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FRONTIER DEFENSE IN THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO, 1846-1853¹

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THE Ninth Military Department was organized in 1848. Coinciding, for the most part, with the territory of New Mexico,² this vast domain embraced extensive and arid elevated plains, lofty and barren mountains, sandy deserts, and occasional fertile valleys. In the mid-nineteenth century a considerable portion of this region was practically a *terra incognita*. Despite its agricultural,³ grazing, and mineral⁴ possibilities it was considered a hopeless and inaccessible

1. This article is the second of a series dealing with the "New Mexican Frontier, 1846-1861." For an account of government explorations during this period, see A. B. Bender, "Government Explorations in the Territory of New Mexico, 1846-1859," in *NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW*, IX, 1-32.

2. R. P. Thian, *Notes illustrating the military geography of the United States, 1813-1830* (Washington, 1881), 45-50, 71. From 1846 to 1863, New Mexico of course included what is now Arizona; and southern Colorado until 1861.

3. Despite its reputation as a desert country, the territory possessed considerable agricultural areas. In 1850 Brevet Lieutenant Colonel George A. McCall, stationed in New Mexico, reported to Secretary of War Crawford more than 120,000 acres of land under cultivation and that some 300,000 acres of cultivated land lay vacant. In the sixties, William A. Bell, a scientist attached to the Southern Pacific Railroad Expedition, reported 500,000 acres of arable land available in the southern part of the territory. George A. McCall, *Letters from the frontier written during a period of thirty years' service in the army of the United States* (Philadelphia, 1868), 510; William A. Bell, *New tracks in North America* (London, 1869), II, 79-80.

4. The territory possessed excellent mineral deposits. Copper, silver, and gold were found in almost every section of the country. A plumbago (lead) mine was discovered in the late fifties. Deposits of zinc, tin, bismuth, antimony, arsenic, graphite, and alum were found in different localities. Richard C. McCormick, *Arizona: its resources and prospects* (New York, 1865), 5-6; Sylvester Mowry, *Arizona and Sonora: the geography, history, and resources of the silver region of North America* (New York, 1864), 37-38, 193; *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 52, p. 208.

sible desert. While hunters, traders, and trappers had explored it to some extent, their accounts were generally of a vague and marvellous character. With the exception of a few scholars who had delved into the old Spanish records, few people in the United States actually knew about the real character of the country. The impression prevailed that it was a worthless desert. The greater part was identified with the "Apache Country," a land of "burning deserts, parched mountains, dried up rivers, rattlesnakes, scorpions, Greasers, and Apache."⁵ In this mysterious and uninviting land the semi-agricultural and wild tribes periodically attacked the immigrants and scattered settlements. A frontier defense policy was urgent. This study attempts to show how the federal government evolved such a policy during 1846-1853.⁶

When the United States acquired the Mexican Cession, various tribes, representing different stages of civilization inhabited the region designated as the Ninth Military Department. The peaceful or Pueblo Indians lived in permanent villages, the semi-agricultural tribes had partially fixed habitations, and the wild tribes roamed everywhere. The various groups of Pueblo Indians in their twenty-odd communities, numbering between 7,000 and 10,000 souls,⁷ led a quiet and industrious life. Agriculture was their chief occupation and a system of irrigation was everywhere used.

5. J. Ross Browne, *Adventures in the Apache country: a tour through Arizona and Sonora with notes on the silver regions of Nevada* (New York, 1869), 11, 16, 27; Mowry, *opus cit.*, 176-177.

6. The defense policy was part of a general comprehensive program which embraced the greater part of the trans-Mississippi country. In the execution of this plan, government officers and engineers established military posts, negotiated treaties with the tribes, opened military and commercial routes, surveyed the principal western rivers, sank artesian wells, and explored the greater part of the Far West.

7. One group was located along the Rio Grande and its tributaries from Taos in the north to San Marcial in the south. The Zuñi were found between the Rio Grande and the frontier of the present state of Arizona. The Moqui lived north of the San Francisco mountains and the Little Colorado river. Adolph F. Bandelier, *Investigations among the Indians of the southwestern United States, carried on mainly in the years from 1880-1885* (Cambridge, Mass., 1890-1892), pt. 1, pp. 114-142; F. W. Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians north of Mexico* (Washington, 1907-1910), II, 324.

Generally, the Pueblo were tractable, easily influenced and managed. Along the Gila and Colorado rivers and in the northern part of the department lived the semi-agricultural tribes, estimated at between 17,000 and 40,000. Of these, the Papago, Pima, and Maricopa were peaceful and friendly toward the whites. The Yuma, Mohave, and Navaho, however, gave considerable trouble.⁸ The Ute or Utah, Apache, and Apache-Mohave or Yavapai, the principal nomadic tribes, constituted the greatest danger and the chief concern of the federal government. Estimated at between 13,000 and 31,000, these bands roamed over a vast area. In the course of their wanderings across the present states of Colorado, eastern Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, and Mexico, these hardy warriors struck terror into the hearts of white men and Indians alike. They depredated stock, robbed ranches, killed *rancheros*, and harrassed immigrant trains.⁹

During the Mexican regime, the wild Indians frequently swooped down upon the white settlements as well as upon the peaceful tribes of New Mexico. The government had been unable to keep them in check. In the course of the Mexican War the United States army came directly in contact with the Indians. When General Stephen W. Kearny entered Santa Fé and proclaimed the authority of the United States, representatives of the Pueblo, Navaho, Utah, and Apache offered submission.¹⁰ This peaceful acquiescence, however, was a mere gesture. Before long the Navaho broke out in revolt. Two expeditions under Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan and Major William Gilpin, respectively, were sent against them before they were

8. H. H. Bancroft, *History of Arizona and New Mexico* (San Francisco, 1889), 50; Edward S. Curtis, *The North American Indian* (Cambridge, Mass., 1907-1926), II, 4-8, 27, 31, 32; Bandelier, *opus cit.*, pt. 1, pp. 102-103, 250-258; Hodge, *opus cit.*, I, 919.

9. James S. Calhoun, *Official Correspondence* (Annie H. Abel, ed., Washington, 1915), 7; John C. Cremony, *Life among the Apaches* (Santa Fé, 1868), 142; Bandelier, *opus cit.*, pt. 1, pp. 177-182; Hodge, *opus cit.*, II, 1874.

