Federal Control of the Western Apaches, 1848–1886

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CHAPTER III

EXTERMINATION—A FRONTIER PANACEA

The end of the Civil War resulted in a temporary disruption and weakening of the military organization in the Apache country. This situation was produced by a gradual mustering out of the California Volunteers and an order from the war department which ended the enlistment of new troops. To prevent the complete collapse of military control on the Apache frontier, the secretary of war made an exception to the order on May 20, 1865, and allowed the recruitment of a regiment of Arizona Volunteers. Six companies composed of a total of three hundred and fifty men were immediately enrolled under the supervision of General McDowell. Half of the new troops were posted in southern Arizona and the others were moved to the Prescott area.¹

No military activity occurred in Arizona until McDowell visited the district in December. Then the advantage of having the department commander close at hand became very apparent. First, certain groups of Pinals and Coyoteros that had practically cut off the delivery of supplies to Fort Goodwin, were easily overawed by commands sent out from Camp Grant.² Next, all the Arizona Volunteers were concentrated at Camp Lincoln for service in the Verde Valley. The government gave scant attention to the troops' needs and much hardship resulted; however, their activities were quite effective. On February 11, 1866, Lieutenant Manuel Gallegos with forty-five men moved down the

valley after a band of marauders. The command, operating only at night, succeeded in locating a large rancheria strongly fortified within a series of caves and caverns. A battle of several hours duration followed, but despite the fact that thirty warriors were killed and twelve wounded, the band could not be dislodged. Similar commands led by Lieutenant Thomas Ewing and Primativo Cervantes struck the Indians north of the Salt River several severe blows in March, killing forty-two of them and wounding many others.

Such unusual punishment forced the Apache hostiles into southern Arizona where they renewed their raids with increased vigor. They probably would have ravaged the region with impunity had not General McDowell, still in the district, ordered troops from Fort Grant into action. As a result, Lieutenant John B. Urmy scoured the region for eleven days, travelled 225 miles, burnt 250 wickiups and killed six Indians from a hostile band he overtook by accident. General McDowell had scarcely started back to his headquarters, however, when the troops ceased their activities. With the exception of forty-one Indians killed and captured in the Verde valley in April, no further punishment followed for several months.

The breathing spell afforded by the troops' inaction gave the civil authorities an opportunity to express their views. Superintendent Leihy was quite critical of the military. Their work, he said, tended to embarrass and complicate the Indian difficulties. He was of the opinion that one-tenth of their expenditures during the past on "fruitless" operations would have provided comfortable homes for all the Indians in the territory. Delegate Poston stated that "the military authorities assume to be the government,"

4. Ewing to Col. C. E. Bennett, Mar. 9, 1866, ibid; Washburn to Capt. John Green, Mar. 26, 1866, ibid.
5. Urmy to A. A. G., Mar. 5, 1866, ibid.
6. Lt. J. D. Walker to Bennett, April 30, 1866, ibid.
7. Leihy to D. N. Cooley, May 18, 1866, I. O., L 155.
and more poignantly, he charged that the officers and men sent to the Indian country were rendered ineffective because of their lack of frontier experience. Governor Goodwin wanted “fair, open and persistent war” until the savages were “exterminated” or forced to “bow their necks in submission.” Then they were to be put on reservations and “made to labor or starve,” so there could be “no patched up treaty to benefit speculators in beef.” One J. D. Cusenbury wrote President Johnson regarding the inadequate number of troops, the incompetency of the commander and of the officers’ belief in extermination. Such an extreme policy was favored, he said, because of the lack of any formulated plans or arrangements for dealing with the Indians in case they should wish to surrender. Prophetically, he declared that 10,000 men and several years would be required to kill all the Apaches; but over-sanguinely, he predicted that they could be placed on a reserve in one year and made self-sustaining in two.

Expediency was still the governing factor, unfortunately, and although the views expressed contained much truth, yet ideas rather than policies were being advanced. Leihy came close to a sound policy when he wrote that adequate material provision would bring most of the bands to the reserves; but he was visionary in his view that such care would “soon” make them self-sufficient, and that the “few” remaining out “would be hunted down and killed by the adventurous prospectors and miners.”

A reorganization of the army on July 28, 1866, increased its bureaucratic nature. The country was divided into military divisions and Arizona, as a district of the Department of California, became a part of the Division of the Pacific. For purposes of Apache warfare western New

10. Cusenbury to Andrew Johnson, May 1, 1866, P 148.
11. Leihy to Cooley, May 18, 1866, I. O., L 155. The citizens of Tucson were reported to be paying a group of Tame Apaches one hundred dollars for each hostile scalp brought in. Dr. C. H. Lord to Cooley, June 4, 1866, 39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 112.
Mexico should have been combined with Arizona, but reasons of economy made it expedient to include the former area in the Division of the Missouri. The reorganization further provided for the replacement of all volunteer troops with regular army personnel.  

No important results followed the military reorganization, but McDowell, weakened by the loss of his Arizona Volunteers, was inclined to use peaceable measures. The Indians of the Verde Valley, because of their recent punishment, were also inclined towards peace. Colonel Bennett was therefore ordered to accept them as prisoners of war at Fort McDowell, where they were to be aided in agriculture. A party had come in on May 28, made arrangements to surrender most of their fellow tribesmen, and would have succeeded had not the presence of a strong number of Pimas frightened them away. Likewise, the presence of other unfriendly bands near Fort Goodwin had prevented the Indians of the Verde from collecting there; yet in the hope that they might later come to Fort McDowell, Bennett was now ordered to continue negotiations.  

Conditions in western Arizona had grown worse. The eight hundred Yavapai who had gone to the Colorado River Reservation in 1865 were thoroughly dissatisfied within a few months. Poor crops, quarrels with the Mohaves, the greed and arrogance of the whites, and especially the government's negligence in furnishing subsistence made them hate the sedentary life. As a result, the entire number in the spring of 1866 fled back to the mountains of central

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General H. W. Halleck was given command of the Division of the Pacific, with instructions from General Grant "to exercise his discretion as to the mode and manner of preventing Indian hostilities ... in the Territory of Arizona." This carte blanche from Grant was quite in contrast to his action the year before in curbing the "too extended" plans aimed against the Apaches. Edwin M. Stanton to James Harlan, July 11, 1866, I. O., W 377; McDowell to A. A. G., Mar. 23, 1866, I. O., Aria. Misc.


Arizona, there to resume their life of hunting and robbing.\textsuperscript{15} The Indians would doubtless have refrained from violence had not the freighters and frontiersmen attacked and killed them at every opportunity. Retaliation followed near Date Creek in the killing of a prospector and the burning of a cabin. A posse of citizens from Hardyville immediately sought revenge by slaughtering ten Yavapai men, including the head chief Wauba Yuma, and also several women and children. Such indiscriminate murder of fairly friendly Indians produced a recurrence of the critical conditions of the year before.\textsuperscript{16} Traffic almost stopped west of Prescott; trains moved with military escorts. Lieutenant Oscar Hutton, sent to the region in July, killed no Indians at first; but he destroyed their resources and thus made the situation worse by leaving the bands more destitute than before.\textsuperscript{17} On August 11 his command and a train he was escorting through Skull Valley were attacked by one hundred and fifty impoverished warriors who demanded the contents of the wagons. A parley followed, but it broke up in a severe battle in which the Indians were worsted with heavy loss. Leihy, certain that costly retaliation would follow, considered the victory a defeat.\textsuperscript{18} The situation was further aggravated by the withdrawal and discharge of the Arizona Volunteers at Date Creek and Wickenburg.\textsuperscript{19}

General McDowell, in the meantime, had become less certain with regard to a proper Apache policy; yet he believed that the punishment given the Indians was worthwhile, and in August he ordered the regular troops to be as active as the Arizona Volunteers had been. But that he also favored pacific methods is shown by his satisfaction

\textsuperscript{15} John Feudge to Leihy, July 31, 1866, 39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 111; G. H. Dorr to Leihy, Jan. 5, 1866, I. O., L 5. Chief Cushackama induced one hundred of his followers to stay on their farms.

\textsuperscript{16} Leihy to Cooley, April 12, 1866, I. O., I. D.

\textsuperscript{17} Hutton to P. A., Aug. 1, 1866, A. G. O., 632.

\textsuperscript{18} The Indian loss was thirty-three killed and fifteen captured. Hutton to Capt. G. W. Downey, Aug. 14, 1866, A. G. O., 632. See also Leihy’s account, I. O., L 239.

\textsuperscript{19} McDowell to A. A. G., Oct. 15, 1866, op. cit.
with the results attained at Fort Goodwin, where several hundred Apaches were collected. This attitude of indecision indicated that the general favored both peace and war, whichever might prove to be the most expedient.  

The military, from the standpoint of war, made an auspicious start. Captain George B. Stanford, in late September, moved from Fort McDowell to Meadow Valley, ninety miles distant, where an unknown Apache rendezvous was discovered. He attacked a large ranchería on October 3, killed fifteen warriors, captured seven noncombatants and destroyed their vast store of winter supplies. More important, the ease of the outward march by way of the Sierra Ancha Range and the equally easy return near the base of the north Mazatzal Peak proved the feasibility of the new route into the hostiles’ country.

Captain Stanford led another expedition into the same region on November 14. This time he moved his lightly equipped command of sixty-four men farther on into the Tonto country. Before the Indians were aware of the intrusion, he attacked one of their large encampments located in a box canyon thought to be impregnable. The result was meager—six slain and five captured—but all the bands of the area were completely discomfited. For several months they gave no further trouble.

At this point the military of southern Arizona took a forward-looking step, which, unfortunately, met the disapproval of higher authority. Colonel Guido Ilges of Fort Grant, in accordance with instructions from his immediate

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20. Ibid., p. 36.

The success of the expedition decided Halleck in favor of a forced peace by “a hunt of extermination.” Orders therefore followed for the establishment of a post, Camp Reno, in the new area. A trail was also to be projected from Fort McDowell to the camp. Gen. Orders no. 39, Oct. 31, 1866, ibid., p. 94.

The Indians of southern Arizona were kept quiet during the year by the establishment of Camp Wallen on Babacomari Creek, and by the operations of Lieutenant Winters in the Huachuca and Mule Mountains. W. H. Winters to Maj. Harvey Brown, Dec. 18, 1866, ibid., pp. 141-144.
superior, Colonel Charles S. Lovell, made a treaty of peace with several chiefs of the Aravaipa, Tonto and Pinal Apaches. The Indians agreed on December 20 to settle upon a reservation where they were to remain at peace, but they reserved the privilege of making extended hunting and food-gathering expeditions to supplement the governmental subsistence that Ilges promised them.23

General McDowell immediately ruled that the treaty was "irregular, injudicious and embarrassing." He contended that the officers only had authority to grant armistices, and that they had made promises impossible to fulfill. To keep the chiefs from suspecting perfidy, he recommended that the peace terms be greatly restricted so that the Indians without the prescribed reserve limits could be considered hostiles. General H. W. Halleck sustained McDowell and ordered him to admonish Lovell and Ilges sharply for their assumption of authority.24 Both the secretary of the interior and the commissioner of Indian affairs also disapproved of the treaty, but they sanctioned the idea of a peaceful solution and stated that since the reservation system had been a success with other Indians there was no reason why it should be unsuccessful with the Apaches. They instructed the new superintendent to cultivate all chiefs inclined towards peace.25

The office of Indian affairs replaced Superintendent Leihy in September, 1866, with G. W. Dent, General Grant's brother-in-law. Commissioner Mix, in notifying Dent of his appointment, requested a full report of conditions in Arizona. He also asked him to administer his office eco-

23. Ilges to A. A. G., Dec. 20, 1866, A. G. O., 163 P.

The territorial legislature, probably for economic reasons, opposed peace. They remonstrated that the feeding system was "a monstrous and most expensive farce." Journal of Third Legislative Assembly, pp. 48, 261.
nominally. The new appointee took charge on December 19 in the face of a hostile military opposition. Thus irked, he became quite critical. According to his view, the territory was in a deplorable condition, chiefly because the military’s “ostensible demonstration” against the savages was “purposeless for the public safety.” To reduce the hostiles properly, he advocated an “active, offensive, persistent, combined and simultaneous war,” in which “they should be hunted to death with fire and famine.” One or two such campaigns would reduce them sufficiently for the civil authorities to assume control; other plans, he was certain, would only intensify the problem. Opposed to McDowell’s view that a lack of subsistence generated the Indians’ hostility, he attributed their ferocity to their jealousy of the whites.

The situation in western Arizona soon gave Dent’s statements much weight, for Yavapai and Tonto attacks on wagon trains became a matter of daily occurrence. R. C. McCormick, now governor, sent out a force of rangers that quickly killed a considerable number of the marauders. This result alarmed the superintendent and he begged for more regular troops, stating that a general massacre of the peaceable Indians along the Colorado River would follow, should it be proved that any of them had joined in the raids.

