9-22-1970

Campaign Decision-Making In New Mexico

Sam A. Carnes Jr.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO 87106

Policy on Use of Theses and Dissertations

Unpublished theses and dissertations accepted for master's and doctor's degrees and deposited in the University of New Mexico Library are open to the public for inspection and reference work. *They are to be used only with due regard to the rights of the authors.* The work of other authors should always be given full credit. Avoid quoting in amounts, over and beyond scholarly needs, such as might impair or destroy the property rights and financial benefits of another author.

To afford reasonable safeguards to authors, and consistent with the above principles, anyone quoting from theses and dissertations must observe the following conditions:

1. Direct quotations during the first two years after completion may be made only with the written permission of the author.

2. After a lapse of two years, theses and dissertations may be quoted without specific prior permission in works of original scholarship provided appropriate credit is given in the case of each quotation.

3. Quotations that are complete units in themselves (e.g., complete chapters or sections) in whatever form they may be reproduced and quotations of whatever length presented as primary material for their own sake (as in anthologies or books of readings) ALWAYS require consent of the authors.

4. The quoting author is responsible for determining "fair use" of material he uses.

This thesis/dissertation by Sam A. Carnes, Jr. has been used by the following persons whose signatures attest their acceptance of the above conditions. (A library which borrows this thesis/dissertation for use by its patrons is expected to secure the signature of each user.)

NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE
Joe Lucero	4/25/81
Leslie Mansfield 2921 Espanola NE Albuq., NM 87110	12/2/82

Oct. 1968—1,000—GS

This thesis, directed and approved by the candidate's committee, has been accepted by the Graduate Committee of The University of New Mexico in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

CAMPAIGN DECISION-MAKING IN NEW MEXICO

Title

Sam A. Carnes, Jr.

Candidate

Political Science

Department

David T. Bond

Dean

Sept. 22, 1970

Date

Committee

T. Phillips Wolf

Chairman

Larry P. Stroup

Robert J. Sickels

CAMPAIGN DECISION-MAKING IN NEW MEXICO

BY
SAM A. CARNES, Jr.
B.A., University of New Mexico, 1968

THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Political Science
in the Graduate School of
The University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico
January, 1971

CAMPAIGN DECISION-MAKING IN NEW MEXICO

BY
Sam A. Carnes, Jr.

ABSTRACT OF THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Political Science
in the Graduate School of
The University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico
January, 1971

CAMPAIGN DECISION-MAKING IN NEW MEXICO

Sam A. Carnes, Jr., M.A.
Department of Political Science
The University of New Mexico, 1971

The purpose of this study is to investigate the decision-making mechanism which operated in a Democratic primary campaign for minor state office (lieutenant-governor, attorney-general, secretary of state, land commissioner, and corporation commissioner) in New Mexico in 1970. Though the study is primarily a case study, the particular campaign is cast in the framework of game theory, utilizing some of the conceptual tools of game theory and analyzed in terms of players, strategies, communications, the payoff system, and the game environment.

A detailed description of the campaign setting or environment is included. This game factor is delineated into the political culture of New Mexico, the nature of primary elections in New Mexico, and the long ballot in the state. In each case the campaign constraints which accompany each sub-factor are noted.

More specifically, the investigation analyzes the decision mechanism of the campaign with reference to the decision-making models of Richard C. Snyder, Karl W. Deutsch, and Karl A. Lamb and Paul A. Smith. The campaign decision mechanism was found to most closely approximate that of the incremental model of Lamb and Smith.

Since the strategy of a campaign is the net product of many of the decisions that are made, an analysis is also performed of the strategy employed by the candidate and his organization. Though the campaign strategy was carefully planned and appeared viable, the candidate was unsuccessful in his electoral endeavor. The main reason for the failure is ascribed to the candidate's misinterpretation of the electoral strengths and weaknesses of his eight competitors.

In conclusion the study indicates the necessity for at least two reforms in the electoral politics of New Mexico. For one, New Mexico should eliminate ballot position by lot and should adopt the rotated ballot. In addition, New Mexico should abandon the long ballot in preference to the short ballot. Voters are incapable of rationally discriminating between men and offices at the level of the minor state office, and, consequently, governors should appoint persons to these positions in order to improve the possibility of efficient and responsible state government.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Much of what political scientists call political behavior can be thought of in terms of competition and cooperation. In the international system leaders of nation-states operate constantly within one or both of these perspectives in order to maintain or to improve their respective "national interests."[1] Indeed, foreign policy in the United States concurrently consists of both cooperation and competition; with respect to the Soviet Union the United States pursues a policy of cooperation concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and at the same time is competing ideologically, economically and militarily with the Soviet Union for the disposition of the "Third World." On the national level political actors in the legislative and executive branches cooperate in much civil rights legislation, but they compete with each other concerning the balance of power in the determination of foreign policy.

On the state scene, during primary election campaigns in New Mexico, political aspirants for minor state office cooperate and compete with each other for what, in some cases, is a somewhat dubious prize. Though much could be explored and written about the cooperation that accompanies such a campaign in New Mexico, the dominant emphasis of this investigation centers on the competitive nature of a primary campaign for minor state office. In addition,

an analysis is made of the campaign strategy that was derived and utilized by one particular candidate and the decision-making mechanism which was employed by that candidate in arriving at his strategy.

A Methodological Note. The investigation uses game theory as a conceptual tool in the organization of the study. Though game theory is "abstract and deductive, [and] not the empirical study of how people make decisions," the characteristics on which the theory is based are useful in analyzing the problem of electoral competition.[2] The quality of the strategy that a political candidate applies in his campaign, a strategy involving an "exploitation of potential force," or a full utilization of his political attributes and an attempt to de-emphasize those of his opponents, is instrumental in determining the success or failure of his electoral venture.[3] In addition to the more abstract and theoretical interests which inspired this study, the author was also prompted by the lack of information and research on primary campaigning within the political science literature. Though the discipline is replete with studies of presidential and congressional elections and campaigns, "practically no studies are available exploring the similarities and differences [between primary and general elections]".[4] Of course, the author was also interested in New Mexico politics, for political behavior in this state, virtually virgin with respect to research, is ripe for investigation.

Early in February, 1970, the author met with an unannounced Democratic primary candidate for minor political office in New Mexico. The

candidate, interested in participating in a study on the nature of campaigning in New Mexico as well as in winning his bid for office, offered to be the subject of a case study about primary campaigning.

The agreement that was made between the candidate and this author included, among other things, a guarantee of anonymity in the final product.[5] In return for the information and resources provided by the candidate to the author, the author agreed to serve as a general "flunky" in the campaign, serving as chauffeur, researcher, disposer of posters and signs, and as an overall handyman who would take care of any menial jobs which might have to be done.[6] Though every effort was made to remain emotionally and politically detached from the campaign, by the time of the election on June 2, the author was "rooting" for the candidate, Mr. Smith. The author waited for a period of time after the election before starting to write, in order that a more objective atmosphere would surround the evaluation of the campaign. Hopefully, the analysis of the campaign is not tainted with any great amount of subjective bias.

NOTES--CHAPTER I

1. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967 (4th Edition)), p. 542.

2. T. C. Schelling, "What Is Game Theory?", in Contemporary Political Analysis, James C. Charlesworth, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 213.

3. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 5.

4. David A. Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy: Campaigns for Congress (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 32.

5. Hereafter the candidate will be referred to as Mr. Smith.

6. Occasionally, during strategy meetings with Smith and his campaign staff, the author was called upon to make inputs into the decision-making process. The author tried to keep these situations to a minimum, and he made suggestions which were very obvious and which rarely and never substantially altered the decision of the group.

CHAPTER II

GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS

In analyzing a competitive situation it is useful to employ as a conceptual tool some of the concepts that have been developed by political scientists, economists, sociologists, and psychologists in the field of game theory. The central features of any game include the players, the payoff system, the communications network, the game environment, and the strategies. The first three of these factors can be relatively easily determined and discussed, in that they tend to operate within the system as independent variables over which any individual participant in the game has little or no control.

The fourth factor, the game environment, is in this case the campaign setting, discussed in Chapter III. The environment also can be considered as an independent variable, consisting of the political culture and subcultures of New Mexico, the constraints of the direct primary system of nomination, and the long ballot, and the environment functions in a game situation as the set of limiting "rules" of the game, rules over which the player has no control and by which he must abide if he is to be successful in his electoral endeavor.

However, the strategy or strategies that a candidate pursues are more difficult to identify and evaluate, for they are products of the candidate's rational, irrational, or nonrational planning and decision-making. The campaign

strategy is a dependent variable, as contrasted with the other factors of the game, for the candidate, hopefully, will observe and evaluate the other parameters of the game and create a strategy which depends essentially on these other features. According to John H. Kessel, "...the central problem facing the candidate is to devise a campaign game strategy that will modify the attitudes [of the voters] and make them more favorable to him."[1] To create such a strategy, the candidate must be aware of the constraints of the system in which he operates. In attempting to investigate the campaign strategy of one candidate for minor state office in New Mexico, the study will include a discussion of the decision-making process that predominated throughout the campaign and an analysis of the strategies and tactics utilized by the candidate in his campaign.

Game theory. The beginnings of game theory in the twentieth century started substantively in the field of economics with the publication of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944.[2] Since that time, however, almost all fields of the social sciences have applied the concepts of the theory, and mathematicians have produced sophisticated studies in the mathematical development of game theory.

Quite generally, game theory is concerned with the behavior of two or more individuals who come into contact over mutually desirable goals. More specifically, for political science,...

> Game theory can be viewed as a branch of decision theory specifically concerned with situations in which there are two or more decision-makers with (typically) conflicting interests. The aim of game theory is to prescribe policies appropriate to such situations, formalized as games, in such a way that the policies are seen as necessary, logical conclusions derived from certain assumptions of rationality and from the constraints of the situation.[3]

In looking at this definition of game theory, three features are particularly striking. The theory is normative, in that it prescribes actions for specific situations; a very important assumption is made, that of rationality; and it is recognized that the "constraints of the situation" define to a large extent the nature of a particular game. As a result of the presence of these three factors, game theory has the capacity to offer "if...then" propositions, where the standard "if" is the maximization of political profits in the play of the game. It is apparent from the definition that game theorists advocate the concept of the "rational political man," much as economists have assumed the existence of the "rational economic man" (the man who maximizes economic profits), in developing much of their theory.[4]

Terminology of game theory. Prior to developing a game of a primary election for minor state office in New Mexico, it is necessary to establish a basic terminology. Games must have players, denoted by P_x, where the subscript indicates which player of the game is being discussed. For instance, if there are n players, the set of players would be noted as $P_1, P_2, P_3, \ldots P_n$. In order to obtain the desired goal of the game, players must pursue given strategies.

Each player has a set of strategies, S, to choose one strategy from, and this set may consist of 2...n strategies. For each possible strategy employed by the player there is a given payoff (or result), and the payoff function for P_1 may be indicated by $P_1 (s_1, s_2, s_3, \ldots s_n)$. The game situation is further defined by three more variables: 1) the payoff system (zero-sum or nonzero-sum); 2) the game's environment or setting; and 3) the presence or absence of communication and the quality of that communication.[5]

A zero-sum game is one in which the gains for the winner of the game are exactly equal to the losses of the other player or players. A nonzero-sum game is one in which the resultant of the playing of the game will not be zero; that is, both or all of the players can win or lose as a result of the game. Generally, game theorists agree that it is more profitable to consider nonzero-sum games, for with the possible exception of a total conventional war or an election, where one side will always emerge as victor and the other as loser, there are very few situations which resemble the zero-sum game in reality.

Payoff system. A cursory examination of electoral competition would indicate that a zero-sum game might be the more appropriate of the two designations,[6] but it is well known that candidates pursue political office for different reasons, reasons in some cases which are not disaffected by suffering an electoral loss. Quite often young attorneys will engage in politics in order to become better known and expand their practices, with no idea of actually winning the election.[7] Some candidates consider other factors to be more important, such

as a general dissatisfaction with the incumbent party or officer, a desire to generate some particular policy, or a desire to help his party, even if he has to be a sacrificial lamb.[8] With these caveats in mind, however, it is convenient to view a campaign as a zero-sum game, for generally, most candidates do want primarily to win the election, and this was certainly the case with Mr. Smith.[9]

If the game of campaigning is zero-sum, then obviously the goal which each candidate is seeking is that of winning the election. Though winning the election by one vote is just as efficacious as winning by a large majority or plurality, since the net effect is identical, it is helpful to analyze the payoff in terms of votes won or lost rather than in terms of simply winning the election. As such the payoff function can be described in terms of votes, so that for the first player of the particular game the payoff function might be P_1 = (20,000, 30,000, 40,000,...120,000). Each of the sets of votes represents that portion of the total vote cast for player #1 which is associated with each one of the strategies which he might pursue. For the candidate, the problem "...is to allocate the resources so as to maximize the function (probability of winning, the expected number of votes, or the size of the plurality)" by selecting a strategy which accomplishes this goal.[10]

Game Environment. The environment of the game, the campaign setting, will be discussed later at length in Chapter III. However, it is important to note here that the understanding of this aspect of game theory has yet to be sophisticated and perfected to the extent that the other factors have been.

Though Martin Shubik and others have recognized the importance of the environment to the play of the game, it is all one can do to establish the environment in a carefully controlled laboratory experiment. To describe and to define the environment adequately of a complex electoral competition is difficult at the very least, for it is a tedious and frustrating task to render an evaluation of the salient political aspect of the environment that would be universally accepted.[11] The result of this analysis, appearing as Chapter III, is a combination of what political analysts and Candidate Smith thought to be important facts about New Mexico's political culture.

Communications network. The existence of communication, and the nature of that communication, in a campaign setting is a strange and ill-defined phenomenon. Unfortunately it is not sufficient to say that communication between candidates and between their various organizations exists. It is more important to comprehend exactly what kind of communication permeates a political campaign, both in order to understand more fully the campaign game and later to evaluate Smith's decision-making style. William H. Riker has delineated a systematic analysis of the communication effect in his The Theory of Political Coalitions.[12] An extension of his definition of "complete information" would be something to the effect that if one player, A, knows precisely the payoff that accrues to B at any time during the campaign, then A has complete information about B.[13] If all of the participants have complete information about each others' status, then Riker maintains that a situation of "systematically complete information"

exists.[14] "Perfect information," again transposing Riker's coalition-oriented theory to the campaign setting, exists when Candidate A knows what move or moves B has made.[15] "Systematically perfect information" occurs when all of the candidates know about all of the moves that each of them has made.[16]

Obviously in a campaign environment neither complete nor perfect information exists at any time. Certainly all candidates would welcome such a situation, for this knowledge would enable them to make many very important strategic decisions, possibly including withdrawing from the competition if defeat were imminent and inevitable. The state of information that does obtain in a campaign for minor state office in New Mexico is both incomplete and imperfect. In the campaign under consideration, all of the candidates derived their information from primarily the same sources: from newspapers, columnists, public opinion polls, political leaders, "spies" in the other candidates' camps, their own campaign workers, and from each other.

