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The Logic Of Herbert Marcuse:An Analysis Of His Critical Theory Of Society.

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THE LOGIC OF HERBERT MARCUSE: AN ANALYSIS OF HIS CRITICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

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B.A., San Francisco State College, 1968

THESIS

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

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A radical socialist who advocates revolutionary change on a world-wide basis, Herbert Marcuse is one of the more controversial political theorists of our time. His synthesis of the theories of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud which he calls his critical theory of society is a peculiar class analysis of technically advanced industrial societies. Despite his numerous publications, his indictment of advanced industrial societies, both capitalist and communist, as totalitarian systems, and his appeal to such radical groups as the New Left, Herbert Marcuse's theory has never been analyzed for its internal consistency.

Because of the controversial nature of his political theory and his influence over such militant groups as the German Socialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS) and the Students for a Democratic Society in America, I have undertaken the task of examining the internal consistency of his theory. In view of the comprehensive nature of Marcuse's theorizing, it has been necessary to focus this analysis on Marcuse's most fundamental concepts--his conception of

man and society. Marcuse's presuppositions on the nature of man and society have been examined in order to determine whether his propositions on the way man "is" and "ought" to be governed logically follow.

Given his presuppositions concerning the nature of man and society, his description of man and society today, and his propositions concerning what man and society can be and ought to be, it has been found that Marcuse's theory is internally consistent. Although his theory is internally consistent Marcuse does, however, create for himself a number of logical problems.

Marcuse turns his Freudian myth, his mythical prehistory of man, into reality. He maintains a paradoxical position in that he is both cynical and idealistic. He makes absolute assertions (i.e., the generals, politicians, and managers rule in the advanced industrial societies) which he is unable to empirically validate. An important correlation to the conclusions reached in this paper is that Marcuse, although professing to be a democrat, advocates an anti-democratic state, an "educational transitional dictatorship," as a means of attaining what he considers to be true democracy, political and economical equality.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently, the point is, to change it.
>
> --Karl Marx

Political philosophers from Plato to the present have searched for the just basis of authority in the state. This search has led them to consider such universal questions as: What is the nature of man? and What is the nature of society? In answering these politically pertinent, psychological and sociological questions, they have developed theories about man and society which have influenced their responses to such basic, yet complex, political questions as: Who governs? Who can govern? Who ought to govern? They have described, predicted, or prescribed rule by one, the few, or the many, as a prerequisite for attaining the social order needed to achieve the "good life" compatible with the nature of man.

The theories expounded by political philosophers are open to criticism on a number of grounds, including internal consistency and empirical warrant. Of course, the absence

of these qualities in a political theory does not necessarily obviate their acceptability for certain individuals and/or cultures. As T. D. Weldon so aptly put it in his book States and Morals: "Political theories are accepted and acted upon not primarily because of their internal consistency but because they conform to moral beliefs about the importance or unimportance of the individual."[1]

The acceptance or rejection of a political theory based on one's moral beliefs is not always a rational act, since moral beliefs are not at all times rational in themselves and seldom well thought out. But then, men are not always rational beings. The political theories they have accepted have not by some tests always been in their own interests nor in the interest of the community as a whole, not withstanding claims to the contrary. It must be remembered that language--even the language of the political theorist--is not only " . . . a medium of intellectual exchange; it is also a method of concealment, an artifice men employ to deceive others as well as themselves."[2]

The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze Herbert Marcuse's critical theory of society in order to determine its internal consistency. Such an analysis, by seeking to establish whatever unities or contradictions exist in Marcuse's writings, should serve to aid our understanding of what is

surely one of the more controversial contributions to contemporary political thought. An analysis of this sort, in view of the comprehensive nature of Marcuse's theorizing, depends upon an examination of the compatibility of his presuppositions on the nature of man and society with his propositions on the way man is and ought to be governed.

This analysis of Marcuse's fundamental concepts--his conception of man and society--will also serve to point out the major doctrines he voices, the compatibility of his doctrines, and the logical necessity of his conclusions. This study does not purport to judge the moral validity of Herbert Marcuse's theory; it seeks only to establish whether or not his theory is logically consistent.

With the publication of his book, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Soceity in 1964, Herbert Marcuse's reputation as an advocate of revolutionary change has spread primarily among the international movement commonly referred to as the "New Left" and among the "New Mandarins," the defenders of the status quo in America and abroad.[3] Unfortunately, Marcuse is still today relatively unknown among the general public, despite his numerous publications.

A number of books and articles have appeared within the last few years which have dealt with various aspects of

Marcuse's works, but none up until now have attempted a complete examination of the internal consistency of his political theory. In this writer's opinion, most of the positions taken by Marcuse's critics have not been reliable primarily because they have been based on a limited sample of his works, or they have merely been personal attacks against the man himself.[4] Marcuse's critics have generally covered only one aspect of his theory and have failed to relate what they have discussed to his theory as a whole. By doing so, they have neglected or overstated certain parts of his theory. His critics have made assertions, but, more often than not, they have failed to adequately prove their cases.

The exceptions to this generalization are few indeed. Those articles by Daniel Callahan, Sal Stern, Andrew Hacker, Stanley Aronowitz, and Maurice Cranston are the exceptions.[5] These men have presented informative critiques based on an examination of Marcuse's major works.

Of the few critics who have commented on the logic of Marcuse's theory, Andrew Hacker stated in his article, "The Philosopher of the New Left," that "Given its assumptions Marcuse's logic is both consistent and plausible."[6] Herbert Gold concluded in "California Left: Mao, Marx, et Marcuse!" that "Assertion follows assertion at a dizzing pace, and an internal mechanism sometimes flashes up Logic--Fault--

or Wait--Too Fast Too Soon in the mind of the attentive listener/reader."[7] For Peter Sedgewick,

> The logic of Marcuse's arguments on science and philosophy is possibly even cruder than that which establishes, e.g., that "the connection of orthodox genetics and eugenics, with Malthusianism, and with theories of race superiority and ultimately with Nazism are not accidental."8

And finally, in "Resistance and Technology," Daniel Callahan writes that "The vision of Eros and Civilization," Marcuse's major work on Freud and society as it "ought" to be, "does not logically require the political consequences Marcuse draws in his later writings. For that matter, they seem incompatible."[9]

The man who has generated all of this interest and concern is a German-born American political philosopher who gained fame late in life as a leading philosopher--if not the leading philosopher--of the New Left."[10] Born of Jewish parentage in 1894, Marcuse attended the University of Berlin and then went on to receive his Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Feiburg in 1922.[11]

As a young man in post World War I Germany, Marcuse was active in Rosa Luxumburg's famed but abortive Sparticus movement.[12] With Max Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno, Marcuse helped to found the "Frankfurt School" of sociology which is based on a synthesis of the insights of Marx and Freud.[13]

In the early thirties, when Hitler began his rise to power, Marcuse was forced into exile by the Nazies.[14] While in exile in Geneva, Switzerland, he taught for a short time at the Social Research Institute,[15] and then moved to America, where he joined the staff at the Institute of Social Research at Columbia University.[16] He became a naturalized American citizen and did his part in the war against Fascism by working as an intelligence analyst in the Office of Strategic Services. After the war he was employed by the State Department in the Office of Intelligence as the chief of the central European section.[17]

Marcuse has either been a research fellow or a professor at Columbia University, the Russian Research Center at Harvard, Brandeis University, and is presently teaching philosophy at the University of California at San Diego.[18] Because of his age--he is seventy-one--he is currently teaching under a one year contract which was to be renewable at the end of each year. Due to his leftist political philosophy, he has become ensnared in the "get tough" policy of the California Board of Regents. When Chancellor William McGill of San Diego State refused to fire Marcuse at the request of the Board of Regents and such patriotic groups as the American Legion--but instead extended Marcuse's contract for another year in opposition to the Regents' demands--

his action resulted in a loss of power for the University of California chancellors. They no longer have the power to appoint or promote tenured faculty members.[19]

While at the Institute of Social Research at Columbia, Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, Franz Neuman, and others formulated their goals as the development of a " . . . theoretical conception capable of comprehending the economic, political, and cultural institutions of modern society as a specific historical structure from which the prospective trends of development could be derived."[20] They all held the belief that such a conception required an objective theory of history capable of measuring the function and aims of social institutions " . . . against the historical potentialities of human freedom."21

For Marcuse, a dialectical materialist conception of society is a prerequisite for determining the potentialities of human freedom and the forces which oppose its realization at a particular time and place. The materialist proposition is a critical concept, according to Marcuse, which expresses a historical fact, the materialist quality of society. Society has a materialist character, an economy which directly influences all human relations. Historical materialism involves the determinist principle that man's consciousness is a product of, it is conditioned by, his social existence.

The materialist proposition is critical in that it holds that the relations " . . . between consciousness and social existence is a false one that must be overcome before the true relation can come to light. The truth of the materialist thesis is thus to be fulfilled in its negation."[22] The blind dependence of men's consciousness on the material processes that reproduce their society will terminate once these material processes have been made rational by the conscious practice of men.

According to Marcuse, a dialectical logic in the Hegelian-Marxian tradition expresses the proposition that the whole determines the truth, " . . . not in the sense that the whole is prior or superior to its parts, but in the sense that its structure and function determine every particular condition and relation."[23]

Marcuse maintains that the dialectic of both Marx and Hegel took " . . . note of the fact that the negation inherent in reality is 'the moving and creative principle.' Every fact is more than a mere fact; it is a negation and restriction of real possibilities."[24] The truth for Marx and Hegel was to be found only in the negative totality. But Marx's conception of the negative totality which Marcuse accepts is, Marcuse believes, " . . . other than that of Hegel's philosophy,

and this difference indicates the decisive difference between Hegel's and Marx's dialectic."[25]

Marx's subversion of Hegel's dialectical logic, his detachment of the dialectic from its ontological base remained, as Marcuse sees it, committed to the idea that dialectical logic reveals what actually occurs in reality.[26] "The Marxian 'inversion' of Hegel's dialectic remains committed to history."[27]

The negative totality which Hegel postulated was " . . . a universal ontological one in which history was patterned on the metaphysical process of being."[28] Hegel's conceptual structure established the rationality of the subject and object. He considered the world to be dominated by the Idea (Geist) which unfolded itself in history. For Hegel, the world is accessible to reason; in fact, it is dependent on it.

Because of the dependence of the empirical world on reason, Marcuse holds that Hegel's philosophy is idealistic. Hegel " . . . subsumes being under thought."[29] For Hegel, " . . . the given world was bound up with rational thought and, indeed, ontologically dependent on it, all that contradicted reason or was not rational was posited as something that had to be overcome. Reason was established as a critical tribunal."[30]

In The Phenomenology of the Spirit Hegel, according to Marcuse, formulated the thesis that the dialectical logic is " . . . a logic of freedom . . . a logic of liberation, for the process is that of an alienated world, whose 'substance' can become subject . . . only through shattering and surpassing the conditions which 'contradict' its realization."[31] But Hegel surpassed the historical process in that he made it into " . . . a metaphysical system in which ultimate freedom is only the freedom of the Idea."[32]

When the concept reason was identified as freedom by philosophy, the creation of a rational world, Marcuse believes, fell outside of the realm of idealistic philosophies like that of Hegel. "Hegel saw the history of philosophy as having reached its definitive conclusion at this point. However, this meant for mankind not a better future but the bad present that this condition perpetuates."[33] Hegel's rationalist protest and critique was restricted to pure thought and will; it did not extend to the material condition of man's existence.[34] Hegel reconciled the antithesis in reason and not in reality. This reconciliation of the antithesis in the world of ideas by Hegel is in direct opposition to the " . . . true materialism of critical social theory and the false materialism of bourgeois practice."[35] Hegel's philosophy retained an element of truth in that it

remained critical of the false materialism of bourgeoisie practice. It was false because it assumed that man could be free despite his material conditions.

While Hegel postulated the negative totality as a metaphysical process of being, Marx interpreted the negative totality as " . . . a historical condition which cannot be hypothesized as a metaphysical state of affairs."[36] The Marxian dialectic, in Marcuse's view, has a historical character which takes into account the negative aspects of the existing society and also its absolute negation--communism. The negative totality which is reality can only be rendered positive, according to Marcuse's interpretation of Marx's dialectic,

> . . . by liberating the possibilities immanent in it. This last, the negation of the negation, is accomplished by establishing a new order of things. The negativity and its negation are two different phases of the same historical process, straddled by man's historical action. The "new" state is the truth of the old . . . it can be set free only by an autonomous act on the part of men, that will cancel the whole of the existing negative state.[37]

The truth transcends the existing historical reality. It grows out of one historical stage into a qualitatively different one, according to Marcuse, by the action of men. The truth is not " . . . a realm apart from the historical reality, nor a region of eternally valid ideas;"[38] it is a " . . . concrete event within the same totality."[39]

First and foremost a dialectician, Marcuse is seeking out the contradictions he believes are inherent in the socio-historical process. "The driving forces behind the historical process are not mere conflicts but contradictions because they constitute the very Logos of history as the history of alienation."[40] The dialectic's first principle is contradiction; therefore Marcuse's first principle is also contradiction. Thinking, for Marcuse, is " . . . essentially the negation of that which is immediately before us."[41] And " . . . reason is the negation of the negation."[42]

Specific events are comprehensible, according to Marcuse's dialectical conception, when they are understood as

> . . . constituted by the "general," as the particular manifestation of a "law" . . . The dialectical notion of historical laws implies no other "destiny" than that which men create for themselves under the conditions of unmastered nature and society. The less the society is rationally organized and directed by the collective efforts of free men, the more will it appear as an independent whole governed by inexorable laws.[43]

The truth in the dialectical notion " . . . that society is more than the mere aggregate of its parts and relations" does not, Marcuse asserts, necessitate a thorough analysis of all the public and private institutions and relations in society in order to comprehend the structure of society.[44] Because the whole defines and determines the parts, a "selective analysis" is necessary, " . . . one which focuses on the

basic institutions and relations in society."[45] This "selective analysis," Marcuse maintains, must be demonstrated to be logically and empirically correct.

The notions of the dialectic are, according to Marcuse, " . . . shaped in accordance with the historical structure of reality,"[46] and they seek to recognize the liberating potentialities in the historical process. Dialectical logic separates essence and appearance, subject and object, freedom and necessity into an antagonistic whole which demonstrates the rationality and unity of the whole which is reality.

As Marcuse sees it, a dialectical materialist interpretation of history " . . . joins theory and practice, philosophy and political economy . . . capitalism and socialism."[47] It bridges the "gap between the laws of thought and those governing reality,"[48] and guides the strategy of the proletariat in the prerevolutionary period and also the revolutionary transformation of society.[49]

Marcuse's critical theory of society is an unorthodox, esoteric, interpretation of orthodox Marxism, based on a synthesis of the monumental theories of Hegel, Marx, and Freud. In his first major book written in English, Reason and Revolution, Marcuse's professed purpose was to clarify Hegel's philosophy by answering the question: "What is the relationship between Hegelian and Fascist philosophy?"[50] He

concluded by quoting Carl Schmitt, noted National theoretician, " . . . on the day of Hitler's ascent to power, 'Hegel, so to speak, died,'"[51] and he defended Hegel's philosophy against those who identified it with the rise of Fascism. "The ideological roots of authoritarianism have their soil in the 'violent reaction' against Hegel that styled itself the 'positive philosophy,'"[52] and not in Hegel's philosophy. The underlying theme of the book is that reason and revolution are one and the same, and revolutionary movements are the only means of liberating mankind. Although Marcuse's professed purpose was to clarify Hegel's philosophy, he appears to be preoccupied with the task of cleaning off the tainted tools of the dialectic.