The military, in fact, had already taken steps to relieve the situation. General J. I. Gregg, with a number of new troops, was placed in command of the District of Pres-


At this time, the inroads of the miners in the Bradshaw Mountains caused two hundred of the Yavapai to seek peace at Fort Whipple. Since no policies had been promulgated, the opportunity was lost. Gen. J. I. Gregg to Dent, April 12, 1867, Ariz. Misc.
cott and the Upper Colorado early in 1867. To guard against a recurrence of the outrages of 1866, he was instructed to keep commands moving throughout the troubled area, and a new post, Camp McPherson, was to be established at Date Creek. General McDowell demanded that no time be lost in waging a vigorous and aggressive war. 29

General Gregg complied in full measure. In April, he issued orders designating as hostile all Apaches and all Colorado River Indians not found on reserves. He even included some bands on the California side of the river. Active operations were to start at once and Indians holding passes issued by the civil authorities were to receive no immunity. 30

These drastic orders resulted in a year of military wrangling practically devoid of constructive results. McDowell decided that wholesale war against a large body of friendly Indians, facing starvation because of congressional negligence, was inhuman. He therefore declared Gregg's orders too stringent and directed their modification. 31 Again Gregg erred. His new orders, on June 11, directed that Indians heretofore hostile were to be considered peaceable except when acting in concert as a tribe. Isolated attacks and thefts by individuals were not to be taken as hostile acts, but "as offenses against the common law, the same as if committed by white citizens." Moreover, he announced that it was impossible to reconcile the commanding general's present views with those promulgated for the government of the district the year before. 32


Inspector General J. A. Rusling, who visited Fort Whipple during the spring, sharply criticized the high maintenance costs of the district. Hay was purchased for $60 per ton, grain for $12 per bushel, lumber for $75 per thousand feet, and the cost of freight from San Francisco was $250 per ton. Reports indicated that the small, headquarters building was erected at a cost of $100,000, with an additional $10,000 for the post flagpole. However, the general advocated a policy of vigorous war. For a detailed account, see, Farish, vol. v, p. 299, vol. vi, pp. 32, 38-40.


McDowell immediately branded his subordinate as an uncooperative popularity seeker who had seriously injured the military service. He directed that existing orders of war against "hostile Indians in Arizona" be carried out, and to make his disapproval emphatic, issued special orders setting forth Gregg's mistakes.\(^3\)

While the superior officers were thus wasting their time, some of the subordinates showed commendable zeal. Captain J. M. Williams with eighty men moved from Fort Whipple, in April, to the upper Verde, where a strong band of hostiles threatened the region. Two spirited fights followed in which fifty-five savages were killed; these blows completely disorganized the bands, and practically relieved Prescott from danger on the east.\(^4\) Likewise, Colonel Ilges and Captain J. H. Vanderslice, from Fort McDowell, combed parts of the Tonto, lower Verde and Mazatzal regions. They accomplished little, although their scouts sharply reduced the horse-stealing forays said to emanate from those isolated points.\(^5\)

The general situation as shown by these scouts perplexed General Gregg. He found his twenty-seven companies, scattered as they had to be, quite inadequate for the tasks of subjugation and preservation of peace. The great size of the district, the roughness of its terrain, the number and frequency of desertions, the shortage of citizen employees and the smallness of the posts were insuperable problems to the district commander. But instead of seriously considering these difficulties, McDowell chided Gregg for beginning more wars than he could carry out, especially when the Indians wanted peace.\(^6\) The burden was thus thrust back into the subordinate's hands, proving that expediency was still the rule of action.

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\(^3\) McDowell to Gregg, July 1, 1867, I. O., Ariz. Misc.
\(^6\) A. A. G. to Gregg, May 18, 1867, op. cit.
Major Roger Jones was now sent to Arizona to give the district a thorough investigation and to make recommendations. He was quite appalled with the situation. Men were killed at various points along his route; stock was stolen within sight of one post he visited; nothing was safe—much less so than when he first saw the region in 1857-1859. He considered the troops practically powerless, and suggested several radical changes: (1) the organization of Arizona into a separate department to eliminate the three months' time required for the transmission of orders to and from the Presidio; (2) the concentration of the troops at a fewer number of posts in order to provide more effectives for scout duty; (3) the provision of facilities to mount the infantry when the regular cavalry was overburdened; and (4) the erection of better quarters and hospitals to prevent inefficiency and desertion. 37

Jones' report was obviously a constructive one, but despite its logical approach towards a military solution of the Apache problem, McDowell sent Halleck a ten-page letter of rebuttal on August 14. He denied the soundness of the major's findings throughout and in an elaborate elucidation of his own administration justified the existing conditions. But his sharp analysis of the military problems inadvertently stamped him as a soldier with an attitude of defeat. 38

General Gregg, meanwhile, became an exponent of pacific methods, and he evinced much concern about certain peacefully inclined Indians of the Verde and Bradshaw regions. Elaborate instructions left him practically unrestricted. He was given full authority to: (1) receive and support them if they wished to give up; (2) consider them hostile if they did not surrender; (3) provide for them if the superintendent could not; or (4) collect, guard and economically ration them in some unsettled locality until the

office of Indian affairs could assume charge. Whatever results Gregg achieved remain unreported.

General Halleck was next to take up the problem of Apache control. Moved, doubtless, by the serious conditions near Prescott, but more perhaps by the critical attitude of the territorial legislature, he made an exhaustive report to the adjutant general on September 18. He admitted the weakness of defense in the west, but attributed it to the fact that only one-ninth of the available strength of the army was assigned to his extensive division. Of the forty-seven companies allotted to the Department of California, twenty-eight were posted in Arizona, where, he pointed out, the inadequacy of their numbers had rendered them almost powerless. Furthermore, he could see no prospects for a safe and permanent settlement of the troubled region until the bitterly hostile Indians were either conquered or destroyed. In any case, they would have to be segregated from the whites and kept under rigid military control. Concentration of troops, he agreed, would increase their efficiency, but decentralization was necessary to maintain the small scattered settlements upon which the commissary depended. Additional troops—not less than two or three regiments, according to his analysis—would be required if the problem were to be solved.

Acting Secretary of War U. S. Grant, after a study of Halleck's report, informed President Johnson in November, 1867, that the Apaches would observe no treaties, agreements or truces. He also remarked that they were the most hostile of the American Indians. His recommendation that the tribe be warred upon until they were completely destroyed or made prisoners of war obviously expressed the dominant view of the federal officials.

40. Arizona Miner, Sept. 11, 14, 17, 24, 1867; Journal of the Fourth Legislative Assembly, pp. 33-38; 83-88.
42. Ibid., p. 80.
During the early part of 1868, the military instituted action in east-central Arizona that set up a constructive trend not to be stopped until the Apaches were subdued. First, General T. C. Devin of the Prescott subdistrict decided to clear the savages out of the country along the eastern rim of the Tonto Basin; then he planned to make a campaign into the basin itself, where the marauders reportedly retreated with their stolen animals and plunder.\(^{43}\) While completing details, he sent runners among the Yavapai to induce them to go to the Colorado river; and, most fortunately, a council was arranged with the notorious Chief Delchay of the Tontos.\(^{44}\)

The council was held twenty-five miles east of Fort McDowell. General Devin offered the Indians peace if they would confine themselves to an area bounded by the Verde River, the Black Mesa and the Salt River. Just what agreements were reached are obscure, but in the autumn Delchay and his Indians actually established themselves at Camp Reno, where some of them were retained as couriers and guides. Others found employment gathering hay for the post contractors.\(^{45}\)

General T. L. Crittenden, simultaneously, made an agreement with the Camp Grant bands, that superseded the one made by Colonel Ilges in 1866. However, the Indians perfidiously broke out as soon as they received a liberal supply of rations. Crittenden, much irked, still favored pacific methods; nevertheless, he ordered a mild punitive expedition into the Tonto Basin, where the culprits were said to rendezvous.\(^{46}\)

General Devin, accordingly, in late April, moved with a strong command into the relatively unknown region east of

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\(^{43}\) According to reports, most of the stock was later traded for by an unscrupulous class of whites near Fort McDowell and Camp Reno.

\(^{44}\) Devin to Dent, Jan. 5, 1868, I. O., Ariz. Misc.

\(^{45}\) Devin to A. A. G., Jan. 8, 1868, ibid.; Vincent Colyer to F. R. Brunot (n. d), 1869, 41 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D., no. 1, vol. iii, p. 536. The contractors paid the Indians one-half cent per pound for the hay and then sold it to the government for three cents per pound.

\(^{46}\) Crittenden to Dent, Jan. 27, 1868, I. O., Ariz. Misc.
Camp Lincoln. He then descended into the basin proper and for forty-five days unsuccessfully scoured the region. All trails showed that the elusive Indians had concentrated towards the Little Colorado river. This fact convinced the officers that the hostiles got their munitions from the Zuñis and Navahos. Despite the paucity of results, Devin's observations led him to believe that the most effective way to control the wild bands was to open trails directly into the heart of their habitats. In fact, he soon made his subdistrict quiet by this method.\(^{47}\)

Meanwhile, Captain Charles A. Whittier, sent from the Presidio, had observed the situation in Arizona at first-hand. Like Jones the year before, Whittier viewed the situation with adverse criticism. He struck at the feeding policy of his superiors, insisting that their maintenance of the Indians as "Indian prisoners" was a violation of the law. But he agreed that feeding was a constructive policy and one that was essential unless the Indians were to be exterminated. As an alternative to the prevailing policy, he suggested the issuance of subsistence paid for by regular appropriations, which method, he insisted, would not only check erratic and defective administrative practices, but would also help to bring in most of the hostile bands. The peacefully inclined bands, he found, were entirely unprotected from the unreasoning frontiersmen; for this reason he concluded that the government was doing very little to solve the Apache problem.\(^{48}\)

No constructive policies resulted from Whittier's report, and as the last half of 1868 was reached, the situation again became serious. Acting Governor H. H. Heath, in a dilemma, asked the citizens to provide locally for their own defense. No better method to accelerate the indiscriminate slaughter of Indians could have been devised.\(^{49}\) This was

\(^{47}\) Devin to A. A. G., June 12, 1868, 40 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii, pp. 63-66.

\(^{48}\) Whittier to Fry, June 6, 1868, I. O. W 1067.

immediately demonstrated when the Yavapai, due to severe epidemics of whooping cough and scarlet fever, moved away from the Colorado river to the more healthful interior. Although the Indians promised to return in a short time, friction with freighters soon developed; and on September 25 ten friendly chiefs, including the able Cushackama, were wantonly murdered near La Paz. Thus at one treacherous stroke was undone all the significant work of the past. 50

Indian hostility now became widespread. At Fort Goodwin where several ambuscades and attacks occurred, the commandant was authorized to seize and hold all male Indians as prisoners until every robber and murderer was delivered up. But the magnitude of the task prevented its execution. 51 The killing of several whites near Fort Whipple made the situation equally precarious in the Prescott district, and General E. O. C. Ord, the new commander of the Department of California, received urged appeals for reinforcements. But the general was handicapped, due to a decrease in the strength of his companies; therefore, all he could do was to urge vigorous action with the forces available. Accordingly, twenty-seven scouts were made from the various posts in the Apache country, but the results were less than one dead Indian per scout. 52

General Halleck, keenly aware of the critical situation, once more made constructive suggestions to the secretary of war. He pointed out that neither proper protection nor aggressive campaigns could be expected without two additional regiments of troops. He also foresaw the need of Indian scouts in conquering the Apaches, and asked that a large increase be allowed his division. Of greater impor-


tance, he recommended that Arizona be constituted a separate military department. 53

No important action followed the general's suggestions; consequently, without any definite planning by responsible officials, the temporizing policy of expediency led to a chaos of conflicting opinions that reached its height in 1869. Naturally, the frontiersmen were certain that a large troop increase and a relentless war against the savages would be a definite solution, but many officials with administrative considerations in their minds were not so assured. General Ord in showing that a post of one hundred and fifty men required an annual outlay of $3,000,000 bluntly stated that war was the economic basis of the territory and that perhaps it was desirable to reduce "the number of troops in the country to the minimum consistent with the interests of the whole country." 54 In fact, General George Thomas' support of Ord's views convinced General Sherman that the occupation of the Southwest was premature and that the cost of maintenance was out of proportion to the results. "The best advice I can offer," he wrote, "is to notify the settlers to withdraw and then to withdraw the troops and leave the country to the aboriginal inhabitants." 55

Despite the adverse views of the high military, General Ord decided against a "temporizing policy." He ordered his troops to capture, root out and hunt the Apaches as they would wild animals. All officers were to be promoted in proportion to their success; and he contemplated a concentration of his troops by the evacuation of some of the small posts that merely "invited" the Indians to attack the government herds and supply trains. 56 Before action could be insti-

55. Sherman to W. W. Belknap, Jan. 7, 1870, A. G. O., 1010 P.
56. Such views as Sherman's tended to convince the sentimental East that all Indian wars should be stopped.
tuted the general waivered and decided that the reservation and feeding system rather than war was a more effective way to bring about a reduction of the savages. Colonel R. F. Bernard was therefore delegated to investigate the probable success of a reserve for the Apaches.\(^57\)

Bernard soon reported that McDowell's experiment at Camp Goodwin had resulted in failure. But he felt assured that the Indians would make peaceful and successful farmers if, in addition to annuities, they were allowed a healthy reserve large enough to afford hunting, planting and the burning of mescal.\(^58\)

The report was scarcely made before conditions throughout the Apache country became worse than they had been for many months. The Yavapai stopped commerce in every part of western Arizona, one hundred whites were killed in a short time, mails moved under escort, picket posts had to be maintained near all settlements and the Overland Route was besieged at all points. Ord, thoroughly bewildered, was more inclined to use pacific methods than ever before. He immediately recommended that a suitable reservation be established at a point completely isolated from the whites.\(^59\)

As a result of Ord's views, Colonel John Green was sent into the remote White Mountain country in July, 1869, to prospect for a suitable reserve location and to select a satisfactory site for a proposed post; ostensibly, his expedition

\(^57\). Bernard to Ord, Mar. 23, 1869, I. D., W 260.

