

4-1-2011

Horses Worn to Mere Shadows: The Ninth U.S. Calvary's Campaign Against Apaches in New Mexico Territory, 1879-1881

Robert N. Watt

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr>

Recommended Citation

Watt, Robert N.. "Horses Worn to Mere Shadows: The Ninth U.S. Calvary's Campaign Against Apaches in New Mexico Territory, 1879-1881." *New Mexico Historical Review* 86, 2 (2011).
<https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr/vol86/iss2/4>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Mexico Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

“Horses Worn to Mere Shadows”

THE NINTH U.S. CAVALRY’S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE APACHES IN
NEW MEXICO TERRITORY, 1879–1881

Robert N. Watt

The Ninth U.S. Cavalry served in the territory of New Mexico from 1876 to 1881. African Americans composed the regiment’s rank and file, and, alongside the Tenth U.S. Cavalry, they are popularly known as the “Buffalo Soldiers.” Compared to other U.S. Cavalry regiments that participated in the Indian Wars from 1866 to 1891, these troops gained a reputation for high levels of discipline and low rates of desertion. A series of campaigns against Apaches, who were led first by Victorio (1879–1880) and then by Nana (1880–1881), marked the second half of the Ninth Cavalry’s tenure in New Mexico. At first glance, the Apaches’ guerrilla strategies and tactics defeated the Ninth Cavalry, who were withdrawn to Indian Territory at the end of 1881. This defeat did not reflect any lack of military prowess on the part of the regiment’s men and officers. Instead, an interplay of factors impaired the regiment’s ability to combat Apaches effectively. These issues fall into three main categories: Apache guerrilla strategy and tactics, the U.S. Army’s

Dr. Robert N. Watt currently lectures on the North American Indian Wars and U.S. domestic politics at the University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. The author would like to thank the following for their help, advice, and encouragement: Catherine Edwards, Durwood Ball, Willy Dobak, Dan Aranda, Emilio Tapia, Berndt Kuhn, Ed Sweeney, Robert Wooster, Bruce Dinges, Bill Cavaliere, Eric and Kathy Fuller, Spike Flanders, Frank Brito, Mary Williams, Karl Laumbach, Ron Burkett, George Hackler, James Irby, Allan Radbourne, Diana Hadley, Luis Perez, Paul Jackson, Dave and Suzy Marsh, Stuart Croft, John Bourne, and Jill Abrahams and Michael Musick (both of the National Archives in Washington, D.C.). I would also like to thank the anonymous referees for their very helpful feedback.

internal organizational structure, and U.S. Army political relations with other American and Mexican actors and institutions. This paper concentrates on the Apaches' targeting the Ninth Cavalry's horses and mules, poor U.S. Army logistical support, and the latter's effects on the regiment's combat readiness and morale. Hard field service against the Apaches impaired the discipline of the regiment and increased the desertion rate.

Causes of the Apache War, 1877–1881

An attempt by the Department of the Interior to concentrate Apaches on a single reservation at San Carlos, Arizona, served as the major cause of the Apache Wars during the late 1870s and early 1880s. This move broke treaties negotiated between various Apache bands and the United States during the early 1870s. The policy also completely failed to understand the hostile relations among different Apache groups.

Overall estimates of the Apache population can be found in the annual report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1880. The document estimated 4,878 Apaches resided on the San Carlos Reservation in Arizona and approximately 1,200 Mescalero Apaches lived on their reservation in New Mexico. The Apaches at San Carlos were listed as "San Carlos, White Mountain, Coyotero, Tonto, Chiricahua, Southern and Ojo Caliente Apache, and Apache Yuma and Mohave."¹ In this context, "Chiricahua" Apaches refers to the Central Chiricahuas led by the late Cochise, while the term Southern Apaches refers to members of the Southern Chiricahuas led by Juh. Victorio and Nana's immediate following were Ojo Caliente Apaches. This group was also known as the Warm Spring or Eastern Chiricahua Apaches; members of this sect living on the San Carlos Reservation were led by Loco. Although these figures should be treated with caution as an indicator of the total number of Apaches, a broad approximation of 6,000 Apaches appears reasonable. According to James Kaywaykla, a young child at the time, Nana and Kaytenna stated they had no more than 75 warriors "and that the Mescaleros and Chiricahuas who joined him did not exceed half that."² Thus, Apache testimony asserts that Victorio and Nana led, at a maximum, 115 to 120 warriors between 1879 and 1881.

Eve Ball recorded Kaywaykla's memories of these events some seventy years later so one has to be wary of memory lapses. Nevertheless, Andrew Kelley, a former employee on the Warm Springs Apache Reservation at Ojo Caliente, Socorro County, New Mexico, spoke to Victorio when the warrior visited the settlement of Canada Alamosa some time around mid-January 1880. On this occasion, Kelley noted that Victorio was leading sixty well-mounted

and heavily armed Apaches. Citizens, like Kelley, had good relations with Warm Springs Apaches and reported that they did not think Victorio had lost any of his following at this point during the campaign.³ In January 1880, the *Grant County Herald* estimated that the Apache leader had a total of ninety warriors.⁴

Some Apache leaders tried to adapt peacefully to the Department of the Interior's changes while others resisted. The first opposition surfaced when dissident Chiricahua Apaches, who had never accepted Cochise's treaty with Americans, contested the closing of the Chiricahua Apache Reservation at Fort Bowie, Arizona, in 1876. Many of these Apaches raided in Mexico and sold their plunder on the Warm Springs Apache Reservation at Ojo Caliente. This exchange prompted U.S. officials to close the Ojo Caliente reservation and transfer the Warm Springs Apaches to San Carlos in May 1877. These events brought Warm Springs Apache leader Bidu-ya, known among Mexicans and Americans as Victorio, to prominence. Bidu-ya served as the main leader of the Apache resistance from 1877 to October 1880, when he was killed at Tres Castillos just south of El Paso, Texas, in Mexico. His lieutenant Kas-tziden, better known to his enemies as Nana, continued Victorio's resistance in New Mexico until August 1881.⁵

Militarily speaking the Apaches formed a powerful force as guerrilla warfare experts who were quick to perceive and exploit any weakness in their enemies. In addition to this formidable foe, the Ninth Cavalry faced a number of internal and external political constraints on their freedom of action. Internally, the regiment contended with a higher command structure more concerned with the creation of a "European" army than supporting the military's effort to defeat hostile Apaches. A fragmented command structure, an inefficient logistical system, and limited resources undermined the Ninth Cavalry's combat efficiency.

Likewise, a number of external factors subverted the Ninth Cavalry's efforts to combat Apache guerrillas. The unit's chronic shortage of supplies stemmed from budget and manpower constraints that Congress imposed on the U.S. Army. The involvement of the Department of the Interior and the Department of State in affairs historically under the jurisdiction of the Department of War was another factor. The Department of the Interior, through its Office of Indian Affairs, was responsible for applying federal Indian policy. Owing to its policy of "concentrating" all Apaches on a single reservation, the Department of the Interior could also be blamed for the Victorio War. Moreover, the U.S. Army fell under the auspices of the Department of War, which feuded constantly with the Interior over who should direct Indian policy.⁶

The involvement of the Department of State highlighted a diplomatic constraint on the ability of the Ninth Cavalry to execute war against the Apaches when they crossed the border into the Republic of Mexico. The Department of State did not sanction the unofficial actions of the regiment once its members reached the border. To complicate matters even further, Mexican authorities were divided into federal and state entities, which often held conflicting views on the political implications of allowing U.S. troops into Mexico.⁷ Finally, the involvement of U.S. territorial (New Mexico and Arizona) and individual state (Texas) actors and institutions, namely governors and other political representatives, the press, state and volunteer troops, and citizens in general, contributed to the overall confusion. Support for the Ninth Cavalry from these sectors was lukewarm at best and hostile at worst. The New Mexican press, for example, was particularly belligerent toward the Ninth Cavalry, although it reserved the most vitriol for the regiment's commanding officer, Col. Edward Hatch. The press also utilized the enlisted men's African American lineage to vilify the U.S. Army's efforts to combat Apaches.⁸

Therefore, the Ninth Cavalry encountered a formidable series of challenges. The impact of horse and mule casualties, as well as poor logistics, also negatively impacted the regiment's effectiveness and morale. Yet, historians have conducted the least amount of research on the effects of these two issues.

