Framing of European Union borders in online news: Multimodal discourses of inclusion and exclusion

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FRAMING OF EUROPEAN UNION BORDERS IN ONLINE NEWS: MULTIMODAL DISCOURSES OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

by

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FRAMING OF EUROPEAN UNION BORDERS IN ONLINE NEWS:
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ABSTRACT

In times of crisis, online news media, on whose reports people heavily rely for information and interpretation of complex European affairs, play an important role in production of knowledge and negotiation of the meanings of the European Union’s response to the “migrant crisis” in 2015 when more than million migrants reached Europe after fleeing their home countries. This research project examines how European online news outlets constructed notions of borders, space, mobility and migration, and thus promoted particular institutionalized discourses on inclusion and exclusion with profound ideological implications. A secondary goal of this research is to explore the particular ways in which new media technologies enable journalists and audiences to co-construct such discourses. The study is grounded in framing theory with the particular emphasis on a multimodal discourse approach to framing, with the aim to address the interrelationship of different semiotic modes in the meaning-making process.

By applying multimodal approach to framing analysis, the analysis of coverage of the migration “crisis” of 2015, in the periods in June and September of 2015 when Hungary first announced the fence erection on its southern external EU border with Serbia, and then sealed the border-crossings, in five European news outlets (Britain’s The
Guardian, Germany’s Deutsche Welle, Hungary’s Magyar Hirlap, Croatia’s Jutarnji list, and Serbia’s Večernje novosti) revealed three dominant frames in news discourse across media outlets: “borders as spaces for managing national and EU security,” “borders as lived spaces,” and “borders as politically negotiated spaces.” While co-participating in the news framing of borders, readers supported the news frames of journalists and also offered complementary and even challenging narratives.

Lastly, this research elucidates how the news framing, through structural features of news reporting and the interplay of communication modalities, enables particular relations of power and relates to broader discourses about the European Union, as a politicized space of both inclusion and exclusion, that favor particular perspectives and thus, reproduce larger ideologies of Orientalism, xenophobia, racism, and balkanism.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Four photojournalists of the U.S. based news organization *The New York Times* and the photography staff of *Reuters*, the London-based news agency, shared the Pulitzer Breaking News Photography award in April of 2016 (“Breaking news photography,” 2019). The two sets of the winning photographs, taken at different times in 2015, portrayed migrants and refugees on their journey across many borders to reach safer destinations. These and many other multimedia news reports around the globe focused the attention on 2015 migrant arrivals and “illegal border crossings” to Europe in the highest ever-recorded levels since the European Union border management monitoring was established in 2004 (“FRAN Q4 2015 Frontex Risk Analysis,” 2016). Thus, by focusing on over one million refugees and migrants who reached Europe in 2015 after fleeing the war-affected and/or poverty-stricken areas, news organizations positioned migration, (im)mobility, and border crossings into the center of European news reports and public attention (Clayton & Holland, 2015).

News media, on whose reports people heavily rely for information and interpretation of complex European affairs (de Vreese, 2003), play an important role in production of knowledge and negotiation of the meanings of the European Union’s response to the “migrant crisis,” as journalists named the migration developments in 2015. To wit, news coverage has featured prominently the building of fences and intensified border controls on national and supranational borders in Europe, thus positioning space, the spatial concept of borders, and im(mobile) human bodies at the center of media discourse on migration. In the current multimedia environment, this kind
of coverage follows a high demand for immediacy and interactivity, leading European traditional media outlets to embrace multiple platforms and technologies to articulate meanings of the “migrant crisis.”

The main goal of this dissertation is to examine how European online news outlets constructed notions of borders, space, mobility and migration, and thus promoted particular institutionalized discourses on inclusion and exclusion and cultural difference with profound ideological implications. A secondary goal of this research is to explore the particular ways in which new media technologies enable journalists and audiences to co-construct such discourses. The study is grounded in framing theory (Entman, 1993) with the particular emphasis on a multimodal discourse approach to framing, with the aim to address the interrelationship of different semiotic modes in the meaning-making process (Kress, 2010; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001).

The analysis focuses on the coverage of two key events in 2015: Hungary’s announcement of the erection of a fence on the external EU border with Serbia in June, and Hungary’s closing of the border and prohibition of border crossings with Serbia in September of 2015. These acts of material and symbolic demarcation provide opportunity to explore the research problem addressed in this dissertation. More specifically, this study explores the multimedia discourses of five different European online media outlets: Britain’s The Guardian, Croatia’s Jutarnji list, Hungary’s Magyar Hirlap, Serbia’s Večernje novosti, and Germany’s Deutsche Welle.

A central argument of the present study is that the process of framing in the digital age should be re-evaluated in the terms of evolving media practices and new cultural dynamics engendered by digital technologies. Therefore, this project aims to re-
conceptualize framing theory by examining how multiple modalities of sense making (i.e. language, photos, videos, sound, maps, graphs and other computer-generated visualizations) work together to articulate fragmented discourses on borders, space, and mobility, and their meanings in the context of local politics, national histories, and transnational and supranational EU policies. This research project also examines how participatory journalism in the form of readers’ comments enriches the process of framing in the digital age. Moreover, by defining borders as culturally contested spaces of meaning and identity production, I focus the present study on the spatial dimension that connects the symbolic construction of European identities, politics of inclusion and exclusion, and notions of cultural difference.

European colonial history and its enduring legacies have strongly shaped migration patterns and routes (Kastoryano, 2010). More recently, those who are escaping from war-ravaged areas, such as Syria and other nations in Asia and Africa, have made Europe their first choice for relocation. Compared to the data from June 2014, detection of border crossings at the external EU frontier marked as “illegal crossings” by Frontex, the European Union Agency that coordinates border management and asylum in the 28 EU member states, increased by more than 140 percent in June 2015, while the number of migrants who applied for asylum grew by two thirds (“FRAN Q3 2015 Frontex Risk Analysis,” 2015).

Since 1995, the Schengen Agreement, which guarantees free movement of people in the EU area and abolished many internal border controls, has made migrants’ movement in Europe easier once when they cross the external Schengen boundary (“The Schengen area and cooperation,” 2009). In their attempt to reach Europe, refugees and
migrants arriving by boats and by land made peripheral EU countries such as Italy, Spain, and Greece their first entry points to the Union. The most frequently used entry point to the EU in 2015 was Greece and its islands. The Eastern Mediterranean route thus became the busiest route of migration to the EU with more than 885,000 detected “illegal border crossings” (“Migratory Routes Map,” 2017). However, after leaving Turkey and entering the EU member state Greece, migrants still cannot reach the European zone of free movement, and thus, this frequently used route and the increased migration have also affected non-EU countries such as Serbia and the Republic of North Macedonia. After passing through Serbia and Macedonia, in the final section of the Eastern Mediterranean route, migrants had to cross the Serbia-Hungary border to reach the Schengen zone of free movement and continue toward more developed Western countries like Germany, France, and Sweden.

Under these circumstances, in which migrants have been entering European countries at the highest rates ever recorded, EU members, especially the so-called Schengen states, revised their existing border policies. However, instead of making a single unilateral decision within the EU, the situation was addressed through a series of national decisions, which were widely reported in the media. First, in June 2015 Hungary announced it was building a barbed wire three-foot fence on its 109-mile long border with Serbia to protect its own and Europe’s overall space (“Serbian PM ‘Shocked,’” 2015, June 18). Then on September 13, Germany announced the reintroduction of border controls with Austria as a measure to deal with non-European migrants, followed by a reciprocal decision by Austria (“Austria Imposes Border Control,” 2015; “Migrant Crisis: Germany Starts Temporary Border Controls,” 2015).
Given these conditions, news discourses across Europe became sites where concepts of migration, borders, and mobility were negotiated and articulated. In the contemporary structure of media production, trends like hypertextuality, multimodality, and interactivity, paired with modern technologies, enabled journalists and other content producers of online articles to use different online formats (e.g., live-blogs) and semiotic modes such as language, photos, videos, sound, maps, graphs and other computer-generated visualizations, to shape public knowledge and understanding. A core assumption of the present study is that to understand news discourse production in the digital era, it is imperative to elucidate how multiple modes of communication enacted by both journalists and citizens operate through fragmentation, interpenetration, and fluidity to set limits and structures to the interpretation of current events.

To address news discourse production in the digital era, this study incorporates framing theory, multimodal discourse analysis, and theorizing on space, borders, and third-space into the theoretical and methodological framework of this project. Multimodal meaning-making reflects the interest of those who participate in the sense-making processes, and takes into consideration the contribution of design, production, and distribution, including the rules built into technologies as well as new online formats (Djonov & Zhao, 2014; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001). Therefore, a framing process in news production combined with the multimodal approach embraces the complexity and multidimensionality of different semiotic modes and their culturally and historically contextualized interconnections.

With the aim of elucidating the structuring of meaning through dominant macro-propositions within and across semiotic modes, I apply framing theory and analysis...
(Entman, 1993). My approach to framing in this study is rooted in sociological and constructionist approaches that define framing as both cognitive and social process. This project also draws on Entman’s (1993) definition of news framing as a process of making selected aspects of an issue more salient by prominent placement, repetition, and frequent association with culturally accepted symbols. According to Entman, the power of framing lies in the process of selecting and emphasizing some features of an event or an issue while omitting other features. Moreover, framing is conceptualized as a process of social interaction situated in cultural contexts (Van Gorp, 2005).

Heavily influenced by journalistic norms, routines, and conventions, as well those of institutions, framing as a part of news production is affected both by cognitive processes and structural factors (de Vreese, 2005). Context-bound processes of social interaction contribute to the understanding of framing as a process of meaning-negotiation between sources, journalists, and audience members. Therefore, framing in the online media environment is conceptualized as a process in which readers, through their immediate content production and contribution to traditional media content, interactively participate in the procedure of multidimensional framing in which they negotiate the meanings they “see” in a story.

In recent decades, convergence media and network communication have been blurring the lines that demarcate professional journalists and audiences and the roles they are assigned to (Bruns, 2005; Jenkins, 2006), allowing users more active participation in content creation through the processes of news production and distribution. The multimodality of expression that is intrinsic to new technologies has contributed to the rearrangement of power from traditional horizontal and hierarchical structures, in which
journalists as the gatekeepers were the sole creators and distributors of the news content, to more open and participatory relations in which citizens are encouraged to engage in public communication (Kress, 2010). Having in mind the openness and participatory nature of online media, I incorporate the lens of participatory journalism into the investigation of the framing of borders. The concept of participatory journalism anticipates that audience members as news users actively contribute to the news content by expressing their opinions. However, it is important to note that even though the audience members’ engagement is encouraged, the level and extent of the audiences’ contribution and collaboration with traditional journalists is determined and designed by media professionals and the institutional structures of news organizations (Nip, 2006).

Moreover, central to the present research project is the premise of space as a product of social relations (Andrews, 2008; Lefebvre, 1974). The construction of borders and delineation of space in the context of tensions between global movements and modern nation-states have brought space, and the human body within that space, in the center of the public discourse on migration. Critical to this study, then, is the understanding of space as social construct that carries meaning and contributes to the production of power and control (Andrews, 2008; Lefebvre, 1974). Constructions of borders and space demarcations occur through the processes of public negotiation and meaning making as well as through processes of material demarcations and border management. Through these processes, borders have become discursively contested sites. It is through this production of material and discursive zones that divisions between inside and outside, and between inclusion and exclusion, are reproduced with significant ideological effects (Carrillo Rowe, 2004).
In the case of the European Union, the tension between who belongs and who does not belong to the EU space is complicated by the continual processes of EU expansion and intra-EU migration (Balabanova & Balch, 2010; Tonkin, 2015). Even though the notion of European unity has been built around discourses of overcoming borders and divisions, the EU expansion is simultaneously a performance of both EU openness and closure (Tonkin, 2015). In the process of erasing the borders between old and new EU members, the expanded EU tightened its outside borders with the countries on the East and Southeast, leaving certain nation-states outside the Union, while controlling and policing the movement of outsiders. The new insiders had to prove that they accept and adhere to European values and that they are worthy of belonging to the European supranational space. However, the member states had to yield some levels of national sovereignty to the EU supranational entity and its policies. In this sense, this dissertation project will explicate the ways in which the “migrant crisis” amplifies the notions of national identity and belonging to the EU exercised in the right to police national boundaries and therefore decide who belongs to the EU space and who does not.

Consequently, the concepts of nation and third space are also relevant to this study. According to Anderson (1983), the notions of territorial and social spaces informed the creation of the cultural artifacts of nationness and nationalism. Modern nation-states are built on the notion of a nation – an imagined limited and sovereign political community in which a group of people feels and imagines together. Nation, according to Anderson, is imagined as a limited community because its boundaries demarcate one political community from another. Even though the European Union seems to meet these conditions as a community in which people imagine together the
borderless space of movement and common trade, Anderson has referred to Europe as an “empty sign” that lacks cultural substance. Nevertheless, the Union continued its growth in territory and has remained attractive for the nation-states outside the EU. While dealing with enlargement-caused policies and identity change, as well as the increase of migrants outside of the Union in the last two decades, EU leaders at the national and Union levels have attempted to define what Europe is and what it means to be European. For instance, Europe has been assigned symbolic constructions of shared values, collective identity, unity, and solidarity (Strath, 2008). Alternatively, Europe has been categorized by religion, ethnicity, and civilization.

Additionally, the concepts of third space, or in-betweenness, is relevant in this study because it emphasizes the practical and political relevance of space where issues of marginality are addressed (Bhabha, 1988; Soja, 2009). The applicability of the concept third space to the present study is twofold. First, it will inform my discussion of news discourses and frames in the Balkan countries, a zone that is positioned either at the EU outskirts or, like Serbia, immediately outside EU external borders. Treated as outsiders, Serbians aspire to the EU membership and perform in ways to show that they are capable of acting according to European values. In the case of aspiring EU members, the concept of third space can be related to the concept of balkanism (Todorova, 2009). Being geographically positioned in Europe, Serbia’s non-member status and its behavior according to EU values grants this Balkan post-communist country an ambiguous status of in-betweenness. The in-betweenness is characterized by the existing tensions of balkanism in which Balkan countries both geographically both belong and do not belong to Europe and are situated between the Ottoman legacy and the European nation-state.
model (Todorova, 2009). The Balkan countries are hence not treated as the other but as incomplete. The ambiguous status of the Balkans as constructed by the West causes tensions in which the Balkan states try to prove their Europeanness and thus to overcome this ambiguity.

This study is, therefore, informed by the concept of in-betweenness to also address the migrants’ bodies and identities within the frames of borders. Borders are contested sites where identities and belonging are produced and negotiated (Shome, 2003). As a dynamic set of human practices and discourses, borders are differently experienced by different social groups (Mezzandra & Neilson, 2013). Therefore, the concepts of borders and in-betweenness have become important in understanding national and collective identities; in seeing migrant bodies constructed as gendered, sexed, classed, and racialized; and in how they are produced as “others” and culturally different (Bhabha, 1988).

The complexity of modern nation-states, national histories, and supranationality of the European Union further problematize the conceptualization of European space, making internal and external EU borders the discursive sites of contestation on multiple levels: between national and European identities; between administrative Europeanization and the concepts of collective identity, solidarity, and unity that define Europeanness; between the West and the East; and between notions of exclusion and inclusion. Moreover, drawing upon Shome’s (2003) argument that the spatial perspective should be recognized as a central component in communication, this research project acknowledges the importance of media texts as sites in which European spaces and borders are constructed, negotiated, and challenged.
In this research project I also acknowledge that media institutions across Europe as well as the journalism profession itself were born within and maintain a significant relationship with the nation-state. Based on Anderson’s (1983) idea that nations are groups of people that start to feel and imagine together, and are united by mutual language and empowered by capitalism based on the (print) press, this project centers European media as institutions that aim, first and foremost, at informing national publics. For instance, on the global level, audience members are most interested in following national and local news. In a study by Mitchell, Simmons, Matsa and Silver (2018), around 86% of the surveyed news users from 38 countries said that they follow national news, and around 78% of them claimed that they are interested in local news. Similarly, Newman, Levy and Nielsen (2015) reported that 72% of their surveyed UK audience sought national news in 2015, whereas 67% of German news users were interested in national news.

On the other hand, electronic capitalism embedded in digital media exceeds national boundaries and has the potential to encourage communities to imagine together on the transnational level (Appadurai, 1996). Since they were first launched in the 1990s, contemporary online newspapers, both those derived from traditional print newspapers as well as online-only publications, have evolved into interactive sites augmented with visuals, audio, and other interactive elements (Greer & Mensing, 2006; Gunter, 2003). Most national online media are sites in which sources, journalists, and publics frame borders on the global level by distributing the news articles on online platforms through complex discursive strategies and processes of negotiation between contested values and attitudes. On one side, for instance, European openness, endorsement of human rights and
multiculturalism, are contested with restricted values of nationalistic pressure to protect the nation, its borders, and its economic interests.

The aforementioned theoretical and methodological framework guides the present study in elucidating power relations in news discourse. While applying critical multimodal discourse analysis to online news articles, I identify news frames as conceptual tools that are mobilized in different ways to make meaning of borders in the context of European space and contemporary migration to EU countries. Additionally, this research project embraces a critical approach to the theorizing of frames by accepting the importance of contextualization, thereby acknowledging the complexity of the framing process through valuing different structural factors that affect frames’ fluidity and dynamics. To contextualize the recent symbolic and material bordering practices, I first provide a brief historical background of the European Union, including a clarification of the concepts of Europeanization and Europeanness. In the next section of the introduction, I provide an overview of the migration patterns in Europe with specific focus on five countries of this study’s interest: the UK, Germany, Hungary, Croatia, and Serbia. After the historical overview of EU history, and the migration patterns, the subsequent chapters will address the theoretical concepts and provide a review of the relevant literature, followed by a chapter on the applied methods, three analysis chapters, and a conclusion.

**Historical Background**

**The European Union: A Project of Simultaneous Inclusion and Exclusion**

European countries have collaborated on the institutionalized trade level since the nineteenth century. For instance, different types of custom unions existed in Central and
Western Europe, making feasible the formation of the first steel pact between France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Belgium in 1926 (Judt, 2005). Further transnational collaboration was intensified after WWII with the establishment of the Council of Europe in 1946, which did not hold any legal, legislative, or executive power, but was initiated with the goal of controlling Germany’s demilitarization. The economic integration continued in 1951 when the European Steel and Coal Community was established between France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands (Judt, 2005). The European Steel and Coal Community was not only seen as a means for and the outcome of economic integration but also as an initiative to unite European countries on the political level and to secure peace (“The history of the European Union,” 2019).

Six years later, in 1957, the same six countries formed the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the European Union. One of the first accomplishments of The European Economic Community, also often referred as “Common Market,” was to simplify trade among the countries by eliminating customs charges for members (“The history of the European Union,” 2019). Judt (2005) argued that the Western European countries were never self-sustaining and thus traded with one another to compensate for their need for food and fuel. Likewise, further economic integration into the European Union in 1991 was driven by the nations’ self-interests to protect their respective agricultures and industries (Judt, 2005).

In 1973, three new members, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, joined the European Economic Community. During the time of the energy crisis in the 1970s, the Community intensified its regional policy to help the poor areas of the Union with infrastructure development funding (Fontaine, 2014; “The history of the European
Union,” 2019). Later, in the 1980s, Greece joined the EEC followed by Spain and Portugal’s membership. The now 12 member countries worked together to overcome the existing issues with the free flow of trade and thus created a “Single Market,” followed by upgrading the Single Market to a market characterized by the free movement of goods, services, people, and money in 1993 (“The history of the European Union,” 2019).

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, an event that catalyzed the reunification of Germany, and the end of the Eastern Bloc, in 1993 the European Union was instituted through the Maastricht Treaty with the aim of creating an “ever closer union among peoples of Europe” (Sokolska, 2018). The Maastricht Treaty consists of the three pillars: the first provides the framework for transferring the sovereignty of the member states to the EU institutions, the second provides the framework for common foreign and security policy, and the third pillar addresses the justice and home affairs cooperation (Sokolska, 2018). The strengthened Union underwent its third expansion by welcoming new member states in 1995: Austria, Finland, and Sweden. The 1990s were also crucial for the reconceptualization of national borders in terms of EU market benefits. In 1995 a majority of the EU member states established the European zone of free movement or “borderless Europe,” in the form of the Schengen zone.

The 2000s brought significant changes to the EU. First, the Euro was introduced as the Union’s new single currency; the 12 EU countries started using Euro in 2002. Second, the Union welcomed 10 new Central and Eastern European countries as part of the largest EU enlargement to that point. In 2004, the former Eastern Bloc countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, together with the former Soviet Union territories Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and two Mediterranean island
countries, Cyprus and Malta joined the Union, followed by the admittance of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU community in 2007 (Fontaine, 2014). In 2013 the former Yugoslav republic Croatia joined the Union as its 28th member (“The history of the European Union,” 2019). In light of the larger territory, which, for the first time expanded to include nations from Central and Eastern Europe, the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 addressed the needed changes and updates of the existing treaties. In 2012 the progress and values of the EU were recognized and the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for “advancing the causes of peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (“European Union receives Nobel Peace Prize, 2017).

The EU Definition. In the Union’s narrative about itself and its principles, the European Union is defined as a unified geographical area of common interests and equality between the countries, which respects the rule of law and human rights, and places value on humanitarian and progressive approaches (Fontaine, 2014). The Union was created with the aim of maintaining and strengthening economic and social solidarity while respecting cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity. While member states maintain their individual cultural identities, they also act together and use their unity as strength to “speak with a single voice” and heighten their influence on the global level (Fontaine, 2014, p. 4). All the citizens of the individual member states are the citizens of the Union even though, as Fontaine explained, the EU citizenship does not replace national citizenship. However, ostensibly common heritage and values, in addition to EU passports, EU driver licenses, anthem, flag and the common currency, contribute to a shared sense of belonging and a common future. The contemporary European identity is constructed as a supranational one in which a national identity is not erased but only
surpassed by a European identity (Herakova, 2009). As the area of freedom, security, and justice for all its citizens, the EU, according to Fontaine (2014), needs to take action to maintain the security of its member states and its common space.

In contemporary academic and news discourses, the notion of Europe as an entity is often reduced to the European Union, a selected and privileged geographical area of common history and shared humanitarian and progressive values. However, the conceptualization of Europe as an entity defined by modernity, Christianity, and an ambiguous idea of the purportedly European values of progress, liberty, and freedom, is in perennial contestation (Wodak, 2007). The contestation is often grounded in the tension between the notions of Europeanness and Europeanization. Europeanness signifies shared democratic values, cultural traditions, and collective new European identity (Strath, 2008; Troulis, 2018), whereas Europeanization refers to processes taking place in particular geographical spaces among people of the EU who do and should identify with the EU, shaped by legal treaties and linked to the organizational and administrative power of the EU (Borneman & Fowler, 1997).

In opposition to Europe’s definition as an overarching entity of cooperation, solidarity, and unity, that signifies peace and welcomes foreigners (Fontaine, 2014), Europe is also defined in regard to the “other” – the outsiders who are positioned outside of the boundaries, and who are subjected to strict criteria for membership in the EU club (Wodak, 2007). The outsiders are understood both as non-Europeans and non-white others (Martínez Guillem, 2018), and as Europeans who are outside of the privileged space and who have to prove that they are worthy of belonging to the European space (Arat-Koç, 2012). Restrictive and exclusionary European identity is constructed through
the simultaneous exclusion of certain groups of people on one hand, and rejection that the exclusion is based on discriminatory and exclusionary instituted practices of the other (Martínez Guillem, 2011). By fixing and securing white identity and associated privileges, Europeans normalize the restricted values and exclude those who do not belong, all in the name of the values of democracy, human rights, tolerance, and diversity (Martínez Guillem, 2018). Therefore, the project of Europe has always been a simultaneously a project of both inclusion and exclusion.

**EU core countries versus EU periphery.** European history is a history of boundaries and national space demarcation that has evolved into the demarcation of the European space from the outside territories (Tonkin, 2015). Even though the concept of the European Union has been built around the discourse of overcoming borders and division, the discussion around borders also emerged within the discourses of EU enlargement and intra-EU migration (Balabanova & Balch, 2010; Tonkin, 2015). The notion of the Iron Curtain created an artificial division between the East and the West, and the EU extension to the Eastern states was framed as the symbolic return of Central European countries to Europe (Tonkin, 2015). A majority of the former communist countries that were deprived of democracy and freedom (defined according to the Western standards) have been able to join the democratic Union (Fontaine, 2014). The core of Europe, institutionalized in the form of the European Union, remained especially attractive for the former communist countries on the Eastern periphery of the European continent. The enlargement process constructed Central and East European countries as desirable EU members that needed to learn to behave in a prescribed European way before they could be admitted to the EU. Specifically, the potential candidates have to
prove that they obey the EU’s legislation and respect the principles of democracy, liberty, and human rights (Arat-Koç, 2010; Fontaine, 2014; Tonkin, 2015).

Tonkin (2015) argued that EU enlargement has been both a performance of openness and closure of the EU. In the process of erasing the borders between the old and the new EU members, the expanded EU tightened its outside borders with the countries in the East. Therefore, the EU promotes free movement of people within its borders while excluding the movement of “others” who are outside the external EU borders. Thus, the conceptualization of “others” includes both the European nations, who have to show they follow the rules and embrace the values of democracy, tolerance, the respect of human rights and the rule of law, and the non-European migrants, especially those who “trespass” on EU territory and who are framed as a “problem” to European security (Fontaine, 2014). To further contextualize the most recent “migration crisis,” and the restrictive bordering policies, the upcoming section provides the overview of the migration patterns in Europe, with a focus on the UK, Germany, Hungary, Croatia and Serbia, especially since the nineteenth century.

**European Countries and Migration Patterns**

Colonial history, postcolonial movements of people, political and economic circumstances in Europe, including nationalistic uprisings and ethnic conflicts, and proximity to Africa and Asia shaped the migration patterns that affected European countries in the twentieth century (Fassmann & Münz, 1994; Thränhardt, 1992). This section outlines a brief history of five different migrant categories – migrants from former colonies, national or ethnic migrants, migrant workers and their families, refugees, and a broad category of “other migrants” who do not belong to the
aforementioned categories (Fassmann & Münz, 1994). Also I address the mobility of these categories with specific focus on the mobility to and from the countries whose media are examined in the analysis: the UK, Germany, Hungary, Croatia, and Serbia.

**Colonial and Postcolonial Migrants.** Until the early nineteen century, the scale of migrant mobility to European countries, especially Western European countries, was not significant. Big colonial powers such as Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and the Netherlands did not consider themselves as immigration countries; nevertheless, they encouraged migration to the dominions to reduce domestic poverty and strengthen their domination in the colonized territories (Coleman, 1994; Thränhardt, 1992). After colonizing Ireland in the sixteenth century, Great Britain first colonized the Caribbean territories in the seventeenth century, and expanded its colonies to the Indian subcontinent, parts of Africa, North America, and Australia in the eighteen century (Miles & Cleary, 1992). Decolonization and post-WWII demand for labor increased the mobility of people who were migrating to the UK. However, people from the colonies and the former colonies were not considered immigrants but British subjects, with the rights to enter the UK and move freely; therefore, no exact data exists about how many British subjects took advantage of the right to work and settle in the UK. For instance, according to incomplete data, out of 19 million foreigners who resided in the UK in 1992, over 11.5 million, or over 60 %, were migrants from the former Asian and African colonies (Fassmann & Münz, 1994).

Over the years the term “immigrant” in the UK has changed its meaning. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century people from Ireland and Jews from Eastern Europe and Germany were considered as immigrants, whereas the discourse had changed in the
1950s and 1960s and the term “immigrant” started to signify only non-white migrants (Fassmann & Münz, 1994; Miles & Cleary, 1992). The discourse on migration was affected and has been affecting political and societal changes in Britain. After the increased scale of arrivals, first of British subjects from the Caribbean followed by the people from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, the British government introduced multiple regulations with the aim to impose tighter immigration control. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act introduced state control in the area of labor demand, followed by the extended Commonwealth Immigration Act from 1968, which initiated control based on different types of British passports limiting mobility rights for the citizens whose parents or grandparents were not born in the UK (Coleman, 1994; Miles & Cleary, 1992). After the oil crisis and the recession of the mid-1970s, the 1981 Immigration Act created stricter rules for bringing dependents to the UK, whereas the 1981 British Nationality Act introduced a narrower meaning of the British citizenship, restricting the rights of citizens of the British-dependent territories and British overseas citizens to enter or live in the UK (Coleman, 1994; Miles & Cleary, 1992).

Tighter border and immigration controls, especially those targeting non-white immigrants, institutionalized racial policies based on the place of birth; those controls also introduced the term of “minorities” into British society, along with a system that relied on naturalization instead on assimilation. Since the 1990s the term “immigrant” has maintained a negative connotation and has expanded to the second and third generations of immigrants (Miles & Cleary, 1992). Racial differences conceptualized as cultural differences, along with efforts to impose stricter immigration rules, have been a focus of the Conservative Party’s political rhetoric and legislative justification. However, in the
1980s migration became a political issue not only in the UK but across Western Europe. After the change in migration patterns in the 1990s when the scale of the arrivals of the Third Countries citizens from Africa and Asia to Europe have increased, the extent of illegal entries to the European countries increased despite the tighter border controls and imposed migration restrictions.

**National or Ethnic Migrants.** The category of national or ethnic migrants, according to Fassmann and Münz (1994), refers to a group of people who migrated to new destinations based on a national or ethnic affiliation that is the same as the majority of people in the new destination countries. Mobility of people based on ethnicity and nationality especially increased in the post-war periods, when many of the borders shifted based on the political agreements of the allies, and when some of the territories of the Axis powers were annexed to neighboring states. In the period between 1945 and 1950 about 8 million ethnic Germans moved to then West Germany from the East Germany and Central and Eastern European countries (Fassmann & Münz, 1994). In the same period, 4.6 million Germans emigrated from East Germany to West Germany, and 0.5 million West Germans migrated to East Germany, while from 1950 to 1992, 2.9 million ethnic Germans moved to Germany, half of which resettled from Poland (Rudolph, 1994). Also according to these data, about 185,000 Germans left Hungary after WWII (Dövenyi & Vukovich, 1994).

Similarly, in the period after WWI and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in the period between 1920 and 1924 over 350,000 ethnic Hungarians who resided in the territories of the neighboring countries – Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the former Yugoslavia - moved to the new, smaller territory of Hungary. In the post-WWI
period about 70,000 ethnic Hungarians both from Hungary and the territories annexed to the neighboring countries emigrated to the United States (Dövenyi & Vukovich, 1994). The end of WWII brought another movement of Hungarians when over 350,000 of them, who were settled in the neighboring countries and the Soviet Union, emigrated to Hungary. On the other side, many other ethnic groups such as Germans and Slovaks were forced to leave Hungary based on population exchange agreements.

Under the communist regime, tight border controls and restrictive emigration policies had maintained low mobility of people to and from Hungary. However, almost 200,000 Hungarians used the opportunity of open borders and left the country during the six-month-long Soviet military response to the 1956 revolution. While in the 1920s Hungarian emigrants who left for the US, Canada, and Australia were mostly from rural areas, in 1956-1957 migratory movement, younger people from urban areas, especially medical doctors and engineers left Hungary to escape the communist rule (Dövenyi & Vukovich, 1994).

**Migrant Workers and Their Families.** After WWII, Western European countries used immigration as a way to boost their economy (Brochmann, 1996). During the post-war economic revival of the 1950s, Western European countries, including Germany, that fast got back on track as a leading European economic power, were recruiting migrants to fulfil their increased labor demand (Fassmann & Münz, 1994; Thränhardt, 1992). Italy, Spain, and Portugal were the first countries to send workers to Germany, France, and Switzerland, whereas the further recruitment through the mid-1970s expanded to the economic workers of the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. By 1970, 2.1 million migrant workers were situated in the West
Germany, and 1.6 million in France, while over 500,000 of foreign workers lived in Switzerland, and 330,000 workers in Belgium (Fassmann & Münz, 1994).

Instead of recruiting European laborers like other Western European countries, the UK relied on Irish workers and workers from the colonies. Britain imposed tight regulations on foreign workers in 1914, mandating that they had to obtain work permits issued by the Ministry of Labor before coming to the UK (Miles & Cleary, 1992). These strict measures were maintained in the 1930s as a way to protect British workers in the era of underemployment. The only time the UK opened its borders for European workers was to fulfill specific positions in hospitals, sanatoria, and the cotton industry. Around 75,000 European workers settled in Britain between 1947-1950, yet some returned to their home countries whereas others became naturalized British citizens (Coleman, 1994).

By contrast, Germany has regulated labor immigration with more flexibility through bilateral agreements with multiple countries, signing the first agreement with Italy in 1955, and the last with the former Yugoslavia in 1968 (Rudolph, 1994; Thränhardt, 1992). The German Ministry of Labor was signing bilateral agreement with Southern and Southeastern European countries, and with Maghreb countries to regulate workers’ rights, and to involve German employers in the recruitment process. Guest workers, as Germany referred to the immigrant labor force, were issued limited work permits, usually for low-skill jobs in manufacturing, construction, and service. German workers not only had priority over the migrant workers, but they had an advantage over the newcomers who were allowed only limited regional mobility.

Guest workers had only limited work permits, but some who were allowed to renew those permits subsequently stayed in the receiving country. In 1974, about 4.13
24 million foreign workers were situated in Germany, whereas 6 million workers and their families were accounted for in the reunited Germany in 1992 (Thränhardt, 1992). Discursively, labor immigrants in Germany were assigned not only foreign but temporary character by the use of the term “Gastarbeiter” or “guest worker.” In the 1970s they were named “Ausländische Mitbürger” or “foreign fellow citizens,” while in the 1990s they were renamed to “Ausländer” or “foreigners” keeping the meaning of those who do not belong (Thränhardt, 1992). In addition to this naming differentiation from German citizens, guest workers’ rights were limited since Germany defended its principles of a nation-state by the application of strict citizenship policy. Germany exercised the open economy practice that was boosted by migrant labor, but at the same time, preserved the closed system defined by citizenship (Brochmann, 1996). Since the 1970s Germany was the leading immigration country in Europe with the lowest naturalization rate (Fassmann & Münz, 1994; Thränhardt, 1992). Foreigners were legally and discursively labelled with their initial nationality, and only with the change of the Foreign Law in 1991, were the second generation of immigrants allowed to apply for German citizenship.

After the continuing increase of labor migrants in the 1950s, 1960s, and the early 1970s, the mid-1970s recession in Europe halted labor migration and Germany alongside other Western European countries introduced restrictive migration policies. In 1973 and the years after, guest workers from Turkey were the most numerous immigrant group in Germany. The recession, followed by the restrictive immigrant regulations, also opened the door for xenophobia supported by the arguments that immigrants, especially Turks, are culturally different and therefore, less likely to fully integrate into German society. The anti-Turkish sentiment was especially prominent during the 1980s when the former
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in a meeting with then UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argued that Turks are culturally different and do not integrate well, and that Germany has to cut in half the number of Turkish immigrants within four years (“Germany’s Helmut Kohl,” 2013).

In addition to the large numbers of Turkish guest workers, labor immigrants from the former Yugoslavia also comprised a significant number of the foreign labor force, especially in Germany. After World War II and before the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989, the former Yugoslavia, constituted of six republics, including Serbia and Croatia, and two autonomous provinces, was positioned as a neutral federation between the two blocs. The country, a successor of the Pan-Slavic Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians, which existed in the interwar period, was a fragile political creation with delicate internal cohesion, challenged with multiple-level tensions between the different Yugoslav nationalities (Malačić, 1994).

While the post-WWII emigration was predominantly politically motivated, the labor emigration had an economic character. The neutral status of the former Yugoslavia, and less rigid border controls compared to other communist countries, enabled the promotion of the temporary labor emigration to Western Europe and the signing of a bilateral agreements with Western European countries. In 1973, there were around 850,000 Yugoslav workers who emigrated to the Western European countries (Malačić, 1994). Even though the labor emigration was seen as a step toward the economic development supported by the Yugoslav authorities, the ineffective return policy, and the economic and political crisis in the 1980s, stimulated further emigration trends.

**Refugees.** The foreign labor reduction since the mid-1970s on one hand, and the
political and economic crisis after the collapse of the Easter Bloc on the other, encouraged different migration patterns. Political instability and rising nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe and deeper economic crisis encouraged more massive mobility of migrants from both East to West and South to North. However, this more massive migration was twofold - the restrictive migration regulations forced migrants to apply for asylum or to enter the more prosperous European countries illegally (Fassmann & Münz, 1994; Thränhardt, 1992).

Communist regimes in the Eastern Bloc countries tightly controlled their borders and migration outflow. Despite this strict control, over 13 million people were able to leave these countries and reach Western European countries, the United States, Canada, and Australia in the period between 1950 and 1992 (Fassmann & Münz, 1994). Central and Eastern European countries were traditionally the emigration countries. Political persecutions and economic deterioration were the main reasons for Central and Eastern Europeans to leave their home countries and seek better futures (Brochmann, 1996; Fassmann & Münz, 1994). For instance, the political or ethnic exiles after WWII settled in the post-war UK where the Labor government worked on the welfare state improvement (Miles & Cleary, 1992). At the time, Polish migrants settled in Britain and were granted a wider range of rights to establish Polish hospitals and schools.

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, political instability, raising nationalism, and ethnic conflicts caused the ethnic war in the former Yugoslavia and the country’s dissolution along ethnic lines. By 1993, about 5 million people were forced to leave their homes in the former Yugoslavia, and around 700,000 refugees dislocated and sought refuge in the more prosperous and safer Western European countries (Malačić, 1994).
The first choice for such refugee was Germany, where about 350,000 refugees migrated, followed by Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria (Malačić, 1994). Fassmann and Münz (1994) argued that in the early 1990s the former Yugoslavia was among the leading sending countries in the East-to-West migration, comprising 17% of the overall migration to Western European countries. The migration from the former Yugoslavia, Poland, and the former Soviet Union encompassed around 46% of the East-West migration.

After imposing more restrictive migration regulation to halt the labor migration in the mid-1970s, Western European countries in the 1990s opened their borders to several new types of migrants – refugees and asylum seekers. The number of asylum seekers in Western European countries increased more than three times in only six years. Compared to 1980, when around 103,000 refugees sought asylum, there were around 438,000 of migrants who applied for asylum in 1992 (Fassmann & Münz, 1994). Yet, more than 60% of all asylum seekers in Western European countries sought asylum in Germany (Fassmann & Münz, 1994).

Proximity to the countries with political instability and ethnic conflicts, as well as the liberal asylum policy and easy access to generous social welfare system, made Germany the leading destination for asylum seekers (Rudolph, 1994). Germany’s liberal regulations that enabled asylum seekers to stay in the country even after being denied asylum. These would-be asylum seekers wound end up relying on the German social welfare system, inflaming the anti-asylum rhetoric in which a negative connotation was attached to asylum-seekers. Christian-Democrats exploited this negative sentiment to launch its anti-asylum seekers campaign (Thränhardt, 1992).

Germany’s response to the increased numbers of refugees and asylum seekers was
to restrict the chances for the refugees to enter the country and seek asylum, and
eventually apply for German citizenship (Rudolph, 1994; Tränhardt, 1992). The
restrictive measures included not only tighter national border controls, but also visa
requirements and restrictive asylum regulations. These measures were followed by the
1993 Constitution amendment, which declared neighboring countries as safe (Rudolph,
1994; Tränhardt, 1992), with further expansion of the “safe countries’ list to all EU
countries, and the expansion in the 2000s that classifies Serbia, the Republic of North
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Albania as safe countries
in which the political persecution and inhuman treatment do not exist (“Germany’s list of
’safe countries,’” 2018). According to the safe list, citizens from the countries that were
declared as safe did not have or rarely would have the right to asylum (Rudolph, 1994;
Tränhardt, 1992).

In addition to the increased mobility of refugees toward Western European
countries, some refugees considered Central European countries as safe destinations. For
instance, as a communist country known for not welcoming refugees, Hungary was not a
desirable migrant destination until the 1980s. However, from 1988 large numbers of
Romanian refugees entered Hungary fleeing from the rigid authoritarian rule of President
Ceausescu. In the 1990s, Hungary also accepted around 90,000 of the former
Yugoslavian refugees (Dövenyi & Vukovich, 1994). The status of Hungary as an
immigration country was confirmed after the increased number of arrivals of the Chinese,
African, and Asian migrants in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

**Broad category of migrants.** The broad category of migrants encompasses all
those who are not included in the categories of colonial migrants, labor migrants,
refugees, national migrants, or ethnic migrants (Fassmann & Münz, 1994), but this particular category more specifically addresses migrants labeled as “illegal migrants.” Suppressive labor migration policies in the 1970s and later tighter asylum regulations could not completely stop migration into Western European countries, but managed to slow it down, making room for migration outside of legal channels.

The number of migrants into Western European countries quadrupled in the four decades: in 1950 there were around 5 million migrants, and the number increased to 15 million in 1982, while it is estimated that around 19 million migrants resided in Western European countries in 1992 (Fassmann & Münz, 1994). Since the 1980s and 1990s, former emigration countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Hungary have become immigration countries. For instance, in the 1970s, the number of Italian migrants who worked and lived in other Western European countries was around 820,000, whereas in the 1990s there were about 800,000 migrants in Italy who came from the Third World countries (Fassmann & Münz, 1994). Italy, alongside Greece, Spain, and Portugal, became the main destination country for immigrants who entered Western European countries avoiding the official border entry points or who overstayed their visa durations.

At the same time, the profile of migrants was diversified by the increase of the so-called Third World countries’ migrants, especially the ones from the African and Asian countries. In 1992 around half of the all migrants in Western Europe were Third-World countries’ nationals (Brochmann, 1996). Germany remained the major recipient of such migrants. Eurostat data provided by the 20 EU states shows that in 2014 Turkey, Morocco, China, and India were the top four countries of origin of non-EU nationals who live in the EU (“Immigration in the EU,” 2015).
The Schengen Zone of Free Movement

Increased immigration, especially through the illegal channels; human trafficking, which is frequently tied to illegal border crossing; terrorism; drug and weapons trafficking; and international crime are usually listed as reasons for tighter European border controls (Brochmann, 1996). Immigration policy used to be solely a national matter, but the EU raised it to a Union-level issue, especially after the Schengen Agreement became effective in 1995. In contrast to the EU pride in humanitarian treatment of migrants and the tradition of accepting the refuges who were fleeing persecution (Fontaine, 2014), the formation of the Schengen zone without borders between the member states intensified the already tight control of the external European borders.

The Schengen Agreement guarantees free flow of people within its signatories’ nations, and includes common rules regarding visas, right to asylum and the information on asylum seekers, and checks at the external borders. The Agreement also enables the cooperation of the member states in the areas of police operations, security and information (Brochmann, 1996; “The Schengen area and cooperation,” 2009). The Agreement guarantees free movement of people in the EU area, and abolishes internal borders and border checks between the Schengen countries, while a single external border was tightened. The EU enlargement in 2004, 2007, and 2013 pushed the external EU borders to the East and South, creating the 2015 Schengen zone, which comprises of 26 European countries including four non-EU member states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland). The UK and Ireland, the countries that opted out of the Schengen Agreement, and newer member states, which still have not met the Schengen
requirements (Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Cyprus) are still not part of the Schengen zone (Fontaine, 2014).

Even though EU member-states are not automatically members of the Schengen zone, the Agreement has introduced further inclusion to and exclusion from the borderless European space. The need to secure the 50,000-kilometer-long (31,069 miles) external borders, of which only 20% consists of land (“Schengen Area,” 2019), forces the Union to apply strict border management, which has only intensified in the last two decades. This entails control over European outsiders, such as Serbia and Macedonia, countries that still do not belong to the European space, thus directly involving Asian and African migrants. The control of these outsiders is codified in the Dublin Regulation, which by 2015 had been revised twice since the original (1990) Convention. The 2003 Regulation’s aim was to standardize the asylum law and practices across the EU, determining which member state was responsible for the asylum application (“The Dublin Regulation,” 2003; Wikström, 2019). However, the 2003 Regulation was putting pressure on the peripheral member states, which have been the first points of entry of the majority of asylum seekers (“The Dublin Regulation,” 2003). The possible third revision was proposed in 2016, suggesting a quota system based on solidarity among the member states, especially according to their size and wealth (“Country responsible for asylum,” 2019). The former Eastern Bloc countries Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Romania disagreed with the quota proposal, rejecting the solidarity and unity approach to relocate migrants across the EU countries (“Europe migrant crisis,” 2017). The pressure to protect the insiders and to exclude the outsiders is especially visible in Hungary’s decision to erect the fence on the external border with Serbia. Seeking to
secure its sense of Europeanness and belonging to the EU, and to prove that a former communist country can now protect European values, Hungary sealed the borders only two and a half decades after it removed the electrified fence along its western frontier to let East Germans pass safely to the West (Judt, 2005).

In addition to the effects of intra-EU migrations, in the global social and economic movement of people, European countries have also become the receiving countries of non-European migrants, primarily from Asia and Africa (Papademetriou, 2006). According to 2006 data, 20% of immigrants in the world emigrated to continental Europe, out of whom between 6 and 8 million were undocumented (Papademetriou, 2006). Almost a decade later, in 2015, over a million migrants fled ethnic and religious conflicts in their home countries and reached Europe to find security for their families. The Schengen Agreement enabled the Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, but European nation-states are more than ever engaged in the tension of whether to adhere to values of Europeanness, and to organize multicultural and multinational societies, or to seal the imagined “fortress Europe.” The notion of “fortress Europe” is an outcome of the policy evolved from the tighter migration controls in the 1970, and is manifested in the exclusionary and restricted space of the Schengen area. The exclusionary policies are based on the effort to keep outsiders out of the European space, based on perceptions of cultural differences rooted in racism and nationalist ideology.

The historical background of European unity and collaboration, supplemented by a brief overview of the migration patterns that show the East-West and South-North mobility in the last two centuries, provide the necessary grounding to better
understanding the current relations between the EU member states and the outsiders, and the migration patterns that affected and were affected by border policies.

Outline of Chapters

With the aim to further develop a study of the framing of borders in the European news outlets, the next chapter provides the theoretical groundings for this study, including framing theory, participatory journalism, multimodality, and the understanding of space. The second section of Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature of the geographical and sociocultural conceptualizations of borders, and discusses the literature on framing borders in the news, and addresses research on multimodality as an approach to news research and participatory journalism.

Chapter 3 addresses the multimodal methodology applied to framing in this study, including research design and analytical strategies.

The three chapters that follow provide nuanced analysis of multiple modes and their inter-relationships in constructing frames of borders. Chapter 4 focuses on the dominant frames of the EU borders constructed in multimodal discourses of online news. Chapter 5 presents discussion of frames about the EU borders and constructed by readers’ comments, and how those frames relate to the frames constructed by professional journalists. Chapter 6 features a discussion of the social relations of power enacted in the interplay of journalists and readers’ framings of borders across the European news outlets selected for study, and how do these frames relate to broader discourses on the European Union as a politicized space of both inclusion and exclusion. Finally, chapter 7 of this project is the concluding chapter, which summarizes the findings, discusses contributions and limitations of the study, and provides suggestions for future research.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

With the aim to develop a theoretical and methodological framework to address the construction of the meanings of borders in the multimodal online news environment, this study is theoretically grounded in the concepts of news framing, participatory journalism, and the understanding of space as a product of social relations. Theoretically and methodologically, this study is grounded in multimodal discourse as an approach to news framing.

The first section of this chapter focuses on framing theory, participatory journalism, multimodality, and the understanding of space as main concepts that this research is grounded in and informed by. The second section of this chapter provides an overview of the literature of the geographical and sociocultural conceptualizations of borders. Additionally, this section also provides the relevant overview of the literature on framing borders in the news, and addresses research on multimodality as an approach to the news research, and participatory journalism.

Theoretical Framework

Framing Theory

The research on news framing was informed by research on gatekeeping and agenda-setting. Gatekeeping is defined as a process of news selection ruled by professional journalistic norms and routines. Journalists involved in this process often strive to find a balance between what audiences need to know and what audiences want to know (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009). As a theoretical lens, gatekeeping has evolved from a focus on the gatekeeper’s personal choices to the theorization of gatekeeping as a process
shaped by organizational routines and norms that includes multiple gatekeepers, and involves both journalists and editors (White 1950; Gieber, 1964; Bass, 1969). Research on gatekeeping in the digital media environment has underscored how digital communication, with a high demand for interactivity, positions audience members as gatekeepers as they interact with news producers and other audience members to influence newsworthiness of information and events (Shoemaker & Vos, 2009).

The selection of information in gatekeeping theory evolved to an understanding that by frequently and prominently placing the news topics, media determine what issues are important and therefore, set the agenda and tell us not what to think but what to think about (McCombs & Shaw, 1968). The conclusion about the effects media have on audience, McCombs and Shaw developed after finding the correlation between the issues media featured as important and the issues audience members listed as important.

