A Long Time Coming: The Seventeenth-Century Pueblo-Spanish War

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In his prize-winning book *When Jesus Came, The Corn Mothers Went Away, Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500–1846* (1991), historian Ramón A. Gutiérrez implied that New Mexico’s seventeenth-century Franciscan missionaries routinely abused their Pueblo Indian neophytes. “New Mexico’s Indians,” Gutiérrez informed us, “were conquered and made mansos [submissive] by a technique for which Fray Nicolás Hidalgo was renowned. In 1638 the friar beat Pedro Acomilla of Taos Pueblo and grabbed him ‘by the member and twisted it so much that it broke in half.’” If, for a fact, grabbing Pueblo men’s penises had been standard procedure in the missions, I dare say that the Pueblo-Spanish War, fought between 1680 and 1696, would have been not such a long time coming.¹

So why, through three entire generations—born, lived out, and buried between the Spanish assault on Acoma in 1599 and the Pueblo siege of Santa Fe in 1680—was redemption so long in coming? Was the colonial regime not really so bad after all? Did the benefits of coexistence repeatedly undermine the urge to revolt, even as smallpox, measles, and flu cruelly reduced the Pueblo Indian population? Or were the Pueblos so deeply divided by traditional grudges—and by the new promise of settling old scores through alliance with Spaniards—that they simply could not rally themselves until 1680?

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A united pre-Hispanic Pueblo world never existed. Taken together, rock and kiva art showing men in combat, projectile points embedded in human bones, mass graves, burned communities, and defensive works testify that this evolving island of town-dwellers was no native Eden before the advent of rapacious Europeans. Nor was this a constant war zone. Warrior gods appeared early in Pueblo creation stories, and evidently hunt and war societies formed to honor them and to feed and protect their people. Yet much of life went on peaceably as various groups exchanged edible, material, and even cultural resources. Cooperation and conflict ebbed and flowed at different times and different places (just as they would during the colonial period). Some late-thirteenth and fourteenth-century discord likely followed upon the introduction of the new kachina ceremonial system borne up from Mesoamerica, as it certainly did when a new Christian ceremonial system arrived two hundred years later.2

As Spaniards fastened their one true religion, common sovereignty, and lingua franca upon New Mexico, they took advantage of Pueblo disunion, enlisting Pueblo Indians to fight other Pueblo Indians. Soon enough, however, as encircling nomadic peoples threatened New Mexico’s agricultural heartland, colonial authorities began to rely on mixed Pueblo Indian auxiliaries who on campaign regularly outnumbered Spanish men-at-arms.

More than once, numerically superior Pueblo Indian fighters sought retaliation not against the kingdom’s nomadic enemies, but against the kingdom itself. Once Spaniards discovered the plots, these conspiracies broke apart, and the survivors took their grievances back underground. In 1680, however, the colony’s recovery from environmental calamity and the emergence of ironfisted Pueblo leaders, at long last, produced the desired outcome. To stunned Spaniards, it was as if the familiar quotas of Pueblo auxiliaries set out one day on campaign and came back the next an angry, ordered, overpowering mob.

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Back in the mid-sixteenth century, Spaniards who first broke in on the Pueblo world were already well practiced in using Indian peoples against each other or as allies in common battles. Francisco Vázquez de Coronado’s reverberating entrada of 1540—upwards of four hundred mounted Europeans and three times as many formidable Mexican Indian auxiliaries—upset the prevailing Pueblo balance of power. Only the self-assured inhabitants at Cicuique, or Pecos, the populous easternmost gateway between pueblos and plains, sent a diplomatic mission to welcome the invaders. “Cieuye [Cicuique],” Coronado’s chronicler Pedro de Castañeda de Nájera recalled, “is a pueblo of as many as five hundred fighting men. It is feared throughout that
NATIVE GROUPS IN AND AROUND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW MEXICO
(Map drawn by Deborah Reade, Santa Fe, from John L. Kessell, Pueblos, Spaniards, and the Kingdom of New Mexico, 2008, courtesy University of Oklahoma Press)
whole land. . . . The people of this pueblo boast that no one has been able to subjugate them and that they subjugate [whichever] pueblos they want to."

