belligerent nations for whom data is available, Japanese soldiers had the lowest rate of captivity, with only half a percent of its troops taken prisoner. Niall Ferguson, “Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing in the Age of Total War: Towards a Political Economy of Military Defeat,” War in History 11, no. 2 (April 2004): 164; George G. Lewis and John Mewha, History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776-1945 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1988): 90-91.
consequences of surrender and captivity for the soldiers themselves. Beyond some introductory and concluding anecdotes, they tend to tell us little about what surrender meant to home front Americans and how they confronted a military disaster that was also a cultural catastrophe.

Historians of other geographic areas have thus paid more attention to surrender and its political, military, and cultural consequences. Indeed, it is notable that contributions to the edited volume *Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace* deal with neither the consequences of surrender for American soldiers nor their experiences of captivity or homecoming. It does, however, treat the POWs of other Allied nations such as Australia, Britain, and France quite extensively. Nevertheless, this body of work provides valuable conceptual frameworks for this study. The scholars and monographs I discuss briefly here have laid important foundations for understanding how World War II era Americans and their descendants have grappled with the “never surrender” mantra so intrinsic to American national identity.

In his study of Civil War surrenders, David Silkenat emphasizes the practice, experience, and consequences of surrender, and briefly discusses its cultural repercussions in the postbellum period. The United States, he argues, harbors a “national sensibility that

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28 Bob Moore and Barbara Hately-Broad, eds., *Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace: Captivity, Homecoming and Memory in World War II* (Oxford: Berg, 2005). This volume came out of an international conference held in Hamburg, and its failure to include a chapter dealing with U.S. POWs speaks to the fact that few scholars are working in this field, or if they are, none applied to or were accepted to the conference. The volume contains chapters on Italian, German, Dutch, British, French, Japanese, Soviet, and Australian prisoners of war.

29 “Never surrender” has long been a mantra of American military leaders, and in *Raising the White Flag* Silkenat emphasizes its importance not only to America’s military and political canon, but also to its cultural life. A few anecdotes point to the prevalence of this attitude, despite the losses of late 1941 and early 1942. The theme of a talk at a Veterans of Foreign Wars ladies’ luncheon in Tampa, Florida in early January 1942 was “We Never Surrender.” Banks urged people to join their Christmas Club savings program with the promise “We will never surrender Christmas.” Victor Norling, a retired Army master sergeant, wrote the poem “America Arise,” and in it proclaimed “America, the hope of the Nations/Will never surrender to Cain.” See “VFW Auxiliary Entertains Two National Officers at Luncheon,” *Tampa Bay Times*, January 7, 1942; “There Will Always Be a Christmas,” *The News-Herald* (Franklin, PA), January 7, 1942; Victor Norling, “America Arise,” *Oakland Tribune*, January 25, 1942.
abhors surrender.” Therefore, he concludes that though surrender was as commonplace as death during the American Civil War and gave officers the opportunity to demonstrate their martial honor and prove their commitment to civilized warfare, by the end of the conflict Americans were “increasingly uncomfortable with surrender” and “repudiated it as un-American…weak…unmanly” and “un-patriotic.” They had difficulty integrating surrender into their narratives and commemorations, and often chose to forget, ignore, repurpose, or minimize its significance in shaping the experience and outcome of the war. Silkenat’s concluding chapter is particularly instructive for this dissertation, because he moves beyond battlefield responses to surrender and explores how Americans ascribed meaning to the surrenders, especially the final surrender at Appomattox.

Scholars have also paid attention the relationship between surrender and martial masculinity. In *The Stigma of Surrender*, Brian Feltman points out that during the Great War surrender robbed German soldiers of both the “triumph of victory” and the “glory of a heroic death,” which compromised not only their martial masculinity but also the public’s ability to recognize and respect their sacrifices. Frank Biess likewise underscores the political, cultural, and social consequences of defeat, captivity, and suffering for German POWs upon their return to East and West Germany in the decade following the end of World War II. And, Ulrich Straus details how the “ironclad strictures forbidding surrender” of Japan’s Senjinkun caused “enormous mental anguish” for Japanese soldiers in Allied captivity. Families were notified of their “glorious death in battle” and were frequently sent hair or fingernail

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clippings, which they then interred at the Yasakuni Shrine. For the Japanese, surrender was so anathema it was erased as a possibility. In her landmark work on Australian POWs, Christina Twomey shows surrender fit uneasily within the nation’s Anzac heritage. Though the public generally sympathized with the plight of its captured soldiers, military and government officials were less compassionate and were “deeply ambivalent” when it came to “their capability as soldiers, their part in the war effort, and…their masculinity.” All of these authors, however, tend to focus on the soldiers’ own experiences of captivity and homecoming, as well as postwar efforts to rehabilitate, reintegrate, and compensate them.

This work on the relationship between captivity and masculinity, in particular, opens an important window for examining how New Mexicans incorporated surrendered men into their war narrative, which I briefly examine here but requires a much fuller analysis because their glaring absence from our historiography of World War II. The work of historians Matt Basso and Christina Jarvis suggest that wartime masculinity hinged on what men did during the war, and sets up a dichotomy that excludes prisoners of war. Basso digs deeply into the histories of several mining towns in Montana to uncover how white working men gave meaning to their wartime experience, and discussing his book in an interview said “Americans who fought in World War II are now called “The Greatest Generation,” as opposed to lesser generations.” And, since most of those “who fought in “The Good War” were men, [w]hat made them the “greatest” was that they had proven not only their willingness pro patria mori (to die for their country), but also their masculinity. They were, well, “real men.” But since the men in his book measured their manhood against combat

soldiers, there seems to be little room for captured personnel. Likewise, Jarvis details the work of government agencies to build a post-Depression fighting man through advertising campaigns, physical fitness regiments, and stringent rating systems designed to evaluate men’s physical prowess. But as civilians well knew from newspaper accounts of the conditions on Bataan, by the time the soldiers’ surrendered they were literally shadows of their former selves. When veterans recalled their last days on Bataan and their years in captivity, they pointed to the difference between their weight at the start of the war and at the end of it to quantify the wasting toll of disease, starvation, violence, and hard labor. After their liberation, Navy cooks and Red Cross volunteers stuffed the former prisoners with ice cream, milk, pot roast, and donuts to fatten them up and disguise the damage. My work builds upon that of Basso and Jarvis by interrogating the conditions under which we assign degrees of masculinity to wartime participants and uncovering the ways wartime civilians made room for prisoners of war in their imagination of what American men at war should look like and how they should act. Incorporating prisoners of war into the story of America’s participation in World War II requires reworking and reevaluating what Americans perceived as masculine, and how they represented it rhetorically and spatially. New Mexicans’ experience of war on the home front in the aftermath of what newspapers, politicians, and military analysts alike called the “heaviest reversal” in American military history, one of the “worst in U.S. annals,” a “record defeat,” and “our biggest loss to a foreign foe” hints at how significant Bataan’s surrender was in the lives of

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Americans in 1942. That War Department officials assured them it was a temporary defeat neither minimized its implications nor catastrophic human consequences. The surrender of Bataan was an important military and cultural moment in World War II. To enrich our understanding of how Americans gave meaning to and remembered World War II, we need to more fully account for the place of defeat, surrender, and captivity in the collective narrative. This dissertation offers a beginning of that much larger project. The sources for this dissertation are diverse, and include newspapers, letters, popular magazines and print media, political speeches, congressional records and legislative documents, official state publications and press releases, as well as personal photographs, historic maps, and documentary interviews. The records of the Albuquerque City Commission, the Albuquerque Parks and Recreation Department, the Santa Fe City Council, the New Mexico Historic Preservation Division, and the New Mexico Supreme Court also offer valuable evidence of the actions New Mexican’s took to make sense of the war.

In Chapter 1, I argue New Mexicans’ experiences of World War II and their remembrances of it were significantly shaped by the state’s long history of military service, suffering, and sacrifice. How New Mexicans responded to the 200th’s role in the defense of Bataan and their subsequent surrender and captivity during the war, and the way they commemorated World War II in the postwar era was shaped not just by the years of uncertainty triggered by the loss of the Philippines, but by the state’s century-long project to obtain recognition for its service, sacrifice, and suffering on behalf of the United States. This chapter shows that from the beginning of its history as a territory of the United States, New Mexicans fought to obtain federal recognition of their patriotism, their service in the nation’s armed forces, and the losses they suffered as a result. New Mexico’s involvement on Bataan
continued that proud tradition of military service, but also—to New Mexicans’ dismay—required them to again undertake the frustrating task of finding ways to make the federal government recognize it.

Chapter 2 situates New Mexico’s experience of World War II within three important historical trajectories: first, within a national saga of military preparedness and the consequences of prolonged isolationist tendencies in the late interwar period; second, within its proud but marginalized history of service and sacrifice as part of the United States; and, third, within a powerful post-war impulse to recognize and appreciate the contributions of America’s diverse populace. I argue the ancestry, composition, and pre-war activation of the 200th Coast Artillery intersected to create an important bond between the unit and its home state, and contend that as a result New Mexicans privileged its dead and its veterans as the epitome of the state’s sacrifices during World War II.

Chapters 3 and 4 explore the intersection of private, public, and official responses to the defeat of Bataan and Corregidor, and how those responses helped Americans make sense of the surrender. I argue Americans converged on a number of important ideas that helped incorporate the surrenders into a more powerful and palatable narrative of total victory. In Chapter 3, I discuss the Roosevelt Administration’s attitude towards and plans for the defense of the Philippines to show how the President and military leaders prepared the American public for the Islands’ eventual loss to the Japanese. Officials couched the doomed defensive campaign in terms of temporary sacrifice essential to permanent victory, a painful logic that infused the narrative Americans constructed about Bataan and its defenders over the course of the war, and provided citizens with much of the context vocabulary they used to make sense of the defeat. In Chapter 4, I describe how war correspondents shaped home front
Americans’ imagination about the course of events in the Pacific, and how their stories contributed to the formation of a vocabulary of surrender that persisted into the postwar era. I examine the ways writers, photographers, and editorial cartoonists visually rendered the defense of Bataan for domestic consumption and gave civilians fodder for their conversations about the causes and consequences of the surrender. Finally, I investigate the Senate’s consideration of S. 1374, a bill introduced by one of New Mexico’s Democratic Senators, Dennis Chávez. The proposed legislation called for the promotion of American prisoners of war who were stationed in the U.S. territories of Wake, Guam, and the Philippines when the war against Japan began, and prompted a widespread debate over the wisdom of rewarding defeated soldiers and who was obliged to do so.

Chapter 5 discusses the aims, activities, achievements, and failures of the Bataan Relief Organization (BRO). I argue the BRO, a voluntary association whose membership consisted of family and friends of the men on Bataan, performed the rhetorical and practical labor that fixed Bataan securely in the state’s memory of its wartime contributions. The BRO embedded the tragedy of Bataan into New Mexico’s wartime identity by helping its families manage the “historical disaster” of the Bataan surrender in their homes, and gave New Mexicans a way to organize the chaos of war. It personalized the trauma of surrender and captivity and redirected New Mexicans’ frustration and agony into productive endeavors explicitly linked to the fate of their sons and brothers. Alongside a growing federal war machine rapidly tooling to help Americans find their “common ground,” the BRO underscored the shared agony of the families across the country whose soldiers were lost in the Philippines and united them in pain and purpose.33 The BRO furthermore supplied a

rhetoric of tragedy, loss, and despair that made the suffering of small-town New Mexican families visible and accessible to the general public in ways federally sponsored propaganda could not.

In Chapter 6, I examine New Mexicans’ wartime dedication of four commemorative space in the state—the Bataan Building and 200th Insignia in Santa Fe, Bataan Bridge in Carlsbad, and Bataan Memorial Park in Albuquerque—to argue during World War II New Mexicans constructed a commemorative culture that privileged the service, sacrifice, and suffering of the men who fought on Bataan and made their experiences of surrender and captivity central to the state’s identity. Additionally, I detail the ways veterans and their communities altered and transformed these spaces during the second half of the twentieth century. New Mexicans continued to augment, embellish, and refine those memorials, suggesting they believed the structures inadequately expressed their appreciation for Bataan veterans’ sacrifices, affirming the BRO’s early assertion citizens could never “repay the debt” they owed them. I highlight veterans’ involvement in the postwar renovations to show how veterans inscribed these commemorative spaces with their own remembrances of war, and in so doing inserted some of their private grief into the public domain.34

Finally, I conclude with a brief summary of New Mexico’s efforts to obtain a Medal of Honor for its Bataan veterans. The highest honor the nation can bestow upon its servicemembers, to many New Mexicans the medal represents unequivocal recognition of the state’s sacrifices in World War II and more particularly the heavy toll it exacted from its 200th Coast Artillery. Indeed, the legislation repeatedly introduced—and repeatedly neglected—raises the ghosts of New Mexico’s hard-won campaign for statehood a century

34 In Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning, Jay Winter details how grief, loss, and mourning were central to Europeans’ private and public remembrances of the First World War.
earlier, and shows that the early history of the state had significant ramifications for how it tackled subsequent events. Bodnar points out “Americans struggled to craft both an understanding of World War II while it was being fought and a remembrance of the war after it ended.” But his observation imposes an artificial bracket around the war. World War II was the disastrous consequence of a decades-in-the-making collision of politics, personalities, and principles, and historians trace the interaction of those elements over time to explain its causes. We should likewise seek to do the same when untangling the complicated nature of Americans’ commemorations of World War II. We need to enlarge our lenses and expand our timelines to consider the “profound centers of human existence” Americans occupied when they went to war we enrich our understanding of how and in what ways the war penetrated their daily lives and what they did to manage its presence.35 Understanding the centrality of the Bataan Death March to New Mexico’s wartime narrative and its implications for the state’s commemorations of World War II therefore requires situating it not just in the larger timeline of the Pacific War, but in a longer history of the state itself.36

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36 The timeline on the following page briefly identifies some of the international, national, and local events significant to New Mexico’s participation in World War II.
TIMELINE OF SELECTED EVENTS

April 25, 1940  111th Cavalry converted to 207th Coast Artillery
July 13, 1940  207th Coast Artillery redesignated 200th Coast Artillery
August 27, 1940 Congress passes Senate Joint Resolution 286, authorizing President to order National Guard into active service
September 16, 1940 Roosevelt signs the Selective Training and Service Act
December 23, 1940 Roosevelt issues Executive Order 8618 calling up the 200th Coast Artillery
January 6, 1941 200th Coast Artillery inducted into the United States Army
August 15, 1941 200th Coast Artillery selected for duty in the Philippines
August 30, 1941 First 200th Coast Artillery batteries set sail for Philippines
September 26, 1941 Last 200th Coast Artillery batteries arrive in Philippines
December 7, 1941 Japan attacks Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Wake Island, Guam, and the British colonies of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaya
December 10, 1941 Guam surrenders to the Japanese
December 23, 1941 Wake Island falls to the Japanese
December 26, 1941 MacArthur decides to withdraw forces into Bataan
December 23, 1941 December 23, 1941 MacArthur declares Manila an open city
December 25 – Jan 6, 1942 U.S. and Filipino forces complete withdrawal into Bataan
February 15, 1942 Singapore falls to the Japanese
February 16, 1942 Malaya falls to the Japanese
February 23, 1942 Roosevelt delivers fireside chat confirming the Philippines will not be reinforced
March 11, 1942 MacArthur leaves Corregidor for Australia
April 9, 1942 Maj. Gen. Edward King surrenders Bataan to Japanese Gen. Masaharu Homma
April 10, 1942 Bataan Death March begins
April 14, 1942 Bataan Relief Organization forms in Albuquerque
May 6, 1942 Gen. Jonathan Wainwright surrenders Corregidor to Homma
May 13, 1942 Bataan Building dedicated in Santa Fe
June 14, 1942 200th Coast Artillery Insignia Dedicated in Santa Fe
July 5, 1942 Bataan Bridge dedicated in Carlsbad, NM
Nov 30 – Dec 23, 1942 First War Loan Drive
March 2, 1943 Albuquerque City Commission establishes Bataan Memorial Park
April 12 – May 1, 1943 Second War Loan Drive
July 18, 1943 Flying Fortress “Spirit of Bataan” dedicated at Kirtland Air Field in Albuquerque
Sep 9 – Oct 1, 1943 Third War Loan Drive
Jan 18 – Feb 15, 1944 Fourth War Loan Drive
January 28, 1944 War and Navy Departments issue joint report, “Japanese Atrocities to Prisoners of War,” detailing Bataan Death March and conditions in POW camps
June 12 – July 8, 1944 Fifth War Loan Drive
October 20, 1944 MacArthur’s forces return to the Philippines
Nov 20 – Dec 16, 1944 Sixth War Loan Drive
January 30, 1945 U.S. Army rangers liberate American prisoners of war at Camp Cabanatuan
May 8, 1945 Germany surrenders to the Allies
May 14 – June 30, 1945 Seventh War Loan Drive
August 6, 1945 U.S. drops atomic bomb on Hiroshima
August 9, 1945 U.S. drops atomic bomb on Nagasaki
August 15, 1945 Emperor Hirohito announces Japanese surrender
September 2, 1945 Japanese sign terms of surrender aboard the USS Missouri
September 1945 Liberated prisoners of war begin returning to United States
Oct 29 – Dec 8, 1945 Victory Loan Drive
October 10, 1947 First American war dead return aboard the Honda Knot
CHAPTER 1

“One of the Grandest and Most Patriotic States”:
Service and Sacrifice in New Mexico from the Civil War to World War I

The day after Bataan fell the Santa Fe New Mexican published an editorial reflecting on the surrender’s significance for the state. The defeat “cast a pall of gloom over the nation and especially New Mexico,” it somberly noted, and reminded readers its soldiers had a long and patriotic record of fighting for peace and liberty:

As these words are written New Mexico carries a pain deep in its heart, but it is also proud—fiercely proud—of its brave men who have given their all that freedom shall not perish from this earth. In every war since 1847 the men of New Mexico have followed the flag of this nation. Never faltering, never questioning, without regard for danger or discomfort, the brave, loyal men of New Mexico have been at the front. Where the fighting was the fiercest was the place where they were always found, and the men of Bataan have continued that tradition. New Mexico is proud of its soldier citizens for it knows that however hard the going may be those men will continue to fight with their heads in the air and a song in their hearts.

The editorial positioned the men in 200th Coast Artillery as patriotic heirs to a military legacy dating to the United States’ acquisition of the territory in the mid-1800s, after the nation wrested the unforgiving expanse of deserts and mountains from Mexico at the conclusion of the Mexican-American War in 1848. It furthermore called attention to the state’s “soldier citizens”—underscoring the complex web of daily life, duty, and devotion that defined the relationship between these National Guardsmen, their communities, their state, and the

1 “A Sad But Proud New Mexico,” Santa Fe New Mexican, April 10, 1942.
2 The United States acquired the land that became New Mexico over a period of about fifty years, beginning with the Louisiana Purchase in 1804, which brought the northeast corner of present-day New Mexico under the flag. The Texas Annexation (1845) added the area east of the Rio Grande, and in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) Mexico ceded the land west of the Rio Grande. The Gadsden Purchase (1853) extended the southern state boundary with a small strip of territory in the lower southwest, and in 1861 the organization of Colorado Territory removed the northeastern-most ribbon of land from New Mexico. See “Territorial Acquisitions of the United States” at https://nationalmap.gov for a detailed map of territorial growth of the United States from 1783 to the present.
nation. Implicitly embedded in the weighty prose, too, was the burden of New Mexico’s territorial period. The Bataan surrender—characterized by private, public, and official voices as the inevitable consequence of the Roosevelt Administration’s neglect of the soldiers, and its apparent indifference towards their suffering and sacrifices—painfully echoed the territory’s long and arduous campaign for statehood from 1850–1912. About one-fourth of New Mexicans were old enough to remember that frustrating chapter in the state’s history—many of them parents of the boys on Bataan—since New Mexico had been a state for less than thirty years when the 200th Coast Artillery headed west toward the Philippines in the summer of 1941.

In this chapter I argue New Mexicans’ experiences of World War II and their remembrances of it were significantly shaped by the state’s long history of military service, suffering, and sacrifice. How New Mexicans responded to the 200th’s role in the defense of Bataan and their subsequent surrender and captivity during the war, and the way they commemorated World War II in the postwar era was shaped not just by the years of uncertainty triggered by the loss of the Philippines, but by the state’s century-long project to obtain recognition for its service, sacrifice, and suffering on behalf of the United States. Understanding Bataan’s centrality to New Mexico’s wartime narrative and its implications for the state’s commemorations of World War II therefore requires situating it not just in the larger timeline of the Pacific War, but in a longer history of the state itself. The purpose of this brief survey of New Mexico’s history from the territorial period to the edge of America’s entry into World War II provides context for reframing the way we think and write about how communities commemorate war. For New Mexico that means recognizing the
significance of service, sacrifice, and patriotism to the state’s identity in its territorial and early statehood years.

To more clearly articulate the significance of New Mexico’s territorial and early statehood for its experience during World War II, I first explore the consequences of some of the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which set the physical, political, and symbolic boundaries of New Mexico’s position within the United States. The 1848 annexation resolutely shifted native New Mexicans’ gaze eastward, reorienting their political, legal, and cultural obligations—but also where they would look for recognition, protection, and internal development. These latter three expectations, however, were fulfilled only insofar as they benefitted the imperial project. Parallel to the United States’ demands that residents display their patriotism by donning uniforms and defending national borders, the “failed promises” of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo inscribed into the land itself a narrative of loss and dispossession—a narrative echoed in the language New Mexicans used to talk about the surrender of Bataan, and made visible when they altered, augmented, and renamed the natural and built environment to commemorate it.3

Next, I review important features of the state’s physical and human geography. New Mexicans were both bound together and separated by a host of natural and manmade features—mountains, rivers, weather, roads, radio waves, ethnicity, language, politics, religion, wealth—and these traits also, to a degree, defined their perceptions of their relationship to the rest of the nation and the federal government. As Roger Lotchin and Martin Schiesl observed in their introduction to a special issue of the Pacific Historical Review, published on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war, “World War II

created many different home fronts, often in the same towns.”

Knowing who New Mexicans were, where they lived, and how they lived gives us a framework for better understanding New Mexico’s home front. Finally, I show how New Mexicans used their quest for statehood as a scaffold to build a rhetorical canon of service, sacrifice, and suffering. Military service, “the ultimate test of a man’s Americanness” had done little to nullify the myth of the potential for New Mexican perfidy and they were continually frustrated and disappointed by the government’s failure to fully recognize and appreciate their sacrifices.  

Congress repeatedly denied the territory statehood, and lawmakers, politicians, and the press routinely accused its majority Hispanic population of lacking the qualities and virtues necessary to become fully American, not the least of which they claimed was the ability to speak English. This incursion into New Mexico’s history reveals a pattern of exploitation, subjugation, and duplicity when it came to both recruitment for military service and recognition of its military contributions. It also shows a concerted effort on the part of New Mexicans to give voice and substance to their patriotism through that military service. Because many of those voices spoke Spanish, their demonstrations of fealty were often ignored, denied, or forgotten by those who wished to exclude them from full citizenship. The men of the 200th carried the weight of these betrayals with them into the jungles of the Philippines.

Signed and exchanged in 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo formally ended the two-year war between Mexico and the United States, and in addition to expanding its southwestern boundaries, added approximately seventy thousand people to the U.S. population. Residents of the region had one year to decide where their loyalties lay; if they

chose to remain in the United States they could “not preserve the character of citizens of the Mexican Republic” and would by default “become citizens of the United States.”\(^6\) When Congress granted New Mexico territorial status as part of the Compromise of 1850 its population stood at just over sixty thousand. About 95 percent of its inhabitants were born in the territory, while about seven hundred hailed from a state in the United States. Approximately two thousand residents were born in a foreign country, and half of those identified Mexico as their place of birth.\(^7\) The majority of the territory’s population was thus Hispanic and spoke Spanish, which some policymakers viewed as an un-American trait. They would argue its dominance as a language showed most of New Mexico’s population was backward, unintelligent, and potentially disloyal, and used its prevalence to preclude New Mexican statehood.

Using what Patricia Limerick calls “a treachery of words,” some Anglos succeeded in doing the dirty work of inscribing in American consciousness an imagination of native New Mexicans as “greasers” of a “mongrel breed” made of a “detestable” mixture of “Apache, negro, Navajo, white horse-thief, Pueblo Indian, and old-time frontiersman with the original Mexican stock” who “hate[d] with a passionate hatred everything that is known to [them] as American.”\(^8\) They had little faith in New Mexicans’ character and willingness to defend the

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\(^8\) Patricia Limerick, “Making the Most of Words: Verbal Activity and Western America,” Under an Open Sky: Rethinking America’s Western Past, ed. William Cronon, George Miles, and Jay Gitlin (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 168; “Greasers as Citizens,” New York Times, February 6, 1882. This opinion piece was apparently written by one of the newspaper’s correspondents, likely on assignment in Trinidad, Colorado, where the story was filed. The term Anglo is generally understood to include “citizens of the United States, Anglo-Saxons, and other foreigners whom the Mexicans associated with the United States.” Carey McWilliams reports several origin stories for the term “greaser,” which may have derived from the occupation of Mexicans along the Santa Fe Trail and in California in the 1850s. Regardless of its origins, it was used much more
Union, but Anglos still expected the Hispanic population of New Mexico to take up arms in the Civil War, tame the “savage tribes” in the newly acquired western lands, and help evict the Spanish from island territories quickly coming under the American imperial gaze. Hispanic military service in these conflicts—whether significant or minimal—received intense scrutiny. Consequently, New Mexico’s contributions to America’s wars throughout the latter half of the nineteenth and first quarter of the twentieth centuries were first disparaged and then forgotten.

Besides the fact much of its population spoke Spanish, many early visitors to New Mexico were disenchanted with its environment, a perception that would shift entirely with the expansion of railroad systems and the invention of the automobile. Its “entirely worthless” landscape and “primitive” population “grievously disappointed” newcomers, but most nevertheless recognized its geographic importance to America’s westward expansion. Politicians, army officers, and travelers tended to view the territory as a transit corridor rather than a valuable place in and of itself. New Mexico’s southwestern landscape was indeed forbidding, and had a significant impact on the way people lived and worked. Ross Calvin made much of the connection between New Mexicans and their environment in his 1934 book, *Sky Determines*. His racial biases notwithstanding, Calvin—an Episcopalian minister and self-styled “interpreter of the Southwest”—believed the “sky, as source of life-giving moisture and of the desert-making heat” shaped a “peculiar environment” that

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9 William S. Kiser, *Coast-to-Coast Empire: Manifest Destiny and the New Mexico Borderlands* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018), 1-5. Kiser describes the attitudes of several military engineers and travelers, as well as President James K. Polk. whose writings and addresses use words like “link,” “through,” “thoroughfare,” and “connecting” to describe New Mexico.
“determined…the direction of its human activities and pursuits.” Rivers, lakes, and streams cover just over one-tenth of a percent of the state—the rest of the region is a combination of mountains, plains, and desert. New Mexico consequently was one of the least densely populated states with about four people per square mile. The settlement patterns of New Mexico reflect the limitations and advantages of its extreme environment. New Mexico is vast; with a land area of approximately 121,511 square miles, it was the fourth-largest state in the Union in 1940 but was one of the least populated, with only 531,818 inhabitants. By comparison, the rest of the nation averaged forty-four people per square mile. The sparseness of New Mexico’s population meant many communities, especially those in the mountains or in desolate plains areas, were small, isolated, and close-knit. Many of these small communities were located in the foothills of the region’s numerous mountain ranges and in the Rio Grande valley. Following a practice dating to the precontact period among Puebloan peoples and their ancestors, New Mexico’s inhabitants established settlements in these areas for access to precious water resources as well as for protection from climactic extremes and colonial violence.


British journalist Alistair Cooke, and beloved American war correspondent Ernie Pyle, had different opinions about the state’s environmental extremes; both shared, however, the opinion that the place of New Mexico affected its residents’ ability to confront and manage the tragedy of Bataan.\(^{13}\) If “sense of place” emerges from the convergence of “the visible particulars of local topographies, the personal particulars of biographical associations, and the notional particulars of socially given systems of thought,” as anthropologist Keith Basso suggests, nowhere is that more evident than in the two journalists’ ruminations on New Mexicans’ mentalities in the aftermath of disaster.\(^{14}\) Cooke traveled through the Southwest in the spring of 1942, part of a cross-country adventure designed to give him an idea of what the American people at war were like. As he meandered along dusty roads and over burning railroad tracks, he contemplated the war’s apparent absence on the American home front. The West, he wrote, was “a circle of earth, something of a vast, clear distance, balmy heat, high still mountains, light sharp as a sword,” and amid that landscape he found it hard to keep in mind the realities of war. Here nature itself imposes the fundamentals of staying alive: water, shade, a sense of direction, a regular supply of food. And up against these, the problems of equipment, of war factories, of the draft, of rationing, of what is called ‘civilian sacrifice’ seem picayune and the war itself a bad habit, a fuss of scratchy humans far from home. In the towns of this brush country, there is not a visible sign of war. The young men who are missing have ‘gone off to the war’. But the war does not come to them, as it has to every city of Europe since September 1939.\(^{15}\)

But just a few days later he passed through the town of Deming. It was mid-April, and just one week after Bataan surrendered. Cooke marveled at the sparseness of the town, its 3,600

\(^{13}\) Ernie Pyle and his wife, Geraldine, made the decision to move to Albuquerque in the 1930s and built a house south of Central Avenue on Girard Boulevard in 1940. His columns for the Albuquerque Tribune described some of the towns and places in New Mexico, like the Carlsbad Caverns, and the city of Albuquerque considered him its “adopted son.” See Footnote 19 for further details and citations.


\(^{15}\) Alistair Cooke, The American Home Front, 1941-1942 (New York: Grove Press, 2006), 103-104. Cooke’s journal of his trip was published posthumously.
inhabitants occupying only “a few rectangles streets interrupting the desert.” His unexpected encounter with a group of mothers anxious to query an outsider for details about the circumstances of loss unsettled him and he was “glad to pull out of Deming” to escape its overwhelming melancholy. Unlike his first impression of the arid desert he found that the “Western landscape…so empty of trivialities, and enclosed only by the eternities of shade and horizon and silence, acts as an echo chamber to the small sadness of persons and sends their feelings back to them magnified into a grandeur of despondency they had not felt indoors.” Rather than alleviating the gloom of his visit, his train voyage out of New Mexico “intensified” it. The people of Deming, Cooke had discovered, were so grief-stricken by what happened to their men in Bataan that the place of the town was consumed by their sadness. Their fear and agony was palpable.

For Ernie Pyle, whom GIs hailed as the “greatest interpreter of G.I. gripes and yearnings,” and whom families admired for prose that made them “feel closer to the boys at the front,” the landscape elicited a different reaction. In one of his weekly “Roving Reporter” columns for the Scripps-Howard newspaper service published just shy of the one-year anniversary of Pearl Harbor, “Albuquerque’s adopted son” pondered the impact of the war on the city.

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18 “Pyle’s Adopted City and State Grieve at Death,” Albuquerque Journal, April 19, 1945. “The Roving Reporter” ran from 1935 until Pyle’s death in April 1945. Prior to 1940 his articles were mostly human-interest pieces inspired by his travels within the continental United States, to Hawaii and Alaska, and to Central and South America. One of the early “embedded journalists,” he covered war preparations in England, the Africa and Italian campaigns, and the D-Day invasion. He was killed by a Japanese sniper in April 19, 1945 after
You don’t seem to feel the war so very much here in Albuquerque. There are plenty of reasons you should feel it; but I think maybe the bigness of the west, and the stoicism of the Indians, and the magnificence of the sky—somehow it’s all so big it can sort of absorb tragedy, and tears, and sorrow. Few communities have been harder hit by the war than Albuquerque. I mean really hit—in the heart…Yet they realize the war is broader and greater than their own grief…Everywhere you go you notice the inroads Bataan made upon Albuquerque…My old set in Albuquerque has ceased to exist…For there’s nobody around anymore.20

Pyle seemed to think Albuquerque was absent of the melancholy Cooke felt in Deming, and that in Albuquerque people had traded their grief for a chins-up, “all out for victory” attitude. What they really did was redirect their anxieties—like many Americans—to activities they thought at the very least might alleviate some of their boys’ suffering in prison camps, and at the most would “hasten their homecoming.”21 Pyle’s comments, too, reflect the war’s impact on the human geography of the state. Even in Albuquerque, a city ten times as large as Deming, the absence of the young men was noticeable.

Both Deming and Albuquerque owed their growth to the railroads, whose expansion into the territory following 1879 shortened the distance between the states’ villages, towns, and cities and eroded New Mexico’s isolation from the rest of the United States. The first few hundred miles of railroad started operating in “the unknown territory…a land of history, mystery, and romance” in the 1880s. People and goods traveled over the tracks on “locomotive[s] [that] seemed to sound a shrill summons to the country it was about to enter to wake up after centuries of sleep.”22 Ralph Emerson Twitchell, an Anglo lawyer and New

———. 20 Ernie Pyle, “Bigness of West Sort of Pushes War Away,” The Brownsville Herald (Brownsville, Texas), December 2, 1943.
21 “Hasten the Homecoming” was the slogan used in the final war bond campaign, the Victory Loan Drive, from October 29 to December 8, 1945.
Mexico politician, wrote the railroads signified “the beginning of an era of permanent prosperity for the people of the territory. . . . At last New Mexico was really in touch with the enlightened progress and modern methods of the people of the eastern states.”

Railways certainly increased access to resources and markets, but they also brought with them thousands of newcomers, many of whom were of a Progressive persuasion and sought to modernize and “Americanize” New Mexico’s population in preparation for eventual statehood. Although Anglos already exercised significant control over the region’s politics and economy, so far New Mexicans’ “language, religion and customs [were] relatively undisturbed.” The railroads facilitated a surge in Anglo settlement as well as the imposition of cultural institutions, particularly schools.

Territorial administrators had difficulty securing the votes necessary to create a system of public education in New Mexico—especially because the Spanish-speaking population viewed attempts to enforce English-only instruction as an attempt to dismantle their cultural inheritance and further politically and economically disempower their communities. The 1891 Act Establishing Common Schools in the Territory of New Mexico, and the education clauses in the new state’s 1912 constitution therefore represented something of a compromise, albeit a superficial one. The 1891 law required teachers to instruct the English language but also stipulated that in school districts where residents spoke only Spanish, teachers had to “have a knowledge of both English and Spanish.”

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1890), 478; “The Unknown Territory,” New York Times, February 9, 1879. After 1910, operational railway miles in New Mexico decreased—with some exceptions, this was generally a trend across the United States due to increased automobile ownership and subsequent highway construction.


24 See M. David Key, “Progressivism and Imperialism in the American Southwest, 1880-1912” (PhD diss., University of New Mexico, 2005).

constitution obliged teachers to “become proficient in both the English and Spanish languages to qualify them to teach Spanish-speaking pupils,” and forbade the segregation of “children of Spanish descent” in schools.  

The letter of the law, then, was that instruction was to take place in English; knowledge of the Spanish language was only necessary to facilitate communication between teachers and their students. Bilingual education, though supported by some high-ranking officials—among them Edward Gray, president of the University of New Mexico from 1909 to 1912—never took hold in New Mexico. That English was the language of instruction is particularly important when it comes to evaluating the significance of language when the War Department chose to send the 200th to the Philippines, and subsequent perceptions of that decision among New Mexicans and people who write their history.

Another important outcome of railroad expansion was the establishment and growth of towns and cities throughout the territory. Albuquerque, whose population in 1890 was half that of Santa Fe, exploded in size and significance after the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad reached the state in the late 1870s. The new section of the city expanded east and west of the railroad tracks, eclipsing the original Spanish and Mexican plaza of La Villa de

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26 “An Act Establishing Common Schools in the Territory of New Mexico, and Creating the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction,” *Compilation of the School Laws of New Mexico* (Santa Fe: New Mexican Printing Company, 1895), 8-9; *Constitution of the State of New Mexico* (Santa Fe: La Voz del Pueblo, 1914), 45-46.

27 Robert Milk, “The Issue of Language in Education in Territorial New Mexico,” *Bilingual Review* 7, no. 3 (September-December 1980): 212-221. See also Lynn Getz, *Schools of Their Own: The Education of Hispanos in New Mexico, 1850-1940* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997); John Mondragón and Ernest Stapleton, *Public Education in New Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005); Rosina A. Lozano, *An American Language: The History of Spanish in the United States* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018). Edward Gray championed the state’s Hispanic population as an untapped (and much maligned) “national resource.” He believed the Spanish-speaking people of New Mexico had the potential to provide an invaluable service to the nation as “public servants.” Their familiarity with the “language, the customs and the habit of thought” of the United States’ Latin American neighbors, to whom they were “racially akin,” would allow them to “win without effort a place in the confidence of the people that the Teuton American rarely if ever secures.” E. D. McQueen Gray, “The Spanish Language in New Mexico: A National Resource,” *Bulletin of the University of New Mexico* 1, no. 2 (February 1912): 37-52.
Albuquerque, which almost overnight became what the U.S. Bureau of the Census would call “Old Albuquerque.” Most of the population of what locals called Old Town was Hispano, while New Town welcomed mostly Anglos—who imposed eastern-inspired gridded layouts and architectural styles. Incorporated as a city of 3.1 square miles, Albuquerque emerged as the “chief city of a new empire in the great Southwest.” By 1940 its population was one-and-a-half times that of Santa Fe. The city also expanded in size to about eleven square miles, a transformation startlingly apparent in the numerous fire insurance maps the Sanborn Map Company produced in the first half of the twentieth century.28 Because of its size, its prominence in the economic life of the state, and its access to lines of communication and transportation, Albuquerque became the center of many of the state’s war-related activities, including those of the Bataan Relief Organization.

Although the population of the entire state grew by 172 percent from 1900 to 1940, the center of population did not shift significantly. The state was still one of the least densely populated units in the nation, with just over four people per square mile. With few exceptions, residents remained along trade and travel routes and near areas of productive farming and grazing land, connected not just by railroads but also by many of the same roads the U.S. Topographical Corps planned and mapped in the territorial period. Primarily military conduits, they also functioned as cultural routes linking otherwise remote

populations to one another. Most remained unimproved through the early 1900s. James A. French, New Mexico’s first State Engineer, found this situation “deplorable” and attributed it to “the sparsely settled condition of the state . . . the general misuse of county road funds, and . . . lack of a central . . . organization.”

But the advent of the automobile, a push towards tourism as a form of state revenue, New Mexico statehood, and a number of federal roads programs generated both increased demand and increased funds for highway construction. By 1940, just over nine thousand miles of state highways snaked across New Mexico, and the majority of those roads were in rural areas. Over one-third of those rural roads, which connected the state’s smallest towns and villages to county seats and larger population centers, were unsurfaced. The New Mexico highway map for 1940 shows large swathes of territory—especially in the northwest and southeast corners—without any highways at all. Those less populous areas were linked by dirt roads, which meant access to resources, information, and each other was often limited and irregular. About five hundred post offices handled mail for New Mexicans, and those offices were located along major roads and highways. The Post Route Map of the State of New Mexico for 1936 shows many communities received mail only three times per week; these limited mail routes affected timely distribution of local newspapers and magazines.

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By 1941 New Mexico publishing firms circulated almost eighty newspapers, most of which were published in English. Despite a rich history of Nuevomexicano “print discourse” spurred in part by a two-decade span during which more than sixty Spanish-language papers flew off the presses, by 1941 only four newspapers in New Mexico were published exclusively in Spanish; a further ten were published in both English and Spanish or contained a Spanish section. The two largest papers in the state were the *Albuquerque Journal* and the *Albuquerque Tribune*, with a combined circulation of about twenty-three thousand. These statistics are important because they tell us how—and when—most New Mexicans would get their information about the war and what was happening to their soldiers thousands of miles across land and ocean. In towns and villages aching for information about a son or husband, the time between visits from the mail carrier likely seemed interminable. These lapses affected the methods New Mexicans used to obtain and distribute information and encouraged them to form networks for the purposes of sharing war news. On a broader scale, however, newspapers carried most of the details New Mexicans had access to when it came to the progress of the war, and the way those stories were told (and from whose perspective) had much to do with the shaping of public opinion when it came to the tragedy in Bataan.

The ethnic composition of the 200th Coast Artillery reflected the demographic consequences of the state’s long history of conquest—what historian and native New Mexican Erna Fergusson called a “pageant of three peoples”—the state’s tri-cultural model—but some sources have distorted the unit’s multi-ethnic identity to describe the unit.

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as an especially poignant example of Hispanic military service. Michel-Rolph Trouillot poignantly observed “History reveals itself only through the production of specific narratives” which are themselves “particular bundle[s] of silences” and “traces,” and one narrative that has taken shape as a result of New Mexicans’ experience of the war is that “most” or the “majority” of the men in the 200th were Hispanic.34 Apparently, no one has questioned or challenged this assertion, which has been made by some of New Mexico’s congressmen, state cultural institutions, and local journalists, as well as federal publications. Of the approximately 1,800 men in the 200th, however, approximately 65 percent were Anglo, 31 percent were Hispanic, and the remaining four percent were Indian. One-third is a significant percentage, but it is not the most or a majority. Some individuals’ insistence on emphasizing Hispanic suffering on Bataan is an important residue of settler colonialism. Fergusson claimed the three groups “have successfully worked out a life together,” a position that ignores the “social, political, and economic hierarchies that remain characteristically colonial,” but does to an extent reflect a sentiment many of the men in the 200th purportedly shared. The unit had, recalled one veteran, “no Mexicans, no Indians, no Anglos in the 200th, just Americans.”35 Nevertheless, some individuals have rewritten—purposefully or unintentionally—some of the 200th’s history and exposed the residue of these three groups’ complicated relationship.36

36 Erna Fergusson, New Mexico: A Pageant of Three Peoples (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1964), xxi; Thomas H. Guthrie, Recognizing Heritage: The Politics of Multiculturalism in New Mexico (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 3. Erna Fergusson was “born in Albuquerque of a cultivated pioneer family,” according to Paul Horgan, who wrote the introduction to the second edition of her book. Thus, she was native in the sense she was born in the state, but she was not a native New Mexican or a Nuevomexicano. Also see Erlinda Gonzalez-Berry and David R. Maciel, eds., The Contested Homeland: A Chicano History of New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000); James Brooks,
Violence, dispossession, and exclusion defined encounters between Indians, Hispanics, and Anglos in New Mexico. Repeated conquest and colonization entrenched ethnic and racial hierarchies in the economic, social, and political systems of the state—which were already encoded in the “racial scripts” of U.S. imperialism.\(^{37}\) When Republicans blocked New Mexico’s admission to the United States, they did so largely because of their prejudices towards its Spanish-speaking population: they questioned their loyalty and overlooked their military service. Their disparagement and exclusion were rhetorical acts of violence against the territory’s Hispanic (and Indian) peoples. That some people have exaggerated Hispanic representation in the 200th Coast Artillery can consequently be viewed as a way to reclaim and reassert Hispanics’ significance to the history of the state and of the nation.\(^{38}\)

Because New Mexico’s World War II narrative has much to do with the way race and ethnicity were constructed in the state and in the United States, it is necessary to account for who lived in New Mexico on the eve of World War II. In New Mexico, centuries of

\(^{37}\) Natalia Molina, *How Race is Made in America: Immigration, Citizenship, and the Historical Power of Racial Scripts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 21. Molina uses the term “racial scripts” to explain how “the lives of racialized groups are linked across time and space and thereby affect one another.” Using her term here to describe the relationship between ethnic groups in New Mexico, helps us untangle the complicated layering of race-based discrimination in the state in the twentieth century. Molina’s racial scripts are “built into institutional structures and practices,” and she emphasizes how easily established cultures of attitudes and practices slide from one group to another and are “always available for use in new rounds of dehumanization and demonization.” My use of this term will become clearer in later discussions of the multifaceted repercussions of Executive Order 9066.

intermarriage—and a longstanding practice among Hispanics of identifying as white—confound any attempt to arbitrarily categorize racial or ethnic identity, much less quantify membership in a particular group. The 1930 census used “Mexican” as a racial category, while the 1940 census asked about participants’ “mother tongue.” Neither enumerative strategy generated wholly accurate figures for New Mexico’s Hispanic population. Based on responses to the question about mother tongue, the 1940 census estimated 221,740 New Mexicans were of Hispanic origin. George Sánchez, a Hispano education reformer, found 270,475 people of Spanish descent in the state, while Dora Hettower, a staffer for the Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs (CIAA), estimated there were approximately 300,000 Spanish-speaking individuals in New Mexico. A fourth, more-recent assessment concludes less than 200,000 people in the state had Mexican roots. The difference is not insignificant.

39 The 1930 census would seem to be a useful resource to help describe the character of New Mexico’s population because, for the first (and last) time in the history of the decennial census, it included “Mexican” as a distinct, nonwhite racial group. Enumerators were instructed that “all persons born in Mexico, or having parents born in Mexico” should be returned as Mexican. These guidelines of course meant that most Hispanics living in New Mexico—with extensive ancestry—would not have identified themselves as Mexican. Only 59,340 individuals in the state were therefore identified as Mexican. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Instructions to Enumerators,” Population and Culture (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1930), 26. In 1940 the U.S. Census Bureau based its calculations of mother tongue on a five percent sample of the population. In the foreword to its report, “Mother Tongue,” the Bureau explained its decision to use sampling for “national minority groups” because it “belie[ved] information as to the number and location in this country of such minority groups would be useful to various agencies in evoking a maximum war effort from the nation.” Enumerators recorded “the principal language spoken in the home of the person in his earliest childhood,” an instruction that does leave room for error. U.S. Census Bureau, “Instructions to Enumerators,” Population and Agriculture (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1940), 16; U.S. Census Bureau, “Table 2.—Nativity and Parentage of the Total White Population, 1940, and of the Foreign-Born White, 1930, by Mother Tongue, for Regions, Divisions, and States,” in “Mother Tongue,” Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population, Nativity and Parentage of the White Population (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), 21. Sánchez used the 1930 census and school enrollment statistics to arrive at his estimate. See George I. Sánchez, Forgotten People: A Study of New Mexicans (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1940), 30. The CIAA presumed census figures were artificially low because some Spanish-speaking individuals avoided census-takers, and when Hettower redid the estimates in 1943 she arrived at a figure of approximately 300,000 Spanish speakers in the state. See Gerald Nash, The American West Transformed: The Impact of the Second World War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 108. The third figure is the lowest estimate; researchers arrived at it using statistical methods devised by Brian Gratton and Myron P. Gutman and described in their article, “Hispanics in the United States, 1850-1990: Estimate of Population Size and National Origin,” Historical Methods 33, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 137-153. For the table see Brian Gratton and Emily Klancher Merchant, “An Immigrant’s Tale: The Mexican American Southwest, 1850 to 1950,” Social Science History 39, no. 4 (Winter 2015): 524. For details on coding and data, see
The lowest figure puts Hispanics at 36% of the population, while the highest puts them at 56%. Taking the average of the four estimates, Hispanics would have accounted for at least 46% of the state’s population in 1940. Anglos also comprised almost half of the state’s inhabitants, while Indians made up about 6.5 percent. Approximately 1 percent of the state’s inhabitants were black, Chinese, or Japanese. These numbers are important to more clearly articulate the significance of New Mexico’s representation in the armed forces during World War II and in particular the proportion of Hispanics in the 200th Coast Artillery, a concern especially when it came to recognizing service and suffering through either awards or benefits in the postwar era. These numbers are also significant, however, because they reflect a presence—albeit a small one—of Japanese in the state.

When Max Frost, secretary of the Bureau of Immigration in New Mexico, wrote a treatise on the suitability of the territory for settlement in 1894 he commented on its inhabitants’ liberal outlook and their commitment—reflected in the constitutions submitted as part of their multiple bids for statehood—to individual freedom and “universal liberty.” But he was writing at a time when the territory’s population grew by less than fifty thousand every ten years; between 1900 and 1920 the population soared by eighty-five percent, adding 165 thousand people to the mix, and in the early twentieth-century milieu of nationalism and xenophobia both white and Hispanic New Mexicans sought to protect their property and way

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of life from diverse and dangerous foreigners. A brief print kerfuffle in the spring of 1913 reflected these attitudes. Both the *Albuquerque Journal* and the *New York Times* ran short articles advertising the potential for a “large colony” of Japanese farmers in the lower Pecos Valley. The articles alleged the Carlsbad Chamber of Commerce “extended an urgent invitation to Japanese farmers” currently living in California, and the general feeling was “that despite some bad features, the Japanese would be of most benefit to the lower valley.” Carlsbad, however, “[didn’t] want the cheap Jap labor in competition with its intelligent white farming labor” and rebuffed the suggestion its citizens would have had anything to do with bringing “little brown men” to the state.42

Few Japanese farmers moved to New Mexico in the early 1900s—most of the Japanese in the state worked on the railroads—and those who did go there settled in the Mesilla Valley, an especially fertile area along the floodplains of the Rio Grande in the southern New Mexico–west Texas border.43 Anti-Japanese agitation was highest in this region, where farmers worried about the “the Asiatic colonists” whose presence they believed threatened white settlement. The *Albuquerque Morning Journal* warned that “once Japanese are permitted to become landowners” it would be difficult to remove them from the state. As their population in places like California increased some New Mexicans—especially Anglo Republicans—perceived they posed a growing “danger to the southwest” and threatened “whites” because they “do not . . . assimilate,” had a birthrate so high they would eventually outnumber whites in the communities in which they chose to settle, and

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had “low standards of living, co-operation, and thrift” that gave them “advantages in economic competition against which it is hopeless for whites to compete.”

Census enumerators counted 251 Japanese in the state in 1920, which hardly seemed a significant threat to New Mexican agricultural or settlement opportunities. Following the lead of other western states, however, the state legislature successfully passed an Alien Land Act in 1921 which barred “aliens ineligible for citizenship” from purchasing land. By the time war was on the horizon in 1940, the Japanese population in New Mexico had dropped to just under two hundred. The Bataan surrender and New Mexican soldiers’ experience on the Death March and in captivity, however, significantly altered the relationship between New Mexicans and their Japanese neighbors. For example, when there was talk of creating a Japanese “colony” in Maxwell, a village in the northwest corner of the state, horrified residents sent a petition to Governor Miles. “Most of our boys are in the army fighting the Japs,” they protested, and “we do not feel that we want the Japs to take their place.” One newspaperman reported New Mexico’s youngsters took the war so seriously the “appearance of Japanese children in the schools would serve toward the development of many embryonic MacArthurs” and turn their classrooms into mini Bataans. After President Roosevelt

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45 Jamie Bronstein, “Sowing Discontent: The 1921 Alien Land Act in New Mexico,” Pacific Historical Review 82, no. 3 (August 2013): 366-378; Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 39-40. With hindsight on our side, we can’t ignore the irony of an editorial published in the Rio Grande Republic in support of restricting Japanese rights in the state. The editorial asserted Japan was incapable of launching a war against the United States and so the federal government should strongarm them to better control the “great menace.” Based on its current state of affairs, the editor argued, the island country was unable “to support a first class ding dong war with America” and “had no great hankering for the game,” and the worst the United States could expect was a stifled trade relationship. “You Can’t Arbitrate with International Crooks,” Rio Grande Republic (Las Cruces, New Mexico), September 30, 1920.
46 By 1940, the number of Japanese reported in the census was 186. Of these, 114 were identified as citizens, i.e. native born, while only 72 were classified as “aliens,” or were born in Japan.
47 “If the Japs Come to New Mexico, Scalps Envisioned by Indian, School Bataans by Educator,” Santa Fe New Mexican, March 6, 1942.
signed Executive Order 9066, Japanese Americans interned in the state were a painful reminder of the absence of so many New Mexico soldiers. The Japanese American community’s later activism (and success) in seeking redress from the federal government for its wartime internment irritated some Bataan veterans and their families—who in the 1970s and 1980s were themselves still trying to obtain medical and financial compensation for the effects of their captivity. In the 1990s, New Mexicans would have difficulty reconciling internees’ desire to memorialize their suffering while in American captivity with their desire to honor the legacies of the state’s soldiers who suffered in Japanese captivity. Consequently, Japanese American efforts to mark and historicize camp locations in the western United States—in New Mexico the Santa Fe Internment Camp—revived the powerful remnants of wartime race hatreds that still antagonized many Bataan survivors and their families.

Finally, in a place where religion is not simply an important part of peoples’ identity but also part of the land in which they live, we would be remiss not to explore its significance for the ways families and communities endured and commemorated World War II. A somewhat limited collection of newspaper articles, church programs, photographs, funeral notices, and audiovisual materials make clear many New Mexicans turned to their faith for comfort and community while they waited to find out what happened to their sons, brothers, and husbands. Religion also provided the language that helped them express the depth of their frustration, agony, and heartache. As of 1936 there were slightly over one thousand

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49 Drew Gilpin Faust points to the crisis of faith many Americans endured when they confronted the mass killing and death of the Civil War. Christian belief systems had long framed the way people thought about death and the meanings they ascribed to it, but the deadly aftermath of men and machines cutting each other to pieces on battlefields by the thousands tested their capacity to come up with rational or spiritual explanations for such carnage. Regardless of the comfort they may or may not have received from it, religion did give Americans one way to muddle through the “suffering [that] exceeded language and understanding.” The horrors of the Western Front during the First World War caused no less an eschatological catastrophe, and George Mosse criticized
church congregations in the state. Half were Catholic and dominated by Hispanic members, the other a variety of mostly Protestant denominations.50

Catholicism came to New Mexico with the Spanish conquistadors; Hispanics and Indians fashioned a faith that on the four-hundredth anniversary of Don Juan de Oñate’s intrusion into the region the Archdiocese of Santa Fe applauded as “adaptable” and “inclusive.” Diocesan leaders pointed to the uniqueness of New Mexican Catholicism: its “historic churches” were “born of this land” as “monuments of adobe,” while its “hand carved bultos, santos and retablos . . . oraciones and alabados” give visibility to its “public expression and devotions. Important, too, are “processions and passion plays.”51 Especially for the state’s Hispanic Catholics, prayers and devotions to the saints whispered in chapels and sanctuaries and uttered at the foot of small shrines in their own homes held not just the possibility of divine intervention, but a sense they were doing something—however small—to protect their loved ones or (even better) speed their safe return. Similar prayers sustained the spirits of men held in prisoner of war camps throughout the Philippines. When they returned to New Mexico at the end of the war, some of the veterans fulfilled a wartime promise to their buddies who died, and revived the tradition of the Easter pilgrimage to El Santuario de Chimayo. Their pilgrimage, made almost four years to the day the Death March

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ended at Camp O’Donnell, is an example of how New Mexicans turned to traditional rituals for spiritual succor, and suffused them with meanings that helped them make sense of the horrors of their war. “It’s not so long as the Death March,” Manuel Armijo pointed out. “I think we’ll all be able to make it all right. We’re in better condition now than then—yeh, quite a bit better.”

The majority walked the thirty miles from Santa Fe to the site’s chapel, but one veteran, Conrado Vigil, walked one hundred miles from his home in Belen. The veterans and their families, as well as the mothers and fathers of the boys who were killed, concluded their pilgrimage with a mass at the Santuario at the image of Santo Niño.

Marching again, this time on New Mexican soil and of their own accord but without food and water, they reenacted the Death March in tribute to their fallen brothers, investing a centuries-old sacred space with new meaning and tying it to their suffering on Bataan. The rhetoric, traditions, and rituals of religion in New Mexico provided not just spiritual sustenance during the war for families affected by the Bataan surrender, but helped shape how, where, and when some individuals would commemorate loss and suffering.

Politicians during the state’s territorial period had little appreciation for the cultural and religious inheritance or legacy that so powerfully shaped some of the state’s commemorative strategies, and indeed viewed it as a weakness, not a strength. Their rebuttals of New Mexico’s repeated application for statehood, however, did give New Mexicans the space to flesh out a vocabulary of patriotism, loyalty, and sacrifice that shaped their wartime rhetoric regarding the 200th’s service on Bataan. Opponents of New Mexico’s admission to the Union questioned the abilities of its residents to understand and participate in democratic institutions, to contribute positively to the life of the republic, to be loyal and patriotic.

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52 “Santa Fe County Vets of 200th Plan Pilgrim Hike to Chimayo’s Santuario,” Santa Fe New Mexican, April 13, 1946.
citizens, and to commit themselves to the defense of their new nation. Daniel Webster, a senator and a masterful orator from Massachusetts, vehemently argued against New Mexico’s potential for productive statehood in a biting speech before Congress just after Mexico and the United States signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. “New Mexico,” he blustered, was filled with “people living along in the bottom of the valley on the sides of a little stream” and could “sustain . . . no more people than are there now.” No one, he argued, would possibly “emigrate from the United States” to a territory filled with “Spaniards . . . peons . . . [and] Mexican landlords with troops of slaves.” New Mexico, he proclaimed, did not “belong anywhere!” New Mexicans were “infinitely less elevated in morals and conditions” and “far less intelligent” than the “better class of our Indian neighbors” and lacked all “notion . . . of any free institutions” and “popular government.” Webster was horrified Congress might make “beloved countrymen” of a group of people who were “one degree removed from the veriest savages” who were as “deficient in energy of character and physical courage as they are in all moral and intellectual qualities.”