The focus on news issues and their frequent and prominent placement, led to the theorizing about media frames. Some authors like McCombs claimed that framing is the second-level agenda-setting, a refined level of agenda-setting that makes some aspects of an issue more salient through various modes of presentation. On the other hand, Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) claimed that the main difference between agenda-setting and framing is the difference between the “what” and the “how.” Thus, agenda-setting focuses on issues and topics selected for media coverage, whereas framing focuses on the ways issues are presented.

Framing issues and events in a particular way empowers media to shape public opinion in favor or against specific political, economic, or societal trends (de Vreese, 2005). In this regard, the application of framing theory has been attractive to
communication scholars despite its inconsistencies in the definition of frame (Cacciatore, et al., 2016; de Vreese, 2005; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Differences in the conceptualization of frame are primarily rooted in the two different disciplinary approaches to framing – one coming from psychology and the other originating in sociology (Cacciatore, et al., 2016; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). The approach to the framing process rooted in psychology does not address what is being communicated but rather how it is being communicated (Cacciatore et al., 2016). It often provides two opposite descriptions of the same issue, such as a problem or a gain for a society (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017). According to Scheufele and Iyengar, the psychological approach treats frames as “informationally equivalent labels” and, therefore, those frames are called “equivalence frames” (2017, p.2). On the other hand, the sociological approach emphasizes the way people make sense of the world (Cacciatore et al., 2016). This approach can be traced back to Goffman (1974), who conceptualized frames as interpretative schemas that organize and categorize, as well as explain the meaning of information people encounter daily. In the sociology-rooted approach, prominence is placed on one set of characteristics of an event or an issue privileged over the other set, and therefore the frames that are formed in this process are known as “emphasis frames.”

Critics of the sociological approach claim that sociology-rooted definition of framing reduces frames to messages and eliminates a clear distinction between frames and other informational and persuasive content (Cacciatore et al, 2016; Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017). In addition, supporters of the psychological approach to framing have criticized the sociological approach because the latter uses an overly broad definition of framing that pushes it into persuasion and makes framing redundant as a media effects
theory. They also criticize the approach for its inductive method, which generates a vast variety of different frame categories (Cacciatore et al., 2016; Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017). On the other hand, followers of the sociological approach criticize the psychology-rooted approach for the absence of contextualization, the limitation of complex framing theory only to media effects, and the constraint of interpretation of an event or an issue (Scheufele, 2000).

The inconsistency in frame conceptualization has led to a variety of definitions including the one of framing as meaning attribution through interpretative packages (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), or a definition of framing as a heavy dependence on wording that links process (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Van Gorp, 2005). The inconsistency in framing also enabled a plethora of various frames categories. The four overarching types of frames – journalist, audience, news frame, and issue frames, according to D’Angelo (2018), are the main frameworks that encompass a variety of subordinate frames. These broadscale frames are informed by Entman’s frames’ loci situated in communicators, receivers, text, and culture.

Journalist frames are frames formed in and around the newsroom discourse, and influenced by journalistic norms, routines, and practices (D’Angelo, 2018; Scheufele, 2004). Journalists frames are built from the information journalists collect on the spot, the information they receive from sources, and the storylines or narratives journalists make when combine and interpret all details they gathered to produce a news story. On the other hand, audience frames represent the ways readers or news receivers understand and interpret messages conveyed in the news articles (D’Angelo, 2018; Scheufele, 2004). Both journalist and audience frames are situated in political, cultural, and historical
contexts, but while journalist frames are guided with the norm of objectivity and fact-based practices, audience frames are affected and shaped by the processes of political socialization of individual audience members (Baden & de Vreese, 2008). However, the technological advancement blurred once clear lines between audiences and journalists, enabling multilayered audiences’ participation in the process of news production.

D'Angelo (2010) and Brüggemann (2014) recognize the existence of news frames, that other scholars do not make. While journalist frames are built upon information journalist interpret when producing news, news frames refer to different elements or modes, such as written text, visuals, and sound, journalists use to communicate messages. The overarching category of news frames contains subcategories such as visual frames (Coleman, 2010; Dan, 2018b), generic frames, and issue-specific frames (de Vreese, 2005; Scheufele, 2004). Visual frames are frames based exclusively on photos and video clips (Coleman, 2010; Dan, 2018b). Generic frames are generalizable frames that can be applicable in the analysis of various news, whereas issue-specific frames contextualize a specific topic (D’Angelo, 2018; de Vreese, 2005; Scheufele, 2004). Lastly, issue frames (D’Angelo, 2018; Nelson & Willey; 2001; Sniderman & Theirault, 2004) usually frame an issue by advocating or supporting one side of an issue over the other. They are often known as frames of emphasis and can be built around different types of arguments. Chong and Druckman (2007) argued that frames can communicate strong or weak arguments depending on salient and repetitive elements in the news coverage.

The nonexistence of conceptual clarity and standardized operational definitions also prompted the academic conversation about different epistemological and methodological approaches to framing. De Vreese (2005) noted that prior scholarship
around framing was focused either on media content or framing effects, whereas he argued that framing instead should be assessed as a process. The dual nature of framing, as D’Angelo (2010) argued, complicates framing in a two-fold way: how journalists, their sources and audiences construct and interpret media messages, and how all those social actors individually contextualize and interpret news messages. However, D’Angelo (2002) supported the inconsistency in conceptualizing framing research as a positive trend since analyzing different aspects of the framing process through the lenses of cognitive, constructionist, and critical perspectives has enabled knowledge to grow and explicate the complexity of news framing.

The most recent take on framing in the scholarly community has evolved in the debate whether framing is still relevant in academic research on media. Cacciatore, Schefuele and Iyengar (2016) argued that inconsistent conceptualization makes framing outdated and dysfunctional, as well as indistinguishable among many other media effects. The weakness of framing in the new media environment, these authors see in framing focus on persuasion and the inability to distinguish salience-based definition of framing from other media effects. They suggest that clearly defined mechanisms behind framing might contribute to the preference-based effects in the new technologically-enabled and increasingly fragmented media environment. On the other hand, D’Angelo (2019), Carragee (2019), Lule (2019), and Rodriguez and Dimitrova (2019) oppose the idea that the framing research should be retired in light of new online environment. Instead, they suggest that the diversity of framing approaches is a strength that enables pushing the limits of framing research by expanding, adapting, and integrating theories (D’Angelo, 2019), re-focusing on close examination of language, visuals, and actions (Lule, 2019),
focusing on contradictory and ambiguous messages within frames opposed to polysemy of media messages, and strengthening the visual framing within the framing approach (Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2019).

The improvement of framing is also seen in the analytic synthesis of generic and issue-specific frames into hybrid frames (Brüggemann & D’Angelo, 2018). Brüggemann and D’Angelo suggested that hybrid frames should be examined through the more holistic tiered-approach - by first analyzing issue-specific frames, and then examining those frames in light of generic frames. Even though this type of analysis is not applicable to all areas of communication, it represents a way of pushing boundaries of the framing research.

The technological advent and the Internet potential of interactivity, and therefore, the content distribution online, Tewksbury and Riles (2018) have seen as crucial to framing in the online news environment. The focus on frame distribution positions distribution as the third element that “operates as a mechanism that mediates the relationship between frame production and framing effects” (p.138). Frame design enabled by technology affects both journalists and audiences. The newsgathering process was aided by finding news and sources on social media, whereas audience members were also empowered to participate in the news production. Tewksbury and Riles argued that the abundance of new online sources can both increase the diversity of voices but also to enable interest groups active online to affect journalists to include the groups’ perception of an issue. Additionally, journalists can be affected by readers’ online comments as well as the news metrics to include and shape frames that will attract wider audience. The encouragement of participatory democracy, according to these authors, can also lead to
less influential messages because readers would only seek news that frame issues similar to their beliefs and values.

My approach to framing in this study is informed by the sociology-rooted approach that defines framing as a process of making sense of the world. In this respect, Entman’s (1993) conceptualization of framing is the most comprehensive basis for further revision of this theory in the digital media environment. Entman defined framing as a process of making selected aspects of an issue more salient by prominent placement, repetition, and frequent association with culturally accepted symbols. According to Entman, the power of framing lies in the process of selecting and emphasizing some features of an event or an issue while omitting other features. Salience and selection are the two most important features of framing. Frames, according to Entman, also define a problem, identify its cause, evaluate a problem by making moral judgements about issues, and suggest remedies to the existing problems. The ultimate goal of framing is to promote a particular problem or an issue in a way that reinforces a particular ideology.

However, framing is also a process of social interaction and is situated in cultural contexts, and as a communication process bridges the notions of cognition and culture (Van Gorp, 2007). It is a construction of concrete and implicit culturally bound information that is shaped by not only journalistic norms and media organizations, but also by political arguments and societal viewpoints (de Vreese, 2005). Journalists interact with their sources and other actors, and audience members interact with media content and with each other. Framing is a process of negotiation in which frames are contested both by journalists and audience members. Framing starts with journalists and their choice of sources, but on the other end of the framing process, the audience actively
interprets messages, making the framing process interactive, negotiable, and prone to counter frames (Van Gorp, 2007). By defining the framing process in this way, Van Gorp rejected the view of frames as static or as a limited inventory that can be drawn upon. He believed that each frame package consists of three elements: framing devices, reasoning devices, and implicit cultural phenomena. Framing devices such as word choice, metaphors, arguments, and visual images are held together under the central organizing theme. The reasoning devices deal with justifications, causes, and consequences and are related to Entman’s four framing functions, whereas the framing process makes the connection between framing and reasoning devices and frames as part of culture (Van Gorp, 2007).

By focusing on news texts as a form of discourse, Pan and Kosicki (1993) argued that framing analysis examines diversity and fluidity in meaning-making. News discourse is a sociocognitive process that involves sources, journalists, and audience members in shared culture. Frames are seen as constructs of signifying elements that provide a “window” through which a news story is seen. By acknowledging that news discourse is cognitive but also shaped by other social factors, Pan and Kosicki focused on framing devices in a wider sense than Van Gorp (2007) because they included many of journalistic routines. According to Pan and Kosicki (1993), there are distinguished four categories of framing devices: syntactical structure, script structure, thematic structure, and rhetorical structure. Syntactical structure includes patterns of the arrangement of words and phrases into sentences, but also journalistic routines and norms such as the lead (which gives a story a newsworthy angle), the headline as the most powerful framing device, the inverted pyramid structure, norms of source attribution, and objectivity. The
script structure focuses on storytelling, including the “five Ws and an H” questions, and the organizational structure of an event description to provoke drama, action, and emotions. Thematic structure has hypothesis-testing features that provide a set of propositions that form causal statements (words such as because, since, and for). The rhetorical structure includes what Van Gorp (2007) refers to as framing devices such as metaphors catchphrases, depictions, visual images, and stylistic choices made by journalists.

I developed this study on the conceptualization of framing as a process that examines news discourse and different discursive constructions. The framing process is culturally, politically, and historically bound, and shaped by journalistic routines and norms, media organizations, and the interplay between media and other organizations. Framing is a fluid process that, depending on a given context and the elements emphasized (and therefore also omitted elements), provides a cognitive window of how an issue could be seen. Both journalists and audience members interpret and negotiate the frames. News stories are sites in which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over a construction of social reality. The frames can differ but are not the product of individuals. Frames are social discursive constructions historically, politically, and culturally contextualized. Moreover, frames are discursively contested sites in which meaning is context-bound. I agree with Carragee and Roefs’s (2004) understanding that framing theory cannot be reduced only to media effects theory because ignoring different aspects that influence frame building—such as journalistic routines and norms, and the influence of external sources and other institutions—would reduce framing to only one dimension. Entman’s concept of framing encouraged other mass communication scholars
to extend, challenge, or reconsider framing theory because framing is a complex and multidimensional process that needs to be revisited in the light of technological advents.

**Visual framing.** Historically, in communication research language was seen as central to the process of meaning-making (Kress, 2010). The development of new technology, especially in the digital age, challenged the domination of language-based research by proposing the idea that visuals significantly affect or even determine how people process news. But even when the importance of multiple modes has been acknowledged, researchers tend to examine only one mode at the time (Kress, 2010).

In existing framing research, in particular, visual images are often considered subordinate to text and are perceived as framing mechanisms used in frame construction alongside linguistic devices—metaphors, catchphrases, and lexical choices (Coleman, 2010; Dan, 2018a; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Tankard, 2001). For instance, Tankard (2001) argued that photos and photo captions are just two out of 11 framing mechanisms, which help researchers identify and measure news frames. However, in the last two decades, research focused on visuals proliferated (Coleman, 2010; Dan, 2018b) suggesting that visuals are as important as words in the communication studies. Coleman (2010) proposed that written and spoken elements work together with visuals in framing topics because they do occur together in media and because audiences process them at the same time.

However, visual images may frame stories independently from verbal images (Coleman, 2010; Dan, 2018b). Coleman (2010) identified visuals as independent framing devices and suggested the use of a visual framing approach that can help explain the visual content of the news. According to Coleman, Entman’s definition of framing is also
applicable to visual framing, as framing refers to selection of one view, scene, or angle when composing, cropping, editing, and selecting an image for publication. Framing begins with the choice of events to cover, followed by the selection of what photo to take at the scene, from which angle, how and to what extent to crop it, and which one to submit to the paper or the website (Schwalbe, 2006). The process of framing continues in the newsroom, where editors decide which photos to publish, which size they should be, and where to position them on the page. When analyzing framing with visual elements, scholars examine not only what elements are present or not in a photo or a video, but they also pay attention to spatial grammar of photos; what are the structural features of visuals such as camera angles and distance, how they are organized in relation to each other and represent specific premises for the modality of visuals (Geise & Baden, 2014).

Messaris and Abraham (2001) distinguished three characteristics of images that affect news framing: analogical quality, indexicality, and the lack of propositional syntax. All three characteristics, according to the authors, are effective tools for framing the news. Analogical quality, according to the authors, is grounded in the nature of the relationship between images and their meanings that is based on similarity. Producing meanings based on analogy, visuals are considered more closely linked to reality and therefore taken for granted. Moreover, because images are more similar to the reality, they are more believable and considered as closer to the truth. The lack of propositional qualities refers to the absence of relational indicators that will allow making generalizations or conclusions about causality (Messaris: 1998; Messaris & Abraham, 2001). This characteristic of visuals enables viewer’s ability to make sense of implicit meanings by reading different contextual references.
**Visuals as ideological sites.** Believability and lack of explicitness make visual framing both a prominent site of ideological constructions within the news and tools for articulating and conveying certain ideological appeals (Braester, 2010; Coleman, 2010; Messaris & Abraham, 2001). To better understand the constructs of ideology, and ideological appeals, this study draws upon Van Dijk’s (1998) understanding of ideology as discursive demonstration of a group’s worldviews, beliefs, and attitudes about, and interpretations of some aspects of the world.

The power of visual images lies in their capability to convey emotions and frame subtle ideological messages. For example, visual framing makes different stereotypes less obvious than verbal framing, and therefore racial, ethnic, gendered or sexual appeals take place more often through visual imagery without directly referencing race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, or age (Elliott, 2011). Images can be used as instruments of dehumanization of people because they visually point out to racial or ethnic differences (Celeste, 2011). Visual stereotypical representations portrayed African Americans as threats, violent, or drug-users (Bird, 1996; Entman, 1994). Migrants are often visually presented as objects or animals and therefore, stigmatized as subhuman and in need of managing and elimination (Steuter & Wills, 2011). Similarly, visuals depicting women in ethnic clothes positions them as cultural outsiders relative to the Eurocentric tradition and reinforces not only ethnical but also religious cues (Lister & Wells, 2001).

Cultural cues such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and class; power relations enacted around those issues; and the geopolitics of space are also produced, reproduced, and challenged in visual framing. Braester (2010) proposed that places where photographs are taken are an important part of the cultural imaginary. He argued that
photographs both convey and create a relationship between a symbol represented in a
photo and a lived space through its multiple frames: pictorial, spatial, and ideological.
Each photograph, according to Braester, is a physical evidence of a place, and at the same
time, it refers to that geographical place. The materiality of a photograph, which follows
certain structural rules, and the geographical place together situate the people in the photo
and the observers in a certain ideological perspective (Braester, 2010). Within this
framework, visuals of places and spaces are used for construction of racial appeals
(Messaris & Abraham, 2001). Urban spaces are constructed as unsafe, violent, and
unappealing (Boskin, 1980) and those spaces in American culture that are frequently
associated with African-Americans thus take on those same characteristics (Boskin,
1980; Gray, 1989).

Visual framing is possible not so through what the is portrayed in visuals but also
through visual affordances such as shots and camera angles. Close-up shots that depict
mostly face or head and shoulders imply intimacy and personal relationship, and increase
peoples’ individuality; medium shots in which people are not depicted in full figure but
rather cut off between the waist and the knees indicate social relationship; whereas long
shots of full figures in a particular setting suggest impersonal relationships and decrease
the ways portrayed people are seen as unique individuals (Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress
& van Leeuwen, 1996; van Leeuwen, 2001). Power relations are produced and
reproduced by camera angles that position viewers and those who are looked at. The eye
level angle is considered as neutral and symbolizes equality, the shot made from the
above implies symbolic power of looking down on something, and lastly, the shot from
bellow indicates power over the viewer (Berger, 1981; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001).
Participatory Journalism

Participatory journalism is an important concept for this research as it is an outcome of the transformation of traditional journalism in Western democracies, in which the relationship between journalists and their audiences has been evolving from the closed and controlled process of news production to a more open and interactive relationship (Domingo et al., 2008). The concept itself contributes to this research because it addresses and expands both the understanding of the shift of the power relations in news production enabled by emerging technologies and new media (Kress, 2010), and the understanding of framing as a culturally and socially bounded practice of meaning negotiation between sources, journalists, and audience members (de Vreese, 2005; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Van Gorp, 2007).

Technological innovations forced journalists to engage and apply new formats and platforms to keep up with the demands created by these innovations, and, at the same time, this also empowered citizens to employ the available tools, participate in the processes of news production and dissemination (Domingo et al., 2008; Paulussen et al., 2007), and enrich the news production with diverse voices, information and experiences (Tewksbury & Rittenberg, 2012). Nonetheless, the newly created participatory culture has still not reached its full participatory potential as it seems that both journalists and audience members have been reluctant to fully embrace the possibility to jointly create news.

Even though the traditional gatekeeping capacity of journalists and editors has expanded gradually to the wider spectrum of roles such as facilitators, moderators, curators, and monitoring agents, the newly encouraged bottom-up content creation has
remained in control of news professionals (Bruns, 2005; Paulussen et al., 2007). By monitoring and authorizing only certain forms and degrees of citizen participation, journalists and editors have remained in charge of the interactive conversation processes, making citizen collaboration and participation limited and interdependent with professional journalism (Hermida & Thurman, 2008). Over the years in addition to changes in journalism profession and its role, the participatory process has also evolved through at least two phases and have become more nuanced and ambiguous in terms of power structure and dynamics between audience members and traditional journalists (Nip, 2006).

The first phase of the participatory journalism is identified as a process of developing interactive relationships with readers, and it involves the creation of different forms of contribution encouragement (Hermida & Thurman, 2008; Thurman, 2008). These range from comments on stories, blogs, polls, message boards, and Q&As to invitations for posting opinions on certain topics, or contribution in reader-produced news stories, photos, and videos (Hermida & Thurman, 2008; Thurman, 2008). In the second phase, the relationship between journalism and audience members have become more complex and complicated, often leaving both journalists and audience members without the clear distinction who controls and who is controlled both by and within the interactive process (Nip, 2006). The ambiguity in power structure and dynamics of the joint news production, opened the door to various forms of participatory journalism.

In addition to traditional journalism, Nip (2006) distinguished four forms of audience participation in making news - public journalism, interactive journalism, participatory journalism, and citizen journalism. In traditional journalism the power
structure is perceived in the most distinguishing way since the public is completely excluded from the processes of gathering, production, and dissemination of news. Compared to the passive role of audience members in traditional journalism, in other four forms of journalism, the audience members’ role in content production has been increasing to various degrees and therefore, blurring the traditional line between the news professionals who produce news and the passive audience members who only receive the news.

According to Nip, public journalism engages citizens in the processes of “news-making and the use of the news” by allowing the public to express concerns in different types of public meetings and polls (2006. p. 126). In interactive journalism audience members are encouraged to break from the linear approaches to content use and apply different technological tools to “read” the news in a variety of ways and employ interactive features such as interactive maps and graphs (Nip, 2006). This form of journalism calls for more personal engagement with the content, but nevertheless, the personal interactivity also depends on journalists’ willingness to chat with news users, and the extent they are open to facilitate content interactivity and participate in interpersonal interactivity.

The third form of citizen engagement - participatory journalism, according to Nip, further enables a variety of ways in which citizens are able to participate in news production, allowing users to create news on the local issues, provide their opinion on certain public issues, or even contribute with photos and videos. However, in this form, professional journalists and institutional actors are the ones who control the variety of contribution options and give users the opportunity to contribute (Nip, 2006). Citizen
journalism, on the other hand, does not involve professional journalists in the process of gathering, producing, and distributing news. In this model, citizens decide what the news is, produce the news, and publish the content on their own. Whereas citizen journalism is possible for various media platforms, interactive journalism is achievable only in the online news environment.

All four forms of participatory journalism engage audiences in different ways and to various degrees, making it hard to clearly delineate one form from the other. Thus, the complexity and the ambiguity of the roles in the news production processes have often caused the interchangeable use of these terms – public journalism, interactive journalism, participatory journalism and citizen journalism – as all refer to the audience participation in the news production. The ambiguity in the power relations between the public and professional journalists and the fluidity in definition of participatory journalism has affected both journalists and the public. The newly created participatory culture has affected existing journalistic values, norms, and routines. The main concerns journalists have in controlling the involvement of non-professional journalists in different phases of content production and distribution address audience objectivity, the preservation of the reputation of and public trust in the news organization, and legal issues (Hermida & Thurman, 2008).

Parallel to the media imposed limited inclusiveness of users’ participation, readers’ interest in participatory journalism seems to be in decrease. The 2016 Pew Research Center data show that out of 81% of adults in the United States who get news online, only 3% comment on a news story, whereas 11% share the news in a social media post (Mitchell, Gottfried, Barther & Shearer, 2016). Compared to the data collected in
2010 when 20% less of the U.S. adults were getting the news online, more than twice news users – 37% of them - participated in the news production, commented on the news or shared news on social media sites (Purcell, Rainie, Mitchell, Rosenstein & Olmstead, 2010).

Those who do participate in the interactive process of news production, are usually the news users who tend to interpret the news by commenting and reacting to the news articles already produced by journalists (Heinonen, 2011). Moreover, the limited number of users who post comments under the news are usually drawn to participate in the public debate about certain issues (Singer, 2011). Readers with similar interests participate in meaning making processes about certain topics and issues, and simultaneously construct their identities and social roles in nation-state contexts (Singer et al., 2011).

This research project is informed by the Nip’s (2006) concept of participatory journalism to examine the way media institutions enable and control citizens’ participation in the online news production processes. In addition to any ways of participation in the online media environment, I also pay special attention to readers’ comments as a format in which media allow readers to provide their opinions in reaction to articles. Some media outlets may require that readers be registered with a news site, whereas some encourage comments without a mandatory registration (Thurman, 2008). Since readers’ comments are considered to be a constitutive element of an online format of live blogs, I am arguing that readers’ comments, when allowed in the online articles, participate in the meaning-negotiation aspect of the framing process.
Multimodal Discourse

The central claim of this research project is that the digital multimedia environment and the development of the Internet challenged the historical domination of language as central to the process of meaning making (Kress, 2010). Critical discourse studies scholars recognized and accepted the need to change the approach to what discourse is and broadened the CDS focus beyond verbal language by incorporating visuals and sound as semiotic resources in their research (Kress, 2010; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001). Kress and van Leeuwen brought their interdisciplinary scholarship in visual sociology and social semiotics into rethinking what discourse involves and the need to extend it to non-verbal aspects of interaction.

Multimodal discourse encompasses multiple modes such as visuals, language, and sound with the understanding that all those different ways of expression are semiotic rather than technical elements stripped of any meaning (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001). Therefore, online news texts are not only a form of discourse (Pan & Kosicki, 1993) understood as text and talk as a social and institutional practice, positioned in socioeconomic contexts (Van Dijk, 1988); they are multidimensional and multisensory, and include written and spoken language, photos, video clips, audio elements, graphs, maps, and other computer-generated visualizations (Mason, 2002). All of those elements have their own characteristics and rules that govern semiotic practices, and are situated, arranged, and accessed in different social, cultural, and historical contexts (Jewitt, 2009). Moreover, all those elements equally participate in the process of sense making, either individually or in the interplay with other elements. The modes are interdependent, and their relationship is fluid and dynamic depending on the ways their possibilities and
limitations are utilized, accessed, and interpreted in different contexts and social circumstances (Djonov & Zhao, 2014; Kress, 2010; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001; Ledin & Machin, 2018). Even though interdependent, all modes do not necessarily contribute equally in different meaning constructions. Some modes individually or in an ensemble with other modes, can produce the same meanings as other modes, can complement or contradict the meaning of other modes, or contest the meanings of other modes in the same narrative or media text (Jewitt, 2009).

Despite the multiple advantages of applying multimodality to the various communication research, scholars pointed out to the limitations of multimodal approach, such as the lack of consistency in terms conceptualization (Forceville, 2010), the inability to generalize, the treatment of all modes solely from a linguistic angle (Jewitt, 2009), focus exclusively on text without considering different approaches to research such as ethnography (Ledin & Machin, 2018), or the equation of multiple interpretation of modes with ambiguous meanings they might create.

**Power and multimodality.** Multimodal discourse plays a role in the production and reproduction of dominant power structures. Power, truths, and therefore a sense of reality, are constructed through discourse in its multiple modes of expression. The role of multimodal discourse analysis in elucidating the creation and re-creation of power dynamics operates through the examination of questions about the ways in which multimodal discourse has been created; about how power structures are constructed, challenged, and negotiated through single modes and through their interaction; and who is given a voice by a particular mode (Jancsary et al., 2016). Arguably, the emergence and acknowledgement of multimodal discourses enable the rearrangement of power
because new technologies and the Internet are more open to different contributions of the content and different ways of expression (Bruns, 2005; Jenkins, 2006; Kress, 2010). This shift in power is conceptualized as a shift from vertical to horizontal structures of power, and from more hierarchical relations of who is entitled to decide what the news is and who produces the news, to more open, participatory relations in which different levels of participation in content production are potentially allowed. The newly empowered modes such as visuals and audio have the potential to become semantic resources that groups underserved by traditional media would opt to use to express their views and concerns, and thus break with their historical invisibility (Jancsary et al., 2016). However, the same modes have the ability to amplify the linguistic mode’s reenactment and reinforcement of dominant ideologies.

**Technology and multiple modes.** Ever since the printing press and later the telegraph, communication technology has played a significant role in the diffusion of news around the world. While transmitting information, technology also transmits the cultural beliefs that are deeply embedded within that information (Carey, 2009). Therefore, media technology influences how people see the world as well as how they perceive themselves, and how they construct societal norms and values.

Moreover, this project embraces the idea that technology and its rules affect the multimodal process of sense-making in a specific cultural domain and the ways that a particular medium becomes a mode translated into computerized numerical data (Djonov & Zhao, 2014; Kress, 2010). The technological advent has enabled digitalization of visual and audio information, purposeful spatial arrangement of language and visuals
with the aim of making and conveying a particular meaning, and lastly, the global dissemination of the message (Jancsary et al., 2016; Kress, 2010).

In addition to the capacity to diffuse a message on the global level, technology has been seen as a site of Euro-American global superiority within modernity (Dinerstein, 2006). Modern technology invites people to participate in the ritual of imperialistic control (Carey, 2009). It is perceived as a cultural site of power relations that enables the West to universalize its own perspective of progress, futurism, religion, whiteness, masculinity, and modernity (Dinerstein, 2006). Dinerstein has argued that Western technology, and especially U.S-based technology, empowers the West to produce and reproduce dominant and therefore U.S-based power structures. Other authors more recently have argued that despite the fact that some technologies might primarily be designed for certain uses and practices and, therefore, affect message constructions, in today’s digital environment users may utilize and interpret technologies in many different ways (Brock, 2012; Havens & Lotz, 2012; Sweeney & Brock, 2014). The latter approach, which argues that new technologies act as cultural platforms for meaning negotiation, enables minorities or those with less power to utilize those technologies and produce empowering messages.

**Live-blog as a new multimodal news format.** The popularity of new media technologies affected breaking news reporting, forcing traditional media to incorporate a new multimodal format of live-blogs. Live blogging challenges the traditional inverted-pyramid structure of traditional news by providing frequently updated information (Thurman & Walters, 2013). When live blogging, journalists do not leave the newsroom, but report as the news unfold and incorporate text, photos, videos, social media posts,
maps, graphics, hyperlinks, and readers’ comments (Thurman & Walters, 2013).
Producers of live-blogs utilize different modes to make sense of what is going on in the world. This relatively online news format emerged as a response to rapid change in technologies that encouraged different processes of people’s engagement in meaning-making (Thurman & Walters, 2013). Being positioned at the intersection of traditional journalism and digital technologies, live blogs maintain traditional journalistic norms and practices, and simultaneously responds to audiences’ expectations of immediacy and interactivity (Pantic, Whiteside & Cvetkovic, 2017; Thurman & Walters, 2013).
Journalists in the newsroom sort out information coming from secondary verifiable sources, and as Thurman and Walters (2013) observed, present the updated news progressively, almost in real time. The features of live blogging, enabled by the new technologies, such as updating, adding information, and including notification to changes and corrections as the story progresses, make live-blogs as very suitable for covering breaking news, sports, and entertainment events.
As one form of screen media, live-blogs are multimodal formats constituting texts, photographs, video clips, social media posts, readers’ comments, hyperlinks to other websites, maps, graphics, and different computer-generated visualizations such as computer-altered photos. Embedding Twitter widgets and including hyperlinks in live blogs comprised 35% of The Guardian live blogs in 2012 (Thurman & Walters, 2013), whereas live blogs showed to be a useful quoting tool, since journalists in British news organizations used quotes attributed to sources 12 times than print articles, and 15 times more than online news stories (Thurman & Schapals, 2017). Live blogs are also praised for their transparency because journalists in them clearly identify all the sources they use.
information or quotes from (Thurman & Walters, 2013). However, the fast pace of reporting news as the events unfold was often used as a ground for a critique that journalists also pay less attention to verify sources and thus lover the standards of professional journalism (Thurman & Walters, 2013).

**Space as Social Practice**

Space, another central construct in which I ground my research project, relates to the idea of socially constructed space as a means and site of dynamic social relations and practices that carries social meaning (Andrews, 2008; Georgiou, 2011; Lefebvre, 1974). As a social practice, space serves as a means of control and domination (Lefebvre, 1974). Space is both a lived and imagined site of meaning negotiation (Georgiou, 2011).

Understanding space as a construct of human practices and not solely a mathematical concept was the biggest shift in conceptualizing space (Andrews, 2008). Apprehension of space moved from the mathematical realm of empty space to the philosophical realm of absolute space, then evolved further into mental and ideological realms until ultimately being imagined as a construct of social relations (Lefebvre, 1974). Human practices create and make use of different conceptualizations of space – a discursive/rhetorical conceptualization and a socio-cultural conceptualization. Discursive/rhetorical approaches argue that space is discursively constructed and produced through various rhetorical devices in public speeches and media texts. Discourse produces meanings and knowledge about the terms of (im)mobility, whiteness, access, border, and the national space, among many other concepts (Carrillo Rowe, 2004; Said, 2000; Shome, 2003). Socio-cultural approaches address space as networked societies (Castells, 2007; Georgiou, 2011; Keightley & Reading, 2014), in-betweenness
(Anzaldúa, 1987; Bhabha, 1988; Soja, 2009), nation, diaspora, and globalization (Anderson, 1983; Appadurai, 1996; Massey, 1994), and citizenship (Rosaldo, 1988).

In this project, I am arguing that space is both a discursive and a lived social construct, and that space should be understood as the interplay of discursive practices and socio-cultural practices. Therefore, the spatial perspective of this study draws both on discursive/rhetorical views of space (Carrillo Rowe, 2004; Shome, 2003) and socio-cultural constructions of space as communication networks (Castells, 2007), in-betweenness (Soja, 2009), and nation (Anderson, 1993).

Space is a culturally, historically, politically, and discursively produced site of contestation over the power to control, operate, and regulate physical or geographical space (Carrillo Rowe, 2004). At the same time, according to Carrillo Rowe, space is a site in which rhetoric and power produce and reproduce differentiated (im)mobilities, opportunities, and levels of (un)safety for differently racialized, classed, gendered, and sexed bodies. Shome (2003) positioned space as central to communication because of its centrality in the production, organization, and distribution of cultural power both as a site for power enactment, and as a product of practices through which identities are contested and reproduced.

Power is also central in understanding space as social flows and networks in which mediated negotiations of power and agency operate both on local and global levels (Castells, 2007; Georgiou, 2011; Keightley & Reading, 2014). The new space of interactive, horizontal networks of communication over the Internet enables a relationship among technology, communication, and power for a variety of social actors both on the local and global levels (Castells, 2007). Digital technologies also provide new
possibilities for images, sounds, and texts to be transmitted and re-contextualized in time and space (Keightley & Reading, 2014). Additionally, space is a product of interrelations and interactions of the real place and mediated space, in which the connections are made across geographical, cultural, and political borders (Georgiou, 2011).

The understanding of third space, or in-betweenness, acknowledges that space is a social construction with practical and political relevance, and calls for multiple approaches to conceptualizing space. Soja (2009) introduced the concept of third space as a space where issues of race, class, and gender can be addressed without privileging one over the other, and where all modes of thinking about space – physical, mental, and social are equally valid. Soja’s third space is an attempt to overcome the duality (perceived and symbolic or conceived space) in spatial dimension.

Third space is a hybrid space that Bhabha (1988) described as a precondition for the articulation of cultural difference and different forms of oppression. The idea of hybridity is also present in Anzaldúa’s (1987) concept of _mestiza_ consciousness—the consciousness of the borderlands enabling other positions to emerge in the U.S.–Mexico borderlands. This conceptualization of third space is closely related to Todorova’s (2004, 2009) concept of balkanism. According to Todorova, the Balkan states’ ambiguous status of in-betweenness, in the sense of both belonging and not belonging to Europe, is the result of historical Western constructions of the Balkans as not European enough but yet not completely Oriental and other. The ambiguous status of these countries is created by perceived tensions between: the geographical position of the Balkan countries in the outskirts of Europe and between Europe and Asia; and the Western European construct of the Balkans as an underdeveloped, primitive, culturally, and economically inferior space.
with tribal, mixed races of Orientals and Europeans who are motivated by aggressive nationalism and therefore not sufficiently European. Although EU membership status signifies the approval of their European status, many Balkan countries still struggle to leave the labels of primitivism and economic inferiority behind them.

This “in-betweenness” approach calls for analysis of the third space where marginality and ambiguous status can be addressed. However, nationalism in the Balkans is also associated with race and class because a part of the Balkan countries’ national identity is influenced by the way Western Europe had treated and treats the Balkans. The Balkan states’ national identities are bound to the spatial, historical, cultural, and political contexts, including the relations with the EU and the spatial position within and on the boundaries of the EU space in the modern history. Moreover, *nation* as an imagined political community both in terms of boundaries and sovereignty is a concept that applies to all European countries that have to yield some groups’ territorial and cultural artifacts and imagination to the supranational imagination of the EU (Anderson, 1983). Thus, nation-state identities are situated at the intersection of state, nation, ethnicity, and supranational territory of the EU. This intersectionality enables institutional and media discourses to emphasize nationalism when the national body needs reassurance about safety of the nationally-owned spaces, alliteratively, to give prominence to Europeanness or regional interests when closer regional collaboration is needed.

The present study overcomes the conceptualization of borders as geographically fixed entities that delineate territories and nation-states, instead arguing that the concept of space as a social construct allows us to investigate the intrinsic cultural, historical, and political contexts of borders. From this perspective, the concepts of space and multimodal
discourse create a framework for critiquing and revising framing theory as applied to online news in the digital media environment.

This study contributes to the reconceptualization of framing as a culturally bound process of social interaction. The space that people both inhabit and construct through social interactions is not only a material and discursive construct, but also both a communication network in which journalists and news users participate, and a constitutive component of historical, political, and cultural contexts. Additionally, this project posits that a spatial perspective is crucial to the understanding of the ways verbal and visual tools contribute to meaning making around who we are, who the others are, and the sense of home, belonging, inclusion, and exclusion.

To further inform this study with the existing research, the second section of this chapter will provide an overview of the literature on borders, framing borders, especially visual framing of borders and framing borders in European news media. Lastly, the upcoming section will summarize the relevant research on multimodal research in the news, and participatory journalism.

**Literature Review**

The aim of this study is to examine the ways multiple semiotic modes frame European Union borders within the larger discourse on migration constructed in online news outlets in five European countries. This project focuses on expanding research on framing by arguing that framing is a complex multimodal process in which both traditional journalists and active audience members participate unequally in the online multimedia environment. In this media environment, news users are encouraged to simultaneously participate in content creation but also in meaning negotiation. Therefore,
calls for immediacy empowered by new media technologies enable users to actively participate in the process of framing to the extent they are allowed to take part in different news production stages. Additionally, the purpose of this project is to unpack the nuanced ways in which different modes, separately and together, participate in the production and reproduction of dominant power structures constructed around the idea of borders as symbolic and material spaces.

Given these overarching objectives for my project, I will first discuss the geographical and sociocultural conceptualization of borders. In the next section I will review the relevant literature on framing borders in the news, multimodality, and participatory journalism will be provided.

**Geographical Conceptualizations of Borders**

Border scholarship began to emerge within the field of geography in the 1950s (DeChaine, 2012). In this early geographical perspective, borders were understood as fixed entities that delineated territories and nation states. However, even though the terms *borders, boundaries, and frontiers* may be used interchangeably to signify social constructs of national power enactment, the three terms differ in meaning (Baud & Van Schendel, 1997). In the Anglophone world, according to Baud and Van Schendel, *boundaries* are part of diplomatic discourses, and the term refers to the exact dividing line between nation-state jurisdictions. *Borders*, on the other hand, refer to delineations of regions, whereas *frontier* signifies territorial expansion into areas, which are considered not to be yet occupied (Baud & Van Schendel, 1997).

There are two types of borders in the geographical sense – natural and artificial (Curzon, 1907). According to Curzon, natural borders as markers of environmental
delineation between territories, peoples, and cultures, are considered the most convenient defense tools against outside enemies. In addition to mountain ranges as the most durable and obvious boundaries and seas as the most instrumental to effective defense, Curzon lists deserts, rivers, forests and swamps as nature-created demarcations that people purposefully use to divide and bound their territory from other territories. In opposition to natural boundaries, societies arbitrarily mapped or erected artificial borders (Curzon, 1907). Tribal societies used to think about their territories in terms of zones and not in terms of linear boundaries (Jones, 1959). Jones also argued that the Roman Empire did not established the system of boundary demarcations with other neighboring nations of equal rank until Augustus set the foundation of the concept of the empire and its administration within fixed borders. However, Chinese rulers who treated outsiders as barbarians erected the Great Wall more as a defensive strategy against the others than for demarcation purposes (Curzon, 1907; Jones, 1959).

The conceptualization of borders in European nation-states is rooted in different definitions of nation, and it is traditionally a view from the center of the perceived nation (Baud & Van Schendel, 1997; Jones, 1995). Under the influence of the Enlightenment Age, the French have favored natural borders based on cultural differences, whereas Germany’s concept of nationalism has been based on language and nationality; therefore, the Germans have preferred demarcations based on nationality or “folk” (Jones, 1959). The geopolitical position of the United Kingdom and its colonizing appetites have shaped the British perceptions of borders as frontiers that have to be reached and conquered in the process of expansion (Curzon, 1907).
According to the modern conceptualization of borders, this notion evolved from a purely geographical idea to the political and social construct of power enactment at the national and territorial levels (Baud & Van Schendel, 1997; Donnan, 2005). In addition to mapping practices, state power has been symbolically represented in fences, walls, flags, control checkpoints, and uniformed guards. However, according to Donnan (2005), the one fixed entities of nation-states and their demarcations have become more fluid and uncertain spaces of human movement and mobility.

**Borders as Constructs of Social Relations**

In the 1970s, borders become a focus of anthropological studies that explored the ways borders influence cultural processes (DeChaine, 2012). Social sciences, especially human geography, positioned space at the forefront of research on multiple understandings of the social world. The proponents of the most significant shift in border conceptualization, that is Lefebvre (1974), Massey (1994), and Soja (2009), began to define borders as socially produced and practiced. DeChaine distinguished two broad border research areas from this postmodernist perspective. The first one gives attention to the construction of border identities and sees borders as a dynamic site of hegemonic struggle over terms for the formulation of national and ethnic identities. The second area of research draws on discourses of globalization and transnationalism and focuses on spatial politics of movement, mobility, migration, and displacement.

Critical communication scholars have examined and questioned the concept of borders within the context of spatial mobility and in relationship with identity production (Shome, 2003), creation of national space (Carrillo Rowe, 2004), and lived experience along the frontier and within the border area (Anzaldúa, 1987). Shome (2003) approached
the border as a site where territoriality is enacted in the contestation and production of identities, and where belonging is negotiated. For example, as sites of contestation and control, borders produce and reproduce immigrant identities as out of place. While focusing on mobility of black and brown bodies, Carrillo Rowe (2004) discussed the social, political, and cultural nature of national space in the formation of U.S. nationalism since it has been built on the controlled mobility and forced immobility of differently racialized, sexualized, gendered, and classed bodies. By acknowledging that space is culturally, historically, politically, and discursively constructed, she defined borders as highly contested sites and as material and discursive zones of demarcation between inside and outside.

Similarly, DeChaine (2012) argued that the primary function of borders is to designate, produce, and regulate the space of difference. Borders are produced, managed, contested, and altered through human symbolic practices. Moreover, Ono (2012) argued that borders are defined and constructed by ever-changing rhetoric and that border effects go beyond geographical space and physical sites. For Mezzandra and Neilson (2013), borders or borderscapes are set of practices and discourses with a dynamic character that different social groups experience in different ways.

**Media Discourses on Borders and Migration**

While most of the research on borders and spatiality, especially on borders in Europe, still comes from the political science studies (Arat-Koç, 2010; Lenard, 2010), ethnic and migration studies (Wallace, 2002), the border and borderlands studies (Carrera & Hernanz, 2015; Scott, 2000), history (Baud & van Schendel, 1997), geopolitics (van Houtum, 2002; 2005; van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002), and geography (Moisio,
communication scholars focused the attention on migration and mobility (Carrillo Rowe, 2004; Flores, 2003; Shome, 2003) and borderlands especially in the context of the migration to the United States.

Furthermore, the discourse and rhetoric studies on migration in the context of Europe, as Martínez Guillem and Cvetkovic (2018) laid out, particularly focus on institutional, everyday, and media discourses on migration. The media research on migration has traditionally been centered on migration to the Western countries (Croucher, 2013, Vilgenhart & Roggenband, 2007), especially the large reception countries such as the UK (Tavassoli, Jalilifar & White, 2019), and France (Costelloe, 2014). The change of status from the sending countries to being the migrant recipient countries expanded the research to Spain (Kim et. al, 2011; Martínez Guillem, 2018, 2015, 2011), Italy (Binotto, 2015; Bruno, 2015; Zidan, 2015), and more recently Greece (Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti, 2016; Milioni & Vadratsikas, 2016; Triandafyllidou, 2001). Additionally, the researchers’ approaches recently shifted to the broader cross-national examination and comparison of media coverage and representation of migrants and borders (Cvetkovic & Pantic, 2018; Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017) including the under-represented countries such as Central and Southern European countries.

As Martínez Guillem and Cvetkovic (2018) pointed out, the media discourse-oriented research from Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe predominately places the focus on intra-EU migration caused by the EU enlargement (Galasinska, 2009; Light & Young, 2009) or the migration from the non-EU member states to the EU members (Erjavec, 2009). The EU enlargement to the East affected the migration patterns and the new Central and Eastern European member-states have become the receiving countries.
whose news media construct non-European migrants from the Third World countries as exotic and culturally different others who are socially and politically excluded from both the given society and the EU space (Grzymala-Kazłowska, 2009; Kralj, 2013; Martínez Lirola, 2014). Therefore, symbolic and material othering practices are present in news discourses in both Western European countries, the traditional migrant receivers, and the Central and Southeastern European countries that became attractive to the non-European migrants since the early 1990s.

**Framing Borders in the News**

In news framing research, borders have been studied as a part of the immigration discussion (Kim et al., 2011; Lakoff & Ferguson, 2007; Van Gorp, 2005). However, the majority of the studies on immigration focus on the U.S. context. Borders are frequently perceived as a subtheme or a part of the overarching frame of national security, or a frame that focuses on migrants from the aspect of the legality of their border crossings, rather than being understood as an independent frame. Kim et al. (2011) found that the news in the United States discussed the U.S. – Mexican border within the frame of national security. The border was a central point when negotiating meaning within the immigration cause-and-solution discourse. Weak border management with the southern neighbor was framed as a cause of the illegal immigration problem, whereas the solution involved tightening border controls. Similarly, Lakoff and Ferguson (2007) recognized the border as a part of the “illegal alien” frame, in which the public assigns the meaning of illegality to the act of crossing border without needed documents. They pointed out that the word “alien” introduced the meaning of immigrants who have the intention to invade the border and the homeland. According to Lakoff and Ferguson, the security
frame emerged as a response to the existing illegal immigration, and emphasized an “us” versus “them” discourse. The security frame refers to securing the border from outsiders in the sense that only sealing the border will provide the needed protection for people inside the borders.

**Framing Borders in Europe**

The increase in the number of migrants who were seeking shelter in European countries has led to a corresponding rise in the number of the news reports about immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in European media. The existing research on migration and immigration in Europe is mainly focused either on discussion on intra-migration within the EU (Balabanova & Balch, 2010), or on immigration in Western Europe (Croucher, 2013, Vilgenhart & Roggenband, 2007). The more recent studies encompass the framing research in terms of the increased migration from the war affected areas such as Syria and Afghanistan (Milioni & Vadratsikas, 2016). The studies on immigration issues in Europe demonstrate that media problematize immigration linking immigrants with insecurity, crime, diseases, and terrorism and therefore, those frames reinforce and legitimize the existing ideological assumptions about migrants as unwanted others. Migrants are perceived and therefore framed, as a threat. The perceived threats may be realistic, such as economic, political and physical ones, or symbolic threats that underline perceived differences in values, beliefs, and norms (Croucher, 2013). While examining Muslim immigrants’ assimilation in France, Germany, and the UK, Croucher (2013) argued that Muslims are treated as targets of prejudice and other forms of hostility. He claimed that dominant European cultures feel threatened by immigrants,
especially the immigrants whose religion differs from the dominant religion of the nation-state.

The most recent cross-national analysis of the news coverage in eight European countries, the UK, Ireland, Germany, France, Greece, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Serbia, showed that the European news media played an important role in framing the migrants’ arrivals as crisis, and in constructing migrants as dangerous and culturally different outsiders (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017). The perception of migrants in the European news coverage escalated from the moderate acceptance and tolerance of migrants in the coverage from March until July in 2015, to fear and the proposal of defensive measures to protect the European space in November of 2015 (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017). In the first period of, what Georgiou and Zaborowski refer to as careful tolerance, news articles framed migrants through the narratives of migrant arrivals seen as an action with both positive consequences focusing on empathy and solidarity, and negative consequences rooted in the anxiety of economic and cultural consequences. The salience of the humanitarian frame, as Georgiou and Zaborowski argued, decreased in November in correlation with the increased prominence of the militarization frame that urged for tighter border management and border closure.

Similarly, during the five-month period in 2010 and 2011, Greek journalists and audience members framed migrants as victims of (1) persecution, (2) global economic conditions, (3) human traffickers, and (4) political parties in Greece that use migrants for self-promotion, but also as (5) victims of racism and xenophobia (Milioni & Vadratsikas, 2016). In the second frame that constructs migrants as a threat, the focus was on migrants as threat to (1) national security and order, (2) national safety and wellbeing, (3) ethnic,
religious, and cultural values and identity, (4) employment, and (5) national rights that migrants dare to claim. Lastly, according to Milioni and Vadratsikas, the active agent frame constructs migrants in a more positive way, as low-wage workers who contribute to the society, and as political subjects who claim their rights.