En route to Cicuique, Coronado’s troop came upon “a fine, large pueblo, destroyed during their wars.” Although relations quickly soured when Spaniards took Cicuique hostages, Coronado testified at his trial in Mexico City that he had requested fighting men from Cicuique to help subdue Tiguex, the province of Southern Tiwas in the vicinity of modern-day Albuquerque. Cicuique’s headmen envisioned a colonial scheme of their own. Their community, cramped by a short, high-elevation growing season and constricted farms, coveted Tiwa land in the lower-lying Rio Grande Valley. “They asked the general,” Coronado’s testimony states, “to give them a pueblo there, which they could settle with their people. And they said that they were coming to help in the war.” But the Tiguex war ended, and the deal was never struck.6

Acoma, another seemingly aggressive pueblo, lacked the population of Cicuique but sat atop an all but unassailable height at the western gateway to the Rio Grande Valley. Its estimated two hundred warriors, characterized by Castañeda as “raiders feared throughout the land and region,” could strike at others and withdraw to the safety of their natural stronghold.7

Spaniards who came after Coronado also noted inter-Pueblo hostilities. Antonio de Espejo’s brash, fast-moving outfit, numbering at most a few dozen, was apparently the first expedition to use Pueblo Indian auxiliaries against other Pueblos in 1583. A contingent of Zuni men armed with bows and arrows volunteered to accompany the expedition to the Hopi pueblos. “Since about thirty of these friendly natives had come with us from the province of Sumi [Zuni], influenced by the Mexican Indian brothers, Andrés and Gaspar—two of those left by Coronado—and these warriors showed a fine spirit, saying they wanted to die wherever the Castillos died, we cut up pieces of red felt and put a colored sign on each man’s head so that all could be recognized.” Although this time the Hopis chose not to fight, no soldier who ever served in a foreign people’s homeland would have failed to appreciate the red insignias that distinguished friendly Zunis from potentially hostile Hopis.8

Fifteen years later, in the summer of 1598, Pueblo lookouts sighted a larger column of Spaniards moving laboriously up the Rio Grande Valley. Bulky animals strained at overloaded carts, children and women walked beside or rode, while cursing men tried to keep livestock from straying. No mere adventurers, these were migrants looking for a new home.

Most of the Southern Tiwas, whose elders recalled their brutal strife with Coronado, simply vacated their pueblos and let these strangers pass by. Developer Juan de Oñate’s many-hued colonists, six or seven hundred in all, finally moved in amidst the Tewas at the pueblo of Ohkay Owingeh,
some twenty-five miles north of later Santa Fe. Oñate called the place San Juan Bautista. Hardly catching a breath, these new arrivals began to explore in every direction looking for mines and performing unintelligible acts of possession in Pueblo communities. Among the hollow benefits promised by Oñate was the *pax hispanica*, an end to conflict in the Pueblo world.9

Pecos, assaulted eight years earlier by the renegade entrada of Gaspar Castaño de Sosa, chose not to resist. Quizzical Pecos guides, hunters, and observers surely accompanied Vicente de Zaldívar and his metal men in September 1598 as they rode out from Pecos onto the plains to corral buffalo. The high and mighty Acomas, in contrast, did resist, throwing down the gauntlet later in 1598 by killing Juan de Zaldívar, Oñate’s second-in-command and brother of Vicente, along with a dozen of his men. Rather than withdraw the vulnerable little colony—probably outnumbered at the time a hundred-to-one in the Pueblo world—a firm-jawed Oñate directed Vicente de Zaldívar and some seventy armed Spaniards to bring the Acomas to European justice. Neither he, nor poet Gaspar Pérez de Villagrá, said anything about enlisting Pueblo auxiliaries.10

Before the colony’s restoration by Diego de Vargas in the 1690s, hardly anyone gave credit to allied Pueblo Indian fighting men. They might indeed have accompanied Vicente de Zaldívar’s force, only to be ignored in formal accounts of the battle, just as Coronado ignored his massive contingent of Mexican Indians.11

At the very least, the vicious three-day fight at Acoma in 1599 must have attracted more than a few Pueblo spectators. Testifying in the wake of the Spaniards’ numbing victory, Pérez de Villagrá swore that the Acomas had “wanted nothing more than to kill all the Spaniards in the army, and after disposing of them to kill the Indians at the pueblos of Zía, Santo Domingo, and San Juan Bautista, because they had failed to kill the Spaniards.”12

The presence of Pueblo auxiliaries at Acoma in January 1599, however, would help to explain that improbable Spanish victory. And why should we not suppose that Oñate’s Spaniards recruited Pueblo Indian allies for their major expeditions eastward across the plains in 1601 and westward to the Gulf of California in 1605, except that no Spaniard bothered to mention them?