Marcuse has revised (modified) Marx's theory in an effort to make it more relevant to the affluent social conditions which exist in modern society. The laissez faire period of free capitalism which Marx analyzed in the nineteenth century gave way to the organized capitalism of the twentieth century. This transformation of free capitalism into organized capitalism created structural changes in society which Marx failed to foresee. Organized capitalism has changed the mode of production, the political conditions, and the political consciousness of the working class.[53] The working class is no longer a revolutionary force in organized

capitalist society today. Because of this, Marx's concepts must be modified. But in order to retain its original structure, Marcuse believes that " . . . the modifications must be demonstrably related to the theoretical basis . . . to the dialectical materialist concept of industrial society."[54] The whole determines the truth for Marcuse, and the structure and function of capitalist society has changed. Therefore, Marxian theory must be revised in accord with the contemporary state of capitalism.

Out of Sigmund Freud's theory Marcuse has attempted to develop the political and sociological substance of the psychological notion.[55] He uses the psychological concepts which Freud developed to analyze social and political events in history. He accepts most of Freud's theory, but claims that it " . . . provides reasons for rejecting Freud's identification of civilization with repression."[56] In other words, Marcuse uses Freud's theory to prove that his conclusions were wrong.

In his analysis and critique of industrial society, Marcuse states that he is attempting to regain a basic concept of classical political philosophy which he believes has been neglected in contemporary social inquiry. That is, the concept that " . . . the end of government is not only the greatest possible freedom, but also the greatest possible

happiness of man . . . a life without fear and misery; a life in peace."[57]

Marcuse believes that the contemporary behavioral trend in the social sciences is dangerous in that it glorifies what "is" as what "ought" to be. The scientific method in the natural sciences and the social sciences fails to go beyond its own instrumentation--it is science for science sake and nothing more.

> When the new scientific method destroyed the idea of a universe arranged in relation to an ultimate end, it invalidated at the same time a hierarchical social system in which the pursuits and aspirations of the individual were predetermined by final causes. The new science, "neutral" as it was, ignored an organized life which deprived the large majority of mankind its freedom.[58]

This view of the neutrality of contemporary social inquiry will be examined in some detail in the forthcoming analysis of Marcuse's presuppositions on the nature of man and society.

The task of the radical social theorist, as Marcuse sees it, is to examine what actually exists in advanced industrial society in order to ascertain the historical possibilities which exist but have been suppressed by contemporary society as "utopian ideals." The historical possibility for a "liberated man" is a real possibility for Marcuse. In fact, in his latest book, An Essay on Liberation, he states that "What is denounced as 'Utopian' is no longer that which has

'no place' and cannot have any place in the historical universe, but rather that which is blocked from coming about by the power of the established societies."[59] According to Marcuse, the liberation of man is the utopian vision common to the social theories of Hegel, Marx, and Freud.

Hegel's universal conception of humanity recognized that individual liberty can only be attained " . . . within and through the whole,"[60] while Marx's social theory is humanitarian in that it has as its goal the reduction of human toil and sacrifice by reorganizing labor in accord with man's individual and social needs.[61] Freud wanted to liberate man, but he described and overemphasized the oppressive nature of social life because his critique of civilization was based on free capitalism which is oppressive and anti-humanitarian.[62] This vision of a liberated man, Marcuse believes, has been neglected by contemporary social thought.[63]

Marcuse's writings show a deep concern for the human condition, and have obviously been influenced by his close contact with the Nazi and the American forms of mass industrial society, and with the Soviet state which turned Marx and Engel's utopian vision of a humane society into an Orwellian 1984. An angry man, Marcuse is disillusioned with what passes for democracy and communism today. His Marxism, it must be pointed out, is not the Marxism of the Soviet

Union. He is opposed to what may be termed "Red Fascism" just as much as he deplores capitalism. Marcuse believes that capitalism is inherently evil, but in his critical theory of society he attempts to prove that the root of man's problems is not merely economic, it is also psychological (i.e., the historical repression of Eros, the sex instincts, in civilization).

Unlike the traditional socialist theorists who hold that qualitative social change requires the liberation of the productive forces (i.e., social control and ownership of the means of production), Marcuse goes a step further in holding that man's consciousness and behavior must be changed along with the oppressive institutions. Marcuse sees little hope, if any, of changing the present situation in which man finds himself short of revolution. He is realistic in his assessment of advanced industrial societies; he realizes that the existing societies are powerful and that they have the capability of containing qualitative social change--revolutionary change--for the foreseeable future. Revolution is the only meaningful alternative for Marcuse, but he accepts the fact that the present situation in the technically advanced societies of today is not even in a prerevolutionary stage. Yet Marcuse continues to offer hope to those without

hope. He remains loyal " . . . to those who, without hope, have given and give their lives to the Great Refusal."[64]

In short, Marcuse is a reformer; and like most reformers he is concerned that present society be reconstituted consistent with what he regards to be the principles of a well-ordered community. Marcuse's reformist impulses, however, are in no way parochial or localized. In the tradition of the classical Marxist, Marcuse conceives of reform efforts on an international scale. For him, "utopia" is non-national. It is transnational. Thus his preoccupation with the two major world powers of our time--the United States and Russia.

Marcuse seems to be obsessed with the fear that Fascism is on the horizon once again--a new form of Fascism which will be more efficient in the conquest of man and nature than the Fascism of the Third Reich. The powers which defeated Fascism in the forties--especially the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--Marcuse asserts, have strengthened and streamlined their social structures, basically the same social structure which produced Fascism. As Marcuse describes it in his theory of international relations, the coexistence between the United States and Russia is a key factor in the world today which serves to strengthen this historical possibility; the possibility of

a new form of Fascism more pleasent but nevertheless more repressive than ever before.

Many view Marcuse's leftist political philosophy as a threat to the established order. Critic Max Geltman epitomizes this fear:

> Herbert Marcuse would put you and me in jail; would stop our publishing ventures, and--if he could achieve it--foreclose our thinking, since he is the first censor on earth who would deprive us of our right to think by a process he describes as "pre-censorship."[65]

Marcuse himself openly admits the subversive nature of his theory. He has tried to show that contemporary society is oppressive in all its aspects and that

> . . . any change would require a total rejection or . . . a perpetual confrontation of this society. And that it is not merely a question of changing the institutions but rather, and this is more important, of totally changing human beings in their attitudes, their instincts, their goals, and their values.[66]

In his writings, Marcuse is attempting to develop man's " . . . conscience and consciousness, to make him aware of what is going on, to prepare the precarious ground for the future alternatives."[67] Marcuse is convinced that the development of this consciousness is a necessary prerequisite for the destruction of the existing oppressive social systems.

It is difficult to assess the influence Marcuse has had on the young radicals of the New Left, but he has obviously had an impact. Revolution, or the language of revolution, is in the air today, and both Marcuse and many young radicals are talking revolution.

In fact, Herbert Marcuse's radical critique of advanced industrial societies is one of the most comprehensive statements supporting the New Left's conception of the oppressive nature of bureaucratic communism and corporate liberalism. According to Nathan Glazer, "The students who sat in, threw out the deans, and fought with the police have, after all, been taught by American academics such as C. Wright Mills, Herbert Marcuse, Noam Chomsky, and many, many others. All these explained how the world operated."[68]

In his works, Marcuse has referred directly to students and intellectuals as potential revolutionary forces in contemporary society. He sees the students as militant minorities " . . . playing the role of the professional members of the intellegentsia before the French Revolution."[69] According to Marcuse, the radical students are today " . . . articulating the needs and aspirations of the silent masses."[70] "We all know," Marcuse holds, "the really revolutionary role which the students are playing in countries like Vietnam, South Korea, and so on."[71] Marcuse believes it would therefore be

wrong to neglect their role and the role of the intellectuals as Marxists did in the past.

The one essential characteristic of the student movement for Marcuse is that they

> . . . apply to reality what has been taught them in the abstract through the work of the masters who have developed the great values of Western civilization. For example, the primacy of natural law, the inalienable right to resist tyranny and all illegitimate authority.[72]

Marcuse has acknowledged and condoned the actions taken by the German Socialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS), the Paris student radicals, the American student radicals, and other radical student groups here and abroad. In turn many New Leftists have praised Marcuse's critical theory and have adopted ideas and a revolutionary idiom similar to Marcuse's.[73]

Marcuse himself has recognized their camarade when he wrote "The coincidence between some of the ideas suggested in my essay, and those formulated by the young militants was to me striking."[74]

The dominant tendencies Marcuse describes and projects into the future are not, he maintains, final in themselves. As Marcuse sees it, a number of historical possibilities always exist. In his works Marcuse has pointed out three dominant trends: (1) The containment of qualitative social change by the advanced industrial societies leading eventually to comfortable but oppressive welfare states, (2) nuclear

destruction, and (3) the overthrow of the existing regimes by revolutionary force and the establishment of a humane one-world socialist society.

FOOTNOTES

[1]T. D. Weldon, State and Morals: A Study in Political Conflicts (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1947), p. 25.

[2]David Spitz, Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 29.

[3]See The Annals, Vol. 382, March, 1969, for a complete critique of the New Left.

[4]Men like Sidney Hook who characterizes Marcuse as a "virtuous barbarian" and Professor Aron who attacks Marcuse for advocating revolution while living in bourgeois San Diego, California, are good examples of critics who deal in personalities rather than facts.

[5]See Bibliography for the titles and dates of publication of these articles.

[6]Andrew Hacker, "Philosopher of the New Left," The New York Book Review, Vol. LXXIII, No. 10, March 10, 1968, p. 34.

[7]Herbert Gold, "California Left: Mao, Marx, et Marcuse!" The Saturday Evening Post, Vol. I, No. 21, October 19, 1968, p. 58.

[8]Peter Sedgewick, "Natural Science and Human Theory," The Socialist Register, ed. by Ralph Miliband and John Saville (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), p. 176.

[9]Daniel Callahan, "Resistance and Technology," Commonweal, Vol. LXXXVII, No. 12, December 22, 1967, p. 381.

[10]See Andrew Hacker, "Philosopher of the New Left," The New York Times Book Review, Vol. LXXIII, No. 10, March 10, 1968, pp. 1-33, 34-35, 37; Lionel Abel, "Seven Heroes of the New Left," The New York Times Magazine, May 5, 1968, pp. 30-31, 128-133, 135; Staughton Lynd, "The New Left," The Annals, March 1969, pp. 64-72; Marshall Cohen, "The Norman Vincent Peale of the Left," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 223, No. 6, June, 1969, pp. 108-110.

[11]Kurt Glaser, "Marcuse and the German New Left," National Review, Vol. XX, No. 26, July 2, 1968, p. 652.

[12]Marcuse has more than just an academic interest in revolution. He took an active part in one of the only proletariat uprisings based on the original Marxian revolutionary model for seizing the powers of the state. On June 15, 1919, the Berlin workers, under the leadership of Rosa Luxumburg, attempted to seize power and aid the Russian Revolution.

[13]Maurice Cranston, "Herbert Marcuse," Encounter, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, March, 1969, p. 40.

[14]Sal Stern, "The Metaphysics of Rebellion," Ramparts Magazine, Vol. VI, No. 12, July 13, 1968, p. 56.

[15]"70-Year-Old Professor Stirs 'New' Youth," Albuquerque Journal, October 27, 1968, Section E, p. E-4.

[16]Herbert Marcuse, "Socialist Humanism?" Socialist Humanism, ed. by Erich Fromm (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), p. 98.

[17]"70-Year-Old Professor Stirs 'New' Youth," p. E-4.

[18]Marcuse, "Socialist Humanism?" p. 98.

[19]Ed Minter, "Chancellor's Life Is No Bed Of Roses," Albuquerque Journal, Wednesday, May 7, 1969, Section A, p. A-4.

[20]Franz Neuman, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory, ed. by Herbert Marcuse (Illinois: The Free Press and The Falcon's Wing Press, 1965), p. viii.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 83.

[23]Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," A Critique of Pure Tolerance, by Robert P. Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 83.

[24]Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 282.

[25]Ibid., pp. 313-314.

[26]Ibid., p. 314.

[27]Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 141.

[28]Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 314.

[29]Herbert Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, trans. by Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 136.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, p. 140.

[32]Ibid., pp. 140-141.

[33]Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," p. 137.

[34]Ibid., p. 141.

[35]Ibid., p. 140.

[36]Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 314.

[37]Ibid., p. 315.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, p. 141.

[41]Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. vii.

[42]Ibid., p. x.

[43]Herbert Marcuse, "Notes on the Problem of Historical Laws," Partisan Review, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, Winter 1959, p. 128.

[44]Ibid., p. 144.

[45]Ibid., p. 124.

[46]Ibid., p. 147.

[47]Herbert Marcuse, preface to Marxism and Freedom, by Raya Dunayevskaya (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1964), p. 19.

[48]Marcuse, "Notes on the Problem of Historical Laws," p. 127.

[49]Herbert Marcuse, "Dialectic and Logic Since the War," Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought, ed. by Ernest J. Simmons (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 347.

[50]Herbert Marcuse, "Rejoinder to Mr. Lowith," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. II, No. 4 (June 1942), p. 564.

[51]Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 419.

[52]Ibid., p. 418.

[53]Marcuse, preface to Marxism and Freedom, p. 20.

[54]Ibid., p. 16.

[55]Herbert Marcuse, preface to Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. XII.

[56]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 4.

[57]Herbert Marcuse, "Ethics and Revolution," Ethics and Society: Original Essays on Contemporary Moral Problems, ed. by Richard T. De George (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 133-134.

[58]Herbert Marcuse, "World Without a Logos," Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences, Vol. XX, No. 1, January 1964, p. 25.

[59]Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 3-4.

[60]Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, p. 55.

[61]Marcuse, "Socialist Humanism?" p. 98.

[62]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 17.

[63]See Judith Shklar, After Utopia (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), who also holds this view.

[64]Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 257.

[65]Max Geltman, "The Philosophy of Pure Terror," review of Negations, by Herbert Marcuse, in National Review, Vol. XX, No. 28, July 16, 1968, p. 700.

[66]"Marcuse Defines His New Left Line," The New York Times Magazine, October 27, 1968, p. 29.

[67]Marcuse, "Socialist Humanism?" p. 98.

[68]Nathan Glazer, "The Campus Crucible: Student Politics and the University," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 224, No. 1, July 1969, p. 53.

[69]"Marcuse Defines His New Left Line," pp. 92, 97.

[70]Ibid., p. 87.

[71]Herbert Marcuse, "Socialism in the Developing Countries," International Socialist Journal, Vol. II, No. 8 (April, 1955), p. 151.

[72]"Marcuse Defines His New Left Line," p. 29.

[73]An example of an influencial New Leftist who has taken up Marcuse's revolutionary idiom is Carl Davidson, interorganizational leader of the SDS. See Carl Davidson, "Students Must Change Lives to be Relevant," National Guardian, Vol. XX, No. 2, October 14, 1967, p. 6.

[74]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. ix.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF MAN

> Man was born free, but is everywhere in bondage.
> --Jean Jacques Rousseau

Herbert Marcuse views contemporary man as a one-dimensional being who has lost the critical dimension, the power to negate what "is" in the name of what "ought" to be. His conception of man as he ought to be is diametrically opposed to his characterization of twentieth century man as a one-dimensional being living in an oppressive, one-dimensional society.