\(^58\). Ibid., The Weekly Arizonian (Mar. 23, 1869) in pointing out that 2,000 Indians had been simultaneously fed and fought without results for two years, inferred that the war had been "conducted for some distinct motive."

\(^59\). Devin to Jones, April (?), 1869, A. G. O., Old Records Division, Dist. of Ariz. pp. 104-106; Ord to Secty. of War, April 20, 1869, I. D.

Near Fort Bayard many Mexicans were murdered and travellers were chased to the immediate grounds of the post. (New Mexican, May 2, 1869.) The San Pedro region lost nearly all of the one hundred original settlers who were there in 1867. (Weekly Arizonian, June 19, 1869.) Pima county alone from January 2, 1868, to July 13, 1869, lost in killed, captured and wounded about thirteen per cent of its total population of 5,500 persons. (Ibid., July 17, 24, 1869.) Major Jones informed General R. B. Marcy on July 21 that 7,300 Apaches, exclusive of the Yavapai and Pinals, were hostile, and that the region from Prescott into Sonora was completely paralyzed. A. G. O., 1010 P.
was intended as a mild demonstration against the Indians. The command of one hundred and thirty men had scarcely penetrated into the southern part of the region before they learned that the villages to the north were growing heavy crops of corn. Since the campaign was a retaliatory one, Captain John Barry with sixty men was sent to destroy the Indians' resources and to exterminate as many of the tribesmen as possible. But Barry was so impressed with their desire for peace that he ignored his orders, rejoined Green and was later exonerated. Green as a result of the expedition reiterated his belief in extermination. Yet he insisted that the Coyoteros, if properly managed and protected by a post in the region, could easily be placed on a reserve where they would form a nucleus for the civilization of all the Apaches.60

Unfortunately, all the other Apache bands grew more formidable, and by fall much of the territory was practically lost to white enterprise. During July the mails were stopped, the cavalry was frequently forced to retire from the field, and the Vulture mine at Wickenburg, the sole dependence of the legislature, was kept open only because General Thomas ordered continuous scouting between the mine and the mill.61 In central Arizona the Tontos resumed their characteristic tactics of thieving and plundering; and Cochise's bands, in the southeastern part, not only threatened to drive civilization out, but completely frustrated the troops operating from Fort Bowie.62 The general situation at the end of 1869 proved that no substantial progress had been made in Apache management.63

60. All accounts of the officers connected with the expedition are printed in 41 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii, p. 544 et seq. Green's findings, especially his proposal that the bands could be induced to fight against each other, were of extraordinary value in later Apache relations.

61. Weekly Arizonian, July 31, Aug. 7, 1869; Green to Parker, Nov. 6, 1869, L. O., A 561.


63. The civil authority had exercised little leadership for three years. Superintendent Dent after his appointment late in 1866, appears to have interested himself in graft, especially in connection with an irrigation project he constructed on the
The year of 1870 saw the start of a new era in Apache control. Nothing spectacular was accomplished, but action was initiated which eventually led to the elimination of the Apache problem. This activity centered mainly in the creation of Arizona as a separate military department and in the measures undertaken to control the Coyoteros. Yet the year began darkly for the settlers, for killings, attacks and robberies were a matter of daily occurrence.64

Governor A. P. K. Safford, thoroughly dismayed with the situation, had already instituted action which permanently affected Indian affairs in the Southwest. During the previous November, in the East, the governor carefully discussed the Apache problem with numerous federal officials and New York journalists. Editorials soon became less pacific in tone and the eastern public began to feel horrified at the continued atrocities of the Apaches.65 With Territorial Delegate McCormick he presented the case to President Grant, General Sherman and the secretary of war; McCormick also aired the situation before congress.66

Meanwhile, on April 15, 1870, the war department made Arizona and southern California a separate department with General George Stoneman in command. Reorganiza-

64. Memorial and Affidavits Showing Outrages Perpetrated by the Apache Indians in the Territory of Arizona During the Years 1869 and 1870 (San Francisco, 1871), p. 3. From July 17, 1869 to July 23, 1870, Pima county lost forty-seven persons killed, six wounded and one captured.

65. Excerpts printed in Weekly Arizonian, Feb. 5, 12, April 30, and July 30, 1870.

tion necessarily required his first efforts, for the eighteen expensive isolated posts scattered over the department were manned by less than one and one-half companies each; therefore, to make his command effective, he kept the troops busy for several months building roads to connect the various posts. Fortunately, General Ord had already practically finished a new road into the White Mountains, and this fact doubtless explained why Stoneman found the Coyoteros so pacific and anxious for a reserve. 67

To his superiors Stoneman was not optimistic regarding the future of the Indians. They will "never be entirely harmless," he wrote, "until they suffer the fate of all the aboriginals that come in contact with the whites." 68 And a little later he reported that the Indians "must either starve, steal or be fed; and as they are unwilling to do the former, it becomes simply a question as to which is the best policy, feed them or continue to endeavor to prevent them from stealing." 69

The new commander announced his full program in July: permanent citizen settlements sufficiently large to protect themselves were to be encouraged; camps and troops were to be concentrated; a widespread drive with citizen cooperation was contemplated; mining was to be aided; and his subordinates were "to regard as hostile all Indians not known to be friendly." His objective was to make the troops available for aggressive activity. 70

Before the program could be developed, the devastations of the savages necessitated a number of isolated actions in the eastern and southern sections of the territory. The Yavapai and Tontos were struck effectively on several occasions; in fact, Captain R. F. O’Beirne arranged a peace agreement with the former which lasted for several months. Cochise was also punished, and after losing sixty-one of his braves he retired to Camp Ord where, for several weeks, he

68. Stoneman to A. G., June 2, 1870, L. O., A 1074.
69. Stoneman to A. A. G., Oct. 31, 1870, A. G. O., 711 P.
70. Weekly Arizonian, Aug. 13, 1870.
enjoyed the full hospitality of Colonel Green. If a definite official policy had existed to guide Green, the bloody wars with the Chiricahuas might have been averted. But unfortunately the opportunity slipped and Cochise soon returned to his former haunts.\footnote{O’Beirne to A. A. G., Oct. 26, 1870, I. O., W 1570; Green to A. A. G., Aug. 13, 1870, I. O., C 631; Weekly Arizonian, July 2, 1870.}

Murder, robbery and destruction now reached greater proportions in the Chiricahua country than ever before. From August 7 to 18, twelve men were killed, one wounded and $10,000 worth of property destroyed. Numerous bodies of cavalry sent out in pursuit were repulsed with sharp losses by Indians who displayed excellent tactics. Even a citizen force scouted unsuccessfully for thirty days.\footnote{Ibid., Aug. 6, 13, 27, 1870.} The press, meanwhile, excoriated Stoneman for his lack of activity, and especially for his action in removing the headquarters from Fort Whipple to Drum Barracks on the Pacific coast. Spurred to action, he issued orders on December 30, which called for “a vigorous persistent and relentless winter campaign.”\footnote{Arizona Citizen, Dec. 24, 1870, Mar. 18, 1871.} Naturally, the campaign never materialized, for the commander was too distant from the proposed field of action.

Despite the unsatisfactory situation in much of the Indian country, a program that promised permanent success was already inaugurated with the strong Coyotero bands. An extensive area in eastern Arizona had, in fact, been defined and proposed as a permanent reserve for them a few weeks before the creation of Stoneman’s command. According to arrangements the military was to put the plan in operation; then the office of Indian affairs was to assume control.\footnote{Special Field Orders no. 8, Mar. 5, 1870, I. O., Ariz. Misc.; Belknap to Cox, Mar. 5, 1870, \textit{ibid}.} General Ord visualized the plan as a final solution to the Coyotero troubles. He foresaw the bands permanently isolated, surrounded by white immigration and forced to pursue agriculture. Such results, he thought,
would strongly encourage the wilder bands to seek peace. To him the only alternative was extermination. 75

The management of the program fell to Colonel Green, who was well acquainted with the Coyoteros and their habitat. First, he built a road into the center of the region; then he established a post, Camp Ord, later called Fort Apache, at the road's terminus. The Indians, because of their half-starved condition, were eager to cooperate, and more than 1,000 of them were present on July 1 for the first count and beef issue. By winter 2,000 were under control, industriously cutting hay and wood which were purchased through the cooperation of General Stoneman. Pointedly, the colonel informed the commissioner that with subsistence and tools a life of peace would be made more attractive than one of war; and that if this result were attained, "their civilization would be a perfect success." 76

Stoneman's other subordinates achieved no successes during the winter, and the spring of 1871 opened with the usual picture of distress and woe. In March, the general returned to Arizona and ill-advisedly took steps of economy which aroused the settlers to extreme fury. One aggressive move, however, that of a camp in the Pinal Mountains, frightened 550 of the Arivaipa and Pinals into Fort Grant for safety; and strangely 1,000 Yavapai came to Camp Verde in quest of peace. Many of the bands were now in a position to be thoroughly crushed, but Stoneman, choosing to control them "through the medium of their bellies," decided to try a policy of peace. He therefore asked for a supply of meat, corn and blankets with which, he announced, they could be induced to stay at peace on reservations. 77

Even before the establishment of the new camp, other related groups headed by Chief Eskiminzin had come to Camp Grant where their sympathetic friend, Lieutenant Royal E.

75. Ord to Parker, April 1, 1870, I. O., A 104.
77. Stoneman to Townsend, April 9, 1871, A. G. O., 1582.
Whitman, had put them to work cutting hay for the post contractors.\(^7\)

But the leading settlers were in no frame of mind to allow any entering wedge to their chief means of livelihood—that of supplying the troops. Almost at once, the territorial press, the governor, the legislature, and almost all interested groups set up a terrific tirade against the reservation or feeding system, or any other plan that promised to bring a cessation of hostilities.\(^7\) Indeed, the more unreasoning and aggressive elements merely awaited a pretext to wreck the Camp Grant experiment. This ominous situation was further aggravated by the continued fiendish ravages of the wild bands in the southeastern Arizona, and in April, Stoneman was forced to revise his policy into one of mixed peace and war. He therefore simply announced that the Indians were to be warred upon until they became willing to seek peace and safety on the reservations.\(^5\)

The policy would doubtless have eased the public feeling had not a “Committee of Safety” from Tucson made demands of the general which sharply touched his prerogatives. As a result of his tactless and caustic replies, the committee publicly announced that “if anything further is expected we must depend upon our own efforts for its consummation.”\(^8\) Subtle intriguers now proclaimed that the friendly Indians at Camp Grant were responsible for all the depredations, and that Stoneman’s policy of peace was the sole cause of the trouble; furthermore, a desperate attack on a wagon train near the post settled the matter from the frontiersmen’s viewpoint.\(^8\)

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\(^7\) Arizona Citizen, Mar. 11, 1871; R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 60. For graft in connection with Whitman’s work see, Farish, vol. viii, p. 157; also, Prescott Miner, July 22, 1871.

\(^8\) Journals of the Sixth Legislative Assembly, p. 42.

\(^5\) General Field Orders no. 2, April 17, 1871, A. G. O., 1870. Stoneman’s action was in agreement with division instructions of August 8, 1870. I. O., W 1662. General John Schofield assumed command of the Division of the Pacific in March, 1870.

\(^8\) The interview is given in the Weekly Arizonian, April 1, 1871.

