5-27-1966

Tension And Rationality Of Decision Making In The International System.

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MANUSCRIPT THESES

TENSION AND RATIONALTIY OF DECISION MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

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A Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts in Government

The University of New Mexico

1966

This thesis, directed and approved by the candidate's committee, has been accepted by the Graduate Committee of the University of New Mexico in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professors Thomas P. Wolf and Harry Stumpf of the Department of Government and Professor Bert Zippel of the Department of Psychology. Their advice and concise criticism have encouraged me in the completion of this study. Nevertheless, I must take full responsibility for any errors which are present.

P.G. Mc.

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INTRODUCTION

"Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed." This first sentence in the Preamble of the Constitution of the United Nation's Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is a concise statement of the motivation of the psychologists now involved in the study of international relations. The end of World War Two and the beginning of the nuclear arms race held special significance for these scholars. Other disciplines had shown their inability to adequately understand the nature of the international system, while at the same time demonstrating their ability to produce the means to destroy it. In the study of international relations a dimension had been ignored, the behavioral or human dimension. In response to this situation the talents and energy of many competent psychologists have been devoted to investigating what Otto Klineberg calls The Human Dimensions of International Relations. Valuable contributions have been made in the understanding of prejudice, nationalism, conflict resolution, group theory and decision making. Continuing research in these and other areas promises to increase the understanding of the problems of international conflict and thereby to contribute to the construction of the defenses of peace.

During the 1950's a quickening of interest in the nature of international conflict was aroused by the increase in international tensions which was accompanied by a dangerous increase in destructive military potential. One result of this increased interest was a series

of theoretical articles by the psychologist Charles Osgood. The theoretical basis of these articles was the established relation between stress and rationality in decision making. Osgood expanded his ideas and formalized them in his book, An Alternative to War or Surrender. The assumption underlying these works of Osgood was that the human being as decision maker in the international system exhibits the same behavior under stress as the human being as decision maker in a personal system. What makes Osgood's works of particular interest is that he not only discusses the psychological factors involved but also, from his evaluation of these factors, he outlines a proposal for the lessening of international tensions. One major weakness that remains in Osgood's book is that he did not examine his underlying assumption in the light of historical events. The examination of this assumption is the purpose of this paper.

The area of arms negotiations provides numerous instances wherein Osgood's assumption can be examined. There are several advantages to this approach. One is that the subject of the arms negotiations is closely related to an important reactive factor in the contemporary tension increasing system, the arms race. Another is that the actual negotiations were, generally speaking, a public matter. A third advantage is that the goal of the negotiations, control of atomic weapons, has been reasonably clear-cut and mutual.

Chapter I is devoted to an examination and discussion of Osgood's formulation of his proposal. Chapter I contains basic

definitions and an outline of the analytic method to be employed. Chapters II, III, and IV are a review of the arms race and the arms negotiations following World War II until the spring of 1960. These chapters provide general background and knowledge essential to the analysis which concludes each Chapter. The significant events are isolated in preparation for review in Chapter V. This final Chapter also contains a summary and conclusions.

CHAPTER I

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

The fear and mistrust which mark the East-West conflict and which contribute to the heightened state of tension between the two sides have been evident to almost all students of the problem; nevertheless, direct and structured proposals to alleviate the fear and mistrust and thus to lower the level of tension have been few, although analyses of the sources of the tension and their place in the dynamics of the arms race have been more numerous. As Amitai Etzioni remarked concerning an overall strategy:

> Such a strategy cannot be limited to diplomatic maneuvers, military deployments, and formation of bloc alliances; it must treat all the basic elements which compose the international organism now infested with potential violence. It has to concern itself with psychological-symbolic forces that affect the public opinion of most nations, with the fate of armed forces and arms, and with interbloc socio-political conflicts . . . The cold war hysteria and the arms race are frequently diagnosed as mere symptoms of a deeper socio-political illness---the interbloc power strife. Symptoms they may be, and treating them alone might well be no more than a palliative; but symptoms left uncontrolled might kill the patient, thus preventing the chance to effect a basic treatment and a cure of his real disease. The temperature of the "cold" war must, therefore, be reduced and the arms race checked, both to keep us alive and to give us an opportunity to tackle the deeper issues.[1]

The "cold war hysteria" as psychological factors related to the disarmament question have been analyzed and discussed by Charles

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[1]Amitai Etzioni, The Hard Way to Peace, (New York: The Collier Press, 1961), p. 13.

Osgood.[2, 3, 4, 5] He feels that exaggerated dependence on various ego defense mechanisms combined with the decrease in flexibility in thinking and decision making which accompanies increase in stress and tension are of major importance to the understanding of the impasse in this area as well as other international problems.

Osgood illustrates his psychological analysis of the disarmament impasse by presenting four paradoxes which he finds in contemporary thinking concerning this subject. These paradoxes are:

Paradox I	-	The greater the destructive capacity of the weapons in our hands, the less most people seem to worry about it . . . .
Paradox II	-	While feverishly engaged in a nuclear arms race, both sides express peaceful intentions and fervent hopes that these weapons will never be used . . . .
Paradox III	-	The more nations spend for defense, the less real security their people have . . . .
Paradox IV	-	The greater a nation's military power, the less seems to be its freedom in initiative in foreign policy . . . .[6]

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[2]Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, (Urbana, Illinois: Scott Foresman and Co., 1956).

[3]Charles Osgood, "A Case for Graduated Unilaterial Disengagement," in Morton Grodzins and Eugene Rabinowitz, (eds.), The Atomic Age, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963) pp. 269-276.

[4]Charles Osgood, "Reciprocal Initiative," in James Roosevelt, (ed.) The Liberal Papers, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962) pp. 155-228.

[5]Charles Osgood (unpublished manuscript) as quoted in Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics, (New York: D. Van Norstrand, Inc. 1962).

[6]Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, pp. 19-20.

If an individual displayed similar paradoxes in his thinking, Osgood states a psychologist or psychiatrist would, in all probability, recommend that he be institutionalized in a mental hospital. He goes on to say that although it is impossible to hospitalize nations, it is of importance to search for the "psychological sources for such paradoxical thinking."[7] The sources of such thinking are to be found in an examination of the dynamics of human thinking under stress. The key to understanding the process is, as Osgood observed, found by looking "into the dynamics of our own minds, because it is only through understanding ourselves . . . (that we can) ever hope to understand others."[8]

As stated, Osgood finds the sources of this paradoxical thinking in the dynamics of human thinking under stress with its accompanying dependence on exaggerated defense reactions. For the individual in ordinary day-to-day life the ego defense mechanisms "are essential for softening failures, protecting us from anxiety, and maintaining our feelings of personal worth and adequacy . . . (They are) normal adjustive reactions unless they are carried to such an extreme degree that they actually interfere with the maintenance of self integrity instead of aiding it . . . . These mechanisms, necessary as they are, also have certain drawbacks. They involve a high degree of self-

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[7] Ibid., pp. 20-21.

[8] Ibid., p. 21

deception and reality distortion and usually are not adaptive in the sense of realistically coping with adjustment problems."[9] The direct relationship between the increase of emotional stress aroused by frustration and threat and the exaggerated utilization of the defense mechanisms is an accepted psychological principle.[10] For the individual meeting everyday problems, leaning too heavily on his ego defenses can often result in personally disastrous situations; in another and larger arena, the emotional stress aroused in international relations can also lead to reliance on the ego defenses which, in the attempt to resolve international conflicts, contributes, at the least, to stalemate and frustration. Stalemate and frustration, in turn, inspire hostility which is perceived as threat which increases anxiety and further reliance on inadequate ego defenses.[11] The reinforcement which each of these components lends to the others can result, for individuals, in a cycle leading to an emotional breakdown; in a nation, the effect of such a cycle on public opinion and decision makers can result in a failure to reach desired goals (peace or maintenance of a way of life) and can eventuate in a breakdown of the environment, either by war or expediency, in which these goals are to be achieved.

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[9]James Coleman, Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life, (Chicago, Illinois: Scott Foresman and Co., 1956), p. 86.

[10]Ibid., p. 83.

[11]Ibid., pp. 83-84.

The various psychological mechanisms discussed by Osgood, while they may have adaptive value to individuals, are each of extreme danger when relied upon by key decision makers in the explosive area of East-West relations. "Self-deception and reality distortion," which are the results of excessive reliance on defense mechanisms, are clearly non-adaptive behavior in international relations. In this sense the non-adaptive and dangerous nature of the arms race can be illustrated by thinking of armaments as another psychological defense mechanism. A cycle is begun in which fear and distrust inspire the accumulation of armaments which in turn inspire more fear and distrust, etc. With the increase in fear and distrust tensions are heightened. The decision to increase armaments under conditions of heightened tension is an effort to reduce the felt tensions. In reality, because of the cyclical nature of the system, the effect is to further increase tensions. In this manner the interaction of the emotional factors (defense mechanisms) with the environmental factors (arms increases) becomes increasingly dangerous to the survival of the system.

Among the emotional components of this cyclical system is denial of reality. This defense mechanism is a method whereby one may "evade many disagreeable realities by ignoring or refusing to acknowledge them."[12] The corollary of this is that supporting information, of any validity or none at all, is sought out.[13] In the areas of international

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[12] Ibid., p. 86.

[13] Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, p. 22.

relations and disarmament the remoteness of the danger lends support to the denial of reality. As Osgood points out, a direct, immediate threat is easy to perceive, whereas an indirect, remote threat is more difficult to perceive and to counter.[14] Directly related to denial and remoteness are the "unimaginable" dimensions of the ultimate threat. Several hundred or thousands dead and whole towns destroyed in a natural upheaval or a man-made disaster are not outside of human experience. Millions dead and whole states or nations destroyed are outside of usual experience. The mind has trouble grasping the idea; there is no previous experience to relate to.[15] Given the tendency of the mind to deny unpleasant reality, the remoteness of the threat, and the unimaginable dimensions of the potential tragedy, it is not difficult to discern the genesis of Osgood's first paradox.