A neo-Freudian, Marcuse views the changes in man's basic instincts as the changes in the mental apparatus of man in the development of civilization. Marcuse maintains that Freud's metapsychology, his pre-history of mankind, and his late theory of man's biological instincts, his "biologism," is social theory in its very substance.[1] He accepts Freud's metapsychology of instincts, repression, and the unconscious, but calls into question and firmly rejects, as suggested in the previous chapter, Freud's proposition

that the development of civilized society necessitates the repressive transformation of man's instinctual structure.[2] Marcuse cannot and will not accept the inevitability of a repressive civilization based on domination which has historically transformed what he considers to be man's basic nature.

Marcuse's psychological theory is basic to his political thought. It is a complex metapsychology which cannot easily be separated from his sociology since it is essentially an abstract social psychology. Through his social psychology he attempts to show how technology has turned into a system of domination and coordination in advanced industrial society.

Marcuse has taken Freud's psychoanalytic theory of repression and attempted to reconcile it with Marx's theory of dialectical materialism and class repression. He has developed Freud's psychoanalytic notions in an attempt to demonstrate the union between man's instinctual structure and the economic structure. For Marcuse the needs generated by the market are false needs which have a stabilizing, conservative effect on man. These false needs and patterns of behavior are interjected, Marcuse maintains, into the organism. They libidinally tie man aggressively to the commodity form. They are the "counter-revolution" anchored in the instinctual structure.[3]

In developing the political, economical, and sociological content of what he has referred to as the "tabooed insights" of Freud's metapsychology, Marcuse postulates the mutability of human nature. According to Marcuse, man has not one, but two natures: an inherent biological nature and an acquired sociological nature. These two natures are for Marcuse in "constant and inseparable interaction."[4]

Because man's biological nature and his sociological nature are in constant interaction, this chapter will necessarily anticipate in part Marcuse's social theory, an approach which is inevitable, since man's second nature, his sociological nature, is a product of his society.

Marcuse's theory of man is full of such Freudian psychological terms as the reality principle, the pleasure principle, and the performance principle. Because of the frequency in which Marcuse uses these terms, definitions will be given here.

The reality principle is the Lebenswelt, the empirical reality, that which constitutes the real material conditions at a particular time and place. The pleasure principle is the primary mental process characterized by immediate satisfaction, pleasure, joy (play), receptiveness and the absence of repression. The pleasure principle corresponds largely (but not entirely) to the unconscious process.[5] The performance principle is a secondary mental process which has historically gained

ascendency over the pleasure principle. According to Marcuse, the performance principle " . . . materializes in a system of institutions,"[6] and the individual learns the requirements of these institutions as those of law and order and transmits them to the next generation.[7] It is also the historical form of the reality principle--a vicious ideology--under which societies have historically been stratified according to the competitiveness of the economic performance of their members. The performance principle is characterized by delayed satisfaction, restraint of pleasure, toil (work), productiveness, and security.[8]

It must also be pointed out here that Marcuse's conception of the term "nature" is distinguished by the fact that it refers to what men and things appear to be and also to what they are capable of becoming--the essence of their Being. The question which must be kept in mind throughout is: Are Marcuse's presuppositions on the nature of man and his description of what man is today compatible with his propositions on what man can be and ought to be?

In his major work on Freud's psychology, Eros and Civilization, Marcuse reopens the quest for the common origin of man's basic instincts, Eros (life) and Thanatos (death), whose dynamic union characterize the life process, for Marcuse and Freud.[9] Marcuse dialectically develops Freud's dualistic

construction of man's mental apparatus, his " . . . dynamic union of opposites of the unconscious and the conscious structures; of primary and secondary processes; of inherited 'constitutionally fixed' and acquired forces; and of soma-psyche and the external reality."[10]

In accepting Freud's metapsychology, Marcuse finds it necessary to defend it against the "right-wing" neo-Freudian revisionists of the cultural and interpersonal schools of psychoanalytic theory today. In their radical empirical onslaught, these "positivist schools" have debunked the mind by eliminating " . . . metaphysics, speculations that are unverifiable in accordance with accepted scientific standards."[11] These schools have resurrected the personality " . . . in the face of a reality which has all but eliminated the conditions for the personality and its fulfillment."[12]

Marcuse believes that there is such a thing as the Self, the Person, which does not yet exist, but is in the process of development.[13] The cultural and interpersonal schools have helped to prevent the development of this "Person" by accepting and condoning the dominant values of the status quo. They hold the belief that man's basic nature is unchangeable and deny the "transcending element of Reason" by emphasizing man's consciousness and cultural factors rather than his unconscious biological factors.[14]

Marcuse's quarrel with Freud over the possibility of a non-repressive civilization is actually a lover's quarrel over the nature of the reality principle, the external reality in which man develops. Marcuse thinks that Freud too closely identified the established reality principle, the performance principle, under which man has historically developed, as the reality principle per se.[15]

According to Marcuse, Freud maintained that the conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle is inevitable. Freud held that "The struggle for existence necessitates the repressive modification of the instincts (Eros and Thanatos) chiefly because of the lack of sufficient means and resources for integral, painless and toiless gratification of instinctual needs."[16] The energy which is necessary for the conquest of nature (work) can only be withdrawn from the primary instincts, Eros (sexual) and Thanatos (destructive), according to Freud.[17] Freud maintained this position while retaining at the same time the idea that Eros, the "Life" instinct operates under the pleasure principle, " . . . establishing and preserving ever greater units of life."[18] That is to say, he held that " . . . civilization is mainly the work of Eros."[19]

Therefore, according to Marcuse, Freud's dialectic of civilization " . . . the conflict between pleasure principle

and reality principle"[20] which is based on the repressive development of man's instincts, Eros and Thanatos, " . . . would lose its finality if the performance principle revealed itself as only one specific form of the reality principle."[21]

Marcuse views the recorded history of man as the history of the repressive development of man's instinctual structure under an oppressive reality principle, the performance principle, which man has imposed upon man. The performance principle is not in and of itself the reality principle, it is only one possible form of the reality principle. Man has historically developed under the rule of the performance principle and he has learned that he cannot satisfy his instinctual needs and desires because the primary characteristic of nature is material scarcity. Because of this material scarcity man must abstain from the immediate satisfaction of his needs and desires; he must restrain his drive for pleasure. The performance principle teaches man that he must work and produce in order to gain the pleasure he desires. Marcuse believes that this conception of scarcity has always provided the most effective rationalization for the repression of man.[22]

The actual historical development of man under the performance principle, its institutions and laws, has hidden the real truth about the human condition, according to Marcuse.[23] "The repressed history of mankind continues to make the history

of man."[24] "The roots of repression" which Freud described are for Marcuse " . . . real roots, and consequently their eradication remains a real and rational job. What is to be abolished is not the reality principle; not everything, but such particular things as business, politics, exploitation, poverty."[25]

In order to discover the truth about the human condition--the essence of man--Marcuse attempts to get behind the recorded historical development of mankind by "reading off" or excluding the " . . . ossification of the performance principle from the historical conditions which it has created" and " . . . from the historical . . . vicissitudes of the instincts the possibility of their non-repressive development."[26]

Marcuse divides the history of man into two different dimensions: the phylogenetic-biological dimension which he maintains was governed by the pleasure principle, and the sociological dimension which is ruled by the performance principle. The phylogenetic-biological dimension marks the development of the animal man in his unconscious struggle for existence in nature, while the sociological dimension refers to " . . . the development of civilized individuals and groups in the struggle among themselves and with their environment."[27] The sociological dimension is further divided into separate categories: ontogenesis and phylogenesis. The former refers

to " . . . the growth of the repressed individual from early infancy to his conscious societal existence;" while the latter refers to " . . . the growth of repressive civilization from the primal horde to the fully constituted civilized state."[28]

Marcuse's conception of man's biological instincts is a key to understanding his theory of man. He defines instincts as the " . . . primary drives of the human organism which are subject to historical modification."[29] Stimuli of instinctual origin act as constant forces since they come from within the organism. Their original libidinal location remains the same and they " . . . find mental as well as somatic representation."[30] Biological instincts are those needs " . . . which must be satisfied and for which no adequate substitute can be provided."[31] Marcuse maintains that " . . . certain cultural needs can 'sink down' into the biology of man,"[32] where they operate as norms of organic behavior.[33] He lists nourishment, clothing, and lodging as the needs and desires of the human organism which must be satisfied. But the most important instinct is the "Life Instinct," Eros, which is made up of the sexual instincts.[34] Marcuse thus postulates the monism of the sexual instincts.

The mutability of man's instincts is established by Marcuse's view of the instincts as " . . . subject to

historical change." This definition conveniently serves the purpose of linking his conception of the phylogenetic-biological dimension with the sociological dimension of man's existence. For Marcuse, man exists in two different dimensions which are represented by two different mental processes and principles: the unconscious and the conscious, the pleasure principle and the reality principle. Even though the changes in the instincts are the changes in the mental apparatus of man in the historical development of civilization, Marcuse maintains that there was a mythical time, a state of nature, in which the animal man operated under the pleasure principle, satisfying his basic needs and desires; a state in which the original instinctual needs were acquired.[35]

In this mythological "aboriginal golden past" which Marcuse postulates, the animal man was a bundle of drives whose only mental process was an unconscious one governed by the pleasure principle.[36] The animal man derived his instinctual energies from the Id which resides in the unconscious. The libidinal instincts, which are the only instincts, are sexual.[37] "They are neither affected by time nor troubled by contradictions."[38] According to Marcuse, the instincts are beyond good and evil and they have an inner barrier which "contains" their driving power.[39] Under the rule of the pleasure principle the animal man strove for nothing

but the satisfaction of his primitive needs and desires. He sought pleasure, joy (play), receptiveness, and the absence of repression.[40]

Since the animal man sought nothing but the gaining of pleasure, his unconscious drew back from " . . . any operation which might arouse unpleasantness . . . "[41] In this state of nature freedom and necessity coincided.[42] The pleasure principle and the reality principle were not in conflict and the animal man lived a life free from anxiety. His instinctual nature drove him to join with his own kind in a union which was characterized by the absence of want and repression. He had spontaneous relationships through "'natural' animal-like expressions."[43] In this mythical state "integral satisfaction was obtained" and the animal man was free and happy. The life of the individual was the life of the genus in this "archaic past."[44]

The animal man's biological and mental processes were guided by an unconscious pleasure ego. His life span was short and his desire for pleasure was negated by the natural biological event of death. The pain which preceded and/or accompanied death drew the instincts into "an orbit of death." The animal man attempted to relieve pain and gain pleasure by returning to the quiescence of the inorganic world.[45] The death instinct, the Nirvana principle, was an unconscious

desire on the part of the animal man to escape from pain and thus choose his own death.

Marcuse pictures the animal man's existence as a meta-psychological utopia where needs and desires were gratified, and the animal man was free from pain and the anxiety of death. The needs of the animal man were very simple; he desired nothing more than the company of his fellow beings, sex, food, clothing, shelter, and leisure. The animal man lived in harmony with nature.

What, then, happened in the history of events to change this animal man from a bundle of drives operating in harmony with nature into a conscious being at odds with his environment? What cataclysmic occurrence changed biological man from a creature free from repression into a slave chained to the institutions of society?

Recorded history fails to go back to the beginning of man; thus men have created such myths as Adam and Eve, Prometheus and Pandora, and Orpheus and Narcissus to explain the mysteries of Creation. Marcuse also creates a myth: a device for telescoping in, getting behind, and explaining what happened before the written history of man.

Marcuse's myth breaks the dynamic and inseparable relationship between man's biological development and his socio-historical development. He shows the distinction between

man's biological nature, and his sociological nature, which is a product of man's socio-historical development.

Marcuse reconstructs the animal man's biological nature, and creates a myth about the beginning of civilization and "civilized" man. Marcuse realizes the difficulty involved in the logical consistency and scientific verification of this myth,[46] but he nevertheless does construct a myth about the beginning of civilized man. He uses this mythical history to illustrate his conception of man's inherent nature.

The following is a retelling of Marcuse's myth:

In the beginning was the primal horde. The primal father ruled over the women, his sons, and daughters, and enforced the reality principle. His rule was rational and just to the extent that it insured the continued reproduction of the group. Acting as the severe representative of Eros, the primal father enforced the first "communal" (social) relations by separating the child from the mother and thus inhibiting the death instinct (the Nirvana impulse), which is a desire to return to the quiescence of the womb. This action forced the child to identify with his brothers.[47]

Material scarcity prevailed, and the primal father forced his sons to work, an activity which diverted the sexual energies of the sons into the conquest of nature. Thus

the primal father created the "preconditions for the 'disciplined labor force' of the future."[48]

The sons both loved and feared their father. They identified with him, and desired the powers and pleasures he possessed, especially his mistress, their mother. The father forbid the sons to have sexual relations with their mother. If this taboo was violated, it would result in castration, exile, or death. Thus the mother represented both pleasure and death for the sons; she embodied "Eros and Thanatos in immediate, natural union."[49]

As time went on the rule of the father changed from the rational restriction of pleasure into a despotic rule in the sole interest of the father. The king-father gratified his own pleasures at the expense of the group. He restricted and required his sons to do the undesirable work in order to satisfy his own pleasures. The father possessed the desired women (the supreme pleasure) and restrained his sons' sexual satisfactions.

The fate of the sons was a hard one under the rule of the despotic father. Those who displeased him were exiled from the primal horde. The banished sons were torn between the love for their father and the desire for their mother. This plight was the epitome of the extreme Oedipus situation. The sons' ambivalence was marked by fear and hatred. This

aggressive impulse against the father was a derivative of the death instinct.

In the end the exiled sons joined together and returned to kill and devour the primal father. They sought the freedom to satisfy their own needs and pleasures. By their act they liberated themselves from the oppressive rule of their father who had dominated over the horde in his own interest. This rebellion against the father, however, was accompanied by feelings of guilt. The sons had rebelled against their father's authority, and destroyed the rule which had up until then preserved the life of the group.[50]

The sons fought among themselves for the powers their father had possessed. While they fought, many of the powers which the father had previously possessed passed to the women of the clan. A matriarchal society was established which was marked by a low degree of repression and by erotic freedoms hitherto unknown. The pleasure principle and the reality principle were reconciled in this society. Scarcity continued to prevail, but the goods were evenly distributed among the members of the group.

When the brothers realized that the only way they could satisfy their desires for the powers and pleasure their father had previously possessed, together they overthrew the matriarchal society and established the brother clan to rule over

the group. The sons re-created the rule of the primal father by an agreement among themselves. They enforced the taboos of their father. They were counter-revolutionary, betraying the promise of their deed--the promise of liberation.

The sense of guilt which marked the beginning of civilization was a dual sense of guilt: the guilt felt by the sons and the group as a whole for the killing of the primal father and the guilt which resulted from the betrayal of their promise of liberation. Civilization thus began with self repression and with feelings of guilt (anxiety) over the failure to establish freedom.

In the brother clan the performance principle gained ascendancy over the pleasure principle, and man delayed the immediate satisfaction of his instinctual needs for security in the future. Under the performance principle, man's basic nature was transformed.

The reason of the reality principle was a reason of domination under the performance principle. Man's sexual energies were diverted into work, and he learned that he had to delay his immediate satisfactions in order to achieve "pleasures" in the future. Productivity became the highest value of the brother clan; productivity at the expense of man's basic nature.