The Killing and Crippling of Horses and Mules

The Ninth Cavalry sustained a number of fatalities between May 1879 and August 1881, losing twenty-seven men, including two officers (see table 1). In terms of casualties, the Ninth Cavalry clearly bore the brunt of the campaign against Victorio and Nana during this period.

Most of the human fatalities sustained by the Ninth Cavalry, from its formation in 1866 to the end of the Indian Wars in 1890, were inflicted by Apaches between May 1879 and August 1881. The Apaches wrought the most extensive damage by deliberately targeting the regiment's horses and mules in ambushes. They also led the Ninth Cavalry on long, gruelling pursuits across difficult terrain that eventually wore down or killed the unit's mounts. During the Ninth Cavalry's field service against the Apaches, the regiment's companies pursued Victorio and Nana in six different campaigns: from September to October 1879; from January to mid-February 1880; from April to early June 1880; from September to mid-October 1880; January 1881; and from mid-July to August 1881. The Ninth Cavalry's four campaigns against Victorio

Table 1. Casualties during the Apache Campaign of 1879–1881

	Killed in action	Wounded in action
Ninth Cavalry	27	28
Tenth Cavalry	9	5
Sixth Cavalry	2	—
Fourth Cavalry	1	3
Fifteenth Infantry	—	2
Navajo Scouts	3	—
Apache Scouts	4	5
Pueblo Scouts	2	—
Civilian Guides	2	2
Total	50	45
% of Ninth Cavalry losses	54	62

Sources: Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Cavalry, Bimonthly Muster Rolls, 1879–1881, Muster Rolls of Regular Army Organizations, 1784–1912, entry 53, Records of the Office of the Adjutant General, 1780s–1917, Record Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereafter RG 94, NA]; Sixth Cavalry, 1879–1881, r. 63–64, Ninth Cavalry, 1879–1881, r. 88–89, Tenth Cavalry, 1879–1881, r. 96–97, *Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments, 1833–1916*, Microcopy 744 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1972), Records of the Office of the Adjutant General, 1780s–1917, Record Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereafter microcopy number, RG 94, NA]; Ojo Caliente, New Mexico, May 1879–March 1882, r. 877, Fort Davis, Texas, January 1879–June 1891, r. 298, Fort Bayard, New Mexico, 1866–December 1879, r. 87, *Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800–1916*, M617, RG 94, NA; Capt. Henry H. Humphreys, Acting Commanding Officer Fort Bayard, to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, 19 January 1880, Santa Fe, New Mexico, entry 439, pt. 3, Records of U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821–1920, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereafter RG393, NA]; Telegrams Sent, District of New Mexico, January–November 1880, vol. 3, entry 431, pt. 3, RG 393, NA; Adam Kramer, Personal File, box 33, Personal Records File, entry 297, RG 94, NA; Augustus P. Blocksom, Personal File, box 463, Personal Records File, entry 297, RG94, NA; and Col. George P. Buell to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 20 November 1880, Fort Stanton, New Mexico, r. 42, *Letters Received by Headquarters, District of New Mexico, September 1865–August 1890*, Microcopy 1088 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1979), Records of U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821–1920, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereafter microcopy number, RG393, NA].

effectively ended in June 1880, when the unit found its equine casualties so extensive that it no longer had the means or resources to chase Apaches. The regiment's bimonthly company muster rolls show that between January and June 1880, the ratio of unserviceable to serviceable horses steadily changed until the former eventually exceeded the latter. By June 1880, the Apaches had effectively dismounted the Ninth Cavalry (see figure 1). As early as 25 February 1880, Colonel Hatch reported that the unit's field service against the Apaches had resulted in "horses worn to mere shadows."⁹




FIG. 1. AVAILABLE NINTH CAVALRY HORSES, 1879–1881

The gray bars represent serviceable horses and the black bars represent unserviceable horses. U.S. Ninth Cavalry, Bimonthly Muster Rolls, 1879–1881, entry 53, Muster Rolls of Regular Army Organizations, 1784–1912, RG94, NA.

More than hostile Apaches were at play in this equation. When examined the bimonthly muster rolls for the regiment reveal that the Ninth Cavalry was already chronically short of horses between January 1879 and December 1881. Only on rare occasions did the number of available men in each company match the number of serviceable horses. Even then the company still had only a few extra remounts, a necessary provision for warfare (see table 2). The companies in the Ninth Cavalry with enough horses to mount all available men enjoyed that capability only for a short time. In the bimonthly muster roll for January–February 1880, for example, companies I and K had more serviceable horses than available men, yet these units had not operated in the field. They participated in the pursuit of Victorio between April and June 1880. Their muster rolls show that at the end of February, companies I and K had fifty-seven horses for fifty-two men and sixty-three horses for sixty-two men, respectively. Two months later, following their initial campaign against Victorio, these figures had dropped to twenty available horses for fifty-six men in Company I and fifty horses for fifty-nine men in Company K. By the end of June 1880, Company I reported twenty-three horses for fifty-five men and

Table 2. Number of Serviceable Horses (SH) to Available Men (AM) in Ninth Cavalry, 1879–1881

