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MILITARY POSTS IN THE SOUTHWEST, 1848-1860

By A. B. Bender

FROM THE beginning of our history to the late nineteenth century, frontier defense formed a chief concern of our government. In dealing with this problem prior to the Mexican War, various methods were tried. Land was purchased from the red man, an "Indian country" was created, annuities and gifts were furnished the Indian, and a chain of forts was established along the edges of the frontier settlements or in the heart of the Indian country. When the war extended our domain to the Pacific and the California gold discovery attracted new emigrant waves to the Far West, the problem of frontier defense became more pressing. The virgin lands of the Far Southwest, which in earlier years had an interest only for traders, trappers, and merchants, now beckoned miners, speculators, adventurous land-hunters, and home seekers from the more populated districts of the East. When the Indian resented the new encroachments of the white man and attempted to stop the rising tide of immigration, the United States army came to the defense of the white man. To furnish protection to emigrant trains, to protect the Overland Mail and the newly-born settlements, as well as to defend the peaceful tribes from unscrupulous white men, the government again made use of its most widely applied method: it erected a chain of military stations. From the western outposts along the Mississippi River, a cordon of forts, by degrees, extended westward along the
Arkansas River to the Rio Grande, the Gila, the Great Colorado, and the Pacific Ocean. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the character and effectiveness of this policy in the Southwest\(^1\) between the Mexican and Civil Wars.

Prior to the Mexican War only fifty-six forts guarded the entire United States.\(^2\) It soon became apparent, however, that the extreme western outposts, which formed an irregular line west of the Mississippi River, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian border,\(^3\) would have to be strengthened. Since the war called for the presence of troops in the Indian country and since civil and military officers emphasized the urgent need for a new line of defense, such recommendations did not go long unheeded.\(^4\)

While troops were moving westward, new posts began to appear. Fort Mann, situated on the north bank of the Arkansas River, about five miles west of the present Dodge City, Kansas, was built in 1847.\(^5\) Three military positions were constructed on the lower Rio Grande: Fort Polk, situated at Point Isabel and Fort Brown, opposite Matamoros, were established in the spring of 1846; in the fall of 1848 troops occupied Ringgold Barracks, about one-half mile below Rio Grande City.\(^6\) Fort Marcy, named in honor of the Secretary of War and situated some 600 yards from the

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1. The discussion of the Southwest in this paper will be confined largely to Texas, the territory of New Mexico, and California.


3. Beginning with Fort Jesup in Louisiana, the chain included Forts Towson, Washita, and Gibson in Oklahoma, Fort Smith in Arkansas, Forts Scott and Leavenworth in Kansas, Forts Des Moines and Atkinson in Iowa, Fort Snelling in Minnesota, and Fort Wilkins on Lake Superior. It should be noted, of course, that prior to the Mexican War some of these outposts were not located in the present day states but rather in unorganized Indian country or in territories. *Ibid.*, p. 220d; *Sen. Exz. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, p. 121.


5. Fort Mann, although not a military post, rendered important service as a depot "to repair wagons and recruit animals" for military and wagon trains en route between Fort Leavenworth and Santa Fé. Built by Daniel P. Mann and a corps of teamsters, the depot was discontinued in 1850 upon the establishment of new Fort Atkinson, on the Arkansas. Lewis H. Garrard, *Wah-To-Yah and the Taos Trail* (Ralph P. Bieber, ed., Glendale, Cal., 1938), pp. 331-33.

heart of Santa Fé, was begun by General Kearny in August, 1846, and completed in the following year. In California military inspections were ordered and several positions were strengthened. The presidio of San Francisco was put in repair, guns were mounted at San Pedro and Los Angeles, and a redoubt was built on a hill over-looking Monterey and mounted with 24-pounders and 8-inch mortars.

At the end of the Mexican War the defense program in the Far West naturally received greater attention. In December, 1848, orders issued from the Adjutant General's office directed officers of the Corps of Engineers and Topographical Engineers to make a careful examination of Texas, New Mexico, Oregon, and California, for the purpose of locating permanent military stations within those areas. The system of defense, however, was not developed according to any definite or scientific plan; military officers were directed to establish forts when and where the need was greatest. Not infrequently, special interests greatly influenced the selection and maintenance of such positions. Merchants, unlicensed traders, speculators, and whiskey dealers played no small rôle in the defense policy in the Far Southwest.

In Texas, or the Eighth Military Department, where a frontier estimated at between 1,300 and 2,500 miles had to be protected against some 20,000 wild Indians—principally


11. At the close of the Mexican War, for purposes of military administration, the United States was divided into three divisions—Eastern, Western, and Pacific—and eleven departments. Texas, the territory of New Mexico, and California were designated as the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Military Departments, respectively. Raphael P. Thian, *Notes Illustrating the Military Geography of the United States, 1813-1880* (Washington, 1881), pp. 8, 20, 25, 40-51.

Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache—the government evolved a system of an inner and outer chain of defense. The former, established in 1848 and 1849 in advance of the frontier, began above San Antonio and ran parallel with the settlements in a northeasterly direction to the Red River. As the emigrants moved westward, the outer chain was created as far as the Rio Grande. An intermediate group of defenses connected the inner and outer lines. Posts were also established to the south and in the "Big Bend" sector.

The original inner chain, erected as a protection for the settlements between the Guadalupe and the Trinity rivers, consisted of Forts Mason, Croghan, Gates, Graham, and Worth. Of this line, Fort Graham, established early in February, 1849, and situated in Hill County, was the best planned. Fort Worth, more typical of the western outposts, was built in the same year at the mouth of the Clear Fork of the Trinity. These military positions, however, failed to impress the Indians. Within the next five years many Texas tribes harried the region along the inner line of defense. The Apache robbed and killed emigrant parties; the Comanche paid flying visits to the Arkansas country; the Waco conducted raids from the Wichita Mountains to the southern border; the Kiowa were even bold enough to mur-


16. St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican, March 19, 1851, October 7, 1853; Washington (Arkansas) Telegraph, February 5, 1851; Stem to Loomis, January 9, Stem to Lea, April 1, 1853, MSS., (In L. R., Indian Office, National Archives, hereafter cited as L. R., I. O.).
Under Indian agent Jesse Stem within a few miles of Fort Belknap.  

Meanwhile, the government had decided upon a more vigorous policy. In 1851, Conrad, Secretary of War, ordered the movement of troops into Texas. A regiment of infantry was directed to march from Jefferson Barracks to the Indian country west of Arkansas, while the Fifth Infantry stationed in the latter country was to advance farther into the interior and establish a chain of forts across northern Texas from Red River to the Rio Grande in the Comanche country. A regiment of Mounted Riflemen was ordered from Oregon to Texas and remounted for active service. Two companies were also to proceed to Corpus Christi.

In accordance with this policy seven new posts soon supplemented the inner line. To overawe the hostile tribes along the Red River, Colonel G. Loomis, in June, 1851, established Camp Belknap, later known as Fort Belknap, on the Red Fork of the Brazos River and in November of the same year troops from the former garrison built Fort Phantom Hill on the Clear Fork of the Brazos. To the southwest, three additional posts built in 1852—Forts Chadbourne, McKavett, and Clark—guarded the zone of Indian depredations. The last post, in particular, occupied a position of primary importance since it faced both the Rio Grande and the Indian

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19. Rister gives the date for establishment of Fort Belknap as September 3, 1850. However, according to post returns of Fort Belknap, a detachment of two companies (G. I.), Fifth Infantry arrived under Captain Carter L. Stevenson on June 3, 1851. Stevenson, in a letter of February 4, 1852, stated that the site was selected and marked out by General Belknap, June 24, 1851. The post was abandoned in 1867 because of an insufficient water supply. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 96, pp. 371-72; C. C. Rister, *The Southwestern Frontier, 1865-1881* (Cleveland, 1928), pp. 49, 52; Fort Belknap, Post Returns, June, 1851, April, 1860, MSS., (in Post Returns, National Archives, hereafter cited as Post Returns).
Camp Cooper, in Throckmorton County, was established in 1856 to protect the Reservation Indians stationed there, and in the same year Camp Colorado in present Coleman County was built. The northern line of defense ended at Preston on the Red River, where it left Texas and proceeded northward via Forts Washita, Arbuckle, and Cobb.

Meanwhile, the Rio Grande—probably the largest and most exposed part of the Union—as well as the settlements along the gulf and the northern frontier, was kept in a constant state of alarm and excitement. "The whole lower country is swarming with Indians and is one continual scene of outrage and murder," declared the Houston Democratic Telegraph and Texas Register. To escape from the Indian danger, entire families moved to the Mexican side of the Rio Grande. In defense of military escorts, bands of Indians, armed with guns, attacked army wagon trains and killed teamsters. Of course, frontiersmen and special interests deluged Congress, the Secretary of War, and the President with petitions and memorials, pleading for greater protection.

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21. At Camps Cooper and Colorado the troops experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining healthy drinking water, while at the latter post, liquor was peddled freely among the troops. Sen. Ex. Docs., 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 52, pp. 185-88; Camp Colorado, Texas, Post Returns, 1856, 1861, MSS. (in Post Returns).

22. Fort Washita, Post Returns, June, 1834, April, 1861, MSS. (in ibid.).

23. For the history of this post, see Grant Foreman, Advancing the Frontier (Norman, Okla., '1933), pp. 260-64; Fort Arbuckle, Post Returns, 1854, 1850, 1870, MSS. (in Post Returns).