The frame of migrants in Greek press construct migrants and migration in a very similar way as the frames located in Dutch media several years earlier. Vlijgenhart and Roggenband (2007) examined news reports and parliamentary discourse on immigration in the Netherlands, and how news media frames of immigration, and parliament discussions and decisions influence each other. The authors identified five dominant frames: the multicultural frame, the emancipation frame, the restriction frame, the victimization frame and the Islam-as-a-threat frame. The multicultural frame addresses issues around the concept of diversity out of which the Dutch society will only benefit. The emancipation frame assumes that immigrants are less advanced and therefore, they need societal assistance in the integration and emancipation processes. The restriction policy frame treats immigrants as the objects of the official policy, and this frame mainly refers to new immigrants who came to the Netherlands by marrying already-legal immigrants or second-generation immigrants. The victimization frame emphasizes cultural violence that the West assumes that the Middle Eastern or African women suffer from. Lastly, the Islam-as-a-threat frame represents not only Muslim immigrants but all of Islam as a threat to the West and the Western values of freedom of expression, gender equality and already established relations between the church and the state.

However, the research on migration and news frames has not positioned borders in the center of inquiry attention. Instead, the existing studies have focused on
linguistically framed borders only as a part of a broader frame of national security (Kim et al, 2011; Lakoff and Ferguson, 2007; Van Gorp, 2005), a part of the territorial dimension of framing migrants by focusing on their illegal entry (Triandafyllidou, 2001), as a part of the frame that constructs migrants as a threat to national safety and security (Milioni & Vadratsikas, 2016), and a part of the frame that promotes militarization of Europe featuring tighter border management and border closure as measures of the Europe’s fortification to preserve its values and security (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017).

Moreover, the European border discourses have been shaped by the narratives of unity and borderlessness within the EU zone, further EU enlargement, and intra-EU migration (Balabanova & Balch, 2010; Tonkin, 2015).

The national security discourse enabled the formation of an “intruders” frame (Van Gorp, 2005). The “intruders” frame in the Dutch press emerged around the need to protect national identity and prosperity from external threats. In this frame, the external EU borders are a bulwark against unwanted intruders. Similarly, Cheng, Igartua, Placios, Acosta, and Palito (2010) found that an “illegal entry” frame in Spanish media was supported by arguments for the necessity of the joint EU border management and tighter controls. The Mediterranean Sea, the coastlines, and the islands, of both Spain and Italy were in the center of Spanish and Italian media as the points of entry of African migrants seeking a safer life and economically better conditions. In the “arrival” frame, the Italian coastline is constructed as a space that should be controlled and surveilled with the aim to safeguard Italy’s national spaces and to maintain the security of the EU as a whole (Bruno, 2015; Zidan, 2015). Bruno (2015) showed how the narrative of landing on Italian coasts embodies a spatial conception of public discourse of otherness: the space that is
perceived as “ours” should be protected from the invaders who come from the outside.

Binotto (2015) went a step further in incorporating spatiality in the analysis of immigration. He drew upon Pierre Levy’s anthropological space metaphors of national community, social body, and home when analyzed the representation of migration and foreigners in Italian media. Each of those spatial metaphors assumes certain identities that people recognize in themselves and simultaneously use to differentiate themselves from others. Within the constitution of those spaces, foreigners, and migrants are viewed as problematic. Binotto argued that there are three types of migrants constructed: the invader, the alien, and the criminal. Each of those three types corresponds to the ways in which the border is framed, and since migrants are seen as threats, framing a border is associated with a collective fear of the “other.”

The invader frame is constructed upon the narrative of the arrival, of the invasion of the borders, and of the entrance to a territory that a national community claims as its own (Binotto, 2015). In this frame, the space is the imagined national community, which is militarily managed, controlled, and surveilled with the aim of securing the entrance to the territory and protecting the space from the trespassing invaders. Borders, fences, and barbed wire, symbolize boundaries that are established to protect the community for the outside peril—that is, from the infiltration of others. The second frame, the frame of the alien, is constructed around narratives of infiltration and contamination of both the physical and the social body of Italians (Binotto, 2015).

The criminal frame is constituted around the “us” versus “them” narrative that includes the subthematic narrative of our and their homes. According to Binotto, Italian media narratives frequently frame “home” as a place that should be secured and
protected. The criminal frame includes narratives about economic security and freedom of movement as closely related to domestic space. The space of home is also understood as the space of commodities that creates the boundary between normal insiders and deviant outsiders who are criminalized. The insiders fear that their space of commodities will be at risk of deprivation and interruption, whereas, according to Binotto, criminality becomes a characteristic of not only individuals but of the whole immigrant population.

**Visual Framing of Borders**

Visuals have advantage over language in understanding of space and spatial concepts, such as borders (Kress, 2010). However, visual analysis of framing in the context of migration is still understudied or marginalized compared to the verbal framing. For instance, in their study of framing immigration in Spanish news texts, Cheng, Igartua, Placios, Acosta, and Palito (2010) claimed that images provide only additional information to frames. They found that visuals in Spanish news articles about immigration were selected strategically to accompany text. Photos of children and teenagers were mostly used in the frames on the joint EU management of border control, child protection policies, and political debate on immigration, to soften the discourses on necessity of bordering and provide a humanitarian angle. Visuals of immigrants at work or of female immigrants were used for the depiction of immigrants within the frame of economic contribution that frames immigrants in a more positive light (Cheng et. al, 2010).

Similarly, Pogliano (2015) focused on photographs, captions, and headlines as the main framing devices in the longitudinal study of Italian weekly newspapers between 1980 and 2007. Two dominant frames of immigrants - a humanist frame, and a
humanitarian frame, emerged from the analysis of, what the author calls, portrayed and stolen pictures. In the humanist frame, immigrants, particularly the ones from Africa, are seen as desperate people who find hope on the Italian soil. The humanist frame in the context of the 9/11 attacks desperation was assigned different meanings particularly the one of passivity and subservience to radical Islam. Thus, the humanist frame became a humanitarian frame of hopeless nameless mass. Stolen images portrayed nameless groups of people and categorize them into not only the racial and ethnic groups, but also as deviant and illegal in Italy. On the other hand, portraits and close-up shots of immigrants were accompanied with their names and were used to represent stories of immigrants’ successful assimilation into the Italian society (Pogliano, 2015).

**Framing and Multimodality**

More recently, scholars who focus almost exclusively on linguistic framing as part of media effects suggest that in the age of new media technologies, framing conceptualization should be reconsidered by focusing on variation of modes of presentation and on expanding framing research to non-verbal, visual and audio cues (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2017). Several studies have explored framing multimodal news content (Geise & Baden, 2015; Pentzold et al, 2016; Powell et al., 2015). Pentzold, Sommer, Meier and Fraas (2016) explored news framing of a holocaust-related war crime case in a multimodal discourse by examining television broadcast reports, websites, blogs, YouTube videos, Facebook posts, online forums and tweets. Multiple modes were employed in framing John/Ivan Demjanjuk either as a culprit or a victim of circumstances. For instance, especially the lack of visuals that would place him in the Nazi was crime contributed to the construct of Demjanjuk as a victim of circumstances.
Powell, Boomgardeen, De Swert and de Vreese (2015) examined the ways frames emerged from only text, mixtures of text and photos, and only photos, differently generate effects on opinions and behaviors of the audience members. By conducting an experiment in which the U.S. –based participants were exposed to different images portraying conflict in the Central African Republic, the researchers concluded that when presented alone, visuals had the strongest framing effects compared to the written text that is not accompanied with any images. However, when presented together, the written text proved to be more influential than the images (Powell et. al, 2015).

Geise and Baden’s (2015) research emphasized the importance of multimodality in the current digitalized media environment suggesting that framing theory is a strong theoretical framework for the interaction of modalities. Each mode has a specific communicative potential as well as limitations. In their research on the multimodal news articles on the Gaza conflict, Geise and Baden argued that specific message properties affect perception and decoding processes as well as the construction of meaningful relations. However, the process of interpretation relates to the message as a whole and, therefore, meaning is constructed based on a mix of individual modality properties that contribute to the overall meaning.

The congruence between visual and verbal modes has been in a center of research on television news (Dan, 2018b; Reynolds & Barnett, 2003). Dan (2018b) reviewed the existing studies on research on television news, with the focus only on verbal and visual modes in terms of the degree of congruence between those modalities. She argued that the examination of both modes should be a part of integrative framing analysis and acknowledged that sometimes visuals can carry the dominant meaning (Graber, 1990),
whereas sometime both modes can construct conflicting meanings (Walma van der Molen, 2001) but, as Dan (2018b) argued, that even when there is no congruency between visuals and verbal mode, their interplay still can communicate the same frame. Dan’s argument coincides with Reynolds and Barnet (2003) research on CNN coverage of the 9/11 attacks when the most dominant war-on-terror frame was communicated across the modalities, even when the congruence between visual and the verbal mode was lower. It is also worth noting, Dan (2018b) argued, that the audience would process the information easier if verbal and visual mode support each other, whereas when they convey conflicting meaning, the audience members find visuals as the mode easier to remember and pay attention to.

**Participatory Journalism and Framing**

New media technology enables news users’ participation, social networking, collaboration, and conversation between traditional media institutions and audiences. New technologies have blurred the demarcation between production and news use, empowering readers to actively participate in the process of news gathering and making (Bruns, 2008; Hermida, 2011). However, the existing research on participatory journalism focuses primarily on the extent and formats media institutions use to encourage/restrict users’ content contributions in the context of redefining journalism culture (Carpentier, 2011; Domingo et al., 2008; Hermida & Thurman, 2008; Thurman, 2008). Very often, such research examines the ways participatory journalism challenges and redefines the traditionally perceived gatekeeping role (Ansari & Munir, 2010; Williams et al., 2011) and evaluate users’ participation from the perspective of journalists (Massey & Haas, 2002).
Participatory journalism also assumes that news users not only contribute to the news gathering and making processes but also negotiate meaning and participate in the process of framing (Milioni & Vadratsikas, 2016). They do so by contributing to the support of hegemonic positions or by providing oppositional views and counter-frames in their comments (Hall, 1980). Van den Bulck and Claessens (2013) examined how news users employed comments to online news and electronic letters to editors as a reaction to the story about a gay celebrity’s death. In this study, counter-frames included both more overt condemnation of suicide of the gay celebrity and simplification of the suicide to the result of a single event. Similarly, in the study on framing migrants in Greek traditional news reports and users’ comments placed under those reports, Milioni and Vadratsikas (2016) found that readers challenged the positive frames of migrants as active agents and victims by offering new angles and differently assign salience. The authors concluded that while readers’ comments do challenge the traditional news frames, they also engage in hate speech, and thus do not contribute to more open discussion.

**Purpose and Research Questions**

My dissertation research aims to contribute to these bodies of knowledge and to fill gaps in scholarly understanding. Research on space and mass communication predominantly focuses on space within the context of new technologies to argue that technologies transform space and provide for temporal and spatial compression to overcome the constraints of the geographical space (Mosco, 1996). On the other hand, research on framing has mainly examined borders as a subtheme of the overarching frame of national security within the discourse on immigration. This research puts forth the argument that the public and media professionals use national security frames to
negotiate meanings of borders as part of their solutions to immigration issues, as well as to articulate the national spaces that are surrounded by borders to protect insiders from outsiders. Even though Binotto (2015) contributed to a spatial approach to the negotiation of meanings within the process of framing, his research focuses solely on the Italian media.

Moreover, the study of multiple modes of meaning-making of borders and migration is understudied. Most of the scholarly research on framing borders focuses on visual elements only as supplemental devices to the process of framing migration in news texts. Not only is the focus on only one modality failing to provide more complex and nuanced meanings, but when visuals have been examined in research, their authors considered only the national media and did not provide a broader, comparative European perspective. Additionally, even though the live-blog, as a popular online multimodal format, was used in reporting breaking news stories about migrant mobility and border crossing in the European context, this fairly new format and its multimodal elements are still understudied within the context of framing and different audience members’ engagement in meaning construction, especially within the issue of migration.

In order to fill the aforementioned gaps, the present study analyzes frames in online articles with the aim of examining multimodal framing of European borders and its ideological implications. Additionally, the aim of this study is to discuss similarities and differences in framing borders in online news across five European media outlets as well as readers’ comments contributions to the process of framing in the online media environment.

The process of framing positions different actors, including journalists and
audience members through the construction of space. The produced social relations operate on different levels enabling journalists and audience members to position borders in different categories, enabling the relation of power and agency negotiation between the journalists and the audience members, and lastly positioning different social actors in relation to nation, and among and across different nations.

The literature examined led to the following research questions:

RQ1: What frames of the European Union borders are constructed by journalists in multimodal discourses of online news?

RQ2: What frames about the European Union borders are constructed in readers’ comments?

RQ3: In what ways do readers’ comments frames relate to the frames constructed by professional journalists?

RQ4: What are the social relations of power enacted in the interplay of journalists and readers’ framings of borders across the European news outlets selected for study?

RQ5: How do these frames relate to broader ideologies about the European Union as a politicized space of both inclusion and exclusion?

The next chapter, Chapter 3, will address multimodal methodology applied to framing in this study, including research design and analytical strategies. The analysis chapters, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will answer the five research questions, whereas the last Chapter 7 will provide the overall conclusion and the contribution of the present research.
Chapter 3

Methodology

New media and technological innovations have influenced news production, forcing traditional media to adopt new multimodal formats in their online editions. By acknowledging the importance of multiple modes in meaning making, my dissertation project employed multimodal discourse analysis to examine framing patterns of the European Union borders in European online news. This methodological approach is relevant to my area of study because online meaning making in contemporary, digital media environments is not accomplished only through a written, verbal, or visual mode. The Internet has affected the signifying process by allowing simultaneous uses of written text, video, photography, audio, maps, graphics, and other computer-generated visualizations. Moreover, multimodal analysis treats all modes as equally important for their potential to generate meaning. Research on news framing, in particular, has traditionally focused either on verbal or visual framing. Here, I develop a methodological framework that allows me to address borders as a spatial concept constructed through multiple communication modes and in social interaction situated in historical, cultural, and political contexts. Although I focus on articles that refer to an EU external border, the Hungary-Serbia border, I also take into consideration how fragmented discourses relate to wider understandings of borders in Europe.

Research Design

My project defines news texts as a form of discourse and holds that every discourse is situated in context (Kress, 2010; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). The research design of this dissertation project incorporated the analysis of news reports and readers’
comments published in five news European outlets: Britain’s *The Guardian* (the UK edition), Germany’s *Deutsche Welle* (the international edition), Hungary’s *Magyar Hirlap* (the international edition in English), Croatia’s *Jutarnji list* (the national edition), and Serbia’s *Večernje novosti* (the national edition). The analysis focused on the coverage of two key events: Hungary’s announcement of the erection of a fence on the external EU border with Serbia in June 2015, and Hungary’s closing of the border and prohibition of border crossings with Serbia in September of 2015.

The historical context of this analysis is situated in the events labeled in news discourse as the migration “crisis” in 2015 and its coverage in online news outlets of five different countries: Germany, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Croatia, and Serbia. These countries were selected because the five have different statuses in, and have expressed different positions toward, the European Union. Variation in EU status—as members and non-members—and ideological positions toward EU supranational policies and rules were the criteria in my selection of online news media outlets. With a focus on identifying dominant framing patterns and circulation of discourses on EU borders, one of the goals of my research was to explore whether the national contexts of the media outlets selected would influence discourse on borders by creating fragmentation and inconsistency in framing or whether framing patterns would be shared across national borders.

In selecting the countries represented in the sample, the following conditions were taken into account. Germany, for instance, is one of the six founders of the European Coal and Steel Community that later grew into the European Union (“The history of the EU,” 2019). It is deemed today the most influential core member state and one of the
leaders in valuing European unity and cultures (Judt, 2005). As economically dominant in
2017, Germany contributed €19.6 billion to the EU, surpassing the total of EU spending
in Germany, estimated at €10.9 billion (“Germany,” 2019). Additionally, Germany has
claimed a leadership role in European foreign policy, as well (Janning & Möller, 2016).

The United Kingdom, together with Ireland and Denmark, joined the EU during
the first enlargement in 1973. Once the largest world colonial power, the UK was also a
smaller market that would benefit from the joint European market, but was hesitant to
join the Union. When the UK decided that the membership would be beneficial for the
country in 1961, France vetoed the UK membership twice before the UK joined the
Union 12 years later (Judt, 2005). In 2000, the UK was the country that benefited the
most from the EU structural funds (Judt, 2005). In 2017, the UK received €6.3 billion
from the EU and contributed €10.6 billion (“United Kingdom,” 2019). The UK’s interest
in the EU has been rapidly in decline, resulting in the 2016 decision to leave the Union.
However, the British exit scheduled for March 29, 2019, has not happened as of this
writing (May of 2019), and has since been extended twice (“Brexit: Your simple guide,”
2019). For the purpose of the present study, which analyzes events of 2015, the UK is
considered a full EU member state.

The former socialist countries Hungary and Croatia joined the EU in 2004 and
2013, respectively. Hungary was a part of the first and the biggest EU enlargement to the
East when the core states welcomed Central and East European countries (the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), marking
“the re-unification of Europe after decades of division (“From 6 to 28 members,” 2017).
Croatia joined the Union in its most recent enlargement in 2013, making a single-country
accession since Greece joined the EU in 1981 (“From 6 to 28 members,” 2017). After Slovenia, Croatia was the second former Yugoslavian republic that joined the Union. Lastly, Serbia, another former Yugoslavian republic, is a candidate country that started the accession negotiation with the EU in 2014 (“Serbia,” 2018). As of 2019, there is no date set for Serbia’s membership into the EU.

The EU member states mentioned above—Germany, the UK, Hungary, and Croatia—have different statuses in regard to the Schengen Agreement that guarantees free movement of people within the borderless Zone (“The Schengen area and cooperation,” 2009). By abolishing internal borders, 26 European countries, out of which 22 are EU member states, created a secure inside area with a common external border that has to be efficiently controlled (“Europe without borders,” 2019). As one of the founders of the EU, Germany was among the five countries that signed the Schengen agreement in 1985. The United Kingdom opted not to join the Schengen area. However, since 2000 the country has cooperated in law enforcement and judicial procedures within the Schengen area. Hungary became a part of the Schengen zone in 2007, three years after its admission to the EU. As the newest EU member, Croatia, along with Romania, Bulgaria, and Cyprus, is not a full member of the Schengen area and maintains its internal borders while waiting for the EU Council to decide whether the conditions for full Schengen membership have been met (“The Schengen area and cooperation,” 2009).

In 2009 the EU abolished visas for the Serbian citizens traveling to the Schengen states (“EU ukinula vize,” 2009; “Visa policy,” 2019). The so-called “positive Schengen list” does allow Serbians visa-free entrance to the Schengen space, but still prevents citizens of Serbia from working within the EU.
In addition, the countries that are represented in this study have different geographical positionings in terms of proximity to the external EU borders. The most recent admission of Croatia to the EU in 2013 reflects slow but steady EU expansion further to the east, placing the former communist countries of Croatia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, along with the old member Greece, at the southeastern external frontier. Serbia is positioned just outside the external EU frontier bordering the EU peripheral countries of Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Being one of the EU founders, Germany is geographically positioned in the center of the EU, whereas the UK is an island on the western part of the EU and physically the farthest away from Africa and Asia; that is, from where most of the recent migrants originate. Different geographic and geopolitical positionalities of the countries enabled the collection of news data suitable for a richer comparative analysis.

Selection of Texts

Five media outlets were selected: the national edition of the British *The Guardian*; the international edition of Germany’s *Deutsche Welle* in English; the international edition of Hungary’s *Magyar Hirlap* in English; and the national editions of *Jutarnji list* and *Večernje novosti*, in Croatian and Serbian, respectively. I am fluent in Serbian, Croatian, and English, and while original excerpts from the editions in English were included in the selection, I translated the articles from Serbian and Croatian sources and included in this study only the excerpts translated to English.

Even though the focus of this study is on online news, the selected news outlets are not online natives but, instead, web editions of traditional print media (*The Guardian*, *Magyar Hirlap*, *Jutarnji list*, and *Večerenje novosti*) and broadcast news organizations.
The Guardian’s online edition was ranked number three in 2016, with 14% of the weekly reach among the surveyed UK citizens, and an increase to 15% in 2018, which situated it at the second position among the most used online news after BBC, which holds 43% of weekly UK users (Newman, 2016; Newman, 2018). The traditional legacy daily newspaper Jutarnji list was holding the second position in Croatia’s market with 30% of surveyed readers, whereas its online portal was ranked in third place (Peruško, 2018). Jutarnji list is owned by Hanza Media, Croatia’s largest print media company. The reason for choosing Večerijenje novosti was two-fold. First, I worked as a reporter for the daily Blic, whose news portal was the leader in Serbia’s media market in 2017 (“Najnovija lista najposećenijih satova u Srbiji,” 2017), and so I decided not to analyze Blic to avoid any potential bias. Second, even though the Večerijenje novosti portal was holding the fifth place in the monthly share in 2017, the portal had an open and easily searchable archive. Without the knowledge of the German language, and facing the challenge of the lack of English editions of German news portals, I decided to include in the analysis the Deutsche Welle international edition in English. Lastly, the difficulty of navigating a website in Hungarian forced me to select Magyar Hirlap, as the most convenient Hungarian web portal, as it features an edition in English.

The diversity in editorial positions was not the main criterion for selection of the news outlets. However, the selection of Magyar Hirlap also served the purpose of reaching the balance between right- and left-leaning news organizations and, therefore, enabled me to analyzed ideological diversity in media discourse. The left-leaning or liberal editorial approach was represented in The Guardian (“History of The Guardian,” 2017), whose left-leaning readers accounted for 43% of all readers in 2017; only 12% of
Since the aim of this study was to analyze patterns in news frames, I have focused the attention on two specific events particularly relevant for the analysis of news frames of external EU borders. First, on June 17, 2015, Hungary announced the erection of a barb-wired fence on the southern border with Serbia. Three months later, on September 14, Hungary closed the border-crossing completely. The decision caused protests among migrants who were stuck on the Serbian side. The border-crossing closure further affected the Balkan route and rerouted migrants toward Croatia and Slovenia. Those two events in June and September of 2015 on the Hungary-Serbia border are highly relevant for the construction of EU borders in European online news not only because of the border management policy involved and the violence that ensued, but also due to the symbolic power of building a fence and controlling the (im)mobility of differently situated bodies. Therefore, I focused attention on articles addressing events on Hungary’s border published on June 12 and through the end of June, marking the time of the announcement, and during September 14, 15, 16, and 17 when the border crossing closure culminated in violence. For the second event, four days of coverage were selected because news outlets covered the same events on different days, between September 14 and 17, 2019.

The articles for analysis were selected through a search on the media outlets’ websites for the words “border,” “fence,” and “wall” as part of a headline. Pan and
Kosicki (1993) argued that a headline is a very powerful framing device that activates related concepts in the reader’s mind. The search generated 28 articles whose headlines included at least one of the aforementioned words for the dates selected. After eliminating ten articles whose headlines did not address the events on the Hungary-Serbia border, a total of 18 articles were analyzed. Out of 18 articles, nine were published in June while nine were published in September. Eight articles are from *The Guardian*, two from *Deutsche Welle*, four from *Magyar Hirlap*, one from *Jutranji list* and three from *Večernje novosti*.

The collected data focused only on news articles and did not include editorial commentary. Among the news packages that were analyzed, there were three live-blog formats (two published in *The Guardian*, and one in *Jutarnji list*), one interview format (in *Večernje novosti*), three video reports supplemented by brief textual description (all published in *The Guardian*) and 11 hard news reports. The live-blog is a relatively new online format that challenges the traditional inverted pyramid structure and offers readers frequently updated information by incorporating text, photos, videos, social media posts, maps, graphics, hyperlinks, and readers’ comments. Two live video feeds were not available at the time of analysis and therefore were excluded from the analysis.

The selected 18 news packages from five media outlets include a total of 18 written reports, 51 photographs, seven video clips, five maps, two graphs, three computer-generated visualizations, an audio clip, a Facebook post, and 66 tweets that contained either text only or a combination of a photo and text or of a video clip and text. *The Guardian* articles included a total of 37 photos, seven video clips, five maps, two graphs, two computer-generated visualizations, and 63 tweets. *Večernje novosti*
incorporated four photographs, and one computer-generated visualization, whereas
Jutranji list’s article contains two photos (combined in a collage photo) and three tweets. Magyar Hirlap included four photos and one Facebook post, and Deutsche Welle incorporated four photos and an audio clip.

Although all five websites exhibited multimodality to a high degree, the extent to which they individually incorporated written text, photos, video clips, audio clips, maps, graphs, social media posts, and other computer-generated visualizations varied. The examination of the 18 articles revealed that live-blogs, compared to the traditional news stories or interviews published in the question-answer format, were the news formats in which journalists utilized multiple modes to a much larger extent. For instance, the three examined live-blogs, two from The Guardian and one from Jutarnji list, featured 25 out of total of 51 photos, 64 out of 66 tweets, both graphs, and four out of all seven video clips.

The use and placement of various elements, such as photos, video clips, and maps, in the online news articles is not provisional. News texts are highly institutionalized narratives delivered in a structured and routinized way (Tuschman, 1978; Van Dijk, 1988). The reporting practices are rooted in the norms of objectivity and balanced approach. All 18 articles were located in the international issues or social related issues sections on the website. Fourteen traditional formats – news reports – followed the inverted pyramid structure in which the most relevant information is placed in the lead. One interview report, displayed in the question and answer format, followed a similar structure because the most prominent interviewee’s point was placed highest in the article, followed by other relevant questions and answers. It is worth noting that the
live-blog format does not follow the traditional inverted pyramid format because the featured lead in live-blogs always offers the newest instead of the most important information. Even in the age of immediacy in online news delivery, traditional news articles are edited and approved by editors before they go online, whereas in the case of the live-blogs, journalists act as curators and content designers who collect, sort out, and include the information immediately, with the option to correct it while reporting.

The packages analyzed were written for the general, mostly national audiences, even though the readers’ comments revealed that, in the case of The Guardian, the readers identified as the ones coming from different countries such as Germany, Croatia, and the Netherlands. However, the chosen international editions of Deutsche Welle and Magyar Hirlap also showed that the articles in English, often translated from the news articles in German and Hungarian respectively, were targeted toward an English-literate international audience.

In addition to reporting practices, the design and layout of web pages in which the news articles were featured were also highly structured and standardized. The headline in a larger font than the rest of the article was typically featured at the top of the article, followed frequently by the subheading, and a photo or a video clip. The featured photos were generally consistent in sizes. Not counting photos and video clips incorporated in the embedded tweets, there were mostly two photo sizes – the larger ones were positioned horizontally and smaller ones were often placed vertically. The news packages were mostly featured on the single web page, engaging readers to scroll down to continue reading. One short Magyar Hirlap article did not demand additional scrolling on a 13-inch laptop screen, whereas the two The Guardian live-blog news reports encouraged
readers to click on the “next page” tab three or four times to be able to complete reading the article.

The initial search generated 8,288 readers’ comments from only two of the five websites: *The Guardian* (8,180 comments in two live-blogs and one article) and *Večernje Novosti* (108 comments published bellow all three articles). With the aim of conducting a close reading, I decided to reduce the data by selecting the first 10 comments that started 10 threads for each of the articles selected, making a total of 472 readers’ comments (212 comments from the live-blog published on September 15; 192 from the live-blog published on September 16, 2015; and 68 comments from the article published on June 22). I also included all 108 comments from the tree articles published in *Večerenje novosti*. After careful evaluation of the ethical concern about who owns the readers’ comments on the publicly accessible websites, I decided to quote full or partial readers’ comments in this research project without providing the name or the online handle of a reader. Also, I kept all the readers’ original typos, abbreviations, and capitalization in readers’ comments as they were published.

The selected news articles generated rich multimodal data for a nuanced, in-depth, and rigorous analysis of emerging frames. Eighteen news packages published over the two periods of time in June and September of 2015 enabled me to ascertain that the period of three months was long enough for the observation of certain framing patterns. The goal of this research was not to provide the generic de-contextualized frames applicable in all situations, nor to generalize the findings to all European countries and media outlets, but rather to be able to draw conclusions about the existing patterns and frames beyond the selected period in a certain historical, cultural, and political context.
I acknowledge that collecting and storing data is challenged by the nature of the online news technology and its frequent updates and inaccessibility of some of the elements in the multimodal ensemble. Thus, all news packages were saved as links and screen shots, while video and audio files were downloaded and stored in video and audio formats. I was aware that the inclusion of images in news packages and in further research studies raises ethical concerns about the power of images to potentially harm people by publication and about the use of published images that identify people without their permission (Elliott, 2011). Therefore, I decided to interpret the images but not to reproduce the analyzed images in this study.

**Analytical Strategies**

News texts are seen as prominent discursive sites or discursive forms (D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). The present study employed critical multimodal discourse analysis to systematically identify the news frames built through multiple modes such as written text, photos, video clips, audio clips, maps, graphs, and other computer-generated visualizations. This study examined how the interplay of modes communicated situated meanings of borders. The interaction and inter-relationship of multiple modes is dynamic and fluid, and modes are situated and accessed in different historical, social, and cultural contexts (Djonov & Zhao, 2014; Jewitt, 2009; Kress, 2010; Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001). The multimodal approach to framing is relevant to the present research because it values discourses realized in a variety of modes that engage with each other in the online news environment. Multimodality also operates on the levels of design, production, and distribution to enable multilayered construction of meaning as well as production and reproduction of power at the micro-level of modes and
the macro-level of relations between different societal actors (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2001).

The present study examined multimodal news discourses to identify frames that influence how news audiences construct meaning (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; van Dijk, 1988). The identification of emerging frames was accomplished through an inductive approach to data rather than though a verification of frames defined and operationalized a priori. Additionally, by recognizing the fluidity of frames and their possible malleability over time and in contexts of social change, this study applied a constructionist approach to framing analysis (D’Angelo, 2002). This approach provides for a discourse-centered conceptualization of power while advancing an understanding of framing as a process that involves the producers of news, news content, and audience members who consume the news (Hardin & Whiteside, 2010).

Critical multimodal discourse analysis is the most appropriate method to address the complexity of different modes and their interaction in creating news frames. The challenge was finding a model that was sufficiently developed to incorporate linguistic texts, photographs, video clips, maps, graphs, different types of montages, audio segments, Twitter posts, readers’ comments, their contextualized interplay, and the power relations between journalists and readers’ competing frames. To construct a methodological framework complex enough to provide a fine-grained analysis of multiple modalities as different units of the analysis in the news discourse this study’s methodological approach was informed by readings on the methodological approaches from semiotics (Van Leeuwen, 2001) and social semiotics (Iedema 2001; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996), critical discourse analysis (Reisigl &
Wodak, 2016; Richardson, 2007; Van Dijk, 2016), cultural studies approach to visual analysis (Lister & Wells, 2001), content analysis of images (Bell 2001; Coleman, 2010), and social media discourse analysis (Androutsopoulos, 2014; Darics, 2013; KhosraviNik & Unger, 2016; Kreis, 2017).

In the examination of multiple modes in news texts, I applied a multilayered analysis that include the five-step model suggested by Jancsary, Höllerer and Meyer (2016). The application of this model was informed by Entman (1993), Van Gorp’s (2005), and Pan and Kosicki’s (1993) theorization of framing as a social process of meaning making that includes sources, journalists, and audience members. The last layer of the analysis examined readers’ participation in the processes of news production and framing through the instant activity of posting comments in the assigned space below the news article.

**The five-step multimodal analysis model.** The five-step analysis model by Jancsary, Höllerer and Meyer (2016) was relevant for this research because the five steps provide guidance for both the micro- and macro-analysis of news texts.

In the first step, I addressed the genre of the news text such as hard news reports, live-blogs, sport news, breaking news, news documentaries. This step provided the overview of the rules specific to a particular genre, such as inverted pyramid structure for the traditional news formats, and “from the most recent to the least recent” information structure in live-blogs. In the first step of the analysis I also addressed who is the news text producer (e.g. reporters, news agencies, or journalists as designers and curators), and who is the audience for which the news text was produced (national vs. international audience).
Following Jancsary et. al. (2016), the second step addressed the language, stylistic strategies employed, and design of the written article. In this step I analyzed the status of modes signaled in the page design, the arrangement of the elements on the page, and the relations the arrangement implies (e.g. the relation of commonality). After coding for each of the analysis units (written text, photos, tweets, video clips, audio clips, maps, graphs, and other compute-generated visualizations) and acknowledging that the modes do not exist individually in a vacuum, I paid attention to: (1) the relationship of every mode individually across all 18 news packages (for instance, the relationship between all the photos), (2) the arrangement and the composition of modes within a single news package, and (3) the relationships of all modes across all news packages. In this step, I incorporated both micro-textual analysis and macro-textual analysis.

**Linguistic mode.** In the linguistic mode analysis, I addressed the strategies of naming and categorization (including name slurring), sentence construction, passive and active sentence constructions, metaphors, and narrative (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016; Richardson, 2007; Van Dijk, 2016).

**Visual mode.** In the case of visual modality, I focused on the main affordance of the photography to represent reality based on analogy to reality (Messaris: 1998; Messaris & Abraham, 2001). Visual conventions such as size and color; compositional techniques such as camera angles, close shots, or wide shots; and the camera’s point of view were categories of analysis. I also coded for the settings (public, domestic, urban, and rural) and whether photographs and video shots included people. In coding photos of people, I placed attention on coding the social characteristics of subjects represented: adults or children, gender, clothes, whether they were portrayed in groups or as
individuals, and whether they were depicted in motion or as passive. Additionally, I paid attention to social distance construction – close-up shots that depicted mostly face or head and shoulders and that implied intimacy and personal relationship, and increased peoples’ individuality; medium shots in which people were not depicted in full figure but rather cut off between the waist and the knees, indicate social relationship; whereas long shots of full figures in a particular setting suggest impersonal relationships and decrease the ways portrayed people are seen as unique individuals (Jewitt & Oyama, 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996; Van Leeuwen, 2001). The analysis also addressed power relations produced and reproduced by camera angles that position viewers and those who are looked at. The eye level angle is considered to be neutral and to symbolizes equality; the shot made from the above implies symbolic power of looking down on something; and lastly, the shot from below indicates power over the viewer (Berger, 1981; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001).

In addition to the aforementioned process of coding visuals, the analysis of video clips was informed by the analysis of television and film data (Iedema, 2001). In line with Iedema’s analysis, I deconstructed video clips into frames (still aspects of a shot), shots (a single-take of a camera move), scenes (a combination of multiple shots that are linked by an action, space or time continuity), sequences (a combination of scenes linked thematically or logically), and genres.

**Audio modality.** For the sound modality, I excluded spoken and written words and analyzed music, special sound effects, tone, natural sounds, and connotative and denotative meanings of those elements when present in the news package.
Social media posts. I treated tweets as a single unit of analysis and distinguished only textual tweets, tweets with a still image, or tweet vid a video clip. To examine Twitter discursivity I coded for verbal strategies such as naming, metaphors, and narratives, as well as computer-enabled non-standard orthography and non-verbal signs (e.g. non-standard spellings, letter repetition and capitalization, punctuation). The non-standard orthography and non-verbal signs proved to be useful in the analysis of the comments of readers who tend to use those to express their feelings or, for instance, to emphasize the point they are making. By paying attention to tweets that also included visuals, I have focused on visual elements listed under the visual mode.

The third step of the multimodal analysis focused on the elements that were missing or were not clearly manifested in the texts. Even though not present or underdeveloped, these elements suggested specific realms of social reality featured in the text. By identifying the latent elements, I was able to locate broader structures of the multimodal discourses.

The fourth step concerned the ways different modes and their affordances related to each other, what kind of functions modes were highlighted in specific instances in the text, and what integrated messages were created though the particular multimodal ensemble. This fourth step also included the identification and interpretation of the dominant frames of borders that emerged from these multiple modalities and their inter-relationships. To identify frames, I went through the second reading of individual modes and their relationships across all 18 news packages, the arrangement and the composition of modes within a single news package, and the relationships of all modes across all news packages. The second comprehensive reading enabled me to identify frames supported by
linguistic choices journalists, their sources and readers made, rhetorical devices such as
metaphors and catchphrases, the interplay of linguistic, visual, and audio modes, and
lastly, the narratives employed in the news texts.

In the analysis I applied Barker’s (2004) definition of narrative as a sequential
organization of both words and phrases into sentences that provide a structure in which
stories are told. The sequential account of an event creates a storyline of a news article.
Therefore, narratives are built upon linguistic choices, rhetorical devices, and the
composition of modes. Narratives are always placed in wider cultural contexts (Barker,
2004). In the context of news production, in particular, the journalistic convention of
including a plurality of sources journalists in the interest of ensuring balance and
credibility implies that narratives are accompanied by counter-narratives defined as
alternative narratives that resist the dominant narratives (Andrews, 2002). The analysis of
the news packages focused on linguistic choices, rhetorical devices, multimodal
ensembles, and narratives and their systematic groupings, through the processes of
prominent placement, repetition, and frequent association with culturally accepted
symbols (Entman, 1993).

After identifying narratives and counter-narratives that were built upon linguistic
choices, rhetorical devices, and multimodal ensembles (including the relationship of
every mode individually across the all 18 news packages photos, the arrangement and the
composition of modes within a single news package, and the relationships of all modes
across all news packages), I looked at the larger clusters of meanings they all create first
in each of the news packages, and then in all collected data. To decide what was a
dominant frame, I paid attention to the salience, prominent placement, and repetition of
modes and their meanings across news packages. The frequency of the linguistic choices, rhetorical devices, and different units of the analysis was important but not the most prevalent strategy in identifying the emergent frames as clusters of created meanings.

Lastly, the fifth step involved the critical evaluation of the implications of findings, including the discussion of what broader social issues and ideologies were enabled in the news discourse, what kinds of interests and power dynamics were supported, and how different modes, separately and in an interplay reinforced, challenged, or concealed such power, and created borders as spaces of interaction where particular identities, power relations, and agency were enacted and constituted.

The last layer of the analysis contributed to the framing analysis by addressing the negotiation of meaning between journalists and the public. By applying the concept of participatory journalism (Nip, 2006), I addressed the presence of formats that encouraged public participation, followed by the analysis of readers’ comments and the ways readers’ comments contributed to the interpretation of frames (Thurman, 2008). In this step, I interpreted the meaning making accomplished through naming, name slurring, lexical expressions of affect conveyed in punctuation or letter capitalization, and the types of utterances readers used.

As the next chapters will show, the frames that emerged from the multimodal analysis related to broader discourses of cultural difference and politics of inclusion and exclusion of people and spaces to and from the EU. Those framing patterns also reproduced ideologies such as Orientalism, Islamophobia, racism, xenophobia, the notions of Europeanness and Europeanization, and the permanent tension between the two. I also looked into the circulation of certain ideas in the frames shared across the five
news outlets, what kind of power dynamics was enacted in the framing patterns, and in what ways borders framed in media in particular ways reinforced, challenged, or concealed dominant ideologies.
Chapter 4

Journalistic Frames of Borders in Multimedia Online News

This chapter focuses on the analysis of news frames of borders constructed in online articles to address the first research question: *What frames of the European Union borders are constructed in multimodal discourses of online news?* After identifying the frames constructed by journalists, in Chapter 5 I will answer the questions related to the readers’ co-construction of frames: “what frames about the European Union borders are constructed by readers’ comments, and: In what ways do readers’ comments frames relate to the frames constructed by professional journalists?” Lastly, in Chapter 6 I will answer the last two questions about broader implications: “what are the social relations of power enacted in the interplay of journalists’ and readers’ framings of borders across the European news outlets selected for study?”, and “how do these frames relate to broader ideologies about the European Union as a politicized space of both inclusion and exclusion?”

This multimodal analysis of coverage of the immigration “crisis” of 2015, in the periods in June and September of 2015 when Hungary first announced its fence erection on the southern external EU border with Serbia, and then sealed the border-crossings, in five European news outlets (Britain’s The Guardian, Germany’s Deutsche Welle, Hungary’s *Magyar Hirlap*, Croatia’s *Jutarnji list*, and Serbia’s *Večernje novosti*) revealed three dominant frames in news discourse across media outlets: “borders as spaces for managing national and EU security,” “borders as lived spaces,” and “borders as politically negotiated spaces” (see Table 1). These patterns of framing were articulated through the journalists’ negotiations of meaning with the sources of information included
in the coverage, as well as the editorial selection, placement, repetition, and interplay of different semiotic resources—including written text, photos, video and audio clips, social media posts, maps, graphs, and other computer-created visualizations. In the context of heightened public interest in immigration issues due to the significant increase in migrants’ arrivals in 2015, and given the popularity of interactive multimedia news, the analysis of this journalistic discourse becomes relevant for understanding of the mediating role of online news media today.
Table 1

*Frames and corresponding narratives*

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<th>Frames</th>
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<th>Readers’ narratives</th>
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<td>Appropriation of lived spaces: speaking for migrants</td>
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In this chapter, I will, first, discuss each of the three dominant frames that emerged in the analysis, highlighting the narratives and counter-narratives that build and support the frames. Within the discussion of each frame, I will also address how different semiotic modes relate to each other to create particular meanings. In the last section of the chapter, I will focus on how design, production, and distribution of multiple modes in online news shape the discourse on immigration in this particular historical context. The central arguments in this chapter are that online news discourses construct European Union borders as fixed lines that delineate European territory and reinforce a normative view of Europe as a political space ruled by liberal values, such as democracy, tolerance, and the endorsement of human rights and the rule of law. As a fundamental element of an imagined European territoriality, the EU borders are constructed as static lines that need further fortification to stop border porosity and halt increasing migrant mobility. Therefore, news frames construct borders as clear territorial demarcations that, at the same time, communicate differences between insiders and the outsiders, and, in some instances, differences among insiders within the European space.

In effect, multimodal constructions of borders also support the demarcation of racial, ethnic, religious, legal, and other cultural differences between insiders and outsiders, and discursively institutionalize borders as spaces of conflictive difference. Overall, the news frames produce and reproduce otherness, amplify the “us” vs. “them” ideology, and reproduce xenophobia, Islamophobia, and racism. This pattern is visible even in news reporting that attempts to open spaces for immigrants’ voices and personal stories in the coverage. Framing patterns thus suggest that the discursive mediation of borders produces complex meanings of home, belonging, and difference, the concepts
that are all interdependent and defined in relation with each other. These complex meanings are underlined by ideologies of racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia. These discourses thus package notions of Europeanness in multimedia formats for European audiences’ consumption.

**Borders as Spaces for Managing National and EU Security**

The “borders as spaces of managing national and EU security” frame is a dominant frame in all articles from the five European online outlets. It is constructed through verbal and visual representations of barbed wire fences, erected walls, surveillance techniques, and uniformed border personnel. The frame is supported by written narratives and visual images of tighter border controls and the erection of a physical obstacle—a fence that is 175 kilometers long (almost 109 miles) and 4 meters high constructed on the Hungary-Serbia border. This frame conveys the meaning of the partition between a domestic space (national and regional) and the “others” in terms of legal and moral justifications for controlling, managing, and surveilling such entrance points in order to regulate mass migration.

This frame is supported by three main narratives: a narrative of justification for the fence erection and tighter border to control migrant bodies and their mass mobility; a narrative that stresses the legality of increased border controls; and a narrative that underscores the cultural otherness of migrants. Within this frame, a counter-narrative that calls into question the fear mongering and the othering of migrants is also present as a subordinate discourse that does not undermine the dominant frame. Overall, the dominant narratives work together, even when challenged, to support the position that borders provide, maintain, and symbolize the security of the European space. Moreover, the
narratives are present in all five news outlets and are supported by a common set of rhetorical devices and metaphors that interrelate the visual and audio modes. The narratives of justification and legality, as well as the counter-narratives that challenge justification, sometimes overlap because of the interplay of the different modes journalist used to tell stories. Hence, in all three narratives, written texts, visuals, and audio elements complement each other in meaning production to support the dominant frame.

**Justification of tougher border management.** In the frame “borders as spaces for managing national and EU security,” both the establishment of a barbed-wire fence on the Hungary-Serbia border and the intertextual references to the reintroduction of border controls within the Schengen space, as in the case of Germany and Austria, are justified on the basis of a perceived threat posed by the migrants’ arrivals. This narrative of justification, as the examples presented below illustrate, works in tandem with an overlapping narrative of migrants as undesirable cultural others and is supported by particular linguistic choices and metaphors of the arrival.

In this narrative, the words “migrants,” “refugees,” “immigrants” and “asylum seekers” are most of the time used interchangeably. To report about their arrival, journalists from all five online outlets employed metaphors such as “the floods of arriving people,” “huge waves of migrants,” and “the unprecedented influx of migrants.” The linguistic mode amplifies the framing by referring to the circumstances as a “migrant crisis,” “serious problem,” “crisis culmination,” “chaos,” “the worst migrant crisis since WWII,” “one of Europe’s biggest challenges in decades,” “uncontrolled mass arrival” or “exceptionally high migratory pressure.”
Moreover, even though Germany’s policy shift to welcome refugees was followed by a shift in naming migrants as refugees and asylum seekers more often than focusing on the illegality of the very action of crossing the border, the numbers used in texts, tweets, graphs, and maps depict the intensity of the arrivals and continue to mark migrants as a threat. Thus, both verbal and visual constructions of migrants as a threat often function as justification for the need for tighter border controls and protection of the national and European space.

For instance, Večernje novosti reported: “Since the beginning of 2015 Hungary has faced the arrival of 54,000 immigrants. The Hungarian government estimates that another 130,000 migrants are on their way to this country.” In The Guardian’s live-blog, a salient semiotic resource is a graph from the Hungarian police website, which shows the monthly increase of migrants’ arrivals to Hungary with the peak in August of 2015. The idea emphasized in the visual mode is reinforced in the written mode when The Guardian reports that “more than half million migrants have appeared at Europe borders in the first eight months of the year,” highlighting that the EU border agency Frontex “announced five consecutive monthly records in the numbers of people reported, with the figure for August alone climbing to 156,000.” Similarly, Jutranji list showcased the daily numbers of migrants who entered Hungary before the complete border closure: “Hungarian police released the statement that the record number of 5,809 people crossed the Serbia-Hungary border on Sunday, whereas 5,353 of them arrived to Hungary Monday afternoon.”

The aforementioned examples reveal that in online news articles, migrants’ arrivals and border crossings were conceptualized as fixed entities instead of processes.
Understanding arrivals and border crossings as entities enables journalists and readers to quantify and see them as causes of problems, and as threatening others. Framing migrants’ arrivals and border crossings as processes would have entailed different understandings of otherness, and negative otherings in different contexts would not be as stark. Instead, attaching numbers to migrants’ arrivals without context, and occasionally followed by exclamation marks, carries the connotation of numerous bodies that are hard to control and to police. The lack of control, or the difficulty to manage and administer the borders implies that the particular space, seen as a territory with boundaries, is difficult if not impossible to guard and protect from a constantly increasing quantity of people who are marked as a threat.

In this respect, the narrative of justification of border management overlaps a narrative of migrants as threatening, undesirable others. The linguistic choice of particular sources quoted, coupled with absence of sources who would counter the fear evoked by such sources, contributes to the conceptualization of migrants as threats and to the justification for tighter controls. The one-sided view of sources selected by journalists is especially evident in shorter reports coming from Magyar Hirlap, Večernje novosti, Jutarnji list and even Deutsche Welle. For instance, Magyar Hirlap quoted government spokesperson Zoltan Kovacs: “We’ve said since May that the situation is getting worse day by day. Millions are on their way to Europe, so we need to prepare for the worst,” he added.” Similarly, The Guardian chose a quote from Kovacs: “We have to stop the flood [of people.]” The choice of sources and the prominent placement of their quoted statements in the subheading of articles position migrants as the arriving threat and
legitimize any means taken to protect the European space by fortifying the external borders.

To support the written text, the corpus of photos examined constructed fences as literal and symbolic barriers that halt migrants and keep them on the other side of the border. The visual mode evokes the symbolism of a successful management of border porosity and suggests the effective way of keeping the unwanted others out. This was particularly salient in September news reports, when the Hungarian government decided to seal the borders and clashes at the border ensued. At the time, photos and video clips showed many nameless, able-bodied, young Middle Eastern men arriving in large numbers. In The Guardian, the actions of the men are said to cause “frenzied clashes with Hungarian police” to break obstacles at the borders and continue their journey to their final destination of choice. The visuals are supplemented with captions that state that migrants are “breaching of the security corridor,” or “trying to burst through a gate.” When the captions in The Guardian indicate that “migrants stand in front of a barrier,” or that Hungary’s police used water cannons to keep migrants away, the photos are wide-shots of masses of people pushing each other in front of the fence, trying to climb and reach over the barrier. The interplay of the modes thus situates migrants as violent and destructive, and as people in transgression of European expectations of orderly conduct.

Similarly, Magyar Hirlap’s headline “Deliberate Attack on Hungary” positioned migrants as attackers and criminals. The multimodal repetition of the idea that Hungary was brutally attacked creates feelings of anger, fear, and animosity toward migrants. For example, the criminalization of migrants operates through reporting of the fact that “14 officers were injured” in an incident; in the same report, a photo that shows migrants
attempting to breach the border fence reinforces the same idea. Nevertheless, the peak of the tension was reached when *Magyar Hirlap* reported that migrant children were injured, “especially two children who were thrown over the security fence by migrants.”