	A		B		C		D		E		F		G		H		I		K		L		M	
	SH	AM	SH	AM	SH	AM	SH	AM	SH	AM	SH	AM	SH	AM	SH	AM	SH	AM	SH	AM	SH	AM	SH	AM
Jan./Feb. 1879	34	45	25	38	32*	42	55	56*	51*	52*	45*	35†	37†	44†	49†	45*	44*	52†	53†	42†	48†	47†	49†	
Mar./Apr. 1879	34	54	24	57	34	50	50	56†	60†	49†	52†	32	55	44	60	32	57	52†	53†	40	55	44	53	
May/June 1879	27	57	22	55	27	47	37	49	56†	47†	52†	28	53	43	58	28	57	51†	53†	39	56	45	55	
July/Aug. 1879	26	61	24	52	28	47	38	45	53	60	47†	28	56	37	57	33	55	47†	49†	35	57	42	54	
Sept./Oct. 1879	26	64	23	59	N/A	59	0	55	11	54	47†	N/A	59	15	61	35	50	48	55	25	60	44	55	
Nov./Dec. 1879	31	60	32	56	33	54	53†	55†	51*	48*	47	35	56	36	57	N/A	49	47†	50†	39	55	44	58	
Jan./Feb. 1880	N/A	55	17	55	N/A	60	40	60	25	52	34	53	54	17	54	57	52*	63*	62*	34	57	12	55	
Mar./Apr. 1880	18	35	22	58	16	47	15	42	29	49	7	38	40	66	N/A	58	20	56	50	30	57	N/A	67	
May/June 1880	18	47	24	48	19	49	N/A	49	1	54	12	44	30	64	28	53	23	55	9	63	N/A	33	64	
July/Aug. 1880	20	46	29	50	25	44	17	52	16	51	16	39	57	25	49	19	58	30	55	25	55	33	66	
Sept./Oct. 1880	40	55	44	56	34	54	14	50	41	53	30	55	62*	49*	48†	20	54	30	57	48†	54†	33	62	
Nov./Dec. 1880	37	56	46	60	46†	51†	16	56	40	56	35	38	61*	50	58	N/A	56	40	55	50*	48*	59†	62†	
Jan./Feb. 1881	40	53	55†	58†	43	53	42	50	40	57	38*	35*	61*	47*	34	58	N/A	50	46†	47†	48†	53	61	
Mar./Apr. 1881	38	52	58†	59†	43†	49†	39	54	36	50	40	57	63*	60*	50	61	38	52	43	53	49†	55†	58†	
May/June 1881	37	53	53*	51*	39	52	37	53	40	44	39	47	59*	45*	44	54	33	57	43	53	N/A	52	54†	
July/Aug. 1881	30	47	32	45	38†	44†	31	56	43	54	48	60	57*	53*	32	54	23	54	40	54	25	52	53	
Sept./Oct. 1881	40	54	42	56	53*	53*	43	60	47	55	48	54	57	60	50	61	31	58	47	63	44†	46†	58†	
Nov./Dec. 1881	68*	52*	52†	56†	57*	50*	N/A	63	54*	50*	63*	56*	60*	51*	46	60	65*	58*	63*	55*	53†	56†	54†	

Note: N/A=No figure entered on the return. NIA=Return missing from the National Archives.

*Serviceable horses equal or above available men.

†Six or less horses required to mount available men.

Sources: Ninth Cavalry, Bimonthly Muster Rolls, 1879–1881, entry 53; Muster Rolls of Regular Army Organizations, 1784–1912, Records of the Office of the Adjutant General, 1780s–1917, RG 94, NA; and Ninth Cavalry, 1879–1881, r. 88–89, Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments, 1833–1916, M744, RG94, NA.

Company K recorded nine available horses for sixty-three men. Indeed, from January 1879 to December 1881, the monthly return and bimonthly muster rolls of the Ninth Cavalry show that the regiment could not, at any point, claim to have a full complement of horses. Even during periods of the most intensive warfare with Apaches, the available men for field service still lacked horses to carry them.

The strategic and tactical effect of campaigning against Apaches is also revealing in regards to the loss of horses. The annual reports for the Secretary of War provide the overall number of horses “sold,” “died,” “lost,” or “stolen.” These figures, however, refer to general U.S. Army losses; they do not show the geographic location of these casualties. They also make no distinction among horses killed in action when fighting Apaches, mounts expired from exhaustion in pursuit of Apaches, or animals simply deceased from natural causes.

A comparison of the Ninth Cavalry’s loss of horses with the U.S. Army’s total loss of horses demonstrates the extraordinary attrition rates of mounts in the Ninth Cavalry during its operations against Apaches. Tables from the Quartermaster Department show that the number of U.S. Army horses died,




FIG. 2. NINTH CAVALRY MONTHLY RETURNS OF HORSES LOST

Ninth Cavalry, 1879–1881, r. 88–89, *Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments, 1833–1916, M744, RG94, NA.*

lost, or stolen from 1879 to 1880 and between 1880 and 1881 totalled 1,181 and 569, respectively.¹⁰ During the same time periods, the number of Ninth Cavalry horses died, lost, or stolen totalled 395 and 120, respectively (see figure 2). In other words, the Ninth Cavalry, one of ten U.S. Cavalry regiments, sustained 34.4 percent of the U.S. Army's overall loss of horses from 1879 to 1880, and 21 percent between 1880 and 1881.

The information presented in figures 1 and 2 strongly suggests that the Apaches' tactic of targeting horses during ambushes and their strategy of engaging the Ninth Cavalry in long pursuits were effective in dismounting portions of the Ninth Cavalry. Moreover, the monthly regimental returns, bimonthly company muster rolls, and some of the post returns reveal that approximately 271 of the 395 horses lost by the Ninth Cavalry from 1879 to 1880 can be directly or indirectly credited to hostile Apache action (see table 3). In other words, the loss of horses attributed to Apaches totals 68.6 percent of those lost by the Ninth Cavalry during this period. Indeed, of the 42 horses lost in August 1881, 33 were shot dead by Apaches. At the end of July 1881, Colonel Hatch could mount 343 troops out of 430 available men from eight companies. These numbers indicate a 9.6 percent fatality rate among the regiment's horses compared to a 1.7 percent fatality rate among its men (1 officer, 5 enlisted men).¹¹

The number of mules sold, died, lost, or stolen in the same time period also suggests that Apaches significantly affected their totals. While the monthly and bimonthly records do not show returns for mules, the aggregate accounting system used by the U.S. Army for these animals is indicative. Essential in the army's pursuit of Apache guerrillas, mules were more versatile than supply wagons, allowing detachments of cavalry and scouts to traverse difficult terrain without losing contact with their supplies. Although they increased overall mobility, mules appear to have been as vulnerable as the cavalry horses they accompanied. From 1876 to 1881, for example, the U.S. Army suffered its highest loss of mules in 1879 and 1880 (see table 4). Table 4 also shows a high number of mules sold by the army each year. Pursuit of Apaches could cripple animals not killed. Those animals that survived rough use and were judged unfit for active duty were sold to civilians. Table 5 shows a similar peak in both the cost and the number of mules purchased by the U.S. Army between 1879 and 1880.

Both table 4 and 5 suggest that the strategies and tactics employed by Apaches impaired the ability of the Ninth Cavalry to remain in the field. From 1879 to 1880, the army did not continuously campaign against American Indians except Apaches. Likewise, the army's authorized strength remained constant during those two years. Thus, the dramatic rise in the cost and the

**Table 3. Ninth Cavalry in Campaigns against the Apaches,
September 1879–August 1881**

Date	Company	Horses lost
September 1879	A	5 horses killed in action (KIA), 18 September* 1 horse abandoned, 15 September
	B	10 horses KIA, 18 September*f
	C	1 horse KIA, 18 September*f
	E	46 horses stolen, 4 September*
	f	52 horses stolen
	G	12 horses KIA, 18 September*f
October 1879	A	9 horses shot by order*
	C	4 horses shot by order*
	G	8 horses shot by order*f
	H	10 horses abandoned*
	L	2 horses abandoned*
January 1880	B	2 horses shot by order* 7 horses abandoned*
	C	9 horses abandonedf
	E	6 horses abandoned*
	H	4 horses shot by order* 5 horses KIA*
	M	4 horses shot by orderf 1 horse KIA, 30 Januaryf
	February 1880	B
	F	7 horses abandonedf
	H	3 horses shot by orderf
	L	1 horse shot by order*
	M	7 horses shot by order*
April 1880	A	12 horses lost exhaustion-thirst* 5 horses KIA*
	D	4 horses captured by Apaches* 7 horses abandoned*
	E	3 horses shot by order* 9 horses KIA*
	F	3 horses abandoned, 18 April*
	G	10 horses diedf
	H	3 horses died from exhaustion*
	I	3 horses died from exhaustion*
	K	4 horses died from exhaustion*f
	May 1880	E
	F	7 horses abandoned*
	I	7 horses abandoned*
	K	9 horses abandoned*
	L	12 horses abandoned*
	M	7 horses abandoned*f
June 1880	M	1 horse abandonedf

