Federal Control of the Western Apaches, 1848–1886

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ETHNOLOGISTS generally agree that the Apache Indians, as members of the widely distributed Athapascan family, originated in the Yukon and Mackensie river valleys. Why they broke away from the parent stock and wandered far to the south will never be known, for their migration occurred prior to the advent of the Caucasians. Since they were evidently in search of a permanent habitat, they probably would have remained in the South Plains had not the powerful Comanches driven them into the arid fastnesses of the Southwest. But once in their new home, greater in size than the New England States and New York combined, they developed into one of the fiercest tribes in America; and for more than three centuries successfully resisted every Indian, Spanish and Anglo-American effort to control or displace them. In fact, from 1540 to 1886 the Apaches were the most important human element in retarding the occupation and development of the Southwest. Their ability to impede the advance of the whites so effectively would have been impossible had not the innate traits and severe physical environment of the tribe combined to develop a race of unusual formidibleness. Thus, these complex factors must be studied and analyzed if the three centuries of Apache resistance are to be understood.

The Apache country—called Apachería by the Spanish—is a vast region. It roughly extends from near the Rio Grande on the east to the Colorado on the west, and from the San Francisco Mountains on the north to the heart of Mexican Chihuahua on the south.  

Physiographically, this region is characterized in the northern part by a southern protrusion of the Great Colorado Plateau, which has been dissected by erosive forces into an intricacy of deep canyons and abrupt mesas. To the south it is a land of rugged mountains, but the ranges dwindle in size from north to south until they appear as isolated ranges in the vicinity of the thirty-second parallel and on into Mexico. The same phenomenon evinces itself in the western part, and the characteristic isolated mountains stand sentinel-like well into the southern part of the Great Basin. Near the southwestern New Mexico boundary, the great Cordilleran Range again rises into the rugged Sierra Madre Mountains, thus forming some of the most forbidding portions of Apachería.  

From the somewhat alpine Colorado Plateau country on the north to the low desert country in the south and southwest, the intervening region consists of vast areas that have been eroded into a labyrinth of the most tortuous and intricate canyons, arroyos and mesas imaginable. A great part of the region is composed of igneous rocks, principally lava which, when washed down upon level plains or flood-plain districts, result in those desolate, forbidding areas that the early adventurers called malpais. Where flood-plains are deeply cut into by meandering rivers, terraced hills almost approaching canyon proportions are left as banks. Nearly all hills and mesas are capped with layers  

2. In connection see frontispiece map in Indian Population in the U. S. and Alaska, Bur. of the Census, (Wash., 1910). See also the U. S. Dept. of the Interior Map of the Territory of the U. S., 1867. Another informative map is included in Annie H. Abel, ed., The Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun while Indian Agent at Santa Fé, and Superintendent of Indian Affairs in New Mexico, (Wash., 1915).  

3. Pacific Railroad Survey Reports: Reports of Explorations and Surveys to Ascertain the Most Practicable Route for a Railroad from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean, 1853-1854, (Wash., 1855-1861), vol. iii, p. 42.
of some volcanic formation which is generally so cut up that travel over the resulting terrain is very hazardous. Likewise, in regions of sedimentary strata, erosion has gashed stupendous chasms that prove equally difficult for travel and endeavor. 4

South of the Gila between the Rio Grande and the Colorado, the region for about 150 miles in width is of the most barren character. This area in New Mexico and to a great degree in Arizona, has the appearance of a level desert plain of sand and gravel, seamed here and there with short, abrupt mountain ranges frequently connected by low lateral “divides.” While not so rough and rugged as the northern area, this region is so cut up by arroyos and ravines of moderate depth, that campaigning against Indians was of the utmost difficulty. The Apaches easily escaped detection in such a region and with equal facility they arranged ambuscades. If too closely pressed they took refuge in one of the convenient ranges, where “you could as well catch a wild chamois.” 5

Climatically, the Apache country is a land of contrasts. In those parts of high altitude swift streams gave the Apaches a plentiful supply of water at all seasons. But frequently extensive areas between mountains were so effectively screened against humid air that deserts resulted in the midst of a region of fair rainfall. Naturally, the Apaches solved the difficulty by attaining a minute knowledge of all water holes, “tanks” and springs. Copious streams as they pushed down into the desert lowlands diminished in size and finally disappeared entirely in the sandy


wastes of their beds. The Indians and experienced frontiersmen obtained water, however, by digging down into the channels until the underground flow was reached.6

What rains fell in the low desert regions were usually of torrential proportions that washed out a myriad of small channels and gullies. These physiographic features gave the unencumbered Apaches an extreme advantage over the slow moving impedimenta-laden military. In flattened areas excess waters collected and later evaporated, leaving desolate alkali playas. These dusty, unvegetative plains were special barriers to successful troop movements.7

The Apache country with its high mountains and low desert plains naturally had a wide variation in temperature. An Apache runner could travel in less than two days from an extensive region of alpine coolness to the burning lowlands of tropical heat. Temperatures over most of the area had a daily range of thirty to fifty degrees, those in the low altitudes standing for months at 100°-120°. What effects these extremes and wide variations had on the Apaches' bodies and minds are merely conjectural. It is probable, however, that the extraordinary stamina and ferocity characteristic of the Apaches, were sharply accentuated by these stimulating factors.8

The word “Apache,” which is probably of Spanish or

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Mexican origin, is the name most commonly applied to the fierce and barbarian people who roamed over the territory just described. The word may have been taken from the Yuman term *e-patch*, generally interpreted to mean “man” or, as applied to the Apache-Yuma and Apache-Mohave, to mean “fighting man.” The word could also have been derived from the Zuñi word “Apachu,” which is understood to convey the meaning of “enemy.” In actual practice the early Spaniards did call the Navaho kinsmen of the Apaches the *Apaches de Nabaju*. Singularly, the Apaches, who do not understand the word “Apache,” call themselves the Tinneh or some of its variants, as Dine, Tinde, or Inde, which mean “man” or people.

It has already been stated that the Apaches migrated from the Yukon and Mackensie river valleys before the coming of European explorers. No exact evidence is available regarding their movement, but their present location as well as certain linguistic changes logically indicate that they broke away from their northern kinsmen at an early period. Ethnologists, however, are quite divergent and indefinite in their views concerning the time, reasons and routes of the Apache migration to the Southwest.

Wissler thinks that as raiders the Apaches might have gradually worked southward, and by the time of the Spanish


11. Frederick W. Hodge, *Early Western History,* in *Land of Sunshine*, vol. xiii, p. 442. This material is in the form of annotations to the translations by Mrs. Edward E. Ayer of Benavides and other early writers’ works.


explorations, they had been in their new habitat long enough to learn pottery making, basket weaving and primitive agriculture. Their mode of life, he also believes, had already reached a stage more complex than that necessitated by the chase alone.\textsuperscript{15} Harrington produces evidence that they may have moved into the Pacific Northwest long ago. From here, in quest of a warmer climate, they possibly pushed on into the Great Basin where, driven by the Utes and other Shoshonean tribes towards Arizona and New Mexico, they at last took up their abode in the uninhabited White Mountains country.\textsuperscript{16} Hodge, more definitely, states that a large band came from the south in 1560 and joined the Navahos. They remained, he believes, unimportant until 1650, occupying a very limited and indeterminable area, but, by steady growth during the succeeding few decades, their importance increased with their numbers, and their aggressiveness with both.\textsuperscript{17}

The Apaches in their migrations developed no distinct culture; but, receptive to extraneous ideas and modes of life, they absorbed without change many cultural elements possessed by the tribes found in the regions through which they passed. This would indicate that they left a culture

\textsuperscript{15} Clark Wissler, "The Apache Indian," in \textit{The Target}, vol. lxxxiii, no. 83, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{16} Dr. Harrington in 1918 had several conferences on the subject of Apache migrations with the late Professor P. E. Goddard of the University of California. Goddard held the same views as Harrington. Harrington also agrees that the Apaches may have migrated south along the eastern base of the Rocky Mountains to the southern plains. From here after an extended period they were possibly forced into their present habitat by the more populous plains tribes. Harrington to the writer, Nov. 15, 1935.
\textsuperscript{17} Hodge, "The Early Navaho and Apache," \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 227.

The first Spanish reference to the Apaches was made by Juan de Oñate in 1598 when he reported them as living in the "Snowy Mountains" of New Mexico. This location was probably not more than seventy-five miles north of the San Juan home of the Navahos; and not in the White Mountain section—the despoblado, or uninhabited region as Coronado's chroniclers aptly termed it. If any Apaches lived to the south in the sixteenth century, they were near the headwaters of the Gila, where, if Benavides' later account is to be accepted, their use of dog sledges definitely indicated their plains' heritage. J. G. Bourke, "Notes and News," in \textit{Amer. Anthrop.}, vol. viii, p. 289. See also, Hodge, \textit{loc. cit.}, for quotations from Oñate, \textit{Obediencia y Vassalaje de San Juan Bautista}, 1598, in \textit{Doc. Ined. de Indias}, vol. xvi, p. 114.

Niza, Coronado and Jaramillo left nothing definite to prove that any Apaches inhabited the region between the Gila and Cibola in 1539-1540. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 228.
marked by no special positive original traits. As an intrusive people they merely appear to have first pushed into plains groups and finally into advanced groups of sedentary people—the Hopis and Pimas. What culture they have is therefore a composite of Plains and Pueblo. However, Bandelier maintains that once in the Southwest no other tribe exercised such a powerful influence on the fate of its inhabitants as have the Apaches. He thinks they completely changed the ethnography of the region.

The Apache tribe was divided into a number of tribal groups or parts, but they have not been united at any time since the period of American occupation. The main divisions remained on friendly terms with one another; occasionally two or more of them cooperated in difficult undertakings. There was considerable intermarriage among them, they had no distinct boundary lines between their several ranges, and in many respects they were more closely related than separate tribes would be. They simply segregated, as the tribe grew, into distinct groups for purposes of more effective marauding. Later, they became known by the names of the country forming their respective ranges: Pinaleño, Sierra Blanca, Chiricahua, Gileño, etc., or from some habit or mental characteristic as reflected in the names Tonto and Coyotero.

The easternmost group were the Mimbrenos. Their principal place of abode was the Mimbres Mountains, but they also lived in many other sections of the region between the Rio Grande and the Rio San Francisco. They roamed

18. Tozzer, op. cit.
20. Tozzer, op. cit.
23. Only those groups coming within the scope of this study will be considered.
widely on both sides of the Rio Grande and into Coahuila, Mexico, as well as into the White Mountains of Arizona. Some writers call them the Copper Mine Apaches and others identify them as a branch of the Gileños. The Mexicans who were issuing rations to them at Janos in 1850 estimated their warrior strength to be 200. During the following twenty years their total number was estimated to vary from 400-750.

A centrally located Apache group were the Coyoteros or "wolfmen," so named because they ate coyotes, or probably because they roamed about extensively. They subsisted mainly on the products secured by agriculture or the hunt, although some observers reported them to be more agricultural than any of their neighbors and to have less need for theft because of their stockraising. This division was geographically separated into the Pinal and White Mountain Coyoteros. They ranged throughout Arizona and western New Mexico. When not roaming they stayed in the mountain regions from which they derived their names, and from these fastnesses they were said to act in concert with the predatory Tontos. Their early numbers are unknown.