The interplay of written text and visuals not only constructs migrants as those who do not obey the rules and violently react when “legally” halted at the border, but as people who are also violent and careless with their children.

The choice of tweets that include photos and video clips, published extensively in *The Guardian*—and taken at the Serbia-Hungary border in the moments when the Hungarian police closed the border crossing points—also contribute to the construction of migrants as angry and capable of opposing and breaking the rules of European countries. For instance, *The Guardian* embedded this tweet from ITV journalist James Mates: “Fed up with waiting in front of locked door, refugees now sitting in the main motorway. All border traffic stopped.” Linguistically, the active voice in sentences that indicate that migrants are breaching barriers, trying to burst the gate, or deliberately stopping the traffic gives migrants agency in choosing to disrupt the existing order. Simultaneously, photos of migrants peeking through the barbed-wired fence or pushing their way to get across the border, published both in *The Guardian* and *Magyar Hirlap*, frame the borders as spaces vulnerable to migrants’ intention to trespass and breach into nationally owned space.

Furthermore, the borders are constructed as spaces where security, control, and order have to be established and maintained through not only halting migrants but also by registering, fingerprinting, controlling, and directing migrants to places where they are allowed to go, and telling them how to behave. In all five news outlets, the reports about
migrants entering both Hungary and Croatia address the need of these countries’ authorities to register migrants. Control over migrants’ mobility is also achieved through registration and their placement in reception centers with the excuse of maintaining the order and normalcy of a European system shaped both by national and EU institutions. This need to control migrants’ chaotic mobility is supported by linguistic choices, as in the use of the verbs “to register” or “to direct.”

For instance, Večernje novosti quoted Radoš Djurović, an asylum protection center manager, who was advocating that after Hungary’s decision to erect the fence, Serbia should adopt temporary measures for refugees from Syria and Iraq since they “will enable us [Serbia] to more effectively register refugees so that we know who is temporality or permanently staying in our country.” Similarly, Jutarnji list reported: “Hungarians claim that they will register refugees in other parts of the country and intensify efforts to stop human trafficking.” In the same Jutarnji list’s report, it is stated: “Large number of migrants were directed toward the border with Austria.” Evidently the word choice and the active sentence in the first constructions from Večernje novosti and Jutarnji list position European countries as active agents who are executing power over migrants by controlling their mobility in the name of national and regional security. On the other side, as it is visible in the second example from Jutarnji list migrants were ultimately assigned the passive role of those who should obey and respect European decisions about their destiny.

Another example of this narrative of justification of control over migrants’ bodies and their mobility in order to maintain the existing order is offered in The Guardian: “German Chancellor Angela Merkel said, ‘Germany’s decision to reintroduce border
controls was necessary for an orderly regime.” Similarly, Germany’s minister of interior Thomas de Maiziere is quoted in the same article: “measures were necessary because record number of refugees, many of them from Syria, had stretched the system to breaking point.” The Guardian also quoted Gyorgy Schopflin—a member of the Hungarian parliament affiliated to the Fidesz party founded by “Hungary’s anti-immigration prime minister Viktor Orban”—who blamed migrants for law and order disruption: “If you have a large number of unassimilated recently-arrived migrants, they are potentially capable of destabilising law and order, which of course puts the whole democracy and liberalism in danger.” These statements emphasize the importance of border controls as a way of maintaining order and re-establishing the rules that regulate the mass mobility of the perceived unwanted others who were physically invading Europe and threatening Europe’s order, normalcy, and values.

In the narratives justifying border control, written and visual representations place border guards’ bodies in juxtaposition to invading migrant bodies. Jutarnji list reported that “tens of riot police officers, supported with mounted units and the army, positioned themselves on the tracks to prevent migrants from crossing over to Hungary, while a helicopter circled over the area.” The Guardian reported that Hungary’s border guards were accompanied by “muzzled police dogs,” and that border fence was equipped with “heat sensors.” Deutsche Welle ran a photo of a border guard who uses binoculars to notice migrants. The caption for the photo said: “Hungarian voluntary police surveil the Serbian border for migrants attempting to cross ‘illegally.’”

Despite the fact that riot police are equipped with shields and weapons, most of the photos and videos taken at border crossings at the time Hungarian officials decided to
stop the flow of migrants show the outnumbered police officers and border guards who tried to control numerous aggressive migrants. *The Guardian* quoted a BBC correspondent who said: “bottles, bricks and stones have been thrown at riot police.” Verbally and visually, migrants are constructed as violent invaders who do not respect Hungary’s and EU laws. The interplay of modes makes migrants an apparent threat and, therefore, provides grounds for rationalizing the decision that, in addition to strict regulations, borders needs physical protection from the outsiders’ menace.

**Asserting the legality of tighter border management.** Another main narrative supporting the frame “borders as spaces for managing national and EU security” is articulated through the reporting of conflicting arguments on whether Hungarian officials broke EU laws when they decided to erect the fence on the EU southern borders with Serbia, and whether Germany’s and Austria’s decisions to re-introduce border controls in the borderless Schengen space were in accordance with the rules of the Schengen Agreement. However, all news outlets examined privileged the position that supported the legality of the fence erection and of the new border controls. This operated through selection of official sources who supported such measures, word choices in coverage, and by linking the argument that the fence would stop illegal migration and protect the national territory to the claim that the fence does not violate any EU laws. Salient rhetorical devices in this narrative also support the overlapping narrative of migrants as threatening cultural others. In this case, the othering of migrants is conceptualized as a difference between migrants who are legally acceptable and those who are not acceptable in the European space.
For instance, *Magyar Hirlap* cited Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter Szijjarto, who claimed that the barrier policy is “not against any EU law” nor it is “exceptional” since “similar barriers are well known for the Greek-Turkish and Bulgarian-Turkish border.” *Večernje novosti* mentioned Serbia’s dissatisfaction with the fence erection in its reports, but nevertheless cited Szijjarto’s claim that the fence “doesn’t violate any international treaty.” From this news outlet, we also learn that Hungary’s government spokesperson Zoltan Kovacs said that the fence would be built exactly as the law required and nobody would be allowed to “shoot at migrants at the security fence.” These claims legitimize the border fence as a means to stop migrants and protect not only the national but also the EU space. The chosen quotes, which emphasize the lawfulness of stricter border policy, are frequently paired with the claims that the fence was the only solution “to handle the situation” and keep the country safe, and, at the same time, “to protect the whole of Europe” as reported in *Magyar Hirlap*.

It is worth noting that the reporting on the law-abiding character of national and EU border fence policy does not provide any details about the existing EU or Hungary’s legislation. This makes evident that journalists take for granted that all EU citizens are familiar with both Hungarian and EU laws. The fact that even in the longer articles journalists did not challenge any of the decisions nor cited any discrepancies with EU law and values strengthened the idea that stricter border controls are morally and legally the right way to deal with immigration and preserve the so called “fortress Europe.” This discursive practice denied readers the opportunity to better understand EU law and question it, and made it easier to legitimize the idea that the fence was the only solution to the “crisis.” Likewise, the legality of Germany’s and Austria’s decisions to reinstate
border controls was asserted in coverage without raising further questions about the EU regulatory system. For example, *The Guardian* reported that the European Commission, the governing body of the EU, determined that Austria’s move, like that of Germany, “was in keeping with the provisions of the Schengen Agreement.” It highlighted that the temporary reintroduction of border controls between member states “is an exceptional possibility foreseen in and regulated by the Schengen Border Code, in crisis situation” and, therefore, “the current situation in Austria is covered by the rules.”

Furthermore, the articles analyzed suggest that in circumstances perceived as a crisis in the eyes of the EU members and Serbia, which has a strong inclination toward the EU membership, the news framing valued EU perspectives over international perspectives on the legality of the policies enforced. For instance, the critics of Hungary’s policy were generally not EU officials but United Nations officers. *Jutarnji list*, for example, cited the criticism of Ernő Simon, UNHCR spokesperson, who said that “each country had the right to protect its territory but not to close the border crossings for people who are feeling war and persecution.” Yet, views like these were not privileged in coverage. Similarly, references to the Geneva Convention that regulates the treatment of refugees remained underrepresented.

**Securing the borders against cultural Others.** As the previous discussion shows, narratives of justification for tighter border management and assertion of the legality of fences and border controls overlap with a recurring narrative of othering migrants. In narratives of justification for border management, a narrative of migrant mobility as a threat to European law and order is activated by visual and textual images of migrants that distinguish this threat as culturally antagonistic to European culture. In
visual texts, migrants whose faces and bodies are visible near the barbed-wired fence on the external EU border are full of ethnic and racial cues. Their darker skin, juxtaposed with that of lighter-skinned guards in uniforms with national markers, evokes the meaning of uncontrolled mobility of racially different “others.” Alongside visuals, journalists used tweets to communicate racial and religious cues. For instance, *The Guardian* featured Matthew Cassel’s insights from the border and his direct communication with Hungarian border guards who, as it is evident from their statement, perceived migrants solely as Muslims and conceptualized their role as that of European guards protecting their citizens from invading Muslims. Cassel tweeted: “Many of Hungary’s official border crossings with Serbia also closed today. When asked why a Hungarian guard said ‘Syria, Islam.’” *The Guardian* also embedded a post from the Croatian National Broadcaster HRT Twitter account to refer to the Croatian tension between respecting European values and welcoming migrants, on one side, and, on the other, the national anxiety over accepting migrants who are different. HRT tweeted Croatia’s Prime Minister Zoran Milanovic’s statement: “We are ready to accept these people, regardless of their race or religion.” The quotation underlines race and religion as problematic differences that, in the end, justify the call for tighter border control.

Furthermore, when the visual modality shows police officers taking care of migrants, photos and videos frequently show guards wearing protective masks and rubber gloves. For instance, *The Guardian* published the photo of a Croatian policewoman equipped with rubber gloves and a protective mask and holding a younger migrant woman by her forearm. The photo’s caption read: “A Croatian policewoman directs a refugee who crossed from Serbia.” The visual image of rubber gloves and protection
masks supports the proposition that guards do not only need to protect and control national and EU borders, but they also need to protect their bodies and nations from threat of diseases that these cultural others might bring in. In sum, visual and textual modes in the narrative that centers racial, ethnic, and religious differences of migrants contribute to a discursive practice in which Europeans claim and re-claim their space through border management.

Within narratives that assert the legality of border control measures in 2015, the othering of migrants operates through a categorization of migrants according to legal status, using the labels “refugees” and “asylum seekers” as the main referential strategies. Refugees, for example, are framed as a group of people acceptable to pursue their voyage to their chosen destinations. Asylum seekers, especially the ones who are perceived as those who falsely represent themselves as being in a need of political asylum, and other types of migrants, especially the economic ones, are framed as groups that are not welcome in the EU. Thus, Syrian refugees were recognized as an acceptable group, especially after Germany’s decision in August of 2015 to welcome all Syrians no matter which EU country was their point of entry to the EU space. This classification of tolerable and intolerable migrants discursively constructs borders as spaces of inclusion and exclusion.

For instance, Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orban, when quoted in *Magyar Hirlap*, justified his country’s plan to fortify the southern border because “everybody should be kept out of Europe who has no right to asylum.” Comparably, *The Guardian* characterized Hungary as the country most affected by the crisis and reproduced Hungarian officials’ claims “that most of those trying to enter are ‘economic migrants’
and not bona fides refugees,” and that some migrants are taking advantage and are “falsely claiming to be Syrians.” In *The Guardian*, even the positions of British government officials with strong anti-immigrant sentiments were included in coverage to mobilize narratives that exclude migrants considered as less desirable. For example, then home secretary Theresa May told *The Guardian*: “Under the system those not in need of protection will be sent back to their country of origin. Claiming asylum must not be viewed as an easy means of resettlement in Europe.”

**Counter-narratives questioning fear mongering and cultural othering.**

Despite symbolic justification of intensified border control and its legality, a contestation of such narratives is also present in the framing of “borders as spaces of managing national and EU security.” The justification for border control and security is contested by activist voices and sources coming from international organizations such as UNHCR that raise questions about migrants’ treatment, forgotten European values, and increased xenophobia and anti-Muslim views. These sources also criticized both Hungary’s razor-blade fence policy and the EU’s lukewarm response to it. Tweets embedded in live-blogs, videos, and computer-generated visualizations were tools that allowed journalists to include diverse voices by utilizing the modes’ meaning potential.

For example, *The Guardian* included a tweet posted by Tirana Hassan, an Amnesty International director of crisis response, in which she criticizes Hungary’s official politics toward migrants: “Army told us to leave #Roszke border and can’t photograph police. Helicopter buzzing, dogs, riot police. Europe’s response to ppl fleeing war?” Another of Hassan’s tweets showcases a photo of the sky and the fence, followed by the words, “Welcome to fortress Europe – literally #Hungary #Roszke.” *The Guardian*
also used tweets to showcase different ways European politicians condemned the moves made to slowdown migrants’ mobility and movement toward wealthier European countries. Some of the tweets bought to light the resistance Hungarian lawyers and former state officials mounted against Hungary’s strict border control regulations that criminalize the act of illegal border crossings. For instance, a Hungarian investigative journalist tweeted: “88 Hungary-an lawyers (@indexhu’s lawyer too) sign a petition&protest the #Hungary-an govt’s refugee-punishing laws.”

In similar fashion, The Guardian used journalist James Mates’s tweets as a reporting tool to introduce diverse voices from the Hungarian political scene: “Hungary’s former PM Ferenc Gyurcsany visits refugees stuck on Serbian side of border. Calls situation ‘disgraceful.’” Mates continued to report: “Fmr PM Gyurcsany has been hosting refugees in his Budapest home. Says humanitarian obligations trump legal ones.” Jutarnji list also uses Mates’s tweets in English to convey the irony and, therefore, to challenge the narratives that justify the border fence. In a live-blog, Mates’s tweet was incorporated as a counter narrative that through irony condemns the fence as the first impression of Europe that Hungary imposed to migrants: “Last gap in 3m fence being closed by Hungarian workmen. From now refugees to be greeted by razor wire and police” (Jutarnji list).

Deutsche Welle, as a primarily radio broadcaster, used an audio clip to criticize Hungarian border policy and anti-immigration campaign. The reporter referred to posters made by the government to warn migrants against taking the jobs of Hungarians and to demand respect for the country’s laws and culture. The writer pointed out that the posters were printed only in Hungarian and, therefore, accessible only to people who speak the
language. However, the reporter noted, the deterring messages reproduce fearmongering among local people while a survey used by the government to “consult the public” associated immigration with the rise of terrorism.

The multimodal interplay in the frame “borders as spaces for managing national and EU security.” This frame is mobilized through a multimodal interplay that communicates arriving migrants as the threat, which, therefore, morally and legally justifies stricter controls and the barbed-wired fence erection. The multiple modes frame the borders as space of illegal activity by migrants that should be controlled at all costs. Thus, relying primarily on official government sources, this frame places the legislative and administrative order in the EU at the discursive forefront. It makes Europeanization through the institutional order a condition crucial to the fulfillment of Europeanness, a quality of sharing European heritage, culture, and values. With focus on justification of the tighter border management and its legality, this frame constructs borders as spaces of political action and protection of European culture.

The interplay of the selected modes—written language, photos, and audio elements—re-contextualized the meaning potential of each mode to produce an ensemble that communicated xenophobia and the coding of religion and race as conflictive cultural difference. Moreover, the pronouns and demonstrative adjectives used in news articles, especially in the selected quotes and social media posts, refer to migrants as “they” and “those people” as further forms of othering. This labeling also implies the power of Europeans as those who with the right to decide on behalf of migrants. Within this frame, migrants are reduced to bodies under surveillance (of government, news media, and news readers) and regulation. Their perspectives and voices were not included in the narratives
discussed above. Instead, in this security frame their muted subjectivities are represented primarily via the visual mode but within narratives of invasion and threat. The links between visuals, tweets, and spoken and written language normalize the relationship between those protecting the European space and those who are invading it.

Even though the narratives that justify tighter border controls and the legality of such measures are the dominant within the frame of “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security,” a counter-narrative, which questions such justification is also present in four out of five news outlets—excluding Magyar Hirlap. However, compared to the narratives for justification and legality, this counter-narrative that challenges the construction of the border as a means to protect and preserve European safe space, is mobilized to a much lesser extent. In the counter-narrative, diversity and fluidity in meaning making of visuals and social media posts enabled journalists to use photos, videos, and tweets as tools to challenge the narratives of the necessity and inevitability of erecting the barb-wired fence.

**Borders as Lived Spaces**

The “borders as lived spaces” frame is constructed through multimodal ensembles that create narratives of foreign bodies that take up European space and articulate in their own voice the lived experience of mobility within the space defined and confined by Europeans. Three main narratives support this frame. The narrative labeled “lived experiences of/at the border: giving voice to the voiceless” underscores the voices of migrants who share their personal stories and, at the same time, embody global mobility and the reasons for forced mobility. The second narrative, labeled “appropriation of lived space: speaking for migrants,” underscores how European politicians re-claim the borders
from migrants by predominantly speaking “for” instead of “about” them. The third
narrative, “the lived spaces of insiders,” highlights how tighter management and
surveillance of borders affect the daily lives of European insiders who experience
bordering practices as a loss of comfort. While the frame “borders as spaces for
managing the security” constructs borders as means of claiming space where insiders
legally belong to and outsiders do not, the frame “borders as lived spaces” constructs
borders as spaces that enable multivocality, transformative practices, and resistance.
However, in both frames, narratives of migrant othering intersect to undermine the full
representation of the human experience of migration.

**Lived experiences of/at the border: giving voice to the voiceless.** A multimodal
interplay of written text, photos, and especially selected quotes coming from migrants
frames a different meaning of borders as a space of lived experiences. Through the telling
of their personal stories, migrants selected as sources narrate the reasons why they left
their home countries and what kind of hardships they had to overcome in the process of
crossing one border after the other. The lived experience is both a personal and a shared
experience of mobility across borders. This constructed experience refers to both life
outside European borders as well as experiences of and at all the borders they had crossed
on their way to the collectively imagined space of safety and freedom. The lived-
experiences narratives display migrants’ resistance and counter-narrative the othering
practices. However, the narratives of lived experiences of and at the borders that
humanize migrants and give them voice and agency are at times contested by official
sources and journalists who other migrants as unruly, demanding to set their final
destinations, and, therefore, disrespectful of European laws and regulation. These
contested narratives are tightly intertwined in the visual and verbal modes to create a fragmented narrative of lived experiences.

In this narrative of lived experiences, migrants are for the first time identified by their personal names, their occupations, and the countries they are coming from. They are not clustered in anonymous groups but recognized at least by country of origin, and therefore, allowed to carry their national identities. Here, migrants are treated as individual human beings situated in particular spatial, historical, political, and cultural contexts. *The Guardian* reported that the Hungarian authorities pointed out that while the most numerous group of migrants comes from Syria, there are “nationals from 74 countries” who entered Hungary, specifically from Afghanistan and Iraq. Although these narratives revealed the humanitarian aspect of human global mobility, the editorial emphasis on countries of origin reinforced the idea of otherness and migrants’ belonging to a particular space different from Europe.

This frame, however, was not reported across the majority of news organizations analyzed. Among the five news outlets selected, voice was given to migrants only in *The Guardian* and *Jutarnji list*. For instance, *The Guardian* devoted an article titled “Migrants on Hungary border fence: ‘This wall, we will not accept it’” to giving voice to migrants to share their personal story. The report focused on the accounts of groups’ lived experience of walking and getting closer to the Serbia-Hungary border:

As the sun sets, huddle after huddle of Syrian refugees, travelling together for protection, edge north along the bends of the river. At other points along the border, migrants pay smugglers to get them across. But here, everyone guides themselves, using tips passed on by those who passed through in previous weeks.
There are doctors and businessmen walking, as well as children and old men. Every so often, in the distant darkness, you can hear a baby cry. (The Guardian)

Additionally, through quotes, photos, and photo captions, migrants were given voices and the opportunity to share their stories, and to overcome being metonymically represented as masses of faceless and nameless bodies. Middle shots of migrants whose eyes directly stare at the camera contribute to the personalization of the stories and enable readers to relate to the stories. For instance, Yama Nayab, a surgeon from Afghanistan, was captured in a photo run by The Guardian while he, dressed in a western logo t-shirt and barefoot, was sitting and holding his daughter. The captions made readers attach the face to a story: “Yama Nayab with his daughter and other migrants in a makeshift camp at an abandoned brick factory in the outskirts of Subotica, Serbia. He was a surgeon in Afghanistan until he was stabbed by a Taliban.”

In the same article, Nayab shared a story of his journey from Afghanistan and what made him leave his home country:

Stabbed four times in the chest by the Taliban earlier this year, he recovered and fled the country with his wife and two toddlers. Since then, they have walked and bussed through Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Bulgaria and Serbia to find somewhere that will offer them a future. (The Guardian)

Nayab said that a Taliban fighter accused him of working for the government and threatened his life. As proof, he pulled up his shirt “to reveal four pink scars circling his heart.” By revealing personal stories, migrants were fighting off the dehumanizing wide-shots of migrants whose faces are not visible. Personal human-interest stories negate the
wide-shots of migrants as representations of a generic migrant – without the face, history, context, and name.

In another report, a Syrian man named Mohamed Hussein shared the details of his transcontinental journey and the related meanings of his tattoos:

On his left wrist he has a tattoo that honours Pink Floyd – “I love progressive rock” – and on his right wrist, an image of a ship. It’s to remind him of the boat he tried to take from Turkey to Europe last December. He says it ran into trouble on New Year’s Eve, and coastguards took him back to Turkey. (*The Guardian*)

Migrants’ narratives allow them to share their fears with the European public and provide a different perspective on the lived experiences of border crossing. The opportunity to share their experiences paints a picture that differs from the remarks Hungarian officials made about the “illegal crossing” or the overall news representations of migrants as “the floods of arriving people,” “huge waves,” or a “problem” and “burden.” For instance, Rahman Niazi, an 18-year-old Afghan student, explained that a group of people he was travelling with paid individually around 10,000 euros (around $US 11,335) to a smuggler whose people gave them instructions as to how to proceed at every stage of their journey:

While they wait for his call, everyone fears an attack from the police. Attempting to walk from Iran to Turkey, two of Niazi’s companions were shot by Iranian border guards. In Bulgaria, he says he was beaten and robbed by the local police (*The Guardian*).

While the “borders as spaces for managing national and EU security” frame predominantly communicated border crossing as an illegal activity, the frame “borders as
“lived spaces” conveys the meanings of hardship, fear, anger, and hope migrants experienced when trying to cross the Serbia-Hungary border, as one of the last obstacles on their way to wealthier European countries.

“We fled wars and violence and did not expect such brutality and inhumane treatment in Europe,” said Amir Hassan of Iraq, soaking wet from the water cannon and trying to wash tear gas from his eyes. “Shame on you Hungarians!” he shouted, pointing toward the Hungarian police who were firing volleys of tear gas canisters into the crowd. (The Guardian)

Twitter, as a reporting tool, is again used to better contextualize borderlands experiences and show images addressing lived experience of families who are searching for shelter in Europe. Tweets in live-blogs portrayed how tear gas used by the Hungarian riot police in September affected not only men but also women and children. Some tweets included photos of men carrying children who covered their faces with T-shirts or bandanas, whereas other tweets showcased photos of migrant children playing in parks, like any children would do anywhere in the world. The only difference is that migrant children were sliding on hills with toboggans while Hungarian border guards observed them policing the nearby borderline.

Additionally, some tweets and photos show children sleeping on the ground with their parents or children squeezing their toys and teddy bears. Those photos carry the meanings of empathy and relationships based on the similarity of experience of parents across cultural differences. Twitter was also used to bring in a human-aspect and show that life continues even in the space confined by fences and border personal. For example, Hungarian journalist Szabolcs Panyi’s tweet included in The Guardian reported:
“A #refugee woman started giving birth to her child during the riot at #Rozske. M1TV reports.”

It is worth noting how exclusion of facts in the articles at the same time showed the fragments of the lived experiences implied in the excluded facts, and contributed to the othering of the lived experiences of migrants at the border. For instance, *Magyar Hirlap* reported that the children were hurt because their parents threw them across the fence. While the Hungarian daily focused on praising Hungarian doctors who took care of the children and the authorities who “helped them go back to their parents,” *Magyar Hirlap* report omitted that children were separated from their parents while being treated and parents were not allowed to join them. In this case, the facts omitted—that both children and parents were exposed to uncertainly for not knowing whether or when the families would be reunited—and the depiction of parents as irresponsible adults who used their own children as a means to their goal, *Magyar Hirlap* not only that suppressed migrant voices by not reporting their side of the story, but also stressed the humanitarian, liberal character of Hungarian doctors and authorities in providing care for the minors.

Another example of journalists’ narratives about migrant lived experiences that simultaneously othered migrants within this frame is found in the reporting on the challenges and difficulties of moving from one border to another in Croatia. In *The Guardian*, the reporting of warnings and maps of Croatia indicated that migrants were approaching minefields left over from the civil war in the 1990s.

Croats have launched a Facebook page warning refugees of the dangers of landmines, according to Balkan Insight. A recent status on the page shows a map of the north-eastern Croatian region of Baranja and territory marked with possible
mines left over from the wars of the 1990s. “Please pay attention, there is some land in Croatia with minefields; many minefields are not marked... so tread carefully and stick to clearly visible roads; highway, railway and local roads are totally secure,” the post in both English and Arabic reads. (The Guardian)

Both the warnings about the land mines and the maps that indicate where the minefields are also call attention to the fact that migrants are trying to find different ways around border restrictions and disregard the routes Croatian and European authorities have chosen for them. Likewise, through a multimodal interplay of photos and written text, the emphasis on migrants’ persistence to reach a desired country in Europe produces discourses of migrants as needy but picky and determined to impose their own final destination while resisting to settle in some of the economically weaker and thus less-desirable European countries. In this way, the framing of the lived experience of borders incorporates the narrative that represents migrants as people who disobey European rules, disrupt the existing order, and manipulate willingness of Europeans to help and accommodate them. Even though the meaning of resistance and challenge to European impositions is present in the readings of the frame of lived experiences, the simultaneous othering of migrants as unruly downplays the importance of their resistance. Not only are migrants demanding and selective in choosing their final destinations, but they also try to avoid registering and fingerprinting on their first points of entry to the EU.

In The Guardian, an article with the headline “Migrants on Hungary’s border fence: ‘This wall, we will not accept it’” illustrates this pattern of the way the narratives of othering creep in and devalue migrants’ voices, agency, and resistance. The multimodal interplay communicates lived experiences of migrants when crossing borders
and the hardships and challenges they faced. At the same time, the photos and written text support the representation of migrants as disrespectful of the existing order. Migrants are given active role in disobeying the rules as they plan ahead every move, from switching their phones off to walking in pairs so they “might not trigger the heat sensors on the border” and manage to cross the border outside of the designated border crossing. Thus, while space for migrants’ voices and experiences was allowed in the news, the message crafted by journalists also conveyed that nothing can stop them, that “not even a wall will put them off,” from reaching the chosen European country. The repetition of Hussein’s determination—expressed in the quote “This wall, we will not accept it”—only amplifies the migrants’ subversive attitude toward the European regulative order (The Guardian).

Even in a live-blog, a format used for breaking news reporting, reporters include migrants’ quotes about choosing a particular country in Europe and the different strategies they use to avoid being registered in other countries on their journey. The Guardian quoted Saleh Ismail, a 28-year old from the Syrian city of Homs, who tried to dodge Hungary’s police with the aim so as to avoid being fingerprinted in Hungary, but nevertheless, he failed to pass through Hungary undetected. After he reached Germany he openly talked about his experience at the borders:

       Germany was my dream from the moment I jumped into the boat to get to Greece. It took a lot of effort to avoid being registered and fingerprinted in Hungary. I hid and walked for days in a forest in the rain. I was frightened of being forced to apply for asylum in Hungary only to be sent back to Greece. In the forest I only had the sound of a train to guide me. Eventually, I was arrested by Hungarian
police who put me in jail for two days. I was beaten and kicked for refusing to register as an asylum seeker (The Guardian).

Similarly, Jutarnji list quoted a 24-year-old engineering student, Amer Abudalabi, who shared that migrants were so intent on reaching Hungary before the border closure that they did not sleep for almost three days. He said: “We heard that Hungary will close its border on September 15, so we had to speed up our journey from Greece. We did not sleep since Saturday morning, and I am really tired” (Jutarnji list).

Moreover, online news articles also portray migrants as people who even after reaching the desired country – Germany – still opposed the choices made for them instead of by themselves. In one story, the reporter noted that instead of arriving in Berlin, migrants “pulled the emergency brake” while on the special train from Munich and “jumped off in the countryside in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt” (The Guardian). In the same story, the authorities offered their version of what could have been the reason for the disobedience:

The emergency brakes were pulled several times during the journey and whole groups of refugees jumped off at different points, police said. According to Berlin state’s social affairs ministry, which is in charge of administering the influx of refugees in the German capital, there could be many reasons why the 179 refugees stopped the train. They either had friends or relatives in the area, or were attempting to avoid being officially registered in Germany so that they could find their way to Sweden instead. (The Guardian)

However, the police rounded migrants up and registered them in the areas where they left the train.
Aside from using written text to verbally represent migrants as imposing and unruly, this way of othering is accomplished though the choice of words journalists used to contextualize the sourced tweets. For instance, *The Guardian* reported: “The BBC’s Bethany Bell photographs refugees in Vienna plotting their journey across Europe.” Even though Bell’s tweet only included a photo of a man who was looking at the map of Europe with a brief description “Vienna Westbahnhof station” and the hashtags #refugeecrisis #migrantcrisis, *the Guardian’s* choice of verb “to plot” implied that migrants are engaging in defiant, illegal or harmful activities.

Within this frame, narratives of lived experiences of and at the border project notions of migrant agency through resistance and transformative practice. This narrative also overlaps with and counter the narratives of migrants as undesirable Others. However, the repetition and salience of othering discursive practices normalizes the understanding of migrants as criminal and unruly, and downplays their agency and the transformative practices they enact at the borders. Othering is accomplished through the representation of migrants as individuals who resist being told where to go and how to behave. They desperately want to reach a safe space, but, at the same time, they resist the laws and rules assigned to the safe space they are longing for. Therefore, borders in this frame become spaces of transformative practices in which migrants resist European rules and imposed obstacles, and at the same time borders are framed as spaces in which journalists and their sources criminalize the action of resistance. Migrants are given a voice, and they use the opportunity to resist and renegotiate borders as fixed territorial lines by assigning them a new meaning of borders as spaces of hope. In resisting, they reaffirm their multilayered identities and reject othering. However, it seems that by choices
journalists make in source selection and in the linguistic decisions they made, they locate
the discourses of transformative practices as inferior to the narratives that criminalize
migrants and fix their identities to unruly others.

Moreover, both migrants, as outsiders, and European nationals, as insiders, construct borders as spaces of power. However, while insiders claim power through the ability to control who belongs to the European space, migrants resist the imposed definition of the European space and negotiate new meaning through the agency of choosing their own routes and disobeying the existing rules forced upon them. For instance, in the following excerpt in The Guardian migrants resist border fences and closed border crossings by engaging in the collective experience of sit-ins:

A group of migrants also blocked the main highway connecting Serbia and Hungary, saying they will refuse food and water until they are allowed to cross into Hungary. The sit-in protest is happening on the no man’s land between Roszke and Horgos, Serbia, which is the main border crossing between the two countries (The Guardian).

There are two dominant sets of images in visual representation of migrants, and a set of visuals of migrants as violent and aggressive also contributes to this counter-narrative of resistance. The online news published in September, when Hungary closed all border-crossing points, contain a set of images of migrants in action, whereas the other set of images taken both in June and September portrays migrants as idle masses who are either waiting at the borders or are walking passively in lines. The images of violent migrants who resist Hungary’s decision to seal the border-crossings counter-narrate the set of images that make a visual narrative of migrants as a passive and idle components of
masses. In these photos taken at the Hungary-Serbia border, migrants fought back Hungary’s police, water cannons and tear gas, broke through the fences, and forced their way into the EU protected space. These visuals combined with the written text mode construct migrants as violent, aggressive, and committed to reaching their desired destination. The discursive representation of migrants’ frenzied response to the closure of the border-crossings, combined with visuals of predominantly young or middle-aged men in Western clothes, implies that migrants who are feeling trapped under tighter border management and surveillance decide for their families and act to condemn and annul the “fortress Europe” policy. This particular set of images contribute to the meaning-making of both migrants’ resistance and the justification of tighter border controls. Thus, the affordances of visuals and written language were configured in different ways so that they took on new meanings and communicate different frames.

In the narrative of “borders as lived experiences of/at the border,” migrants portrayed as a large, threatening mass constructed in the frame of “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security” are juxtaposed with the representation of a collective of organized individuals who use tactics of political resistance and collective action (both non-violent and violent) that are well known in liberal democratic polities. Yet, when enacted by foreign others outside the lines of the nation, the action is re-contextualized as criminal behavior. The aforementioned excerpts and visual representations showcased that by employing sit-ins, hunger strikes, and protests, migrants negotiate the meaning of borders. Borders, a spatial concept that signifies physical detention of unwanted others, at the same time have become space of collective action and hope that should be open for people who use global mobility to find shelter and better economic conditions. Therefore,
the borders became places of transformative practices and resilience. However, when resistance is performed within lived spaces in which European rules apply, politicized and collectively organized actions of migrants are not worthy of European hospitality and assistance.

**Appropriation of lived spaces: speaking for migrants.** Another salient narrative in this frame features European insiders speaking for migrants. This narrative is built upon photos, videos, and word choices of political leaders. Migrant stories, present in the lived experiences narrative, are underrepresented in comparison to the space given to official statements coming from political leaders. In contrast to the “lived experiences of/at the border” narrative, in this narrative politicians talk for and, instead, of migrants in an attempt to appropriate migrants’ lived experiences and take over the lived space migrants occupy and embody. By doing so, politicians are reclaiming borders and discursively marking them as the space that not only distinguishes the European territories from the outside space, but also as a space Europeans own and are in charge of. Additionally, the narratives that appropriate migrants’ lived experiences, especially coming from the politicians from peripheral EU countries and Serbia, assign a temporary character to the lived space because, according to them, migrants do not want to stay in these countries and, nevertheless, they are only passing through.

For instance, the Serbian prime minister, Aleksandar Vučić, said that migrants do not want to stay in Serbia: “We give them assistance and food... Despite that, they do not want to stay in our country,” Vučić said (*Večernje novosti*). Similar claims came from Croatian officials. Both *Jutarnji list* and *The Guardian* reported Croatian Prime Minister Zoran Milanović’s statement that Croatia is working intensively to enable migrants to
pass through Croatia. “Milanovic has said the country will allow the free passage of refugees across its territory ‘to where they apparently wish to go’” (The Guardian).

By speaking for migrants, Serbian and Croatian politicians create a narrative in which they negotiate the need to control and claim the space as their own. They simultaneously give migrants the right to participate in the process of claiming the space but the only acceptable choice given to them is to not stay there permanently. These narratives have a twofold role because politicians communicate contested narratives only to promote the opposite values. On the one side, they communicate the respect of the European values of openness and welcoming migrants, especially those labeled as refugees, while, on the other side, they tend to appeal to domestic audiences and reassure them that the nationally owned space and economic interests will be protected because migrants willingly choose to go elsewhere.

However, speaking for migrants can also be a useful tool for telling untold stories that migrants did not or were not able to share, and to do so without appropriating the lived space migrants created and negotiated. Besides sourcing politicians’ quotes, journalists also use quotes from nongovernmental representatives whose organizations help migrants. By selecting these sources, journalists still chose official and elite sources to talk about migrant experiences.

For example, Muntada Aid agency’s manager Mona Mahmood emailed the testimony to The Guardian to raise awareness of the ways Hungarian refugees treated Muslim migrants. After visiting the migrants on the Serbia-Hungary border, he shared migrant stories that they were “reportedly being offered pork by Hungarian authorities.” According to the source, after providing sandwiches that contain pork to Muslim refugees
who are prohibited from eating pork, the Hungarian police seemed not to care about Muslim dietary restrictions:

The next morning police again brought eight baskets of sandwiches, all containing pork salami. Again they were returned, and the police were asked not to bring pork. By the evening more sandwiches arrived also containing pork. When one of the volunteers complained a police officer said the refugees should just remove the pork and eat the bread. He said it felt as though the police were mocking them. This is shocking and offensive to Muslims. The authorities are aware the refugees were Muslim. But don’t seem to care (*The Guardian*).

The above excerpt provides an insight into the treatment of migrants at the EU external border in Hungary. At the same time, the narrative perpetuates the belief that all migrants were practicing Islam, and, again, creates a generic image of Muslim migrants that erases their diversity. Moreover, statements like this tend to support discourses of cultural difference that pose that migrants’ culture is not only different but also incompatible with European shared culture, heritage, and values. Thus, the use of the quotes of politicians, who tend to appropriate migrants’ experiences and take their voices away, is not much different than the use of other sources who, at first sight, seem to advocate for migrants. The sources selected for the reports also confirm the journalistic convention of relying on official and elite sources to preserve the credibility and validity of published information. In this case, the selection of official sources tends to reproduce xenophobia and Islamophobia. Furthermore, the coverage raises questions about the angles preferred by the sources quoted, the reasons reporters select these particular viewpoints, and the ideological positions perpetuated by such narratives.
**Lived spaces of the insiders.** Although less salient in coverage, a narrative that addressed how tighter border management disrupted the life of insiders, or citizens within European nation states, entered the discursive field. This narrative emerged within the frame of “borders as lived spaces” and was constructed primarily through texts and visuals of long lines of vehicles in front of border crossings. As migrant crossings and increased security halted the once-smooth traffic across borders, especially the in the borderless Schengen areas, traffic jams and hours-long delays disrupted everyday routines for local residents in border zones. Europeans, who did not need any travel documents to enter Germany or Austria, were facing long waits in lines and at passport checks at border crossing points that have been inactive for the last 20 years. At 10 crossing points, Austria’s police were stopping “vehicles selectively for checks of passports and other travel documents” (*The Guardian*). *Večernje novosti* ran the photo of long lines of cars and trucks in front of the official border crossing point between Serbia and Hungary, placing the photo immediately below the headline to signify the importance of the issue and the disrupted order.

In these visual narratives, Hungarians, Croats, Serbs, Germans, Slovenians, or Austrians who live in the border areas and who are directly affected by tighter border policies are not given voice in the reporting of how the fence or reinstated border controls affect their lives. Instead, in the selected articles analyzed, sources quoted transfer the problem of disrupted lives at the local level to national and EU levels, arguing that “the influx of migrants” compromises national and supranational law and order of the European Union. For instance, Istvan Pasztor, the leader of the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians—a party that represents the Hungarian minority in Serbia and is primarily
active in the northern Serbian province that borders with Hungary—did not see the fence causing any problem for the locals, and neither did he explicitly blame Hungary for the interrupted mobility of Hungarians across the border. Instead, he blamed migrants and stated that “the wall is a signal for the EU with the aim to urge the Union to find a solution for the migrant issue” (*Večernje novosti*).

Nonetheless, the multimodal ensemble identifies migrants as the main cause of the disrupted order in local sites. Similar to the *Večernje novosti* report, The Guardian published a photo of traffic congestion at the border while several migrant women and children, easily identifiable by their non-Western clothing, were sitting on the highway curb juxtaposing the cause and the effect of the increased number of migrants. In this narrative, visuals also carry the latent meaning of who is to blame for the disruption in the free movement of people, labor, and goods inside the Schengen Zone. These visuals are the dominant mode in the narrative of lived spaces of the European insiders, and they convey the idea of loss of comfort and mobility among Europeans due to increased migrant arrivals.

**The multimodal interplay in the frame “borders as lived spaces.”** To sum up, the narratives that build and support the frame “borders as lived spaces” reveal and contextualize migrants’ mobility and the hardships they face while on the migration journey. The multimodal interplay enables migrants to claim borders as lived spaces where they negotiate the fixed meanings of borders by contesting the meaning Europeans assign to the borderlines. In this frame, migrants voice and embody the multiple identities they bring into the EU space. However, the multiple modes used by reporters to identify ethnic, racial, religious, and gender cues serve to imply that migrants are culturally
distant and incompatible with Europeans. Moreover, this frame juxtaposes the representation of migrants through a humanitarian lens that emphasizes their hardship with the representation of migrants as violent “others. This split image ends up promoting the discourses of difference and fearmongering that shape and are shaped by the ideologies of xenophobia, Islamophobia, and racism. It is worth noting that these discourses of fearmongering and difference are accomplished through the appeal to European laws and values that underlie EU legislative and administrative decisions to keep migrants out of the European space.

The visual images in the frame “borders as lived spaces” operate on multiple levels and can contradict both the visual and written constructions of lived experiences. For instance, while photos from the Hungary-Serbia’s border published in *The Guardian* and *Magyar Hirlap* depict active but violent migrants who responded to the border closure and water-cannon violence exercised by Hungarian police, the majority of photos across *The Guardian*, *Večernje novosti*, *Jutranji list* and *Deutsche Welle* depict migrants as passive, idle and vulnerable masses. Additionally, while written texts with migrants’ personal accounts give migrants voices to share their personal migration stories, only a few photos published in *The Guardian* are medium shots in which readers see the faces and relate faces to the names of migrants provided in captions. In effect, a majority of photos across all five news outlets predominantly depict migrants as nameless and faceless masses—in a similar pattern identified within the frame of “borders as spaces for managing European and national security.”

This kind of visual representation constructs migrants and their experiences as generic. The erased individuality in the visuals homogenizes all migrants and their
different experiences, histories, personal stories, and identities, stripping them down to a broad signifier of the “arriving other.” Moreover, while the visual mode in the security frame represents migrants who are protesting the border closure constructing them as irrational and violent, photos of migrants in the narrative of borders as lived experiences are depict migrants both as violent others and as groups of migrants while walking, resting, and waiting at the borders. However, both sets of shots, to different extents, portray migrants as arriving threatening waves. Those shots are mainly taken from a distance, not allowing migrants’ facial expressions to be visible. These long-distance, wide shots other and dehumanize migrants and create social distance between them, as outsiders, and those who consider themselves insiders.

While the wide shots contribute to the creation of social difference, the contrast of the wide shots and the portrait photos of the EU and national member states’ leaders constructed a hierarchy with visually assigned power. This contrast dominates in the frames of “borders as lived experiences” and “borders as politically negotiated spaces.” Long-distance photos of faceless and nameless migrants, even though usually larger in size, carry negative meaning and communicate the minimal power that migrants hold. On the other hand, close-up shots and profiles of politicians, also present in all five news outlets, usually with the national and the EU flags in the background, imply a sense of order and stability and the higher status of politicians.

Although close-up shots of migrants are completely absent across all examined articles, the majority of medium and wide shots represent them as passive while resting or waiting in the border areas, train stations, and temporary refugee camps. The represented passivity and idleness simultaneously contradicts the representation of
migrants as a threatening mass, and complements the narratives that focus on the numbers of arriving others. Photos of migrants who sleep on the ground or wait at the border crossings carry cues of desperate people who are running away from the war zones. Their visualized passivity and powerlessness imply that they are stationary while European countries decide the direction and conditions of their mobility. Even the medium shot photos, in which migrants reveal their facial expressions to the camera, communicate their assumed and expected dependence on those who belong to the European space. The status of power and dependence is communicated through the frequent above-the-eye perspective from which the photos are taken. The above-the-eye perspective assigns more power to the viewers of the photos because they are looking down at migrants. This perspective positions migrants as powerless and as less worthy of acceptance.

The absence of captions in some photos in *Jutranji list, Večernje novosti* and *Magyar Hirlap* further contributes to the perception of migrants’ weakness and helplessness because the lack of captions strips photos of the appropriate context. For instance, some photos of migrants sitting on the road or in front of the barb-wired fence render them inactive and idle without explicating whether they were waiting for the approval to proceed and cross the border or actually participating in sit-ins and hunger strikes as a response to closed borders.

Visuals are also used as tools to communicate ethnic and religious othering. While men are mostly shown as younger able-bodied males in Western clothes, photos of women more frequently capture them wearing long robes and head scarfs covering their hair. The frequency of images of women with scarves and long-sleeved tops and dresses
in the summer time suggests the religious cues and presents migrants as exclusively Muslim. In addition to visual representations of women, the brown-bodied and dark-haired men were juxtaposed with fair-skinned and light-haired border guards both in Hungary and Croatia. The juxtaposition of fair-skinned and dark-skinned men was present both in the frame of “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security” and the frame of “borders as lived spaces.” While in the former frame, the visuals reinforced the written messages that communicated the idea of migrants as violent and different others, in the frame of lived experiences the skin contrast carried meaning of racial, religious, and cultural differences. Racial and cultural othering was featured in the written language mode to a minimal extent, but instead, the subtle cues of racial, religious, and cultural differences were manifested in visuals. The latent meanings of racial, ethnic, and religious signals evoked the perception of culturally different, foreign bodies that might present a threat to the national fair-skin bodies.

The migrants, therefore, embody ethnic and cultural differences that are mainly conveyed in visuals. Their bodies are equated with their biophysical presence and the visible ethnic and religion identities they carry. Maps seem to be of crucial importance in designating cultural, ethnic, and religious differences that migrants embody because maps are not only used to visualize the long journey migrants endured, but also to mark the distant places migrants are coming from. By designating geographically distant places like Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan, maps also signify the cultural remoteness and cultural difference migrants bring with them. Maps therefore, place migrants in the distant places they belong to, and they seem to be in tension with photos and videos that portray them
as faceless and homogenous masses. However, both modes serve the purpose of othering migrants as those who do not belong to the European space.

**Borders as Politically Negotiated Spaces**

The third dominant frame in the coverage, “borders as politically negotiated spaces,” emphasizes the political nature of border spaces. This frame is built by verbal and visual narratives in which EU-level and national-level politicians negotiate: (a) the definition of the problem in the so-called “migrants crisis,” (b) the cause of the problem, and (c) the possible and feasible solutions to the problem. Some of this frame’s narratives overlap with some of the narratives under the border security frame discussed above—for instance, tighter border management. However, rather than consensus on national and regional security, this framing of the border emphasizes the multiple disagreements among European countries as they call for re-thinking and re-defining the meaning of the European Union as well as its future. Therefore, in this frame, the spatial concept of borders is crucial for the discursive organization and distribution of the political and administrative power of both nation states and the EU. At the same time, negotiations over border space become crucial for the extension of political power into cultural power through the production and reproduction of notions of Europeanness.

The “borders as politically negotiated spaces” frame is built upon three dominant narratives that shift the meanings of borders from fixed territorial demarcations to the conceptualization that Parker et al. (2009, p. 583) called “the space of political itself.” The first narrative, labeled here “political border-making and border-negotiating practices” is elaborated through written text and visuals that convey the bureaucratic power behind cross-border porosity and mobility control. The second narrative, labeled
“mudslinging over border porosity,” addresses both the accusations five countries hurled at each other for poor border control and the disagreements between different national parties in regard to border policies. Lastly, the third narrative in this frame addresses the center-periphery relations in the European Union and the different ways that core and margin countries conceptualize governmental imaginaries of borders, EU, space and the meaning of European solidarity.

**Political border-making and -negotiating practices.** The visual mode is the dominant mode in this narrative, which features European politicians negotiating their border-making practices to highlight the political nature of space. Most prominent are the photos of politicians featured in all news outlets. These photos supplement the reports on political meetings, frequent live-blog updates, and incorporated tweets from the scene. The photos include images of politicians in their chambers—away from the nation’s physical borders—or of politicians in the border zones seeking photo opportunities to advance their interests. Therefore, in this narrative borders are politically constructed and deconstructed spaces where politicians exercise power and make decisions about borders without having to acknowledge the lived experience of and at those borders.

In this narrative, the photos of individual politicians communicate who holds the political power. Compared to the photos of migrants, photos of European politicians are predominantly portraits. They are mostly taken in the offices and often display both the EU flag and a national flag, particularly the Hungarian, Croatian, or German flag. The political leaders seem to personify the country they represent, with the display of flags symbolizing the sense of belonging to the nation-state and to the EU entity. The photos of national leaders such as Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel or Hungary’s Prime
Minister Viktor Orban significantly outnumber the photos of EU officials. Arguably, this emphasis suggests the idea that, since the EU did not come to a unanimous solution to the “migrant crisis,” the immigration problem and its resolution were being transferred to national levels of decision making.