26. Houston Democratic Telegraph and Texas Register, August 7, 1859; Daily Missouri Republican, September 6, 1850.

27. Daily Missouri Republican, April 4, 1851.


29. Houston Mercantile Advertiser, August 4, 1849; H. Journal, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 400; Rusk to Conrad, February 23, 1852, MSS. (in L. R., S. W.); Johnston to Bee, February 14, 1857, MSS. (in Letters Sent, Tex., National Archives, hereafter cited as L. S., Tex.).
The War Department, in the meantime, had not been idle; it had established an outer chain of defense. Along the lower Rio Grande, Forts Polk, Brown, Ringgold Barracks, McIntosh, and Duncan served as key positions to the upper provinces of Mexico, acting not only as a bulwark against the wild tribes, but also as a salutary influence along the boundary line, especially in protecting the revenue laws. Three forts supplemented the rear of this line, while to the northward and eastward nine additional posts served as connecting links between the outer and inner chains. This subsidiary group of defenses, occupying a central position and garrisoned principally with cavalry, could easily dispatch mounted troops to any threatened point—eastward toward the settlements or westward toward the Rio Grande. Among these defenses, Fort Martin Scott established in 1848, Fort Lancaster in 1855, and Camp Wood in 1857 occupied strategic positions, since they commanded numerous Indian trails leading into southern Texas and across the Rio Grande into Mexico. The “Big Bend” sector, favorite resort for

30. For Forts Polk, Brown, and Ringgold Barracks, see page 2 of this article.
31. Fort McIntosh, about three quarters of a mile above Laredo, was built in 1850, although Lieutenant Egbert L. Viele entered Laredo with a company of troops in March of the previous year. Originally known as Camp Crawford, the post was abandoned in 1858 and the troops removed to Fort Brown; it was again reoccupied in December, 1860. Billings, op. cit., p. 215.
32. Fort Duncan, situated at Eagle Pass, was considered one of the most commanding positions on the frontier. Although occupied in 1849 by two companies of infantry under Captain John B. Scott, buildings were not erected until the following year. Abandoned in 1861, it was again reoccupied in 1868. Sen. Ez. Docs., 31 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 152; Billings, op. cit., p. 217, Frederick Law Olmsted, A Journey Through Texas (New York, 1859), p. 314.
36. The six other positions occupied by troops in this line included San Antonio, Fort Lincoln on the Rio Seco, Camp Verde in Kendall County, Camp Hudson in Crockett County, Austin, and Fort Terrett on the Llano River. Hamersly, op. cit., pt. 2, p. 140; Sen. Ez. Docs., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, pp. 277-80; ibid., 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 52, p. 188, 191-92; Whiting to Deas, March 14, 1859, MSS., (in L. R., C. E.); Mansfield to Thomas, October 13, November 21, 1859, MSS., (in L. R. Adjutant General, National Archives, hereafter latter will be cited as A. G.)
Indian attacks on California-bound emigrant and cattle trains, was guarded by four additional outposts. Forts Stockton, Davis, and Quitman protected the stage line and emigrant road between San Antonio and El Paso, while Fort Bliss guarded against Mexican raids. The marauding activities of the picturesque Mexican bandit, Cortinas, in the summer of 1859 and spring of 1860 led to the strengthening of the defenses in the lower Rio Grande. Fort Brown, which had been abandoned, was again reoccupied; a detachment of artillery was ordered to take station between Forts Clark and Duncan, and a company of cavalry was on its way from Camp Hudson. Four new camps were established along the lower Rio Grande. Meanwhile, many military positions established since 1848 had been abandoned.

Theoretically, the double system of defense—the series of posts erected at strategic positions between thirty and three hundred miles beyond the frontier settlements—was quite effective, but in actuality it proved inadequate. In the “Big Bend” sector and in the region between the Nueces and the Rio Grande (where the country was sparsely settled and infested with thieves, robbers, and murderers from Mexico and Texas) its effectiveness was questionable. On the eve of the Civil War the twenty-six military posts in Texas, al-

37. Austin Texas State Gazette, August 27, 1857, August 28, September 4, 1858.
though furnishing some degree of security, did not solve the Indian problem.\textsuperscript{42}

In the territory of New Mexico or Ninth Military Department, there was no definite line of defense as in Texas. A heterogeneous white population of some 61,000, distributed among the seven counties of the territory, surrounded by some 6,000 peaceful Indians and nearly 37,000 of the wild tribes,\textsuperscript{43} was not conducive to peace. The contemporary press pictured the Indian danger as very grave. Reports of periodic attacks on emigrants and scattered settlements, paralyzing industry and endangering life, brought forth memorials and petitions declaring: "We must have more troops . . . or we are lost."\textsuperscript{44} To cap the climax, the Mexican government filed claims against the United States for Indian depredations from across our border.\textsuperscript{45}

In response to this state of affairs, the War Department supplemented the original fortified positions along the upper Rio Grande, such as Fort Marcy, Taos, Albuquerque, and El Paso. By 1852, upon the recommendations of civil and military officers in the territory,\textsuperscript{46} seven new posts were built. Of this number, three bordered the Rio Grande\textsuperscript{47} and the others guarded the Navaho and copper mine country.\textsuperscript{48} The


\textsuperscript{44} Daily Missouri Republican, September 23, November 14, 1848, February 16, July 8, August 6, 12, 16, 25, December 9, 10, 12, 18, 19, 20, 1849, June 21, 23, 1850, March 22, May 18, 1851; Houston, Democratic Telegraph and Texas Register, June 27, 1850.