A generation later, in 1634, Franciscan propagandist Alonso de Benavides observed that the Tewa nation, among which Oñate’s colonists first settled, “is very attached to the Spaniards, and when a war breaks out they are the first to join and accompany them.” Benavides gave credit to one of his fellow friars for establishing peace between Tewas and Jemez who had been previously, according to Benavides’s excited account, “so hostile to the Christian Teos [Tewas], their neighbors, that one of their captains wore around his neck a
In February 1632, Zunis at the pueblo of Hawikuh had risen and murdered Fray Francisco Letrado. Why would the Spanish punitive force that camped at El Morro a month later “to avenge the death of Father Letrado” not have included eager members of Tewa war societies?

Pueblo men, traditionally good fighters, had their own reasons for joining the Spaniards. Besides a furlough from their missions and a chance to travel, campaigning alongside Spaniards allowed them to demonstrate their fighting prowess, to exact revenge on their own enemies, and to share in the spoils of war, including trophy scalps. The Spaniards’ motives hardly mattered. Military campaigns often turned to trading or slaving, and commercial ventures sometimes broke into fights.

By enlisting Pueblo Indian auxiliaries against other Pueblo Indians, Spaniards kept pre-contact animosities alive or created new ones, thus preventing the Pueblo world’s fighting men from joining forces against them. When, however, Spanish governors resorted to gathering quotas of Pueblo males from different communities and language groups to campaign together against common enemies of the kingdom, a notable shift occurred. Alien Pueblo war captains got to know each other and learned to fight shoulder-to-shoulder. Recruitment fell to New Mexico’s half dozen alcaldes mayores, or district officers, who parleyed with local Pueblo leaders for the desired number of Pueblo fighters. Throughout the century, as the non-Christian, non-town-dwelling peoples who ringed the Pueblos’ homeland—Apaches, Navajos, and Utes—increasingly raided from horseback, Spaniards grew ever more dependent on mixed Pueblo Indian allies.

Corps of Native fighters could also be employed for personal gain. During the brief and raucous administration of Gov. Bernardo López de Mendizábal, New Mexico’s Franciscans raised a chorus of protests. Rather than defend the kingdom from invading bands of heathens, López had turned its scant military resources toward taking slaves for sale in the mines to the south. “For this purpose of making captives,” the friars complained to superiors in Mexico City, the governor in September 1659 “sent out an army of eight hundred Christian Indians and forty Spaniards, though there was evident risk at the time.” Even if the Franciscans exaggerated, a force of half that size would have included Indian men from many different pueblos.

To coordinate such a complex, polyglot enterprise, Governor López must have relied upon don Esteban Clemente, Native captain general of the eastern frontier and the most prominent, thoroughly Hispanicized Pueblo Indian in the kingdom. Distinguished by the honorific “don,” military rank, and likely a written commission, cane of authority, and items of a Spanish
officer’s uniform, Clemente by all odds rode a horse and wielded a sword and arquebus. Yet most of the hundreds of Pueblo Indians on the expedition of 1659 probably still walked—they could make twenty to thirty miles in a day—and camped a little way off from the Spaniards. Protected in combat by hide helmets, shirts, and shields, they relied for fire power on bows and arrows, at times on slings and dart-like spears, and at close quarters on a variety of clubs.

The Spanish-speaking Clemente, raised in the Tompiro missions of the dry Salinas province a hundred miles south of Santa Fe, knew several Native languages and ran a trading operation to Plains Apaches. Both a business associate of the governor and a favorite of the Franciscans, Clemente got caught in the crossfire between church and state. The missionaries condemned Pueblo Indian kachina dances, while Governor López, who considered these ceremonials nothing more than harmless folk rituals, encouraged their revival. In 1660 the scandalized friars urged Clemente to dictate a statement condemning these “idolatrous” Pueblo rites. The kachinas, a dutiful Clemente swore, “are evil.”