But not all easterners believed New Mexico’s membership in the Union spelled disaster for the future of the nation. Organizers for Santa Fe’s Tertio Millenial Anniversary in 1883—planned by businessmen more to “attract the attention of eastern people to Santa Fe, to induce them to visit the city and thereby to acquaint them with its historic interest, its climatic excellence and its great business advantages”—invited Walt Whitman to present a poem at the event. The poet, a self-proclaimed “lover and sympathizer” who “[did] not

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53 Daniel Webster, *The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1903), 10:23, 28-29, 31. For “one degree removed…intellectual qualities” Webster quoted the writings of George Frederick Ruxton, an Englishman who traveled extensively in the West.

54 “Tertio-Millennial—Santa Fe’s Business Men Decide to Celebrate an Anniversary and Choose a Big Name for a Big Undertaking,” *Santa Fe New Mexican*, December 11, 1882. The year 1883 was not the 333-year anniversary of Santa Fe’s founding. The city was founded between 1607 and 1610, but organizers apparently used the numerical misnomer to account for the number of years of the region’s exposure to Europeans and
separate the learned from the unlearned . . . the white from the black, or the native from the immigrant” and before whom “all else seem[ed] to burn up under his fierce affection for persons,” was unable to attend the anniversary celebration and instead penned a letter. He applauded Santa Feans for drawing attention to the history of their city. “Spanish character,” he wrote, “will supply some of the most needed parts . . . religiousness and loyalty . . . patriotism, courage, decorum, gravity, and honor” to “that composite American identity.”

Yet it was exactly the Spanish character of the region that stifled New Mexico’s bids for statehood over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Lawmakers—especially Republican senators Nelson Aldrich from Rhode Island and Albert J. Beveridge from Indiana—echoed Webster’s early concerns about admitting “savage and alien” populations to the United States. Beveridge argued against granting the territory statehood on the basis of two “powerful pathological strains in American thought at the turn of the twentieth century—colonialism and racism.” He and many of his contemporaries believed the United States first had to rid New Mexico—as well as the noncontiguous territories of Puerto Rico and the Philippines—of its “Spanish sloth.” The best way to “Americanize” these territories, they argued, was by making sure “the three key agents of Americanization—public schools, courts, and public officials” reproduced and upheld Christianity. See Tom Sharpe, “Celebrating Santa Fe’s History, Even When Numbers Don’t Add Up,” Santa Fe New Mexican (July 3, 2010), accessed March 31, 2019, https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/celebrating-santa-fe-s-history-even-when-numbers-don-t/article_6cf25059-25a1-5c75-a5eb-9bf6491f0407.html.

“America’s enduring values and principles.” And of course, the business of becoming American required learning the English language. For the Spanish-speaking majority of New Mexico, however, language was an “enduring symbol of their ‘Spanish’ (white) racial identity” that reaffirmed a “history of [European] conquest and settlement with which Americans could more readily identify . . . and even admire” and they held tightly to it as a way to both protect and celebrate their cultural heritage.

Beveridge harped on New Mexicans’ use of the Spanish language as grounds for their exclusion from full citizenship. He chaired the Senate Committee on Territories; in the first decade of the twentieth century the committee held a series of statehood hearings both in the prospective states and in Washington, D.C. The senators’ questions reflected their prejudice and indeed the way they (as well as some of the Anglos who testified) believed language could be used as a yardstick for measuring a group’s fitness for inclusion in the American polity. Beveridge asked Diamo Deo Sena, a census enumerator from Las Vegas, to quantify the number of people he spoke to as part of his duties who “spoke American.” Out of “about eight hundred altogether . . . twenty-five spoke American.” H. S. Wooster, a Las Vegas judge who hailed from New York, reported to the committee that political speeches and electoral ballots were “all in Mexican.” Americans spoke English, while Mexicans spoke “the Spanish language, or tr[ied] to . . . but not the pure Castilian . . . a sort of a jargon of their own,” or what Reverend Harvey Shields called “mongrel Spanish.” Beveridge seized on the testimony of Martinez Amador, a Mexican-born Las Cruces farmer, to prove to his colleagues the


Spanish language and economic backwardness of the territory rendered its people unfit for statehood. Amador supported statehood—but not for people of his generation who “belong[ed] to the Mexican race” and were “ignorant.” They elected candidates based on the “emblem” on the ballot, and did “not know who they vote[d] for.” Bernard Rodey, an Irish American transplant to New Mexico who served as the territory’s delegate to the House of Representatives, attacked the committee’s obsession with the English language as a prerequisite for full citizenship. Congress continued to deny statehood to territories like New Mexico and Arizona, but on a recent trip to a Long Island beach “most of [the people] talked in such a way that I could not understand them” and “spoke every language that was ever even dreamed of at the Tower of Babel, excepting English” yet they were able to “live in the States” and become “citizens in five years.”

For Major William Llewellyn, a close friend of President Theodore Roosevelt and a resident of Las Cruces who led Troop G of the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry during the Spanish-American War, New Mexico had demonstrated its capacity for statehood through military service. He testified before the Committee on the Territories that “there is not a more patriotic, there is not a truer, there is not a more loyal people in the world,” “There has not been a time since New Mexico was part of the United States,” he argued, “when our people have failed to respond to a single call on the part of the National Government.” Llewellyn described the Union victory over Confederate forces at Glorieta Pass in 1862 as “an illustration of the patriotism of [New Mexicans],” whom he claimed had “a devotion to and a

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love for this country” about which he had “not a question of doubt.” If New Mexico were allowed to become a state, he promised he and his fellow inhabitants would “build . . . one of the grandest and most patriotic States there is in the United States.”

Indeed, over six thousand New Mexicans—most of them Nuevomexicanos—enlisted in the New Mexico Volunteers or served in the Territorial Militia and fought for the Union during the Civil War. Jerry Thompson points out New Mexico sent more men to war than most of the other western territories and states. But they did not fight just to preserve the Union; they were also called on to enlarge the Union by waging war against Native American peoples of the Southwest and participated in “a relentless campaign to rid the Santa Fe Trail of the Navajo, Mescalero, Chiricahua Apace, Comanche, and Kiowa of the plains. Through their military service Nuevomexicanos participated in the United States’ ongoing imperial project in the Southwest and secured more land and peoples for a nation in which their own status was still uncertain.

59 Hearings on House Bill 12543, 359-360.
60 Jerry D. Thompson, A Civil War History of the New Mexico Volunteers & Militia (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2015), 13. Thompson painstakingly tabulated data from muster rolls, enlistment records, and pension applications to identify those individuals who volunteered for military service during the Civil War era. All of the names and relevant data can be found in “Appendix J: Comprehensive List of New Mexico Volunteers and Militia,” 465-824. Not all military and territorial leaders had confidence in New Mexicans’ martial abilities, and their attitudes were largely informed by their own ideas of racial superiority and they had difficulty overcoming their prejudices in the early phases of recruitment and enlistment. Thompson discusses this at length in the first chapter. Thompson’s description of New Mexico’s army as it marched off to war is uncomfortably similar to the postsurrender evaluations of the 200th Coast Artillery and their comrades who participated in the defense of the Philippines: they “were brave and intrepid, but they were poorly equipped, with little if any training, and they were sometimes inadequately led . . . to say that they were properly prepared for the war that was about to engulf them would be greatly misleading. In many ways, their story was to be a great tragedy.” (71) Given Thompson’s discussion of the desperate economic situation of most New Mexicans in the territory, the authority brandished by wealthy patrones, and the financial benefits offered by military service, we perhaps should not be surprised enlistments in New Mexico were higher than in the other territories, despite its lower population. Regardless of their motivations for enlisting, however, “many in the territory would come to take great pride” in their record of service, 111. For troop numbers, see Frederick H. Dyer, “Summary of Troops Furnished by the Several States and Territories During the War of the Rebellion,” A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion (Des Moines: The Dyer Publishing Company, 1908), 11-12.
During the Civil War, neither Union nor Confederate forces, however, were convinced of New Mexico’s patriotism, or at the very least, the willingness of its people to demonstrate it. Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, who commanded the Department of New Mexico, believed most people in the territory were loyal to the United States, but thought “their private, and often petty interests” would “[delay] or [defeat] the objects of the Government.”62 They cared just as little for the civilian population. James Bartek concludes both sides, in addition to recognizing the significance of the territory for westward expansion, also “found common ground in their estimation of Mexican Americans, looking upon them with condescension or outright contempt.” Texans, convinced Mexicans were a treacherous lot and not to be trusted, “Remember[ed] the Alamo!” all the way to Glorieta Pass, plundering and pillaging as they went. Union forces too did their own share of damage across the territory, pressing poor Hispanics into service and treating them “as less a people to defend than a resource to exploit.”63 Of course New Mexicans had just as short a memory as the Texans and remembered bitterly the “Tejano” invasion of Mexico, an attitude Darlis Miller suggests had just as much, if not more, to do with their support for the Union than did abstract ideals of liberty and freedom. Naysayers pointed to the Union defeat at Valverde and high rates of desertion as evidence of New Mexicans’ inadequacy and cowardice, but Miller found in the case of the former it was the regular troops (not New Mexican volunteers) who “failed to charge the enemy as ordered,” and in the latter most of the volunteers were likely obeying orders to return home, issued by commanding officers in the field. New Mexicans, for their part, were somewhat disappointed by their military service. They suffered from low

62 Thompson, A Civil War History, 16.
63 James M. Bartek, “‘The More of Them Are Killed the Better’: Racial Identity and Noncombatant Immunity in Civil War New Mexico,” New Mexico Historical Review 85, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 324-326, 337.
morale and endured “poor training, inferior equipment, inadequate rations, discrimination in the ranks, and irregular pay.”64 As I discuss in chapter 4, in the aftermath of the Bataan surrender New Mexicans were especially sensitive to any suggestion their soldiers were anything less than brave, honorable, duty-bound men. And we see here as well the perceived specter of federal abandonment of and neglect towards the people of the Southwest that later haunted New Mexicans’ opinions when it came to the handling of the war in the Pacific.

Their participation in the Civil War provided an opportunity for New Mexicans to “be proven equal to [their brethren in any of the states] in defending the flag of our country on the field of battle,” but it neither convinced the rest of the United States of their patriotism nor significantly advanced the cause for statehood. The war against Spain further stifled the territory’s dreams of statehood, especially because Hispanics had little representation among the famed Rough Riders who trampled the Spanish in Cuba under the leadership of Teddy Roosevelt. Thirty-five years after thousands of them marched to war for Father Abraham, few of the approximately 340 men who volunteered for the First United States Cavalry and fought against the Spanish in Cuba were Nuevomexicanos. Shortly after the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana Harbor, Governor Miguel A. Otero had promised the New York World, “New Mexico [would] furnish, as she did during the war of the rebellion, more men in proportion to her population than any state or territory in the Union” and though “a large majority of her soldiers [were] Spanish-speaking” they were “as loyal to this country as any New England troops” and would “rally round the stars and stripes.” He even sent a telegram to Secretary of War Russell Alger stating New Mexico was prepared to field a “full regiment

of cavalry, 95 per cent Spanish-speaking” since he presumed they would “be very desirable in a Spanish-speaking country.”\textsuperscript{65} The surnames on the Rough Riders’ muster rolls, however, were mostly Anglo American. A combination of gubernatorial influence, disorganized recruitment practices, and the memory of their treatment during the Civil War did contribute to low Hispanic enlistment.\textsuperscript{66} Neither the press in the East, nor the press in New Mexico, missed this fact.

To make certain there was no doubt about the loyalties of its Spanish-speaking population, the \textit{Albuquerque Citizen} assured readers that “every Spanish-American citizen in New Mexico is a true-blue, patriotic defender of the ‘stars and stripes,’ and . . . would prove gallant warriors against . . . butchers from Spain” if there were a second call for enlistees. The article pointed out that “Capt. Max Luna, a loyal Spanish-American, and others of his nationality” serving with the Rough Riders would “give a good account of themselves” before the war ended.\textsuperscript{67} Its editors admitted low enlistment and “the actions of certain individuals . . . [gave] color to the story that the native people [were] disloyal,” but they “indignantly denied” that the “Spanish-Americans [were] too cowardly to enlist” and suggested that if “a regiment of Spanish-Americans be called for,” the “slander upon the territory [would] be effectually refuted.” A rumor that a priest in Española had waved a Spanish flag in church raised the \textit{Citizen’s} hackles, and lest there be any doubt about the newspaper’s attitude towards those who might harbor some sort of affinity for Spain, the

\textsuperscript{65} Miguel Antonio Otero, \textit{My Nine Years as Governor of the Territory of New Mexico 1897-1906} (1940; reprint, Santa Fe: Sunstone Press, 2007), 35-36, 38. The University of New Mexico Press published the original edition in 1940.


\textsuperscript{67} “Every Spanish-American . . .,” \textit{Albuquerque Citizen}, May 10, 1898.
paper insisted “all Spanish sympathizers” and “any man caught waving a Spanish flag in New Mexico should be hanged.” Reverend John Roux of the Santa Cruz parish rebutted the accusations and claimed the church did not even own a Spanish flag. “The only flag for me, and for my people, that will ever wave over this church,” he promised, “will be the American flag on the Fourth of July.” He signed the letter, which he sent to Governor Otero, “An American Citizen.” In one fell swoop he denied any sympathy for Spain, confirmed his and his congregation’s allegiance to the United States, and symbolically linked New Mexico to the birth of the Union in 1776.

The Santa Fe New Mexican attributed Nuevomexicanos’ poor representation in the volunteer army to the work of “malevolent agitators” who “spread all sorts of lies and evil reports” that they “would be nothing but food for powder” and appealed to its Nuevomexicano population to answer current calls for fresh troops:

The New Mexican hopes and trusts, for the good name of the territory, for the sake of its future welfare and advancement and in order to show that our citizens of native extraction and of Spanish descent are loyal and true to this the greatest republic on earth and to the glorious flag that floats over them and under which they enjoy the utmost liberty, freedom and prosperity, that a suitable proportion of the volunteers to form the infantry battalion now being recruited, will be of the young men of [Mexican or Spanish descent], and that they will take part in the war that this country is now waging for humanity, for liberty and justice to down-trodden people.

Nuevomexicanos thus had to walk a careful line between claiming Spanish heritage as a way to overcome Anglo prejudice towards non-whites, and denying that affinity in favor of a country whose “humanity, liberty, and justice” they had yet to see fulfilled in their own

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69 “Letter from Father Roux,” Albuquerque Citizen, July 8, 1898.
70 “Good Advice,” Santa Fe New Mexican, July 7, 1898.
towns and villages. In his *Illustrated History of New Mexico*, Benjamin Read—himself the son of an Anglo father and Mexican mother—acknowledged this tension. “It was natural that they should, at least, cherish in their hearts,” he empathized, the “sympathy inherent in persons of the same race.” Notwithstanding that limited affection, the patriotism displayed by the “sons of New Mexico” was without “parallel in the annals of universal history” and “the Spanish-Americans who went to that war were all descendants from the first Spaniards who conquered New Mexico” and the territory sent more men “in defense of their flag . . . in proportion to their population than any other state in the Union.”

Read devoted himself to reclaiming Nuevomexicano history and “la muy injustamenta tratada raza Latina” (the very unfairly treated Latino race) from the clutches of Anglo historians who had deprived them of “la justicia historica” (historical justice). He carefully avoided any numeric accounting of Nuevomexicanos who fought with the Rough Riders, but by reiterating the claim about disproportionate representation, Read’s writing contributed to the evolution of a powerful narrative about the relationship between patriotism, service, and sacrifice in New Mexico.

A corrido published by a poet who signed his work “X.X.X.” in *El Nuevo Mexicano* managed to both applaud the American victory over Spain in the Battle of Manila Bay and commemorate the region’s Spanish inheritance:

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*Los españoles perdieron*

*Todo menos el honor*

*Despegando igual valor*

*Cual mostraro sus mayores*

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The Spaniards lost

Everything except honor

They displayed the same bravery

Their ancestors showed

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72 Benjamin M. Read, *Guerra México-Americana* (Santa Fe: Compania Impresopa de Nuevo Mexicano, 1910), 6. See also Erlinda Gonzales-Berry, “Benjamin Read: New Mexico’s Bernal Díaz del Castillo,” in Antonia I. Castañeda and A. Gabriel Meléndez, ed., *Recovering the U.S. Hispanic Literary Heritage*, vol. 6 (Houston: Arte Público Press, 2006): 24-41. Gonzales-Berry points out Read was determined to decolonize New Mexico’s history despite his own marginalization in the field—the result of “a deliberate act of erasure once Anglo hegemony was achieved in the cultural institutions of the state”—and correct the many errors he saw in the work of Anglo scholars. Ibid., 25.
The corrido, the most-popular and -common folk-song form in Mexican culture, paid tribute to New Mexico’s Spanish history by drawing attention to the noble aspects of America’s foe: their honor and their bravery in battle. It rhetorically supplanted alternately Native, Spanish, and Mexican homelands with a singular American one—and thus integrated New Mexico into the political and military traditions of its own conqueror. Less than half a century later New Mexicans would find themselves embroiled in an imperiled defense of those islands whose subjugation they were asked to support to prove their patriotism.

Though the corrido seemed to accept the civilizing mission of the United States and the assumption that improvement that would follow wherever around the world its flag flew, New Mexicans hesitated to impose on anyone the “second-class status and degrading rejection” they experienced in their history as a United States territory. Historian Richard Melzer points out New Mexican support for colonization of the Philippines was limited. The New Mexico Territorial Council “reasserted their loyalty to the United States and steadfastly defend[ed] their native rights and customs” by proposing the United States ratify the treaty with Spain but also “grant political independence to the citizens of Puerto Rico and the Philippines so that the U.S. occupation of those lands ‘should be only temporary.”’ The Senate of course did not heed the suggestion. The consequences, not just for the territories but for New Mexicans as well, were deeply tragic.

73 For a detailed description of the number of individuals of Mexican and Hispano heritage in New Mexico, see Richard L. Nostrand, The Hispano Homeland (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992);
Both Puerto Rico and the Philippines “suffered years of violence, mistrust, and injustice,” which the Council had hoped to prevent. Looking forward, however, is where we see the most tragic ironies of the Senate’s ignorance of New Mexico’s concerns. Japan’s power in East Asia grew in the early twentieth century, and increasing tensions between it and the United States (especially over immigration and U.S. racial policies) moved many to consider the possibility of war with Japan and prompted military planners to devise War Plan Orange, which anticipated “Japan would almost immediately isolate the Philippines by sea and mobilize and transport two hundred thousand troops to the principal island of Luzon to destroy the garrison.” They wrote off the Philippines as indefensible, which is one reason New Mexico’s Republican senator Albert B. Fall supported their independence. “The Philippine Islands,” he warned his colleagues, “constitute the weak point in the line of our defense.” Though he foresaw unrest among the Filipinos in response to a string of broken promises on the part of the U.S. government when it came to the granting of independence, he also ominously predicted “the only way to rid ourselves of the trouble with the Filipinos—and very possibly with other nations of the world on account of the Filipinos—is for us . . . to allow them to assume their own burdens for a while.” Of course the Philippines did not attain independence, and New Mexicans would pay dearly defending it.

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74 Melzer, “Governor Miguel Otero’s War,” 102-103. New Mexicans were not alone in their resistance; Americans were divided on the issue and though some thought the islands an important ingredient in fulfilling the aims of manifest destiny, others remembered the wars of their forefathers and found overseas expansion distasteful. See, for example, Robert L. Beisner, Twelve against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968).


77 With the benefit of hindsight, we can also identify several other peculiar connections between Filipinos and New Mexicans of the late nineteenth century, and their World War II era descendants. General Arthur MacArthur, Jr. served in New Mexico after the Civil War and was involved in operations against Geronimo and the Apaches in New Mexico, and after U.S. victory over Spain led a campaign that resulted in the capture of Filipino Resistance leader Emilio Alguinaldo, securing the Philippines Islands as a U.S. colony. He later served as military governor of the Islands. His son, Douglas MacArthur, commanded U.S. troops in the Philippines.
New Mexico’s loyalty continued to come under attack in the first couple decades of the twentieth century. Even after President William Howard Taft signed the proclamation granting New Mexico statehood on June 12, 1912, some people in the United States continued to doubt its citizens’ allegiance despite a strong Nuevomexicano showing in the military ranks. After Pancho Villa’s raid on the southern New Mexico border town of Columbus in March 1916, a “Spanish-American “legion’” in the First New Mexico Infantry helped patrol the international boundary. Almost “every company” had some men of “Mexican descent” who were “just as proud of their American citizenship as are the members of the Second Massachusetts Infantry, encamped at their side.” Their commander, Col. E. C. Abbott, advertised the New Mexico troops were “the first to mobilize” and though naysayers predicted “in the event of any impending trouble with Mexico [the] Spanish-Americans would be slow in coming forward,” their quick response showed “the reverse was true” and “they were among the first to fall into the ranks and shoulder rifles,” a sentiment that would be echoed in admiration of their defense of the Philippines in 1942.78

Taking up arms against their former countrymen surely exhibited their readiness to defend the United States, but doubters still accused them of harboring inconstant loyalties. Historian Phillip Gonzales points out Nuevomexicanos’ used la junta de indignación (mass meeting of indignation) to protest “particularly egregious disparagements,” especially


78 “Mexicans Help in Border Work: Spanish-Americans In New Mexico Display Loyalty to U.S.,” The Billings Gazette (Billings, Montana), September 1, 1898. The muster-out rolls for the New Mexico National Guard, after Major General John J. Pershing’s Punitive Expedition into Mexico ended in early April 1917, show Companies A, E, and L were largely Nuevomexicano. Nuevomexicanos accounted for about thirteen percent of the 52 officers and 732 enlisted men. See Karen Stein Daniel, “New Mexico’s Participation in the Mexican Punitive Expedition: Prelude to World War I,” New Mexico Genealogist 44, no. 3 (September 2005): 134-146.
“publicly expressed racism.” Nuevomexicanos organized one of these mass meetings at the Santa Fe County court house on January 14, 1916, to “dissipate [a] false national impression of Spanish-speaking New Mexicans.” They aimed their indignation at press outlets within the state, and passed a resolution indicting them for having “created racial prejudice in the minds of the unadvised and thoughtless” people against the non-Anglo population. Those “unadvised” people included Anglos “who are not informed of the fealty” of Nuevomexicanos who “yield[ed] . . . their lives, their health, their limbs, and their fortunes” in the Civil and Spanish-American Wars. They reaffirmed “their consistent, constant and unwavering fealty and allegiance to the government of the United States,” and reminded Americans their “knowledge of the Spanish language and the geography of Old Mexico” made them particularly useful in any conflict at the border. New Mexicans then were not just loyal Americans ready to “join in an invasion of Mexico if national honor demands it,” but a particularly useful resource waiting to be tapped for service in Spanish-speaking countries.

During and after World War II, New Mexicans would speculate that was exactly the reason the 200th Coast Artillery was selected for service in the Philippine Islands.

By the time the U.S. Congress passed the Selective Service Act in 1917, New Mexico had decided it was going to preempt future accusations of New Mexican infidelity and certify for posterity the commitment of its residents to the defense of U.S. interests by publishing a “Golden Book” that would “contain a detailed statement of the men who served their country

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79 Phillip B. Gonzales, “La Junta de Indignación: Hispano Repertoire of Collective Protest in New Mexico, 1884-1933,” Western Historical Quarterly 31, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 164. La junta de indignación is a “mass meeting of indignation.” Gonzales positions the genre as one particularly used between the late 1880s and the early 1930s, and as the result of Nuevomexicano modification of Mexican and American forms of collective action. Importantly, Gonzales argues la junta de indignación reflected a growing Spanish-American identity among New Mexico’s middle-class Hispanic population previously assumed to be a strictly upper-class mentality.

80 “Spanish Americans Ready to Uphold Honor of Flag,” Santa Fe New Mexican, January 15, 1916.
and perhaps died for it,” and record the “war work and other patriotic activities” of the state’s civilians. The state still felt the sting of Congress’ prolonged refusal to grant New Mexico statehood, and yet again had to neutralize any lingering doubt among the general public that “Nuevomexicanos . . . would not be loyal to the American flag in times of crisis.” The state thus viewed its contributions to the nationwide war effort as a way to “expunge all remaining doubts about New Mexicans’ loyalty.” As it had done in past wars, and as it would continue to do throughout the twentieth century, New Mexico measured its patriotism in blood and sacrifice and claimed “its record equaled that of any state in the union and in instances its contributions to the cause exceeded that of many of the other states.”

Just over seventeen thousand New Mexicans—five percent of the state’s population—served in some capacity during World War I. Approximately five hundred of them died as a result of their service. Unfortunately due to state funding issues the Golden Book was never published and New Mexico’s contributions to World War I were instead recorded in a series of essays in the 1919 New Mexico Blue Book. The state also managed to mail questionnaires to most of its servicemen, but only one-fourth of them returned the surveys. New Mexico’s efforts to record its patriotism reflected national sensibilities as well—the United States entered World War I when nativist and xenophobic attitudes were again on the rise, and suspicious Americans eyeballed each other for any clue the former part of their hyphenated identities.

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82 The 1910 and 1920 censuses give the population of New Mexico as 327,310 and 360,350, respectively. The average of the two (1915) is 343,830. The World War I Centennial page for New Mexico estimates the population for 1917 at 345,000. Statistics for enlistment figures can be found in several locations, but the most complete and descriptive is in Holtby, Lest We Forget, 81-109. His series of essays written for the “Centennial of New Mexico Statehood” in the Center for Southwest Collection at the University of New Mexico also contains some statistics in a more condensed format. See David V. Holtby, “WWI and Military Service,” (2008) https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/ths_nm_statehood/1/.
83 Holtby, Lest We Forget, 4.
might be overtaking the latter. New Mexicans wanted there to be no question they were proud Americans willing to die for their country.

In the midst of U.S. participation in the war, Harry R. Walmsley, writing as Henry Wray, raised the hackles of New Mexicans and instigated another junta de indignación when *The American Review* published his inflammatory letter in their August 1918 issue. He poked the bear of racial antagonism and proclaimed New Mexicans were “Mexican in every sense of the word,” and by that word he meant “of mixed blood, interbred, and physically and mentally degenerate . . . burrow-like, stubborn, uncertain, ignorant, and vindictive” with a “hatred for the gringo.” They “kept themselves Mexican” because they spoke Spanish, and were still so much a part of Mexico that “a state of treason existed” in New Mexico, whose “native population awaits the hour to strike,” and “confidently expects to arise and join again the mother country.”84 Citizens gathered for a mass meeting in Santa Fe’s historic plaza and composed a resolution that reiterated all of New Mexico’s military contributions to the nation. Charles Springer, chairman of the New Mexico Council of Defense, demanded an apology from the *Review’s* editor, George Harvey, for the “slander and libel upon the people of the state who are doing their full share in every way for the successful prosecution of the present war.” Senator Fall’s telegram to Harvey insisted on both an apology and an immediate correction, offering Harvey a catalogue of New Mexico’s military achievements as evidence of its vigorous patriotism. Harvey issued an apology in the magazine’s *War Weekly* and the October *Review* offered a longer mea culpa. Based on the evidence so many New Mexicans provided in defense of their state, “No fair mind could fail to be assured . . . of the unqualified allegiance of the State of New Mexico to the Union.” As Americans, the

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Review claimed, “we are proud of New Mexico,—prouder than of any other State in the Union, except, of course, Vermont.”\textsuperscript{85} Congressman William B. Walton’s remarks in the House reiterated New Mexico’s horror over Wray’s “half-baked . . . attack” and reminded his colleagues “the people of New Mexico have been systematically abused for years by all sorts of publications” and though they had “become calloused to the assaults of the ignorant and vicious” the letter in the Review was “just a little more than we can stand, because it strikes at our honor.”\textsuperscript{86}

New Mexicans were far from “calloused” when it came to race-based attacks on their character, however, and they reacted similarly when in the 1930s a professor at the University of New Mexico devised a questionnaire intended to measure “white racial attitudes towards the Spanish-speaking people of the Southwest.” The questionnaire further irritated the already-festering wound inflicted by perceived institutional racism within the University.\textsuperscript{87} Yet again Hispanics’ legacy of taking part in America’s wars was raised as evidence of their belonging. Eugene D. Lujan, an attorney, said, “There had never been a traitor among the Spanish-American when they fought for the American flag during the Civil War, the Spanish-American war, war with Mexico or the World war.”\textsuperscript{88} There is little evidence the racial-attitude survey queried the extent of Hispanic patriotism or military

\textsuperscript{86} Representative Walton, 65\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 2\textsuperscript{nd} sess., Congressional Record 56, pt. 9:9305.
\textsuperscript{87} Gonzales, “La Junta de Indignación,” 182-185. See also Phillip Gonzales, Forced Sacrifice as Ethnic Protest: The Hispano Cause in New Mexico and the Racial Attitude Confrontation of 1933 (New York: Peter Lang, 2001). According to Gonzales, fraternities and sororities at the University of New Mexico bore a significant degree of responsibility for the charges of racism leveled at the University in the early 1930s, because they “formed the most visible sign of group inequality…and their presence had the effect of making Hispanos feel like they were not fully integrated or accepted at the institution,” 73-76.
\textsuperscript{88} “Give Governor 24 Hours to Oust Those Responsible for Racial Questionnaire,” Albuquerque Journal, April 28, 1933.
service, but Lujan was not alone in hurrying to offer it as unassailable proof of national belonging.

Tomas Rivera, a World War I veteran from the small town of Ribera, New Mexico, southeast of Santa Fe, a wrote a lengthy letter to the editor of *El Nuevo Mexicano* in support of Hispanic unity as the remedy to racial unrest—a unity possible, he asserted, because Hispanics always “todos peleamos con valor por el derecho de los hombres” (fight with courage for the rights of men). Military service was not simply proof of patriotism, but a stake in the claim to the rights and privileges of full citizenship they fought to defend—among them the right to defend their community against discriminatory practices or attempts to sow racial unrest. Rivera continued, “The battlefield of Europe was watered with Hispanic-American blood, and not a single soldier of Spanish blood betrayed his duties as an American soldier…this proves we are of a noble and patriotic blood Both Lujan’s and Rivera’s remarks reflect a historically-ingrained mentality that any race-based attack on the state’s Hispanic population required a recitation of their military canon. They furthermore show how intertwined military service was with their identity as Americans. Because Anglos repeatedly undermined their claim to that identity the state’s Hispanics continued to put it on display whenever their belonging in or commitment to the United States was questioned.

Between 1937 and 1941 the Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Progress Administration, established to employ out-of-work “writers, editors, historians, research workers, art critics, architects, archeologists, map draftsmen, geologists, and other professional workers,” published the American Guide Series, intended in part to “understand

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90 El campo de batalla en Europa quedó regado con sangre hispano-americana. Y no se cuenta que ningún soldado de sangre hispana fuera traicionero a sus deberes de soldado americano…esto prueba que somos de una sangre noble y patriota. Ibid.
and interpret the ‘American character.’”\(^{91}\) New Mexico: A Guide to the Colorful State emphasized the state’s “the diverse elements” were “slowly working toward homogeneity” but were “dominated . . . by the irresistible middle current of Anglo-American civilization.”

At the same time, however, the Guide asserted that the “veneer of Americanization in places runs thin indeed,” and questioned New Mexicans’ capacity to become fully American:

> It is difficult to think of a modern America in a village of the Pueblo Indians, while the inhabitants dance for rain. To be sure, a transcontinental train may thunder by, or an airplane soar overhead; but the prayers never stop, the dance goes on, and the fantastic juxtaposition seems to widen the gap between. Who could dream of the American Way in a mountain hamlet where the sound of the Penitente flute is heard above the thud of the scourges, and Spanish-American villagers perform medieval rites of redemption in Holy Week?\(^{92}\)

Indians and Spanish-Americans alike, it claimed, were trapped in the cultural, linguistic, and ritual traditions of their ancient pasts. Indeed, as the rest of America trundled rapidly forward into a technologically enhanced, consumer-driven future, the Guide made it seem impossible native New Mexicans would ever be completely part of the United States.

Most New Mexicans, however, believed their state was an important part of the American empire. They rejected federal lawmakers’ accusations that they were lazy, unpatriotic, and superstitious throwbacks to medieval Spain, or mongrels unworthy of citizenship and incapable of appreciating American democratic institutions. Indeed, they turned to their long record of military service, sacrifice, and suffering on behalf of the United States to argue for inclusion in the national polity. Indeed, New Mexicans would use much of the same rhetoric to celebrate the achievements of their men on Bataan. It is imperative to

\(^{91}\) Compared to other states, the Federal Writers’ Project produced only four books for New Mexico, among them The Spanish-American Song and Game Book. Jerre Mangione, The Dream and the Deal: The Federal Writers Project, 1935-1943 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 47, 49, 387.

remember, too, New Mexico was a place of environmental extremes; its physical and human landscapes reflect residents’ ability to manage and tame their surroundings. During World War II, they used those same energies to alter, accommodate, and transform their physical, cultural, and political spaces to manage the trauma, grief, and loss caused by the fall of Bataan.

Despite this demonstrated persistence, resilience, and adaptability, Hispano education reformer George Sánchez, writing in 1940, lamented the condition of Nuevomexicanos and questioned their ability to participate fully in the American community. “The great masses of the people,” he opined, were a “severely handicapped social and economic minority,” made so because they were “neglected for more than two hundred years as Spanish colonials and Mexicans,” a “situation not greatly improved by the territorial regime.” Though he emphasized the condition of rural New Mexicans living in the northern part of the state—specifically those who lived in Taos, or Taoseños—he insisted his observations reflected their circumstances in towns and cities across New Mexico. New Mexicans, he argued, were educationally, culturally, politically, and economically isolated from the rest of the United States, and as a result they “often carr[y] on in inferior and obsolete practices and beliefs.” The New Mexican, “midst the wreckage of his economy and his culture, and unprepared for the new order of things . . . is pathetic in his helplessness—a stranger in his own home.” Furthermore, he argued, federal indifference had “pyramided handicap upon handicap” upon the people of New Mexico, and its “neglect” left them “maladjusted to the current norms of American life.” The United States, he admonished, failed “to recognize the . . . responsibility it assumed when it brought these people forcibly into the American society.” New Mexicans were a “forgotten people,” abandoned by the “foster parent” but were nevertheless “loyal and
uncomplaining.” Their service in the Civil War, Spanish-American War, and World War, Sánchez argued, “showed the loyalty of the people to the central government.” But in the same volume he warned they were “unprepared to participate successfully in current affairs” and, on the eve of a global conflict that would demand full mobilization, “unresponsive to the goals and values of [their] fellow Americans.”\footnote{George I. Sánchez, \textit{Forgotten People: A Study of New Mexicans} (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1940), 27-28, 25-26, 89. Sánchez defines New Mexicans as those people, native to New Mexico, who speak Spanish and are descendants of Spanish colonizers.}

The lack of press coverage for \textit{Forgotten People} in New Mexico suggests few people read the book, and it received little attention in other papers around the country. Had they read it at least a few New Mexicans would likely have had something to say about Sánchez’ dismal assessment of their condition. Nevertheless, Sánchez’ analysis gives us an index for how one reformer viewed the educational cultural, political, and economic isolation of New Mexico, as well as the fraught relationship between the state and the federal government. Sánchez’s token mention of New Mexicans’ military representation cheapened the legacy they worked so hard to defend. New Mexicans were loyal to the government, it seemed, but not to their fellow Americans—which is not a distinction they made when it came to their military service. For Sánchez, New Mexicans could not possibly identify with American “goals and values” because they were not as healthy, wealthy, or wise. They were not “fully incorporated into the American fold.”\footnote{Sánchez, 97. The original reads “The goal of this study is the proper incorporation of the New Mexican into the American fold.”}

That a native New Mexican made these observations and judgments in the late 1930s about the condition and prospects of other Hispanics living in the state shows that even after almost one hundred years of citizenship, New Mexicans still had to defend themselves against critics and disparagers who impugned their commitment to
America and its ideals. The rough circumstances of New Mexico’s existence and the many years of federal neglect he identified in his narrative, as well as the memory of that abdication of responsibility, would find echoes in the narrative of sacrifice and abandonment constructed by New Mexicans in the early 1940s when they sent their hometown boys off to war.
CHAPTER 2
“After All, They’re the Home Town Kids”:
New Mexico and its National Guard on the Eve of World War II

On August 14, 1941, Ken Dixon, editor of the Daily Current-Argus and later a war correspondent for the Associated Press, reflected on the 200th Coast Artillery’s stay in Carlsbad near the tail-end of its week-long tour of the state. He applauded Colonel Charles G. Sage for training a “fine bunch of boys” who “acted like a bunch of well-behaved young Americans.” They drank liquor and “danced on the street corners,” but “couldn’t have been any drunker than some civilians.” After all, he reminded readers, “those are the boys who may be called upon to get in the thick of a bloody, bitter battle one of these days…if they’d been better behaved, we might have been inclined to worry about whether they were tough enough for what they may have to face.”¹ Dixon’s prescient words proved more accurate than he and his readers likely anticipated. While the regiment wrapped up its training excursion and returned to Fort Bliss, Texas, eighteen hundred miles away in Washington, D.C., Lieutenant Colonel Stanley R. Mickelsen reviewed a memorandum from Brigadier General Leonard T. Gerow to General George C. Marshall. The memo briefly detailed the minimum requirements “to offer a reasonable chance of successful defense of the Philippines,” among which was sending a coastal artillery unit to the islands. Almost forty-two years to the day since the U.S. Army raised the Stars and Stripes over Manila in 1898, Mickelsen made a change that sealed the fate of the 20th. Under “Action Recommended,” he crossed out “198th” and wrote “200th” in its place, and initialed his modification. The next day Major General George V. Strong,

¹ Kenneth Dixon, “You’ll Have to Show Us,” Daily Current-Argus, August 14, 1941.
Commanding General of the Eighth Corps Area at Fort Sam Houston in Texas, received a secret telegram with instructions for the “movement of the 200th Coast Artillery Regiment to San Francisco Port of Embarkation for tropical service.” What started out as a training expedition along the highways and byways of their youth became a farewell tour for the largely homegrown 200th Coast Artillery.

Though some men from other states were added to the regiment when they were drafted, most of the soldiers in the unit called New Mexico home. The approximately 1,800 men in the 200th came from every county in the state, and some from towns and villages with populations of no more than sixty people. Those in the 200th Coast Artillery were not the only New Mexican men to don uniforms for Uncle Sam during the war. Their war, however, is the one that has emerged as the state’s dominant narrative of World War II. New Mexicans were intimately invested in the life and legacy of the 200th Coast Artillery; their response to the invasion of the Philippines, the lengthy defense of Bataan, and the ultimate surrender of American and Filipino forces at Bataan and Corregidor was immediate, zealous, and enduring.

In this chapter, I argue the ancestry, composition, and prewar activation of the 200th Coast Artillery intersected to create an important bond between the unit and its home state. First, I briefly explain the origins of the regiment from the Spanish colonial period in the late 1500s and its conversion from cavalry to coast artillery in the late 1930s to situate the 200th within the state’s long military tradition. Doing so helps us see the 200th’s involvement in the defense of the Philippines, and the rhetoric of sacrifice and

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2 Gerow to Marshall, “Reinforcements and Movement of Troops to Philippine Dept. and USAF Far East,” August 14, 1941; Box 614, 1940-1942, 370.5 (8-1-141) Part I, Entry 360; Classified Decimal Files, 1941-1954; Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, Record Group 407, National Archives, College Park.
betrayal it instigated, as part of New Mexico’s much longer history of frustrated and underappreciate martial spirit. It also underscores the regiment’s essential identity as a state, not a federal, unit.

Second, I summarize the prewar legislation and executive orders that put the National Guard at the forefront of America’s defensive posture in the early 1940s. New Mexico’s National Guard units were some of the first of the approximately 300,000 guard troops from around the country federalized during the military build-up in 1940 and 1941, and bought valuable time for the expansion of regular army forces. Both the activation and subsequent deployment of the 200th to the Philippines aroused some controversy, though largely in the postwar era, and here I account for the impact this trend has had on the ways some individuals remember and relate the regiment’s wartime history.

Third, I detail the affection of New Mexico’s cities and towns for their guardsmen and describe the things they did to show support for the soldiers when they were first activated, and when they returned to the state on a training tour just before they left for the Philippines in the summer of 1941. Citizens’ activities reflected the ownership they felt over the 200th, revealed them as important stakeholders in its future, and underscored their sense the 200th carried with it into battle the history of the state and the nation.

Finally, I explain the prevailing reasons why people believe the 200th was sent to the Philippines. Doing so situates New Mexico’s experience of World War II within three important historical trajectories: first, within a national saga of military preparedness and the consequences of prolonged isolationist tendencies in the late interwar period; second, within its proud but marginalized history of service and sacrifice as part of the United
States; and, third, within a powerful postwar impulse to recognize and appreciate the contributions of America’s diverse populace.

During his tenure as U.S. Army adjutant general, Major General John P. Jolly wrote a short account of the New Mexico National Guard. The two-hundred-page manuscript is not widely available, but it is the best summary of the Guard’s history. The Army officially marks 1880 the year the New Mexico National Guard was born with the establishment of the New Mexico Volunteer Militia, but Jolly and a number of other historians—as well as the Guard itself—trace its lineage to the Spanish colonial period, when colonists in the early seventeenth century bore responsibility for the defense of the colony. In an essay about the state’s twentieth-century military history, Barron Oder remarked that beginning with Spain’s incursion northward into North American in the mid-1500s to its final ousting from the Americas in 1898, “each period . . . has one thing in common: the militia,” of which “the citizen-soldier formed the backbone.” After 1900, Oder continues, the National Guard rather than the Regular Army dominated the state’s military landscape. Indeed, when the federal monies promised by the Militia Act of 1903 barely trickled into the territory, Roswell residents funded the construction of storage and drill facilities for the town’s artillery unit: they raised over ten thousand dollars, and also furnished horses to tow the battery’s three-inch guns.

New Mexico’s guardsmen were among the first to head to the border when General John J. Pershing launched his punitive expedition against Pancho Villa in 1916.

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One year later, they were the last to return home. They could not, however, cross the border—the Militia Act of 1903 authorized the president to mobilize the Guard, but deploy it only domestically.\(^5\) The National Defense Act of 1916, however, enabled the president to federalize guard units, and then send them overseas. Unfortunately for the Guard, however, the language of the 1916 law was vague about maintaining unit integrity when it was federalized. When President Woodrow Wilson mobilized the entire National Guard for service in World War I, he had the authority to draft “\textit{any or all members of the National Guard.}” When men were drafted as individuals, “the Army unceremoniously stripped units with long traditions and histories of their state affiliations,” and offered no guarantees that enlisted men and officers would stay together.\(^6\) Roswell’s Battery A managed to stay together and served with distinction in France, but with a different designation; by 1940 it had been redesignated the 146\(^{th}\) Field Artillery Brigade, the 158\(^{th}\) Field Artillery Regiment, and the 104\(^{th}\) Anti-Tank Battalion. As I explain later, the fate of Guard units during World War I prompted the National Guard Association to support policy changes that would preserve units’ state identities—which ultimately had disastrous consequences for large regiments like the 200\(^{th}\) Coast Artillery.

During the relative peace of the 1920s and 1930s in both New Mexico and the United States state governors called on the Guard—by this time the 111\(^{th}\) Cavalry—to manage domestic disturbances, particularly labor disputes, and respond to natural disasters. In 1927, for example, Governor Richard Dillon dispatched guardsmen to Raton

\(^5\) An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia, and for Other Purposes, Public Law 33, U.S. Statutes at Large 33 (1903): 775-780.

to discourage a possible strike among New Mexican coal miners, and in 1933 guardsmen from Albuquerque, Clovis, and Roswell went to Gallup when Governor Arthur Seligman declared martial law in McKinley County to police a strike at the Gallup American Mining Company. The Rio Grande flooded a number of small towns in Socorro County in June and September 1929—including San Marcial, which was destroyed by the second deluge—and National Guard troops hurried to the area to prevent pillaging in the aftermath and offer relief and shelter to residents whose homes were destroyed.

At the Guard’s annual encampment in the summer of 1930, Governor Dillon reminded New Mexicans of their long history of military service and the important role the state’s guard troops played in the defense of the United States. He pointed out that the growth of the National Guard boosted the economy of many communities. It also, however, cultivated “a just pride in our Guardsmen on the part of our citizens in general and when we see what these boys are doing voluntarily, the sacrifices they make and the time they spend, in order to fit themselves for the defense of our country, we shall know better how to appreciate them, encourage and honor them.” The Las Vegas Optic boasted the 111th Cavalry was a “splendid organization” of which the “state is justly proud,” and the towns that hosted the troops have “taken a lively interest in its personnel.

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and training.” Indeed, during the dark days of the Great Depression citizens of Clovis managed to scrape together the $1250 needed to purchase lots to build an armory for the town’s machine gun troop, part of the New Mexico 111th Cavalry. When Governor Arthur Seligman attended the opening of the armory just before Christmas in 1931, he counseled Clovis residents not to treat the armory as “temple of Mars, an edifice dedicated to war or to armed violence,” but to consider it “a community center, a place where social gatherings will be held and where children may spend enjoyable hours in health-giving recreation and play.” Carlsbad residents were proud of their local guardsmen, and noted the unit had “developed into an organization of fine young men, representing many of the city’s best families.” Jerry Thompson’s description of the Nuevomexicanos who volunteered during the Civil War helps explain why New Mexicans held their guardsmen in such high esteem:

In the fullness of their youth, they came forth from the snowy mountain villages of the north, the small farms and ranches of the Taos Valley, and the remote placitas of Rio Arriba County. They came from Truchas, Trampas, Pojoaque, and Peñasco, from the verdant Mora Valley, from Las Vegas, and from the windswept hamlets along the Rio Pecos. They came from the rock and adobe capital of Santa Fe and the rough and rowdy villages of the Rio Abajo such as Albuquerque, Los Lunas, La Joya, Lemitar, Polvadera, and Socorro.

This summary easily describes the young men who joined the guard in the late 1930s and a short time later found themselves in the tropical islands of the western Pacific. They came from all over the state, from small towns and big cities. There was barely a community that did not have at least one young man in the local guard outfit. Residents

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12 Thompson, A Civil War History, 12.
considered them heirs to a “long and illustrious” legacy, and having “ridden under three flags and a host of names,” they were “woven” into the military history of New Mexico.

The National Guard Mobilization Act of 1933 in part sought to protect that long and illustrious legacy. Section 111 was modified and gave the President the authority to “order into the active military service of the United States…any or all units and the members thereof of the National Guard.”13 None of the previous iterations of the Act explicitly called for dissolving units when their members were drafted, but neither did they protect them. National Guard Association lobbyists fought tooth and nail for this provision, claiming it would help units retain their histories and state identities, which would certainly go a long way to promoting morale. What it just about guaranteed, however, was that the federalized units would not just train together but also deploy together. The 1933 Act furthermore rendered guardsmen across the country “soldiers not only of the state, but also of the nation” who were “instantly available for active service,” and created the legal conditions that gave Roosevelt the authority to federalize the 200th and send it to the Philippines.14 The 1916 Act made it theoretically possible men from the same Guard unit would find themselves dispersed to other units and thus deployed to different locations during a national emergency such as international war. Under the 1933

13 Amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916 passed in June 1920 (P.L. 66-242; 41 Stat. 769) addressed some of the National Guard Association’s concerns about unit identity by stipulating after the period of national emergency drafted guardsmen would be discharged and reinstated into their guard unit, but it was the 1933 amendments that sought to retain whole units during guardsmen’s federal service. The National Guard Association is a congressional lobby that was founded in 1878 to advocate on behalf of the National Guard. See An Act to Amend an Act Entitled “An Act for Making Further and More Effectual Provision for the National Defense, and for Other Purposes, ” Approved June 3, 1916, and to Establish Military Justice, Public Law 242, U.S. Statutes at Large 41 (1920): 784-785, italics in quotation added for emphasis; An Act to Amend the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, as Amended, Public Law 64, U.S. Statutes at Large 48 (1933): 153-162.

Act, however, Guard units would train together, deploy together, and fight together. That
New Mexico’s 200\textsuperscript{th} Coast Artillery would suffer such significant losses because they
were sent en masse to the Philippines was perhaps an unintended consequence of the
policy designed to maintain unit integrity.\textsuperscript{15}

The size of the New Mexico National Guard changed little in the decade before
World War II. In 1930 it boasted 975 officers and enlisted men, and by 1939 had grown
to 1,014 men. Young men could earn around $1 per day of drill, or about $75 per year, so
service in the Guard provided a welcome source of income in a state where the average
annual income hovered at just under $300 during the leanest years of the Great
Depression. In 1932, when the nationwide unemployment rate exploded to almost
twenty-four percent and incomes dropped dramatically, the strength of the National
Guard as a whole reached a new peacetime high with 187,412 soldiers. New Mexico’s
National Guard added 86 young men to its roster.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} As Sligh points out, however, the 1933 Act did not really prevent the “dismembering” of National Guard
units. Prior to and following their activation in 1940 and 1941, many units (like the 200\textsuperscript{th}, for example)
were converted and/or redesignated to “plug gaps in the nation’s defense structure.” See Sligh, 125-151.
\textsuperscript{16} “Pay and Allowances,” Title 37 \textit{U.S. Code}, § 23 (1934); “Table 1.—Per Capita Income Payments by
169-170; I have found little explanation for the decline in New Mexico from 1932 to 1938.
The decrease was slight—only about twenty or so members—and we can speculate some men left the
Guard to work at jobs provided by New Deal programs. Others may have been unhappy with being used as
strikebreakers in labor disputes in the mid-1930s. Or, it may be as simple as enlistments running out. Under
the 1933 Act initial terms of enlistment were for three years, and after that Guardsmen could reenlist for
one to three years. That the number of Guardsmen dropped in 1937 and 1938 suggests enlistees from 1931
and 1932, for whatever reason, chose not to reenlist.
Figure 1.1 The table shows the relationship between income and National Guard enlistment in New Mexico. Enlistment peaked when per capita income was at its lowest, and dropped when it was at its highest.

In early 1938 Roosevelt announced the beginning of a “vast program of rearmament.” He framed his recommendation as a policy borne of the need to assure America’s continental defense. “Every part of the United States of America,” he warned, had to be defended against the “merciless devastating conflict” presently engulfing the Far East and Europe. Though his early recommendations focused on enlarging and modernizing the navy, the growing Nazi menace and the dismal outcome of the Munich Conference convinced Roosevelt and his advisers that steps needed to be taken to “place the defense of the United States and the continent against any possible aggression from the outside on a safer basis.”


18 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Five Hundredth Press Conference,” November 15, 1938, ibid., 599-500. Interestingly, at this conference a reporter asked Roosevelt whether he had considered “the possibility of it being necessary to build a fleet large enough to defend both the Atlantic and Pacific Coast at the same time.” He answered in the negative, and we see here the navy’s inability to aid in the defense of the Philippines was to a degree by design.
a national emergency and authorized manpower increases for both the Regular Army and
the National Guard. By the summer of 1940, 242,402 troops filled the National Guard’s
ranks.19 In addition to enlarging the nation’s armed forces, military leadership sought to
modernize its machinery. A General Staff study in the late summer of 1940
recommended converting outdated cavalry divisions into “units deemed more essential
for national defense.” In fact, a series of air attacks—most notably, the Luftwaffe’s year-
long bombing campaign over London and its suburbs that killed over 40,000 civilians—
between 1937 and 1941 convinced Roosevelt and his advisers airpower, and the ability to
defend against it, would be essential components of the coming conflict.20 The Adjutant
General of the New Mexico National Guard, Russell C. Charlton, was aware of the
nation’s shifting defensive requirements and recognized conversion to coast artillery
would not only increase the size of the unit but also make it more useful to the Army. The
111th Cavalry officially converted to the 207th Coast Artillery at midnight on April 25,
1940, but changed its designation in July 1940 in deference to a New York National
Guard regiment that wanted to retain the “7” in its own name.21

New Mexico’s cavalrymen had to give up their beloved “Dobbins,” but the
cavalry’s transformation to a coast artillery unit did little to dampen New Mexicans’
attachment to their guardsmen. A month after the conversion the Daily Current-Argus
published a lengthy summary of the National Guard’s “strange and changing” history,

19 Doubler, 173. A year earlier, the Guard had 199,491 soldiers. See National Guard Report, 1940, 4.
20 National Guard Report, 1941, 14-15. For a discussion of the history and role of the General Staff in war
planning, see “The General Staff: Its Origins and Powers,” in Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar
Plans and Preparations, United States Army in World War II, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington,
21 For a brief summary of the conversion of the 111th Cavalry to the 200th Coast Artillery, see Jolly, 58-60;
For the lineage of the New York 207th Coast Artillery and its historic usage of “7,” consult the Army’s
Lineage and Honors series, “53d Support Detachment,”
which was “known to every school child of the state.” The article chronicled the Guard’s origins as settler soldiers “from the time of the Spanish Conquistadores” to their service overseas during the World War.\textsuperscript{22} Guardsmen too, were proud of their military legacy. In 1939 they paid out of their own pockets for the publication of a “pictorial review” of the New Mexico National Guard, a hard-bound volume which featured photographs of all of the units, a selection of their training drills, and other activities from the past year.\textsuperscript{23} These rhetorical and visual celebrations of the Guard’s history certainly recognized that “since 1846 only the American flag has flown over the guardsmen of the Sunshine State,” but that accounted for only half its lifetime. The constant for the New Mexico National Guard was its connection to the land, people, and places of the state. Its federalization in January 1941—though the beginning of another chapter of New Mexico’s service and sacrifice on behalf of the United States—would do little to alter New Mexicans’ sense of the Guard as a regiment of local boys.

By the time Guardsmen returned home after their summer training and review at Camp Maximiliano Luna at the end of August 1940, Senate Joint Resolution 286 had become law. The legislation authorized the president to call out the National Guard and reserves for a full year of active military service. A Gallup poll administered in early August while Congress debated the measure asked Americans whether they thought the National Guard should be called up for a year of training. An overwhelming majority, 85 percent, answered “yes.” The votes in Congress reflected this public sentiment. The resolution passed both the Senate and the House with resounding majorities:

\textsuperscript{22} “History of Vanished Cavalry Interwoven In New Mexico National Guard’s Early Activity,” \textit{Daily Current-Argus}, May 26, 1940.

\textsuperscript{23} “Guard Booklet,” \textit{Santa Fe New Mexican}, March 26, 1940.
voted 71 to 7 in favor of the measure, while the House approved it with a vote of 342 yeas, and 34 nays. All three of New Mexico’s congressmen voted for its passage. Another poll later that month indicated 71 percent of interviewees favored drafting men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-one for a year of service in the armed forces. By the end of the summer, Congress had also passed the Selective Service Act, thus inaugurating the nation’s first peacetime draft. Roughly two-thirds of New Mexicans supported conscription.

What they did not support, however, was sending their boys overseas. Most Americans, it seemed, recognized the importance of building up the country’s armed forces in the interests of national—that is, domestic—but not global defense. Roosevelt paid attention to this public sentiment. On the campaign trail in late October 1940 Roosevelt reinforced this sensibility when he delivered speeches in Philadelphia and Boston: We are “following the road to peace,” he proclaimed. “We will not participate in foreign wars and we will not send our army, naval or air forces to fight in foreign lands outside of the Americans except in case of attack.” He promised “mothers and fathers” their “boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.” Some New Mexicans put stock in his carefully crafted rhetoric. New draftees marched in an Armistice Day

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28 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Formally Opening 1940 Campaign,” (Speech, Philadelphia, PA, October 23, 1940), File No. 1320, Box 54, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Campaign Address” (Speech, Boston, MA, October 30, 1940), File No. 1330-A, Box 55, both in Series 1, Franklin D. Roosevelt Master Speech File, 1898-1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde Park.
29 Roosevelt’s promise to keep Americans out of a foreign war was part of a well-planned strategy to slowly “educate the people to the inevitable.” He “knew we were going to war,” but also needed to win the
parade in Las Cruces, and newspaper editor Wallace Perry suggested their participation reassured the 1918 generation “that they did not fight in vain,” and guaranteed “no troops of foreign dictators will ever live on American soil.”30 After the New Mexico National Guard was mobilized but before they left for training, Governor John E. Miles and Charlton announced plans for the construction of a number of armories and related structures in Santa Fe, Las Vegas, Raton, Gallup, Taos, and Tucumcari in preparation for the unit’s return “from its year’s active duty.”31 But at a National Defense Council meeting just days before Guardsmen boarded the train, Charlton admitted it was “doubtful the recently-mobilized New Mexico National Guard will be released at the end of a year,” though he was anticipating continued training, not necessarily wartime service.32

A number of New Mexicans doubted Roosevelt’s eloquent pledge. Boyd Bullock suggested people who voted for Roosevelt in the upcoming election would “make war inevitable” and “[send] American boys into a foreign cauldron of hell.” One mother shared she was going to vote for Wendell Willkie because “the re-election of Roosevelt would mean a certain war…and I have two boys who would be the first to go.” An editorial in the Santa Fe New Mexican reprinted Roosevelt’s tenuous statement and asked readers, “Can the 12 million young Americans who have been registered for peacetime election. His Boston speech was the first time he did not qualify his promise with the phrase “in case of attack” or something similar. Clearly once America was attacked the conflict was no longer a “foreign war.” For a discussion of Roosevelt’s 1940 campaign strategy when it came to the possibility of American involvement in the war, see Richard Moe, Roosevelt’s Second Act: The Election of 1940 and the Politics of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), especially chap. 15.