\textsuperscript{45} The claim of the state of Chihuahua alone was more than $20,000,000. Daily Missouri Republican, November 4, 1851.

\textsuperscript{46} H. Ex Docs., 31 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 6, pt. 1, p. 112; Sen. Ex. Docs., 31 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 64, pp. 138-39; McCall, op. cit., pp. 526, 530-36.

\textsuperscript{47} Forts Conrad, Fillmore, and Union were erected in 1851. Sen. Ex. Docs., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, I, pt. 1, pp. 203, 239.

new military positions, however, failed to intimidate the wild tribes. In the Mesilla Valley the treacherous Apaches had converted the region into a "land of widows" in which agricultural and mining activities had virtually stopped; even pastoral life could be carried on only under the protection of artillery. The distribution of gifts in the form of meat, flour, "red cloths and calico shirts," served only as temporary palliatives.49

With the acquisition of the Gadsden Purchase the problem of defense became more acute. The prevalent belief of the existence of rich mineral deposits in the territory brought a great influx of immigrants into the region between the Santa Rita Mountains and the Colorado River.50 To protect the new arrivals from attacks of some 5,000 newly acquired Indian wards as well as from depredations of the older tribes required additional defenses. Between 1853 and the opening of the Civil War, therefore, new posts were built on both sides of the Río Grande, in the southwestern part of the territory, in the north, and along the upper Colorado, and several of the older positions were abandoned. The repeated and insistent demands of the Mexican government that we restrain the wild tribes, as well as the clamor for greater protection by the frontier settlers, led to the establishment of Forts Thorn and Craig. Since it was believed that the new positions would guard effectively the El Paso-Santa Fé route against Apache and white outlaws, Forts Webster and Conrad were abandoned.51 Peace on that frontier, however, was not secured. In the spring of 1855, when the Mescalero and Jicarilla bands of Apache took to the war path, Fort Stanton was established on the Bonita River some twenty miles east of the White Mountains.52 To protect the


Santa Cruz Valley and to restrain the tribes north of the Gila, Fort Buchanan on the Sonoita was built in the following year.\footnote{H. Ex. Docs., 34 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 1, p. 3.}

When the Mormon War broke out and some of the troops were transferred from the Southwest to the seat of trouble, the warlike bands became more bold. Not only did they levy tribute on commercial and emigrant trains entering the territory,\footnote{Daily Missouri Republican, February 6, 1857.} but also murdered United State Indian agent Henry L. Dodge.\footnote{Santa Fé Weekly Gazette, March 14, 1857.} Colonel Bonneville's Gila expedition against the Apache and that of Lieutenant-Colonel Miles against the Navaho into Cañon de Chelly brought only temporary relief.\footnote{For an account of these expeditions see Bender, loc. cit., IX (October, 1934), pp. 355-59.} Demands for more adequate defense naturally followed. But petitions of some 600 citizens of Doña Ana County as well as the recommendations of General Garland, Lieutenant Sylvester Mowry, and special Indian agent George Bailey, for the erection of a series of cavalry posts to check the plundering expeditions of the Apache, proved disappointing. Only one new position—Fort Garland—was established in 1858, and this a substitute for the abandoned Fort Massachusetts.\footnote{Sen. Ex. Docs., 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 559, pt. 2, pp. 291-93, 297-98, pt. 3, p. 778; John H. Nankivell “Fort Garland Colorado,” Colorado Magazine, XVI (January, 1939), pp. 14-23.}

During 1859 military officers in New Mexico attempted to inject greater vigor into the defense program. Colonels Bonneville and Joseph E. Johnston, after inspecting most of the garrisons, effected a post reorganization; Fort Thorn was abandoned and its property moved to Fort Fillmore; a post was located at the Copper Mines on the site of Fort Webster; a company of Third Infantry was stationed at Hatch’s Ranch on the Gallinas River; and at the junction of the San Pedro and Arivaipa, Fort Breckenridge was erected.\footnote{Bonneville to Thomas, July 15, 1859, Scott to Cooper, October 3, 1859, MSS., (in L. R., A. G.); Sen. Ex. Docs., 35 Cong., 1 Sess., II, No. 2, pt. 2, pp. 295, 606-07; Ibid., 36 Cong., 2 Sess., II, No. 1, pt. 2, pp. 222-23.} This spurt of energy, however, did not quite
satisfy the territorial legislature. Early in 1860 this body memorialized Congress for the establishment of seven additional permanent military posts.\textsuperscript{59}

When Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy succeeded to the command of the Department of New Mexico, he worked out an elaborate military reorganization program, which was intended both to strengthen the defenses within the department and to protect the emigrant and mail route from Missouri. Fauntleroy’s plan, embracing no less than twelve proposals, provided for the abandonment of some of the existing military positions, the creation of new forts, the strengthening of the garrisons and the more efficient and economical supplying of the mounted troops.\textsuperscript{60} The recommendations were followed by orders for drastic changes in the military organization of the territory.\textsuperscript{61} But before the new plan could be effected, the Civil War had broken out, so that some of the military positions in New Mexico were temporarily discontinued and the troops removed.\textsuperscript{62}

The establishment of a line of military posts in California completed the system of frontier defense in the Southwest. Whereas in Texas and New Mexico the chief problem was the protection of emigrants and settlers from Indian attacks, on the Pacific coast it involved the additional task of defending the peaceful tribes from the mad rush of impatient prospectors and land-hungry frontiersmen, who seemed content with nothing less than possession of the entire country. In wrestling with this problem, the government fortified the coast settlements, built forts in the mining districts, near the mouth of the Gila, and along the upper Colorado.

The defense program was inaugurated in 1848 when commanding officers in California and Oregon were directed to establish posts and garrisons within their respective com-
mands. During 1849-1850 clashes between unscrupulous whites and Indians in the Russian River country, the upper San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys led to the stationing of troops at Camp Far West, some thirty miles from Sutter's Fort and at Rancho del Jurupa near Cajón Pass. The murder of Captain William H. Warner of the Topographical Engineers in the fall of 1849 near Goose Lake was followed by an order for the establishment of a post in the Sierra Nevada near the 42nd parallel. In the following year forts were built at Camp Yuma, Warner's Ranch, and on the San Gabriel.

Since the disturbances of 1849-1850 showed the need of winning the Indian's good will, the President appointed three special agents for California, who were to go into the Indian country, study the Indian's needs, select sites for agencies, and negotiate treaties. In the spring and summer of 1851 the newly-arrived Indian officials succeeded in carrying out the President's orders but as the prospectors and miners nullified the work of the special agents, the Indians rose up to defend their rights. The Indian war scare naturally brought forth numerous petitions for protection. To appease such clamors, the California legislature instructed its members in Congress to secure additional troops and to build a line of military posts along the California borders.

67. For the colorful history of this post see H. Ex. Docs., 34 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 76, p. 34; Eugene Bandel, Frontier Life in the Army, 1844-1881 (Ralph P. Bieber, ed., Glendale, California, 1932), p. 260; Medical History of Fort Yuma, 1850-1873, MSS., (in Medical History of Posts).
70. Daily Missouri Republican, March 17, 19, 1851; San Francisco Daily Alta California, January 14, August 26, December 12, 1851; Conrad to Gwin, December 27, 1851, MSS., (in L. B., S. W.).
Thus, within the next five years when ruthless whites and war speculators continued with the policy of Indian extermination and the Indians retaliated, the government attempted to maintain order by erecting additional defenses. Along the northern frontier forts Umpqua, Lane, Jones, Humboldt, and Reading were established while in the south forts Miller and Tejon were built. Troops were also stationed at Rancho del Chino about 120 miles north of San Diego, at Stockton, on the Sacramento, and on the Trinity. But the Californians were dissatisfied. The Daily Alta California, a champion of overland migration, even went so far as to declare it “a disgrace to our government” that a line of posts from the Humboldt to Independence, Missouri, had not been established.

Although such criticism was not taken too seriously, military officers in California had not been idle. Early in May, 1857, when General N. S. Clarke assumed command of the Department of the Pacific, he introduced a more vigorous defense policy. Within a few months Camp Bragg and Camp Hollenbush (later Fort Crook) were built in the Pitt River country. In the following year when the northern tribes attacked a mail stage, massacred an emigrant company, and were reported planning a mass uprising, Camp Gaston, later known as Fort Gaston, in Hooper Valley and

71. San Francisco Daily Alta California, December 12, 1851, March 2, April 5, 1852, March 30, September 5, 1853, April 29, 1854, October 15, 1856; McKee to Lea, April 5, July 30, 1852, Hitchcock to Adjutant General, U. S. A., August 5, 1852, MSS., (in L. R., I. O., Cal.)


73. Of the northern posts, Fort Humboldt, established early in 1853, was the most important; in the south Fort Tejon, built in the following year, was intended to quiet the Reserve Indians at the mouth of Tejon Cañon, to command Tejon Pass, as well as to control the tribes along the Mohave and Colorado rivers. H. Ex. Docs., 35 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 88, p. 103; ibid., 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 2, p. 784; San Francisco Daily Chronicle, August 13, 1855; Mansfield to Thomas, April 23, 1859, MSS., (in L. R., A. G.)