Notably, the higher frequency of Merkel’s photos in the selected news articles, compared to lesser frequency of her statements, and the higher frequency of Orban’s quotes compared to his less prominent visual image, seem to relate to the unequal influence that each member state symbolically carries in EU decision making. A greater number of images establish and maintain Merkel’s political prominence and importance in Europe. In contrast, the imbalance between visuals and verbal narratives on behalf of Orban may symbolize the resistance of newer member states to comply with core states rules and connote the power that Eastern member states are exercising on the EU decision-making level. For instance, since Hungarian *Magyar Hirlap*’s edition in English targets predominantly foreign audiences, this news organization features almost exclusively the photos of Hungary’s politicians to suggest that country’s determination to use the fence to halt migrants’ mobility and “provide security for the whole of Europe.” The selection of politicians’ photos implies the increased political power Hungary has in the practices of border-making and border-negotiating. Those images also symbolize Hungary’s bureaucratic power to control cross-border mobility as relevant not only in Hungary’s national space but also to the overall EU space.

Aside from featuring top political leaders such as Merkel and Orban, news reports incorporated visuals and quotes of lower-level politicians who used the border to promote their personal agendas. For instance, Hungary’s former prime minister, Ferenc
Gyurcsany, used his presence in front of journalists at the external EU border with Serbia to criticize the policies of the current prime minister, which he called “shameful” (*The Guardian*). Similarly, the former British secretary of state for foreign affairs, David Miliband, raised concerns about the migrants’ treatment and promoted his position as the President of the International Rescue Committee (*The Guardian*). Comparably, *The Guardian* featured journalist James Mates’s tweet as a tool to feature the Serbian minister in charge of migration issues, Aleksandar Vulin, who visited the sealed border-crossing on the Hungary’s side in an effort to release the tensions at the border. Mates’ tweeted Vulin’s photo at the border accompanied by this text: “Serbian minister Aleksander Vulin at blocked Hungarian border. Says he’s asked Hungarians to open. They’ve refused.”

In the case of Serbia, a non-EU member state that does not directly participate in EU decision making, the politicians employ the photo-opportunity at the border to promote Serbia’s stance on the migration issue and tighter border management, insisting that as a non-EU member it cannot be treated as a “dumping ground for migrants” and left out of the EU plans for migrants’ relocation:

Serbia has warned that it will be unable to cope with being the “centre of arrivals” for refugees, including those sent back from Hungary and others flowing in from Greece and Macedonia. It urged the EU to come up with a coherent plan (*The Guardian*).

In a different story, in *Deutsche Welle*, a quote from Serbian prime minister Vučić puts forth the argument that “Serbia will not build walls, it will not isolate itself.”

These examples reveal that the Serbian political establishment does not necessarily focus on migrants and what will happen to them, but instead argues for its
interests in urging the EU to release more funds for Serbia—assigning itself the role of the EU’s loyal partner. In this way, Serbian officials also use borders as spaces for the production of the power they lack, as they do not officially belong to the EU space. By calling on European countries to show solidarity in solving the migration problem (as reported in *The Guardian* and *Večernje novosti*), they echo a main postulate of the EU. Thus, Serbia’s officials try to prove to the EU that Serbia accepts and promotes EU values and therefore belongs to the EU. This interplay of multiple modes—photos, written text, and videos embedded in tweets—conveys the idea that Serbia treats migrants as a temporary problem that can be used to bargain for convincing the EU that Serbia plays by the rules and engage in appropriate European behavior.

**Mudslinging over border porosity.** The “border as politically negotiated space” frame is also built upon narratives that emphasize political disputes over border management both on the national and the EU levels. Eastern EU members, and candidate countries such as Serbia, blame each other by shifting the responsibility for migrant arrivals to other neighboring states on the external EU borders. These countries also used border porosity to transfer migrants across borders and, therefore, forcefully engaged other countries to claim responsibility for them. For instance, Hungary not only sealed its borders crossings with Serbia, forcing migrants to go back to Serbia, but also engaged in a quick transfer of migrants to Austria by “shipping out as many refugees as possible” and creating “the bottleneck on Austrian border” (*The Guardian*). As an illustration, *Jutarnji list* reported that, according to the German media outlet *Bild*: “Hungary’s authorities emptied migrant facilities in Roszke and transferred migrants to the border
with Austria.” Similarly, as reported both in Jutranji list and The Guardian, Croatia was ready to pass migrants through to Slovenia.

Even though quotes from Croatian and Serbian politicians emphasized the willingness and success of their countries in dealing with the migrant situation, they, at the same time, blamed Hungary for its ineffective resolution of the problem. For example, The Guardian quoted Croatian Prime Minister Zoran Milanović’s argument that a barbed wire in Europe in the 21st century is not an answer to a problem, but a threat and a “terrible message.” In criticism of Hungary, he said: “These people are here….They do not want to come to Croatia or Hungary either and that is why I do not understand where is the problem of letting them passing through that country (The Guardian).”

Serbian minister Vulin claimed no responsibility for migrants who left Serbia and entered Hungary. “They are on Hungarian territory, and I expect the Hungarian state to behave accordingly towards them,” said Vulin for The Guardian. On the other side, Hungary blamed Serbia for border porosity. Večernje novosti quoted Viktor Orban: “It is not fair that Serbia directs refugees towards Hungary. Refugees have to be stopped in Serbia.”

The central argument for moving migrants to other countries and blaming others for ineffective border management emphasizes the position that the countries on the EU periphery make about their non-involvement in events that that made migrants flee their home countries. For instance, Vučić, Serbia’s prime minister, expressed his “shock and surprise” by Hungary’s decision to erect a wall on the borders, “especially because Serbia is not at fault for the current crisis,” and called for an effective resolution on the EU level (Večernje novosti).
The blame game was not only restricted to the countries on the periphery of the EU. In this narrative, nation states are assigned human characteristics, which enable them to be perceived as subjects who keep blaming each other for the ineffective strategies to deal with migrants. For instance, Hungary blamed Germany’s decision to “open borders to unregistered refugees” (*The Guardian*). Hungary’s Viktor Orban extended the guilt to all EU members, blaming them for failing to strictly apply the Dublin system rules and send back migrants to their first country of entry. “If everyone did so, there wouldn’t be so many migrants arriving to Hungary,” Orban told *Magyar Hirlap*.

The blame game among the countries positioned on the southern EU external borders prompted Europe-wide accusations made on multiple levels, including by member states’ governments and different national political parties. *The Guardian* reported that the Czech Republic joined Hungary in blaming Germany “for the migration crisis in the latest round of mudslinging.” *The Guardian* included a tweet from the Czech interior minister Milan Chovanec in his native Czech, accompanied with a translation to English: “In a Twitter post Czech interior minister Milan Chovanec said: ‘The current biggest problem of solving migration is an inconsistent policy of Germany. And showing muscles to the neighbors across the border won’t conceal it.’”

The exchange of insults and accusations took place also within the internal political scene of EU member states. The news discourse on blaming incorporated contradictory opinions about the solution to the migrant crisis within national political parties. For instance, political parties in Germany, including Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, disagreed with her “open door” policy and forced Merkel to re-introduce border controls:
Politico Europe recons Merkel was forced to partially reverse her government’s welcoming response to refugees after opposition from local governments. The chancellor faced intense pressure from state and local officials expected to house and feed the growing wave of asylum seekers heading to the country. Their message to the German leader: genug, enough. In many cases local governments have proved unable to cope with the large numbers. ‘The mood is changing, and fast,’ said a senior official from Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union. At a meeting of the party’s executive committee on Monday, state and local representatives made it clear they were overwhelmed by the masses. ‘Every mayor likes to be a good German, as long as the refugees are not put into his gym,’ the source said (The Guardian).

In the excerpt above, The Guardian quoted Politico’s report on CDU’s internal disagreement with Merkel’s welcoming policy. Politico, as The Guardian reported, quoted an anonymous source who claimed that local CDU representatives opposed Merkel’s “open door,” policy arguing that they could not handle large numbers of arriving refugees. Therefore, as The Guardian reported, Merkel had to calm the spirits and re-introduce border controls. According to the anonymous source, it was easier for local authorities to support their leader’s decision in the situation when they did not have to provide facilities, including school gyms, to host migrants until their status was officially solved.

In addition to Germany’s politicians and political parties that could not reach common ground on the best approach to deal with the increasing numbers of migrants, even political parties in the UK, a country not directly affected by migrants’ mobility
across the external southern EU border, were lacking consensus about the role the country claims in the process of accepting migrants. *The Guardian* reported:

 Claire Baker, Scottish Labour’s democracy spokeswoman, echoed his [Humza Yousaf, the Scottish minister for Europe] complaint that the 20,000 person ceiling and five-year time scale set by David Cameron, the prime minister, was unacceptably low and ungenerous. There were 3,000 unaccompanied children caught in the wave of refugees now in Europe. “On the refugee crisis the UK government has been reacting rather than leading. It is therefore important that we, as a parliament, should not stop applying pressure on Downing Street,” Baker said.

 As the examples above suggest, individual European countries not only could not reach agreement about border management and migration policy, but the EU member states’ political parties and their members were divided about the same issues. Paradoxically, the narrative of placing blame on the others revealed a desired diversity of voices that is deemed to strengthen the Union’s prosperity and democratizing influence on the global level (Fontaine, 2014). The narrative of open disagreements and accusations, especially between the countries on the EU periphery, is complementary to and overlaps with the third narrative in this frame, which emphasizes the division between EU core states and new member states.

 **Core-states vs. new member states.** In this narrative, which underscores center-periphery differences, written language is the dominant mode. This narrative is supported by word choice and catchphrases, such as “sharing the burden,” and “European solidarity,” and by quotes. The written language, in this narrative especially, construct the
blame that Western EU countries, or the core EU countries, place on the newer members – that is, the former communist countries situated on the Eastern EU periphery.

In the news narrative of all media outlets, the blame for the current crisis and the simultaneous call for “European solidarity”—which became a prominent catchphrase across news articles—arose around the suggested proposal of quotas and relocation of migrants. According to the proposed “quota system,” each EU country, depending on their economic strength and population, would receive a certain number of refugees. While the core EU countries, led by Germany, argued that the quota system would disperse the burden of migrants, as frequently coined in the news, across the EU and, therefore, represent a joint solution to the migrant issue, the former Eastern bloc—Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, which joined the Union during the EU enlargement in 2000—rejected the compulsory fixed-quota scheme arguing that quota system affects their homogenized societies and puts countries at risk of Islamist terrorism (“Europe migrant crisis: EU court rejects quota,” 2017. However, these countries opposed the suggested solution while still demanding a joint EU resolution of the problem.

In this narrative, the core countries were critiquing Hungary and other newer members for resisting the quota system and, therefore, for not participating in sharing the burden in the current situation. In this regard, Austria’s Chancellor Werner Faymann said, referring to Hungary: “You can’t just stick your head in the sand.” Faymann also critiqued the countries that opposed the proposed “quota system” and complained that “some countries were passing the buck to others (The Guardian).” Additionally, Germany “called for greater European co-operation and an end to the blame game.” At a
news conference, Germany’s Angela Merkel reminded the EU countries of the importance of solidarity: “We cannot manage this challenge by looking at someone else and telling them, ‘you’ve made this mistake’… We can manage to solve it [the migrant crisis] and we will but only on a common level” (*The Guardian*).

The former communist countries of the Visegrad Four – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – “welcomed the fall of the quota system” (*Magyar Hirlap*). This group of Central European countries, led by Hungary’s officials, has the goal of working in a “number of fields of common interest within the all-European integration” (“About the Visegrad Group,” 2019). As reported in *Magyar Hirlap*, “the Visegrad Four have lobbied successfully against the introduction of compulsory migrant quotas in the European Union,” adding that the Hungarian government spokesperson, Zoltan Kovacs, emphasized the unity in the rejection. “The V4 countries were united in their rejection of the compulsory quota,” Kovacs said, while the president of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Zsolt Nemeth, emphasized that “the principle of solidarity triumphed” (*Magyar Hirlap*).

These excerpts communicate both the re-distribution of political power within the EU and the re-conceptualization of the European value of solidarity. In support for the partial re-distribution of political power from the core countries to the new Eastern member states, a Hungarian member of the parliament, Gyorgy Schopflin, said “the silent majority” of Europeans did not welcome more refugees despite the visible welcome made by many members of the public (*The Guardian*). This quote points out that the Eastern member states, which previously had to prove that they belong to the EU family, now create a less visible, yet powerful enough group to reject the core countries’ proposal.
The partial shift of power is supported by a re-definition of the value of solidarity. In the EU, solidarity is conceptualized as partnership and cooperation between wealthier and poorer member states (van Houtum, 2002). This has conventionally been defined as the value of finding common interests and equality between countries with a single voice to maintain and strengthen economic and social unity while respecting cultural diversity of individual member states (Fontaine, 2014). In the case of the former Eastern Bloc member states, such definition is re-conceptualized by assigning a new meaning to solidarity as a consensus among some of the peripheral member states that will account for protecting the interests of only those states based on their disadvantages position when compared with core states. Moreover, the re-interpretation of the term “solidarity,” combined with the partial shift in power suggests that the new member states, once observed and tested by core member states to confirm their belonging to Europe, gained the right to equally participate in the “single EU voice” and decide the EU future. This framing implies that the unity or camaraderie of the Eastern states is seen as their empowerment to claim their European status and oppose the countries that were challenging their Europeanness before the EU enlargement.

**Multimodal interplay in the frame “borders as politically negotiated spaces.”**
To summarize this framing pattern, the “borders as politically constructed spaces” frames spatiality as a political and social construct. This frame is bound in historical, political, and economic contexts and discursively constructs borders as contested spaces both on national and supranational levels. The frame proposes the idea that EU member countries are incapable of making a joint decision in a crisis situation and lack the political ability to apply Europeanness-based values of solidarity and liberal consensus under the
leadership of Western Europe in decision making processes. However, the incapability to make a joint decision is in tension with the discursive efforts across all five countries to stop migrants and control migration and mobility. Therefore, the overall acceptance of the individual nation-states’ efforts that challenge and negate European values of tolerance, and the respect of human rights, seem to be featured over criticism of disrespecting these values. Additionally, as the findings of this study imply any individual efforts are welcomed as moves that work for the protection of the whole European space.

This frame also suggests the re-distribution of power within the EU political space, followed by the re-conceptualization of European solidarity by political actors in Eastern Europe. It also calls for a re-definition of the EU in terms of its future expansion and its joint stance regarding outside crisis and possible implementation of new rules. The shift of power as constructed in news discourse refers not only to certain nation states, but also to the overall shift of power from the EU level to the nation states in crisis situations; this shift calls for the recognition of the importance of the national space in the reconfiguration of political power by weakening the supranational unity of the EU and strengthening national sovereignties.

**Discussion and Conclusion: Nuances in News Frames and the Distribution of Multiple Modes**

The three frames discussed in this chapter were present in the discourse of all five media outlets analyzed. Even though the news organizations and articles are situated in different historical, political, and cultural contexts of five nation-states, the overarching clusters of meanings position borders as material and symbolic obstacles needed for the
protection of the European space. Despite contextual differences, the news discourse shows significant consistencies. In terms of framing patterns, the most dominant frame, “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security” was the most prominent across all five outlets—in terms of frequency and saliency. Similarly, as Cvetkovic and Pantic (2018) found in their study of live blogs, by emphasizing the number of migrants arriving in European nations and creating a sense of an “overwhelming crisis” Europeans are facing, all five outlets framed borders as a necessity for the protection of both the national and EU spaces. All outlets legitimized the need for tighter border management, control of mobility of migrant bodies, and their surveillance. The mobilized narratives of the clear distinction between the national and the EU space and the “others” who were invading that space traced a clear demarcation between those who belong to the European space and the “others” who are excluded from that space. The “borders as spaces for managing national and EU security” frame constructs “fortress Europe” as space of exclusion where European identity is constituted, maintained, and negotiated.

At the same time, verbal and visual representations of the “borders as lived spaces” frame—while opening space for migrants’ stories of hardship—construct racial and religious identities of migrants in ways that serve to differentiate them from Europeans. Those verbal and visual narrative representations of others—supported by the representation of migrants as picky, needy, violent, and irrational—contribute to the creation of fear, xenophobic attitudes, and moral panic. Therefore, alongside the frame of “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security,” the framing of “borders as lived spaces” intensifies the notion of border crossings as a problem for Europe and reinforces the “us” versus “them” ideology. These acts of material and symbolic
demarcation provide nuanced and complex constructions of inclusion in and exclusion from the EU space as benchmarks for current and future understandings of Europe.

Contextual differences and target audiences also contribute to variation in the emphasis placed on narratives of internal division among European actors within the three frames. For instance, the three countries are positioned on the EU periphery, and thus, Serbia’s, Croatia’s, and Hungary’s news outlets (*Večernje novosti*, *Jutarnji list*, and *Magyar Hirlap*) focused more on neighborly animosity over border management and porosity than did Germany’s *Deutsche Welle*. On the other hand, Britain’s *The Guardian* and Germany’s *Deutsche Welle* focused more on the need for European solidarity and the call for sharing the burden among the EU member states. The “borders as politically negotiated space” frame focused also on the mudslinging among and different understandings of solidarity in core and periphery member states. Thus, this frame created meanings of Europe as a two-tier system of membership—the core countries and the new peripheral members who have to accept European values and norms as prescribed by core countries. This frame also promoted a political dimension of space and the contestation of political power within the EU space.

Across the three frames, border narratives operate discursively through multiple modes, including language, video clips, audio, photographs, Twitter posts, maps, graphs, and computer-generated visualizations. This type of multimodal production, particularly the juxtaposition of linguistic and visual texts, contributed to the creation of complex discursive strategies and negotiation of contested values and attitudes, such as the tension between European openness, fair treatment, and inclusion of migrants versus a nationalistic-level desire to protect the nation and its economic interests. Moreover, it is
important to note that visuals and social media posts, individually and combined with written text, did create contesting narratives that included diverse voices and the critique of the fence erection and the treatment of migrants. Those contesting narratives were mobilized within all frames, but were the most prominent in *The Guardian*. Additionally, *The Guardian* provided more space to migrants’ voices than did the other four outlets. However, the explanation for this practice might be found in the fact that a larger number of news articles from The Guardian was generated in the data-selection process.

It is also worth noticing that all five news organizations, regardless of their liberal or conservative leaning, supported the ideological mobilization of discourses reinforcing notions of otherness that promote xenophobic opinion. In general, modes complement each other as single modes or are intertwined in a multimodal interplay of meanings, as in the case of the written references to migrants as a flood and the visual representation of migrant mobility as an uncontrollable massive flow at the border-crossings. The different modes with their specific emphases reinforce a set of common meanings suggested in each of the three frames of borders. Together, the modes contribute to the ominous representation of othered migrants and justify the intensified border protection.

Some salient differences between modes were also observed. For instance, visual modes, such as photographs and video clips, more often communicated racial, gendered, and religious otherness while those appeals were not overtly present in a linguistic mode. Moreover, visuals enriched the contextual information that constructed migrants as spatial and cultural outsiders and offered justifications for fortification and securitization of European space. In this sense, as argued in my methodology chapter, multimodality as an approach to frame analysis enriches the understanding of the framing process by
expanding the critique of the repertoire of images that enable fluidity and multiplicity of meanings.

The interplay of modes—as in the ways in which verbal and multimedia Twitter posts provide diversity of sources and introduce the criticism of European xenophobia and migrant treatment—enables the critique of the conceptualization of a frame as a binary between the two opposite descriptions of an issue. This analysis supports the sociology-based approach to framing by showing how the multimodal text creates multi-dimensional meanings of borders within the same frame. The overall contribution of the multimodal approach to framing is the identification of nuanced and fluid meanings that different modes create interdependently, especially the new meanings constructed through the ensemble of multiple modes and their different configurations.

Multimodal discourses also create meanings through other meaning-making domains: design, production, and distribution (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001). For instance, the arrangement of photos, embedded tweets, video, audio clips, and maps in combination with written text, sometimes in bold letters or color-blocked, produces a dynamism that both attracts and challenges the readers’ attention. In this case, even though a majority of photos seems to convey the passivity and powerlessness of migrants facing the control of European security forces, the arrangement of those visual modes, with their implicit racial, ethnic, and religious cues suggests that the public needs to be not only involved but also alert. Alertness is aligned with fearmongering narratives and reproduces ideologies of xenophobia, racism, and Islamophobia.

As discussed earlier, at the level of design, multimodality—especially in live-blogs—has the potential of shifting authority. While written news reports exclusively
carry the authority of the author, live-blogs as a multimodal format have the potential to transfer authority of production to everybody who contributes to the content, particularly ordinary citizens who use social media and produce their own opinion and visual content. However, as shown here by the analysis of the selected packages, as well as by the findings of a study on framing borders in live-blogs (Cvetkovic & Pantic, 2018), this is illusory because live-blogging journalists relied heavily on the conventional routine of quoting official sources rather than migrants or ordinary citizens’ tweets, photos, and video clips.

This suggests how the design process is both active and constrained by journalistic norms and routines. It is active because it allows journalists to create online news while employing multiple modes and frequent updates. However, those choices are constrained by journalistic norms and technological restrictions. For example, while journalists use multiple photos, the size of the photos is still restricted to two options that fit the pre-designed webpage. Also, journalists have been exposed to a large pool of online sources, but are still restricted by the journalistic norm of verification. Thus, journalists mainly rely on known and verifiable sources, confirming the findings of framing practices in live-blogs (Cvetkovic & Pantic, 2018). The results of the present analysis reveal that the vast majority of quoted material came from institutional sources. However, the input of such institutional sources was less restrained when quotes were sourced and embedded in Twitter posts. In such cases, the same traditional rules of attribution and quotations styles did not apply. Instead, the rules of social media posts took over.
Lastly, this analysis highlights how technology affects meaning construction in the production process (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001). Online news, overall, and especially live-blogs as a new news format, embrace the logic of the screen and employ Twitter widgets, photo slides, and visual arrangements that allow readers to choose whether they will engage in further reading of multimodal texts by clicking on the next page, a video-clip “play” button, a slideshow option, an interactive map, or a hyperlink. For instance, in the discourse analysis we cannot determine to what extent readers read the whole article, click on the next page or engage in watching video or listening to an audio clip. Compared to the age of traditional newspapers, when readers were exposed only to the verbal mode, and photographs, and maps, the advent of digital technology in journalism affected meaning construction by allowing embedded tweets and using tweets as sources of photos and videos. Those visuals carry the affordance of immediacy, they are unedited, with angles or shots, such as facing the floor or the feet, that would never be available to the public in traditional newspapers. The visuals, even though often they do not meet the standards of the profession, are used to immediately convey information about the event development. Also, the present analysis was conducted on a 15-inch screen, but readers have options to access the same news packaged on apps on smart phones and tablets. The smaller screen then would dictate the arrangement and accessibility of different elements. Thus, the technology affects the discourse by affecting the different design of the page, compared to that of traditional newspapers, as well as the ability to feature multiple multimedia formats in the same news package, thus allowing for the verbal, visual, and audio modes to act together and complement or contradict certain meanings.
In the next chapter, Chapter 5, I will address such interactions by focusing on how readers participated in the co-construction of meaning to support the three dominant frames created by journalists: “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security,” “borders as lived spaces,” and “borders as politically negotiated spaces.” I also discuss how readers expand and complicated the discursive repertoire through online dialogue with reporters, news sources—both official sources and migrants—and other readers. The ideological implications of these co-constructed framing patterns will be discussed in Chapter 6.
Chapter 5

Readers’ Co-construction of News Frames of Borders

This chapter answers the question about the frames of EU borders constructed in readers’ comments and discusses how readers’ framing relates to the frames constructed by professional journalists, as shown in Chapter 4, in the process of co-constructing public discourse. The upcoming chapter 6 will address the ideological implications of these co-constructed framing patterns, while the last chapter, Chapter 7, will provide an overall conclusion of the findings, address the limitations of the study, and suggest directions for the future research.

Readers’ participation in news production is warranted by the interactive features of the online media environment that enable readers to actively engage in the interpretation and (re)framing of news. In this analysis I will address the comments provided by readers on six news articles that featured interactivity with readers; three packages (out of eight) were published by The Guardian and three by Večernje novosti. The other news outlets analyzed, Magyar Hirlap, Deutsche Welle, and partially The Guardian (in five news packages) did not allow readers to post comments. Jutranji list did allow posting comments but none comments were still visible under the selected articles at the time I conducted my analysis.

The multimodal analysis reveals that readers, even with limited participatory engagement, interpreted borders in ways that were similarly to those of journalists, and that they co-constructed the three dominant journalistic frames discussed in Chapter 4: “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security,” “borders as lived spaces,” and “borders as politically negotiated spaces.” While co-participating in the news framing
of borders, readers supported the news narratives of journalists discussed earlier and also offered complementary and even challenging narratives built upon different word choices, lexical expressions, and arguments. In this chapter, I will discuss how readers’ comments relate to each of the frames, highlighting how their narratives support and, at times, challenge the journalistic frames.

The overall readers’ contribution to the discourse is accomplished through: (a) comments that address the news narratives of journalists, (b) comments that debate the ideas posed by sources quoted in news articles, coming from both official sources and migrants, and (c) comments in response to other readers’ posts in threads. By doing so, readers enriched the frames by providing different arguments, paying attention to the broader historical and social contexts that influenced tighter border management, and by contesting some of the news narratives within the same frame.

While readers did not use the visual and audio mode, they did apply a more conversational tone in the written mode, complemented with specific abbreviations, typos, and use of punctuation to mimic spoken language, and supported by hyperlinks to other media or EU documents. Compared to the journalistic practices, readers more frequently used pejorative expressions when referring to migrants, and they utilized punctuation and letter capitalization to convey sarcasm, contempt, criticism, and hostility as lexical expressions of affect that were confined solely to the written form. In this sense, readers’ comments are considered here as one of the elements, and a part of the written language mode, that contribute new meanings in the multimodal ensemble.

The main arguments in this chapter are that while news frames in the selected media outlets resonated with readers, readers used the online environment and its
participatory component actively to provide multiple voices and opinions, to challenge journalists’ choices of sourced quotes, and to debate about the extent to which the information reported by journalists should be explained, supported by different arguments or contextualized. Furthermore, I will elaborate on how, even though controlled and limited, participation of readers in the public discourse supports the perpetuation of ideologies of racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia that shape and are shaped by the institutionalized media discourses.

**Borders as Spaces for Managing EU and National Security – Framing in Readers’ Comments**

Readers framed “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security” through three dominant narratives: the narrative of justification of tougher border management, the narrative that othered the (un)desirable migrants, and a narrative of debate on support or disapproval of the policy of constructing the fence. All three narratives were present in the discourse of audience members who participated in comments section, and all three narratives constructed the spatial concept of borders as a means of providing, maintaining, and symbolizing the security of the European space. All three narratives also complemented each other and were intertwined, and each of them was constructed through multiple voices that supported or challenged each other—a multivocality that the journalistic narratives overall were lacking.

**Justification for tougher border management.** Readers co-constructed the frame of “borders as spaces for managing national and EU security” through narratives about building fences and tighter border controls. Echoing journalists, readers crafted metaphors of arrivals, amplified by the number of migrants and linguistic constructions
of migrants’ arrivals as a problem and crisis. Thus they justified the need to erect the fence on the EU’s southern external border. For example, to describe migrants’ arrivals, readers used metaphors like “hordes of migrants,” “tides of people,” or “swamps of people.” Compared to the journalists’ word choices—such as “waves of migrants” or “the influx of migrants”—readers used pejorative terms with derogatory meanings as for instance, calling them fake refugees, to downgrade migrants. Readers constructed the very act of arrival as the “overrunning” of Europe, implying that borders are necessary tactics to keep Europe and Europeans safe.

With a similar approach to that of journalists, readers constructed arriving migrants as a problem and a disaster. This is evident in the following example: “It’s a disaster because there are — literally—millions more who also want to come” (The Guardian).

While the terms “migrants,” “refugees,” and “asylum seekers” were frequently used as synonyms in the news articles, readers tended to focus on clarification when it came to the practice of naming. Readers would correct each other in the comments thread about whether migrants are “refugees” or “economic” and “illegal immigrants.” It seems that while journalists used the terms “migrants,” “refugees,” and “asylum seekers” interchangeably, readers assigned equivalent meaning to “economic migrants” and “illegal migrants” in both The Guardian and Večernje novosti. For instance, supporting the claim that arriving migrants were illegal migrants, and not refugees, a reader posted:

If they are refugees, then they will stop as soon as they get a refuge. Which would be Turkey for those fleeing Syria. Once they leave Turkey, they become illegal
immigrants. Unless they go through the legal procedures for immigration first. None of them seems to be doing so. *(The Guardian)*

Readers also went a step further and assigned the trait of “illegality” to the migrants’ choice not to claim refuge in the first country they entered after fleeing their home county. A reader commented: “Illegal immigrants. If they were GENUINE refugees, they would have claimed asylum in Turkey, which is a safe country. The fact that they have moved on from there makes them illegal immigrants” *(The Guardian)*. Another reader contributed to the thread by claiming that migrants who were arriving in Europe should not be considered as refugees: “Economic migrants otherwise they would stay in the nearest country” *(The Guardian)*.

In the above examples, it is evident that the term “economic migrant” was assigned a negative meaning and criminalized the act of leaving one’s country of origin in pursuit of better economic conditions. Both terms – “economic migrant” and “illegal migrant”—labeled migrants with a disparaging meaning and expressed hostility on behalf of European insiders. Taking into consideration that threatening and extremely offensive speech, including hate speech, is not allowed in the comments of either *The Guardian* or *Večernje novosti*, arguably the negative connotation readers assigned to the terms of “illegal migrants” and “economic migrants” transformed those terms into slurs.

The complexity of naming migrants is also present in contesting narratives of audience members who disagreed with the assumption that agency in mobility and settlement should be classified as legal or illegal:

Semantics over refugee etc is beside the point…what are we thinking… that these people are walking all the way when they really don’t need to? That they are
doing it for housing benefit… come on guys, let’s just have a think about it… (*The Guardian*).

Similarly, a reader expressed the opinion that a semantic difference between migrants and refugees is irrelevant and that instead of discussing different naming practices, European countries have to focus on the solution: “Trying to draw a line between those who deserve and those who don’t seems like pointless Victorian bureaucracy – it just fogs the issue and probably stops countries creatively addressing the issue” (*The Guardian*).

Another reader explained that naming is appropriate only after migrants’ statuses have been already established, implying that Europeans should decide who is a refugee and who is not: “Well, are they refugees, migrants…I try to use the word ‘people’ from now on because you don’t know until you processed their application” (*The Guardian*).

The above excerpts revealed that, compared to journalistic multimodal narratives that implied that some migrants’ traits—such as religion, age, or able-bodied-ness—made migrants less desirable, readers overtly distinguished among more or less desirable migrants based on the choices migrants made about their mobility. However, in the case of *Večernje novosti*, the distinction in naming was less obvious. *Novosti*’s readers used the terms “migrant,” “refugees,” and “asylum seekers” interchangeably. At the same time, those terms carried both positive and negative meaning depending on whether readers perceived migrants as a threat to European security or as people in need.

**Securing the borders from (un)desirable others.** In readers’ comments, naming and categorizing migrants expanded the journalistic narrative into a more nuanced discussion about migrants’ traits—such as religion, economic status, age, and able-bodied features—that made them less desirable for European countries. In the narrative,
explicitly supported by word choice, the narrow and derogatory categorization of
migrants as Muslims, criminals, disease carriers, or terrorists positioned them as others
and as a multiple-level threat to the national and EU space. While journalists used visuals
to imply that migrants were racially, ethnically, and religiously different, readers
predominantly placed migrants in certain groups, such as Muslims, criminals, disease
carriers, or terrorists, mostly the ones Europeans are less comfortable with, to specifically
mark migrants as a threat. Therefore, this narrative incorporated narrow categorizations
of migrants as a threat to rationalize border fortification as a way to protect national and
the EU space from culturally, religiously, and racially different others.

In these narratives readers much overtly expanded the journalistic visual
representation of migrants as unwanted others – as religiously and racially different. By
doing so, readers often used pejorative expressions and paired religious differences with
criminalization of migrants. However, in this case, criminalization of migrants was not
related to the illegal border crossing but was instead constructed as felony, misdemeanor,
or petty larceny committed while migrants travelled or were briefly situated in some
regions. The criminal behavior, often just assumed and not witnessed, called for tighter
border management as a means of both precaution and protection.

For instance, a Večernje novosti reader supported the fence, arguing that Serbia,
as well, should build a wall on its borders because borders should be the means of
protection from the poor migrants who steal from the insiders: “Without migrants we
already have enough problems and poverty. We do not need thousands of hungry people
who we will feed and assist, and tomorrow they will attack us and steal from us. WE
NEED THE FENCE.” In this example, letter capitalization is used to express frustration
at migrants’ behavior and, therefore, support of the fence as a deterrent against the growing threat. The capital letters are used as a lexical expression of affect, particularly the feeling of contempt toward migrants and their criminal behavior.

Another reader shared his personal experience of migrants’ wrongdoing with an attempt to generalize to all migrants and all conditions migrants are in:

I am from the border town of Subotica. Because of the illegal immigrants and how many of them are on every corner, very soon we will not be able to leave our houses. What will happen when their money runs out? They will attack us on the streets as mad dogs. I am a truck driver who drives on a variety of European routes. They [migrants] overrun Europe. The worst situation is in France around the city of Calais where their encampment is. They attack the truck drivers, steal whatever they can, forcibly enter into the trailers (Večernje novosti).

Similarly, another reader equalized migrants with thieves and criminals even though the reader’s negative opinion about migrants is based only on assumptions and taken-for-granted societal beliefs that unwanted others always cause trouble:

In my understanding Hungary is erecting a fence for itself, not against Serbia. I understand the reasoning for this move, when a man is not invited and illegally enters a house, that man is treated as a thief and a criminal no matter what his intentions were. It is well known that the insiders will have to pay for the damage that the outsiders will cause (Večerenje novosti).

Furthermore, some readers grounded their support for the tighter border management on the assumptions that migrants are destructive masses prone to conflict, whereas other readers went a step further by arguing that migrants are terrorists. For
instance, in the following example, a reader referred to details from other news articles when arguing that migrants are violent toward their children:

The disaster for Europe is the fact that they are letting thousands upon thousands of the sort of young men massing at the Hungarian border into Europe. Fighting, hurling missiles, using their children as weapons. This is not a group of desperate people, this is an invasion of violent, aggressive young men who will stop at nothing to get their own way. (*The Guardian*)

Another reader followed up by blaming migrants for violence at the border without addressing the fact that migrants reacted to the water cannons fired by the Hungarian riot police:

It was stupid and irresponsible of those illegal immigrants to attack the border and border guards, as well as starting fires and throwing rocks at the Hungary police. Furthermore, it was totally irresponsible for these illegals to use their children and babies as shield. SHAME on those parents. NOW the world can see what these illegal immigrants will do when they don’t get their way in the EU (*The Guardian*).

Moreover, readers identified young migrants as especially undesirable on European soil. Young and able-bodied migrants were constructed as a direct and immediate threat against the European order and values. For instance, pointing out to the age of migrants, a reader wrote, “We should let people sort out their own problems. Send aid but leave them to it. So all those young men fleeing to Europe should be staying and fighting for their country (*The Guardian*).” Another reader asked, “Can we rely on all those young men coming over to help us fight their war or are we expected to offer own
our young men’s lives to do it for them?” In this post the reader implied resentment over
the presence of European soldiers in conflict zones by questioning whether young
migrant men should stay and fight for their own countries.

The need for control and order was promoted as a European value and an
important goal no matter whether readers come from the European space inside or
outside of the fence. For instance, a reader utilized irony to make a point that those who
disrespect European laws are not wanted, saying: “Ooh people prepared to go at any
lengths to break our laws – they are just the very sort of people we really want in Europe
(The Guardian).” Other readers who reside in European countries felt the need to protect
the European perception of democracy, freedom, and liberalism. For instance, a post said:

Europe will never be the same when in time of peace hordes of people invade and
make demands. What is happening now is great travesty of freedom, peace of
European countries by people who themselves did not make effort to achieve in
their homelands what European countries achieved. (The Guardian)

Appeals to the necessity of protection, control, and order were intensified by the
othering of migrants as terrorists. A Večerenje novosti reader wrote, “We [Serbians]
should do the same [erect a fence], having a million people wandering the streets is a
very serious issue! When uncontrolled, people who are coming represent a danger of
importing many terrorists as well as diseases.” Another reader made an explicit analogy
between terrorism and Islam: “Hungary’s decision is normal and it is not directed against
Serbia but to protect the border from the unbelievable flooding of the future jihad
soldiers” (Večerenje novosti).
The above examples show that readers, no matter whether they came from the EU member states or from Serbia, tended to categorize migrants as criminals, terrorists, and disease carriers. They did so also by making intertextual connections with other news articles from a variety of media organizations, by employing words that carry disparaging meanings, and by utilizing different punctuation styles and letter capitalization to convey criticism, contempt, and disapproval of migrant behavior. These examples also revealed that readers based their opinions on pre-existing, taken-for-granted beliefs about outsiders to interpret breaking news about migrant arrivals. Such beliefs found support in the news narratives of media. These taken for granted beliefs shaped the way readers understand space and reproduced the “us versus them” ideology. Furthermore, while racial, ethnic, religious, and age-related cues were featured almost exclusively in the news articles visuals, some readers verbalized those cues and employed group labeling to construct migrants as undesired others. The perception of the arrival of others, who are racially and culturally different, constructs and reconstructs Europe as an exclusive space composed of those who share the same values, history, and tradition.

Religion and race, for example, play a significant role in constructing migrants as others who are invading a predominantly Christian space that does not belong to them. For instance, narratives about migrants coming from Africa and the Middle East seem to arrange migrants in a hierarchy, ranking brown-bodied Middle Easterners as more desirable than dark-skinned Africans. A reader implied that particular geographical spaces are exclusive for certain races: “Zero of the refugees are Libyan – those coming through Libya are from Sub Saharan Africa. Hint: Libyans are not black” (The Guardian). However, readers also constructed Muslim migrants as the gravest threat to
European values and, therefore, as the least desirable. This example also shows how readers make migrant’s identities limited and fixed by combining race and religion into a static identity.

For instance, a reader identified Muslim migrants as follows: “Unfortunately, when lots of Muslims get together the outcome – and I’d say even for most Muslims as well – but definitely non Muslims is not good at all” (The Guardian). Similarly, a Večernje novosti reader expressed belief that Muslims are a problem in Europe and the global world to the extent that the wall is not a solution to keep them out:

Muslims run away from Muslims. Europe is still safe and protected from inter-Muslim wars. However, many second and third generation of Muslim immigrants, who Europeans believe to be fully integrated, participate in the Muslim wars outside of Europe. And they are among the cruelest fighters. The problem is very complex and therefore, a wall is not a solution to keep Europe safe.

The construction of negative images of the out-groups by making a strong relation between Islam and violence, and the simultaneous construction of the in-groups in this particular context, recontextualizes Said’s (1979) idea of the constructed division of Westerners as “we” and of Orientals, perceived almost exclusively as Arabs and Muslims, as “others.” In this sense, the portrayal of migrants as violent Muslims fuels historical patterns of Orientalism and Islamophobia.

However, othering based on religion is also contested in readers’ comments. In The Guardian, readers either critiqued othering and exclusion of Muslim migrants, or argued against the assumed heterogeneity of Islam. For instance, a reader critiqued the identification of Muslim migrants as a threat that should be shipped back home: “That’s a
racially motivated nastiness on Muslim war refugees.” Another reader pointed out the
diversity of Islam in terms of national diversity: “Muslims is not a race. Secondly, in fact
many of these people have little in common. Pakistani and Afghans have almost nothing
in common with Syrians.” Other reader pointed out that not recognizing diversity in
Islam caused a problem in European perception of migrants:

You know, the problem lies here partially … ‘WE MUSLIMS.’ Not Syrians, not
Afghans, not Pakistanis, not Iraqis, but ‘we muslims.’ Culture and people differ
hugely in these countries, yet you club them together into one group. As it’s not
even one country, but its religion which you club them together on. Don’t you
find it naïve? (The Guardian)

However, readers also disagreed on what constituted diversity. While some made
distinctions between Muslims based on their various home nation-states, others seemed to
classify Muslims as either peaceful or radical. For instance, a reader wrote, “Here are
countries out there who have shared religions peacefully for centuries. It takes
radicalization to cause problems and that’s not what we are welcoming in, we [Germans]
are welcoming at large peaceful Muslims” (The Guardian).

These excerpts suggest that Europeans, by representing Muslims in a negative
light, imply the identification of their space as solely Christian. In this respect, preserving
Christianity justifies fortifying Europe by placing physical obstacles at the borders.
Moreover, the analysis shows that most European readers, even when exposed to
comments of some who raised concerns about the homogenization of Muslims, tended to
clump Muslims into a single group of unwanted invaders.
These discussions around race and religion in readers’ comments evolved into a discussion about cultural differences. By identifying migrants as culturally different, readers extended the journalistic construction of social difference and cultural remoteness accomplished only through photographs and maps. When identifying the differences, readers made references to cultural incompatibility based on migrants’ inability to share European values often very broadly defined as “liberal western values,” implying that they struggle to identify the values such as democracy, tolerance, the respect of the human rights and the rule of law. Readers, especially those who read and comment on *The Guardian* articles, mostly agreed that while racial differentiation is not appropriate, the cultural differentiation is. For instance, in a response to the reader who critiqued othering Muslim migrants as “racial nastiness,” another reader stated: “It is culturally motivated and quite understandable.” Another reader supported this perspective by claiming that migrants come from “cultures which not share your attachment to liberal western values” (*The Guardian*).

Some readers applied cultural difference as a support for moral reasoning about why the border control should be stricter. As an illustration, a reader argued that acting according to moral principles would be possible if migrants were coming from culturally accepted spaces: “If we had infinite land and resources. If we had a plan to successfully integrate millions of people from an incompatible culture, then morality would be easy” (*The Guardian*). Similarly, the following example also positions cultural difference as the main reason why European countries should keep migrants out of their democratic and liberal space: “Their cultures that are monstrously intolerant of minorities, women, plurality or liberalism. Keep them out to protect Europe” (*The Guardian*).
While some readers argued that migrants and refugees are culturally different and cause trouble, and even blamed Muslims for bringing in those differences to Europe, a less salient, but still fairly sizable visible, sub-set of readers disputed those claims by arguing that all Muslims are not the same and that Europeans are racially motivated when discussing global migration issues.

**Asserting the legality of border management and claiming national sovereignty in times of crisis.** As discussed earlier, journalistic frames supported arguments in favor of the decision to erect a border fence and re-introduce tougher border controls based on narratives of the legality of the policies. These narratives of legality generally understated appeals to nationalism. The narratives readers used to co-construct the “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security” frame did not solely focus on narratives of legality but also invoked narratives of national sovereignty to complicate the debate on Hungary’s decision to erect the fence on the external EU border with Serbia. Their overarching narrative was built upon micro-narratives of support to the fence erection that problematized the journalistic narrative by also calling attention to the righteousness of protecting a country’s sovereignty and nationhood, the illegality of border-crossing practices, and the criticism of national governments that were not following Hungary’s example. Additionally, *Večernje novosti* readers used the online space to engage in the debate over the conspiracy theory myth to position Serbia as a victim always blamed and punished by the West, and to resist the EU and embrace the in-betweenness that the Western core countries have historically assigned to Serbia.

Readers who supported tighter border management in terms of physical obstacles mobilized discourses on nation, homeland, and sovereignty of individual member states.
For instance, a reader centered the very definition of nation-state on its right to control its borders: “While I am no advocate of such physical measures, a country that cannot control its own borders from undesired visitors is not a country” (The Guardian).

Similarly, another Guardian reader wrote: “I don’t approve of walls, much preferring properly manned borderlines. However, a free and independent nation must have the right to control its borders; otherwise, what is it?” A comment in the same thread provided additional support for the necessity of individual EU countries maintaining and executing their sovereignty over the EU supranational entity, as the most obvious way to protect and maintain nationhood: “Absolutely correct. No sovereignty, no nationhood. That’s ain’t rocket science” (The Guardian).

With the fence support narrative in mind, some readers highlighted, rather than the legality of the policy, the illegality of migrants’ mobility in border areas and backed the ways Hungary dealt with illegal border crossings: “Good to see them doing something about the illegals” or “Don’t see what’s wrong with the Hungarian approach. Real refugees can still apply for status. The others can go back where they came from” (The Guardian). Similarly, favoring the fence erection as a solution for illegal border-crossing practices, another reader wrote: “The border is closed for illegal crossing only – they are letting people through in a controlled way and transport them away on buses and trains” (The Guardian).

It is worth noticing that especially in The Guardian threads, the approval of Hungary’s policy was almost always a response to a post that disapproved of the fence erection, striking a balance between the readers who supported this policy and those who disapproved it. By offering arguments for and against the fence, readers created an online
public debate where opinions were sometimes supported with links to other news articles. However, readers rarely talked about the legality with references to the national or international laws as journalists did. Instead, they argued whether the act was “right” or “fair,” and focused on righteousness and fairness as semantic tools to rationalize the necessity of keeping migrants outside of the European space.

Compared to those of *The Guardian*, *Večernje novosti*’s audience members focused more on Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orban, to praise his decisions. A commentator said, while identifying Hungary with its leader, “Orban is the rarest kind of a politician: veracious, capable, the fighter for his nation. His decision [to erect the fence] is the correct one.” Other readers similarly praised Orban’s fence decision, implying that a similar policy should also be on the Serbia’s political agenda. A reader wrote: “Bravo Hungarians! I have always admired their national politics strategies! For respect!” Another reader exclaimed: “Well done Orban!”

By addressing the fence construction as Orban’s personal decision instead of a governmental decision in Hungary, *Novosti*’s readers also implied that there are similarities between strong prime minister figures in Serbia and Hungary. However, Serbia’s audience used the opportunity to simultaneously criticize its own country’s political leadership by implying that its lukewarm attitude toward migrants is nothing more than a way to meet Western Europe’s expectations. A reader wrote, alluding to Serbia’s pro-EU foreign policy and that multiple conditions that Serbia had and has to meet on its road towards EU membership, wrote the following: “The Hungarian Prime Minister deserves praise. That’s the right way to protect the homeland, and not like us [Serbia] who always have to meet multiple conditions.” Likewise, another commentator
linked his criticism with Serbia’s right to sovereignty: “When it comes to Orban, his decision is the smart one, an exemplar of the effort to protect his own country. Serbia is not a sovereign state. Anybody who wants, crosses our borders easily, and Serbia does not return refugees back.” A reader added: “Vučić is only complaining. We need a decisive man who is not afraid to speak up and approve Hungary’s decision to erect the fence. Hungarians should make whatever decisions they want about their territory.” The last comment also implies a disagreement with the Serbian prime minister’s compliance with EU values rather than promoting national values. Similar comments also favored Hungary’s strict border management by critiquing the Serbian prime minister’s weakness and indecisiveness to “put a lock” on Serbia’s borders.

Some of Novosti’s readers argued against the EU and notions of Europeanness by invoking a conspiracy theory myth embedded into Serbia’s political and historical narratives that hold that “the rest of the world is against Serbia.” This narrative decenters migrant arrivals as the cause of Hungary’s decision to fortify its southern border and, instead, positions Serbia at the center of a conspiracy in which the West always identifies Serbia as the main “enemy” and implements regulations only to “hurt” Serbia. Arguing that the EU is against Serbia, a reader wrote: “Hungarians are not erecting the fence to stop migrants, but they are doing it according to the EU instructions and against Serbia.” Likewise, another reader predicted the country’s fate if migrants were kept in Serbia and used capital letters to highlight the seriousness of the issue: “Our politicians will keep quiet, whereas EUROPE WILL REMAIN BLIND AND DEAF [to the migrant issue] BECAUSE IT DOES NOT CARE ABOUT SERBIA” (Večernje novosti).
The conspiracy theory is situated in the perception of the in-betweenness of Serbia and the existing tensions in the discourse on balkanism, which conceptualizes the Balkan countries as the ones that are situated between Europe and Asia and do not belong to either. The spatial ambiguity of belonging, according to Todorova (2009), constructs Serbia and other Balkan countries as incomplete and defective territories that resemble both worlds. Those countries carry the burden of in-betweenness and long for the EU approval and affirmation. Thus, they tend to comply with EU laws and requests with the aim of showing the EU that they do, in fact, belong to the European space. Thus, the conspiracy theory narrative is a form of resistance to numerous attempts to convince the EU that Serbia is good enough and accomplished enough to join the club, and it represents the acceptance of in-betweenness that comes with the history of this specific space. The resistance is visible in posts that supported the fence erection as a way to oppose EU-imposed expectations that all Serbian laws and regulations should be in sync with EU laws. For instance, the following posts from Večernje novosti supported the resistance narrative: “We beg you to close the borders, because we are tired of the EU” and “[the fence is] a great idea to catch a breath from the EU-Satanism.”

Counter-narratives of national sovereignty and legality. Some of the readers and commentators in Večernje novosti and The Guardian constructed counter-narratives to narratives of legality and of the need to protect national sovereignty and homeland by (a) opposing the views that border fortification is a solution to a migrant crisis and (b) raising questions about differences in policymaking and the clarity of the legal framing.