Toward the end of the 1660s, the kachinas and whatever other powers controlled the Pueblo universe seemed bent on revenge. Searing drought, famine, disease, crop and supply failures, and ever more frequent Apache raids scourged the kingdom. Hard-pressed governors appealed to the friars to empty their mission larders in support of defensive campaigns. Gov. Juan de Medrano y Mesía in the summer of 1669, hoping to lay waste the crops of western Apaches and Navajos, vowed to launch from the Jémez pueblos a force of fifty armed colonists and six hundred Christian Indians.

To parry thrusts from eastern or Plains Apaches, Governor Medrano in 1670 appointed combat-scarred Capt. Juan Domínguez de Mendoza as field commander of thirty Spanish men-at-arms and three hundred Pueblo auxiliaries. Designating Abó, home pueblo of Esteban Clemente, as the staging area, the governor, not surprisingly, failed even to mention Clemente.
Whether he came gradually to treason or decided all of a sudden, Clemente conspired to overthrow the colonial regime and win back the kachinas. The Spaniards’ brutal crackdown on his Piro neighbors late in the 1660s may have contributed to the timing of Clemente’s attempted revolt, probably around 1670.

The inevitably thick file of writs and declarations that described what Clemente tried to do has gone missing. All we have today is a statement made in 1681 by Diego López Sambrano, a tall, red-headed, and beady-eyed Hispanic native of Santa Fe, hated by the Tewa Indians. According to López Sambrano:

An Indian named Don Esteban Clemente, governor of all the Salinas pueblos, whom the whole kingdom secretly obeyed, launched another conspiracy which was general throughout the kingdom. He ordered the Christian Indians to drive all the horse herds of every district into the mountains, so as to leave the Spaniards afoot, and on Maundy Thursday night, as was attempted during the administration of General Concha [1649–53], to consume the entire body of Christians, sparing not a single friar or Spaniard. Having exposed this treason, they hanged said Indian, Don Esteban, and calmed the others, and when the property of said Indian was seized there was found in his house a great quantity of idols and whole pots of idolatrous powdered herbs, feathers, and other disgusting things.

Clemente had fallen short. His revolt was simply not a long enough time coming. The eleventh chapter of 2 Samuel in the Christian Old Testament begins, “In the spring of the year, the time when kings go out to battle.” Both Clemente and his unnamed predecessor plotted to engage the Spaniards in the spring during Christian Holy Week. Would not mid-August, as all hands turned to the ripening harvest, have been a more opportune season? In retrospect we might also question an insurgency planned for the worst of times, when resources were scarce and everyone went armed. Chances were, when conditions improved, the Spanish ruling class would grow lax and less alert. After years of recruiting Pueblo Indian auxiliaries to accompany Spaniards on campaign, Clemente had apostatized to marshal the same Pueblo war captains against the colonial regime. Why would they have trusted him? He was too widely known, his connections too inclusive, and someone informed the Spaniards.

With the collapse of Clemente’s project and the abandonment of the Salinas and some Piro pueblos in the 1670s, energy in the Pueblo world shifted notably from south and east to north and west, back to the heartland of the
Tewas and their Tano (or Southern Tewa) allies, along with an unsubmissive circle of outlying neighbors.

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Pueblo-Spanish relations pivoted on the year 1675. Combative Juan Durán de Miranda, ousted as governor in 1665 but reappointed in 1671, was finally leaving. By one of his last acts, Miranda commissioned Juan Domínguez de Mendoza to lead fifty-four Spanish men-at-arms and two hundred fifty Pueblo auxiliaries against Faraón Apaches in central New Mexico. Whether they chose to admit it, by this time Spanish and Pueblo defenders of the kingdom had become codependent.

Not much of a record survives for the incoming governor Juan Francisco Treviño, except for one fateful episode. In 1675 the mission supply caravan returning to Mexico City carried not only former governor Miranda but also Franciscan superior Francisco de Ayeta, en route to appeal at the viceroy’s court for aid to the desperate colony. The rumble of the wagons had scarcely faded when Treviño found himself in deep distress.

Again our best source is colonist López Sambrano, who stood center stage in the developing drama. At San Ildefonso Pueblo, northwest of Santa Fe, an Indian interpreter had accused Tewa “sorcerers” of bewitching long-suffering Fray Andrés Durán. The new governor, frightened by locals into condoning a witch hunt, dispatched his secretary Francisco Javier, along with López Sambrano, Luis de Quintana, and other vigilante riders, to sweep through Tewa country rounding up alleged sorcerers and confiscating ceremonial paraphernalia. It did not end there.