Marcuse's mythical explanation of the beginning of civilization is the base upon which he builds his conception of man. It shows the replacement of the pleasure principle by the performance principle in the development of the individual and the genus. This supplantation is the most traumatic event man ever faces; it first occurred in the primal horde when the primal father enforced the reality principle; it is represented on the individual level at birth when the child's parents and other figures of authority restrain the child's free gratification of pleasure. Before birth the child's needs and desires are completely satisfied by his mother. On contact with reality, the individual soon learns that he cannot completely satisfy his drive for pleasure.

Like Freud, Marcuse believes that a part of the id " . . . which is equipped with the organs for the reception of and the protection from stimuli gradually develop(s) into the ego."[51] The ego is the reality tester for the id in the external world. The function of reason is developed by man when he comes into contact with reality " . . . the ego has the task of representing the external world for the id, and so of saving it; for the id, blindly striving to gratify its instincts in complete disregard of the superior strength of outside forces, could not otherwise escape annihilation."[52]

The ego initially perceives reality as hostile, but in order to protect the id from destruction and thus gain pleasure, it conforms to the existing demands of the reality principle (e.g., society's norms and laws). Its conformity results in the development of another mental "entity," the superego.

The superego " . . . originates from the long dependency of the infant on his parents; the parental influence remains the core of the superego."[53] The restrictions of the societal and cultural norms are introjected into the ego and become its conscience. Certain cultural needs sink down into the very biology of man and take root to form the second nature of man by transforming the very organic structure of man.[54]

" . . . A society constantly re-creates, this side of consciousness, an ideology, patterns of behavior and aspirations, as part of the 'nature' of its people . . ."[55] These ingrown patterns in man are the introjected morality which represent the dominant reality principle, the performance principle.

Individual psychology, according to Marcuse, is in its very essence group psychology. The prehistoric feelings of guilt derived from the group killing of the primal father and from the failure to liberate man links all men together.[56]

The instincts are subdued, not by nature, but by man himself. The reality principle is not repressive; repression comes from without by other men and is supported from within. From the brother clan to present day industrial society man has struggled against freedom.

Marcuse asks, "When will we realize that there was no god that failed, because there was no god, and that failure was ours, and theirs?"[57] The failure to create a humane society rests on man's shoulders. The first crime was no crime at all because it was committed against an oppressive tyrant, the primal father, who suppressed the true aspirations of humanity. The saviors, the brothers, brought liberty for a short period of time, but they reinstated an oppressive rule, a counter-revolution, in the image of the primal father's domination. They thus unconsciously set up the king-father as a god who was imitated, worshipped, and obeyed.

Scarcity has been a fact in man's history, but Marcuse believes that scarcity did not predestine that the satisfaction of human needs had to be constantly restrained and delayed. If goods had been distributed evenly among the members of the group, man's prehistoric needs could have been satisfied with a minimum of repression. Today, with modern technology, man no longer has to delay the satisfaction of his basic needs. Scarcity is a fact perpetuated by the haves upon the have

nots. The unequal distribution of resources creates the scarcity prevalent in the world today.

Marcuse distinguishes between two types of repression: "surplus repression" and "repression." Surplus repression is "the restriction necessitated by social domination." Repression is "the modification of the instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization."[58] In the development of man surplus repression and repression have been intertwined, but, according to Marcuse, surplus repression has dominated man's existence.

Surplus repression results in the domination of man over man. The primal father was the first to use brute force to reorientate the libidinal energies of man into the social energies needed for work and the gradual conquest of nature. Marcuse maintains that the use of force marks the greater part of man's history, but subsequently force was replaced " . . . by a more rational utilization of power."[59] The new rationality which replaced brute force was more effective because it was more pleasent and tolerable, but, needless to say, it remained what it was before, "the rationality of domination."[60]

For Marcuse, domination differs from the rational use of authority. Domination is "exercised by a particular group or individual in order to sustain and enhance itself in a

privileged position,"[61] while rational authority is authority which is founded on "knowledge and necessity;" its ultimate aim is the "protection and preservation of life."[62] Rational authority is " . . . confined to the administration of functions and arrangements necessary for the advancement of the whole."[63] Rational authority is, for Marcuse, "inherent in any societal division of labor,"[64] and "hierarchical relationships are not unfree per se."[65]

Marcuse believes that the rational exercise of authority has been the exception in the socio-historical development of man. Domination is the norm which has prevented man from being what he can be--a free agent determining his own existence in union with his fellow beings.

The reality principle which man adjusts to mentally and physically is an oppressive reality which transforms his basic nature. Man develops the function of reason under the performance principle, but the reason of this reality into which he is born is an irrational, oppressive reason.

By nature man is a rational being who requires freedom. But he is born into an unfree society. His conscious mental apparatus is effectively subordinated to the performance principle; he accepts the dominant rationality of the system. He accepts the reason of contemporary society because he has been bought off by an abundance of goods. He values material things

more than he values life. The individual has been co-opted by the goods and pleasures of the system into complying with an "irrational" rationality.

> He relinquishes his liberty to the dictum of reason itself. The point is that today the apparatus to which the individual is to adjust and adapt himself appears to be so rational that individual protest and liberation appear not only as hopeless but as utterly irrational.[66]

The only mode of thought which remains committed to man's basic nature is phantasy. The autonomy of the individual is represented by phantasy, or imagination. Phantasy connects man's secondary mental process to his primary mental process, the unconscious. The imagination (unconscious) " . . . has its own rationality and truth (perhaps more valid, more rational, than that of the establishment)."[67] On contact with the reality principle, man resigns himself to the reason which prevails rather than to the images of phantasy.

Phantasy retains " . . . what is not yet present as a goal in the present."[68] It shows man what he really wants--to be free. In contemporary society, however, phantasy is considered to be utopian thought, and utopian thought is considered unscientific, therefore irrational. Thus man's only link to the rational unconscious is looked upon with disfavor and rejected.

Man's unconscious desires are rejected and diverted by the rationality of the work-a-day world. Today an oppressive consumer economy has created a second nature which ties man "libidinally" and aggressively to the commodity form.[69] Man recognizes himself in his commodities. He lives in "an euphoria of unhappiness" characterized by false needs and false aspirations. He identifies his needs with the needs of society.

Man's libidinal energies, which are generated by the id, are organized into the genital organs, leaving the rest of the libidinal energies free for work. Man expends his sexual energies working for future pleasure. His free time today is not his own. It is organized for him by his society. He is propagandized into believing that he really does need and desire a color television, a second car, and a swimming pool like the neighbor's next door.

Marcuse defines man as one-dimensional today because man has lost the critical dimension, the ability to negate the oppressive society in which he lives. Man accepts the rationality of the whole, which is in its essence irrational. Rational, for Marcuse, cannot be that which builds or produces to destroy; which creates the means of destroying the world in the name of peace; or that which produces agricultural products and stores them while people all over the world starve.

Marcuse is a materialist. He accepts industrialization and its potential benefits, but rejects the uses to which modern technology has been put. "Science is neutral" with regard to all values and goals that, from the outside, may be assigned it.[70] What has occurred, however, is that in maintaining its neutrality, science has changed the empirical reality without an ultimate aim in sight. It has transformed man's basic nature, Eros, into a state in which aggressiveness, or the death instinct, is dominant today.

The neutrality of science is therefore no neutrality at all. It is in effect in the interest of the few, in that it perpetuates their rule while dehumanizing and destroying, not only the critical dimension, but man himself. Science and technology have no value in themselves, but the uses to which they have been applied are irrational and destructive of the potentialities of man.

According to Marcuse, what man is today--a one-dimensional being--is not what man can be or ought to be. Marcuse envisions self-conscious individuals on an aesthetic level "Being-for-others." His conception of man as he ought to be is diametrically opposed to what man is today. It is built on his belief in man's instinctual nature, Eros, existing in a materially abundant world. His view of man in the future is an image of the unfettered satisfactions of human faculties

and desires, a state in which man is filled with love and occupied by play. It is an Adamite conception of utopia in a fully automated society.

Man in this future state will have conquered necessity and, unlike men today, will not be anxiety-ridden over his own death. "Men would experience death primarily as a technical limit of human freedom whose surpassing would become the recognized goal of the individual and social endeavor to an increasing extent, death would partake of freedom, and individuals would be impowered to determine their own deaths."[71] In this state man would accept death as a natural biological event which is not the beginning of a life after death, but the termination of a life well lived.

Marcuse's archetypes of the future are Orpheus and Narcissus. The images of Orpheus and Narcissus are the images of the self-actualizing man fulfilling himself in joy, play, beauty, and creativity. Orpheus and Narcissus embody: "The voice which does not command but sings; the gesture which offers and receives; the deed which is peace and ends the labor of conquest; the liberation from time which unites man with god, man with nature."[72] They reconcile Eros and Thanatos and symbolize, not man at work, but man at continual play in harmony with nature. Play would be entirely subject to the pleasure principle, as opposed to the necessary and the useful.[73]

The impulses which determine play would be the pre-genital ones: "play expresses objectless auto-eroticism and gratifies those component instincts which are already directed toward the objective world."[74] The unnatural concentration of the libidinal energies in man's sexual organs and the death instinct would be transformed into Eros by the release of surplus repression. All human activity would be libidinalized and man's body would be polymorphous perverse. Eros as the "life instinct" would encompass larger and larger units of life and would turn the necessary work for the perpetuation of the species into play.

This release of sexual energies would lead to the full enjoyment of man's body and mind in a receptive environment. Because man would have liberated himself from surplus repression, he would conquer the repressive past of mankind and would continually make his own history. The free gratification of man's instincts would entail the absence of anxiety and the dual sense of guilt.

Marcuse dreams of a state in which man would be free; a state where man would realize his true essence. This realization would entail not only freedom, but knowledge and cognition. Man would once again realize that the individual is in essence the social entity, that man is a social animal. At this stage of development, when the individual interest

coincides with the interest of the whole, the true history of mankind would begin.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 5-6.

[2]Ibid., p. 4.

[3]Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 11.

[4]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 133.

[5]Ibid., p. 12.

[6]Ibid., p. 15.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid., p. 12.

[9]Ibid., p. 28.

[10]Ibid., p. 22.

[11]Herbert Marcuse, "Theory and Therapy in Freud," The Nation, Vol. 185, No. 9, September 28, 1957, p. 200.

[12]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 240.

[13]Herbert Marcuse, "Love Mystified: A Critique of Norman O. Brown," review of Love's Body, by Norman O. Brown, in Commentary, Vol. 43, No. 2, February 1967, p. 74.

[14]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 6.

[15]Ibid., p. 130.

[16]Ibid., p. 132.

[17]Ibid., p. 82.

[18]Ibid., p. 26.

[19]Ibid., p. 82.

[20]Ibid., p. 5.

[21]Ibid., p. 130.

[22]Ibid., p. 17.

[23]Marcuse, "Love Mystified," p. 72.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Ibid., p. 73.

[26]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 131.

[27]Ibid., p. 133.

[28]Ibid., p. 20.

[29]Herbert Marcuse, "Eros and Culture," The Cambridge Review, Vol. I, No. 3, Spring, 1955, p. 107.

[30]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 8.

[31]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 10.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Ibid., p. 11.

[34]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 28.

[35]Ibid., pp. 138-139.

[36]Ibid., p. 13.

[37]Ibid., p. 28.

[38]Ibid., p. 29.

[39]Ibid., p. 226.

[40]Ibid., p. 12.

[41]Ibid., p. 13.

[42]Ibid., p. 18.

[43]Ibid., p. 39.

[44]Ibid., p. 142.

[45]Ibid., p. 25.

[46]Ibid., p. 59.

[47]Ibid., p. 79.

[48]Ibid., p. 62.

[49]Ibid., p. 76.

[50]Ibid., p. 64.

[51]Ibid., p. 30.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Ibid., pp. 31-32.

[54]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, pp. 10-11.

[55]Ibid., p. 11.

[56]Marcuse, "Theory and Therapy in Freud," p. 200.

[57]Marcuse, "Love Mystified," p. 75.

[58]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 35.

[59]Ibid., p. 36.

[60]Ibid.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Ibid., p. 224.

[63]Ibid., p. 36.

[64]Ibid.

[65]Ibid., p. 224.

[66]Herbert Marcuse, "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology," Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, Vol. IX (1941), p. 421.

[67]Herbert Marcuse, "The Individual in the Great Society," Alternatives, Part II, Vol. I, No. 2, Summer, 1966, p. 30.

[68]Herbert Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, trans. by Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 154.

[69]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 11.

[70]Herbert Marcuse, "World Without a Logos," Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences, Vol. XX, No. 1, January 1964, p. 25.

[71]Herbert Marcuse, "The Ideology of Death," The Meaning of Death, ed. by Herman Feifel (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959), p. 69.

[72]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 162.

[73]Marcuse, "Eros and Culture," p. 119.

[74]Ibid.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF SOCIETY

> Together with the machine, the bureaucratic organization is engaged in building the houses of bondage of the future, in which perhaps men will one day be like peasants in the ancient Egyptian state, acquiescent and powerless, while a purely technically good, that is rational, official administration and provision becomes the sole, final value, which sovereignly decides the direction of their affairs.
>
> --Max Weber

Herbert Marcuse is an angry man. He views the historical forms of society as oppressive and antagonistic to man's basic nature and questions not only the legitimacy and practices of civilization, but also its values and goals. Outraged at the existing forms of social organization and what he considers to be the rampant misuse of social resources--material as well as mental--Marcuse is searching for the revolutionary social forces which will destroy the legally established governments of today and create a free transnational socialist society.

Marcuse's conception of the historical development of society is similar to Marx's, but Marcuse modifies and adds

to the Marxian theory his own neo-Freudian interpretation of the dialectic between man and civilization. The result is a peculiar class analysis of contemporary society which he calls his critical theory of society.

In his critical theory of society Marcuse performs a threefold task: (1) analyzes and criticizes the development of advanced industrial society (2) sets forth propositions on what society can be and ought to be, and (3) demonstrates the means by which the "good life" might be attained. Marcuse believes that the empirical world in which we live must first be comprehended, then transformed by subversive practices if necessary " . . . in order to become that which it actually is."[1]

As Marcuse sees it, the role of the social theorist today is " . . . to analyze the existing societies in light of their own functions and capabilities (if any) which lead beyond the existing state of affairs."[2] He thinks that social theory must break through the manipulated consciousness of men, comprehend and express the new potentialities of a qualitative existence. Social theory is, for Marcuse, the basis for closing the gap between theory and practice.

In his critical theory, Marcuse attempts to detect and trace to their origin the tendencies that link the liberal past with its totalitarian liquidation in culture, that is to

say, in the representative philosophy of Western civilization.[3] He attempts to show how bourgeois economic and political freedom has turned into bourgeois economic and political unfreedom.