For example, a smaller group of commentators argued that the fence would not solve the problems of global migration. This narrative constructs European people as
humanitarians who should open borders, and welcome and assist migrants and refugees who are in need. For instance, one reader commented: “the disaster for Europe is the lack of charity exemplified by the Hungarians” (*The Guardian*).

Other readers’ posts highlighted migrants’ hardships on their journey to safety while building arguments that border fences should not be used to restrict the mobility of people who are escaping danger and death. They often tried to engage other readers by asking questions and making them imagine being in migrants’ shoes. For instance, a reader posted:

Think for a second: why would anyone risk probable death of themselves and their children to cross into another country illegally, unless their lives were untenable and in mortal peril? Building a fence or hating people isn’t a solution, it’s a head-in-the-sand cop out. (*The Guardian*)

Similarly, a reader used an interrogative sentence to reprimand the choice of not helping migrants but instead supporting the fence as a solution: “Imagine yourself in this situation? Walking/traveling from Afghanistan with two small children?… It is not time to put your heads in the sand (*The Guardian*).”

In *Večernje novosti*, some readers also called for empathy, but they often supported the humanitarian approach with an example from the Serbia’s history. They recalled the period of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia when many refugees and internally displaced people sought refuge in Serbia. In the following post, a reader implied that fleeing warfare is a familiar experience that many Serbs from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo were familiar with:
Migrants will find other ways to pass through, but we have to be humans and assist those people together. It is not easy at all for them, nobody flees because of having a nice life. At least we Serbs should know that. *(Večernje novosti)*

Another reader shared a post in which a commentator argued that people easily forget that many important people, including scientists and a linguist, were immigrants:

Have we already forgotten that many of us, not so long ago, had been fleeing the war (Sloba [Milošević], Franjo [Tuđman], Alija’s [Izetbegović])? Have we forgotten that Jesus, Einstein, Freud, Marx, Tesla, Vuk Karadzić… were emigrants? Let’s not forget, as Americans did, that their forefathers were emigrants. *(Večernje novosti)*

These commentators, while appealing to national differences, argue for the subordination of national identities and political notions of sovereignty to the need for identification with migrants and empathy with the plight.

Debating the construction of the fence also led to counter-narratives that complicated the narrative of legality of border management. In contrasting the difference between Hungary’s policy to erect the barb-wired fence and Germany’s policy reversal—which first declared an “open door” policy to Syrians and later closed its borders and re-introduced border controls—readers showed that the journalistic narrative of legality was built upon unclear arguments. Their comments suggested that readers needed more detailed explanation to comprehend which laws and regulations were at play when decisions were made. In the absence of clarity in the news reports, readers sought to explain to each other the difference between Hungary and Germany’s policies.
For instance, a reader criticized the language used in *The Guardian* to frame Hungary’s decision as a border “crackdown” and Germany’s decision as a border “control mechanism”:

Why is what Hungary is doing a ‘crackdown’ and what Germany is doing ‘border control’?... Germany two weeks ago declared that ‘all are welcome to come.’ So they are coming. Again, the horrible situation with the endless refugees is a consequence of Merkel’s statement. Closing the borders today, as Germany is doing, is making it worse. Merkel is jerking everybody around.

In the same thread, another reader directly addressed the previous commentator to offer her or his view of the difference between Hungary and Germany’s approaches:

Does the picture of the fence with the razor wire on top that Hungary has been building help not you understand the difference? Germany is just asking for passports, which I suspect is a policy you are otherwise all for. (*The Guardian*). Further conversation in the same thread developed around the soft approach Germany applied and the firm and, therefore, inhumane approach of the Hungarian government. A reader posted:

Germany isn’t closing its borders, it is controlling them. That’s a difference…

The German-Austrian border **is not** closed. There are spot checks at the border.

The consequences of the spot checks:

1. Some refugees are registered at the border and send to camps from there on
2. Some refugees are still arriving in Munich and elsewhere (remember: spot checks)
3. Some refugees are not stucked in Austria (which is a problem for Austria and there is an Austrian/German meeting today)

4. A lot of traffic jam

Budapest does two things:

1. Closing down the Serbian-Hungarian border and denying anybody reaching this border the ability to claim asylum in Hungary (big difference between Germany and Hungary)

2. Transporting the refugees already inside Hungary to the Hungarian-Austrian border. Once these people arrive the border the Hungarian authorities simply don’t care anymore (denying ownership).

That’s the difference” (The Guardian).

On the other hand, a reader supporting Hungary’s decision pointed out that the difference was not between Germany’s and Hungary’s policies about border control, but between legal and illegal traffic across borders:

Hungary is controlling its border, too. Legal traffic is still allowed across (not the Hungarians’ fault that migrants are blockading the roads so it can’t actually pass), and you can still declare asylum at a Hungarian border post. Who it’s closed to is migrants who don’t want to register in Hungary, and don’t have the legal right to cross, and that’s absolutely fair enough. (The Guardian)

It is worth noting how, in this interplay of opinions and explanations of policy decisions in Hungary and Germany, the counter-narratives complicate the journalistic discourse yet construct migrants as subjects in need to be controlled, registered, fingerprinted.
Borders as Lived Spaces – Framing in Readers’ Comments

Readers co-constructed the “borders as lived spaces” frame by expanding and contesting narratives in the journalistic frame that mobilized narratives of migrants’ hardship, narratives in which Europeans appropriate migrants’ lived spaces, and narratives of the lived experience of migrants and Europeans at the borders. While expanding and challenging the journalistic frame, readers offered context-bound narratives about borders as lived spaces both for migrants and Europeans affected by stricter border controls.

Readers’ comments supported the frame’s three dominant narratives: the narrative of lived experiences of and at the border, the othering of migrants, and the narrative of lived spaces of the insiders. However, the emphases and nuances in readers’ comments differentiated them from the journalists’ discourse. First, unlike the news narratives, in readers’ narratives of lived experiences commentators did not give voice to migrants. Instead, they complemented the news discourse by sharing concerns about migrants’ wellbeing. Second, readers did not tend to focus on appropriating migrants’ voices and experiences, but rather questioned the authenticity of the migrants’ accounts and dismissed migrants’ agency in mobility. Lastly, readers showed that, compared to journalists, they were more likely to focus on the situation of Europeans living in border areas and coping with interruptions of border mobility, or in the case of Serbia, the interruption of smooth border-crossing practices, and the disruption of normal life and comfort in border zones.

Lived experiences of/at the border. Readers of both The Guardian and Večernje novosti were concerned about the conditions migrants and refugees faced while moving
to the safer spaces, or while waiting at some borders or being transferred to some other borders. For instance, a reader addressed the poor hygienic conditions migrants were struggling with on their route: “So they are just left out in the open with no toilets or washing facilities…. treated like scum (The Guardian).” Another reader listed the facilities migrants stay in in Europe to point out the austerity of conditions they are exposed to: “Old schools, hospitals and any kind of building more or less suitable are used to host migrants” (The Guardian). Furthermore, a reader expressed concern about migrants’ safety and wellbeing because “there are a lot of criminals making money off them [migrants], or beating them up.”

In a similar fashion, a reader expressed concern about the migrants being outdoors all the time in the upcoming colder weather while en route toward Germany after they crossed the Serbia-Croatia’s border: “I agree with you about the winter urgency 100%. Here in Slovenia, it has become quite common among ordinary people to comment any bad weather forecast with concerns about the refugees” (The Guardian). Similarly, another posting from The Guardian read: “If anyone is not familiar with geography of this region: see possible route from Serbia across Croatia across NE Slovenia to Austria in lowlands. See this relief map of Yugoslavia. However, the winters are cold (continental climate).” Another reader posted links to an animated GIF map of climate in Europe, to a map showing average temperature for each month of the year, and to a map showing average temperatures in January by hours of the day “for the people who are not familiar with the COLD winters in Central Europe along the refugee route” (The Guardian).
Commenting on news about the possible landmines in Croatia that included maps and tweets from the official sources, several readers raised concern about the possibility that migrants who avoided main roads for fear that they would be stopped and returned to Serbia might unknowingly end up hurt by the remaining land mines in Croatia. Several readers shared links that included maps of land mines. For instance, a reader posted a link to a map of land mines accompanied with the text: “There is a tiny little problem with this new route [in Croatia]: Land mines from the Balkan wars… I hope they [migrants] are able to understand the Croatian sentence: Ne prilazite (Don’t come closer).” *(The Guardian)*

Other readers addressed the overall treatment migrants are exposed to in Hungary. For instance, a reader wrote:

*Hungary is very xenophobic and very hostile to Muslims and is treating refugees in unacceptable ways and keeping them in awful conditions (according to the Budapest office of the Helsinki Committee for Human rights). In addition, some of the refugees have some family or other connections in other EU members and it is reasonable to unite them.* *(The Guardian)*

To support the claim about Hungary’s hostility the reader also provided a link to an article that discussed in detail the migrants’ conditions and treatment in Hungary.

The experience migrants had been through in their home countries and the atrocities that forced them to flee and seek safety were also topics of multiple comments. In some comments, like in the following one, readers acknowledged the reasons migrants left their homes as legitimate and valid. In an interrogative fashion, a reader responded to a commentator who said migrants should stay put in their own cities or countries:
Staying put? What, in Aleppo or Mosul or Helmand? … yeah, sure you would hero. Why are they leaving their home? Because their home is being bombed or has disintegrated as a state… Eritrea, Afghanistan. Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan… Just a list of the worst places in the world to live really… (The Guardian)

It is also worth noting that in multiple threads around different news stories, there were also posts that followed the othering narrative that claims that migrants do not respect the existing order—because they “throw away food and water” and they “throw their children over the fence.” In those posts, readers constructed migrants as those who were resisting European order and rules, and even refusing European hospitality. A reader posted: “First time Hungary tried to register migrants, the hordes refused to go to the transit centers which had bed, food, and water” (The Guardian).

Thus, these examples of readers’ posts constructed migrants and their experiences at, and of, the borders in a two-fold way. While some readers argued that migrants were fleeing wars and were people in need who also should be treated in humane and respectful ways, others positioned migrants as picky and ungrateful for the hospitality they get in European countries. However, even the narratives of concern for migrants sometimes constructed them as people who were not obeying the order because, for example, migrants could end up in the minefields because they are avoiding the main roads. Similarly, the narratives that portrayed migrants as people in need echoed neo-colonial discourses of paternalism in which a good colonial master should help the subordinate people in need and in which the bad colonial master mistreats migrants and positions them as violent and ungrateful subjects.
Othering migrants: questioning authenticity and the right to mobility. As stated above, in framing borders as lived spaces, narratives of otherness overlapped in the discourse. While in the news narrative of lived experiences migrants were given voices and presented as people with names, professions, fears and hopes, some readers challenged such accounts and questioned the authenticity of migrants’ personal stories. For instance, a reader questioned the factualness of migrants’ stories and claimed that migrants were misrepresenting themselves as refugees:

For example, regarding ‘war refugees,’ some of these people aren’t fleeing war, some of them aren’t refugees and many aren’t from Syria. We had an article yesterday in the Guardian, hotly dissected in the comments, on a supposed refugee who snuck into the UK in a lorry from Calais. All of this story was one-sided – we only heard his version of events – but it raised eyebrows. For example, first he fled from Syria to Turkey – a safe country. But that wasn’t economically good for him. Secondly, he claims he didn’t earn enough in Turkey, yet he went on to say that he paid thousands of euros to give to a people smuggler. Thirdly, he left his family behind. In the war zone. In Syria. The place that was too dangerous that he just had to flee it. Those are just some of the issues in his story alone. (The Guardian)

Similarly, a Večernje novosti reader questioned the authenticity of migrants’ representation as refugees and pointed out that the falsely so-called refugees abuse the system in the European countries: “An immigrant discarded the passport to conceal the country of origin. Until the country of origin gets established, they [migrants] live on the tax payers burden.”
In addition to questioning refugees’ status, some readers questioned both migrants’ personal stories about the poor living conditions in their home countries, and other readers’ posts about concerning the conditions migrants were facing. In this regard, some readers implied that, although migrants talk about poverty, they still could afford hundreds of dollars to pay human traffickers. For instance, a reader wrote implying that money was not a problem for migrants because they could afford to pay their way out of their home countries. As further proof, readers pointed out that migrants also were able to afford the most expensive cell phones, “Perhaps, they should have thought about that [poor conditions on the way] when they spent hundreds of dollars paying human traffickers to get them there. But hey, at least they still have their iPhones (The Guardian).”

These comments are examples of a neo-colonial discourse in which Europeans construct the other as irrational, uneducated, and underdeveloped and, thus, as people who need to be enlightened and civilized. Migrants who are educated and own iPhones disrupt the image Europeans have of others coming from developing countries and from former European colonies. These framing patterns reveal power relations operating through labeling the whole group of arriving migrants with descriptions that carry disparaging meanings. The process of labeling in itself signals fear of the loss of power and the reconfiguration of power that the migration crisis both challenges and reinforces.

Another discursive strategy readers used to challenge the authenticity of migrant personal stories operated through the creation of an online debate in which readers selected and posted a certain migrant’s quote from the news article, and then responded to the quote. Using this tool of immediacy, readers created an online dialogue with
migrants without facing them in real life. For instance, a reader responded to the quotation “This wall, we will not accept it” in this manner: “OK. But it is for you not to accept. You are not even allowed to do this” (*The Guardian*).

In a similar fashion, when responding to a migrant who said that the wall would not put migrants off because they would break the wall or take the gloves needed to cut the electrified fence, a reader equated migrants’ political resistance to European control and rule over migrants with migrants’ criminalized violence. In the same post, while critiquing migrants for not obeying EU laws, the reader questioned the authenticity of migrants’ representation as highly educated people: “Well they managed to cut the electricity in Syria so I do not doubt will be able to cut the wires they wish in the EU. But seriously, two doctors and a pharmacist?” (*The Guardian*). Likewise, another reader expressed disbelief that all migrants are intellectuals:

> Actually, from what I have seen from the news interviews, every Syrian seems to be a doctor, teacher or engineer! Not many cleaners or manual workers tough, so the plan might fall down there. Although I did see someone who said he was a plasterer! (*The Guardian*)

A *Večernje novosti* reader more overtly referred to migrants as “hungry, thirsty, and uneducated” and therefore, argued that people in Serbia “could not benefit” from them: “Everybody has the right to protect its borders. What would be the reason for me to invite a few migrants to my home? I wouldn’t benefit from them in any way because they arrived hungry, thirsty and uneducated.”

Evidently, readers expected migrants to be uncivilized and uneducated, and thus
suggested migrants were pretending to be highly educated. On the other hand, readers implied that European countries, especially Germany, actually do not need educated people, but instead are only interested in manual workers. Therefore, the presumption was that well-educated migrants are not needed in Europe because Europe, as in colonial times, only needs people for manual and low-paid jobs. This kind of narrative suggests that readers in Europe, regardless of nationality and their countries’ EU membership status as member or non-member, assumed migrants are backward and primitive people who bring their backwardness to the European space. The assumption of backwardness transforms migrants into unwanted others who are perceived as a threat to a progressive and modern European space.

**Appropriation of lived spaces: speaking for migrants.** The journalists’ narrative labeled “appropriation of lived space: speaking for migrants” was also supported in readers’ comments. In journalists’ frames, this narrative underscored how European politicians reclaim the borders from migrants by predominantly speaking “for” instead “about” them. Readers also tended to talk for migrants, as did the politicians quoted in narratives within the frame “borders as lived spaces.” In effect, readers addressed with apparent confidence the mobility goals of migrants, as in the case of Serbian readers who claimed that “migrants do not want to stay in Serbia because it is a poor country.” For instance, a reader argued that migrants certainly do not choose Serbia as their final destination, an assumption that aligns with Serbian officials’ intention not to make an effort to offer them permanent shelter in Serbia:

> When they come to Serbia, we should pass them through. They do not want to stay here [in Serbia] because they know we are a poor country. Their goal is to go
further to the EU. If Serbia’s border control guards “catch” them, then Serbia has to cover costs of their stay, food, shelter, medical attention… Do you think that it is cheap?… But if we turn a blind eye, migrants can reach their desired destination, which will be a good solution for both sides (*Večernje novosti*).

Migrants’ mobility is not only perceived as illegal but also deemed as an opportunistic country-hopping strategy. Like official sources in the journalistic frame, readers overtly condemn migrants’ agency to make choices about what country they will choose as their final destination. The arguments against the migrant’s freedom to choose his or her final destination are constructed as a judgment on whether choices are based on the migrant’s economic or safety concerns, even when safety should be considered a primary reason for fleeing the war affected countries.

For instance, a reader commented: “If they are refugees, then they should request asylum in the *first* safe country they enter. Not embark on a world tour through numerous countries until they find the benefits system that suits them best” (*The Guardian*). Similarly, another *The Guardian* reader voiced the reasons migrants choose some countries and avoid others:

Safety of a county has zero to do with it. Economic prospect has everything to do with it. I am sorry that for whatever reason these people are forced or choose to leave their home country; there are rules, however, and they exist for a purpose.

The migrants who choose a country over another one are perceived as those who are not in genuine danger and, therefore, are not genuine refugees. The assignment of the labels “genuine” or “fake” to migrants, coupled with the characterization of migrants as picky, choosy, and abusing the welfare state system, construct arguments in favor of
intensified protection of the European space. For instance, by red-flagging the migrants’ choice to go to Germany, a reader said: “They should be wanting to flee war, not cherry picking where they will live” (The Guardian). Another reader referred to migrants as “freeloaders” who are “money and economy driven” (The Guardian). A reader who identifies as Australian brought in the argument that country-hopping is a global problem: “Yes, this is a fiasco behind it all. Few are ‘genuine’ refugees; they are country-hoppers and jurisdiction shoppers. We in Australia know all about it and won’t tolerate any more rubbish being spoken to the contrary” (The Guardian).

Expressions such as “country-hoppers,” “jurisdiction shoppers,” and “freeloaders” carry a very negative connotation about migrants, transforming them from people who fled a war into the people who would like to benefit from a war. These slurs not only generalize all migrants’ experience by placing them into the same group of “country-hoppers” but also intensify the existing tension between the insiders and the outsiders. Therefore, criticizing migrants’ agency in their mobility as undesirable and in opposition to the approval of the European countries creates a justification for the physical barriers on the southern border.

Contrary to The Guardian readers who condemned the country-hopping phenomenon, a majority of Novosti’s readers did not identify country-hopping as a problem but as a solution. The knowledge that Germany is the migrants’ top final destination was communicated as a relief because migrants do not want to stay in Serbia and are only passing through. This narrative simultaneously affects and is affected by the official rhetoric of Serbia’s politicians who frequently say that despite Serbia’s efforts to assist migrants, they are not interested in staying in Serbia, and nevertheless, see the
country only as transitional space on their way to wealthier countries in Western Europe. For instance, a *Večernje novosti* reader wrote, “Serbia is a transit country… what would have happened if they would had stayed in Serbia?” Another reader added that “Serbia has the best defense system against migrants: it is the worse country compared to the ones migrants are coming from and, therefore, nobody wants to stay in Serbia.”

The transitional character of some spaces, especially on the EU periphery, was seen as desirable feature that assists in keeping migrants out. A reader explained that the transitional character of some countries only benefits them because migrants do not see those spaces as worth settling down:

To come to Europe, migrants have to go through Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania. They did not come though Albania. In other words, they come to Hungary after accessing the EU at some other point of entry. What does it have to do with us? Greeks do not want to see them, Rumanians also do not want to notice them, while Bulgarians were always blind. The solution is that Hungarians let them pass to Austria and Hungary, and the problem will be solved. (*Večernje novosti*)

Another reader provided the opinion that even the EU countries, such as Bulgaria and Greece, should not condemn migrants’ agency in their mobility, but see it as the solution to get rid of the migrants:

At least 99 percent of those migrants come to Serbia through Bulgaria and Greece. That means that they first enter the EU but then exit it so that they can get a hold of Germany and other wealthier countries…. Only if Romania had erected a wall, then migrants would have stayed in Bulgaria and Greece until they reached
a critical mass, and then those countries would have had to systematically transfer them to Germany (Večernje novosti).

On the other hand, while some readers constructed migrants’ agency in mobility in a negative way as country-hopping, other readers’ voices rationalized migrants’ choice of a country they should reach because people who do choose some countries over others usually follow the established route of their countrymen who had already settled in a certain European county:

I’d be extremely cautious with what some channels convey about the reasons for refugee’s preferences. Sweden has a large number of Syrian refugees and it is known for migrants to prefer going where they know they can find fellow countrymen already established. (The Guardian)

These arguments that migrants tend to cluster together in space confirms Van Hautum and Van Naerssen’s (2001) claim that migrants tend to stick together not only when they migrate but also when they settle because by staying in culturally known groups they can emotionally protect themselves from uncertainty in new environments. However, no matter whether the constructions of migrants who cross different borders to choose their final destination country have negative or positive connotations, both constructions communicate migrants as a threat, and therefore as undesired others. Moreover, this frame generalizes migrants’ mobility as country-hopping, implying that borders are a legitimate and valid solution to prevent migrants to roam without any control in the European space and shop for better “refugee pay.”

The lived spaces of the insiders. While journalists constructed the frame of “borders as lived spaces” as the disturbances of the comfort lives of European insiders,
readers expanded and complicated the frame. Journalists visually pointed to traffic jams at border stations and the disturbances caused by migrants’ arrivals in the lives of local citizens used to more efficient border crossing procedures. The narratives in readers’ comments verbally addressed the uncertainty of closed borders and its consequences, safety in border towns, the way border patrol officers benefit from the stricter border regime, and the consequences of the border fence in relation to wild life.

For example, some Serbian readers expressed concern about the impact of the newly erected barbed-wire fence on Serbian citizens who want to enter Hungary. A reader was confused about the consequences that the fence might have for Serbian citizens: “Have they closed the border crossing? And also, will travelers with regular visas be able to go to Hungary and leave Hungary?” Other readers tried to explain that the “border crossings will remain open but the so called green border will be fenced,” while others offered advice “to go to Hungary via Bulgaria and Romania.” (Večernje novosti)

Serbian readers were worried about their own cross-border mobility. Their concern is rooted in the historical context when Serbian citizens were not able to travel to the Schengen countries without visas. Serbia was granted a so-called “white Schengen status” in 2009, which allowed Serbian citizens to freely travel to and stay in the Schengen states within a 90-day period (“EU ukinula vize,” 2009; “Visa policy,” 2019). For Serbian readers, Hungary’s decision to close its borders was reminiscent of the late 1990s and the first nine years of the 2000s, when those who wanted to travel and (could afford to travel) to the European countries had to wait in long lines to submit their required paperwork so that they would be granted visas (“Bez redova za vizu,” 2007).
Together with Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and the Czech Republic, Hungary joined the Schengen zone of free movement in 2007, which restricted the free movement of Serbian citizens who needed visas to visit their neighbor to the north (“Bez redova za vizu,” 2007). The concern of Večernje novosti readers, therefore, implied that the fence and stricter border controls once again excluded Serbia from the European space and possibly imposed new restrictions on Serbian citizens who wanted to cross the border into Hungary.

Večernje novosti readers also constructed the imposed border controls as an opportunity certain individuals took to make profit. However, they did not exclusively criticize corrupt border patrol personnel (who used the erected fence as an excuse for making profit); they also blamed arriving migrants, who created the opportunities for such corruption. For instance, readers pointed out that the increased number of migrants also created considerable opportunity for corruption at the borders because “border personnel take money from migrants to let them cross the border.” A reader recommended that “Serbian border patrol officers should take their hands off their butts and do their jobs” to prevent border porosity. Other readers placed the blame not only on “easily bribable Serbian border control officers” but also on Hungarian personnel and human traffickers: “Border officers are only humans. They love money. That is why they turn a blind eye when asylum seekers should cross the border. They probably take bribes in collaboration with Hungarians” (Večernje novosti).

In this narrative, readers constructed borders as lived experiences for in-group Europeans whose life was disrupted by the increased numbers of migrants. However, at the same time, some Europeans resisted the fear-mongering narratives about the outsiders
and embraced the situation as an opportunity to use migrants and the space they control as a means to earn new, illegitimate income. Moreover, readers did not make a point of condemning human traffickers or critiquing border patrol officers for assisting in human trafficking. Instead, they seemed to take for granted that borders represent a lived space where insiders use borders in multiple ways, take care of borders as a part of their jobs, and at the same time, use borders to make a profit.

Lastly, readers constructed borders as a lived space for nature where humans and wildlife co-habit. Absent from the journalists’ framing, this narrative crafted by readers raised concerns about the ways in which natural life in the border zones, interrupted by physical obstacles, would affect the lives of animals. For instance, a reader expressed concern about the “free movement of wild animals across borders,” whereas another reader argued that “the wall is the ecological disaster” (*Večernje novosti*). This narrative also shows the perspective of those who live in the border areas and are directly exposed daily to the challenges created by tighter border controls.

Overall, readers’ comments within the frame of “borders as lived spaces” enact competing discourses on the ways the fenced borderline affects both migrants and Europeans. Some of the comments expressed concern for migrants lives and hardships in the heavily managed border areas. Other comments mobilized narratives that carried negative connotations and reinforced the need to exclude “others” because the tighter border management negatively affected insiders’ ordinary lives. Overall, readers supported the news framing of migrants as those who disrespect the national and EU imposed order by choosing the country where they would like to settle, and claimed the European space by denying migrants the opportunity to negotiate their own mobility. By
rejecting migrants’ transformative practices and questioning the authenticity of their status and truthfulness of their accounts, readers claimed that European space belongs to Europeans - without making a distinction between European in EU member states Europeans and Europeans who live outside of the southern EU border.

**Borders as Politically Negotiated Spaces – Framing in Readers’ Comments**

In readers’ comments, the frame “borders as politically negotiated spaces” was supported by two dominant narratives: the narrative of causes and solutions, and the narrative of blaming. Notably, the news narratives about tensions between EU core states and new member states did not emerge in readers’ posts. Rather, the politics of border-making and border-negotiation among nation states were articulated in narratives of pragmatism, as in finding causes and solutions to the migrant crisis. Another difference was that in the news narratives, the focus was on mudslinging between European countries and parties that were blaming each other for border porosity and the number of accepted migrants. The analysis of the readers’ posts showed that, instead, readers placed blame on particular powerful countries or politicians for the situation with migrants.

**Narrative of causes, solutions, and blame.** In the narrative on causes and solutions, readers used the online discussion space to shift focus from narrow political border-making practices to the wider context of global migration problems, including the critique of who was responsible for the wars and poor economic conditions; how certain countries, such as Hungary, forgot their own migration pasts; and what solutions to this crisis should be. Readers expanded the journalistic narratives by showing interest in detailed explanations of causes of global migration as they drew on historically, economically, and socially bounded contexts more frequently than journalists did. Those
narratives of causes and solutions were present in reader’s comments in both *The Guardian* and *Večernje novosti*.

Readers expanded the narratives about borders as constructed and deconstructed spaces where politicians exercise power and make decisions without having to acknowledge the lived experience at those borders. By expanding these narratives, readers focused more on the responsibility of certain European countries when it comes to the conflicts in Syria and the Middle East that were the root of global migrations. Some readers blame the United States and the United Kingdom for escalating the crisis in Syria and causing massive migrations. For instance, a reader commented:

> Among other things (as ‘marginal’ as total devastation of Iraq and VERY many dead people), the fantastic US/UK occupation of Iraq totally destabilized the whole region, and then the US/UK duo cowardly abandoned the mess they have themselves created, leaving behind a total chaos and vacuum, which also enabled the rapid rise of ISIS. Eh, about a million Iraqis fled to Syria as refugees on the UK’s watch. It is a total disgrace that the US and the UK who are to be blamed for quite a lot of the present mess in the Middle East are the ones LEAST ready to shelter the refugees (*The Guardian*).

Similarly, a reader included France in the mix of countries responsible for the situation in the countries devastated by war: “US, UK, France bombed Libya and assisted the armed rebellion in Syria. The refugees are simply consequences of those decisions” (*The Guardian*).

*Večernje novosti*’s readers seemed to agree with their *The Guardian* counterparts
in blaming the United States and United Kingdom for the wars that forced global migration. Generalizing to all Europeans and Americans as Westerners, a reader wrote:

The reality is: Europe and the U.S. are the ones who caused this. The Westerners caused all the wars, and now people are feeling those wars. If Viktor Orban disagrees with the situation, he has the right to leave the Western club. (*Večernje novosti*)

With a similar goal of placing the blame on the Western world, another reader added:

“America caused all the migrations and thus, Americans should accept migrants instead of sending them to Europe” (*Večernje novosti*).

However, some readers defended individual countries as not the sole perpetrators, but instead, referred to complex circumstances. For instance, a reader of *Večernje novosti* claimed that all European countries act in their own economic interests:

Frothing at the mouth and blaming the UK for every ill going shows you are not so bright and are unable to process the complexities of the circumstances that has led to this crisis. Many other EU countries trade in arms (Germany, France, Italy etc.) and to suggest they adopt a more ethical approach to this trade is laughable. Events around this crisis show that countries that you undoubtedly consider ‘good’ Europeans, act in their own interests in manipulating and bending the rules around the established accords and agreements.

Some readers went even further to equate the West with capitalism and, therefore, blamed capitalist societies for global migration. For instance, a reader wrote: “Migrants go there to be used as cheap labor. In the past, Western countries pursued slaves in Africa, now the slaves came on their own. The magic of capitalism, right?” (*Večernje
In this post, a reader was implying that former colonial powers still have an influence over their former colonies and still use the people from the former colonies as cheap labor.

Blame placed on Western Europe, the United States, and capitalism resonated with some readers from Serbia only when making historical references to newer member states, such as Hungary, a country that went through significant changes in order to transform from a former socialist country into an EU member state. Readers were making the point that Hungary’s decision about the fence erection is incompatible with Hungary’s experience in the 1950s when, under the Soviet occupation, Hungarians sought shelter outside of their country. For instance, a reader wrote: “Hungarians have a short memory. Tito should have erected the fence when they were feeling the Soviets in 1956” (Večernje novosti). Another reader used sarcasm to point out that Hungarians were themselves illegal immigrants in the 1950s:

Apparently the Hungarians forgot that they were illegally coming to Yugoslavia in the 1950s, running away from the political pressure. Some were in transit and some stayed in Yugoslavia and blended easily in Vojvodina where they were not even forced to learn the Serbian language (Večernje novosti).

Additionally, Večernje novosti’s readers used Serbia’s historical context and Hungary’s decision to erect the fence to digress and re-contextualize the fence as a means that Serbians should have used in the past to resolve their dispute with Kosovo Albanians. A reader wrote, “If we [Serbia] had been smart enough to build a wall on the border with Albania, we wouldn’t have Shiptars as a majority in Kosovo” (Večernje novosti). This micro-narrative was supported by the ethnic slur “Shiptar” for the whole
population of Kosovo Albanians. Another reader wrote: “What Hungarians are planning to do on the border, we should have done in 1992 on the border with Albania.” This reader implied that the once Serbian southern autonomous province, which declared independence in 2008, would have remained under Serbia’s jurisdiction if Serbia had implemented stricter border policy with Albania. By not accepting Kosovo’s independence, a reader suggested, that the EU should direct migrants to Kosovo:

All asylum seekers should be placed in our southern province of Kosovo and Metohija with the condition that the EU secures them accommodation in the apartments and properties abandoned by or taken away from Serbs who were forced to leave Kosovo. Of course, that kind of accommodation has to be temporary and under a strict control. (Večernje novosti)

These examples from the Večernje novosti imply that the fence should have been a solution in the inter-ethnic conflict and reveal that readers tend to recontextualize familiar problems of people’s post-WWI relocation to relate to their own experiences. Additionally, they also imply that Islam, since Kosovo Albanians are Muslims, is a major cause of problems around the world.

Solutions to the migrant problem. While pointing fingers at particular Western countries as the ones to blame for the wars that caused global migration, many readers suggested different solutions to the existing problem. The proposed solutions ranged from the relocation of migrants to the countries that caused the problem (or to Germany, a country that invited refugees), to a proposal to send migrants back to either their home countries to fight the war or to other Muslim countries.

In this regard, a group of readers who participated in the discussion about the
Most suitable solution, suggested that the UK and the US should be the parts of the solution and, therefore, accept most of the migrants. For instance, a reader suggested that an Irish low-cost airline should be commissioned to transfer the migrants to the UK: “We should get Ryanair to fly them to the UK, get the liberal tax payer to foot the bill and everybody is happy” (The Guardian). Another reader supported the theory that the solution lies in the US and the UK assuming responsibility and taking in the migrants: “A fair solution would be to send all ME [Middle Eastern] refugees by ships to the UK and the US. They are the ones who largely created this problem. I have heard this opinion quite many times in continental Europe” (The Guardian).

Sending migrants to the Middle East “where they belong” in the eyes of the readers seems to be another viable solution. In this case, readers tend to use short declarative sentences to express the idea that Europe needs to take a firm approach in resolving the migrant crisis. A reader wrote: “We can send them a map with directions to Saudi Arabia I guess” (The Guardian). Another reader expressed that migrants’ staying in Europe is even beneath any consideration because they should go back and fight the war in their own country: “I’d give each and every of them a sturdy pair of boots and a weapon, and ship them back” (The Guardian). Similarly, the space outside of Europe is seen as the most appropriate for migrants. A reader wrote: “My thoughts are to build a dozen or more huge tented refugee camps on the borders of the EU. Just like in Lebanon I expect few would bother travelling then” (The Guardian).

With a similar solution in mind, a Večernje novosti reader used an interrogative sentence to point out that Europe is not the most obvious final destination for migrants from Syria. According to this reader, other Middle Eastern countries are a more rational
choice for migrants to end up: “Did anybody ask themselves why they do not emigrate to Saudi Arabia or Kuwait or UAE that are closer to them and richer countries that the European countries?” (*Večernje novosti*)

Some readers, however, offered a more complex solution for migrants that includes larger EU involvement in funding migrants’ settlement outside of Europe. A reader wrote:

Of course not back to Syria. Back to the camps in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon (where the migrants have stayed for years after they were incentivized by ISIS and Germany to migrate to Europe; for different reasons, of course). And substantially improve the funding of these camps. Then take manageable numbers out of the campuses and resettle them in Europe. The British approach is commendable. The German approach is an unmitigated disaster. (*The Guardian*)

Evidently, some readers agreed that European countries have to be more involved in solving the migrant problem, but it seems that Europe’s inclusion should start and end with efforts to place the migrants in camps, outside of the EU space, and to keep them away. For instance, a post said:

Policing the border is futile; but repatriation of refugees to the camps in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon will be effective, as it would remove the incentive to migrate. But then we need to support these camps adequately; and restore a stable government to Syria, probably with military means (together with Russians and Iranians). (*The Guardian*)

Instead of the proposed solution about what to do with migrants who are already in Europe, another group of readers focused their attention on how to prevent migrants
from accessing the European space in the first place. For instance, a reader pointed out that Greece, the first European country on the migrants’ route to Europe, should be a focus of European fortification: “The only solution is to prevent as far as possible further landings of immigrants in Greece. But how that can be achieved given the length of the Greek coast and the many islands?” (The Guardian). Another reader also expressed concern about how to protect the long maritime borders in Greece and Italy: “Free movement within Europe can only be sustained with Hungarian type fences around it, and I don’t see how that can be achieved with the frontiers of Greece and Italy” (The Guardian). In the same thread, another reader posted: “Patrolling the sea is a lot of easier than patrolling a land border. It’s not like you have to build a fence all along the coastline” (The Guardian).

The protection of the external European borders seems to be a part of a readers’ discussions in which they addressed the need for the European countries to stick together and share the burden in solving the problem. A reader directed other readers to, and quoted, the European Commission statement:

The outer Schengen borders need to be better protected by joint action of all Schengen members – rather than letting the countries with the outer Schengen borders take on the burden. Possibly this has to include also non-Schengen outer EU borders (e.g. Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania)…From the EC [European Commission] statement after yesterday’s meeting: “We must keep the borders between EU Member States open, but at the same time we also need stronger joint efforts to secure our external borders.” (The Guardian)

By using bold font and italic letters the reader wanted to make the point that the
solidarity is needed to solve the problem, which evidently aligns with the reader’s personal opinion.

Another reader referred to necessary European unity in dealing with migrants, but at the same time, accused the UK of abandoning the continental Europe in solving the problem: “The UK is yet again betraying its long-term EU partners and refusing to solve problems together with them” (*The Guardian*).

Lastly, some readers, from both *The Guardian* and *Večernje novosti*, shared the opinion that since Germany invited Syrians, migrants should be sent directly to Germany. For instance, a reader wrote: “Cheaper than the 175m long and 4m high fence would be to buy a one-way ticket to Germany for each migrant (*Večernje novosti*).” A reader from *The Guardian* expressed a similar opinion: “If she [Angela Merkel] wanted so many refugees she should have sent planes to get them and transfer to Germany. That way other European countries will not have to face dealing with unwanted people.”

However, what really differentiated the readers’ narrative from the news narrative was the way readers favored sending migrants to Germany as the solution for the other Europeans states. In this narrative, they tried to make sense of why Germany declared its “open door” policy. This micro narrative was built upon stories of German low birthrate and need of labor, and the causes of the low birth-rate. For instance, one reader wrote:

I’ve got a serious question, or questions, for the Germans on here. We keep hearing that Germany needs immigration of the order of 500,000, per year in order to keep the economy going and to provide for an aging native population. I read somewhere that the German birthrate is the lowest in the world, and well below the replacement rate. So my questions are: Why have you efficiently given
up on more convention means to population replacement (aka “having kids”)? Do you think that importing people en masse from cultures that might not share your attachment to liberal western values just so that those now in late middle age can enjoy a comfortable retirement, with no thought to the effect it might have on future generations, is necessarily a good idea?” (*The Guardian*)

Similarly, another reader accused Germany of “committing a national suicide solely in order to satisfy the hedonistic impulses of the current cohort (*The Guardian*).”

Another reader agreed that Germany’s solution to the low birth rate is to “import” children, and extended the question into why Germany does not import European workers:

Also, the EU countries have an average rate of unemployment of 12% so Germany has a vast pool of possible workers within Europe, yet they choose to try to get their workers from outside of Europe. Why? Because Germany is looking for cheap labor at the expense of helping their citizens have more children and helping their fellow Europeans (*The Guardian*).

By defending Germany’s choice, a different reader responded that German women had chosen not to have children:

Because the life quality here [in Germany] is too good. Richer people have fewer children. And —via the welfare state—Germany is about the richest nation…. It is also a scientific nation and that mindset is vastly different to the romanticizedchildcentric culture the neo-con states like the US and UK try to instil…. Also Germany is a nation that is very big on dignity and equality, for historic reasons. Forcing your women to breed for the state is clearly outside of both of those.
In a similar manner, a reader posted: “If German women don’t want lots of children then there is not much you can do about it. They’re not baby making machines” (The Guardian).

In the above posts, readers not only drew a distinction between countries in Europe that encourage higher birth rates (and therefore implied that those states affect women’s rights to reproduction) and those that do not, but also subtly implicated that the “child-bearers” should be imported from outside of Europe. This argument implied that Middle Eastern women were less emancipated than German women and therefore, the ones who accept being “baby making machines” compared to educated and independent German women who reject being treated as child making machines.

The blame game: border porosity and the numbers of accepted migrants.

While in the frame “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security” readers mostly discussed whether they supported or disapproved of Hungary’s decision to fortify Europe’s border with a fence, in this narrative readers focused on blaming the measures taken predominantly by Germany and the UK. This narrative was found only in comments posted in The Guardian.

For instance, a reader suggested that poor border and migrant management in Greece and Hungary caused the preventive measures Germany and Austria have adopted:

German and Austrian border controls were installed because Greece and Hungary did not register those refugees. If you don’t register them, you lose track of them. If you lose track of them, you can’t address the problem properly. (The Guardian)
Other readers blame Germany and its inviting policy toward migrants. For instance, a reader used a question to call attention to Germany’s unpreparedness for migrants who are coming but are not refugees from Syria:

Shouldn’t Germany have put in a repatriation in place BEFORE they opened the floodgates? I believe at the moment failed Asylum seekers are not forcibly removed from Germany, presumably they disappear into the black market or more often try their hand in other countries. (The Guardian)

Another reader’s post expressed a disagreement with Merkel’s politics and belief that the “open door” policy would actually place a burden on other countries:

Merkel made what was rapidly turning into a crisis into a massive disaster. Controlling them? Controlling? What fascist crap is that? She’s handpicking a few for Germany and then dumping the problem on Serbia, Macedonia, Italy and Greece with the great help on building concentration camps (The Guardian).

Readers used capital letters or the strategy of word repetition to criticize with contempt the political decisions Germany was making. Similarly, another user disguised a forbidden offensive word with two asterisk signs to express rage against with Germany’s policy. This reader expressed disagreement with Merkel’s open invitation to Syrian refugees followed by the contradictory decision to re-instate the border controls:

What a mess. Merkel makes a pronouncement, goes whoops that was a cock up, and then says ‘I f**ked up but I am so righteous and in the name of European unity you will fix the mess I made.’ Surprise, surprise other countries have said you created the problem you fix it. (The Guardian)
Overall, narratives about Germany’s responsibility were highly contested between those claiming that “the EU and Germany ignored the problem in Greece for 5 years… and they are therefore massively culpable (for the migrant situation),” and the claim that “Germany did not cause this crisis in the first place and already has done a lot to accommodate people” (*The Guardian*).

However, Germany is not the only country blamed for inefficient handling of the situation. Readers also accused the UK of stepping away from the migrant problem and dealing with it in a very lukewarm manner. For instance, a reader posted:

The British approach is to ‘talk’ about taking 20,000 over 5 years, then do nothing, and wait until the electorate forgets all about the refugees and Camerons ‘promise.’ Four thousand Syrians a year for a country as wealthy as the UK. (*The Guardian*)

Another reader pointed out that Germany and Britain cannot be compared because Germany has a humanitarian approach, whereas the UK wants to evade more direct involvement: “Britain can’t be put in the same league as German humanitarian and logistical greatness. Always amusing how stingy Britain think she has the moral upperhand with everyone else” (*The Guardian*).

Whereas some readers focused on who should be accepted to Europe and what is the danger behind a more open access, the others defended the UK as not stingy but a generous nation that helps those in need financially and from a distance. A reader used cynicism to defend Britain’s approach in monetary aid to refugee camps: “Stingy Britain has donated more money to Syrian refugee camps than the whole of the rest of Europe together” (*The Guardian*).
The blame game narrative in readers’ co-construction of the frame of “borders as politically negotiated spaces” was focused not only on arguments about whether some countries were making good decisions about migrants, but also on how individual countries’ moves at the national level affect other European countries. In this narrative, readers participated in the discussion to reveal the reasons behind the approaches certain European countries adopted.

To sum up, in the frame of “borders as politically constructed spaces,” readers focused on blaming the United States as well as European countries for the current situation but they tended to emphasize either the historical context of responsibility for the current situation in Syria or to offer solutions. While only readers of The Guardian and Večernje novosti participated in the discussion, it is still evident that the readers’ focal points in some of the narratives differed. For instance, Serbian readers tended to focus on the EU and US responsibility for the current situation with migrants, and to blame capitalism for global migration tendencies. They also tended to create micro-narratives that were highly contextualized in the historical relations with Western countries and the neighboring countries. By bringing into their discussion historical events that forced Hungarians to seek shelter in other European countries, Večernje novosti readers implied that the Europeanization of Hungary made them forget important historical moments during which Hungarians were forced to flee their own home country.

Moreover, whereas the journalistic frame did not offer a solution to what they saw as the crisis of global migration, readers tended to suggest that flying migrants directly to Germany or the UK would solve problems for the countries that did not want migrants. The other suggestions included sending migrants back either to fight in their own
countries or to settle in other Middle Eastern, predominantly Muslim, countries. The analysis of different proposals revealed that migrants were constantly othered as different people who do not belong to the European space. Readers’ narratives also suggested that migrants should be kept out of Europe, and even in the narratives about Germany’s open door policy, readers engaged in a dialogical effort not to embrace Germany’s humanitarian approach but to explain why Germany wanted to rely on the non-European outsiders when the European outsiders could serve the same purpose of providing labor.

**Discussion and Conclusion: Reader Comments’ Frames and Design, Production, and Distribution of Multiple Modes**

In this chapter, I discussed the frames of borders constructed in readers’ comments and the relationships between those frames and the frames constructed by journalists. By posting comments beneath the news articles, readers of *The Guardian* and *Večernje novosti* generally supported the three dominant news frames - “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security,” “borders as lived spaces,” and “borders as politically negotiated spaces”—constructed by journalists to support the justification of tighter border controls as a measure to keep the European space safe. However, when negotiating the frames of borders, readers co-constructed the three frames by both enriching and challenging the understanding of migrants as spatial and cultural outsiders. Compared to journalists, readers both provided and demanded additional contextual information about the causes of global migration and the potential solutions.

Readers’ involvement in frame construction demonstrates the importance of the existing online public sphere for the mobilization of a diversity of voices. Readers either complicated the interpretive repertoire within the frame or incorporated new sources and
narratives that journalists did not cover. For instance, readers negotiated the journalistic frames by emphasizing the importance of social, economic, cultural, and historical contexts of global migration and mobility, an angle generally neglected in news reports. They shifted focus both to hyperlocal or global issues that journalistic frames were lacking. Readers thus offered new perspectives and asked for broader understanding of permanent solutions to global migration. Moreover, while journalistic frames, by focusing on Europeanization, made a clearer demarcation between the EU member states, Schengen states, and those who are not members, readers’ comments—especially in *The Guardian*—included references to non-EU member states, such as Serbia, as part of the definition of European space.

In a study on framing migrants in Greek traditional news reports and users’ comments placed under those reports, Milioni and Vadratsikas (2016) found that Greek readers offered new angles and differently assigned salience to particular issues and topics. They also noted that readers’ comments included hate speech and failed to contribute to a more open discussion. In the present study, I argue that in the multimedia online environment, audience members, when allowed by news organizations’ platforms, do contribute to a more open discussion—especially by verbalizing and negotiating meanings that journalists constructed through visuals. While some readers’ comments included slurs and pejorative expressions the analysis has, arguably, shown that the more explicit and/or derogative language mirrored cues that readers had been exposed to, predominantly through the news packages’ visuals. To wit, readers’ narratives that focused on othering migrants as culturally different and brought race, religion, and gender into the online debate did not coincide precisely with the verbal mode in the
journalistic discourse. Yet, they were supported by, and they themselves supported, visuals that often communicated racial, gendered, and religious appeals. For instance, xenophobia, Islamophobia, or racism, as socially constructed phenomena, were simultaneously present in the news, in readers’ comments, in official sources quotes, and, more covertly, in visuals.

Additionally, readers not only offered new angles but also provided counter-narratives about national sovereignty and homeland, what is considered to be safety, and who belongs where in the globally (dis)connected world. Readers also used the debate online to enable readers to support their claims and provide local or historical examples, quotes from other media texts, and links to media texts and EU institutional documents. Audience members with different educational backgrounds participated in the public debate, predominantly on The Guardian website, and challenged other readers to fact check and support their claims with official sources statements. Challenging misinformation in readers’ comments was present also on the Večernje novosti website, as in cases when readers corrected other readers’ claims that Hungarians were descendants of the Huns but still did not provide links to official websites as the proof of fact checking. Fact checking was used as a tool to check what other readers had said, whereas journalistic narratives were complicated through readers’ different interpretations of news frames.

Page design and the comments’ accessibility were important factors that not only affected the frame-construction but also limited the way readers’ comments were perceived as valuable in news production. In both news outlets, the higher status or value of the news articles was communicated by their prominent placement on the web page.
On the other hand, the lower status or value of readers’ comments was signaled in the placement of the readers’ comments at the bottom of the article or page. The lower status of those comments compared to that of the news articles was also communicated in the layout, where comments were selectively visible and required readers’ further engagement through additional tab clicking in order to access readers’ contributions to the news text.

In the case of The Guardian, the comments section was positioned not only beneath the related article but also below the “related stories” section. The average reader, without any intention to even contribute to the discussion was allowed to see only six comments: two initial comments that started the thread and two of the comments in each thread. The visibility of the other six comments was conditioned by the effort to click on the “click for more comments tab.” A similar page layout was used in Večernje novosti. Readers’ comments were positioned below the related article, but also below the news from the same section. Readers were allowed to see only 10 comments without the requirement to click on the “click for more comments” tab. Therefore, the page design was simultaneously interactive and user friendly when it came to encouraging readers to interact with the news text. On the other hand, even when readers’ comments were allowed, they were placed low on the page and were given a much less friendly interface for readers’ involvement in the comments section. Thus, the design of the page assigned low value to readers’ contributions in the news production processes.