\(^8\) Capt. Frank Stanwood to Schofield, May 19, 1871, I. O. 368. See also, R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 60–67.
Immediately, the most important citizens of Tucson, led by W. S. Oury and Jesús Elias, organized an expedition of one hundred and forty-six men with whom they planned the most drastic retaliation. Armed and provisioned by the territorial adjutant general, the party set out for the Indians’ camp on April 28, and two days later succeeded in staging a savage morning attack while the unsuspecting victims were yet asleep. The gruesome work was soon ended, and thirty minutes later the party retired without loss up the San Pedro, leaving behind them eighty-five Indians crushed, shot and battered to death, seventy-seven of whom were women and children. Barbarously, twenty-nine children were carried away into virtual slavery.83

The massacre, while strongly approved in the West, caused great consternation in the East, especially among the proponents of the peace policy. President Grant, terming the massacre an outrage, informed Governor Safford that martial law would be proclaimed in Arizona if the participants were not brought to trial. Accordingly, one hundred and four men were perfunctorily tried and acquitted in December.84

General Stoneman was now blamed by all factions—the citizens, the “ring” at Tucson and the peace advocates of the East. Consequently, Safford and McCormick had little difficulty in obtaining his removal.85 The general had not failed, however. Under the most adverse circumstances he had worked out a policy, a combination of peace and war, which was later to solve the problem of Apache control.

A policy very similar to that of Stoneman’s had simultaneously been developed for the Western Apache bands of southwestern New Mexico. But the civil authorities in New

83. Arizona Citizen, May 6, 1871; Whitman to A. A. G., April 30, 1871, I. O., A 326. R. B. I. C., 1871, pp. 60-68; McClintock, vol. i, p. 207 et seq. Accounts vary as to the actual number killed. Slightly more than one hundred may have perished.
84. The Alta California, Feb. 3, 1872, covers the trial completely. J. B. Allen, who outfitted the expedition, served as a member of the jury.
85. Arizona Citizen, May 20, 1871; Richardson and Rister, The Greater Southwest, p. 322.
Mexico, in contrast to those of Arizona, played a most significant part in the formation of the policy. For three years following the Civil War, the impoverished New Mexican bands had kept up destructive hostilities sufficiently extensive in the eyes of General John Pope to necessitate the maintenance of Fort Cummings at Cook’s Springs, Fort Selden on the Rio Grande, Fort Stanton on the Bonito, and Fort Bayard near Silver City. Besides, numerous temporary posts were opened to prevent the abandonment of many widely separated settlements. One officer even felt that if the Apache raids east were to be prevented, a cordon of forts would be required from the Navaho country to Fort Bayard. 86 On several occasions the civil officials fruitlessly suggested that supplies and a reservation would make the hostiles docile within a year’s time. 87

This unsatisfactory condition prevailed until August, 1869, when Governor R. B. Mitchell, alarmed at the increased temerity of the Apaches, issued a proclamation which designated them as outlaws subject to be killed if found away from reservations. 88 High officials immediately announced that the proclamation would interfere with a contemplated permanent Indian policy, and ordered Superintendent William Clinton not to allow its “propriety or expediency.” Serious complications would doubtless have arisen, but a change in governors resulted in a new proclamation with less drastic provisions. 89

This imbroglio, fortunately, had a positive effect on Apache control, for the commissioner now decided that peace could best be attained through the civil authority. Accordingly, Lieutenant Charles E. Drew took charge of the Southern Apaches on August 23. Drew spent several weeks with

86. Pope to Sherman, Aug. 11, 1866, 39 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii, p. 29; Daily New Mexican, Nov. 17, 1868.
89. Parker to W. T. Otto, Aug. 14, 1869, R. B. no 18, p. 492; Parker to Clinton, Aug. 16, 1869, L. B. no. 92, pp. 73-75; 41 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii, p. 699.
the Indians and found that Loco and his followers were anxious for peace. They desired to plant their crops near their old reservation site, but demanded the right to hunt over a vast area that extended even east of the Rio Grande. Sagaciously, the agent urged his superiors to make “judicious arrangements.”

The Indians became more destitute as cold weather approached and the agent realized that if peace were not made devastations would reach great proportions during the winter. Therefore, on October 10 he met Chief Loco at Cañada Alamosa for a peace powwow. In addition to Loco, Chiefs Victorio, Lopez, Chastine and several Mescalero leaders were present. This fact indicated to Drew that the bands through cooperation were becoming more formidable. An agreement was made whereby Loco was to collect the groups and hold them at peace near Cañada Alamosa, while Drew was to do his utmost to get the “Great White Father” to furnish food and clothing.

The chiefs adhered faithfully to their agreement; but as weeks passed with only half rations available, the bands grew more threatening, especially when they realized they were likely to be attacked by groups of citizens opposed to any plan that promised peace. Yet Drew held the Indians fast. He visited their camps frequently, reassured them of the government’s intent, and sometimes showed his trust by staying overnight with them. Finally, on January 5, 1870, just at the moment when he despaired, word was received that the office of Indian affairs had allowed $2,800 to meet the agreement of the past October. An outbreak was thus prevented; moreover, with the favorable example of the Navahos before them, and with many bad whites and Mex-

90. Drew to Clinton, Sept. 29, 1869, ibid., pp. 690–691.
91. Drew to Clinton, Oct. 11, 1869, I. O., C 612.
92. Drew to Clinton, Dec. 12, 1869, I. O., C 801.
icans around them, the Apaches had other strong reasons for choosing peace. By October, 1870, seven hundred and ninety Indians, including Cochise and some of his bands, had collected at Cañada Alamosa. 95

A constructive conference soon followed between Cochise and W. F. M. Arny, a special agent sent out to count the bands and to promote peace. 96 The chief was eager "to hear what the Great Father had to say," but indicated that his bands were desirous of peace and security. He promised to bring in all his braves and keep them at peace, provided the government would furnish provisions and clothing. Arny, unauthorized to make an agreement, reported to the commissioner that the time was most opportune for a permanent peace if the government really cared to take the necessary steps. He recommended a general issue of one thousand blankets to the bands as well as a small, daily ration issue to each Indian who would remain at the agency during the winter. He also recommended the establishment of a permanent reserve far out in the Apache country where the various groups would be thoroughly isolated from the contaminating influences and liquors of the unscrupulous whites. No treaty was to be made, the reservation was to be surveyed, and agency buildings were to be erected. The Indians were then to be cared for on the reserve and those who stayed away were to be "considered as at war" and "dealt with accordingly." Until arrangements could be completed, he advocated a continuance of the feeding policy at Cañada Alamosa. His plan, he felt, was the only one that would prevent the ultimate extermination of the savages. 97 No less important were the views of the new agent, A. G. Hennisee, who predicted that if the plan were properly supported 2,000 Apaches would be at peace by the end of the year. 98

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96. Parker to Clinton, Mar. 26, 1870 (n. f.).
97. Arny to Parker, Oct. 24, 1870, I. O., N. Mex., A 1502; same to same, Nov. 5, 1870, ibid., A 1518. Cochise reported that many of his braves had fallen and that the women greatly outnumbered the men. Ibid., 1579.
These field reports aroused keen interest among Washington officials. Vincent Colyer, secretary of the board of Indian commissioners, informed Secretary Delano that Hennisee's success demonstrated "beyond question" that with larger appropriations "the whole of the Apaches might, long before this, have been brought into peaceful relations with the government." Delano, now convinced that feeding was cheaper than military action, asked at once for $30,000 to "subsist, maintain peace, and promote civilization among them." Since no funds were available for diversion from the regular channels, President Grant, on December 23, shifted the burden of feeding the Indians to General G. W. Getty of the District of New Mexico. This decision now left the field clear throughout the Apache country for a trial of the president's "Peace Policy."

CHAPTER IV

THE GOVERNMENT'S THorny Peace Policy

The report of the Indian peace commission of 1867 aroused the whole country to the fact that the Indian service of the federal government had fallen into a sorry state. Fortunately, a strong movement for reform followed the exposé, and congress, through the appropriation act of April, 1869, authorized the president to organize a board of Indian commissioners, who were to "exercise joint control with the secretary of the interior over the disbursement of the appropriations made by the act."2

This provision represents both an expression of the lack of confidence in the Office of Indian Affairs and a determination to correct some of the abuses charged against it. The board, first organized in June, 1869, had its powers sharply increased and modified from time to time. Among its more important duties during the first few years of its existence were the supervision of the purchase and transportation of annuity goods, and the audit of the accounts of the Office of Indian Affairs. Members of the commission also visited the different tribes and counseled with the chiefs and agents; they frequently escorted parties of Indians to the cities of the North and the East; investigated, reported, and publicized the cruelties committed by white persons against the tribesmen; recommended needed changes and improvements in the service; and championed Indian rights throughout the nation. They served gratuitously, and appear to have been men "eminent for their intelligence and philanthropy," as the act required. The commission became

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at once a dominant force in determining the Indian policy of the government.  

Along with the establishment of the board of Indian commissioners came another important change in the administration of Indian affairs. This was President Grant's peace policy or "Quaker Policy." Soon after his election, Grant had a conference with an executive committee representing the Orthodox Friends in the United States. The committee suggested that the president appoint religious men as Indian agents and employees, believing that such persons would have a more wholesome influence over the savages than that exercised by the grafters and spoilsmen under the prevailing system. The president perhaps thought he saw in the proposal a partial solution for the vexing Indian problem, or possibly he felt that here was a means for shifting the responsibility, should failure result. In any case, he accepted the plan and promptly adopted a new policy relative to the appointment of Indian agents by delegating their nominations to the several religious organizations interested in Indian mission work.

Considerable delay was to elapse before the plan could be instituted among the Apaches, for no official agreements had been made with them; neither had they been assigned to any definite reservations. However, the board of Indian commissioners was ready to lay the necessary groundwork. Shortly after the organization of the board, Vincent Colyer, its secretary, while inspecting the Navaho agency near Fort Defiance, New Mexico, met a deputation of visiting Apache chiefs. He ascertained that they were anxious for a general peace council, and in his subsequent report to the board stated that a part of the wild Apaches were gathered near Cañada Alamosa, where they sought both aid and a reservation. Due to his efforts, a small amount of subsistence was furnished the Southern Apaches during 1870, and the re-

suits, according to the field reports, were encouraging enough to instill a feeling among the members of the board that far-reaching efforts should be made to bring about peace with all the Apaches.\(^6\)

The board's desire for peace was also heightened by various other significant factors. In the East there was a growing conviction that war as a method of Indian control was futile, and that a pacific policy should be tried. The enormous costs of the wars, the paucity of results attained and the outrages of the whites against the Indians were harped upon until the most bitter prejudice was aroused against the people of the Southwest. Even Territorial Delegate McCormick felt himself constrained to declare in congress that the "war policy" had failed and that the peace policy must be tried.\(^7\)

The sudden development of a keen interest in the mining possibilities of the Apache country also worked mightily for a trial of the peace plan. Until 1869, the federal officials stationed in the Apache range had shaped their reports to their own selfish ends; consequently, the section was commonly represented as a barren and worthless land with limited mineral resources. But this view was quickly changed by the publication of J. Ross Browne's, Report on The Mineral Resources of the States and Territories West of the Rocky Mountains, and by Governor Safford's vivid elucidation, during the winter of 1869-1870, of the fact that a solution of the Apache menace loomed as a prerequisite to mineral exploitation. Immediately, powerful capitalists and mining groups interested themselves in a solution of the Apache troubles, and generally they accepted the views of the advocates of peace.\(^8\)

Thus, with strong forces working in their favor, the

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\(^{6}\) Cf. supra, pp. 37-38.

\(^{7}\) Weekly Arizonian, Feb. 23, 1869; Arizona Citizen, June 24, July 29, 1871; Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, p. 559; 42 Cong., 2 sess., Cong. Globe, vol. cvii, appendix, p. 397.

board of Indian commissioners persisted in their aim for a peaceful solution of the Apache troubles, and they quickly gained considerable support from high officials. Early in March, 1871, the officials of the department of the interior, strongly supported by President Grant, authorized Superintendent Nathaniel Pope of New Mexico to send Cochise and a select party of Apaches to Washington for a peace conference. But the attempt failed, because of the chief's ingrained distrust of the military and the citizens, and his lack of confidence in the intentions of the government.

This failure made the board more determined than ever to strike directly at the Apache problem. Accordingly, congress was induced to appropriate seventy thousand dollars "to collect the Apache Indians of Arizona and New Mexico upon reservations . . . and to promote peace and civilization among them." The commissioners now directed Colyer, in his capacity as special commissioner, to visit the Apache country to avert an expected outbreak of hostilities, and late in May the department of the interior decided that he should be specifically instructed to coöperate with the military in its attempt to locate the Apaches upon the White Mountain reservation; moreover, they agreed to allow him one-half of the recent appropriation to effect the task. To insure "harmonious coöperation" the war department directed the military in Arizona to afford the special commissioner "every facility in their power for the accomplishment of the object."

Colyer, evidently with a more elaborate program in mind than had been planned, had a conference with President Grant at Long Branch, New Jersey, on July 13, 1871, which resulted in a considerable enlargement of his powers.