74. San Francisco Daily Alta California, October 9, 1854.

Camp Wright in Mendocino County were established. Indian alarms in the Humboldt and Klamath regions led to the erection of Fort Terwaw on the Klamath reservation in 1859, and when the Mohave and Paiute tribes in the vicinity of the 35th parallel became troublesome, Lieutenant-Colonel William Hoffman, in the spring of the same year, led more than 700 men from Fort Yuma to Beale's Crossing on the Colorado River and established Fort Mojave—the last important military post in the Department of California. Hoffman's display of force humbled the neighboring tribes only for the time being. On the eve of the Civil War, when the departments of California and Oregon were merged into the Department of the Pacific and some 1,700 troops occupied the dozen posts and stations in California, the defense problem remained unsolved.

The effectiveness of this long line of military posts did not fail to bring forth animated discussion and considerable difference of opinion among military and civil authorities in Washington as well as on the frontier. Secretary of War Conrad maintained that safety could be secured best only by a constant display of military force in the Indian's own immediate neighborhood. Territorial and state governors importuned by settlers and special interests invariably championed the establishment of new posts. Governor Bigler of California in a message to the legislature declared that the erection and maintenance of military stations at intervals of

77. Daily Missouri Republican, September 26, October 18, 1859; San Francisco Daily Alta California, October 6, December 16, 1859, January 10, 26, 1860.
79. Although geographically in New Mexico Territory, Fort Mojave was in the military Department of California. Sen. Ex. Docs., 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, pt. 2, pp. 387-95, 405, 417; ibid., No. 52, pp. 235-36; Bandel, op. cit., pp. 57, 60, 251, 258.
81. For a detailed account of the life at the distant posts in the fifties, see Bender, "The Soldier in the Far West, 1848-1860," Pacific Historical Review, VIII (June, 1939), pp. 162-71.
seventy-five or one hundred miles, garrisoned with fifty men each, would afford needed security for the entire trans-Mississippi country.83

A unique proposal for defending the Far West was made by Henry O'Reilly, pioneer builder of telegraph lines. O'Reilly's plan, which involved the establishment of postal and telegraph facilities, the erection of stockades, twenty to thirty miles apart, also provided for mounted troops to patrol the routes, to transmit the mail, and to protect emigrants and settlers. But since General Scott pronounced the scheme "impracticable, uneconomical, and ineffectual," it was not tried.84

On the whole, officials in Washington as well as officers in the field condemned the policy of numerous small posts. Quartermaster-General Jesup and Secretary of War Davis contended that a more effective plan was to mass a few large bodies of troops at strategic positions and from these to dispatch large detachments annually into the Indian country.85

In Texas General Worth, commander of the Eighth Military Department, and other officers held similar views.86 More critical of the government's defense policy was B. E. Tarver, member of a surveying and exploring expedition across northern Texas. Writing to Governor Pease in June, 1857, Tarver declared: "The system of frontier defense as applied to Texas is a signal failure... [it] has yielded neither laurels to our army nor protection to our citizens. It should be changed."87

The most severe critic was Captain John Pope of the Topographical Engineers. In a fifty-nine page "Military Memoir of the Country between the Mississippi River and

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84. *Ibid.*, April 22, 1850; Scott to Floy, June 1, 1857, MSS. (in L. B., H. A.).
86. Whiting to Totten, June 19, 1849, Whiting to Deas, January 21, March 14, 1856, MSS. (in L. R., C. E.); Worth to Wood, February 15, 1849, MSS., (in Governors' Letters); Johnston to Thomas, November 17, 1866, MSS., (in L. S., Tex.).
87. Tarver to Pease, June 22, 1857, MSS., (in Governors' Letters).
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the Pacific Ocean..." addressed to Secretary of War Floyd, Pope analyzed the existing system of defense in great detail, pointed out its weaknesses, and proposed changes. Pope agreed that prior to the Mexican War the employment of numerous small posts had proved effective since they were situated in fertile lands and formed nuclei for rapidly growing settlements, but with the acquisition of the Mexican Cession the former method was no longer adequate. Despite the new conditions, however, special interests in the distant territories proved so powerful that the government was virtually compelled to establish a multitude of posts along the whole line of frontier settlement.

In Texas, for example, where the first line of defense was within the cultivable region, successful effects could be noted as in the Mississippi Valley. But with the movement of troops into barren areas, where inducements to settlement proved less favorable, cries for protection immediately arose—the loudest clamors coming from merchants, traders, and profiteers. "So soon as the small posts were fairly established in this desert region, a number of people at once flocked around them," Pope declared, "not...to make permanent settlements..., but simply to sell to the soldiers and employees of the garrison whiskey and other forbidden articles,... Some (and they were only few) cultivated small fields of grain to be sold as forage to the Government," while others sold whiskey and guns to the Indians.

An exceedingly profitable trade, thus, readily converted quasi settlers into champions of frontier defense, who no sooner heard of the government's intention to remove a military post than they immediately raised a cry of "defense."