In sum, the potential of reader participation to broaden the debate, to incorporate a wider range of angles in the story, and to open space for negotiation of frames constructed by journalists are avenues through which news audiences can enrich public
dialogue. Across the selected news outlets, as the findings of the present study show, frames constructed by readers did support the news frames, although, at the same time, a significant contribution of readers was the complication and contestation of the narratives that supported the news frames. Audience members participated in the interpretation of news by offering new perspectives and expanding and complicating the existing narratives. However, readers also participated in the broader process of news production by fact-checking other readers’ posts and by answering the questions that other readers posted. In addition to visuals, readers’ comments both enriched and challenged the contextual information that migrants were constructed as spatial and cultural outsiders and gave grounds to critique policy decisions. This potential of readers’ contrition should not be overlooked by journalists, but instead, should be used as guides to what issues journalists should address or contextualize in their reports.

Chapter 6 will discuss how these co-constructed frames, and especially the interplay of different modes, relate to broader discourses of the European Union as a politicized space of inclusion and exclusion. By addressing how journalistic discourses reinforce notions of inclusion and exclusion of people and spaces outside of the European Union, I will also explicate the ideologies supported by the use of particular modes and framing patterns. In analyzing the discourse and ideologies that facilitate material and symbolic practices of exclusion and inclusion, I will also unpack the social relations of power that are enacted in the ensemble of different modes and framing patterns.
Chapter 6

News Framing and the Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion:

Ideological Implications

This chapter addresses how the dominant frames and narratives of borders co-constructed by journalists and readers mobilize and articulate broader ideologies that facilitate material and symbolic practices of inclusion and exclusion of people and spaces in and from the European Union. A vast body of scholarly research on the EU has focused on the political, news, and everyday discourses and practices that encourage inclusion and exclusion (Martínez Guillem, 2011; 2015; Tonkin, 2015; Wodak; 2007). This chapter contributes to that conversation by elucidating how the news framing of the 2015 migrant crisis, through structural features of news reporting and the interplay of communication modalities, relates to broader discourses on the European Union as a politicized space of both inclusion and exclusion. While Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 identified news frames and discussed framing in terms of the thematic macro-propositions advanced in frames and their supporting narratives, Chapter 6 focuses in more detail focuses on (a) how the institutionalized practices of journalists and readers, individually and in interaction, re-contextualized the modes’ meaning potential to enable particular relations of power, and how they shape politics of news production, and (b) how multimodal discourses of inclusion and exclusion favor particular perspectives and thus, reproduce larger ideologies of Orientalism, xenophobia, racism, and balkanism.

The European Union was created as a supranational entity in which European nation-states that share common interests, culture, and history, partially transfer their sovereignty to the supranational level of the Union. Members of the EU participate in the
creation of policies in the areas of security, freedom, and justice for all member states and citizens (Fontaine, 2014; Herakova, 2009). In institutional discourses, the aim of this political entity is defined as one geared to maintaining and strengthening regional economic interests and social solidarity while respecting the cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity of the members of the EU. Member states maintain their national cultural identities and exercise the right sovereignty, but they also act together and use the Union to “speak with a single voice” and heighten their influence on the global level (Fontaine, 2014, p. 4). Underlying the official rhetoric, this discourse constructs a notion of the EU, and of European identity, as a space of inclusion, cooperation, solidarity, unity, and cultural openness.

In tension with this discourse, EU institutional rhetoric and practices have also defined the European space in opposition to “others,” that is, outsiders positioned beyond the boundaries of the Union who must meet strict criteria and pass a test to become eligible to join the EU club (Wodak, 2007). Therefore, the EU’s project Europe promotes inclusion of many European nations and free borderless space, while at the same time strengthens the external border to protect its privileged space and people from perceived outsiders (Tonkin, 2015). A restrictive and exclusionary European identity is constructed through the simultaneous exclusion of certain groups of people on one hand, and, on the other hand, the negation and the rejection of the idea that exclusion is based on discriminatory and exclusionary practices of the other (Martínez Guillem, 2011). In this context, the conceptualization of “others” includes European nations that are not members of the EU and that as potential candidates for membership must show that they follow EU-imposed rules and embrace the same values of the Union. The categorization
of “others” also includes individuals, particularly migrants who “trespass” the EU territory, and are framed as a “problem” to European security (Fontaine, 2014).

The main argument in this chapter is that in the context of a perceived migrant crisis in 2015, framing patterns employed by both journalists and readers promoted a discourse of exclusion through the deployment of politically and culturally marked categories that labeled people and spaces as more or less desirable and acceptable. Such bordering practices, through multimodal discourse, created multilayered material and symbolic practices of exclusion. I am also arguing that, in this news coverage, the association of the EU and Europe with values like cooperation, unity, and solidarity supported conditional or limited practices of inclusion. Through the assignment of limitations and conditions for inclusion, the discourse diminishes any inclusion effort to the point of serving, in the end, as a strategy of exclusion.

This chapter will be structured as follows. I will present, first, a discussion of the politics of news production and of the way power is enacted in the co-construction of news frames by focusing on professional journalistic practices, and the interaction between journalists and audiences in the online environment. In the second section of the chapter, I will address the way framing patterns and multimodal news discourses enable both material and symbolic practices of inclusion and exclusion of people and spaces to and from the European space. I will end the chapter by providing the conclusion and the broader implications of the framing patterns that reinforce ideologies of xenophobia, Islamophobia, racism and exclusion based on cultural differences, and thus, contribute to the limitation of the institutional protection of migrants and to the normalization of violence over and mistreatment of migrants, and affect the global rise of rightist parties.
and their promotion of anti-immigrant policies.

**Power in the Co-Construction of News Frames: Politics of News Production**

Online news articles are part of interactive online communication networks that enable a relationship between technologies, communication, and power for a variety of social actors (Castells, 2007). Online articles are interactive spaces where journalists, their sources, and readers co-construct frames and negotiate power relations. These negotiations of power operate through different practices of meaning making. In this section of the chapter, two practices will be highlighted: professional journalistic practices—conventions, norms and routines of news gathering, writing and reporting—and the interaction between journalists and audiences in the online environment as a negotiation of power that shapes discourse. Both practices manifest the political nature of news production.

**Power Enacted Through Professional Journalistic Practices**

News stories are the sites in which various social groups, institutions, and their ideologies negotiate power in the process of constructing social reality. The mediated reality, as well as the process of framing as a form of reality mediation, is highly influenced by journalistic norms and routines. For instance, news texts are highly structured scripts that focus on event storylines organized in a way to provoke drama, action and emotions (Pan & Kosicki; 1993; Van Dijk, 1988; Van Grop, 2005). In traditional articles, the lead, an introductory paragraph that features the most newsworthy information, has a prominent placement immediately after the headline. Therefore, the prominent placement of a headline and a lead signals the newsworthy angle of the story, placing the verbal mode as the dominant one. The meaning of a news event, according to
van Dijk (1988), is suggested in the headline. The headline’s role is to attract readers’ attention and to provide the main point of the article. Thus, the wording of headlines played a crucial role in framing borders as spaces that need to be protected from invading migrants.

For instance, Deutsche Welle’s headline “Hungary to erect anti-migrant border fence” already positioned borders as part of an offensive strategy. Similarly, Večernje novosti’s headline “Hungarians are erecting the Great Wall of China as a protection against migrants” provides the justifying undertone (protection against) for the news article. Sometimes, quotations are featured in the headline to convey the dominant tone. For instance, in one out of two articles that featured migrants’ voices in The Guardian, editors did not choose a quote about the hardships of migration but used, instead, this quote: “This wall, we will not accept it.” The complete quotation, with more elaboration, is placed at the very end of the article, preceded by many other migrant recollections of why they fled their countries or of the challenges they faced on the journey. However, by quoting a defiant voice in the headline, editors give a negative slant to the entire article.

In addition to the verbal mode in headlines and leads, the selection and composition of photos can complement or even dictate the construction of frames. Compared to traditional print news, in almost all of the online articles the photos are placed under the headline. This very placement assigns visuals an important role, more significant than the one they have in print media, where a headline and a lead would precede other parts of the news article. For instance, in Jutarnji list the headline “Hungary closed its border with Serbia! On their way to Austria and Germany, refugees can take a route via Romania or Croatia…” precedes a photo collage with photos of the
Hungarian army protecting the barbed-wire fence and of workers building the fence on the railroad tracks. In this case, Jutarnji list communicated the consequences of Hungary’s decision in the headline, intensifying the outcome with photos of a militarized, sealed border. Thus, headlines and visuals together can set the tone of the overall news text.

Live blogs offer a different layering of meanings. The structure of live-blogs, featuring not the most newsworthy but the latest information first, has prompted different layout and design conventions that challenge the traditional domination of the written mode in a news story. Live-blogs are often used to report breaking news (or news as it unfolds) event by event, in reverse chronological order. This new layout, with time stamps placed at the beginning of each news entry, communicates the status of the news according to timeliness. In the selection I analyzed, live-blogs about the events on the external EU borders framed migrant arrivals and border protection as events of high importance that provoke drama and intense emotions. The focus on the most recent developments of a news story also legitimizes neoliberal discourses that value time as a scarce resource and allow readers to consume just the newest information.

In live blogs, visuals and tweets have also changed textual dynamics because they assign more relative power of signification to the visuals. For instance, The Guardian’s layout of live-blogs, in addition to placing a photo or a video underneath the headline, features the same visual at the top of each page of the live-blog. In The Guardian, the photo of a migrant who resists the border closure, published beneath the headline “Refugee crisis: Hungary uses teargas and water cannon at Serbia border,” assigns negative meaning to migrants as a group that does not respect laws. In this case, the
prominent placement of the visual image as well as its frequency—as they appear in a mixture of traditional visuals taken by photojournalists, as well as in tweets—assigns more power to the visual mode in blogs than in traditional news articles.

The power of visuals, whether published in traditional or live-blog news formats, lies in their believability and feature to direct readers’ attention to a certain aspect of a culture (Moritz, 2011). Furthermore, the photo angles and the ways photos are cropped assign different levels of power to people in the photos. For instance, migrants are almost exclusively portrayed from a distance in wide and medium shots. These types of shots dehumanize migrants since the audience members’ attention is focused on their bodies instead of their full humanity (Celeste, 2011). Compared to distant and wide-shot photos of powerless migrants, a powerful status is assigned to politicians whose photos are exclusively portraits or medium shots. Long-distance photos of faceless and nameless migrants, even though usually bigger in size, carry negative meaning and communicate the minimal power migrants hold. In contrast, close-up shots and portraits of politicians, usually with national and EU flags in the background, imply the higher status politicians have in the decision-making processes about border management.

Power status is also assigned through the different angles from which the photos are taken. Some of the photos that portray migrant families and evoke compassion and, at the same time, denigrate migrants because they are taken from the above-the-eye level perspective. This perspective of the positional superiority assigns more power to the viewers of the photos because they are looking down at migrants (Berger, 1981; Jewitt & Oyama, 2001). By looking down at migrants, viewers may perceive them as powerless and less worthy. Such images evoke feelings of pity and contempt, and socially define the
“us” group as dominant, culturally superior, and worthy of being in control (Steuter & Wills, 2011). Providing more close-ups or portraits of migrants, especially the portraits of women, and overall photos taken from the eye-level angle would enable different understandings of migrants as equal, worthy, and human.

In the processes of news gathering and reporting, journalists’ choice of sources of information also plays an important role in producing and reproducing power. In the articles I analyzed, the vast majority of quotes came from official sources – politicians, both on the international and the national levels, human rights organizations representatives, and other journalists or news organizations. In only two articles journalists quoted migrants. However, both articles, in The Guardian and Jutarnji list, gave male migrants voices to share personal accounts of their migration. By providing voices solely to the male migrants, journalists transferred power to them, marginalizing women’s experiences of mobility.

Journalists also used Twitter to add a variety of sources to their reporting. Nevertheless, Twitter was used only to add official sources rather than to give voices to migrants or unofficial sources at the borders. In effect, the analysis showed that journalists conformed to institutional practices and gave voices to authoritative and familiar sources, who, at the same time, guaranteed the validity of information (Tuchman, 1978). This heavy reliance on official sources, paired with the wide-shot photos of faceless and nameless migrants, empowered Europeans not only to make decisions about migrants’ mobility but also to speak for them instead of about them. When some of the official sources, especially those from non-governmental and human rights organizations, criticized the building of the fence and challenged the dominant narrative of border
management justification, their quotes were placed lower in the news article, signifying their secondary value or lower status vis-à-vis national and EU officials.

The ensemble of verbal and visual modes also assigns differential power to space. For instance, exterior spaces at the borders are presented as cluttered with migrant bodies, implying that numerous migrants are coming to invade the European space to which they do not belong. Even though photos of migrants are taken mostly in outdoor spaces, the composition and the angles of the photos never suggest that those spaces offer safety for migrants. Contrary to the representation of outdoor spaces in news articles on border management, the interior spaces of political chambers are constructed as signifiers of power. Those spaces are not crowded and do not suggest emotion or drama, as opposed to a set of photos of migrants protesting the border closure. Instead, they seem urban, clean, and organized, with staged interiors featuring flags that signify national and the EU control over an orderly decision-making process. The visuals of interior spaces in this selection assign the power to manage the exterior space of borders to politicians far away from the borders. Bordering practices are determined in the interior spaces. At the same time, exterior spaces are constructed as unsafe and violent spaces that need to be controlled.

**Power Relations between Journalists and Readers**

My analysis also revealed that despite the technology-encouraged, bottom-up content contribution practices, news production and framing in all five news outlets remained in control of journalists and editors (Bruns, 2005; Paulussen et al., 2007). Readers’ participation was controlled and limited to a single form of participation—the comments positioned under the news articles. Readers’ participation was controlled not
only in form, but also through the layout and design of the webpages. In the packages I analyzed, only two news outlets created space for audience interaction. In those two, Večernje novosti and The Guardian, news stories were placed on the upper part of the page, signaling the higher status of the news produced by professional journalists. Readers’ comments were placed below news articles, signaling the lower value of readers’ contributions. This lower value is also communicated in the design of the features that are meant to further readers’ engagement. In both Večernje novosti and The Guardian, readers who would like to contribute to the news content by providing comments have to register and accept the news organizations’ rules in order to be allowed to make a comment. Furthermore, only a limited number of comments is visible underneath the news article, which demands that readers click further if they are interested in reading more comments. In the case of The Guardian, the comment section is positioned not only beneath the related article, but also below the “related stories” section.

The average reader with no intention to contribute comments to the online discussion but who is interested in reading what others have posted is allowed to see only six comments at a time, two initial comments that started the thread and two of the subsequent comments in each thread. The visibility of these other six comments is conditioned by the effort to click on the “click for more comments tab.” A similar page design is used by Večernje novosti, where readers’ comments are positioned below the related article and below the news articles from the same section. Readers are allowed to see only 10 comments without the requirement to click on the “click for more comments” tab.
Engagement options to post or read the readers’ comments are cumbersome when compared to the much easier navigation of the news article. The lower value assigned to readers’ contributions, limited visibility of comments, and the strict editorial control of readers’ access to comment sections may have influenced the trend toward lower interest in participatory journalism. Readers’ participation decreased 20 percent from 2010 to 2016 in the United States (Mitchell et al., 2016; Purcell et al., 2010). During this time, control over the comments has increased and the commenting option was cancelled due to hate speech and toxic commentary (Prichard, 2016).

In sum, the analysis here demonstrates that in the online news production environment, journalists, editors, and official sources follow journalistic practices and routines to maintain a position of relative power over discourse production. While exercising power of signification, journalists, sources—and readers to a lesser extent—mobilize different modes to ascribe power positions to the different people and spaces they cover, as the next section will expose.

**Multimodal Discursive Practices of Inclusion and Exclusion**

In this section, I focus on composition and interdependence of different communication modes that support certain discourses and ideologies of inclusion in and exclusion from the EU space. I will unpack the discourses and ideologies that support inclusion of people and spaces, and then I will explicate the discourses and ideologies that facilitate exclusion of certain groups of migrants, followed by the arguments for exclusion of particular spaces from the EU space.
Multimodal Discursive Practices of Inclusion

Multimodal discursive practices of inclusion reproduce the ideological tension between Europeanness and Europeanization in terms of constructing people and spaces. In times of crisis and the perceived threat, this tension is manifested in the negotiation between the appeals to European humanitarian values and the respect for international rules for treatment of migrants, and the identification of those groups of migrants who are more acceptable than others. The notion of a compassionate and respectful Europe and Europeans are contested by the construction of a Europe of power that others migrants through practices of identification that determine who can be easily assimilated into European society. At the same time, the tension is created between the identification with the Union as a privileged space for certain members, and the identification with the geographical space of Europe that includes the non-EU members with the aim of keeping the non-Europeans out of the European space.

Selective inclusion of migrant people. The multimodal ensemble in the “borders as lived spaces” frame and in some counter-narratives of the “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security” frame communicate the value of accepting desperate migrants in need based on humanitarian principles and legal conventions. These frames and narratives perpetuate a meta-narrative of the EU as an inclusive and accepting space ruled by humanitarian principles and respect for international legal conventions guiding the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers.

First, these notions of European inclusiveness and selective inclusion are conveyed in news framing that personalized migrants’ stories and thus humanized them and their experiences. They are articulated through the sourcing of migrants’ personal
accounts and quotes, and photos of migrants accompanied with captions that include their names—a humanizing angle absent in most of the news stories I analyzed. The written text also supports the inclusion because it provides either personal accounts of migrants or journalists’ narratives about migrants’ hardships and reasons they had to leave their home countries, as discussed in Chapter 4. The visual vocabulary in narratives of hardship is composed of photos of smaller groups of migrants who are looking directly at the camera and, therefore, directly at the audience. The modes ensemble introduced only men, mostly in their 20s and 30s, who talked about their individual experiences of leaving their countries and struggling on their way to reach particular countries in Europe. While narratives and photos became discursive appeals to the humanity of Europeans, the absence of individual portraits or personality profiles with human interest limited the appeal of such emotional accounts to some extent. The images also reinforced the gender power relations by the inclusion of men’s voices and absence of women and their voices.

Furthermore, in written narratives that focused on migrants’ experiences – the reasons why they were forced to leave their homes, and the physical, mental, and monetary challenges on their way between crossings of different borders—the mentioning of migrants’ professions framed them as good and desirable migrants who would not use European state resources and welfare systems but, instead, would contribute to society. Notions of selective inclusiveness of desired migrants were suggested through the reporting of their higher educational background and professional status—e.g. a pharmacist, a doctor, a surgeon, a computer scientist, a sales manager, and a student were given voice in the coverage. The narratives about highly qualified migrants,
their economic status, class, and upward mobility constructed a hierarchical classification of migrants that positioned particular migrants as desirable and acceptable to the European societies (Celeste, 2011; Martínez Guillem, 2013).

The use of referential strategies in the process of naming in written texts was another strategy of selective inclusion of specific categories of migrants which was also achieved through referential strategies or the process of naming. In the articles published in June 2015, journalists from all five news organizations used the words “migrants” and “immigrants” most often to characterize the people they were writing about. After Germany’s proclamation of the “open door” policy for Syrians, migrants were more frequently referred to as “refugees” and “asylum seekers.” Often, these four words were used interchangeably. However, the labels “migrants” and “immigrants” were frequently accompanied with adjectives such as “economic” or “illegal.” This very ambiguous classification of migrants, based on the reasons for the migration and the legality of their mobility across borders, provided a leeway for the construction of certain migrants as acceptable (Syrian asylum seekers) or not acceptable (economic and illegal migrants) into the German, and to a lesser extent, European space.

A third discursive strategy that signaled selective inclusion was the identification of the migrants’ countries of origin. These also played a role in the news discourse about inclusion and desirability, with the labeling of Syrians as legitimate refugees who were therefore recognized as an acceptable group of migrants. Other than Syrians, unclear understandings of what nationalities were acceptable to the European space at times blurred the conditional inclusion based on the country of origin. The journalists’ ambiguity in labeling and categorizing migrants as those who do or do not deserve
European inclusiveness was mirrored in the readers’ comments. Readers supported a vague, conditional inclusion based on a strict differentiation between genuine and insincere refugees determined by legal categories. Those who were perceived as true asylum seekers or refugees were more likely to be deemed acceptable for inclusion while those who did not fit the category were labeled illegal, frequently equating illegal migrants with economic migrants.

It is worth noting that, overall, the verbal mode was also prominent in the construction of the institutional conditions for inclusion of migrants into the European space and on Europeans’ terms. As reported in the news, migrants had to be “controlled,” “registered,” and “fingerprinted” so that European authorities could file migrants’ data into a common EU database, keep records of them, and “direct” them to where they are allowed to go. This regulation of migratory flows, both by journalists and readers, was constructed as a pre-condition for inclusion based on terms of both the EU as a whole and the individual member states.

Visuals were a dominant mode of communicating the humanitarian dimensions of the selective inclusion. The selective inclusion of desirable and acceptable migrants in the European space was also achieved through placement of visuals, including visuals featured in the embedded tweets, of families and children that evoked readers’ empathy. For instance, in The Guardian, Deutsche Welle, and Jutarnji list, featured images included: families sleeping outdoors on the ground while waiting for the border-crossings to open; barefoot parents with sleeping children in their arms; a child with a teddy bear who was waiting to board a train; and children playing in a park while border patrol officers stood behind, controlling migrants’ crossings. Images like these humanized
migrants, especially families and children, and made their experiences tangible. These photos evoke readers’ emotions of sympathy for migrant families and understandings of their suffering. In the case of Serbian readers, the hardships migrant families were facing also evoked identification with migrants in the context of similar experiences of Serbs displaced from Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the NATO intervention in Kosovo. Readers’ comments expressing concern for migrants supported these visual images. In the comments, a specific focus on women and children reinforced the idea that those categories of migrants were less problematic and, therefore, controllable.

Visuals of migrant families and/or passive migrants who were walking in line or waiting at the border depicted migrants as desperate and helpless. By providing a sensory experience and evoking feelings, visuals expanded the scope of the verbal mode, which focused on providing factual information (Jancsary et al., 2016). Photography, as a mode that chronicles events in a realistic style (Colson, 2011), personalized the message and, at the same time, framed borders as spaces of hope. The portrayal of migrants as people with fears, desires, feelings, and hopes, who were positioned physically in the spaces of hope, enabled the possibility of a discourse on the transformative practices of migrants.

Lastly, Twitter as a multimodal tool was another discursive practice that enabled inclusion by expanding the diversity of sources and opinions. While politicians’ voices were quoted in news articles to promote the fence construction and tighter border management, tweets provided many counter-narratives coming from human rights organizations and the non-governmental sector. Although Twitter posts were not used to give migrants voices or to claim that migrants had human rights, they opened a space for
a discourse that criticized European xenophobia, anti-Muslim views, migrant treatment, and the overall lukewarm EU response to the fence erection. For instance, The Guardian included a tweet posted by Tirana Hassan, an Amnesty International director of crisis response, in which she criticized Hungary’s official politics toward migrants: “Army told us to leave #Roszke border and can’t photograph police. Helicopter buzzing, dogs, riot police. Europe’s response to ppl fleeing war?” Another of Hassan’s tweet showcased a photo of the sky and the fence, followed by the words, “Welcome to fortress Europe – literally #Hungary #Roszke.”

Counter-narratives were incorporated through the meaning potential that multimodality offers. Even though Twitter’s current role is to provide many-to-many communication that creates hyper-publicity (Faina, 2012; Van Dijck, 2012), journalists used it in a different way: as a tool that brought in the voices of criticism and the promotion of inclusion. In this case, Twitter was used as a part of the bordering strategy that, as van Houtum and van Naerssen (2002) claimed, rejecting othering. By embedding tweets that questioned or objected to the othering migrants and criticized existing bordering practices, journalists enabled a discourse of political inclusion.

In sum, the discourse on selective inclusion of migrants was articulated through an interplay of verbal and visual modes that constructed migrants as an acceptable group when they were identified as highly qualified people who would not drain the host country’s resources, or as vulnerable and non-problematic groups. By utilizing the naming strategy, journalists and the sources they cite categorized migrants as refugees and asylum seekers, another set of categories to identify groups that were more acceptable based on the reasons they fled their home countries. Lastly, selective inclusion
was also constructed through European voices that criticized the control of global migration flows as expressions of xenophobia, Islamophobia, and migrant mistreatment. By including tweets in the news reports, journalists also used Twitter as a mode and offered alternatives to the othering of migrants and opened a space for a discourse on a compassionate and respectful Europe.

I argue that these discursive strategies that portrayed migrants as people in need and appealed to European humanitarian values and respect for international rules for the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, served the interests of a neo-colonial order that deployed discourses of paternalism in which the good colonial master helped the subordinate subject in need. However, such humanitarian gestures were selective; in this case, desperate migrants in need were deemed more worthy of assistance if they could provide for themselves and contribute to the European society, or if they were easily controllable, and thus, could be easily integrated and moldable into European cultural standards.

**Limited inclusion of European spaces.** In contemporary news and academic discourses, the vision of Europe as a political and economic entity is often reduced to the European Union. This loosely defined community of 28 independent states not only holds power in terms of geographic control but also represents normative, institutional power (Gündüz, 2010). The Union was founded on the principles of freedom, democracy, the protection of human rights, and the rule of law (“Treaty on European Union,” 1992). Its goals were to provide security and foster a collective identity (Judt, 2005). The EU and its external boundaries are typically set by the member states’ national territories; these territorial boundaries have often come to define the “European” space. However, in the
discourse analyzed, the terms “EU” and “Europe” were used interchangeably, creating an ambiguous construction of the European space as a malleable space whose boundaries are contested and negotiated in time of crisis.

In the multimodal news discourse examined, different narratives across all three frames—and especially in the frame “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security”—promote a selective inclusion of territories as part of an imagined European space, regardless of the EU membership status. However, this type of selective inclusion took place only in times of great political turmoil when the EU was lacking a unilateral stance about the increase of migrants arrival and their treatment. News narratives and the narratives constructed by readers loosely defined Europe as the space at large (without reference to individual countries) to which migrants arrived after leaving Turkey. Narratives that justified the fence as a necessary protection of the European space included non-member states’ territories in the definition of European space. For instance, even though the building of the fence geographically placed Serbia and Macedonia—both non-EU members on the Balkan route—outside of the European space, the ambiguity within which news writers and readers used the term “Europe” enabled practices of inclusion of these countries in the discourse. This instance of discourse included all European territories, based on a geographical definition of Europe, and set boundaries only in opposition to non-Europeans who were arriving at the European space.

In storylines and quotes from both supporters and critics of the fence, journalists and sources used the terms “EU” and “Europe” interchangeably, often implying that countries in the border zone actively participated in the defense of the European security. Readers, especially The Guardian readers, in their comments mentioned Serbia and
Macedonia, along with other EU member states, when they discussed the “European” solution of the crisis. They also objected to the solution of “shipping migrants out” to the EU non-member states and, instead, proposed sending migrants outside of “Europe.” In addition to acknowledging Germany’s open door policy, readers argued that the best solution for Europe would be sending migrants to their home countries, or to other Muslim or Middle Eastern countries. Even when Večernje novosti readers resisted the EU conditions for Serbia’s membership, they did not offer any other future for Serbia that was different from the European path.

Thus, in the conceptualization of European borders as spaces for the protection of Europe as a whole, journalists and readers did not predicate their concept of “Europe” on a division between member states and non-member states. This was evident in the use of maps in the multimodal ensemble. In the majority of the maps, European countries west of Turkey were usually marked in the same color, signifying a united European space.

This definition of European space has significant ideological implications. It activated a discourse that enabled non-EU member states to claim their belonging to Europe. In the historical expansion of the EU, the enlargement process gradually constructed Central and East European countries as desirable EU members, but conditioned those countries’ membership on the learning of and adherence to prescribed European ways before they could be admitted to the EU. Before the first enlargement into the Central and Eastern European space in 2004, the potential candidates had to prove that they would obey EU legislative decisions and respect the principles of democracy, liberty, and human rights (Fontaine, 2014; Tonkin, 2015). The same expectations are set up for the current candidate countries. In this context, the identification of non-EU
members with the imagined European space in news discourse enables countries such as Serbia to assert its belonging to a common European future (Judt, 2005).

This is a significant discursive practice if one considers that the definition of the European space has been historically rooted in the conceptualization of the Balkan countries as a border zone of Europe (Judt, 2005; Mazower, 2000). The status of borders states, no matter whether they are inside or outside of the external EU borders, carries the marks of vulnerability and pride (Judt, 2005). Judt argued that throughout history, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, and Romania claimed the status of defenders of civilized Europe. Hungary and Croatia, in particular, as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, were populated by Christians and served as defensive zones for protecting Europe from the Ottoman Turks (Judt, 2005). In this sense, the current narratives of Hungarian politicians in favor of erecting a fence perpetuate the idea that Hungary continues to maintain a protective barrier against the arriving non-Europeans.

In the rhetoric of Serbian politicians, in particular, borders are conceptualized as spaces for inclusion and for the generation of a position of power that they lack, as Serbia does not officially belong to the EU space. By calling out to European countries for solidarity in solving the migration problem (as reported in The Guardian and Večernje novosti), they echo a main postulate of the EU. Thus, the news discourse analyzed supports the political position of Serbia’s officials who try to prove to the EU that Serbia accepts and promotes EU values and therefore is worthy of membership in the EU. The interplay of modes – photos, written text, and videos embedded in tweets—conveys the idea that Serbia treats migrants as a temporary problem that can be used as a way to convince the EU that Serbia plays by the rules and engages in appropriate European
behavior.

As suggested above, the interchangeability of the terms “Europe” and “the European Union” promotes the spatial inclusion of non-EU member states in the conceptualization of Europe in times of crisis. However, in news discourse, this inclusive space was constructed with some variations that were, arguably, shaped by the external conditions and discourses that conformed to the different statuses regarding EU membership and membership in the Schengen club. For instance, Hungary, an EU member since 2004, and a member of the Schengen zone of free movement since 2007, claimed the position of European defender against arriving others and justified its building of fence on the border with Serbia as a necessity to protect the European space of free movement. Hungary’s government framed the legality of the fence as a lawful means aligned with international laws, as did the dominant frames in the news discourse. The country’s EU and Schengen status enabled the right-of-center Hungarian government to make decisions without a fear of further EU conditioning to adopt necessary laws. Croatia, on the other hand, as the newest EU member, in 2013, but still in the process of meeting the requirements for the Schengen area membership, is more lenient regarding the position of the core EU countries, especially Germany. Croatia’s officials underlined the country’s belonging to the EU space, as the space of human rights and basic principles of solidarity. Therefore, Croatia’s politicians, as it was visible in the news coverage I analyzed, frequently highlighted the country’s preparedness and willingness, from both humanitarian and legal standpoints, to facilitate migrants who were passing through to reach Slovenia, Austria, and Germany. Lastly, Serbia, a non-EU member country with EU membership aspirations, valued EU regulations over international ones.
Additionally, Serbia’s officials, as quoted in the news coverage, highlighted Serbia’s place within the European space, a space in which Serbia provided aid to migrants and, thus, obeyed the EU laws and protected human rights.

In their official rhetoric, as the news analysis showed, European countries, not matter their EU membership status, in this time of migrant “crisis” focused inward by making all European nations participate in fortifying the “fortress Europe” with the aim of safeguarding European values. To this purpose, European countries abandoned their self-sufficiency and territorial integrity, and instead, embraced the practice of dealing with migrants on the supranational level. This response reproduced the efficiency the nation-states evidenced under the framework of EU larger institutions, and modified their sovereignty, territoriality, control of the means of violence, and administration (Guibernau, 1999). The negotiation of borders and re-definition of the united European space in this time of turmoil has suggested that the European countries as the post-traditional nation states have modified the understandings of who belongs to Europe as a way to remain sustainable while undergoing the effects of different globalization processes. They focused less on the national territorial integrity and transferred the backbone of European security to the external border region states, both EU and non-EU members, with the aim of protecting Europe as a whole. Only as a mechanism to stop the inflow of invading non-Europeans did EU member states include the countries on the Balkan route and their citizens under the idea of European citizenship to strengthen political, economic, and social interdependence as a way to keep the whole of Europe safe. The EU – a nation without states, as Guibernau (1999) defined it - in the times of crisis did manage to instill a strong sense of European identity among both EU and non-
EU members. Therefore, the news discourse implied that the inclusion of non-EU spaces in the understanding of the meaning of Europe was conditioned by the expectation that strengthening of and interdependence between EU member states and the non-EU members would benefit all sides in protecting the European space from non-Europeans.

To sum up, the news frames co-constructed by journalists and readers framed borders as a means of controlling the inclusion both of people and spaces into the privileged European space. The limited material and symbolic inclusion of certain categories of people constructed as desirable and acceptable migrants, and the selective inclusiveness of certain spaces of non-EU member states, I argue, is a part of the strategy of exclusion. By including certain categories of people and spaces, journalists, their sources, and readers were claiming the space marked as the space of home and belonging that should be protected of the others. The emerging narratives of humanitarian values and critiques of xenophobia lacked any emphasis on European core values such as multiculturalism and dialogue. Journalists institutionalized the discourses of selective inclusion not only by emphasizing certain narratives but also by failing to use a variety of available modes to promote multiculturalism and encourage intercultural dialogue. Readers reproduced the same discourses of limited inclusion by applying pejorative language and by showing that they had no interest in establishing dialogue with migrants, except in the online dialogue mediated and limited by the journalists’ choice of migrants quotes. The lukewarm EU-level response to the announcement of the intention of building a wall on the border—reproduced in the news discourse overall—supported Hungary’s border management strategy and, therefore, became a part of a European covert exclusion disguised in discourses of limited inclusion.
Multimodal Discursive Practices of Exclusion

In this section I focus on multimodal discursive practices of exclusion of both people and spaces from the European privileged space. The politics of exclusion of people is affected by, and simultaneously affects, the broader ideologies of Orientalism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and racism, whereas the exclusionary practices of non-EU countries from the EU space are accomplished through tension between the identification with Europe and claiming Europeanness on one side, and rejecting the Balkan heritage by claiming the EU status, on the other, with the aim of maintaining the tiered-system of the European spaces and keeping the EU as the space of privilege.

Ideological Reproduction of Exclusion of Migrant People

All three frames, and the narratives they are built upon, reproduced ideologies of Orientalism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and racism. Multimodal discourses of bordering as well as material practices of bordering enabled very explicit practices of positioning Europeans as insiders confronting the arriving migrants—the outsiders. Material practices refer to the erection of the physical obstacle and the consequences the fences make on migrant bodies, whereas symbolic practices refer to the meanings of fences. However, materiality of the fences can only be apprehended through symbolic practices. These practices positioned migrants as unwanted others and perpetuated the material and symbolic exclusion in which “we” Europeans have to protect “our” lands, democracy, history, and other common values from “them,” the group that is invading European space and, thus, is perceived as a grave threat.

Othering irrational invaders: The echoes of Orientalism. Multimodal composition of the migrant “crisis” of 2015 across news outlets examined contributed to
the promotion of a positive European in-group identity by its opposition to the negative representation of out-group members, who, in this case, are migrants who are portrayed as a peril through verbal and visual constructions. Most of these constructions produce a split image of migrants: as a dehumanized mass that is passive and idle on the border spaces or as a violent mob that refuses to comply with European laws and rules when confronted by border control measures implemented by authorities. These types of images have been discussed as recurring rhetorical elements in Western colonial discourse across time. In general, the split image makes a group unintelligible to the European observer and ends up justifying Western intervention, authority, and control over the colonial and neocolonial subjects (Spurr, 1993).

These colonizing images, in the contemporary context, recontextualize Orientalism. Said (1979) has discussed Orientalism as a domain of knowledge about the East that generates the types of representations of peoples and places in the Middle East, North Africa, and the East that justify Western domination. A feature of this discourse is the division between Westerners as “we” and Orientals as “them,” perceived almost exclusively as Arabs and Muslims. This discourse about the Orient has contributed to the process of defining European space on the basis of a discursive contrast with spaces and people who are distant from Europe and perceived as radically different. However, othering is not just a process of binary construction. It is a process of maintaining relations of power in which Western European countries maintain colonizing practices toward subjects coming from cultures that, historically, have been deemed by European elites as needing to be enlightened, civilized, administered, and ruled by European powers (Said, 1979). The post-Sept. 11, 2001, regime of national and international
security reactivated Orientalist discourses, as did the massive arrival of migrants, primarily from Middle Eastern countries.

For example, in the journalistic coverage, the images of migrants who protested at closed border crossings in September of 2015 exemplified the recontextualization of Orientalism. Migrants were represented as violent and angry masses who were breaking European rules and order, and even picking and demanding to be allowed to reach the European country of their preference, with the sole aim of breaching the European space. These photos were always taken as wide shots and from the angles that show masses of migrants who outnumbered the border personnel, and who are trying to breach the fence.

In *The Guardian*’s coverage of the protest, an introductory photo in a live-blog showcased a shirtless migrant who looked as if he were throwing something over the fence to the Hungary side. In the photo, rocks, a bottle, and trash on the ground suggest that other migrants on the scene had thrown such objects toward the European authorities stopping them at the fence. The photo was placed below the headline on each of the five pages of the live-blog. Accompanied with the caption, “A migrant protests as Hungarian riot police fires tear gas and water cannon at the border crossing with Serbia,” the photo emphasized the migrants’ destructive and violent behavior and their provocation of a response by the riot police.

There were another eight photos in the same article, taken from behind the migrants’ backs and pointing toward the fence. In these photos, migrants were portrayed in action while throwing rocks and protesting in front of the border fence. Additionally, on the same page, *The Guardian* featured a video from Hungary’s daily tabloid Blikk featuring migrants with bandanas over their mouths who were kicking the fence. The
video was taken from the Serbia’s side of the fence and focused almost exclusively on migrants’ activities. In the beginning of the video clip, around 10 male migrants were shown kicking the door fence closer to them. The Hungarian riot police were positioned behind the second fence line that none of the migrant protestors came close to. In a 50-second video, the camera focused only for four seconds on the neatly organized manned defense lines of the riot police. Then, the camera panned out to the dense disorderly mob of migrants on the right-hand side of the frame. The video clip was introduced by a sentence: “This video shows how the Röske security border was breached,” and the video clip was accompanied with the captions: “Refugees force open gates at the Serbia-Hungary border.”

In contrast to the multiple images of protestors as aggressive and on the offensive, in the live-blog only two visuals focused on the Hungarian riot police. A photo and a brief video were featured in two tweets posted by Hungarian journalists. In the first photo, the riot police squad, equipped with protective helmets, body armor, and batons, took up the whole image. In the second visual, a short video clip, the camera briefly followed the squad from behind running toward the border. Journalist Aron Lukacs wrote in the tweet details not visible in the video clip: “#Hungary-an special forces #TEK is at #Roske border w 2 tanks” (my emphasis). The hashtag #TEK, which is the abbreviation for the Hungary’s counter-terrorism force, is a powerful signifier. However, The Guardian journalists did not provide any information about the fact that Hungary responded to the migrants’ protest with its counter-terrorism unit and military tanks to deal with migrants at the border.
Instead, tweets focused on migrants’ violent transgression rather than on Hungary’s heavy military response:

TV pictures continue to show refugees hurling missiles at police trucks firing water cannon in Horgos, on the Serbian side of the Serbia-Hungary border. One man was holding aloft a stick with a piece of clothing material alight. The protesters, mainly young men continue to pour water over their eyes and cover their faces, presumably suffering the effects of teargas. (The Guardian)

The shots taken from Serbia’s side of the fence that are focused on migrant bodies and their violent behavior, downplaying, and to some extent justifying, Hungary’s military response. At the same time, the featured visuals added a dramatic and ominous tone. The camera angles and distance the visuals were taken from, in concert with the verbal mode, constructed migrants as numerous bodies that were hard to control and to police. This othering of migrants as a menace, in verbal and visual modes, fueled the perception that migrants were the cause of the in-group loss of comfort at the borders and the interruption of the existing order.

At the same time, multimodal narratives of migrants protesting at the closed border-crossings enabled moments of rupture in the neocolonial discourse by offering an alternative to the views of migrants as violent criminals or helpless victims with a view of migrants as political agents acting collectively against the European power. Migrants resisted being told where to go and how to behave. They resisted and renegotiated borders as territorial lines, reassigning a new meaning to borders as spaces of hope. Even though some of the news frames of borders enabled transformative practices for migrants who define the safe spaces on their own terms, migrants were, simultaneously,
represented as outsiders who resisted the laws, rules, and values that were assigned to the safe space they are longing for. While migrants resisted the imposed definition of the European space and negotiated new meanings through the agency of choosing their own routes and disobeying the existing rules forced upon them, the insiders were assigned the position of power through the ability to ultimately control who was allowed in the European space.

**Multimodality and xenophobia.** The multimodal composition, overall, promoted a fearmongering message and emphasized the importance of border controls as a way of maintaining order and re-establishing the rules that regulated the mass mobility of the perceived unwanted others who threatened Europe’s order, normalcy, and values. The process of othering was fueled by xenophobic attitudes and behavior. Xenophobia entails hostility toward or vilification of foreigners by a community, nation, or ethnic group (Mikrakis & Triandayllidou, 1994; Triandayllidou, 2001). The fear and hostility, according to Triandayllidou are often associated with economic factors. The interplay of written text, photos, and videos of the examined news coverage, provided grounds for supporting xenophobia and further rationalizing the decision that in addition to strict regulations of borders, Europeans needed physical protection from outsiders who were a menace on multiple levels: as criminals, disease carriers, animalistic subjects, country hoppers, and terrorists. Thus, as the analysis of the coverage shows, Europeans’ hostility expanded the fear associated with economic factors, and instead, produced multiple dimensions of xenophobia.

The criminalization of migrants was most evident in the use of the term “illegal” to refer to them, a referential strategy used in all five news outlets. By positioning them
as attackers of European order and institutions, journalistic discourse criminalized migrants not only based on the fact that they crossed borders undocumented but also because of the behavior they exhibited once in the European space. Readers also participated in the othering of migrants based on their assumed, but not witnessed, criminal behavior. Migrants were constructed as thieves, burglars, and trespassers. Readers not only that mirrored the ways that the news criminalized migrants but they broadened the “criminal” category by name slurring and amplifying the negative portrayal of migrants.

Another label used to arouse xenophobia was identifying migrants as disease carriers. Journalists implied this primarily through visual images. In one article, images of rubber gloves and protection masks—details visible solely in the visual mode—suggested that guards did not only needed to protect and control national and EU borders, but they also need to protect their bodies and nations from possible diseases that outsiders might bring in. In this case, visuals were used as a metaphor of migrants as a plague or disease. Readers, too, verbalized references to disease and germ cues available in the visuals. For instance, a Večernje novosti reader expressed fear of consequences that the increased number of migrants might bring into Europe: “When uncontrolled, people who are coming represent a danger of importing many terrorists as well as diseases.” Linking migrants to germs or germ carriers historically has been a way of justifying the managing and controlling mechanisms that should prevent the contamination of space and people (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2011).

In addition, the repetition of images of migrants arriving in large numbers set the overtone of visuals and implied a latent understanding of migrants as animalistic subjects,
especially as insects or rats. The association of migrants with insects attacking crops, food and livestock, stigmatized migrants as inferior and in need of control (Steuter & Willis, 2011). The visual representation of migrants as pests that disrupts the social order and well-being warranted stricter border control strategies, including the treatment of migrants as cattle being directed by authorities, as in the case of a *The Guardian* report on 179 migrants who “jumped off the train in the countryside in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt” were “rounded up” and registered by the police in the areas where they left the train.

Interestingly, individual photos of migrants were not included in the journalistic discourse, reinforcing the view of migrants as a depersonalized mass. They were not pictured in news discourse individually, not even when they shared their stories about the challenges they were facing on their migratory route. Even when migrants were given voice in the verbal mode, photos of them were in a medium-shot style that showed several men sitting or crouching. Combined with the photos of families who were sitting or sleeping on the ground, taken from the above-the-eye perspective, these images assigned more power to the viewers of the photos because they were looking down at migrants. This positional superiority situated migrants as a powerless yet collective actors less worthy of acceptance. Celeste (2011) argued that visuals combined with the verbal mode contribute to the exclusion of migrants because the viewers do not see them as fully human. The perspective in the photos I analyzed encouraged the Western gaze in which Europeans were directed to look at the migrants’ sufferings from a safe distance (Celeste, 2011). The Western gaze was mirrored in the readers’ comments: readers in multiple threads expressed concerns about migrants’ hardships or questioned the authenticity of
their stories, but they never shared any experiences of engaging directly with migrants on
the roads or in the crop fields, or of providing help to migrants in any way, shape, or
form.

Another label used by journalists to invoke xenophobia was the reference to
migrants as “country-hoppers.” This construction characterized migrants as picky and
ungrateful and, therefore, not worthy of hospitality. The negative emphasis on migrants’
persistence to reach a desired country in Europe shifted focus from their suffering and
hardship, to their condition as needy, manipulative, and opportunistic. Readers, both in
*The Guardian* and *Večernje novosti*, mirrored the news frames and described migrants in
more derogatory terms such as “country-hoppers,” “jurisdiction shoppers,” and
“freeloaders.” The othering of migrants, effected by portraying them as parasites and
opportunists of the European welfare systems, justified not only the borders as a means of
precaution and security, but also rationalized the status of unwanted others for both
journalists and readers assigned to them.

In sum, the labeling of migrants as criminals, disease carriers, and country-
hoppers by journalists and readers served to stigmatize migrants as unwanted others
threatening the European order and undeserving of entering the European welfare
systems and secure space. Othering migrants by generalizing the complexity of their
identities and characterizing them as irrational, violent, illiberal, illogical, and incapable
of holding real values echoed post-colonial writing across historical contexts (Said, 1979;
Spurr, 1993). These images, at the same time, constructed a contrasting image of
European space and European people as rational, peaceful, liberal, and logical. This
verbal and visual vocabulary in the news examined not only supported migrants’
exclusion from the space that signified European values and qualities, but also enabled symbolic violence over migrants.

**European Islamophobia and racism.** Othering migrants by implicitly and explicitly pointing out that they are religiously, racially, ethnically, and culturally different from Europeans supported the enactment of Islamophobia and racism, which is in the European context often disguised in the form of othering based on cultural difference. The practice of othering based on cultural difference was intertwined with Islamophobia, xenophobia, and racism, and often featured an emphasis on European liberal values; this contrasted with aliens purported backwardness and promotion of gender inequality.

While racist ideologies contribute to subordinating, marginalizing, and exploiting some racial groups by excluding them from material and symbolic resources of the other racial groups (Hall, 1989; Martínez Guillem, 2018; Triandafyllidou, 2001), the exclusion of migrants as cultural aliens became a new, modern form of racism without an explicit mentioning of race (Gilroy, 1991; Rex, 1993). The contemporary rhetoric of the right-wing parties in Europe rationalized the exclusion of immigrants based on their different culture (Stolcke, 1995). The cultural differentiation, and therefore hostility and exclusion of foreigners, were supported by the assumption that national and foreign cultures are not only fixed, and bounded within the nation-states, but also incompatible (Stolcke, 1995). The notion of cultural difference, according to Stolcke, is built around the notion of xenophobia. Since the 1980s, the rightist parties in Britain and France have embraced the rhetoric of sociocultural and geopolitical exclusion with the aim of recontextualizing migration policies through the contemporary anti-immigrant sentiment and the
ascendance of rightist parties across Europe (Stolcke, 1995).

References to cultural difference in the examined news coverage predominantly came from official sources, especially in Hungary and Croatia. However, visuals, especially maps, seemed to be of crucial importance in designating cultural differences that migrants embodied because maps were not only used to visualize the long journey migrants endured, but also to mark distant places they were coming from. By designating geographically distant places like Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan, maps also signified the cultural remoteness and cultural difference migrants brought with them. Maps, therefore, located migrants in the distant places they belonged to, and served the purpose of othering migrants as those who do not belong to the European space.

Different types of visuals added to the perception of migrants as culturally different and incompatible. For instance, in the photos that focused on smaller groups of migrants, men and women would almost always be featured as separate groups. Even when migrants were given voices, the voices of migrant women in the articles were absent. This pattern resonated with the research of Georgiou and Zaborowski (2017), who argue that female voices are seldom heard, which thus implies that the male-oriented Muslim culture is contrasted against European liberal values of gender equality.

Whereas cultural differences were frequently latently constructed through visuals, readers overtly verbalized those cues. Readers in this research study discarded racial differentiation as one that does not exist in Europe; instead, they fully embraced the differentiation made concerning culture by valorizing cultural uniformity not only on the level of the nation-state, but also on the supranational level of a Europe opposed to the different and incompatible culture of migrants. Readers also built on the cultural
difference based on gender role perceptions to blame migrants for being “monstrously intolerant of minorities, women, plurality or liberalism (The Guardian),” and, therefore, constructing them as the ones who should be kept out of Europe, a space that is paradoxically perceived as the opposite – the space of tolerance for women, minorities and a plurality of ideas. Therefore, the xenophobia in the 2015 migrant crisis facilitated migrant exclusion in the news discourse based on the distant cultural locations (the Orient) from they were coming and the different cultures they brought with them. Fear of different cultures generated anxiety at the European level, and encouraged Europeans to materially and discursively claim and reclaim the space as exclusively their own.