10. Stephen W. Kearny, *Letter Book, 1846-'47*, pp. 48-51, 64. Ms., Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis (hereafter cited as Kearny, *Letter Book*); Bancroft, *opus cit.*, 418.

quieted.¹¹ The peace treaty made at Bear Spring¹² on November 22, 1846 was not observed by the Indians.¹³

After concluding peace with the Navaho, Doniphan set out on another peaceful mission. Accompanied by several Navaho chiefs, he visited the Zuñi villages and succeeded in establishing friendly relations between them and the Navaho.¹⁴ Upon Doniphan's departure for Chihuahua and the arrival of Colonel Sterling Price, a new disturbance developed in which the Taos Indians were involved. In January, 1847, the Mexicans and Indians of Taos valley broke out in revolt and murdered Governor Charles Bent. The revolt spread rapidly to the east and south, but by July it was fairly quelled by the American troops.¹⁵ Many of the ringleaders were captured, tried, and punished.¹⁶

During the Mexican War there was great difficulty in maintaining the federal troops in New Mexico adequately supplied. The Indians committed depredations on army trains, drove off cattle, and killed many of the drivers. Early in 1847, Major W. H. T. Walker with a detachment of volunteers penetrated the Navaho country as far as Cañon de Chelly. This expedition, however, proved a failure and only served to increase the contempt of the Indians for the American troops. The following year Colonel Edward W. B. Newby, with a much larger force, conducted a third campaign against the troublesome Navaho, but like the former,

11. Doniphan led a force of 300 men from Santa Fé to Albuquerque and then into the Navaho country. Gilpin with about 180 men marched from Abiquiú and joined Doniphan at Ojo del Oso but there was no fight. John T. Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition* (Cincinnati, 1848), 143-185; Martha R. Barnidge, "Missouri in the Mexican War" (M. A. thesis, Washington University, 1923), 93-104; Kearny, *Letter Book*, 67-68.

12. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 540; Hughes, *opus cit.*, 188-189.

13. Barnidge, *opus cit.*, 107.

14. *Ibid.*, 104, 192-194.

15. George F. Ruxton, *Adventures in Mexico and the Rocky Mountains* (New York, 1848), 197; Lewis H. Garrard, *Wah-To-Yah and the Taos Trail* (Cincinnati, 1850), 131-162; *Daily Missouri Republican* (St. Louis), March 30, April 1, 9, July 24, August 2, September 22, 1847.

16. Four Mexicans and five Indians were executed at Taos. Barnidge, *opus cit.*, 139.

accomplished nothing but the negotiation of a treaty. This agreement the Indians promptly disregarded and continued their depredations on a greater scale.¹⁷

In the meantime the policy of establishing military posts in the department was inaugurated. Prior to the Mexican War there were only fifty-six military posts in the entire United States.¹⁸ The coming of the war created an immediate necessity for stationing troops in the Indian country. In his report of November 10, 1846, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Medill, Governor Bent of New Mexico territory pointed out the necessity of establishing "stockaded forts" in the Utah and Navaho countries. Bent recommended that one post be located at some suitable point on the Arkansas river for the protection of travellers between Missouri and New Mexico. Another was to be established in the southern part of the territory to guard against the Apache and the Mexicans who might try to reconquer New Mexico.¹⁹

At the end of the Mexican War a definite defense policy was inaugurated. In December, 1848, orders were issued from the Adjutant General's Office for a careful examination of Texas, New Mexico, Oregon, and California by competent authorities assisted by officers of the Corps of Engineers and Topographical Engineers. The examinations were to be made with a view toward locating permanent military posts.²⁰ In the selection of sites, the officers and engi-

17. This treaty is not listed in Charles J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws, and Treaties* (Washington, 1904). Presumably it was not ratified by the United States senate. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 8, p. 545; Barnidge, *opus cit.*, 140-144.

18. These posts were distributed among the eight military departments, comprised within two divisions: twenty-nine posts in the Eastern Division,—departments 5, 6, 7, 8 and twenty-seven posts in the Western Division,—departments 1, 2, 3, 4. *Sen. Docs.*, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pp. 220-228.

After the Mexican War there was a reorganization. According to General Orders Number 49, issued from the adjutant general's office, August 31, 1848, the departments were renumbered. The Eastern Division comprised departments 1, 2, 3, 4 and the Western consisted of departments 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. A Third Division (Pacific) was created to consist of Departments 10 and 11 (California and Oregon). *Sen. Docs.*, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pp. 220C-220E; General Order Books, XII, 1847-1850, p. 211. *Ms.*, O. R. S., A. G. O.

19. Calhoun, *opus cit.*, 8.

20. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, p. 161.

neers were to be guided by the following considerations: (1) protection to the white settlers; (2) economy and facility in supporting the troops; (3) defense of Mexican territory against Indians within the borders of the United States.²¹

The defense policy in New Mexico, as in other portions of the Far West, was characterized by a gradual evolutionary development. The government did not establish modes of defense on its western frontiers according to any definite plan. Military posts appeared at different points only when the need was most urgent. Fort Marcy, the first military post in the territory, was built by General Kearny to protect the frontier settlements.²² At the close of the war, federal troops were stationed in several villages of the territory. One company of the First Dragoons was located at Taos, a second at Albuquerque, and a third at Socorro. Garrisons of about twenty men were placed at Tomé and Doña Ana. At Fort Marcy were stationed one company of the Third Artillery and a company of the Second Dragoons.²³

While the defense program was being inaugurated President Polk announced his Indian policy. Despite the bad faith shown by the New Mexican Indians, he recommended fairness and leniency. He believed that the presence of Indian agents among the tribes, distribution of gifts, and the maintenance of a small military force would secure the Indians' good will and be sufficient to preserve the peace. The president's plan was tried but it proved ineffective.²⁴ The renewed westward migration, the niggardliness of congress, and the lack of a definite and firm policy by the offi-

21. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, pp. 117, 125, 243.

22. Fort Marcy was situated some 600 yards from the heart of Santa Fé. Construction was begun in the latter part of August, 1846, the work being done by volunteers aided by Mexican masons. L. B. Prince, *A Concise History of New Mexico* (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1922), 180; John S. Billings, *Report on Barracks and Hospitals with Descriptions of Military Posts* (Washington, 1870), 257; *H. Ex. Docs.*, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 41, p. 32.

23. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, p. 165.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

cials within the department failed to check the Indian menace.²⁵

In the meantime the Apache went on the warpath. In the winter of 1848 several scouting parties followed in pursuit but accomplished no definite results. On November 13, Lieutenant Joseph H. Whittlesey, First Dragoons, with a force of some fifty dragoons and six mountaineers as guides left Taos in search of Apache reported in the vicinity of Rio de los Animas. After a two days' march Whittlesey gave up the chase because of a severe snowstorm.²⁶ In the same month Sergeant Charles Williams, First Dragoons, led a detachment of forty-three men against another band. Some sixty miles west of Taos, Williams encountered the Indians but there was no fight. Williams held a parley with the principal chiefs and impressed upon them the necessity for peace and friendship with the white men.²⁷ A report having reached the command at Taos that F. X. Aubry's²⁸ wagon train, on the way from Santa Fé, had been attacked by Apache, a third expedition left Taos in the latter part of December. Major B. L. Beall with a detachment of forty-eight dragoons got as far as the valley of the Green Horn. After a week's march Beall, too, was compelled to abandon the chase because of a severe snow storm. He had found no trace of Apache but he had met Aubry's train intact. The rumor of the Indian attack had proved false.²⁹

In the spring of 1849 the federal government moved several of the Indian agencies westward. The agency of the

25. Anne E. Whittaker, "The Frontier Policy of the United States in the Mexican Cession, 1845-1860" (M. A. thesis, University of Texas, 1927), 157; Bancroft, *opus cit.*, 659, 662-663.

26. Joseph H. Whittlesey to John Adams, November 18, 1848. Ms., Letters Received, Headquarters of the Army, Old Records Section, Adjutant General's Office, Washington (hereafter cited as Ms., L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.).

27. Charles Williams to L. Beall, December 4, 1848. Ms. L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.

28. For Aubry's famous rides and subsequent career, see R. P. Bieber, "Letters of William Carr Lane, 1852-1854," in NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, III, 190, footnote 29; Prince, *opus cit.*, 171, 193-194.

29. L. Beall to John H. Dickerson, January 16, 1849. Ms., L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.

Upper Missouri was moved to Salt Lake City and the agency at Council Bluffs was moved to Santa Fé.³⁰ James S. Calhoun³¹ was appointed Indian agent and Washington Barrow of Tennessee and John C. Hays of San Antonio were made sub-agents.³² Calhoun was directed by Commissioner of Indian Affairs Medill to gather statistical and other information that would give an intelligent understanding of the Indian situation in the department.³³

Calhoun arrived at Santa Fé on July 22. A week later he wrote to Medill that the Indian presumed a great deal upon his knowledge of a safe retreat into the mountains; he could not be restrained until he was chastised.³⁴ As a protection against the Navaho, Calhoun urged that military posts be established at Tunicha, in the Cañon de Chelly, at or near Jemez, Zuñi, Laguna, and in the Pueblo country. Upon this recommendation, forces were stationed at once at Cebolletita and Jemez, strategic positions for defense against the Navaho.³⁵

Meanwhile the Apache and Navaho again disturbed the frontier and punitive expeditions were sent against them. On May 30, 1849, Captain W. W. Chapman led a company of

30. Thomas Ewing to William Medill, March 29, April 11, 13, 1849. Ms., Letter Books, Secretary of Interior, Indian Division, Department of Interior, Washington (hereafter cited as Ms., L. B., S. I., I. D., D. I.)

31. James S. Calhoun was an outstanding figure in the Territory of New Mexico in handling the government's Indian affairs in the early years. A southerner by birth, he had served with distinction in the Mexican War. At first he was appointed as United States Indian agent at Santa Fé and later promoted to the office of superintendent of Indian affairs and governor of the territory. Calhoun was thoroughly capable, honest, and intelligent—a rare instance in the Indian service of the period. Though occasionally maligned by his enemies, he accomplished considerable for the frontier territory. He died in June, 1852, on the plains between Santa Fé and Kansas. Calhoun, *opus cit.*, Introduction, xi-xiii.

32. As Indian agent, Calhoun's salary was \$1,500 per year. He was authorized to employ one interpreter at \$300 per year and an additional interpreter at not to exceed \$200. Calhoun was also authorized to spend an additional \$300 to secure the release of Mexicans held captive by the Indians. Ewing to Medill, March 29, April 5, 11, 13, 1849. Ms., L. B., S. I., I. D., D. I.

33. Medill to Calhoun, April 7, 1849. Ms., Letter Books, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Indian Office, Department of Interior, Washington (hereafter cited as L. B., C. I. A., I. O., D. I.).

34. Calhoun, *opus cit.*, 17-19.

35. *Ibid.*, 31, 35, 36, 77; *H. Ex. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 17, pp. 199, 212-225.

forty men against a band of Apache who had murdered a number of settlers near Abiquiú. After a sharp engagement the Indians were routed with a loss of twenty warriors. The following August federal troops had two encounters with Apache and made an elaborate show of strength against the Navaho, but with slight effect. Lieutenant (later Major General) A. E. Burnside, Third Artillery, and his command chastised some forty Apache in the vicinity of Las Vegas. At the same time Brevet Major Enoch Steen, First Dragoons, and a company of fifty men tracked a band of Apache to the Santa Rita Copper Mines and defeated them.³⁶ It was only after an elaborate expedition against the Navaho, led by Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Washington, military commander and governor of New Mexico territory, that this tribe was seemingly humbled and sued for peace.

Washington's imposing army of 175 men, with its wagons, pack-mules, artillery³⁷ and thirty days' rations for 500 men left Santa Fé on August 16, 1849 for Cañon de Chelly, the reputed stronghold of the Navaho. At Jemez the command was increased to 400 men.³⁸ Marching westward the army arrived at Cañon de Chelly on September 6 and three days later Washington and Calhoun entered into a treaty with the Navaho. Through their chiefs, Mariano Martinez and Chapitone, the Indians agreed to deliver all the American, Mexican and Indian captives, restore stock and other stolen property, and surrender the murderers of the citizens of Jemez as soon as apprehended. The treaty also provided for free passage through their territory and for the establishment of military posts and agencies. The Navaho gave up the Mexicans and a part of the stolen prop-

36. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 5, pt. 1, pp. 108-111; *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 24, pp. 16-29; E. Steen to J. H. Dickerson, September 1, 1849. Ms., Letters Received, Chief of Topographical Engineers, Old Records Section, Office of Chief of Engineers, Washington (hereafter cited as L. R., C. T. E., O. R. S., O. C. E.).