Pope, of course, was not alone in the belief that reports

89. Ibid., p. 37.
90. Houston Democratic Telegraph and Texas Register, October 30, November 6, 1850; Austin State Gazette, September 11, 13, 1858; Daily Missouri Republican, September 3, 1859.
of Indian atrocities were greatly magnified and that selfish motives played a prominent rôle in demands for the establishment and maintenance of new military positions. A French traveller, passing through northern Texas in the fifties, declared that except on the very distant frontiers the Indian danger was reduced to a minimum; this observer maintained that a degree of security prevailed on the Indian frontier which was superior to that found in the streets of New York, London, or Paris. Similarily, Captain (later General) George B. McClellan and Secretary of War Conrad did not hesitate to explode the greatly exaggerated Indian danger. "It is well known to this Department," wrote Conrad to Governor Bell of Texas, "that the inhabitants in the neighborhood of military posts, have other reasons for wishing them to be kept up, besides the protection they afford. The Department, therefore, is frequently urged to establish posts where there is no real necessity for them." The settlers, of course, strenuously denied such charges and the Austin State Gazette, championing the cause of the frontiersmen, berated the federal government for its inaction and indifference. The States Rights faction even went so far as to declare that since the national government failed or refused to render adequate protection the citizens were justified in severing their relations from the Union.

The clamor for protection in New Mexico was even on a grander scale than in Texas, Pope stated in his Memoir, not because the Indian danger was greater but because the New Mexicans had no market for the surplus products other than that afforded by the government. Eighty per cent of the money in circulation in the territory, it was estimated, had been contributed by the civil and military departments of the United States. Naturally, when attempts were made to remove troops from the towns into the interior or aban-

93. Conrad to Bell, September 30, 1852, MSS. (in Governors' Letters).
94. Committee of Citizens to Governor Pease, March 13, 1854, MSS. (in Governors' Letters); Austin State Gazette, May 21, 1859.
95. Ford to Runnels, June 2, 1858, MSS. (in Governors' Letters).
96. Pope, Military Memoir, pp. 42-43.
don a military post the business interests became panicky. The Santa Fé Weekly Gazette declared the removal of troops would ruin the country since it would deprive the people of thousands of dollars in trade.\(^97\) Besides the desire for legitimate profit, the illicit trade in whiskey and arms, plied by unlicensed traders in defiance of the law, often resulted in violence and in subsequent pleas for more adequate defense.\(^98\) Thus, in many instances, a demand for protection was in reality only a plea for the continuance of a lucrative trade.

Moreover, friction between the two races on other grounds frequently played into the hands of the “champions of frontier defense.” During the so-called periods of peace when the New Mexican Indian visited the towns he was invariably fleeced by the white man. Since the Indian rarely received justice in the courts he sought redress in the only way he knew. A cry of Indian danger at once arose.\(^99\) The common herding of flocks—each herd under the charge of a single man or boy many miles away from the settlements—served as another cause for trouble. If in the course of a quarrel between herders, a New Mexican killed an Indian and took away part or all of the flock, little was known; but if the Indian committed the violent act the settlers at once pleaded for greater military protection.\(^100\) Since many of the western newspapers magnified the Indian danger and the press in other sections of the country reproduced such reports, the special interests won out. The numerous posts were kept up.\(^101\)

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\(^97\) Weightman to Alvarez, May 6, 1852, MSS., (in Twitchell Collection, New Mexico Historical Society, Santa Fé).

\(^98\) McLaws to Ker, January 16, 1850, McLaws to Alexander, June 6, 1850, McLaws to Buford, June 25, 1850, MSS., (in L. S. N. Mex., Books 6, 7); Graves to Manypenny, November 29, 1853, MSS., (in L. R., I. O. N. Mex.); Daily Missouri Republican, December 8, 1851; Santa Fé Weekly Gazette, November 26, 1853.

\(^99\) Pope, Military Memoir, pp. 43-44; Russell to Greiner, July 29, 1852, Greiner, “Overawing the Indians,” 1852, MSS., (in Ritch Collection, Huntington Library).

\(^100\) Pope, Military Memoir, pp. 44-45.

\(^101\) Pope, Military Memoir, pp. 37-38. Commenting on the Indian danger, John H. Rollins, Special United States agent for Texas Indians, wrote to General Brooke: “The reports about Indians... are to be received with many grains of allowance... The News-Papers are full of falsehood on this subject and men who do not belong to the frontier proper are writing communications for the papers... to bring on an Indian war to subservive some selfish end.” Rollins to Brooke, October 4, 1850, MSS., (in Governors’ Letters).
In California, where the white man encountered the least warlike tribes of the North American continent, the outcry against the Indian danger was no less constant and no less exaggerated. The rougher elements in the mining districts, acknowledging neither the right of property, nor of life in the red man, often ruthlessly and wantonly attacked his settlements because of imaginary offenses. The latter, feeling himself innocent, proceeded according to the mosaic principle of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." When ambitious politicians and greedy war speculators "manufactured" Indian atrocities and Mexican greasers kidnapped Indian children and wantonly killed the parents, the war was on. The cry for greater protection was followed by the establishment of new posts.