32 “Defense Council Maps Program,” Albuquerque Journal, January 12, 1941. Charlton’s comments about the length of the Guard’s federal service were meant to reflect his sense that some members would need to remain with the equipment to train the next group of selectees, but nevertheless, his assessment was realistic based on the international situation and defense needs.
conscription, and their mothers and wives and sweethearts...depend upon...a man who has broken so many promises...to keep this one?” Indeed, some viewed the 1940 election as one that would ultimately determine who would have the authority to “say...when and where [their] sons shall fight and die.” One reader urged New Mexicans to write their congressmen to protest American involvement in the “unholy maelstrom that has caught half the world in its whirling waters.” Another pointed out each of the names published in “column after column” of the draft lists was “a young man with a life to live.” Roosevelt, she bitterly complained, should have the decency to show “he was at least in sympathy with the sacrifice he has forced on us, and would do his utmost to prevent endangering a single one of those precious lives.”

He did, however, recognize the sacrifice he was asking men and their families to make, which is why he had waited until the middle of the summer to prevail upon Congress for the necessary authority. “Realizing as I do,” he wrote to the Senate, “the personal sacrifice that a period of extended active duty demands...I have deferred until now any request for immediate action in this respect.”

Once he had the authority to call out the National Guard, Roosevelt wasted no time. He issued his first executive order on August 31, 1940; seven more followed over the next year, and by October 1941 over 300,000 National Guard troops had been inducted into federal service. New Mexicans had great faith in the National Guard. An editorial in the Clovis News-Journal read: “Men—ah, you either have men or you don’t. And these men look very good indeed...You feel that they will be good soldiers. These

34 “President’s National Guard Plan,” New York Times, July 30, 1940. The resolution restricted the geographic areas in which members activated under its authority to the Western Hemisphere, with the exception of U.S. territories and possessions, including the Philippines.
men and as many millions as necessary to follow them will defend America. You can read in their faces the safety of our country.” They were soon to find out of what stuff their own men were made. Throughout the fall of 1940 rumors flew about the anticipated winter activation of the state’s largest Guard unit, and on December 23, 1940, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8618 activating the 200th Coast Artillery. Effective January 6, 1941, the 200th Coast Artillery belonged to Uncle Sam. As of that date, the 200th Coast Artillery had 58 officers and 849 enlisted men. Over the next few months their numbers swelled as draftees filled the ranks and brought the unit to full strength; by the time they left for the Philippines in August and September of 1941, the unit had about 1,875 men. By the end of November 1941, just before Pearl Harbor, the unit boasted a total of 77 officers and 1,732 enlisted, owing to some men being discharged for medical or family reasons. After the holidays Guardsmen reported to their local armories to await further orders and transport to Fort Bliss. Knowing they would be separated for at least a year, high school sweethearts William Phebus and Darline Flegge decided to marry and tied the knot in a New Year’s Eve ceremony. A private in the 200th, William survived the war and returned home in the fall of 1945. In the early winter of 1941 New Mexicans,


36 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Executive Order 8618 of December 27, 1940, Ordering Certain Units and Members of the National Guard of the United States Into the Active Military Service of the United States,” Federal Register 5, no. 250 (December 27, 1940): 5255.


38 “Mr. William Phebus and Darline Flegge Wed New Year’s Eve,” Albuquerque Journal, January 14, 1941.
whose soldiers were “among the nation’s best” with a “great tradition behind” them, proudly, if somewhat tearfully, sent their troops to Fort Bliss.\(^{39}\)

At the urging of the State Selective Service, communities across the state bid their Guardsmen fond farewells. Deming residents held a dance that featured a number of patriotic tunes, as well as sentimental—but foreboding—favorites like “Keep the Home Fires Burning.” The local orchestra regaled soldiers and their families with renditions of “Oh, How You’ll Love Him in His Uniform,” and “There’s Something about a Soldier,” Clovis sponsored a similar event for its soldiers at the Hotel Clovis. The city’s Chamber of Commerce held a “gift shower” to collect small remembrances and treats” for its two Guard units. Citizens filled “appreciation boxes” with cigarettes, cigars, tobacco, candies, pipes, books, and stationery, and were encouraged to donate “anything that will suggest “Goodbye and Good Luck” from the home town.” Gallup organized a “rousing send-off” that included a police escort and an entourage of government officials. Thirty or so of the men left the next day, and reporters estimated somewhere between three and five hundred people attended the “civic farewell” staged in their honor. Daily Current-Argus staff in Carlsbad made plans to send its daily papers to the boys while they trained at Fort Bliss, and residents filled boxes with “toothpaste, razor blades, cigarettes, shoe polish, soap, combs, shaving cream, and whisk brooms” to make sure the boys, whose “pay days…[were] few and far between” had the “necessities that don’t cost a lot.” Cliff McKinney, Commander of the American Legion Post that sponsored the drive, directed donors not to designate articles for particular individuals so the items could be distributed to the men who needed it most. The Legion planned to deliver the boxes to Fort Bliss on

\(^{39}\) “New Mexico’s Troops,” Santa Fe New Mexican, January 8, 1941.
a weekly basis. The city also took up a collection of magazines to send to the soldiers.\footnote{“State to Mobilize 2000 in Month,” Albuquerque Journal, December 20, 1940; “Will Entertain Soldiers Saturday,” Deming Headlight, January 10, 1941; “Gift Shower” for Soldiers Ends Monday,” Clovis Jews-Journal, January 12, 1941; “National Guard To Entrain Tuesday; To Ft. Bliss,” Clovis News-Journal, January 13, 1941; “Civic Send-Off For Guard Unit Tomorrow,” Gallup Independent, January 13, 1941; “Band, Crowds Cheer Battery At Train,” Gallup Independent, January 15, 1941; I have been unable to trace the origins of the song, “Oh, How You’ll Love Him in His Uniform,” and in fact the only mention of it anywhere appears to have been in the Deming Headlight article about the dance. Perhaps it was composed locally; “Papers for Guard,” Daily Current-Argus, January 13, 1941; “Got Any Razor Blades, Cigarettes, or Shoe Polish for Battery Boys?” Daily Current-Argus, January 26, 1941; “More Magazines,” Daily Current-Argus, March 5, 1941.} Caring for the boys in this way is one example of how communities in New Mexico treated the men in the 200\textsuperscript{th} as if they were family—whether or not they were related by blood or kinship. This ownership over and care for the men of the 200\textsuperscript{th} continued through the defense of Bataan, and as I detail in later chapters, throughout their long period of captivity.\footnote{The 200\textsuperscript{th} was not the only guard unit treated this way upon its departure. Another coast artillery unit, the 206\textsuperscript{th} from Washington, D.C., was feted at a number of stops along its “regimental road march” from D.C. to Fort Bliss. John A. Hamilton, Blazing Skies: Air Defense Artillery on Fort Bliss, Texas, 1940-2009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 38.}

These rituals would be repeated less than a year later when the men toured the state during a training exercise. Though the two other New Mexico National Guard units were called up—the 120\textsuperscript{th} Engineers on September 16, 1940 and the 104\textsuperscript{th} Tank Battalion the same day as the 200\textsuperscript{th}—their departures appear to have garnered less attention and affection, if newspaper coverage is any indicator. On the eve of their departure the 104\textsuperscript{th} Tank Battalion was given a few lines in the Santa Fe New Mexican mostly for being quarantined due to a case of scarlet fever. Even combined the 104\textsuperscript{th} and 120\textsuperscript{th} did not have as many men as the 200\textsuperscript{th}, but they still accounted for a significant number of the state’s Guardsmen. Why, then, did New Mexicans seem more preoccupied with the 200\textsuperscript{th}, even prior to their combat involvement?
Beyond simply having more men, the 200th had heritage on its side. Official dates trace the 200th’s lineage to 1880, but New Mexicans recognized and celebrated the regiment’s colonial origins. The men who served in the 200th in the early 1940s therefore directly inherited a proud military past, the achievements of which I discussed in the previous chapter. The 120th descended from Company A of the New Mexico Territorial Militia, organized in 1898. The 104th, however, was only constituted in 1920 as Battery A of the 158th Field Artillery. Furthermore, the 200th was the state’s only entire regiment. The 104th was a battery of the 158th Field Artillery, headquartered in Oklahoma, while the 120th operated as an element of the 45th Infantry Division. The 200th was headquartered in Deming and kept armories in eight towns. It boasted a band as well as a medical detachment, and fielded eight batteries. The 200th, more so than the 104th or the 120th, represented the entire state of New Mexico. The map in Figure 1.2 shows where in the state the men of the 200th came from. County seats, as well as cities with or near the armories, provided the largest contingents of men. Albuquerque, for example, was home to approximately 255 men in the 200th. Carlsbad offered 90, while Deming was represented by 82. The smallest symbols on the map represent just one man, but it is important to note some of the towns and villages these men called home were so small their populations were not listed in the 1940 census.


Figure 2.2 County seats are labeled. The circles are proportionally larger to show how many men from each community served in the 200th. 44

1941-1945 (Las Cruces: Yucca Tree Press, 1994). Matson details her data-collection process on pages 113-321. Data for casualties, missing personnel, and overseas burial came from databases maintained by the American Battle Monuments Commission and the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency. Some discrepancies within and between the sources make a perfect statistical accounting of the 200th difficult, and so readers should remember that all numbers and percentages offered in this dissertation are estimates based on the aggregate of the best available data.

44 Data for the map is compiled from Matson’s It Told for New Mexico, and was created using QGis, an open source geographic information systems mapping program.
In the days leading up to the 200th’s departure, local newspapers printed photographs of the troops completing drills, receiving uniforms, and performing kitchen duty in preparation for their new army lives. The snapshots gave civilians a glimpse of the lifestyle changes the boys were readying themselves to endure. Moreover, hindsight betrays the youth and enthusiasm captured in these snapshots. We can imagine when the boys’ service was extended in the summer of 1941 and they received orders to the Philippines, and later were embroiled in the doomed defense of Bataan, their mothers must have returned desperately to these images to hold onto hope they were safe. As would be the case for many photographs taken prior to their retreat into Bataan in the winter of 1942, half of those men pictured would not return. Figure 1.3 shows Sergeant John Reynolds issuing Private Rochell Cochran a pair of new shoes. Both men lived in Clovis and served in Battery E. When the Japanese attacked Clark Field on December 8, 1941, Reynolds had just turned twenty-five while Cochran was barely twenty. Cochran returned home at the end of the war. Reynolds was killed aboard a Japanese transport, the *Arisan Maru*, in October 1944, and his remains were never recovered.45

45 “Not Too Big,” *Clovis News-Journal*, January 7, 1941; Matson’s *It Tolled for New Mexico* shows both Reynolds and Cochran died during the war. Reynolds perished when the U.S. Navy torpedoed the *Arisan Maru*, while Cochran supposedly died in Camp Cabanatuan. However, military casualty records, the Bataan Corregidor Memorial Commission’s Names Project, and post-war newspaper reports do not support her data. Cochran returned from the war and was discharged in 1945, and thereafter lived a short and troubled life. He was arrested, charged, and convicted on several occasions for auto theft, public drunkenness, and check fraud. He died at the age of 39 in 1962.
In mid-August 1941 the 200th returned to New Mexico for a week-long training exercise that ultimately became their farewell tour. A convoy of approximately 275 vehicles carrying men and equipment—the unit’s three-inch guns, searchlights, and sound locators—left Fort Bliss just before dawn on Friday, August 8. The convoy’s first stop was Deming. The troops held a parade and retreat, and the band gave a concert at Deming Downs, the local race track. Businesses closed to allow owners and employees to attend the festivities. The 200th left Deming in the late evening and headed to Hatch; they drove the almost fifty miles on Route 26 with their lights out to simulate blackout conditions, and Deming residents were advised to stay off the road to avoid collisions.46

Local citizens’ attentiveness to the activities and movements of the 200th continued in much the same way until the unit wrapped up its trip one week later. Residents were eager to host the officers and their men, and especially happy to see the familiar faces of soldiers from hometown batteries.

Headlines advertising the 200th’s return the state reveal the sense of ownership New Mexicans had towards their former National Guard: “New Mexico’s 200th Coast Artillery Regiment Comes Home for a Visit,” “Our Soldiers Come Home,” “Carlsbad Guardsmen Due Home on Wednesday.” After winding its way northward through Hot Springs and Socorro along U.S. 85, the regiment received “a warm welcome” in Albuquerque on Sunday afternoon. Several of the city’s civic organizations planned a dance for the men, and City Commission Clyde Tingley announced the boys were free to “yoo-hoo” at as many young ladies wearing shorts on the tennis courts and golf courses as they wanted.47 Reporters predicted “parents, wives, sweethearts, and friends” from towns throughout New Mexico would descend on Albuquerque to see the boys, who were “not on a pleasure trip, but on war exercises.” Indeed, crowds estimated in the thousands arrived in time to watch the regiment as it entered the city and headed west on Route 66 to set up its camp at the state fairgrounds, escorted by representatives from the fire and police departments. The young soldiers took Tingley’s dispensation to heart: “Every group of young women along the route was greeted by lusty ‘yoo-hoos,’ and the girls . . .

47 “National Guardsmen Can Yoo-Hoo All They Want Here, Says Tingley,” *Albuquerque Journal*, August 3, 1941. Tingley’s comment poked fun at a recent disciplinary debacle, whereby Army General Ben Lear punished 350 soldiers for whistling and yelling at bare-legged women on a golf course with a fifteen-mile hike in blistering temperatures. A member of the House criticized the general’s actions, claiming he was restricting “the buoyancy and effervescence that makes the young American a great soldier.” The affair caused quite a stir and journalists had quite a bit of fun at Lear’s expense. Tingley of course could not supersede military orders, and the troops would have to obey the orders of the commanding officers, but his jest does reflect the attitude among many New Mexicans that the boys deserved to be boys while they could, before war ended their relatively carefree days.
‘yoo-hooed’ lustily back.” As in Deming, the 200th held a parade and review for visitors before participating in series of night maneuvers at Kirtland Air Field. Families from all over the state made the trip to Albuquerque for a chance to visit with the boys, and a number of dances and cocktail parties feted the officers and enlisted men. Martha Mennet made the drive from Las Vegas to see Private Carlos Armijo. The pair had but a short time to “renew [their] friendship” during the unit’s brief stay in Albuquerque. They never saw each other again. Twenty-two-year-old Carlos, who was promoted to corporal and transferred to the 515th Coast Artillery in late December, died as a prisoner of war at Camp Cabanatuan in July 1942. His remains have not been recovered.

![Figure 2.4 This photograph shows Private Carlos Armijo with Martha Mennet during the 200th’s stay in Albuquerque in August 1941.](image)


49 “New Mexico’s 200th Coast Artillery Regiment Comes Home for a Visit,” *Albuquerque Journal*, August 11, 1940
By the time the 200th Coast Artillery returned to New Mexico for a training exercise in August 1941, the people of Carlsbad were already familiar with the daily trials and tribulations of their young army men. Dwayne Davis, who by the end of the year’s training put on a sergeant’s stripes, wrote a series of columns for the *Daily Current-Argus* detailing the unit’s everyday life—especially that of Battery F—at Fort Bliss. Between January and May of 1941, Dwayne penned approximately ten stories for the paper, and occasionally sent short snippets of information to fill the gap between their publication. His lighthearted stories relayed the results of boxing matches, the quality of mess hall chow, and soldiers’ consistent attendance at Sunday services. He also shared with readers news of promotions and transfers, and sometimes explained Army regulations and procedures. As best he could, then, Dwayne shortened the experiential and contextual distance between Carlsbad and Fort Bliss. Family and friends did not, however, just read about the soldiers’ daily lives. The Davis family had lived in Carlsbad since 1913 and was both well-known and well-respected. Ray and Nora Davis owned a photographic studio in town, and in the late nineteen-teens, Ray took the photographs featured in *National Geographic* that were partially responsible for sparking national interest in Carlsbad Caverns. After the fall of Bataan, Davis was elected president of Carlsbad’s Bataan Relief Organization.50

Dwayne’s older brother, Gene, was also in Battery F and served as its official photographer. Both boys had worked at the studio prior to the 200th’s activation. Armed

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with a 16mm camera Dwayne recorded colored films of their activities. Almost eight hundred “mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, sweethearts, friends, and neighbors” showed up to the Cavern Theatre on May 15, 1941 for a chance to see Battery F in action. The Rotary Club, a longtime sponsor of Battery F, hosted the free event but encouraged the audience to donate to the boys’ recreation fund. The boys “were pictured taking baths, writing letters, shooting big guns, peeling spuds, marching, camouflaging mechanical equipment, and, to top it all off, shooting craps!” The Current-Argus reporter who wrote up the story suggested the entertaining depiction of Army life soothed mothers who worried their sons would be drafted, but the film—just like the training exercises—barely grazed the reality of war. A public relations officer had told the audience he estimated Carlsbad’s men gained at least six pounds each because they ate so much during their training; within the year many of them would lose five times that during the defense of Bataan. Three years later, in late October 1944, Carlsbad residents celebrated MacArthur’s return to the Philippines; Ray Davis compared his anticipation of that long-awaited day to getting a tooth pulled. “I have dreaded looking forward to it, but glad it has now happened. I have faith that my boys and their comrades will return.”51 Two days later Dwayne and Gene Davis were both killed when an American submarine torpedoed the Arisan Maru. Their bodies were never recovered, and they are memorialized on the Walls of the Missing at Manila American Cemetery.

Carlsbad was the last stop on the 200th’s tour before it returned to Fort Bliss. Ken Dixon’s “Pecos Pete” reminded Carlsbad residents the town’s “own First-in-Spite-of-Hell kids” were coming home. “Pete would feel sorta bad about it if it didn’t look like we

were glad to see them,” he wrote, and suggested those with friends or family in the 200th ought to “pitch a party for a bunch of them” to show their hospitality. After all, he continued, “If a man can’t be proud of his folks, his family and his home town, what is there left to be worth fighting for?” Mothers dug out “favorite cake recipes” and cooked up “special dishes,” while the boys’ sweethearts made signs and readied “other surprises.”

The day the regiment arrived, Dixon reiterated the town’s affection for not just the “big bunch of local boys” but for all the soldiers. His sentimental welcome offered a poignant summary of the connection National Guard troops had to their home towns and home states throughout the country. Dixon’s editorial explains the intimate investment of towns like Carlsbad in their troops:

There’s an especially warm spot in the welcome for the Battery F boys, because, after all, they’re the home town kids. They grew up on these streets, and went to the schools here and held their first jobs here. It’s no wonder that we’ll be looking especially for familiar faces in your ranks, then—and no wonder that we’ll have an especially hearty welcome home for them. But we’re mighty glad to see all of you. . . . We want you to take back to Fort Bliss—or wherever else you go—the realization that Carlsbad and Eddy county folks are mighty proud of you. We know what this year in the army is costing a lot of you in careers, plans and personal lives; we know because we were here when you left…The idea is this is the hometown of you Battery F boys, and the hometowns of all the other boys are scattered around over the state and southwest—other Carlsbads in their separate sections…These are the places you are training to defend…We only hope we look like the sort of people and the sort of hometown worth defending.

Carlsbad did its best to make sure it was a hometown worth defending. The city hung a welcome sign to greet the soldiers as their convoy arrived in town on Route 285. Officers dined at a luncheon sponsored by the local Rotary Club, and the whole regiment was treated to a private tour of Carlsbad Caverns. The men of Battery F even starred in their

52 “Pecos Pete,” Daily Current-Argus, August 11, 1941; “Carlsbad Will ‘Kiss The Boys Hello,’” The El Paso Times, August 12, 1941.
own movie; the Cactus Theater promised viewers they could see the “interesting, humorous, entertaining” moments of “army life as lived by our Carlsbad boys.” Officials closed the beach and park at Lake Carlsbad to the public to give the boys the opportunity to “cavort” and enjoy a few hours of “nautical” exercise. To honor the occasion and show their support for the boys, local businesses sponsored a two-page spread in the *Daily Current-Argus*. A photograph of “Carlsbad’s Own Battery F” dominated the page, framed by American flags and drawings of the Coast Artillery manning their gun. At the bottom, Dixon warned readers the nation’s patriotism, unity, and strength were about to be tested. The “UNITED lads in khaki,” whose names marched in ordered columns down the center of the page, were charged with preserving the “spirit of ’76.” This tribute reinforced that the 200th was not a unit of anonymous strangers plucked from around the country but of boys who grew up together in the small-town state. It furthermore recognized they were no longer responsible just for protecting their home towns, but for defending the people, ideals, and institutions of the United States.

While the former New Mexico National Guard toured the state, the President, Congress, and a cadre of government officials made three important decisions with far-reaching and disastrous consequences for the 200th. First, while Roosevelt met with Churchill off the Newfoundland coast aboard the U.S.S. *Augusta* to discuss American involvement in the European war, his temporary freeze of Japanese assets morphed into a total embargo, thus initiating a chain of “war-breeding” diplomatic failures. Over the summer of 1941 war with Japan seemed increasingly likely, but many Americans—New Mexicans included—had high hopes diplomacy and economic sanctions would check its militaristic impulse. Respondents to a Gallup poll recognized that if Japan turned its
belligerent gaze southward “it would mean the end of the Philippines.” At the very least, Roosevelt and his advisers hoped diplomacy would buy valuable time to build up America’s defense. Negotiations of course failed, and American forces in the Philippines ultimately had to provide the nation the time it needed.54

Second, Congress debated and narrowly passed the Service Extension Act. Marshall pushed for its passage, urging Congressmen they “must realize… we must not speculate with our security. Our only hope is that we do too much rather than too little to protect ourselves.” With a vote of 203-202 in the House and 45-30 in the Senate, “Congress… hereby declares that the national interest is imperiled” and activated the provisions of the Selective Service Act and extended the service of Guardsmen, Reservists, and draftees for eighteen months. New Mexico’s Congressmen, Representative Clinton P. Anderson, and Senator Carl Hatch, voted in favor of the bill. The New Mexico contingent still had six months or so left of its federal commitment, but given Marshall’s testimony it is possible they would not have been able to go to the Philippines if their term of service expired in January, because of the training, travel, and materiel requirements for such a distant posting. General Leonard Gerow’s memorandum to Marshall reinforced this possibility, claiming reinforcement of the Philippines was “subject to… final action authorizing the retention of the National Guard and Selectees in service.”55

Furthermore, during and after the war the defense of Bataan was cast as a “delaying action,” a strategy intended to give MacArthur’s armies time to withdraw to the southern part of the peninsula, to stall the Japanese advance through the southwest Pacific, and to a certain extent give American industry the time it needed to ramp up war production.\footnote{Franklin D. Roosevelt, “We Must Keep on Striking Our Enemies Wherever and Whenever We Can Meet Them,” February 23, 1942, in \textit{Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1942}, 105-116; Morton, \textit{Fall of the Philippines}, 62; For a discussion of the Army doctrine of a delaying action and its implementation in the Battle of Bataan, see John W. Whitman, “U.S. Army Doctrinal Effectiveness on Bataan, 1942: The First Battle” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984).} An unfortunate editorial published in the \textit{New York Times} on August 13, however, overestimated the impact the Service Extension Act would actually have on military preparedness:

As a consequence of the decision...a great many young Americans who will soon have contributed a full year of their lives to the service of their country will be called upon to make a further sacrifice. But they make this sacrifice now to forestall a worse sacrifice later on. They give their time in order than an unprepared American Army may not be butchered in a war brought on by its own weakness...The price is high. But in this uncertain world of 1941 it is a good bargain.\footnote{“Men Under Arms,” \textit{New York Times}, August 13, 1941.}

The men and families of the 200$^{th}$ certainly did not believe the defense of Bataan was a “good bargain,” and no amount of manpower could make up for the lack of war machinery—ships, planes, tanks, and ammunition—necessary to successfully wage war.\footnote{I offer a brief analysis of American military preparedness as it stood in the autumn of 1941 in chapter 3.}

The third decision—the one to send the 200$^{th}$ Coast Artillery to the Philippines—has been the subject of significant debate and speculation, particularly in postwar accounts and recollections. There are three prevailing explanations for why the 200$^{th}$

\textit{Congressional Record 87}, pt. 6:6881; It is important to note that the Service Extension Act was entirely legal and in no way a betrayal of draftees and their families, since under the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Selective Service Act terms of service could be extended if “Congress declared that the national interest is imperiled.”; Gerow to Marshall, “Reinforcements,” 2-3.
Coast Artillery was sent to the Philippines. First, several sources claim the 200\textsuperscript{th} was the unlucky winner of a coin toss with the 206\textsuperscript{th} CA (AA) from Arkansas, whose loss sent them to Alaska. It is highly improbable Army decisions about unit assignments would be left to the frivolity of a coin toss, but this tale has colored the stories some people tell about the circumstances that put the 200\textsuperscript{th} in harm’s way. The second, and most probable reason, is that Army planners—who generally only considered “training, troops strength, and completeness of equipment” when making assignments—decided the 200\textsuperscript{th} was the best-trained antiaircraft artillery unit available in the late summer of 1941. Finally, there is a widely-held notion the 200\textsuperscript{th} was sent to the Philippines because a large proportion of the unit was Hispanic and many of the soldiers spoke Spanish, and were therefore culturally well-suited for an assignment where they would have to communicate fairly extensively with other Spanish-speakers. Despite little evidence that in the 1940s New Mexicans believed their ethnicity was responsible for sending them to the Philippines, this view has been the most enduring one and has powerfully shaped the way some New Mexicans, reporters, public officials, and others narrate the circumstances and consequences of the 200\textsuperscript{th}’s deployment to the Islands.

The idea that Army officials would use the flip of a coin to determine unit assignments is absurd. Even more ridiculous is the notion that unit officers—lieutenants, sergeants, captains—had any authority to make command-level decisions. Nevertheless, the story that the 200\textsuperscript{th}’s destination was the result of a coin toss has worked its way into the narrative. Though the story of the coin toss is a larger part of the 206\textsuperscript{th}’s war narrative, it is important to discuss it here because it shows the impact myth, lore, and legend have on the way people remember war. As much as is possible the coin toss
tempers the debate surrounding the decision to send the 200th to the Philippines. It gives
the illusion the men had a say (however limited) in their assignment, which might relieve
some of the traumatic burden of believing they were purposely selected for a doomed
mission.

When Bataan veterans and Santa Fe city officials made tentative plans to open a
Bataan Memorial Museum on the second floor of the old state capitol building in the late
1980s, Hollis Engley’s story announcing the project attributed the 200th Coast Artillery’s
Philippine assignment to chance. “In June of 1941,” he wrote, “a tumbling 1905 Liberty
head 5-cent piece forever changed the lives of thousands of New Mexican men and their
families.” The 200th supposedly won the coin toss and got the “plum assignment” to the
Philippines, which Engley described as a tropical retreat with “warm beaches and good-
looking brown women.” Halfway through the story it turns out Max Love, the sergeant in
the 206th who provided the nickel, was “not entirely certain that the story is true,”
because “he wasn’t there to see it,” but “it could be.” An article published in the Carlsbad
Current-Argus in 1997, however, claimed Love did more than provide the coin—he was
the one who tossed it.59 That these two stories disagree suggests that story is something of
a myth, invented by soldiers who wanted at least the perception they had some control
over their destiny. Dr. Robert Boon, who had served with the 206th, repeated the story in
an interview for the Veterans History Project, but stipulated he did not know if it was true
or not. His interviewer told him an “exhaustively researched” book, The Williwaw War,
said it was true.60 According to the authors of the book, Donald Goldstein and Katherine

59 Hollis Engley, “Bataan Death March: Building a Museum of War Memorabilia,” Santa Fe New Mexican,
60 Robert Boon, interviewed by Stephanie J. Dixon, Veterans History Project, Huntsville, AL, December 7,
Dillon, a coin toss “is precisely what happened,” despite its being “thoroughly illogical.”

Colonel Elgan C. Robertson, the 206th’s commander, supposedly flipped a coin with the 200th’s commander, who would have been Colonel Charles G. Sage. The authors are completely convinced the story is true, to the extent they implicitly suggest Robertson and Sage bear some of the blame for what happened to the 200th:

With the advantage of hindsight, it is tempting to chastise the two regimental commanders for determining the fate of their officers and men in such a frivolous, irresponsible manner…such a decision should have been made at a level higher…Furthermore, that higher echelon should have taken many factors into consideration, such as the amount and condition of assigned weaponry, the troops’ state of training…To understand if not necessarily to exculpate Robertson and his colleague, one must realize that neither one had any idea that the choice of destination involved real danger…they could not foresee that, as a result of their friendly coin toss, the 200th CA (AA) would suffer horribly and be decimated in the Philippines.61

Goldstein and Dillon, however, failed to consult any documentation beyond veterans’ own recollections—questionnaires the veterans completed between 1989 and 1992—and as their notes and bibliography indicate, they only reached out to Arkansas veterans. A number of them recalled hearing about the coin toss, though none of them witnessed it. At a reunion in 1960 Colonel Robertson allegedly confirmed the tale was true.

If, as Goldstein and Dillon argue, “the tale was spreading through camp” in late July and early August 1941, why was there no discussion of it among the New Mexico troops? Not a single mention of their heading to the Philippines was made when they toured the state during their training exercise in early August, and newspapers speculated

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about their destination until mid-September. Furthermore, the timing of the 200th’s orders for the Philippines contradicts the stories that suggest the decision was made in June or July. The War Plans Division memorandum that recommended sending a coast artillery unit to the Philippines was dated August 14, 1941, and it listed the 198th CA (AA) as the selected unit, not the 200th. Mickelsen’s amendment, changing it from the 198th to the 200th, was made on August 15. Therefore, as of August 14, 1941, the 200th was not heading to the Philippines. If the commanders tossed a coin in July to decide assignments, the 200th would presumably have been typed into the original memo. In his account of the 200th’s participation in World War II, published in the 1945-1946 New Mexico Blue Book, Sage reported “information was received from the War Department the 200th had been selected for service in the Philippine Islands…on August 17, 1941…because of the highly satisfactory and advanced state of its training,” and in all of his postwar public engagements as the past commander of the 200th and as the Adjutant General of the New Mexico National Guard, he made absolutely no mention of a coin toss.62 We can presume if he spoke about it, the tale would have made its way into New Mexico’s newspapers well before 1986. William Maxwell, another historian, could not substantiate the story in his own account of the 206th and concluded it was “a persistent tale, worthy of Ozark folklore status.” In his history of air defense artillery training at Fort Bliss, John Hamilton also rejected the story as “an old myth.”63

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63 William E. Maxwell, Jr., “Never Give Up! A History of the 206th Coast Artillery Regiment of the Arkansas National Guard in the Second World War,” March 1992, available at https://sites.google.com/site/206thfieldartilleryvets/206th-field-artillery-historical-documents; William E. Maxwell, Jr., “Dutch Harbor Revisited,” Arkansas Military Journal 1, no. 3 (Spring 1993): 11-13; Hamilton, Blazing Skies, 47. Maxwell’s father was an officer with the 206th, and one wonders what his father said about the coin toss. He does not mention it in either of his accounts about the 206th and its service in Alaska. The entry for “Williwaw War” in the online Encyclopedia of Arkansas states the coin toss is “a story widely believed at the time (and which may actually be true),” acknowledging the
Most of the sources that discuss the coin toss have to do with the 206th, not the 200th. Indeed, the stories in the *Santa Fe New Mexican* and the *Carlsbad Current-Argus* do not give any credit to a New Mexican veteran for sharing the coin toss story; they quote only Max Love. It would seem the idea the 200th went to the Philippines and the 206th to Alaska coming down to a coin toss is much more a part of the 206th’s heritage than the 200th’s. If that is the case, what relevance does it have to the story of the 200th and the way people remember New Mexico’s war? Tom Shultes, a reporter for the *Deming Headlight*, wrote that “stories abound” about the 200th New Mexico National Guard, among them “the method of deciding” where the unit was being sent. He too referenced the coin toss, this time in an article about Deming’s plans to build a Bataan memorial in 1990. In 1999, *Carlsbad Current-Argus* writer Valerie Cranston reminded readers about the coin toss in her story about the upcoming Bataan Death March Exhibit at the Carlsbad Museum and Arts Center.64 These allusions to the coin toss, however, are few and far between. New Mexican survivors’ memoirs do not mention the story.

Dorothy Cave makes no reference to it in *Beyond Courage*, and she interviewed almost one hundred veterans from the 200th and 515th. It seems most New Mexicans are probably not familiar with the coin toss story. In conjunction with the following discussion of combat readiness and language as factors in their assignment to the Philippines, however, it is part of a persistent attempt to explain the decisions that ended in the trauma and horror of the Bataan Death March. When Bataan veterans narrate the end of their war,

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Footnotes:


https://encyclopediaofarkansas.net/entries/williwaw-war-3158/
they describe how they were “surrendered.” They, and their families, absolve themselves of any responsibility for the defeat, insisting they would have continued to fight. An important piece of that narrative construction is the continual quest to assign blame and to locate in their experience the choices, conditions, and circumstances that determined their fate, regardless of how outlandish they might seem.

According to other sources, National Guard anti-aircraft units were selected for service to Hawaii, the Philippines, and Alaska because compared to Regular units they were “demonstrably at a better stage of readiness” in the summer of 1941. That the 200th was better prepared than other units seems surprising, given its relatively short training period. By August of 1941, approximately twenty National Guard anti-aircraft regiments and battalions had been inducted into active duty. Four of those—the 202nd from Illinois, the 200th from New Mexico, the 206th from Arkansas, and the 260th from the District of Columbia—trained at Fort Bliss, Texas. The 202nd had been there since September 1940, and the other three units arrived in January 1941. The 200th was the newest unit, having only completed its conversion from cavalry to coast artillery one year earlier. Despite its short stint as an anti-aircraft unit, however, a competition between the 200th and regular army units at Randolph Field supposedly prompted the Army to recognize the 200th as “the best anti-aircraft Regiment (regular or other) now available to the United States armed forces for use in an area of critical military importance.” Jolly claims the unit was chosen for the Philippine assignment because of its “highly satisfactory state of training,” but there appears to have been no mention of this recognition in any New Mexican newspapers. The newspapers were generally attentive to the 200th’s activities, and it seems odd they would not publish news of the citation. The *Eddy County News* did
mention the achievement, but it does not specifically reference the citation. In December 1943 its publishers compiled a pictorial to commemorate the regiment. In this “Bataan Memorial Edition,” Will Robinson pointed out planners sent the 200th Coast Artillery, or the “Sacrifice Regiment of Bataan,” to the Philippines because of its “magnificent efficiency,” and because it was “the leading command of its kind…certain to give the most brilliant service in the defense of Bataan.”65 The citation was supposedly dated August 17, 1941, which was the same date the 200th received its orders to the Philippines. This glowing summary of its training achievements could have been part of those official orders. Glen Williford, in Racing the Sunrise, does point out the Army clearly “selected some of the most prepared, best-trained units it could” at the time, though he found no evidence the Army considered competition or maneuver results when it made assignment decisions.66

Other sources, however, question the 200th’s advanced state of readiness, and suggest the unit was not combat-ready. In an article on American antiaircraft artillery

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65 Vincent Silva, Senso Owari: The War is Ended (Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2008), 8; Jolly, A History of the New Mexico National Guard, 67; Will Robinson, “New Mexicans Wrote a Brilliant Epoch in Bataan Campaign,” Eddy County News, December 1943. In “Dutch Harbor Revisited,” William Maxwell says the “real reason the 200th went to Alaska and not the Philippines” was because “it was the best of five antiaircraft regiments then training at Fort Bliss.” A couple weeks later the 200th was apparently told it was the best antiaircraft regiment available to the Army.

66 That the unit did receive the citation has generally been accepted as a fact. Vincent Silva quotes it in his memoir, Senso Owari, and Margaret Garcia repeats it in her father’s biography, Tell Me Another War Story. Neither of them offers a facsimile of the citation. Garcia does not credit her father with the information. Dorothy Cave includes it in Beyond Courage, and the Bataan Corregidor Memorial Foundation repeats the claim on its official website. Jolly mentions it in his history of the New Mexico National Guard, but none of them provide verifiable documentation. Cave is Glen Williford’s source for the citation, and he suggests “those who…survived the hardship of four years as POWs were naturally convinced that their particular unit was the Army’s “best.” The only official citations awarded to the 200th are listed in McKenney’s compilation of the lineage and heraldry for Air Defense Artillery units; all of those awards are for campaigns, battles, and war service. There is a possibility the award or citation given to the unit for the competition was unofficial and so not recorded in Army documents. Regardless, the citation has been repeated and used by a number of individuals, groups, organizations, and levels of government to underscore the skill and heroism of the men in the 200th. Glen M. Williford, Racing the Sunrise: Reinforcing America’s Pacific Outposts, 1941-1942 (New York: Naval Institute Press, 2013).
during World War II, Bryon Greenwald pointed out commanders at Clark Field failed to alert the 200th to incoming Japanese aircraft when the base was attacked on December 8, 1941. “Not that it would have mattered,” he wrote. “This collection of Mexicans, Anglos, and Indians” was one of many “clumsily converted” antiaircraft units, and its designation as “best” was “far from good enough.” As a matter of fact, when the unit sailed for the Philippines it did so “without having had a target practice with any of its weapons.” Not once had the 200th practiced firing with live ammunition, instead training with “broomsticks and boxes or wooden models” and “fired rocks for ammunition and shouted bang.” This unsatisfactory preparation combined with World War I era weaponry prompted Walter Edmonds’s unflattering analysis of antiaircraft units in the Philippines on the eve of the Japanese invasion: “the antiaircraft defenses of Luzon were hardly worth the name.”

Critics of the units’ preparedness have tempered their assessments by referencing the surrender, as if connecting the poorly prepared defense to the surrender and suffering of so many men somehow compensates for, redeems, or justifies the early failures. Blair Case, for example, suggests the Bataan defenders “rescued their reputations and careers by their heroism during the desperate defense of Bataan” but those who succumbed after the surrender had no chance to redeem themselves, since the “only epilogue to Clark Field was death on the nightmarish Bataan Death March.”

Bryon Greenwald’s

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68 Case, 7.
summation is slightly more charitable; the antiaircraft regiments went “on to fight with valor until forced to surrender;” but those who survived “spend the rest of the war in captivity.”69 Though they were in the mess hall eating “pork chops and chocolate cake” when Japanese Zeros dropped their first bombs on Clark Field, the 200th’s batteries were the “first to fire” and according to General Charles Sage managed to shoot down almost ninety enemy aircraft while losing twenty of their own men.70 The 200th and 515th were cited for “outstanding performance of duty in action” while they defended Clark Field in December and later protected the withdrawal into and defense of Bataan. After the surrender, General John Williams, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, wrote to Governor Miles to share news of the citation. Despite their recent conversion from a cavalry unit the 200th “deserve[d] great credit for speedily adapting themselves to new conditions, conducting themselves admirably in their first engagement, and writing forever upon the Nation’s roll of honor the name of their unit and New Mexico.” Williams repeated his praise for the regiment in his annual report.71

Regardless of their actual state of readiness, however, the U.S. high command determined the 200th was relatively better prepared for the overseas assignment than other anti-aircraft units currently in training. For reasons he did not disclose in the document, Mickelsen crossed off “198th” and wrote in “200th.” Perhaps because it was training at Fort Bliss, planners decided it was easier to transport the 200th to the embarkation point than

69 Greenwald, 40. Both Case and Greenwald ultimately criticize the state of antiaircraft artillery at the start of the war, and do make a case that training, armaments, and inter-service cooperation vastly improved over the course of the war as the United States more fully developed its air power and air defenses. The 200th bears no blame for the inadequacies of their training or equipment, and they were far from the only units ill-prepared for a modern air war.
71 John F. Williams to John E. Miles, May 11, 1942, Governor John E. Miles Papers, 1939-1942, Collection 1959-105, Box 10, Folder 346, New Mexico State Records Center and Archives, hereafter Miles Papers; National Guard Report, 1942, 58.
other units. Convoys to Hawaii, the Philippines, Wake, and Guam departed from San Francisco, and getting the 198\textsuperscript{th} from its training camp in Massachusetts to the west coast would take longer. Williford makes it clear convoy schedules were critical to the reinforcement of the Philippines; sending the 200\textsuperscript{th} was likely in part a logistical decision.

Many accounts that claim the 200\textsuperscript{th} was sent to the Philippines because it had a significant Hispanic contingent have failed to offer documentary proof to support their claim. Approximately one-third of the 200\textsuperscript{th} was Hispanic and spoke Spanish, but there is little evidence to prove that fact had anything to do with its assignment. Williford, who relied heavily on archival documents and Army communications in his account of the Philippine reinforcement, makes no mention of language proficiency as a factor in the decision-making process. Indeed, the following description of languages spoken in the Philippines on the eve of World War II makes it somewhat improbable the U.S. Army considered Spanish proficiency useful in the region:

Over sixty-five dialects are spoken in the Islands…after forty years of American occupation about 27 percent spoke English and 3 percent Spanish. Of the many native dialects, Tagalog…was chosen as the basis for a national language in 1937…While the many dialects have certain similarities, it is not possible for the natives in different parts of the Islands to understand each other readily. This fact made the recruitment of Filipinos for military service on a national scale difficult, since troops recruited from one island often could not understand their American or Tagalog officers, or troops from other islands.\textsuperscript{72}

With such a small percentage of Spanish-speakers, and communication difficulties within the Filipino Army itself, it seems it would matter little what language the men of the 200\textsuperscript{th}

\textsuperscript{72} Morton, \textit{Fall of the Philippines}, 6; Florentino Rodao argues the 1939 census of the Philippines likely underestimated the number of Spanish-speaking individuals, and points out other estimates (though less reliable) suggest the figure could have been as high as one million Spanish speakers. Even that figure, however, would put Spanish-speakers at just over six percent of the population. Spanish was more widely spoken among elites in Filipino society, and much of the rank and file of the Filipino Army would not have spoken the language. See Florentino Rodao, “Spanish Language in the Philippines: 1900-1940,” \textit{Philippine Studies}, 45, no. 1 (1997): 94-107.
spoke. None of the letters New Mexicans sent to Congressmen, War Department
officials, and the President during the war mention ethnicity or language as a reason why
their boys were sent to the Philippines, though some residents, especially Hispanics,
likely perceived this to be the case.

Whether language influenced the Army’s decision to send the 200th to the
Philippines has little to do with the subsequent series of events that led to the U.S.
surrender, but it has had much to do with how people have perceived the relative sacrifice
of New Mexico’s National Guard. The proportion of Hispanic representation in the 200th
has made it easy for some to see irony in the 200th’s dispatch to the Philippines, in that
soldiers from a former Spanish colony and U.S. territory were sent to defend a country
with a similar pedigree. To a lesser degree it has produced what is really a myth about the
significance of the 200th’s ethnicity and the unit’s subsequent sacrifice in the Philippines.
Additionally, the 200th has been heralded as an unmatched example of Hispanic service
during World War II—to the point that some individuals believe awarding Bataan
defenders the Congressional Gold Medal will finally give Hispanic World War II
veterans the recognition they deserve. The 200th has also been held out, however, as an
example of the excellent service rendered by National Guard units during World War II,
however, and those accounts tend to make no mention of its ethnic composition.

Despite a few allusions to some New Mexicans believing language influenced the
200th’s overseas assignment, the bulk of evidence suggests this assumption was a postwar
development. When U.S. forces returned to the Philippines in October 1944, New
Mexico’s Adjutant General, Brigadier General Ray Andrew, speculated a number of the
200th’s members who were still listed as missing in action had managed to disappear into
the hills and join Filipino guerrillas because “they spoke Spanish…had learned the ways of the Filipinos,” and “found it easy to elude the enemy,” thus suggesting Spanish proficiency an important tool for survival, but it is unlikely the language was very useful in the Philippine jungles.\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, Lorenzo Banegas, a private in the 200\textsuperscript{th}, noted how limited Spanish was among younger Filipinos: “The old people speak Spanish, but the younger ones, they know very little. All the islands know Tagalog, but they have different dialects throughout the islands. But everyone understands Tagalog.”\textsuperscript{74} The earliest reference I have found citing language as a factor in the decision to send the 200\textsuperscript{th} to the Philippines is a special edition of the \textit{Santa Fe New Mexican} published to honor both the return of New Mexico’s Bataan survivors and to commemorate Armistice Day in November 1945. Reporter Art Morgan commented “unofficially two reasons have been widely quoted among the folks at home” to explain why the 200\textsuperscript{th} went to the Philippines. The first was “many of the gunners spoke Spanish fluently” and would “get along well with the Filipinos,” while the second was their “gunnery record for accuracy,” which “later reports” seemed to confirm.\textsuperscript{75} In 1975, Roger Morris, an historian and National

\textsuperscript{73} “Believes 200\textsuperscript{th} Boys Guerrillas,” \textit{Santa Fe New Mexican}, October 23, 1944. It is unlikely Spanish would have helped too much in the hills and jungles since it was neither widely used nor understood by Filipino soldiers. And though the Japanese occupiers did not forbid the language in the islands, they discouraged its use since they could not understand it. Since most Spanish-speakers lived in Manila—and many lost their lives in the Battle of Manila—Spanish words filtering out of the jungle would have been something of a giveaway to Japanese patrols. See Dadao, 103-104.

\textsuperscript{74} Lorenzo Banegas, interview by Robert C. Moore, Las Cruces, NM, April 27, 1992, Voces Oral History Project, Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin, quoted in Jordan Beltrán Gonzales, “\textit{Con Dolor de Corazón}: Militarization and Transracial Recognition among Mexican Americans and Filipinos in the Bataan Death March,” in Maggie Rivas-Rodriguez and B. V. Oguin, eds., \textit{Latina/os and World War II: Mobility, Agency, and Ideology} (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014), 168. Lieutenant Albert Fall Chase, from southern New Mexico, served with the 45\textsuperscript{th} Infantry and was an instructor with in the Philippine Army. He spoke Spanish well, and in a letter to his parents described the difficulties he and his fellow officers had communicating with the Filipino soldiers. See Nancy Shockley, “The Life and Death of Albert Fall Chase, 1918-1944,” \textit{Southern New Mexico Historical Review} (January 2004): 25-26.

\textsuperscript{75} Art Morgan, “200\textsuperscript{th} First and Last to Fight,” \textit{Santa Fe New Mexican}, November 1, 1945.
Security Council official under Presidents Nixon and Johnson, paid a visit to the Santa Fe National Cemetery the summer after U.S. forces left Vietnam. New Mexico’s National Guard was sent “to an imperial frontier 9,000 miles across the Pacific,” he wrote, and they “went…because many of them spoke Spanish, an added convenience, as some War Department bureaucrat saw it, in dealing with the Filipino colonial dependents they were protecting.”76 In 1990, the Department of Defense published a booklet titled “Hispanics in America’s Defense,” which indicated the 200th and the 515th “had been selected because many of the men in the unit spoke Spanish, a principal language of the Philippines.” This statement directly contradicts the language summary in Morton’s Fall of the Philippines.77 Morgan’s assessment of the language situation was probably the most accurate—that folks at home, when pondering why their boys had been sent to such a distant location, concluded their native language was partly responsible.

The bigger evidentiary problem is with those writers and historians who attribute the decision to some unknown government official. Morris calls him “some War Department bureaucrat,” while Everett Rogers and Nancy Bartlit, in Silent Voices of World War II, presume the “Pentagon thought that cultural similarity would help the American troops get along well with Filipinos,” and nowhere mention the impact of the unit’s training on their assignment.78 Construction on the Pentagon did not start until

77 Department of Defense, Hispanics in America’s Defense (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Manpower and Personnel Policy, 1990); Despite this being a Department of Defense publication, a factually incorrect detail suggests the claim about language sending the troops to the Philippines might also be inaccurate. The 515th was not formed until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, which means it was not “sent” to Clark Field.
78 Everett M. Rogers and Nancy R. Bartlit, Silent Voices of World War II: When Sons of the Land of Enchantment Met Sons of the Land of the Rising Sun (Santa Fe: Sunstone Press, 2005), 36. Rogers and Bartlit provide no citation for this statement.
September of 1941, and it is impossible “the Pentagon” had anything to do with the decision. These writers’ failures to identify their sources are problematic, because their statements about the significance of language have been absorbed into the stories people tell and retell about the 200th’s wartime service, and have contributed to a textual exaggeration of the proportion of Hispanics in the unit.

The belief that language played an important part in sending the 200th to the Philippines gained traction especially from the 1990s forward, when Americans began to think about commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II. And, importantly, the combat readiness of the 200th Coast Artillery has increasingly been sidelined—and in many instances erased altogether—as an important factor in the unit’s selection for overseas service. Historians, public officials, federal agencies, and private organizations have contributed to the inflation and politicization of the unit’s ethnicity as a reason for its involvement in the defense of the Philippines. In its fact sheet on Hispanic Americans, the 50th Anniversary of World War II Commemoration Committee stated the 200th and 515th were especially effective in combat “because many of the soldiers spoke Spanish, a principal language of the Philippines.” The National World War II Museum also provides a fact sheet on Latino service during the war. Its pithy summary of Hispanic service in the Philippines does not even identify the 200th by name: “Latino soldiers were of particular aid in the defense of the Philippines. Their fluency in Spanish was invaluable when serving with Spanish speaking Filipinos. These same soldiers were part of the infamous ‘Bataan Death March.’” None of the autobiographical accounts of

79 “Los Veteranos—Latinos in WWII,” National World War II Museum Fact Sheet, https://www.nationalww2museum.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/los-veteranos-fact-sheet.pdf. The context surrounding the statement about the Bataan Death March actually suggests it was another unit, not the 200th, that was involved in the defense of the Philippines and the Bataan Death March.
Bataan survivors, however, suggest they used their Spanish to communicate with their Filipino comrades. An abstract for a public lecture sponsored by the New Mexico History Museum titled “Before Bataan: New Mexico’s 200th Coast Artillery” offered the following summary: “The 200th Coast Artillery held 1,816 New Mexicans, many of them fluent in Spanish. That skill inspired military leaders to deploy them to the Philippines in September 1941.” Historian Lorena Oropeza wrote an essay titled “Fighting on Two Fronts: Latinos in the Military for the National Park Service’s Latino Heritage Initiative, and in it repeated the same story—that New Mexicans were “sent to the Philippines because of their ability to use Spanish to communicate with their Filipino allies.” As part of a Congressional hearing on Hispanic military service during National Hispanic Heritage Month in 1994, one witness testified the “majority of the troops” in the New Mexican National Guard “were Hispanic.” This is factually untrue, but shows a narrative has developed that exaggerates the size of the Hispanic component of the regiment.

The 200th Coast Artillery therefore functions as the supreme example of Hispanic sacrifice during World War II. In a press release announcing the reintroduction of legislation to award Bataan defenders a Congressional Gold Medal, for example, Senator Tom Udall and his colleagues claimed the unit was “largely comprised of Hispanic Americans from New Mexico, Texas and Arizona,” and was “sent to the Philippines

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because they could speak Spanish and communicate with our Filipino allies.”83 The New Mexican Hispanic Culture Preservation League, along with a number of senior military leaders from the state and some private citizens, have suggested Congress’ continued failure to award Bataan veterans a Gold Medal is an example of how the “historical record...[tends] to overlook the role of Hispanics in American history.” In a way it mirrors the government’s failure to grant New Mexico statehood in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries despite its long record of military service, when Senator Beveridge and his cronies repeatedly blocked New Mexico’s admission to the Union largely because a majority of its inhabitants spoke “mongrel Spanish.” The Beveridge Report concluded that when the “so-called “Mexican” population . . . have become identical in language and customs with...the American people . . . and English-speaking people . . . have . . . done [their] modifying work with the ‘Mexican’ element . . . this mass of people . . . will finally come to form a creditable portion of American citizenship.”84

Of all the things New Mexicans celebrated about the 200th Coast Artillery during the year preceding its deployment to the Philippines, its ethnic composition was not one of them. Nor did they remark upon its Spanish-language proficiency. After the surrender, however, and after the war ended, ethnic identity has emerged as a meaningful part of the story New Mexicans and others tell about the state’s wartime sacrifice in the Philippines. Whether or not military planners actually selected the unit for its ethnicity and language is less important than the perception that they did. Forty years after New Mexico’s own

84 Omnibus Statehood Bill, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 36, pt. 1:189.
politicians recommended against acquiring the Philippines—familiar with both the demands and downfalls of territorial rule—Hispanic soldiers were sent to protect it.

Underscoring the imperial linkages between New Mexico, the Philippines, and the United States—and exposing a bitter irony—this narrative about the significance of language to the decision to send the 200th to the Islands suggests qualities that made New Mexico’s admission to the Union so distasteful rendered its National Guard unit invaluable to the nation’s defense.85

The 200th’s service and sacrifice in the Philippines was largely a consequence of New Mexico’s imperial inheritance, an inheritance that public officials clearly articulated when they dedicated its territorial capitol in 1900. After military bands played “My Country, ‘Tis of Thee…this sacred national hymn,” Chief Justice William J. Mills spoke to the crowd. “Who would have predicted only four short years ago that…the glorious stars and stripes would to-day be waving over…that great outpost of ours in the Orient, the Philippine Islands, one of the greatest and richest colonial possessions that has ever fallen into the lap of a nation? We must march onward, ever onward. It is our destiny.” New Mexico’s soldiers would indeed “face westward” to protect and preserve that destiny. Francisco Manzanares, former territorial delegate, reminded the audience New Mexico was “ungenerously kept out of the galaxy of free states…and…subject to [the] capricious dictation” of the United States government, an accusation later generations echoed when they pleaded with Congress to send aid to the soldiers they believed the government was purposefully sacrificing. And, LeBaron Prince, who served as governor

85 For an excellent analysis of the relationship between the Spanish language, citizenship, politics, and culture and its uses in those spheres, see Rosina Lozano, An American Language: The History of Spanish in the United States (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018).
from 1889 to 1893, suggested New Mexicans “dedicate every patriotic word, every ennobling utterance, every heroic deed, every faithful and conscientious service…within these walls” to “the honor, the prosperity, the glory of New Mexico!”

New Mexico’s sons died and were buried at that great outpost on the edge of America’s empire less than fifty years later, making their bodies a permanent part of the islands whose subjugation their ancestors so enthusiastically celebrated. In 1942, while its soldiers suffered and died in prison camps, the state installed the 200th’s handmade concrete insignia as a memorial on the Capitol’s front lawn, over which anxious and grief-stricken parents bowed their heads in prayer. After they returned, Bataan veterans recalled the agony of surrender at the memorial by raising a white flag, a ritual they repeated almost every year after 1953. And, in the late 1960s, the state christened the old Capitol the Bataan Memorial Building. These acts of remembrance symbolically connected, through space and time, the frustrating legacies of the state’s territorial period to its painful contributions during World War II.

New Mexicans celebrated the “long and illustrious history” of their National Guard. Its soldiers had “ridden under three flags and a host of names,” and they were now training to “keep Old Glory sailing high in spite of any eventuality.” When orders for that eventuality came, some of the soldiers and their sweethearts joined the almost two million young American couples who tied the knot in anticipation of uncertain separation. Jack Fleming and Janie Angell had planned a February wedding, but cancelled those plans and hurriedly married in Las Cruces.

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86 “Dedication of the New Capitol a Memorable and Interesting Event,” Santa Fe New Mexican, June 5, 1900.

Figure 2.5 This photograph shows Janie (Angell) and Jack Fleming around the time they married, shortly before he headed to the Philippines with the rest of the 200th.88

Ralph Trujillo and Virginia Lopez too had a large wedding in the works, but instead married in a ceremony in El Paso. Patricia MacPherson, from Gallup, flew to California to marry Clinton Seymour before he shipped out. The Daily Current-Argus announced the 200th’s imminent departure in late August 1941 with the headline “200th Faces Westward towards Distant and Secret Location.” The choice of words suggested adventure, excitement, and a hint of mystery. It also, however, carried an implicit reminder of the state’s imperial past and unknowingly gestured toward the 200th’s upcoming participation in the defense of one of the United States’ territorial outposts. The first half of the 200th departed San Francisco on August 30 and arrived in Manila on

88 “Janie and Jack,” Janie Moseley Papers, 1943-1997, Southwest Collection, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas.
September 16, and the second half left on September 8 and docked at the Philippine capital on September 26. While the soldiers sailed across the Pacific, an editorial in the *Santa Fe New Mexican* captured the state’s attachment to and pride in its National Guard. “New Mexico’s own—the 200th coast artillery anti-aircraft—has set sail for parts unannounced and with it goes the love and admiration of every citizen in the state.” They had faith in their soldiers, whose unit “was considered one of the finest regiments in the newly formed army of the nation,” and though they did not know where they were headed “whatever or wherever that destination is the men…will be of value to the defense of the nation.” New Mexico, the column continued, is “proud of its regiment and rests secure in the knowledge that wherever it lands it will soon have the situation well in hand.” Just as they had when the 200th was training at Fort Bliss, New Mexicans hurried to provide their boys with the comforts and tokens that would let them know the folks at home remembered and cared for them, and in late November 1941 sent $1,200 to the men in the 200th to spend on a Christmas celebration. The check never cleared the bank, because on December 7, 1941, Japanese forces attacked Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, marking the beginning of another episode in the history of the New Mexico National Guard.