Furthermore, racism in the multimodal discourses examined was accomplished particularly through a visual mode, and to a much lesser extent through a verbal mode. Racial visual coding, for instance, in The Guardian and Jutarnji list juxtaposed brown-bodies and dark-haired migrants at the fenced borders—no matter whether they were protesting the border-crossing closure or were just waiting—with fair-skinned and light—haired border guards both in Hungary and Croatia. The symbolic juxtaposition was frequently achieved in photos that positioned the border between the migrants and the guards. The physical barrier played the role of the symbolic divider between the Europeans and racially and ethnically different others.

A few photos published in The Guardian showed African migrants who were coming by boats to the shores of Italy and Spain. These photos implied that the difference between the black bodies of migrants and white Europeans is so obvious that it does not need close contrasting. However, the visual representation of lighter, but still different, Middle Eastern bodies was accomplished through the direct contrast to the fair skin and
light hair of the European people. Both representations racialized migrants and equated migrants with non-Europeans and non-white others (Martínez Guillem, 2018).

The communication of racial and ethnic difference was frequently paired up with discourses on religious differences. The focus on religious differences reinforced the ideology of Islamophobia. Islamophobia promotes othering based on religion and operates in ways that advances the view of Islam as a threat to European values by centering Christianity as an important European norm that gets attacked and threatened by Islam (Özyürek, 2009). Therefore, Islam is not seen as a European religion, but a religion of the “other” (Özyürek, 2005) and thus, Islamophobia is conceptualized as a means of fortifying Europe (Bunzl, 2005).

In the examined news coverage, religious difference was covertly communicated in The Guardian, Večernje novosti and Jutarnji list in the photos of women who were often featured wearing long robes and head scarves covering their hair. The frequency of images of women with scarves assigned a religious cue to the whole group, and presented migrants as exclusively Muslim. These narratives, built upon the composition of verbal and visual modes, perpetuated the belief that all migrants were practicing Islam, and created a generic image of Muslim migrants. This latent framing of migrants as exclusively Muslim facilitated both Islamophobia and xenophobia.

In addition to photos, the verbal mode especially in sourced quotes showed that treatment of migrants at the Serbia-Hungary border included practices grounded in Islamophobia. For instance, a journalist tweeted from a border to reveal that Hungarian border patrol officers believed that they were protecting Europe from Islam (The Guardian). Similarly, a human rights organization representative reported that Hungarian
border guards disrespected Muslim dietary restrictions and provided migrants with pork sandwiches on several occasions (*The Guardian*).

Similarly, in the reporting on political debates in Germany between the Christian Democratic Union members, among whom some supported while the other opposes the Merkel’s “open door” immigration policy, the sources quoted claimed that the arguments of those who disagreed with Merkel’s policy based their arguments on the beliefs that Muslim migrants do not fit within German society, which aligns with Özyürek’s (2005) claims that Muslims are perceived as unfit and incompatible with pro-European values. By the same token, readers facilitated exclusion of religiously different others, supported by Islamophobia and xenophobia, especially in the comments in which they equated Muslim migrants with terrorists who were attacking Europe.

To sum up, othering migrants through the multimodal construction of “them” as invaders, criminals, disease carriers, country-hoppers, and as culturally, racially, and religiously different, facilitated ideologies of xenophobia, Islamophobia, racism, and cultural incompatibility. Different modes used in othering migrants overlapped across different frames of borders but all multimodal compositions, no matter which mode was the dominant one, supported and justified the exclusion of migrants from the European space. Material and symbolic practices of bordering and othering were used to objectify, dehumanize and dominate migrants over migrants, who were perceived and, therefore excluded, as culturally, racially, and religiously different others.

**Ideological reproduction of exclusion of European spaces**

In this section of the chapter, I examine how multimodal interplays institutionalize and promote practices of exclusion with a particular focus on the three
bordering countries on the EU external border – Hungary, Croatia, and Serbia - in the context of increased migrant arrivals.

Inclusive strategies that focus on the geographical inclusion and rhetoric of unity of all European territories in times of crisis operate, at the same time, as contested mechanisms of exclusion of certain non-EU countries from the EU space. The exclusion is supported by discourses that center re-claiming sovereignty on the national level, reclaiming the territorial integrity through re-instanting border controls, reclaiming the control of immigration that used to be an issue dealt with on the supranational level, and redefining the periphery countries toward their “neighboring others.” The interplay of written text and maps, in particular, became a strategy to promote a tiered system of political and administrative power distribution both within the EU, and between the EU and non-EU countries. Thus, this section unpacks the tension between Europeanization and balkanism in terms of power relations between the countries on the EU periphery.

After proving that they were good Europeans and that they belonged to the EU, the three countries exercised power over each other and reproduced whiteness by identifying with Europe and distancing themselves from their Balkan heritage.

The multimodal narratives in which EU members Hungary and Croatia, and a candidate country Serbia, blamed each other by shifting the responsibility for migrant arrivals to other neighboring states on the external EU borders promoted inclusive exclusion practices through power claims based on the EU and Schengen zone statuses, as well as through practices of distancing from balkanism. The inclusive exclusion as an oxymoron is suitable to explain the practices in which countries through a variety of practices exclude the European nations from the EU space by discursively disguising
those practices under the veil of inclusion. The news coverage implied that among the three countries on the external EU borders, Hungary as an EU member for over a decade, and as a part of the Schengen zone, held the highest status. The symbolic and material practices of border management that Hungary’s government undertook implied that Hungary superseded the supranational main role in managing external borders and migration, and re-claimed the right to make decisions important for the national interests of the country. Respecting its national sovereignty, the EU did not have any mechanism to reverse the border decisions made by the Hungary’s rightist government. Therefore, in the context of news coverage, the existing dynamics between the countries implied that Hungary, by erecting the fence, used its higher EU status compared to Croatia and Serbia, and as the Schengen Agreement signatory state, justified the fence erection as the correct move in protecting the European space of free movement. Hungary also used its belonging to the Schengen zone as an important factor to re-claim the right to make decisions on the national level, leveraging it for the safety of the whole Schengen zone.

This higher status, as the news coverage implied, played a significant role in Hungary’s decision to reject migrants’ asylum requests, and transfer them to neighboring Croatia and Austria. Its decade long EU membership empowered Hungary to, together with the other former communist Central European countries Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic to confront the core EU countries and stop accepting migrants. Instead, Hungary transferred them to Austria, the country migrants saw as more desirable, and to Croatia, a lower-tier member and a country that migrants were likely to merely pass through on their way to the more developed western countries. At the same time, Hungary refused to respect Serbia’s similar strategy of facilitating migrant transit to the
wealthier western countries, and blamed Serbia, a country outside of both the EU and the Schengen zone, for border porosity and the influx of migrants who are coming to Hungary and therefore, the EU space en route from Serbia. By doing so, Hungary was executing power based on status over less powerful Croatia and Hungary. This power status implies that by identifying with the Union, and claiming the higher status than the other two countries, Hungary was mirroring the behavior of the core member states that set the norms of Europeanness. Thus, Hungary used its own higher status to exercise power over Croatia and Serbia, and to make decisions without any sanctions from the core member countries.

In the news narratives constructed around the blame game, Croatia had less leverage as the newest EU member state and one that was still working on meeting the conditions for joining the Schengen zone. Being positioned on the external EU borders, if Croatia did not police its borders effectively, the country would have seemed to be incapable of joining the Schengen area. The statements in the news coverage, made by Croatia’s officials, that a barbed-wire fence in Europe in the twenty-first century was not an answer to a problem, but a threat and a “terrible message,” indicated that Croatia was aware of the power inequality within the EU, and that by disagreeing with Hungary’s measures had chosen to follow the politically and economically most powerful core EU countries such as Germany and Croatia’s neighbor - Austria. Croatia has been relaying on the more-powerful states to get additional EU funds and support in order to climb the ladder in the EU hierarchy. At the same time, Croatia was signaling to Hungary that there was an evident hierarchy in the EU and that within the hierarchy Croatia was leaning
toward the powerful nations, making explicit that Hungary still did not belong to the EU elite.

With regard to its relationship with Serbia, as was implied in the news coverage, Croatia marginalized Serbia’s position by focusing on its relationship with Hungary, Slovenia, and Austria, and passing migrants to those countries. However, in the news texts immediately after the examined period, on September 17, Croatia claimed its own higher EU status and closed all seven official border-crossings with Serbia, blaming the non-EU member for the deliberate expediting of migrants to Croatia (“Hrvatska zatvorila granice prema Srbiji,” 2015). Additional blockage of the traffic culminated in a complete border closure, with consequences for border-crossings of the locals on the both sides and for the movement of goods to and from the two countries (“Milanović ne odustaje,” 2015). In the power exercising game, Croatia backed off from the more powerful Hungary, but used it power, which came with the EU membership, to execute dominance over Serbia, and thus, exclude Serbia from the EU space of decision making.

Serbia, on the other hand, as a non-EU member state that does not directly participate in EU decision making, employed strategies, as seen in the news coverage, for regulating migration to urge EU to release more funds to Serbia. The country also used its treatment toward migrants for convincing the EU that Serbia is a loyal partner to the EU that plays by the rules and engage in appropriate European behavior. Serbia’s politicians employed a photo-opportunity at the border to promote Serbia’s stance on the migration issue and tighter border management, insisting that as a non-EU member it could not be treated as a “dumping ground for migrants,” “centre of migrant arrivals (The Guardian),” and left out of the EU plans for migrants’ relocation.
However, at the same time, all three countries were excluded from the EU space through the selected modes in the core EU countries’ news outlets. For instance, while the three countries employed different practices to exclude each other based on the power status they claimed and that was related to the EU status and membership in the Schengen zone, *The Guardian*, as the exemplar of the core Western media, used maps to mark all three countries and Macedonia in a darker grey color, differentiating them from the other EU countries, which were labeled with a lighter grey color. A map labeling the four countries differently from the rest of the EU, published in *The Guardian*, had the descriptive title, “Main migration routes,” and was placed above the section in which Austria’s chancellor Werner Faymann critiqued Hungary and the countries that opposed the proposed “quota system” and complained that “some countries were passing the buck to others” (*The Guardian*).

Without any specific explanation of different color marking, the map equalized Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia, stripping them of any EU-related power statuses and placing them in a lower position compared to the rest of the “real” Europe. The map also implied symbolic stigmatization of the countries as the former communist, Eastern European, and the Balkan states. As the news coverage implied, it seems that a response from Hungary to the core EU countries’ cues that placed the countries on the periphery and thus as unworthy of claiming European heritage, was a rejection of their Balkan heritage. Hungary identifies with European values only through rejecting its Balkan heritage. Hungary, Serbia, and Croatia, the countries that were the focus of the present research project as the news coverage implied, negotiated or rejected their Balkan status, not only in terms of geography but also in terms of culture and values.
In historical contexts and national historiographies, the Balkan countries’ national identity was constructed through the prism of the Western understanding and treatment of the Balkans. The West has been constructing the Balkans as an underdeveloped, primitive, culturally and economically inferior, tribal territory of mix-raced aggressive and violent people made of Orientals and Europeans (Todorova, 2009). Todorova argued that balkanism is not a form of Orientalism but that it is characterized by the existing tension of both belonging and not belonging to Europe, and the assigned incompleteness of the area. This geographical, racial, class, and cultural in-betweeness simultaneously carries features of both the Ottoman legacy and the European nation-state model. The stigmatized status of incompleteness had prompted the Balkan countries to claim their geographical and cultural belonging to Europe with the aim of overcoming the assigned ambivalent status (Todorova, 2009).

First named after the mountain chain, the Turkish name of the Balkans started dominating since the nineteen century (Todorova, 2009). The understanding of the geographical boundaries of what had been considered to be the Balkans was always fluid. This fluidity, according to Todorova, enabled the broad identification of the Balkans with Southeastern Europe, later stigmatized as a communist space. This broad definition included Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and the European part of Turkey. However, as a part of the former powerful Austro-Hungarian Empire, Hungary has historically denied possession of any Balkan characteristics. The denial of any such connection to the Balkans was accomplished through Hungary’s claims to Western culture and its superiority over the Slavic people in the Balkans (Hoffman, 1963; Todorova, 2009).
Within this context, when news outlets covered Hungary’s blaming of Serbia’s and Macedonia’s border porosity, Hungary’s references to Greece’s responsibility, and the announced fence erection on the border with Romania, this served to reinforce Hungary’s rejection of any Balkan heritage. Its historical superiority and its current EU status placed Hungary even above Romania, since both Romania and Hungary joined the EU in the 2004 enlargement process, but Romania still has not met the Schengen conditions. However, despite Hungary’s rejection of any ties to the Balkan culture and values, the West, as some of the maps suggest, still assigns Hungary the ambivalent status of the Balkans with the role of bridging the developed West and the backward East, downplaying Hungary’s status based on EU and Schengen membership.

The Central European EU members – Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland – once included in the privileged EU space, as the news coverage suggested, have strengthened their position since the 2004 enlargement when those countries together joined the EU club. After joining the Schengen zone in 2007, and further enlargement in 2013, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland symbolically climbed the EU status ladder and claimed a mid-tier position between the core countries in the West, and the Southeastern members outside of the Schengen zone – Romania and Bulgaria, and a new member – Croatia. Once outsiders themselves, the Central European countries, as Arat-Koç (2010) argued, have been imagining themselves as already proven to be properly European. With this regard, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, mirrored the Western practices toward outsiders, and toward both migrants and European countries outside of the EU, and started applying exclusionary policies (Arat-Koç, 2010) toward those who were perceived as outsiders.
Croatia and Serbia both identify with Europe by claiming their European values and clinging to the core EU countries with higher power status. By choosing the side in the EU, they admit that overcoming the ambivalent character assigned by the West is possible only by the recognition of their Europeanness by the same West. Croatia excludes Serbia from the process of decision making, signaling its own higher EU status, whereas Serbia negotiates its balkanism by proving its Europeanness to the countries that are still considered to be decision makers in the EU, such as Germany. Through the processes of exercising Europeanization, claiming Europeanness, and symbolic exclusion of migrants as the “others,” both countries reject the in-betweenness and any association with the Orient, that the West historically assigned to them.

I claim that the media coverage and the application and combination of a variety of modes implies different positionings of European countries based on the power relations constructed through their EU membership status. The tensions between the European nations in the West and East are constructed through the tiered system of claiming and assigning Europeanness. The Central and Southeastern European countries identify with Europe, and negotiate their belonging by proving they are worthy of EU membership. At the same time, these peripheral member states mirror the core countries’ behavior, and by claiming the higher status is the EU and the Schengen zone exclude the lower-tiered and non-member countries from the processes of decision making.

Lastly, the broader implications of the inclusive exclusion practice could be interpreted as a strategy of whiteness (Arat-Koç, 2010; Martínez Guillem, 2013). Whiteness is normalized as an immanent European feature that carries within itself social class, ethnicity, nationality, and cultural identity, and therefore, distinguishes Europeans
from others. In the case of migrants, those others are discursively constructed as irrational, backward, economically underdeveloped, violent, and illiberal. However, in the East-West dichotomy, whiteness within discourses of European identity can be broken down into different shades of whiteness based on the EU status, and ethnic and class differences in Europe (Moore, 2013). The core EU states have been subtly classing and racializing the Central European countries by forcing them to prove they belong to Europe and distance themselves from the communist past (Arat-Koç, 2010). After getting access to the privileged space of the EU, the Central and Southeastern EU members mirrored the behavior of the core states, and claimed the mid-tier status and the mid-shade of whiteness by re-defining and othering the neighboring non-EU members. While waiting for the additional EU enlargement, the Balkan states keep trying to prove to the EU that they play by the rules. At the same time, the news coverage in which the verbal and visual modes racialized migrants, implied that these countries reclaim whiteness as means of distancing themselves from the non-European others, and overcoming the in-betweenness and incompleteness assigned to the Balkan territories.

**Implications and Conclusion**

In this chapter I unpacked how the co-constructed frames, and especially the interplay of different modes that is a part of the framing patterns, relate to the ideologies of the European Union as a politicized space of both inclusion and exclusion. By addressing the ways in which the mediated discourses facilitated inclusion and exclusion of people and spaces outside of the European Union, Chapter 6 explicated the ideologies supported by the use of particular modes and framing patterns, and addressed the social relations of power that are enacted in the ensemble of different modes and framing
The chapter sought to answer the questions “what social relations of power are enacted in the interplay of journalists and readers’ framings of borders across the European news outlets selected for study?”, and “how do these frames demonstrate and create broader ideologies that construct the European Union as a politicized space of both inclusion and exclusion?” Therefore, the analysis has shown that in the online news production environment, journalists, editors, and official sources followed journalistic practices and routines to maintain a position of relative power over discourse production. While exercising power of signification, journalists and sources—and to a lesser extent, readers—mobilized different modes to ascribe power positions to the different people and spaces they covered. The practices of journalists, sources, and audience members manifested the political nature of news production.

Addressing broader ideologies that construct the European Union as a politicized space of both inclusion and exclusion positions the European space as a site of dynamic social relations and practices where Europeans negotiate their identities and their values in opposition to arriving others. The news coverage and its framing patterns showed that space, and a spatial concept of borders, carry multiple, complex, and nuanced meanings that affect and create politics of inclusion and exclusion, control and marginalization, privilege and superiority. In the practices of inclusion and the exclusion of people and spaces in and from the European space, as the news coverage showed, Europe, and more precisely the EU, is constructed as a contested space in which migrants are othered and excluded, while at the same time, certain groups of migrants are constructed as more desirable. Moreover, the European space is both constructed as a space of unity in the
times of crisis, and as a space of a tiered-system in which in insiders protect their safety and keep the non-EU countries out of the safe and privileged zone.

More precisely, in the practices of inclusion this space is also identified as a space of values and traditions that have become symbols of the unity of all European nations. As the analysis revealed, in a time of crisis, when facing the threat of migrant arrivals, Europeans tend to group together and act in defense of their mutual space. When negotiating European safety and prosperity, Europeans shielded under the unity of the European Union to protect their common history, tradition, values, and democracy, no matter their EU membership status. Europe has been historically moving outward, but the new crisis made it focused inward, constructing all European nations as “fortress Europe” to safeguard European values.

At the same time, borders, as a part of the European social space, serve as a means of control and domination (Lefebvre, 1974). The domination of Europe and Europeans over the reputedly irrational and backward perceived Orientals is reinforced through the processes of tighter border management and physical obstacles at the borders that enable not only control over the insiders’ space, but also control over processes of deciding who is allowed into that space and under what conditions. Geographic boundaries accompany and align with social and cultural demarcations, constructing the European space as the space that only Europeans, and selected others, can belong to. Therefore, borders are spaces of segregation and marginalization of people who are constructed as the ones that should be kept out, and whose bodies should be policed and controlled.

On the other side, the nation states the UK, Germany, Hungary, and Croatia, as
the news coverage implied, re-appropriated their rights of decisions and executed power on the national level over less powerful EU and non-EU members. The hybrid identities of the nation-states at the intersection of state, nation, and supranational territory of the EU, enabled institutionalized media discourses to emphasize sovereignty and nationalism when the national body needed reassurance about the safety of nationally-owned spaces, or highlighting Europeanness or regional interests when closer regional collaboration was needed. Discourses of space and the frames of borders constructed the difference between the West and the East, making the West become even more Western (Said, 1979), including its positioning both toward the Oriental outsider bodies and toward the non-EU countries.

The use of different modes in news reports, as well as their different configuration, reinforced ideologies of xenophobia, racism, Islamophobia, and cultural differences. The promoted ideologies promoted selective inclusion and inclusive exclusion strategies. The ideologies reinforced and sometimes challenged the power relations between people and spaces considered to be European, and people and spaces constructed as outsiders. These discourses carried the information that was relevant in a particular space about which spaces carried higher status, and covertly institutionalized repositories of hatred toward the outsiders.

These framing patterns also promoted the mistreatment of migrants on various levels. Globalized mobility urges the West to re-define mobility. This redefinition, however, operates in part through a recontextualiazation of the Orient (Said, 1979). The redefinition also involves the rethinking of space overall, borders, and border management, with the aim of controlling access to the European space, and possible
assimilation into that space by assigning who is non-problematic and more worthy of gaining access to the European space.

Discourses on bordering and othering, and ideologies that support bordering and othering, also encourage promotion of not only symbolic but physical violence against migrants involving various actors who normalize violence. For instance, Hungary’s supreme court normalized violence against migrants after acquitting Hungarian video reporter Petra Laszlo for tripping and kicking a migrant father who was running with a child in his arms (“Hungary court acquits ‘morally incorrect’ journalist,” 2018). According to The Guardian report, Hungary’s Supreme Court ruled that journalist’s conduct was immoral but it was deemed as a disruption, not vandalism, in the context of the hundreds of migrants who were running away and assaulting police forces.

Xenophobia, Islamophobia, racism, and exclusion based on cultural differences and incompatibility continue to encourage limited or inadequate access to health care, labor markets, education, and social resources. The lack of the institutional protection also supported the marginalization and mistreatment of migrants who entered the black labor market, while the othering practices enable Europeans to turn a blind eye and exploit the “othered” people as voiceless and disadvantaged cheap labor (Martínez Guillem, 2013). Furthermore, multilayered othering and bordering facilitate intolerance based on religion, ethnicity, and race, and foster the development of restrictive and discriminatory policies on a global level, such as family separation at the borders.

With this regard, the amplified xenophobia, racism, and Islamophobia encourage and are encouraged by the global rise of far-right political parties who promote anti-immigration policies and nationalism based on fear of globalization and “dilution of
national identity” (“Europe and nationalism,” 2019). According to a 2018 BBC report, the coalition government in Italy formed out of the Five Star Movement and the right-wing League furthered plans for mass deportation of migrants, whereas in Germany the far-right Alternative for Germany, which promotes anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment, entered the federal government for the first time. The Austrian far-right Freedom Party formed a coalition government in 2017, while the strict immigrant-control Sweden Democrats party won 18% of that nation’s votes (“Europe and nationalism,” 2019). Hungary’s Prime Minister Victor Orban won his third mandate in 2018, and Slovenia’s anti-immigrant Democratic Party and Poland’s conservative Law and Justice party won most of those countries’ the votes in the 2018 general elections (“Europe and nationalism,” 2019) by promoting fearmongering messages about migrants, and opposing the “quota system” of sharing migrant burden among the EU countries.

The upcoming Chapter 7 will provide an overall conclusion of the findings, address the limitations of the study, and suggest directions for the future research.
Chapter 7

Conclusions

In the context of heightened public interest in immigration issues due to the significant increase in global migration flows, I posit that the investigation of multimodal news discourse on immigration enables us to develop a more holistic understanding of interactive, online news media as key institutional actors in the discursive co-construction of borders, of the political nature of space, of the sense of belonging, and the politics of inclusion and exclusion.

This dissertation focused on news discourse co-constructed by journalists, sources, and readers in five European news outlets covering events in 2015 that led to public debate about the perceived migration “crisis” in Europe. The research questions leading the framing analysis of multimodal news discourse were:

RQ1: What frames of the European Union borders are constructed in multimodal discourses of online news?

RQ2: What frames about the European Union borders are constructed by readers’ comments?

RQ3: In what ways readers’ comments frames do relate to the frames constructed by professional journalists?

RQ4: What are the social relations of power enacted in the interplay of journalists and readers’ framings of borders across the European news outlets selected for study?

RQ5: How do these frames relate to broader ideologies about the European Union as a politicized space of both inclusion and exclusion?
In this final chapter, I will present the main findings of this examination of the co-construction of news discourse on borders to provide answers to the research questions posed and to advance the discussion of the main implications of the research. This chapter will also address the limitations of the study and pose the questions for future research.

Review of Findings and Implications

In this study, framing was approached as a process of social construction of meaning situated in historical, political, and cultural contexts, and influenced by journalistic practices, media organizational structures, and broader political and cultural ideologies (de Vreese, 2005; Van Gorp, 2007). In Chapters 4 and 5, I discussed the three dominant frames that emerged in the analysis across all five news outlets: borders as spaces for managing national and EU security, borders as lived spaces, and borders as politically negotiated spaces. The chapters featured the interpretation of the framing patterns—built through the selection, interplay, repetition, and placement of different semiotic resources—that journalists, sources, and readers constructed to make sense of the events taking place at the borders and their implications.

Journalists' Frames of Borders

The close examination of written text, photos, video and audio clips, social media posts, maps, graphs, and other computer-created visualizations, and their ensembles, showed that the most dominant frame across all five news outlets was the frame of “borders as spaces for managing national and EU security.” This frame was built upon narratives of the justification for, and the legality of, tighter border management. Both narratives were intertwined with a narrative that underscored the cultural otherness of
migrants. This frame was supported by linguistic choices and metaphors of the migrants’ arrival. The examined corpus of photos constructed fences as material (physical) and symbolic obstacles that halted migrants and kept them on the other side of the border, simultaneously othering migrants though visual cues of racial and ethnic difference. Even though the discourse included counter-narratives challenging the construction of borders as an effective way of keeping unwanted others out, the framing, overall, represented migrants as an arriving threat and, therefore, morally and legally justified the erection of a barbed-wire fence as a sound policy on the grounds of security.

The “borders as lived spaces” frame was constructed through multimodal ensembles that created narratives of foreign bodies who took up European space and articulated their (mediated) own voices the lived experience of mobility within the space defined and confined by Europeans. Narratives of the ways in which migrants embodied global mobility and reasons for the forced mobility supported the frame. In addition, storylines in which Europeans tried to reclaim and deny the foreign embodiment of those lived experiences also supported the frame. In narratives of lived experiences of and at the border, the subjectivity of migrants was enacted in the stories they shared with journalists. These co-existed with narratives of appropriation of lived space by European politicians who reclaimed the borders from migrants and spoke for migrants. Lastly, the third narrative in this frame was the narrative of lived spaces of the European insiders who experienced bordering practices as a loss of comfort.

It can be argued that the frame “borders as lived spaces” constructed borders as spaces that enabled transformative practices and resistance, but, at the same time, the visual representation created tension in the discourse as it reduced their full humanity to a
generic representation of their experiences as migrants. The multiple modes were utilized to identify ethnic, racial, religious, and gender cues that implied that migrants were racially, religiously, and culturally different, and therefore, culturally distant and incompatible with Europeans. Thus, this frame conveyed the meaning of borders as practices of othering migrants, and distanced them from perceived European common heritage and values—such as democracy, civility, peacefulness, solidarity, and humanitarianism.

Lastly, the frame “borders as politically negotiated spaces” was bound in historical, political, and economic contexts, and discursively constructed borders as contested spaces both on national and supranational levels. Through emphasis on the rhetorical appeal to mutual blaming, this frame emphasized the European countries’ inabilities to make joint decisions in a crisis situation and the political inability to make decisions that reflected Europeanness based on values of solidarity and liberal consensus under the power of Western Europe. At the same time, written and visual modes constructed the narrative of center-periphery differences and division among the EU member states. This narrative was supported by word choices, catchphrases such as “sharing the burden” and “European solidarity,” and quotes from official sources. The written language in this narrative constructed the blame that Western EU countries, or the core EU countries, placed on the newer members—the former communist countries situated on the Eastern EU periphery.

This frame also suggested the re-distribution of power within the EU political space followed by the re-conceptualization of European solidarity by political actors in Eastern Europe, therefore calling for a re-definition of the EU in terms of its future
expansion, its joint stance regarding outside crisis, and possible implementation of new rules that would reflect the power shift from the EU supranational level to national levels in decision making. The shift of power as constructed in news discourse referred not only to certain nation states, but to the overall shift of power from the EU level to the nation states in crisis situations; this shift called for the recognition of the importance of the national space in the reconfiguration of political power by weakening the supranational unity of the EU and strengthening national sovereignties.

The analysis of the three dominant frames in the multimedia articles in all five news outlets suggested that multimodal news outlets are sites in which borders are framed through complex discursive strategies and processes of negotiation of contested values, such as European inclusiveness of certain groups of migrants in tension with discourse about efforts on the national level to protect the nation, its people and space, and its economic interests. Even though journalistic narratives tended to feature neutral language, the dominant narratives within all frames, even when contested, still had an overall negative slant against migrants. However, it is important to note that visuals and social media posts, individually and combined with verbal texts, created contesting, subordinate narratives that included diverse voices and critiques of the fence erection and the treatment of migrants.

Thus, this textual analysis shows that multimodality as a method and an approach to framing is fruitful for the study of online news. Arguably, framing theory is best applied when it is sensitive to the media’s evolving practices and new cultural dynamics engendered by digital technologies. Moreover, this analysis showed that while written text, visuals, and sound, individually and together, contribute to meaning making, but the
framing processes should also be considered from the perspective of design, production, and distribution of online news (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001).

In the analysis of multimodal news, new technologies affected the design and accessibility of online news and, subsequently, affected multiple facets of meaning making. As shown, they can influence the production of more nuanced and fluid meanings through different modes operating interdependently and through the new discourse practices enabled by the technology and design of pages (e.g. features for readers’ comments or the embedding of Twitter posts). Therefore, this research project moves beyond the understanding of the framing process as the conceptualization of two opposite descriptions of an issue, or the opposition between issue frames and generic frames, to argue that the strength of framing lies in its power to articulate multidimensional meanings of borders that are often intertwined and contested within the same frame to reveal the fragmented, contradictory, residual and emerging tendencies that operate within and across discourses. Therefore, the distinction between journalist frames and news frames in the multimodal news environment is not clear since journalists cannot interpret events and produce news without using multiple modes to tell the story.

**Readers’ Co-constructed Frames of Borders**

To address the second research question, Chapter 5 expanded the discussion of the journalists’ frames to provide analysis of the readers’ online engagement with journalists’ frames through the form of readers’ comments. This analysis revealed that readers’ interpretations of border making in the face of a migrant “crisis” reproduced the framing of journalists to co-construct the frames “borders as spaces for managing EU and national security,” “borders as lived spaces,” and “borders as politically negotiated...
spaces.” While co-participating in the construction of the new frames of borders—even with the limited participatory engagement allowed by news organizations in the design of their online platforms—readers both supported existing news narratives and challenged the journalistic narratives or offered additional narratives built upon different word choices, lexical expression, and arguments.

In the frame of “border as spaces for managing EU and national security,” readers supported the journalistic framing of borders as a means to provide, maintain, and symbolize the security of the European space. However, the ambiguous naming and categorization of desirable and non-desirable migrants in the news triggered more nuanced clarification concerning which categories of migrants are more acceptable. However, the nuanced categorizations led to the derogatory categorization of migrants as Muslims, criminals, disease carriers, terrorists, and country-hoppers, positioning them as others, and as a multiple-level threat to the national body as well as to national and EU space. Additionally, this frame did not solely focus on the legal side of the border management. Instead, readers built the discussion about border security either by supporting or disapproving Hungary’s decision to build a fence. They offered micro-narratives of righteousness to support the idea of protecting their country’s sovereignty and nationhood, to support stopping the illegal border-crossing practices, and to encourage criticism of other governments that were not following Hungary’s example.

Likewise, readers expanded and challenged the range of meanings within the journalistic frame “borders as lived spaces.” They offered context-bound narratives about borders as lived space both for migrants and Europeans who are affected by stricter border controls. Readers expressed concern for migrant wellbeing, but they did not focus
on appropriating migrants’ experiences. Instead, they questioned the authenticity of the migrants’ accounts and dismissed migrants’ agency in mobility. By rejecting migrants’ transformative practices and questioning the authenticity of their status and truthfulness of their accounts, readers claimed that European space belongs to Europeans without making a distinction between EU member-states Europeans and Europeans who live outside of the southern EU border. Lastly, readers showed that, compared to journalists, they are more likely to focus on interruption of borderless mobility, or, in the case of Serbia, the interruption of smooth border-crossing practices and the loss of a comfortable life at and around the border.

The frame “borders as politically negotiated spaces” was supported by two dominant narratives – the narrative of causes and solutions, and the narrative of blaming. The news narrative of the tension between the core states and the new member states was not identified in readers’ posts. Rather the micro-narratives of political border-making and border-negotiating were situated in the narrative of causes and solutions. However, the offered solutions did not address the resolution of humanitarian crisis caused by forced migration, but instead, range from relocation of migrants to the countries that caused the problem or to Germany, a country that invited refugees, to a proposal to send migrants back to either their home countries to fight the war or to other Muslim countries. Also, while in the journalistic narrative of mudslinging over border porosity European countries and parties were blaming each other for that problem and for the number of accepted migrants, the analysis of the readers’ posts showed that readers, instead, placed blame on either certain countries or politicians for the current forced migration.
The findings show that in the multimedia online environment, audience members, when permitted to do so, do contributed to a more open discussion by (1) negotiating and challenging the news frames by emphasizing the importance of social, economic, cultural, and historical contexts of the global migration and mobility, (2) focusing on both hyperlocal and global issues that journalistic frames were lacking, (3) verbalizing ethnic, racial, and religious cues journalists mostly expressed through visuals, and (4) signaling to journalists and editors their various inconsistencies in naming or lacking the explanation by posing questions and answering the questions posted by other readers. However, the overall negative slant in readers’ comments showed that readers’ arguments that migrants were culturally different and unwanted others mirrored the mediated representation of migrants; even though the arguments did not reflect verbal journalistic discourses, they supported and were supported by visuals that often framed racial, gendered, and religious differences as undesirable.

The multimodal features of online media support the media’s role and duties to encourage and nourish the public debate process and to allow readers to participate in the process of news production and framing. Even though in this study only two out of five outlets enabled and encouraged readers to contribute with their comments, this research is still relevant because it showcases the instant negotiation of frames co-constructed by journalists and by audience members. The limited number of outlets that allowed comments affected the possible richness of data across different European media outlets, but the ones that enabled comments testified to the importance of audience members’ participation in the processes of framing. Additionally, even though participatory journalism seems to be in decline, the multimedia online news articles, and especially the
new news formats such as live-blogs, remind us of the importance of further research on online news and its participatory nature.

**Broader Implications of News Framing of Borders**

The primary focus of this study was on the production of framing patterns and meaning making accomplished through the interplays of different modes available in the online media environment. However, this analysis would be incomplete without addressing how different frames, articulated through multiple modes, related to the broader discourses of the European Union as a politicized space of both inclusion and exclusion to reproduce particular ideological positions.

In Chapter 6, I addressed how the variety of modes, their composition, meaning potential, and structuring according to journalistic norms and routines, played a crucial role in the enactment of power between different social actors. Thus, the main argument in that chapter is that, in the period of crisis, framing patterns employed by both journalists and readers promoted discourses of multilayered othering of peoples and spaces. This was accomplished through the deployment of politically and culturally marked categories that assigned peoples and spaces varying degrees of acceptability. For instance, EU discursive practices that associated the EU with promotion of the values of cooperation, unity, and solidarity, were reproduced in news discourse to support conditional or limited practices of inclusion. At the same time, the assigned limitations and conditionality diminished any inclusion effort to the point that conditional or limited inclusion practices served solely as strategies of exclusion.

The findings of this study show that journalistic conventions and practices, as well as the interaction of readers in interactive online news web sites, are important
structural elements that enact power relations in the news production process. Although the written language still dominates in online news articles, the technologically empowered online news environment assigns more power to photos, video clips, and maps. The signifying power of the different modes affects and is affected by editorial decision making and power relations between different social actors. To wit, while the choice of sources, the conventional structure of headlines and leads, or the selection of quotes may emphasize the view of migrants as a threat, the visuals may provide the perspective of othering migrants as merely racially, ethnically, religiously, and culturally different but not actually threatening.

Inclusion of people and spaces. Chapter 6 also addressed how journalists and readers used different modes, individually and together, and re-contextualized modes’ meaning potential to reproduce ideologies that facilitated inclusion and exclusion. The news frames co-constructed by journalists and readers framed borders as means of controlling the inclusion of both people and spaces into the European privileged space. The limited material and symbolic inclusion of certain categories of people constructed as desirable and acceptable migrants, and the inclusiveness of certain spaces of non-EU member states, I argue, was a part of the strategy of exclusion. By including certain categories of people and spaces, European media claimed the space marked as one of home and belonging that needed to be protected from the migrant others. Even in narratives stressing humanitarian values and the critique of xenophobia, there was a lack of promotion of European core values such as multiculturalism and dialogue. Journalists institutionalized the discourses of selective inclusion not only by featuring certain narratives but also by failing to use a variety of available modes to promote or encourage
the intercultural dialogue, define forced migration as a humanitarian crisis, or promote inclusion in light of human rights.

At the same time, it is important to note that nationalism was not as a prominent feature of the news as I had expected it to be. Readers reflected the same discourses of limited inclusion by applying pejorative language and lacking any interest to get involved in a dialogue with migrants, except in the online dialogue mediated and limited by the journalists’ choice of migrants quotes. The lukewarm EU-level response to the announcement of the intention of building a wall on the border supported Hungary’s border management strategy and, therefore, was a part of the covert European exclusion disguised in the discourses of limited inclusion.

**Exclusion of people and spaces.** Othering accomplished through verbal and visual modes facilitated exclusion of people and spaces from the European space. All three frames, and the narratives they are built upon, communicated discourses of othering that implicated and supported ideologies of Orientalism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and racism. Multimodal discourses of bordering as well as material practices of bordering also enabled very explicit material and symbolic practices of positioning Europeans as insiders who were confronted by the arriving migrants - the outsiders. These practices positioned migrants as unwanted others and perpetuated the material and symbolic exclusion in which “we” Europeans have to protect “our” lands, democracy, history, peace, and other common values from “them,” the group that is invading European space and, thus, is perceived as a grave threat. Othering of migrants was accomplished through multimodal ensembles that portrayed migrants as irrational invaders, a multilayered threat, and racially, religiously, and culturally different others, and reproduced
Orientalism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and racism.

Furthermore, inclusive strategies of spaces based on geographical inclusion of all European territories in times of crisis, operated alongside of, and were contested by, mechanisms of exclusion of certain spaces from the EU space. The same modes and their compositions, especially the interplay of written text and maps, were used as strategies to promote the tiered system of political and administrative power distribution both within the EU and between the EU and non-EU countries. This analysis unpacked the tension between the Europeanization and balkanism in terms of power relations between the countries on the EU periphery. After proving that they were good Europeans and that they belonged to the EU, the three countries exercised power over each other and reproduced whiteness by identifying with Europe and distancing themselves from their Balkan heritage.

Therefore, I argue that multimodal interplays can be a type of discourse that supports the institutionalization of practices of exclusion. Such exclusion is supported by discourses of re-claiming sovereignty on the national level, reclaiming the territorial integrity through reinstating border controls, and reclaiming the control of immigration, an issues that that used to be dealt with on the supranational level. At the same time, the tensions between the European nations in the West and East were constructed through the tiered system of claiming and assigning Europeanness. The Central and Southeastern European countries identified with Europe, and negotiate their belonging by proving they were worthy of EU membership. However, the strategies of proving this worthiness changed with the EU status and thus, the peripheral countries with higher EU status excluded those with lower status from the processes of decision making.
The news narratives in which Hungary, Croatia, and Serbia blamed each other by shifting the responsibility for migrant arrivals to other neighboring states on the external EU borders, promoted inclusive exclusion practices through claims based on EU and Schengen zone membership as power statuses, as well as through practices of distancing from balkanism. With specific focus on the three countries on the EU external borders – Hungary, Croatia, and Serbia – the framing patterns communicated discourses of the tiered-system countries based on their EU membership, and showed how the Central European EU member states mirrored the exclusive practices of the core states. Thus, for instance, after proving that Hungary was worthy enough of EU membership status, the country executed power over a less powerful and newer EU member, Croatia, and made moves to further exclude a non-EU member, Serbia, from the EU privileged space. These narratives support political ideologies that position the EU as the desired imagined space for all peripheral European countries that, in turn, claim their geographical and cultural belonging to Europe by rejecting their Balkan heritage of incompleteness and ambivalence.

Political discourses on bordering and othering, complemented by discourses of exclusion based on cultural difference, encouraged promotion of not only symbolic but physical violence against migrants, involving various actors who normalized violence. Xenophobia, Islamophobia, racism, and exclusion based on cultural differences and incompatibility prevent institutional protection for migrants, and encourage limited or inadequate access to health care, labor markets, education, and social resources. Furthermore, multilayered othering and bordering facilitate intolerance based on religion, ethnicity, and race, and foster the development of restrictive and discriminatory policies.
on the global level, such as family separation at the borders, tighter border management and border surveillance, and more restrictive citizenship policies. Additionally, the institutionalized discourses contribute to populism, propaganda, and the rise of rightist parties, which promote anti-immigration policies.

**Contributions, Limitations, and Future Research**

The research seeks to extend frame analysis methodology by incorporating multimodal discourse analysis and thus giving equal attention to the analysis of written text, visuals, sound, design, and layout. The research also integrates the study of news framing and co-construction of meaning by journalists and online readers with the conceptualization of space as a socially constructed site of dynamic social relations and practices (Andrews, 2008; Georgiou, 2011; Lefebvre, 1974). This approach thus adds to the understanding of space and spatiality as relevant categories of analysis in the study of news framing of migration flows in historically and culturally specific contexts.

This study also contributes to bridging the gap in the literature between research on discourses of borders and bordering practices and research on news production of such discourses. It provides a comparative study of five news outlets from five European countries (Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, UK, and Germany) and includes three countries (Serbia, Croatia, Hungary) that have been understudied in research on framing and discourse on migration.

There are, however, a few limitations in the scope of analysis that need to be identified. The selected texts—18 news packages generated in June and September of 2015, when Hungary announced the building of a fence and when the country closed its border crossings with Serbia—did generate rich multimodal data for qualitative, nuanced,
and in-depth analysis of emerging frames. But this turning point, event-centered framework for data collection evidently affected the number of stories published in each of the news outlets selected. The limited time frame of events selected for data collection, as well as differences in the financial resources of selected media, and the structural differences in the design of interactive features—including reader comments sections—resulted in an unequal distribution of news packages. Almost half (8 out of 18) of the analyzed news packages were from *The Guardian*. The British news outlet also featured longer articles compared to the other four outlets. However, it is important to note that despite unequal numbers of articles per outlet, the emergence of similar, dominant frames across news organizations provided a strong rationale for building arguments about the repertoire of frames and narratives circulating in European news discourse based on the selection of texts.

Another structural factor that limited the collection of data in this study was the fact that the readers of only *The Guardian* and *Večernje novosti* participated in the comments section. The absence of comments posted in *Deutsche Welle*, *Jutarnji list*, and *Magyar Hirlap* affected the scope of analysis of audience members’ participation in news production via the negotiation of frames with journalists and their sources. However, the presence of comments only in two news outlets whose general audience is considered to be geographically concentrated on the island nation (the UK) that is the farthest from the EU’s southern external border and on one that is just outside of the EU space (Serbia), provided and interesting and relevant case for the comparison of framing patterns. In the end, the analysis revealed shared patterns of framing in both news outlets.
Research has shown that only readers who are particularly interested in certain topics tend to post comments (Singer, 2011). Although there is no available demographic information about readers who post comments, it is highly likely that the UK’s limited effort and participation in the reception of migrants, and Serbia’s official policy in line with the main EU humanitarian approach, with the simulations emphasis on migrants’ transit status through Serbia, affected the variety of viewpoints and the dominant tone in narratives in the readers’ posts within the frames. The different positions of the UK and Serbia generated different emphases and viewpoints in readers’ comments but still there were shared framing patterns in these two news outlets. In future research, including a larger number of texts produced by readers’ participation in news production across all five news outlets would provide richer data about instant responses to news articles and, therefore, the co-constructed frames would reveal more nuanced narratives patterns negotiated among readers, journalists, and journalists’ sources.

From this multimodal analysis of the texts selected, several questions and problems emerged for further research. First, the incorporation of hyperlinks as a mode of communication would provide better understanding of the network of ideas and political positions that are linked to journalistic framing to constitute larger discursive fields operating in society. Future research on framing would also benefit from in-depth interviews with journalists and ethnography of digital newsrooms to further our understandings about how journalists see that their practices of sourcing and of including and captioning visuals, combined with technological advancements, affect the perspective they take on issues such as borders.
In future research, a comparative approach to news framing of borders in Europe and others border regions of the world—e.g. the US-Mexico border—would be a significant contribution to the literature and to the understanding of the global circulation of discourses and ideologies. In terms of theory and methodology, this study also suggests the value of incorporating multimodality in research on meaning making processes in new news formats, such as live-blogs, long-form scrollytelling, listicles, data visualization stories, or stories told with 360-degree video, and virtual and augmented reality. Future research on framing and multimodality should be also expanded in the direction of more nuanced examination of under-researched modes and their interplay’s contribution to meaning making in the news, such as captions, typography, color-blocking, and absence of sound in auto-play videos on Facebook. Lastly, the theoretical extension of framing theory should go beyond the conceptualization of frames as a binary between two descriptions of an issue, and focus more on contested and even ambiguous meanings that certain post-modern modes of storytelling and cultural production can carry.

**Translation and Researcher’s Positionality**

It is also important to address my own role in the translation and data interpretation processes. Fluent in both Serbian and Croatian, the dialects of the formerly known Serbo-Croatian language, I was able to conduct the analysis of the articles from *Jutarnji list* and *Večernje novosti*, and readers’ comments posted in *Večernje novosti* in their original languages, and to provide the translation of the selected excerpts featured in the three analysis chapters, without providing the original excerpts in Serbian or Croatian. Switching between languages always assumes choices that an interpreter should make.
about the literal or the most appropriate translation from Serbian or Croatian to English. The choices I made during the translation of texts and the decisions about whether the excerpts preserved their authenticity when translated to English must be considered parts of the subjective, interpretive process of qualitative inquiry.

Additionally, my own social and cultural positionality inevitably affected the decisions made during the process of the data interpretation. My interpretations were in part shaped by my own lived experience of balkanism in my home country, Serbia; my lived experience of exclusion from the EU privileged space; and my training at a U.S.-based university. I label myself as a liberal in my political beliefs, and I had worked as a political journalist for the privately owned daily *Blic* during the early and mid-2000s, where I reported on the EU-Serbia relations, and on the EU Delegation to Serbia. As a former journalist who reported for over eight years, I am familiar with journalistic norms, routines, and everyday practices in the newsroom that transcend the local level of reporting in Serbia. With the aim of avoiding bias and given my own direct familiarity with *Blic* and its reporters, I decided to exclude *Blic* from the pool of news outlets suitable for my analysis.

However, the lived experience of exclusion from the EU spaces in terms of obtaining visas to travel did affect my interpretation of the EU practices of exclusion of people and spaces who do not belong to the EU space. In the early 2000s, before Serbia was classified as a country on the “white Schengen list”—which allowed Serbian citizens to travel to the EU countries without obtaining visas—I, who at the time travelled to EU countries to report on EU-Serbia related issues. On several of these occasions I had to wait for at least six hours before being admitted into the embassy buildings and
submitting various documents that would verify my employment status and purpose of travel. Both domestic and German personnel in front of and inside Germany’s embassy wore surgical masks to protect themselves. Additionally, as a journalist who was covering EU-Serbia relations, I recall reports in early 2000s—after the election of the first democratically elected officials in Serbia—that the EU might open its doors to Serbia in 2008, if Serbians continued democratic reforms and synchronized national laws and regulations with the EU. A decade later, in 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that 2025 might be a possible accession date for Serbia, “but that both Serbia and the EU have to be reformed before any further enlargement” (Simić, 2018). Therefore, two decades of continuous efforts by the Serbians still seem not to be insufficient to get admitted to the privileged EU club.

In addition to my experiential knowledge of bordering practices of inclusion and exclusion, my academic positioning influenced the process of interpretation. The access to new concepts and theories in graduate programs at U.S. universities enabled me to reflect on and redefine the term “balkanism” in my own terms, and to theoretically anchor my lived the experiences of not belonging and of in-betweenness. However, having lived through these specific political and cultural circumstances, and especially in the U.S. context, I have always claimed a European identity, relatable to other Europeans who share similar values, traditions, and history. The subjective identification with Europeanness, while understanding that the EU administrative power still tests Serbia to prove its “good” European behavior, has become conflicted with new sense of “not belonging” that I faced for the first time while living in the United States. While underlining that this is a personal experience, I have met several Europeans from core
European countries and through several open discussions, I realized that “real” Europeans do not necessarily think that they share values and a heritage with people from Serbia. In conversations I had with other fellow students from Western Europe, Serbia was never labeled as being simply European but, instead, always needed additional labeling of belonging to Southeastern Europe, or belonging “somewhere” that is not the “real” Europe. Therefore, my existing assumptions and preconceptions might have prevented me from providing more diverse perspectives or noticing additional nuances in the analysis. Nevertheless, the lived experience of marginalization and exclusion from certain spaces in the EU-controlled space encouraged me to reflect more deeply on my own experiences and their relationship to, and effect upon, my interest in theorizing the meanings of home, belonging, and inclusion that are institutionalized in news discourses.
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