Another of the emotional components of the reactive cycle is the defensive reaction of projection. Projection is a psychological means to "(1) transfer the blame for our own shortcomings, mistakes and misdeeds to others, and (2) attribute to others our own unacceptable impulses, thoughts and desires."[16] In line with this thought, ethnocentrism, the tendency to project outward our own norms "as the natural design of the universe," is seen to be a group manifestation of this

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[14] Ibid., p. 23.

[15] Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[16] Coleman, p. 98.

mechanism.[17] Projection and ethnocentrism are distinctly associated with what Osgood calls "psycho-logic." "Psycho-logic substitutes emotional consistency for logical consistency"[18] and is the operationalization of the "we" - "they" dichotomy in thinking. Essentially, "psycho-logic" separates the "good" from the "bad" on the basis that "we" and "ours" are "good" and "they" and "theirs" are "bad." It is a convenient and easy method for solving moral problems. Unfortunately it leads to confusion when "they" advocate something which would be to "our" benefit. It leads to further confusion by encouraging double standards in order to explain why a certain thing done by "us" is "good" while it is "bad" when "they" do it. According to Osgood, the thorough entrenchment of "psycho-logic" in thinking about international relations is due to the difficulty of reality testing in this area.[19] Projection supported by ethnocentricism and "psycho-logic" is the key to understanding the genesis of Osgood's second paradox. "We," being naturally good, would never think of manufacturing, much less of using, these horrible weapons if it wasn't for the fact that "they" have driven us to it.

Osgood's third and fourth paradoxes find their genesis not only in the emotional environment but also in the military-technological

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[17]Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, p. 24.

[18]Ibid., p. 26.

[19]Ibid., pp. 27-28.

facts of the arms race. The third paradox states that "The more that nations spend for defense, the less real security their people have...."[20] The great technological strides that have produced the unimaginably destructive weapons of the nuclear era have been quite long in the area of offense and very short in the area of defense. The resulting situation is one in which each side has great and increasing offensive potential combined with a decrease in security due to the inadequate defenses available. Unlike pre-nuclear military situations where a good offense was often considered to be the best defense, offense in nuclear war is not protective due to the inability of the offensive weapons to destroy the offensive weapons of the opponent. The weapons themselves have a deterrent effect, which is the basis of current defense policy, but once they are used the offense-defense imbalance becomes operative. The inability to adequately control the proliferation of the weapons is another grave danger. The nature of the weapons, in their proliferation, in the speed of delivery, and in their technological complexity, requires diffusion of control with increased likelihood of unauthorized use or malfunction.[21] Closely associated with the offense-defense imbalance is the loss of flexibility in meeting foreign affairs crises (Osgood's fourth paradox) which has been evident during the nuclear era and is

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[20] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[21] Norman Cousins, In Place of Folly, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 38.

typified by the massive retaliation posture of the Dulles era in United States foreign policy. The very massiveness of the destructive potential held by both sides has created a precarious stability which each side is fearful of disturbing. Thus fear, a realistic fear, has effectively narrowed the range of alternatives available in meeting foreign policy crises.

In this sense Osgood's fourth paradox can be understood. Another interpretation of this paradox reveals a contradiction. The corollary of the paradox states that the less the military power of a state, the more flexibility a state would have in conducting foreign affairs. In the absolute sense this is clearly not so. A small weak state with little or no military power has neither the ability to defend itself or the flexibility in meeting foreign affairs crises that a strong state has. Not withstanding the fact that Osgood's fourth paradox is subject to contradictory interpretations, the genesis of these last two of his paradoxes reveals the interaction and mutual reinforcement of the psychological and military-technological factors in the nuclear crises.

Osgood discusses two other psychological phenomena which contribute to the present state of stalemate and frustration in the arms negotiations. These two are possibilism and stereotypy which could be called shortcut thinking. The important fact about possibilism is that it substitutes, in the decision making process, the possibility of an occurrence for the probability.[22] The danger inherent in possibilistic

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[22]Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, pp. 30-31.

thinking, as Osgood points out, is that "the higher the stakes, the greater the potential rewards or punishments, the more possibilistic becomes decision making behavior even though the odds remain the same."[23] In contrast, realistic decisions are based on well founded probabilities, which are restricted in number, not on amorphous possibilities, which are almost unrestricted in number.

The other method of shortcut thinking is stereotypy. This is a means by which past experience creates a set or attitude which is called upon in meeting new situations. Stereotyping enables the mind to sort many incoming stimuli and deal with them in an expedient manner. The danger of stereotyping is when past experience, no matter how limited, and previous knowledge, no matter how spurious, is utilized in decision making in place of more valid data which are available. As emotional tension increases beyond an optimal level, reaction to new stimuli becomes stereotyped, flexibility is reduced and decisions tend to be made upon habitual lines.[24] The constantly changing nature of the international situation places a premium on realistic appraisal and flexible response, which are both inhibited when possibilities replace probabilities in equations and these possibilities are acted on in a stereotyped way.

The point where psychological phenomena become effective in the East-West conflict is in the decision making process. Rational decision

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[23] Ibid., p. 31

[24] Ibid., pp. 31-32.

making requires that the decision maker be aware of the goals of the group for which he acts. He must also include a realistic appraisal of the tangible and intangible investment that the group has already made in the problem. Further, the making of rational decisions is dependent on the validity of the information available to the decision maker and in the inclusion of "the most critical variables" in his deliberations. Finally, decision making is often frustrated, after the fact, by the occurrence of unanticipated consequences.[25] Psychological factors can enter into the process at any step from the first perception of the problem to the final choice between alternatives. They can become effective either through their manifestation in the group or in the decision maker. The danger inherent in the East-West conflict, with its nuclear overtones, serves to make irrational decisions more likely because of the defensive reaction cycle and its concomitant increase of stress and tension.

In his discussion of decision making Osgood emphasizes two areas where psychological factors can affect the rationality of the process. "The first of these concerns information - its availability, bias, and overload in the human decision system. The second concerns tension level and its dynamic relation to the mechanism of thinking . . ."[26] Availability of information is directly related to the time span in

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[25]John M. Pfiffner and Robert Y. Prestus, Public Administration, (New York: Ronald Press, 1960), pp. 115-131.

[26]Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, p. 57.

which events are occurring and to the geographic distances involved. Bias can be introduced into the system either by a participant in pursuit of a goal or inadvertently as a result of exaggerated dependence on ego defense mechanisms. The rapid advance of technology has compressed the time span in crises situations thereby sharply reducing the availability of information. At the same time, the global nature of the conflict has increased the absolute amount of information available while restricting the availability of, or making more difficult the selection of, critical variables. Also, as the time span is shortened the information available, although restricted, is disproportionately high in relation to the time needed for consideration and overloads the system. The bias introduced into the system as a result of the dynamics of the ego defense reactions will increase as the system becomes overloaded and the decision maker will be driven to extreme reliance on shortcuts such as possibilism and stereotypy. It is evident that under such conditions the making of rational decisions is seriously inhibited.

The second important condition that affects the rationality of decision making is the general tension level. Above an optimum tension level "that maintains interest without unduly restricting the flexibility and creativity in solving problem,"[27] is the area where, "as stress increases from moderate to intense (threat) levels, there is a steady decrease in all indices of complexity."[28] The optimum tension level

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[27]Ibid., p. 59.

[28]Michele Driver, The Perception of Simulated Nations, PhD. Dissertation, (Princeton University, 1962), p. 243.

can be conceived of as a balanced system. In this balanced system, the incoming stimuli are of such a frequency and intensity that the response mechanism is not overloaded. In other words the number of stimuli being received is compatible with the ability of the receptor to make appropriate responses. Stimuli which elicit conflicting responses also affect the balance of the system by creating competing demands.

Osgood finds that the sources of international tension can arise in events which are either external or internal to the nations involved or internal to the individuals concerned.[29] Crises occurring in any one of these areas contribute to the increase in the general tension level with "effect on flexibility and rationality....quite independent of the source."[30] As the tension level increases the "flexibility and creativity" that marked the optimum level is lost and rational decision making is inhibited by increased reliance on ego defenses and shortcut thinking. The result is that "the range of possible alternatives narrows and the proportion of these alternatives that are likely to be irrational increases."[31] The maximum danger of a catastrophic breakdown of the decision making system occurs when an acute crisis is introduced into the system when the tension level is already high.[32]

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[29]Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, p. 60.

[30]Ibid., p. 61

[31]Ibid., p. 59.

[32]Ibid., p. 60.

The rationality of a decision, according to Osgood, is dependent upon three criteria. They are "understanding one's own ultimate goals, weighing the consequence of alternatives (sic) means to these goals, and then selecting among the alternatives in terms of their success probabilities."[33] Thus, irrational decisions could arise during any one of these three steps in decision making. An irrational decision could arise because of lack of understanding concerning ultimate goals. In the analysis of contemporary foreign policy decisions it is not too difficult to determine the ultimate, broad goals and irrationality should rarely occur because of lack of understanding here. The determination of short term goals is another matter. Often these goals are obscured in the complexities of the situation. Short term goals are, of course, the alternative means to ultimate goals. In weighing the consequences of alternative means, irrationality can result because of exaggerated dependence on defense mechanisms. To identify irrationality at this stage it is necessary to identify the psychological phenomena which are symptomatic. At the stage of selecting among alternatives, irrationality can be established by showing that success probabilities have been ignored. In this paper will be the basic criteria for identifying irrational decisions. In the analysis which follows, rationality is determined by establishing the ultimate goals, identifying or establishing the absence of exaggerated psychological symptoms, and examining the success probabilities of the major decisions involved.

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[33]Osgood, as quoted in Foundations of International Politics, p. 708.