Father Ayeta recalled later the “repeated and severe punishments” Spanish governors had inflicted on practitioners of Pueblo religion, in his words, most “recently in the year ’75 . . . by Don Juan Francisco Treviño, who hanged four Indians in one day and had forty-three sentenced to whipping and being sold into slavery as convicted and confessed idolaters, sorcerers, and homicides.” The preemptive hangings took place among three different Pueblo language groups—Tewas, Keres, and Jemez—indicating a wider circle of unrest. Jailers whipped the prisoners, but before they could be sold, Tewa fighting men staged a daring coup.

López Sambrano picks up the story: “One morning more than seventy Indians armed with macanas [clubs] and leather shields entered the house where the said general [Treviño] was, filling two rooms.” Keen observers of Spanish behavior, these Tewa men, like their fathers and grandfathers before them, carried token gifts. But they were armed, and an unflinching resolve shown in their eyes. They demanded that the governor pardon and release the prisoners or they would kill him and attack Santa Fe with reinforcements.
waiting in the hills. Treviño caved. “Wait a while, children,” he supposedly said, “I will give them to you and pardon them on condition that you forsake idolatry and iniquity.”

Bearing malice, the whipped and pardoned prisoner from Okhay Owingeh whom Spaniards would later accuse of plotting a general Pueblo revolt, had a notable advantage over Esteban Clemente—no Spaniard knew who he was. None of his accusers ever found out his Christian baptismal name. And when finally they did learn an approximation of his Tewa name, Po’pay, loosely “Ripe Corn,” it was too late.

Meanwhile, in 1677, Father Ayeta reappeared with the convict-settlers and supplies he had wrung from the viceroy, and ineffectual Antonio de Otermín took over the governorship from a chastened Treviño. The Tewa coup of 1675 seemed all but forgotten. Defensive codependence resumed. The veteran Domínguez was back in the saddle in 1678, commanding fifty armed colonists and four hundred Pueblo auxiliaries against Navajos west of the Jemez Mountains.

If Domínguez really did have four hundred Pueblo fighting men under his command, and the average quota per pueblo was forty, or more likely twenty, Pueblo males from ten or twenty different communities took part. In addition to the usual core of Tewas and Tanos, the force must have incorporated Keresan and Jemez men, and probably Northern Tiwas from Taos and Picuris, foreshadowing ominously the Rio Grande confederation of 1680.

Pedro Naranjo, a Keresan elder testifying in 1681, revealed how the anonymous Po’pay had established his command post in a kiva at Taos, the farthest pueblo north of Santa Fe and home to a fierce tradition of defiance. Naranjo did not say when Po’pay moved north or how long he conspired with conjured Native super-heroes. There is no way to know whether the Pueblo war captains on Domínguez’s campaign of 1678 had any idea of plans already underway for a massive revolt.

Po’pay, unlike Clemente, appears to have been more than a paramount war captain, most likely a major religious leader of the Tewa summer people. Through skillful negotiations and, according to Naranjo and other witnesses, a campaign of fear and coercion, he gained the temporary allegiance of both spiritual and military leaders across a broad sector of the northern and western Pueblo world. As the time drew near, Po’pay and his chief lieutenants—several of whom had dangerous kinship ties to Spaniards—would use knotted yucca-fiber cords and smoke signals to spread the word.

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The bloody Pueblo Revolt of August 1680—the first and swiftest act of the Pueblo-Spanish War—caught the Spaniards notoriously off guard. That
Saturday, 10 August, feast day of San Lorenzo, veteran Capt. Francisco de Anaya Almazán and eight herders had drawn routine duty guarding horses near the Tewa pueblo of Santa Clara. Attacked without warning, two of the herders fell dead as Anaya and the others spurred hell-bent for Santa Fe. After a terrifying, ten-day Pueblo siege of their capital, Spanish survivors broke out, and their besiegers let them go. Six weeks later, just northwest of El Paso, Governor Otermín’s aides counted 1,946 refugees. Upriver, some four hundred of their neighbors lay dead. The Pueblos had taken back their world.32