Table 3. (Continued)

Date	Company	Horses lost
September 1880	C	8 horses lost in stampede* ¹
	D	41 horses lost in stampede*
	F	2 horses abandoned*
January 1881	C	1 horse abandoned on scout ^f
August 1881	B	10 horses KIA or captured*
		8 horses KIA* [‡]
	H	9 horses KIA ^f
	I	6 horses KIA* ^f
	K	9 horses KIA*

Note: *Statistics compiled from Ninth Cavalry, September 1879–August 1881, r. 88–89, *Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments, 1833–1916*, M744, RG 94, NA
[†]“Record of Events,” in individual returns, Ojo Caliente, New Mexico, May 1880, r. 877, *Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800–1916*, M617, RG94, NA.
[‡]“Record of Events,” in individual returns, Fort Bayard, New Mexico, August 1881, r. 88, *Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800–1916*, M617 RG94, NA.
^fNinth Cavalry, 1879–1881, Bimonthly Muster Rolls, entry 53, *Muster Rolls of Regular Army Organizations, 1784–1912*, RG94, NA.

Table 4. U.S. Army Mule Losses, 1876–1881

	Sold	Died	Lost/Stolen	Total
1876–1877	500	449	247	1196
1877–1878	416	644	137	1197
1878–1879	535	482	276	1293
1879–1880	751	797	121	1669
1880–1881	594	529	158	1281

Sources: “Report of the Quartermaster-General,” in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1877*, 45th Cong., 2d sess., 1877–1879, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 1794, p. 290; “Report of the Quartermaster-General,” in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1878*, 45th Cong., 3d sess., 1877–1879, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 1843, 1878, p. 348; “Report of the Quartermaster-General,” in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1879*, 46th Cong., 2d sess., 1879–1881, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 1903, p. 307; “Report of the Quartermaster-General,” in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1880*, 46th Cong., 3d sess., 1879–1881, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 1952, p. 421; and “Report of the Quartermaster-General,” in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1881*, 47th Cong., 1st sess., 1881–1883, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 2010, p. 324.

number of mules purchased cannot be ascribed to any expansion of the U.S. Army during this period. The strongest indication that the Apaches had significantly affected the army’s budget came in late May 1880. At that time, Gen. William T. Sherman informed Colonel Hatch, via Brig. Gen. John Pope, that no money would be available to buy additional horses and mules until Congress could approve the army’s appropriation in July.¹² The problem for the Ninth Cavalry stemmed from a limited budget that did not account for the replacement of horses and mules required to maintain pressure on

Table 5. Mules Purchased by the U.S. Army, 1876–1881

	Cost (\$) of U.S. Army mules	Number of U.S. Army mules
1876–1877	105,915.12	842
1877–1878	151,245.63	1,162
1878–1879	156,963.23	1,489
1879–1880	276,045.30	2,265
1880–1881	111,744.80	1,006

Sources: "Report of the Quartermaster-General," in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War*, 1877, 45th Cong., 2d sess., 1877–1879, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 1794, p. 289–90; "Report of the Quartermaster-General," in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War*, 1878, 45th Cong., 3d sess., 1877–1879, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 1843, 1878, p. 348; "Report of the Quartermaster-General," in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War*, 1879, 46th Cong., 2d sess., 1879–1881, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 1903, p. 309; "Report of the Quartermaster-General," in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War*, 1880, 46th Cong., 3d sess., 1879–1881, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 1952, p. 420–21; and "Report of the Quartermaster-General," in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War*, 1881, 47th Cong., 1st sess., 1881–1883, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 2010, p. 323–24.

Apaches in the field. This data suggest that poor logistical planning and execution were significant and independent of any action taken by Apaches that impeded the Ninth Cavalry's ability to combat these guerrillas.

Inefficient Logistics

Logistics were a key element within the Victorio campaign. Both the Apaches and the army faced critical logistical constraints. The Apaches' Achilles heel was the maintenance of a secure and regular supply of ammunition for their breech-loaders while the army operated within the budgetary constraints laid down by Congress each year. For example, the general shortage in horses outlined in table 2 *predates* the flare-up of hostilities between Victorio and the Ninth Cavalry in September 1879. The Apaches did not create this situation; it resulted from poor logistical support. The shortage indicates that an inefficient system of supplying remounts already existed. Apaches only compounded the problem. The budget restraints imposed on the army by Congress directly affected the Ninth Cavalry's ability to confront hostile Apaches. In this system, if a Ninth cavalryman could be mounted, then he would leave his station with only one horse. The congressional budget given to the U.S. Army did not account for the rugged southwestern campaign that required either the stabling of a large number of remounts at various posts in the war zone or the accompaniment of each cavalryman by several remounts while he pursued hostile Apaches. Likewise, the purchase of replacement mounts for the Ninth Cavalry sometimes proved problematic. On 3 September 1879, Colonel Hatch noted that the majority of horses sent to the Ninth

Cavalry were too small to carry a trooper and his field kit.¹³ Almost exactly one year later, he noted that replacement horses were not acclimated to conditions in New Mexico and, on arrival, were often immediately deployed on difficult field service.¹⁴

Yet, the Apaches' strategy of targeting horses also had significant effects on Ninth Cavalry troops. As horses were rendered unserviceable or as the mounts died, more cavalymen became infantry and had to continue their pursuit of Apaches on foot. This reality wore out the dismounted men's clothing and boots and had a negative effect on the regiment's overall discipline, health, and morale. In a letter dated 12 February 1880, for example, a correspondent to the *Grant County Herald* reported his impressions of Maj. Albert P. Morrow's detachment after Ninth Cavalry men had been pursuing Victorio for almost a month:

At Tularosa we met Maj. Morrow and his command who had just arrived, (morning of the 4th) in close pursuit of Victorio and his band. His men were nearly destitute of clothing and rations, and it is a wonder that he has been able to keep up the fight and pursuit as long as he has, while labouring under so many disadvantages. The greater part of his men have been marching and fighting on foot across some of the most rugged country in New Mexico.¹⁵

The Ninth Cavalry also depended on local suppliers to provide forage for their horses and mules. Local citizens, usually ranchers, were appointed as contractors to supply feed for cavalry horses. The army contracting system was often ill adapted for keeping cavalry troops in the field, and throughout the Victorio campaign, the headquarters appointed, dismissed, or received the resignation of New Mexican citizens serving as forage agents.¹⁶

Consequences

The hard service performed by the Ninth Cavalry during campaigns against Apaches in New Mexico diminished the regiment's effectiveness in a number of ways. When the unit engaged Apache guerrillas, they invariably fought on the Indians' terms. Despite claims to the contrary by Colonel Hatch, not one example of a Ninth Cavalry detachment inflicting a defeat on the Apaches exists between 1879 and 1881. Hatch, for example, claimed the skirmishes that occurred with Apaches in and around Hembrillo Canyon between 5 and 7 April 1880 and near the U.S.-Mexico border on 5 June 1880 as major victories for the Ninth Cavalry. The fights between the Ninth Cavalry and

Apaches in Hembrillo Canyon, however, almost resulted in disaster for two detachments from the regiment. According to recent archaeological evidence, only the onset of darkness saved Lt. John Conline's company on 5 April. Before nightfall the Apaches had successfully pinned down his command and infiltrated round his flank into the rear of Conline's position.¹⁷ On 6 and 7 April, Capt. Henry Carroll and two companies of the Ninth Cavalry were trapped overnight in Hembrillo Canyon, only to be rescued by another Ninth Cavalry detachment and a mixed force of Apache scouts and men from the Sixth Cavalry.¹⁸ The Apaches withdrew in good order and would not have considered this endeavour a defeat.