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CHAPTER 3

“In the Story of that Defeat There Is Written in Very Large Letters a Victory”: The Roosevelt Administration and the Language of Defeat

While MacArthur readied his retreat into the Bataan Peninsula, the small American garrison at Wake Island surrendered to the Japanese after a two-week battle on December 23, 1941. Through a combination of newspaper stories, official speeches, congressional bills, and individual musings, Americans grappled with the unfamiliar feeling of military failure. Newspaper headlines tempered the sting of defeat by regaling readers with tales of valor in the face of overwhelming odds and quickly labeled the unfolding saga the “Alamo of the Pacific.” Many papers published the text of a Navy report that impressed upon Americans the futility of the “doomed” defense and the defenders’ unrelenting heroism: “Probably no military force in American history, not even the defenders of the Alamo, ever fought against greater odds nor with greater effect.” One editor suggested the battle cry “Remember Wake Island” would remind the Japanese “they had bitten off more than it was in the cards for them to chew.” Others injected humor into the loss, like the weatherman who predicted “storms for Japs” when U.S. Marines “tied into some of those Sons of the Rising Sun in anywhere near a fair fight.” In his State of the Union address just after the New Year, Roosevelt noted the defense of Wake Island should inspire home front civilians to “render their own full share of service and sacrifice.” Cartoonist Herbert Block sketched an admonishment underscoring the President’s message, advising citizens they ought to think about the men on Wake and in the Philippines before complaining about their relatively trivial hardships. One newspaper editor opined that “in everything except the final control of the
battle scene Wake Island was a victory,” and that it should “be employed as an example
to teach our people how Americans fight and die.” A young wife whose husband was a
civilian contractor on Wake penned a prayer. “At home by the fireside alone, with [a]
heavy, aching heart,” she hoped he was alive and well. If he had “gone down in battle for
Uncle Sam,” she pleaded, “may your labor not be in vain!”

These private, public, and official reactions to the fall of Wake Island were
somber but proud—and importantly few of them actually referred to it as a surrender.
Instead, they said the island was “invaded,” “lost,” “taken,” “captured,” or “fallen.” This
tendency suggests Americans were uncomfortable with surrender; to overcome that
anxiety they looked for ways to reframe and repurpose military defeats. Indeed, an
editorial in The Oregonian proclaimed Wake Island was really a victory for the United
States. It had “not fallen, but has risen,” because “Remember Wake Island” was a “vow
of vengeance on barbarian treachery.” The American public found this framing of the
defeat at Wake Island a useful strategy to help incorporate the surrenders of Bataan and
Corregidor into a victorious war narrative.

Its defense and defeat certainly stirred Americans’ patriotic passions, but
compared to the prolonged campaigns on Bataan and Corregidor, Wake Island was a
minor battle fought by far fewer soldiers, and though the rhetoric of defeat as victory
endured, Wake Island failed to capture the American imagination for as long or as

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1 “Marines’ Epic Stand at Wake Island Told,” Los Angeles Times, December 29, 1941; “Things to Steer
By,” Marion Star (Marion, OH), December 31, 1941; “Storms for Japs; Some Showers Here, Forecast,”
Miami News, December 28, 1941; Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, January 6, 1942,
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1942, 32-41; Herbert Block, “Before Anyone Starts
Moaning Low,” Austin-American, January 10, 1942; “Remember Wake Island,” Daily Oklahoman, January
12, 1942; Mrs. J. C. Trammell, “Prayer for Wake Island,” Sacramento Bee, December 24, 1941.
2 “Remember Wake Island Also!” Oregonian (Portland, OR), December 26, 1941; Lowell Limpus, “Hitler
intensely as Bataan. Approximately 600 military and 1,100 civilian personnel were on the atoll at the time of the Japanese invasion, and of those less than 1,500 became prisoners of war. Lowell Limpus, a reporter for the *Daily News*, recognized the worst was yet to come when he commented Wake Island was a “high point of America’s story,” but only a “preliminary skirmish” and not a “genuine Japanese major effort.” If it was not a genuine effort, then neither was it a genuine victory. Just prior to news of the fall of Bataan, Limpus claimed the Japanese “can’t win any genuine victory” without capturing Corregidor. One week later, he called the Japanese triumph in Bataan a “strategic sideshow,” and when Corregidor finally fell he assured readers “our blood was well spent,” yet in the same analysis asserted “Corregidor isn’t nearly as important in May as it was in January” because “the war has moved on to other fields.” He praised the soldiers and their commanders for making the Japanese “pay the price” for their gains, but he minimized the significance of the loss. If Japan had not won genuine victories, the United States had not suffered genuine defeats. This logic helped Americans develop a vocabulary of defeat they used to make sense of the surrenders at Bataan and Corregidor.

In this chapter I argue the Roosevelt Administration’s attitude towards and plans for the defense of the Philippines show that the President and military leaders prepared the American public for the Islands’ eventual loss to the Japanese. Officials couched the doomed defensive campaign in terms of temporary sacrifice essential to permanent victory, a painful logic that infused the narrative Americans constructed about Bataan and its defenders over the course of the war. The Roosevelt Administration made no secret of

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the fact the battle raging in the Philippines was doomed. With MacArthur’s battlefront reports and War Department communiques in hand, Associated Press writers surmised in late December 1941 that “little hope was held out for a prolonged defense of the island.” Beginning on the eve of MacArthur’s withdrawal into Bataan, Americans used the vocabulary of defeat that began percolating with the fall of Wake Island to shape an enduring discourse about the meaning of surrender in America. This conversation emerged at the intersection of private, public, and official responses to the defeat of Bataan and Corregidor defenders. Americans converged on a number of important ideas that helped incorporate the surrenders into a more powerful and palatable narrative of total victory.

By the time newspapers reported that American and Filipino forces had been “crushed and captured” in the nation’s “greatest military defeat” at Bataan, citizens back home had already done much of the rhetorical labor necessary to transform the “poignant tragedy” into a “glorious victory.” First, I detail the War Department’s last-ditch efforts to reinforce the Philippine Islands. Their late attempts to build up the distant outpost’s defenses with men and materiel shows they briefly imagined it was possible to successfully defend the archipelago, but also allowed planners, and indeed Roosevelt himself, to take advantage of rhetoric that framed the loss as part of a long-held strategy. Next, I offer some examples of how popular media presented the defense of the islands as robust and impenetrable, which, in tandem with the War Departments language of

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“planned defeat,” reinforced Americans’ sense their soldiers had been sacrificed and abandoned. I also show how crumbling defenses on Bataan, and the apparent unwillingness of the Roosevelt Administration to relieve its embattled troops, provided the public, the press, and politicians with emotional fodder to criticize its war strategy. Finally, I explore the befuddling mixture of fact and fiction surrounding Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s alleged remark that “there are times when men have to die.” There appears to be no concrete evidence he either said it or wrote it, yet the comment has become an important part of the Bataan narrative, and a number of veterans, writers, and the general public have found using it an effective way to synthesize the political, geographic, and cultural causes and consequences of the surrender.

In the months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the War Department set some of the most significant intellectual parameters for the content of wartime discussions about surrender. The Department’s top-secret war plans, known as RAINBOW 5, made limited provisions for the defense of the Philippines. RAINBOW 5 prioritized offensive operations in the European theater, while “a strategic defensive was to be maintained in the Pacific until success against European Axis Powers permitted transfer of major forces to the Pacific for an offensive against Japan.”

Despite a short-lived alteration of these plans after MacArthur assumed command of United States Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) in late July 1941, Roosevelt and his staff had little faith that even increasing the Philippines garrison would do much more than stall Japanese aggression in

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the Pacific while the United States built up its military arsenal. Consequently, by mid-
summer 1941 there were no plans to reinforce America’s Pacific outposts. But with an
optimism that “infected the highest officials in the War Department and the government,”
MacArthur managed to convince the War Plans Division (WPD) to revise RAINBOW 5. In
August 1941 the War Department reversed its policy regarding the islands in an
“eleventh-hour struggle” and rushed to send MacArthur the men and materiel he believed
necessary to “build up enough force to repel an enemy.”6 Approximately 9,500 men—
among them 1,800 from the 200th Coast Artillery—made it to the Philippines by the end
of November. Production, shipping, and communications delays, however, prevented the
bulk of MacArthur’s requested supplies, as well as additional manpower, from reaching
the islands before December.7 This stunted reinforcement would have disastrous
consequences for the Philippines and the men sent there to defend it.

But the challenges of fortifying the Philippines were largely kept from the general
public. Civilians were informed the Philippines were the “powder keg of the Pacific,” and
would be at the “center of the explosion,” but they were instead encouraged to believe the
military build-up was going off without a hitch. “The Pacific Fleet [is] its first line of
defense,” and “the island commonwealth is building up a formidable line of land and sea

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6 Morton, *Fall of the Philippines*, 31-32; In late 1940 and early 1941, slow progress was made in
modernizing and enhancing Filipino defenses, but this process accelerated in late summer of 1941. General
George Grunert bears some responsibility for the defensive build-up in the Philippines, which he suggested
would in part check the prevailing “defeatist attitude” in the Philippines that the U.S. cared little about
defending the islands. Defensive plans for the Philippines were much more complicated than what I recount
here, and more complex military and political concerns prompted their modification. As always, however,
functional, financial, and philosophical limitations stifled a robust amplification of the island’s defensive
capabilities. See Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 411-452; Douglas MacArthur,
Kolakowski, *Last Stand on Bataan: The Defense of the Philippines, December 1941-May 1942* (Jefferson:
McFarland & Company, 2016); Glen M. Williford, *Racing the Sunrise: Reinforcing America’s Pacific
Outposts, 1941-1942* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010).
7 Morton, *Fall of the Philippines*, 31-50.
defenses.” Furthermore, they were advised, they could rest easy because General Douglas MacArthur, “the man Japan fears most,” was overseeing the Philippines’ defense program. Henry Wolfe, a freelance journalist, celebrated MacArthur’s achievements in the Pacific in a lengthy piece in This Week, a Sunday supplement carried in a number of newspapers. Wolfe had spent time in Japan prior to the war and contributed foreign affairs articles to popular periodicals like Harper’s, The Atlantic, and the New York Times Magazine, and in the story that appeared in late November he recounted the MacArthur family’s long history in the Philippines. He reminded readers many people viewed the Philippines as “military and naval liability,” and had “urged that the United States retire from the archipelago and let it fall into the lap of the first aggressor who came along.” MacArthur, he pointed out, “sharply challenged this defeatist attitude” and argued a well-fortified Philippines would deter any potential belligerents. His article helped craft MacArthur’s status as the hero of the Philippines even before the Japanese attack.

A series of photographs accompanying the article gave the impression defensive preparations in the Philippines were farther along than they actually were. One photograph, for example, showed machine gunners draped with ammunition belts and orderly rows of mines lined up at the shoreline. In others, “new guns” were said to be “pouring in from America,” while “bombers and fighters have been sped from U.S. factories.” War games kept troops—both Filipino soldiers and the U.S. Army “regulars”—“on their toes, ready for anything.”

In late December a photographic essay

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8 “The Philippines…Powder Keg of the Pacific,” Los Angeles Times, November 9, 1941.
by Carl Mydans in *Life* reinforced this mindset and showed readers the defensive preparations in the Philippines and reassured them with images of tanks, bombers, shells, and uniformed soldiers the “invaluable” islands were ready for the Japanese onslaught. Mydans had “gladly agreed not to photograph many new weapons that had arrived in the last few months” to preserve military secrecy. Ironically, a half-page photo of P-40s was captioned, “in wartime planes would never be grouped in this manner.” Those planes were grouped in exactly that manner on December 8, which was why the Japanese were able to destroy over half of the fleet.¹⁰ This robust representation of the military situation in the Philippines was misleading, and later in the war Dr. Spensley sent a heated letter to Governor Dempsey declaring the Roosevelt Administration had lied to the American people when it came to the state of affairs in the Pacific. “WE were the saps,” he wrote, and “if my son and I had been told the truth, he would not be” in the Philippines. “He would have stayed at the U.N.M. where he was entitled to stay.”¹¹

Spensley would have been horrified if he had been aware of the limitations of the War Departments plans for the defense of the Philippines. War Plan ORANGE-3 (WPO-3), the WPD’s longstanding plans for the defense of the Philippines, had always planned on a withdrawal to Bataan. It anticipated squirreling away just six-months-worth of provisions and armaments, and made no provisions for what would happen after the retreat into Bataan:

Informed naval opinion estimated it would require at least two years for the Pacific Fleet to fight its way across the Pacific. There was no plan to concentrate men and supplies on the west coast and no schedule for their movement to the Philippines. Army planners in early 1941 believed at the end of six months, if not sooner, supplies would be exhausted and the garrison would go down in defeat. WPO-3 did not say this; instead it said nothing at all. And everyone hoped that when the time came something could be done, some plan improvised to relieve or rescue the men stranded 7,000 miles across the Pacific.\(^\text{12}\)

The WPD thus envisioned the bulk of the fighting in the islands as a delaying action, and a likely doomed one at that. But MacArthur refused to accept what amounted to a planned defeat, and insisted the beaches “be held at all costs.” His new plan anticipated defensive preparations would be completed by April 1942. He also changed WPO-3, and as a consequence few preparations were made for a withdrawal into the Bataan peninsula.\(^\text{13}\) After successful Japanese landings at Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay, on Christmas Eve MacArthur decided to revert to the original WPO-3.\(^\text{14}\)

It was too late for quartermasters to adequately stock withdrawal routes, and soldiers were forced to retreat to the peninsula with a fraction of the food, ammunition, and medical supplies needed to sustain a prolonged siege. Japan’s “smashing blow” to the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor “made obsolete the carefully prepared plans of defense in the event of war in the Pacific,” and a string of Japanese victories in the Pacific—the surrenders of U.S. forces at Wake and Guam, and the sinking of two British battleships,

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\(^\text{13}\) James Albrecht, Joseph Edwards, and Terrence Popravak, ““Come as You Are” Warfare: The Bataan Example,” *Military Review* 83, no. 2 (March-April 2003): 86-87. The authors spend a great deal of time discussing the logistical nightmare that ensued as a result of MacArthur’s decision to defend the beaches rather than retreat to Bataan, and argue “the Bataan Campaign was lost because the principles” of “modern logistics operations…simplicity, flexibility, economy, survivability, sustainability, responsiveness, and adequacy…were violated wholesale.”

\(^\text{14}\) A significant factor in MacArthur’s decision to withdraw, though he never admitted it and in fact publicly claimed the opposite, was that he was forced to confront the limited abilities of his undertrained troops and recognized they were a poor match for Japan’s more capable soldiers. See Morton, *Fall of the Philippines*, 163-164.
the HMS *Repulse* and HMS *Prince of Wales* in the South China Sea—further quashed hopes for a successful resistance. The Arcadia Conference had just gotten underway in Washington when MacArthur made his decision, and that too thwarted any hope of diverting men and resources to the Philippines. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and their flock of advisers codified the “Germany first” policy, subordinating the plight of the American-Filipino garrison to more immediate and pressing global defense concerns.

The outcome of the Arcadia Conference only confirmed what Roosevelt had been preparing the public for since Germany had pushed its way into Poland in the fall of 1939, and though enthusiasm for a successful defense of the Philippines grew in the latter part of 1941, it should have come as no surprise to most Americans that the outlying territories of the Pacific were still not war planners’ biggest priority. Roosevelt made it clear he believed Germany posed the greatest threat to American security. After Hitler’s armies invaded Poland, most of his fireside chats addressed the significance of the European war for U.S. security and safety. Even as late as September 1941—after the reinforcement of the Philippines was well underway—Roosevelt barely gestured towards the potential for Japanese aggression in his radio conversations, instead reminding listeners how close the Nazi menace was to American shores. The *Chicago Tribune*’s

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leak of Roosevelt’s top-secret war plans in early December 1941 advised “the first major objective of the United States and its associates should be the complete military defeat of Germany.” In the “immediate future,” it continued, the United States’ objective in the Far East should be merely to “hold Japan in check.” Careful readers would take note that the report also warned that because of the “shortage of essential equipment,” the country “will not be prepared for ultimate decisive modern combat before July 1, 1943.”17 Philippine defenses had therefore been modernized, but only compared to their previous state of affairs.

Over three-quarters of American homes tuned in to Roosevelt’s fireside chat after Congress declared war against Japan, and they heard him verify American war production was not at full capacity. “Assembly lines are now in operation,” he intoned, “But it is all only a beginning of what still has to be done.” He also reminded them Germany and Japan were working together as part of a “simple and obvious grant strategy,” which “the American people must…match with similar grand strategy.”18 Though American blood boiled at the treachery and destruction of Japan’s attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, Roosevelt carefully repeated his conviction the bulk of the nation’s fighting forces had to be concentrated in Europe, not Asia.

All of these conditions laid important psychological groundwork for how Americans prepared for, received, and understood the news that Bataan had surrendered

240, 633-644; Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat to the Nation,” September 11, 1940, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941, 384-391. For a discussion of Roosevelt’s attitudes towards Germany and Japan, see, for example, Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War Against Nazi Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, the 2001).
18 Casey, 35; Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat to the Nation Following the Declaration of War with Japan,” December 9, 1941, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941, 522-530.
in April 1942. The defensive build-up in the Philippines was a case of too little too late, and the press coverage it received exaggerated its extent and its capabilities. The American public therefore had a distorted view of the archipelago’s significance to U.S. strategy—and the Roosevelt Administration’s willingness to defend it—by the time the first Japanese aircraft flew over Clark Field on December 8. The seeds had also been planted for the Clare Boothe’s article in the December 8, 1941 issue of *Life*—which went to press before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor—made use of detailed maps to point out the difficulties of a Philippine defense despite MacArthur’s vigorous efforts, surrounded as it was on three sides by the Japanese. Importantly, the maps accompanying the story also showed readers just how far away the Philippine Islands were from the United States—almost seven thousand miles by sea from San Francisco to Manila via Pearl Harbor—a formidable distance even in peacetime conditions, but an almost impossible one in light of Japanese naval dominance in the Pacific. But like Wolfe, she hailed MacArthur as the savior of the Philippines. He was the only military man who believed “the Philippines could hold their own in any immediate scramble for them.”

Washington and the American public balked at spending money on Philippine defenses, but MacArthur—who foresaw the Japanese landings through his “crystal ball,” “damned military myopia…and flatly predicted…the Philippines must drop like an overripe plum into the Japanese basket.” Boothe’s conclusion to the biopic was an eerily prescient combination of reminiscence and speculation:

> Today General MacArthur at his headquarters of the Army of the Far East stands on the ramparts of an old Spanish fort looking out over Manila Bay where 43 years ago Dewey said so quietly: “You may fire when ready, Gridley.” That shell raised the American flag over an outpost 6,000 miles from American shores. It still waves there. But for how long? Will the Japanese try to land at the strategic spots on Luzon, Subic, Lingayen, Batangas Bay, or will their Navy try to force
that tight little Rock of Corregidor in the harbor? Will this Island of Luzon then become a great theater of war, and General MacArthur the outstanding khaki-clad figure in it?\(^{19}\)

At the same time they distorted perceptions of military preparedness in the Philippines, stories like Boothe’s tacitly condemned the Roosevelt Administration (and the American people) for ignoring the Philippines for so long. MacArthur’s forces in the Philippines were woefully unprepared for war when it came in early December 1941, but as a number of historians have shown, he himself bore some of that responsibility.\(^{20}\) Nevertheless MacArthur emerged the hero of the Philippines, and the Roosevelt Administration the villain—even more so when the garrison finally surrendered in April.

Roosevelt, Marshall, and Stimson, however, did their own part to contribute to Americans’ sense of what was happening in the Philippines. The fall of the Philippines had, until the end of 1941, been preordained by the WPD. More to the point, surrender was the expected outcome. Last-ditch defensive preparations did little to alter its likelihood, and by the end of December it was clear—at least in military circles—the Philippines were going to be lost. British officials, too, recognized some losses in the Pacific were unavoidable. In his history of the war Churchill recalled his sense in the waning days of 1941 that the U.S. and Britain would have to make “fearful forfeits,” and during an “indefinite period of military disaster” would face “many dark and weary


months of defeat and loss.” Marshall had sent a radio message to MacArthur on December 11 assuring the general “every effort” was being made “to reach you with air replacements and reinforcements as well as other troops and supplies.” But Stimson recorded in his diary “the news from the Philippines is somber,” and “we cannot as yet reinforce our people,” though “we are trying to work out all kinds of ways for solving that situation.”

Americans were cautioned about the likely turn of events in the Philippines. For example, in his syndicated column, Drew Pearson reminded Americans the long-standing policy toward Philippine defense had been to surrender the islands. He advised readers though much had been done to improve the military situation of the Philippines, “the attack at Hawaii had changed the situation,” and “the injury to the fleet…may mean not only that no U. S. ships could go to the rescue of the Philippines, but also that it would be difficult to convoy ammunition to beleaguered Manila.” Furthermore, the losses of “the island stepping stones of Guam, Wake, and Midway made it “difficult to get new airplane

reinforcements to MacArthur.” Indeed, he concluded, “the American public should reconcile itself to the possibility of the eventual fall of the Philippines.”

On December 28, Roosevelt delivered a radio address to Filipinos, which gave many the impression supplies were being rushed the Islands. “The resources of the United States,” he pronounced, “have been dedicated by their people to the utter and complete defeat of the Japanese war lords.” Newspapers across the United States reprinted the President’s message the following day, along with snippets from an “encouraging” statement from the Navy Department reassuring them it was “following an intensive and well-planned campaign against the Japanese forces which will result in positive assistance to the defense of the Philippine Islands.” Wallace Perry, editor of the Las Cruces Sun-News, speculated this meant Navy commanders were going to “give the Japs themselves some of the surprises…going around,” and that “more men and war planes are being rushed to the relief of harried Filipinos and the too-meager force of Americans now on the firing line.” And indeed, convoys had been dispatched, but they never reached the Philippines. A couple days later Roosevelt dispatched identical notes to

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24 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Radio Address, “Tribute and Pledge to the People of the Philippine Islands,” December 8, 1941, in War Messages of Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 8, 1941 to October 12, 1942 (Washington, D.C., 1946). Roosevelt also cabled Quezon, promising that “every vessel available is bearing to the southwest Pacific the strength that will eventually crush the enemy and liberate your native land,” and that “vessels in that vicinity have been filled with cargo of necessary supplies and have been dispatched to Manila.” Manuel Quezon, The Good Fight: The Autobiography of Manuel Luis Quezon (New York: D. Appleton Century Co., 1946), 242. The key words here were “eventually” and “dispatched.” By late December it was clear the Japanese controlled the waters around the Philippines, and few ships and submarines were able to break through the blockade with supplies.

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and Stimson, directing them to “explore every possible means of relieving the Philippines.”

In response to Roosevelt’s directive, General Leonard T. Gerow from the WPD prepared a “ruthless” memorandum detailing the cheerless situation in the Philippines. He predicted the “partially trained and equipped” garrison would not last any longer than three months, and concluded “the forces required for relief” could not be moved into the Philippines soon enough to alter the pending outcome. Consequently, sending those resources to the region “would necessitate an entirely unjustifiable diversion of forces from the principal theater – the Atlantic.” He ultimately advised “operations for the relief of the Philippines not be undertaken.” The report horrified Stimson. “Everybody knows the chances are against getting relief to MacArthur,” he wrote, “but there is no use saying so beforehand.” And like Stimson, Eisenhower knew they had to do what they could “to keep him fighting,” even if it was only on hopes and promises.

MacArthur did his own part on the battlefront to convince his forces help was coming, and on January 15 he sent a message to the men under his command: “Thousands of troops and hundreds of planes are being dispatched.” But of course, they were not.

26 Roosevelt to Knox and Stimson, December 30, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers as President: The President’s Secretary’s File, 1933-1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Series 2, Box 8, Philippines, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/psf/psfa0110.pdf.

27 L. T. Gerow to Marshall, January 3, 1942, Memorandum, “Relief of the Philippines,” WPD 4639-3, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, Entry NM-84 281, Correspondence and Reports, 2/1918 – 3/1942, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD; Stimson Diaries, January 5, 1942.

28 Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 387. Matthew S. Klimow harshly criticizes Roosevelt, Stimson, Marshall, and even MacArthur for the lies they told the troops regarding the reinforcement of the Philippines. He argues they knew (or should have known) after December 8 getting aid to the Philippines was impossible, and their failure to communicate the truth to the soldiers (and civilians back home) was an “inexcusable breach of integrity” that likely had little effect on the fate of the Philippines. See Matthew S. Klimow, “Lying to the Troops: American Leaders and the Defense of Bataan,” Parameters 20 (December 1990): 48-60.
A number of military analysts offered Americans their gloomy predictions when it came to the war in the Far East, and by January the term “delaying action” was part of Americans’ lexicon to describe the defense of the Philippines, thus easing the psychological burden of dealing with the inevitable outcome of such a strategy. MacArthur’s men were stalling the “hydra-headed Japanese invasion” as part of a “strategy that makes defeats inevitable.” The term furthermore helped Americans see the loss of Bataan as a fundamental part of Allied victory. People were going to have to get used to “the slow working out of military plans” and “keep faith in the…command,” even when it seemed nothing was being done. An editorial in the *Clovis News-Journal* noted the loss of the Philippines would be a tragedy, but the United States was “pledged to regaining them” to make good on its promise of Philippine independence, and so the defeat was only temporary. The men who “fought on, doggedly, bravely” were “unconquerable”; they were laying “the corner stone of…triumph” with their “toil, sweat, blood, and sheer guts.”

Confronted with a befuddling mix of encouraging communiques from the front and bleak analyses from reporters at home, Americans wavered between optimism and resignation when it came to the situation in the Pacific. They were told “MacArthur’s indomitables” continued to fight “amid indications that powerful American reinforcement…can be expected.” The Navy announced it was following a “well-planned campaign” that would “result in positive assistance to the island’s defense,” but an editorial reminded civilians this was likely not going to happen any time soon because the

Philippines were almost seven thousand miles from the United States, and were “literally encircled by Nipponese bases.” Others suggested it was “suicide to risk all our resources in defending the Philippines,” and that people ought to “petition God, not the administration,” for relief of the beleaguered islands. Barnet Nover, a foreign affairs specialist and columnist for the *Washington Post*, told readers MacArthur’s defense of the Philippines was certainly valuable to the war effort, but was nonetheless “a rear-guard fight,” and the brave “little band of Filipino and American troops” would “have to continue to give ground unless the impossible happens and reinforcements reach him.” Raymond Clapper, another respected columnist, darkly told the public they could “not view with any optimism whatever the position of General MacArthur in the Philippines.”

Irate citizens were frustrated with the stagnant pace of relief efforts, but also disgruntled because they believed the supplies American soldiers on Bataan so desperately needed were being diverted to other theaters. In a letter to the editor of the *Akron Beacon-Journal*, one citizen fumed because it seemed there was “lend-lease aid for all the world—except our own people in the Philippines.” In his editorial column “Pecos Pete,” Ken Dixon of the Carlsbad *Daily Current-Argus* wondered if the “men in Washington could use a tabletop map,” because “mebbe if they had a couple they could figure out…howcum Uncle Sam sends an A. E. F. to North Ireland where it ain’t

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needed…and don’t send none to the Philippine Islands.” John Robison, a Republican congressman from Kentucky, voiced his constituents’ concerns when took to the House floor to criticize the War Department for sending so many supplies to the British in the Atlantic who were “armed to the teeth” while ignoring MacArthur’s “begging” from the Pacific. “The minds of the American people are stirred…their hearts are bleeding in their anxiety for General MacArthur and his heroic men in the Philippines,” he opined.

Others accused politicians of too much talk and too little action. “Maybe our boys in the Philippines would have had something besides rifles and hand grenades to fight with,” he grumbled, “if all the energy that has gone into speeches had been used to make guns, tanks, and planes.” Furthermore, many believed frivolous issues were not only distracting lawmakers from the desperate situation on Bataan but also diverting financial resources from essential war requirements, such as “hootchy-kootchy” dancer Mayris Chaney’s appointment to the fitness division of the Office of Civilian Defense. One newspaper criticized her selection as an example of government boondoggling and scoffed,

MacArthur and his sorely harassed men in the Philippines can now rejoice. We are going to have a protégé of Mrs. Roosevelt to teach aesthetic dancing to the civilian defense workers. So General MacArthur can be assured that help is on the way. We are going to all learn how to drape bedsheets around us and prance in the air raid shelters. That should be a great relief to MacArthur…This administration boondoggled away fifty thousand million dollars of the taxpayers’ money, and we don’t seem to have any planes or ships to send to MacArthur’s aid or to Wake Island.32

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32 “The Lady Dancers to the Rescue,” Daily Independent (Murphysboro, IL), February 6, 1942.
Representative Edward Cox, from Georgia, took to the House floor to complain about wasteful spending that did nothing to advance the war effort, one example of which was giving “hootchy-kootchy entertainers and fan dancers preferential treatment.” Representative Cox, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88, pt. 1:1147.
Editorial cartoonist Clifford Berryman captured the overwhelming sensibility that resources were being misdirected to the detriment of the war effort in an illustration depicting an aide asking a harried MacArthur what he should do with the latest headlines from the States, news which might “cause the soldier in the front line in the Bataan Peninsula to throw down his gun in disgust.”

![Figure 3.1 Clifford Berryman's illustration, "Here's the News from Washington," contrasted the rapidly deteriorating and desperate conditions on Bataan with the apparently frivolous, wasteful, and selfish matters occupying Congress. Editorial cartoons like this reinforced the public’s sense the government was shirking its duty to the men on Bataan. The last piece of news—“many kind statements”—was the wartime equivalent of today’s much-maligned “thoughts and prayers.” Pleasant statements, it implies, are not as useful as planes, tanks, and more men.](image)

34 Clifford Berryman, “Here’s the News from Washington, Sir, Shall I Post It?” February 8, 1942, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Washington, D.C.
Indeed, many Americans—and especially New Mexicans—watched with growing angst the unfolding disaster and aimed their ire at congressmen and War Department officials, whom they believed bore much of the blame for continued neglect of the Pacific theater. Senator Millard Tydings, a Democrat from Maryland, shared these frustrations and chastised his colleagues from the Senate floor. “We went into the war unprepared,” he raged, but “unless someone begins to speak, and to speak courageously, this war might be lost, and all the dead will be just as dead as if the war had been won. . . . Perhaps what I am saying may be wrong, but where the American flag flies and where our troops fight is the first place I would send our men.”

Senator Dennis Chávez of New Mexico received letters from constituents who were following the increasingly futile situation in the Philippines “with keen interest and many tears.” The letters, which he read into the Congressional Record, accused the government of sending the boys “as a suicide squad.” The exasperated missives showed that people believed when surrender came it would not be the fault of the men but of their government. Verma Sherman from Deming, whose son Fred was in the 200th and was later killed aboard the *Oryoku Maru* believed the nation had failed the boys “and is no longer interested in them, since they leave them to fight until there is no alternative but to surrender.” Ethel Bickford, one of the mothers who helped found the Bataan Relief Organization, assured Chávez she and her fellow New Mexicans were “true Americans” and did “not object to our boys fighting for their country,” but they did “object to our boys being sacrificed” for other military objectives. The government had sent the “men to die like rats in a trap,” and they were “being murdered without a chance.”

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On February 23, 1942, Roosevelt put an end to any further speculation about the likelihood of reinforcements reaching the Philippines. After detailing the problematic geography of the distant archipelago, he told Americans the Philippines were completely encircled by the Japanese, and no enforcements could reach them. “For forty years,” he counseled, “it has always been our strategy . . . [to] fight a delaying action.” Furthermore, “we knew all along . . . to obtain our objective . . . operations would be necessary in areas other than the Philippines,” and “nothing . . . in the last two months has caused us to revise this basic strategy of necessity.” MacArthur and his men “are gaining eternal glory” and “making Japan pay an increasingly terrible price.”

Just two days later Stimson sent a reply to Governor John Miles’ inquiry about the status of New Mexican boys fighting in the Philippines, and wrote “everything possible is being done to feed, supply, and protect our soldiers in the Philippines,” but at that point it was clear nothing could be done that would have any bearing on the ultimate outcome of the defense of the Philippines. Soldiers on the front lines listened to Roosevelt’s address. One of those, Lester Tenney, later recalled hearing Roosevelt say “in every battle there comes a time when one group of warriors must be sacrificed for the benefit of the whole.” Roosevelt did not utter those exact words, but that is the meaning Tenney and his comrades derived from his somber message.

This was in fact the meaning many Americans ascribed to the situation they now had little choice but to recognize. The Philippines would eventually fall to the Japanese, and though the word “surrender” was rarely used in newspapers, that was the outcome.

38 Henry L. Stimson to John E. Miles, February 25, 1942, Miles Papers, Box 10, Folder 346, NMSRCA.
they were being groomed to accept. Roosevelt’s message gave civilians the fodder they needed to construct the dominant narrative about what the surrender of the Philippines meant. First, he established that the fall of the Philippines was a planned-for outcome. It was part of an overall American strategy of war meant to delay Japanese progress to more valuable targets in the Pacific, and give the nation the time it needed to ramp up military production and train its young army. The Philippines, and the men fighting to defend it, had to be sacrificed to conquer both Germany and Japan. Therefore, it could be cast as an essential (and intentional) part of the eventual Allied victory, and was not a true defeat.

Second, he exposed the painful consequences of isolationism and limited defense spending—and thus indicted the American people themselves for some of the economic, military, and cultural conditions that proscribed a more vigorous (and successful) defense of the islands. As a result, Bataan became a tragic symbol of Americans’ apathy towards national defense and world affairs and was used to spur all manner of wartime activities and attitudes. Individuals and organizations—in official and unofficial capacities—incorporated Bataan into a variety of cultural forms to encourage military production, investment in war bonds, and conservation, and to shape attitudes toward sacrifice and suffering.

Third, he gave Americans a scapegoat for their suffering. If the loss of Bataan was part of a long-standing strategy for global war, government and military leadership bore the brunt of the blame for the surrender—not the men themselves. In fact, Roosevelt’s confession meant for many Americans that leaders had not simply, and perhaps forgivably, made mistakes. Another one of Berryman’s cartoons makes this point clear.
When the War Department announced the surrender, Stimson declared, “We have nothing but praise and admiration for the commanders and the men who have conducted this epic chapter in American history.” And indeed, reasoned many of the folks at home, he and other officials had sent the men on Bataan little but useless words.

![Figure 3.2](https://example.com/clifford-berryman-cartoon.png) Clifford Berryman’s cartoon criticized Stimson’s hollow tribute, and countered it to remind the War Department Bataan was a lesson in the consequences of military unpreparedness. His cartoon also reminded citizens of their home front obligations to conserve materials, produce armament, and buy bonds to support the war effort. Because, after all, praise would not win the war.

They had instead intentionally sent young American men to a virtually indefensible outpost and then left them there. The men had been abandoned, forgotten, neglected, and forsaken—words Americans at home used to form the enduring rhetorical

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40 “Bataan Defenses Collapse,” Minneapolis Star, April 9, 1942.
41 Clifford Berryman, “They Made a Gallant Fight, Mr. Secretary, and I’m Glad to See These Expressions of Praise,” April 10, 1942, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Washington, D.C.
canon of what happened on Bataan. Accordingly, citizens modified dominant constructions of martial masculinity to include the defenders of Bataan and Corregidor. They made room in America’s victory culture to recognize, honor, and commemorate men who themselves often expressed feelings of shame and dishonor at having surrendered and spent the war in prison camps instead of on the front lines.

A number of historians have credited Henry Stimson with distilling the War Department’s abandonment of American and Filipino forces on Bataan to a single sentence: “There are times when men must die.” His conclusion was recently given new life on Twitter, where Allwyn Collinson, a historian at the Museum of London, live-tweets World War II events under the account @RealTimeWWII. One commenter observed it “never ceases to amaze me how many leaders were quick to let their people die,” while another called Stimson a “cold-hearted bastard.” @GoofyGeoff lamented it was “too bad Stimson didn’t have to march.” A reply to an especially vulgar comment was more phlegmatic: “Shit happens.” These present-day judgments of Stimson’s dismissive shrug closely mirror the way Americans in the 1940s felt about the War Department’s abandonment of its soldiers, and reflect how powerfully the defense of Bataan has been infused with the rhetoric of necessary sacrifice and intentional abandonment. Stimson’s remark is a familiar and well-used part of that narrative.

Collinson did not offer a source for Stimson’s statement, but so many other historians

have by this point attributed it to him, that he did say it is taken for granted. A close examination of those historians’ work and their citations, however, suggests there is no definitive proof Stimson uttered those words.43

In 1960, Stimson’s biographer, Elting Morison, claimed Stimson made the comment to Marshall while they were drafting a telegram for Quezon and MacArthur. Several later historians use the biography, *Turmoil and Tradition*, as their own source for Stimson’s statement, and they repeat much the same story: it was a comment made as the two leaders prepared a telegram bearing the news no reinforcements were coming, and that forces in the Philippines would have to “keep the American flag flying…so long as there remains any possibility of resistance.” It is possible that Stimson said “There are times when men have to die” or some equivalent variation, given what he and Marshall were deciding about the fate of the Philippine garrison. But historians’ accounts differ regarding when, where, and how that statement entered the lexicon of the Bataan surrender. Some, like Morison, contend Stimson said it in conversation with Marshall. Others claim he made the remark to Churchill during the early days of the Arcadia Conference, a couple believe that he wrote it after receiving the WPD report in early January, and still others indicate he made the dismal observation in his diary in early February. A few of the authors explicitly cite his diary entry for February 2, but a close

43 This phrase has been uttered and written by many others, for a range of purposes. For example, a widely-carried editorial published in newspapers in 1903 reflected on that year’s peace conference and argued that sometimes war was necessary, and contained the exact phrase “There are times when men must die.” See “No Universal Peace?” *Buffalo Enquirer* (Buffalo, NY), December 28, 1903. The phrase was also used in a number of newspaper articles during World War I. A religious leader used it to reference the death of Jesus in his sermon. See “Sermon,” *Indiana Gazette* (Indiana, PA), July 8, 1955. And, a private citizen used the phrase in a letter to the editor protesting the Vietnam War. See “Civil War in Vietnam,” *The Record* (Hackensack, NJ), June 22, 1965. Several amateur poets employed the phrase in poems submitted to newspapers. Indeed, most of the articles that turn up in a search for “times when men must die” predate World War II. This finding suggests writers and historians may have given Stimson’s meaning a form already familiar as an expression of religious and patriotic sentiment and ideology.
reading of that entry does not bear out their claims. In fact, Stimson made no mention of the situation in the Philippines at all in his entry for that day. The author of a brief online biography of Delmon Bushaw, a sergeant in the 192nd Tank Battalion from Janesville, Wisconsin, goes as far as to claim Stimson made the comment during a radio broadcast that he and his fellow soldiers listened to from their foxholes.

By repeating these claims without actual proof, historians are complicit in shaping public understanding of the War Department’s attitude towards the Bataan defenders. Several paint Stimson as somewhat sympathetic to the defenders’ plight and say he “recorded gloomily,” “wrote bitterly,” or was “weeping” when he said it, but most characterize his remark as “cold,” “dispassionate,” “chilly,” “stark,” and “matter-of-fact,” suggesting he and other officials cared little for the fate of the men trapped in the Philippines.44 In reality, their inability to reach the Philippines with much-needed

supplies weighed heavily on Stimson. On the day he and Marshall sent their telegram to MacArthur, he recorded in his diary, “It had been a pretty hard day, for the taking of the decision we reached was a difficult one, consigning as it did a brave garrison to a fight to the finish.”

Stimson’s alleged comment and the supposed callousness with which he either said or wrote it have become part of the lore of the Bataan surrender. His remark has been repeatedly used to reinforce the dominant narrative of government betrayal, abandonment, and sacrifice and offers a succinct crystallization of how soldiers and their families felt about the circumstances that led to the surrender. For example, James Murphy and his son, Kenneth, adapted Stimson’s comment for the title of his autobiographical account of the war and replaced “die” with “live.” This defiant substitution emphasizes the heroism of the men who fought on Bataan, and underscores its usefulness in absolving individual soldiers (and their officers) of any responsibility for the defeat. A radio operator in the U.S. Army Air Corps who was taken prisoner on Bataan, Murphy coauthored the book with his son and offered it to readers “as a caution to societies and an inspiration to individuals,” and surmised if the troops knew what Stimson said, “they would have wondered how the leaders of the world’s most powerful military establishment could adopt such a defeatist point of view” and “give up on a single, valued American life, let alone thousands of its finest forces.”

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45 *Stimson Diaries*, February 9, 1942.

The Murphys’s dedication celebrated the soldiers who were forced to surrender while heaping blame for the loss of Bataan and Corregidor on the “handful of statesman-politicians in Washington, D.C.,” for their failure to adequately prepare and then reinforce the islands’ defenses. Roosevelt, the War Department, politicians, and the press created the language of defeat that contributed to the formation of this enduring narrative. That the American soldiers on Bataan and Corregidor fought as long as they did in spite of their nation’s abandonment of them made their achievements, and their losses, all the more admirable. This powerful story of individual bravery in the face of catastrophic odds took shape during the earliest days of the defense of the Philippines, and was sustained by the almost-daily accounts of the battle for Bataan printed in newspapers and magazines across the country.

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47 This statement contains a veiled indictment of the American public for clinging to the isolationist sensibilities that obstructed increased military spending.
CHAPTER 4
“The Men of Bataan Lived Up to the Best American Tradition”: Journalists, Civilians, Politicians, and the Meaning of Surrender in America

In the spring of 1943, almost a year after Bataan surrendered, Clark Lee visited New Mexico, fulfilling a promise he had apparently made to some of its soldiers that when he got out of the Philippines he’d “come to New Mexico and tell their families about it.” The Associated Press correspondent had been in the Philippines when the Japanese attacked, and was on Bataan until February.\(^1\) The *Gallup Independent* reminded its readers “Lee lived and talked with these men from New Mexico in their fox holes on Bataan. His stories…often bore the names of the boys with whom he talked, and in many cases it was through Lee’s stories that parents and friends received the only word from the soldiers after the outbreak of the war.”\(^2\) Accounts of his talks in Santa Fe and Albuquerque tell of the “welcome news” he brought to the soldiers’ families and friends, but in some ways the information he shared was less important than his physical presence. The *Albuquerque Journal* reported: “He was with our boys in the Islands. Though he brought no direct message from any of them, parents who

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1. The date Lee left is important, because the newspapers reporting his talks in Santa Fe and Albuquerque shared how he had reassured families the men were doing well, and had enough food. He also told them there was no reason to think the Japanese were mistreating them. After Lee left the conditions deteriorated rapidly. I cannot find evidence he purposely misled them, and it would be awfully cruel of him to have done so. He based his comments on what he knew or believed to be true when he left the Philippines. Quite frankly, however, by March 1943 even he should have read enough of the stories from other correspondents, like Hewlett, to know that the conditions on Bataan had been miserable.

2. “Lee to Tell Of Bataan in Talk Tonight,” *Gallup Independent*, March 29, 1943; State senator George Armijo delivered a few remarks after Lee spoke, and commented “It was particularly fitting that the man who brought word on how New Mexicans had fought in the Philippines was standing in the shadow of the bust of Captain Maximiliano Luna, a New Mexican hero, once speaker of the house, who lost his life while serving the American flag in the Philippines 45 years ago.” “Clark Lee in High Tribute to 200th,” *Clovis News-Journal*, March 29, 1943.
greeted him felt that they were clasping a hand that had gripped the hands of their sons, and that they were looking into eyes that had seen their brave deeds.”

Figure 4.1 Ynez Sanchez shakes Clark Lee’s hand. Her son, Cristobal, was in Battery C of the 200th Coast Artillery. She listened to Lee’s talk, hoping to hear some snippet that would assure her he was still alive. He was not. Cristobal Sanchez died three months earlier in Camp Cabanatuan, on December 19, 1942.

Lee provided the physical reassurance so many anxious mothers and fathers needed, and just as his war stories from the front lines during the defense of Bataan stood in for the letters they hoped for but never received, his body became a proxy for the hundreds of soldiers they feared they might never see again. Most Americans, however, were more likely to read Lee’s words than they were to shake his hand. The stories Lee, and other war correspondents like him, crafted amidst the chaos of the front lines on Bataan complemented the Roosevelt Administration’s language of defeat with a vocabulary of heroism, courage, and gallantry shaped how Americans ascribed meaning to the Bataan surrender.

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In this chapter, I argue home front Americans repudiated the stigma of surrender and embraced the loss of the Philippines as essential to final Allied victory over Japan, and show how Americans used political, military, and cultural spaces to make sense of what was transpiring in the Philippines. A few cultural products tried to camouflage the problem of surrender. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer’s 1943 film *Bataan*, for example, suggested that most heroic soldiers on Bataan fought to the death rather than surrender or be taken prisoner. The Museum of Modern Art’s *Road to Victory*, a photographic collage of America’s early days at war, made room for the defeat in its otherwise triumphal parade of American military, industrial, and economic successes, but recognized the dead, not the living. Beneath a life-size photograph of GIs with guns at the ready, a short poem penned by Carl Sandburg paid tribute to the defenders. The verse was an ode to the dead.

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5 The “stigma of surrender” refers to the “social pressures that compelled soldiers to view surrender as shameful.” Writing about German prisoners of war during World War I, Brian Feltman notes “soldiers and civilians alike revered sacrificial death as the highest expression of national devotion,” and so “society often relegated prisoners of war to the commemorative emptiness between victory and death.” See Brian K. Feltman, *The Stigma of Surrender: German Prisoners, British Captors, and Manhood in the Great War and Beyond* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 3.
These two examples indicate an undercurrent of discomfort with the implications of surrender for American military might, but as I show in this chapter, Americans took advantage of the vocabularies of defeat at their disposal to overcome that uneasiness and forge a narrative of surrender that made it fit readily into its growing victory narrative. I

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detail the ways war correspondents shaped home front Americans’ imagination about the course of events in the Pacific, and how their stories contributed to the formation of a vocabulary of surrender that persisted into the postwar era. In addition, I examine how other writers, photographers, and editorial cartoonists visually rendered the defense of Bataan for domestic consumption and gave civilians fodder for their conversations about the causes and consequences of the surrender. Finally, I explore the Senate’s consideration of S 1374, a bill introduced by one of New Mexico’s Democratic Senators, Dennis Chávez, that called for the promotion of American prisoners of war who were stationed in the U.S. territories of Wake, Guam, and the Philippines when the war against Japan began. The proposed legislation prompted a widespread debate over the wisdom of rewarding defeated soldiers and who was obliged to do so, and the contents of that discussion reveal a great deal about what surrender meant to Americans during the war.

Reckoning with the legacies of the Bataan defeat helps fill the historiographical gap in the literature on America’s experience of World War II. The surrender was a defining moment of the war for many Americans, and we need to more fully account for how home front Americans imagined and managed its causes and consequences. Though this dissertation focuses on New Mexico, it is important to remember that New Mexicans did not live in a vacuum. Small-town newspapers reprinted stories from national news services, and publications like Time, Life, and Newsweek made their way into literate hands across the state. Though only about half of the homes in New Mexico had radios, enterprising women took turns manning listening posts and shared information with families who had sons in the Pacific. After the surrender, the Bataan Relief Organization freely distributed its monthly bulletin to imprisoned soldiers’ loved ones, and its editors compiled news items from
national metropolises like Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles, letters from worried families throughout the country, and lengthy tidbits from the congressional floor to apprise their readers of the state of affairs when it came to prisoners of war and the work being done on their behalf. Indeed, much of what New Mexicans knew about and how they reacted to the surrender was shaped by the national conversation churning around them in the first few months of the war. Likewise, some of those same sources shared with the rest of the country New Mexico’s particular agony. In this chapter I stray from my fairly singular emphasis on New Mexico, but I do so because it is critical to understand how surrender fit into the American experience of war. Even if they knew no one in the Philippines, all Americans had to come to terms with what surrender meant for American military might, the likelihood of Allied victory in the war, and long-held convictions about the nation’s martial superiority.

American war correspondents and analysts did their part to ensure folks on the home front knew the men fighting in the Philippines were indeed heroes who, but for lack of supplies and reinforcements, poor nutrition, and a slew of debilitating tropical diseases, would have successfully fended off the Japanese invasion. In February 1942, Barnet Stover warned journalists they had to report the war responsibly; they were in the habit of emphasizing “what they believed to be interesting over what is important,” but in wartime were obligated to address the latter, lest readers “one day be shocked into discovering that while we have been winning all the headlines our enemies have been winning the war.”7 The press mediated Americans’ knowledge of the defense of Bataan and wielded significant power in shaping their contemporaneous and subsequent narratives of the campaign. With words and images, reporters and photographers crafted stories that lived well beyond the date

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of their publication. They furthermore made New Mexico’s particular plight more accessible to the broader public. Civilians, especially those with men on Bataan, grabbed onto both the good (heroics, morale, patriotism) and the bad (abandonment, starvation, disease) to make sense of their significant losses, to inspire home front sacrifice, to demand accountability from the federal government, and to transform the surrender from a story of defeat to one of ultimate victory.

A number of foreign correspondents happened to be in the Philippines at the time of the Japanese attack, and MacArthur promised the pluckiest among them they could have a “ringside seat” to the action in the Philippines if they were “willing to risk being killed.”

Frank Hewlett was Manila’s United Press bureau chief and accompanied the retreating forces to Bataan. His wife, Virginia, worked for the High Commissioner and chose to stay in Manila where she was captured by the Japanese and interned at Santo Tomas. Carl Mydans, a Life photographer, and his wife, Shelley, a researcher for the magazine, also remained in the city. They were both captured and held prisoner for almost two years by the Japanese, and were repatriated during a prisoner exchange in 1943. Carl returned to the Philippines with MacArthur in 1944, and took one of the most iconic photographs of the Philippine campaign. Melville Jacoby and his fiancée, Annalee Whitmore, arrived in Manila in late November after fleeing China. He was a correspondent for Time and Life magazines, and she wrote for Liberty. They remained in the Philippines until they escaped from Corregidor in late February. Clark Lee had been on his way back to the United States from China when war broke out and was stranded in the Philippines; he joined the Jacobys for the perilous trip south. Nat Floyd of the New York Times worked for the Manila Daily Bulletin along with

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8 “War Orders,” Time 38, no. 24 (December 15, 1941): 56.
Dean Schedler, who also reported for the Associated Press. Floyd, Hewlett, and Schedler were the last correspondents to leave the Philippines before the surrender.

These reporters and photographers indeed risked their lives to give Americans back home the words and images they desperately needed to make sense of what was happening in the Pacific. War Department regulations guided the parameters of dispatches from the front: their articles had to be “accurate,” they could “not supply military information to the enemy” or “injure the morale of our forces, the people at home, or our allies,” and they could not “embarrass the United States, its allies, or neutral countries.” Many newspapers published the War Department’s daily war communiques, but they offered little context for people on the home front. For example, the communique for December 24, the day MacArthur’s forces began their withdrawal into Bataan, reported additional Japanese landings on Luzon. It read that “Though American and Philippine troops are greatly outnumbered they are offering stiff resistance…in a series of delaying actions.” Hewlett’s article on the landings, however, embellished the details offered by the spare press release. MacArthur had “assumed personal command,” he wrote, and suggested to readers the ensuing battle might decide “the immediate fate of the Philippines.” Clark Lee described the sounds of war, telling readers how in Manila “the scream of air raid sirens mingled with the tolling of the church bells.”

These details certainly filled out the matter-of-fact War Department releases, but the public appreciated even more the stories that told them about the fighting men themselves. The Japanese invasion interrupted mail service, and for the duration of the defensive campaign

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10 War Department, “War Department Communique No. 27,” December 24, 1941; Frank Hewlett, “MacArthur, Manila’s Own Forces Rush to ‘All Out’ War Front, Face Foe of Superior Numbers,” *Salt Lake Telegram*, December 24, 1941; Clark Lee, “Island Defenders More Than Holding Own,” *Casper Star-Tribune* (Casper, WY), December 25, 1941.
folks back home received little to no mail from the frontlines. Short of this intimate contact, stories about their loved ones from men who had actually seen them alive and spoken with them was the next best thing.11

These stories and photographs—of ordinary men at war—gave a “hero-hungry nation” the heroes it needed during the darkest and most uncertain days of the war, and importantly fostered a connection between home front civilians and the young men engaged in the Bataan campaign.12 MacArthur’s biographers have chronicled the overwhelming attention he received (and sought) as the indefatigable leader of U. S. forces in the Pacific, but the press also paid attention to the antics and achievements of average American GIs and personalized them for Americans back home. A couple days after the attack on Clark Field, for example, Lee filed a story about the antiaircraft artillery unit responsible for shooting down the first Japanese plane during the air assault. He had spent the night with “American youngsters,” who after just “one day of war” had become “tough, determined soldiers” and were no longer “kids in soldiers’ uniforms.” The Office of Censorship’s press guidelines prevented him from identifying the unit by name, but Lee’s careful remark that they spoke with “the drawling accent of a Southwestern State” convinced editors at the *Albuquerque Journal* he was talking about the 200th Coast Artillery, and they printed the story with the headline “Southwest Gunners Knock Down Five Jap Planes.”13 Other papers across the nation, however, emphasized the universal message of the story—that war had made the boys

13 The story printed in the *Albuquerque Journal* also capitalized “Southwestern” within the story. It could have been an editorial oversight, but a quick survey of the other papers that carried the story shows they generally kept the geographic reference in lowercase. Later on, the 200th was cited for being the first to fire on Japanese airplanes, and so Lee’s story was in all probability about a gunnery unit from the 200th. Clark Lee, “Southwest Gunners Knock Down Five Jap Planes,” *Albuquerque Journal*, December 11, 1941.
tough, grizzled fighters. Later in the month *Life* printed firsthand accounts of the Clark Field
written by Joe Smith and Paul Womack, both sergeants from Carlsbad. Their tales confirmed
both the *Journal*’s deduction and Lee’s assessment of the soldiers’ overnight transformation.
“We were just a bunch of little kids out there when we started,” Womack wrote, but “we
know now we’ve got what they can’t take.”

The feature in *Life* introduced the nation to Smith, Womack, and Battery F, and in
April 1942 they became hometown heroes when Lee wrote a story about Carlsbad’s “First in
Spite of Hell” just before the surrender. Lee did not identify the unit, but the details in his
story did. He reassured families as of February their boys were alive and reported a few
statistics about their battlefield successes. He named several of the young men—Smith, Gene
and Dwayne Davis, and a Sergeant Hall—and remarked they had “Bataan faces” that were
“lined, strained, and streaked with dust.” Despite the harsh battlefield conditions “none of
them was grumbling.” When the next day’s headlines reported Bataan had fallen, the people
of Carlsbad clung to Lee’s assurances “the boys were all alive and well.”

Ken Dixon captured the mood of the town when he penned a letter to Lee as his daily editorial. The AP
picked up his missive, and papers across the country reprinted the editorial, commenting,
“Wherever people read it they were proud of their fighting men.” Dixon shared with Lee
“how much that story . . . pepped up” the families back home.

15 Both the War Department’s field manual for war correspondents and the Office of Censorship’s *Code of
Wartime Practices for the American Press* asked reporters not to publish details that revealed the identities of
troops or their units. See Office of Censorship, *Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press*, Edition of
“Small Ray of Hope Seen for Carlsbad Boys,” *Daily Current-Argus*, April 9, 1942; The 200th had two “Sergeant
Halls,” but Lee identified this particular Hall as hailing from Texas. Matson’s *It Tolled from New Mexico* shows
both with New Mexico hometowns. The likeliest is Milus Hall, whose home town is identified as Clovis, which
is near the Texas border. He died in Camp Cabanatuan in October 1942. A number of men in the 200th were
originally from New Mexico, despite their listed home towns suggesting otherwise. See Matson, 296-297.
Bataan,” he wrote, “and those boys’ parents here in this little Pecos river valley city know it.” But, he continued, “You said ‘I talked to them’ and ‘I heard them say,’ and . . . it was as good as hearing direct . . . These folks have come to regard you as a personal friend who brings them daily messages from their boys.” In fact, “if we took a vote among all the families of the . . . boys as to their favorite hero, they’d pick MacArthur first—but we believe you’d be second.”

Advertisements for John Hersey’s first book, *Men on Bataan*, published in June of 1942, reflected this infatuation with MacArthur and marketed the novel as an account of the illustrious general. Many people remember John Hersey for his account of the devastating destruction of the atomic bomb from *Hiroshima*, but in this lesser-known work he paid attention to the everyday heroism of America’s earliest combat soldiers. Some reviewers carefully pointed out half of the novel was filled with “stories of individuals . . . of privates, corporals and sergeants and commissioned officers” and their “acts of heroism that became commonplace in Bataan.” Hersey relied on dispatches filed by the Jacobys and Mydans for much of his writing, but he did some of his own research: he contacted families for information about the men, asking for intimate details like nicknames, hobbies, talents, idiosyncrasies, girlfriends, wives, and children so that the “heroes [were] made human.” He wanted Americans to appreciate “the good young men who loved their mothers.” And so he

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told them how tough Smith was. He “grew up muscular” and broke his nose when he “played soldier” with his brother. He was a strong swimmer and liked to box. Womack loved to make people laugh, but he collected Indian artifacts and wanted to be a doctor just like his father. Hersey filled the “crying vacuum” of American morale by helping readers humanize the otherwise amorphous “Bataan defenders” and portraying them as “reluctant warriors…average, clean-living young men from small towns whose patriotism led them to fight a war in tropical jungles.” One biographer noted the patriotic impulse behind Men on Bataan, written largely “for the sake of morale and truth in this year of American defeat,” and the hero-hungry public lapped it up. It sold more than seven thousand copies in six months, and spent twenty-six weeks on the New York Times best-seller list.