To test Osgood's assumption that human beings as decision makers in an international system behave under stress in a manner similar to human beings in a personal system requires determination of the relation between rationality and tension level in an international system. It has been seen from the preceding discussion that the probability of irrational decisions increases as the tension level increases above an optimum operating level in a personal system. To determine whether or not this is true in an international system it is necessary to roughly measure the international tension level. To exactly quantify events as to tension potential is outside of the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is necessary to determine an approximate tension level if the relationship with rationality is to be determined. An approximate evaluation of the tension level can be made by an examination of the events occurring during a particular period. For the purposes of this paper tension levels are assigned as low, moderate or high. Also for the purpose of this paper the low tension level is designated as the approximate optimum operating level. A designation of low tension level is assigned to a period in which the events which mark internation contacts are characterized by relative friendliness, relatively free communication and non-antagonistic behavior at all levels. A designation of high tension level is assigned to a period in which the opposite characteristics predominate. A moderate tension level is one in which no definte pattern exists in the contacts. Several points should be remembered in connection with the designation of tension

level. One is that a designation of low does not mean that there is a virtual absence of tension. Another point is that the assignment of tension level is made from the predominant characteristics of the period; isolated non-conforming events do not qualify the designation. A third point to remember is that the system under examination is a cyclical system in which behavior tends to reinforce similar behavior. The cycle can be slowed and reversed by what can be termed triggering actions. Such an action is opposite in direction to the dominant trend and of enough importance that it affects the general direction.

In his discussion of "the conditions that strengthen and exaggerate non-rational mechanisms in human decision making," Osgood emphasizes that the ones he analyzes "are only some of the ways in which humans reach decisions without benefit of logic and without even maximizing their own self-interest over the long run."[34] The inter-relationships between the various mechanisms and especially the mutual reinforcement which they lend to each other are of importance in understanding the culminating nature of the danger. The cycle that results is reactive to outside events. In the case of the arms race the increase of armaments and their quality reinforces the psychological reactions and further increases the tension level. Events in other areas also contribute to the cycle. The arms race is thus seen, by Osgood, as a situation of mounting tension with concomitant increased probability of irrationality in decision making. The

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[34]Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender, p. 56.

heightened tension level with its associated increase in distrust make problem solving through negotiations a highly tenuous undertaking at best. The solution to this increasingly dangerous problem is seen, by Osgood, to be dependent on a general lowering of tensions and relaxation of the mutual distrusts. Only under these circumstances can the cycle be reversed and an environment conducive to fruitful negotiations established.

Osgood sees the arms race as a tension-increasing system, "a kind of graduated and reciprocated, unilaterally initiated, internation action."[35] Within this sytem the various psychological facts previously discussed reinforce the tendency for the arms race to accelerate with the danger of irrational decisions increasing as the tension level increases. In a situation of high tension the probability of a breakdown of the system due to irrational decisions is seen by Osgood to be unacceptable.

Osgood's basic assumption concerning rationality of decision making under tension in an international system can be examined. A review of the arms negotiations will establish the long-range, ultimate goals and rejected and abandoned negotiating positions. An examination of events during the period will establish approximate tension levels. Further, the analysis of the period will establish the presence or absence of symptoms of exaggerated psychological reactions,

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[35] Ibid., p. 87.

such as extreme reliance on defense mechanisms. The decisions themselves can be analyzed in the light of their success probabilities. Finally a relationship can be determined between rationality in decision making and tension level in an international system. The information obtained will be an indication of the validity of this basic assumption.

The course of the arms negotiations between 1945 and 1960 can be arbitrarily separated into three periods. The first period, 1945-1952, can be called the period of the Baruch Plan. The dominating characteristic of this period was the step by step increase of tensions which resulted, in early 1950, in a complete breakdown of communications which immediately preceded the Korean crises. The second period, 1953-1956, can be called the period of transition. The stabilization and lowering of tensions from the high levels which prevailed during the Korean crisis was followed by a period in which high tensions prevailed in the United States and relatively low tensions in the USSR. During this period arms negotiations were carried out by the Soviets with a degree of flexibility not matched by the United States. The multiple crisis of the fall of 1956 ended this period. The third period, 1957-60, can be called the period of reciprocation. Tensions were lowered and negotiations showed progress until an unintended crisis intruded and a breakdown of communication resulted. A review and analysis of the periods will provide the necessary background for the testing of the postulated relation between tension level and rationality in decision making.

CHAPTER II

PERIOD I - 1945-1952

The event that marked the beginning of the post-World War II arms race and gave to it its uniquely terrifying character occurred shortly before the end of that war on July 28, 1945. This event was the successful explosion of the first atomic bomb near Alamogordo, New Mexico.[1] It is probable that the leaders of the Soviet Union were aware of the explosion and of the particular significance of this momentous event.[2] Certainly any doubts they may have had about the nature of the Alamogordo explosion were dispelled with the use of the new weapon against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The stark horror of these two events not only announced the acquisition of a new and terrifying military potential by the United States but also inspired a universal world opinion that the bomb be eliminated from national arsenals and further, on the part of the Western democracies, that considerations of national sovereignty should not interfere with the attainment of this goal.[3] The continuing importance of

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[1]Robert Jungk, Brigher Than a Thousand Suns, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1958), pp. 195-202.

[2]Ibid., p. 187

[3]Phillip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1958), p. 182.

this goal and the attention given it has been well illustrated by Bernard Bechhoeffer, an American participant in many of the negotiations. In 1961 he observed that:

> The subject (arms control) has appeared on the agenda of every United Nations General Assembly commencing with 1946. A series of commissions, committees, and sub-committees either established or recommended by the United Nations have dealt in each year with some phase of this problem.[4]

The history of the negotiations has been a long, generally futile and mostly discouraging history. The most encouraging fact that emerges from this history is that a mutually accepted goal has been a continuing factor in these negotiations. Some times eagerly pursued, at other times held but not pursued, in the early stages idealistically formulated in terms of elimination of the weapons, in later stages more realistically formulated in terms of control, the goal has been constant. The means to achieve this goal have been the subject of the conflict. This conflict is but a small part of a much more encompassing conflict, the cold war. A discussion of the small conflict must, of necessity, be placed in the context of the larger.

The year following the end of World War II and preceding the first formal step in the arms negotiations, the presentation of the Baruch Plan, was one of general but lessening good will and trust between the Soviets and the Western allies.[5] The pre-war fear and

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[4]Bernard Bechhoeffer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, (Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institute, 1961), pp. 4-5.

[5]John Lukacs, A History of the Cold War, (New York: Doubleday, Anchor, 1962), p. 38

distrust which had been an element in Soviet-Western relations prior to the joint effort against Nazi Germany had not been forgotten, but, during this year was only rarely mentioned. Nevertheless, as early as August 16, 1945, Winston Churchill, in response to the method of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, protested the "police governments" which had been established "behind the iron curtain which divides Europe in twain."[6] Later, in March, 1946 at Fulton, Missouri, Churchill was to develop this theme to its logical conclusion by calling for an Anglo-American alliance to meet the Communist challenge.[7]

A serious military instability accompanied the developing political instability. This instability was a result of the American monopoly of atomic weapons and the Soviet preponderance in conventional weapons, especially land forces. Thus, the United States possessed offensive capabilities which the Soviet Union could not counter. In partial response to the perceived atomic threat, Soviet attempts to further extend control of her border areas in Iran and Turkey can be seen as initiating actions that produced the reactive cycle. The solution to the Iranian and Turkish problems was arrived at through negotiations, a solution which would be rarely resorted to in later crises during the remainder of this period. Thus, the emerging cycle is discernable in the first year of peace, the pattern of the cold war.

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[6]Evan Luard, The Cold War, (New York: Fredrick A. Prager, 1964), pp. 19-20.

[7]Ibid., p. 22.

The cold war continued and intensified during the next six years. Reinforcement of the West's deepening distrust of the Soviets came from the Soviet involvement in the Greek civil war and the consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. On the Soviet side, fear of the West and justification for Soviet actions was supported by the terms of the Truman Doctrine and the more extensive ideas which became known as containment. The success of the Communist coup d'etat in Czechslovakia in March, 1948 can be designated as the event which completed the estrangement of the war-time allies.

Further events in Europe contributed to the reactive cycle. The movement towards the unification of the Western occupation zones in Germany was countered by the Berlin blockade. Western reaction to this provocative Soviet move was to speed the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A particular menace was felt by the Germanophobic Soviets when the Western allies sponsored the formation of the German Federal Republic. Thus, by the end of 1949 the lines and limits of the struggle in Europe had been fairly well defined and the scene of the major confrontation shifted, with the success of the Communist revolution in China, to mainland Asia. By this time the reactive cycle, supported by the events in Europe, was severe enough that adjustment to the altered power balance in Asia was effectively precluded.

For the next three years East-West relations were to be dominated by the events which followed the success of the Chinese Communists. This Communist victory was, in itself, the precipitating cause of the almost

total cessation of East-West negotiations which was the result of the Soviet walkout from the United Nations. The immediate reason for this Soviet action was the United States' and the United Nations' refusal to acknowledge the altered power structure in Asia. The advent of the Korean War climaxed the period. The effect that this crisis had of stablizing tensions at an extremely high level was to last through the next two years and was to end only when internal political changes in the two major nations involved were to facilitate the lowering of the overall tension level and thereby allow renewed efforts towards the settlement of differences.

The tension level of this period can be seen to rise in a step by step manner from the low level that prevailed at the end of World War II to the extremely high level that marked the Korean War. Evidence that the tension level was low at the beginning of the period can be adduced from several factors. The fact that East-West communication was relatively free and unimpaired is supported by the meeting of heads of states at Potsdam, the participation of leading statesmen from both sides in the formation of the United Nations, and the initial working together of both sides in the occupation of conquered Germany and Austria. Friendliness and willingness to accommodate predominated on the Western side, nor was it absent in the Soviet position. The Soviet accommodation in Iran, although under pressure, is an indication of at least limited Soviet willingness to accommodate at this stage while tensions were still low. There were differences

and disagreements but behavior on both sides was essentially non-antagonistic. Following the first year of peace the situation can be seen to degenerate, at first slowly and then with a gathering of momentum. Friendliness and relatively free communication were features which were seen less and less in the confrontation. Antagonistic behavior such as the Berlin blockade and formation of the German Federal Republic became more the rule than the exception. The nearly complete breakdown of communications that occurred following the success of the Chinese Communists is illustrative of the high tension level that had been reached at that time. During the period of the Korean War few, if any, of the characteristics of a period of low tension were evident. Thus, this entire period, 1945-1952, is seen as one in which tension mounts from a relatively low level to a high level where effective communication was severly restricted and internation contacts were limited and unproductive.