When Candidate Smith needed some information about one of his competitors who had earlier endorsed a primary opponent of the incumbent Democratic United States Senator, one of Smith's campaign workers researched the Albuquerque newspapers to locate the relevant articles. In addition, Smith subscribed to a statewide newspaper clipping service during the course of the campaign to keep abreast of the activities of his competitors.[17]

Fred Buckles, author of the daily political column, "Inside the Capitol," of the Albuquerque Tribune, is one of the most popular political columnists in the state. Periodically Mr. Buckles analyzed the campaigns of

the various candidates for the office under consideration in this study, and all of the candidates courted his favor in hopes of obtaining advantageous press coverage. Jim Boyer's column, also of the Tribune, and Eric McCrossen's column in the Albuquerque Journal were also widely read by the candidates.

Early in April, more than two and one-half months prior to the election, this author helped organize and coordinate a public opinion poll of Bernalillo County, contracted by one of the candidates for major office. Items on the questionnaire included races other than that of the original purchaser, and one of the candidates for the office under consideration, but not Mr. Smith, purchased the results of the poll from the principal contractor. Due to a general lack of interest by the public about the races for minor state office, the press focused its efforts on the gubernatorial and senatorial races. The primary candidates in both parties for the two U. S. Representative positions were unopposed, and thus, received little press coverage. Consequently, it appeared that the lesser candidates sought out information on the gubernatorial and senatorial contests trying to correlate these races with their own. The Albuquerque Tribune ran a straw poll on these two offices in various parts of the state immediately prior to the election, but the information derived from this "poll" appeared to be unscientifically obtained and was too late in the campaign to be of much value to the candidates, other than to reassure the named leaders of the straw vote and to discourage those who trailed.[18]

A fourth source of information for the candidates was the political leadership. Mr. Smith, time after time in his travels around the state during

the heat of the campaign, paid his respects to the local political leaders and asked, "Is there any [minor state office] activity going on?" One of the chief problems with attempting to obtain information in this manner was that the process of "selective exposure" operated most of the time.[19] Smith generally saw those men who favored his candidacy, and therefore, he rarely if ever heard any discouraging information.[20] Even when Smith had occasion to converse with leaders who opposed him, he never received any debilitating or critical information; why should Smith's opponents' supporters offer criticism which might be constructive for Smith?

Yet another source of information, at least as reported by Smith, was through his "spies" who were working in other candidates' campaigns or were privy to knowledge of other campaigns. It appears doubtful that this system of espionage contributed much information however, for, generally speaking, candidates will "leak" exactly what they want to be heard by the other candidates. Grouped with this category are the candidate's own campaign workers, who tell the candidate endlessly how well he is doing or how poorly his opponents are doing, their judgments obscured somewhat by a lack of objectivity and by a tendency of "not seeing the forest for the trees," a characteristic imparted by the lack of perspective which accompanies campaign dedication. Occasionally, Smith would try to ask individuals detached from his campaign to evaluate his activity, trying to escape the "rose-colored" subjectivism of his own workers.

Lastly, candidates have occasion to exchange information between themselves. Since a candidate for minor office can rarely draw his own crowds, he attaches himself to the major political candidates, attending their rallies, passing out his own pamphlets there, eating their food, and meeting their potential supporters. At these gatherings the candidates usually talk to each other, one, with tongue in cheek, telling the other how smoothly his campaign is running. On one of the trips to Las Cruces, Smith furnished one of his opponents with transportation, and the two of them analyzed the gubernatorial and senatorial races county by county, indicating at the same time their own status in each area of the state.

An unobstrusive measure that candidates used to determine the status of their opponents' campaigns was through attendance at various meetings. In particular, Smith felt that attendance at the state Democratic platform convention, held in April, was important politically, for here ward and division leaders from throughout the state met for two days formulating the party's platform. On another occasion Smith drove for a total of twelve hours to attend a barbecue given by Mrs. Dessie Sawyer, longtime national Democratic committeewoman. After arriving, it was obvious that nearly every statewide candidate was there. All of the office-seekers had, in effect, come to pay homage to the matriarch of the party, hoping to obtain the favor of a woman who all of the candidates perceived to be powerful. It was not so much the reality of power which was important, but rather, those persons who were perceived to be powerful were courted for political favor and support.[21] Nonattendance at rallies and meetings

represented to Smith unacceptable campaign behavior, and he felt that the candidates who were not appearing at these meetings were not doing well in the competition.[22]

Players. The last significant factor of the campaign game to be considered here is the players. Nine men presented themselves to the Democratic electorate for this particular office, on June 2, 1970, and though the actual identity of these men is not important, a discussion of these men and their characteristics is important to an understanding of the campaign. Due to the large number of candidates, and the subsequent apportioning of the votes that would take place, it was incumbent on Smith to become knowledgable about these men and their electoral strengths and weaknesses, for much of Smith's eventual strategy had to be based on an understanding of his competition.

On filing day, April 7, party leaders, candidates, journalists, and interested on-lookers stationed themselves outside the Secretary of State's office in the capitol in Santa Fe. A bulletin board, showing the names of all the statewide and special district elections to be held in the primary, was closely watched, and periodically a new name of a candidate was added to the list. Smith arrived to file just before noon, and he was the fourth person in the Democratic party to file for his office. Prior to filing date he had calculated, through newspaper announcements and political rumors, that nine men would file for his race. Nine candidates did eventually file by 6:00 p.m., but one of the men Smith had thought would file for his position filed for another minor

state office, and in his place a surprise candidate entered the field. The nine men who comprised the field were, with their player designations:

P_1 was a Spanish-American, approximately fifty-five years of age, who had retired just a year prior to the campaign from a highly rated civil service job in the Department of Defense in Washington, D.C. In order to compensate for his virtual absence from the state for the last twenty years, this candidate was one of the hardest working campaigners, making it a full-time job from November to June.

P_2 was another Hispano, about thirty years old, an owner of a restaurant in Albuquerque and a disc-jockey of the major Spanish-speaking radio station in the state. As a member of the state's House of Representatives, he became a favorite of the Democratic liberals in Albuquerque and was popular with his fellow legislators. His campaign was marked by a rather easy-going attitude, playing the guitar at rallies, and it was entirely low-key.

P_3, another Hispano, about thirty-five years old, was a former school teacher from Taos. Presently he is an insurance agent there and he served in the state's House of Representatives. His campaign was strange in that it was well-known among his opponents and candidates for other political office that he was supporting one of the three gubernatorial candidates, a tactic the other candidates tried to avoid.

P_4, still another Hispano, about sixty years old, was a probate judge from Santa Fe. Having the same surname as candidate P_3, some political rumors charged that he was a "stooge" planted to cut into the votes for P_3.

P_5, an Anglo, about forty-five years of age, was an appointee of former Governor Jack Campbell to the State Highway Commission. He was identified, at least by some of his opponents, to be with the "old school" of politicians, and for a while he was considered by Senator Montoya's advisors to be the front-runner in the race.

P_6, an Anglo attorney of about thirty years of age, was from Albuquerque's Heights. He had run for the same office in the primary in 1968 and had run second in a five-man field at that time. He was one of three candidates in this race who had electoral experience in striving for statewide political office.

P_7, a Hispano from Albuquerque had served in the state Senate. After he entered the race, his campaign never really began, reportedly because his financial backers lost interest when so many candidates filed for the office. At no time during the campaign was he really a viable candidate.

P_8 was an Anglo rancher from the eastern side of the state. He was the surprise candidate, and at first his opponents spent some time trying to imagine for whom he was a "stooge." Active in New Mexico politics during the decade of the 1950's, he organized an effective campaign, especially on the east side, and it became apparent that he was nobody's "stooge."

P_9, an Anglo from Los Alamos, also had statewide electoral experience, having run for this office in the 1968 primary. His following came primarily from ranchers and laborers in Little Texas in the southern part of the state.

The complete field of candidates then was composed of five Hispanos and four Anglos. Categorized by age, four of the candidates mirrored an image of youth, four were middle-aged, and one was elderly. With respect to electoral and legislative experience, six of the nine candidates were qualified, though later Smith and one of the other candidates conceded that experience in the state legislature was probably the most important qualification. The identification of these men, of their strategies, and of their strengths and weaknesses, of their electoral viability, of the effect each of them had on Smith's campaign eventually became an important factor in the determination of Smith's own strategy.

NOTES--CHAPTER II

1. John H. Kessel, "A Game theoretic Analysis of Campaign Strategy" in The Electoral Process, M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, eds. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 295.

2. Martin Shubik, Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 6.

3. Anatol Rapoport and Carol Orwant, "Experimental Games: A Review," Behavioral Science, VII (January, 1962), p. 1.

4. Steven L. Coombs, Michael Fried, and Stewart H. Robinowitz, "An Approach to Election Simulation Through Modular Systems," in Simulation and the Study of Politics, William D. Coplin, ed., (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968), p. 287.

5. Shubik, p. 11.

6. William H. Riker, "Bargaining in a Three-Person Game," American Political Science Review, LXI, March, 1961, p. 642.

7. At the end of the 1970 primary, the candidate whose campaign is the subject of this study, indicated that though he lost the election and expended personal financial resources, he hoped the publicity he received during the campaign would help his business. A young attorney who ran for attorney-general was analyzed by another candidate to have run for this exclusive purpose.

8. David A. Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy: Campaigns for Congress (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), pp. 20-21.

9. Additionally, the problem of dealing with interpersonal comparison of utilities, how much more does Candidate A value the office than Candidate B, has been a stumbling block for game theorists, a hinderance this author hopes to avoid. Generally the "Welfare economists" have attempted to study this approach. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963) and Jacob Marschak, "Scaling of Utilities and Probability," in Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior, Martin Shubik, ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964).

10. Howard Rosenthal, "Voting and Coalition Models in Electoral Simulations," in Simulation and the Study of Politics, p. 240.

11. William N. McPhee, "Note on a Campaign Simulator," The Public Opinion Quarterly, XXV, Summer 1961, pp. 184-193.

12. William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 77-101.

13. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, p. 78.

14. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, p. 78.

15. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, p. 78.

16. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, p. 78.

17. This was not the only function of the subscription to this service. Smith also wanted to be aware of his press coverage around the state as compared with the other candidates, to be able to determine what kinds of press releases were receiving the most coverages, and what issues in what part of the state to become associated with.

18. According to the Tribune, the pollers, two journalists, traveled throughout the various sections of the state and interviewed at random on the street.

19. Bernard R. Berelson, Paul E. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 119. Throughout the campaign Smith, who had obtained the campaign itinerary of Senator Montoya from one of Montoya's aides, followed hot on the heels of the Senator wherever he traveled around the state. The same aide reported to Smith every Monday afternoon on the results of the weekly Monday-morning meetings between Senators Anderson and Montoya about the New Mexico political races. Progressively, the aide indicated to Smith that his name was being mentioned more and more as the leading contendor in his race. In substance, and in progression, Montoya reported to Anderson that A was leading in this race, then that Smith and A seemed to be leading the field, and finally that Smith was easily the front-runner. This is an example of planned selective exposure on the part of Smith to a politically influential man.

20. During one trip to the southern part of the state (Dona Ana, Chaves, and Otero counties), Smith did hear of one of his opponent's extensive campaign activity there. Smith and his local supporters were not worried, however, for the man was a Hispano campaigning in areas where the majority of the residents had traditionally discriminated against Hispanos in the voting booth in primary elections. After the election results were in though, this man did very well in that part of the state comparatively.

21. It is interesting to note that the victor in this election did not attend either the platform convention or Mrs. Sawyer's barbecue.

22. Perhaps Smith derived emotional gratification from these meetings (as would some other candidates), i.e., an occasion for ego inflation, flattery, sense of involvement in a grand enterprise, etc. Or it could be that attendance at these meetings was perceived as one of the rules of the game to generate activist support.

CHAPTER III

THE CAMPAIGN SETTING

The environment in which this case study is cast necessarily had a great effect on the campaign strategy that Smith devised and subsequently applied. The author feels that there were three salient components that defined this environment: one theoretical parameter, the political culture of New Mexico, and two institutional components, the direct primary system of nomination and the long ballot in New Mexico. All three of these factors had direct implications both for the electoral behavior of New Mexico's voters, and consequently for the campaign strategies which candidates must utilize in pursuing their goals.

Political Culture

The ability of any political aspirant to succeed in his electoral venture depends to a great extent on his understanding and appreciation of the political culture of his constituency. The development of New Mexico as an independent political system has been characterized by the temporal and spatial nature of its settlement, and the resultant economic and social demography have had an important effect on politics in New Mexico.[1]

According to Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., political culture "...consists of attitudes, beliefs, values, and skills which are

current in an entire population, as well as those special propensities and patterns which may be found within separate parts of that population."[2] In the case of New Mexico, the latter part of this definition becomes especially significant, for political analysts tend to agree that a regional/ethnic basis of analysis is perhaps the most rewarding.[3] Prior to and after each state-wide election, "Monday morning quarter-backs" of every vocation and persuasion can be found making the following kinds of statements: "The Democrats didn't have a chance with two Mexicans in the governor/lieutenant governor spots;" "Candidate A would have lost if he hadn't paid his respects to Filo Sedillo in Valencia County;" "Candidate B shouldn't have gone bar-hopping while he was down in Little Texas;" "It's a good thing for X that the voters in Bernalillo register Democratic and vote Republican;" or "Candidate Y had the election won in the Heights, but the Valley bolted and Z took home the marbles." Although each of these analyses is obviously simplistic and incomplete, each does exhibit a partial understanding of the nature of electoral politics in New Mexico.