Lee, Hersey, and the Jacobys gave the public stories of boys who became men overnight, of sons who wrote letters home and carried them in their uniform pockets, and of battle-weary soldiers who did their duty despite immense fatigue. They ensured the G.I.s on Bataan were not anonymous. They were brothers, sons, fathers, husbands whose families and communities missed them, felt deeply their sacrifices, and mourned them when they were lost. Americans were compelled to self-identify with the soldiers, imagine them as the boys next door, and admire their skill and courage in the heat of battle. Families with men in the Philippines need not be ashamed or embarrassed that they had surrendered, because the boys were “like you and your sons and your sisters and your friends. They have reacted as you will react when your crisis comes, splendidly and worthily.”

Editorial cartoonist Henry Barrow

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19 The phrase “crying vacuum” is drawn from Alfred Knopf’s letter to Hersey just after Pearl Harbor asking him to write something about the war with Japan, Quoted in Treglown, Mr. Straight Arrow, 63; Gary R. Hess, The United States at War, 1941-1945 (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 2011), 63.
reinforced that the soldiers on Bataan embodied the qualities of martial masculinity with his drawing, “Eternal Fire,” published in a number of newspapers around the country.

![Figure 4.3 Barrow's cartoon, which ran a week after the surrender, affirmed the men who fought, died, and surrendered on Bataan were nothing less than heroes, who possessed the qualities to which every fighting man should aspire: patriotism, courage, valor, heroism, spirit, and fortitude.]

The surrender was not a reflection of the men themselves and could not be blamed on weakness of character, body, or will but was instead militarily necessary. It was an outcome the soldiers they had read about likely neither desired nor welcomed, and most probably resisted. To underscore this point, in addition to reprinting an excerpt from it, the *Coast Artillery Journal* recommended *Men on Bataan* as a must-read for officers, soldiers, and civilians. The excerpt featured Smith and his fellow artillerymen and ran with the title,

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“Better Than the Enemy,” a less-than-subtle insistence on the American fighting man’s combat superiority.23 Radioman Irving Strobing’s last radio message out of Corregidor before the “enemy snatched his fingers” away from the machine was also reprinted in the issue, just a couple pages before Hersey’s story, and the accompanying introduction—“He was only one of several thousand Americans who did what they could” in the Philippines and “stuck to his post to the very end”—reinforced this sentiment.24

Frank Hewlett’s frontline reporting describing the conditions on Bataan and Corregidor furnished both the evidence and the adjectives that proved to readers the men on Bataan bore none of the blame for the surrender. One of his first dispatches detailed how a colonel in the Philippines “was merely voicing the sentiments of men of all ranks” when he “promised to fight to the last man.” “Spirits were high in these beleaguered islands,” he reassured readers, and there were few American casualties. His reporting was so associated with the campaign that when, in December 1942 he reported on MacArthur’s first offensive at Buna, the United Press editors inserted a lead-in to his story describing him as “heretofore a reporter of American defeats.” The majority of his reports from Bataan had little to do with the overall course of the defensive action and instead offered vignettes to give readers a more personalized account of the battle. His first dispatch off the peninsula described the makeshift prison holding captive Japanese soldiers. Importantly, he hinted at Japanese attitudes toward surrender, and the likelihood U.S. troops would soon face a similar choice. “The impression here is that…if the tide of battle turns, there will be no Luzon counterpart of Dunkirk; rather, the men must fight or die.” Another described the bravery, skill, and determination of the

soldiers, like that of a Filipino private who killed eleven Japanese—first with a machine gun that jammed, then a pistol that also jammed, and the last two with their own weapons. His first transmission out of Corregidor reported that despite heavy bombing since January the Rock “still stands, a great headache to the Japanese warlords.” The “Stars and Stripes still wave,” and “the garrison shows not the least sign of faltering.” American artillerymen had managed to shoot down enough Japanese planes to discourage further raids, and one of those downed planes “cost United States taxpayers a total of $15 for 260 rounds of ammunition.” This commentary on the cost of war was a clever reminder of the comparatively meager financial sacrifices civilians were being asked to make to equip the army. Hewlett made much of the morale of men fighting on the island, and told people back home MacArthur’s escape to the Philippines “renewed hope that a way will be found to send them reinforcements.” Men on Corregidor, he wrote, “were sticking gamely to their posts against the most tremendous odds.” With only antiaircraft guns to deter Japanese bombers because “the defending forces are without air strength” the task was a formidable one.25

Soldiers’ morale, however, was neither as high nor as impenetrable as the upbeat articles suggested, a point Clark Lee made to his readers when he shared the satirical conversations a few “hard-bitten soldiers” had about rumors that help was coming—a million-man convoy was on its way, and a whole quarter-mile of a new bridge between San Francisco and Manila was already finished. The story was meant to be entertaining, but their

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fanciful banter belied their sense of despair and isolation, made clear in a private’s melancholy comment: “I bet my mammy and pappy done forgot they had a son. They probably sawed my corner off the dinner table,” bemoaned Private Williams. Hewlett highlighted the gloomy satire of these exchanges when he penned the ditty that has since come to epitomize the sense of betrayal and abandonment the men on Bataan felt when they started to realize no reinforcements were coming their way. *Time* used the first two lines of Hewlett’s tune in a story in its March 9 issue, and Americans wasted no time incorporating them into their letters urging the Roosevelt Administration to speed relief to the Philippines. Upon his return to the United States in 1945, Wainwright included the entirety of “the little tune” in his autobiographical account of the war, which ran in newspapers across the country:

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We’re the battling bastards of Bataan,
No momma, no poppa, no Uncle Sam
No aunts, no uncles, no nephews, no nieces,
No rifles, no guns or artillery pieces
And nobody gives a damn.27
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The rhyme reinforced Americans’ faith in the soldiers’ courage and resourcefulness but also confirmed their rapidly growing realization nothing was going to be done to alleviate the situation in the islands. The subsequent, and highly publicized arrests, of Robert Noble and Ellis Jones on charges of sedition showed how sensitive U.S. leadership, and the public, was to any suggestion the men in the Philippines—especially MacArthur—were anything less than heroes. Noble and Ellis used the couplet published in *Time* to criticize the general for

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running “out in the dead of night” and leaving his men behind, an interpretation of events in the Philippines that threatened to undermine the carefully crafted image of MacArthur as the savior of the islands—an image made all the more powerful by his well-publicized assurances that his first priority in Australia was to organize relief and reinforcements for the Philippine garrison. Though the men doing the fighting felt less than charitable towards “Dugout Doug,” news of his daring escape to Australia thrilled his admirers stateside, for whom his surrender or death “would be a symbolic and psychological shock,” and further convinced them he was the only one who cared about the fate of the boys in the Philippines.28

If Hewlett’s “battling bastards” hinted at the deteriorating conditions on Bataan, his dispatches immediately after the surrender confirmed them and rendered the reputation of the men on Bataan unassailable. “Courage seemed too weak a word to describe the conduct” of men who were “hard as nails from the rugged outdoor life” and from “fighting the Japanese.” They were “tough,” and “suffered the tortures of hell” during the campaign and ultimately were felled not by lack of spirit, courage, or will, but by “fever, hunger, and fatigue.”29 Medical personnel estimated eighty percent of soldiers on the peninsula were unfit for duty due to disease, and reported that giving

an accurate word-picture of conditions…at the time immediately preceding the surrender of our forces on Bataan would tax the descriptive powers of a rhetorical genius, but…almost every man in Bataan was suffering, not only from the effects of prolonged starvation, but also from…dysentery and malaria…Of the supposedly well men…all were thin and weak from starvation. Many were swollen with nutritional anemia.30

And so, Hewlett reported, it was malaria and dysentery, not the Japanese, who were “the
deadliest of our enemies.” *Life* published a series of photographs taken by the Jacobys in two
issues immediately following the surrender that offered further proof of soldiers’ bravery and
the toll illness, disease, and a lack of supplies extracted. Doctors, lacking proper medicine
and equipment, resorted to treating gangrene by slicing open festering wounds and exposing
them to air.31 Readers could see severed skin, shredded muscles, and hints of bone, forcing
them to confront the violent bodily consequences of war, and the suffering made worse
Critics viewed the quinine shortage as yet “another of those dark pictures of unpreparedness
or suspected mismanagement of the American war effort which causes the parents and other
kin of soldiers at the front to feel resentment and experience doubt and foreboding.” The loss
of Bataan surely brought “bitter grief,” but people should take comfort in the “spiritual
compensation” that Hewlett’s story provided, that “the fighting edge of the troops was never
dulled” and “remained keen in spite of everything.”32

The stories of boy-next-door heroism and “last stand” imagery proffered by Hewlett
and his colleagues made it easy for home front Americans to pull similarly inspiring tales
from the nation’s past, in particular the heavily mythologized and symbolically powerful
“epics of defeat” like Bunker Hill and the Alamo.33 The effects of this recollection of some

31 Notably, most of the wounded pictured were Filipino, either military personnel or civilians. Most of the
Americans in the images were shown in hospital beds or sitting outside convalescing. “Philippine Epic,” *Life*
32 Frank Hewlett, “Remaining Americans on Bataan Surrendered to Japs,” *Bakersfield Californian*, April 11,
April 26, 1942.
33 See, for example, Paul Lockhard, “‘Remember Bunker Hill!’?” *Quarterly Journal of Military History* 23, no.
Books, 2013); Holly Beachley Bear, *Alamo: Myth and Ritual at an American Shrine* (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1995); Richard R. Flores, *Remembering the Alamo: Memory, Modernity, and the Master Symbol*
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002); Phillip Thomas Tucker, *Exodus from the Alamo: The Anatomy of the
Last Stand Myth* (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2010).
of its foundational myths were threefold. First, it helped Americans reframe the defeat as both a practical and a figurative victory: practical because the loss was essential to the final conquest of Japan, and figurative because it demonstrated the proficiency, spirit, and devotion of America’s fighting men. Second, it underscored the defense of the Philippines as part of a cycle of colonial violence, thereby casting American and Filipino soldiers as agents of eventual redemption and liberation. Third, it reconfigured constructions of martial masculinity to make room for suffering male bodies by emphasizing their self-sufficiency, discipline, obedience, and sacrifice. Collectively, this helped Americans give meaning to the sacrifices made by the men on Bataan and ascribe some meaning to their death. Indeed, if men died at Bunker Hill and the Alamo to forge and expand the American republic, men died—and surrendered—at Bataan to help preserve it.

Newspaper editors, public officials, and even Roosevelt were quick to give readers history lessons that provided some context for the Bataan surrender. They reinforced the transience of the defeat, affirmed the martial inheritance of the peninsula’s defenders, and welcomed Filipinos into the nation’s martial tradition. One applauded Clark Lee’s reporting, particularly his stories about the gunners, and claimed his dispatches did “more than 50 home-front rallies to stir patriotism,” but importantly reminded readers what marksmen “did at Bunker Hill…is being repeated on Bataan Peninsula where a new generation of Americans is taking careful aim when it sees ‘the whites of their eyes.’” History was repeating itself, argued another: General MacArthur was “giving to Bataan the immortality that Captain Prescott gave to Bunker Hill.” Speaking to Nebraska businessmen, state supreme court justice Bayard H. Paine acknowledged America has always made “a slow start in war,” like losing the “battle of Bunker Hill in 1775,” but American spirit and production would soon
“turn the tide our way.” A widely circulated commentary on Rudyard Kipling’s *White Man's Burden* professed the bard had been wrong; Filipinos thirsted for freedom and instead of a liability were “the white man’s boast.” The “brown legion of Bataan, MacArthur’s stubborn fox-hole fighters,” were the “heirs of Bunker Hill [and] the Alamo.” When Roosevelt issued the annual proclamation recognizing April 6 as “Army Day,” he highlighted the contributions of citizen-soldiers to the cause of liberty, like “Israel Putnam, who left his plow in a New England furrow to take up a gun and fight at Bunker Hill.” Harry Saylor of New Jersey’s *Courier-Post* remarked Bataan was the “Bunker Hill of the 20th Century,” and comforted citizens by reminding them that “Americans ever have drawn their most inspiring battle cries not from the glories of victory, but from the challenge given by temporary defeats.” America had lost the battle, he continued, “but we will win the war.” An editorial in *The Express*, the local paper for Clinton County, Pennsylvania, which had sent a number of young men to the Philippines, declared “hero is an inadequate word for those men whose feats of arms have been military miracles...[they] fought a battle which ranks with Bunker Hill...for heroism has nothing to do with defeat or victory; its spiritual triumph rises above the military outcome of a courageous fight against overwhelming odds.” The men who defended Bataan possessed “heroism, dauntless courage, unconquerable spirit,” and the surrender would only become a defeat if home front civilians “let disappointment weaken our efforts” and “betrayed the heroes of Bataan by lukewarm and gloomy attitudes.” Indeed, “Bataan was another Bunker’s Hill, important merely as a milepost in the war.” These “hard-fighting grim veterans...[made] a stand for freedom” and because they “refused to break faith, “sealed Japan’s doom.” Bataan was a “victorious defeat” because “they accomplished exactly what they set out to accomplish.” Americans should remember its “soldiers have been beaten
before” at the Alamo and Bunker Hill, but “the Stars and Stripes still wave over Massachusetts and over Texas,” and “Old Glory again will wave over the Philippines.” Dr. Edgar Jones, a clergyman, wrote Bataan would “go down in storiest page alongside Bunker Hill” and “evolve encomiums, inspire poetry, and give magic to the painter’s brush,” and was, like Valley Forge, a “synonym for suffering and sacrifice.” And when Corregidor, too, fell, people still found the metaphor useful and reiterated it was “materiel, not manhood” that failed. “American blood had soaked the battlefields of defeat” like Bunker Hill and the Alamo, but Bataan and Corregidor were not “conquered,” they were “occupied,” and in time the American flag would “run up on every flagpole in Manila.”

People found the Alamo an especially appealing trope for the heroism and self-sacrifice of the men on Bataan. Unlike Bunker Hill, which largely functioned as an allegory for martial tradition, courage, patriotism, and freedom from tyranny, the Alamo recalled an “apocalyptic” clash between “civilization” and “barbarism.” It was consequently a more tempting analogy for the first prolonged war between the United States and Japan. One editorial, for example, scoffed at the surrender and charged the “little brown…barbarians” won only victories of “overwhelming numbers…and treachery,” not of “superior soldiery”

34 “Marksmanship,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat, February 5, 1942; There is no evidence the phrase “don’t fire until you see the whites of their eyes” was ever said, but that it was said is presumed to be fact and is part of the lore of the battle of Bunker Hill. “General MacArthur,” Elizabethton Star (Elizabethton, TN), February 19, 1942; “Justice Paine Advises Business Men to ‘With the War First,’” Lincoln Star, February 22, 1942; “Where Kipling was Wrong,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 7, 1942; Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Proclamation 2542—Proclaiming April 6 as Army Day,” March 20, 1942, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-2542-proclaiming-april-6-army-day; “Bataan: Bunker Hill of the 20th Century,” Courier-Post (Camden, NJ), April 10, 1942; “Clinton County Heroes on Bataan,” The Express (Lock Haven, PA), April 10, 1942; “Wartime Alexandria,” Alexandria Daily Town Talk (Alexandria, LA), April 11, 1942; “A Victorious Defeat,” Times Herald (Port Huron, MI), April 10, 1942; Dr. Edgar Dewitt Jones, “Bataan—A New Symbol,” The Pantagraph (Bloomington, IL), April 20, 1942; “Corregidor Like Bunker Hill,” The Times Recorder (Zanesville, OH) May 12, 1942; “Corregidor Isn’t Conquered,” Wilmington News Journal, May 13, 1942.

nor “braver hearts.” In her syndicated column, Elsa Maxwell asserted when historians wrote about Bataan and Corregidor “500 years from now,” their accounts would “outrival the Odyssey of Homer and the battle of Thermopylae, where a handful of Spartans (like our peerless Filipinos), led by Leonidas (like our General Wainwright), held the pass of Thermopylae against the barbaric hordes…to the last man.” A Texas newspaper gave readers a brief history lesson on the significance of the Alamo for the present-day: the defeat at the Alamo “might well have ended the great adventure” of winning freedom for Texas, “but not for stout men who knew what they wanted and were willing to pay whatever the cost to get it.” Americans had failed to recognize the threat Axis nations posed to their liberties, and were “paying dearly due to our lack of preparation,” but America would ultimately “preserve its own freedom…and make all men free.” Another compared MacArthur to Davy Crockett and claimed his “stand” was being made by “the kind of soldiers that exemplify American manhood.” In a Los Angeles Times piece on the history of the Alamo, the fort’s defenders “peered from the Valhalla of America’s valiant” onto “MacArthur and his men” who “would without question…go to their deaths fighting.” A month before the surrender, the Lansing State Journal remarked that a lesson of the Alamo was that “no matter how brave…the soldiers of one side may be, they cannot win if vastly outnumbered,” and the United States was going to have to prepare itself for a similar juncture “this coming spring.” Richard Morehead, a reporter for the United Press, pointed to other similarities between Bataan and the Alamo. In both instances, the beleaguered garrisons requested help that never came, and kept the enemy busy long enough to give the country “time to prepare for later victory.” Like the Alamo, Bataan should “be remembered as one of the great feats of courage that make freedom and democracy possible.” Furthermore, Japanese commanders had asked U.S. forces
to surrender—a demand well-publicized (and extensively mocked) in the American press—and they refused, another parallel that did not go unnoticed. Like their frontier ancestors, the men on Bataan “ignored the demand” and chose to fight “against overwhelming odds with…courageous hardihood.” California Bank printed an ad for defense bonds that claimed Bataan would “live forever in memory with Bunker Hill [and] the Alamo” as “a story of American courage, initiative, self-sacrifice and heroism.”

Drawing upon these powerful referents for American military might gave Americans a way to make the surrender more palatable. It furthermore helped them explain it as not simply a military problem but also a cultural and political one. Indeed, if American “lethargy” bore some of the blame for the conditions that precipitated the defeat, then “Remember Bataan!” could be an effective clarion call for meeting the civic demands of the warfare state. No sacrifice on the home front could come anywhere close to matching those made on Bataan, and so citizens should do their duty cheerfully and without complaint; to do otherwise would certainly hamper the war effort, but would more detrimentally dilute the hard-won (hard-lost?) spirit of Bataan and betray the men who did the fighting. An editorial in the Asheville Citizen-Times crystallized the ways Bataan became a benchmark for wartime sacrifice:

The loss of Bataan is bitter medicine for the American people…all the more unpleasant because our nation with its tremendous military potential had to leave the men to their fate…but…it may enrage us so that we will begin now to throw our whole effort into the desperate job of winning this war…If the loss of Bataan has such an effect on all of us, then it may prove to be the turning point in the war. For America aroused, unified and busy is invincible…To all of them, we the American

people owe much. They fought prodigiously and suffered greatly. They have furnished a new yardstick by which patriotism is to be measured in these testing times. May all of us…emulate in our several duties the sacrificial spirit which they have shown!\footnote{“Alamo, 1942 Model,” \textit{Asheville Citizen}, April 10, 1942.}

Indeed, as James Sparrow and others have pointed out, government agencies took advantage of Bataan’s symbolic power to inspire home front heroism and asked citizens to measure their sacrifices against those of frontline soldiers—a strategy, of course, that assured civilians would always be found lacking. The Treasury Department’s \textit{Message from Bataan}—a theatrical script for high school students—painted a grim picture of the desperate defense and attributed the defeat to America’s unpreparedness. Folks at home could not save the men now, but by lending their money to the government with the purchase of war bonds, they could make sure “soldiers and sailors and flyers will never again be caught short by our enemies.”\footnote{Bernard J. Reines, \textit{Message from Bataan}, in Education Section, Savings Bonds Division, U.S. Department of the Treasury, \textit{War Savings Programs for Schools at War: Tested Plays, Program Ideas} (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1944), 52. James T. Sparrow, \textit{Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 139-140; Albert Wertheim, \textit{Staging the War: American Drama and World War II} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 165-166.}

In the House and Senate, frustrated congressmen rebuked their colleagues and constituents for all manner of behaviors and attitudes they asserted broke faith with the men on Bataan and made folks at home unworthy of the soldiers’ selfless sacrifice. They furthermore used Bataan as a symbol of the consequences of ineptitude and inaction. For example, Berkeley Bunker, a Democrat from Nevada, berated war profiteers who “slowed down war production and are worthy of the disgust and contempt of every patriotic American.” Sheridan Downey, a Democrat from California, railed that the “wounded, captured, and even dead men of Bataan…stand invisibly at our elbows” and reminded
Americans of “some bitter truths,” most importantly for his fellow senators that Bataan fell “because of our lack of foresight, our slothfulness, our incapacity to make up our minds and act.” When debating the poll tax bill, New York’s Donald O’Toole wondered what the soldiers “pushing aside the scum of a tropical stream to allay their thirst…must have thought of a system” that denied them the right to vote. Representative O’Connor shrewdly pulled out the Bataan yardstick when he advocated improved living conditions in Washington. He argued the chaos of the city prevented officials from getting about the business of war. “The starving boys of Bataan scanned the skies and seas for planes and ships that never came,” he griped, and when they looked to Washington found not a government that would help them, but a “city overflowing with pleasure seekers, grafters, chiselers, and other parasites.” Jerry Voorhis, from California, reminded his fellow congressmen they had to “live in sight of their bloodshot eyes, in sound of their voices, and in reach of their breath until we remake the world,” to warn them against the bickering, opprobrium, and cynicism he believed would undermine the war effort.39

These senators and representatives clearly believed—like many of their constituents—the Bataan defenders’ sacrifices demanded recognition and accountability. For some, however, the guilty rhetoric was not enough. Nor was it satisfactory to simply go about the business of war and claim accomplishment in the name of fallen soldiers. When Chávez read the letters pleading for reinforcements for the Philippines back in February, William T. Evjue, the founder and editor of Wisconsin’s Capital Times, had called the fuming congressman to task and suggested his “demagogic political speeches” were little more than

39 Senator Bunker, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88 pt. 3:3412; Senator Downey, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88 pt. 3:3439; Representative O’Toole, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88 pt. 6:8134; Representative O’Connor, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88 pt. 3:3462-63; Representative Voorhis, 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 88 pt. 3:3467-68.
attempts to gain “political capital…from the safety of his senate armchair.”

Chávez, he contended, had consistently voted against war measures, in particular lend-lease and extension of the Selective Service Act, and so had no moral high ground on which to rest his laurels.

He was not altogether wrong; Chávez’ legislative record in the 1930s and early 1940s did reflect his isolationist leanings, but it also showed he supported a reasonable national defense. Like it did for many of his countrymen, however, Pearl Harbor reversed Chávez’ attitude toward U.S. involvement in the war. With almost two thousand of his own constituents in the Philippines he became an important spokesperson for soldiers and their families and proposed legislation intended to recognize and reward their service and sacrifice. In September 1943, Chávez introduced Senate Bill 1374, “A Bill to Provide for the Promotion of Certain American Prisoners of War” (S 1374), and by doing so provided citizens with a platform upon which to further articulate the significance of the Bataan surrender and a vehicle through which they could attempt to compensate soldiers for their sacrifices. Indeed, the bill’s reintroduction throughout the course of the war ensured people were regularly reminded of the defenders’ sacrifices. Moreover, Chávez’ bill forced civilians to think about the significance of POWs in wartime society and the relative wisdom of rewarded defeated soldiers.

Chávez’ introduction of the bill was largely a response to the suffering of families throughout New Mexico who had men in the Philippines, but the proposed legislation found

40 “Chavez’ Record Hardly Qualifies Him as a Critic,” The Capital Times (Madison, WI), February 25, 1942.
41 The Congressional Record for August 7, 1941 shows Chávez was absent and did not vote on the selective service measure, nor was he present on August 14 when the Senate voted on the amended version of the bill from the House. See S. J. Res. 95, 77th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 87, pt. 6:6881 and S. J. Res. 95, 77th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 87 pt. 7:7126.
just as eager an audience among other Americans who believed the men deserved recognition from the government that let them down. The bill required

that effective December 8, 1942, each officer of the Army, Navy (including the Coast Guard), or Marine Corps below the grade of colonel or corresponding grade in the other services and each warrant officer and enlisted man below the grade of master sergeant or corresponding grade in the other services, who was serving in the Philippine Islands or on Wake or Guam on December 8, 1941, and who is now a prisoner of war, shall be advanced one grade from the grade he held on that date; and similar promotions shall be made on December 8…each year thereafter.43

The bill was designed specifically to promote men who were in the Pacific theater the day the Japanese attacked, and made provisions neither for those who had been captured since that date, nor for those who became prisoners in other theaters of war. When he appeared before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in October, Chávez recognized these exclusions posed something of a problem and conceded it the bill had “any merit at all it should cover some” of the other men taken prisoner in locations besides the Pacific, but the only concession Chávez made was to add “or other Pacific or Asiatic ocean areas” to the version of the bill introduced in January 1945.44 Senator Tom Connally, from Texas, objected to his insistence on the geographic restriction, but other senators found it hard to argue with Chávez’ logic.45 The men in the Philippines, he protested, “were taken under circumstances

43 U.S. Congress, Senate, Promotion of Certain American Prisoners of War, S 1374, 78th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in Senate September 24, 1943.
45 Connally introduced his own bill for the promotion of prisoners of war, S 2169, which contained no geographic or temporal prerequisites. He was in part prompted to do so by his constituent Amon G. Carter, the influential publisher of the Fort Worth Star-Telegram, whose son was a prisoner of war in Germany. Stimson reported no more favorably on Connally’s bill than he did S 1374. Connally was not the only congressman to try to push through legislation to promote POWs. Between 1943 and 1945, senators and representatives introduced at least a dozen bills calling for the promotion of prisoners of war, most were worded to apply to all POWs, not just those in the Pacific between December 8, 1941 and May 6, 1942. See Amon G. Carter to Tom Connally, August 15, 1944, Item 19; Tom Connally to Amon G. Carter, August 29, 1944, Item 22; Henry Stimson to Tom Connally, September 15, 1944, Item 25; Tom Connally to Amon G. Carter, September 25, 1944, Item 24; all in Box 60, Amon G. Carter Papers, MS 014, Archives and Special Collections, Mary Couts Burnett Library, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, Texas; U.S. Congress, Senate, To Provide for the
which are not applicable to prisoners taken elsewhere.” His New Mexican colleague, Carl Hatch, agreed. The bill, he said, “was introduced at a time when it seemed peculiarly fitting with respect to prisoners in the Philippines, who went through that tragic experience called the march of death.” It was “a mark of our country’s appreciation of what those men suffered under those circumstances,” and “should be passed as it was originally introduced.”

Furthermore, the bill was “the only expression the Government can make for the prisoners” that it “recognize[d] the services, the trials, the dangers, the hardships, and the terrors through which they have gone.”

Notwithstanding its discriminatory language, letters of support from around the country poured into Chávez’ office. The letters, some of which Chávez shared with the Committee, repeated the now-familiar story of abandonment and suffering. To many Americans, promoting prisoners of war offered the Roosevelt Administration a way to atone for its blunders in the Philippines; because of course, those men would not be prisoners if they had been properly equipped. Indeed, the debate surrounding S 1374 helped set the stage for post-war demands for compensation and special medical benefits that recognized the unique suffering of prisoners of war—particularly those held by Japan, whose notorious contempt for the Geneva Conventions contributed to disproportionately high death rates in its POW camps. Promotion, they argued, was “one of the few ways to repay our men for their

Promotion of American Prisoners of War, S 2169, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., introduced in Senate September 21, 1944.

46 Senator Chávez and Senator Hatch, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 90, pt. 6:7616-17.

47 Most U.S. POWs held by Japan were captured after the fall of Bataan and Corregidor. Approximately forty percent of American POWs in Japanese captivity died, compared to less than two percent of those held in other theaters. Van Waterford provides a detailed statistical accounting in Prisoners of the Japanese in World War II: Statistical History, Personal Narratives and Memorials Concerning POWs in Camps and on Hellships, Civilian Internees, Asian Slave Laborers and Others Captured in the Pacific Theater (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1994). Charles Stenger’s report, “American Prisoners of War in World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam: Statistical Data,” originally compiled in 1979 and regularly updated throughout the early 2000s, is generally accepted as the statistical standard and is referenced in congressional reports, legislative
sacrifices.” While “it was true we could not help them on Bataan,” we “have a chance to help them now in Washington,” because “our men in the Philippines knocked a home run even though many of them will never reach the homeland again.” Families at home “haven’t forgotten” about the men on Bataan, but “sort of felt that everyone else had.” If the legislation passes, “they will know that they were remembered by the country for which they fought.” The “fine brave men deserve this promotion as much as some men…who will never see actual overseas service,” especially since they “had the misfortune to be sent to the Philippines when we were so patently unprepared to defend the islands.” Proponents of the bill made it clear with their language of sacrifice, suffering, and abandonment they believed the men did not choose to surrender but were forced to do so by conditions beyond their control.

The word “surrender” is noticeably absent from most of their letters. This tendency suggests they were uncomfortable with its meaning, and hints they sensed the implicit awkwardness of rewarding defeat. They instead chose to describe soldiers’ resistance up to the point of surrender, and comment upon their suffering as captives after the surrender. They overcame this hesitancy, however, when Stimson sent a letter to Chairman Reynolds opposing the legislation. His response antagonized the families of the surrendered men, and they took it as a personal attack on the heroism of the Bataan defenders:

The War Department recognizes the spirit that prompted the introduction of the proposed bill but believes that granting of additional benefits or pay to captured personnel should not be accomplished by means of promotions. The prime consideration in the making of wartime promotions is to give [personnel] the rank

appropriate to the duties and responsibilities they are discharging…Other circumstances besides capture, such as prolonged illness or hospitalization for wounds, may hinder or prevent a soldier’s promotion. In the case of captured personnel there is no way to distinguish between those men who, by virtue of having fought to the last, might be deserving of a reward in the form of promotion and those who surrendered in circumstances under which they might reasonably have been expected to continue to resist. The general effect of promoting such personnel would be to establish a reward for becoming a prisoner.\footnote{Stimson to Reynolds, reprinted in \textit{Promotion Hearings}, 11-12, italics added for emphasis.}

For Stimson, rejecting the bill was a matter of policy. Passage of the bill would be a slippery slope to the wholesale promotion of prisoners of war, regardless of the circumstances of their capture.

To the mothers and fathers whose sons were prisoners of war, however, his coldhearted response was a rejection of the men themselves and the sacrifices they made on behalf of an apparently ungrateful nation. The Navy, too, opposed the bill, but Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard avoided the question of surrender and instead in part argued the bill discriminated against men whose status as POWs could not be verified because they were missing in action. Stimson’s rejection horrified Chávez:

\begin{quote}
How in God’s green earth would he expect the boys in the Philippines…to continue to resist. I think the implication…is that those boys, who are now going through the agony of the damned because they were captured…quit of their own volition…To come around here and say that there might have been an American boy in the Philippine Islands, Guam, or Wake that dared to quit because he didn’t want to fight is beyond comprehension…Why is it up to someone behind the lines to judge as to why those boys are prisoners…? Now I know why, and everybody else knows why. They didn’t have the wherewithal with which to fight. I was not their fault; it was probably the fault of someone who could write such a letter.\footnote{Promotion Hearings, 15.}
\end{quote}

The day after the hearing, Chávez went before his colleagues in the Senate to express his indignation at Stimson’s insinuations. He took the opportunity to emphasize New Mexico’s significant sacrifices in the Philippines. “I have in my hand a list of every boy from New

\footnotetext[49]{Stimson to Reynolds, reprinted in \textit{Promotion Hearings}, 11-12, italics added for emphasis.}
\footnotetext[50]{\textit{Promotion Hearings}, 15.}
Mexico who was in the Philippine Islands,” he offered, “The list comprises 38 pages of closely typewritten names,” and “I resent the intimation…even one of [those boys] would surrender when he might still be able to continue to resist.”51 His fellow senators were sympathetic and news agencies quickly picked up the story. They branded Stimson’s rejection of the bill as a “‘sneer’ at Yanks,” and repeated Chávez’ charge he had accused the soldiers of “cowardice” and suggested they were “yellow-bellies.” These epithets angered families across the country and drew attention to Chávez’ bill, prompting another spate of letter-writing.

Citizens’ angry responses to Stimson’s rejection of the bill drew upon the rhetoric they had stockpiled in the early months of the war, and further established their conviction there was nothing shameful in the soldiers’ surrender. They believed because the government had abandoned its soldiers in the Philippines, it was duty-bound to reward them for the suffering they endured, both in combat and in captivity. When Stimson refused to endorse the bill, he gave people the impression the government cared little for the plight of its captive servicemen and made himself the scapegoat for their grief-stricken accusations of negligence and indifference. Leila Cook, whose son Charles was a sergeant in the Army Air Corps and taken prisoner on Bataan, wrote to Chávez she “remember[ed] help was promised to them…and that while they were fighting with absolutely no help…a Division of American troops was sent to Ireland.” She noted the government “apparently…desired that Bataan be forgotten,” but “we mothers and wives and relatives of those. Men can never forget.” Frank Anders, a veteran of the Spanish-American War and a Congressional Medal of Honor recipient, found it incomprehensible “these men should have been abandoned by the

government after being inadequately equipped, clothed, and fed.” Mr. Dunlap, from Venice, California, did not have anyone in the Philippines but contended that if he had, he “would have been tempted to change the heads of the war dept by personal extermination.” It was “criminal negligence and criminal stupidity that led to the mass murder of our boys,” he continued, and it was entirely the fault of “our bungling, blundering, bragging, bluffing executive heads, who…should have known…we didn’t have enough planes…to chase away a flock of gulls – let alone Japs.” Marie Malosek, who served as secretary in the Mothers of American Soldiers in the Philippines in Hollywood, sent a telegram to Stimson. It was “YOU who shoved them off to the Philippines with promises, but no food or supplies—to be massacred by the Japs,” she charged, and “if this war is ever won, it will be IN SPITE OF YOUR MISTAKES.” The Cross family, from New Jersey, suggested the next batch of Red Cross packages “should contain as the special contribution for the State and War Depts a vial of quick poison for each man.”

Other letters were less vindictive but just as confident in their assessment of the War Department’s objection. They reflected, too, a sense that the boys in the Philippines had sacrificed more than any other soldiers. Within these missives civilians gave shape to a hierarchy of sacrifice, which they used as a standard for the patriotism of soldiers, civilians, and public officials. Bataan defenders occupied one of the highest positions. At the bottom were “chair warmers” and officials like Stimson, who was not “even half the man he was supposed to be,” and “sitting on velvet in Washington” had the gall “to “call someone who was fighting, dead, wounded and rotting in a prison camp…yellow bellies.” Not too far from

52 Leila Cook to Chávez, December 14, 1943, Frank Anders to Chávez, January 29, 1944, W. W. Dunlap to Chávez, December 3, 1943, Marie Malosek to Henry Stimson, December 7, 1943, Mr. and Mrs. Barton Cross to Chávez, December 4, 1943, Box 92, Folders 51-52, Dennis Chávez Papers, MSS 394 BC, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, University of New Mexico.
those officials were workers who were too busy striking instead of “being Americans,” like “our boys in the Japanese prison camps.” Somewhere in the middle were other servicemen, who spent the war “doing nothing but sitting behind desks and taking it easy” yet were “promoted over nite and make stripes and bars.” Alfredo Trujillo, from Taos, complained it was unfair there were “thousands of men in this country who never have seen a single day of active warfare, are being well fed, are enjoying every luxury our government affords them, and are being promoted every few months.” Even soldiers serving in other combat areas could not match the suffering of the Bataan defenders, because they “have weapons to fight with, full stomachs to build up their strength. If sick or wounded they have medicine, blood plasma and hospitals.”

To people at home, the deprivation of the Philippine campaign amplified the martial masculinity of the Bataan defenders because they had to fight with less, because, “unless the public has been badly misinformed, our men…surrendered only after taking physical, mental and moral beatings beyond the capacity of human nature to absorb.” They had to rely on things no quartermaster could provide to endure privation, hunger, and illness—a state of affairs that regrettably continued after the surrender, when attempts to send relief and aid to prisoners in the camps were repeatedly squashed. They pushed their bodies and minds to the edge of human endurance, and thus could lay claim to an unimpeachable masculinity that dwarfed that of men who had the luck not to have been assigned to the Philippines. Furthermore, some recognized that if the soldiers returned home the physical and

54 “Prisoners from Bataan,” Portage Daily Register (Portage, WI), December 10, 1943.
psychological consequences of combat and captivity would persist—thus their time on Bataan imposed a lifelong burden. The Buckners from Hope, New Mexico, argued failing to recognize their sacrifices reflected poorly on the citizens at home. We “sit in luxury, enjoying more than ever before,” they wrote, “and every dime is stained with the lifeblood of our poor boys that gave their all.” Even if the boys returned home, they predicted, “their lives are wrecked, their ideals shattered, they can never forget.”

Some people observed there was a hint of merit in Stimson’s objection to the bill. But they still could not accept the men on Bataan were anything less than heroes, and all but denied the possibility a single man would have surrendered before he was ordered to do so. They had been “sacrificed, necessarily but cold-bloodedly…and fought long after they had suffered the shock of learning notwithstanding all the glowing promises they had heard, they were completely on their own,” and so it was possible “a few…ordinarily courageous men…broke under the strain.” But, as an editorial in the Shreveport Journal surmised, it was “not at all probable…an American fighting man quit when he should have continued resisting the enemy.” Certainly, those men should not be rewarded. But neither should “the failure of one individual to perform his duty” deny others their promotions. “The war department should be able to separate…the few cowards, if any, from the great mass of brave men who gave their best efforts.” E. O. Walker, from Fort Worth, Texas, was convinced the men in the Pacific were beyond reproach. Stimson, he asserted, was wrong not because he presumed some soldiers might surrender too easily before battlefield conditions warranted it, but because his blanket statement lumped the nation’s earliest war heroes in with all of its soldiers and ignored the Roosevelt Administration’s part in their defeat. “The circumstances

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55 Mr. and Mrs. J. C. Buckner to Chávez, February 5, 1944, Box 92, Folder 52, Chávez Papers.
and conditions surrounding” the capture of U.S. soldiers in the Philippines, Wake, and Guam, he wrote, “cannot be compared with those of any other location on our far-flung battle fronts” because the boys were sent there “on a suicide mission.” Walker did not say whether he opposed or supported the bill, but his letter shows how sensitive citizens were to language that challenged Bataan defenders’ fortitude and bravery. It was the “tenor” of Stimson’s rejection he found problematic, not his opposition to the bill.  

Conversation about the bill died down over the holiday season, but renewed in earnest when the Army and Navy released a joint report detailing Japanese atrocities against U.S. personnel captured on Bataan and Corregidor. The report, colloquially known as the “Dyess Story,” ran in papers with inflammatory headlines. The Clovis News-Journal reported “Sickening Jap Atrocities on Heroes of Bataan, Corregidor Told.” “U.S. Pledges Vengeance,” the Daily Mail blasted, “Fear Japs Murder 25,000.” Others quoted former OWI manager Palmer Hoyt, who alleged “Most of 50,000 Captured on Bataan Murdered.” Families had spent almost two years tormented by the dearth of information available about what happened to the men after they surrendered. Occasional form postcards told them little, and some never heard a word at all from their loved ones. The report put an end to those nagging questions with horrifying detail. Americans read of the “march of death,”

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57 Congress approved release of the report and newspapers immediately published the story in full. The details in the report came from prisoners who escaped from the Japanese in the spring of 1943, most notably William Dyess, an officer in the Army Air Forces. He was barred from sharing information about the defense of Bataan and what happened afterwards, and was killed in action before its release. People criticized the government for holding onto the story for so long without releasing it. Newspapers had carried occasional stories about Japanese mistreatment of American prisoners (and in fact, James Young mentioned “the death march of the Corregidor captives” in a serial story that ran in the Shreveport Journal in August 1943) and the lack of robust responses to those stories is surprising). See James R. Young, “Author Tells of Horrible Torture Japs Inflict on Their Prisoners,” Shreveport Journal, August 31, 1943.

beheadings, and of men being buried alive. Japanese soldiers denied the defeated soldiers food and water. Hunger, disease, and violence killed as many as fifty men per day, and prisoners were routinely tortured. Outraged families railed against the Roosevelt Administration’s decision to keep the report secret, and under the auspices of the Bataan Relief Organization, furious mothers and fathers descended on Washington for a third hearing on S 1374.

These parents still raged against Stimson and his rejection of the bill, despite his office’s form-letter attempts to assure them “no one prizes more highly than myself the valor and heroism of these men, nor appreciates more greatly the magnificent patriotism they proved.” Stimson to Betty Scarbery, December 14, 1943, Box 92, Folder 52, Chávez Papers; Betty Scarbery to Stimson, February 21, 1944, Box 92, Folder 52, Chávez Papers; Promotion Hearings, 24. Now, not only did they blame Stimson and the War Department for the defeat, but for the treatment of American soldiers in Japanese prison camps. “The people all over New Mexico feel that the blame for our boys being in prison camps, starving and tortured lies in Washington,” wrote the Buckners. Withholding the Dyess story was yet another mistake, some argued. Had the “ghastly knowledge” been publicized sooner, perhaps “the Japanese might have accorded our men better treatment.” Furthermore, those who knew but made “no real effort…to alleviate the situation” were “terribly guilty.” Those boys, declared Betty Scarbery, whose son Frederic was a Navy radioman and had been captured at Guam, were “worthy of something besides a forgotten record—worthy of more than a forgetting Secretary of War and a forgetting Congress.” And though they were now in prison camps, they were “still on the job,” and “what higher courage can any man give than” surviving the dreadful conditions in a POW camp? Were they “any less soldier[s] because [they] fought [their] fate with courage and stamina in a prison camp” instead of on battlefields? Albert McArthur,

59 Stimson to Betty Scarbery, December 14, 1943, Box 92, Folder 52, Chávez Papers; Betty Scarbery to Stimson, February 21, 1944, Box 92, Folder 52, Chávez Papers; Promotion Hearings, 24.
president of the American Bataan Clan of Maywood, Illinois, reiterated the boys had not been defeated on Bataan, and it they “had the material and food to fight, those islands would still be in” Allied hands, and “those boys would not be prisoners.” S 1374 gave the War Department the opportunity not only to right a dreadful wrong, but to recognize its soldiers in the Philippines had won a victory. The only failure in the entire campaign came from the “betraying, ungrateful set of Anglophile Washington officials.” Furthermore, those officials continued to neglect the heroic soldiers who suffered in captivity. S 1374, these parents argued, gave the War Department the opportunity to right a dreadful wrong and recognize the soldiers it sent to die in the Philippines “didn’t surrender,” but “became too weak to fight” and had to “crawl on their bellies to the front lines to shoot at the Japs and kill because they couldn’t stand up.”

Despite being reintroduced several times, Chávez’ legislation never passed as originally written. Its language established geographic and temporal conditions that excluded far more men than it included, and some policymakers, though sympathetic, found altering military regulations an inappropriate mechanism for recognizing exemplary service. Nevertheless, the proposed law set off an impassioned debate about the wisdom of rewarding defeated soldiers and raised questions about who bore responsibility for doing so. It called attention to the fact many Americans believed the sacrifices and suffering of men who were in the Pacific between December 8, 1941 and May 6, 1942 deserved particular recognition, especially from the government that had so callously sent them to the Philippines and then abandoned them. Indeed, the vocabularies Americans used to describe the service, sacrifice, and suffering of their men in the Philippines shows they rejected the idea there was anything

60 “Stimson Called Pearl Harbor’s ‘Chief Culprit,’” *Chicago Tribune*, December 10, 1943.
61 *Promotion Hearings*, 20-21.
shameful about surrender. The Roosevelt Administration’s insistence the defense of the Philippines was always meant to be a delaying action helped them recast the defeat as a victory, made all the more impressive because they withstood the Japanese offensive with no reinforcements. They also found recalling epics of defeat from the nation’s military past, such as Bunker Hill and the Alamo, useful in underscoring the strategic significance— and impermanence—of the loss. After Marines liberated prisoners from Camp Cabanatuan—the POW camp in the Philippines where as many as fifty American prisoners had died in a single day—an editorial in the Charlotte Observer reflected on the sacrifices of the Bataan defenders, and summarized how many grieving, but proud, families viewed the surrender and its ghastly cost, and the relative impossibility of adequately honoring them:

When rescue came at last, those who could still walk marched proudly out with heads high like the American soldiers they were…At that moment the saga of American courage rose to new heights and reached the sublime…Surely their devotion has gone above and beyond the call of duty. But what medal ever struck could be a fit emblem of their sacrifice? What sculptor could fashion a symbol worthy of their ordeal? Their decorations are the scars of wounds and torture that can never be erased from their bodies…Let them all have the Medal of Honor. It is the highest we can give them, but tawdry in comparison with the deeds it recognizes. We at home cannot face these men.62

Rather than repudiate the surrender as weak, unmanly, or cowardly, home front Americans positioned the Bataan defenders’ willingness to continue to fight against impossible odds as the epitome of what it meant to be an American soldier. And indeed, though they would certainly try, families and friends would struggle to reconcile their comparatively meager domestic sacrifices with those made by their fathers, sons, and brothers captured on Bataan.

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CHAPTER 5

“We Will Not Let Them Down”:
Baseball, Boxcars, Bonds, Bombers, and the Bataan Relief Organization

On Friday, April 10, the day most people in the United States woke up to read headlines reporting Japanese “hordes” had “crushed” the “epic Bataan stand,” Ethel Bickford and Frances Landon determined during an anxious phone call they and other parents needed to plan some sort of relief project to get supplies to the Philippines. If the government could not manage to get their boys the medicine and food they so desperately needed, they were going to have to do it themselves. Their sons, Harlan and Edwin, along with most of the rest of the 200th Coast Artillery, were among the over 36,000 Filipino and American troops newspapers grimly reported as “either slain or facing captivity.” They recruited Dr. Vincent H. Spensley, whose son Homer was also in the 200th, to organize and lead the meeting. ¹ A few days later, as the sun set over the western mesa and the air started to chill on the evening of April 14, 1942, almost seven hundred “sorrowing relatives” of the men in the 200th Coast Artillery crowded into the Elks Lodge at the corner of Gold and 5th in downtown Albuquerque. Those who could not find seats swarmed outside, standing “in a close-pressed semi-circle” against the front door. They had learned of the surrender one week earlier, only a few days after celebrating Easter, and were gathering “to see what can be done” to send aid to the “American soldiers lost on Bataan.” A reporter described the crowd as a “cross-section of New Mexico’s people.” The “wives and sisters” wore “chic, week-old Easter outfits” while fathers arrived in their “business men’s suits” or “work men’s overalls.” Some of the

mothers were “gray-haired women of the “little old lady” type,” others were “club women” who sported “neat matrons’ attire,” and those who were “patient and brooding in their black dresses and shawls” he pronounced as “typically New Mexican as sunshine and yucca.” By the end of the evening, despite their “tired eyes and uncontrollable tears,” families and friends formed the Bataan Relief Organization. Dr. V.H. Spensley, who was soon appointed chairman, thought the name especially appropriate because the initials BRO, also shorthand for “brother,” underscored “all those men out there” were their “brothers.” By the end of the war, the BRO counted thousands of individuals in chapters across the United States among its members.²

In this chapter, I argue the BRO embedded the tragedy of Bataan into New Mexico’s wartime identity by helping its families manage the “historical disaster” of the Bataan surrender in their homes. The BRO, led and composed as it was of the families and friends of the men trapped in the Philippines, was a homegrown defense against both the real and imagined horrors of the war in the Pacific. It performed the rhetorical and practical labor that fixed Bataan securely in the state’s memory of its wartime contributions, and gave New Mexicans a way to organize the chaos of war. It personalized the trauma of surrender and captivity and redirected New Mexicans’ frustration and agony into productive endeavors explicitly linked to the fate of their sons and brothers. Alongside a growing federal war machine rapidly tooling to help Americans find their “common ground,” the BRO underscored the shared agony of the families across the country whose soldiers were lost in the Philippines and united them in pain and purpose.³ The BRO furthermore supplied a

² “Join Move to Aid Soldiers,” Albuquerque Tribune, April 14, 1942; “Parents Organize to Aid Soldiers Trapped on Bataan,” Albuquerque Journal, April 15, 1942.
rhetoric of tragedy, loss, and despair that made the suffering of small-town New Mexican families visible and accessible to the general public in ways federally sponsored propaganda could not. To show how they accomplished these things, I discuss the aims, activities, achievements, and failures of the Bataan Relief Organization.

This chapter details three of the BRO’s activities within New Mexico. First, I discuss the founding of the BRO in mid-April 1942, shortly after the fall of Bataan. It is important to know which New Mexicans formed the core of the BRO’s leadership, and how its composition shaped its presence in the state and its ability to reach a national audience. BRO leaders and members—and the families they represented—believed the faster they could procure relief for captive personnel, the fewer of them would die, and the more likely it was their sons would return to them at the end of the war. They therefore acted with a degree of moral authority when they pleaded with congressmen and War Department officials to devote more resources to the Pacific theater. It is important to remember that despite the way they presented themselves in their official capacities to the rest of the state and the nation, BRO officers were, by definition, parents, wives, and relatives who were steeling themselves against a significant probability of loss.

Second, I examine several of their initial fundraising activities, in particular a carrot auction organized in Grants in late summer of 1942. The circumstances and outcome of the carrot auction speak to the ways some New Mexicans’ particularized their experience of war. Here too I briefly discuss the BRO’s relationship with the Red Cross in the earliest phases of its POW relief program. People were initially enthusiastic the Red Cross could secure passage of direct relief through Japanese-dominated Pacific waters, which prompted them to organize these and other fundraising activities, but optimism soon gave way to bitter
disappointment when the Japanese government repeatedly refused to allow relief ships safe passage.

Third, I detail the BRO’s involvement with the Department of the Treasury’s war bond program. The BRO’s participation in Albuquerque’s Bataan Day in September 1942 helped New Mexicans build a hierarchy of sacrifice and relative suffering. Their sponsorship of a bond drive in January 1943 to purchase a B-17 Flying Fortress, and their support for the Fourth War Loan in January 1944 on the heels of the Army and Navy’s report of Japanese atrocities against American prisoners of war, firmly entrenched General MacArthur as the state’s personal hero and irrevocably tied the futures of their boys to his. The BRO exhorted citizens to purchase war bonds because it imagined every dollar pledged got POWs one day closer to liberation. Its campaigns provided the rhetoric and engagement New Mexicans needed to manage their feelings of uselessness, and set the discursive frame of continued abandonment and neglect that propelled the way New Mexicans would remember this period.

These three responses to some of the significant moments, demands, and patterns of the war, help us think about how Americans across the United States managed the demands of the warfare state. In this chapter the surrenders of Bataan and Corregidor in the spring of 1942, Japan’s snub of the Geneva Conventions in the late summer of 1942, and Department of the Treasury’s robust implementation of periodic promotions and sales drives for its National Defense Savings Program beginning in the fall of 1942 are nationally significant events that provide a framework for positioning New Mexico within the larger war effort. These moments are important touchstones for how we as society narrate and commemorate World War II, and the examples I provide help us think more carefully about how individuals and communities reacted to macrocosmic events. We also have space to sort out where
individual and federal ideologies, aims, and methodologies either overlapped or diverged, and what the impact of those junctures has been on the way New Mexicans remember Bataan.

The BRO was originally founded with the express purpose of providing material relief to soldiers captured by the Japanese after the surrender of Bataan. Indeed, at that first meeting, relatives and city officials eagerly donated funds to fill a “mercy ship” with “food, clothing and medical supplies.”

But as they quickly learned, getting relief to the Philippines was not as easy as buying, boxing, and loading canned goods, chewing gum, and bandages. The vicissitudes of wartime diplomacy, the Roosevelt Administration’s prioritization of national defense requirements, and Japan’s obstruction of international aid efforts regularly stifled the BRO’s attempts to provide direct relief to captured personnel. The BRO’s significance, however, was independent of its ability to send tangible relief to the Philippines.

The BRO’s wartime agenda laid the groundwork for post-war advocacy on behalf of former prisoners of war from all of America’s wars, and constructed the framework upon which New Mexico’s Bataan survivors and their families continued to build a legacy of heroic service, sacrifice, and loss. More broadly, this chapter reveals the power privately founded organizations have to shape the meaning-making projects individuals and communities undertake to make sense of their experiences of war. The BRO articulated a rhetoric that both challenged and embraced the overall war aims of the national government and redefined the contours of wartime sacrifice. It helped New Mexicans create a civic space in which individuals could fulfill their obligations to the warfare state while still attending to the needs of their own unique home front. We see this especially in their involvement in the

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4 “Plan Ship to Bataan,” *Carlsbad Current-Argus*, April 15, 1942.
war bond drives. Furthermore, New Mexicans exhibited behaviors that complicate the process Mark Leff calls a “politics of sacrifice.” Instead of “parlay[ing]” their “sacrifices and contributions…into political advantage or into efforts to shift war burdens to others,” New Mexicans emphasized their sacrifices in an attempt to mitigate the burdens of war by relieving both real and imagined suffering. As a result they devised a hierarchy of sacrifice that drew comparisons between prisoners of war of the Japanese, POWs held by other belligerents, and United States servicemen in stateside and overseas postings. Their hierarchy also considered the relative suffering of mothers, fathers, wives, and children, and more broadly included comparisons between communities and states.

The BRO also sometimes failed to represent the interests of all New Mexicans connected to the war in the Pacific and was occasionally myopic when it came to recognizing the similar circumstances of military personnel captured in other theaters and their families. These tendencies had several unintended consequences. The BRO reframed war-related activities into tasks whose outcomes directly affected the fate of the boys on Bataan. Some towns, like Grants and Gallup, interpreted this to mean their fundraising should specifically benefit boys from their community, not POWs writ large, and their dissatisfaction with the BRO’s commitment to aid all Japanese prisoners of war led to conflict that reveals a degree of parochialism when it came to claiming and distributing relief funds. Furthermore, the

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6 The term “hierarchy of sacrifice” is prevalent in literature on both religion and war. It has been used to describe systems of choice and the relative value of the chosen subjects, whether for ritual sacrifice or military service. For the latter, see for example, Bart Zino, “Enlistment and Non-enlistment in Wartime Australia: Responses to the 1916 Call to Arms Appeal,” Australian Historical Studies 41, no. 2 (June 2010): 217-232. Pierre Purseigle offers a more inclusive use of the term in Mobilisation, sacrifice, et citoyenneté, Angleterre – France 1900-1918 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2013), and describes a hierarchy that put fallen combat soldiers (military) at the top, with individuals like war profiteers (civilians) at the bottom. His monograph is at present only available in French. See Martha Hanna, review of Mobilisation, sacrifice, et citoyenneté, Angleterre – France 1900-1918 by Pierre Purseigle, First World War Studies 6, no. 2 (December 2015): 205-207.
BRO’s Articles of Incorporation clearly stated the intended benefactors of its activities were “American Soldiers held as Japanese prisoners of war,” but families with sons, brothers, and fathers in the European theater sometimes felt their own suffering was slighted or ignored.\(^7\)

Wearing a pair of Pacific-oriented blinders certainly fixed Bataan securely in the state’s memory of its wartime contributions, but as I discuss in subsequent chapters, it also limited the success of legislative efforts to obtain special benefits and recognition for Bataan veterans.

The BRO was one of many grassroots organizations founded in communities through the United States during World War II that have not yet been accorded a significant place in the historiography of wartime America. This chapter helps fill that gap in the literature. Scholars have generally turned to the records of well-known organizations and agencies to examine the ways Americans mobilized for war. Federal agencies like the Office of War Information, Office of Price Administration, and the Department of the Treasury, for example, produced an abundance of materials historians have repeatedly consulted in an effort to gauge the agencies’ effects on the American public. Other quasi-state groups like the United Service Organization, the War Advertising Council, and the American Red Cross also feature prominently in discussions of civilian involvement in home front activities, and a number of scholars have dissected the contributions of journalists, photographers, and filmmakers affiliated with major presses, publications, and studios to shaping Americans’ attitudes and behaviors.\(^8\)

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\(^7\) Bataan Relief Organization Bulletin, September 1943, 3, MSS 387, Box 1, File 2, Bataan Relief Organization, 1944-1945, Gordon Family Papers, Cuba Family Archives, The Breman Museum, Atlanta, Georgia. The Bulletins in this collection are digitized and available at [www.thebreman.org](http://www.thebreman.org).

\(^8\) In Warfare State, for example, James Sparrow largely relies on the records of the Office of War Information to detail Americans’ growing acceptance of an increasingly powerful central government. In Pocketbook Politics, Meg Jacobs focuses on the Office of Price Administration and the increasingly politicized nature of consumer spending. Megan K. Winchell’s Good Girls, Good Food, Good Fun explored the gendered work of hostesses...
rationing, and metal scrap collection, to name a few—have found a place in a number of monographs dealing with home front mobilization. Groups like the BRO, however, have been overlooked, largely because they lack the institutional memory of larger state-sponsored organizations and programs. Despite its impact in New Mexico during World War II and the commitment of its leadership to maintaining the organization in the post-war era as an advocacy group for ex-prisoners of war and their families, no institutional records seem to have been retained. Those BRO records that do exist were largely generated in the postwar era under the aegis of its successor, the American Ex-Prisoners of War Organization (AXPOW). Additionally, the raison d’être for relief groups aimed at helping captured American servicemen faded as Allied armies made their way through Europe and the Pacific, and all but disappeared when the last of the liberated POWs made their way home in the fall of 1945. That the BRO survived postwar reconversion with a solid base of returning New Mexican veterans to take over the reins of leadership made it unique among similar groups. Its reinvention as a support and advocacy group for returned POWs and its later absorption of POWs from subsequent wars, notably from Korea and Vietnam, solidified New Mexico’s importance to prisoner of war affairs.