37. This consisted of one six-pounder and three mountain howitzers. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 64, pp. 60-61.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

erty, agreeing to deliver the remainder at Jemez within thirty days. The government was to distribute gifts and fix the boundaries of the Navaho at an early date.³⁹ This treaty, like those that preceded it, was a dead letter. The Navaho reverted to their old practices and military forces had to be sent against them.⁴⁰

Meanwhile the frontier settlers demanded greater protection. A convention of New Mexican citizens at Santa Fé on September 24, 1849 petitioned the federal government for the permanent establishment of two regiments and the erection of a military post in the heart of the Navaho country.⁴¹ On October 15 Calhoun wrote to Medill that a military post was being established south of Albuquerque and a month later that posts were being erected at Cebolleta⁴² and at Jemez. In his report of November 28, 1849, Adjutant General R. Jones listed seven military posts in the department, occupied by 885 troops.⁴³

A month later Calhoun negotiated a treaty with the Utah at Abiquiú similar to the one agreed upon by the Navaho.⁴⁴ Calhoun next proposed a plan for the maintenance of peace in the territory as a whole. He suggested that treaties should be made with all of the tribes who should be confined within specified limits; intercourse between tribes should be limited; the Indians should be instructed and compelled to cultivate the soil; above all, the Indians should be made to respect the power of the federal government. To

39. It was not until June 1, 1868, however, that the government fixed the boundaries of the Navaho. *Ibid.*, p. 107; United States, *Statutes at Large, 1789-1863* (Boston, 1852-1867), IX, 974-975; Bureau of American Ethnology, *Eighteenth Annual Report* (Washington, 1899), pt. 2, pp. 780, 848-849.

40. J. P. Dunn, *Massacres of the Mountains: A History of the Indian Wars of the Far West* (New York, 1886), 258; T. E. Farish, *History of Arizona* (Phoenix, Arizona, 1915), I, 308-309.

41. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 17, pp. 93, 104.

42. Calhoun, *opus cit.*, 57, 77; George A. McCall to R. Jones, October 1, 1850. Ms., L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.

43. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 5, pt. 1, p. 188D.

44. This treaty was signed by Quixiachigate, the principal chief, and twenty-seven subordinate Utah chieftains. It was approved by Brevet Colonel John Munroe, civil and military governor of the territory and ratified by the senate on September 9, 1850. Kappler, *opus cit.*, II, 585-587.

carry out this program, Indian agencies were to be established among the tribes.⁴⁵ In reply to Calhoun's proposals, congress, in December, 1850, made the necessary appropriations. Indian agents were appointed, who were also to serve as commissioners. They were instructed to collect statistical and other information concerning the Indians of the Southwest and to cultivate friendly relations whenever possible.⁴⁶ It was not, however, until July, 1851, that the Indian agents, Richard H. Weightman⁴⁷ and John Greiner, arrived.⁴⁸

Despite Calhoun's honest and persistent efforts, conditions in the department did not improve. The Apache again became troublesome. On February 5, 1850, Brevet Major Steen, commanding at Doña Ana, wrote to Lieutenant L. McLaws, acting assistant adjutant general at Santa Fé, that the Apache in broad daylight and within a mile of the garrison, drove off cattle and captured Mexican citizens. They also continued the practice of seizing Mexicans,⁴⁹ and Indians of other tribes and holding them for ransom.⁵⁰ To check these practices, Steen led several unsuccessful expeditions against these lawless bands. The physical conditions of the country were against him. Often the trails led into impassable cañons or sandy deserts and he was forced to give up the chase.⁵¹

In the early part of May an express party from the United States had been cut off by Indians about forty miles east of Las Vegas, and the entire party of eleven men was

45. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 17, pp. 223-224.

46. *Ibid.*, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, pp. 28, 29, 42.

47. Like Calhoun, Richard Hanson Weightman was a prominent figure in the affairs of New Mexico during the fifties. For an account of his career, see R. E. Twitchell, *Leading Facts of New Mexican History* (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1912), II, 304-305.

48. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 3, p. 461.

49. The Indian appears to have been the natural enemy of the Mexican for he killed him whenever he found him and frequently for no plausible reason. Mexicans had such dread of Indians that they rarely met them in open combat and generally fled at the first indication of their presence. *Ibid.*, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, p. 328.

50. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, pp. 68-70, 137.

51. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, pp. 68-74.

massacred.⁵² Army officers stationed at various points in the department reported depredations by the Navaho in the vicinity of Cebolleta and on the Puerco.⁵³ At the same time the territorial legislature complained that the Indians were again robbing, killing, and carrying off inhabitants into captivity. Plundering was carried on chiefly by Apache and Navaho in close proximity to the military posts. Within eighteen months, the property loss, mainly in sheep, mules, cattle, and horses, was estimated at \$114,500.⁵⁴

To obtain greater security, suggestions appeared from various quarters. Hugh N. Smith, the New Mexican delegate to congress, recommended the appointment of Indian agents to the Comanche, southern Apache, Navaho, Utah, and northern Apache.⁵⁵ The Pueblo, too, needed agents to advise them in the settlement of their land claims. These agents were to be aided by a strong military force. Smith was of the opinion that the Indians considered the United States government weak,—a belief resulting from long delays and failures to check depredations.⁵⁶

Superintendent of Indian Affairs D. D. Mitchell suggested that a treaty be made with all the tribes west of the Missouri to the northern line of Texas, embracing the Indians of the mountains and including those of New Mexico. He recommended that a council be held at Fort Laramie where a sufficient military force could be displayed and thus inspire the Indians with awe and respect. His plan provided for the establishment of definite boundaries, each tribe being held responsible for depredations committed in

52. McCall, *opus cit.*, 493-494.

53. John Buford to L. McLaws, June 10, 25, 1850. W. H. Gordon to McLaws, May 27, 1850. Ms., L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.