24. The Memorial of Fray Alonso de Benavides, 1630, (Chicago, 1916), footnote 43, p. 265. This work was translated by Mrs. Edward E. Ayer and annotated by F. W. Hodge and C. F. Lummis.
27. Josiah Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies, or the Journal of a Santa Fé Trader, (New York, 1845), vol. i, p. 290; "Yuma" to Sylvester Mowry, Dec. 25, 1859, United States Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Affairs, General Files, Arizona, M 169. Hereafter files of this class will be designated by I. O. (Indian Office), followed by their respective file numbers. Those of other territories will be kept distinct. Cf. also Whipple, op. cit., p. 120.
28. M. T. McMahon to C. E. Mix, Dec. 15, 1860, I. O., Indian Division Files, M. 416. At one time the Indian Office had an Indian Division which dealt with Indian administrative matters handled by the Secretary of the Interior himself. Hereafter such files will be designated I. D., and followed by the respective file number.
The Tonto group appears to have been a heterogeneous body of Yavapai, Yuma and Mohave with some Pinaleño Apache included. Nineteenth century writers applied the term to practically all the Indians roaming between the White Mountains and the Rio Colorado. Many of the Yavapai in the group selected wives from the Pinal Coyoteros. Uniquely, those bands living in the Tonto Basin were so isolated that they had the characteristics of a distinct group, and they developed a dialectic difference not easily understood by the other Apaches. The first scientist to observe the Tontos reported that they had always lived near the junction of the Verde and Salt rivers, fighting Pimas and raiding into Sonora, until the establishment of Fort McDowell at that point in 1865. Then, he said, they retired eastward to the canyons northeast of Four Peaks where the army so harrassed them that they were unable to take up a permanent abode. They were low in the scale of humanity and relatively harmless according to the second scientific report concerning them.

An Apache group important in governmental relations, but insignificant in numbers was the Arivaipa. Their name meant "girls" and likely indicated the performance of some unmanly act. They lived south of the Gila in several rancherias located in the Arivaipa Canyon. Although they were somewhat agricultural, they raided far southward and were reputed to have laid waste many towns in northern Mexico prior to the Gadsden Purchase. Only a few hundred in number, the Arivaipa were credited with the extermination of...
the Sobaipuri Pimas in the late eighteenth century. Their association with the Pinaleños was very close.34

Another group of great historical importance was the Yavapai or Apache-Mohave. These ethnologically complex “eastern people” or “people of the sun” were not different from their kinsmen, the Yumas and Mohaves, except that they lived a nomadic life in the mountains of west-central Arizona, instead of a sedentary one along the Colorado. Their language differed from that of the Apaches, but their customs, habits, and especially their hostility to the whites were sufficient to class them as Apaches. Their Yuman blood endowed them with a strong physique and an utter lack of feeling, while Apache contact taught them alertness and activity.35 Estimated at 2000-2500 souls in 1863, they were more definitely established as a group of 1000 in 1873.36

One other group of unknown numbers in the pre-reservation period, and perhaps the most widely known Indians of North America, were the “Great Mountain” or Chiricahuas.37 They furnished many noted warchiefs and as aboriginal diplomats were unexcelled. Their country closely approximated the extreme part of southeastern Arizona, but under their succession of able chieftains, they carried their forays through a great part of New Mexico, Arizona, and

34. “Yuma” to Mowry, Dec. 25, 1859, op. cit.; Handbook, pt. i, p. 87. Hodge in indicating that: the Arivaipa “laid waste every town in n. M.exico as far as the Gila prior to the Gadsden purchase in 1853” probably means that the raids were south from the Gila rather than north to the same.

The term Gila Apaches, or Gileños has at various times been applied to nearly all the bands living along the Gila. There were about 4000 Indians so designated in 1853. The name is now obsolete. Ibid., p. 492.


Bourke identified the Apache-Yumas as almost identical with Yavapai. Bourke, op. cit. They were probably more closely allied with the Yumas and less with the Tontos than the Yavapai were. See Handbook under Tulkepaia, pt. ii, p. 836.

37. Associated with the Chiricahuas were the Pinaleños or “Pinery People.” Their home was in the Pinalenos and Pinal Mountains of Arizona. Writers often confused them with the Pinal Coyoteros. Benavides’ Memorial, footnote no. 43, pp. 260-261. See also Handbook, pt. i, p. 255, pt. ii, pp. 282, 284.
northern Mexico, even spreading terror and dismay to the very gates of Durango. Given security by geographical environment and endowed with insatiable warlike propensities, they dotted their entire range with the graves of their victims.

There are many estimates of the population of the Apaches. Usually, the early observers included the eastern groups in their figures. Benavides thought there were more Apaches than all the other people of New Spain, while Catlin over two centuries later estimated them at 30,000 persons. Even Cremony, in their midst during the 1860’s, estimated them at 25,000 souls. Engineers and explorers modestly placed their numbers at 5,000-7,000. The latter figures, more in conformity with those recorded in reservation days, doubtless, approximate closely the actual early numbers of the Western groups.

Ethnologically, the Apaches appear to have been a varied group, their numbers having been augmented by captives taken from neighboring tribes as well as from the settlements of northern Mexico. Hrdlicka says, however, that they were a clearly defined physical type of “remarkable homogeneity.”

The Apaches in physique were below average, being about five feet five inches in height and weighing 140-150 pounds. Nevertheless, they satisfied every requirement for a robust and healthy race. With broad, deep and full chests,

40. For the eastern groups see *Handbook*, pp. 63-67; Carl Coke Rister, *The Southwestern Frontier*, 1865-1881, (Cleveland, 1928), pp. 33-35; Rupert N. Richardson, *The Comanche Barrier*, p. 52. See also Richardson and Rister, *The Greater Southwest*, (Glendale, 1934), chap. i.
42. George Catlin, *Last Ramble among the Indians*, (London, n. d.), p. 130. Catlin never saw a war party of more than 300 braves; nevertheless, he reported a total of 8000 warriors.
straight shoulders, well proportioned limbs, strong and muscular, they were products of their environment.\textsuperscript{46} They had high cheek bones, very broad faces and Roman noses, with firm set, rather large under jaws. Their outer ears were pitched more forward and set straighter up and down than were those of the whites. In color they varied from dark to light mahogany. Their well-shaped heads looked enormously large because of the even coat of thick mane-like hair which covered them.\textsuperscript{47} The women, though generally several inches shorter than the men, were better specimens physically. The younger women possessed regular, clear cut features, large, liquid, brown eyes, and clear, smooth skin embellished with a mass of long shining, black hair. These attractive personal characteristics, further enhanced by slender figures that terminated in shapely limbs and small feet, caused early commentators to describe Apache maidens as individuals of unusual beauty.\textsuperscript{48}

The strength, endurance and stamina of the Apaches were a source of amazement to those whites who knew the Indians well. Their lung power was remarkable, and they were swift and tireless at climbing mountains or making long marches. "Ninety miles by trail in thirteen hours was nothing unusual for the Apache runner," and on the side of a mountain they could outrun a horse.\textsuperscript{49}

Physical pain and suffering could be borne to a great degree. The Apaches could race through cacti that would cover a horse or mule with blood; also, they have been known to endure temperatures down to twenty to forty below zero, dressed in nothing but a breech-cloth.\textsuperscript{50} Individuals were

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{46} Dr. J. B. White, \textit{ms. no. 179, B. E.,} p. 21; J. G. Bourke, \textit{An Apache Campaign in the Sierra Madre: An Account of the Expedition in Pursuit of the Hostile Chiricahua in the Spring of 1883}, (New York, 1886), pp. 22-23.
\item \textsuperscript{48} O. L. Hein, \textit{Memories of Long Ago}, (New York, 1925), p. 89; \textit{Arizona Miner} (Prescott), Mar. 9, 1872; White, \textit{op. cit.}
\item \textsuperscript{49} E. D. Tussey, "The Apache Wars in Arizona, \textit{ms.}, \textit{University of Iowa}, 1926, p. 8; N. S. Higgins, \textit{ms. no. 180, B. E.}, (1866), p. 8.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Reclus, \textit{Primitive Folk}, p. 125; Cremony, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 33-34.
\end{itemize}
seldom killed outright. Higgins knew of a buck who, before he fell, ran three hundred yards through bushes which tore off parts of the viscera that protruded from an abdominal wound. He also knew of another one that, though seriously wounded eight times, kept on the warpath until he was hanged at Apache Pass in 1862. General Crook looked upon them as an embodiment of physical endurance, resembling "as little the well-fed Indian of the eastern reservations, as does the hungry wolf the sleek house dog."

Violence and disease, notwithstanding, decimated the Apaches despite their physical hardihood. Opinions vary regarding infant mortality. Those officials concerned with the military control of the tribes, saw only the strong and perfectly developed children surviving, while those in civil control found infant mortality slight, and an increasing birthrate. When they were herded on reservations, individuals of all ages were plagued by diseases of sedentary life. Respiratory troubles, eye diseases, fevers and digestive troubles took a heavy toll. Closer contact with the whites induced smallpox and venereal maladies. Mysteriously, meningitis frequently attacked the children. Among the adults the dissipation incident to excessive drinking, exposure while drunk, lack of sanitation and sleepless nights at medicine ceremonies broke them down physically and made the inroads of disease easy; furthermore, their medicinal practices spread the scourges instead of curing them.

Dr. White found that the Apaches matured early, died relatively young and seldom lived to be grandparents. But Dr. Charles Henry reported to Schoolcraft that many were cen-

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53. Hrdlicka found among the southwestern tribes, except in the case of the Apaches, an excess of males over females. Their exception, he felt, was due to violent deaths resulting from their continuous wars and raids. Hrdlicka, op. cit., p. 38.
54. Reclus, op. cit., p. 135; Clum, Apache Agent, p. 95, 144.
tenarians and that the old men were extraordinarily well-preserved. 56

The Apaches from the psychical standpoint are difficult to estimate. This is due to the differences in the views of the whites and the reds. The settlers and military generally looked upon them as little above the gruesome forms of animal life that infested the same habitat. But when the whites called them cowards, perhaps the Apaches in their own estimation were exercising the greatest courage. Bourke declared them entitled to rank among the bravest, and Crook said they knew their rights and were not afraid to maintain them. 57 When mortally wounded or when escape was impossible they would fight until death. Boys were as courageous as adults and the women often exhibited more real courage than the warriors. 58

In aboriginal duplicity, diplomacy and woodcraft, the Apaches' resistance to control was further increased. Bandelier found them to be quick of perception with a practical turn of mind, and cunning rather than bright. 59 Their hearing, vision and imitativeness were cultivated to perfection. Their knowledge of camouflage proved that they had a perfect understanding of the assimilation of colors. 60

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Dr. White's observations in the years 1873-1875 were made at a time when a very great proportion of the older people had undoubtedly suffered violent deaths incident to military activity, or had succumbed to the vicissitudes resulting from it. Out of every 1000 Indians, he reported 146 husbands, 156 wives, 110 bachelors and widowers, 126 spinsters and widows, 226 boys under 13 and 236 girls under 13. White, op. cit. p. 23.


Young army officers frequently accused Apache military scouts of being cowardly because the scouts preferred stealth and adroitness to close combat. Hand to hand fighting did terrorize the warriors, for being imaginative the effect of disaster was not measured by actual loss and suffering, but by the source, shape and suddenness of it. Lt. G. O. Eaton to Post Adjutant (Camp Verde), Nov. 7, 1874, United States Department of War, Adjutant General's Office, Old Files Section, Executive Division, no. 8254. Hereafter files of this class will be designated A. G. O., followed by their respective file numbers. See also Francis A. Walker, The Indian Question (Boston, 1874), p. 46.


All this native ability was used in war and the chase. The Apaches' idea of war was to keep a general feeling of insecurity for life and property among their victims, striking them only when there could be no retaliation. They surveyed the terrain along the trails with a rapidity and a thoroughness astounding to Caucasians. Their knowledge of the topography of the country over which they ranged was almost perfect. Besides, they knew expertly how to utilize both the plant and animal resources of the area. These factors allowed the bands to maintain their existence under the most trying conditions.