To explain the nature of New Mexico's political culture simply in terms of regionalism and ethnicity necessitates a brief discourse on the social, economic, and historical developments that have occurred to make this basis of analysis viable. When the Spanish invaded and settled New Mexico, they traveled up the Rio Grande, avoiding the aridity and heat of the plains and the rugged terrain and cold of the mountains. The larger communities of Las Cruces, Socorro, Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Taos were established at sixty or seventy mile intervals along the Rio Grande, while smaller villages were erected along

tributaries of the river.[4] The later development of these population centers came with the land grant system, so that each village or town became largely self-sufficient economically, socially, and politically, with the major institutions of church, family, and patron assuming all authority and responsibility within each societal unit.[5]

When the Anglos (non-native New Mexicans) migrated en masse into New Mexico during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they encountered an established social, economic and political system which had the stability and inertia of two centuries of Spanish domination. However, the Hispanos accommodated and adopted much of the intruders' culture and life-styles, to the extent that by the time of the adoption of the 1910 constitution, the "native" New Mexicans were quite capable politically, electing a sizeable contingent of Hispanos to the constitutional convention.[6] With the immigration of Anglos, the Hispanos began to concentrate in the valley regions of northern New Mexico, leaving the southern half of the state for Anglo habitation. When oil was discovered in eastern New Mexico, what is now commonly referred to as "Little Texas," workers and oil men from West Texas invaded to exploit the natural resources of the area. Agricultural exploitation in the counties of Union, Quay, Curry, and Roosevelt by Anglos from West Texas also characterized much of the immigration.[7]

Ethnicity. An electoral factor, which is often suggested by politicians as being significant but has yet to be thoroughly investigated, is the ethnic basis of

voting; Hispanic candidates historically have not done well in the "Little Texas" counties (unless the Democratic party label is attached to the name), but these same men have a decided advantage over Anglo candidates in the "native" counties of northern New Mexico. Prior to the days of the primary, this factor was not overly important strategically, for the nominating conventions of each party managed often to match Anglo candidates against each other and Hispanic candidates against each other.[8] Though the convention system never delivered the fifty percent of the nominations to the Hispanos that would statistically accrue to them, over a third of the state-wide nominations were awarded to them between 1912 and 1940.[9]

However, with the advent of the primary the party leadership was no longer able to control for the factor of ethnicity. Consequently, presently for both the primary and general elections, the preparation of campaign strategies must account for this factor. The relative importance of this factor has become more and more pronounced with the changing distribution of population in New Mexico. The percentage of the state's vote which in the past was concentrated in the Hispanic counties has been steadily decreasing, a fact which prompted T. Phillip Wolf to note that the advantage that at one time obtained for a candidate with a Spanish surname may become an electoral liability.[10]

Raymond E. Wolfinger maintains that "Ethnic politics flourish in those parts of the country where national origins are a salient dimension of individuals' perceptions of themselves and of others."[11] He goes on to say that the minority groups have tended to accept electoral recognition rather than to demand sub-

stantive policies to alleviate tangible problems and to satisfy immediate needs.[12] The emphasis on racial balance within each party's slate of candidates during the convention era in New Mexico is certainly evidence to support this thesis.[13] Although the empirical validity of this proposition, operationalized in terms of electoral success of Spanish and non-Spanish surnamed candidates, has not been extensively investigated, Jack Holmes has studied the trends of electoral competition in terms of ethnicity, but for state legislative posts only.[14]

Regionalism. For the purpose of this study New Mexico will be geographically categorized into four main segments: 1) Little Texas (Chaves, Curry, De Baca, Eddy, Lea, and Roosevelt counties), 2) the Hispanic or "native" counties (Rio Arriba, Taos, Mora, San Miguel, Santa Fe, Sandoval, Valencia, Guadalupe, Socorro, and Dona Ana), 3) Bernalillo County, and 4) others.[15] Far from being arbitrary, this categorization is based on the political and economic developments within New Mexico that have resulted in an ostensibly differentiated political culture.

Little Texas. The Little Texas counties, bordered by Texas on the east and the south, are heavily Democratic, politically conservative, and religiously Southern Baptist.[16] According to Holmes' analysis, these counties were at one time considered with six other counties to be "Progressive" counties and supporters of third party movements.[17] As such, these areas have shared several significant characteristics: much of the land was developed by miners and homesteaders; settlement in these areas occurred mainly between 1890 and 1910; there were

no Spanish land grants in these counties; and the proportion of native Hispanos residing here was small.[18] The relative wealth of this area, derived principally from the oil industry, has been in stark contrast with the economic deprivation of the rest of the state, especially the Hispanic counties.[19] In addition, the Little Texas counties have displayed many of the characteristics of traditional one-party states, with consistently strong support for Democratic nominees.[20] Perhaps as a result of the one-party status of this area and the accompanying lack of electoral competition, much of the political leadership in the state legislature has been provided by the electors and politicians of this section of the state.

The Hispanic Counties. A second region which comprises a political sub-culture important to a comprehension of New Mexico's political culture in general, consists of the "native" or Hispanic counties, extending along the Rio Grande Valley from El Paso, Texas, northward to the Colorado border. Due to the influx of Anglo citizens in the southern part of the state during the early twentieth century, the assumption of Anglo economic dominance, and the absence of Spanish land-grants in this area, native New Mexicans migrated to the northern counties, where the terrain and technology that sustained their moderate farming existence were readily available.[21]

The political culture that developed in these areas was a synthesis of Spanish institutions, customs, and mores, and Indian practices which, when combined, resulted in a patrón/jefe político style of life.[22] A series of many

isolated villages, based on economic self-sufficiency and semi-communality appeared in close proximity to the various land grants. The patrón or jefe político was able to control, or at the very least, to influence the political activities of his dependent neighbors, Although at the present time several of these men are identifiable in Valencia County, Rio Arriba County, and the North Valley in Bernalillo County, and other parts of the state, the political influence that they once had seems to be eroding, so that many candidates and political analysts are beginning to question the power of these men.[23] The consequence of this loss of power has been that payoffs to the various jefes throughout the state does not guarantee any specific percentage of the vote for the candidate, indicating that in the future candidates and their organizations may not court the personal political approval of such leaders, as much as they have in the past.

Bernalillo County. The third significant region to be considered is Bernalillo County, location of Albuquerque and of the state's only Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).[24] At the present time, Bernalillo claims more than a third of the state's population, a major portion of the state's economic output, and the University of New Mexico (the largest state educational institution), all factors which must be considered as weighty when devising a political strategy for a campaign.

Even though Albuquerque has never been thought of as a "sleepy Spanish town," the political salience of the community did not really become

significant until after World War II, when its population started booming with the phenomenal growth rate being attributed to the input of federal governmental programs and commensurate federal monies.[25] Whereas prior to this time the population of Albuquerque was concentrated in the Valley, along the banks of the Rio Grande near "Old Town," the population explosion of the subsequent two decades was located primarily in the Heights, where employees of the new Sandia Laboratories, Sandia Base, Kirtland Base, and the rapidly expanding University of New Mexico, began to reside.[26]

Due to this historical development of Albuquerque, it is conventional to analyze the city in terms of a Valley/Heights dichotomy.[27] The Valley (actually composed of the North Valley, the South Valley, and the West Mesa) includes that part of the city which was originally settled by the Spanish in 1706 and which continued to attract the populace for the next two centuries. This section of the community has been and will probably continue to be the location of Hispanic residence, where fifty percent of the inhabitants have Spanish surnames.[28] Democratic political candidates have long relied on the Valley voters for electoral support in winning and losing elections, for the Heights voters have been a Republican stronghold for twenty years. Despite a large registration advantage for the Democratic party in Bernalillo County, the County voters have given Republican gubernatorial candidates majorities 73.3% of the time since 1940.[29] Due to the increasing Republican registration, however, the support of Republican candidates may become even more impressive in the future.[30]

Others. The remaining counties in the state constitute the fourth category. As a sub-unit, they are not homogeneous, and, therefore, are hard to classify meaningfully. However, two of the counties do deserve mention. Los Alamos County, situated in the north central mountainous region of New Mexico, is a wholly synthetic region, in that it is a community composed largely of scientists and engineers contracted by the Atomic Energy Commission of the federal government.[31] Supportive personnel reside there also, but the flavor of the political culture of this sub-system is defined to a great extent by the staff employees of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories. As an aggregate, the residents of Los Alamos share many of the political and social characteristics of upper income and highly educated citizens, but, in addition, they desire isolation, are more rational (always seeking to "solve problems," social as well as scientific), and generally participate more at the polls.[32] Bias towards education is also a noticeable characteristic. The other county which is significant is San Juan County in the Four Corners region, in which is situated Farmington, a secondary population center.[33]

In considering New Mexico from these geographical and ethnic perspectives, it is important to recognize the salience of such an analysis with respect to the development of a campaign strategy. The preceding discussion, to an extent, justifies the hypothetical statements of the "Monday morning quarterbacks" made at the beginning of this section. To plan a successful strategy for a statewide political campaign, and especially for a primary competition, where the party label is not attached, the candidate must

understand the political culture and subcultures of New Mexico, recognize his own particular assets and liabilities which either help or hinder his standing within each faction, and concentrate his activities in those areas where they are most profitable. It is clear from the previous discussion and Figure 1 that for an Anglo to center his campaign in the Hispanic counties, or for a Hispano to devote most of his time and money in Roswell and Hobbs is sheer foolishness politically. For either candidate to ignore Bernalillo County might be electoral suicide. To be concise, the candidate must go where the votes are, and most importantly, where his potential votes are.

The Primary in New Mexico

One of the characteristic trademarks of a democratic political system, according to both popular opinion and sophisticated political theorists, has been the existence of free and open elections.[34] In a representative democracy, the ability of the masses to choose their political leaders has been and will continue to be a factor which is paramount in the minds of individuals. As the two party system has developed in the United States, the opportunity of the masses to choose their party nominees has necessarily become important also, for if the voter has only to decide between "Tweedledum" and "Tweedledee," with no occasion to select the leaders of either of the two parties, the act of voting can become meaningless.[35] Movements to maximize or to increase the individual's participation in this aspect of the political decision-making process have historic roots in the American republic, characterized by the changes from the

Figure 1. Percentage of total state vote cast for governor, 1942-1968, by Hispanic, Little Texas, and Bernalillo counties



Sources: Jack Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, p. 108, and State of New Mexico Election Returns, 1966, 1968

legislative caucus to the party convention and finally to the direct primary.[36] The distilling process of determining the nature of public choice via the nominating system culminated in a mechanism which the primary advocates thought would "check the accretion of privilege in the hands of those who manage to grasp public power."[37] The unfair power of the political "bosses" and "machines" would be eliminated, and power would return to where it legitimately belonged, to the people.

History of primary in New Mexico. Although the primary system of nominating was experimented with by various states for many years, it was not until the "Progressive" movement of the early twentiety century that this selection procedure was regularized and adopted by many of the states. New Mexico was delinquent in subscribing to this electoral method, and in 1938 it joined the ranks of those states which had adopted the primary system approximately thirty years earlier.[38]

Due to pressures exerted by the public, the press, and several politicians throughout the decade of the 1930's, the New Mexico Senate and House of Representatives finally passed the primary bill during a special session of the legislature in the Fall of 1938.[39] As a statute, the primary "required nomination by direct primary of all elective offices except city, town, and village officials" and except special elections to fill vacancies.[40] In addition, the primary was closed, registration requirements for candidates were specified, filing fees for the various offices were enumerated, and nominating petitions

were required.[41] Names were to be placed on the primary ballot according to the order of filing, and limits were placed on campaign expenditures for each office.

During the course of the initial use of the direct primary election procedure, several changes were instituted. The requirement of nominating petitions was suspended, and the ballot position was to be determined by lot.[42] To replace the nominating petition, declarations of candidacy with accompanying filing fees were required. Due to the rather undignified jockeying for position which preceded each filing, with candidates or their representatives "camping out" on the capitol grounds in order to obtain the desirable first position on the ballot, the primary election code was amended to provide ballot position by drawing lots.

After a decade of using the primary as the nominating mechanism, shortcomings of the system became apparent, and "...there was a substantial demand for remedy."[43] Charles B. Judah identified several problems which coexist with the use of the primary, consisting of general problems which apply to all users and problems which are unique to New Mexico:[44] 1) the primary increases the time and costs of elections; 2) the sacrifices of two campaigns eliminate some potential candidates; 3) lack of guidance by the party leads to blind voting; 4) candidates can be elected by a small plurality in a hotly contested race and, thus, lack majority support in the general election; 5) the primary hinders the possibility of an ethnically and geographically balanced ticket; 6) the power of the parties over their candidates is decreased; 7) the

primary invites "stalking horse candidates" or "stooges" to file, not hoping to win, but merely hoping to draw votes from another candidate; and 8) political racketeering, whereby a politician would threaten various political opponents with filing for an office and blackmail them for not filing, was encouraged.

To correct these shortcomings, and as a result of the political maneuverings of several party officials, a movement began in the 1949 session of the state legislature for a modification of the primary election code, a modification which would re-establish the power of party organizations.[45] The final product of this movement, the Pre-primary Designating Convention law, however, was amended in 1951 due to the dissatisfaction of the press and some of the public.[46] These groups made the same arguments against this modification as they had against the convention system, making loud cries of "bossism" and "return the power to the people." The amended document allowed the non-designees of the parties' conventions to run for office.

After the notable lack of success of the pre-primary convention, and after much political maneuvering, New Mexico returned to the direct primary during the legislative session of 1955.[47] In 1957 State Senator Fabian Chavez attempted to repeal the direct primary law to return to the convention system, but it appeared that the primary system was now to be a permanent fixture of New Mexico electoral politics.[48]

The current primary law in New Mexico. As the primary election law operates currently, it has the following pertinent characteristics: 1) in March of each

even-numbered year, the governor shall proclaim a primary election; 2) the election shall be held on the first Tuesday of June of each even-numbered year; 3) the law applies to all offices that are to be filled in the general election, except for municipal, school district, and special district offices; 4) primary candidacy is restricted by one year's registration preceding the primary in the particular party; 5) candidacy is limited to one office per person; 6) the candidate's declaration of candidacy and his appropriate filing fee shall be given to the specified office (Secretary of State or County Clerk); 7) the candidate shall file in person or through his representative between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on the first Tuesday of April in each even-numbered year; and 8) ballot position is determined by lot.[49]

Two of the aforementioned characteristics of the current primary system have serious implications for the selection of candidates for statewide office in New Mexico. First, designation of ballot position by lot endows the system with an incomplete randomness which favors the first name on the ballot, or the first row of names on the ballot when the number of candidates for a particular office is large. Since the ballots are identical throughout the state and identical on every voting machine, the complete randomness that would obtain with a rotated ballot is not available. Secondly, the inclusion of all elective offices in the primary election is merely a doubling of the alleged undesirable qualities of the "long ballot."

New Mexico's voters' response to the primary. Returning to the original reason for adopting the primary nominating system, to include the "people" in the selection process and to democratize further the electoral process, we can now evaluate the effect the primary has had on New Mexico's voters. In the first primary 45 percent of the potential electorate availed themselves of this additional opportunity to make an unput into the decision-making process.[50] After the novelty wore off, however, the turnout rate stabilized around a much lower percentage, with the average turnout from 1940-1964 being approximately 26.4 percent of the eligible electorate.[51] Table I (following page) shows the percentage of the eligible registered voters who have participated in lieutenant governor primaries by regions from 1942 through 1970, while Figure 2 indicates the changes in party registration from 1941 to 1970 in the different regions. Figure 3 correlates the percentage of the total state vote cast for lieutenant governor between 1942 and 1970 with the various regional areas.