54. The amount of property stolen by the Apache was incalculable. According to the returns of the United States marshalls there were stolen in New Mexico alone, between August 1, 1846, and October 1, 1850, no less than 12,887 mules, 7,050 horses, 31,581 horned cattle, and 453,293 head of sheep. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 558; McCall, *opus cit.*, 526-527; David Y. Thomas, "The History of Military Government in Newly Acquired Territory of the United States," in Columbia University, *Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law*, XX, No. 2, pp. 150-151.

55. Orlando Brown to Calhoun, April 24, 1850. Ms., L. B., C. I. A., I. O., D. I.

56. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, pp. 142-143.

its territory. To compensate them for the loss of buffalo, timber, and grass, the Indians were to be paid \$40,000 annually in Indian goods. Mitchell also suggested that representatives of the different tribes be invited to visit Washington.⁵⁷ Secretary of War Charles M. Conrad also advocated a peace policy. He suggested that the federal government should adopt some system whereby the Indian would be induced to abandon his wandering life and settle down in villages, engaging in agricultural pursuits.⁵⁸

Commissioner of Indian Affairs Orlando Brown suggested a display of force. He believed that the New Mexico Indians could be adequately controlled only through fear. To accomplish this end, he, like Mitchell, proposed that large delegations of Indians be assembled at some point in the presence of a considerable military force. A similar effect, Brown, believed, might be achieved by bringing representatives of the principal tribes to some of the larger cities.⁵⁹

Captain A. W. Bowman, Third Infantry, stationed at El Paso, believed that the only way to control the Indians was to establish military posts in their own country. He recommended, therefore, that one post be established at the Santa Rita Copper Mines and another in the Sacramento Mountains, some 200 miles northeast of El Paso. The troops at these prospective posts co-operating with the garrisons at Doña Ana and El Paso, Bowman believed would be sufficient to check the 2,000 or more Apache warriors who threatened this area.⁶⁰ To keep the Navaho and Utah in check, Assistant Quartermaster Thomas L. Brent recommended that one post be located between the Pecos and the Rio Grande, a second between the Rio Grande and the Colorado of the West, and a third on the Gila River.⁶¹ Adjutant General Roger Jones also advocated the establishment of posts in the heart of the Indian country, with sufficiently

57. Sen. Ex. Docs., 31 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 70, pp. 4-5.

58. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, p. 5.

59. Brown to Calhoun, April 24, 1850. Ms., L. B., C. I. A., I. O., D. I.

60. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, pp. 295-296.

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 293-295.

large garrisons to pursue and punish troublesome and dangerous Indians.⁶²

In response to these recommendations, several reconnaissances for military posts followed. In the spring of 1850 Captain Henry B. Judd, Third Artillery, made an examination along the Pecos. With Light Company C, equipped as cavalry, and a train of five wagons Judd travelled about 200 miles from Las Vegas to the southern extremity of the Bosque Grande. Judd considered the Bosque Redondo and Bosque Grande particularly suitable for mounted garrisons.⁶³ A military post along the Pecos, however, was not selected until the time of the Civil War.⁶⁴ In March Major Steen reported to Lieutenant McLaws that he had made an examination of the Santa Rita Copper Mine country and found it suitable for the location of a military post.⁶⁵ The following month Captain W. N. Grier examined the New Mexican frontier and found that the line to be defended passed through Abiquiú, the Rio Colorado, Rayada, La Junta, Las Vegas, and San Miguel,—a broken and mountainous country. Grier reported to McLaws if the settlements within this line were to be adequately protected and the two roads leading to the United States were to be kept open, additional military posts would be necessary.⁶⁶

Inspector General George A. McCall made a tour of inspection⁶⁷ of the military posts of the department. In his

62. Roger Jones to George Deas, June 5, 1850. Ms., L. R., C. T. E., O. R. S., O. C. E.

63. Henry B. Judd to L. McLaws, March 30, 1850. Ms., L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.; See also Bender, *loc. cit.*, IX, 12-14.

64. Cremony, *opus cit.*, 199-200.

65. E. Steen to L. McLaws, March 26, 1850. Ms., L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.

66. W. N. Grier to L. McLaws, June 6, 1850. Ms., L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.

67. McCall arrived in Santa Fé on March 11, 1850. His instructions directed him to make a tour of the department. In addition to the regular inspection of the troops, military posts, and staff departments, he was to gather information about the character of the country and its inhabitants. McCall's inspection, extending from August 29 through October, included the posts at Abiquiú, Taos, Rayada, and Las Vegas in the north and Albuquerque, Cebolleta, Socorro, Doña Ana, El Paso, and San Elizario in the south. McCall, *opus cit.*, 490, 495-525.

report to Adjutant General Jones, December 24, 1850, McCall maintained that the only effective way to distribute troops in New Mexico was to post them in the heart of the Indian country; forces should be of sufficient strength to overawe the Indians. McCall, accordingly, recommended the establishment of three such military posts: one was to be located in the Navaho country near Cañon de Chelly; a second in the Apache country, somewhere on the eastern slope of the Sacramento Mountains; a third on the Gila or near the old Santa Rita Copper Mine. These posts were to be strongly garrisoned with forces ranging from 350 to 500 men, each.⁶⁸ At the close of 1850 troops were stationed at eleven different points in the department. Mounted forces were reported at Las Vegas, Santa Fé, Albuquerque, Doña Ana,⁶⁹ Socorro, Rayada,⁷⁰ and Abiquiú, in addition to the infantry at these places and at Taos, San Elizario, and El Paso.⁷¹ In November, the post at the mouth of the Gila was temporarily established which later became the famous Fort Yuma.⁷²

In the meantime Colonel Edwin V. Sumner assumed command of the Ninth Military Department,⁷³ having marched from Fort Leavenworth with a considerable force.

68. George A. McCall to Roger Jones, Dec. 24, 1850. Ms., L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.

69. Doña Ana was an important position for a dragoon force. It had been a favorite crossing for the Apache while making incursions into Mexico. McCall to Jones, October 10, 1850. Ms., L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.

70. As a site for a military post, Rayada possessed many advantages. About forty miles east of Taos, it was close to the border of the great plains, was well screened from observation, and commanded an excellent view from its rear. It was near the range of the Comanche and also within striking distance of the wintering places of the Apache on the Canadian and of the prairie tribes of the headwaters of the Arkansas. McCall to Jones, September 16, 1850. Ms., L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.