The most important element in Apache resistance to military control was perhaps their effective use of signs and signals and their ability to communicate over long distances. Parties on the trail left stones and sticks so arranged as to show numbers, purposes, results of undertakings and the necessity of assistance. Intruders into the Apache range left the facts concerning their numbers, character and time of their passing by the nature and condition of the grass that they had pressed down, and by the ordure of their mounts. Intelligence was communicated to all parts of Apacheria in twenty-four hours through the use of smoke signals by day and fire flashes at night. Such effective communication allowed the small detached bands, which the unreliability of natural subsistence necessitated, to operate in unusual concert, and with remarkable formidableness to maintain control over the vast region they inhabited.

Hostile Apaches were extraordinarily difficult to apprehend. If pursued their courses led over terrain that left no trails and through regions where surprise or capture was a possibility.

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62. Bourke, op. cit., p. 35; White, op. cit., p. 46.
63. Lt. S. W. Fountain to A. G., Dec. 12, 1885, I. O., 3205. After 1880 all communications received at the Indian Office were filed serially by number. See also Cremony, op. cit., pp. 184-186.
64. Information concerning the movements of troops was “smoked through” for distances of 300 miles in 2-3 hours. Military couriers 5-6 days later would confirm the correctness of the Indians’ messages. Farish, vol. iv, p. 79.
mere accident. They avoided all water holes, going easily a hundred miles without halting; their drinking water was carried along in the intestines of animals killed by the way. Attacks were made at moments when their enemies felt most secure. Then the Apaches scattered like wolves to rendezvous again at some distant spot known only to themselves. To experienced army officers they were the fiercest and most redoubtable of all the warlike Indians.\footnote{65. Crook to A. A. G., Sept. 21, 1872, 42 Cong., 3 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. ii, p. 78; Crook to Welch, July 16, 1884, op. cit.; Crook to A. G., Jan. 11, 1886, I. O., Land Div., 4684.}

The Apaches as diplomats were good talkers and not readily deceived. Probably equaling the Iroquois in the maxim of "divide and rule," they took good care to be at peace with some of their sedentary neighbors while devastating others. They once tried to burn San Xavier when 3,000 friendly Apaches were camped close to Tucson. They commonly sold at El Paso the plunder taken from Sonora, and certain Mexican towns were always courted so that troop movements could be ascertained. Even as late as 1886, Nacori and Becodeguachi were exempt from devastations for this reason.\footnote{66. Bourke, "Notes and News," op. cit., p. 288; W. Turner, "The Fearless Apaches," in National Republic, vol. xvi, p. 39.}

Partisan views made an analysis of the Apache moral life very difficult. A fair estimate is therefore impossible because Apache standards differed so widely from those of their observers. Most frontiersmen naturally vilified the Indians as "murderers by descent and thieves by prescription."\footnote{67. Journals of the First (Prescott, 1864) Legislative Assembly, p. 43.} Partisan views made an analysis of the Apache moral life very difficult. A fair estimate is therefore impossible because Apache standards differed so widely from those of their observers. Most frontiersmen naturally vilified the Indians as "murderers by descent and thieves by prescription."\footnote{67. Journals of the First (Prescott, 1864) Legislative Assembly, p. 43.}

The whites considered the Apaches a treacherous race, but the tribesmen in training their children from birth to regard all other people as natural enemies made treachery a prime virtue. The chief excellence of a warrior was to outwit his enemies in order that the highest honors could be bestowed upon him because of his rascality; therefore, even the charge of intertribal treachery loses its force, for each
band was strictly independent of all other bands. Thieves were more esteemed than brave men, especially by Apache debutantes, yet theft within the band was frowned upon as the worst of crimes. Deceit was regarded with the greatest admiration. To take advantage of a credulous enemy was a splendid stroke of policy. Justice and revenge were synonymous ideas, and the next comer was held strictly responsible for the acts and intentions of his predecessors.

Naturally, the Apaches were a cruel race, representing as they did generations steeled in fighting against enemies "as cruel and revengeful" as they themselves. Taught in their childhood how to inflict heinous punishment on captive birds and animals, they later, as adults, practiced it on their human victims by roasting their heads over slow fires, by cutting off piecemeal the less vital parts of their bodies and by the final crushing of their heads.

What differences of culture one finds among the Western Apaches and other aboriginal Americans are essentially due to geographical determinism. The Apaches were strictly products of their particular environment. Their ability to live off their region was expressed by a very old Apache who said, "There is food everywhere if one only knows how to

66. M. T. McMahan to C. E. Mix, Dec. 15, 1860, I. D., M 416; H. H. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 1590-1888, (San Francisco, 1889), p. 552; Froebel, Seven Years Travel, p. 489. Intertribal looseness benefited the United States at a later time, for had General Crook been unsuccessful in inducing the bands to fight against each other, the tribe would have been almost unconquerable. Tussey, op. cit., p. 17.

69. Cremony, op. cit., pp. 72, 86.


71. Prescott Miner, July 1, 1871; Arizona Citizen, Sept. 13, 1881. Some superstitious idea about the body must have caused the habitual crushing of heads. After firearms became common, a bullet was always fired through the heads. Certain types of mutilations were committed out of high respect for the victims. When an enemy's heart was cut out and eaten, it was done so the courage of the victim would be transmitted to the victors. The stirrup foot and the right hand were skinned as a mark of respect to a foe who sold his life dearly. Scalping (seldom practiced) and disfiguring were restricted to those who had fought for their lives. Arizona Miner, Nov. 13, 1875; Farrish, vol. v, p. 289; Geronimo's Story, pp. 54, 60. .

The Apaches were not devoid of higher feelings and emotions, and despite a stoical attitude they could not endure pain as well as the whites. They often made special efforts to assuage the cares and burdens of their maimed and decrepit people. Corbusier, loc. cit., pp. 24-25; Emory, Notes of a Military Reconnaissance, p. 61.
find it.” 72 This statement especially explained the Apache's fitness to be nomadic and predatory, for they were at home anywhere.73

Meats were a staple part of the diet, large game being preferred, but rats, hares, coyotes, lizards and caterpillars were also acceptable. Pork was rejected and fowls were not eaten except under duress. Horse meat was highly prized and mule meat was a delicacy. The fetus of a calf and parts of the viscera of slain animals were titbits. The marrow of bones and the blood of animals were carefully utilized. Fish, bear and beaver were avoided entirely as were most animals associated with water. This custom was doubtless due to forgotten cosmogonic and religious views.74

Practically every plant of the Apaches' habitat furnished some edible product. Piñon nuts, mesquite beans, mushrooms, greens, bulbs, roots, wild fruits, acorns, barks and grass seeds were used in various ways. The cacti family rendered heavy tribute. Mescal, made from the bulb of the aguave, was indispensable.75 The amount of food available to eat varied with the seasons; sometimes there was want. When pressed the Apaches would resort to articles of food unknown or repulsive to white men. Gormandism characterized such an irregular economy, and when un­matured fruits and vegetables were consumed, serious dietary troubles followed. Infant mortality was largely due

72. Cremony, op. cit., p. 296.
to the immediate change of Apache babies from milk to the diet of adults.\(^76\)

Liquor was a scourge among the Apaches. They drank that of the whites when available, but relied chiefly on their own brew called tiswin. This liquor, combined with the Apache mode of drinking, had perhaps the most effective result of making men pugnacious and quarrelsome that the world has ever seen.\(^77\)

Goodwin viewed Apache life as tripartite: Hunting was practiced, but the game was never exhausted or driven from the Apache range; therefore, the hunters seldom went long distances for it. Agriculture was followed, but not sufficiently to induce sedentary life; and as users of indigenous plant foods, the Apaches still found it necessary to hunt and farm. Their existence, as a consequence, kept them moving about, following a seasonal schedule. Naturally, they developed habitations adapted to the arid climate of their range and the constant shifting necessitated by their mode of life.\(^78\)

Their huts, called wickiups by the whites, were hemispherical to bluntly conical in form. They were ten to twelve feet in diameter and nine to ten in height. Slender poles stuck in the ground to form a circle with the tops then bent over and tied together composed the framework. Rushes, branches or hides spread over this skeleton except at a vent near the top completed the structure. The interior was excavated for several inches, and the excess earth was piled around the outside base as a protective reenforcement. Isolation was attempted in wickiup arrangement, yet a tendency towards congregation by families was usual. This results in a scattered village of important biological aspects.


\(^77\) Will C. Barnes to the writer, Aug. 6, 1935. Mr. Barnes was first stationed at Fort Apache in 1880. See also, Ales Hrdlicka, "Method of Preparing Tesvino among the White River Apaches," in *Amer. Anthropologist*, vol. vi, p. 191; Tussey, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

\(^78\) Goodwin, *loc. cit.*, p. 63.
Villages were generally composed of only a few huts; in seasons of plenty the number might reach a hundred.\footnote{White, op. cit., p. 21; Ales Hrdlicka, "Notes On the San Carlos Apaches," in Amer. Anthropologist, vol. vii, pp. 482-483.}

The Apaches required few technological materials, but they made a variety of containers, utensils and implements of the correct type and design which met their indispensable needs. As basket makers the tribe reached a high stage of art with products which easily excelled those of all other Indians. No doubt this perfection was developed because the Apaches as nomads found the basket the most effective container for carrying their property.\footnote{A. B. Reagan, ms. no. 2847, B. E., pp. 61-66; K. T. Dodge, "White Mountain Baskets," in Amer. Anthropologist, vol. ii, p. 183. For a very detailed discussion, see Helen H. Roberts, "The Basketry of the San Carlos Apache," in Anthropological Papers of the Museum of Natural History, (New York, 1929), vol. xxxi, pt. ii, pp. 121-218.} Art was not reached in pottery making, probably because the vessels were designed for utility alone.\footnote{Corbusier, "The Apache-Yumas and the Apache-Mohaves," loc. cit., p. 9.}

The primitive Apache weapons were bows, arrows and lances. These arms were objects of much beauty and ingenuity. Catlin regarded the Apaches as unexcelled in the making of arrowheads.\footnote{Catlin, Last Rambles, pp. 183-185. See also Gerald Fowke, "Stone Art," Thirteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, (Wash., 1896), p. 195.} These were mounted on perfectly smooth and balanced cane shafts about three feet long. The bows used in shooting them were usually five feet in length. Bows and arrows were a necessity in Apache life and the braves were never without them even when armed with modern weapons. Skillful warriors used them with deadly effect, and for the picking off of unsuspecting victims they were superior to guns. In close quarters when other weapons failed or ammunition ran out, they were
especially reliable. Poisoned arrows were frequently used in war.\textsuperscript{83} The lance, also a thing of beauty, was made of the stalk of the aguave, reenforced at points of strain with intact pieces of skin peeled from a stag leg. A long knife blade of a bayonet inserted in the end completed the weapon. The total length of the lance was about fifteen feet.\textsuperscript{84}

Unlike the beauty and perfection demanded in their arms, the Apaches were satisfied with clothes of any variety, the more grotesque the better. Conventionality existed only in the design of the moccasins, the breechcloth of the men and the buckskin skirts of the women. The breechcloth was about two yards long. It passed between the legs and hung over the belt in front and behind, the rear part almost reaching the ground. A common buckskin skirt was composed of two buckskins hung over a belt, one in front and the other behind in the form of a kilt. The edges of the skirt were cut in deep fringe. The Apache moccasins were much like a boot. They reached nearly to the knees, and each was made of half a buckskin turned over in two or three folds, allowing them to be drawn up as a protection to the thighs; otherwise, the folds could be used as receptacles for implements, small arms and trinkets. The soles were made of undressed cowhide with the hairy side out, and the toes were turned up two inches to protect the feet when running. This particular type of moccasin was a direct response to an environment of poisonous reptiles and xerophytic vegetation.\textsuperscript{85} Thus again is demonstrated that the Apaches in the world of material things were thorough students of adaptation. Yet in the organization of their society they were even more pragmatic.