10. E. S. Parker to Delano, July 21, 1871, R. B. I. C., 1871, p. 68.
12. Parker to Delano, May 29, 1871, I. D.; Delano to Felix R. Burnot, May 29, 1871, I. D., L. B. no. 10; Belknap to Delano, May 31, 1871, I. D.
In fact, the president directed Secretary of War W. W. Belknap to give full support to “any arrangement” that Colyer might make with the Apache bands.\textsuperscript{13}

The special commissioner proceeded at once to Santa Fé, where he learned that the irate citizens near Cañada Alamosa had formally organized with the intention of exterminating all the Indians collected at the Southern Apache agency. Fearful of a calamity that would frustrate all hopes for peace, he hurried on with Superintendent Pope to Cañada Alamosa, and here met the spectacle of an agency without Indians. Intelligence soon revealed that the 1,200 Indians recently gathered there had stampeded to the mountains to avoid the threatened massacre. Colyer now tried to arrange a general council, but the chiefs refused to leave their hiding places. Thus frustrated by a “few lawless white men” who were “allowed to overturn all the good work of the government,” he decided to inspect regions more remote from the settlements, with a view of establishing a reservation.\textsuperscript{14}

The Colyer party, strongly escorted and fully provisioned, entered the isolated Apache country of western New Mexico and eastern Arizona at Ojo Caliente. Proceeding to the Tularosa valley, the special commissioner was delighted to find that the area was ideally suited for a reservation, and he reported that it was “remote from white settlements, surrounded by mountains not easily crossed, sufficient arable land, good water, and plenty of wood and game.” Without delay, he declared the region beginning at the headwaters of the Tularosa River “and extending down the same ten miles on each side for a distance of thirty miles, to be an Indian reservation for the sole use and occupation of the Southern and other roving bands of Apache Indians . . .”

\textsuperscript{13} Grant to Delano, July 13, 1871, \textit{R. B. I. C.}, 1871, p. 68; Grant to Belknap, July 14, 1871, \textit{A. G. O.}, 2618.

The president’s interest caused the department of the interior to invest Colyer with power to take any action needed “for locating the nomadic tribes of those territories upon suitable reservations.” Acting Secretary to Colyer, July 21, 1871, \textit{R. B. I. C.}, 1871, p. 68.

\textsuperscript{14} All correspondence in the case is printed in \textit{R. B. I. C.}, 1871, pp. 69-72. See also Colyer’s letter of Aug. 22, 1871, in \textit{ibid.}, p. 38.
At the same time he ordered Superintendent Pope to have the Indians that were collected at Cañada Alamosa removed to the new reserve at once.  

Unsuccessful in solving the Apache troubles in New Mexico, but certain that the groundwork for an eventual peace had been arranged, Colyer reached Camp Apache on September 2. Colonel John Green, in command, was enthusiastic about the peace plan and reported that the Indians in the immediate vicinity of the post were ready for its inception. The Indians themselves, especially Chief Miguel, welcomed Colyer, and well might they, for a consignment of $2,000 worth of beef, corn and clothing that he had ordered for them when he first reached the Indian country had just arrived. In a few days, nearly four hundred Indians were at hand, all making the most effusive professions of peace. Colyer lost no time in designating a vast area about Camp Apache as an Indian reservation, and the next day, September 7, he held a general peace council. Colonel Green as spokesman explained to the assembled chiefs the advantages to be derived from peace on a reservation, where rations and supplies would be furnished free, and where the bands would be safe from molestation. But he made it clear that all who stayed away would be pursued and killed. The chiefs, after insisting upon the immediate delivery of provisions and requesting that their beef be delivered on hoof so that they could get the hides and tallow, agreed to comply with the government’s demands. A systematic distribution of Indian goods followed, and then Colyer, convinced that the peace plan was successfully inaugurated among the Coyoteros, prepared to leave for Camp Grant.

15. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 6, 1871, I. O., C 631; Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reservations, p. 128; Colyer to Pope, Aug. 29, 1871, A. C. O., 3441.
17. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 6, 1871, op. cit.; Colyer to Green, Sept. 5, 1871, I. O., 631. For a detailed description of the reservation, see Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reservations, p. 7.
18. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, I. O., C. 37. Five days after the council one Coyoter band was charged with the theft of fifteen horses from near the post, Arizona Citizen, Oct. 7, 1871.
The Colyer party in its journey to Camp Grant penetrated directly through the heart of the Apache country. Wherever Indians were found the special commissioner was met with the greatest manifestations of goodwill, but the frontiersmen looked upon him with intense displeasure.\textsuperscript{19} In fact, Governor Safford had taken the unprecedented action of issuing a proclamation calling upon the citizens to receive the federal commissioner with "kindness and hospitality."\textsuperscript{20} But Colyer had eagerly anticipated success at Camp Grant, and on his way west, at Lawrence, Kansas, had selected the post "as a reservation on the west, where the Apache Indians are to be protected and fed." He had also arranged for Lieutenant Whitman to be left in charge, and at his request the military had sent runners to bring in the peacefully disposed bands.\textsuperscript{21}

No time was lost in arranging a council. Chiefs Eskiminzin and Chiquito were present with all their followers who had survived the massacre in the spring, and it was obvious that their desire for peace and safety would result in the easy collection of several hundred other tribesmen, once they were assured that the government was sincere in its promises. Colyer, now quite aware that a reserve at Camp Grant was doomed to be a temporary one due to the prox-

\textsuperscript{19} Colyer was shamefully abused by the frontier press during the summer, and he erred by not giving proper attention to the citizen's side of the question. His life was even threatened on one occasion. News reached the East that parties involved in the Camp Grant massacre intended to assassinate him to prevent the delivery of a report to the president. Peter Cooper then asked Grant to render the special commissioner proper protection, and Secretary Belknap actually issued a public statement to reassure the proponents of peace. Cooper to the President, Sept. 19, 1871, A. G. O., 3299; Belknap to Cooper, Sept. 21, 1871, \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{20} Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, \textit{op. cit.} The proclamation may be found in \textit{Arizona Citizen}, Aug. 26, 1871, or in \textit{R. B. I. C.}, 1871, pp. 79-80.

\textsuperscript{21} Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, \textit{op. cit.}; A. G. to Crook, Aug. 2, 1871, I. O., A 344. Just at the time Colyer reached Camp Grant, a party of nearly two hundred armed whites were only twelve miles from the reserve. The post officers saw that the Indians feared another massacre, and to prevent a general stampede, ordered the party not to approach nearer than ten miles to the post. Since this action practically closed travel between Tucson and Florence, Crook censured the commandant, declaring that such orders would "unnecessarily provoke the hostilities of the citizens toward the military and the Indians." Crook to Capt. Wm. Nelson, Sept. 22, 1871, \textit{R. B. I. C.}, 1871, p. 82.
imity of a dangerous white population, attempted to induce the Indians to remove to the Camp Apache region. But the Indians rejected the plan, and the special commissioner, "believing it better for the sake of peace," designated a considerable area contiguous to the post as a reservation for all peacefully inclined Arivaipa, Pinal and other roving bands of Apache Indians. He made it clear to the chiefs that their followers would suffer dire punishment if they strayed beyond the reserve limits. On the part of the government he agreed that, besides furnishing them subsistence, an attempt would be made to restore the children carried away at the time of the massacre.\textsuperscript{22}

The peace party then hurried on to Camp Verde\textsuperscript{23} to examine conditions in the eastern Yavapai country. Since the Indians of this particular region were quite impoverished and exhausted, Colyer, with the aid of the post officers, had little difficulty in collecting them for a conference. On October 2, 1871, when the council began, the general wretchedness of the tribesmen was vividly apparent. The chief was so weak and sick from hunger that stimulants and food were required before he could command strength enough to participate in the talk. No less enervated were the mass of his followers. Danger from the whites, ineffective arms for the chase, and a general scarcity of game were responsible for the deplorable state to which the bands had fallen. Already the old men had resigned themselves to their fate. Despite their condition, the Indians resisted his suggestion of a reserve at Date Creek, but agreed that they would welcome the establishment of one somewhere along the Verde River. Accordingly, after the post officers had indicated

\textsuperscript{22} Colyer to Delano, Sept. 18, 1871, \textit{op. cit.; Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reservations}, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{23} En route, at Fort McDowell, Colyer's efforts to parley with the Tontos met with failure. The unwillingness of the Tontos to talk peace was doubtless due to the fact that they had come to view all peaceful overtures of the whites as perfidious. Nevertheless, the commissioner made the post reservation a temporary Indian reservation and feeding station. He allotted the commandant $400 to buy clothing for those tribesmen who might come to the fort later in the year. Colyer to Delano, Sept. 24, 1871, I. O., C 562; Colyer to Col. N. A. Dudley, Sept. 25, 1871, \textit{ibid.}
their preference for a Verde location, the commissioner acquiesced, by ordering that the Indians should be protected and fed on a reserve to be twenty miles wide and to extend upstream from the post area for forty-five miles.24

Colyer now visited Fort Whipple for a discussion of the Apache problem with General Crook.25 Sharp differences were quickly uncovered and naturally so, for Colyer had already written Delano that Crook’s retention as department commander “jeopardizes the success of the President’s Indian policy here.” Nevertheless, he accepted the commander’s advice not to move the Yavapai of western Arizona to the new Verde Reservation during the approaching winter, but rather, to establish a temporary reserve for those Indians who loitered about the military post of Camp Date Creek.26 Although the two men conferred in the most cordial manner, Colyer had scarcely left Fort Whipple for San Francisco before Crook wrote General Schofield an unusual personal letter that eventually reached the adjutant general. This communication shows that Crook, who believed he was “to be allowed the entire settlement of the Apache question,” felt that Colyer considered himself as “the representative of the President in carrying out his (the President’s) ‘Pet Theory’ with the Indians.” Crook further shows that the peace policy “managers” were merely using Colyer as an “instrument” to make it appear that a lasting peace could be made with the “much abused and injured Apache” were it not for the opposition of the military; and that they were really anxious for him (Crook) to wage war so that he “would be abused as the great North American Butcher.” In order to offset the designs of the “Policy Men,” the general proposed to remain nominally inactive as long as Colyer was “sitting on and controlling the valves.” Colyer’s

25. Cf. infra, note 27.
26. Colyer to Delano, Oct. 6, 1871, R. R. I. C., 1871, p. 57; same to same, Sept. 17, 1871, I. D.
peace with the Apaches he characterized as a "humbug" which would soon come to naught.  

Meanwhile, Colyer reached San Francisco, conferred with General Schofield, and then entrained for the East. Few details concerning their talk are known, although the general indicated that he was pleased that Crook had been left with the entire supervision of those Indians who might choose to stay on the new reservations. However, the special commissioner was not reassured, and by wire requested Delano personally to see that Belknap issued no orders "looking to war" until a report could be made.

Colyer reached Washington on October 27, only to find that Delano was absent from the city. Fearing that the "contractors, politicians and Indian exterminators" might gain the president's ear, he rushed to the White House, where he met Secretary Belknap who had just arrived for a cabinet meeting. Belknap, somewhat angered, said that Colyer was "interfering," and indicated that he "only awaited the President's word" to strengthen General Crook. But the special commissioner was not to be frustrated, and through a message to the president received the assurance that he would be received immediately upon Delano's return. During the next few days he arranged "that such pressure would be brought on the President as to stop an aggressive war."

President Grant took up the Apache problem with Delano, Belknap and Colyer on November 6. After a long and careful discussion, a general line of policy was evolved, which Delano was directed to prepare more fully in the form of specific recommendations. This fundamental program completed within a few hours, stipulated that (1) the pres-

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27. Crook to Schofield, Oct. 10, 1871, A. G. O., 3920. In this letter Crook states that part of his information resulted from talks that Mrs. Crook had recently had at Washington with Secretary Delano.
28. Colyer to Delano, Oct. 19, 1871, I. D. 
Schofield notified Sherman that "the President ought to know how very differently his military and civil representatives in Arizona view the Apache question." Schofield to Sherman, Oct. 23, 1871, A. G. O., 3920.
29. Colyer to Delano, Oct. 30, 1871, I. D.
dent was to designate as reservations the areas selected by Colyer; (2) the roving bands were to be required to locate upon the reservations, where they were to receive subsistence and protection as long as they remained friendly “with the Government, each other, and the white people”; (3) the braves as well as the noncombatants were to stay within the reserve limits; (4) the whites were to be warned that the government would protect the peaceable Indians to the full extent of its power; (5) the superintendent of Indian affairs was to locate at Fort Whipple; and (6) the war department was to select “suitable and discreet” army officers to act as Indian agents until superseded by civil agents.

The execution of the program devolved upon General Sherman, and without delay he ordered the division commanders of the Division of the Pacific and the Missouri, to comply with Secretary Delano’s recommendations. Sarcastically, he pointed out that since the Office of Indian Affairs was rarely able to provide food, the commissary department would be required to meet the implied condition that those Indians “acting in good faith should not be permitted to starve.” The general also stated that after a reasonable time General Crook was to feel assured that “whatever measures of severity” he might adopt to bring peace would “be approved by the War Department and the President.”