The skirmish near the Mexican border on 5 June 1880 claimed the life of Victorio's son, Washington, and several other Apaches. The casualties are widely attributed to troops under Major Morrow's command. However, local newspapers credited Apaches attached to Morrow's command with the action; the U.S. Army did not rebut these reports.¹⁹ In fact, between 1879 and 1881, Apache scouts caused most of the casualties sustained by Victorio and Nana on U.S. soil. The Ninth Cavalry may have ended a number of skirmishes holding the field, and the men certainly displayed great valor and determination, yet the Medals of Honor awarded during this period were won in adversity not victory.

The failure to inflict a clear defeat upon hostile Apaches led to a number of problems within the regiment. The testimony of Ninth Cavalry officers and the monthly and bimonthly returns show a number of trends that suggest declining morale and discipline in the regiment. Lt. Col. Nathan A. M. Dudley, the Ninth Cavalry commander at Fort Cummings, New Mexico, in late 1880 and early 1881, noted a distinct drop in the discipline of the Ninth Cavalry men under his command. He attributed the deterioration of the regiment's behavior to the gruelling and often frustrating character of scouting after Apaches in small detachments, which in many cases were commanded by noncommissioned rather than commissioned officers. He also believed

Table 6. Comparative Desertion Rates

	Ninth Cavalry	Sixth Cavalry	Fifteenth Infantry
1879	15	101	53
1880	44	101	82
1881	81	90	83

Note: The Sixth Cavalry and Fifteenth Infantry were selected for comparison with the Ninth Cavalry since all three served in the Southwest from 1879 to 1881.

Sources: Sixth Cavalry, 1879–1881, r. 63–64, *Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments, 1833–1916*, M744, RG94, NA; Ninth Cavalry, 1879–1881, r. 88–89, *Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments, 1833–1916*, M744, RG94, NA; and Fifteenth Infantry, 1879–1881, r. 166–167, *Returns From Regular Infantry Regiments, June 1821–December 1916*, M665, RG94, NA.

Table 7. Ninth Cavalry Sick Rates by Company, 1879-1881

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	K	L	M	Total for month
Jan. 1879	1	1	2	—	2	4	1	3	5	—	4	5	28
Feb. 1879	—	3	—	1	1	6	—	4	6	—	4	4	29
Mar. 1879	5	3	1	2	7	3	2	—	5	2	1	4	35
Apr. 1879	4	2	2	1	1	5	2	—	3	—	2	3	25
May 1879	—	—	2	—	2	4	—	4	2	3	—	2	19
June 1879	—	1	1	2	2	5	3	2	2	1	1	3	23
July 1879	—	1	1	—	3	3	1	1	4	—	2	3	19
Aug. 1879	1	2	4	2	2	3	1	2	3	4	1	3	28
Sept. 1879	—	3	3	—	1	4	2	1	3	—	4	4	25
Oct. 1879	—	2	2	2	1	4	—	—	3	1	0	5	20
Nov. 1879	6	2	6	5	3	4	2	4	4	2	1	5	44
Dec. 1879	—	3	3	5	5	2	1	2	5	2	2	4	34
Total	17	23	27	20	30	47	15	23	45	15	22	45	329
Jan. 1880	4	3	2	4	5	1	2	—	1	3	1	1	27
Feb. 1880	2	6	—	5	4	1	1	5	8	7	—	5	44
Mar. 1880	—	3	3	1	—	4	1	3	1	3	—	—	19
Apr. 1880	4	2	2	8	3	7	1	2	6	4	—	—	39
May 1880	4	2	1	4	5	5	1	3	6	6	—	—	37
June 1880	4	1	—	3	4	3	1	4	9	4	2	—	35
July 1880	2	1	—	6	1	6	4	—	7	6	3	2	38
Aug. 1880	7	5	1	4	1	6	4	3	7	7	4	—	49
Sept. 1880	3	3	—	—	2	4	—	11	6	8	5	1	43
Oct. 1880	1	1	—	—	3	5	1	6	6	4	7	—	34
Nov. 1880	—	4	—	2	3	8	1	5	5	11	6	2	47

Continued to next page

Table 7. (Continued)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	K	L	M	Total for month
Dec. 1880	5	2	3	4	2	7	4	5	4	7	9	—	52
Total	36	33	12	41	33	57	21	47	66	70	37	11	464
Jan. 1881	4	1	6	2	2	11	3	—	2	6	4	2	43
Feb. 1881	2	1	4	5	2	9	6	2	6	6	5	1	49
Mar. 1881	4	5	2	3	2	4	7	2	7	4	5	6	51
Apr. 1881	5	5	11	1	8	5	7	2	8	5	2	4	63
May 1881	3	4	1	1	3	9	7	—	4	6	2	3	43
June 1881	2	8	7	—	5	10	2	2	2	3	3	—	44
July 1881	4	8	5	—	6	6	2	3	3	4	2	1	44
Aug. 1881	5	7	6	—	5	2	—	4	6	3	3	1	42
Sept. 1881	5	5	5	—	6	3	1	6	3	4	6	1	45
Oct. 1881	7	3	6	1	4	5	2	3	2	2	6	1	42
Nov. 1881	4	3	3	15	3	10	2	4	6	3	2	1	56
Dec. 1881	5	5	2	3	4	7	2	3	5	4	5	4	49
Total	50	55	58	31	50	81	41	31	54	50	45	25	571

Sources: Ninth Cavalry 1873–1880, r. 88–89, Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833–1916, M744, RG94, NA.

Table 8. Loss of Ninth Cavalry Personnel, 1879–1881

	Suffered disability		Dismissed by order of court martial
1879	7	3	13
1880	23	17	2
1881	47	10	52

Sources: Ninth Cavalry 1873–1880, r. 88–89, *Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments 1833–1916*, M744, RG94, NA.

that the punishing nature of this service led to a lower morale among his troops.²⁰ It was not uncommon for detachments to cover hundreds of miles of rough terrain without seeing, let alone engaging, hostile Apaches. Dudley, for example, reported an epidemic of army store pilfering by his troops for sale to the local community. In one instance, a trooper called Brown was caught trying to sell a carbine, stolen from another soldier, for eight dollars.²¹ In November, at Fort Cummings, two Ninth Cavalry men turned on each other; one man died while the other was hospitalized. The investigating officer found no apparent reason for the fight.²² In March 1881, a man was stabbed in a second brawl. The soldier claimed that his victim had “cursed him & that he was always trying to impose upon him.”²³

Dudley’s views were certainly influenced by his disdainful opinion of the capabilities of African American soldiers but the regimental returns suggest a diminishing morale in the Ninth Cavalry. The regiment’s desertion rate increased from fifteen men in 1879 to eighty-one men in 1881 (see table 6). During that last year, the Ninth Cavalry’s desertion rate was comparable to rates for the Fifteenth Infantry and Sixth Cavalry, both of which were white units. Historians have generally agreed that desertions among African American troops were lower than those in white regiments. This assertion was certainly true for the Ninth Cavalry in 1879, but by 1881, the desertion rates were broadly comparable with other regiments stationed in New Mexico and Arizona.