In planning a general or primary election campaign for state office, it is incumbent upon the candidate or his organization to consider the information that is represented in the table and figures. It is interesting, for example, that in the Hispanic counties the Democratic registration figures are rising while the Republic registration is decreasing. This might indicate that the viable two-party system, which Holmes purports to exist in the northern counties, is eroding, and the Hispanos are beginning increasingly to identify with the Democratic party, a trend which is characteristic of most minority groups.[52] The community divisiveness which has caused partisanship in the Hispanic counties in the past

(rather than partisanship being linked with ethnicity) may eventually heal in the spirit of the social consciousness of ethnic solidarity or "Chicano power," as evidenced by the precursory and admittedly unsuccessful movements of the

Table I. Percentage of Registered Voters who have participated in lieutenant-governor primaries, 1942-1970

Region	1942	1948	1958	1970
Little Texas	30.1	28.1	40.1	41.5
Hispanic counties	33.4	32.4	37.9	46.0
Bernalillo	36.5	29.5	29.1	48.7
State	31.8	31.2	36.2	45.6

Sources: New Mexico Blue Book, 1941-42, 1949-50, 1959-60, and State of New Mexico Official Returns: 1970 Primary Election Returns, Ernestine D. Evans, Secretary of State.

Alianza and the Brown Berets. The strategic implications for campaigning could possibly be an increasing importance of the ethnic factor in voting, to the extent that given the choice between an Anglo and a Hispano, the Spanish-American voter will support the Hispanic candidate every time. Figure 2 also shows that the Democratic/Republican gap in Bernalillo County is decreasing at a fairly steady rate, suggesting possibly that the Republican advantage in Bernalillo County general elections, due both to Democrats bolting the party and a lower Democratic turnout, might become even greater with an eventual unitary ratio

Figure 2. Percentage shifts in party registration, 1941-1970



Sources: New Mexico Blue Book, 1941-42, 1949-50, 1959-60, State of New Mexico Official Returns, 1970 Primary Election Returns

Figure 3. Percentage of the total state vote cast for lieutenant-governor, 1942-1970, by Hispanic, Little Texas, and Bernalillo Counties in general and primary elections



Source: New Mexico Election Returns, 1942-1970

between the two parties' registrations in the future.[53]

At first glance at Figure 3 it would appear that the political adage, "The North selects and the South elects," is patently untrue.[54] According to this graph, clearly since 1960 the Little Texas counties have not been able to muster at the polls for the primary or general election to the same degree as have both the Hispanic and Bernalillo voters. Though the native counties are losing much of the electoral muscle which they once commanded, it appears that they will retain statistical dominance over Little Texas for some time yet. The caveat which must be made with respect to this graph is that no indication is made of the type of primary involved. That is, if the primary is hotly contested, Little Texas is often unable to maximize its political power by supporting one candidate.[55] However, at the time of the general election, Little Texas Democrats are loyal to their party and vote heavily for the party slate, a mode of behavior which is more uncommon in the North, and in Bernalillo County particularly.

The Long Ballot in New Mexico

It is not unusual for a voter in New Mexico to enter a voting booth, pull the curtains, and stagger at the lengthy list of names with which he is confronted. For the general election the situation is exasperating, but for the primary election, when as many as ten candidates may be striving for the party's nomination for one office, the prospect of finding a "rational" voter is rather doubtful, and voting can become a psychologically demeaning activity for the individual.

To ask a voter to become politically aware about the campaigns that pertain to the U. S. Senate, the U. S. House of Representatives, the governor's office, or the state legislators of his district is not an overly ambitious request. However, when that same voter finds it incumbent upon him to select judges at all levels, clerks, city commissioners, county commissioners, Corporation Commissioners, a Commissioner of Public Lands, a lieutenant governor, a secretary of state, an attorney general, an auditor, a treasurer, ad infinitum, in both the primary and general elections, a study of his voting behavior is a study in frustration.

Democracy, operationalized in terms of accountability of leaders to their constituencies through free and frequent elections, can become a somewhat farcical concept, except for the more conspicuous offices.[56] It is nearly a full-time if not an impossible task for a voter to maintain a constant surveillance of his government in its entirety. Though the politically "rational man," in terms of Anthony Downs' creation, engages in a complete analysis prior to his act of voting, the actual existence of such a creature is a moot point.[57] V. O. Key, Jr., has found that, indeed, when a voter is confronted with a ballot of huge proportions, he "abdicates and refuses to perform a substantial part of his duty."[58] This "abdication" effect can be seen in the 1970 primary results by establishing the total vote cast for governor in each party as unity and by calculating comparative values for each of the minor races. For the Democratic party the values are: lieutenant governor--0.93, secretary of state--0.90, attorney-general--0.79, Corporation Commission--0.74, and Land Commissioner--

0.82. For the Republican party the values are respectively 0.83, 0.70, 0.79, 0.66, and 0.81.[59]

In New Mexico the long ballot has several effects on state government and on the campaigns and elections which place the state's leaders in Santa Fe. Charles Judah and Frederick Irion have made the point that New Mexico is actually governed by a "collective executive," by officers who are independently elected and who can thus act independently.[60] Rather than a governor having complete control of his administration and cooperation from his attorney-general and his secretary of state, inordinate amounts of time can be spent on inter-governmental squabbling and bickering.

The long ballot in the primary election forces the average voter either to make incompetent decisions or no decisions at all with respect to the nominations of minor state officials. In the 1970 primary, for the minor offices (designated as lieutenant governor, secretary of state, attorney-general, Corporation commissioner, and Commissioner of Public Lands) there were 19 candidates in the Democratic Party and 8 in the Republican party.[61] The ability of a voter to intelligently discriminate among these men who are running for offices whose functions are not well-known to the average man, is questionable at best.[62]

In addition to the voter's dilemma in making choices on minor offices, the candidates for these offices are faced with both strategic and tactical problems in their campaigning. They must devise a strategy and, utilizing appropriate tactics to complement that strategy, it must be one which will attract

voters who are generally ignorant about the office and are unwilling to expend any costs in alleviating their unknowledgable condition. Due to the relative unimportance of these offices and the practice of voter abdication, candidates must go where the crowds are, take advantage of any situation which is proffered, and be willing to expend, both in time and money, inordinate sums to obtain small numbers of votes. The fifty votes here or there which candidate X neglects will surely be courted by candidate Y.

NOTES--CHAPTER III

1. Jack E. Holmes, Politics in New Mexico (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1967), p. 1.

2. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1966), p. 23.

3. See, for example, Holmes' Politics in New Mexico, pp. 11-16.

4. Holmes, p. 18.

5. Holmes, pp. 22-23.

6. Holmes, p. 49.

7. Holmes, p. 63.

8. Holmes, pp. 228-231.

9. Holmes, pp. 228-229.

10. T. P. Wolf, "The 1966 Election in New Mexico," Western Political Quarterly, 1967, p. 592. For additional information on ethnicity and voting in New Mexico, see T. P. Wolf, "The Political Role of the Spanish-Speaking Citizen in New Mexico" (A paper presented at the Rocky Mountain Social Science Association Annual Meeting, Lubbock, Texas, May 2-3, 1969), and Jack E. Holmes, Party, Legislature and Governor in the Politics of New Mexico (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1964), pp. 287-288.

11. Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Some Consequences of Ethnic Politics," in The Electoral Process, edited by M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 43.

12. Wolfinger, p. 52.

13. Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, p. 217.

14. Holmes, pp. 227-231.

15. According to Holmes, Bernalillo is considered to be a "native" county, but due to the peculiar Heights/Valley differences and due to its importance statistically, Bernalillo County will be analyzed separately. Less Valencia and Dona Ana, these are the Hispanic counties used by Wolf in his various papers cited herein.

16. T. P. Wolf, "The 1968 Election from the Perspective of a Nixon State: New Mexico," (A paper presented at the Southwest Social Science Annual Meeting, April 5, 1969), p. 1.

17. Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, p. 12.

18. Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, p. 12.

19. Wolf, "The 1968 Election from the Perspective of a Nixon State: New Mexico," p. 1.

20. Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, p. 62. 1968 presented the first election when Little Texas did not give a majority to the Democratic gubernatorial ticket.

21 Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, p. 19.

22. Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, p. 22.

23. Based on a series of conversations with various Democratic candidates during the primary campaign in 1970. In Rio Arriba County the power of the recognized political "boss" was somewhat neutralized by an internal power struggle with the mayor of Espanola. The influence of yet another jefe político, Filo Sedillo of Valencia County, may also be on the wane. Towards the end of the Democratic primary campaign of 1970, political rumors were heard which indicated that Mr. Sedillo could "deliver" his county (viewed by some analysts to be a pivotal county), to either of the gubernatorial front-runners for the modest fee of $17,500. A week after the first offer was made, the price allegedly dropped to $10,000. One of the gubernatorial candidates assured this author that neither he nor the other viable candidate would indulge Mr. Sedillo. Looking at the election returns for Valencia County indicates that Mr. Sedillo was not successful in his bid to become "kingmaker."

24. Cline and Wolf, "Albuquerque: The End of a Reform Era," in Urban Politics in the Southwest, L. E. Goodal, ed., 1967, (Tempe: Institute of Public Administration, Arizona State University, 1967), p. 7.

25. Cline and Wolf, p. 8.

26. T. P. Wolf, "Urbanization in New Mexico: With Emphasis on Electoral Patterns," in Urbanization in the Southwest, C. J. Wingfield, ed. (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1968), p. 4.

27. For example, see: Jack Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, pp. 55-59; Wolf, "Urbanization in New Mexico: With Emphasis on Electoral Pattern," p. 14; Wolf, "The 1968 Election from the Perspective of a Nixon State: New Mexico," p. 2; and Cline and Wolf, "Albuquerque: The End of a Reform Era," p. 11.

28. Wolf, "Urbanization in New Mexico:...," p. 22.

29. Wolf, "The 1968 Election from the Perspective of a Nixon State: New Mexico," p. 2.

30. See Figure 2, p. 39, of this study.

31. Jack Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, pp. 72-96; and Science Town in the Politics of New Mexico (Albuquerque: Division of Research, Department of Political Science, University of New Mexico, 1967).

32. Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, pp. 86, 94-96.

33. T. P. Wolf, "The 1968 Election from the Perspective of a Nixon State: New Mexico," p. 2.

34. See Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 84.

35. According to Anthony Downs, a two-party system necessitates a great degree of similarity between the policies and activities of the parties, for each group, trying to appeal to a majority of the constituents, will develop platforms and programs which are attractive to basically the same population. An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 117-122.

36. V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952), pp. 400-411.

37. V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 97.

38. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, pp. 410-411.

39. David A. Wagner, Some Effects of Formal Nominating Processes on Recruitment of Candidates, Party Organization, and Election Results in New Mexico (M.A. Thesis, University of New Mexico, 1957), pp. 2, 8.

40. Charles B. Judah, Aspects of Nominating Systems in New Mexico (Albuquerque: Division of Research, Department of Government, University of New Mexico, 1957), p. 3.

41. Judah, pp. 3-4.

42. Election Handbook of the State of New Mexico, 1969 Edition, Ernestine D. Evans, Secretary of State, pp. 95-105.

43. Judah, p. 10.

44. Judah, pp. 4-9. See also, Wagner, pp. 10-12; Charles B. Judah and Frederick C. Irion, The 47th State: An Appraisal of Its Government, (Division of Government Research, University of New Mexico, 1959), pp. 17-20; and Paul Beckett and Walter F. McNutt, The Direct Primary in New Mexico (Albuquerque: Division of Research, Department of Government, University of New Mexico, 1947), p. 22.

45. Wagner, pp. 12-15.

46. Wagner, p. 21.

47. Wagner, pp. 24-31.

48. Wagner, pp. 31-32.

49. Election Handbook of the State of New Mexico, 1969 Edition, pp. 95-105.

50. Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, p. 238; Holmes defines eligible electorate as persons over 21 years of age, not requiring party registration as a criterion of membership in this category. The following figures, however, use the number of registered voters as the universe, making the act of registration a prerequisite for electoral eligibility. Consequently, the figures in these graphs are higher in these graphs than Holmes' figures are.

51. Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, p. 237.

52. Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, p. 54.

53. An alternative explanation might be that the Republicans are beginning to register those registered Democrats who lean toward the Republican Party and who have voted for Republican candidates regularly anyway.

54. Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, p. 242.

55. Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, p. 242.

56. V. O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduction, p. 15.

57. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, pp. 36-50.

58. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, p. 655.

59. State of New Mexico Official Returns: 1970 Primary Election Returns.

60. Judah and Irion, p. 43.

61. State of New Mexico Official Returns: 1970 Primary Election Returns.

62. A good indication of the voter's ability to participate in minor races is shown in two polls that have been conducted in Bernalillo County and with which this author was associated. During late July in 1968, prior to the primary, approximately 800 registered voters were polled on their preferences on various political races, including president, governor, attorney-general, and county sheriff. The recall rate by the respondents decreased progressively from president down to county sheriff (in percentages respectively 93.3%, 79.5%, 44.0%, and 35.8%). A similar poll, where only registered Democrats were surveyed, was conducted in April, 1970, prior to the primary election in June (the races included U. S. Senator, governor and a minor state office) and the results were comparable, with the highest recall rate occuring with the senatorial race, followed by the gubernatorial race, and with the minor state office race in dead last (recall rates respectively were 76.9%, 52.9%, and 17.8%).

CHAPTER IV

CAMPAIGN DECISION-MAKING

The relationship between decision-making and strategy in a political campaign is shown by a series of questions which Karl Lamb and Paul Smith pose in their Campaign Decision-Making: The Presidential Election of 1964.[1] With respect to decisions, how are they made? Who makes them? Is there an "overall strategy?" If so, who makes this strategy? What sort of research or information is sought to sustain the strategy? How comprehensive and detailed is the strategy? How flexible is the strategy? How are the varied ideas for running the campaign integrated? How are the disagreements among campaign staff resolved? What are the channels of access to those at the top? In effect, the campaign strategy is the resultant of the decision-making process. A candidate and his organization must accumulate information, appraise that information, and devise and implement a strategy which will "...manipulate the behavior of a wider number of people...to his advantage."[2] This chapter will be concerned with the identification of the decision-making process which Smith utilized in his campaign, the mechanism under which he and others, who were associated with his electoral venture, operated during the course of his electoral appeal. In addition, tactical decisions were made periodically during the actual campaign (April 7--June 1), the results of which ideally would be

appropriate to the general strategy and accomplish its objectives. The subsequent chapter, Chapter V, will consider Smith's campaign strategy and its viability and will include an analysis of the strategy in terms of the actual election results of the June 2 primary.