None of the twenty-one friars slain in their missions had died farther south than San Marcos in the Galisteo Basin or Santo Domingo on the Rio Grande.33 The epicenter of revolt was in the north (as it would be again in 1696, 1805, 1837, and 1847). The Southern Tiwas, Piros, and Tompiros had either abandoned their pueblos earlier or gone south with the Spaniards. Not surprisingly, when Otermín mounted an abortive reconquista in the winter of 1681, he had with him not only twenty-one Manso Indian auxiliaries from El Paso, but also fifty-six Piros, thirty-one Southern Tiwas, and nine renegades from Jemez.34

The decade-long second act of the Pueblo-Spanish War played itself out between 1681 and 1691, severely punishing both sets of widely separated former combatants. Exiled Spaniards and contingent Pueblo Indians endured misery in refugee camps around El Paso. And, up the Rio Grande, independent Pueblo Indians, rid of their colonial overlords for the time being, fell back into disunion.

Keresan war captain Bartolomé de Ojeda watched it happen. Raised in the missions, Ojeda, like Clemente, spoke and wrote Spanish. Evidently he had taken an active part in the Pueblo Revolt. Later, when Gov. Domingo Jironza and southern Pueblo fighters marched upriver to sack Zia in 1689, Ojeda fought them like a wounded mountain lion. Captured and taken to El Paso, Ojeda experienced a change of heart and quit the revolt.

Testifying before Governor Jironza, the rehabilitated Ojeda not only related in graphic detail how Jemez, Acomas, Zunis, and Hopis had put to death seven Franciscans in 1680, but also the subsequent discord he had observed among the Pueblos. The Keres of Zia, Santa Ana, San Felipe, and Cochiti, along with the Jemez, Taos, and Pecos Pueblos, warred incessantly against the Tewas and Picuris. The Acomas had split; one faction abandoning their stronghold to join other disenchanted Keres at Laguna. Zunis and Hopis were also at war. Apaches traded with some pueblos and committed hostilities against others, while Utes raided wherever they could.35

Whether Ojeda had the alliances and misalliances straight, his testimony implied severe disharmony in the Pueblo world. Moreover, endemic Pueblo
factionalism tore apart certain Pueblo communities, notably Acoma and Pecos. Taken together, such disintegration invited the Pueblo-Spanish War’s third and final act: Spanish restoration of the kingdom in the 1690s.

Capable, lisping, forty-seven-year-old Diego José de Vargas Zapata Luján Ponce de León y Contreras acceded to the governorship of New Mexico in exile at El Paso in February 1691. Vargas would use Pueblo Indian auxiliaries against other Pueblos more often and more effectively than any governor before or after him. A significant number of Pueblo leaders now recognized that rule by one of their own offered less security and fewer benefits than the colonial regime. To rally such “pro-Spanish” headmen, Vargas relied on Ojeda, who became the governor’s chief advance man, recruiter, and adviser on Indian affairs. Other Pueblo leaders, who vowed to die rather than allow the Spaniards’ return, led their people to mesa-top fortifications and dared Vargas to come get them.

Vargas’s strategy of restraint during his ritual reconquest in 1692 won the Spanish governor steadfast Pueblo allies in future battles. He had refused to loot abandoned Pecos Pueblo. Hence, in the last days of 1693, as Spaniards stormed the many-tiered citadel Tewas and Tanos had built right over the top of the old governor’s palace, one hundred and forty Pecos fighters joined Vargas’s command. Indian-occupied Santa Fe fell. Precarious as their hold proved to be, the Spaniards were back.36

In 1694, Vargas, relying consistently on more Pueblo Indian auxiliaries than Spanish men-at-arms, assaulted and eventually carried the three high places fortified by breakaway Keres warriors from Santo Domingo and Cochiti on the Mesa of la Cieneguilla de Cochiti, defiant Jemez on San Diego Mesa, and Tewas and Tanos atop Black Mesa.37 The Keres had splintered, yet Ojeda kept the majority of his kin from Zia, Santa Ana, and San Felipe solidly in the Spanish camp.