71. McCall did not believe that a strong garrison should be maintained at El Paso. Its importance as a principal crossing place on the route to and from Chihuahua was already supplanted by the lower road crossing at San Elizario, some twenty miles below. The lower road was preferred as it avoided the "sand hills." *H. Ex. Docs.*, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, p. 110; McCall to Jones, October 12, 1850. Ms., L. R., H. A., O. R. S., A. G. O.

72. For the history of this post see Bender, *loc. cit.*, IX, 15, footnote 42.

73. Sumner assumed command on July 19, 1851. For a brief account of his career see William Hutchinson, "Sketches of Pioneer Kansas Experience," in Kansas State Historical Society, *Transactions*, VII, 393; Thian, *opus cit.*, 50.

Under his direction government farms⁷⁴ were cultivated by the troops but with little success. In addition to agricultural implements, Sumner brought fine horses and cattle. His instructions directed him to select new sites for military posts, to co-operate with the superintendent of Indian affairs of the territory, to punish the Indians, and to reduce expenditures.⁷⁵

While Sumner proceeded to carry out his manifold instructions Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup and Secretary of War Conrad exchanged views as to the most effective distribution of troops on the western frontiers. Jesup believed that large bodies of troops should be stationed in a few strong garrisons and thus create an impression of military power.⁷⁶ Conrad was of the opinion that the Indians were best overawed by a constant display of military force in their own immediate neighborhood. He maintained that troops should be located as near the frontiers as possible.⁷⁷ Jesup and Conrad agreed that the troops should be removed from their locations in the small villages.

On the whole, Conrad's views prevailed. To test his plan, Quartermaster Thomas Swords was sent to New Mexico in May, 1851, to make a survey and suggest necessary changes. Swords made a thorough examination of all the towns where troops were located. He found many unfavorable conditions such as high rents, shortage of water, grass, timber, and an unhealthy condition of the soldiers' morals.⁷⁸ Upon Swords's order the troops were moved from the villages to the frontier. Three new military posts—Forts

74. By General Orders Number 1, issued from the adjutant general's office, on January 8, 1851, a novel plan was tried in the United States army. To promote the health of the troops and to reduce the expense of subsistence, a system of kitchen gardens was instituted in the permanent posts and stations. The work was to be done by the soldiers. A program of more extended field cultivation, embracing the cultivation of grain for bread and forage and long forage was also contemplated for the frontier posts. This ambitious scheme was tried, proved a failure, and was ultimately abolished. General Orders, Number 1, January 8, 1851. Ms., General Order Books, XIII, O. R. S., A. G. O.; *H. Ex. Docs.*, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, p. 35.

75. Twitchell, *opus cit.*, II, 285.

76. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 225.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

78. *Ibid.*, pp. 235-229.

Conrad,⁷⁹ Fillmore,⁸⁰ and Union⁸¹—thus came into existence. In addition to the distribution of troops at the various posts, Sumner sent out Brevet Major James H. Carleton with a company of dragoons to scour the plains between Fort Union and the Arkansas River.⁸²

The federal government had ordered the establishment of military posts, the formulation of treaties, and the appointment of Indian agents. None of these solved the Indian difficulties. In February of 1851 congress extended over the New Mexico territory all the existing laws of trade and intercourse with the Indians, at the same time providing for the appointment of four Indian agents at an annual salary of \$1,500 each.⁸³ Calhoun was the first governor under the regular territorial government.⁸⁴ As the limits of authority of the civil and military officials were not clearly defined, his position was rather trying. Colonel Sumner disagreed with him about the method of defense.⁸⁵ Sumner and the inhabitants also clashed.⁸⁶

This lack of harmony emboldened the Indians to renew their depredations. On March 18, 1851, Calhoun issued a

79. Fort Conrad, situated at Valverde, occupied an elevated position of more than 4,000 feet above sea level. In 1853 the post was moved a few miles to the south and renamed Fort Craig. *Ibid.*, p. 203; John Garland to L. Thomas, October 29, 1853. Ms., Letters Received, Adjutant General, Old Files Section, Executive Division, Adjutant General's Office, Washington (hereafter cited as L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.).

80. Fort Fillmore was located on the east side of the Rio Grande about forty miles north of El Paso. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, p. 58.

81. Fort Union, situated about 100 miles northeast of Santa Fé, was to serve as a check upon the northern Apache and Utah. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 52, pp. 221-222; Billings, *opus cit.*, 260.

82. Calhoun, *opus cit.*, 417.

83. From 1851 to the eve of the Civil War a long list of Indian agents appeared in the territory. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 2, pt. 3, p. 446; Twitchell, *opus cit.*, II, 299, footnote 223.

84. Calhoun was inaugurated on March 3, 1851. Ms., Territorial Papers, listed in D. W. Parker, *Calendar of Papers in Washington Archives Relating to Territories of the United States to 1873* (Washington, 1911), Number 5304, Bureau of Rolls and Library, Archives Division, Department of State, Washington (hereafter cited as Ms. T. P., Parker, Number B. R. L., A. D., D. S.). The Territorial Papers used were typewritten, collated copies.

85. Prince, *opus cit.*, 192.

86. See pp. 260 *infra*.

proclamation authorizing the raising of a volunteer corps for the protection of the citizens of the territory against incursions of hostile Indians. He also authorized the Pueblo Indians to attack any tribe of Navaho that might approach their towns.⁸⁷ To President Fillmore, Calhoun wrote, "Until the Apache and Navaho are completely subdued we can have neither quiet nor prosperity in this territory."⁸⁸ In October, Indian agent John Greiner⁸⁹ reported that a large band of Kiowa and Arapaho had made several attacks on a peaceful Utah village, about thirty miles from Taos, had driven off all their stock, and had captured a number of women and children. The Utah were forced to retreat to Ojo Caliente where they were uniting their forces for a retaliatory attack.⁹⁰ The Navaho continue their depredations. The wild tribes of the territory continued their incursions into Mexico, attacking settlements in Sonora.⁹¹ Four new military posts appeared in 1852. As a bulwark against the Navaho, Fort Defiance⁹² and Cantonment Burgwin⁹³ were

87. Calhoun's proclamations, March 18, 19, 1851. Ms. T. P., Parker, Numbers 5307, 5308, B. R. L., A. D., D. S.

88. Calhoun to Fillmore, March 29, 1851. Ms., Letters Received, Secretary of War, Old Records Section, Adjutant General's Office, Washington (hereafter cited as Ms., L. R., S. W., O. R. S., A. G. O.).