Hard field service also affected the regiment’s health and discipline record. The number of men reporting sick during this period steadily rose from 329 men in 1879, to 464 in 1880, to 571 in 1881 (see table 7). The number of troops lost through disability climbed dramatically between 1879 and 1881. When compared to the numbers of deaths caused by Apaches, the figures for deaths caused by disease were surprisingly low, probably because of the relatively benign climate in New Mexico. Yet, in 1880, when the regiment was effectively dismounted by the Apaches, disease claimed the most lives. This reality suggests a possible correlation between exhaustion through hard field service and weakened immune systems among some of the soldiers (see




FIG. 3. NINTH CAVALRY IMPRISONMENT

Ninth Cavalry, 1879–1881, r. 88–89, *Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments, 1833–1916*, M744, RG94, NA; and Ninth Cavalry, Bimonthly Muster Rolls, 1879–1881, entry 53, *Muster Rolls of Regular Army Organizations, 1784–1912*, RG94, NA.

table 8). Table 8 also allows us to examine the discipline of the Ninth Cavalry between 1879 and 1881. At first glance, it shows a decrease in the number of dismissals from the regiment by order of court martial during 1880. As Dudley pointed out, however, it could take between six and eight months to bring a case before court martial.²⁴ The discharge of men from the regiment as a result of court martial declined from 13 in 1879 to 2 in 1880. The number of discharges rose to 52 in 1881. Many of these individuals should have been charged in 1880. This delay was partly attributed to a shortage of officers in the Ninth Cavalry, which made it difficult to convene the number of officers required for a court martial. Dudley also noted a lack of officers needed to oversee or perform normal garrison duties at Fort Cummings.²⁵

The monthly regimental returns and bimonthly company muster rolls also show an increase in the number of men imprisoned for infractions against the Articles of War. These confinement rates peaked between July and August 1879 and spiked again between November 1880 and July 1881 (see figure 3). The latter is generally higher than the former and also coincides with the

Table 9. Ninth Cavalry Discipline Record, 1879–1881

	Company A	Company B	Company C	Company D	Company E	Company F	Company G	Company H	Company I	Company K	Company L	Company M
Jan./Feb. 1879	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Fair
Mar./Apr. 1879	Good	Good	Good	Good	Excellent	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
May/June 1879	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
July/Aug. 1879	Good	Good	Good	Good	Fair	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
Sept./Oct. 1879	Good	Good	Good	Good	Fair	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
Nov./Dec. 1879	Good	N/A	Fair	N/A	Fair	Good	Good	Fair	Fair	Good	Good	Good
Jan./Feb. 1880	Ordinary	Good	Good	Fair	Fair	Good	Excellent	Good	Fair	Fair	Good	Good
Mar./Apr. 1880	Good	Good	Good	Good	Fair	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
May/June 1880	Good	Good	Good	Good	Fair	Good	Good	Good	Fair	Good	NIA	Good
July/Aug. 1880	Good	Good	Good under circumstances	Good	Good	Fair	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
Sept./Oct. 1880	Good	Fair	Fair	Fair	Good	Only Fair	Good	Only Fair	Good	Fair	Good*	Excellent
Nov./Dec. 1880	Good	Fair	Very much improved	Good	Good	Improving	Good	Good	Good	Improving very much	Fair	Good
Jan./Feb. 1881	Good	Good	?	Good	Good	Fair	Good	Good	Fair	Fair	Good	Good
Mar./Apr. 1881	Good	Good	Fair	Good	Improving	Good	Good	Good	Fair	Good	Good	Good
May/June 1881	Very good	Good!	Good	Good	Good	Good	Very good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
July/Aug. 1881	Good	Good!	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Good
Sept./Oct. 1881	Good	Good!	Good	Very good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Fair	Good	Good	Good
Nov./Dec. 1881	Very good	Good	Good	Good	Good	Excellent	Good	Good	Excellent	Good	Good	Good

Note: N/A=No figure entered on the return. NIA=Return missing from the National Archives.

*Good—considering the amount of time the company was in the field.

Sources: Ninth Cavalry, 1879–1881, B1:Monthly Muster Rolls, 1879–1881, entry 53; Muster Rolls of Regular Army Organizations, 1784–1912, RG94, NA.

period when Lieutenant Colonel Dudley noticed an increase in discipline problems with the Ninth Cavalry men at Fort Cummings.

Although the Ninth Cavalry's returns suggest that the unit's grueling campaigns against hostile Apaches contributed to the rise of desertion, sickness, and discipline problems among the regiment's rank and file, the increased rates of illness and discipline infractions cannot be attributed to hard field service alone. Clearly, the Ninth Cavalry's arduous service in New Mexico from 1879 to 1881 undermined morale but it did not produce a general collapse in discipline. An increasing number of individual Ninth Cavalry men deserted, reported sick, or proved insubordinate as the campaign against Victorio and then Nana progressed. Equally, the efforts to combat Apaches during this period demonstrate that a majority of the Ninth Cavalry was more than willing to take the field for long, grueling campaigns in the desert Southwest (see table 9). Although the officers who filled out the bimonthly muster rolls noted some fluctuations, evaluating the discipline of their rank and file as "good" was very common. Throughout the campaigns, their appraisals never dropped below "fair." The criteria for these judgements remains unclear, but company commanders did not typically report poor discipline unless they were forced to by extreme circumstances, as an officer risked his superiors blaming him for such poor behavior. Nevertheless, a complete breakdown in discipline would have been difficult if not impossible to conceal.

Thus, at first glance, when Major Morrow campaigned against Victorio and his followers in September and October 1879, and again in January and February 1880, he and his soldiers held excellent records for maintaining contact with hostile Apaches. They continued their pursuit well beyond the expectations of Morrow's commanding officers. Although Morrow commanded more engagements with Apaches than any other officer in the Ninth Cavalry, the major did not decisively defeat them. Instead, Morrow and his black troopers may have unconsciously fallen victim to Victorio's ultimate strategy as their campaigns only resulted in exhausted men and high equine casualties.

Colonel Hatch tried to improve on Morrow's tactic by organizing three battalions in New Mexico, but, in April 1880, those converging units failed to trap hostile Apaches at Hembrillo Canyon partly because of poor communications and insufficient logistics. These issues had plagued Colonel Hatch's efforts to reorganize his troops prior to Hembrillo Canyon.²⁶ From late April to early June, Hatch was forced to adopt on a larger scale Morrow's earlier tactic of deploying the maximum number of available men in an attempt to remain on Victorio's trail. Likewise, these measures proved unsuccessful, and the regiment's losses in horses and mules effectively crippled the Ninth

Cavalry by June 1880. In May 1880, at the headwaters of the Palomas River, an Apache scout company, operating independently of the Ninth Cavalry, scored the army's only significant victory over Victorio. Poor communications and equine casualties already sustained by the Ninth Cavalry marred the Apache scouts' success because the regiment was unable to support Apache scouts in time or in sufficient numbers.²⁷

Col. George P. Buell's expedition from southern New Mexico into northern Mexico, which occurred in September and October 1880, involved six companies of infantry; two companies of Apache scouts; and nine companies of cavalry, three from the Fourth Cavalry and six from the Ninth Cavalry.²⁸ They also had support from approximately six companies of cavalry and three companies of Apache scouts from Arizona.²⁹ Although Buell's expedition significantly contributed to Victorio's demise at Tres Castillos, Chihuahua, at the hands of Mexican state troops, commanded by Col. Joaquin Terrazas, U.S. troops failed to make any contact with hostile Apaches. The ease with which Apaches could detect and avoid them presented a problem for such a large body of troops.