We may never sort out the hatreds and loyalties that drove Vargas’s Pueblo Indian allies. Were their ambivalent passions born during the Pueblo-Spanish War or summoned from obscure memories that long antedated that conflict? What possessed Ojeda’s Keresan auxiliaries to battle other Keres fortified on Cieneguilla Mesa? When he led these same Keresan fighters up San Diego Mesa against Jemez defenders, did their motivation harken back to the fourteenth century when belligerent ancestors of these Jemez pushed roughly into Keresan territory? Whatever impelled them, Pueblo Indians had fought other Pueblo Indians during the Spanish conquest just as they did again during the Spanish restoration.

When open revolt flared once more in June 1696, ending the lives of five more Franciscans and some twenty Spanish colonists, Vargas scrapped
diplomacy and campaigned hard, always with Pecos and other Pueblo fighting men at his side. After 1696 Pueblo warriors never again fought against other Pueblos on a large scale. By year’s end, the Pueblo-Spanish War was over.

Instinctively, the kingdom’s old defensive codependence between Pueblos and Spaniards fell back into place. Vargas, in fact (imprisoned by his successor in Santa Fe, acquitted in Mexico City, and reappointed to the governorship of New Mexico in 1703), led a campaign against Faraón Apaches in the early spring of 1704. His forty-some presidial soldiers and armed colonists were outnumbered typically three-to-one by Pueblo Indian auxiliaries from at least a dozen villages, but most from Pecos. Abruptly, operations ceased. Don Diego de Vargas, recolonizer and twice governor of New Mexico, had fallen ill evidently with dysentery, and died a few days later.

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By the time Fray Nicolás Hidalgo allegedly grabbed Pedro Acomilla’s penis in 1638, Spaniards had occupied New Mexico for forty years. Another forty-two years passed before the revolt of 1680. During those eighty-two years, the Pueblo Indians’ population shrunken from sixty thousand to twenty thousand. Similarly, the number of Pueblo communities fell from around ninety to fewer than forty. Did Po’pay feel the urgency to act knowing that Pueblo war societies had shrunk notably since the days of his father, further still since those of his grandfather? Like sand in an hour glass, the Pueblos’ numerical superiority was slipping away.

And all the while, time ripened. Experiences were stored up. Some Pueblo Indians resisted, failed, and died; Spanish governors gouged the colony and left; colonists’ children played with Pueblo children. On campaign after campaign, Pueblo Indian war captains, serving alongside Spaniards, grew in confidence and in acceptance of each other. Then, in the 1660s and 1670s as the forces of nature bore down on the kingdom, certain Franciscans saw the devil leering from every shadow, and more and more Pueblo Indians turned again to the kachinas. Finally, the sons of August showed the way. It may be that the stunning success of the Pueblo Revolt in 1680 owed most to the singular and undeniable fact that it was such a long time coming.

Notes


5. “La Relación Postrera de Cibola (Fray Toribio de Benavente’s Narrative),” in *Documents of the Coronado Expedition*, 348.


12. Hammond and Rey, *Don Juan de Oñate, 1470–1494*


15. A number of historians, including Carroll L. Riley, have noted the potential danger to Spaniards of reliance on armed Pueblo fighting men. Yet no one has focused specifically on Pueblo auxiliaries in the seventeenth century. Oakah L. Jones Jr. began his coverage in the 1690s, writing mistakenly, “Pueblo Indians were not used extensively by the Spaniards for early campaigns against the raiding tribes.” While France V. Scholes acknowledged that the alcaldes mayores oversaw “the employment of Indians as house servants, farm laborers, and herdsmen,” he said nothing


17. For more than a century, Spaniards had been using Native auxiliaries and commissioning their leaders. Powell, *Soldiers, Indians, and Silver*, 158–71.


21. Juan Rodríguez de Medrano y Mesía, Appointment of Juan Domínguez de Mendoza, 11 September 1670, Santa Fe, document no. 22, in Marc Simmons and José Antonio Esquibel, *Juan Domínguez de Mendoza* (forthcoming).


33. For the list of Franciscans killed, see Hackett, Historical Documents, 335–39.
39. See Jones, Pueblo Warriors.
41. Excluding the Zuni and Hopi pueblos, Elinore M. Barrett calculated that between 1600 and 1680 the Pueblo people had abandoned fifty of some eighty-one communities and that their population fell from about sixty thousand to an estimated fifteen thousand. Elinore M. Barrett, Conquest and Catastrophe: Changing Rio Grande Pueblo Settlement Patterns in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002), 115–16.