The family was very important in Apache society, and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{83} J. G. Bourke, "Notes on Apache Mythology," in \emph{Jour. of Amer. Folk-Lore}, vol. iii, p. 219; \emph{Pac. Railroad Reports}, vol. ii, pp. 97-99; White, ms. no. 179, B. E., p. 32.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Barnes to the writer, Aug. 6, 1935. One of Geronimo's braves at Fort Bowie, Arizona, gave Mr. Barnes a beautiful lance in September, 1886. This was at the time the renegades were being exiled to Florida.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Gen. O. O. Howard, in \emph{Washington Morning Post}, Nov. 10, 1872; Schoolcraft, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 211; Corbusier, \emph{loc. cit.}, pp. 6-7.
\end{itemize}
marriage occurred at an early age. The debut of an Apache girl took place during the second year of puberty; after this she was deemed marriageable. Usually, girls were permitted to select their husbands, but the men made the initial advances. When a suitor felt that he was sufficiently esteemed he staked his horse in front of his love's abode and awaited the issue. If she cared for his horse within four days, the marriage was consummated. Among some bands a warrior not only had to show his ability to make a living before marriage, but he also had to build a domicile in advance. The girl then occupied it with him for four nights without being molested or having her presence observed. If she prepared his breakfast on the fourth morning, she became his wife. They then returned to the village where the bride's romance turned to a life of toil and slavish suffering, typical of an Apache wife.86

Polygamy was the marital law, but there were restrictions. Individuals had to be members of different clans and the children followed the mother's clan. A man had to marry his unmarried sisters-in-law as fast as they grew to maturity. He also had to marry his brother's widows one year after his brother's demise. However, other members of his clan could marry the widows, for clan members were all considered brothers. This complicated arrangement was obviously designed to promote household felicity. Naturally, a man married no more wives than he could support. Divorce was easy but not abused. No Apache would speak to his mother-in-law and he apparently never looked at her; she, in turn, reciprocated his courtesy.87

Woman's influence in Apache society was great. A warrior's standing was determined by the esteem the women held for him as a brave man and a dexterous thief. And a

86. Cremony, op. cit., pp. 245-249; Farish, vol. vii, p. 10; Curtis, op. cit., p. 138. Brides were paid for in horses. The families charged according to their estimation of the services lost. Hrdlicka, *Physiological and Medical Observations*, p. 46.

great thief stood high, for he could support many wives comfortably. A definite division of labor existed between the sexes, but the women were the mainstays in the Apache economy so far as everyday life was concerned.88

The Apaches welcomed the birth of children and their training, particularly that of the boys, began early. Their education was mainly physical with the prime objective of making them able, strong and fearless. Self reliance and judgment were induced by the elders who gravely consulted the boys as if they were men. The girls' training was equally thorough, although their instruction was largely of a domestic nature.89

A discussion of the Apache political organization, their government and their laws is very difficult. Bourke and Cremony, themselves, appear to have had only a modicum of knowledge on the subject. Before the time of Anglo-American intrusion, all united tribal governmental organizations had disintegrated, and even the traditions of the Apaches were vague about this matter. The whites found the several divisions of the tribe broken up into still more numerous bands, each one independent of the other. The bands were held together in close relationship by speech and custom, but not in political unity. They occasionally united under a capable leader against a common enemy; then they dissolved with equal facility when the danger was removed.90

The strongest uniting factor in the bands and tribal groups was clan and blood relationship. Bourke found thirty-four Apache clans, and learned that some of them showed a strong correlation with sedentary neighbors whom they had conquered in the past. The clans were exogamous only for regulating marriage and descent in the female

line. They were named after the peculiarities of their own habitat such as topographical or locational features rather than animals. Some were also given the names of places where certain plants grew. Members of a clan camped together, united in war and exacted justice. Obligations were only binding on clan relatives, but this "far flung web of interrelational obligations" was a strong cohesive force among all the Western Apache groups.

The bands were broken up into local groups each one possessing a distinct territory. Thus, the local groups became the bases for the Apache social and political organization. A typical local group was composed of nine to thirty wickiups, owned by three to six family groups, and these, in turn, were composed of from three to eight households. The family group members were usually within the limit of second maternal cousins, although relatives by marriage were also included.

Tradition indicates the probability in primitive times of great Apache headchiefs. In historic times, however, chiefs ruled over clans and local groups. They not only settled disputes, directed hunting, farming, war, raiding parties, medicine dances and diplomacy, but also promoted cooperation among the bands. Generally elected for life, they led because of prestige and good example, losing the office if their leadership was not sustained. Hereditary succession was common among some bands. The chiefs also chose the captains or headmen who ruled over local groups of only a few rancherias. The headmen were the same as chiefs in their respective spheres, and from their number new chiefs were chosen. War chiefs, sometimes selected when several tribal divisions united against an enemy, frequently held their positions for long periods.

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91. Bourke, loc. cit., pp. 111-114. Exogamy was likely developed to provide more women workers and to furnish interpreters and spies from other groups. Ibid., p. 120.
92. Ibid., pp. 115, 118; Goodwin, loc. cit., p. 58. For a technical account of the clan, see Handbook, pt. i, pp. 303-305.
The warriors stood next to the chiefs in importance. Their training was very rigorous and they seldom attained the coveted rank until they were seventeen. A young man must have accompanied a war party four times in the capacity of a servant. If his conduct was creditable, the council made him a warrior of the lowest rank; if not, he had to await invitation. From this rank he arose by his own prowess, for the council never voted on a warrior again except to make him a chief. Old men did not lead in battle, but their advice was always respected.

The Apaches developed ideas of justice much in contrast to those of civilized peoples. Murderers in primitive days were so declared by the tribal council. The next of kin to the murdered person could then challenge the criminal to a duel. The entire village witnessed the affray and the outcome was binding. If a close relative refused to challenge, some other warrior relative could seek retribution. Not infrequently, the friends of an innocent victim killed a cold-blooded murderer. Such reprisal usually resulted in a destructive factional fight which was finally settled by a payment of horses to the most injured group. Criminals were often banished in such a manner that they could not join other tribes. If they afterward banded together in too strong numbers they were exterminated.

Trials by jury were also held. Aggrieved individuals who did not wish to settle a difficulty personally could complain to the chief; and occasionally the band made investigations and placed charges. The chief, if the case were serious, then called in two or three prominent men to sit with him. In case of conviction the plaintiff fixed the penalty, subject to the confirmation of the chief and his associates.

95. *Geronimo's Story*, pp. 37, 189-190. The organization of an ordinary war party was a simple matter. Some chief or a rising young warrior arranged a war dance. A circle was marked off in such a manner as to indicate the number desired, the distance to be travelled and when they would leave. The warriors wishing to participate entered the circle and chanted in unison. The medicine men accompanied the party to advise and incite them to deeds of valor, but they did not fight. Higgins, *op. cit.*, p. 15; Corbusier, *loc. cit.*, p. 17.


97. *Geronimo's Story*, pp. 185-186.
No individuals exercised greater influence among the Apaches than the medicine men. They wielded great power in all phases of life. Their cult was usually composed of men of superior ability—crafty, scheming and political. Their special powers and knowledge were supposed to have been received in dreams or in connection with some notable event in their lives; and they were credited as worthy on demonstration of their ability to cure.\(^9^8\)

The medicine men possessed no systemized body of knowledge, but used individual mystic rites and weird ceremonies. Specialization also flourished to a considerable degree. With their methods, designed to excite the patient’s imagination, they effected cures by driving the evil spirits away. Failures in practice were attributed to certain witches—usually enemies or old women—and sometimes the sacrifice of these offenders as an appeasement to the evil spirits was demanded and secured. Naturally, such a system engendered many inter-tribal schisms and much widespread violence.\(^9^9\)

The medicine men in addition to their strictly medicinal ritualistic work, conducted all the important ceremonials pertaining to Apache customs and traditions. These rites are without the scope of this study, but they were undoubtedly a powerful impediment to the government’s subjugation and control program. Nevertheless, Hrdlicka decided that the common sense of the Apaches left them

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Medical practices with a scientific basis were not restricted to the medicine men. A discussion of the practices is given by E. Andrews, "Military Surgery among the Apaches," in *Chicago Medical Examiner*, 1869, vol. x, pp. 599-601.
"less hampered in making progress by aboriginal traditions, beliefs and observances than other Southwestern Indians." 100

A CLASH AND A PROBLEM

The Spanish, in their imperious conquest of the North American aborigines, encountered little opposition from the sedentary Pueblo tribes along the Rio Grande del Norte, as they extended their elongated northern frontier to the very heart of the continent. With equal ease they extended their sway over the docile California tribes as far north as San Francisco Bay. But forming a great human wedge between these conquered peoples, the Apache groups presented a formidable obstacle to exploration and conquest and constituted a serious threat to the Spanish settlements for several hundred miles south of the Rio Gila.¹

The territory which lay between the two prongs of the Spanish frontier remained essentially a terra incognita until Padre Kino, from 1687-1711, pushed civilization northward into what later became the Gadsden Purchase.² By 1750, the San Pedro and Santa Cruz valleys of the present southern Arizona were in a marked state of prosperity, but the persistent attacks of the Apaches and the peculation of the Spanish officialdom completely reversed the situation during the next thirty-six years.³ In fact, enough of the region had been abandoned ⁴ to create fear that there might be a sharp regression of the northern Spanish frontier contiguous to Apachería. As a consequence, General Ugarte in 1786 by order of the viceroy, introduced some radical changes in Indian policy whereby the Apaches by force of arms were to be compelled to make treaties with the Spanish.

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². Ibid.
⁴. See the letter dated November 24, 1777, from Manuel Barragana of Tubac to Allande y Savedra, commandant of the Presidio of Tucson (Pac. Railroad Reports, vol. vii, appendix C, pp. 29-30), for a vivid account of the Apache inroads.
When a peace basis should be achieved, the reduced Indians were to be closely watched, kindly treated, furnished supplies, encouraged to settle near the presidios, taught to drink intoxicants and to be made dependent upon Spanish friendship for their needs.  

There are few details regarding the working of the policy during the next twenty-five years, but the slight indication of devastations argues that the government at an expenditure of $18,000 to $30,000 a year must have had unusual success. At least, Sonoran establishments had their nearest approximation to prosperity during this period.

The chaotic conditions in New Spain after 1811, resulted in a complete breakdown of the Apache policy, and the factional struggles of Mexican politicians after the Revolution prevented even the regaining of a semblance of control. Don Ignacio Zúñiga, commander of the northern frontier presidios estimated that from 1820-1835, 5000 Mexicans were killed, 100 settlements destroyed and about 4000 settlers forced to leave the region. With the exception of the garrisoned towns of Tucson and Tubac, the remaining parts of northern Sonora had become ranchos despo-oblados. And by 1848, even the important town of Fronteras was in the hands of the savages. Such were the conditions when by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, ratified on May 5.

6. Ibid.

Under the 11th article of the treaty the United States agreed to (1) restrain Indian raids into Mexico, and to exact satisfaction when they should occur; (2) to make it illegal to own captives or property taken from Mexico by Indians; (3) rescue and deliver up all Mexican captives, and (4) bear in mind the security of the Mexican frontier in laws governing Indian removals. Ibid., pp. 1112-1113. J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York, 1926), p. 68; James M. Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York, 1932), pp. 209, 215.
30, 1848, Mexico was forced to cede New Mexico and California to the United States.

At the time of the treaty, the Southwest was fairly well known to the Americans. The opening of the Santa Fé Trail in 1822 made Santa Fé the mart for the exchange of all the products of New Mexico, northern Mexico and a part of California; consequently, American adventurers and trappers had penetrated into every section of the region. Led by such bold spirits as Antoine Leroux, Sylvester and James Pattie, Bill Williams, Felix Aubrey, Pauline Weaver and Kit Carson, the intruders from the East soon gave the Apache tribal councils cause to question the desirability of friendship with the aggressive Anglo-Americans.