The reactive nature of the political events during the years 1947-1952 had its counterpart in the mounting danger from the emerging nuclear arms race. At the same time that the United States was testing weapons in the Pacific, the Soviet Union produced its first atomic bomb and successfully tested it on August 29, 1949.[8] The United States monopoly of nuclear weapons was broken and the world moved rapidly towards what would come to be known as the "balance of terror." Within four years of the first Soviet A-bomb, both of the major powers had

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[8]Jungk, p. 264.

achieved H-bomb capabilities. Also during this four year span a third member, the United Kingdom, had gained membership in the nuclear club by developing their own nuclear weapons.[9] The arms race was in full momentum. Phillip Noel-Baker's statement of the relation between testing and the arms race fits this period very well. He said:

> As each government learns from its intelligence sources of the advances which others have made, so it is driven on to further tests itself, and the anxiety and suspicion it creates through the struggle for the lead, grows more intense. In other words, this testing, retesting and counter-testing is the arms race in one of its most dangerous forms.[10]

This observation of Noel-Baker's serves to place the arms race in its proper place as one of the major components of the reactive cycle operative in East-West relations. The arms, themselves, were contributory to the heightened tension level. It was with this political and the military-technological background, that the arms negotiations were conducted.

During this period progress in the advancement of weapons technology was matched in magnitude by the lack of progress towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. Further, the possibility of attaining this goal through negotiations was seen to recede as proliferation and perfection of nuclear weapons increased the complexities of the problem. The first formal step in the arms negotiations occurred early in this period. In response to the unanimity of world opinion concerning the desirability

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[9] Ibid., pp. 302-305; 10, xii.

[10] Noel-Baker, p. 259.

of the prohibition and elimination of atomic weapons the United States, in June, 1946, proposed and submitted the Baruch Plan to the United Nations.[11] The essence of this plan was the formation of an International Atomic Development Authority (IADA) which would control all phases of atomic energy research and development. Under the plan the IADA would manage all steps in this field, from the mining of the ores to the operation of the larger reactors. National Atomic Energy Commissions would have control of small reactors, some reactors for the production of electricity and the handling of radio-active isotopes in their respective countries.[12] It was further proposed that there would be no veto in IADA matters and violators would be internationally punished. As the last stage of the establishment of the IADA, the United States offered to give to the IADA its stockpile of nuclear weapons and the facilities for their manufacture.[13] The plan soon became obsolete because of the advance and spread of nuclear technology and the details of the negotiations concerned with it were likewise outdated. The importance of the plan, as Bechhoeffer observed, was that ". . . the plan itself was the keystone of Western policy towards arms control for nine years. . ."[14]

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[11]Bechhoeffer, p. 41

[12]Noel-Baker, pp. 184-189.

[13]Ibid., pp. 190-191

[14]Bechhoeffer, pp. 41-42.

The Soviet interpretation of the "unanimity of world opinion" was decidely at variance with the Western view. Within a week of the presentation of the Baruch Plan to the United Nations the Soviet Union had labeled it "the notorious Baruch Plan" and had made strenuous objections to it on the grounds that it would undermine the Charter of the United Nations and would infringe upon the sovereignty of the various Nations. There were other and deeper reasons for the outright Soviet rejection, as Anthony Nutting, the chief British negotiator for many years, observed:

> . . . .the Soviet Union was then too far behind in the atomic race to subordinate her development program and contribute all her materials to any international monoply. Her rulers wanted time to catch up and freedom to use all their resources to this end, while extracting the maximum advantage from the cry of 'Ban the Bomb.'[15]

The Soviets countered the Baruch Plan with a proposal which called for a "ban on the production or use of nuclear weapons, a committee to insure the prevention of use of atomic energy to the detriment of mankind, destruction of all existing weapons within three months and another committee for the exchange of scientific information."[16] The major points of disagreement were then clear. They centered around the question of the nature of control and inspection and the priority between control and disarmament.[17] The United States' proposal and the Soviet Union's counter proposal were, for at least the next five years,

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[15]Anthony Nutting, Disarmament, An Outline of the Negotiations, (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 5.

[16]Noel-Baker, pp. 191-192.

[17]Nutting, p. 5.

to be the basis from which the nuclear disarmament debate would be engaged.

The next five years were years of frustration and stalemate in the arms negotiations, much the same as they were in the other areas of East-West contact. The scientific progress which was evidenced by the proliferation of mushroom clouds was not matched at the conference table. During this five year period the most important event which affected the arms negotiations and the arms race was the Korean War which began on June 30, 1950. The Soviets, who had withdrawn from all United Nations participation in January, 1950, thus effectively halting disarmament talks, resumed participation in August, 1950 as a probable result of the Korean conflict.[18] A further effect of the Korean War was its dampening effect on Western enthusiasm for disarmament and negotiations in that area.[19] Another illustration of the deterioration of relations was that during the Korean War when talks resumed at the United Nations they consisted mainly of personal attacks by the delegates upon one another and insulting and unfounded charges against the integrity of the countries involved. The bulk of this conduct originated from the Soviet side of the table. The period ended at the conference table in much the same manner as in other areas of East-West contact, with communications impaired and behavior typified by highly antagonistic inter-nation contacts.

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[18]Bechhoeffer, pp. 147-148.

[19]Nutting, p. 6.

One compelling conclusion is that during the period, 1945-1952, the Soviet Union engaged in tactics of obstruction which effectively eliminated any possibility of international agreement for nuclear disarmament or control. From the Soviet viewpoint one can understand the reasons which must have caused them to obstruct the efforts of the conferences. These reasons would include the need of the Soviets to develop their own atomic energy program for reasons of national security and to provide atomic power. Another reason was probably the fact that they would have been in a minority in the IADA which would have been under the domination of the United States. A third important reason can be adduced from the closed nature of Soviet society which would not have been amenable to outside inspection much less to outright management of an important sector of their natural resources. In the atmosphere of distrust and the increasingly higher levels of tensions which marked this period the conduct of the Soviets in these negotiations can be seen as part of the more general reactive deterioration in East-West relations.

Support for the above conclusion can be found in the initial Soviet reaction to the Baruch Plan and their subsequent approach to the arms negotiations. In June, 1946 East-West tensions were not at a sufficiently high level to warrant the extreme Soviet reaction. The tenacity with which the Soviets held to their position is further evidence that they deliberately frustrated the proceedings of the disarmament conferences with a view towards the time when they

could negotiate from a geographically and militarily secure position. It appears that a real or imagined gross imbalance of power is inhibitory to fruitful negotiations. The dominant power sees no gain from negotiations while the weaker power fears to lose. This situation, of itself, is tension producing at the same time as the efforts of the weaker power to restore the balance create more tensions. On the Western side, reaction to the consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe and the probing actions in their border areas was evident in the Western de-emphasis on negotiations in the area of disarmament. The rigid adherence of the West to the Baruch proposals can be seen as a result of this de-emphasis in that the futility of the negotiations seemed not to justify the time and effort necessary to develop new approaches. During this period the increasing rigidity of the positions parallels the general course of East-West relations. The underlying Soviet insistence on attaining atomic parity and geographical security before sincerely participating in the arms negotiations effectively precluded disarmament hopes. The Soviet attitude also initiated the reactive cycle in which tensions increased as the thrust and counter-thrust of events led in a seemingly inexorable manner to the nearly complete paralysis in East-West relations evident during the Korean War.

The facts to be learned from the review of the period of the Baruch Plan are of importance to the review and analysis which follows. Concerning tension level there are two points which should be kept in mind. The first is that a base level for low tension can be estab-

lished for the period immediately following the end of World War II. The second point is the development of the reactive cycle. The initiating circumstance was the military and geographical insecurity felt by the Soviets and the triggering events were the Soviet actions towards alleviating this insecurity. The other important facts which emerge concern the actual disarmament negotiations. Of primary importance is the fact that the goal of elimination or secure control of nuclear weapons was formulated and accepted by both sides. The Soviet willingness to postpone the actual accomplishment of this goal until they could negotiate as an equal appears, from developments in the next period, to have been a matter of timing. Also from the negotiations it is possible to pinpoint the major areas of disagreement and to establish the negotiating positions. The major area of disagreement concerned the priority of control or disarmament. The negotiating positions, which were mutually rejected, were the Western Baruch Plan and the Soviet proposal for banning the bomb. Similarities between this period and the next period, the period of transition, are few. The major similarity is that the goal of the arms negotiations was maintained.

CHAPTER III

PERIOD II - 1953-1956

The spring of 1952 marked the beginning of a period of transition during which an accommodation to the altered power structure would be actively sought by the Soviets in the face of active distrust and high tensions felt by the United States. One early sign that the Soviet attitude was changing was the significant concessions included by the Soviets in 1952, on a bid for resumption of negotiations on the German problem.[1] In another arena, the Korean armistice talks, which had begun in July, 1951, and the semi-stalemate in the fighting in Korea were signs that both the East and the West were aware of the dangers inherent in the developing situation. The whole of 1952 was, perhaps, the least eventful year in East-West relations since the end of World War II. A probable major reason for this was the forthcoming election and change of leadership in the United States. Another probable reason was that the Soviet Union had attained an approximation to their goals of atomic military capability and geographic security. The developments which were to follow in the spring of 1953 were to produce the circumstances which would set the tone for the rest of the period.

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[1]John Lukacs, A History of the Cold War, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 104-106.