A number of New Mexican authors have chronicled the experiences of the state’s soldiers captured by the Japanese, but their accounts of the BRO’s activities are fairly superficial and obscure its broader implications for the way Americans negotiate and remember war. In Beyond Courage, Dorothy Cave introduces the BRO when her narrative gets to 1944, two years after its inception. She inaccurately states it was founded in March of 1942 and summarizes just a few of its activities. Her goal is to chronicle and capture the

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for the United Service Organization, and James Kimble’s Mobilizing the Home Front interrogates the U.S. Treasury’s war bond campaigns and their efforts to increase public morale during the war.
experience of New Mexico’s soldiers rather than offer critical analysis, and as if to reinforce her purpose she claims “it is impossible to measure the impact of the BRO.” She does not, however, pass up several opportunities to berate the War Department and the Roosevelt Administration for their apparent disinterest in the plight of New Mexico’s soldiers. Eva Matson devotes a short chapter to the BRO in her statistical compendium of New Mexicans’ involvement in the Pacific theater, *It Tolled for New Mexico*, and calls the group the state’s “greatest contribution to the families of all American men and women captured by the Japanese,” but suggests its work ended the day the last survivor came home. Her conclusion is shortsighted, because as I argue in this chapter, the BRO’s wartime activities established important frameworks for continued recognition and commemoration of the Bataan surrender, and furthermore formed the cornerstone of post-war advocacy for POW’s legal, financial, medical benefits. Everit Rogers’ and Nancy Bartlit’s *Silent Voices of World War II* reduces the work of the BRO to “flood[ing] the U.S. War Department and the White House with letters demanding that help be sent to the Philippines.”9 Perhaps not surprisingly the most complete history of the BRO thus far can be found in the third volume of the American Ex-Prisoners of War (AXPOW) historical series, published in 1995. John S. Edwards, a former POW who was captured by the Germans when his B-24 was shot down over Germany, authored the book. His chronological summary of the BRO’s more well-publicized activities, though it is limited in its coverage and lacks retrospective scrutiny, does make it clear the American Ex-Prisoners of War is the BRO’s successor organization.10

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10 Jeff Wilkin, “Niskayuna’s John S. Edwards Was a True Patriot,” *Daily Gazette* (Schenectady, NY), May 27, 2016, accessed July 1, 2019, https://dailygazette.com/blog/type-a-to-z/niskayunas-john-s-edwards-was-true-
genealogy is critical to understanding the persistence, reach, and legacy of the BRO in both
the immediate aftermath of World War and in the extended post-war era.

Like the “many hundreds of thousands” of “obscure, scattered, and often small” voluntary associations formed across the United States, the BRO lacks [a readily accessible] official institutional memory.11 There is no full accounting or permanent record of the organization’s activities. This chapter thus relies heavily on stories from mostly New Mexican newspapers to reconstruct its involvement in fundraising and war bond campaigns during the first two years of the war. The BRO primarily communicated with its members through the Bulletin, a monthly newsletter that provided information about upcoming and past events, reported contributions to the relief fund, and distributed messages received from POWs. The earliest Bulletin I have been able to locate is from September 1943, over one year after the BRO’s founding.

One of the first orders of business at the BRO’s founding meeting in April 1942 was the creation of an executive committee. It is unclear how committee members were selected, but coverage of the meeting indicates they were “appointed.” Spensley was a leader in his masonic lodge and was active in a number of other fraternal organizations in Albuquerque. He was both well-known and well-connected, and it is therefore reasonable to assume Spensley—as the chairman—nominated parents who expressed an interest in serving, or whom he knew from his plethora of community activities. With the exception of Sam G. Bratton—U.S. Circuit Judge and one of Spensley’s fellow freemasons, as well as a former

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Democratic senator for New Mexico—all of the committee members had sons in the 200th.\textsuperscript{12}

It is important to note here that of the approximately 1,800 men in the 200\textsuperscript{th} Coast Artillery, Anglos comprised about two-thirds and Hispanics one-third of the unit; four percent were Native Americans. The BRO’s founding officers, therefore, did not demographically represent the unit. Indeed, they reflected the tendency of voluntary organizations to attract (or recruit) people whose middle-class status afforded them the financial freedom to involve themselves in civic activities. Many of these names could often be found together in the society pages of the \textit{Albuquerque Journal}, where writers detailed the teas, socials, dinners, and travel plans of the city’s more prominent citizens. Spensley was a dentist, and Glenn Ream, selected as vice-chairman, was the principal for Albuquerque High School. Helen Hazelwood, a widow whose husband had worked for Montezuma Grocery Company, served as secretary and treasurer. Other members of the committee included Fred Landon, who was a draftsman for the U.S. Forestry Service, Ethel Bickford, whose husband Charles was a veteran of the Spanish-American War and a clerk for the U.S. Forestry Service, and Tillie Lingo, whose husband Frank was a veterinarian. These individuals, however, were representative of the families with sons on Bataan in a much more tragic way. Of the six parents on the original committee, four would later mourn the loss of their sons who died while in captivity: James Hazelwood died after the surrender, likely during the journey from

\textsuperscript{12} Bratton’s term of service with the BRO was short-lived, but for reasons undisclosed in available records. He was originally appointed as the Director of Activities and charged with exploring ways to get supplies through Japanese line to the prisoners of war. According to Spensley’s testimony in Gunderson v. Sage, Bratton was the BRO’s legal advisor. Spensley and other parents likely thought Bratton could use his Washington connections to get information about the situation in the Philippines as well as secure avenues to direct relief efforts. In June 1942, however, he was elected Council Chairman of the Albuquerque United Services Organization (USO), and in addition to his court duties probably had less time to involve himself in the BRO’s activities. Bratton’s own son, Howard, enlisted in the Army and after finishing officer candidate school was commissioned as an officer in the Quartermaster Corps. The BRO’s Articles of Incorporation, filed in September 1943, restricted membership to members of the Armed Forces who fought in the Pacific. It is possible Bratton believed his presence on the Executive Committee was improper since his son was not in the Pacific theater.
Bataan to Camp O’Donnell in April 1942; Homer Spensley, in Camp Cabanatuan in October 1942; Edwin Landon, at Camp Osaka in February 1943; and Harlan Bickford, in Camp Omori in March 1944.

Well-connected Albuquerqueans whose sons had been captured in the Philippines thus formed the backbone of the BRO, and this continued to be the case for the life of the organization. By the summer of 1942 the BRO boasted an executive committee of sixteen individuals, which included Anglos, Hispanics, and Pueblo Indians—all from Albuquerque or its immediate environs. The City of Albuquerque granted the BRO its official charter as a charitable organization in September 1943. Spensley carried on as president, and Bickford became Vice-President. Paul McCahon, a retired train operator and a member of Spensley’s masonic lodge, whose son James was a lieutenant in the 200th’s band and survived the war, was elected as secretary and also served as editor for the Bulletin until his death in 1945, just before Japan surrendered. Leonard Smith was elected Treasurer; he had two sons, Timothy and George, in the 200th—both returned home at the end of the war. Carl Whittaker chaired the executive and later became President; his son, Carl, died when a U.S. torpedo sunk the Japanese transport ship Arisan Maru in October 1944. Harold Hubbell was a private in the 200th but was injured in an explosion during Japan’s initial attack on the Philippines in December 1941. He was evacuated to Australia prior to the surrender. When he returned to New Mexico in May 1942 Hubbell joined the BRO and was later elected Vice-President.14

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13 “Working Committee Selected by BRO; Constitution Adopted,” Albuquerque Journal, July 9, 1942.
14 Other members of the Executive Committee, when it was chartered in 1943 included: Gladys M. Brutsche (her son Paul Lees was a Marine and reported missing in June 1942; he was liberated from Bilibid Prison in 1945); Eva Jane Norris (her son, William, died at Cabanatuan); Angelina Domenicali (her son, Peter; Mary J. Plomteaux (her son Francis died on the Arisan Maru); Emma S. Reardon (her son, William Reardon, survived); Fred E. Landon; Ovidio Franchini (his son Frank survived); Earl R. Beck (his son, Garrison, died at Cabanatuan).
BRO leadership was quick to assert it was not in the business of soliciting funds from people, and formalized this policy in the group’s bylaws. It expressly forbade the “solicitation of funds” on its behalf or in its name without approval from the executive committee. The first official BRO publication, a brochure printed in both English and Spanish and dedicated to “the Mothers of all the Boys on Bataan” for Mother’s Day in May 1942, reiterated their position. In it, Spensley stated committee members agreed it was “unnecessary to ask for contributions” because it was “not a question of giving, but a matter of fulfilling an obligation and of paying a debt we owe…one of honor.” In their view, Americans had borrowed lives and time from the Bataan defenders and “owe[d] more than we can pay.” Indeed, when the commander for the newly-completed Carlsbad Army Air Field, Colonel William Lewis, held a meeting to promise residents the incoming throng of servicemen would have no ill effects on the town’s peaceful environs, Ken Dixon told him not to worry. Those young men were being trained to “fight for hundreds of pretty little cities just like Carlsbad,” Dixon wrote, and “we’ll know those planes are friendly…a sign…we don’t have to worry about hostile bombers doing their death dives down on Carlsbad.” But what’s more, the editor continued,

This town has a big investment in the war, Colonel Lewis—an investment so big that until the reports begin to filter out of the Philippines, we’ll never know how vast it really is . . . don’t worry too much about what few inconveniences the air base may mean to us. If we can, by enduring them, do some little bit toward repaying that huge debt we owe the boys on Bataan and Corregidor, then we’ll not only be glad to, but we’ll also take a great pride in so doing!

Thus, New Mexicans could pay a small portion of their debt to the Bataan defenders by going about their daily lives without complaining about the comparatively minor

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inconveniences war brought to the home front. The language of the boys on Bataan as an investment and their sacrifices as a debt requiring repayment were prevalent in the way the BRO and New Mexicans framed their responsibilities in the war.

Not a single advertisement seeking donations specifically for the BRO fund appeared in any of the state’s newspapers. Donors could send checks or deposit directly into the BRO’s account at either the First National Bank or the National Trust and Savings Bank in Albuquerque if they wished to contribute.17 Within a few days the BRO received almost $2,000 in spontaneous donations, and various clubs, societies, and organizations continued to raise money for the BRO for the duration of the war.

Figure 5.1 This photograph of a parade in Artesia shows local women, likely all mothers of boys on Bataan, and probably members of the town’s Mothers’ Club, encouraging people to donate to the Bataan Relief Organization. The caption on the original photo, written in by an archivist, suggests the parade was for July 4th celebrations in 1942.18

Spensley knew their goals to affect significant relief in the Philippines might surpass their ability to reach them, especially since, as Bratton warned, “We ourselves don’t know yet what, if anything, it will be possible for us to do.” Spensley therefore announced a “close record of all gifts is being kept, and all the money will be refunded it if is found impossible to

17 BRO Bulletin, Articles of Incorporation of Bataan Relief Organization, September 1943, Records of the President’s Committee on War Relief 1939-1947, Record Group 220, Box 219, NACP.
18 Courtesy of the Artesia Historical Museum, Artesia, New Mexico.
deliver relief to the boys.”19 I have not located the BRO’s financial records, but their activities suggest its finances were never very large. There is no evidence the BRO ever refunded any of its donors. It did send some of its monies to the Red Cross, and directly purchased Red Cross POW parcels, but it also paid to print and distribute the Bulletin free of charge to families and relatives, and beginning in 1943 funded a number of its leaders’ trips to Washington.

One of the founding objectives of the BRO was to send a mercy ship filled with supplies to soldiers on Bataan and people in New Mexico were eager to help fill the coffers if it increased the chances their boys’ suffering could be alleviated. The Albuquerque Dukes and the Kirtland Kellys, both local baseball teams, played an exhibition game on the afternoon of April 26 to support the cause. No tickets were sold prior to the game to avoid the appearance the BRO was soliciting funds. Servicemen attended the game for free because Spensley wanted “all the men in the armed services to feel that we’re behind them,” and others could buy tickets for fifty cents. If they wanted to “pay more, that is their privilege.” Paul Weeks, sports editor for the Albuquerque Journal, predicted “the strangest crowd ever to sit in on a game in these parts” would fill the stands at Tingley Park. The Dukes won the “Bataan Benefit” game 9-6 in front of a crowd of about eight hundred, but according to Weeks “for the first time men in uniform probably outnumbered civilian fans,” which means the BRO’s revenue for the event was somewhat less than it expected. In passing along all the profits to the BRO, the Duke’s business manager Eddie Miller gave the organization good publicity. As Spensley reminded them, many of their own boys played baseball. What better way to boost Albuquerqueans’ morale than by watching other young men play a game so

19 “Spensley Bataan Relief Chairman,” Albuquerque Journal, April 17, 1942.
many of their own sons enjoyed themselves? The game demonstrates how New Mexicans, inspired by the BRO’s mission, recast everyday pastimes like baseball as meaningful to the home town war effort. For the price of admission, and the cents they spent on “peanuts, cold drinks, and pillows” they could directly help their boys. Watching a game of baseball, they felt that much closer to their sons who were suffering untold miseries miles away across the Pacific.20

As the war progressed, however, fundraising events as large as the benefit game were fewer and farther between as the prospect of getting aid to prisoners in Japanese camps dimmed. A week before the Dukes and Kellys squared off the BRO announced the Red Cross was taking charge of “dispatching supplies” to prisoners of war if it was “humanly possible.” Spensley and the BRO were enthusiastic about the cooperative enterprise and hoped to tap into its federal partnership, humanitarian clout, and international reach to hasten relief efforts. Norman Davis, chairman of the ARC, assured Spensley and the BRO the monies raised under the auspices of the BRO would be earmarked for Bataan prisoners.21 The American Red Cross (ARC), however, had little success relieving the plight of American captives in the Far East. A postwar Red Cross report furthermore shows it received donations totaling approximately $250,000 for American prisoners of war, but does not identify whether any donors named Bataan prisoners as the intended recipients. In fact, by the end of the war, of the almost $142 million it spent on prisoner of war relief, only three million

21 “Red Cross Given Bataan Aid Task,” *Albuquerque Journal*, April 21, 1942. During World War II, national Red Cross societies worked with the International Red Cross and other national societies to coordinate global relief activities, and so it is appropriate here to simply refer to them collectively as the “Red Cross.” The BRO’s communications were with the American Red Cross. Davis served as chairman until his death in 1944, when he was succeeded by Basil O’Connor.
dollars’ worth of goods were shipped to the Far East. The ARC estimated each POW in that area received at most approximately one-tenth of the supplies their counterparts in Europe did, owing to Japanese obstruction of humanitarian efforts.\footnote{American Red Cross, \textit{Red Cross Service Record: Accomplishments of Seven Years, 1939-1946} (Washington, D.C.: American Red Cross, Office of Program Research, 1946), 51-54; The \textit{Red Cross Service Record} in fact shows over one million dollars were contributed for the relief of foreign prisoners of war, while another $3.8 million was donated for particular national groups. We can guess donors who gave money on behalf of groups like the Polish American Council and the Yugoslav Relief Fund, for example, were less certain Red Cross funds would trickle down to prisoners of war from those nations, and so were more careful to mark their donations.}

In the summer of 1942 the Red Cross, the State Department, and all the families with servicemen in the Pacific were still hopeful the Japanese would honor their promise to meet the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, despite never having ratified it.\footnote{On February 4, 1942, the American Embassy in Switzerland forwarded a telegram from the Swiss Minister in Tokyo carrying confirmation from the Japanese government it was “strictly observing the Geneva Red Cross Convention as a signatory state” and even though it was not “bound by the Convention,” it would “apply mutatis mutandis provisions” of the Convention to American POWs in Japanese custody. See \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers}, 1942, General; The British Commonwealth; The Far East, vol. 1, ed. G. Bernard Noble and E. R. Perkins (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1960), doc. 680. In legal terminology \textit{mutatis mutandis} means “by changing those things which need to be changed.” In the context of World War II, Stanley Falk states \textit{mutatis mutandis} meant the Japanese would follow the rules regarding treatment of POWs “so long as they did not conflict with Japanese law, policy, and customary procedure.” Japan’s hypermilitarist society promoted intense discipline, deference to authority, and spartan personal comfort. There was no room for physical or mental weakness, two qualities embodied by men who would rather surrender than face certain death. This clash of cultures and its effect on Japanese prisoners of war is well-documented by a number of scholars. Stanley Falk, “Prisoners of Japan,” Review Essay, \textit{The Journal of American-East Asian Relations} 4, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 279-280.} Shortly after the surrender in the summer of 1942 a series of diplomatic exchanges via neutral vessels like the Swedish liner, the \textit{Gripsholm}, fostered optimism supplies—packed in what little cargo space was available—could be funneled to the Philippines. In mid-June Davis advertised 20,000 Red Cross packages were en route to American POWs in Far East, and their distribution was to be managed by representatives of the International Red Cross.\footnote{According to a report written by Col. Wibb E. Cooper of the Medical Corps, supplies from the \textit{Gripsholm} eventually reached prisoners of war in the Philippines in late November 1942. “Medical Department Activities in the Philippines from 1941 to 6 May 1942, and Including Medical Activities in Japanese Prisoner of War Camps” Colonel Wibb E. Cooper, April 23, 1946; Miscellaneous File, 1945-1948; Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, 1907-1966, NACP.} In early August, he announced the Red Cross had chartered the \textit{Kanangoora}, a Swedish cargo ship, to carry
“food parcels, clothing, shoes, medical supplies, and tobacco” to military and civilian prisoners scattered throughout the Pacific. He made no promises, because so far the Japanese had not confirmed their willingness to allow humanitarian cargo ships through Pacific waters. “The American people,” Davis counseled, should keep in mind a number of “difficulties and complications have been confronted in arranging the dispatch of relief to American prisoners.”25 His warnings did not dampen the spirits of families in New Mexico, however, and Spensley encouraged them write short letters to their presumably imprisoned sons and send them via airmail to Chicago to reach San Francisco by the date of the Kanangoora’s sailing, scheduled for August 14—even though Japan had not released official prisoner of war lists. With its balance of just over $2,000, the BRO purchased $800 worth of supplies to send to the Philippines, and gave a further $1,025 to the ICRC for Philippine relief.26 Not everyone in New Mexico was as confident the ARC would gain Japanese approval and they encouraged caution and patience. Wallace Perry, editor of the Las Cruces Sun-Times, observed “little but doubt and disappointment...has greeting the efforts of friends and relatives” of the men in the Philippines and told his readers he “didn’t feel like urging Dona Ana county residents to contribute, either in money, games, or musical instruments” until “assurances are definite” the “gifts will get through to the boys who have fallen prisoner.”27 Alice Thomas, writer of the Sun-Times column “Desk Gossip” shared Perry’s concern. She claimed it was “hardly fair to relatives of those prisoners to spread false rumors” since “THERE HAS BEEN NO RELIABLE information that mail would be

25 “Red Cross Striving to Send Supplies to Philippines,” Albuquerque Journal, August 6, 1942.
26 “BRO to Hold Meeting Friday,” Albuquerque Journal, October 16, 1942. Compared to the monies raised in California, these amounts were almost trivial.
27 Wallace Perry, “Chaparral,” Las Cruces Sun-Times, July 13, 1942. “Chaparral” was the title of Perry’s daily editorial.
delivered to them.” Families could go ahead and send letters if they wanted to, she reasoned, but they “should know before they do so that it is only a hope, rather vague and tenuous.” She acknowledged “the agonizing wait for news is slow torture,” but urged New Mexicans to wait for confirmation from legitimate sources like the War Department or the Red Cross. In the “meantime,” Thomas proposed, “we can all hope news of a prison camp…where the climate is cool and all-in-all…a very pleasant spot…is accurate and that better days are ahead for the gallant band.” Thomas did not heed her own advice that readers “evaluate news sources and make an intelligent selection of what to believe and what not to believe.”

The camp in question was Camp O’Donnell, but it was far from a very pleasant spot. By the time New Mexicans heard about its existence—word of mouth from an unnamed officer who managed to leave Bataan before the surrender—the astonishingly high death rate of American and Filipino prisoners had forced its closure. On average twenty-two Americans and almost four hundred Filipinos died every day from malnutrition and tropical diseases like malaria, dysentery, and beriberi.

Most New Mexicans were dissatisfied with Perry’s and Thomas’ tempered evaluation of the situation. Even as the proposed sailing date came and went with no positive response from Japan, communities throughout the state searched for ways to do their part to help their

28 Alice Thomas, “Desk Gossip,” Las Cruces Sun-Times, August 14, 1942 (capitalization in the original); Thomas was referencing a brief news item carried in the Albuquerque Journal and reprinted by the papers in Las Cruces and Deming. Quincy Craft, an accountant for the U.S. Forest Service shared the information about O’Donnell. His son Dean was with the 515th in the Philippines, and though he survived imprisonment he died when a U.S. aircraft bombed the Japanese transport ship Oryoku Mara. His source was a friend who knew an officer who had evacuated Bataan prior to the surrender. He does not identify the name of the friend or the officer. “Luzon Prisoners Said to Be at Camp O’Donnell,” Albuquerque Journal, August 9, 1942.

boys in the Pacific. There was much support for the BRO, but as the circumstances surrounding the founding of a competing group by two western New Mexico towns—Grants and Gallup—in the waning days of summer 1942 suggests, some individuals believed the BRO’s approach to fundraising moved too slowly. Moreover, they found the BRO’s pledge to help all prisoners of war in the Philippines problematic. In a period marked by numerous demands upon their presumably patriotic pocketbooks, not all Americans wanted their dollars to benefit an anonymous soldier, or, in the case of New Mexicans, necessarily fund the fighting in the European theater. Residents of Gallup and Grants were not only disappointed by the seemingly sluggish relief movement, but also hesitant to loosen their purse strings for an organization like the BRO with no guarantee their contributions would actually benefit their own loved ones. These attitudes were reinforced when Spensley and civic leaders from Grants and Gallup testified in Gunderson v. Sage, a case heard before the New Mexico Supreme Court in 1950 to decide the disposition of the funds raised by the towns’ solicitation campaign and carrot auction. Roosevelt advised Americans winning the war required “a national unity that can know no limitations of race or creed or selfish politics,” but this instance reminds us sometimes local affections mattered more.\footnote{Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat On Progress of the War,” February 23, 1942, \textit{Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1942}, 105-116.} The whole affair furthermore augured the mostly futile undertaking of raising funds and expending energies for direct relief efforts to prisoners of war, when Japan was openly not in the business of bending to the humanitarian demands of its adversaries.

At the urging of John Church, a vegetable packer and shipper with operations in both New Mexico and California, businessmen from the town of Grants organized a carrot auction
to raise funds for Bataan relief.\(^3\) Grants is located about eighty miles west of Albuquerque and in 1940 had a population of approximately fifteen hundred. The area was well-known for its bumper carrot crop, aided by intensive irrigation and its convenient proximity to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad. Growers revered the carrots for their “color, size, and quality,” and the Grants Chamber of Commerce, led by prominent businessman Carroll Gunderson—called “Gundy” by his Anglo friends and “El Gunso” by his Hispanic friends—had high hopes for their fundraising endeavor.\(^3\) The town of Salinas, California had raised almost $185,000, mostly from a series of lettuce auctions in midwestern and eastern markets, to fill its own “Bataan Mercy Ship.” Over one hundred soldiers from Salinas formed Company C of the 194\(^{th}\) Tank Battalion, one of the units in Bataan when it fell. As in New Mexico, the community—forced to “watch a catastrophe” unfold and frustrated by its inability to “lift a finger to avert it”—rallied to raise money for “Salinas’ Own,” who “made their magnificent stand” to “protect and safeguard their people back home.” At five dollars per crate a boxcar full of lettuce would net $1,600, but “one carload of the same, plus patriotic impulse” went for just over $30,000 on the block in Los Angeles. Grants and Gallup had high hopes for their own auction, anticipating their 346 crates of carrots would yield upwards of $50,000 for the fund.\(^3\)

Unfortunately, on the eve of the carrots’ departure from New Mexico, newspaper headlines across the country quashed the likelihood bidders would dig too deeply into their


pockets for prisoner of war relief. New York produce purchasers awoke Sunday morning to find Japan had “denied the assurance of safe conduct across the Pacific of a neutral ship,” the Swedish liner Kanangoora, “already loaded exclusively with supplementary food, clothing, and medical supplies for American prisoners of war.” In New Mexico, the Albuquerque Journal bore the maddening headline, “Japs Refuse to Guarantee Mercy Ships Safety.” The Japanese attitude was “repugnant and abhorrent…but not entirely unexpected after the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor.” Neither should it have been unexpected after several months of drawn out negotiations between the ARC, the State Department, and Japanese officials. By mid-September any possibility of dispatching a relief ship directly to the Philippines was all but quashed. The Japanese government responded to accusations its refusal to allow the Kanangoora through the Pacific violated Geneva Conventions by reminding U.S. officials the supplies from the Gripsholm “have been admitted and will be distributed at Manila and other regions,” and the reasons for blocking passage of any ships through Japanese-controlled waters were “strategic.” Relief could only continue via the “exchange vessels.”34 Notwithstanding this dismal news, people in Grants and Gallup “went right ahead…and set off a carload of carrots,” an event which at first appeared to be a cooperative effort between Grants, Gallup, and the BRO.35

Spensley was involved in the early planning of the auction and attended an exploratory meeting with Gunderson. He personally paid for a banner to attach to the loaded boxcar, which he recalled read “The Bataan Relief Organization Says We Will Not Let Them

Down, and Neither Will We.” The Gallup Independent announced “proceeds of the sale are to be turned over to the Bataan Relief Organization,” and on August 31, Governor Miles, along with Spensley and McCahon, attended the “gala day” to help load the produce into a boxcar and send it off to New York City.

The Albuquerque Journal went so far as to claim the BRO had “sponsored the shipments,” with Spensley asserting monies “would be held in trust by the BRO and the Red Cross” for the use of “those who return and the families of those who do not return” if shipping supplies was later impossible—an increasingly likely outcome given Japan’s rejection of the Red Cross’s proposed relief program.37

Shortly after the carrots left New Mexico, however, a quarrel seems to have developed. At the urging of Church’s New York colleagues, Grants and Gallup each contributed $1,000 towards the auction to spur potential bidders, and they hoped Albuquerque would add the same amount. Spensley and McCahon both personally donated

Figure 5.2 This text of the banner on the boxcar in this grainy photograph from the case files for Gunderson v. Sage is barely legible, but the top line at least says “New Mexico Bluewater Valley Carrots for Bataan Relief.” Whatever is written below is illegible, but that it says simply “Bataan Relief” does suggest the funds from the auction were intended for more than just the boys from Gallup and Grants.36

to the fund. The BRO, however, did not. It “had only one fund at that time, and that was the
relief fund, and no money could be used out of that fund for any other purposes than direct
relief.” Though Spensley provided a banner for the carrot gala at his own expense, spoke at
the send-off, and made a personal donation to the cause, Dr. Richard Pousma, the chairman
for the Gallup group, remembered Gunderson telling him and the rest of the committee in
attendance “he had got a cold shoulder in Albuquerque” and Spensley’s group was “simply
not interested” in helping with the carrot campaign. Despite (and perhaps because of) the
perceived lack of interest on Albuquerque’s part, Gunderson and his comrades in the
Chamber of Commerce decided their own relief effort “should be developed on a statewide
scale” and involve “all communities in the state” whose boys were in the 200th, a move
which would put the group in clear competition with the BRO. Gunderson “was peeved at
Albuquerque for not wanting to chip in” to raise the $3,000 starter fund. Thus, when Pousma,
remembering “how hard up the boys were at the end of the first World War,” suggested the
fund be held over in a trust for returning veterans if wartime relief efforts failed, Gunderson
jumped on the idea as a way to hold onto the money for the boys from McKinley and
Valencia and keep it out of the hands of the BRO.38

This plan was more than a case of giving the BRO its comeuppance. Alice Walsh, 
secretary and treasurer for the Gallup group, distinctly recalled discussing plans for fund at
the first meeting. Her statements reflect a degree of parochialism when it came homegrown
relief efforts. “Local people,” she recalled, “didn’t care to donate to anything unless they felt
their own boys would benefit.” Gallup residents had been disappointed when a mother’s club
raised money only to send it to “some organization in Albuquerque,” she said, and so to

38 Gunderson v. Sage, 109, 48-49; “Bataan Relief Plan Here Gets Off to Good Start,” Gallup Independent,
September 4, 1942.
boost fundraising efforts this time they “told the local people that this money would be held in its own locality and not sent someplace else or to some other organization.” Pousma reinforced Walsh’s impression of the sentiments of people in Gallup that “there was an unpleasant feeling regarding” the BRO, and they “wanted to be able to tell our people that our money wouldn’t go to that organization.” And so, the gentlemen formed a “soliciting committee” whose responsibility it was to go door-to-door requesting financial contributions for the “Gallup Bataan Relief Fund,” a designation that assured the folks of Gallup and Grants the monies were no longer going to be funneled to the general BRO account. During the face-to-face canvassing campaign volunteers could assure donors their own neighbors would benefit from the donation. But Walsh, Pousma, and even Gunderson affirmed supplies purchased during the war were “not only for the New Mexico men,” but also for “all of those on the Philippines, prisoners of war.” Only if Japan never guaranteed safe passage for relief ships would the funds specifically benefit the boys from McKinley and Valencia.\(^{39}\) The \textit{New York Times} had the impression that, at the very least, the auction was intended to benefit just New Mexico men: “1,400 soldiers” from the state “went to the Philippines,” and the Japanese block relief ships “the money, it is understood, will be held in trust for the men, or their families.”\(^{40}\) That this story ran just a couple days before the auction perhaps helps explain its unexpectedly meager outcome.

\(^{39}\) Gunderson v. Sage, 43, 50-51, 60; “Bataan Relief Plan Here Gets Off to Good Start,” \textit{Gallup Independent}, September 4, 1942. Gunderson testified “the plan was to send these relief supplies to all of the boys on Bataan and if they couldn’t be delivered there that the money was to be divided among the boys that came back from McKinley County and West Valencia County.” Walsh and Pousma offered testimony to the same effect, and based on news coverage of the committee’s activities, it is clear no explicit distinction was made between “wartime” and “post-war” recipients until the end of October, well after the carrots had been auctioned and most individual and corporate donations had been secured. Canvassers who solicited donations probably assured their donors, in their face-to-face encounters, the money would go to local men.

By the second week of September, Grants and Gallup had publicly severed any ties with the BRO and announced the Gallup Bataan Relief Fund “has no connection with the previously announced Bataan Relief Organization in the state.” They did so the same day the paper published the earnings from the auction. Japan’s refusal to grant safe passage to relief ships handicapped the sale, and the carrots brought in only $9,609.71. This amount was far less than they had hoped, but still a substantial sum for the rural communities. In late October fourteen representatives from Grants and Gallup formally established the Gallup and Grants Bataan Relief Committee, and they affirmed the two towns would “share in the money received from the auction,” a decision they had reached early in September but only just now shared with the community. They furthermore assured donors if the fund could not be used for prisoner-of-war relief, “it is probable that it will be reserved for those men of the 200th Battalion who volunteered in McKinley and Valencia counties.” Spensley was probably surprised when he heard this decision; the plan to reserve the funds for only a few of the boys was not in keeping with the spirit of the BRO.41

It became clear that Gallup and Grants differed from the BRO in their sense of what counted as relief. In the summer of 1943, when Spensley traveled to Washington, D.C. as part of Governor John Dempsey’s fact-finding delegation to query government officials about the progress being made to assist prisoners of war, he and McCahon apparently asked Gunderson and his committee to help sponsor the trip and pay for some expenses. Gunderson and the committee refused; McCahon’s reply to what was probably the negative response informed Gunderson the trip was “just as much a part in helping to save their lives” as was

41 “High Bids on Carrot Load,” Gallup Independent, September 9, 1942. The article reported the carrots were auctioned for $13,000, but $3,000 of that was money pledged by the towns of Grants and Gallup; “Bataan Relief Drive Starts,” Gallup Independent, September 9, 1942; “Bataan Relief Gets Big Hike,” Gallup Independent, October 22, 1942.
buying clothes and medical supplies. Donations marked clearly for relief were “held intact,” an implicit acknowledgment some funds were used advocacy on behalf of the POWs. McCahon managed to sneak in a dig at what the BRO perceived as a narrow-minded view of relief efforts. “We are fighting for ALL boys who were in the Philippines,” he reminded Gunderson, “not just for those from Bernalillo County.” In spite of Gallup’s and Grants’ disavowal of any affiliation with the BRO, McCahon politely offered to add any interested individuals to the BRO’s mailing list. “We have very few members in Gallup and Grants,” he penned, “yet we consider you folks as much a part of the BRO as ourselves.” By that point Gunderson had little faith in the ability of any group—his included—to affect the course of events in the Philippines. He admitted it “seems to be an impossible job,” and neither Spensley’s nor his own committee “could do anything that has not been done by all those in charge of this department of our government.”

Despite its predictions the Gallup Bataan Relief Fund was going to “develop on a larger scope than originally contemplated,” the committee appears to have fizzled by the end of autumn of 1942—with the exception of the maintenance of the trust, which was handled by Walsh. The *Gallup Independent* regularly listed donations to the fund, often on the front page. Individuals gave as little as fifty cents and as many as five dollars, local businesses tended to give between ten and twenty dollars, and larger companies up to one hundred dollars. Solicited donations plus the profits from the carrot auction added up to a sum of

42 Paul McCahon to C. G. Gunderson, August 2, 1943, in Gunderson v. Sage, 168-170. The date on the transcript of the original letter in the court documents is given as August 2, 1942. Based on the details in the letter—specifically Governor Dempsey’s appointment of a POW delegation, Spensley’s trip to Washington, D.C., and reference to the dedication of the bomber *Spirit of Bataan*, as well as the date on the subsequence letter in the transcript, it is clear the correct date should be August 2, 1943; C. G. Gunderson to Dr. R. H. Pousma, August 4, 1943, Gunderson v. Sage, 170-171. I say “apparently” and “probably” because the entire string of communication between the two groups is not contained in the court files, but the content of the letters does suggest the BRO had asked Gunderson to help fund Spensley’s trip, and Gunderson refused.
$13,371 in the relief fund. After late October, however, no further announcements about contributions appear in the newspaper and we can assume active solicitation for the fund ended shortly thereafter. The fund was never used to purchase relief supplies, and a meeting of Bataan survivors from McKinley and Valencia counties in December 1945 to decide its final disposition instigated a protracted legal battle between the fund’s trustees, local veterans, and the Bataan Veterans Organization.

That this feud was extended after the war into a debate over who should benefit from the funds—either only the men from Grants and Gallup whose families and communities had donated them, or all of the state’s Bataan veterans—reveals the parochialism of local relief agencies and shows how these smaller groups helped families and communities “particularize” the trauma of war. All manner of agencies and organizations asked Americans to dig a little deeper into their pockets with the general platitude they were helping to win the war, but rarely did citizens have an opportunity to see exactly how they were doing so. The conflict between the BRO and the Gallup group shows that both shaped New Mexico’s response to the surrender. The Gallup and Grants Bataan Relief Committee made residents stakeholders in their own war. Through door-to-door canvassing and their promise to families and friends the funds would be “held in trust” for their own “Bataan boys.” They believed money they raised would go directly to help save the lives of men from their own community. And if it could not save all of those lives during the war, at the very least it would help improve some of them afterwards. Even more than when they purchased war bonds and dutifully paid their taxes, these rural New Mexicans could “envision themselves as directly assisting the combat soldier” from their own home town.43 The intense localization

43 James Sparrow, Warfare State, 121.
encouraged by the Gallup and Grants Bataan Relief Committee stifled its potential for growth, especially as the urban-based BRO grew in both size, scope, and influence. Its presence as an active agency in the community was short-lived. Its program never expanded beyond the two towns, and there were no more carrot auctions. A consequence of their insistence the funds be preserved only for boys from the two counties if relief to the Philippines was impossible—the probability of which grew by the day—was that few people outside of those counties ever gave to the fund. The BRO, on the other hand, advanced a broad platform that recognized the wartime needs of not just New Mexico’s POWs and their families, but those from the rest of the United States as well.

As part of that broad platform the BRO enthusiastically supported the Treasury Department’s war savings program; it furnished the BRO with a way to show the boys in the Philippines they had not let them down. If direct relief could not get to the boys in the Pacific, at the very least New Mexicans could pay for the tanks, bombers, and aircraft carriers that would liberate them. On the first of April Governor John E. Miles announced the last two weeks of the month were to be “Defense Bond Pledge Week.”44 Citizens were expected to commit a portion of their income to future purchases of savings bonds and stamps. Publicity for the drive tapped into the state’s preoccupation with the increasingly desperate situation in the Philippines. When Albuquerque’s Defense Savings Staff needed volunteers to go house-to-house soliciting contributions it tried to make residents feel guilty for their inaction: “What will you say to the men of Bataan about this?” the ad chastised. “Those men who are doing the fighting,” it reminded them, were “watching.” The implicit

44 “Proclaims Defense Bond Pledge Week,” Santa Fe New Mexican, April 1, 1942. The April pledge drive was a nationwide initiative; most states participated, and they were free to hold the drive at any time. See “Pledge Campaign Under Way,” The Minute Man 2, no. 1 (March 28, 1942): 3-4.
command to not “let them down,” though a common patriotic appeal, here echoed the widespread sense by many of their families that the boys on Bataan had already been abandoned once, and it was up to them not to let it happen again. An ad for the drive published the day of the surrender stressed even further New Mexicans’ responsibility to help finance the war. It capitalized on the hard-hitting tragedy to encourage New Mexicans to commit to future war bond purchases, and reminded them of the investment they had already made in the war. “What is YOUR answer to today’s news of Bataan? Your boy—your neighbor’s boy—your Gallup boys are on Bataan today in its darkest hour. Now, what are you going to do about it?” The answer was they should promise to buy defense savings bonds, a “patriotic contribution” to finance the war effort. The day the BRO had its first meeting another ad in the Albuquerque Tribune impressed upon readers the surrender brought “the tragedy of war close to Albuquerque,” where there was “hardly a person…who didn’t have some friend, relative, or acquaintance at Bataan.” An angry and determined Uncle Sam rolled up his sleeves as if he was getting ready for a fight. The message, of course, was that Bataan hit too close to home for New Mexicans to be complacent. They too had to join in the fight so that it was “never again…necessary for our boys to fight against such overwhelming odds.” They were “expected to make every effort to help win the war by making good their pledges.”45 From this point forward, the state’s connection to Bataan was recalled in most of its war bond campaigns. The BRO’s involvement in Bataan Day bond sales in September 1942, its sponsorship of a war bond drive in January 1943, and its management of a drive in January 1944 as part of the Fourth War Loan illustrate how the

BRO used the federal government’s own programs to imprint the short- and long-term significance of the Bataan surrender into the state’s memory of the war.

The War Finance Committee (WFC), the group formed within the Department of the Treasury to direct the far-reaching fiscal program that ultimately borrowed more than $185 from citizens, banks and businesses, held eight almost-month-long loan campaigns over the course of the war. With its clever use of metaphor, carefully designed advertising, and finely-tuned appeals to public sentiment, the WFC sold more than bonds. It peddled the “unity and heightened nationalistic spirit” needed to overcome the ideological gap between the painfully sluggish defensive war and the presumed inevitability of Allied victory.46 For Americans mostly “fighting the war on imagination alone,” the exaggerated symmetry between soldier and civilian deployed in the war bond campaigns reinvigorated much-needed morale.47 The WFC provided “information, ideas, inspiration, and instruction” to its “field staff” in its regular newsletter, The Minute Man, but encouraged state and county officials to tailor campaigns to fit local needs and temperament.48 With that guidance the BRO personalized the distantly administered program and adapted the Treasury’s heavily propagandized rhetoric and aims to make it clear to New Mexicans they were not helpless bystanders to the failures in the Pacific. In the fall of 1942 just two months before the First War Loan and

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46 James J. Kimble, Mobilizing the Home Front: War Bonds and Domestic Propaganda (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 6-7; For a description of the creation of the Defense Savings Staff, see Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1941 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1942), 215. See also Laurence M. Olney, The War Bond Story (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Savings Bonds Division, 1971); Paul Fussell argues the utter destruction and disillusionment of the First World War plagued the Second World War with an “ideological vacuum.” The former, he argues, exhausted the philosophical reserves that might have helped give the latter at least a veneer of “human meaning.” He concludes both soldiers and civilians struggled to make sense of the purpose of the war, and when pressed avoided grandiloquence and simply said they were fighting “to get the goddamn thing over and get home.” Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 138-143.
47 Sparrow, 65.
48 The title of the newsletter from 1941 to 1942 was “Field Organization Newsletter.”
shortly after they digested the demoralizing report Japan was blocking relief efforts, several communities throughout New Mexico staged “Bataan Days” designed to both boost war bond sales and commemorate the sacrifices made during the defense of the Philippines. The BRO’s campaigns stressed the unmatched sacrifice made by the soldiers in the Philippines, but also explicitly called attention to the suffering of their relatives. The BRO insisted all New Mexicans had to witness the effect the Bataan surrender had on their neighbors, and encouraged families to make themselves visible as part of the sales effort.

At least three cities outside of New Mexico planned Bataan Days for the same month. Maywood, Illinois, Salinas, California, and Port Clinton, Ohio had sent many of their own young men to the Philippines, and they too took advantage of the WFC’s designation of September 1942 as “Salute to Heroes Month” to honor their hometown heroes.

The themed campaign kicked off in movie theaters across America with the slogan “Buy a Bond to Honor Every Mother’s Son in Service.” New Mexico’s share of the billion-dollar quota was $1.25 million. Bernalillo County was allocated one-fourth of the sum. There was no shortage of heroes in New Mexico, and there were plenty of heartsick mothers to prompt citizens to do their patriotic duty. The defense committee designated September 15 “Bataan Day” to boost sales in Albuquerque, and set a $35,000 quota. The amount itself was symbolic: it was the total of “only one $25 bond for every New Mexico man who fought so valiantly in defense of the Philippines.” If every resident in the city spent one dollar on stamps and bonds, they would meet their quota. Spensley and the BRO mailed special service flag pins to relatives of the men on Bataan and asked them to wear the flags all day Tuesday. Ward Hicks, chairman of the Bataan Day Committee, echoed Secretary of the

50 Albuquerque’s population in the 1940 census was 35,449.
Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s plea to citizens to dig even deeper into their pockets and increase their war bond purchases. He remarked the flags were an important reminder to Albuquerqueans that “many people have given in a way that hurts.” Mothers, fathers, wives, children, and sweethearts lent their sons, husbands, daddies, and beaus, but unlike the war bonds, there was no guaranteed return. The “boys far away who had gone that [they] might stay” sacrificed the most, surpassed only by those among them who died either during the defense of Bataan or later during captivity. Those who purchased bonds received a tag as well, but one that acknowledged their sacrifice could never match that of the boys on Bataan, much less their families. Spensley assured families others could only “try to approach the honor of wearing these flags.” They could do no more than “have the privilege” of pinning “I Bought in Honor of the Men of Bataan” tags to their lapels. Regardless the money they spent, they could never “buy War bonds or Stamps…in a way that hurts” as much as losing a son to death or captivity in the Philippines. The miniature flag reproduced the service flag popularized during the First World War to signify a family member serving in the armed forces during wartime; a blue star represented an active service member, and was covered

51 “Bataan Day,” Albuquerque Journal, September 14, 1942; “Bataan Relatives Get Service Flags,” Albuquerque Journal, September 10, 1942; Henry Morgenthau, Jr., “Until It Hurts,” The Minute Man 2, no. 9 (September 15, 1942): 33-34; Anna D. Clark, “Our Boys,” BRO Bulletin, November 30, 1944, 9, CFA; “Women Volunteer for Bataan Day,” Albuquerque Journal, September 13, 1942. It should be pointed out that the idea one should “give until it hurts” has theological origins. Some modern sources inaccurately attribute the phrase to Mother Theresa, but a quick scan of newspapers shows ministers of all denominations culled from an assortment of religious scriptures and teachings to instruct their congregations to give their spiritual and material riches freely. Warren Candler, Bishop of the Southern Methodist Episcopal Church, explained the notion to “give until it hurts” in a way that helps us move the concept from a tenet of faith to patriotic practice. “Giving which leaves great resources behind,” he wrote, “may be no more than a gratification of vanity, a purchase of public applause, or the indulgence of an agreeable pastime.” If we “give until it hurts,” however, “it is because we have found something better than ourselves upon which to expend money…if exhausting giving is accompanied by an exhilarating spirit, it rises to the height of sacrifice.” Though he was speaking about spiritual well-being, the “uncalculating, courageous, self-abandoning benevolence” that might inspire people to charity and tithe could very well stir their civic spirits. See Bishop W. Candler, “Giving Hilariously When It Hurts,” North Carolina Christian Advocate, February 19, 1901. The phrase was used heavily during World War I in the European aid, Red Cross War Fund, and war savings campaigns.
with a gold star if the soldier died.\textsuperscript{52} Veronica Forest, a playwright and poet from Los Angeles, penned a short verse that described well the angst many mothers in New Mexico felt as they gazed upon the small banners and contemplated their sons’ fate:

\begin{quote}
The blue star  
Seared her breast  
Through Bataan’s long day;  
While the alchemist—Mars—  
Turned the blue into gold.\textsuperscript{53}
\end{quote}

While the flags hanging in the windows of businesses and homes united people in their shared sacrifice, the miniature pins given only to Bataan families elevated them on the sacrificial ladder and called others’ attention specifically to their bereaved status.

The distribution of such pins did lend an air of solemnity to the bond sales, which the \textit{Albuquerque Journal} described as “enthusiastic turmoil.” The Mothers’ Service Club, led by Bertha Meyer whose son Bill was in the 200\textsuperscript{th}, along with other women’s groups in the city manufactured and distributed over five hundred war stamp corsages. Opera star Lily Pons showed off her spray of “a dozen or so stamps inclosed [sic] in individual cellophane envelopes…attached to artificial flower stems” and “gathered together with a red, white and blue ribbon” when she passed through Albuquerque in early April 1942. The most “luxurious” patriotic adornments sold for as much as $18.75, the cost of a single twenty-five-dollar bond. Ladies pinned on their “Victory corsages” and men sported boutonnieres for weddings, dances, teas, but were advised to wear them “only a few times” before adding them to their war stamp albums.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52} For a brief discussion of the origins of the service flag and its symbolism, see Lisa Budreau, \textit{Bodies of War: World War I and the Politics of Commemoration in America, 1919-1933} (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 95-97.

\textsuperscript{53} Veronica Forest, “Gold Star Mother,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, September 18, 1942.

\textsuperscript{54} “Defense Stamp Corsage is Worn by Lily Pons…,” \textit{Albuquerque Journal}, April 1, 1942; “AWVS Headquarters Also Gift Shop,” \textit{Santa Fe New Mexican}, August 20, 1942; “Aids War Savings,” \textit{Santa Fe New
To further connect the bond-buying to the men in the Pacific, the J. C. Penney store in downtown Albuquerque offered buyers the “privilege” of selecting the name of a Bataan soldier and watching it get painted on the store’s large display windows. The soldiers’ names were carefully lettered in large, white characters. Below each buyer’s name was printed in gray. The promotion was so popular three painters were enlisted to meet the demand. The names inscribed on the glass floated over the department store’s display of men’s suits, pajamas, and shoes. The contrast is marked: the boys languished in the Philippines and suffered from malnutrition, disease, and exposure, but here on Central Avenue their names were suspended just beyond reach of the everyday luxuries of eventual freedom. No amount of money could collapse the distinction between the violence and deprivation of the boys in the Philippines and the comparatively comfortable daily lives of the folks at home, and one wonders what passers-by thought about when they looked at the names and saw their own reflections staring back at them, broken by the solid strokes of glaring white paint. At the very least seeing the soldiers’ names did personalize the bond sales, and reminded people each of those prisoners was somebody’s son, brother, husband, or father.

*Mexican*, September 3, 1942. Groups could buy corsage-making kits from florists around the country, who proffered boxes packed with crepe paper, ribbon, floral stems, and instructions.
Of the forty or so names distinguishable in the photograph of the J. C. Penney storefront half died while in captivity. For as long as those names remained on the window, however, they held out a promise that maybe they were still alive. Their families and friends could imagine they would come home at the end of the war. The strategy worked, and garnered almost $6,000 in bond purchases. By the end of the day Albuquerqueans more than doubled their quota and bought $73,820 worth of bonds and stamps. The massive support for the campaign confirmed they “[had] not forgotten” their “captive sons of Bataan.” From late 1942 onwards, the Treasury Department utilized an effective sales strategy that fused combat soldiers with home front civilians; sales materials emphasized the direct connection between an individual’s war bond purchases and the soldier’s battlefield heroics. As we have already begun to see with the BRO’s initial involvement in war bond drives, however, its rhetoric

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55 Janie Moseley Papers, 1943-1997, Southwest Collection, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas.
tempered this conflation and had the effect of reinforcing a hierarchy of sacrifice that always privileged the boys on Bataan.

In the winter of 1943 the BRO sponsored a week-long statewide campaign beginning on January 21. The closing day coincided with General MacArthur’s birthday. Governor John Dempsey proclaimed that day be recognized as “MacArthur Day,” and made observance of it the highlight of the campaign. Like much of the rest of the United States, New Mexicans and the BRO were convinced the Roosevelt Administration had deserted MacArthur and his troops. MacArthur, they declared, was the “only General in the United States Army” who cared about the “Heroes of Bataan and Corregidor.” They claimed Roosevelt and his military leaders created the conditions that left Pearl Harbor vulnerable to a “sneak attack” and held them “strictly responsible” for the casting their “heroic, unsupported, starved boys” into the clutches of “merciless Japs.” MacArthur was their champion: he was the “only one who has pledged himself to the recapture of the Philippines and the saving of our boys.”

America’s perception of the general was carefully managed by MacArthur, the press, Congress, and his superiors—who in reality had little patience for the “big baby” who “should have saved his planes on December 8”—but nonetheless recognized his value to “this psychological warfare business.” As Walter Borneman makes clear, MacArthur was the hero Americans needed in the bleakest days of the war. New Mexicans regarded the BRO’s war-bond drive as an excellent opportunity to display their support for “his untiring efforts to redeem his pledge to liberate our sons.”

57 BRO Bulletin, October 11, 1943, 1, CFA; BRO Bulletin, September 9, 1943, CFA; BRO Bulletin, November 15, 1943, 1, CFA.
59 “Relief Organization to Sponsor Bond Sales,” The Deming Headlight, January 15, 1943.
The goal of the January 1943 campaign was $300,000, enough to pay for a single B-17 Flying Fortress. Regular bond purchases, that is, those that contributed to meeting pre-established quotas, did not count towards the buy-a-bomber fund. Citizens had to buy extra bonds if they wanted the “privilege and honor” of naming a plane. Clark Lee, whose dispatches from the Philippines were gobbled up by worried relatives for any tidbits about their kin, reported a year earlier that the soldiers on Bataan had started a “‘bomber for Bataan’ fund.” Their dark slogan captured the “irony, tragedy, and heroism” of their situation: “Better buy one bomber than be buried on Bataan.” Reporters at a White House press conference shortly after the story ran in the newspapers asked Roosevelt to comment on the soldiers’ plan. His cynical (but realistic) response was if the boys on Bataan could tell him how to get a plane to the islands they could certainly have it. Needless to say, no bombers made it to Bataan before the surrender. Spensley reminded New Mexicans of their soldiers’ desperation—and America’s inability to relieve it—when he told them the aim of the drive was to finally buy that bomber on the boys’ “behalf as a birthday present for General MacArthur.” The act of purchasing the bomber was both practical and symbolic. “They shall have that bomber working for them in effecting their release [as] prisoners,” Spensley declared. Of course he was not in a position to make such promises; communities had no say in where planes went or what missions they flew, and in fact this was a point of contention when the BRO wanted assurances the B-17 would be directly involved in the liberation of the Philippines. For New Mexicans the bomber functioned as a living monument.

60 “Bonds Buy Bombers…Bombers Sell Bonds,” The Minute Man 2, no. 16 (January 15, 1943): 9. The WFC published estimated costs for war materiel in several of its newsletters, and in its itemized lists generally advertised the cost of a light bomber as somewhere in the neighborhood of $250,000, while heavy bombers rang up at $350,000. The B-17 Flying Fortress, manufactured by Boeing was a decidedly heavy bomber. Held aloft by four engines, in addition to its five machine guns it could carry a payload of almost five thousand pounds.
61 “Bond Bombers Fly!” The Minute Man 2, no. 19 (March 1, 1943): 12.
to their boys. For the soldiers still alive, it was a “token of our respect for their brave
determination,” and for those who were not, the Flying Fortress would drop the bombs that
would “redeem from the hands of the enemy the hallowed ground in which lies the remains
of those who gave their all for our country.” Indeed, as Don Harris, editor of The Deming
Graphic somberly observed, war bonds “are our flowers for the living, as well as for the dead
A tribute to Bataan, but also a promise to the future.”

The WFC launched its Schools at War program the previous September, and to
capitalize on this promising strategy the BRO reached into schools across the state to help
fund the bomber. This approach was effective in a state like New Mexico where the average
income hovered around $550; though income rose steadily throughout the war, it did not
increase as rapidly as in most of the rest of the United States. Schoolchildren and their
families could purchase war stamps—the “little pipsqueak companions” to full-value war
bonds—for 10¢, 25¢, 50¢, $1, and $5. These denominations were more affordable for most
New Mexicans, and allowed them to make small purchases over time until they amassed
enough stamps to exchange for a bond. The BRO planned a contest to select a “MacArthur
Day Queen” to encourage citizens to complete their stamp books and turn them in for bonds,
or, to start filling new albums. Rather than inspire students across the state to sell more
bonds, however, the competition began as something of a patriotic prom queen election. Girls
eighteen years old and younger could enter the contest, and they got “votes” every time

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64 John Bush Jones, All-Out for Victory! Magazine Advertising and the World War II Home Front (Lebanon: Brandeis University Press, 2009), 250. In 1941 the annual per capita income in New Mexico was $415; by the end of the war it was $812. The difference between New Mexico’s income and the rest of the United States was $278 for the former and $338 for the latter.
someone gave their names when they turned in filled stamp albums. The “princesses” with the most votes from each county received a $25 bond, and the girl with the most votes overall was named Queen and received a $100 bond. Towards the end of the drive a change in the rules suggests Spensley and the BRO realized the MacArthur Day Queen promotion came across as a popularity contest rather than an inducement to sell or buy stamps and bonds. In addition to getting credit for filled albums turned in on her behalf, for every bond a contestant sold she was credited the equivalent of three albums.65

Towns and cities across the state held drives to contribute to the fund. In Albuquerque children from the Old Town School bought over $1000 in war stamps; Gallup Junior High School acquired $3000 worth of stamps; and students at Deming High School made purchases totaling $2500. Charline Sage, the daughter of Colonel Charles G. Sage, commander of the 200th Coast Artillery, a student in Deming had the most sales and was named “Princess of Luna County.” Surely a number of the votes were cast in both sympathy for and in recognition of her father’s service and imprisonment in the Philippines.66 Jeannette Franchini, a student at St. Mary’s High School in Albuquerque, managed to sell over $32,000 in bonds and was named “MacArthur Day Queen.” The Albuquerque Journal reported her “fervor” during the campaign was “fired” by the War Department’s recent telegram notifying her family her brother, Frank, was a prisoner of war. An accomplished violinist, he served in the 200th Coast Artillery band. Her parents, Ovidio and Angia, were active in the BRO and other civic organizations in the city. The BRO presented her with the award on April 9, 1943, as part of their observance of the first anniversary of the surrender.67

66 “MacArthur Birthday Drive Boosts Bond Sales,” The Deming Headlight, January 29, 1943.
The BRO’s campaign peaked with the celebration of MacArthur’s birthday. By that point the BRO had selected the name “Spirit of Bataan” for the bomber. A few advertisements for the drive ran in papers throughout the week, among them a creative offering from Bob’s Super Market. None other than General MacArthur himself, appropriately adorned with a grocer’s white apron, was going to carry bags loaded with fresh produce to mothers at home fighting a war against poor nutrition. Most businesses reserved their budget for the big push on its closing day and their patriotic inducements dominated the day’s paper. Drawings of the Flying Fortress, likenesses of MacArthur, caricatures of Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo, and the usual assortment of patriotic motifs—stars, stripes, eagles, and a number of “V for Victory” logos—filled the pages. With few exceptions the ads made an explicit connection between bond purchases, the bomber, and the war in the Pacific. Several told readers to “buy a bond to bomb Japan,” while another promised readers the bomber they bought would get their own boys home faster: “Let’s Help Him Help Our New Mexico Boys Return Home to Us!” Fred Mackey’s, a menswear store, suggested with the bomber MacArthur would finally fulfill his vow to return to Japan. “Let’s Send MacArthur over Bataan Again!” With their “most powerful weapon…money-in-War Bonds,” buyers could “give the Japs a bad dose of MacArthuritis.” The Albuquerque Gas and Electric Company donated its ad space to the BRO, whose message reiterated there was no “better way to keep faith with [MacArthur] and with the New Mexicans men…under his command” than to buy war bonds. If the “‘Stay-at-Homes’” in the state do not come up with the $300,000,” they will “fail our Hometown Heroes.” Bond-buying not only gave New Mexicans each a “share in the bomber,” it was a sign of their “loyalty to those of Bataan and Corregidor.”