Models of Decision-Making. The fact that "Decisions and decision-making currently command increasing attention as objects of study in the social sciences" is well-known.[3] Research by psychologists, social psychologists, sociologists, economists, business administrators, psychiatrists and political scientists into this realm of the human mind and of associations of human minds is plentiful, and it is difficult to discriminate among the thousands of research efforts that have entered the literature of this sub-discipline. However, of necessity we will consider only a few of the major contributions that have been made to the study of decision-making, hoping later to apply some decision-theoretic concepts to the decision-making style and process of Smith's campaign.

Richard C. Snyder, prolific in the fields of decision-making and foreign policy, has professed that any analysis of decision-making must be made from the perspective of the actors who make the decisions.[4] After noting some rather general behavioral assumptions (he denies the institutionality of governmental actions) and some specific assumptions which define to a great extent his model of decision-making, Snyder and Paige set out to explain how a particular foreign policy decision was made.[5] The authors maintain that decision-making "is a sequence of activities which results in the selection of

one course of action from a set of socially defined alternative courses of action intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision makers."[6] Factors which Snyder and Paige envison as being determinants of the behavior of the policy-makers include organizational-individual factors, internal setting factors, external setting factors, and situational factors.[7] The authors further argue that all of these factors are interrelated, that sub-factors within each category exist and must be identified, accepted and considered by the decision-makers, and that although the existence of sub-factors will vary from situation to situation, some feature of each general category will be operational in any situation.[8] After identifying the decision-makers, and after determining the organizational units, the authors believe that collecting data about the organizational roles and relations, communication and information, and motivation will result in sufficient information to enable the scholar to successfully analyze the making of a decision.

Karl W. Deutsch has presented the discipline with a model which studies the communication process but which has serious implications for decision theory.[9] In it he offers what he calls a "crude" scheme or functional diagram of information flow as a design of how decisions are made.[10] His model, largely derived from the cybernetic world of computers, includes concepts such as inputs, outputs, screens of selective attention, selective recall, selective memory, tentative decisions, screens of acceptable recalls and of acceptable and feasible policies, final decisions, and feedback. The study was originally made for the purpose of investigating foreign policy decisions,

but his identification of the significant dimensions and of the chronology of the decision process is invaluable when analyzing any kind of decision, on the individual level or on the level of national policy making.

Easily the most valuable study of decision-making for the purposes of this study is the investigation of campaign decision-making of the 1964 presidential election by Lamb and Smith. Like Herbert A. Simon, Lamb and Smith maintain that the decision process has three distinct and identifiable components: "the focus of attention, the search for alternatives, and the choice itself."[12] The focus of attention is a process by which the decision-maker delineates what items are relevant to consider; the search for alternatives involves the process of research and obtaining information, usually undertaken by a campaign staff; and the choice itself consists of selecting the most rewarding alternative. In the prefatory chapter, the authors proceed to offer two models of campaign decision-making: the comprehensive model and the incremental model.[13] Together, these two models account for the two popular conceptions of how campaign decisions are made--"The most admired of these [conceptions] held that decisions should be made at a central point, communicated in an orderly way, and executed by specialists. The second conception held that, like it or not, campaigns are decentralized, disorderly, and confused."[14]

The comprehensive model is based on the ideals of centralized decision-making and hierarchical organization, and it requires that each decision-maker have a clear perception of the goals, an unclouded perception of the scope and purpose of his and others' decision-making authority, and full

cognizance of the relationship between his decisions and the variety of goals to be attained. The model insists on exhaustive searches for information and alternatives, and the process of choosing among alternatives is so complete as to figuratively, if not literally, require a cost/benefit analysis of each potential strategy of action. The hierarchical structure is clearly defined with unbroken lines of authority and communication. The campaign organization would be familiar to the inhabitants of Plato's Republic, for functional specialization predominates as well as the definitive hierarchy. Of course, there is a reward for those who must endure the compelling restrictions of this idealized bureaucratic structure--"The election might not be won, but the candidate would receive all the votes it would be possible for him to garner in the given circumstances."[15]

The authors admit the defects of this model: it is unrealistic in terms of actual human behavior; permanent agreement on goals is unlikely due to an unchangeable pluralism in the campaign organization; complete information is unavailable; campaign ends and means often cannot be separated; and there are no limitations on the costs of decision-making, such as for information retrieval and dissemination.[16] Thus, the authors have derived a model of the "ideal type" in the Weberian sense, admitting that it will not function except under ideal conditions.

Though the incremental model employs many of the concepts and procedures of the comprehensive model, it relaxes the rules to the extent that the authors think that it is better suited for actual campaigns.[17] As contrasted

with the rigor of the comprehensive model, decision-makers in this scheme: 1) accept given goals and do not rank them or try to separate ends from means, 2) review only goals and means used by others before them, 3) take up only urgent and pressing problems, hoping that subordinates will resolve the less important contingencies, 4) pick themes, rather than be dedicated to a set of goals, and 5) choose themes and goals on the basis of "distributive tests" such as census data.[18] In addition, "Collective decisions are coordinated through bargaining and mutual adjustment in a decentralized and flexible organizational structure."[19] Whereas the comprehensive format prescribes an exhaustive and complete overview of all aspects of the campaign, with all of the cogs fitting in the wheel, and is devoid of an apparatus for change (unless it originates at the top of the hierarchy), the incremental model focuses on immediate and tangible needs and is characterized by a flexibility and pluralism which allows for change throughout the campaign, from decision to decision.

Generally, the liabilities of the incremental model are the assets of the comprehensive type, and vice versa. The incremental approach lacks the firm and finely delineated structure of the other. There is a bias against novel strategies and tactics, and there is an emphasis on pressing problems to the extent that the remedial and serial resolution of these immediate problems might divert attention from the larger contingencies.[20]

Application of Decision Models to a Primary Campaign. As with most research on political campaigning, models of decision-making are not directly applicable

to a primary campaign for a minor state office. The Snyder and Deutsch theories were designed for studies of foreign policy, and the Lamb and Smith work is concerned with an election on the national level. It is intuitively obvious that a direct, one-to-one relationship between the theoretical models and the actual primary campaign in New Mexico cannot be drawn. However, it is useful to use these models as heuristic devices to analyze Smith's campaign, to determine to what extent the campaign corresponds to the models of decision-making, and to recognize what aspects of Smith's decision process do not resemble what has been heretofore discovered. In other words, what modifications must be made in the abstract models to enable a greater understanding of the decision-making process at this micro-level?

A candidate pursuing a primary nomination in a statewide race necessarily must create an organization which is composed of many members who are chosen from many diverse backgrounds and for many different purposes. Smith maintained his headquarters in Albuquerque, and the majority of the workers in his campaign organization were residents of Albuquerque. Smith did manage to have a campaign coordinator in every county of the state, though in some cases these persons were housewives, businessmen, or professional men who could not devote as much time to the campaign as their titles would indicate to be necessary. Since all the personnel involved in Smith's campaign were working in a voluntary capacity, Smith could not apply punitive sanctions to any of his campaign staff. He could and did display intangible sanctions, such as disapproval, unhappiness, or pleasure. One man in particular, was initially

assigned the function of preparing press releases on various issues, and only after a great deal of prodding did he begin to fulfill his task. Once his releases were received by the candidate, however, they could not be used, for the worker, evidently a man fighting for many liberal causes, had not confined himself to the normal flowery rhetoric of a campaign, but went farther, calling for quite radical solutions to almost every available problem. Even though Smith was quite a liberal himself, both in terms of his political ideology and activities, he could not afford to insult the substantial portion of the Democratic electorate which would find these press releases offensive. Consequently, in as tactful a manner as possible, this man was given another job.

Outside of Bernalillo County, and principally in the southern and eastern parts of the state, Smith's campaign coordinators were substantially independent, both in their decision-making procedure and in the execution of strategy and tactics. In almost every case Smith respected and appreciated the judgment of his local leaders, recognizing that their evaluations would be much more informed than his own. On each of Smith's trips to various parts of the state, he would meet with both his local campaign coordinator and with some of the recognized political leaders. In both cases, Smith asked about the status of his race and his own particular campaign there, and he sought advice about strategy and tactics that he should apply in that part of the state. Invariably, Smith followed their advice. It must be noted, however, that he probably accepted this advice both out of respect for them and out of a fear of losing the one worker that he might have in that area. Due to the independence

of these campaign workers, and due to the relative lack of knowledge about their activities, as compared with the resources available to the author in the Bernalillo County setting, the analysis of the decision system will be confined to the process as it operated in Bernalillo County.

In Albuquerque, Smith's primary campaign staff consisted of an engineer, a teacher, a photographer, an employee of one of the local television stations, and two attorneys. Their functions, respectively, were the following: two Bernalillo County coordinators, two public relations experts, a press coordinator, and a financial chairman. These assignments were given at the beginning of the campaign, and both the functions and the personnel failed in some cases during the ensuing months. Minor figures in the campaign were workers, invaluable in the execution stage of the campaign, but they did not actually participate in the decision-making process for the electoral effort in Bernalillo County.

There were at least three decisional units which were active in Bernalillo County. The first group (Group I), composed of the two county coordinators and the candidate (and often his wife), was responsible for creating the strategy and proposing the tactics that would be administered in the county. Much of the work of this unit was completed prior to the beginning of this study, but the decisions that were made and the decision process that the members utilized during this time were made available to the author. The second group (Group II), consisting of the two public relations experts, the press coordinator, and the candidate, was charged with the duty of planning

all stages of advertising, including television, billboards, newspaper releases and publicity gimmicks.[21] The third committee (Group III) included the financial chairman, who later also became head of "Lawyers for Smith," and the candidate, and its purpose was to elicit financial contributions. It is noteworthy that Smith was included in the membership of each of the groups (in fact, no facet of the entire campaign escaped his purview), indicating that he was the most powerful member of each decisional unit.

In creating the general campaign strategy, Group I had access to the following information:[22] 1) Smith's memories of his 1968 campaign; 2) a campaign scrapbook of the 1968 election, including all of his press releases and campaign gimmicks; and 3) the 1968 election results. Additionally, Smith was in contact with his 1968 supporters, received their analyses of the contemporary political scene, and evaluated their interpretations before devising his 1970 strategy. Most of Smith's memories of the 1968 election were stored mentally; he never had bothered to write them down because he never perceived a need to do so. The scrapbook was of limited utility in the development of a strategy but was more helpful in choosing among campaign tactics and gimmicks. It also provided somewhat of a chronology of the election.

The 1968 election results were probably the most useful data which Smith had at his disposal. With these results a computer engineer produced results which analyzed areas of Smith's strengths and weaknesses. In Table 2 we see the county by county analysis, while in Table 3 the precincts in Bernalillo County which delivered the bulk of Smith's county support are

shown. From these tables Smith was able to discover his areas of regional and county electoral strength, a determination which enabled him to concentrate his campaign activities where they would probably be the most productive. Bernalillo County and the southern part of the state, including four of the six Little Texas Counties, and the secondary population centers of Santa Fe, Farmington, Silver City, Gallup and Belen, afforded Smith with 78 percent of his 1968 total. Since Bernalillo County had delivered 32 percent of his total state-wide vote, Smith decided to focus his campaign in Albuquerque. Further, looking at the Bernalillo County breakdown, he decided to center his attention in Albuquerque on the Heights, particularly the Northeast Heights, where 19 of his top 26 precincts had given him 86.5 percent of his 1968 county vote.

Of course, if Smith had been comprehensive in his decision-making style, he would have performed a cost/benefit analysis with respect to each of his expenditures.[23] Unfortunately, he did not perform this operation. Rather, the campaign staff, including all three groups, talked over the various ways of spending the budget, and decisions were made in a somewhat arbitrary manner. Smith, due to his propinquity to the budget, recognized limitations on the possible campaign expenditures more readily than the members of his staff, but even he did not have valid reasons for each of the budget items or a rational expananation of the proportion of money that he spent on the various types of items. Broadly, he and his staff realized the necessity of placing his name before the public through television, matchbooks, and other advertising

Table 2. Twenty Counties Accounting For 93.5% of Total Vote For Smith in State (29,584), 1968

Key County	Total State Vote for Smith %	Rank	Total State Vote for the Minor State Office %	Rank
Bernalillo	32	1	29	(1)
Lea	8	2	5	(4)
Dona Ana	5.5	3	6	(3)
Santa Fe	5.5	4	7	(2)
San Juan	4.5	5	3	(8)
Curry	4	6	3	(9)
Eddy	4	7	4	(5)
Grant	4	8	3	(10)
McKinley	4	9	2.5	(19)
Valencia	3.5	10	4	(6)
Chaves	3	11	3	(11)
Otero	3	12	3	(12)
San Miguel	2.5	13	3	(13)
Quay	2	14	1.5	(17)
Roosevelt	2	15	2	(15)
Colfax	1.5	16	1.5	(18)
Los Alamos	1.5	17	2	(16)
Lincoln	1	18	1	(19)
Luna	1	19	1	(20)
Rio Arriba	1	20	4	(7)
	93.5%		88.5%	

Source: Smith's personal records.

Table 3. Twenty-Six Precincts* Accounting For 86.5% of Total Smith Vote in Bernalillo County, 1968

Rank	Precinct	% Total County Vote for Smith	Smith	Candidate A	Candidate B	Candidate C	Candidate D
1)	43	6.0	545	352	89	210	61
2)	36	5.5	520	349	112	227	72
3)	44	5.5	529	316	104	209	68
4)	17	5.0	458	396	106	238	79
5)	47	5.0	503	265	84	216	68
6)	33	4.5	429	428	130	287	91
7)	38	4.5	429	338	88	206	65
8)	40	4.5	424	425	135	302	112
9)	42	4.0	377	471	140	221	120
10)	46	4.0	383	202	53	178	70
11)	37	3.5	325	351	72	236	63
12)	45	3.5	335	231	71	205	51
13)	52	3.5	341	233	80	207	86
14)	4	3.0	297	383	139	201	73
15)	8	3.0	327	663	235	214	87
16)	39	3.0	302	253	90	141	46
17)	50	3.0	303	218	85	167	71
18)	51	2.5	238	195	57	158	48
19)	14	2.0	197	572	226	164	60
20)	29	2.0	180	478	69	78	32
21)	41	2.0	174	187	71	157	45
22)	3	1.5	125	236	141	87	29
23)	12	1.5	152	268	64	76	45
24)	20	1.5	158	354	94	102	33
25)	32	1.5	133	289	71	149	26
26)	18	1.0	111	314	143	79	35
		86.5%	8,295	8,762	2,749	4,715	1,636

Source: Smith's personal records.

* Note change in terminology from making the smallest unit of the electoral system a precinct instead of a voting division, and creating wards. The 1968 precincts shown above are composed of several voting divisions each.