Marcuse claims to measure the established way of organizing society against other possible ways; ways which he believes offer a better chance for alleviating man's struggle for existence. In his historical calculus, he claims to take into account the intellectual, material, scientific, and technical resources available in society and also the inhumane sacrifices imposed upon the members of society in their struggle for existence in war and in peace.[4]

Ever a value theorist, Marcuse is convinced that his social theory points out those institutions which must be changed if a "free society" is to be established--a society in which freedom and necessity coincide. He admits that value judgments play an integral part in his critical theory, but at the same time he claims that his theory is historically objective and empirically verifiable.[5]

The medium of the dialectic portrays for Marcuse the process of the historical reality. It is a " . . . conceptual tool for comprehending an inherently antagonistic society."[6] The dialectic recaptures on a theoretical plane what actually occurs in reality; it " . . . gets to . . . the totality of class society and the negativity that underlies its

contradictions and shapes its very content is the negativity of class relations."[7] True consciousness, according to Marcuse, is represented by the correct theory, dialectical materialism, which shows man how to organize society in the interest of the whole and in the direction of the content of the productive process.[8]

Marcuse believes that all facts are historical facts, and once they are comprehended in their historical development through the dialectical method (critical thought) they become what Marcuse has referred to as "nodal points" of possible change in the dynamic development of society. By focusing his analysis on the most important parts and relations in a society--the cultural, political and economic institutions which are, he maintains, the outgrowth and reflection of the basic division and organization of social labor--he claims that he is able to comprehend the evolution of society.[9] Indeed, changes in a social system are, Marcuse believes, determined by the division and organization of social labor which provides the basis for historical predictability, or the projection of foreseeable events.[10]

Once institutionalized, the basic forms of societal reproduction determine the direction and development of society. New societies emerge within the framework of the old social systems. The changes in society are cumulative and result in

essentially different structures.[11] History progresses through the development of the productive process which, according to Marcuse, is progress not of the realization of freedom, but in the creation of the prerequisites of freedom.[12] The historical process is, for Marcuse, a rational and irreversible process which can be captured, so he maintains, by the dialectical mode of thought.

Qualitative changes, according to Marcuse, have as their goals the establishment of new modes of existence and institutions. Marcuse refuses to accept the prevailing social facts as the " . . . final context of validation."[13] Instead, he "transcends" the given social facts "in light of their arrested and denied possibilities."[14] Marcuse believes that his social theory will be validated when it is " . . . translated into reality by historical practice," by revolutionary social struggles.[15]

Marcuse is concerned with the historical possibilities existing within the reach of advanced industrial societies, with the subversive alternatives which he believes continually haunt the established societies. His critical theory upholds " . . . the truth which past knowledge labored to attain,"[16] the universal propositions that " . . . man can be more than a manipulated subject in the productive process of class society,"[17] that man is rational, that he requires freedom,

and that the highest good is man's happiness.[18] These are the humanitarian principles which contemporary social thought continues to neglect.

Marcuse's critical theory is essentially concerned with the essence of man. Man, according to Marcuse, is moral; that is to say, "Prior to all ethical behavior, in accordance with specific social standards, prior to all ideological expressions, morality is a 'disposition' of the organism, perhaps rooted in the erotic drive to counter aggressiveness, to create and preserve 'ever greater units' of life."[19]

Marcuse thus postulates the existence of what he has referred to as the "instinctual foundation for solidarity among men." Eros, the sexual instincts, is, according to Marcuse, the Life instinct, which is also a dimension in the infrastructure of society. Man is a social animal with a biological disposition towards joining with his fellow beings in creating a humane society, a communistic society based on love.

The development of man under an oppressive reality principle, has transformed man's basic nature. Marcuse believes that man's socio-historical nature is a product of society, and that society has continually restrained the pleasure principle and substituted for it the performance principle, which

is the basis for organizing and diverting man's sexual energies into the conquest of nature.

The origin and growth of civilization has been governed by a specific reality principle, the performance principle. Under this repressive principle, man is taught that scarcity of material resources is a fact of nature and that work (production) is necessary. Historically societies have been stratified on the basis of the economic performance of their members.[20] As society progressed, so has the rational domination of man over other men and things increased.

Marcuse believes that the driving power behind the historical development of society are the contradictions in the social process. Violence has been the compelling condition of society and " . . . terror has been the god-father of progress."[21] Society has been based on oppressive class relationships and on the repressive performance principle. Man's instinctual structure has been transformed in the development of society; the development of man has been crippled by the oppressive historical forms of society.

Those who have controlled the means of production, the ruling classes, have restricted man's development by the use of surplus repression. The Life instinct, Eros, which drives men to join with other men in communal living, has been transformed by an oppressive society which organized the death

instinct by the repressive sublimation of the sex instinct in order to free the sexual energies of man for work. "Destructive energy becomes socially useful aggressive energy, and the aggressive behavior impels growth--growth of economic, political, and technical power."[22]

According to Marcuse, " . . . the process of civilization has turned the organism into an instrument of work."[23] Man's second nature, his sociological nature, is a product of an oppressive society; the needs and desires of man's sociological nature are false needs and desires imposed upon him by society. In other words, the social relations into which men enter are preshaped and predetermined by the existing society.[24]

Marcuse is of the opinion that this repressive development of man under an oppressive reality principle is only one of many historical possibilities in which man and society could have developed. The fault of this repressive development does not lie with society; it rests squarely on the shoulders of man. "It is through man's own practices that the technical world has crystalized into a second nature . . . more hostile perhaps and more destructive than initial nature, pretechnical nature."[25]

Marcuse traces the repressive development of society into its advanced industrial stage, which he defines as

> . . . a society in which mechanization of large scale industry has already embarked on the stage of automation, a technically advanced society in which, for the working class as well as for others, the standard of living can be continually improved . . . In this kind of society, the cultural, political, and economic power is concentrated to an unprecedented degree. To a large extent, economics are determined by politics and the economy can only function because of the direct or indirect intervention of the state in vital sectors.[26]

Marcuse focuses his critical theory of society on the most technically advanced capitalist and socialist countries of the twentieth century--the United States and Russia. He does so because he believes that industrialization is the trend of the future and that the United States and Russia are the models on which many backward countries will base their future industrialization.[27] Of the two most technically advanced countries, Marcuse is primarily concerned with the United States because he believes that up until now it has effectively contained, through its coexistence with the socialist countries, the qualitative social changes so desperately needed on a world wide basis.

Marcuse sees the United States as the symbol of capitalism today--an oppressive, irrational class society based on inherent contradictions. He believes that the productive process, the trend towards automation, is the principle contradiction in American society. The system is advancing towards full automation, but it cannot accept full automation

because that would mean " . . . the breakdown of the existing institutions."[28] If full automation were implemented there would no longer be a need for man to work. Since our institutions sustain and perpetuate work, there would no longer be a need for these oppressive institutions.

American productivity is for Marcuse " . . . destructive of the free development of human needs and faculties, its peace maintained by the constant threat of war, its growth dependent on the repression of the real possibilities for pacifying the struggle for existence--individual, national, and international."[29] Capitalism in its advanced industrial stage is, according to Marcuse, an oppressive global power with an economic and military hold on the four continents, a neo-colonial empire which "subjects the majority of the underlying population to its overwhelming productivity and force."[30]

Although a radical socialist opposed to capitalism, Marcuse nevertheless does not condone many of the practices of the socialist countries today, with the exceptions of North Vietnam, Cuba, and China which he favorably views as revolutionary regimes opposed to the bureaucratic administration of socialism.[31] Marcuse views technologically advanced societies, both in the East and the West, as oppressive. He believes that these societies have effectively contained the natural political struggle between the classes, between the

rulers and the ruled who have opposing goals and world views. Order in these technological societies, Marcuse writes, is maintained at the expense of both the rulers and the ruled. The masters cannot be free so long as they enslave the servants; the ruled identify so much with the system that they do not even realize that they are enslaved. The ruling class--politicians, managers, and generals--will not relinquish its cherished positions of power and authority without a fight, and the ruled do not yet have the class consciousness necessary to join together to overthrow their rulers.

Marcuse holds that both democracy and socialism as represented in the United States and Russia are sick political systems which enslave men to the prevailing order. Marcuse defines a sick society as a society in which the " . . . basic institutions and relations, its structure, are such that they do not permit the use of the available material and intellectual resources for the optimal development and satisfaction of individual needs."[32] Political disorders are reflected in personal disorders; a sick society produces sick individuals. Marcuse views deviants in society, particularly political deviants of the left, as progressive because he believes they reflect the contradictions inherent in society.

In tracing the development of society into its totalitarian form in technically advanced society, Marcuse distinguishes

between culture, the background, and civilization, the ground. The institutions and relations of a society should, Marcuse affirms, more or less embody the socially accepted cultural values. Marcuse defines culture as " . . . the complex of moral, intellectual, aesthetic goals (values) which a society considers the purpose of the organization, division, and direction of its labor--'the good' that is supposed to be achieved by the way of life it has established."[33]

Civilization appears as the "realm of necessity" which Marcuse contends has always consisted of "socially necessary work and behavior, where man is not really himself and in his own element, but is subject to heteronomy, to external conditions and needs."[34]

The social institutions which have historically been used to attain or approximate cultural goals have been based on cruelty and violence. According to Marcuse, the forces of violence and cruelty and the institutions which embody these forces have been an integral part of culture.

There is, Marcuse maintains, a great disparagement between what society proclaims as its values and what society actually practices as its values. For example, the United States professes great technological achievements for the benefit of all: it produces millions of luxurious cars each year which take thousands of lives each week; it harvests and

stores tons of food while millions starve; it sends men to the moon and leaves men to die in the ghettos. These contradictions " . . . may explain the paradox that much of the 'higher culture' of the West has been protest, refusal, and indictment of culture not only of its miserable translation into reality, but of its principles and content."[35]

The "higher culture" of Western civilization which Marcuse identifies as humanism excludes not only cruelty but also fanaticism and unsublimated violence. It is, Marcuse maintains, a process of humanization which is " . . . characterized by the collective effort to protect human life, to pacify the struggle for existence by keeping within manageable bounds, to stabilize the productive organization of society, to develop the intellectual faculties of man, to reduce and sublimate aggressions, violence, and misery."[36]

Marcuse admits that his writings are ideological in character when he identifies himself as a socialist and then claims that socialism is essentially humanism. He claims that " . . . humanism is still an ideology today, a higher value, which little affects the inhumane character of reality."[37] Humanism remains an ideology despite the fact that the liberation of man and the creation of a free society is possible today.

Contemporary advanced industrial society has dragged down the higher dimension of human fulfillment, culture, and proclaimed that it has been realized in the existing social institutions and relations. Culture has been translated into operational ideas today. It is bought and sold in advanced industrial society like any other commodity on the market. This obliteration of the two-dimensional culture, critical culture, " . . . takes place not through the denial and rejection of the 'cultural values,' but through their wholesale incorporation into the established order."[38] This assimilation is, for Marcuse, historically premature; " . . . it establishes cultural equality while preserving domination."[39]

The tension between culture and civilization, which for Marcuse is a real tension, has been seemingly cancelled by the integration of cultural values into society. Society has flattened out the real historical tension between what society "ought" to be and what it actually "is," between the potentiality and the actuality, the future and the present.[40] This tension appears to be solved, but in fact it is only methodically reduced.[41]

The reduction of cultural tension has occurred, Marcuse says, in the two major advanced industrial societies, the United States and Russia. These two societies have developed in a one world historical continuum. They are both the

outgrowth of the same technical base. "Modern machinery is susceptible to capitalist as well as socialist utilization. This amounts to saying that mature capitalism and socialism have the same technical base and that the historical decision as to how this base is to be used is a political decision."[42]

For Marcuse, the technical base of industrial society is neutral. It is the basis for private enterprise in the West as well as nationalized enterprise in the East. The decision as to how the base is to be utilized is a political one which can go in the opposite or in the same direction as the developing productive apparatus.[43] This political decision can either enslave man, turn him into another commodity on the production line, or it can liberate man, free him from exploitation, misery, and injustice.

The material base of advanced industrial society is, for Marcuse, a technological base. The machine, the primary productive force, has changed the productive relations in advanced industrial society. " . . . The machine is no longer a means of production in the hands of the worker or the group of workers."[44] In Marcuse's opinion, the development of automation " . . . is a 'crucial factor' in a development which seems to have outmoded the whole concept of the means of production as Marx defined it."[45] Today, in semi-automated industry and moreso in fully automated society, the machine

is more than a productive force; it is used as an instrument of social organization and domination.

Although Marcuse values the machine as the basis for the liberation of man in the future, he sees it as the oppressor of man today. In the manipulation of the machine man performs and begins to think and act like a machine. The machine " . . . has become an element in the whole system of organization which determines the worker's behavior, not even just in the factory, but outside it, in every realm of activity."[46] In the factory, as Marcuse puts it, man "is in the swing of things." This phrase, according to Marcuse, "admirably expresses the change in mechanized enslavement: things swing rather than oppress, and they swing the human instrument--not only in its body, but also its mind and even its soul."[47]

The shift from physical to psychological strain by the use of the speed-up method in the factory is an inhumane act. In fact, Marcuse says, "it is probably even more inhumane than the heavy physical labor which used to be the rule."[48] While at work the individual is cut off from his fellow workers, isolated in the semi-automated factories. Political apathy accompanied by the integration of the worker into the system is a direct result of this isolation in the factory. The worker is more passive today. He "reacts" to stimuli like

a machine rather than respond to his surroundings like a human being.[49]

Marcuse explains the apathy and integration of the worker in advanced industrial society by the use of such terms as "reification" and "alienation." Reification refers to the "veil of commodity production," the separation of physical from intellectual work, and the enslavement of man by the machine. "Technology has become the great vehicle of reification."[50]

Marcuse places a special emphasis upon the scientific mode of thought, technological rationality, which he believes to be dominant in advanced industrial society. Pure science, at least potentially applied science, leaves the essential structure of the empirical reality unchanged. Science is valued today by most people as the answer to all their problems, but the scientific method remains dependent on a specific Lebenswelt (empirical reality).

This technological rationality is dominant today. Its truths are subordinate to the standards of the existing society, adjustment and compliance. Reason has found its resting place in advanced industrial society in the continued perfection of the systems of standardized control, production, and consumption.[51] Science and techniks (the techniques of the existing systems of domination) which are instrumental

in the continued functioning of society as it exists today, dictate their own ends; they are either true or false. If they perpetuate standardized control, production, and consumption they are adopted. "As the laws of mechanism of technological rationality spread over the whole society they develop a set of truth values of their own which hold good for the functioning of the apparatus, and for that alone."[52]

The technological controls exercised by society over men and things " . . . appear to be the very embodiment of reason for the benefit of all social groups and interests to such an extent that all contradictions seem irrational and all counteraction impossible."[53] Because of this technological rationality imposed upon the workers, the system is accepted as it is and the real possibilities for creating a humane society do not even enter the minds of the workers. Critical thought is negated by technological reason.

Marcuse claims that alienation is entirely objective today. It has reached a new stage of development in which the individual is totally encompassed by his alienated existence.

> Alienation is intensified as it becomes transparently irrational; it becomes unproductive as it sustains repressive productivity, and where the established society delivers the goods that raise the standard of living, alienation reaches a point at which even the consciousness of alienation is largely repressed: individuals identify themselves with their Being-for-others, their image.[54]

Those who retain the critical power of reason today--critical thinkers--attempt to communicate the oppressive nature and power of the whole to the oppressed masses in theory and in practice. The struggle for radical social change by the students, the young middle-class intellectuals, and the ghetto population, outline, for Marcuse, " . . . the limits of the established societies, of their power of containment."[55] But at the same time each step towards radical social change, extra-parlimentarian actions and uncivil disobedience, tends to isolate the rebels from the masses and increases the " . . . mobilization of institutional violence against the opposition, thus further diminishing the prospects for radical change."[56]

The individual is today stripped of his individuality by the rationality under which he lives. He relinquishes his liberty to an oppressive reason. Rational behavior is today " . . . identical with the matter-of-factness which teaches reasonable submissiveness and thus guarantees getting along in the prevailing order."[57] Marcuse believes that man is today a one-dimensional being living in a one-dimensional society. He has lost the critical power of reason and accepts society as it is. Society is therefore no more than what man has made it, an oppressive, irrational system which contains

qualitative change. "Technological rationality has become political rationality."[58]

This technological rationality prevails in the most advanced industrial societies of today. According to Marcuse, the post World War II development of competitive coexistence between capitalist and socialist countries, especially the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is a determining factor, if not the determining factor, which " . . . serves to justify--subjectively and objectively--repressive competition and competitive mobilization on a totalitarian scale."[59] It is a factor which determines the institutionalized structure of both capitalist and socialist countries.