Because of the vast area of the trans-Mississippi country, and the character of the roving Indian population, many critics considered the numerous, small frontier posts useless and expensive. Pope recommended drastic changes. First of all, he proposed that the trader, the emigrant, the traveller, and the business man should confine their travel to the summer months. Moreover, Pope suggested that the small posts beyond the reach of the settlements should be broken up and the troops concentrated at three or four large forts within the settlements themselves. From these outposts some mounted troops were to be dispatched into the Indian country during the summer months, while others were to serve as escorts for the great overland trails. Like Jesup, Davis, and Johnston, Pope believed that constant pressure of troops in the immediate neighborhood of the


103. Wilson to Brown, May 31, 1850, Johnston to Brown, July 6, 1850, MSS., (in L. R., I. O., Cal.); San Francisco Daily Alta California, January 6, December 9, 1851, September 5, 1853.

104. San Francisco Daily Evening Picayune, December 5, 11, 1851; San Francisco Daily Alta California, April 7, 1855, May 12, 1856; Wool to Henley, March 5, 1855, Henley to Manypenny, April 9, 1855, MSS., (in L. R., I. O., Cal.); Vallejo to Governor, August 4, 1849, MS., (in Unbound Documents, pp. 93-94, Bancroft Library, University of California).
Indians and their families would create a deeper impression on the red man than a thousand ineffective engagements directed from numerous small outposts. Whether the system of numerous small posts was entirely wrong or whether the recommendations of Captain Pope and his supporters would have solved the problem of defense any better is not entirely certain. Neither method would probably have proved a complete solution. This being a transition period, the successful method of defense had to be evolved gradually.

Added to the criticism of the numerous small posts was the major use of infantry, which some characterized as a "capital military blunder." The *Daily Missouri Republican*, typical of the frontier press, considered infantry a "dead and useless expense." A writer in the same paper declared: "The posts, generally garrisoned by mere fragments of a company of infantry, are no more effective in rendering defense than so many head of sheep." J. W. B. Reynolds, a member of a California emigrant company, writing from San José, California contended that it would be about as sensible to dispatch a company of boys with pop guns to storm Sebastopol as to send infantry to fight Indians. The Brownsville (Texas) *American Flag* declared that the "government had as well place its soldiery on crutches and to command them to capture the wild antelope, as to send them, on foot, in the war path of the well-mounted warriors of the plains." Such criticism, however, proved of little avail. The burden of defense was left largely in the hands of the foot soldier. The difficulty in securing horses and the exorbitant cost of maintaining mounted men in the

110. *Austin State Gazette*, December 24, 1856.
111. Brownsville (Texas) *American Flag*, in *Austin State Gazette*, July 1, 1854.
Indian country, undoubtedly, help to explain this condition.\textsuperscript{112}

In the dozen years preceding the Civil War the federal government had erected more than sixty military posts and stations in the Far Southwest, but Indian outrages and depredations continued daring and numerous. Discounting the exaggerated reports of settlers, speculators, and the frontier press, the fact remains that marauding bands murdered settlers, drove off stock, and even dared to attack the military posts. During this period of unrest, in New Mexico Territory alone, some 200 whites were killed and a million dollars' worth of property was destroyed. Women and children captured by the Indians were frequently sold as slaves to distant tribes.\textsuperscript{113} The bloody campaigns waged on both sides of the Pacific coast range, while proving disastrous for the Indian, failed to establish a permanent peace. The frontier defense policy had been but partially successful.

Nevertheless, despite the harsh criticism directed against the ineffectiveness of the government's chief weapon of defense, the military stations in the Far West—and much of the criticism was well founded—the distant posts performed a real service. Although rendering but partial protection to emigrants and the remote settlements, they nevertheless served as pioneers of civilization,\textsuperscript{114} since they served as nuclei for important punitive and exploring expeditions. As the officers and men scoured the plains and penetrated the mountain fastnesses in search of plunderers, they learned considerable about the region which heretofore had been described as a land of "burning deserts, parched mountains, dried up rivers, rattlesnakes, scorpions, Greasers, and Apache."\textsuperscript{115} Along the Rio Grande frontier, the military posts played no small part in the development of an extensive

\textsuperscript{112} Daily Missouri Republican, September 4, 1859; Whiting to Totten, July 4, 1849, MSS. (in L. R., C. E.); Jesup to Conrad, November 4, 1850, MSS. (in L. B., Q. G., F. M.).

\textsuperscript{113} San Francisco Herald, August 21, September 14, 1859.

\textsuperscript{114} William A. Bell, New Tracks in North America (London, 1869), I, 28; Abert to Marcy, November 17, 1848, MSS. (in U. S. Miscellaneous, Library of Congress).

\textsuperscript{115} J. Ross Browne, Adventures in the Apache Country (New York, 1869), pp. 11, 27.
trade with Mexico. Furthermore, the troops, stationed in the West, accompanied by government surveyors, engineers, and scientists, constantly opened new trails, built roads, and surveyed western rivers. Thus, the distant military stations materially aided in binding together the older settlements with those in the Far West and paved the way for the disappearance of the “Last American Frontier.”