Table 4. Candidate's Statement of Election Expenses, 1970

Date	Item	Category	Amount	% of Budget	% of Category
3-7-70	Filing Fee		400.00		
5-22-70	Newspaper mat	3	45.24	1.4	26.0
5-22-70	Newspaper ads	1	170.30	5.2	11.6
3-12-70	200 signs	4	54.86	1.7	18.1
3-27-70	25,000 matches	2	225.94	6.9	23.7
3-27-70	Bumper stickers	2	50.00	1.5	5.3
4-1-70	Bumper stickers	2	57.64	1.8	6.1
3-27-70	Television	2	616.72	18.7	64.9
5-6-70	Small billboards & bus posters	1	187.20	5.6	13.2
5-6-70	Bus	1	260.00	7.9	17.8
3-3-70	Buttons	4	248.60	7.6	
4-30-70	16 Billboards	1	399.36	12.1	27.4
4-30-70	16 Signs	1	133.12	4.0	9.1
5-6-70	Billboards	1	312.00	9.5	21.4
5-6-70	Literature	3	128.76	3.9	74.0
			$3,289.74		

Key to categories:

(1) Items used exclusively in Albuquerque
(2) Items used primarily in Albuquerque
(3) Items used throughout the state
(4) Items rarely used

media, but neither the actual decision to order eleven ten-second spots on television rather than eight or nine, nor the decision to have 25,000 matchbooks rather than 50,000 had valid arguments. The limiting constraints were a feeling of "tight money" and the lack of time to dispose of any more advertising.[24]

One specific occurrence during the course of the campaign called for a modification in Smith's strategy. On filing day, April 7, Smith drew an unfavorable ballot position. On the way up to Santa Fe earlier that morning he had talked about nothing but the advantages of being number one on the ballot or being on the first row of the ballot. He claimed that such a position would assure his victory, or at least diminish the amount of campaigning that he would have to do for the next three months. This author attempted to counter his unguarded optimism about drawing a good position with statistical statements about the odds against obtaining a choice spot on the ballot with the large number of candidates filing for that office. When he drew an unfavorable position, in spite of his state of depression, he began to think about tactics which would neutralize his poor luck. About one month later, after meeting with Groups I and II, a decision was made to purchase approximately 30,000 leaflets, containing a sample ballot with a circle drawn around his name. Though this represented an additional investment, the candidate believed it to be essential to the campaign.[25] This decision is exemplary of one of the characteristics of the incremental model, meeting problems as they arise, and not anticipating them before they occur.

Group II busied itself once a week during breakfast with a recap of the previous week's events. Occasionally this discussion would include some aspect of the campaign, but usually other topics were found to consider, such as the men's families, their children's dental work, or the problems at the University of New Mexico. Decisions were rarely made by this group, and many of its responsibilities were assumed by the candidate or by other members of the campaign staff. When the candidate appeared at the sessions of Group II with no agenda, it was difficult sometimes to even mention the campaign for fear of changing the subject.

This author never met with Group III, the finance committee, but it was reported by the candidate that the other person on this board did relatively little and that most of the duties of locating resources were accomplished by the candidate himself. In all, about $1,000 was donated in cash (the largest contribution being $500 from an individual in Hobbs and the smallest being a $5 donation from a friend of the candidate in Albuquerque), $700 worth of credit on oil credit cards, $400 worth of credit on a telephone credit card, and occasional free airplane transportation on some of the candidate's trips around the state.

Summary. In Snyder's terminology the "internal setting" consisted of those persons who were supportive of Smith's electoral venture, the "external setting" of Smith's competitors, their campaign organizations, and their supporters, and the "situational properties" of the campaign were composed of the campaign

for the office itself by all the candidates and of the perceived variables in New Mexico politics which affected the campaign decision-making process. The features of Deutsch's model which are applicable to Smith's campaign are minimal, in that the campaign decision-making did not even closely resemble the sophistication of the theoretical scheme. Certainly there were "inputs," such as the 1968 Democratic primary election returns, "memories" of Smith's 1968 electoral endeavor, various "tentative decisions" which were occasionally rejected, such as the decision to purchase additional posters, the occurrence of "feedback" when fellow campaign workers admired the use of some tactic, and, of course, the "outputs" of Smith's strategy and tactics were the result of the decision-making process. But trying to analyze Smith's campaign in terms of Deutsch's theory becomes unprofitable, for Deutsch created a model which is best suited for an analysis of a single decision, rather than a process which is multi-dimensional and sequential in nature.

The decision-making process that accompanied Smith's campaign certainly was not similar to the comprehensive model of Lamb and Smith. Though Smith was the dominant member of each decisional unit, he did not possess or display the centralization that is characteristic of the comprehensive model. The search for alternatives was not exhaustive, and the selection of the one final alternative was not based on an even informal cost/benefit analysis. In name only did Smith assign personnel to functions with which they were familiar; the problem was not due to the non-congruence between personnel and their functional tasks, but due to their general inefficiency, particularly with

respect to Group II. For the comprehensive model to operate, "...the available information, and the process of search and assessment must be comprehensive, just as the resulting decision must be accepted and carried out in every part of the organization."[26] It is only by a profound stretch of the imagination that Smith's campaign decision-making can be said to approximate the comprehensive model.

It is much more legitimate to posit that Smith's decision mechanism was similar to the incremental model. There was a tendency by the various units to consider only pressing problems, and many of the various themes and projects were chosen on the basis of "distributive tests," such as the 1968 election results. However, there was no statistical analysis to determine if there had been any substantive change in the electorate between 1968 and 1970. The decision apparatus was quite pluralistic and very flexible, but there were no members of the campaign staff who were as knowledgable as the candidate on the subjects of New Mexico politics and campaigning. The presence of such a person might have served as a check on the predominant influence of the candidate.[27] In general, however, Smith's organization qualified with respect to the other criteria of the incremental model.

It would be ludicrous to be normatively critical of Smith, his organization, and the mode by which they made decisions. Undoubtedly, candidates in a primary election for minor state office cannot offer many of the glamorous and bureaucratic assets that draw crowds of volunteers to candidates running for a major office. They do not have the financial resources to employ campaign

managers or campaign workers, and do not have sufficient time to manage and participate in their own campaigns (Smith had to devote some of his efforts to his share of the work at his law firm during the primary). Candidates in a race such as this must welcome whatever volunteer help they can obtain, encourage those workers to become involved in the decision-making process so that they do not become discouraged by the syndrome of taking orders, and suffer the consequences of the decisions that are made. The high degree of development that would accrue to the comprehensive model or to a professional campaign management firm is nearly meaningless to a candidate for minor state office.

NOTES--CHAPTER IV

1. Karl A. Lamb and Paul A. Smith, Campaign Decision-Making: The Presidential Election of 1964 (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1968), p. 3.

2. Dan Nimmo, The Political Persuaders: The Techniques of Modern Election Campaigners (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 10.

3. James A. Robinson and R. Roger Majak, "The Theory of Decision-Making" in Contemporary Political Analysis, James C. Charlesworth, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 175.

4. James N. Rosenau, "The Premises and Promises of Decision-Making Analysis," in Contemporary Political Analysis, James C. Charlesworth, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 194.

5. Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme," Administrative Science Quarterly, III, (December, 1958) (reprinted as a Bobbs-Merrill Reprint #PS-268), pp. 341-378.

6. Snyder and Paige, p. 347.

7. Snyder and Paige, p. 346.

8. Snyder and Paige, pp. 346-347.

9. Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press, 1963). See also, Karl W. Deutsch, "Communication Models and Decision Systems" in Contemporary Political Analysis, James C. Charlesworth, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 273-299.

10. Deutsch, p. 258.

11. Lamb and Smith.

12. Lamb and Smith, p. 18; Herbert A. Simon, "Political Research: The Decision-Making Framework" in David Easton, ed., Varieties of Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 15.

13. Lamb and Smith, pp. 20-38.

14. Lamb and Smith, p. 20.

15. Lamb and Smith, p. 21.

16. Lamb and Smith, pp. 23, 26-28.

17. Lamb and Smith, p. 30.

18. Lamb and Smith, pp. 30-31.

19. Lamb and Smith, p. 31.

20. Lamb and Smith, pp. 34-35.

21. Another member was added to this group later in the campaign, but his attendance at the weekly meetings was of a dubious motivation. Smith contracted much of his advertising work through this man, and though he claimed that he was "really giving Smith a discount," it is difficult to ascertain his position on the committee. He must be given credit, however, for participating in the campaign after the conclusion of his business transaction.

22. Other sources of information which aided in the planning and modification of strategy and tactics were discussed in Chapter II.

23. For an abstract mathematical analysis of campaign decision-making in terms of budgets, see Gerald H. Kramer, "A Decision-Theoretic Analysis of a Problem in Political Campaigning," in Mathematical Applications in Political Science, II, Joseph L. Bernd, ed. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966), pp. 137-160.

24. During one of the weekly breakfasts that Smith had with Group II, the opportunity to purchase two hundred more posters was presented to the group, and Smith, in a daze due to lack of sleep, hurriedly said yes. One of his staff asked him what they were going to do with the two hundred posters they already had, and it was only then that Smith realized what he had said and changed his mind.

25. Though it is pure conjecture, this author feels that a better or the best ballot position would not have assured victory for Smith. For literature on the problem of ballot position, see Jack L. Walker, "Ballot Forms and Voter Fatigue: An Analysis of the Office Block and Party Column Ballots," Midwest Journal of Political Science, X (November, 1966)

pp. 448-463; Howard White, "Voters Plump for First on Ballot," National Municipal Review, XXXIX (1950), pp. 110-111; and Henry M. Bain, and Donald S. Hecock, Ballot Position and Voter's Choice (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957). In the Bain and Hecock work an analysis is made on the effect of ballot position in various state and local elections in Minnesota. Though the mathematical assertions of the book suffer from some severe methodological and statistical problems, the authors indicate the way for some further research.

26. Lamb and Smith, p. 21.

27. Such a person, for instance, might have suggested a closer and more realistic analysis of Smith's competition. The opponents who Smith feared the most generally fared worse than he did at the polls (in one case much worse). The winner of the contest was never considered to be significant opposition.

CHAPTER V

CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

The behavioral process with which we dealt in Chapter IV, the decision-making process, is but a prefatory note to the subject of the present discussion, an investigation into the identity of Smith's campaign strategy. Further, we wish to know how does his strategy compare with the theories of strategy which exist in the literature, and what was the degree of success of his strategy? If political strategy consists of an "accurate appraisal, eventual capture, and effective deployment of existing power structures plus the applied ingenuity to attract increasing strength to the power base one commands,"[1] did Smith devise a strategy which fit this description and achieved his goals? Aside from the more general prescriptions for campaign strategy of 1) getting supporters to vote, 2) activating latent support, and 3) converting the opposition,[2] do theorists of campaign strategy mention any other salient characteristics which might apply to New Mexico primary elections and more specifically to Smith's campaign.

Certainly the most prolific institution in the fields of voting behavior, electoral models, and campaign studies has been the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. In addition to the investigations and surveys which have actually emanated from there, the results of its studies have prompted

numerous political scientists to initiate further research.[3]

Perhaps the most basic result of these studies which has relevance for this study concerns a question on the omnibus surveys which were conducted by the Survey Research Center in 1960 and 1962. In the questionnaires respondents were queried as to the reasons for their choices in the 1960 and 1962 Congressional elections.[4] The results are indicated by the following table:

Table 5. Voter Orientations in Congressional Elections, 1960, 1962

	1960 percent	1962 percent
Candidate	40	44
Party	47	31
Issues	5	13
Group	3	5
Other (influence of relatives, etc.)	5	7
Total	100	100

Source: David A. Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy, p. 14.

Although it is obvious the results of this poll cannot be directly applied to a primary election,[5] a minor modification (deletion of partisan orientation) of these results provides the investigator with interesting concepts with which to analyze such an election.[6]

Not only is it possible to evaluate voters' attitudes or orientations to candidates in primary elections, but one can also attempt to analyze a candidate's strategy in terms of these same ideas.[7] Kessel created an election game matrix in which the distribution of strategy emphases is shown. Each component of the matrix "represents the extent to which the vote of the electorate is motivated by the combination of particular attitudes."[8] For two candidates, for example, the entry "A (candidate) B (issue)" in the matrix indicates the net effect of A's appeal as a candidate and B's attractiveness due to his issue positions. It is the task for each candidate, in developing his strategy, to determine to what extent he wishes to emphasize each of the three components (in the case of a primary campaign) of the election game. For instance, the strategy for A might be designated by (1/2, 1/4, 1/4), so that his emphases are respectively 1/2 on candidate orientation, 1/4 on issue orientation, and 1/4 on group support orientation. The emphases of a given strategy must always add to unity. In accomplishing this task the candidate must evaluate the probable strategies of his opponents as well. Kessel continues by stating that knowledge of the various candidates' strategies and the election matrix enables the investigator to calculate the outcome of the election. Of course, Kessel's model is abstract and valueless as an actual indicator (the quantification of strategies and of the election game matrix being, at the present time, a subjective and non-verifiable process), but it is valuable as a conceptual tool, by which strategies can be categorized, classified, and delineated into more visible variables.

Smith's campaign strategy. Smith was confronted prior to and during his campaign with the necessity of devising a strategy and appropriate tactics which would deliver the election to him. Before finishing this task, he had to search for certain information, assimilate that information, and consider his own electoral assets and liabilities. Luckily he was not faced in the primary with an incumbent opponent, but he was opposed by eight other men, a field of competition so large and diverse as to compound the difficult problem of creating a successful strategy. The campaign setting was complex (far more complex than the relatively brief discussion of Chapter IV), and the mental problems associated with applying the projected strengths and weaknesses of the campaign's nine candidates to an electoral environment strongly affected by regional and ethnic factors were ones which would confound political experts as well as novices.

Extrapolating from primary election returns from previous years, and considering the higher primary turnout rate for Democrats over Republicans,[9] it was anticipated that approximately 125,000 votes would be cast for the minor state office. These votes were to be divided among the nine candidates, so that an "average" candidate should receive approximately 14,000 votes.

As mentioned previously (Chapter IV) Smith adopted a strategy that was regionally based, concentrating his activities in Bernalillo County and the southern part of the state (including Little Texas). Though he visited nearly every part of the state, his non-Bernalillo County activity (in terms of trips taken around the state) was 5:1 in favor of the southern counties. In terms of the strategy model espoused by Kessel, we believe that in terms of time and financial

resources expended on the personal attributes of the candidate, (including tactics designed to increase the voter's recognition of his name) issues, and group endorsement, that the ratio was overwhelmingly in favor of the candidate orientation.[10]

Results of Smith's strategy. As noted earlier, Smith lost in his bid for the Democratic Party's nomination for a minor state office. Rather than conclude with that statement, however, it is necessary to perform at least a brief critique of his campaign strategy and his conduct of the campaign.