Although the more aggressive chiefs began to rise in influence, it is probable the proponents of peace would have triumphed, had not certain unscrupulous Americans become tools of the Sonoran and Chihuahuan governments in treacherous attempts to exterminate some of the Apache bands near the Santa Rita Mines.

These events of 1838 resulted in the Mimbrenos making the able and warlike Mangas Coloradas their chief. He immediately settled the factional disputes among his bands, cleared southwestern New Mexico of Mexicans, and made his region so formidable that American trappers ventured


The Santa Rita Mines near the present Silver City, New Mexico, were opened in 1834. For over thirty years they supported a population of 600 people who carried on a keen trade with Mexican centers. In 1838 after the attempts at extermination, the Apaches forced the abandonment of the region. The mines were not reopened until 1850. Bartlett, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-228.
into it only with the greatest temerity. During the next eight years he cemented his position among the Apache groups by successful raids into Mexico and by the marriage of his three half-breed daughters to prominent chiefs of neighboring tribes.\textsuperscript{13}

The Apaches might thus have remained undisturbed for many years had not the Mexican War sent troops through their range. Although they remained generally friendly during the time, intelligent military observers foresaw the task the government would have in reducing them to its control.\textsuperscript{14} Neither did the end of the war lessen the problem, for the Apaches in their belief that peace made legitimate their Mexican raids, merely increased them in frequency and daring. This convinced civil and military authorities that the government could never comply with its recent Mexican treaty obligations.\textsuperscript{15}

Indeed, the Americans themselves were soon faced with direct hostilities. On February 2, 1850, a band of Gila Apaches in an attack on the town of Doña Ana, killed one man and wounded three. While Major Enoch Steen was after them in vigorous pursuit another band cleared the settlement of stock. The major at once advised the location of a post at Santa Rita to overawe the hostiles.\textsuperscript{16}

Captain A. W. Bowman, who was sent to investigate the situation, reported that the Apaches faced by the failure of their game supply, said, "We must steal from somebody; and if you will not permit us to rob the Mexicans, we must steal from you, or fight you." He estimated that there were 1,100 warriors near the place who would have to be fed or

\textsuperscript{13} Pac. Railroad Reports, vol. iii, p. 80; Cremony, Life among the Apaches, pp. 30, 308.


exterminated. He insisted upon the establishment of a six-
company post. 17 Almost simultaneously the commissioner of
Indian affairs suggested the appointment of an agent for
the Southern Apaches. 18 And during the fall, Secretary of
War C. M. Conrad, informed President Fillmore that the
prohibitive costs and the inadequacy of the army of 12,927
men made it expedient to settle the Apaches on reserves and
induce them to start farming, rather than to subdue them
by force. 19

The first step taken was the establishment of Fort
Webster at Santa Rita by Colonel John Munroe in command
of the department of New Mexico. Depredations stopped,
the mines were reopened and a Gila chief went to Santa Fé
to see Superintendent Calhoun. 20 These results convinced
the superintendent that the Gila Apaches could easily be con-
trolled if Congress would do its part. 21

The War Department acted first, however, by replac­
ing Colonel Munroe with Colonel E. V. Sumner. He was
instructed to coöperate with Calhoun, but to pursue an ag­
grressive policy towards the Indians. 22 Meanwhile, Calhoun
prepared to go to Santa Rita to make a treaty. When he
requested an escort Sumner violated his recent instructions
of coöperation by a flat refusal; whereupon, Calhoun re­
ported that Indian affairs would necessarily have to be
neglected or conducted by the army. 23

During the summer the United States Boundary Com­
mission headed by James R. Bartlett, spent several weeks
near Santa Rita in close association with the Mimbreses.
At first the friendliness of the Indians and the frequent

17. Bowman to A. Quartmaster, April 21, 1850, 31 Cong., 2 sess., S. E. D. no. 1,
vol. i, pp. 295-297.
18. Orlando Brown to Jas. S. Calhoun, April 24, 1850 in Calhoun Correspondence,
pp. 192, 225.
20. Munroe to Gen. R. Jones, Jan. 27, 1851, Calhoun Correspondence, p. 290.
22. Conrad to Sumner, April 1, 1851, 32 Cong., 1 sess., S. E. D. no. 1, vol. i, p.
125.
23. Calhoun to Lea, July 30, 1851, Calhoun Correspondence, p. 394; same to same,
Aug. 22, 1851, ibid., p. 401.
visits of the chiefs convinced Bartlett that the tribe was eager for peace with the Americans; but it was evident to him that they would allow no interference with the captives or plunder taken by them on their Mexican raids. Nevertheless, he did interfere, and notwithstanding military aid from Fort Webster, he lost so many animals and was so harried that he was practically forced out of the region afoot. Indeed, the military fared little better than he. The Indians were now convinced that they had driven the whites away, and it is doubtful that any good would have resulted had an agent been attached to the commission as desired by Calhoun.

Apache relations were further complicated at the time by a rush of 150 desperate gold miners into a new field discovered at Pinos Altos, near Santa Rita. And when Mangas Coloradas sought to get them away by telling of bonanzas in remote Sonora, the miners severely flogged him to expose his ulterior motives. This was an evil day in Apache affairs. Not only was the chief’s back scarred, but the wound to his pride was deeper and more permanent. From that moment on until he was killed during the Civil War, his desire for revenge against all whites was never satiated. Numerous Apaches also suffered death at the hands of the miners, but the remissness of the civil authority in meting out severe punishment to the murderers, merely increased the tribe’s hostility.

Neither were the relations improved by uncertainties


In 1864, Manuelito, a Navaho chief and son-in-law of Mangas Coloradas, revealed that the troops activities at Fort Webster, had prevented Mangas with the aid of 400 Navaho allies from exterminating the commission. Cremony, *Life among the Apaches*, p. 84.

For the famous case of Inez Gonzales, who was recovered by Bartlett and restored to her family in Sonora, see Bartlett, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-309.
26. Wellman, *Death in the Desert*, p. 54; Calhoun to Lea, Aug. 31, 1851, *Calhoun Correspondence*, p. 415.
which appear to have developed in connection with the establishment of Fort Webster. Apparently the post was intended as a temporary one to furnish protection to the boundary commission; therefore, when the commission moved away, the troops evacuated at once, and in undue haste perhaps, because of a threatened alliance between the Apaches and the Navahos. This action, of course, augmented the hostiles' courage, as it did their numbers, for many Mexican Apaches now immigrated into the Gila country to take advantage of the immunities afforded by the new boundary line.

Regardless of causes, the Apaches became so aggressive in early 1852, that they practically held the country to the east and the west of the Rio Grande Valley. Not only this, but also in their raids (which the United States had pledged herself to stop), they were practically driving civilization from northern Mexico. In that part of Mexico, which was soon to be known as the Gadsden Purchase, travellers and adventures found the region a land of widows, in which all agricultural activity had stopped, and where in the eastern part, even pastoral activities were carried on under the protection of field pieces. In the western part Tucson and Tubac with a combined population of 1,009, maintained a most precarious hold.

Bartlett was now convinced the United States could not stop the raids until the savages were forced to give up their predatory habits; and Lieutenant A. W. Whipple, more realistically, recommended four permanent posts for their

29. Chas. Overman to Calhoun, Aug. 31, 1851, ibid., p. 420; Sumner to Jones, Jan. 1, 1852, ibid., p. 435.
31. Captain M. J. Box, Captain J. Box's Adventures and Explorations in New and Old Mexico, (New York, 1869), pp. 26-28. This unusual volume was found in the Rare Book Collection of the Library of Congress.
32. Julius Froebel, Seven Years, p. 397. See also chaps. xi, xii and xiii.
33. Wislizenus, a few years earlier, predicted the Mexicans would become the vassals of the Apaches. Dr. A. Wislizenus, Memoir of a Tour to Northern Mexico, connected with Colonel Doniphan's Expedition in 1846-47, 33 Cong., 1 sess., S. M. D. no. 26, p. 26.
control: one at the Copper Mines, one on the Rio Salinas, one at the mouth of Rio San Pedro and another on the Rio Colorado. High officials, however, were apparently unwilling to undertake any comprehensive steps, but Calhoun, who had recently become governor of New Mexico, sent Charles Overman to make a treaty with the Gilas if the opportunity developed. He also angled for the support of Secretary of State Webster, by declaring that a general Indian war threatened.

As the spring advanced the situation did become so menacing as to create a cooperative attitude on the part of Colonel Sumner, who now offered the governor one hundred stands of arms to equip a body of citizen militia. But a dispute over deliverance of the arms, voided the effort, and the colonel decided to make a general campaign with the regular troops. Before this could be done the general political situation in New Mexico became so threatening that the colonel modified his plans by appropriating those of Calhoun.

Meanwhile, Calhoun stricken by a fatal illness had left for the States. In his place he left John Greiner as acting superintendent, and Greiner immediately arranged through runners to meet the Gila chiefs at the Acoma Pueblo for a peace powwow. Colonel Sumner, however, decided to conduct the negotiations himself, and after virtually forcing Greiner to accompany him, made a satisfactory treaty on July 21, for which Greiner claimed the main credit.

35. Calhoun to Overman, Feb. 25, 1852, Calhoun Correspondence, p. 483.
36. Calhoun to Daniel Webster, Feb. 29, 1852, ibid., pp. 485-486.
37. Sumner to Calhoun, Mar. 21, 1852, ibid., p. 493.
38. Sumner to Calhoun, April 8, 1852, ibid., p. 520.
40. He died on the plains near Independence, Mo., in late May. Calhoun Correspondence, p. 541.
41. Greiner to Lea, July 31, 1852, with all enclosures, ibid., pp. 541-544. For the treaty, see Chas. J. Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, (Washington, 1904), vol. ii, pp. 698-660. Kappler gives July 1, as the date of the treaty. It was ratified by the Senate on Mar. 23, 1853. U. S. R. S., vol. x, p. 979.
No efforts at civil control followed the treaty until the next April, when the new governor, W. C. Lane, made further treaties whereby the Indians were to receive corn, salt, beef and some breeding animals for the first year, and a reasonable amount of subsistence during the next three years. Without awaiting the senate's action, he collected a large number of Mimbrenos near Fort Webster, and advanced considerable funds. In August he was replaced by David Meriwether, who found the funds practically exhausted almost at the moment he learned the senate had refused ratification. As a consequence, the Indians were soon hungry, and thus infuriated by the bad faith of the whites, they subsisted themselves during the next year at the expense of the settlements which were reported to have suffered a loss of several lives and nearly $100,000 worth of property.42

In addition to the government's bad faith the Apache problem was intensified by the reestablishment of a garrison at Fort Webster, by the presence of numerous surveying and exploring parties in their country,43 and by the increased immigration passing through the Southwest to the California gold fields.44 In fact, the avalanche of immigration that poured through Apacheria following the discovery of gold set up a chain of events that resulted in the Gadsden Purchase, ratified by Mexico and the United States on June 30, 1854.45 Naturally, the government seized the oppor-

tunity to abrogate the impossible article xi of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, but by acquiring more Apaches as well as more of the country over which they raided, its problem of control was vastly increased.47

The magnitude of the increased problem apparently discouraged Governor Meriwether from attempting any immediate conciliatory gestures,48 but Congress came to his aid on July 31 by appropriating $30,000 for the purchase of goods, tools and presents to be used in making treaties with the hostile tribes.49 Even with this encouragement Meriwether made no effort to make peace with the Gilas until the next summer, and then not until they had been thoroughly overawed by General Garland’s severe handling of the Utes, Jicarillas and Mescaleros.50 But at this propitious moment he had little difficulty in getting the chiefs to make a treaty, whereby the bands were to take up agriculture under the direction of a resident agent, Dr. Michael Steck.51

Doctor Steck, who was well known to the Gilas, went to their camping grounds at once, where he was welcomed with manifestations of friendship; but more important, he found them eager to start farming. As a consequence he put them to work, and to their credit they raised fair crops the first season. Spurred on by their success, they did much better the next year, producing in addition to their regular needs, half enough surplus in corn and vegetables to subsist themselves during 1857.52

But while the Indians under the immediate supervision of the agent thus became quite tractable, certain bands of

52. Same to same, Sept. 30, 1856, 34 Cong., 3 sess., S. E. D. no. 2, vol. v, p. 731.
related Mogollons farther to the west, incensed, no doubt, by the posting of troops in the Gadsden Purchase, began marauding against the Rio Grande settlements. To end the raids Lieutenant Horace Randall with a strong command in November, pursued fifty of the raiders for over three hundred miles—well beyond the present Arizona line. Although a large number of stolen animals were recovered, the pursuit merely demonstrated the futility of such tactics. Nevertheless, it led to the immediate establishment of Fort Buchanan in the very heart of the Gadsden Purchase.