Crook, in fact, had been quite active during the summer of 1871 despite the government’s peace efforts. He arrived unannounced in Tucson, on June 19, fifteen days after having assumed command, and within one hour was working on his plans and preparing instructions. By sundown every officer in southern Arizona had been ordered to report to him. He then spent the next few days in consultation with every individual he could find who had any significant information that would be of value in planning a

31. Sherman to Schofield, Nov. 9, 1871, A. G. O., Headquarters of the Army L. B. vol. liv, p. 418. A letter to Sheridan was identical, except the reference to Crook.
campaign against the savages. Yet the general had no intention of an immediate offensive. Rather, he looked forward to a thoroughly planned war that would bring a final and complete success.\textsuperscript{32}

Action would doubtless have been deferred for an extended time, had not a sudden increase in killings and attacks in the Chiricahua country required a demonstration against Cochise. Therefore, with the joint purpose of leading a training expedition into the field and of striking the chief a decisive blow, Crook collected around himself some of the most able and ambitious young officers in Arizona, organized a command of six companies of cavalry and scouts, and moved out for Fort Bowie on July 11. No Indians were encountered en route, but sufficient evidence of their numbers was noted to convince the general that a permanent peace would be impossible until the Chiricahuas were subjugated.\textsuperscript{33} News concerning Colyer's peace mission now ended the plan to run Cochise down, and instead, Crook decided to move his expedition farther north, where he hoped not only to meet some hostile parties, but also to form an alliance with the friendly Indians near Camp Apache.\textsuperscript{34}

The command upon its arrival at Camp Apache on August 12, was gratified to find some five hundred Indians under Chiefs Miguel, Chiquito and Pedro, hard at work cultivating corn, which fact Crook enthusiastically reported as "really the entering wedge in the solution of the Apache

\textsuperscript{32} 49 Cong., 1 sess., H. R. no. 531, p. 3; Arizona Citizen, June 24, 1871; Bourke, On the Border with Crook, p. 108; Crook to A. G., Sept. 28, 1871, 42 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, pp. 77-78. Crook's basic plans included: (1) supplies to be brought from California by water rather than by land; (2) wagons and saddles especially made to withstand heat and hard usage to be furnished; (3) telegraph lines to be built into department; and (4) pack mules to be made more serviceable by giving them extraordinarily particular care.

\textsuperscript{33} Crook to Townsend, July 10, 1871, I. O., A 501; Arizona Citizen, Sept. 9, 1871.

\textsuperscript{34} 42 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 78.

Shortly after Crook left Fort Bowie, the beef herd was attacked within a stone's throw of the parade ground. The Indians killed two men and made away with thirty-eight animals. About the same time a body of troops bound for the post engaged four hundred savages near the San Pedro and killed thirteen. The military suffered a loss of four. Arizona Citizen, July 22, 23, 1871.
Question."35 The Indians acquiesced to the general's view that white pressure necessitated a life of peace, and he easily enlisted a group of scouts to help him ferret out the incorrigibles. He also persuaded all the friendly Indians to enroll their names at the post, where each of them was furnished a written, personal description as a guarantee against violence by the whites.36 But some of the less docile Coyoteros had gone on the warpath as a protest to the Camp Grant Massacre, and these the general now hoped to strike on his way to the department headquarters at Fort Whipple.37

The resulting reconnaissance westward to Camp Verde accomplished little at the moment, although by the time the post was reached the commander had formulated far-reaching plans for "concentrating on one band . . . at a time until they would submit to peace at any terms." Since orders had just come to suspend all aggressive operations until Colyer's mission was completed, the general pushed on to Fort Whipple "to await further developments."38

Colyer, as previously noted, ended his peace tour within a short time and hastened back to Washington to win the approval of his superiors.39 But despite the fact that considerable improvement did follow among the Coyotero, Pinal, Arivaipa and Verde bands,40 events in the Indian country soon proved that the Apache troubles were far from settled. On the morning of November 5, 1871, a California stage loaded with eight passengers was attacked near Wickenburg

35. Crook to Townsend, Sept. 1, 1871, I. O., A 570.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid; Arizona Citizen, Sept. 16, 1871.
38. Crook to Townsend, Sept. 1, 1871, I. O., A 570.

Twelve hundred Southern Apaches were located on Colyer's Tularosa Reserve, where they continued to depredate, but less so than formerly. Gen. Gordon Granger to A. A. G., Sept. 20, 1871, A. G. O., 3863. Colonel H. Davis, who inspected the agency for General Pope, decided that the new site would offer no barrier to further depredating. For this reason he counseled that the "experiment" of peace be tried at Cafiada Alamosa. Davis to A. A. G., Oct. 25, 1871, A. G. O., 4047.
by a raiding party of Apache Mohaves, said to belong to
the main group of nearly one thousand tribesmen who were
fed at Date Creek. This attack was made especially signifi-
cant by the fact that of the six persons killed,\(^1\) three were
members of the Wheeler Expedition,\(^2\) one of whom was
Frederick W. Loring of Massachusetts, a young writer of
great promise, widely known in the East.\(^3\) The eastern
press gave wide publicity to the killing of Loring, and many
prominent pacific-minded individuals now became convinced
that Apache affairs had been described inaccurately, "by
those who have allowed their philanthropy to outrun their
judgment and sense of justice."\(^4\)

Public opinion was further influenced against the peace
efforts by a notorious and rabid western press which assailed
Colyer and the peace advocates with a deluge of journalis-
tic execration. The pages of the *Alta California* and the *San
Francisco Times*, throughout the last half of 1871, were
filled with bitter communications from officials and visitors
in the Apache country, and many of these tirades were re-
printed in the eastern papers. Even the federal grand jury
at Tucson resorted to similar methods of propaganda, for
its report in October, largely an investigation of Indian mat-
ters, was essentially a castigation of the peace policy as in-
augurated by Colyer.\(^5\)

The situation soon played into the hands of the war
party, and upon the receipt of General Sherman's instruc-
tions,\(^6\) the military again prepared to pursue a rigorous
policy. The adjutant general suggested to Schofield that the
reserves selected by Colyer might be abandoned, but Scho-

\(^1\) For details of the massacre see, Capt. Chas. Meinhold to Lt. F. H. Ebstein,
Nov. 9, 1871, A. G. O., 4546; Wm. Krueger to W. G. Peckham, Dec. 9, 1871, in *Grand
Army Journal*, Jan. 6, 1872.

\(^2\) Wheeler's epochal surveys are covered in George M. Wheeler, *Report Upon
Geographic Surveys West of the 100th Meridian*, in charge of First Lieutenant George

\(^3\) While at Harvard, Loring had drawn the attention of James Russell Lowell.

\(^4\) McCormick to Safford, Nov. 16, 1871, in *Arizona Citizen*, Dec. 23, 1871.

\(^5\) The complete report is given in *Arizona Citizen*, Oct. 28, 1871.

\(^6\) Cf. supra, p. 50.
field apparently ignored the proposal by replying that until the experiment of peace was tried “it would be wise not to appoint any civilian agents for the Apaches but to leave them under exclusive military control,” because “strict military control of the Indians on the reservations is necessary to effect the desired changes in their habits.” Then using Sherman’s instructions as a point d’appui, Schofield made out general orders for Crook’s guidance, which later proved to be epochal in nature. These orders completely shattered the outworn policy of expediency and set forth the following instructions “for the government of Indians subject to military control in the Territory of Arizona:” (1) all roving bands were to go upon the reservations at once; (2) if found away, they were to be punished as hostiles; (3) an army officer was to act as agent on each reservation; (4) a descriptive list was to be made of each male old enough to go upon the warpath, with the number in his family recorded, and a duplicate form was to be on his person at all times; (5) the presence on the reservation of every male was to be verified at least once each day; (6) a tribe, unless guilty of giving aid, was not to be punished for the acts of individuals; (7) the families of absent warriors were to be held in custody until captures were effected; (8) the department commander was to fix a time-limit for the inauguration of the new regime; (9) no whites except officials were to be allowed on the reserves without permission, and official escorts were to be furnished in all cases; (10) each Indian was to receive a specific amount of rations, and the issues were to be supervised by army officers; (11) vigorous operations were to be continued against the hostiles until they submitted; (12) incorrigibles were to be hunted down with the aid of friendly scouts; and (13) full authority was conferred upon the department commander “to adopt such measures” as might be needed “to give full effect to the policy of the government.”

47. Townsend to Schofield, Nov. 11, 1871, A. G. O., 3806; Schofield to Townsend, Nov. 21, 1871, ibid., 4156.
At Washington, the official attitude fully indicated that temporizing was ended. That Colyer had lost the support of Grant, Sherman, Delano and Belknap, is shown by their action in promising that Crook would be “warmly supported in rigorous aggressive operations.” Delano even ordered Superintendent of Indian Affairs Herman Bendell either to cooperate with Crook in the new plan of pacification, or to resign at once.49

Arrangements were also made for a general movement of new troops to the Apache country and congress was asked for $50,000 to build a military telegraph into Arizona.50 But the peace advocates were not to be worsted without a struggle. In fact, after the Loring massacre, “certain interests” continued to harp upon the matter until they led a large portion of the eastern public to believe that a party of frontiersmen had committed the crime to insure a continuance of the war. Some of the military also supported the peace group, by declaring that the Indians could never be reclaimed by “following two directly opposite policies at the same time—one of war, the other of peace.” And the civilian friends of the tribesmen insisted “that there is no chance to get up a war with the Apaches as all are on the Reservation and at Peace.” President Felix Brunot of the board of Indian commissioners boldly wrote that a policy of “judicious forbearance” should be substituted for General Schofield’s stringent orders which, if continued, were certain to defeat the peaceful designs of the government. Always lukewarm towards a policy of force, the officials of the department of the interior became positively opposed when they realized that a consummation of the war plans might

49. McCormick to Safford, Nov. 16, 1871, in Arizona Citizen, Dec. 23, 1871; Delano to Comm., Nov. 8, 1871, I. O., I 971.

Herman Bendell of Albany, New York, was appointed superintendent early in 1871. He took charge in late March. Bendell to Parker, April 16, 1871, I. O., Superintendent’s Letter Book (hereafter cited as S. L. B.), vol. i, p. 9.

50. 42 Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D., no. 14.

almost identical orders to regulate the control of the Western Apaches in New Mexico. All bands, including those that might “come into New Mexico,” were to be concentrated at the Tularosa Reservation. Gen. Orders no. 8, Nov. 20, 1871, ibid., 2465.
result in an intrenchment of military control. But of the greatest weight to the peace party were the views soon to be expressed by the president:

"I do not believe our creator ever placed different races of men on this earth with the view of having the stronger exert all their energies on exterminating the weaker. If any change takes place in the Indian policy of the government while I hold my present office it will be on the humanitarian side of the question."

The war party, meantime, had gone ahead with their plans for a drastic policy, and Crook in December 1871 sent word to the bands that they must be on the reservations by February 15, 1872, if they wished to avoid severe punishment. In compliance hundreds of Indians rushed to the reserves where, according to reports, they not only avoided the rigors of winter and the pangs of hunger, but also prepared for hostilities by caching their surplus rations and increasing their store of munitions. Crook waited patiently until February 7, and then announced that after the elapse of nine days no Apache absent from a reserve would be received except as a prisoner of war. And Schofield, in close touch with affairs, wired the war department two days before the deadline that "late" advices from Crook indicated the necessity of an immediate "unavoidable campaign."

War was now at hand on the frontier, but peace had again triumphed in Washington. In fact, Crook had scarcely


52. Grant to Geo. H. Stuart, Oct. 26, 1872, I. O., Scrap Book, B. I. C. In general, President Grant probably favored a mild policy in Indian relations. The pressure of strong pro-war economic and political groups was doubtless the cause of his inconsistent views.


moved his commands into the field before the war department, at the request of Delano, notified Schofield to avoid hostilities as much as possible. Telegrams of protest recounting recent outrages accomplished nothing, for the president, Secretary Delano and Secretary Belknap had conferred again and decided that instead of war, "the Apaches should be induced by persuasive means, if possible, to return to their reservations, or better, to go upon some reservation in New Mexico." But of greater chagrin to the war party was the intelligence that a new agent of the interior department would soon visit the Indian country "to coöperate with the military" in preserving peace.

The president and Secretary Delano wished to make no mistake this time, and after much pondering over the choice of an agent, selected General O. O. Howard, an official of proved experience in the field of Indian diplomacy. Delano instructed him to proceed at once to the Indian country, where he was to take steps which in his own judgment seemed best adapted "to maintain peace and secure the execution of the policy of the government." Fully admonished to confer and coöperate with the military, the general was also directed to persuade as many chiefs "as possible" to return with him to Washington for a peace conference.