It appears that the regional factor in Smith's campaign strategy was sound. From Table 2 (Chapter IV) we see that whereas he obtained 78 percent of his vote in the counties of Bernalillo, Lea, Dona Ana, Santa Fe, San Juan, Curry, Eddy, Grant, McKinley, Valencia and Chaves in 1968, he received 83.7% of his total vote in these counties in 1970.[11] From Table 6 we also see that though he did better than "average" both in Bernalillo and in the Little Texas Counties, his percentage of the vote in the ten Hispanic counties was a dismal 7.8%. Even with such a poor showing in the Hispanic counties, Smith won 15.8 percent of the total statewide vote for his office in the democratic primary, 4.7 percent more than he deserved as an "average" candidate.

In Bernalillo County, Smith's greatest competition came from P_2 who obtained 36.3 percent of the county's votes to Smith's 20.1 percent. P_2, identified more fully in Chapter II, beat Smith in the Valley (legislative

Table 6. Percentages of county and regional votes obtained by Smith and his opponents.

	P_1	P_2	P_3	P_4	P_5	Smith P_6	P_7	P_8	P_9
1) Hispanic									
a) Dona Ana	23.5	13.8	23.9	7.2	5.2	12.3	2.1	8.2	3.9
b) Guadalupe	22.8	49.8	4.6	2.6	4.0	4.3	0.2	11.1	0.4
c) Mora	22.9	11.8	56.7	2.7	0.9	1.4	0.1	3.4	0.1
d) Rio Arriba	12.5	12.9	54.9	7.7	2.2	3.2	1.9	1.7	2.9
e) Sandoval	10.0	29.9	17.9	9.9	17.1	6.2	4.6	3.6	0.7
f) San Miguel	6.2	20.1	40.0	4.3	1.3	2.4	0.5	25.0	0.3
g) Santa Fe	11.6	19.4	24.7	17.6	5.1	10.1	1.3	8.0	2.2
h) Socorro	19.7	30.2	16.1	4.9	5.8	6.4	4.8	10.6	1.6
i) Taos	4.3	5.5	72.4	12.3	0.7	3.1	0.7	0.9	0.2
j) Valencia	14.1	36.3	11.2	6.7	9.5	11.4	2.0	5.8	2.7
Total	13.7	21.1	30.3	9.7	5.5	7.8	1.8	7.9	2.1
2) Little Texas									
a) Chaves	22.9	9.9	9.6	5.9	8.1	23.9	1.1	12.8	5.8
b) Curry	12.9	13.6	10.6	3.2	5.2	20.3	0.8	29.0	4.4
c) De Baca	19.5	11.6	9.1	5.3	5.0	7.9	0.6	36.8	4.2
d) Eddy	11.5	7.3	27.8	6.4	7.6	12.9	0.9	14.0	11.5
e) Lea	10.9	10.3	16.3	3.8	7.6	27.0	0.3	15.8	7.9
f) Roosevelt	13.3	12.2	17.3	3.8	6.4	21.3	0.5	20.2	5.0
Total	13.7	10.1	17.3	4.8	7.2	20.6	0.7	17.8	7.7
3) Bernalillo	9.8	36.3	7.1	3.1	12.0	20.1	4.2	5.4	1.9
4) State	13.9	21.0	17.9	6.3	8.2	15.8	2.4	10.6	3.8

Source: State of New Mexico Election Returns: 1970 Primary Election Returns.

districts 1-9) by a ratio of almost 3.8 ÷ 1, while in the Heights (legislative districts 10-18), the race was substantially even (72 votes difference in favor of Smith out of over 9,000 cast for P_2 and Smith in the Heights).[12] In 1968 Smith lost Bernalillo to the victor of the campaign by approximately 4,000 votes and lost the election by about 2,000 votes. In this primary election, however, he lost the county by almost 5,400 votes and lost the election by 6,249, indicating that his support outside of Bernalillo County dropped also by almost 3,000 votes.

It would be inappropriate to fault Smith's strategy in terms of his emphasis on the various components of Kessel's electoral game. Since in primaries few people know the names of the challengers and hence are likely to vote for familiar names,[13] Smith's whole-hearted emphasis on his personal attributes, especially his name, was undoubtedly a wise part of his strategy. With respect to issues, by the candidate's own count of the press releases for all of the candidates (compiled from his statewide clipping service), he received as many releases as all of the Hispanic candidates combined and more than the other three Anglo candidates combined. The successful coverage of issues by the state press correlated highly with stories carried by Associated Press and United Press International; through these two wire services Smith had his statements on 90-day justice and the problems at the University of New Mexico published throughout the state. With respect to group support, Smith received about as much group identification as the other candidates,obtaining endorsements from several labor unions and emphasizing his membership in the

Catholic Church in Bernalillo County and in the North. He did not receive the endorsements of either of the Albuquerque newspapers; P_2 had that honor. From the perspective of the election game approach, then, Smith's strategy was fairly sound.

There was only one principal defect in the candidate's strategy. He underestimated the electoral strengths of the winner and the candidate who ran second, and he over-estimated the strengths of some of his other opponents. Smith never recognized P_2's electoral popularity in the Heights of Albuquerque, and he expected to win that area, his place of residence, by about the same margin as he lost the Valley.

The electoral viability of P_3 (also described in Chapter II) in the Southern part of the state was astonishingly strong. Towards the end of the campaign Smith learned that P_3 allegedly had been "slated" with the favorite gubernatorial candidate in that region, thus partially accounting for P_3's strength there and the concurrent loss of votes for Smith in that area.[14]

P_1 also accumulated more votes in Little Texas than the "average" candidate should obtain. During the course of the campaign Smith heard that P_1 was campaigning hard in the southern part of the state, especially in Chaves and Otero counties. Of course, this seemed to be strange campaign behavior, for a Hispano candidate had never won a primary election by concentrating his efforts in the South. Though P_1 did not win the election or even obtain a plurality in this area, he collected 13.7 percent of the votes there, votes which might have gone to Smith. P_8 also did well in the Little Texas areas, beating

Smith in three of the six counties there.

The fact that Smith over-valued the strength of some of his opponents was also a strategic mistake. He believed until the end of the campaign that P_5 (discussed in Chapter II) was his major competition, but this candidate received approximately one-half of Smith's vote and only 8.2 percent of the total state vote. As might be expected, during the last stages of the campaign, particularly during the last ten days, Smith heard and started to believe some analyses that other candidates were real "sleepers," especially P_1 and P_8, but the success of these "dark horses" never materialized.

Other than the strategic error mentioned above, Smith committed only one other serious error during the course of the campaign--he did not follow his own strategy, or he did not follow it in the right manner. In spite of P_2's popularity in the Heights in Albuquerque, Smith could have decreased P_2's margin of victory in Bernalillo County if he had carried out his own strategy. Bernalillo was to be the pivotal county for Smith, and thus he planned to devote most of his campaign effort on the votes in Bernalillo. Admittedly, this is the county where he spent most of his campaign budget, but evidently the benefits that were to accrue from such a financial expenditure never developed. Smith's personal appeal, though, to the Bernalillo voters was minimal, in that he spent much more of his time worrying about other counties and actually visiting the other counties. According to his strategy, Smith should have spent at least 30 percent of his campaign time in Albuquerque. In actuality, time in Albuquerque was devoted to catching up on his business

and resting for more trips around the state. While Smith was rather half-hearted in his Bernalillo County activities, P_3 centralized his efforts here and extended a more direct campaign to the voters. P_2's favorable reputation as a legislator and his more direct campaign were sufficient to give him approximately a 6,000 vote plurality in Bernalillo and a commanding lead in the rest of the state.

NOTES--CHAPTER V

1. Herbert M. Baus and William B. Ross, Politics Battle Plan (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 144.

2. Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies and Tactics," in The Electoral Process, M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, eds. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 7.

3. See Jennings and Zeigler, The Electoral Process; Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy; Dan Nimmo, The Political Persuaders, etc. In almost every new research report that is published, constant reference is made to the Michigan-based studies.

4. Leuthold, p. 14.

5. Nimmo, p. 5.

6. In a poll conducted by this author, questions were asked about the general nature of qualifications for the governor's office and a minor state office. In response to the inquiry about the governor's office, people who chose to respond (most did not) predominantly answered in terms of the personal attributes of the man. With respect to the minor state office, very few members of the sample responded at all (perhaps 10%), and those who did again emphasized the personal characteristics of the office-holder. Although on a question concerning one issue perceived by the respondents' as being of state importance only 35% had "no answer," past surveys and research indicate the inability to link issue positions with correct candidates.

7. Kessel, pp. 290-304.

8. Kessel, p. 290.

9. Holmes, Politics in New Mexico, p. 238.

10. Nearly all of the expenditures were made to emphasize the candidate orientation (the author assumes that since part of the campaign brochure included issue positions as well as an orientation to the candidate, part of the cost of the pamphlet must be ascribed to issue orientation), press releases were free, and no money was spent in seeking group endorsements.

In terms of time, Smith attended several labor union meetings, spent approximately 1/3 of his campaign staff meeting time on the subject of issues and press releases, and the vast majority of his time was consumed in traveling, in conferring with political leaders throughout the state, and in general "stumping."

11. State of New Mexico Official Returns: 1970 Primary Election Returns. It is important to note, however, that the 78 percent in 1968 accounted for approximately 23,000 votes, while the 83.7 percent of 1970 amounted to less than 16,000 votes.

12. State of New Mexico Official Returns: 1970 Primary Election Returns.

13. Froman, p. 10.

14. In New Mexico Primary politics, occasionally major candidates or county organizations create a "slate" of candidates to serve as a guideline for the voters in the area. Though it is difficult to assay the consequences of this activity, one example will indicate the effect. In 1968 Michael Alarid, a well-known and popular Hispano, received approximately 500 votes from Lea county. In 1970 P_3, a less familiar name, received 1100 votes from that county. P_3, allegedly slated with Jack Daniels, a very popular resident of Hobbs and a candidate for governor, won 600 more votes than did Alarid in 1968. Though it would be difficult to empirically verify and quantify this "slating" effect, the fact that such an effect exists is undoubtedly true.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The material covered in this study calls for the formulation of at least two types of conclusions. For one, something must be said about the pragmatic implications of a campaign for minor state office. In general, what are the personal constraints which operate on a candidate and on his campaign? Does such a campaign have an effect on the electorate? What is the nature of the voters' response to this competition? Is there any practical way to improve the selection process of minor state office-holders?

The second class of conclusions concerns the broader theoretical implications of campaigns for minor state office. Certain essential questions must be answered. What is the function of primary electoral competition for minor state office? Is that function a viable one? Is the system of electoral competition for minor state offices efficient?

Pragmatic Suggestions for Elections of Minor State Officials

Running for any statewide office is an arduous task. Running for a minor state office is even more arduous, for the rewards that accrue to a gubernatorial or congressional campaign and potential election are greater financially and psychologically. To campaign effectively a candidate must

sacrifice a great deal of time and/or money in his efforts, and the final and only significant test of the efficacy of these expenditures is performed by the voters on election day. Win or lose, all candidates devote much of their energies to their campaigns, energies that might otherwise have been spent in business or pleasure. In addition to the monetary and temporal investments that a campaign demands, the candidate, his family, and his friends suffer from a political disease that is concurrently invigorating and debilitating. The excitement that is partially a result of the flurry of campaign activity is more than neutralized by the frustration and anxiety that accompany any bid for office. Whether or not the possibility of success counter-balances the development of an ulcer, a strained marriage, a slump in business, estrangement from former friends, and physical exhaustion, however, is ultimately an individual decision.

The political science literature is replete with investigations which argue that campaigns do not normally have a substantial impact on the electorate.[1] However, there is an increasing proportion of political analysts who are beginning to reassess the effects of campaigning.[2] This return to the study of electoral competition is especially relevant to this investigation, for very little work has been done to evaluate primary campaigns and elections and to test the results of previous general election studies with primary elections. Since a primary does not offer the convenient guideline of party label, and since name familiarity is very low in primary elections, more studies need to be made of such elections.

The concomitant low level of recall for the minor state office (17.8 percent) that was indicated in the poll conducted by this author in April before the primary and the relatively high rate of voting on this race, leads one to believe that, unless those who voted made their decisions randomly, the various campaigns had some effect on the electorate.[3] Any attempt to identify this effect is speculative, but the very nature of many of the campaigns, with their emphases on name orientation and familiarity, were based on theories of mass persuasion.[4]

Other than the obvious nature of the electorate's response to the campaign, the fact that they voted, how did individual citizens react to a campaign for minor office? In Smith's case probably no more than fifty people were involved in any capacity in the campaign statewide. As other studies have shown, on the level of national campaigns approximately ten percent of the electorate participate in some manner.[5] Of course, at the state level, and for primary elections, this figure is undoubtedly lower. In effect, very few people show outward signs of being affected by a campaign for minor state office. Those who do participate do so generally out of personal friendship with the candidate.[6]

In Chapter III we implicitly suggested two reforms that are needed with respect to elections of minor state officials.[7] At the very least, New Mexico should adopt the rotated ballot to replace the designation of ballot position by lot. It seems preferable, however, to eliminate many of the minor state offices from the ballot entirely. Each administration would enjoy the

advantages of a unified executive, and the voters would be able to make their officials accountable in a much more rational manner.

Theoretical Implications

Naturally the function of electoral competition is to select leaders and representatives for the political system, and for a primary election, the voters select the parties' nominees for the general election. To the partisan, the party slate should be accepted by all other party identifiers, but, fortunately or unfortunately, this is not the case. The direct primary in New Mexico has the inherent liability of selecting on the basis of plurality. Candidate P_2 in this study won the election with but 21.0 percent of the state vote. In 1968 the Democratic gubernatorial nominee won his primary election largely due to ethnic voting. It is entirely possible that in the case of a crowded primary, the electorate in June could nominate a man who is supported by only ten percent of his party's registered voters and by less than seven percent of all the registered voters in the state.[8]

The state has already experimented with and rejected the pre-primary designating convention. Run-off primaries are deemed to be too expensive and too incapacitating, both for the candidates and the electorate. A failure-doomed effort was made to return to the days of the convention system. It appears that New Mexico will, therefore, maintain the direct primary.

The theoretical implications of this fact of possible nominating a man by a small percentage of the votes are obvious. Such a serious incursion into the American democratic policy of majority rule has serious connotations for democratic theory.