Apparently the western bands became bolder in 1857, for they extended their murderous raids in all directions, especially southward into Mexico. From here after completely destroying many flourishing haciendas, they returned with numerous captives and great herds of stock. But Colonel B. L. Bonneville in temporary command of the department, took no action until the Navaho agent, H. L. Dodge, was brutally murdered near Zuñi. He then ordered Colonel Dixon S. Miles with a force of 400 men to crush the hostiles. Late in June, Miles moved quickly into an unknown country along the upper Gila, trapped a large band thirty-five miles from Mount Graham on the 27th, killed forty-two, captured thirty-six and destroyed much of their growing crops. Almost simultaneously Colonel W. W. Loring, detached to the north, struck another band at the Cañon de Los Muertos Carneros, where, in addition to killing seven more (including the notorious Cuchillo Negro), he seized several families along with over one thousand head of stock. In all, the expedition suffered only ten casualties.

Unfortunately, the expedition produced no permanent

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53. The first troops sent to the region probably took post at Tucson, early in 1856. 34 Cong., 3 sess. S. E. D. no. 5, vol. iii, p. 3.
57. Steck to Denver, Aug. 7, 1857, ibid., p. 577.
58. The numerous reports covering the expedition are given in, 35 Cong., 1 sess. S. E. D. no. 2, vol. ii, pp. 135-141.
effects; nevertheless, the crestfallen Mogollons did ask for a conference with Bonneville and Steck, to which the Pinal captains were also invited. In a talk lasting three days the Indians admitted their guilt, and three chiefs offered their lands in exchange for peace. This overture was refused, but Bonneville told them dire punishment would follow any further depredations. Steck, however, gained some new views as a result of the conference, especially when he learned the expedition had frightened away his peaceable charges. As a consequence, he informed the commissioner of Indian affairs that in a region so poorly defended, and where the Indians must plunder to exist, a pacific policy characterized by a liberal distribution of subsistence was best if the Indian's methods of a century were to be radically changed.

Colonel James L. Collins, who had succeeded Meriwether as superintendent, pushed Steck's views even further when he informed Denver that ultimately the department would be forced to choose between a policy of peace and subsistence, or one of "total extermination." Declaring that a pacific policy was preferable, he constructively recommended the establishment of a reservation on the Gila at a point far removed from the settlements and vested interests. Here under the shadow of a large military post that would be necessitated, he believed the bands could easily be concentrated, fed and kept at peace.

With more of a material outlook, Lieutenant Sylvester Mowry insisted that the Indian policy should be shaped to bring a greater development of the Overland Route and the budding mining enterprises of the Gadsden Purchase. He

60. Steck to Denver, Aug. 7, 1857, ibid., p. 577.
63. Same to same, Aug. 30, 1857, ibid., p. 564.
preferred extermination, but suggested that a cavalry post near Tucson, one on the San Pedro and another above the Pima Villages, would keep the Indians hemmed in to the north of the Gila where they could do little damage. 64

Impressed with these suggestions, Secretary of War John B. Floyd enlarged upon them by recommending the establishment of a strong line of cavalry and infantry posts along the entire Indian frontier, close enough to the bands’ habitat to prevent the sallying forth of raiding parties. 65 When Congress took no action the territorial legislature, at first disappointed, became desperate, and in the following February, sent in a petition requesting the removal of the wild tribes to some point north of the 34th parallel. 66 Again they were disappointed; but more to their dismay, the number of troops defending the southern settlements was sharply reduced. 67 In fact, General Garland himself somewhat dismayed by the activity of Land Office surveyors in the Indian country, in vain asked his superiors for instructions. 68

In contrast to the lethargy at Washington, Agent Steck on the headwaters of the Gila, continued his constructive control. Although the Gilas had suffered many injustices including numerous killings, they showed great restraint in allowing small parties of immigrants to travel unmolested through their country. Diseases contracted from the whites had reduced the warrior strength one-half, but this, no doubt, along with the pacific influence of Mangas Coloradas, was what caused them to center their attention on the cultivation of their 150 acres of corn. To Steck the only hope for their survival lay in the early establishment of a reservation far removed from the enervating influence of the

66. 35 Cong., 1 sess. S. M. D. no. 208, pp. 1-2.
68. Garland to Army Headquarters, May 31, 1858, ibid., p. 290.
whites. 69 In addition Steck, by unofficially cultivating the friendship of visiting White Mountains bands, also managed to exercise considerable restraint over the Apaches to the west. He even became sanguine enough to predict that a general council with the various bands would stop their raids into the Gadsden Purchase. 70

Concerned over these raids the Indian Office sent Special Agent George Bailey to study the situation. Without delay he reported that most of the raids did emanate from north of the Gila, and that the raiders on their return with their plunder from Mexico and the Gadsden Purchase, by necessity, had to follow the few water courses through the region; therefore, the location of a post at the mouth of the Aravaipa, one at the crossing of the San Pedro and one near the site of Fort Webster would solve the difficulty and be cheaper than depredation claims. 71

The report immediately decided the Department of the Interior that a “decisive policy was necessary”; and President Buchanan seizing the opportunity, but with his vision more extended than to mere Indian control, suggested to Congress that the rapid development of the Gadsden Purchase demanded the location of some strong posts in Northern Mexico. 72

Alarmed at the probability of military control, the civil officials moved first by holding a conference in December with the Chiricahuas near Apache Pass. Steck easily exacted their promise not to molest immigration along the Overland Route; but he reported that the situation would be more secure if they were removed further north. 73 In the following February, he also counseled at Cañon del Oro with 300 Pinal chiefs and warriors, reported as representing 3000 Indians. Although the Indians readily promised peace,

70. Ibid., p. 550.
71. Bailey to C. E. Mix, Nov. 4, 1858, Ibid., p. 558.
most of the settlers thought severe punishment alone would make the peace real.\textsuperscript{74}

In order to ascertain the true condition of the region, Colonel Bonneville in the early summer made an extended inspection of the Apache country. Near Santa Rita he found the Mimbreños quite tractable, but taking Dr. Steck’s advice, he ordered the establishment of a post as a protection to the miners. Further to the west, the Chiricahua outside of numerous thefts of stock which they declared they had mistaken for Mexican animals, were keeping the peace. But Bonneville saw at a glance that protection was necessary for the development of the San Pedro and Santa Cruz valleys. He therefore recommended the establishment of a two-company post in the “Tucson Mountains,” and another of equal strength on the San Pedro.\textsuperscript{75}

Before action could be taken, however, the savages in a sharp attack on the Patagonia mines killed a prominent citizen. This proved that the peace was unreal; but the military from fear of retaliations along the immigrant route remained quiet, and asked the department commander, Colonel T. T. Fauntleroy, for instructions.\textsuperscript{76}

In contrast to the erratic Chiricahua, the Mimbreños and Mogollons under Dr. Steck were causing the government little worry. As disease and vice decimated their ranks (their warrior strength had decreased from 400 to 150) they became more sedentary, and they were now growing crops for a distance of three miles along the Santa Lucia River. Trouble was caused by their use of Mexican liquor, but instead of depredating on the Americans, they raided into Mexico for their plunder and animals. If a reservation could not be given them, Steck reported the only other alternative was to force them north of the Gila.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{75} Bonneville to A. A. G., July 15, 1859, 36 Cong., 1 sess. S. E. D. no. 2, vol. ii, pp. 306, 309; A. B. Bender, op. cit. p. 367. Fort Breckenridge was established at the junction of the San Pedro and the Arivaipa late in the year.

\textsuperscript{76} Lt. I. V. Reed to A. G., Aug. 3, 1859, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 323-325.

\textsuperscript{77} Steck to Collins, Aug. 12, 1859, op. cit., p. 715.
While the military was awaiting instructions, Steck made further efforts to forestall punitive action against the western bands. On October 29 he gave presents to 800 Indians assembled in the Burro Mountains. He then met 400 of the Chiricahuas on the San Simón, where, despite the military's criticism of his treating with perfidious Indians, he again exacted Cochise's promise to refrain from hostilities. After concluding that the Chiricahuas should be united with the Mimbrenos, he counciled an assemblage of 2,500 others, mostly Coyoteros, at Pueblo Viejo, near the present Safford, Arizona. Their advanced state of agriculture impressed him so much that he immediately reported they could be made wholly self-supporting if given tools, put on a reservation and compelled to remain there. But the presence of some 200 hostile Pinals gave him certain misgivings regarding the whole situation. Indeed, he decided the available military force in the territory was insufficient to overawe the 2,500 Indians found north of the Gila. He therefore asked that the commanding general be told of the situation with a view to the establishment of a strong post in the region. Yet he advised against any extended scouts, reasoning that they would merely result in terrible retaliations against the settlements.

The department commander Colonel T. T. Fauntleroy took a more aggressive view; consequently, Colonel I. V. Reeve from his depot on the San Pedro in late November, pushed with nearly 200 men into the Pinal country. He chased the Indians for 350 miles, lost most of his mounts, and upon his return to his base, reported that troops to operate successfully against hostiles needed to be stationed directly in the Indian country rather than out.

79. Ibid.
80. Steck to Collins, Nov. 30, 1859, ibid. In the earlier files a bundle of letters was often given a single file number.

Disregarding the fact that Reeve killed eight and captured twenty-three of the Pinals as well as 111 of their animals, Colonel Fauntleroy showed his ignorance of the problem by branding Reeve's expedition an "entire and utter failure." Ibid., pp. 24-26.
Reeve's expedition apparently ended all official contact with the Apaches for several months. In the following September, however, Superintendent Collins without stating how, and without any consideration of the frontiersmen's attitude, suddenly presented Commissioner Greenwood with an idealistic program that would end all the Apache troubles by the reduction of the various bands to the Pueblo system. What might have followed the proposal can only be conjectured, but immediate developments in the Chiricahua country near Apache Pass, made it obvious that Collins was visionary.

Cochise and his tribe at this time lived near the pass where, in the most friendly manner he fulfilled a wood contract held with a Mr. Wallace, the Butterfield Stage Line agent. He also afforded the stages operating through the region complete protection. Everything was harmonious until in October when troops from Fort Buchanan came to the pass on the hunt for a band of raiders who had been marauding on the Sonoita. Although the culprits were probably Pinals, Lieutenant G. N. Bascom in command, treacherously arrested Cochise and four of his leading men. Cochise soon made his escape and wishing to guarantee the lives of his men, captured Wallace and two other whites whom he held as hostages. When Bascom refused a proposal of exchange, Cochise immediately killed his prisoners; whereupon, Bascom retaliated by hanging the Indian captives.