The influence of dominant personalities is well illustrated during this period by the sudden passing from the scene of one such personality and the emergence in a position of power of another. The death of Stalin in the spring of 1953 was of major importance in facilitating the shift in Soviet approach and attitude that was first evident in 1952. The dominant position of Stalin had been instrumental in setting both the general tone and the direction of Soviet foreign policy. That Soviet foreign policy had become increasingly dominated by hyper-suspicious attitudes can be attributed to the increasing dominance of this tendency in the personality of Stalin.[2] The coincidence of his death with the feeling of security which the Soviets had come to feel was instrumental in producing the more conciliatory approach to East-West differences which the Soviets adopted.

Also coincidental with these events was the successful conclusion of the Korean armistice talks by the new administration of President Eisenhower in the United States. This contribution can be ascribed to President Eisenhower who, with the fulfillment of his election promise to stop the fighting in Korea, placed the conduct and control of foreign policy in the hands of his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.[3] Dulles' policies dominated United States foreign policy for the next six years and, in part, can be seen as the

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[2] Ibid., p. 100.

[3] Ibid., p. 101.

antithesis of the policy of conciliation which the Soviets were pursuing.[4] Thus Stalin, by passing from the scene, and Dulles, by his emergence, were prime factors in the cold war struggle during this period. The Soviet policy of co-existence, made possible with the passing of Stalin, was to be confronted by the Western policies of massive retaliation and liberation made dominant by the emergence of Dulles. This confrontation is the key to understanding of the period of transition.

Evidence for the lessening of tension felt by the Soviets between 1953 and 1955 is strong. American insistence on an Austrian State Treaty had been made as one condition which had to be met if the Soviets were to be trusted by the West. The low tensions felt by the Soviets allowed this accommodation and the treaty was signed in 1955.[5] Other Soviet actions in Europe such as the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia and the initiation of diplomatic relations with West Germany are indicative of the low tension level prevailing in the Soviet Union. Further evidence for the low tension level is adduced from the Soviet willingness to accept many of the points in the Western disarmament position including provisions for inspection. Also, on numerous occasions, contacts between the Soviet leaders and foreign leaders were carried out in a friendly manner.

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[4] Ibid., p. 101.

[5] Ibid., p. 113.

For the first time Soviet leaders traveled outside their country and met with foreign leaders in their countries.[6] Finally the rather low level of antagonistic behavior by the Soviets during this period further supports the contention. A picture emerges of a noticeable lowering of tensions felt by the leaders of the Soviet Union. Probable causes for this were, as previously mentioned, the changed internal conditions in the Soviet Union which followed the death of Stalin and their attainment of relative military and geographical security. Thus, until the multiple crises of the fall of 1956, the tensions felt by the Soviets during this period were of a relatively low intensity.

On the other hand the increased security of the Soviets was viewed as definitely threatening by the United States. The response to this perceived threat was increased tensions and further distrust of the Soviets. This feeling of distrust is further illustrated by the position of Dulles which, when translated into disarmament policy, can be seen as the September, 1955 rejection of the Soviet acceptance of the West's pre-Geneva points. The 1953 outright rejection of the proposed meeting of heads of states because the Soviets "couldn't be trusted" is evidence of the high tension level that prevailed in the United States.[7] Internal conditions in the United States between 1952 and 1955, as illustrated by the phenomena of McCarthyism, are

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[6] Ibid., p. 109.

[7] Ibid., p. 113.

also indicative of the tension level.[8] The picture is one of moderately high tension level and especially one of a key decision maker operating under this condition. Not until the summer of 1955, when the Geneva Summit Conference was held, could it be said that tensions felt by the United States were lowered from the predominating high level. Due to Dulles' interpretation of events as a struggle between "good" and "evil" and his rigid approach to the solution of problems, the historian, John Lukacs, feels that "perhaps great historical opportunities were missed" and a course was set with fateful consequences.[9] The effect of operating under high tensions, whether occasioned by fact or fancy, are, indeed, of extreme importance.

The tension picture during the period of transition is seen to be more complicated than in the period which preceded it. The period of transition shows that events which serve to lower one country's tension level can often be the cause of another country's increased tension level. A similar situation on a less grand scale would be the tensions felt by two individuals of approximately equal resources engaged in a controversy, one of a more secure and trusting nature than the other. The death of Stalin and the Korean armistice reduced tensions in both the East and West. Nevertheless, the increased security which the Soviets had attained and the initial success of their policy of co-existence, while lowering the tensions

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[8] Ibid., p. 108.

[9] Ibid., p. 101

on the Soviet side, increased the perceived threat and tensions felt by the leadership of the United States. The key to the high tension level of the United States during most of this period is the interaction of the fact of Soviet nuclear capability and the chronic distrust of the Soviets felt by American leadership. It follows that if you thoroughly distrust another who has powerful weapons and you feel that he is likely to use them against you at any time you will be subject to tensions of a rather high order. The period then is one of high tensions on one side and low on the other with multiple crises occurring at the end of the period raising tensions on both sides.

The area of weapons testing reflects the general tension picture of the period. Testing by the United States was conducted at a rate far in excess of testing by the Soviets. During the period 1952 to the end of 1955 the United States carried out forty-two test explosions while the Soviets carried out seven. Four of the seven Soviet tests occurred after the 1955 Geneva Summit Meeting and the Western rejection of the Soviet concessions in the arms negotiations. The year following these two events saw thirteen tests by the United States and seven by the Soviets.[10] At the end of this testing period, an approximate atomic parity was evident between the two powers. This lopsided ratio, indicative of the exaggerated insecurity felt by the

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[10]United States Senate, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Hearings Before the Foreign Relations Committee, (Washington, D. C.: The Government Printing Office, 1963. pp. 333-334.

United States, supports the conclusion that the felt tensions in the United States were at a high level in comparison to the low level of the Soviets.

Also, it was during this period that another and more easily channeled fear was added to the fear of the weapons themselves. The inherent dangers from nuclear testing were dramatically introduced into the tension cycle. The events which inspired this reaction occurred in conjunction with the H-bomb tests which were carried out in the Pacific by the United States in 1953 and 1954. Radio-active fallout from one of the more powerful H-bomb explosions seriously contaminated several of the Marshall Islands and injured a group of United States servicemen and a larger group of the inhabitants. A more serious consequence was the contamination of the Japanese fishing boat "Lucky Dragon." The crew of the boat was exposed to a very high dosage of radiation and as a result one of the members died.[11] This newly perceived and more immediate danger from the arms race created a heightened sense of urgency in a substantial portion of world opinion to the effect that it was necessary to control the arms race and further that the nuclear weapons tests must stop.[12] Due to the fact that the United States was responsible for the contamination and the tragedy that occurred and was also the main participant in

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[11]Jungk, pp. 310-312.

[12]Ibid., p. 312.

weapons testing at that time, the major force of the criticism was directed against her. The defensive posture assumed by the United States in the face of this criticism, the belittling of the danger from fallout and the justification for the tests in terms of the Soviet nuclear threat (total of forty-six tests for the United States at the end of 1954 in comparison to six for the Soviets[13]) further illustrate the tensions felt during this period. The perception of the world situation which was of determining importance in producing the tensions felt during this period will also be discernable in the following discussion of the arms negotiations.

In January, 1952, the United Nations, in deference to Soviet views concerning the indivisibility of conventional and nuclear disarmament, authorized a Disarmament Commission which combined the UNAEC and the Commission on Conventional Disarmament. The purpose of this new commission was to prepare a draft treaty which would contain provisions for the reduction of armed forces, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and international control to insure the elimination of atomic weapons and the peaceful uses of atomic energy.[14] Upon presentation of the proposal for the new commission the Soviets initially opposed its formation but later withdrew their

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[13]United States Senate, pp. 333-334.

[14]Noel-Baker, p. 202.

opposition and the commission held its first session in February, 1952.[15] In April, 1952 the United States presented their "Six Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program." The six principles stated that:

1. The goal is to prevent war.
2. The cooperation of all nations is needed to attain this goal.
3. Armed forces need to be reduced to the level necessary to maintain internal security and United Nation's obligations.
4. International agreements are needed for the progressive reduction of armed forces and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.
5. The agreements must provide adequate enforcement through inspection.
6. There must be a "system of progressive and continuing disclosure."[16]

With the presentation of these six principles the Western powers marked out the boundaries within which they sought agreement in the area of arms control with the Soviet Union.

From January, 1952 until May, 1955 there was little noticeable progress on any of the problems facing the Disarmament Commission. In fact the Commission or its Sub-Committee met only during six months of this period of twenty-six months.[17] Changes in the political and military situations, though, were, during this same period, instrumental in causing a reappraisal of positions that would make the summer of 1955 the most dramatic and hopeful season in the ten post-war years of arms negotiations.

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[15]Bechhoeffer, pp. 165-169.

[16]Noel-Baker, pp. 12-14.

[17]Ibid., p. 203.

Of direct effect on the negotiations was the changed nature of the weapons which was a result of the tests. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increase of destructive power from kilotons, as represented by fission bombs, to megatons, as represented by fusion bombs, had made obsolete both the Soviet position of seeking a ban on the bomb and the Western position of support for the Baruch Plan. The deficiencies in these positions made necessary a re-appraisal by both the East and the West in their approach to the arms negotiations.[18] On May 10, 1955 the delegate of the Soviet Union to the United Nation's Disarmament Commission Sub-Committee presented a paper to the Sub-Committee which was an acceptance, with very slight changes, of the six principles which the United States had proposed on April 24, 1952.[19] On the question of inspection and control the Soviets made two significant observations. The first was to the effect that "the mistrust at present prevalent in international affairs made impossible the institution of a fully effective control system."[20] The second observation was that evasion in the area of control and manufacture of weapons was a possibility beyond the effectiveness of any proposed control organ.[21] Nevertheless the

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[18]Bechhoeffer, p. 242.

[19]Noel-Baker, pp. 19-22.