In their coexistence these two antagonistic forms of industrial society meet and

> . . . challenge each other in the same international arena, neither one strong enough to replace the other. This relative weakness of both systems is characteristic of the respective structures and therefore a long range factor: the end of one system's effectiveness would be tantemont to the end of the system.[60]

The coexistence between the East and the West explains, for Marcuse, not only the changes which have occurred in capitalist societies, but also the corruption that the original socialist ideal has undergone in practice.[61]

By their failure to use socialist violence against the capitalist countries, the socialist countries have perpetuated the growth and productivity of capitalism and have suspended the contradictions which exist in capitalist society. This renunciation of violence has in effect strengthened capitalistic exploitation in the world.[62] Indeed, the socialist countries have acted as a stabilizing force cast in the role of the enemy from without whose threat the capitalist countries continually use to rationalize a war economy based on exploitation and inequality. Marcuse maintains that " . . . if it were not for communism, it would be impossible to explain the political and economic unification of the capitalist world--a unification which, so to speak, embodies the old Marxist spectre of the universal cartel."[63]

Of course, the classic form of imperialism no longer exists today, but, Marcuse claims, a new form of imperialism, neo-colonialism, has taken its place in dividing up the world. The integration of the capitalist world is a response to the increased strength of the socialist block and to the fact that " . . . organized monopoly competition makes it possible to extract exceptional profits and surplus value, so that large-scale industry, monopolistically organized, can afford to pay higher real wages--not only for a short while but over a long period."[64]

The primary differences between the free capitalist system which Marx analyzed and the organized capitalist system of today are: a growth in productivity, a rise in the standard of living for the working class, and the concentration of economic and political power.[65] These developments have resulted in a change in the life style of the Marxian vehicle of revolution, the proletariat. A large part of the working class under these changed conditions acquired, so Marcuse maintains, " . . . a vested interest in the society whose 'absolute negation' (it was) supposed to represent."[66]

Although the socialist countries claim to be socialistic, by their acceptance of many of the values and aspirations of the West, especially the American standard of living, they in fact are not. The proletariat in many of the socialist countries has been co-opted by an abundance of material goods, manipulated by a bureaucratic administration, and is no longer a revolutionary force in the world today.

The productivity of the West has kept the socialist countries on the defensive. They have had to rationalize and justify the repressive, totalitarian form of centralization in order to create the heavy industry needed to compete with the West. They use their Marxist ideology as an instrument of domination.

Marcuse believes that a thorough theoretical modification of Marxian theory is necessary today in order to comprehend the contemporary world situation. Such a modification must be based on the historical alternatives inherent in the original Marxian conception, the dialectical materialist concept of industrial society. Without such an alteration based on the dialectical materialist concept, Marcuse believes that the Marxian notion of the working class as a revolutionary force is a meaningless term when applied to the technically advanced capitalist and socialist countries of today.

According to Marcuse, Marx anticipated in part many of the basic trends and tendencies in contemporary industrial society, but he failed to draw the correct conclusions from his analysis. Marcuse goes on to say that Marx's analysis of the inherent contradictions in capitalist society captured on a theoretical plane many of the economic and political features of contemporary capitalist society. But the contradictions did not, as Marx foresaw, explode and destroy the capitalist system. Instead,

> . . . the "era of imperialism" has seen an intercontinental regrouping, and also an intercontinental stabilization of the Western world--in spite of or because of a "permanent war economy." While the socialist revolution was prepared and begun under the guidance of rigidly Marxist conceptions, the subsequent construction of socialism in the communist orbit exhibits hardly any of the substance of the Marxian idea.[67]

According to Marcuse, Marx thought that the working class would only become " . . . the historic subject of revolution because it represented the absolute negation of the existing order."[68] But with the stabilization of the bureaucratic capitalist states, the rise of the oppressive bureaucratic socialist states, and the integration of the proletariat into both of these oppressive systems, Marcuse recognizes the fact that the proletariat is no longer a revolutionary force in industrial societies today. The working class, because of these changes, is " . . . no longer qualitatively different from any other class and hence no longer capable of creating a qualitatively different society."[69]

Marcuse accepts in part Lenin's interpretation of Marxian theory--his dictum that class consciousness has to be brought upon the proletariat from without--but he accuses Lenin of failing to draw the theoretical consequences from the new situation in capitalist society. Lenin's avant-garde strategy acknowledged in fact what it denied in theory. Lenin saw that the peasantry had to be integrated into Marxian theory and strategy because the revolutionary potential of the urban proletariat had diminished; part of the proletariat had turned into a "labor aristocracy." But Lenin failed to accept the long range consequences of his theory of the "labor aristocracy" in his theoretical works.[70] As formulated by Lenin, the theory

of the labor aristocracy, according to Marcuse, does not capture the situation in which the vast majority of the working class has been integrated into the system of industrialized society.[71]

Marcuse's explanation of this transformation of the proletariat from the subject to an object in the revolutionary process is a key factor in his analysis of contemporary society. He believes that an external and an internal proletariat exist in the world today.

The internal proletariat is divided into blue collar workers and white collar workers in advanced industrial societies. They have been integrated into the system by a rise in the standard of living and by the changes in their working conditions.[73] The increase in the number and importance of the white collar workers, the "new working class" (i.e., technicians, engineers, and specialists), and the decline in the need and importance of the blue collar workers has divided the working class.[74]

Members of the working class which bear the brunt of exploitation play a smaller role in the productive process while the instrumentalist intelligentsia, the "new working class," which is in a position to change the existing mode and relations of production, has " . . . neither the interest

nor the vital need to do so; they are well integrated and rewarded."[75]

The external proletariat consists of the urban and rural working classes in the Third World and those minorities in the capitalist countries who do not benefit from the higher wages, the better living conditions, or the greater political influence afforded to the mainstream of society.[76]

Marcuse, like Lenin, draws the rural proletariat, the peasantry, into the orbit of Marxian theory and strategy. He attempts to redefine the prospects for a proletariat revolution in the capitalist and socialist countries of today. The proletariat revolution, Marcuse believes, now depends on "the growth of the political organization of the laboring classes, who, acting as a class conscious force, pursue their 'real' interests, not in but against the capitalist system."[77]

The revolutionary threat comes from without, according to Marcuse; from those who do not have a vested interest in the established societies, but have a vital need, a biological need, to change the intolerable conditions which advanced industrial societies impose upon them. It is a primitive threat, " . . . a slave revolt, rather than a revolution, and precisely for this reason more dangerous to societies which are capable of containing or defeating revolutions."[78] Advanced industrial societies, capitalist and socialist, are

threatened, " . . . for the slaves are everywhere and countless, and they indeed have nothing to lose but their chains."[79]

How does Marcuse see the new society if, indeed, the chains of oppression were broken?

The new society, according to Marcuse, would be a free, transnational, socialist society with an aesthetic form. It would be a society of abundance, since "only an order of abundance is compatible with freedom."[80] Not only would it be a society of abundance, it would also be light, beautiful, and playful because these qualities are for Marcúse essential elements of freedom.[81] Freedom is when the individual's free time is his own time; it is " . . . living without toil, without anxiety: the play of human faculties."[82]

Such a society presupposes throughout, Marcuse maintains, the success of a world-wide revolution and " . . . the achievements of the existing societies, especially their scientific and technical achievements."[83] Science and technology would no longer serve as instruments of domination and exploitation; they would be organized and redirected for the purposes of eliminating global poverty and toil. The empirical reality would be transformed into a work of art. "Technique would tend to become art and art would tend to form reality."[84]

The aesthetic imaginations of men and women no longer capable " . . . of tolerating any repression other than that

required for the protection and amelioration of life"[85] would create an environment of freedom. They would create " . . . a universe where the sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful become forms of existence and thereby the form of the society itself."[86]

Beauty for Marcuse pertains to Eros and Thanatos, the primary instincts. The beautiful is not only sensuous, it is also useful and beneficial because it is an object of unsublimated drives which has " . . . the power to check aggression; it forbids and immobilizes the aggressor."[87]

The original perception common to all men, the image (the dream) of unfettered satisfaction which phantasy upholds would be actualized " . . . at the highest attained level of civilization,"[88] according to Marcuse. The reality principle would be reconciled with the pleasure principle and the "non-necessary would become a "vital need" for nonaggressive, erotic, receptive men and women. These men and women would have new morals and a new language, a poetic language, to define and communicate their new values. All of man's basic needs in such a society would be satisfied, and the necessities of life would " . . . cease to demand the aggressive performance of 'earning a living,' and the 'non-necessary' (would become) a vital need."[89] The sphere outside of labor would define the freedom and fulfillment of the individual. Materialism

would be cancelled through its realization and quantity would turn into quality once the control of production came into the hands of the immediate consumer.[90]

All laws in this society would be

> . . . self-given by the individuals: "to give freedom is the universal law" of the "aesthetic state"; in a truly free civilization, "the will of the whole" fulfills itself only "through the nature of the individual." Order is freedom only if it is founded on and sustained by the free gratification of the individual.[91]

It is difficult to go into further detail in describing the new society, since Marcuse believes that it would not be created by the historical-animal man of today, but be the " . . . conscious, rational subject that has mastered and appropriated the object world as the arena of his realization."[92]

FOOTNOTES

[1]Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 123.

[2]Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 3.

[3]Herbert Marcuse, preface to Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, trans. by Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. xii.

[4]Herbert Marcuse, "Ethics and Revolution," Ethics and Society: Original Essays on Contemporary Moral Problems, ed. by Richard T. DeGeorge (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 140-142.

[5]Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. x.

[6]Herbert Marcuse, "Dialectic and Logic Since the War," Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought, ed. by Ernest J. Simmons (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 349.

[7]Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 314.

[8]Marcuse, "The Concept of Essence," Negations, p. 84.

[9]Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 2-3.

[10]Herbert Marcuse, "Notes on the Problem of Historical Laws," Partisan Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Winter, 1959, p. 122.

[11]Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, pp. 3-4.

[12]Ibid., p. 2.

[13]Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. xi.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," Negations, p. 152.

[17]Ibid., p. 153.

[18]Ibid., p. 152.

[19]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 10.

[20]Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 44.

[21]Herbert Marcuse, "Recent Literature on Communism," World Politics, Vol. No. 4, July, 1954, p. 517.

[22]Marcuse, "Aggressiveness in Advanced Industrial Societies," Negations, p. 257.

[23]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 50.

[24]Marcuse, "Notes on the Problem," p. 124.

[25]Herbert Marcuse, "World Without a Logos," Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences, Vol. XX, No. 1, January, 1964, p. 25.

[26]Herbert Marcuse, "Socialism in the Developing Countries," International Socialist Journal, Vol. II, No. 8 (April, 1955), p. 140.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid., p. 144.

[29]Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, pp. ix-x.

[30]Ibid., p. vii.

[31]Ibid., p. viii.

[32]Marcuse, "Aggressiveness in Advanced Industrial Societies," p. 251.

[33]Herbert Marcuse, "Remarks on a Redefinition of Culture," Daedalus, Vol. 94, No. 1, Winter, 1965, p. 190.

[34]Ibid., p. 192.

[35]Ibid., p. 191.

[36]Ibid., pp. 190-191.

[37]Herbert Marcuse, "On Science and Phenomenology," Boston Studies In The Philosophy of Science, ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Mark W. Wartofsky (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), p. 290.

[38]Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 57.

[39]Ibid., p. 64.

[40]Marcuse, "Remarks on a Redefinition of Culture," p. 196.

[41]Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, p. 124.

[42]Herbert Marcuse, "Transition from Socialism to Communism," Power and Political Thought in the Twentieth Century Civilization, ed. by David Cooperman and E. V. Walter (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1962), p. 346.

[43]Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, p. 121.

[44]Marcuse, "Socialism in the Developing Countries," p. 147.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 26.

[48]Marcuse, "Socialism in the Developing Countries," p. 147.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 169.

[51]Herbert Marcuse, "Some Social Implications of Modern Technology," Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, Vol. IX (1941), p. 422.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 9.

[54]Herbert Marcuse, "The Individual in the Great Society," Alternatives, Part I, No. 1, March-April, 1966, p. 15.

[55]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. viii.

[56]Ibid., p. 68.

[57]Marcuse, "Some Social Implications," p. 421.

[58]Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. xvi.

[59]Marcuse, "Transition from Socialism to Communism," p. 341.

[60]Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, p. 7.

[61]Marcuse, "Socialism in the Developing Countries," p. 139.

[62]Marcuse, "Notes on the Problem," p. 146.

[63]Marcuse, "Socialism in Developing Countries," p. 146.

[64]Ibid., p. 145.

[65]Marcuse, "Recent Literature on Communism," p. 515.

[66]Marcuse, "Dialectic and Logic Since War," p. 348.

[67]Herbert Marcuse, preface to Marxism and Freedom, by Raya Dunayevskaya (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1964), p. 15.

[68]Marcuse, "Socialism in Developing Countries," p. 150.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, pp. 31-33.

[71]Marcuse, "Socialism in Developing Countries," p. 145.

[72]Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, p. 31.

[73]Marcuse, "Socialism in Developing Countries," p. 145.

[74]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 55.

[75]Ibid.

[76]Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, p. 35.

[77]Ibid., p. 19.

[78]Marcuse, "The Individual and the Great Society," p. 16.

[79]Ibid.

[80]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 194.

[81]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 26.

[82]Marcuse, preface to Marxism and Freedom, p. 18.

[83]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 23.

[84]Ibid., p. 24.

[85]Ibid., p. 28.

[86]Ibid., p. 25.

[87]Ibid., p. 26.

[88]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 150.

[89]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 5.

[90]Marcuse, "Transition from Socialism to Communism," p. 344.

[91]Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 191.

[92]Ibid., pp. 150-151.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS ON REVOLUTION

> Without a revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement.
>
> --V. I. Lenin

Herbert Marcuse is a radical social critic--one of the few critics today who calls into question the cherished ideas many of us hold. His indictment of advanced industrial societies is harsh. It is an attack against what we in the advanced industrial societies blindly defend and even sacrifice our lives for--social systems which we believe to be egalitarian. The thrust of Marcuse's argument is twofold: (1) democracy today has turned into its opposite; it is an oppressive system of domination in which the masses freely elect their masters, a system in which constitutional freedoms perpetuate the rule by the few in the interest of the few, and (2) communism as practiced today in its various forms is also an oppressive system of domination and coordination which exhibits few of the original socialist ideals; it is a system in which the machinery of the state has been

strengthened by vested interests, those in positions of power and authority, for their own benefit.