Cochise then exacted terrible revenge along the Over-

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82. The approach of the Civil War evidently stopped most of the federal activity. Not a single letter from Dr. Steck was found in the 1860 file.
84. Wellman, *Death in the Desert*, pp. 59-60; Clum, *Apache Agent*, pp. 33-34.
85. Higgins says the Indians had eaten the animals stolen, but that Cochise agreed to replace them with animals to be gotten from Mexico. N. S. Higgins, ms. no. 180, Bur. of Ethnology, p. 21.
land Route, and late in the year Commissioner C. E. Mix sent Special Agent M. T. McMahon to study the situation. McMahon was a realist, seeing at a glance that the only solution to the problem lay in the control of all the Apaches rather than in the Chiricahuas alone. He therefore recommended their severe punishment, and, as an added link in the cordon of protection along the Apache frontier, the location of a new post at the great bend of the Gila.

The outbreak of the Civil War and the withdrawal of all troops from the Apache country prevented any trial of the plan; indeed, the ingress of Confederate troops in 1861-1862, and their elimination of the few federal Indian officials, left the savages unrestrained in ravishing the settlements. With the exception of Tucson which sank to a mere village of 200 people, every enterprise or town in Arizona was either abandoned or completely destroyed.

Conditions became equally chaotic in southern New Mexico. After killing most of the isolated settlers, Mangas Coloradas in September made a concentrated attack on Pinos Altos. Although he failed to take the town, his further killings and devastations soon forced the abandonment of the Mimbres Valley settlements. With affairs thus obviously beyond the control of the regular officials, Superintendent Collins asked for federal military control.

Early in 1862 the government decided to reassert its authority in the region, and a California regiment—the California Volunteers—commanded by General J. H. Carleton, was ordered to the Rio Grande. No difficulties were

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87. Within sixty days 150 Americans had been killed. Poston to Cooley, May 17, 1866, op. cit. Farish says "Bascom's stupidity" probably cost 5000 American lives and several hundred thousand dollars worth of property. Farish, vol. ii, pp. 32-33.
88. McMahon to Mix, Dec. 15, 1860, I. D., M 416.
89. Lockwood, op. cit., p. 86.
encountered until certain advance contingents under Captains Thomas Roberts and John C. Cremony reached Apache Pass, but here to their surprise, they were forced to fight Cochise and Mangas Coloradas a severe fight before the pass could be negotiated. With its strategical importance thus demonstrated General Carleton upon his arrival a few days later, made the possession of the pass permanent by establishing Fort Bowie at its base. He then moved on unmolested to Santa Fé, where he issued orders inaugurating a war of extermination against the Apaches.

At this juncture Commissioner W. P. Dole insisted that the scarcity of game necessitated depredations on the part of the Apaches and that for this reason Carleton's policy was unwise. He suggested as an alternative, a reservation, subsistence and instruction. Nevertheless, the general showed his determination to carry his policy through by investing the Pinos Altos region with troops centered at a new post called Fort West. The troops then struck with vigor, killing Mangas Coloradas and a great number of his braves during the next few weeks. By 1864 the Mimbreno was reduced to one of the least formidable among the Apache bands.

Naturally, sharp opposition developed against a continuation of Carleton's ruthless measures. Humanitarians in arguing for treaties insisted that if depredation claims were paid out of annual funds that would be allowed the band, a great saving would result in the annual expenditure of $7,500,000 required for maintenance of the military in New Mexico. They even argued that by paying each In-

94. Cremony, Life among the Apaches, 158-166. Mangas Coloradas received a dangerous wound during the fight. See Wellman, op. cit., pp. 79-80.
96. Carleton to Col. J. R. West, Oct. 11, 1862, 39 Cong., 2 sess., S. R. no. 156, p. 99. This valuable document contains all the important correspondence on Indian affairs found in the Rebellion Records. It will be cited hereafter as S. R. no. 156.
98. For an extended account of the chief's work, see Cremony, op. cit., pp. 176 et seq.
dian a considerable sum each year, the annual military expense could be halved.\textsuperscript{100} And when the proponents of extermination contrasted Carleton's work with that of Steck in a light highly favorable to Carleton, Steck and his friends insisted that at one-twentieth of the military cost they could achieve results far more fundamental to the permanent peace of the territory.\textsuperscript{101}

But the extermination policy was to receive no check, for the discovery of gold deposits at a point soon to be known as Prescott, and the creation of Arizona territory in February, 1863, created further need for aggressive action against the Apaches.\textsuperscript{102} A rush of several thousand miners and ranchers to the new diggings led to the location of Fort Whipple in the Chino Valley on December 23.\textsuperscript{103} Major Edward Willis, the commandant, immediately made a peacable agreement with a local band of three hundred Apaches who lived to the northeast. Unfortunately, he had already warned the approaching territorial officers of Indian dangers; therefore, when they inadvertently met the peacable band a few days later, their escort made an attack and slew twenty of the bewildered savages. This act of treachery put all the bands of central Arizona on the warpath.\textsuperscript{104}

Charles D. Poston, the new superintendent of Indian affairs, called at once for added protection,\textsuperscript{105} and J. Ross Browne, a special official of the Department of the Interior, in pointing out that the 150 soldiers at Tucson were insufficient to protect their horses, prophetically estimated that it would require 3,000 men to protect the immigration that would flow to the gold region.\textsuperscript{106} The first territorial legislative assembly went even further in support of the extermination

\textsuperscript{100} J. G. Knapp to Comm., Jan. 24, 1863, I. O., New Mex., K. 11.
\textsuperscript{101} Steck to Dole, Sept. 19, 1863, 38 Cong., 1 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. iii, p. 220.
\textsuperscript{102} Lockwood, Pioneer Days in Arizona, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{103} S. R. no. 156, p. 126 et seq. In May, 1864, the post as well as the seat of government was moved several miles south to the present location of Prescott.
\textsuperscript{104} Fairish, vol. iii, pp. 45-46.
\textsuperscript{105} Poston to Dole, Dec. 31, 1863, I. O., Ariz. Misc.
\textsuperscript{106} Browne to Dole, Dec. 27, 1863, 38 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. v, p. 308.
policy by declaring that "relentless and unchangeable" war would be necessary until the savages were reduced or forced on a reservation.\textsuperscript{107}

The white occupation was indeed threatened within a few weeks. Ranches were swept bare of stock, miners were killed at their work, and the Indians were so numerous and dangerous that the region was destitute of transportation. Workmen erecting buildings in Prescott went armed and no one could go beyond the town limits in safety. In March a band of Tontos raided up the Hassayampa River to Weaver, where they killed seven persons including two of the most prominent citizens.\textsuperscript{108}

Frontier spirit now reached the exploding point, and King S. Woolsey, a prominent rancher, organized and led a punitive expedition of sixty whites and sixty Pimas and Maricopas into the hostiles' haunts. After arranging a council at Bloody Tanks near the present Miami, Arizona, he treacherously murdered twenty-four of the savages.\textsuperscript{109}

Conditions were equally bad in the southern part of the territory. Near Tubac Colonel Sam Butterworth and a party of mining engineers after losing two of their number were forced to stop their field work. The military at Fort Lowell was too weak to give protection, and further killings and devastations practically drove all enterprise from the region. Somewhat baffled, Poston turned to Washington for aid. In his request for more troops he also asked for military concert between the departments, pointing out that "It is almost equal to going in a foreign country to pass one military department to another." He suggested that 3,000-5,000 cavalrymen would be needed to reduce the hostilities.\textsuperscript{110}

On February 20 Governor Goodwin asked permission of the War Department to raise a regiment of volunteer in-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[107] Journal of First Legislative Assembly, p. 43.
\item[108] Farish, vol. iii, pp. 256-257.
\item[109] Rumor has it that Woolsey gave the Indians a feast of poisoned pinole—whence the name "Pinole Treaty" for the fight. See McClintock, vol. i, p. 186 for details.
\item[110] Poston to Dole, Jan. 18, 1864, I. O., p. 141.
\end{footnotes}
fantry. Permission was granted, but the authority was not exercised until June, 1865.\textsuperscript{111}

In the meantime the Apaches practically invested Prescott. Their scouts, unknown to the whites, watched the movements of travellers so closely that it was almost suicide for a small party to venture in any direction. R. C. McCormick, secretary of the territory and former journalist from New York, attempted to get more troops and wrote Poston that the sentiment at Prescott was for "utter extermination of the savages."\textsuperscript{112} Poston, instead of taking up his duties at Prescott, remained at Tucson haggling over Indian traderships. He worked out no constructive program, but he wanted to take a delegation of chiefs to Washington. This would be a much cheaper way to impress them with "the power and resources of the Government," he believed, "than by engaging in a long Indian war."\textsuperscript{113}

But the frontiersmen of Arizona preferred direct action, and late in March they again organized under Colonel Woolsey. Proceeding into the edge of the Tonto Basin, they fell upon a large village of sixty wickiups composed mainly of squaws, children, and old men. The entire village was wiped out, and Carleton's statement of fourteen killed probably referred to the warriors alone.\textsuperscript{114}

For several months Carleton had expended most of his energy against the Navajos and Mescaleros, trying to confine them to the Bosque Redondo in Eastern New Mexico.\textsuperscript{115} He also continued minor operations against the remaining Mimbres and Mogollons. The new gold fields were not forgotten, however, and he contemplated a new post to be known as Fort Goodwin on the Gila, north of Fort Bowie. To the people of Arizona he sent word that troops would soon be sent not to make "a little march out and back again,"

\textsuperscript{112} McCormick to Poston, Mar. 3, 1864, I. O., Ariz. Misc.
\textsuperscript{113} Poston to Dole, Mar. 14, 1864, I. O., P 172.
\textsuperscript{114} S. R. no. 156, p. 260.
\textsuperscript{115} Frank D. Reeve, "Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico, 1868-1880," in N. M. Hist. Rev., xiii (Jan. 1938), chap. iii.
but to wage a serious war against the Apaches.\textsuperscript{116} He sought the cooperation of the governors of Sonora and Chihuahua, extending to them the privilege of crossing into his department, and he requested them to put a large force in the field about June 1 for a three months campaign.\textsuperscript{117} A similar plea for aid and cooperation was sent to Governor Goodwin in which he declared that if the Apaches were not subjugated by Christmas, a war of twenty years length could be anticipated.\textsuperscript{118}

In fact General Carleton probably wishing to learn the fighting methods of the Western Apaches, had already sent Captain J. H. Whitlock on a campaign along the upper Gila. Thirty-four Indians killed, many others wounded and forty-five head of stock captured, indicated that the hostiles could be worsted. Colonels E. A. Rigg and H. H. Davis, late in May, penetrated into the same region to choose the site for the new post. They selected a spot near the Gila about six miles from the present Fort Thomas, Arizona, and then campaigned until they had killed forty-nine more Indians.\textsuperscript{119}

Despite these early prospects of success Carleton's proposed campaign failed to materialize. The records give no clue, but it is possible that the frontiersmen's unwillingness to volunteer for the campaign cooled the general's ardor.\textsuperscript{120}

Officials in the territory now began to realize the magnitude of the Indian problem. The surveyor-general informed his superior that the Apaches could muster 1,800 warriors.\textsuperscript{121} John C. Dunn in charge of the Yavapai at Potosi's direction, saw that the whites were associating these friendly Indians with the hostile bands to the east. He predicted that white encroachment would soon force the Indians into hostility along the trails from the Colorado River to