68 “This is the Armory, Mrs. Jones,” Albuquerque Journal, January 22, 1943.
69 Albuquerque Journal, January 26, 1943.
language and imagery of these advertisements told New Mexicans it was a straight shot from their pocketbooks to the Japanese islands, reinforcing their sense they were closer to bringing their boys home.

By the end of the week-long campaign New Mexicans bought $377,025 in Series E bonds. Only the purchase of Series E bonds counted towards the total needed for the bomber, but the grand total of all bond sales was $540,000. The sales totals from Luna County for the month of January show how effective the buy-a-bomber campaign was in the state. Deming, the county seat, was home to eighty-three of the boys on Bataan, and vigorous bond sales were a mark of pride for the area. By the end of the month residents throughout the county purchased $47,175 worth of stamps and bonds; of that total, $17,943.75, were sold during the BRO’s drive.70 Stamp and bond sales across the nation, however, trended slightly higher for the month. The WFC had designated the month “Stamp Album Clearance Month” and encouraged citizens to finish filling their albums and turn them in for war bonds, so this likely contributed to the higher sales. A study commissioned by the Treasury Department in early January 1942 suggested most people were “thinking of the war and purchase of bonds and stamps largely in personal terms,” which could be described as “materialistic rather than idealistic or altruistic.” Fifty percent of interviewees said the best reason to buy bonds was because it was a “good investment,” while thirty percent said it was a “good way to save.” Less than twenty percent believed it was their “patriotic duty” or that doing so would “help with the war.” Even fewer bought the idea “we can’t fight but we can buy bonds.” The

70 “MacArthur Birthday Drive Boosts Bond Sales,” Deming Headlight, January 29, 1943; “War Bond Sales Up,” The Deming Headlight, February 5, 1943. Luna County had a track record of leading the state in its percentage of quota sales, which was perceived as “in keeping with the fact that Deming and vicinity sent scores of soldiers to the Philippine Islands.” “Luna County Tops War Bond Sales,” Albuquerque Journal, January 1, 1943.
almost eight hundred people interviewed did not demographically represent most of New Mexico’s population, but the responses do suggest that even in New Mexico many people likely bought bonds because first and foremost it was a sound financial decision. Given the state’s intimate connection to the war in the Pacific and their urgent interest in MacArthur’s ability to worm his way back to the Philippines, however, it is also just as likely the BRO’s personalized appeal and hopeful language prompted the “over the top” bond purchases. Whatever their reasons for buying the bonds, New Mexicans got their bomber. On July 18, 1943, Spensley, BRO members, public officials, and ceremonial guests dedicated the “Spirit of Bataan” at Kirtland Air Field. About three hundred others attended the dedication and sat just outside the fenced perimeter.

Figure 5.4 This photo shows the dedication of the Spirit of Bataan at Kirtland Air Field. City Commission Chairman Clyde Tingley is standing. To the far left is Jeannette Franchini, who was crowned “MacArthur Day” queen. Seated behind Tingley are Governor John J. Dempsey, Colonel Kenneth McGregor from the Army Air Forces, Dr. V. H. Spensley, and Gold Star Mother Mrs. Arturo Garcia.

City Commission Chairman Clyde Tingley delivered a short talk, as did Governor Dempsey and Spensley. Jeannette Franchini, the MacArthur Day Queen, sat among the few guests

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permitted just in front of the nose of the B-17 Flying Fortress, and the honor of unveiling the
name went to New Mexico’s first Gold Star mother, Francis Garcia. Her son, twenty-one-
year-old Ruben, was killed the week after Japan’s initial attack on the Philippines. The
ceremony was bittersweet for Spensley. Just two weeks earlier he and his wife were notified
their son, Homer, had died in a prisoner of war camp. As he sat listening to the speeches that
day he could probably not help but think their efforts were too late to save his son.
Congressman Clinton Anderson shared Spensley’s heartache with his colleagues in
Washington, and read from a letter penned just hours before he received the War Department
telegram. Spensley wrote he was willing to “make any and all sacrifices in behalf of my son
and his comrades,” and as his presence at the dedication shows, he remained committed
despite (and, as he would probably agree because of) his own personal tragedy.73

The Albuquerque Post Office issued a limited-edition air mail cachet to
commemorate the occasion that visually reinforced the BRO’s objective for the campaign. A
head-on silhouette of the bomber flew over Mount Mariveles. The dormant volcano was the
highest point on Bataan, and it was the backdrop against which American and Filipino forces
had surrendered in early April 1942. The American flag to the left, and New Mexico’s state
flag to the right, flanked the scene.

73 78th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 89, pt. 6:7514.
Only two thousand of the specially-printed envelopes were put into circulation, and they were all cancelled at four o’clock in the afternoon to mark the time of the dedication. The symbolism is hard to miss. With its bond sales New Mexico bought the United States a bomber, and together they unleashed the powerful machine to facilitate MacArthur’s return to Bataan. The act of cancelling the air mail envelope at the exact time the bomber was handed over to the Army Air Forces for its “task of vengeance” doubly reinforced New Mexicans were sending off a bomber to fly over Japanese-controlled territories to liberate their boys.

The BRO hoped aviators from Albuquerque’s Kirtland Air Field would command the bomber and use it against the Japanese but the best the War Department could do was confirm is was flying over “one of our fighting fronts winging death and destruction upon our enemies.” Spensley was dissatisfied with this response, and chalked it up to New Mexicans either not belonging to the “right club” or being too opinionated when it came to the Administration’s military priorities. The War Department’s refusal to share the “military

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74 Author’s personal collection.
75 “Special Air Mail Cachet Marks ‘Spirit of Bataan’ Dedication,” Albuquerque Journal, July 18, 1943.
information,” he fumed, was yet another example of the “powers-that-be” shortchanging the boys in the Philippines and snubbing their families. In June of 1945, however, “one of bomber’s crew members—who had in fact been stationed at Kirtland—passed through Albuquerque while recovering from a battle injury and reported to the *Albuquerque Tribune* the “retribution ship…smashed several important Japanese targets” before lumbering over the Philippines to complete its “most glorious” mission of “vengeance.” As the war with Japan neared its end, the news confirmed New Mexicans’ hopeful bond purchases had done what the BRO told them it would.

Spensley wrote in the January 1944 *Bulletin* the BRO was not sponsoring any drives during the Fourth War Loan, but news reports and additional articles in later editions of the *Bulletin* indicate otherwise. The *Albuquerque Journal* identified Spensley and the BRO as responsible for a second MacArthur Day war bond drive, to again be observed on the General’s birthday at the end of the month. The BRO cooperated with fifteen other groups from the state and sponsored a three-day drive to begin on January 26. Their goal was to achieve sales of one million dollars.

The rhetoric of its earlier campaigns persisted, and BRO encouraged New Mexicans to buy war bonds to “help get [their] boys back home.” Though the slogan of the Fourth War Loan was the same as the Third, “Back the Attack,” the theme was “Sacrifice: Everyone Buy Extra War Bonds.” The rhetoric of its early activities persisted and the BRO asked everyone in New Mexico to purchase that extra war bond and dedicate it broadly “to the liberation,” and more specifically to a particular soldier from the 200th. Spensley addressed

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77 *BRO Bulletin*, July 5, 1945, Genaro B. Lopez Collection, Cat 60 ACC 104, Bataan Memorial Museum, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
78 Olney, 77.
his fellow New Mexicans via radio after buying a $500 bond for his son, Robert, and
dedicated in Homer’s memory. “We must not fail our sons in the prison camps,” he said,
“We must work diligently for their early delivery.” A special poster designed for New
Mexico’s drive made their goal clear: “Avenge Bataan!” Few newspaper ads marked the
short campaign, but Albuquerque National Bank ran an ad telling Bernalillo County residents
the “eyes of our fighting men are upon” us, watching to “see if we are going to “Avenge
Bataan”.” Halfway through the Fourth War Loan and at the end of the three-day MacArthur
Day drive, the Army and Navy issued a joint report colloquially known as both the “Atrocity
Report” and the “Dyess Story.” The release of this report was the first time Americans
learned of the “march of death” endured by the embattled Bataan defenders in the aftermath
of the surrender, and its timing angered many who believed it to be a publicity stunt designed
to sell more bonds. When citizens across the country read the detailed account of torture,
starvation, disease, and the forced march across the Bataan peninsula their blood boiled. New
Mexicans’ furious grief propelled the remainder of the state’s Fourth War Loan campaign.
The Court Café reproduced the Albuquerque Journal’s front-page headlines from the day of
the announcement and used large block letters to declare, “Avenge Bataan.” New Mexicans
were told to buy the bonds needed to get their revenge, but were also reminded Americans
were better than their Japanese enemies and would not win the war by outdoing their
inhumanity, but by “outpower[ing them] in equipment.”

The variety of civic activities detailed in this chapter represent but a small slice of
what the Bataan Relief Organization did during the war to try and fulfill its mission of

79 “State is Expected to Go Over Top in Bond Selling,” Las Vegas Daily Optic, January 26, 1944; “MacArthur
Day Opens Campaign,” Albuquerque Journal, January 26, 1944; “A Message to Every Man, Woman, and
making sure its members and their fellow Americans did not let down the boys on Bataan the way the government did. The BRO offered New Mexico’s families, and indeed families of other Bataan defenders around the country, a way to navigate their uncertainty and anxiety about the fate of their boys on Bataan. The controversial ending to the carrot auction, however, does show that not everyone felt the BRO represented the interests of all New Mexicans. The interactions between the BRO and the towns of Grants and Gallup help expose some of the fractures that are sometimes obscured in wartime. The patriotic rhetoric of doing one’s part to help the war effort by buying bonds was grand in its implication, but could be anonymous in its effect. The Bataan Relief Organization ameliorated some of the bureaucratic anonymity. Buying bonds in honor of their boys on Bataan, painting their names on shop windows, and dedicating a bomber they believed would help liberate their men gave New Mexicans practical, visible, and achievable ways to personalize the sometimes-alienating demands of wartime patriotism. Finally, the BRO’s persistent efforts on behalf of the men on Bataan reassured its members, other New Mexicans, and families around the country that though the federal government had forgotten the men on Bataan, their hometowns had not, thereby providing an important foundation for how those hometowns honored and remembered their heroes during and after the war.
CHAPTER 6

“In the Anguish of Our Loss There is Mixed a Deep Pride for Our Sons”: Mourning and Memory on the New Mexican Home Front

New Mexicans recognized the difficulty of adequately honoring the men fighting on Bataan, and before news of the surrender hit the newspapers were already contemplating ways to let the boys know their home towns had not forgotten them. A brief article in the April 9, 1942 issue of the Albuquerque Journal—below the headline story Bataan’s defenses were crumbling—advertised Joe Valdez Jr.’s suggestion to Governor John Miles he present a “New Mexico Medal of Honor” to Bernalillo County parents whose boys were fighting on Bataan at that year’s San Felipe de Neri Fiesta. The San Felipe de Neri parish anchored the small town when it was founded in 1706, and large crowds regularly attended the yearly celebration held to honor its patron saint. The feast day, May 26, meant the festival weekend sometimes coincided with Memorial Day observances. The medals would recognize “gallantry and courageous conduct,” offered the Albuquerque businessman, who headed the committee planning the fête, and he imagined other communities might be inspired to make similar tributes. Miles agreed. “I am highly in favor of this or any other form of recognition the state can give its heroic soldiers,” he declared, “If any soldiers ever deserved recognition, they do.” Miles did not hand out any medals, but the fiesta that year “took on a muted, patriotic tone” and the Sunday program featured somber oratory from various officials.1

1 Sylvia Rodriguez made this observation about wartime fiestas in Taos in her article “The Taos Fiesta: Invented Tradition and the Infrapolitics of Symbolic Reclamation,” Journal of the Southwest 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 39. Her assessment applies to this fiesta in Albuquerque, and the same could likely be said of other wartime fiestas held throughout the state. The March-April 1947 issue of the Coast Artillery Journal was dedicated to the 200th Coast Artillery, and a photograph of San Felipe de Neri Church was used for the issue’s cover. See Coast Artillery Journal 90, no. 1 (March-April 1947).
Gilberto Espinosa, assistant U.S. district attorney for the state, presided over a memorial service honoring local men on Bataan and delivered his remarks in Spanish. Spensley spoke on behalf of the Bataan Relief Organization, and a corrido dedicated to the 200th Coast Artillery was performed for the first time.

Luis Martínez, a local businessman and poet, composed the corrido. In it he recalled Japan’s treachery against the United States and celebrated the martial accomplishments of the state’s National Guard:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Mil nuevecientos cuarenta} & \quad \text{In nineteen hundred forty} \\
y uno temenos presente, & \quad \text{one we remember,} \\
\text{el imperio de Japón} & \quad \text{the Japanese empire} \\
nos azotó de repente. & \quad \text{Attacked us without warning.} \\
\text{Doscientos de Artillería} & \quad \text{The 200th Coast Artillery} \\
de Nuevo México fueron, & \quad \text{of New Mexico went,} \\
día ocho de diciembre & \quad \text{on December eighth} \\
su bandera defendieron & \quad \text{they defended their flag.} \\
\text{Los primeros que pelearon} & \quad \text{They were the first to fight} \\
os primeros que murieron, & \quad \text{they were the first to die,} \\
con resistencia y valor & \quad \text{with resistance and valor} \\
su fama la distinguieron. & \quad \text{their reputation distinguished them} \\
\text{Soldados de Estados Unidos} & \quad \text{Soldiers of the United States} \\
también suramericanos & \quad \text{and South Americans} \\
encotraramos en batalla & \quad \text{they found themselves in battle} \\
van valientes Mexicanos. & \quad \text{as brave Mexicans.} \\
Pondrán hombres alabados & \quad \text{Men will sing hymns of praise} \\
\text{con las oraciones,} & \quad \text{with their prayers} \\
comprando trimbas y bonos & \quad \text{they will buy stamps and bonds} \\
\text{para fabricar cañones.} & \quad \text{to manufacture cannons.} \\
\text{Que gane en todo lugar} & \quad \text{May the flag of the United States} \\
bandera de Estados Unidos, & \quad \text{fly everywhere in victory,} \\
emblem de libertad & \quad \text{an emblem of liberty} \\
\text{que nos tenga agradecidos.} & \quad \text{over a grateful people.}\end{align*}\]

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2 Luis S. Martinez, “En las Islas filipinas,” in Enrique Madrid, Cantos de Honor y Sacrificio: A New Mexico Legacy of Honor for the Veterans of Sandoval County (2007), Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico. This is an excerpt from the corrido, which has ten additional stanzas.
Martínez’ corrido contained a simplified narrative arc that described the war in the Pacific and its significance for New Mexico. The 200th was already in the Philippines when war broke out, and it was the first unit to fire upon the enemy in battle. He importantly drew attention to the soldiers’ ethnic heritage, pointing out they fought with both American and Mexican blood. Proud families on the home front would do their part to help the war effort by buying savings stamps and war bonds, but would also turn to God and their faith for solace. Japanese control of the Far East was only temporary, and under the leadership of Roosevelt and MacArthur the traicionero imperio would soon be defeated. This corrido was one of the earliest attempts New Mexicans made to honor and recognize the 200th’s wartime service. Martínez recorded in his poem a feeling he shared with many of his fellow New Mexicans: “Doscientos de Artillería los tengo en mi corazón.”

Valdez’ proposal the Fiesta offered an ideal setting in which to give medals to Bataan defenders’ parents coupled with the debut of Martínez’ sentimental corrido during the ceremonial portion of the Fiesta program gives us insight into the nature of New Mexicans’ efforts to recognize and remember the state’s wartime contributions. In this chapter, I argue during World War II New Mexicans constructed a commemorative culture that privileged the service, sacrifice, and suffering of the men who fought on Bataan and made their experiences of surrender and captivity central to the state’s identity. New Mexicans established spaces and rituals to recognize, remember, and mourn the men of the 200th. By dedicating buildings, bridges, monuments, and parks, New Mexicans wove the catastrophe into the fabric of the state’s history. Some of their efforts were more enduring than others, but all demonstrate the urgency with which they moved to mark the state with reminders of their soldiers’ sacrifices. I examine four memorial spaces: the Bataan Building and 200th Insignia in Santa Fe, Bataan
Bridge in Carlsbad, and Bataan Memorial Park in Albuquerque. New Mexicans’ reverence for its returned soldiers, both living and dead, and the things they did to honor them, refined and reaffirmed the hierarchy of sacrifice they structured during the war. New Mexicans also continued to augment, embellish, and refine these memorials—as well as construct additional ones—which suggests they believed their commemorative spaces inadequately expressed of their appreciation for Bataan veterans’ sacrifices, affirming the BRO’s early assertion citizens could never “repay the debt” they owed them. Furthermore, their actions heralded Bataan veterans as archetypes for military service and positioned them at the center of New Mexico’s wartime identity.

The ink had barely dried on the surrender documents when people in New Mexico began marking spaces throughout the state to honor their soldiers. Communities across the nation debated how best to remember World War II, but with resources temporarily directed toward winning the war, they made plans for monuments and memorials and did little building. Furthermore, in the spring of 1942 America’s war was so far what Roosevelt called a “phase of serious losses.” The human cost of the war had not yet been realized, and though the Roosevelt Administration made it a priority to shape the ideological significance of Allied victory, the outcome was hardly a foregone conclusion. Drawing upon the monumental lessons learned after the First World War, civilians and civic leaders pondered the wisdom of constructing living memorials—those that served a useful civic purpose, such as libraries, hospitals, and stadiums—versus traditional memorials—edifices like obelisks, arches, and statues. The American Commission for Living War Memorials’ pamphlet,

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3 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat to the Nation,” April 28, 1942, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1942.
“Memorials that Live,” argued living memorials “accomplished the high purpose” of paying citizens’ “great debt” to the “brave men . . . all physically fit, who have suffered the hells of Bataan . . . and elsewhere.” Memorials were “local affairs” and “community endeavors for home folks’ heroes, by the home folks,” and should reflect the means and needs of the towns that built them. In addition to “keeping alive the memories of the heroic deeds of the past,” they should develop “physically fit and mentally rugged men and women.” An editorial in the *Albuquerque Journal* drew attention to the pamphlet’s message. “Statues, obelisks, and plaques…only take up room and soon are noticed only by sightseers,” it read, and not only were they artistically deficient, but “detracted from the memory of those they were supposed to honor.” The editor suggested Albuquerqueans “start considering such “living memorials” for our heroes of Bataan, Corregidor, and the rest of the war fronts right now.” The editorial, however, was published in March 1944. By that point, New Mexicans had—without identifying them as such—dedicated several living memorials in the state to the memory of the men on Bataan.

New Mexico, like much of the rest of the nation, had little money in its coffers for memorial projects. Instead of erecting new structures, civic leaders instead took advantage of current or planned municipal projects to designate commemorative spaces. As a consequence, not all of their efforts generated enduring or “successful” memorials. The speed with which New Mexicans began setting aside public spaces to honor the men on Bataan, however, does demonstrate they were anxious to install reminders of the men whose absence they felt deeply. In the spring of 1942 construction on a vocational building for Santa Fe

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High School was nearing completion. The shop, a Works Progress Administration (WPA) project, cost approximately $158 thousand, with the federal government contributing $114 thousand and local sponsors adding $45 thousand. Located at the corner of Marcy and Grant streets, the new shop housed equipment to teach aeronautical mechanics and ship welding.\(^7\)

Ruth Laughlin Alexander, a prominent Santa Fean and well-known novelist, served on the school board and at one of its meetings proposed naming the building “either ‘Corregidor’ or ‘Bataan,’ since two-hundred Santa Fe boys were serving over there.” Thomas Muir, who owned the Santa Fe Motor Company, seconded her motion and also suggested a plaque inscribed with the names of all the Santa Fe boys be installed in the building. One week after Corregidor surrendered school officials and Santa Fe residents gathered to dedicate the new building, and at least until the early 1980s it was called the Bataan Building.\(^8\)

\(^7\) “WPA Allotments Given Approval,” Santa Fe New Mexican, April 22, 1941;
\(^8\) “Bataan Building Dedicated Wednesday May 13, 1942,” History of the Santa Fe Public Schools Vol. IV, Collection 1959-294, Box 14179, Santa Fe County Records, New Mexico Municipal Records, New Mexico State Records Center and Archives; “New High School Mechanics Shop Named Bataan Building,” Santa Fe New Mexican, May 15, 1942. Santa Fe did not have two hundred soldiers on Bataan. Approximately 100 men were in Battery C, which was headquartered in Santa Fe, and of those men about 90 were from Santa Fe.

\(^9\) Ibid.
No exterior text or other decorative elements appear to have marked the structure as the Bataan Building. Nor do photographs, included in several of Santa Fe High School’s (SFHS) yearbooks, show any signage that would convey to residents or visitors the building was named for the battlefield where many of the city’s soldiers had bravely fought. Yet some effort was made to reinforce its function as a commemorative space, and in so doing called attention to the oft-ignored fact not all New Mexican men serving in the Philippines were in the 200th or 515th, though it is their experience that dominates the state’s narrative of the defense, surrender, and captivity.\textsuperscript{10} In January 1943, students capped off the week-long war bond campaign, during which they bought over $700 in stamps and bonds, by dedicating a “special Bataan service flag” with stars representing SFHS students and graduates who were thought to have been on Bataan when it surrendered. Of the thirty-four stars on the flag, twenty-eight were for men on Bataan, three for men in the 60th Coast Artillery, one for a Marine captured on Wake Island, and one for a man in the 31st Infantry. The flag replicated the smaller flags families displayed in their windows to indicate they had members serving in the armed forces. Parents, relatives, and friends of the young men were invited to attend the dedication ceremony. As part of the patriotic program Lieutenant General Ray Andrew of the New Mexico State Guard and Superintendent Raymond Sweeney delivered speeches, with Sweeney spending time sharing stories about the boys and their lives as high school students. Helen Lopez and Viola Tafoya, whose brothers and Jim and Eddie were prisoners, presented the flag to the audience.\textsuperscript{11} Jim and Eddie returned home at the end of the war, along with

\textsuperscript{10} Eva Matson makes note of this in \textit{It Tolled for New Mexico}, and includes figures for prisoners of war from other units as well as civilians who hailed from New Mexico. See Matson, 3-5, 391-427.
\textsuperscript{11} “High School to Dedicate Service Flag,” \textit{Santa Fe New Mexican}, January 26, 1943.
twenty of their former classmates. Twelve of the men died in POW camps or aboard hellships.

That the Bataan Building was part of Santa Fe High School, and a flag bearing stars representing students in combat in the Philippines was dedicated and hung in it, suggests some locals viewed the building as a space meant to particularly honor Santa Fe students who were on Bataan, but in 1946 the school board evidently mounted a plaque with the names of “Santa Fe boys who were in the First Battle of Bataan” in the building, implying it was meant to recognize all Santa Feans on Bataan. But how well did it function as a memorial? The Bataan Building was not built as a memorial, it was simply named and dedicated for Bataan—in all likelihood because the surrenders occurred so close to its completion. As part of an educational institution it fit the bill as a living memorial, and during the war hundreds of students and workers trained for defense work with the aeronautical machinery and welding equipment it housed.

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12 I say “evidently” because there is no evidence (that I have found) to suggest they actually put a plaque in the building. A newspaper article asserts the board made the decision to do so, but no further documentation verifies the plan was carried out. “School Board Bickers,” Santa Fe New Mexican, May 15, 1946.
This advertisement ran in the Santa Fe New Mexican, and promotes the Bataan Building’s function as a vocational school. The ad sought men and women interested in learning how to perform valuable war work, such as aircraft maintenance, welding, and machine operation.\footnote{“Train Now,” Santa Fe New Mexican, November 28, 1942.}

It is surprising there is no paper trail suggesting Santa Feans connected the building’s purpose—churning out defense workers to build the ships and planes they so desperately wanted sent to the Philippines—to the men who suffered for their lack. But there is also no evidence to suggest the school board intended it to be a permanent memorial to the men, and so although it served as a useful site for occasional remembrance during the war, Santa Feans had little interest in maintaining it as such in the postwar era. In her gossip column in the Las Cruces Sun-News, Alice Thomas noted the nationwide penchant for “naming things after heroes,” and pointed out there were “dozens of MacArthur items over the nation,” and reminded New Mexicans they were acquiring their own cache of “historical reminders,” like
the Bataan Building. But this particular reminder did not last long. After the war, the building housed music programs and home economics classes, but by the 1960s was the target of repeated vandalism—usually broken windows—and in the 1970s the school district used it to store extra desks. Today, the building blends into the rest of downtown Santa Fe. No texts, plaques, or markers tell visitors it was once named for the city’s men on Bataan. Nevertheless, it is an example of how New Mexicans attempted very early in the war to create spaces dedicated to making sure people remembered the boys on Bataan.

The other historical reminder in New Mexico Thomas included in her column was the Bataan Bridge in Carlsbad, which ultimately became a far more enduring memorial than Santa Fe’s Bataan Building. In late April, newspaper editor Ken Dixon countered local and state leaders’ suggestion the newly reconstructed bridge over the Pecos River be named for General MacArthur by proposing it instead be named Bataan Bridge. At the bridge’s original dedication, Miers Johnson, who served on Carlsbad’s Chamber of Commerce, and Ivan Hilton, chairman of the State Highway Commission, as well as Governor Miles, all agreed naming it for the celebrated warrior was appropriate, but a “gentleman” suggested to Pecos Pete, his editorial persona, that MacArthur already had enough things named after him, including plenty of babies. And “‘besides,’ sezze he to Pete, ‘Carlsbad was well represented on Bataan—as was the whole nation—and naming the bridge Bataan would be a tribute to all of them, as well as to General MacArthur.’” Pecos Pete had a point. In 1942, over eleven thousand babies were named “Douglas,” making the moniker the twenty-third most popular name in the country.

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River in downtown Carlsbad had been in the works since 1932, but when funding was made available in 1939 defense restrictions on the purchase of building materials like steel delayed the project.\textsuperscript{16} Construction on the bridge, made possible because the route was declared a military access road, finally began in November 1941—the week before Pearl Harbor—and was opened to traffic just two days before Bataan surrendered.\textsuperscript{17} Carlsbad businesses and residents celebrated the bridge’s completion, and promoted it as a vital part of the war effort.

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Figure 6.3} One of the many ads that ran in the \textit{Daily Current-Argus} to celebrate the opening of the Greene Street Bridge in April 1942. The ad’s language reinforces the bridge as an important part of the state’s contribution to the war effort, and by qualifying it as “another,” reminds readers Carlsbad had already done much for the war, not the least of which was send so many of its young men to the Philippines.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} “Chamber of Commerce Reports Progress,” \textit{Daily Current-Argus}, August 17, 1941. In 1932 a series of state highways was reorganized as a “transcontinental” trade and tourism route. The route runs from El Paso, Texas to Niagara Falls, NY. About 110 miles of the highway are in New Mexico, and it traverses the southeast corner of the state, entering New Mexico just north of Pine Springs, Texas, and leaving the state east of Hobbs.

\textsuperscript{17} The Defense Highway Act of 1941 released funds and materials for road construction and improvement deemed vital to the national defense. See \textit{Defense Highway Act of 1941, U.S. Code} 23 (1941), §§101-117.

The original dedication ceremonies, held on April 17, were “grim, colorful and more than a little sad.” The day Governor Miles traveled to Carlsbad to dedicate the bridge, the War Department confirmed most of New Mexico’s soldiers were on Bataan when U.S. forces surrendered. “An element of sorrow rode with the parade and showed in the faces of the crowd” that gathered to dedicate the bridge, and the event acquired “a grim and military bearing.” To underscore the bridge’s potential contribution to the war effort, and even more so the state’s commitment to doing its part for national defense, the *Daily Current-Argus* traced the history of the bridge back to the efforts of community leaders and businessmen who pushed for improved roads in the southwest to facilitate potash mining.  

Governor Miles used the dedication as an opportunity to remind people of the sacrifices made by the men on Bataan. “It makes my blood run cold when I think of the men on Bataan and Luzon and all the Philippines who have been blasted out of this life,” he said, “and then think of those in our midst who would halt and delay munitions production because of selfish interests.” It was the responsibility of those gathered in the audience, he commanded, “to see to it that those who perished on Bataan did not die in vain.” Carlsbad residents favored naming it Bataan Bridge as opposed to MacArthur Bridge. “The name most folks seem to be plugging for is Bataan Bridge,” reported the *Current-Argus*, and at their June meeting the State Highway Commission approved the name, and plans were made to merge Fourth of July festivities with the dedication.


20 *Albuquerque Journal*, April 18, 1942; The text of Miles’ speech differs between the *Journal* and the *Current-Argus*, but the meaning is the same.; “Bataan Bridge,” *Carlsbad Current-Argus*, May 26, 1942; “Confirm Span Bataan Bridge,” *Daily Current-Argus*, June 14, 1942.
The Independence Day dedication program took place on July 5 because July 4 was a Saturday, a reminder that work in “a vital defense area” could not be stopped, even for a celebration honoring the state’s heroes. When Dixon and others recommended renaming the structure, they suggested Bataan Bridge was more suitable than MacArthur Bridge because it recognized all the boys on Bataan, not just a single man. But when the State Commission approved the name, it did so to specifically honor New Mexico’s boys in the Philippines. And although announcements about the upcoming ceremony indicated the bridge would be dedicate to the 200th Coast Artillery, the organization of the event itself emphasized local men in the unit and “honor[ed] not only Carlsbad’s soldiers, but their families as well.”

Only about two hundred people—mostly families of the ninety Carlsbad men on Bataan—attended the dedication ceremonies, further reinforcing its function as a memorial specifically for those men. A bridge had spanned the Pecos River in that same spot almost since the founding of the city in 1889, and it was part of Carlsbad residents’ daily lives. Its historic centrality to downtown Carlsbad and its significance as a point of entry to the city muddled its memorial significance, especially since despite civic leaders’ promises a plaque would be erected went unfulfilled and only a simple sign identified the bridge. Indeed, after the boys started returning home in the fall of 1945, residents eagerly began debating building a memorial for the men of the 200th—apparently forgetting they already had one. The State

21 “Program Honors Bataan Defenders,” Daily Current-Argus, July 3, 1942;
23 “The bridge on Greene Street,” The Eddy Argus, October 26, 1889.
24 A photograph of soldiers in the Carlsbad National Guard firing a salute at the 1982 dedication ceremonies shows a small sign at the edge of the bridge that reads “Bataan Bridge,” but there is no information indicating when the sign was added. See Dina Urquidez, “It Was A Special Moment,” Carlsbad Current-Argus, September 16, 1982.
Highway Commission provided a photograph and details about the bridge to *New Mexico Magazine*, which featured the bridge in its August 1942 issue.25

![Figure 6.4 Photograph of Bataan Bridge, in New Mexico Magazine.](image)

Some Carlsbad residents, like high school senior Connie Davis, whose brothers Eugene and Dwayne both died on the *Arisan Maru*, believed the bridge too pedestrian to be an appropriate memorial. The *Current-Argus* sponsored a writing contest in the spring of 1947, “Carlsbad’s Biggest Needs,” and asked locals to write articles identifying the city’s “greatest and most pressing needs” and suggesting how those needs could best be met. In his entry, Davis proposed the town needed a better and more spacious civic auditorium and youth center, and recommended it “be a memorial to those brave men who were on Bataan.”27 But Roy Carey, Jr., a junior at Carlsbad High School, reminded his neighbors they already had a memorial. Auditoriums and stadiums would certainly be “fitting

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26 Ibid.
commemorations” but there is an “insignificant materially, but far-reaching morally” way to “pay tribute to those men.” “I refer,” he wrote,

To the memorial which was to have been erected at the Bataan Bridge. I know not why this has not been done. If it has been forgotten, or lost in the realms of democratic government, it would be in itself a breach of the spirit for which this monument was intended. Therefore, this is a reminder that the sadly inadequate and temporary sign should be replaced with a more appropriate remembrance of the cause for which the bridge was dedicated.28

Carey’s indictment of the town’s neglect of Bataan Bridge was reminiscent of the state’s fury when they believed the Roosevelt Administration had betrayed its soldiers and abandoned them on Bataan. Nonetheless, the town did little with his suggestion for the next forty years.

Fortieth-anniversary commemorations of the surrender in April of 1942 reignited local interest in the bridge, and local reporters speculated as to why there was no marker on the bridge. Barry Casebolt, an editor at the Current-Argus, went so far as to claim “the act of commemorating the span in honor” of Bataan defenders “was never performed,” a disparaging sentiment that minimized Carlsbad residents’ early attempts to honor their soldiers.29 Perhaps it was an “oversight,” or “a lack of metal during the war.” Possibly it was “just a busy time where no one remembered,” or if there was a marker, “it could have been destroyed in a flood.” According to one reporter, “state officials somehow forgot about it.”30 Ron Ripley, the state engineer who researched the issue, told a Carlsbad reporter he was unable to find any “mention of an intent to place a marker” in State Highway Commission records. 31 In fact, according to the caption accompanying a photograph of the bridge in New Mexico Magazine, Carlsbad’s Chamber of Commerce had been responsible for installing a

30 Urquidez, “It Was A Special Moment.”
plaque, not the state. But at a meeting of the State Highway Commission in 1982 the state assumed responsibility for the missing marker and approved its placement. Burt Dwyre, who had been the engineer on 1942 when the bridge was dedicated, and Jim Chaney, Vice Chairman of the Commission and a Bataan veteran, both attended the meeting and supported the proposal.32

![Figure 6.5](image-url) (Left to Right) Burton Dwyre, Governor Bruce King, Tom Mann, and Jim Chaney at the State Highway Commission meeting in April 1982, seeking approval to install a plaque marking the Bataan Bridge as a memorial to the Bataan defenders.33

The autumn dedication of the bridge—its third—matched the solemnity of the first two. The event attracted an audience twice as large as that of the 1942 even, and this time included Bataan veterans from across the state. Governor King reminded the audience the bridge was only “one small way to pay respect” to the veterans, whose sacrifice was “something we can never repay.” Carlsbad’s mayor, Walter Gerrells, told them the words “never have so many

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32 Victor Minter, who served as secretary of Carlsbad’s Chamber of Commerce when the bridge was dedicated in 1942, wrote several letters to the State Highway Commission inquiring about the marker in 1942 and 1945, but it is unclear how the Commission responded to those letters. See Jim O’Hearn, “Marker for Bridge Is Approved,” Carlsbad Current-Argus, April 16, 1942.
33 Ibid.
owed so much to so few” applied “more to the Bataan veterans than anyone else,” a statement that reinforced where the state’s Bataan veterans fit in its hierarchy of sacrifice.\textsuperscript{34} The plaque, unlike the sentiments expressed in the 1942 ceremony, dedicated the bridge to “those brave New Mexicans who served so gallantly in World War II on Bataan.”\textsuperscript{35}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image1.png}
\caption{Governor Bruce King, Jim Chaney, and Donald Harris unveil the new Bataan Bridge marker at the bridge rededication in September 1982. Carlsbad’s mayor, Walter Gerrells, was in the original photo but has been cropped out.\textsuperscript{36}}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image2.png}
\caption{Bataan veterans Vincente Ojinaga and Arthur Smith salute during the bridge dedication ceremony.\textsuperscript{37}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{37} Smith, “Dedication.”
An editorial in the *Current-Argus* applauded the state for its speedy work addressing the wartime “oversight,” and imagined “thousands of voices, long stilled in death” could be heard “whispering a “Well done” to those whose efforts are rectifying a matter which was overlooked for too long a period.” Yet, the final placement of the plaque—and the explosion of other commemorative sites dedicated to Carlsbad’s Bataan veterans—raises the question of how adequately citizens’ felt the site fulfilled its memorial purposes. A screenshot captured using Google Maps’ street view feature, shows the plaque’s placement relative to the bridge.

![Figure 6.7](image.png)

*Figure 6.7* This screen shot from Google Maps shows how far the plaque is from the bridge, and shows that it is obscured by the branches and shadows of an overhanging tree.

Located approximately two hundred feet from the bridge on the northeast corner, a towering evergreen somewhat obscures the plaque. City officials worried locating the plaque on the bridge would cause accidents when drivers stopped to read it. Yet dwarfed by a tree and at such a distance from the bridge, one wonders about its effectiveness reminding people of the bridge’s significance as a memorial. Longtime Carlsbad resident Joe Liddell was grateful for the bridge’s reminder about the “brave men who saw their duty and ill-equipped as they were

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39 Screen shot captured using Google Maps.
did it,” and lamented local youngsters’ lack of knowledge about war events with local importance. He was critical, however, of the city’s apparently single-minded focus on its Bataan veterans. “It was very well and good to read the article in your tabloid about the dedication of the Bataan Bridge!” he snarked, “But do you realize the pain and suffering that was undergone during the “Battle of Corregidor” and the subsequent fall of?” For Liddell, remembrances of the state’s Bataan veterans came at the expense of other units who were equally as valiant and deserving of recognition. He had a point. By the 1980s, Bataan dominated Carlsbad’s public landscape. In the summer of 1942 the old Carlsbad Hospital was converted to officers’ housing and renamed Bataan Apartments. Bataan Bridge was dedicated in 1942 and 1982. In the late 1960s, Bataan Restaurant opened—with a special dining area called the Bataan Room—at the corner of East Greene and James Streets, just southeast of the bridge. Bataan Park, a recreation area south of the bridge, was developed in the 1970s and dedicated in 1982 at the same time as the bridge. An elementary school was named for Joe Stanley Smith, the young gunner who became one of America’s Bataan heroes in the pages of *Life*, and was later killed in an airplane crash after surviving the war. and at some point in the late 1960s a Bataan Restaurant opened. That Carlsbad residents have continued to set aside new and different spaces for Bataan veterans proves Governor King’s observation the sacrifices of the men on Bataan could never be repaid nor adequately recognized. But the plethora of spaces devoted to those men also demonstrates the extent to which they privileged the experiences of men in the 200th and 515th over that of New Mexican soldiers on other battlefronts.41

41 A number of other monuments to Bataan veterans have been erected in Carlsbad. The community has also installed memorials and markers to other conflicts and other veterans. See the Winter 2012 issue of Carlsbad’s community magazine, *Focus on Carlsbad*, available at https://issuu.com/focusnm/docs/2012winter/13.
Of the two memorial spaces discussed thus far—Bataan Building in Santa Fe and Bataan Bridge in Carlsbad—only one survived into the twenty-first century as a commemorative space. And to do so it required a plaque, according to interested residents, to function as a proper memorial to Bataan veterans. Though the Bataan Building was the first space in Santa Fe dedicated to Bataan veterans, it was ultimately not the only—nor the most significant—of those spaces in the city. In the May of 1942, Governor Miles announced the concrete insignia the 200th Coast Artillery built and installed near their barracks at Fort Bliss during their training in the summer of 1941 was going to have a new home at the State Capitol. He recognized it was not designed as a monument, and originally was just the handiwork of industrious, but proud, soldiers during their down time:

The marker is merely a simple symbol in concrete using the regulation insignia of the 200th Coast Artillery. It was never intended for anything but to designate the location of the New Mexico camp at Ft. Bliss. But today the marker has taken on new significance and importance. It deserves to be preserved permanently.42

A delay setting up the six-by-four-foot insignia forced city officials to postpone the dedication, originally scheduled for June 7. And so, like other wartime ceremonies honoring the 200th (except this time unintentionally), the event coincided with a holiday already part of America’s patriotic canon—Flag Day. Governor Miles and Adjutant General Russell C. Charlton presided over the dedication, and their remarks reflected the optimism and hope many families had regarding the fate of the boys of Bataan in the summer of 1942. “The vast majority of our men in the 200th Coast Artillery still live,” Charlton reassured the anxious relatives, and “when we have won this war, they will return to us with new strength forged in the white heat of conflict.”43 Myttie Skiles, whose husband, Leonard, a lieutenant in the

42 John E. Miles, Press Release, May 28, 1942, Miles Papers, Folder 167, NMSRCA.
200th, was in the crowd. Two weeks earlier she wrote to Miles inquiring about the date of the dedication; she wanted to make sure she attended.\footnote{Myttie Skiles to John E. Miles, Miles Papers, Box 10, Folder 346, NMSRCA.} Myttie, like other wives and mothers, had also written a number of letters to anyone she thought might have information about the whereabouts of her husband. When newspapers reported a group of nurses had recently returned from the Philippines, she penned a note to one of them—Lieutenant Lucy Wilson—whose generous response was excerpted in the Deming Headlight. She reinforced Charlton’s message of hope. “I like to think they are being treated as nicely as the Japs are able to—why believe bad? Faith and hope must be our motto just as it was of the boys.”\footnote{“No Braver Heroes Than Those on Bataan, Nurse Writes,” Deming Headlight, August 27, 1942.} Lieutenant Colonel Allison Scott, from the Anti-Aircraft Training Center at Fort Bliss, entrusted the care of the marker to New Mexicans. Scott drew attention to the unit’s unique ethnic composition and its significance to the military success of the nation. “These boys of Spanish, Indian, and American descent,” he remarked, “like their ancestors, fought, bled and died defending the most humane and democratic way of life the world has ever known.” Of course, many New Mexicans’ encounters with imperialism had been far from humane and democratic, but Scott’s comments reminded those gathered for the dedication the shared suffering of the men on the front lines and their families back home muted, temporarily at least, the unevenness of their experience.

The marker installed on the Capitol lawn served as a symbol of that faith and hope to the families gathered at the dedication, and during the war functioned as a shrine for relatives and friends who desperately needed a space of reflection, solace, and mourning. For many, the marker was the last physical link to the men on Bataan. It was a surrogate for the soldiers who designed and built the marker with their own hands. Not all Santa Feans, however,
appreciated the crude monument. Amelia White, an art patron, philanthropist, and something of a historic preservationist, raised the hackles of her adopted community when she belittled the marker in a letter to the *Santa Fe New Mexican*.

I hope this hideous object is only a temporary arrangement. No one in New Mexico could help being shocked at the thought that these blobs of colored concrete represent our pride in the heroic defenders of Bataan. In all the history of New Mexico there is nothing more glorious than this—that our boys were there and gave such an honorable account of themselves. Santa Fe will hear from the rest of the state if we all this preposterous marker to remain as the memorial to any New Mexican boy.

Charlton’s retort to White stressed the monument was, for most New Mexicans, not a piece of art. Its selection and placement had nothing to do with its aesthetic value, but its emotional power:

It was brought here as a tribute to the sacrifice of the men of the regiment. It was intimate to them and the only thing they left behind. The beauty and the intrinsic value of the marker was not considered. We viewed it solely as an object of spiritual intimacy, as one would treasure a letter from a dearly loved friend who is no longer here. The colors are flashy, but they are just as the young men who made the marker wanted them. They were not artists and they did the best they could with the materials and tools that were available, and we didn’t try to improve their work.\(^{46}\)

Santa Fe indeed heard from the rest of the state, but not with the reaction White anticipated. Major Raymond Bell from Las Cruces, a retired Army officer recalled to active duty, too rebuffed White’s biting appraisal. Like Charlton, he noted the meaning of the marker lay in its personal connection with the men that no other monument could replicate, no matter how beautiful. The reason why he and others could appreciate the “simple creation, simply done” was because they had friends or family in the 200th, and so had relationships with the men that profoundly affected their interactions with the marker. “Miss White,” he reasoned, can

\(^{46}\) Both long quotes are from “200th Regiment’s Tablet ‘Hideous Object’, Says Miss White,” *Santa Fe New Mexican*, June 16, 1942.
never “appreciate why such a marker…may be treasured by us New Mexicans….as a mother loves her babe no matter how homely to others, we treasure this piece.”

Wallace Perry, the plainspoken editor for the Las Cruces Sun-News, accused White of being tactless and insensitive. “Those tough youngsters from the farms and ranches and grocery stores and filling stations of New Mexico” were not artists, and “no matter how rugged their workmanship,” the insignia was made exactly the way they wanted it. Both Perry’s and Bell’s responses subtly reminded readers—and White—she was neither a local nor a friend or relative to any of the men in the 200th, and therefore could not possibly understand why most New Mexicans appreciated the marker for what it was. Perry’s nostalgic commentary also called attention to some of the ways New Mexico was still a

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47 “In New Mexico,” Albuquerque Journal, June 18, 1942.
48 The original photograph appeared in the June 18, 1942 issue of the Santa Fe New Mexican, but was of a poor quality. This copy of the photograph is from the website maintained by the Bataan Corregidor Memorial Foundation in Albuquerque, at http://www.angelfire.com/nm/bcmfofm/bmc/eternal_flame.html.
small-town state. Its men on Bataan were known and cherished in their communities; they were the boys next door, the kids who helped their folks harvest crops, delivered their neighbors’ newspapers, and bagged their groceries. An editorial in the *Deming Headlight* shared Perry’s opinion:

> Whether the marker is a diamond studded affair, or, as you say, just a “blob,” it is the handiwork of our boys. As to the hideous colors, [they] represent the State colors embodied in the New Mexico State Flag. Members of the 200th, the majority of whom where New Mexicans…loved the state emblem enough to lay down their lives for it…The marker may be hideous from the standpoint of art but those of us who have loved ones in the 200th feel…for the sake of sentiment it warrants an honored place on the capitol grounds…we suggest it will meet with the unanimous approval of all true New Mexicans.50

In addition to insinuating White was not a “true New Mexican,” the editorial pointed to another layer of intimacy ascribed to the marker. The men did not decorate it with an American flag or some other national patriotic emblem; they instead used the colors and symbols of their home, which the editorial claimed represented the soldiers’ willingness to suffer and die on behalf of New Mexico and its people. This observation underscored the 200th’s identity as a National Guard unit and the mutual affection between the soldiers and the state.

Other angry citizens wrote letters to the editor of the *Santa Fe New Mexican* that recognized White’s standing in the community but agreed with their neighbors her criticism was unwarranted. Furthermore, they hoped the marker would endure as a monument to the men and their sacrifices. Jim Kilkeneny, a Santa Fe businessman and a member of the American Legion, applauded White’s “benevolent generosity.” By constructing the marker, however, the men of the 200th had “contributed something fine and good for the spiritual, moral, and physical well-being of their fellowmen.” He called the monument a “sacred

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shrine, one that represents the last physical efforts of our boys in this country before they answered the call of duty” in the Philippines. “I pledge myself to look upon it with only the deepest humility and with the greatest reverence, breathing a silent prayer within my heart for the welfare of those great men of this heroic regiment,” and “I hope…perpetual care is given to this marker…that it may be handed down to posterity.” A woman who identified herself as “Wife of an Officer of the 200th” said she and the other wives and mothers hoped “that hideous object” would remain at the capitol “at least long enough for some of our boys to return and see it there,” because seeing how their community had revered and preserved it “would fill them with deep pride and appreciation,” and was more meaningful that “a million-dollar slab.”

Some New Mexicans clearly worried White’s criticism might dissuade state officials’ from keeping the marker at the Capitol. “A Reader who thinks the boys did and are doing a fine job” wrote to the New Mexican promising the city would “hear from the rest of the state…if that marker doesn’t remain where it was placed.” The Allingham-Golding Post of the American Legion, in Silver City, insisted “no higher tribute could be paid to the men” of the 200th and unanimously passed a resolution requesting the marker “remain on the capitol grounds…as a permanent monument to the 200 C.A.” Miles reassured the Legionnaires state leaders “fully intend for the monument to remain,” and reinforced Santa Fe’s commitment to keeping the marker when he told the Post Adjutant W. B. Miller they planned to install a plaque explaining its history nearby.

51 “Letters to the Editor,” Santa Fe New Mexican, June 18, 1942.
52 “Letters to the Editor,” Santa Fe New Mexican, June 19, 1942.
53 Miller to Miles, July 14, 1942; “Resolution,” July 6, 1942; Miles to Miller, July 20, 1942, all in Miles Papers, Box 10, Folder 346, NMSRCA.
At least one person admonished his fellow New Mexicans for suggesting White should have held her tongue. “I do not believe the boys in the 200th would agree with a thing Miss White had to say,” he allowed, “but some of them have died that she might have a right to say it.” The Santa Fe New Mexican’s editors agreed.54 People found White’s critique repugnant. She too hailed the 200th’s achievements as a remarkable feat in the state’s history, but like the artists and architects who found living memorials too mundane and unremarkable to do the important work of honoring fallen soldiers, she believed it an insufficient tribute to their sacrifices. Her criticism sparked a discussion that gave New Mexicans space to invest the concrete marker with far more meaning than the soldiers who built it likely ever anticipated. On the grounds of Fort Bliss, the cement guns and Zia symbols functioned as a landmark for the unit, and as a reminder of their origins as a guard unit. Visitors to Fort Bliss were directed to the “big concrete block” to find the New Mexicans. “You could always depend on finding some of those boys right there by it evenings when we could stop and tell them hello,” recalled Besse Foreman, a mother who surmised her son, but for her having moved from New Mexico to Texas, would likely have been on Bataan with the 200th.55

Much like it had in the windblown and dusty cantonment in the shadow of Mount Franklin at Fort Bliss, the marker became a site of fellowship and camaraderie. Families and friends of the men in the 200th, as well as fellow New Mexicans, gathered at the marker in reverent silence to share their angst, grief, and modest but persistent hope. Unlike the Bataan Building a few blocks north, the 200th’s insignia on the Capitol lawn became an important site for New Mexicans who craved material and spiritual connections with their missing men. The physical environment in which the marker was installed made it more accessible as a

54 “Letters to the Editor,” Santa Fe New Mexican, June 23, 1942.
55 “Letters to the Editor,” Santa Fe New Mexican, June 20, 1942.
contemplative space. It was on Capitol grounds, but in the 1940s the state building was surrounded by grass and trees. These natural, park-like features separated the marker from the bustle of the city and helped the marker become a “sacred shrine” for families and friends, who visited it for prayer, reflection, and mourning.

Newspaper headlines sometimes offered gloomy predictions about the likelihood local boys would return home, giving their families all the more reason to visit the memorial. For example, shortly after the one-year anniversary of the surrender the New Mexican printed a story about War Department telegrams and titled it, “All But Half Dozen of Santa Fe Battery Survive.” The only evidence the newspaper had for that egregiously inaccurate claim was that the “flow of messages” from Washington “ceased suddenly,” but it nevertheless insinuated most of Santa Fe’s boys on Bataan had been killed.

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56 “Aerial View of the State Capitol Building,” 1925-1945, T. Harmon Parkhurst Collection, Palace of the Governors Photo Archive, New Mexico History Museum, Santa Fe.
Santa Feans recognized the space as especially important for mothers, who throughout the remainder of the war visited the memorial with flowers and greenery. Many though the memorial was “a treasure to be shared by all the mothers of those boys,” and was “as dear to their hearts as that tiny baby shoe with maybe a worn-out toe or a toy of his that she has saved and treasured for years.” Indeed, the marker was a relic of the men themselves and served as a proxy for their bodies until they returned. “Several times in the past 10 days I have stopped and uncovered my head at the northwest corner of the capitol grounds and let my thoughts loose to gaze around that simple monument to the immortal 200th,” reflected Jesse Brownlee, a prominent Santa Fean who had recently retired from the U.S. Civil Service. “If, here and there, hidden away in the bottoms of some old trunks are a few baby shoes and are taken out of evenings and kissed by proud mothers, whose sons made their last shoe tracks in the mud of fox holes on Bataan then it matters little what I say.” Brownlee recognized mothers especially viewed the memorial as a piece of their sons, an emblem of their lives before they went away to war. The memorial was a sacred space that invited reflection and reminiscence, as well as prayer.57

Mothers, particularly from Santa Fe and Albuquerque, took charge of maintaining the marker and the grounds in its immediate vicinity. They cared for the memorial like they might care for their sons’ graves, and embellished it with flowers and shrubs.58 Additionally, war bond sales and other federal campaigns provided opportunities for Santa Fe to highlight these women and its Bataan heroes, as well as use the memorial as a ceremonial space. The War Finance Committee designated September 1942 “Salute to Our Heroes Month” to

57 “Letters to the Editor,” Santa Fe New Mexican, June 19, 1942.
58 “100,000th Service to Men of Armed Forces Expected,” Santa Fe New Mexican, August 12, 1944; “Will Decorate Bataan Marker,” Santa Fe New Mexican, December 20, 1944; “Flowers Placed on Memorial Service Club Takes,” Santa Fe New Mexican, March 31, 1945.
promote war bond sales, and Santa Feans took advantage of the month-long homage to
servicemembers to honor their Bataan heroes in what the New Mexican called “the first city
wide public tribute” to Santa Fe’s soldiers.59 Miles issued a proclamation setting aside
September 26 as “Bataan Day,” and local women’s service organizations busied themselves
organizing the festivities, which featured a combination of civic, religious, and commercial
elements. Young girls, and children from St. Vincent’s Orphanage, made and sold an
estimated four thousand red and yellow paper “Bataan roses” to raise money for the care of
the memorial. The Capital City Business and Professional Women’s Club sponsored a
reception for the mothers and wives of the men in the 200th, after which they joined the
procession that began at the Plaza and concluded at the Capitol, where in the “climax” of the
program, Lieutenant Colonel Ray Andrew laid the “huge garland of American Beauties” in
the shape of a “V” at the foot of the memorial.60 Father Theodosius Meyer, the rector at St.
Francis Cathedral, called attention to the special suffering of the Bataan mothers, and told
them they were “making an even greater sacrifice” than the men because they were “troubled
by uncertainty and longing for the safety of those near and dear to you.” After they left the
memorial, mothers, wives, and a few children gathered for a tea held in their honor.61

In addition to honoring women whose sons and husbands were on Bataan, the event
drew attention to the historical significance of the 200th’s military presence in the Philippines
and highlighted the persistent imprint of manifest destiny on the state. The Bataan Day
procession began at the Plaza, a roughly two-acre plot of historicized real estate in the heart

59 “Bataan Day Important Here,” Santa Fe New Mexican, September 24, 1942.
60 “To Dedicate Bataan Marker at Capitol,” Santa Fe New Mexican, September 21, 1942; “Miles Address to
Feature Bataan Rites,” Santa Fe New Mexican, September 24, 1942; “Bataan Sales Goal $50,000,” Santa Fe
New Mexican, September 25, 1942; “War Bond Sales Soar in Salute to Heroes,” Santa Fe New Mexican,
September 26, 1942.
61 “$55,463 War Bonds Sold To Observe Bataan Day,” Santa Fe New Mexican, September 28, 1942; “100
of the oldest part of the city. Santa Feans had long used the Plaza to stage religious and civic pageants, and it often functioned as the starting point and/or terminus for parades, along with seats of power throughout the city, such as churches and government buildings. The Bataan Day parade, beginning in the Plaza and ending at the 200th’s marker on the lawn of the Capitol, established a symbolic connection between the circumstances of the state’s founding and its citizens’ involvement in the defense of the Philippines. The tragedy on Bataan was partly the consequence of the same imperial violence that made both New Mexico and the Philippines part of the United States. The procession symbolically recalled the long durée of New Mexico’s history and carried its legacy of service, sacrifice, and suffering forward by spatially marking the painful but proud narrative on the city’s cultural environment. As one newspaperman pointed out when the peninsula surrendered, “in every war since 1847 the men of New Mexico have followed the flag of this nation. Never faltering, never questioning, without regard for danger or discomfort, the brave, loyal men of New Mexico have been at the front. Where the fighting was the fiercest was the place where they were always found, and the men of Bataan have continued that tradition.”

Thus the men of the 200th were positioned as having served in one of the most treacherous and inhospitable theaters of the war, and consequently as having suffered more than other servicemen from the state.

The Bataan Day event furthermore left little doubt the state prioritized its soldiers who fought in the Philippines by encouraging residents to buy war bonds specifically for men who had fought on Bataan. The Santa Fe County War Savings Staff offered residents a form they could fill out to identify in whose name they were purchasing war bonds, and its instructions all but ignored entirely men serving in other theatres: “Here is a convenient

62 “A Sad But Proud New Mexico,” Santa Fe New Mexican, April 10, 1942.
coupon to facilitate purchases of War Savings bonds in honor of men on Bataan or in the service elsewhere.”63 After bond sales were calculated the newspaper published a list of the bonds dedicated to servicemen, noting most of them were purchased “in honor of men who were on Bataan.” Most buyers named individual soldiers, but a few simply specified “for the boys on Bataan.” With the bonds bought in their name, the article proclaimed, the boys “sock[ed] the Japs again from their prison camps.” The Women’s Division of the State War Savings Staff wrote a letter to the New Mexican thanking the community for its participation, and in so doing reinforced the powerful narrative of New Mexico’s essential contribution to victory in the Philippines. Their war bond purchases were “a tribute that will enable men to carry out to victorious conclusion the glorious history of Bataan” and loaned the government the money it needed “so that Bataan will once again resound with her own gay Spanish and American voices.”64

The placement of the 200th’s insignia on the Capitol lawn offered Santa Fe a way to bring the state’s immense sacrifice to the attention of the rest of the country. Kenneth Allen, a Santa Fean (formerly of Clovis) who worked for the State Tourist Bureau, sent Life magazine a copy of the New Mexican’s photograph of Miles and Charlton standing in front of the marker. His letter ran in the July 6 issue of the magazine in the “Letters to the Editor” section, and in it he shared an abbreviated history of the marker. “The whole of New Mexico’s 200th was captured by the Japs,” he explained. Americans were not entirely unfamiliar with this fact; many of them, along with Allen, had read in the newspapers in late April that most of the guardsmen serving on Bataan had been captured. The War

63 “Any Bonds Today?” Santa Fe New Mexican, September 24, 1942.
64 “For Whom Bonds Were Bought,” Santa Fe New Mexican, September 29, 1942; “Letter to the Editor,” Santa Fe New Mexican, October 2, 1942.
Department’s press release pointed out approximately one hundred New Mexican soldiers and officers managed to escape to Corregidor before the surrender, but Allen wanted to make sure his fellow Americans knew now they too had been captured when Corregidor fell in May, giving New Mexico the tragic distinction of having “the largest number of men from a single state to meet that fate.”