Howard, thus armed with plenary power, hastened west and entered the Apache country at Fort McDowell. From

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55. A. G. to Schofield, Feb. 20, 1872, A. G. O., 549. Sheridan was similarly instructed.
56. The post herd was stolen at Fort McDowell; eight hundred Indians left Date Creek, killed two men, attacked two trains and invested the Prescott-Wickenburg country; and a like number left Camp Verde, although all the women and children remained at the reserve. The bucks then harrassed every mine and ranch in the region. Crook to A. A. G., Feb. 20, 1872, ibid., 3057; Capt. C. C. C. Carr to A. A. G., Feb. 22, 1872, ibid., 1210. See especially Schofield to Townsend, Feb. 26, 1872, ibid., 508.
this point, after a most harmonious conference with General Crook, he pushed on to Fort Grant only to find upon his arrival that the one thousand Indians under the care of Major E. W. Crittenden were ready to flee at a moment's notice.\textsuperscript{59} The new civilian agent, Edward C. Jacobs, had just arrived,\textsuperscript{60} but Howard "deemed the presence of Lieutenant Whitman essential to assist in restoring a change of confidence with them," and had him temporarily returned from his point of incarceration at Camp Crittenden.\textsuperscript{61} In a constructive council on April 26, 1872, the Indians not only demanded the return of their stolen children, but also insisted that Whitman be restored as their agent. More important to future relations, the chiefs suggested that they be given a new reservation, far removed from the whites, in some healthier locality. Howard considered their proposal of extreme importance, and upon leaving for Tucson, promised that he would arrange for the holding of a general conference of Indians, citizens and territorial officials at the post on May 21.\textsuperscript{62}

The general tarried in Tucson only long enough to arrange with Safford for the return of the captive children held in the town; then he turned north to the Prescott area. En route, at Date Creek, he recommended that the nine hundred poverty stricken savages living near the post be moved to the Colorado River Reservation as soon as their crops were harvested.\textsuperscript{63} Unfortunately, a sharp increase in

\textsuperscript{59} Howard to Schofield, April 18, 1872, I. O., A 1352.

\textsuperscript{60} Jacobs was a nominee of the Dutch Reformed Church, I. O. I 1219.

\textsuperscript{61} The unrest of the Indians was caused by the recent arrest of Agent Whitman. The lieutenant, always an object of suspicion to both the citizens and the military, was arrested and held for court martial on March 12 by order of General Schofield. He was charged with not obeying General Orders no. 10. Special Orders no. 17, Mar. 12, 1872, I. O., W 1463. The Rev. E. P. Smith, who accompanied Howard, reported that Whitman's downfall was caused by groups who feared his success as agent would react too favorably for the peace policy. Smith to Walker, April 8, 1872, I. O., S 777. Crook, viewing the matter differently, said one year later: "I told General Howard that the administration of their affairs under Whitman, Third Cavalry, was criminally rotten and needed a thorough investigation, but so far from heeding my suggestion he intensified matters by giving the persons concerned in this rottenness his moral support ..." Crook to A. A. G., July 3, 1873, A. G. O., 2933.

\textsuperscript{62} Howard to Delano, April 27, 1872, I. O., H 1390.

depredations by Tontos and Indians of the Verde region endangered the peace policy; yet Howard without hesitation notified Crook that "amongst the incorrigible hostile there is no course left but to deal with vigor, according to your discretion."64

General Howard rested in Prescott for a week, and then accompanied by General Crook and Superintendent Bendell crossed over the country to Camp Grant, arriving on May 20. Since Governor Safford had already arrived with a large delegation of officials, citizens and Indian chiefs, the pre-arranged conference began the next morning. After three days of extended speechmaking—figurative and symbolic on the part of the Indians and paternalistic and designing on the part of the whites—a general peace was made among the various tribes of southern Arizona, in which the Apaches specifically promised to trail thieves and to help Crook ferret out those individuals among their bands who remained incorrigible.65

Howard complied with the Apache chiefs' demands for a healthier location, by designating a large area (to be known as the San Carlos Reservation) contiguous to and directly south of the White Mountain Reservation as a future home for all the bands collected at Camp Grant. But in the case of the retention of Whitman as their agent, he persuaded the chiefs that the lieutenant would be required to join his regiment.66 Howard now closed the conference, and

64. Howard to Crook, May 9, 1872, A. G. O., 2100. Before an execution of General Orders no. 9 (cf. supra, p. 56) should occur, Howard suggested that every commandant be informed that peace and civilization were the motives of all action to be taken. Crook immediately ordered his officers to "aid the duly authorized agents of the government, by every means in their power, in their efforts to civilize and elevate the Indians under their charge." 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p. 171.

65. The governor located and brought six of the captured children to the conference. The other twenty-one (two others had escaped soon after their capture) were reported to be in Mexico. The council almost broke up into a battle when Howard, due to the objections of the district attorney, refused to turn the six over. However, he restored order by agreeing to hold the children at the agency until the president could make a decision. Arizona Citizen, May 25, 1872. The president restored the children a few weeks later. McCormick to Bishop J. B. Salpointe, July 31, 1872, in Arizona Citizen, Sept. 7, 1872.


Whitman dropped out of sight after Schofield, at Howard's request, ordered him to report at division headquarters. Special Orders, no. 29, June 8, 1872, A. G. O., 2386.
accompanied by seven prominent Indians who had agreed to journey with him to the East left the Indian country by way of Camp Apache, where three Coyotero chiefs were added to the peace delegation.\textsuperscript{67}

The delegation reached Washington on June 22, 1872, and during the next three weeks, in conferences with high officials and in a public appearance at New York, did much to strengthen the eastern sentiment for peace.\textsuperscript{68} But the administration decided that its policy among the Apaches would never be successful unless Cochise were included; therefore, President Grant directed Howard to return to the Apache country on a second mission of peace.\textsuperscript{69}

Howard reached Camp Apache on August 11, only to find that the Coyoteros were on the verge of an outbreak. This situation had developed because of the arrest of several chiefs, and also because an impasse had arisen between the department of the interior and the war department over the issuance of rations. Diplomatically, the general secured the release of the prisoners; and by replacing the acting agent, Major A. J. Dallas, with Dr. Milan Soule, the post surgeon, he insured a continuance of the issues.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{67.} Howard's complete report of his mission is printed in 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, pp. 148-158. See also a detailed report of the Camp Grant council in Arizona Citizen, May 25, 1872.

\textsuperscript{68.} R. B. I. C., 1872, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{69.} Grant to A. G., July 3, 1872, A. G. O., 2663.

\textsuperscript{70.} During the spring and summer of 1872, conditions in the Cochise country became fully as serious as they had been in former years. All the depredations were attributed to the Chiricahuas. Lt. Stephen O'Connor to A. A. G., June 26, 1872, A. G. O., 3095; Arizona Citizen, May 4, 11, June 1, 15, 29, July 6, 1872.

Dallas to editor, Aug. 11, 1872, in Arizona Citizen, Aug. 24, 1872; Howard to Bendell, Aug. 14, 1872, I. O., Howard Correspondence. Hereafter this file will be designated H. C.

On June 25 the war department ordered its officers to stop issues to Indians. Howard's arrival temporarily solved the problem, and later an exception was made whereby supplies could be furnished. However, the issuing would have to be done by non-military men. All the correspondence is given in A. G. O., 2061, 2612 and 8985.

Most of the trouble was caused by the delay of the officials of the department of the interior in approving Bendell's beef contracts, for contractors were reluctant to make deliveries without approved contracts. But anxious for large profits, they were willing to deliver the same beef at six cents per pound (one cent extra) in exchange for certified vouchers. Howard made the concession. \textit{Op. cit.} Howard had
Howard now moved eastward to the Tularosa Reservation, where he hoped to complete arrangements for a conference with Cochise. But again he was forced to postpone his main mission in order to prevent a collapse of Colyer's work in New Mexico. During his visit of eight days with the Southern Apaches, the chiefs advanced every possible argument against Tularosa as a reserve, and insisted that their bands be returned to Canásada Alamosa. They also pressed for a new agent, by pointing out that their blankets fell to pieces when damp. The general, of course, refused to accede to their request, but his promise to submit their questions "to the President for his decision" apparently satisfied them. However, his action in ordering a liberal increase in their rations was probably the factor that reconciled them.

Still unable to communicate with Cochise, Howard secured the services of Thomas J. Jeffords, an unusual frontiersman, who was certain that a peace could be made, provided the general would go to the chief's stronghold in the Dragoon Mountains of Arizona. The proposal was accepted, and the party of three whites and two Indian friends of the Chiricahuas set out at once.

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71. Out of 1,600 Southern Apaches reported to be at Canásada Alamosa in March, 1872, only 450 had removed to Tularosa by September. O. F. Piper to Pope, Aug. 31, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. 1, p. 306.
73. Jeffords was a close friend of Cochise. Dr. Henry S. Turrill, the post surgeon at Fort Bayard in 1872, later wrote that Jeffords gained and kept the friendship of Cochise by selling him ammunition. See The New York Society of the Order of the Founders and Patriots of America. Publication no. 18 (N. Y., 1907), pp. 16-21. Major W. R. Price claimed he had witnesses who would testify that Jeffords had traded ammunition to the Indians for stock. Price to A. G., Aug. 1, 1873, A. G. O., 3383.
74. Howard compromised himself at this point, by giving two Southern Apache bands permission to go to Canásada Alamosa instead of Tularosa. A rancorous correspondence during the next three months, which involved Sherman, Sheridan, Belknap, Delano and many other officials, vividly portrays the burning animosities that practically paralyzed all efforts to solve the Apache problem. The correspondence is collected in I. O., W 551.

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likely erred on his first trip when he advised Bendell to accept bids which would have allowed different amounts of issues at the respective reserves. This fact would have caused unrest among the Indians—hence, the delay in approval. A. G. O., 2612.
When the Stein's Peak region was reached, early in October, smoke signals were set up, and within a few hours some sixty of Cochise's followers had made their appearance. The party was then led over deserts and mountains directly to the chief's famous retreat. The parley started as soon as the bands could be assembled. Cochise was so anxious for peace that he even agreed to move to Cañada Alamosa, but his captains would consent only to a reserve in Arizona. Howard soon realized that there could be no peace among the Apaches unless the Chiricahua were included; therefore, when Cochise emphatically agreed to restore stolen property and to guarantee the safety of travellers in his country, the tribe was promised a reserve of their own selection. But of far greater satisfaction to the bands, was the announcement that Jeffords was to act as their agent. The next day, October 13, near Fort Bowie, Howard completed the final details of the conference, by directing the post commander to furnish the tribe rations until the department of the interior could assume the responsibility; he then left for Washington to deliver his report.  

All the Apaches had now been drawn within the scope of the peace plan, but affairs at the reserves proved that the problem of control was yet in its infancy. Liberal subsistence at Camp Grant did not stop the raids; moreover, without a daily muster and with a ration issue every tenth day, the raiders had ample time to cover a great amount of territory and still be back at the appointed time. In fact, the increase in marauding and the development of a storm of criticism, strongly reminiscent of the situation previous to the Camp Grant massacre, forced Howard, at the start of the second trip, to replace Agent Jacobs with George H. Stevens who was popular with both the frontiersmen and
the Indians. And just after his peace with Cochise, the general, even more alarmed, ordered that the Camp Grant bands were to be removed to the San Carlos Reservation not later than January 1, 1873.\textsuperscript{76} The situation failed to improve under the new agent, but it was not until December, 1872, that Crook was able to bring about the requirement of a daily muster. At the end of the year, Stevens reported affairs to be in a “hubbub.” To Bendell’s view, however, the trouble was caused by a “lack of firmness on the part of the agent.”\textsuperscript{77}

Conditions at the Verde Reservation were no more favorable than those at Camp Grant. The management of the Indians collected at the former point proved to be relatively easy immediately after Colyer’s visit, but in December, 1871, when Crook inaugurated military control, about five hundred of the savages fled to the mountains. During the next few months so many of the others left that General Howard gave no attention to the reserve on either of his trips. In fact, when Dr. J. W. Williams, an appointee of the Dutch Reformed Church, arrived at the agency in July, 1872, the absence of all but five of the tribesmen caused his transference to Date Creek.\textsuperscript{78} Several bands, however, were anxious for peace, and upon being told by Captain C. C. Carr, the commandant at Camp Verde, to come in, obey orders and receive rations, some eighty Yavapai and Ton-tos surrendered. Many others followed until it appeared that all would return, but the killing of an important Tonto prisoner caused every Indian on the reserve to seek safety in flight. During August, a considerable number of the Indians, entirely unwilling to confine themselves to the reserve, adopted a policy of coming in for rations and then leaving. Crook solved the problem from the military stand-

\textsuperscript{76} Arizona Citizen, May 4, June 22, 29, Sept. 7, 14, 28, 1872; Howard to Bendell, Aug. 29, 1872, I. O., Ariz. Misc.; same to same, Oct. 17, 1872, H. C.