\textsuperscript{116} Carleton to Col. N. H. Davis, April 1, 1864, \textit{S. R.} no. 156, pp. 171-172.
\textsuperscript{117} Carleton to Don Ygnacio Pesquira and Don Louis Terrazas, April 20, 1864, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 177-178.
\textsuperscript{118} Carleton to Goodwin, April 20, 1864, \textit{ibid.}, p. 179.
\textsuperscript{119} \textit{S. R.} no. 156, pp. 184, 260.
\textsuperscript{120} \textit{S. R.} no. 156, pp. 184, 260.
\textsuperscript{121} Journals of First Legislative Assembly, p. 132.
Prescott. When the situation became desperate in early August, he went to Date Creek, where with considerable success he counseled the Yavapai to go to the Yuma Reservation on the Colorado.\footnote{122 Dunn to Dole, Aug. 25, 1864, I. O., D 563.}

Dunn's efforts deterred the Prescott frontiersmen from waging immediate war on the Yavapai; instead, ninety of them pushed into eastern Arizona on a combined gold-hunting and Indian-fighting expedition. No Indians were killed, but the expedition in moving through a country hitherto unexplored, gained a great deal of new geographical information. More important, the expedition not only proved that the number of Apaches was greatly exaggerated, but it also demonstrated that their remote haunts could be reached.\footnote{123 Woolsey to Goodwin, Aug. 28, 1864 in Farish, vol. iii, p. 258 et seq.}

The defensive strength of the territory suffered sharply during the fall by the mustering out of a considerable number of the California Volunteers. This checked active scouting, but skeletal forces were maintained at the posts. With slight prospects of reënforcements and with hostility spreading to formerly peaceable bands, Carleton decided that 2,000 troops would be required to subjugate the aroused Apaches.\footnote{124 Carleton to Goodwin, Oct. 13, 1864, A. G. O., L. B. no. 16.}

Carleton was soon relieved of the defense of Arizona, however, for the territory was shifted in January, 1865, to the Department of the Pacific. Unfortunately, this move discouraged and enervated the few remaining commands, and thus the savages were left practically unrestrained. Early in February they committed numerous killings and robberies in southeastern Arizona, and then they attacked the small group of videttes stationed at Fort Buchanan, drove

\footnote{122 Dunn to Dole, Aug. 25, 1864, I. O., D 563.}
\footnote{123 Woolsey to Goodwin, Aug. 28, 1864 in Farish, vol. iii, p. 258 et seq.}
\footnote{124 Carleton to Goodwin, Oct. 13, 1864, A. G. O., L. B. no. 16.}
\footnote{The territorial legislature took Carleton's hint and began to think of self-help, provided the federal government would furnish the money and arms. They also demanded that Arizona be shifted to the Department of the Pacific. 38 Cong., 2 sess., H. M. D. no. 18.}
them out and actually took the post and its impedimenta. 125

West of Prescott the whites gave the Yavapais and Apache-Yumas no chance to be peaceable. Although various bands of them worked on the roads and herded stock for the settlers, a command from Fort Whipple, early in January, wantonly attacked and killed twenty-eight men, women, and children of Chief Hosekma’s band, including the friendly chief himself. The Indians still hoped for peace, but a month later an intoxicated settler killed Chief Amasa. Killing of whites then became general, and the Indians soon cut off all communication to the Colorado. By June it appeared that central Arizona and contiguous parts would have to be abandoned. 126

The territorial officers now tried to raise a force. Governor Goodwin and Colonel Woolsey were sent as special commissioners to San Francisco to negotiate a loan, but they found the bankers unresponsive. While in San Francisco they presented the plight of affairs to the department commander, General Irvin McDowell. He agreed to send reinforcements at once and promised to make Arizona a separate military district. 127

General McDowell moved rapidly, and in May General J. S. Mason arrived in Arizona with 1,000 troops. He came home too soon, for even the friendly tribes of the Colorado River were ready to start war. 128 With the troops came elaborate instructions. The territory was to be divided into a number of sub-districts in which the commander of each was to be absolute in all matters of active field operations. “Activity and energy” was demanded and a careful study of the tribes was ordered. 129

The new superintendent, G. W. Leihy, 130 determined to continue Poston’s plan of colonizing the friendly Indians on

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125. M. O. Davidson to Dole, Feb. 11, 1865, I. O., D 672.
126. Dunn to Dole, May 23, 1865, I. O., D 736.
128. Davidson to Dole, Aug. 12, 1865, I. O., D 770.
130. Leihy’s appointment followed Poston’s election as delegate to Congress. Dole to Leihy, April 1, 1865, I. O., Ariz., Misc.
the Colorado and of leaving the hostile bands to the military and frontiersmen.\textsuperscript{131} He therefore hastened to Prescott to facilitate cooperation with Mason.\textsuperscript{132} The Indian Office also became cooperative and instructed Leihy to give the military full control in times of hostilities. Even in the case of supply issues, he was to be governed solely by military recommendations.\textsuperscript{133}

General Mason decided upon immediate action. He directed Colonel C. H. Lewis to clear the hostiles from a newly created district south of the Gila and east of the Pima Villages. But Lewis failed to take action, and the situation rapidly grew worse. Troops from Fort Bowie, more in accord with the spirit of instructions, campaigned extensively; nevertheless the hostiles remained unreduced.\textsuperscript{134}

Mason accompanied by Goodwin, meanwhile, proceeded to Fort Bowie. He attempted to arrange a council with the Indians, but as they had experienced the violation of five flags of truce during the past year none could be gotten in. He then worked out a plan of campaign whereby the savages were to be wiped out by incessant attacks throughout the territory. Those who would surrender, however, were to be placed on certain designated reserves, where they were to receive rations and protection.\textsuperscript{135}

The most important reserve thus designated was near Fort Goodwin. Superintendent Leihy was enthusiastic about its location and he predicted that with liberal appropriations the experiment would prove very successful.\textsuperscript{136} The territorial politicians also became enthusiastic,

\textsuperscript{131} Poston wrote, "The Apache richly deserve extermination . . . I have no objection to seeing them burnt alive, men, women and children." Poston to Leihy, April 12, 1865, \textit{ibid.}


\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Comm. to Leihy, July 27, 1865, I. O., Ariz. Misc.}

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Farish, vol. iv, pp. 124-127.}

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{136} Leihy to Comm., Oct. 18, 1865, \textit{op. cit.}
and to attract immigration gave out propaganda that the Apache troubles were practically ended. 137

But the widespread hostility in central Arizona during the summer of 1865 proved the falsity of their statements. Attacks were of hourly occurrence around Prescott, and the necessity for defence made it practically impossible for the territorial judge to keep his jurors in the box. 138 Killings and raids attributed to the Pinals and Tontos necessitated greater permanent protection to the Salt River Valley; consequently, General McDowell ordered the establishment of a five-company post near the junction of the Salt and Verde rivers. This was done on September 7 by Colonel C. E. Bennett who named the post Fort McDowell. 139 The choice of location was a most sagacious one, for in addition to its strategical value, it forced the hostiles when raiding to pass through the country of their dangerous enemies, the Pimas and Maricopas.

General Mason now decided upon a winter campaign. He planned to make Verde the frontier line from which all expeditions were to penetrate eastward. Leihy supported the plan and reported that the future of the territory depended upon the outcome of the war. But Leihy was a realist and he saw that the contempt the average settler had for the Indians made a permanent peace almost a chimera. Besides, he realized that the wide searches the Indians were forced to make for indigenous foods naturally led to clashes with the whites. 140

He therefore eagerly awaited an opportunity to remove those bands in closest proximity to the settlements of central


140. Leihy to Comm., Oct. 18, 1865, op. cit., p. 691.
Arizona. His chance came in October when war broke out among the widely divergent tribes up and down the Colorado. Enlisting the aid of Chief Iretaba of the Mohaves and Chief Cuesucama of the Yavapai, he induced about 800 of the semi-hostile Yavapai allies of the Mohaves to move to the Colorado River Reservation. This success not only gave needed relief to Mason's troops, but in causing commerce to start again, it prevented the white abandonment of much of western Arizona.\textsuperscript{141}

Mason's troops soon showed unusual vigor, for General McDowell announced he planned a winter inspection of the district of Arizona. A strong command in October successfully defended the Verde settlements against two hundred raiders and killed five of them. Almost simultaneously Cochise's band was struck in the Chiricahua Mountains and rendered \textit{hors de combat} for the rest of the winter.\textsuperscript{142} Fort McDowell troops campaigned actively along the lower Verde, but the ubiquitous hostiles were too elusive to be decimated.\textsuperscript{143}

Unfortunately, the vigor of the troops west of Prescott was retarded by a lack of cooperation on the part of the citizens;\textsuperscript{144} and in the Fort Goodwin area, Major James Gorman's interest in graft prevented any effective blows.\textsuperscript{145}

General Mason in December, promulgated a new policy for the Yavapai and other tribes of western Arizona by establishing a north and south peace line midway between Prescott and the Colorado. West of the line the Indians were to be considered peaceable; those to the east at war.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., p. 687.
\textsuperscript{143} Lt. J. D. Walker to Bennett, Dec. 12, 1865, \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{144} In one typical case, a packtrain of fifty animals belonging to one Wormster was attacked by fifty Indians. The packsters gave the escort under Captain A. S. Grant no aid whatever. Wormster quickly placed his loss at $800, but when he saw that the troops would be successful in recovering almost all of his packs, he immediately raised his estimation of losses to $1500. Grant to Col. Green, Dec. 25, 1865, \textit{ibid}.
\textsuperscript{145} Gorman made a treaty with Chief Francisco, who agreed not to molest the region near the post. With Gorman's rations his band raided and murdered to the Rio Grande. They then returned with the stock of their victims, finding the post sutler and some of the officers eager buyers. Frank and B. C. Morehouse to M. O. Davidson, Oct. 30, 1865, I. O., D 917.
If the whites could be prevented from overt acts of hostility, he looked upon the new policy as a complete solution for the problem.\textsuperscript{146}

The New Mexican authorities gave little attention in 1865 to the Western Apaches left to their control. In March General Carleton decided the Mimbreno\'s should be established at the Bosque Redondo, and for that purpose he sent Captain N. H. Davis to interview them. Davis counseled with Victorio and his sub-chiefs at Pinos Altos on April 20, where he found them destitute, tired of war and ready to send an examining committee to the Bosque. A point of rendezvous for the start was selected, but no delegation appeared. Davis then closed all possibilities of success by ordering his men to kill every male Indian found. In reporting to Carleton he set forth that a true policy toward the "rattlesnakes" would be one of "unrelenting war." \textsuperscript{147}

During 1865 the officials of the Department of the Interior showed far less interest in the Apaches than either the Arizona or New Mexico military. In fact, the commissioner late in 1864 stated that Apache relations were governed by the course of events rather than by the adoption of a policy.\textsuperscript{148} No one in the department apparently understood the problem, and Leihy\'s suggestion that a bribe of $300-$500 each, would keep the chiefs peacable,\textsuperscript{149} proved that men in the field had no constructive views. Commissioner Cooley reported that the Apache troubles were due to a lack of congressional appropriations for subsistence,\textsuperscript{150} but more appropriately, he could have said that a lack of funds deterred the formulation of a constructive Apache policy.

\textsuperscript{146} General Order no. 15, Dec. 18, 1865, I. O., L 48. The Army War College has a vast collection of military orders covering the Indian wars. Many of the orders also accompanied documents sent to the Interior and War Departments. The Old Records Division of the Adjutant General\'s Office has many files of orders, but these are rather inaccessible.

\textsuperscript{147} Davis to A. A. G., May 3, 1865, S. R. no. 156, pp. 304-307.

\textsuperscript{148} Dole to J. P. Usher, Nov. 15, 1864, 38 Cong., 2 sess., H. E. D. no. 1, vol. v, p. 165.

\textsuperscript{149} Leihy to D. N. Cooley, Dec. 1, 1865, I. O., L 4.

\textsuperscript{150} Cooley to Harlan, Dec. 20, 1865, R. B. no. 15, p. 26.
Whatever other conclusions may be drawn regarding the Apaches at this point, it is certain that a definite policy for their control remained to be charted.

*(To be continued)*