Allen’s proud but sobering letter to Life advertised New Mexicans’ early efforts to start honoring their men on Bataan. Indeed, Santa Feans displayed their investment in the commemorative space by regularly decorating the memorial for holidays like Christmas and Easter—significant in the majority Catholic state not just because of their religious origins, but also because in wartime New Mexico the two holidays bookended New Mexico’s tragedy: in 1941 Christmas had come quickly on the heels of the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, while in the spring of 1942 Bataan surrendered just four days after Easter. In the spring of 1945, for example, Bertha Meyer from the Albuquerque Mothers’ Service Club adorned the marker with “Easter lilies, fresh piñon, and juniper branches.” The marker did serve to center many of Santa Fe’s commemorative activities, functioned as a site for prayer and reflection, and too often served as a space of grief and mourning. Thought residents had adorned the marker floral offerings, no organization had assumed official responsibility for maintaining the grounds surrounding the marker, prompting an editorial in the summer of 1944 that complained the “boldly growing weeds” and “sorry shrubs” surrounding the marker made it look “as if it might have been on Bataan itself.” citizens jumped into action. Horrified by the neglect, the local chapter of the

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65 Kenneth Allen, “New Mexico’s 200th,” Life 13, no. 1 (July 6, 1942): 2; War Department Communique No. 203, April 21, 1942.
American Women’s Voluntary Services (AWVS) corrected the situation and established a committee to oversee care of the monument. Two sisters, Isabel Eckles and Mary Johnson, headed the group. They wasted no time fixing up the plot, and after weeding and cleaning the marker, “crowned it with an evergreen V that seems to [exude the] same defiance with which the 200th’s soldiers met the Japs.” The sisters’ continued their work throughout the rest of the war, and when MacArthur’s forces returned to the Philippines in October 1944, they raised a flag over the marker. Their tribute inspired “an impromptu ceremony” at the marker: “passers-by stopped, bared their heads,” and some “were uttering short prayers.”

The flag flew over the memorial for the rest of the war, and a special commemorative edition of the New Mexican, published on Armistice Day weekend in 1945 to celebrate the Bataan veterans’ homecoming, point to the memorial as evidence of the community’s respect for its soldiers, and that they had not forgotten the men. “The Stars and Stripes flying over the Bataan Memorial on the Capitol grounds,” it professed, “gives proof to the now liberated 200th Coast Artillerymen that the citizenry of Santa Fe had frequent cause to remember them during the long years all of them were suffering and many of them dying in Japanese prisons.”

Approximately half of the Santa Fe boys in the 200th returned home at the end of the war, and as families turned to the work of welcoming, or burying, their sons, the marker faded as a devotional site. No plaque was added and fiscal considerations limited non-war spending. As an editorial in the New Mexican pointed out, “it was proper” to postpone

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67 “Decorate Marker,” Santa Fe New Mexican, July 31, 1944;
68 “[…] Glory,” Santa Fe New Mexican, August 15, 1944. Part of the newspaper is unreadable, so I have taken some liberties filling in the missing words for the quotation used in the text, indicated with brackets. With the exception of the word “glory,” the title is illegible.
69 “Flag Flies Over 200th Marker to Hail Invasion,” Santa Fe New Mexican, October 20, 1944.
transforming sites into memorials until the 200th “came marching home” and “the full history of their heroic part in the stand on Bataan peninsula is revealed.”

The New Mexico state legislature proposed setting aside Fort Marcy—the earthen fortifications built by General Kearny’s army in 1846, but by the early 1900s mostly unrecognizable ruins—to create a memorial park, but nothing came of the legislation and the memorial was never built. By the end of the 1940s some complained the insignia was “neglected and trodden down,” and in 1952 was removed entirely to make space for renovations to the State Capitol.

Larry Waterman, who chaired Santa Fe’s Recreation Council, observed “as yet no living memorial has been erected in memory of those who gave their lives for us. What would you think of a Bataan Memorial Pool?” His comment recognized the utilitarian appeal of living memorials for urban planners and suburban development, but also implied the monument the city did have offered little to engage the community. Furthermore, though he referenced “those who gave their lives for us,” meaning all veterans, he proposed naming it for the Bataan veterans. Perhaps he thought the city’s esteem for Bataan veterans would inspire a speedier and more robust project. It is also possible he, like many other New Mexicans, overlooked the service of veterans in other theaters of war whose contributions the overwhelming tragedy of the surrender often eclipsed.

In the early 1950s, local histories, national trends, and international politics converged to foment a transformation in the way New Mexicans regarded the 200th’s memorial. In 1951 the United States and Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty,

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71 “Bataan: Senate Action for Memorial Park Laudable,” *Santa Fe New Mexican*, March 18, 1943.
72 Mary June-el Piper, “The History and Archaeology for the Historic Fort Marcy Earthworks, Santa Fe, New Mexico,” (Santa Fe: City of Santa Fe Planning and Land Use Department, 1996): 8-14, 31.
73 “Insignia of Old 200th Gets Permanent Spot,” *Santa Fe New Mexican*, August 9, 1953; “Cap’s Bataan Memorial Is Due To Be Restored,” *Santa Fe New Mexican*, November 18, 1952.
formally ending the war. The year also marked the beginning of a series of ten-year anniversaries, some more widely acknowledged and celebrated than others. Furthermore, the geopolitical significance of the Philippines made it an important U.S. ally during the Cold War; it served as a geographic and symbolic bulwark against the spread of communism in the Far East, and when in March 1952 Philippine President Elpidio Quirino signed a proclamation declaring April 9, 1952 “Bataan Day” in the Philippines, Congress followed suit and issued a joint resolution that heavily politicized the anniversary. The joint resolution avoided reminding the public of America’s defeat, and instead of using the word “surrender” called it the “end of the epic struggle.” Congress appropriated and all but elided soldiers’ suffering in the resolution; it had more to do with the current politico-military climate than it did the circumstances of the surrender, and reads as a symbolic abandonment of the Bataan veterans. But veterans too, saw the Korean conflict as a useful backdrop against which to offer the public a powerful tonic against forgetting the consequences of military unpreparedness. The transformation was not a quick one, however, and April 9, 1952 passed with barely a mention of the surrender across New Mexico, except those that occurred in the privacy of New Mexicans’ hearts and homes.

The marker’s temporary removal from the Capitol grounds briefly renewed public interest in it as a memorial to Bataan veterans, and it was subsequently revived as a object of

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75 The first of those anniversaries was Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1951. There was little national interest in marking that anniversary, however, because many leaders were hesitant to remind Japan of its treachery. Doing so would not be a propitious way to begin a new era in political, economic, and cultural relations, especially in the turbulence of the early Cold War.


77 The joint resolution is horrifying. It entirely usurps the Bataan surrender to promote the U.S.-Filipino partnership in the Pacific against the threat of communism. Designating April 9, 1952, as Bataan Day, Public Law 310, U.S. Statutes at Large 66 (1952): 52.

78 “BVO Members Mark Bataan Anniversary,” Albuquerque Journal, April 9, 1952.
reverence in 1953 when the Bataan Veterans Organization (BVO) rededicated the marker. This project, spearheaded largely by the BVO, signaled a shift in the ways Bataan veterans, their families, and the community would commemorate the Bataan surrender. After renovations at the Capitol were completed, the marker was permanently placed at the southeast corner of the building. The BVO took charge of providing a bronze plaque for the newly placed memorial, and Manuel Armijo, state commander for the organization, observed—as his relatives and friends had done a few years earlier in defense of his unit’s handiwork—“to us it’s beautiful.” The BVO sold copies of former prisoner of war Kenneth Day’s “49 Days in Hell: The Story of the Oryoku Maru,” a compilation of POWs’ accounts of their journey on the ill-fated Japanese hellship, to fund the plaque. On August 15, Bataan veterans and their families gathered at the Capitol for a ceremony that reinvigorated the marker as a memorial to the Bataan defenders and an enduring centerpiece of the state’s indebtedness to them. The 1953 service echoed the one held a decade earlier. This time, however, Bataan veterans were in the parade, and painfully aware half of their fellow soldiers were not. Wives and Gold Star Mothers again attended a tea held in their honor, and a mix of civic and religious addresses reminded attendees of the history of the marker and the regiment it represented.

80 “200th Will March Again at Dedication,” Santa Fe New Mexican, August 14, 1953; “BVO Wives Bidden to Mansion Saturday,” Santa Fe New Mexican, August 16, 1953.
In 1954 an editorial on the front page of the *New Mexican* admonishing Santa Feans for forgetting the surrender’s anniversary suggests they found it difficult to commemorate

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81 *Santa Fe New Mexican*, August 16, 1953.
82 Ibid.
Bataan veterans after the war ended. The article pondered how a community that had held its collective breath for four years awaiting the return of its beloved 200th could allow such a day to pass with nary a mention. “Hundreds of New Mexico’s fine young men perished…it should be the day all New Mexicans remember and honor the men who fought the battle of Bataan. In memory of these brave heroes, Santa Fe flew no flags today. Santa Fe has a short memory.” A photograph of a single white flag flying next to the 200th’s insignia accompanied the article, a visual lashing that recalled the isolation of America’s soldiers on the Bataan peninsula a dozen years earlier. This time, however, the accusatory finger was pointed not at the federal government, but at the soldiers’ own community.83

![Flag of surrender](image)

*Figure 6.12 The flag of surrender blows in the breeze at the 200th’s monument at the Capitol.*84

It may not have been Santa Feans memory that was short, but in fact a shortage of strategies to remember the awkwardness of defeat and to incorporate returned prisoners of war into American war commemorations. These difficulties were augmented by the embarrassing and

83 “Remember?” Santa Fe New Mexican, April 9, 1954.
84 Ibid.
ambiguous conclusion to the war in Korea and the shocking news some U.S. prisoners of war refused repatriation—an episode Major William Mayer, an army psychiatrist, blamed on soldiers’ lack of “historical American standards of honor, character, loyalty, courage and personal integrity.”

Santa Feans looked to Bataan veterans themselves to reconcile the complicated nature of commemorating the defeat and their captivity. Bataan veterans were more willing to incorporate the surrender into their remembrances. Largely through the efforts of Manuel Armijo and the Bataan Veterans Organization, the white flag—the BVO’s official flag—emerged as the symbol that best represented their experience of war, and “It’s the flag of surrender,” said Armijo, “and that’s the purpose of it—to remind people of the surrender.”

He admitted some folks had criticized the BVO for its choice to use the flag. “You know how people are,” he explained, “they’re inclined to forget,” and “some people…don’t understand.” But “our feeling is that we want to remind people that surrender happened to us once and it could happen again unless we remain strong.” The flag, a “symbol of national shame,” was a “constant reminder that we did once witness the surrender of the United States.”

Like some New Mexicans, General Sage, former commander of the 200th and New Mexico’s Adjutant General, questioned the “use of the symbol of defeat.” Armijo’s explanation of the flag’s significance, however, showed the flag was more than just a symbol of defeat. Armijo rejected surrender as a choice and insisted it “happened to us.”

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85 Interview with Major William Mayer, “Why Did Many GI Captives Cave In?” *U.S. News & World Report*, February 24, 1956, in William B. Reardon Papers, Box 2, Folder 3, Center for Southwest Research, University Libraries, University of New Mexico. See also Brian McKnight, *We Fight for Peace: Twenty-three American Soldiers, Prisoners of War, and “Turncoats” in the Korean War* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2014); Charles S. Young, *Name, Rank, and Serial Number: Exploiting Korean War POWs at Home and Abroad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

fellow veterans had “witnessed” the surrender. Therefore, the white flag symbolized the government’s abandonment of its soldiers in the Philippines, and the suffering they endured because of it. Because Bataan veterans were comfortable openly remembering the surrender, their community followed suit. An article about the annual event published in the *Albuquerque Journal* claimed the “white flag of surrender will fly again…as it has every April 9 for the past 18 years” over the Capitol, suggesting the author either did not know his history, or the sight of the white flag fluttering in the breeze every April gave the illusion of tradition.  

Nevertheless, by the 1960s, the memorial had become an important and enduring space of ritual commemoration for New Mexicans to remember the service and sacrifice of Bataan veterans.

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87 “State Capitol to Again Fly White Flag,” *Albuquerque Journal*, April 5, 1961. The calculation could also have been a mathematical error. An article published to recognize Armijo’s death in 2004 said Armijo raised the flag over the marker for the first time in 1946. An article in the *New Mexican* says the tradition started in 1953. I have been unable to locate newspaper accounts or other sources that pinpoint the correct date, but I think it is more likely Armijo began his ritual in 1953. See “White Flag Recalls State’s Darkest Hour,” *Santa Fe New Mexican*, April 9, 1963; Miguel Navrot, “Oldest Death March Survivor Dies,” *Albuquerque Journal*, July 24, 2004.
The anniversary ceremony evolved over the following decades, and on the occasion of MacArthur’s death in 1964 and Sage’s in 1967, the white flag flew at half-mast in their memory. In 1967 an eternal flame was installed at the site, and by the end of the decade New Mexicans had shifted their rhetorical focus from the somewhat intangible “shame of surrender” to the corporeal consequences of combat and captivity. The flag as “a symbol not of surrender, but of defiance.” Soldiers were “completely cut off from the rest of the American war,” and the ceremony is a “simple reminder of broken bodies struggling and dying in the sun.” Subsequent ceremonies recalled POWs’ suffering through a combination of storytelling, theatrical reenactment, keynote addresses, and the presence of the veterans themselves as guests of honor. The marker families and friends used for prayer and reflection

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89 “White Flag Rites Slated Thursday,” *Santa Fe New Mexican*, April 7, 1964.
during the war consequently became a site for veterans to remind their fellow Americans of the price of unpreparedness and the traumatic consequences of surrender.

The creation of another memorial space in Albuquerque during the war reflected New Mexicans’ desire to imprint the Bataan surrender onto the landscape of the city itself. On March 2, 1943, the City Commission passed a resolution setting aside a tract of undeveloped land for use as “Bataan Memorial Park.” The “people of Albuquerque and the State of New Mexico…will forever be mindful of the heroic deeds performed by the super-human sacrifices” the men in the 200th made, and they “desire, in a spirit of humility…to pay tribute to its soldiers, both living and dead, who served so nobly, that their deeds and sacrifices shall forever be etched in the memories of the people of the community which they left for so valiant service to their country.”

Charles McDuffie, a prominent builder responsible for much of the city’s suburban development, had donated the six-acre property to the city in 1940. It was situated in what was known as the McDuffie Addition. The city had plenty of room for physical expansion: it had grown little since statehood, and “on the eve of war was basically what it had been since the railroad brought it into being in 1880: little more than a small town that attracted tourists and health seekers and served as a trading and distribution center for a limited hinterland.” As of 1940 Albuquerque had a population of approximately 35,500 in an area of eleven square miles; a combination of annexations and economic growth during the decade almost tripled its population and doubled its area, and local developers kept pace, building over twenty thousand new homes in subdivisions around the city, many of them around the university.

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91 “Resolution,” March 2, March 1943, Albuquerque City Commission Meeting Minutes, 2.
Bataan veterans reflected the “cultural context of the home front,” where “New Deal, wartime, and postwar planning overlapped.”\textsuperscript{94} New Mexicans took advantage of suburban growth, in part fueled by Federal Housing Authority loans that made home ownership a realistic dream for more Americans, to save a swathe of green space to honor its soldiers’ sacrifices on the edge of the growing town.\textsuperscript{95}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure6.14}
\caption{This Sanborn Fire Insurance Map, which depicts the area just northeast of the University of New Mexico, shows many of the plots of land were still undeveloped in 1942. The area set aside for Bataan Memorial Park is on the left, and is the tract of land bounded to the south by Los Lomas, to the west by Tulane, to the north by Marmac, and to the east by Amherst.\textsuperscript{96}}
\end{figure}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{94} Andrew M. Shanken, \textit{194X: Architecture, Planning, and Consumer Culture on the American Home Front} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 15.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
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Residents found the park an especially suitable memorial for the men on Bataan because they believed turning the site into a “spot of beauty” was a project that could be “appropriately taken even in these war days.” When the city commission passed the resolution in March, workers were already planting dozens of trees on the property. No monumental features, however, were to be added until after the war. The BRO proposed “someday, when war materials will no longer be needed for war,” MacArthur’s letter to Spensley paying tribute to the men of the 200th might offer suitable prose for a bronze plaque. Spensley shared the letter with the Albuquerque Journal, which confirmed what New Mexicans already believed about their boys’ heroism and reassured them MacArthur would not rest until they had been liberated. “They have written their own immortal record in the bloody transcript of Bataan,” he noted, “I knew them well and loved them greatly. Never a day goes by that I do not pray that God will give me strength to redeem those who

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97 “Aerial photograph of Albuquerque, New Mexico,” No. 994-046(1)-0006, Albuquerque Photograph Collection, 1900s - 1960s, Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico.
survive.”

It was unlikely MacArthur knew the men in the 200th as intimately as his missive suggested, especially since “Dugout Doug” rarely made excursions to the front lines. Regardless, New Mexicans believed he was one of the only military leaders who cared at all for the fate of their soldiers, and the put great stock in his words of honor and comfort.

It is not clear whom the memorial park was specifically intended to honor—men from Albuquerque, from Bernalillo County, the entire 200th Coast Artillery, or all Bataan veterans, and in fact, it would eventually be the veterans themselves who made that decision. The ambiguous wording of the resolution suggests the commission was not necessarily committed to recognizing a single group. An article in the *Albuquerque Tribune* claimed the memorial park was for both Albuquerque and Bernalillo County soldiers. It told readers the park had been named “in honor of Albuquerque men on Bataan,” and that Mayor Tingley promised the city would erect a “monument with the names of all Bernalillo County members in the 200th Coast Artillery” after the war.

Spensley’s suggestion MacArthur’s comments about the 200th be used to help consecrate the space gave the impression it was for the entire regiment. But, in the fall of 1943 the BRO *Bulletin* carried news of a suggestion from the Mothers of Men in Service (MOMS) group in Pontiac, Michigan, that “there was no more fitting and appropriate location” for a monument to the men of Bataan and Corregidor than New Mexico, since it had sent more men to the Philippines than any other state. The *Bulletin’s* editors affirmed the state already had “the very location of which she speaks,” and described the recently-designated park near the University. No formal dedication services

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100 “General Renews Bataan Pledge,” *Albuquerque Journal*, March 5, 1943.
101 General MacArthur to Mr. V.H. Spensley, February 9, 1943, Dempsey Papers, Series 5, Folder 6, NMSRCA.
marked the space as a memorial park, and with the exception of the trees planted in 1943, the park was untouched for the rest of the war.

The planting of those trees—many of them Siberian Elms, a species Tingley favored so much long-time residents called their springtime detritus “Tingley dandruff”—for some locked the park in the era in which it was built, and was a source of consternation and controversy when local residents and Bataan veterans sought to renovate the park decades later. Tingley had given away thousands of the trees for free, and so they were planted all over the city in the 1940s. When the commission set aside the park as a memorial in 1943, Tingley allegedly promised two hundred trees would be planted as “a living monument to the men” in a border around the park. There are no records to indicate how many trees and of what species were actually planted, but in 1999 the city conducted a survey of the trees in Bataan Park, and over two-thirds of the 117 trees were Siberian Elms.103 The Siberian Elm is hardy and drought-resistant, and can withstand beetle invasions that devastate other tree species, but its rapid growth menaces underground infrastructure, and without proper care, tends toward the spindly and twiggy rather than stately.104 Despite its hardiness some of the trees failed to take root, and when further development on the park began in the spring of 1946, city crews removed some of them. By 1947 workers had installed a sprinkler system and planted grass, and the park was ready for general use by the spring of 1948. Between Tingley’s proclamation and the city’s memorial tree project, through which families could plant and dedicate trees in parks to their loved ones, for some locals the trees were an

103 Jeff Hart, “Bataan Park Inventory,” April 6, 1999, Courtesy City of Albuquerque Parks and Recreation Department.
essential feature of the memorial park. Consequently, later efforts to rejuvenate the park and replace aging trees raised questions over the usefulness of the park as a memorial to the state’s Bataan veterans.

Even after construction on the park was finished, there was little about the space that distinguished it as a memorial except for the dedicated trees. On May 8, 1949, the BVO planted a tree in honor of Captain Frederick B. Howden, Jr., in conjunction with ceremonies commemorating the fall of the Philippines. The forty-year-old Episcopalian minister from Roswell who was married with three children when he left for the Philippines, had not only refused to evacuate Bataan with injured personnel prior to the surrender so that he could remain with his men, but also regularly shared his rations with fellow POWS despite suffering from dysentery and pellagra. He died at the Davao Penal Colony, a camp on Mindanao Islands, in December 1942; his remains were returned to New Mexico for burial in 1948, and he is interred at Fairview Memorial Park in Albuquerque.105 A year later, Spensley and the BVO planted a tree in the park in honor of Spensley’s son, Homer, who died in Camp Cabanatuan in October 1942. Spensley and his wife, Adeline, received a War Department telegram in the summer of 1943 just before the BRO helped dedicate the “Spirit of Bataan” at Kirtland Air Field. Two months after the tree planting ceremony, Spensley’s body was returned to his family and he was buried at Sunset Memorial Park in Albuquerque.106

In May 1956, the BVO planted a tree for Charles Schubert, a sergeant in the 200th’s medical detachment. He was killed in Palawan on December 14, 1944, during what later became known as the Palawan Massacre. Japanese soldiers had herded the prisoners into wooden air raid shelters in anticipation of attacks by American aircraft, but refused to let them out when the threat had passed. They instead poured gasoline over the wooden air raid shelters and set them aflame. Approximately 140 American prisoners were burned alive, gunned down, and stabbed with bayonets. Five other New Mexican soldiers were killed in the massacre, and the majority of the recovered remains were buried in a mass grave at Jefferson Barracks.

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107 Ibid.
National Cemetery in Missouri in 1952. With his remains in St. Louis, the tree offered his mother—who helped dedicate it—a place to mourn. Throughout the rest of the 1950s, however, a lack of evidence regarding further tree plantings suggests the park was largely used for recreation instead of commemoration.\textsuperscript{109}

There was little to distinguish the park as a site of remembrance beyond trees, marked with small plaques at their base. In 1943 the city commission claimed the park was supposed to “forever etch” the 200\textsuperscript{th}’s service and sacrifice in the community’s collective memory, but the grassy field was devoid of any features that recalled their “heroic deeds.” There was some discussion in the late 1950s of putting a Japanese Zero airplane on display on the park, but nothing ever came of it.\textsuperscript{110} To more clearly establish the park as a memorial, in the spring of 1960 Albuquerque’s 200\textsuperscript{th} Bataan Club obtained permission from the city to install a monument at the south end of the park. The three-thousand-dollar monument, made of gray granite, was dedicated in a ceremony on Memorial Day. Bill Reardon, who had served as a major in the 200\textsuperscript{th} and retired in 1948 as a lieutenant colonel, spoke at the dedication and remarked while serving with the 200\textsuperscript{th}, “I changed my definition of a hero. I learned that a hero is an ordinary person, who, in spite of hunger, discouragement, and overwhelming odds, has a job to do—and does it.” His comments reinforced the men of the 200\textsuperscript{th} were local boys, who had simply done their duty, and done it well.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{109} “Bataan Vets to Plant Tree to Salute Comrade,” \textit{Albuquerque Journal}, May 13, 1956.
\textsuperscript{110} Committee on Donations, Meeting Minutes, August 6, 1958, Courtesy City of Albuquerque Park and Recreation Department.
\textsuperscript{111} Mrs. W. H. Richardson to Mr. R. Burgan, March 24, 1960; Robert Burgan to Mrs. W. H. Richardson, March 25, 1960; John Todd, “Bataan Park, Albuquerque, New Mexico, U.S.A.,” December 12, 1964, all courtesy Albuquerque Parks and Recreation Department; “Bataan Monument to State Veterans is Dedicated Here,” \textit{Albuquerque Journal}, May 31, 1960. John Todd’s summary of how Bataan Memorial Park got its name is inaccurate, and was apparently written to give a Filipino visitor to the city some background on the park. Todd was office manager for the Parks and Recreation Department, and in his account claims the park was named by a “former city employee, Roy Chaffin…who had been in the Bataan Death March” when the city map was being updated. The tract was “unnamed,” so “Chaffin urged the name “Bataan,” and it was lettered in. No one
The monument featured the 200th’s insignia, and the inscription below the crossed guns read:

Dedicated to the Members of the 200th and 515th C.A.A.A. of New Mexico who served in the Philippines in World War II. In grateful appreciation and honor to those living, and those who made the supreme sacrifice, this monument has been erected by the members of the Bataan Club, composed of mothers and near relatives of the Albuquerque men in these units.

The inscription established the memorial park was intended to honor all Bataan veterans, and the semi-circular brick wall surrounding it served to frame the entirety of the park as a memorial. That same month the New Mexico National Guard donated a 90mm gun to the city. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Moser, U. S. Property and Fiscal Officer for New Mexico, suggested since the gun was “of the same type that was used by the 200th Coast Artillery” in the defense of the Philippines, its placement in the park “would be in keeping as a memorial.” The Parks and Recreation Board accepted the donation, and the gun was placed

questioned it, it was readily accepted, and remains the name to this day.” There is no way Chaffin had anything to do with the naming of the park, because he was still imprisoned in Mukden when it was dedicated in 1943. 112 “Bataan Monument.”
on the park grounds. In 1964 residents observed Memorial Day by dedicating a new flagpole at the park. They held the ceremony in honor of MacArthur, who had died the previous month, and the Bataan veterans. Spensley participated in the dedication, along with a couple Gold Star mothers, and soon thereafter some local boys who lived across the street from the park assumed responsibility for raising and lowering the flag. Throughout the 1940s and early 1950s residents seemed happy enough to preserve the park as a memorial by adding dedicated trees that fit in with the original landscaping. The BVO’s participation in fundraising events for the construction and dedication of Bataan Memorial Hospital in 1952 perhaps satisfied some of the desire to create a more monumental space, but veterans’ organizations still regularly used the park for Memorial Day observances. During the 1970s the park was popular as a site for rallies and political gatherings—in particular anti-war protests—and veterans’ organization often used it to hold Memorial Day services. Because it was a public park individuals and groups could use the space for a variety of functions, which by the 1990s caused increasing conflict in the neighborhood and prompted veterans and interested citizens to more clearly establish the park as a memorial to the state’s Bataan veterans.

The proposals veterans’ organizations made to the city’s Parks and Recreation Department suggested they felt the park’s utility detracted from its effectiveness as a memorial. One proposal called for an “avenue of flags” to be erected about the park, with one flag flying every ten feet, a project the department estimated would require 160 flag poles. Another proposal reminded the city the park had never been officially dedicated, and suggested a “true dedication of the park as Bataan Park,” at which time a memorial to “all ex-

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prisoners of war, regardless of the war designation or location of incarceration” should be added. This proposed addition reflected how New Mexico’s Bataan veterans became important spokesmen for former prisoners of war, a position they had cemented in 1949 when they converted the BVO to the American Ex-Prisoners of War at their annual conventions. On November 11, 1987, the park was officially dedicated as “Bataan Park,” but its language differed from the original resolution. Mayor Ken Schultz issued an executive order dedicating Bataan Park in memory of “victims who suffered during that infamous time,” and declared it would “serve to remind us of the sacrifices made by all American ex-prisoners of war.” A plaque was added below the inscription on the 1962 monument, and it became a memorial to all prisoners of war, not just the Bataan veterans. Since its completion in the late 1940s, various veterans’ groups had used the site for a range of commemorative activities, few of them exclusively for Bataan veterans, so the dedication and the plaque had the effect of formalizing what by the 1980s was unofficially assumed.

In the mid-1990s the popular drugstore chain, Walgreens, entered negotiations to purchase property just across the street, to the east of the park. Area residents were horrified by the idea, and protested the transaction, which would require the demolition of a shopping center that housed locally-owned businesses. Fiftieth-anniversary commemorations of the end of World War II had already increased attention to veterans’ experiences in the war, and when Walgreens threatened to move into the area next to the park it caused a ruckus that ultimately led to the formation of an organization devoted to preserving the history of New

115 The group was still often referred to as the Bataan Veterans Organization.
Mexico’s Bataan veterans—the Bataan-Corregidor Memorial Foundation (BCMF). Agapito Silva, a Bataan veteran, helped found the organization and served as its first president. According to its bylaws the BCMF was founded to “maintain for future generations the memory and unique history” of the Bataan defenders, and “ensure adequate maintenance of Bataan Memorial Park as well as keeping the character and integrity of Bataan Memorial Park in perpetuity.” At one point the city proposed buying up the property and expanding the park to keep Walgreens from occupying the space. State Representative Gail Beam hoped the scheme would be successful, and thought it would give the city a chance to “create a better memorial for the Bataan veterans. David Bercaw, a member of the Summit Park Neighborhood Association (SPNA), believed the plan admirable. “Instead of a Walgreens,” he argued, “wouldn’t it be appropriate to have some sort of building to contain memorabilia of the brave men and women who gave so much of themselves for the United States and Mexico?” He continued, “We are not just fighting for our neighborhood, but also to honor the memory of those New Mexicans at Bataan.”

Yet a survey of local residents conducted in 1995 in preparation for renovations to the park suggested most people in the immediate vicinity valued the park as a recreational space, not as a memorial. A planning firm mailed questionnaires to the over two thousand residents living within a half-mile radius of the park, and when given the opportunity to make specific recommendations about the additions they would like to see made to the park, many suggested practical and utilitarian features, such as playground equipment, toilet facilities, volleyball and basketball courts, and picnic tables. Quite a few stated the park was just fine.

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as it was, and they felt too many improvements might attract destructive “undesirables.”

Only a few indicated they wanted to see the memorial features of the park expanded:

- Brief explanation of the importance of Bataan in history. Recognition of veterans to raise public awareness
- A plaque with the names of the soldiers that lost their lives and were part of Bataan death march
- We should use part of the park for an interpretive display about what Bataan was all about
- Bring the gun back – that’s what this park is really about – not tearing it up with sports!
- Bataan monument needs upgrading
- Shell stage for ceremonies (military, vets organizations,) three flag poles for area on Lomas (American flag, state flag, pow/mia flag)
- TREES! Return the cannon! GRASS! FLOWERS!
- What happened to the cannon? I think it should be put back to honor veterans.

Others commented they appreciated the history of the park, and were “glad its named Bataan.” One asked that the city “maintain the…reflective and respectful meaning of the park.” One respondent was horrified the city would even contemplate adding anything to the park. Doing so, he/she argued, would be an insult to the veterans. “This is a memorial park. Would you put swings at the Vietnam Memorial?” Another cared little for the park and its monument, and simply wrote, “Remove the military crap!”

The mix of these comments suggests Albuquerqueans were unsure whether a park was a suitable memorial, and if it was, how could its recreational purposes be reconciled with its more solemn project as a site of remembrance?

Despite residents’ limited interest in either maintaining or augmenting the memorial features of the park, Bataan veterans felt differently, and when the city began its renovations, construction was temporarily halted while residents, city officials, and Bataan veterans sorted out their differences and tried to reach a resolution regarding the ultimate purpose of the

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park. One of those differences was whether or not the park actually constituted a memorial. A memorandum from Sandy Zuschlag, program manager for the city’s Capital Implementation Program (CIP), to David Keller, a member of the SPNA, responded to one of the group’s questions about the planned renovations. The SPNA wanted to know if the park was “officially a memorial park.” One would presume its designation in 1943, plus its dedication by mayoral executive order in 1987, would make such a question superfluous. Zuschlag’s response, however, suggested otherwise. “The word “memorial” is significant only as being part of the name of the park,” she replied, “There is no “memorial” or “historic” status associated with the park.” Georgianna Peña-Kues, president of the SPNA, penned a response informing Zuschlag the Bataan veterans wanted a memorial wall installed at the park, and they wanted it to list the names of all the men who were on the Bataan Death March. They envisioned something “similar to the wall at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.” The more visible consequences of the city’s renovation projects—tree removal, electrical boxes, water valves—offended a couple of the veterans who perceived them as a visual affront to their sacrifices. Leo Padilla, one of the city’s Bataan survivors, compared the city’s desecration of the park to the brutal treatment they received in captivity, and complained he and his friends were “still having to fight.” They were angry that some of the memorial trees had been cut down, and angrier still they had been replaced with “Jap trees.” Silva accused the mayor of having “disgraced the honor of the men who died for our country,” and demanded the city remove the “monoliths of plumbing and electrical stations…and water valves” they had installed near the memorial, insisted it replace the trees,

120 Sandy Zuschlag to David Keller, January 16, 1998, courtesy Albuquerque Parks and Recreation Department.
and add a memorial wall “listing the names of those brave souls living and deceased who fought for our country.” During the meetings that followed, Bataan veterans expressed their sense that since a veterans’ memorial dedicated to all New Mexico’s veterans had recently been completed, Bataan Memorial Park should “once again be dedicated specifically to those veterans who served” in the 200th and 515th. 122

If any doubt existed about the status of the park as a memorial, it was resolved in the winter of 1999 when the New Mexico State Legislature passed a joint memorial recommending a monument to the 200th and 515th be built in the park:

The measure of heroism is quantified by the standards of valor, honor, loyalty, service, sacrifice, valor, and most of all humility…The men and women of the great state of New Mexico have, in every war, personified the meaning of the word hero, and the men of the 200th coast artillery, the New Mexico national guard…put their personal stamp on and defined the word hero during their defense of the Philippines, during the Bataan death march and during their imprisonment for three-and-one-half years and their abuse as slave labor…The inevitability of time has left few of those men to walk among us now…The defense of Bataan and Corregidor was one of our nation’s darkest and brightest hours…Therefore, be it resolved by the legislature of the state of New Mexico that the preservation of the record and these great deeds be remembered by the construction of a monument in Bataan park and that the city of Albuquerque be requested to maintain and manage the Bataan park in dignity and honor. 123

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122 José Armas, “Bataan Vets Now Have to Battle for Home Turf,” Albuquerque Tribune, August 18, 1998; Agapito Silva to James Baca, August 3, 1998. At the time he wrote the letter to the mayor, Thomas Foy, not Silva, was the commander of the BVO. In October 1998, Foy sent a letter to City Councilor Tim Kline indicating he had not authorized any “members or non-members” of the organization to “represent that we are dissatisfied” with the city’s efforts to “insure the public memorialization” of Bataan veterans at the park. His letter suggests Silva’s letter was a rogue act and did not necessarily express the opinions of the BVO or American Ex-Prisoners of War. Thomas Foy to Tim Kline, October 28, 1998, courtesy Albuquerque Parks and Recreation Department. There is also some reference in an email within the Parks Department files to two “dissidents” who refused to accept the will of their fellow Bataan veterans’ when it came to making decisions about a memorial at the park, who felt they could “will their way to success in this endeavor” the same way they “survived the Japanese” because they “refused to die.” Those two veterans may very well have been Padilla and Silva. Lou Hoffman to Timothy Durant, February 23, 2001.

123 H.J. Mem. 48, 44th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 1999). The Parks and Recreation Department files on Bataan Memorial Park contain a copy of a bill put before Albuquerque’s City Council, which called for the permanent dedication of Bataan park to the memory of the 200th and 515th, as well as its enrollment as a state historic site, but it does not appear the bill was enacted.
Additionally, the city of Albuquerque filed an application to include Bataan Memorial Park on New Mexico’s State Register of Cultural Properties, which, if approved, would mean the state’s Historic Preservation Division would have to sign off on any future additions made to the park. The application, prepared by local historian David Kammer, noted interest parties were anxious to “retain the historic integrity of the park so that it continues to serve as a visual reminder of the purpose for which it was first dedicated.” Kammer further pointed out the park was significant because it “represented two of the major forces that shaped Albuquerque during the 1930s and 1940s.” In addition to being a part of the city’s suburban growth, it was a reminder of “the great price its citizens paid” because of the 200th’s service on Bataan, and was an example of “the city’s response to the heroic efforts” of its soldiers.124 The application was approved, and in the summer of 1999 was placed on the Register of Cultural Properties, which more so than the dedication in 1987 signaled to the veterans the city recognized Bataan Park as a memorial to them and their buddies who never came home.

After many discussions and planning meetings between the BCMF and city officials, the city began construction on a larger memorial at the south end of the park. Bill Perkins, a local architect, designed the memorial with input from the veterans who insisted the names of all the men in the 200th and 515th, living and dead, be inscribed on it. In 2002 the city broke ground at the park, and worked quickly to have the monument finished in time for the 60th anniversary of the Bataan surrender that April. The finished monument included a number of design elements intended to recall the surrender, the Death March, and the location of the soldiers’ suffering.

A series of twelve six-foot-tall granite pillars, inscribed with the names of all the men in the 200th, represented the Death March; when the Board discussed placement of the names on the pillars, Perkins pointed out right and left justifying of the two columns on each side of pillar, so that the names were symmetrically centered, resembled the men’s ribcages, thereby incorporating an important bodily reminder of their suffering, particularly their starvation and physical weakness, into the memorial. The height was also important, and BCMF members insisted the pillars could be no shorter than the prescribed six feet because they were intended to “symbolic of a man standing—or perhaps marching—as if in a line across the Bataan Peninsula,” and lowering them would “compromise the spirit of this symbolism.” The pillars gently curved out from a central flag pole.

125 Courtesy Albuquerque Parks and Recreation Department.
Figure 6.20 These granite pillars are part of the Bataan Memorial at Bataan Memorial Park, and have the names of every man in the 200th and 515th Coast Artillery inscribed on them.\textsuperscript{126}

The BCMF also maintained a stone map of the Philippine Islands, made to resemble stepping stones, had to be part of the design. If it was excluded, they would “consider the design incomplete.” They wanted to emphasize the “strong bond” between the people of New Mexico and of the Philippines, rendered through their “shared experience.” Another map carved into a block of granite near the stepping stones showed a more detailed rendering of the Bataan Peninsula and traced the route of the March.

\textsuperscript{126} Courtesy Albuquerque Parks and Recreation Department.
A shaded trellis in the middle of the memorial with benches provide a space for rest and reflection. The $450,000 project, paid for with state grants, was completed in time for the sixtieth anniversary commemorations, and the city dedicated the Bataan Memorial on April 8, 2002.\textsuperscript{128}

Shortly thereafter, the City Council passed legislation permanently dedicating Bataan Memorial Park to the 200\textsuperscript{th} and 515\textsuperscript{th}, and in so doing created the impression the park and its contents were frozen in time and therefore unchangeable. In addition to “reaffirming the intent of the original dedication,” the legislation gave the park’s elm trees “official memorial status” and guaranteed monuments in the park would “forever remain” there. “The memorial trees and built memorials shall be preserved and protected for all time,” it confirmed, and “Bataan Memorial Park shall forever remain a place to contemplate the heroism of our brave

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\textsuperscript{127} Courtesy Albuquerque Parks and Recreation Department. \\
\textsuperscript{128} Bataan-Corregidor Memorial Foundation of New Mexico Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, October 16, 2001; William Perkins to Dorothy Victor, August 15, 2001, courtesy Albuquerque Parks and Recreation Department; Lloyd Jojola, “Bataan Memorial Takes Form at Last,” \textit{Albuquerque Journal}, February 8, 2002.
\end{flushright}
citizen soldiers.”

The city’s proclamation the park was an official memorial to the state’s Bataan veterans, combined with its promises regarding the static nature of its memorial features, created tension between individuals who wished to use the park for memorial purposes and those who used it for recreational purposes. One example demonstrated the difficulty of retaining or replacing memorial features in the park. In 2008, while the BCMF was in the middle of pushing the city to remove trees from Bataan Memorial Park that were neither dedicated to Bataan veterans nor of a species planted in the park during the 1940s, an oak tree dedicated to Max Lichtenthal, a World War II veteran, was hacked down in an act of vandalism. The timing was suspicious, and the city was torn between its promise to maintain the historical nature of the park and its desire to compensate the veteran’s family. A second example shows the clash between recreational and memorial purposes. In 2008 the BCMF began holding a ceremony in the park similar to that held in Santa Fe, and a couple years later Peña-Kues complained about a volleyball group that was scheduled to use the park the same day as the annual ceremony. She sent a six-page “incident report” to the Parks and Recreation Department complaining about the general misbehavior of groups who gathered at the park, whom had been observed “drinking alcohol, being loud and verbally abusive, and urinating.” She argued groups like the BCMF that applied for permits to use the park should “be given preference if a dispute arises regarding park use.” Peña-Kues was horrified the volleyball players continued to play throughout the ceremony, and thought it an affront they could not be bothered to “stop and pay a respectful silence during the prayers.” She concluded by asserting she and others “may not receive respect for our Bataan Veterans and our volunteer efforts to honor these brave men, but we do expect equal governance of City

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Ordinances…That is a right and a privilege that these men and so many others have fought and died to secure for us.”

During World War II New Mexicans set aside a number of spaces and dedicated them as memorials to the men in the 200th who had fought on Bataan. The named a high school vocational building, one of the last WPA projects in the state, the Bataan Building. They installed the 200th’s concrete insignia on the lawn of the state Capitol in Santa Fe. They dedicated a renovated bridge as Bataan Bridge in Carlsbad, and set aside a tract of undeveloped land as Bataan Memorial Park in Albuquerque. In 1942 and 1943 they knew little about what happened to the men after the surrender except that if they were not dead, they were most likely prisoners of war. They felt their absence deeply, and creating memorials dedicated to those men gave home front civilians a way to manage their grief and anxiety. They wasted no time marking their physical environment with evidence of their suffering and sacrifice. The defense of Bataan was cast as a consequence of the government’s abandonment and neglect, a narrative with which New Mexicans were all too familiar when it came to their servicemen; constructing commemorative sites was a way to show the boys, when they returned home, that at least their families, friends, and communities had not forgotten them. When the soldiers did return home, these memorials became important sites for conversations about the meaning of the surrender and its consequences for the soldiers, their communities, the state, and the nation. The periodic transformations, additions, and rededications of these sites demonstrate not only how a community’s commemorative needs change over time, but also how they felt their monumental tributes were always lacking when compared to the sacrifices of the Bataan veterans.

130 Georgianna Peña-Kues to Parks and Recreation Department, April 10, 2010, City of Albuquerque Parks and Recreation Department.
CONCLUSION

“A Proper Place in Our Nation’s History”:
Legacies of Defeat and Surrender in New Mexico

Shortly after Japan surrendered on August 14, 1945, the *Daily Current-Argus* pondered what sort of headlines newspapers might carry since the war was over. The first headline that came to mind was, “RETURN OF BATAAN AND CORREGIDOR HEROES,” capitalized and in bold print, showing what was first and foremost in the minds of many families all over New Mexico.¹ Their celebrations of Japan’s surrender were more robust than they had been in May when Germany folded. “New Mexico’s own stake in the Pacific War…tempered” any “unrestrained V-E-joy,” and as Spensley reminded his fellow New Mexicans, “The war is not over for us. We must go on and on until our sons in bondage are free, every one…We must go on until Japan is…defeated.” He spoke of “sons,” but his own son, Homer, had reportedly died in Camp Cabanatuan in 1942. When the war against Japan did end, though he was surely relieved, he must also have felt a deep and abiding grief. The *New Mexican* called V-J Day a “day of atonement,” and headlined its story about the surrender by urging readers to “Remember [the] 200th.” Carl Whittaker, who had been active in the BRO and the state’s War Prisoners Relief Commission, mourned the loss of his son. “It’s grand news,” he said, “but it is just too bad we had to lose so many in prison camps and ship sinkings.”² In Carlsbad, against the raucous backdrop of honking horns and exuberant shouting, some people “flocked to churches” where they “bent their knees in deep thanksgiving,” and “prayed for the speedy return of their loved ones who were prisoners of

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the Japanese government.” More men than they thought, however, would not return.

Statistics published in New Mexico newspapers, provided by the state’s War Prisoners Information Bureau, estimated 366 of the men in the 200th were dead, but the actual number was about twice that.\(^3\) John Candelario, a local photographer, snapped a photograph of Santa Fe’s homecoming parade for its returning prisoners of war that captured the extremes of New Mexico’s experience of war.

![Figure 7.1](image)

*Figure 7.1* John Candelario took this photograph during Santa Fe’s Bataan Day parade, held on Armistice Day, to celebrate the homecoming of its prisoners of war from Bataan.\(^4\)

The caption somberly reflected that “more adequately than a thousand words, this photograph tells the mingled joy and sadness of Santa Fe in greeting its returned Bataan heroes, and mourning those who did not return.” The “black-shawled woman” in the photograph was unidentified, but in her anonymous sorrow she could have been “the mother,

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aunt or grandmother of one of the boys who did not come back,” and so “symbolize[d] the proud grief of those whose boys did give their lives.” Santa Fe spent “Bataan Day” celebrating its returned heroes; a special “Bataan Edition” of the New Mexican paid tribute to the men of the 200th and highlighted the history of their war in the Philippines.

The special edition reiterated New Mexico’s affections for the 200th Coast Artillery, and used the same language home front Americans had used to make sense of the surrender to reassure the boys their countrymen were proud of their service. Advertisements on every page of the issue told the soldiers what their sacrifices meant to the folks back home. “To all America you are the first and greatest heroes of this war,” and “you symbolize all our heroes everywhere.” And, it reaffirmed the 200th’s place in the hierarchy of sacrifice civilians had constructed during the war. “We hope you can understand that our words convey something larger than mere greeting—something deeper than a simple welcome…we can never repay our debt to you…we can only acknowledge it, and honor you.”

Many of the advertisements offered both praise and promises of post-war abundance, and suggested an ideal way to welcome the veterans home was to give them jobs. One slyly told young women refreshing their hairstyle would let the men know how much they were missed, and quite a few encouraged readers to show their appreciation to the survivors by buying bonds.

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5 Ibid.
The Santa Fe National Bank’s welcome home message encouraged Santa Feans to buy victory bonds to thank the boys for their service. The text in the ad reminds readers the boys on Bataan “bought, at a greater price than we’ll ever know, Freedom for all the world…let us not lose the peace.” The ad echoed the sentiments of many New Mexicans first of all that the sacrifices of the men on Bataan were far greater than anyone on the home front could make, and second of all that it was up to everyone else to make sure those lives had not been needlessly given.\(^7\)

The ode to the state’s Bataan veterans was celebratory, and with the heavy commercial emphasis on jobs, dates, cars, and the daily affairs of postwar living, gave little space to those who Santa Feans could not welcome home. Albuquerque too honored both its living and its dead, and during its Bataan Day observance in December, held a “mammoth parade” on Saturday, and a memorial service on Sunday.\(^8\) We can imagine the deafening applause that must have filled the gymnasium at the University of New Mexico, when “the greatest ovation

\(^7\) Ibid.
ever received by any persons in the history of this city was accorded the men who fought and were captured on Bataan and returned home.”

9 The next day “mothers, fathers, wives, buddies, and friends” returned to the gymnasium to remember the dead. Their overwhelming sadness, “present in choked-up throats,” muffled the applause of the previous day and replaced it with “poignant silence.”

10 One Albuquerquean recognized his son’s sacrifices more privately, by building a memorial in his front yard. D. B. Baca’s son, Ernest, died in Camp Cabanatuan. He erected a sixty-foot flagpole, affixed a gold star at the top, and engraved Roosevelt’s condolence message in a concrete block at its base.

These public and private tributes to the living and the dead of Bataan, held in other communities around the state as well throughout the fall and early winter of 1945, show how important it was to New Mexicans to prove to their soldiers they had not been forgotten. And indeed, in New Mexico and other towns and communities around the country that had large contingents of men on Bataan, they were not. Home front New Mexicans labored throughout the war to fashion a rhetoric that incorporated defeat, surrender, and captivity into its narrative of World War II, and undertook a host of civic and commemorative activities to make sure when their men returned from Bataan they could look around their hometowns and see evidence their families and friends recognized their service, suffering, and sacrifice. They recognized the men of the 200th Coast Artillery as heirs to a legacy of service on behalf of both the state and the nation, and the state dedicated its 1945 Blue Book especially to them:

DEDICATED TO:
The ever-living memory of the men of New Mexico, the valiant living and the heroic dead, who fought and died on World War II battlefields, battle-seas and battle-skies, and to the men of the 200th, who symbolize so well the state’s sacrifices in the world’s

struggles for freedom, for all peoples.\textsuperscript{11}

In addition to the dedication, the \textit{Blue Book} included a short history of the unit, remarkable only partly because it was the “first in action in World War II,” written by Brigadier General Charles G. Sage. No other New Mexico National Guard unit was featured in the issue, an absence that speaks to the ways New Mexico has distinguished the men of the 200\textsuperscript{th} as epitomizing the state’s loyalty, patriotism, and devotion.

This dissertation began by situating New Mexico’s war within a longer history of the state itself, and shows that its experience in World War II largely continued its proud legacy of service, sacrifice, and suffering. Throughout its territorial period New Mexico struggled to prove to racist and imperialist policymakers it was worthy of statehood. Lawmakers refused its admission largely because most of its residents spoke Spanish, which led many of them to presume New Mexicans could never become fully American. Yet this attitude did not stop them from asking the territory’s citizens to fight the nation’s wars. I demonstrate that it was in fact citizens who did the fighting, and show how fond New Mexicans were of their citizen-soldiers. New Mexicans were intimately invested in their National Guard, and when they sent their hometown boys off to war they did so happily but nervously. Even though the regiment had only been named the 200\textsuperscript{th} for less than a year when it headed to Fort Bliss, New Mexicans attached themselves to the identity. There was talk of reorganizing the National Guard after the war, but state officials fought to keep the 200\textsuperscript{th}’s numerical designation, which their service in the jungles of Bataan had rendered an important part of their regimental lineage.

\textsuperscript{11} Dedication, \textit{New Mexico Blue Book, 1945-46} (Santa Fe: State of New Mexico, 1946), 5.
Folks at home had just mailed out Christmas packages to the boys in the Philippines when Japan attacked the United States and its outlying territorial possessions, and its soldiers became embroiled in a war fought at the edge of the empire its ancestors had once fought to stay out of. The Philippines was at such a distance from American shores that military planners had barely given a thought to spending money to build its defense or train its armies, and New Mexico’s soldiers paid the price. The Roosevelt Administration provided Americans with a language of defeat that helped them incorporate the doomed defense of Bataan and the inevitable surrender into part of a larger narrative of total victory. Combined with the front-lines reporting of war correspondents Americans developed discursive strategies that helped them make sense of the confusion and chaos of surrender. I show how they framed the surrender as an important part of the U.S. war effort, and rather than portray the Bataan defenders as weak and cowardly, they pointed to their heroism and courage against impossible odds. Citizens’ conviction that the Bataan defenders epitomized martial masculinity is evident in the debates over Chávez’ legislation that proposed all POWs captured between Pearl Harbor and the surrender of Corregidor be promoted while in captivity, particularly in their pushback against Stimson’s alleged “smear” that some personnel might have surrendered before it was absolutely necessary. An officer who left the Philippines before the surrender reported to the press, “there are no atheists in the foxholes on Bataan.” According to most home front Americans, neither were there any cowards. The final two chapters show what New Mexicans did at home to manage the disaster of the surrender. The Bataan Relief Organization recast everyday activities as ways home front civilians could help the war effort, and more particularly, their men on Bataan. The BRO kept New Mexicans busy finding ways to speed relief to their soldiers. They were for the
most part unsuccessful in doing so, but nonetheless gave loved ones ways to make their wartime efforts more meaningful by connecting them directly to their boys overseas. Wartime New Mexicans created and set aside spaces to pay tribute to and remember the men of the 200th. Before they even knew the fate of their soldiers, New Mexicans found it important to mark their communities with sites that would show the men they were not forgotten at home. The Bataan Building in Santa Fe faded as a commemorative site, but the 200th monument down the street, Carlsbad’s Bataan Bridge, and Bataan Memorial Park in Albuquerque exist to this day. What these spaces look like and how they are used has changed in the last fifty years, in no small measure due to the influence and efforts of Bataan veterans to make the sites representative of their experiences in the Pacific. In addition to renovating the memorials and monuments they created during the war, New Mexicans have continued to create spaces, rituals, and texts that make Bataan a permanent part of their physical and cultural landscapes.

This dissertation is the beginning of a much larger project, one that more carefully, broadly, and deeply interrogates how New Mexicans, and indeed Americans, grappled with the cultural trauma of surrender. What other cultural, political, and historical forces worked to make the surrenders of the early month of World War II more palatable? Why, in fact, have America’s early defeats slipped beneath historians’ radar when it comes to explaining Americans’ attitudes toward the war, their lives during it, and their remembrances of it afterward? Most immediately, of course, defeats suffered by the U.S. during World War II were powerfully recast as battles that were lost along the way to winning the entire war. Individual defeats, no matter how traumatic, were forgotten or elided by a narrative that privileged clear and decisive victories, particularly those marked by V-E and V-J days.
Prisoners of war are an important part of this conversation: of the approximately 142,000 soldiers taken prisoner during America’s twentieth-century wars, over 130,000 of those were captured during World War II. Yet aside from statistical chronicles, narratives of suffering and survival in POW camps, and their own journals and diaries, we have little to tell us about their presence in commemorations of war, and their absence is telling (and compelling). It is significant, for example, that at the National World War II Memorial was only see prisoners of war when they are being liberated—not at the moment of surrender or during captivity. This framing tells us too there is much more to be done when it comes to dissecting how Americans’ attitudes toward surrender shaped wartime constructions of martial masculinity.

My dissertation points to the important role Bataan veterans have played in shaping postwar commemorations of surrender and captivity in New Mexico. We need a fuller accounting of how Bataan veterans been both agents and objects when it comes to constructing their identities as veterans, survivors, and victims. Indeed, how have Bataan veterans been politicized, and where do we see the veterans themselves ascribing identities to themselves to achieve particular outcomes, such as winning political office, obtaining housing, getting medical benefits, or obtaining reparations? Additionally, while I drew parallels, pointed out ironies, and identified connections through space and time, the imperial and transnational relationship between New Mexico and the Philippines also merits inquiry.

My discussion of the Bataan Relief Organization, largely focused on their work on war bond campaigns, should not obscure its other wide-ranging activities. Its work as a relief organization separate from those federally sponsored campaigns was even more enduring, particularly since its leadership created the foundations of the American Ex-Prisoners of
War, a group that is inclusive of all former prisoners of war, not just those from Bataan. Additionally, because New Mexico was so invested in the plight of prisoners of war, state officials created the War Prisoners Relief Commission and the War Prisoners Information Bureau to aid their families and advocate on behalf of POWs in Washington. Created in part at the BRO’s urging, these organizations also show how significant POWs were to New Mexico’s wartime experience. New Mexicans looked to Washington to address the needs of their prisoners of war, and they constantly pushed Congress as well as War Department officials to recognize the urgency of providing relief to the soldiers captured in the Philippines.

That many New Mexicans insisted the federal government take responsibility for aiding its prisoners of war points to a significant question when it comes to the cultural memory of the Bataan surrender. Since 2007, New Mexico’s senators and representatives in Washington have repeatedly introduced legislation seeking to award the Congressional Gold Medal to soldiers who fought on Bataan and Corregidor. The legislation has never passed, and through several iterations of the bill, its language has alternately been exclusive or inclusive, and has including varying amounts of references to the 200th Coast Artillery. In 2016, President Barack Obama signed the Filipino Veterans Gold Medal Act into law, and under the legislation any soldier who fought in the Philippines at any time during World War II is eligible to receive the medal—including New Mexico’s Bataan veterans. In fact, some of New Mexico’s Bataan veterans have been awarded the Gold Medal over the last four years. Yet New Mexico’s congressional contingent continues to introduce legislation for a Gold Medal specifically for Bataan veterans. This practice has important implications for how we think about and frame the timing of the defense of Bataan—the Gold Medal legislation
restricts the timeline much like Chávez’ promotion bill—which suggests the qualities attached to the defenders (who fought, surrendered, and were captured) differ from those attached to the liberators. Members of New Mexico’s Hispanic community, however, have argued giving the Gold Medal to Bataan defenders would recognize the contribution of Hispanic soldiers to their nation’s defense. This legislation and the arguments in support of it echo the territory’s campaign for statehood in the early 1900s, when statehood was denied because there were too many Spanish-speaking people within its borders. Arguments in favor of the bill because it would recognize the contributions of Hispanic soldiers give the false impression that Hispanics comprised the majority of the 200th Coast Artillery, and, that the 200th Coast Artillery dominated the defense of Bataan. To many New Mexicans, the Congressional Gold Medal represents federal recognition of New Mexico’s sacrifices during World War II, and while the state, its communities, and its people have incorporated the 200th’s service, sacrifice, and suffering into their cultural memory of the state’s wartime experience, the federal government has failed to do so.

The centerpiece of New Mexico’s wartime narrative is that the men on Bataan did not surrender, they were surrendered. Their government abandoned them. New Mexicans fought against that abandonment throughout the war, and created language, spaces, and rituals that marked the state with evidence of defeat and surrender not simply as a cautionary tale that surrender could happen again, but that they remembered, were proud of, and recognized the sacrifices their men made on behalf of them and on behalf of the United States. But without the Congressional Gold Medal, it seems, the men on Bataan are still waiting.
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