\textsuperscript{78} Williams to Walker, July 6, 1872, I. O., W 91.
point by ordering their arrest and daily muster; yet in taking such action he ended all possibilities for a peace without war.

In contrast to their Verde kinsmen, the 900-1000 Yavapai who had collected at the Date Creek feeding post proved to be especially coöperative for several months following Colyer's mission. Submissive to military control from the first they readily accepted, during July, 1872, the more rigid discipline introduced by their new civil agent, Dr. Williams; nevertheless, after more than one hundred hostiles had been forced in, Williams reported that the troops were "the controlling factor with them."80

The agent improved his authority, however, until an epidemic of fever, in August, forced him to permit several hundred sick Indians to retire to the cool highlands. But, once more in their former haunts, his charges decided against ever again submitting to reservation control.81 Crook now came to his relief, and after arresting four of the Loring massacre participants,82 inaugurated a sharp campaign against the recalcitrants. This action, which resulted in the slaughter of seventy of their warriors, greatly humbled the bands' haughty spirit, and by December, 1872, the reserve was filled with more Indians than ever before.83 Reservation control now appeared to be a reality among the Yavapai at Camp Date Creek.

81. Lt. W. J. Volkmar to A. A. G., Sept. 1, 1872, A. G. O., 3815; James Grant to C. O., Date Creek, Sept. 6, 1872, ibid., 3908.
82. Several of the Date Creek Indians were involved in the crime. But of greater importance to Crook was the fact that some of them had been reserve Indians prior to the killing. Long convinced of the necessity of demonstrating to both malcontents and friendlies that none but truly peaceable tribesmen could find safety by flight to reserves, the general went to the post on September 8, and succeeded, by a clever stratagem, in making the arrests. Crook to A. A. G., Sept. 18, 1872, A. G. O., 4091; Prescott Miner, Sept. 14, 1872.
Far to the east of the Date Creek Indians, the Coyoteró bands of the White Mountains readily accepted reservation control as initiated by Colyer. Their favorable and friendly attitude was doubtless due to the fact that their prescribed reservation necessitated no radical changes in their habitat or mode of life; moreover, the advantage of receiving regular issues of rations made their life easier and less precarious. Some difficulties arose during the first year over the matter of subsistence, but officials felt that the appointment of Dr. Soule would end all serious embarrassments. 84 And their views proved correct, for both Soule and Bendell, by open market purchases and by advance acceptance of beef deliveries, insured themselves against any catastrophic exigencies. 85 The Indians, in addition to behaving well, worked very energetically during the growing season of 1872, and at harvest time they sold more than 80,000 pounds of corn and fodder. At peace among themselves and satisfied with their new regime, the only dangers that threatened the Coyoteró near the end of the year were those that might arise in connection with Crook’s impending campaign. 86

Crook, of course, never warred against peaceable Indians, but in planning aggressive action he invariably eliminated all factors that might lead to abortive results. Therefore, with the aim of not only protecting the Coyoteró, but also of preventing the less docile bucks from joining neighboring hostile groups, he directed on November 5, 1872, that after ten days all Indians of both sexes were to concentrate within one mile of Camp Apache and submit to a daily muster; also, that if any individual should fail to conform

84. Cf. supra, p. 60.

Soule accepted a six months supply of beef (700,000 lbs.) on October 10. Soule to Bendell, Oct. 10, 1872, I. O., B-667. No explanation was offered two months later when he informed Bendell that a further supply of cattle would be required from New Mexico to meet the Indian needs. Soule to Bendell, Dec. 21, 1872, I. O., Ariz. Misc.

It is possible the contractor herded most of the supply in New Mexico.

86. Cf. infra, p. 69.
after a reasonable time, he was not to be received except as a prisoner of war.\textsuperscript{87}

This drastic order, by ignoring Howard's promise to the Indians of safety anywhere on the reservation,\textsuperscript{88} left the bands exposed to summary punishment even though they actually remained within the legal boundaries. It also left them under exclusive military control except in the case of issues. So naturally they became quite disturbed when Major W. H. Brown arrived a few days later to enlist scouts and personally enforce the order. They were unwilling to leave their homes where some of their crops remained unharvested and where their stock would stray and become prey to wild beasts. Besides, they were reluctant to enlist in scout companies that might later be forced to fight against their own bands.\textsuperscript{89} The test tried them severely, but they conformed with cheerfulness and cooperativeness. As a result, they were soon permitted to stay as far as ten miles from the post.\textsuperscript{90}

Despite the general improvement that resulted from Colyer's and Howard's efforts, the continuance of devastations and killings proved that the peace policy \textit{per se} was insufficient as a method of Apache control. Attacks were numerous in both northern and southern Arizona during the summer months of 1872, and conditions in the Prescott area again resembled those that followed the Civil War.\textsuperscript{91} Once again the situation played into the hands of the advocates of war, and naturally it strengthened the views of those

\textsuperscript{87} A. A. G. to G. O., Fort Apache, Nov. 5, 1872, I. O., B 462.

\textsuperscript{88} Howard probably anticipated Crook's action, for he had already recommended that the Department of Arizona be modified so that the White Mountain and Chiricahua reservations should be included in the District of New Mexico. Howard to Walker, Nov. 7, 1872, I. O., H 383. Grant, Belknap and Delano favored the change, but deferred to Sherman who refused to give his approval when he found that Pope and Crook were strongly opposed to the plan. Delano to Belknap, Dec. 10, 1872, A. G. O., 6055; Sherman to Belknap, Jan. 8, 1872, I. O., W 721.

\textsuperscript{89} Pedro to Howard, Nov. 18, 1872, I. O., H 532; Miguel to Howard, Nov. 19, 1872, \textit{ibid.} C. E. Cooley wrote for the chiefs.


\textsuperscript{91} Crook to A. A. G., May 28, 1872, A. G. O., 2388; \textit{Arizona Miner}, June 29, 1872; \textit{Arizona Citizen}, June 29, Aug. 31, 1872.
persons who had always thought that the Apaches would have to be beaten into submission.\textsuperscript{92}

Crook believed from the time he first entered the territory that the Apaches would have to be reduced by war, but with great prudence he avoided all steps that might interfere with the success of the peace policy or cause an affront to public opinion.\textsuperscript{93} Sheridan entertained a similar view and insisted that the government would be forced by public sentiment to "render every portion of our extensive frontier safe for a citizen to travel over or occupy." He also said that a policy was an erroneous one that taught the Indian what was right, but failed to teach him that which was wrong. Even the Washington officialdom, keenly alive to public opinion, turned to a policy of war.\textsuperscript{94}

Crook, thus supported, now determined to press his views with vigor. On September 21, 1872, he informed the war department that the Apaches on the reservations were guilty of many of the murders and devastations that occurred during the summer, and to substantiate his incrimination, sent in a long list of outrages which he branded as "a ghastly commentary upon the result." Assured that humanity at last demanded the punishment of the "incorrigibly hostile," he requested the full cooperation of the civil agents as compensation for his aid to their cause.\textsuperscript{95}

Superior officers approved his views. General Schofield announced on October 15, that "no course is open except a vigorous and unremitting prosecution of the war, until they are completely subdued, and the Department Com-

\textsuperscript{92} New York Herald, Sept. 10, 1872.


\textsuperscript{95} Crook to A. G., Sept. 21, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 79. His list included forty-four killed and sixteen wounded.
mander should have ample power of restriction over reservation Indians."  

Crook was fully prepared to make war, having used his long periods of forced inaction in arranging every detail of organization for the proper management of the impending campaign. He planned his campaign in such a way that the final crushing blows would be struck in the very center of the hostile country—the Tonto Basin. To accomplish this end, preliminary campaigns were to be waged in regions appendant to the main Indian country. These operations, he felt, would greatly reduce the warring groups and result in their final concentration in the basin proper. Then he planned for several strong, swiftly-moving columns to converge upon them from various points along the rim of the basin. Crook, on his own part, intended to help organize the columns and, with the campaign once under way, to move from point to point along the whole periphery of the battle area, exercising general supervision of movements, but leaving the details of fighting to the respective officers. With the idea of carrying war to the savages at a time when winter weather would most handicap them, November 15 was designated for the start of the preliminary movements.

Promptly, three separate commands of one company of cavalry and a detachment of forty Indian scouts each, left Camp Hualpai to scout through to Camp Verde by way of the San Francisco peaks and upper Verde country. The movement was unusually successful, and during the fifteen days required to reach the post, the commands destroyed numerous winter rancherías, killed thirteen warriors and captured several squaws. Meantime, Captain George F. Price, at Date Creek, sent out two expeditions with instructions to clear the country of Indians on the west side of the Verde as far down as Fort McDowell. Cooperating with him

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were two other commands sent from Camp Verde to scout the Red Rock and Black Hills country. Price's commands found many Indians scattered about between Date Creek and Camp Verde, but they failed to effect any decisive actions. In contrast, the two associated commands killed thirteen warriors, captured three others and pushed many hostile bands eastward into the Tonto region.98

Crook was even more active than his subordinates. First at Camp Verde he completed his plans and then at Camp Apache he began the enlistment of extra scout companies. The Coyotero bands, near the latter post, were quite "feverish," but his "requirements were met with alacrity." Although Crook noted some discrepancies in agency administration, time was too limited for investigation, and after organizing one expedition to be commanded by Captain George M. Randall, he pushed on to Camp Grant. Here he completed arrangements for the organization of three additional expeditions, one of which was to take the field from Camp McDowell.99

The final campaign now arranged for, the nine columns speedily penetrated into the haunts of the hostiles. Because of the hazardous terrain over which the troops were forced to operate, and also because of the decentralized nature of Apache society, the fighting naturally developed into an innumerable number of small engagements. The columns from Camp Grant, commanded by Captain W. H. Brown, did some of the most effective and spectacular fighting of the whole campaign, especially at the battle of the caves on Salt River, where seventy-six Indians were killed and eighteen others captured.100

Crook's other commands, although not so spectacular, did equally effective work. During the three months fol-

100. Crook to A. G., Sept. 22, 1873, I. O., 355. This communication is Crook's annual report for 1873. It arrived too late to be printed. See also Nickerson to A. A. G., Jan. 11, 1873; A. G. O., 213; Arizona Citizen, Sept. 20, 1873; Lockwood, The Apache Indians, pp. 196-199.
lowing the start of the campaign, they harried and deci-
mated the hostile bands almost continuously. No accurate
figures are available, but it is probable that nearly three
hundred warriors were killed or received mortal wounds.
In addition, a considerable number of noncombatants suf-
fered a like fate, and occasionally some warriors were taken
 captive. All indications showed, at the end of February,
1873, that a few more punitive blows would result in a gen-
eral surrender.101

Punishment was not long deferred. About the middle
of March, some five hundred savages, who had evidently
taken refuge in the region between the Gila and the Colo-
rado, began to harry the Wickenburg country. Most of them
were thought to be on the verge of surrender, but one party
murdered three important citizens of the town itself. This
outrage resulted in a new offensive on the part of the troops,
and within a short time eighty warriors were killed and
thirty squaws captured. Such losses completely broke most
of the hostiles; consequently, they fairly precipitated them-
selves to the reservations.102 A sizeable group, however, fled
into the Tonto Basin, only to lose sixty-six warriors at the
hands of Major Randall's column. The major then pushed
relentlessly after the survivors, and a few days later suc-
cceeded in capturing the entire group of one hundred and
thirty-six souls on Turret Mountain, west of the Verde
River.103

By the first of April, great numbers of Indians, earnestly
begging for peace, had collected near Camp Verde. General
Crook was also ready for peace, fearing that further slaugh-
ter might arouse other peace efforts in the East. He there-
fore went to the post, and “being satisfied that their profes-
sions were sincere,” concluded a general peace by which the

101. Bendell to Walker, Dec. 31, 1872, op. cit.; J. F. May to Howard, Jan. 27,
1873, I. O., H 856; Arizona Citizen, Mar. 1, 1873.
15, 1873; Arizona Citizen, Mar. 22, 1873.
103. J. E. Roberts to Bendell, April 29, 1873, I. O., Ariz. Misc.; Arizona Citizen,
April 12, 1873.
bands agreed to stop all violence, to remain strictly upon their reservations and to comply with all regulations of their authorized agents. In turn, as long as they remained true to the treaty terms, Crook promised to be responsible for their protection. It was also agreed that after sufficient time had elapsed to enable all renegades and straggling parties to reach the reservation, the military was to pursue and force them in, destroying all who refused to surrender.\footnote{104. General Orders no. 12, April 7, 1873, Army War College; Crook to A. A. G., April 12, 1873, A. G. O., 1882.}

On April 9, Crook complimented his troops as entitled "to a reputation second to none in the annals of Indian warfare," and as having "finally closed an Indian war that has been waged since the days of Cortez." General Orders no 14, April 9, 1872, Army War College.

\textit{(To be continued)}