89. Like Calhoun, Greiner was a capable and honest official who was held in high esteem by both Americans and Indians. Between July, 1851 and May, 1853, he served in the capacity of Indian agent, acting superintendent of Indian affairs, and secretary of the territory. Bieber, *loc. cit.*, III, 189, footnote 25.

90. John Greiner to Calhoun, October 20, 1851. Ms. T. P., Parker, Number 5324, Bureau of Index and Archives, Miscellaneous, A. D., D. S. (hereafter Bureau of Index and Archives, Miscellaneous cited as B. I. A., Misc.)

91. Conrad to E. A. Hitchcock, October 30, 1851. Ms., L. B., S. W., O. R. S., A. G. O.

92. Fort Defiance, some 190 miles west of Albuquerque was very strategically located, being at the mouth of Cañon Bonito, a favorite resort of the Navaho, and near fertile valleys and good water. On the eve of the Civil War it was considered the most isolated post of the frontier. *Sen Ex. Docs.*, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 96, pp. 424-426; "Reminiscences of Fort Defiance," in *Military Service Institutions of the United States*, IV, 90-91.

93. Cantonment Burgwin was named in honor of Captain Henry John K. Burgwin who had been mortally wounded at Taos on February 4, 1847. The post was situated in a beautiful but rough and mountainous country, about nine miles from Taos. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, p. 60; L. S. Lane, *I Married a Soldier* (Philadelphia, 1893), 46-47.

built in the Navaho country. Fort Webster⁹⁴ was established in the Santa Rita Copper Mine district; Fort Massachusetts,⁹⁵ the most northerly post in the territory, was built as a protection against the Utah and Apache.

Throughout 1852 the civil and military authorities in the department were formulating treaties and planning military programs in attempts to keep the Indians in check. In the winter of 1851-1852, Sumner and Calhoun met a large party of Navaho warriors and several principal chieftains at Jemez and proposed another treaty. Sumner told them plainly that unless they would cease their depredations the troops at Fort Defiance would prevent a single blade of grain from being raised. Many of the assembled Indians at first refused to consider the proposition of a treaty but finally, after an exciting council among themselves, agreed to sign and make binding the treaty previously concluded with Colonel Washington. The chieftains promised that the young braves would remain quiet in the future and that they would surrender all their Mexican prisoners. They gave hostages as a pledge of keeping the faith,⁹⁶ a pledge which was readily broken.

This treaty was accompanied by a display of energy by both the military and civil authorities of the department. On February 3, Sumner wrote to Adjutant General Jones that he had ordered a concentration of troops at Fort Conrad and had directed Major Howe to move immediately into the Apache country with three companies of cavalry and one of infantry.⁹⁷ A week later Calhoun wrote to Sumner re-

94. Fort Webster was situated about eight miles east-northeast of the Santa Rita Copper Mines, in the northeastern part of Grant county. The post does not seem to have had the desired effect upon the Indians. It was abandoned in December, 1853, and the troops removed to Fort Thorn. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 80. John Garland to S. Cooper, October 29, 1853. *Ms.*, L. R., A. G., O. F. S., E. D., A. G. O.

95. Fort Massachusetts was located in a sheltered valley on Utah Creek, about eighty-five miles north of Taos. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, p. 60.

96. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 541; Calhoun, *opus cit.*, 434.

97. E. V. Sumner to R. Jones, February 3, 1852. *Ms.*, T. P., Parker, Number 5345, B. I. A., Misc., A. D., D. S.

questing 500 stands of arms for the purpose of holding in check and chastising the Apache by an immediate expedition into their country with the militia of the territory. This request was refused.⁹⁸ In the same month Calhoun also wrote to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Luke Lea that he had sent S. M. Baird and Charles Overman, special agents for the Navaho and Apache, to Jemez and Socorro, respectively, to keep an eye on those Indian bands.⁹⁹ When the Gila Apache were committing depredations at San Antonio, between Valverde and Socorro, Sumner ordered a movement of troops there and issued an order for 100 stands of arms with ammunition for the use of the inhabitants in that district. However, as Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Brooks, commander at Santa Fé, was short of carbines and cartridges, the arms and ammunition were not issued.¹⁰⁰

Calhoun felt very much discouraged. In the latter part of February he wrote to Secretary of State Webster about the Indian dangers and about the inadequacy of the military protection. He pointed out that the federal troops in the territory were practically useless. Because of the feeble and half starved condition of their horses, the mounted men were unable to perform their duty. Infantry was of no value. The Indians were becoming bolder and bolder. The Apache had attacked federal troops and had forced them to retreat. On the *jornada* between Fort Conrad and Fort Fillmore, parties were being entirely cut off. The San Elizario-Santa Fé and San Antonio mail had been attacked despite the presence of military escort. A train of wagons loaded with government freight from Fort Fillmore to the Copper Mines had also been destroyed, the teamsters alone escaping. Calhoun enclosed a petition from the citizens of Socorro county signed by Rafael B. Garcia and 142

98. Calhoun to E. V. Sumner, February 11, 1852. Ms., T. P., Parker, Number 5342, B. I. A., Misc., A. D., D. S.

99. Calhoun to Luke Lea, February 29, 1852. Ms. L. R., C. I. A., I. O., D. I.

100. Sumner to Calhoun, March 21, 1852, D. V. Whiting to Sumner and H. Brooks, March 27, 1852, Calhoun to Sumner, March 28, 1852. Ms., T. P., Parker, Numbers 5348, 5349, 5350, 5353, B. I. A., Misc., A. D., D. S.

others, requesting greater protection.¹⁰¹ Suffering from ill-health and despairing of bringing about law and order in the territory, Calhoun, on May 6, 1852 left for the states.