[20]Anthony Nutting, p. 16.

[21]Ibid., p. 16.

Soviets pressed for a continuation of the deliberations of the Sub-Committee with a view to preparing the draft treaty which was the principal job of the Sub-Committee.[22] The Soviet about-face was further evidence of the increased security which the Soviets felt. Another probable reason was the shift on the part of the Western powers away from the idea of international management toward a system of inspection. Also of major importance was the fact that the Soviets had changed their evaluation of the consequences of nuclear war from the view that only "decadent capitalism" would be destroyed to the more realistic view that nuclear war would, in all probability, result in mutual catastrophe.[23] The Western powers reacted to the Soviet Union's acceptance of the six principles by asking for and getting a recess over the Soviet's objection. The Sub-Committee did not meet again until August, 1955.[24]

The Western reappraisal had begun as early as 1952 as a response to the development of the H-bomb. The Soviet development of its H-bomb and delivery capability in the form of long range bombers were also important factors which contributed to the reappraisal.[25] During the recess of the Sub-Committee, President Eisenhower made his

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[22] Ibid., p. 10.

[23] Bechhoeffer, pp. 270-271.

[24] Nutting, p. 20.

[25] Bechhoeffer, pp. 245, 252, 271.

"open skies" proposal at the Geneva Summit Meeting. The proposal, in its essentials, would have allowed unhindered aerial access to both sides for purposes of reconnaisance with a view to quieting fears of surprise attack. The Soviet reaction to the proposal was that once again they had been asked to open themselves to inspection without any measure of disarmament.[26] When the Sub-Committee met again the delegate of the United States made reference to the "open skies" proposal and on September 6, 1955 placed a reservation on all pre-Geneva positions taken by the United States.[27] The other Western powers followed the lead of the United States. The reason given for the Western about-face was that no system of inspection yet devised would be able to locate hidden stockpiles of nuclear weapons.[28] The underlying reason behind the about-face was reaction to the shift in the balance of power from a Western pre-dominance in nuclear weaponery to the near parity which the Soviets had achieved.[29] The "open skies" proposal was related to this shift by the increased emphasis on the possibility of cheating and the related fear of surprise attack.[30] Both of these points are directly related to the overwhelming distrust of the Soviets which characterized the attitude of the American Secretary of State.

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[26]Nutting, p. 20.

[27]Ibid., p. 19.

[28]Noel-Baker, p. 23.

[29]Nutting, p. 19.

[30]Bechhoeffer, p. 329.

In this atmosphere, in spite of the conciliatory moves made by the Soviets, the negotiations again became deadlocked on the issue of the priority between inspection and disarmament.

The tone of the period of transition was thus set by the confrontation of the positive Soviet drive towards accommodation and conciliation with the active distrust of the Soviets felt by the leadership of the United States and especially by the dominant figure, Secretary of State Dulles. The high tensions felt by the United States reflected the interaction and mutual reinforcement between the original American distrust and the fact of increased Soviet security and military capabilities. The high tension felt by the United States was extremely important in precluding what appeared to be the possibility of significant progress in the arms negotiations. The substitution of the extremely simple and unrealistic "open skies" proposal for the considered and, what is more important and highly significant, the almost completely accepted pre-Geneva proposals can be interpreted as a retreat under circumstances of relatively high tension to a less complex and less rational position. Less rational in that the success probabilities of the "open skies" proposal were far less than the success probabilities of negotiations with mutual acceptance of the six principles. Further, the refusal by the United States to accept any agreement without foolproof inspection provisions was hardly realistic considering the advanced state of nuclear weapons technology. The retreat from the six principles also

shows a high degree of possibilistic thinking in its genesis from fears of surprise attack and cheating. Further evidence of possibilistic thinking is forthcoming from the additional proviso that the United States placed on prospective agreements to the effect that they would be unacceptable in the absence of foolproof inspection provisions, a patently impossible provision. The arms negotiations were to be stalemated on these points until the fall of 1956 when the Hungarian and Suez crises increased tensions to the points where the East-West dialogue was interrupted. Thus the period of transition ended with communications severely constricted and internation contacts restricted and formal.

The important points to be remembered from this period are again concerned with tension level and negotiating positions in the arms talks. This period shows that possibility of successful resolution of problems is distinctly hindered in a system in which there is a large disparity between the tension levels of the contending sides. It also shows that tension level is determined not only by the actualities of a situation but also by the psychological predisposition of the parties involved; in this case an active distrust of one party by the other which would not yield in the face of convincing conciliatory behavior. The main point to be remembered from the arms negotiations is the "open skies" proposal and the element of distrust in its genesis. Also of importance is the conciliatory nature of the Soviet approach and their acceptance in principle of the necessity of

inspection. The maintenance of the ultimate goal is continued during this period but the approaches to it by the parties involved is altered from the previous period. During that period the insecurity which Soviets felt led them to postpone the active pursuit of the goal until a more propitious moment. During the period of transition insecurity and dominant distrust of the Soviets influenced postponement on the part of the United States. The next period, the period of reciprocation, will reveal an altered tension picture with the re-emergence of discarded negotiating positions under conditions of high tension at the end of the period.

CHAPTER IV

PERIOD III - 1957-1960

The disruption of East-West relations that followed the crises of the fall of 1956 marked the interruption of what appeared to be a Soviet drive towards settlement of many outstanding differences including the arms control impasse. The year 1957 was to see a continuation of the crisis atmosphere that would prevail until the consolidation of power in the Soviet Union by Khrushchev in March, 1958. Following this event the picture would be confused with alternating conciliatory and antagonistic behavior which would be seen to end in coincidence with the resignation of Dulles as United States Secretary of State in April, 1959. The year that preceded the May, 1960 Summit Conference would be characterized by mutually conciliatory behavior with a marked lowering of tensions which would abruptly cease with the U-2 incident. Thus, a period which began with high tensions evident on both sides and during which a concerted effort markedly lowered mutual tensions was ended with an incident which illustrated the basic insecurities of the antagonists.

During 1957 the high tensions which resulted from multiple crises of the fall of 1956 were seen to be only slightly lowered. Events during the spring of 1957 were mainly concerned with the chaotic Middle Eastern situation. The Soviet move into the area and her efforts

to be included in a settlement in the area inspired the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact, both of which were aimed directly at the Soviet aspirations in the Middle East. Further illustration of the high tension level is given by the decision of the United States in the summer to introduce tactical atomic weapons in Europe. This decision was followed by the Soviet walkout from the London disarmament Conference. Tensions remained high during the fall of 1957 and into the winter. The success of the Soviet space efforts in October followed by the NATO decision to accept American intermediate range ballistic missiles in December follows the pattern which characterizes the year.[1]

The consolidation of power in the Soviet Union by Khrushchev in March, 1958 signaled the change in the course of events which would eventuate in the marked lowering of the tension level in 1959. The year 1958, though, was one during which tensions would be lowered to a moderate level in which alternating conciliatory and antagonistic behavior would present a rather confused tension picture. Of a conciliatory nature was the Soviet action on March 31, 1958, four days after Khrushchev's triumph, announcing a unilateral suspension of nuclear testing for a period of six months.[2] The Middle Eastern crisis of the late spring with the somewhat restrained but ominous

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[1]Luard, pp. 34-35.

[2]Ibid., p. 35.

Soviet reaction was of a different nature. Also indicative of the confused picture was the resumption of the arms talks during the summer and the Western acceptance of the informal test ban in the fall. The crisis in the Formosan straits at the end of the summer with the Soviets backing the Chinese was clearly tension increasing. A return to a high tension level was accomplished with the Soviet precipitation of the Berlin crisis in November, 1958.[3]

The confused tension picture evidenced by Soviet behavior during this year was a possible result of Soviet indecision concerning internal relations in the Communist camp. The seeming lack of success of the Khrushchev policy of seeking a detente with the West and the events in Eastern Europe which followed the liberalization of Soviet internal policies occasioned a questioning of these policies by the Chinese. The visit of Khrushchev to Peking in July, 1957 to discuss these differences is indicative of the dilemma in which he found himself.[4] On the one hand, he could abandon his efforts towards an East-West detente in hopes of maintaining the unity of the Communist camp or on the other hand, he could continue his policy and hope that success would give him the stature within his camp that he would need to maintain its unity. The events of the fall of 1958 are indicative of the continuing nature of his dilemma. Khruschev's decision in

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[3] Ibid., p. 36.

[4] Ibid., p. 36

favor of seeking the detente coincided with the resignation of Dulles as Secretary of State in April 1959. Thus, in spite of the emerging conflict within the Communist camp, the spring of 1959 was to witness a concerted Soviet-Western drive to reduce tensions and prepare the way for the resolution of the Soviet-Western conflict which was, by general agreement, not amenable to military solution.

With the resignation of Dulles as United States Secretary of State in April, 1959, an intensification of Soviet conciliatory efforts became apparent. The positive reciprocation which the West offered and which served to maintain the momentum of this trend indicates a shift away from the Dulles approach in Western policy. The sequence of events illustrates the lowering of tensions on both sides. Dulles resigned on April 15; reciprocal visits by Koslov and Nixon occurred during the summer; Khrushchev visited the United States and met with Eisenhower at Camp David in September; Khrushchev followed his United States visit with a visit to mainland China where he urged moderation by the Chinese in the East-West struggle; a cut of 1.2 million men in the Soviet armed forces was announced in January, 1960; a relaxation of Soviet jamming measures against Western broadcasts occurred in February; and the plans for the Paris Summit Conference were completed during the spring.[5] Agreement in the form of the Antarctic Treaty was possible in this atmosphere of lowered tension.[6]

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[5]Ibid., pp. 37-38.

[6]Lukacs, p. 37.