In his critical theory of advanced industrial society, Marcuse exemplifies the threefold function of political inquiry as set forth by Robert S. Lynd and George E. G. Catlin. For Lynd and Catlin the role of the political theorist is to identify a problem, specify a solution to that problem, and demonstrate the means by which that solution might be put into effect.[1]

Herbert Marcuse has identified what he considers to be a grave social problem and he has outlined the dimensions of that problem. According to Marcuse, advanced industrial societies--"societies in which the mechanization of large scale industry has already embarked on the stage of automation"[2]--are not democratic as they profess to be. They are sham democracies, totalitarian social systems which perpetuate misery, social injustice, and the struggle for existence on a world-wide basis. For Marcuse, the term "totalitarian" refers not only to a terroristic political control of society, but also to the non-terroristic economic-technical coordination of people through the creation and manipulation of false needs and values by the few in the interest of the few.[3]

Who governs in the technically advanced societies of today? Marcuse's response to this empirical question is:

the generals, politicians, managers, and their lackeys (engineers, technicians, and plant superintendents).[4] According to Marcuse, a very small minority, not more than a dozen people, make the life and death decisions which effect us all. However, Marcuse does not inform us how he arrived at this number or who these twelve men are. He holds that the people do not govern; they do not participate in the important decisions. The people only participate in secondary decisions which little effect their lives.[5] Any important decisions such as whether or not to wage war in Vietnam, invade Czechoslovakia, or send a man to the moon are not made by the people, but always by a very small minority in the interest of the generals, managers, and politicians. Once the important decisions have been made the support of the population is solicited by vested interests through the mass media and other socializing institutions (i.e., churches, schools, and the armed forces).

Like C. Wright Mills, Marcuse fails to prove that the generals, politicians and managers do in effect rule.[6] He states that he is unable empirically to validate this knowledge because of the changes which have occurred in the productive process in the advanced industrial societies. For Marcuse, the changes in the productive process have transformed the means of domination. Today a "technological veil"

(technological rationality, one-demensional thought) hides the presence of the masters in the machine process and their manipulation of this process in their own interest.[7] The technological organization of the means of production and distribution is also a technological organization of the minds and bodies of the masses. This new form of domination--which is more pleasant than previous forms of domination but probably more inhumane since it produces voluntary servitude--is reflected in the social, political, and cultural superstructure of the advanced industrial societies.

Marcuse uses the concept "technological veil" as a dodge, a device by which he avoids demonstrating the means by which he arrived at the conclusion that the generals, politicians, and managers, represented by twelve men, rule in the technically advanced societies of today. According to Marcuse, one-dimensional men cannot see the presence of the masters in the machine process due to this "technological veil." The implication here is that two-dimensional men are more rational and that they can therefore see through the technological veil and arrive at the same conclusion Marcuse does. But Marcuse either refuses or is unable to show whence comes his knowledge that twelve men do indeed rule. The question Who Governs? remains an empirical question, whether there is a technological veil or not. Thus Marcuse's proposition concerning who governs

in the advanced industrial societies should be capable of verification. In fact, in his article, "Notes on the Problem of Historical Laws," Marcuse himself stated that his theory, his selective analysis, must be demonstrated to be empirically correct.[8]

Marcuse believes that the rulers have effectively organized the technological base of society, the machine, as an instrument by which they control the needs and desires of the people. The machine today determines the behavior of the workers in the factory as well as outside of it. It influences the lives of all who come within its contact, in work and in play. But the machine is not in itself an instrument of domination. Marcuse makes it very clear that the machine is the prerequisite for freedom, since only an order of abundance and the freedom from work which the machine can provide in a fully automated society is compatible with a state of freedom. "Not technology, not technique, not the machine are the instruments of repression, but the presence in them of the masters who determine their number, their life span, their power, their place in life, and the need for them."[9]

Marcuse sees that the way in which the rulers have organized technology and the technological advances of contemporary society has led to a system of total administration and domination. By controlling the technological base the

rulers have been able to homogenize public and private life, social and individual needs,[10] and they have also been able to contain all effective opposition to the established system. Marcuse believes that the advanced industrial societies, capitalist as well as communist, are totalitarian primarily because of the way in which the masters have organized the technological base.

As mentioned earlier, Marcuse is concerned with advanced industrial societies in general, but he focuses his critical theory primarily on the United States which he views as the representative of the capitalist societies in the twentieth century. His emphasis on the United States is a result of his belief that capitalism is in its very essence an oppressive, irrational system and that it has transformed the socialist countries into the oppressive systems they are today. Marcuse believes that the capitalist countries together with the socialist countries perpetuate servitude and inhumane conditions on a world-wide scale.

In his critical theory Marcuse has attacked such cherished notions held by contemporary democrats as pluralism and countervailing powers described by political theorists like Robert A. Dahl. The thrust of Marcuse's criticism is that democratic pluralism and countervailing powers as practiced today is compatible with a totalitarian system of domination

and coordination and serves to further non-freedom.

> One might in theory construct a state in which a multitude of different pressures, interests and authorities balance each other out and result in a truly general and rational interest. However, such a construct badly fits a society in which powers are and remain unequal and even increase their unequal weight when they run their own course.[11]

The masses are "marshalled" into a system of democratic pluralism and countervailing powers which, Marcuse maintains, is harmonious with the prevailing totalitarian systems of production and distribution.

In representative democracies like the United States, Marcuse claims that the elected masters only obey the demands of the masses. But this harmony between the rulers and the ruled is, according to Marcuse, preestablished and predetermined by the rulers and the institutions which they defend. Marcuse believes that the

> . . . free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves. Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear . . . And the spontaneous reproduction of superimposed needs does not establish autonomy; it only testifies to the efficiency of the controls.[12]

The people are indoctrinated by the conditions under which they live and think and by the manufactured public opinions of the vested interests; the needs of society appear as their own needs; their choices within the existing system appear as

freedom. "Voluntary servitude" is reproduced in the individual because the achievements of advanced industrial society, the happiness and fun which result from more goods and services, justify such servitude.[13] The masses are free to purchase what they please; they are free to make democratic choices every so often for the masters who will best rule in their own interests. But the interests are always the same: they always represent the existing system of domination.

> The semi-democratic process . . . produces and sustains a popular majority whose opinion is generated by the dominant interest in the status quo. As long as this condition prevails . . . the general will is always wrong--wrong in as much as it objectively counteracts the possible transformation of society into more humane ways of life.[14]

Marcuse maintains that the conditions of tolerance in the representative democracies are "loaded," determined by institutional inequality, by the class structure of contemporary society. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of opinion, and the other constitutional freedoms have turned into instruments of repression which are used by the rulers to perpetuate the unnecessary inhumane struggle for existence. These freedoms, once liberating forces, no longer serve the purpose of liberation in the technically advanced societies. Instead, they enslave men to the prevailing order.[15] The universal tolerance practiced by the Western democracies " . . . becomes questionable when its rationale no longer

prevails, when tolerance is administered to manipulated and indoctrinated individuals who parrot, as their own, the opinions of their masters, for whom heteronomy has become autonomy."[16]

Those who abide by the rules of the game add legitimacy to the oppressive systems of total administration. The freedoms which are practiced today are deceptive devices that serve to perpetuate servitude and discrimination " . . . by testifying to the existence of democratic liberties which, in reality, have changed their content and lost their effectiveness."[17] These freedoms, Marcuse believes, are the instruments for absolving and perpetuating servitude, not only in the industrial societies but on a world-wide basis. As a dialectician, Marcuse views the existence of these freedoms as a prerequisite for once again capturing their critical function in the existing systems.[18]

It must be recognized that Marcuse has identified a real problem: advanced industrial societies are not egalitarian as they profess to be, despite, as in the United States, their representative form. His characterization of advanced industrial societies and twentieth century man as one-dimensional contains a great deal of validity, in spite of his tendency at times to exaggerate.

Like all social theorists who rely on historical data, Marcuse selects his material and neglects those facts and information which might contradict his conclusions. He focuses on the worst aspects of man and society in the belief that such examples (i.e., wars, mass destruction, exploitation, intolerance, conspicuous consumption, etc.) exemplify the nature of man and society today. This emphasis on the worst features of man and society leaves Marcuse vulnerable to the accusation that he himself is one-dimensional in his criticism. Despite accusations to the contrary, Marcuse is not one-dimensional. He not only condemns man and society for what they are today, he also deals with historical possibilities--what man and society can be and ought to be, what they are capable of becoming.

Man today, as Marcuse holds, is not free. He is not a free agent determining his own existence and developing his full potentialities. Even though man believes he is free, he is in fact a prisoner. As in Kafka's The Trial, if he steps out of line, if he moves out of the mold society has set for him, his trial ends and his imprisonment begins. Those who conform to the prevailing order, because it is easier to do so rather than to oppose the injustices which exist, are able to acquire the benefits--material goods as

well as social status--by their conformity. We are free to choose what has already been chosen for us.

Marcuse is opposed to the manipulation and coordination of individuals, to the socialization process of the existing systems which he considers to be immoral. This creates a logical problem for Marcuse, for in his critical theory he has denounced the societies in which we live as totalitarian in that they control and predetermine men's lives. He believes the political needs of society have become the needs of the individual. Yet Marcuse turns right around and advocates the same thing for his utopian society. That is to say, the manipulation and coordination (socialization) of the population is justifiable and even desirable so long as it adheres to Marcuse's moral standards.

According to Marcuse, three basic alternatives (historical possibilities) exist today: (1) the continuation of the existing systems of domination leading eventually to comfortable but oppressive Welfare States, (2) nuclear destruction which would be so devastating that man would almost literally have to begin all over,[19] and (3) the revolutionary overthrow of the existing regimes and the creation of a utopian society with an aesthetic Form. As a revolutionary Marxist, Marcuse, of course, opts for the third alternative.

Marcuse maintains a paradoxical position: he is both a cynic and an idealist. He is a philosopher of despair--things can only get worse--and at the same time he offers a ray of hope. He believes that utopia is no longer "nowhere," that it is realizable today. Man's continued conquest of nature has paid off; the prerequisites of freedom now exist.

For Marcuse, utopia cannot be built by the existing societies, by the social institutions and relations which perpetuate servitude; nor can utopia be built by one-dimensional men who reproduce this servitude themselves. Marcuse is convinced that the existing societies must be destroyed, but that their scientific and technical achievements be mobilized and redirected, "liberated," for the purpose of eliminating global poverty and creating a humane society, an enviornment in which man can live in freedom with his fellow men.

But if utopia cannot be built by one-dimensional men in the existing societies, from where will it come? The construction of such a society cannot be built tomorrow, for tomorrow is not yet here. In other words, it must be built here and now, in this society by men who live in this society today. Utopia, if it is to be built at all, must come out of the existing societies.

Marcuse's conception of society as it ought to be--the "good life"--is " . . . beyond definition and determination,"[20]

since, he maintains, it would be built by new men and women with new values and new needs. Marcuse does predict that the new society would have an aesthetic form; that is, it would be light, beautiful, and appealing to the senses. It would be a free society in which man would no longer be enslaved by oppressive institutions " . . . which vitiate self-determination from the beginning."[21] In such a society the individual would determine his own life; he would be able " . . . to determine what to do and what not to do, what to suffer and what not."[22]

In describing the means by which the "good life" might be attained, Marcuse shows his true face: he is a would-be reformer, a propagandist for a new ideology, a new system of values. He follows in the Judeo-Christian tradition in playing the role of the self-appointed prophet, the savior who has come to show us the way. Indeed, Marcuse wants to save the world.

In posing the question to Marcuse: How can utopia be realized today? How do we get from here to there? Marcuse answers that only by a violent social revolution is a utopian society attainable. Revolutions do, as history has demonstrated, create new social systems, but the logical question which must follow is: How do we get a revolution today in advanced industrial societies which Marcuse has described as totalitarian

systems in which the masses " . . . parrot, as their own, the opinions of their masters . . ."?[23]

Marcuse is a man of ideas who, like Lenin, Trotsky, Che, and Mao, holds an action-oriented philosophy. Dedicated to the instigation of a world-wide revolution, Marcuse is convinced that theory must be translated into practice. In his works he is striving to develop the moral conscience and revolutionary consciousness of the masses in order to stir them to radical action. He believes that in the affluent societies of today a highly developed consciousness and imagination generates a vital need for radical social change.[24]

Political radicalism is, for Marcuse, moral radicalism. Political radicalism today attests to the emergence of a new morality which preconditions man for freedom. It activates " . . . the elementary, organic foundation of morality in the human being."[25] In other words, revolutionary <u>praxis</u> hastens the organic "disposition" which is rooted in the erotic drive to counter aggressiveness, the desire, the biological need, " . . . to create and preserve ever greater units of life."[26]

The revolutionary consciousness of the masses--the external and internal proletariat--can be developed, according to Marcuse, by demonstrating the inherent contradictions which exist in contemporary societies, revealing the oppressive nature of the societies in which we live, and pointing out

the unrealized potentials which exist but have been long suppressed as "unrealistic ideals."

Marcuse dreams of a moral transformation of man--a "new sensibility"--which will arise from revolutionary practice, the struggle against the violence and exploitation of the contemporary systems.[27] This belief in the moral transformation of man is similar to the Christian notion of the rebirth of man through baptism. For Marcuse, the rebirth of man is achieved, not by baptism, but by revolutionary praxis.

Like Marx, Marcuse holds the idea that the consciousness of man is formed by the economic conditions under which he lives. He maintains that those individuals who come under the sway of the oppressive technological rationality which is dominant today are more manipulated, more suppressed, than those who remain on the fringes of society. That is to say, the social outcasts, unemployed, racial minorities, and the external proletariat are more prone towards revolutionary action than the integrated elements of society. The students and intellectuals are also revolutionary-oriented, in fact, they are in the forefront of the avant-garde today because they are exposed to new ideas and because they have had no experience in the "faked and bloody" politics of the Establishment.[28] Because of their positions in society, these groups are more likely to be two-dimensional, critical of the systems

in which they live. But, according to Marcuse, " . . . none of these forces is the alternative."[29] The agent of the revolution is still the working class--the external and the internal proletariat. Marcuse writes, "In spite of everything that has been said, I still cannot imagine a revolution without the working class."[30] This is so because of the proletariat's position in the productive process, its numbers, and the exploitation it continues to endure.[31]

This brings us to one of Marcuse's most important points as a revolutionary theorist: when men live as paupers they are more revolutionary-oriented than when they live as affluent members of rich, materialistic societies.[32] Whereas the integrated working class of today--the "labor aristocracy"--is materially comfortable and feels it has nothing to gain by revolution, the paupers have everything to gain and nothing to lose by destroying the system. For this reason, Marcuse places great emphasis on the exploited masses in the Third World as the revolutionary force of the future. This insight has been demonstrated in history: from the Russian Revolution to the Cuban Revolution it has been the rural proletariat along with the students and intellectuals, and not the affluent urban proletariat, which has carried on the successful revolutionary struggles of this century.

The advanced industrial societies which perpetuate intolerable conditions all over the world must, Marcuse affirms, be attacked from within and from without. Marcuse envisions a world-wide revolution, a revolt of the masses (the slaves), which will sweep the world. This revolutionary struggle will be a military one, an unconventional guerrilla war in the backward countries.[33] Marcuse remains silent on the strategy of the revolution in the metropolitan areas.

Like Castro, Mao, and Ho, Marcuse advocates many Vietnams. He believes that the creation of many Vietnams would put pressure on the exploitative capitalist and communist countries, force them to spread their resources thin, and cut off their markets and the natural resources needed for continued production.