Sumner again made a temporary display of energy.¹⁰² He established a strong military force in Santa Fé, formed a large camp at Albuquerque,¹⁰³ and negotiated a treaty with the Apache.¹⁰⁴ Conditions, however, did not improve. On June 23, Douglas presented to the senate a memorial from the citizens of New Mexico Territory, pleading for more adequate protection.¹⁰⁵ In response, Secretary of War Conrad promised that a detachment of mounted troops, nearly 100 strong, would leave Fort Leavenworth for Santa Fé about the middle of August.¹⁰⁶ But the promise of a mere 100 additional men meant little. A much larger force was needed. In November C. H. Merritt, marshall in New Mexico Territory, wrote to Secretary of State Seward that Indian outrages and depredations continued and that the military establishment was entirely inadequate to cope with the situation. He suggested that premission be granted to raise 1,000 mounted riflemen.¹⁰⁷

The New Mexico press championed the cause of frontier defense. It took Sumner to task for his peace policy and lack of military energy. The *Santa Fé Weekly Gazette*

101. Calhoun to Daniel Webster, February 29, 1852. Ms., T. P. Parker, Numbers 5340, 5341, B. I. A., Misc., A. D., D. S.

102. Upon Calhoun's departure, John Greiner was placed in charge of civil and Indian affairs, the position he held until the arrival of Governor Lane. When Sumner evinced a desire to take over the governorship, Secretary of War Conrad warned him against supplanting civil by military authority. He ordered Sumner to refrain from all interference in civil affairs. Conrad to Sumner, December 23, 1852. Ms., L. B., S. W., O. R. S., A. G. O.

103. Sumner to Webster, May 8, 1852. Ms., T. P., Parker, Number 5359, B. I. A., Misc., A. D., D. S.

104. On July 1, Sumner and Greiner met a half dozen Apache chiefs at Santa Fé and concluded a treaty. The usual promises were made by both parties to the agreement. This treaty was ratified by the senate on March 23, 1853. United States, *Statutes at Large*, X, 107-109.

105. *Senate Journal*, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., 485.

106. Conrad to Webster, July 30, 1852. Ms., T. P. Parker, Number 5370, B. I. A., Misc., A. D., D. S.

107. C. H. Merritt to W. H. Seward, November 30, 1852. Ms., T. P., Parker, Number 5375, Senate Files, A. D., D. S.

maintained that Sumner did not overawe the Indians. Peace had been bought rather than conquered. The wild tribes feigned friendship only when congress appropriated money with which to buy them presents. It was not Colonel Sumner but the "red cloths and calico shirts" that had cowed the Indians. Sumner retaliated. In a letter in the *Santa Fé Weekly Gazette*, March 5, 1853, he characterized the mass of the New Mexican population as "thoroughly debased and totally incapable of self-government." He went so far as to advocate the removal of the military posts, permitting the civil population to take care of its own defense.¹⁰⁸ Great resentment followed, resulting in Sumner's removal.¹⁰⁹

Despite reports of Indian depredations and the continual clamor for greater military protection, Secretary of War Conrad in his report to the president, December 4, 1852, maintained that Indian depredations in New Mexico Territory had been stopped. The Navaho and Apache, he stated, had been completely overawed and manifested a desire to be at peace with the whites.¹¹⁰ Conrad's sanguine report was not borne out by the existing conditions on the New Mexican frontier.

William Carr Lane,¹¹¹ who had succeeded Calhoun as governor and superintendent of Indian affairs for New Mexico Territory, had a theory of his own for solving the Indian problem. Being an advocate of peace, he believed that the most economical and effective way of keeping the Indians quiet was to feed and not to fight them. Accordingly, he made provisional treaties with some of the north-east and southwest Apache bands, agreeing to furnish food for five years and other aid to all that would work. Without waiting for approval of these treaties, Lane spent between \$20,000 and \$40,000 in the execution of his experiment.¹¹²

108. *Santa Fé Weekly Gazette*, February 26, March 5, 1853.

109. See footnote 116.

110. *H. Ex. Docs.*, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 2, p. 3; Calhoun, *opus cit.*, 290.

111. For a brief account of Lane's career, see Bieber, *loc. cit.*, III, 180-182, 197-201; Twitchell, *opus cit.*, II, 293, footnote 218.

112. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 432; *Santa Fé Weekly Gazette*, December 31, 1853.

A considerable number of northern Apache were induced to settle on a farm at Abiquiú and a like experiment was tried at Fort Webster. In the summer of 1853 about 1,000 Indians were being fed on these farms and about 100 acres were under cultivation. The experiment proved a failure. When the distribution of rations was suspended, the Apache became bolder than ever.¹¹³ Lane's policy proved unpopular and he was ultimately removed.

Meanwhile E. A. Graves of Louisville, Kentucky, and H. L. Dodge were appointed Indian agents. Dodge, who was to be the agent for the Navaho, was an excellent choice as he was well acquainted with Indian life and was able to exercise considerable influence over them. For a brief period depredations lessened but did not entirely cease.¹¹⁴ On June 1, Sumner reported to the adjutant general that the Navaho were again committing depredations.¹¹⁵ Shortly afterwards Sumner commenced operations for a formidable campaign and had his plans well advanced when he was relieved from command by Brevet Brigadier General John Garland.¹¹⁶ Lane was also succeeded at this time by David Meriwether.¹¹⁷

The half dozen years following the close of the Mexican War were characterized by constant Indian warfare on the New Mexican frontier. The wild tribes proved a source of constant terror and annoyance. Separating into small and predatory bands, the doughty warriors overran the country. They devastated farms, destroyed crops, drove off herds of cattle, murdered the inhabitants or carried them off into captivity. The federal government's policy of frontier

113. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 374.

114. E. A. Graves to R. McClelland, May 29, 1853. Ms., Miscellaneous Letters, I. D., D. I.

115. Sumner to S. Cooper, June 1, 1853. Ms., L. R., C. I. A., I. O., D. I.

116. On June 1, 1853, Lieutenant Colonel Dixon S. Miles, Third Infantry, was assigned to the command of the Ninth Military Department. Two days later Sumner again headed the department. On July 1 Miles took over the command a second time and held it until July 20, when he was succeeded by Brevet Brigadier General John Garland. Thian, *opus cit.*, 50.

117. For the previous career of Meriwether, see Twitchell, *opus cit.*, II, 296-297; *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 541.

defense had proved inadequate. Its Indian agents, treaties, military posts, and occasional punitive expeditions secured neither awe and respect for the white man's government nor peace for the inhabitants of the territory. Despite vast expenditures of money,¹¹⁸ the federal government's New Mexico defense policy to 1853 had been but partially successful. The solution of the Indian problem was to come later.

118. Between 1848 and 1853 the federal government had spent \$12,000,000 in the Ninth Military Department for defense, in addition to expenditures for civil service. *Sen. Ex. Docs.*, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pt. 1, p. 437.