During this year between the resignation of Dulles and the scheduled Summit Meeting the only behavior not conforming to the dominant trend occurred in the chronically unstable Berlin situation and was of minor importance. Indeed, a major Soviet conciliatory move was made in connection with this situation when they agreed to refrain from unilateral action and to seek a solution by negotiation.[7] This year of good will was abruptly brought to an end in the short two weeks before the scheduled Summit Meeting by the U-2 incident. This incident was to be the precipitating cause of the failure of the Summit Meeting due to the inept handling of the incident by the United States and the reactive nature of the Soviet response.

On May 1, 1960, just two weeks before the scheduled Summit Meeting, the Soviets shot down, deep inside the Soviet Union, an American U-2 plane which was on an espionage flight in violation of accepted international law. Flights of this nature had been authorized by President Eisenhower shortly after the 1955 Geneva Conference and could be said to be a unilateral institution of the "open skies" proposal which had been rejected by the Soviets at Geneva. On May 5th, the Soviets announced that the plane had been downed but were vague as to the details. The American contention that the plane was a NASA plane gathering weather information which had gone off course was countered by the Soviet action in producing both the plane and the

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[7] Ibid., pp. 165-166.

pilot, thus effectively maintaining their contention that it was a spy flight. After some confusion in Washington, President Eisenhower admitted the truth of the Soviet charge but stated that the continuation of the flights was made necessary by dominating national interests. Thus on the eve of the Summit Conference an unintended occurrence intruded into the tension cycle with results that would adversely effect not only the conference but other areas of internation contact. In Paris, Khrushchev demanded an apology and assurances that the flights would stop. After further hesitation, Eisenhower gave his assurances that the flights would stop for the rest of his Presidency but did not yield to the demand for an apology. With this statement by the American President the low-keyed response of the Soviets was abandoned and in a burst of temper Khrushchev denounced the President and cancelled the Soviet participation in the Conference.[8] Different interpretations of the motivations which led to the magnification of this incident have been advanced. It should be emphasized, as Presidential candidate John Kennedy did in the first of the television debates on October 7, 1960, that in similar circumstances the United States had expressed regrets to nations, including the Soviet Union, whose territory had been violated by over-flights.[9] One interpretation of the U-2 incident states that the Soviet Union utilized the incident as an

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[8] Ibid., pp. 179-180.

[9] John F. Kennedy as quoted in Sidney Kraus, (ed.), The Great Debates, (Bloomington, Indiana: The Indiana University Press, 1962) p. 371.

excuse to wreck the Conference since they felt that no meaningful agreements would be arrived at. The evidence for this is not fully conclusive being based, as it is, on conjecture about internal conditions in the Soviet Union concerning opposition to Khrushchev's policies.[10] A different interpretation of these conditions would indicate that the Summit was of extreme importance to Khrushchev's position and that he abandoned it in anger only after having asked for and been denied an apology which in similar circumstances had been forthcoming. This interpretation would indicate that he needed a success, even if only of a token nature, in order to maintain the support of his policies toward a detente and to meet the criticisms of the hard liners both in the Soviet Union and in China. Another interpretation, based on the interaction of psychological and environmental factors, would be that the incident, itself being closely connected to basic considerations on both sides, aroused extreme reactions of projection and denial of reality. These reactions accelerated the deterioration of the environment and resulted, among other things, in a blocking of communication. It is, of course, impossible to predict the course of events had an American expression of regrets been forthcoming as it had been in other over-flight situations. This incident and its immediate aftermath served to mark the end of a short period of reciprocation in actions towards the lowering of cold-war tensions and in a larger sense the failure of the Soviet drive towards a detente.

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[10]Lukacs, pp. 180-181.

Thus, the most promising period in East-West relations since the end of World War II was brought to an end by a tension increasing event which cancelled a whole year of concerted effort which had succeeded markedly in lowering tensions. The tension level during the period was seen to decrease from the high level predominating in 1957 through the moderate to high levels in 1958 to the low level predominating in the spring of 1960. The inhibited communications and antagonistic nature of internation contacts evident in 1957 slowly gave way to the relatively free communications and non-antagonistic nature of the contacts preceding the events of May, 1960. The intrusion of the U-2 incident into the tension system radically altered the tension level since the incident was so closely related to basic concerns of the governments involved. On the American side the insecurity which was characterized by the distrust of the Soviets evident in the preceding period was still operative as evidenced by the continuation of the flights. The fact that the United States was shown to be engaging in operations contrary to international law and was caught in a lie concerning it, occasioned defensive reactions by the United States which was expressed in terms of the felt distrust. As pressure for an apology was increased by the Soviets such a response by the United States became increasingly impossible because of considerations of national pride. From the other side the position of Khrushchev in the face of criticism within the Soviet Union and the Communist camp was placed in jeopardy. His policy of attempting a detente was seen to lead to a

situation in which a proven violation of Soviet sovereignty would not even gain an apology from the nation at fault. This was an affront to national pride and, if for no other reason, demanded a show of hardness which is seen in the refusal to sit at the conference table with the responsible person who had refused to apologize. A new period of high tensions was initiated, a period which would last until the end of 1962 and during which the most dangerous confrontation in East-West relations, the Cuban missile crisis, would occur.

The technical genesis of the problem which would be confronted during the Cuban missile crisis can be discerned in the development of the arms race during this period. At about the beginning of this period, the arms race shifted from a contest predominately concerning quantities to a more subtle contest aimed at a predominance of quality and the perfection of delivery systems. Weapons testing continued throughout 1957 and into the spring of 1958 when this aspect of the arms race cycle was interrupted on the Soviet side by their unilateral six month moratorium on testing. Western testing continued until the fall of 1958. The Soviets also resumed testing for a short period during the fall of 1958.[11] The moratorium was then accepted by the West in November and lasted until 1961.[12] Preceding the Soviet

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[11]Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, (Chicago, Illinois: Henery Regnery Company, 1963), p. xix.

[12]United States Senate, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Hearings Before the Foreign Relations Committee, p. 334.

initiative by a few short months, an important new factor had been introduced into the "balance of terror" by the Soviet launching of the first earth satellite on October 4, 1957.[13] This imposing scientific accomplishment changed the dimensions of nuclear war by increasing the threat from massive destruction to one of almost instant massive destruction. Surprise attack became a more ominous threat because of the tremendous speed of the new delivery systems and the near impossibility of defense against ballistic missile attack. With the wedding of nuclear warheads to operational inter-continental missiles the danger from a catastrophic breakdown in the international system was increased far beyond the previously unacceptable limit, as would be illustrated five years later by the Cuban crisis.

During the first year of this period progress in the arms negotiations was slight. The first sign of progress was the tacit agreement in the spring of 1957 to separate the questions of cutoff of weapons production and broader disarmament from the question of weapons testing. A further sign was the Soviet acceptance of the Western contention that a test ban should be subject to international control.[14] These decisions had been made at the London Disarmament Conference where, nevertheless, the Soviets continued to press for their favorite idea, a nuclear test ban without inspection.

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[13]Voss, p. xix.

[14]Bechhoeffer, p. 354.

During the summer of 1957 the Soviet position concerning the test ban and conventional disarmament became increasingly rigid culminating in the Soviet walkout from the Sub-Committee and the Disarmament Commission.[15] The arena of the negotiations moved, under these conditions, out of the United Nations into the area of direct communication between states.[16] Nevertheless, the areas of disagreement remained the same, the provisions for inspection, the place of the veto, and technical problems.[17]

The assumption of full power by Khrushchev in March, 1958 was to be of determining importance to the arms negotiations as it was in other areas. As previously noted it was only four days after this event that the Soviet Union announced its intention to unilaterally cease nuclear weapons tests for a period of six months if the other nuclear powers would follow suit.[18] The negotiations which had ceased the previous summer were renewed on July 1, 1958 when a conference of experts convened to study the technical aspects of a test ban and its inspection. Actual negotiations toward a test ban treaty began in Geneva in the fall at which time the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union ceased the testing of nuclear weapons for

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[15]Nutting, pp. 40-42.

[16]Ibid., pp. 43-44.

[17]Voss, pp. 93-105.

[18]Nutting, p. 47.

a provisional year.[19] Also at the same time a conference to provide measures against surprise attack began in Geneva.[20] The Soviets, from their positions of enhanced strength, had assumed the initiative and, in a sense, scored a victory with the unsupervised test moratorium.

The following year would witness the continuation of conferences of technical experts and of statesmen, and a continuing inability on the part of the nuclear powers to resolve their differences concerning detection and inspection under a test ban treaty, much less on any of the broader aspects of the control of the arms race.[21] Nevertheless, an indication of the eventual solution in the search for a formal test ban treaty was seen on April 13, 1959 when President Eisenhower in a personal letter proposed to Khrushchev a phased plan for a test ban.[22] The first phase was to cover suspension of atmospheric and underwater explosions, which are easily detected from any point on earth, and was not to cover explosions in space and underground, which types would be exempt until resolution of the disagreements concerning detection and inspection.[23] A second letter from

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[19]Ibid., pp. 47-48.

[20]Ibid., p. 49.

[21]Bechhoeffer, pp. 488-520.

[22]Ibid., p. 510.

[23]United States Senate, p. 278

Eisenhower on May 16 pressed the proposal.[24] The Soviet Union rejected the phased plan but indicated a desire to come to a compreshensive agreement to ban all tests and expressed a desire to discuss the number of on-site inspections per year which they hoped would be few in number.[25] The closeness between the Eisenhower proposal and the eventual Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was emphasized in the Senate hearings on the Treaty.[26] During the spring of 1960 the Soviets overcame their objections to the phased plan. In February, 1960 the United States proposed a plan for banning all tests except underground tests of low yield and tests in outer space. The Soviets countered in March with a proposal to ban all tests except underground tests of low yield. Agreement in the terms of the eventual Test Ban Treaty[27] was close; the points of disagreement were few and not insurmountable.[28] The subject was to have been discussed at the Paris Summit Conference. The unilateral initiation by the United States of a previous proposal, the "open skies" proposal, intervened in the form of the U-2 incident and the heightened tension level precluded agreement on this issue as it did in other areas.

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[24]United States Senate, p. 279.