Marcuse believes that an economic crises must precede revolution in the advanced industrial societies.[34] But, unlike Marx, Marcuse's theory does not explain how this economic crises is to come about. What he implies is that conditions must get worse prior to the revolution. This puts Marcuse in an extremely delicate position: as a professed humanist, he is concerned with man's lot, but as a practical revolutionary, he must advocate the worsening of conditions for the masses, here in the technically advanced countries where the proletariat has turned into a "labor aristocracy," as well as

in the underdeveloped countries where the masses already live intolerable, miserable lives. Marcuse maintains this position because he believes that " . . . a radical political consciousness among the masses is conceivable only if and when the economic stability and the social cohesion of the system begin to weaken."[35] Marcuse is of the opinion that an economic crisis today will produce one of two alternatives:

> The so-called neo-fascist possibility, in which the masses turn toward the regime that is much more authoritarian and repressive, and the opposite possibility, that the masses may see an opportunity to construct a free society in which such crisis would be avoidable.[36]

For Marcuse, the international chain of exploitation must be broken at its strongest link.[37] The liberation of the Third World depends upon the weakening of the superpowers from within, cutting off the money and supplies they send to the backward countries to suppress the masses. But the liberation of the advanced industrial societies in turn depends upon the success of the revolution in the backward countries, since " . . . the 'external proletariat' is a basic factor of potential change."[38] Due to the external proletariat's position in the world, it is subject to the oppression of the affluent societies and also to the oppression of its own indiginous ruling classes.[39] The glaring contradictions between the rich and the poor in the underdeveloped countries will, according to

Marcuse, lead to the radicalization of the underprivileged, exploited masses.[40]

Such a radicalization process has already begun to occur in the advanced industrial societies among racial minorities (the Blacks) and the students (the New Left). These forces are loosely organized and often act spontaneously and even anarchisticly, outlining the limits of containment in the established societies.[41] Their revolt is an anti-authoritarian rebellion against the form, the obscene morality, affluence, and values of corrupt, degenerate societies. They have initiated the Great Refusal, the "permanent challenge," the "permanent education" of the masses.

> . . . they have again raised the specter (and this time a specter which haunts not only the bourgeois but all exploitative bureaucracies): the specter of a revolution which subordinates the development of productive forces and higher standards of living to the requirements of creating solidarity for the human species; for abolishing poverty and misery beyond all national frontiers and spheres of interest, for the attainment of peace.[42]

Marcuse, like the New Left in Germany and the American New Left, is an advocate of extra-parliamentary activity--violent confrontations with those in positions of power and authority and their armed bands. This type of action, Marcuse feels, may radicalize others in that it exposes the latent fascist tendencies of the systems in which we live. Recent events tend to confirm this observation. The demonstrations

at the Democratic convention in Chicago, the strike at San Francisco State College, and the fight for the People's Park in Berkeley radicalized people who were mere observers exposed to the brutal actions--the overreactions--of the police and the politicians.

Marcuse is also fully aware that such violent confrontations with those in power may have the tendency to increase repression and alienate the population from the rebels. In an oppressive system of total administration and coordination this, Marcuse believes, is a risk that must be taken. Indeed, " . . . all militant opposition takes the risk of increasing repression. This has never been a reason to stop the opposition."[43]

Marcuse and the New Left appear to be in a bind: if they act the support they gain is relatively insignificant compared to the Right Wing reaction their tactics produce; if they don't act they add legitimacy to the existing system. However, this is what Marcuse wants--a worsening of conditions, economic crisis, the loss of legitimacy, the neutralization of large segments of the population, and finally, the overthrow of the existing systems by revolutionary forces dedicated to his critical theory of society.

According to Marcuse, there is violence and then there is violence. There are forms of violence--arbitrary violence,

cruelty, and indiscriminate terror--which no revolution can condone because they " . . . negate the very ends for which the revolution is a means."[44] Marcuse defends the use of revolutionary violence on the same grounds as did Rousseau: revolutionary violence is counterviolence which is initiated against the legalized violence of the established societies. It is justifiable in that it has as its goal the creation of a higher form of freedom.[45] The premeditated violence condoned and perpetuated in war and in peace by the existing societies is indiscriminate, cruel, and arbitrary violence which has been institutionalized because it is functional and profitable. Since the vested interests which defend and perpetuate these violent institutions will never voluntarily abdicate, revolutionary violence, so Marcuse maintains, is justifiable.

Like other political theorists who have their roots in the European tradition (Karl Marx, Mikhail Bakunin, Georges Sorel), Marcuse is ends-orientated. That is to say, he believes that the ends--freedom--justify the means--revolutionary violence and the establishment of an educational transitional dictatorship. But the ends justify the means only " . . . if they demonstrably serve human progress in freedom. This legitimate end, the only legitimate end, demands the creation of conditions which would facilitate and expedite its realization."[46]

Marcuse, unlike Georges Sorel, does not justify violence per se, in spite of Kurt Glazer's accusation to the contrary.[47] Marcuse does not break the link between violence and reason, but attempts to historically calculate the violence perpetuated by the existing systems and the benefits a successful revolution will bring.

Although Marcuse professes to be a democrat and condemns the existing democracies as totalitarian systems, he himself advocates the establishment of an anti-democratic state, an educational dictatorship, as a means of attaining what he considers to be true democracy. But Marcuse, it must be pointed out, unlike the neo-Machiavellians (Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels), believes that democracy is desirable and possible. Marcuse's belief in the ability of men to govern themselves once they have been liberated is derived from his conception of the innate goodness of man. Therefore, we may conclude that, although Marcuse is anti-democratic in advocating a transitional dictatorship, he is, in the long run, democratic, for he believes that the people should govern and can govern themselves.

Marcuse thinks that an educational dictatorship is necessary today in order to force men to be free. In defense of this position Marcuse favorably quotes the "liberalist" anti-democrat, John Stuart Mills, who considered women to be unfit

to rule, and justified the rule by an elite. According to Marcuse's interpretation of John Stuart Mills, prior to the time when men are capable of improving themselves in free and equal discussions, they remain barbarians, and a despotic form of government is legitimate since only such a government is capable of improving such barbarians.[48] In other words, the liberal democrats, as Marcuse sees it, placed a precondition on universal democratic tolerance. " . . . It was to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties."[49]

In describing men today as one-dimensional, Marcuse implies that most men--the masses, whose support he solicits--are not in "the maturity of their faculties;" they are barbarians unfit to rule themselves. By taking this position, Marcuse follows a long tradition of anti-democrats, elitists, who advocate the rule by those who have the "right" knowledge.[50] He believes that only a few men today are capable of governing and that

> Coersion is necessitated by the immoral, repressive conditions under which men live. The basic idea is: how can slaves who do not even know they are slaves free themselves? . . . they must be taught and must be led to be free, and this the more so the more the society in which they live uses all available means in order to shape and preform their consciousness and to make it immune against possible alternatives.[51]

Under such conditions as these Marcuse advocates the withdrawal of tolerance from what he considers to be regressive movements

of the right. He is in favor of suppressing the "self-styled conservatives" of the political right and he justifies intolerance towards the thoughts, opinions, and words of those who oppose his philosophy because, he maintains, this is an age, the post fascist period, of clear and present danger in which the distance between propaganda and action is too short and could at any moment trigger off total catastrophe.

According to Marcuse, the first phase of socialism, the educational dictatorship, after the revolution will not last long because the anti-authoritarian revolutionary forces, with their "new sensibility," " . . . would militate against the prolongation of (this) 'First Phase,' that is, the authoritarian, bureaucratic development of the productive forces . . ."[52] and the educational dictatorship of the masses.

Marcuse fails, however, to inform us about the fate of the former ruling classes of the defunct industrialized societies. We may assume that they will either be reeducated along with the rest of the masses or exterminated. He does make it clear that the successful revolutionary movement presupposes throughout the scientific and technological achievements of the superpowers. Collective ownership, collective control and planning of the productive and distributive process would be instituted to abolish global poverty and turn quantity into quality.[53] The goal would be the creation of an aesthetic

society, the abolition of the performance principle, and its replacement by the pleasure principle as the new reality principle.

The first phase of socialism would be one in which the masses would learn how to be free--free from the false needs and values which have been introjected into their lives as their own. The masses would get their information slanted in the opposite direction of their previous indoctrination. This would enable them, Marcuse asserts, to become autonomous, free-thinking, sensuous individuals able to determine " . . . by themselves what is true and what is false."[54]

Who, according to Marcuse, would be the "educators," the rulers, in this educational dictatorship following the revolution? Of course, Marcuse does not openly admit it, but, more likely than not, he would be the Head Master of the intellectual elites. Marcuse claims that " . . . everyone 'in the maturity of his faculties' as a human being, everyone who has learned to think rationally and autonomously . . ." would rule in the "democratic educational dictatorship" of free men.[55] In other words, the anti-authoritarian, revolutionary forces would rule. But Marcuse does not explain who or what will determine when an individual is in the "maturity of his faculties."

Marcuse admits that such a government would not initially have the endorsement of the majority of the people; it would

be a dictatorship. But, he maintains, " . . . once the chain of the past governments is broken, the majority would be in a state of flux, and released from the past management, free to judge the new government in terms of the new common interest."[56] Marcuse's conception of the common interest is much like Rousseau's idea of the "General Will." Individual interests would not be balanced--compromised--with the general will, but men would be free with others. The individual will would be the general will; the individual would find freedom in the group, and the group would find freedom in the individual's freedom.

Marcuse's critical theory is logically consistent given his presuppositions concerning the innate goodness of man and society, his description of man and society today, and his proposition on what man and society can be and ought to be. Although his theory is internally consistent, he does, however, create for himself a number of critical problems and enigmatic questions.

One such logical problem is created through the use of a myth by which he symbolically demonstrates the historical development of man and society under an oppressive reality principle, the performance principle. Marcuse admits that his myth is scientifically unverifiable and logically inconsistent, and yet he persists in using this myth and in the end

accepts it as the truth; he turns the myth into reality. For Marcuse, the rulers today take on the characteristics of the "primal father." They, " . . . the fathers, are guilty; they are not tolerant but false; they want to redeem their own guilt by making us, the sons, guilty; they have created a world of hypocrisy and violence in which we do not wish to live."[57] Thus, if one rejects Marcuse's basic assumptions about the nature of man and society, if one rejects his mythical prehistory, his entire theory comes into question.

As a dialectician, Marcuse claims to rely on historical data, but, unlike Marx, he is in fact unhistorical. He is primarily concerned with abstract social thought, speculations as to what is historically possible, and not with the record of past events or the empirical validation of his propositions. According to Marcuse, the dialectical method reveals what actually occurs in reality; it gets to the essence of man and society. But the dialectical method as a method of inquiry can be used for various purposes. Another theorist using the dialectical method and the same historical data could and probably would arrive at conclusions incompatible with those of Marcuse. For Marcuse is and remains a value theorist. He begins his analysis with preconceptions as to what is right and wrong which continually influence his selection of material and also his conclusions.

The question which must be asked is: Does the negative critical approach allow Marcuse to accomplish the task he has set out to effect? Marcuse is open to the same criticism that Marx and Engels leveled against the Young-Hegelians (Bruno Bauer, Max Stirner, and Ludwig Feuerbach) in The German Ideology. Marcuse wants to liberate men, set them free from " . . . the chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings under the yoke of which they are pinning away."[58] He assumes a critical attitude, revolts against the rule of thoughts, and attempts to teach men to exchange their one-dimensional images for two-dimensional thoughts which correspond to his conception of the essence of man. By knocking these one-dimensional images out of the heads of men, Marcuse assumes that the existing reality will collapse.[59]

In his last major work, An Essay on Liberation, Marcuse, although dealing for the most part with historical possibilities and the obstacles and delays which the revolutionary forces face, makes an important statement: the struggle initiated by the revolutionary forces in the underdeveloped world, the ghetto populations, and the student radicals " . . . is spreading in the old socialist as well as capitalist countries."[60] He goes on to predict that the struggle for liberation " . . . can no longer be contained by the rules and regulations of a pseudo-democracy in a Free Orwellian

World."[61] Unfortunately for Marcuse and probably for us, the proposition that the revolution would be a liberating one carried out by non-repressive forces existing in the contemporary societies is, he informs us, " . . . no more--no less--than a hope."[62]

This hope is characteristic of Marcuse's work, for he does believe in the innate goodness of man, but at the same time he is fully aware of the atrocities men perpetrate against their fellow men. For this, he is pessimistic. But in the end, he remains committed to the oppressed and the forgotten masses, giving hope to the hopeless.

Marcuse puts his faith in the hope that the forces of revolution today will not sustain the continuity of domination, in the desire that this revolution will not follow the path of the previous revolutions; that it will not turn into just another Animal Farm where the "Pigs" once again rule.

FOOTNOTES

[1]See Robert S. Lynd, Knowledge for What? (Princeton: University Press, 1939) and George E. G. Catlin, "Political Science and the Practical Problem of Peace," Western Political Quarterly, XII, No. 46, December, 1959. See also Harold V. Rhodes, Utopia and Political Thought (Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1967), pp. 10-11, for a discussion of the Lynd-Catlin criterion of political inquiry.

[2]Herbert Marcuse, "Socialism in the Developing Countries," International Socialist Journal, Vol. II, No. 8 (April, 1955), p. 140.

[3]Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 3.

[4]Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. x.

[5]Jean-Louis Ferrier, et al. "Marcuse Defines His New Left Line," trans. by Helen Weaver, The New York Times Magazine, Section 6, October 27, 1968, p. 97.

[6]The late C. Wright Mills, like Marcuse, is a hero of the New Left who identified a trinity: the corporate managers, the military establishment (generals), and the politicians as the ruling class (power elite) in America. Both Mills and Marcuse believe that these three groups consciously perceive their interests to be the same and that they act in unison in making all of the important decisions. But Mills and Marcuse are unable to effectively demonstrate their contentions about the ruling class. See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

[7]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, pp. 11-12.

[8]Herbert Marcuse, "Notes on the Problem of Historical Laws," Partisan Review, Vol. 26, Winter, 1959, p. 124.

[9]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 12.

[10]Marcuse, "Socialism in the Developing Countries," p. 141.

[11]Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," A Critique of Pure Tolerance, by Robert P. Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 93.

[12]Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, pp. 7-8.

[13]Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," p. 98.

[14]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 65.

[15]Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," pp. 84-85.

[16]Ibid., p. 90.

[17]Ibid., p. 84.

[18]Ibid., p. 84.

[19]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 87.

[20]Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," p. 87.

[21]Ibid., p. 87.

[22]Ibid., p. 86.

[23]Ibid., p. 90.

[24]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 15.

[25]Ibid., p. 10.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid., p. 25.

[28]Ferrier, et al. "Marcuse Defines His New Left Line," p. 97.

[29]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. viii.

[30]Ferrier, "Marcuse Defines New Line," p. 89.

[31]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 16.

[32]Marcuse, "Socialism in Developing Countries," pp. 150-151.

[33]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 81.

[34]Ferrier, "Marcuse Defines New Line," p. 89.

[35]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 54.

[36]Ferrier, "Marcuse Defines New Line," p. 89.

[37]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 82.

[38]Ibid., p. 80.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid., p. 16.

[41]Ibid., p. 89.

[42]Ibid., pp. ix-x.

[43]Ferrier, "Marcuse Defines New Line," p. 30.

[44]Herbert Marcuse, "Ethics and Revolution," Ethics and Society: Original Essays on Contemporary Moral Problems, ed. by Richard T. DeGeorge (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), p. 141.

[45]Ibid., pp. 137-139.

[46]Marcuse, "Ethics and Revolution," p. 147.

[47]See Kurt Glazer, "Marcuse and the German New Left," National Review, Vol. XX, No. 26, July 2, 1968, p. 652.

[48]Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," p. 86.

[49]Ibid.

[50]For a discussion of anti-democratic thinkers in America, see David Spitz, Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

[51]Marcuse, "Ethics and Revolution," pp. 137-138.

[52]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 89.

[53]Ibid., p. 87.

[54]Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," p. 98.

[55]Ibid., p. 106.

[56]Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 70.

[57]Ibid., p. 9.

[58]Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 1.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid., p. viii.

[61]Ibid., p. x.

[62]Ibid., p. 71.

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