During September and October 1880, the monthly returns and bimonthly muster rolls show a general improvement in the balance between serviceable and unserviceable horses and they detect only a slight increase in the number of horses lost (see figures 1 and 2). This imprisonment suggests that commanding officers instructed field units to be more conscious of the high cost of replacing horses and mules, but as the Ninth Cavalry eased its pursuits, the regiment was far less likely to contact Apache guerrillas than they were on earlier expeditions. During this period, ammunition shortages prevented Victorio from adopting his usual decoy of engaging his pursuers in a long chase designed to cripple and kill the U.S. Army's horses and mules while his dependents slipped away. Thus, Victorio tried to avoid all contact with U.S. troops, and therefore, during the Buell Expedition, the Ninth Cavalry could not mount such hard pursuits, as they could not find a trail clear enough to follow, which, by default, led to lower equine casualties.

In 1881 Colonel Hatch resumed the strategy of sending a detachment, often dangerously small, in pursuit of Apache raiders, while attempting to guide units from other posts to the area. Scarce resources and extraordinary Apache mobility made these small detachments vulnerable to an ambush. Indeed, during August 1881, Apaches mauled three Ninth Cavalry units before other detachments could hone in on the Indian raiders and encourage their return to Mexico.³⁰

From 1879 to 1881, the U.S. Army's failure to create and deploy successful countermeasures against hostile Apaches probably caused increases in

individual disciplinary problems, sickness rates, and desertions. Despite its inability to defeat hostile Apaches during this period, however, the Ninth Cavalry did not exhibit any reluctance to continue the struggle, even in its final campaign against Nana in 1881.

Conclusion

The Ninth Cavalry failed against the Apaches between 1879 and 1881. The warriors who carried on the war after Victorio's death surrendered only when Gen. George Crook confronted them in Mexico's Sierra Madre in 1883.

When examining the Apache Wars, historians must remember the U.S. Army's political goals during its campaigns against Victorio and Nana from 1879 to 1881. The army either wanted to kill enough Apaches or harass them onto reservations. Despite its best effort, the Ninth Cavalry did not achieve these goals. The regiment faced opponents whose principles of war struck consistently at its weakest point: the ability to supply its companies with sufficient horses and mules and to keep those animals alive in the field. The strategies and tactics employed by the regiment's command also played directly into the hands of Apaches who intended to engage U.S. troops in long, drawn-out pursuits. By targeting horses and mules during ambushes, hostile Apaches proved all too effective in their fight against the Ninth Cavalry. Yet, Apache warfare techniques caused many Ninth Cavalry men to display their finest valor, tenacity, and steadfastness, even though Apaches often turned the regiment's best efforts against them. To neglect the Apaches' effect on the Ninth Cavalry's combat efficiency only underestimates the bravery and resolve exhibited by both sides during this war.

Notes

1. "Table of Statistics Relating to Population &c., by Tribes and Their Respective Agencies," in *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1880*, E. M. Marble (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1880), 360, 370.
2. Eve Ball, *In the Days of Victorio: Recollections of a Warm Springs Apache* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1970), 73.
3. *Ibid.*; *Las Cruces (N.Mex.) Thirty-Four*, 28 January 1880; Dan L. Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 261–62; and Karl W. Laumbach, *Hembrillo, an Apache Battlefield of the Victorio War: The Archaeology and History of the Hembrillo Battlefield* (White Sands, N.Mex.: White Sands Missile Range, 2000), 121.
4. *Grant County (N.Mex.) Herald*, 17 January 1880.
5. For the background and course of the Victorio campaign, see Ana Maria Alonso, *Thread of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution, and Gender on Mexico's Northern Frontier*,

- Hegemony and Experience series (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995); Ball, *In the Days of Victorio*; Eve Ball, *Indeh: An Apache Odyssey* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980); Peter Cozzens, ed., *The Struggle for Apacheria*, vol. 1, *Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars 1865–1890* (Mechanicsville, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 2001); Shelley Bowen Hatfield, *Chasing Shadows: Apache and Yaquis along the United States-Mexico Border, 1876–1911* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999); Charles B. Gatewood, “Campaigning against Victorio in 1879,” *The Great Divide* (April 1894): 102–4; Laumbach, *Hembrillo*; Stephen H. Lekson, *Nana’s Raid: Apache Warfare in Southern New Mexico, 1881*, *Southwestern Studies*, no. 81 (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1987); Sherry Robinson, *Apache Voices: Their Stories of Survival as Told to Eve Ball* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000); Joseph A. Stout, *Apache Lightning: The Last Great Battles of the Ojo Calientes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria*; Dan L. Thrapp, *Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches*, *The Civilization of the American Indian* series (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974); and Robert N. Watt, “Raiders of a Lost Art?: Apache War and Society,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 13 (Autumn 2002): 1–28.
6. See Robert A. Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865–1903* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988); and Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866–1891* (1973; repr., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984).
 7. See Bruce J. Dinges, “The Victorio Campaign of 1880: Cooperation and Conflict on the United States–Mexico Border,” *New Mexico Historical Review* 62 (January 1987): 81–94.
 8. Robert L. Hart, “Colonel Hatch and the Territorial Press during the Victorio War,” *Southern New Mexico Historical Review* 6 (January 1997): 44–49.
 9. Col. Edward Hatch to Assistant Adjutant General, 25 February 1880, vol. 5, District of New Mexico, General and Special Field Orders, Letters and Telegrams, entry 475, pt. 3, Records of U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821–1920, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereafter RG 393, NA]. For a slightly edited version of this letter, see Albert P. Morrow, Personal File, entry 297, box 71 and 72, Records of the Office of the Adjutant General, 1780s–1917, Record Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereafter RG 94, NA].
 10. “Report of the Quartermaster-General,” in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1877*, 45th Cong., 2d sess., 1877–1879, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 1794, p. 290; “Report of the Quartermaster-General,” in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1878*, 45th Cong., 3d sess., 1877–1879, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 1843, 1878, p. 348; “Report of the Quartermaster-General,” in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1879*, 46th Cong., 2d sess., 1879–1881, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 1903, p. 307; “Report of the Quartermaster-General,” in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1880*, 46th Cong., 3d sess., 1879–1881, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 1952, p. 421; and “Report of the Quartermaster-General,” in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1881*, 47th Cong., 1st sess., 1881–1883, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 2010, p. 324.
 11. Ninth Cavalry, July–August 1881, r. 89, *Returns from Regular Army Cavalry Regiments, 1833–1916*, Microcopy 744 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records