[25]Bechhoeffer, pp. 512-523.

[26]United States Senate, pp. 277-279.

[27]Ibid., pp. 6-8.

[28]Bechhoeffer, pp. 512-513.

During the period of heightened tensions which followed the failure of the Paris Summit Conference both the United States and the Soviet Union began to press positions in the arms negotiations which had been previously abandoned. The United States pressed a vague type of "open skies" proposal which had first been rejected by the Soviets at Geneva in 1955. On the other hand, the Soviet Union retreated to its old standby, complete and general disarmament with extremely vague control and inspection features.[29] The reappearance of these discarded positions as formal approaches to the disarmament problem was indicative of the high level of tensions which prevailed following the events of May, 1960.

Again, during this period as during the previous periods, the goal of the arms negotiations was maintained. The emphasis was seen to shift, though, from attempts to realize this goal through all-inclusive, comprehensive agreements to attempts at a step by step approach. The tension system is seen to be different from the preceding periods. During this period a return to the mutuality of the felt tensions occurred. The importance of triggering events is illustrated by the U-2 incident with its effect of radically changing the tension level from a low to a high level in a very short time. From the negotiations, the approach to agreement in the eventual form of the 1963 Test Ban Treaty is important in establishing the success probability of the decision to abandon this approach. This

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[29] Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXI, No. 23, pp. 6-8.

series of events lends support to the postulated relation between high tension level and irrationality in an international system.

The effects of possibilistic thinking and stereotyping can be seen in the revision of the United States position in the arms negotiations following the events of May, 1960. The retreat under conditions of high tensions to the previously rejected "open skies" position supports this. Evidence of possibilistic thinking is adduced from the genesis of the proposal from fear of surprise attack. It reveals the utilization of stereotypy in that it was a reliance on past behavior that had proved to be non-adaptive in the sense of realizing the goals of the arms negotiations. The irrationality of the decision is established by the fact that its success probability was close to zero and the success probability of the abandoned position was high. The high success probability of the abandoned position is illustrated by the mutuality of the position in the spring of 1960 and the circumstance of the extreme similarity between the proposals of 1960 and the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Thus, the events following the U-2 incident support the postulated relation between tension level and rationality of decision making.

The Soviet behavior lends further support for the postulated relation. The Soviet decision in the arms negotiations to abandon the very promising position concerning the proposed test ban in favor of the rejected and discredited "complete and general disarmament" position is a clear instance of stereotypy influencing decision making.

The decision is seen to be irrational in terms of the contrasting success probabilities for the same reason that the decision of the United States was irrational. Symptomatic psychological behavior is also evident in the Soviet actions during and after May, 1960. Khrushchev's display of temper and bad taste in Paris and later in New York at the United Nations meeting are illustrative of this behavior. Thus, Osgood's assumption that decision making in an international system tends to become more irrational as the tension level increases beyond an optimum operating level is supported by both American and Soviet behavior during the period of high tension following the U-2 incident.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Charles Osgood's proposal for the reduction of international tensions through unilateral initiatives towards this goal assumed that decision makers in an international system are subject to the same psychological influences as decision makers in a personal system. It was seen that fear and distrust produce a state of anxiety in the individual who perceives them. As the feeling of anxiety mounts the individual has recourse to psychological defense reactions such as projection and denial of reality. Since excess reliance on defense reactions is non-adaptive in that such reliance effects the validity of incoming information, meaningful and effective action towards the reduction of the felt anxiety becomes increasingly difficult. Misinterpretation of events contributes to a cycle in which tensions mount with an accompanying increased probability of irrational decisions. The irrationality results because of the tendency as tension increases, towards seeking simplistic solutions through reliance on shortcuts such as possibilism and sterotypy. The rationality of a decision is determined by identification of symptomatic psychological behavior and, more definitely, by determining the success probability of the decision in terms of the goal. A more concise statement of Osgood's assumption will serve to illustrate its potential importance.

Concisely, Osgood assumes that the human being as decision maker in an international system exhibits similar behavior under stress (tension) as does the decision maker in a personal system. This behavior is characterized by increased probability of irrational decisions as the tension level increases above the optimum operating level. The potential danger of this type of behavior in an international system in which technology has placed the means of instant mass destruction is evident.

The international tension level is determined by events which are external to the nations involved or internal to the nations or individuals involved. An indication of the felt tension level is determined by an examination of the events concerned with internation contacts during a particular period. A period during which low tensions prevail is one in which internation contacts are characterized by friendliness, non-antagonistic behavior, and relatively free communication. A period of high tensions is one in which the opposite characteristics prevail. With the determination of approximate tension levels the relation between rationality and decision making in an international system is possible. Not all decisions made under conditions of high tension are irrational, but the probability of irrational decisions is increased. Within the terms outlined, the preceding analysis of the three periods in the arms negotiations has supported Osgood's assumption.

Support for Osgood's assumption is gained from each one of the three periods. The period of the Baruch Plan, during which tensions were seen to rise to a very high level, evidenced no decision by either side which had a high success probability in terms of the mutually accepted goal of securely controlling atomic weapons. In fact, both the Baruch Plan and the Soviet proposal for "banning the bomb" were mutually unacceptable to the protagonists. The evidence from the period of transition is also of a supporting nature. The tension levels of the two nations most immediately involved, the United States and the Soviet Union, were not equal. It was seen that during that period the Soviets operated under relatively low tensions while the United States was operating under high tensions. During this period the Soviets were seen to have accepted the "six principles" for a disarmament agreement which the West had proposed, a rational decision in terms of success probabilities. The abandonment of the "six principles" after the Soviet acceptance and the substitution of the unacceptable "open skies" proposal is evidence of irrational decisions arrived at under conditions of high tension. The course of the arms negotiations during the last period, the period of reciprocation, further supports the assumption. The mutual acceptance of the proposed test ban during the spring of 1960 was an instance of a rational decision arrived at under low tensions. The high success probability of the proposals is evidenced by the extreme similarity between the Soviet and the American proposals, and the similarity between the proposals

and the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The final piece of evidence from these negotiations comes from the abandonment of these proposals in favor of rejected proposals after May, 1960 under conditions of high tension. It can be argued that the abandonment of the test ban proposals was merely strategy involved in reaching a higher order goal. This view fails to explain the mutuality of the abandonment and the mutuality of the revision to the repudiated positions. Further, this view fails to take into account the simultaneous nature of the abandonment and revision, i.e. they were independent actions and not reactive to each other. Thus a review of the arms negotiations and the cold-war lends support to Osgood's assumption that behavior of decision makers in an international system is similar to behavior in a personal system in that high tensions increase the probability of irrational decisions. Further, the maintenance of the goal of secure control of nuclear weapons, even during periods of high tensions, indicates that a decision to replace control with uninhibited rivalry and general use of these weapons in the settlement of international disputes would occur only at the stage of breakdown in the international system.

That the goal has been maintained and the arms negotiations have continued in spite of their seeming futility and in the atmosphere of mutual fear and distrust is a significant fact. It has been, in part, due to the awareness by both sides of the catastrophe that

is an ever-present possibility.[1] In addition to controlling the nuclear weapons already in the hands of the nuclear powers, containing the spread of nuclear weapons technology to other powers is of extreme importance. This is because it is necessary to reduce the possibility of accidental war or nuclear war initiated by an irrational lesser power in search of some desperate advantage.[2] A further compelling reason for the maintenance of the goal is to reduce the expense of the arms race which would be to the benefit of the contenders and all humanity. The reduced expenditures would release a significant amount of money and resources for competition in less dangerous areas and could result in improvement in the standard of living throughout the world.[3] To these pressures for the maintenance of the goal must be added a fourth of a less tangible nature. As Albert Schweitzer observed, "Now we must rediscover the fact that we--all together--are human beings, and that we must strive to concede to each other what moral capacity we have."[4] It is common humanity and awareness of it, although it is not often voiced, that is the most important of these areas of mutual interest. Awareness of common humanity goes

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[1]Bertrand Russell, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), p. 15.

[2]Etzioni, pp. 52-55.

[3]Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, (London, England: Weidenfeld & Nicholoson, 1961), p. 13.

[4]Albert Schweitzer, Peace or Atomic War?, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958), p. 45.

beyond the necessity of preserving it from destruction to include common aspirations toward a better life for all people. The question of how to achieve a better life is the issue underlying the conflict of which the arms race is but one factor. The English scholar, Hedley Bull, aptly commented upon this. He said:

> No human conflict, those in which Britain and her allies are involved no more than any others, can be regarded as a struggle of right and wrong; each, in so far as it is a moral struggle, is a struggle of right and right; that is to say a tragedy.[5]

In the face of such compelling reasons for agreement it would seem that lesser considerations than the survival of civilization would not be able to obstruct agreement. This has not been the case. Anthony Nutting discerned the basic cause of frustration at the same time as he noted the value of negotiation when he said, "It is not possible to have disarmament without confidence or to have confidence in a divided world. If all these months and years of fruitless international debate on these issues have done nothing else, they have at least been able to show where the log-jam is and which are the logs that have to be removed."[6] The log-jam is the nature of the international competition in which distrust heightened by fear of unique dangers has driven statesmen to seek protection within the framework of outdated concepts of national sovereignty and its place in the

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[5]Bull, p. 20.

[6]Nutting, p. xi.

international system. In one sense, the fact is, as Norman Cousins has said:

> The fully sovereign nation has become separated from its historic reason for being. It is not only incapable of protecting the lives, values, and property of its citizens; it has actually become inimical to life and creative freedom.[7]

Further attempts to come to realistic agreements in the arms control area and in other areas will have to be initiated within the bounds of the present concepts of sovereignty. Knowledge of the relation between tension level and decision making can facilitate this process. At present the concept of sovereignty is a political consideration of great importance. Nevertheless, it follows from reasons of necessity that as agreements are reached the concept of sovereignty will be revised and made more campatible with contemporary imperatives.

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[7]Cousins, p. 101.

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