- Service, 1972), Records of the Office of the Adjutant General, 1780s–1917, Record Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereafter microcopy number, RG 94, NA].
12. Gen. William T. Sherman to Brig. Gen. John Pope, 29 May 1880, vol. 13, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, Military Division of the Missouri, entry 2539, pt. 1, RG 393, NA; Capt. John S. Loud quoting [Gen.] William T. Sherman's letter to Col. Edward Hatch, 31 May 1880, Fort Craig, New Mexico, vol. 3, January–November 1880, Telegrams Sent, District of New Mexico, entry 431, pt. 3, RG 393, NA; and Gen. William T. Sherman to Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, 28 May 1880, r. 14, *Special Files Created by the Military Division of the Missouri, Victorio Campaign, February 1879–November 1880*, Microcopy 1495 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service), Records of U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1821–1920, Record Group 393, National Archives, Washington, D.C. [hereafter microcopy number, RG 393, NA].
 13. Col. Edward Hatch to Assistant Adjutant General, 3 September 1879, r. 6, letter 438, vol. 19, January–October 1879, *Letters Sent by the Ninth Military Department, the Department of New Mexico, and the District of New Mexico, 1849–1890*, M1072, RG 393, NA; and Col. Edward Hatch to Assistant Adjutant General, 3 September 1879, in Maj. E. A. Platt to Commanding Officer, 24 October 1879, r.39, *District of New Mexico, Letters Received by Headquarters District of New Mexico, September 1865–August 1890*, M1088, RG 393, NA.
 14. "Report of Maj. James Biddle, 10 September 1880," in U.S. Congress, House, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1880*, 46th Cong., 3d sess., 1879–1881, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, pt. 2, serial 1952, p. 214.
 15. "Correspondence Mesilla NM Feb 12 1880," *Grant County (N.Mex.) Herald*, 21 February 1880.
 16. Special Order (SO) 12, 11 February 1879; SO 29, 2 April 1879; SO 28, 18 April 1879; SO 48, 17 May 1879; SO 67, 21 July 1879; SO 104, 20 October 1879; SO 17, 5 February 1880; SO 66, 11 June 1880; SO 114, 23 September 1880; SO 19, 16 February 1881; SO 80, 29 June 1881; SO 101, 25 August 1881; SO 96, 30 September 1879; SO 71, 28 June 1880; and SO 80, 29 June 1881, District of New Mexico Printed Special Orders, 1869–1888, entry 450, pt. 3, RG 393, NA.
 17. Karl W. Laumbach, Douglas D. Scott, and Jim Wakeman, *Conline's Skirmish: An Episode of the Victorio War; Archaeological and Historical Documentation of an 1880s Skirmish Site on White Sands Missile Range* (Tularosa, N.Mex.: Human Systems Research, Inc., prepared for the Directorate of Public Works, White Sands Missile Range, 2005), 50–70.
 18. Laumbach, *Hembrillo*, 169–86.
 19. *Las Cruces (N.Mex.) Thirty-four*, 2 June 1880; and *Grant County (N.Mex.) Herald*, 12 June 1880.
 20. Lt. Col. Nathan A. M. Dudley, 4 January 1881, r. 2, vol. 5, 26 October 1880–4 January 1881, Endorsements Sent, *Headquarters Records of Fort Cummings, New Mexico, 1863–1873 and 1880–1884*, M1081, RG 393, NA.
 21. Lt. Col. Nathan A. M. Dudley to U.S. Attorney for the Territory of New Mexico, 20 April 1881, r. 1, letter 710, vol. 7, 25 October 1880–24 June 1881, Letters Sent, *Headquarters Records of Fort Cummings, New Mexico, 1863–1873 and 1880–1884*, M1081, RG 393, NA.

22. 2d Lt. Charles W. Taylor to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, 2 November 1880, Fort Cummings, r. 5, Troops in the Field, Letters Received 1880–1881, *Headquarters Records of Fort Cummings, New Mexico, 1863–1873 and 1880–1884*, M1081, RG 393, NA.
23. 2d Lt. P. R. Powell to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, 26 March 1881, Fort Cummings, New Mexico, r. 3, letter 71, vol. 3, Register of Letters Received, 3 January 1881–3 March 1882, *Headquarters Records of Fort Cummings, New Mexico, 1863–1873 and 1880–1884*, M1081, RG 393, NA.
24. Lt. Col. Nathan A. M. Dudley, 4 January 1881, r. 2, vol. 5, 26 October 1880–4 January 1881, Endorsements Sent, *Headquarters Records of Fort Cummings, New Mexico, 1863–1873 and 1880–1884*, M1081, RG 393, NA.
25. Lt. Col. Nathan A. M. Dudley, 18 December 1880, r. 2, vol. 5, 26 October 1880–4 January 1881, Endorsements Sent, *Headquarters Records of Fort Cummings, New Mexico, 1863–1873 and 1880–1884*, M1081, RG 393, NA.
26. Col. Edward Hatch to Assistant Adjutant General, 23 February 1880, vol. 5, District of New Mexico General and Special Field Orders, Letters and Telegrams Sent, entry 475, pt. 3, RG 393, NA. See similar comments in Col. Edward Hatch to Assistant Adjutant General, 25 January 1880, District of New Mexico General and Special Field Orders, Letters and Telegrams Sent, vol. 3, entry 431, pt. 3, RG 393, NA; Capt. John S. Loud to Assistant Adjutant General, 23 March 1880, vol. 3, Telegrams Sent, District of New Mexico, January–November 1880, entry 431, pt. 3, RG 393, NA; Col. Edward Hatch to Assistant Adjutant General, 16 March 1880, r. 14, *Special Files Created by the Military Division of the Missouri, Victorio Campaign, February 1879–November 1880*, M1495, RG 393, NA; Col. Edward Hatch, General Field Orders No. 1, 23 February 1880, General Orders, Circulars and Court Martial Orders, 1870–1881, Department of Arizona, District of New Mexico, entry 183, pt. 1, RG 393, NA; and Col. Edward Hatch, General Field Orders No. 1, 23 February 1880, Printed Special Orders, 1869–1888, District of New Mexico, entry 446, pt. 3, RG 393, NA.
27. “The Fight on the Headwaters of the Palomas,” *Grant County (N.Mex.) Herald*, 29 May 1880. For a different version, see Col. Edward Hatch to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, 25 May 1880, Santa Fe, vol. 5, District of New Mexico General and Special Field Orders, Letters and Telegrams, entry 475, pt. 3, RG 393, NA.
28. Col. George P. Buell to Assistant Adjutant General, 20 November 1880, Fort Stanton, New Mexico, r. 42, Department of Missouri, January–April 1881, file 658–1658, *Letters Received by Headquarters District of New Mexico, September 1865–August 1890*, M1088, RG 393, NA. In June 1880, Buell, the commanding officer of the Fifteenth Infantry Regiment, was placed in charge of U.S. troops in New Mexico and, thus, directed the operations against Victorio in September and October 1880.
29. Col. Eugene A. Carr to Assistant Adjutant General, 12 September 1880, Fort Bowie, Department of Arizona, letter 552, vol. 8, 6 September–12 December 1880, Troops in Southeastern Arizona, Department of Arizona, entry 232, pt. 1, RG 393, NA; and Col. Eugene A. Carr to Adjutant General, 19 September 1880, Whipple Barracks, Department of Arizona, letter 569, vol. 8, 6 September–12 December 1880, Troops in Southeastern Arizona, Department of Arizona, entry 232, pt. 1, RG 393, NA; and Special Orders No. 58, 17 September 1880, Headquarters, Troops in the Field in Southeast Arizona, Camp near Fort Bowie, Arizona Territory, vol. 2, Special Orders, October 1879–January 1881, Department of Arizona, entry 239, pt. 1, RG 393, NA.

30. On 12 August 1881, Capt. Charles Parker lost five men, two killed and three badly wounded, in a detachment of nineteen men at Carrizo Canyon. Lts. George R. Burnett and Gustavus Valois fortunately suffered no fatalities. Two of their men, however, were seriously wounded in the Cuchillo Negro Mountains in western New Mexico on 16 August 1881. Lt. George W. Smith and three men were killed and three others wounded in Gavilan Canyon on 19 August 1881. See Lekson, *Nana's Raid*, 22–26, 30–31; and Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria*, 211–16.