Aside from this statistical threat to the democratic political system, there is another menace which is much more insidious. With the accelerating rate of technological advancement in the fields of mass communication and persuasion, the possibility of the "selling of a candidate" becomes very real. If these methods are applied to the selection of nominees at any or all levels of government, the consequences could shake the foundations of the political system. Since New Mexico, as well as other states, is not encumbered with a preponderance of "rationality activists," the improper disposition of these advanced methods of persuasion would not be met with great resistance by the electorate. We do not question so much the ability of the people to select their leaders, ceteris paribus, but uncontrolled use of the mass media may result in a situation where the people are at an unconscious or sub-conscious disadvantage.

William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook have listed a series of "satisfactions" which accrue to the voter in his act of voting. Among these are,[9]

> 1) the satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting... 2) the satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system... 3) the satisfaction from affirming a partisan preference... 4) the satisfaction

> of deciding, going to the polls... 5) the satisfaction of affirming one's efficacy in the political system....

The authors offer compelling reasons to accept their calculus of voting, but in this particular article they consider only the means by which collective choices are made, and do not concern themselves with the quality of those decisions.

Since the average man does not resemble the model of the "rational political man" or the "ideal democratic citizen,"[10] it is as important to question the quality of collective choice as the means of collective choice. If it is impossible for voters to render rational choices on particular races under a present electoral system, and if by a different process rational choices could be made, and the leaders would still be accountable to the voters by an indirect route, it would seem preferable to adopt the latter formula.

A campaign strategy based on voter rationality is certainly doomed to failure.[11] Since the main objective of the election game is victory, and not educating the public, a rational campaign strategy must be based on the irrationality or the non-rationality of the voter, as well as on the other relevant factors (players, environment, communications, etc.). Any other premise would lead to immediate defeat at the polls.

NOTES--CHAPTER VI

1. See William H. Flanigan, Political Behavior of the American Electorate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), p. 98; Paul F. Lazarsfeld; Bernard Berelson; and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), p. 101; and Robert A. Schoenberger, "Campaign Strategy and Party Loyalty: The Electoral Relevance of Candidate Decision-Making in the 1964 Congressional Elections," The American Political Science Review, LXIII (June, 1969), p. 519.

2. Nimmo, The Political Persuaders, pp. 4-5. The relatively time-honored practice of accepting the contention that campaigns are ineffective had its foundation perhaps, in the discovery fully two-thirds of the voters make their electoral choice prior to the campaign period. Recognizing the significance of the remaining 33 percent of the electorate, researchers are beginning again to investigate political campaigns and their functions and limits.

3. See supra, pp. 50, 44. Even if the low recall rate is multiplied by a factor of two to account partially for the nonpartisans and weak partisans questioned in the poll who probably did not vote in the primary, the difference between the two numbers is still sufficiently significant to merit this conclusion.

4. Nimmo, pp. 30-32.

5. Flanigan, p. 96.

6. In Smith's campaign we know of no case where an individual who worked in the campaign did not know the candidate personally.

7. See supra, pp. 38, 43-45.

8. See supra, p. 80. This occurred in the 1970 primary for the minor state office under consideration.

9. William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," The American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), p. 28.

10. Hugh A. Bone and Austin Ranney, Politics and Voters (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 54.

11. Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategy and Tactics," in The Electoral Process, edited by M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 9. Voter rationality here refers to the "ideal"democratic citizen" who investigates the candidates for each office fully before deciding for whom to vote.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Shifts in Party Registration in New Mexico, 1941-1970

1941

	Democrats	Republicans	Other	Total
Little Texas				
Chaves	5841	1584	230	7655
Curry	7953	1122	673	9748
DeBaca	1515	268	150	1933
Eddy	7922	1164	901	9987
Lea	7604	853	1042	9499
Roosevelt	6865	715	600	8280
Total	37700 (80.2%)	5706 (12.1%)	3596 (7.7%)	47002 (100.0%)
Hispanic Counties				
Dona Ana	7555	2701	1872	12128
Guadalupe	2835	1503	259	4597
Mora	2426	2585	350	5361
Rio Arriba	6939	3333	843	11115
Sandoval	2409	1937	366	4712
San Miguel	8575	3808	1197	13580
Santa Fe	9727	3558	2127	15412
Socorro	4359	1554	410	6323
Taos	4590	2626	709	7925
Valencia	4228	2838	1109	8175
Total	53643 (60.1%)	26443(29.6%)	9242(10.3%)	89328 (100.0%)
Bernalillo	22891 (63.7%)	7062(19.6%)	5987 (16.7%)	35941 (100.0%)
State	144,258 (63.7%)	57,206 (23.9%)	21190 (11.3%)	222,654(100.0%)

APPENDIX I--continued

1948

	Democrats	Republicans	Other	Total
Little Texas				
Chaves	9538	2205	702	12445
Curry	10590	1786	761	13137
DeBaca	1454	309	119	1882
Eddy	13792	1652	661	16105
Lea	9922	820	2516	13258
Roosevelt	8217	683	626	9526
Total	53513 (80.6%)	7455 (11.2%)	5385 (8.1%)	66353 (99.9%)
Hispanic Counties				
Dona Ana	11466	3719	2243	27428
Guadalupe	2582	1835	154	4571
Mora	2682	2991	271	5944
Rio Arriba	7739	5265	833	13837
Sandoval	2643	2640	378	5661
San Miguel	9398	4760	1243	15401
Santa Fe	10626	7491	2490	20607
Socorro	3542	2958	511	7011
Taos	5539	3469	696	9704
Valencia	4427	3696	903	9026
Total	60644 (55.5%)	38824 (35.6%)	9722 (8.9%)	109,190 (100.0%)
Bernalillo	40544 (62.7%)	16410 (25.4%)	7676 (11.9%)	64630 (100.0%)
State	203,715 (64.4%)	83450 (26.4%)	29251 (9.2%)	316,414 (100.0%)

APPENDIX I--continued

1958

	Democrats	Republicans	Other	Total
Little Texas				
Chaves	12250	3601	470	16621
Curry	10037	1592	527	12156
DeBaca	1473	191	22	1686
Eddy	17716	2144	385	20245
Lea	16061	1565	97	17723
Roosevelt	6490	601	199	7290
Total	64327 (85.0%)	9694 (12.8%)	1700 (2.2%)	75721 (100.0%)
Hispanic Counties				
Dona Ana	11529	3912	1060	16501
Guadalupe	2145	1353	95	3593
Mora	1783	2335	95	4213
Rio Arriba	8080	4992	553	13625
Sandoval	2782	2062	205	5049
San Miguel	7898	4122	657	12677
Santa Fe	12627	7780	2031	22438
Socorro	3858	2375	890	7123
Taos	4998	2733	272	8003
Valencia	8014	4279	880	13173
Total	63714 (59.9%)	35943 (33.8%)	6738 (6.3%)	106,395 (100.0%)
Bernalillo	50529 (59.7%)	27960 (33.0%)	6196 (7.3%)	84685 (100.0%)
State	238,484 (66.9%)	98042 (27.5%)	20069 (5.6$)	356,595 (100.0%)

APPENDIX I--continued

	1970 Democrats	Republicans	Other	Total
Little Texas				
Chaves	9938	4804	475	15217
Curry	8950	2508	361	11819
DeBaca	1177	139	9	1325
Eddy	14162	2565	306	17033
Lea	14893	3246	176	18315
Roosevelt	4925	1170	127	6222
Total	54045 (77.3%)	14432 (20.6%)	1454 (2.1%)	69931 (100.0%)
Hispanic Counties				
Dona Ana	14742	6553	1296	22591
Guadalupe	1787	852	53	2692
Mora	1265	1138	38	2441
Rio Arriba	7523	3132	245	10900
Sandoval	4657	1428	296	6381
San Miguel	6696	2704	437	9837
Santa Fe	14627	6405	1698	22730
Socorro	3138	1939	318	5395
Taos	4940	2542	248	7640
Valencia	10907	4228	778	15913
Total	70282 (66.0%)	30831 (28.9%)	5407 (5.1%)	106,520 (100.0%)
Bernalillo	67790 (56.7%)	44126 (36.9%)	7352 (6.2%)	119,468 (99.8%)
State	250,240 (65.4%)	114391 (29.9%)	17935 (4.7%)	382,566 (100.0%)

APPENDIX II

Total vote cast for lieutenant-governor, 1942-1970, by Little Texas, Hispanic, and Bernalillo Counties and the State of New Mexico for primary and general elections

	1942		1944		1946	
	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General
Hispanic						
Dona Ana	2800	4817	2066	6935	2899	5822
Guadalupe	1753	2936	1549	3115	3666	2724
Mora	1606	3208	1390	3133	1407	2734
Rio Arriba	3562	6473	2514	7278	2189	7901
Sandoval	1262	2626	1344	2635	1822	2704
San Miguel	4302	7611	2732	8465	4235	7306
Santa Fe	4909	8638	3260	9913	5738	10532
Socorro	2254	3853	1249	3899	1476	3625
Taos	2066	4557	1585	4926	2582	5040
Valencia	2202	4714	2111	5046	2390	5054
Total	26,726	49,433	19,800	55,345	28,404	53,442
Little Texas						
Chaves	2813	2790	1438	6045	3295	4661
Curry	2397	2449	1440	5374	3000	4593
DeBaca	684	593	267	1175	527	817
Eddy	3354	2845	2003	7128	4036	5443
Lea	1986	1734	912	4014	3083	2739
Roosevelt	1851	1671	1591	3751	1770	2598
Total	13,085	12,082	7,651	27,487	15,711	20,851
Bernalillo	8,357	14,852	7,885	22,583	11,299	21,309
Total Vote Cast	64,151	106,211	47,133	145,885	75,417	129,843

APPENDIX II--continued

	1948		1950		1952	
	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General
Hispanic						
Dona Ana	4170	8613	5293	8816	3856	10368
Guadalupe	1707	3107	1572	2785	1492	2915
Mora	1785	3442	1647	3357	1796	3244
Rio Arriba	4429	9081	4646	8607	4545	8898
Sandoval	2691	3580	2285	3093	1910	3460
San Miguel	4117	9642	4901	9056	4989	9824
Santa Fe	6361	13749	8218	13805	7577	15798
Socorro	1876	3809	1844	3727	1903	4006
Taos	2721	5822	2957	5547	2840	5638
Valencia	2349	6243	3075	6650	2763	7155
Total	32,206	67,088	36,438	65,443	33,671	71,306
Little Texas						
Chaves	2616	7680	5354	7118	2772	10772
Curry	3825	7878	5180	6062	4516	8426
DeBaca	673	1140	848	1188	845	1304
Eddy	4505	9961	7053	8365	3340	13495
Lea	3199	5931	4714	4230	4279	9677
Roosevelt	2332	4095	3144	3618	2661	5312
Total	17,150	36,685	26,293	30,581	18,413	48,986
Bernalillo	16,825	35,590	18,805	35,284	20,666	56,903
Total Vote Cast	89,483	187,485	108,943	175,715	98,547	237,045

APPENDIX II--continued

	1954		1956		1958	
	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General
Hispanic						
Dona Ana	2980	8162	3919	11628	6128	9137
Guadalupe	1089	2767	1319	2699	1410	2513
Mora	1610	2939	1674	2965	1343	2608
Rio Arriba	4678	8586	4837	8746	4854	7976
Sandoval	1854	3276	2051	3506	2116	3217
San Miguel	4546	8814	5076	9052	4873	8118
Santa Fe	5756	14006	6866	16097	7649	13731
Socorro	1228	3594	1858	3775	1956	3419
Taos	3190	5501	3194	5801	3408	4866
Valencia	2622	6784	2346	8037	4037	7381
Total	29,553	64,429	33,140	72,306	37,774	62,966
Little Texas						
Chaves	3499	7857	4480	11548	6488	8795
Curry	3448	5435	4727	8171	3935	5518
DeBaca	841	1044	911	1206	954	933
Eddy	5080	10016	6249	14086	8269	10590
Lea	4028	5818	4587	11315	6469	7182
Roosevelt	2694	3685	3561	4602	3562	4411
Total	19,580	33,855	24,515	50,928	29,677	37,429
Bernalillo	14,465	44,899	18,445	64,085	22,831	49,005
Total Vote Cast	87,828	190,834	104,414	247,397	121,913	199,571

APPENDIX II--continued

	1960		1962		1964	
	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary	General
Hispanic						
Dona Ana	7546	16110	6549	12150	5538	17465
Guadalupe	1834	2811	1119	2540	948	2638
Mora	1918	2807	1310	2567	1080	2489
Rio Arriba	6516	9860	4641	8401	4131	9465
Sandoval	2509	4050	2252	3389	1849	4409
San Miguel	6217	9434	4670	7879	3351	8286
Santa Fe	9778	17355	7317	15682	5291	18137
Socorro	2458	4065	1804	3408	761	4090
Taos	3835	6245	2930	5401	2327	6094
Valencia	4883	11817	4420	8895	3992	11457
Total	47494	84,554	37,012	70,812	29,268	84,530
Little Texas						
Chaves	7005	14705	6066	12227	3270	16570
Curry	4591	9170	2568	6943	3144	9757
DeBaca	1039	1277	442	1059	429	1180
Eddy	8138	16225	6935	13498	5374	17513
Lea	6722	14775	7698	10807	6335	15470
Roosevelt	3910	5448	2316	4029	2184	5379
Total	31,405	61,600	26,025	48,563	20,736	65,869
Bernalillo	35,785	83,961	29,039	66,595	21,203	95,331
Total Vote Cast	153,423	301,898	122,178	241,611	95,607	318,037

APPENDIX II--continued

	1966		1968		1970
	Primary	General	Primary	General	Primary
Hispanic					
Dona Ana	7429	13537	9377	19441	7816
Guadalupe	1325	2220	1110	2261	1118
Mora	1391	2339	1197	2246	1152
Rio Arriba	5947	8052	5315	8921	5207
Sandoval	2544	3762	2644	4709	3294
San Miguel	5147	7757	4480	8266	4561
Santa Fe	10027	16314	10663	19290	11514
Socorro	2116	3812	2166	4205	2198
Taos	3766	5680	3529	6184	3304
Valencia	5053	10116	6132	11778	6299
Total	44,745	73,589	46,613	87,301	46,463
Little Texas					
Chaves	6485	11962	4806	13497	6026
Curry	4580	7679	4455	9724	4363
DeBaca	762	917	675	1064	715
Eddy	8814	13488	5367	14569	7149
Lea	5824	10779	6942	14566	8117
Roosevelt	2744	3777	2380	5356	2052
Total	29,209	48,602	24,625	58,776	28,442
Bernalillo	40,056	79,705	54,980	100,781	54,488
Total Vote Cast	147,330	260,212	159,570	318,910	166,117

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Documents of the State of New Mexico

Ernestine D. Evans, Secretary of State. Election Handbook of the State of New Mexico, 1969 Edition.

Secretary of State. New Mexico Blue Book, 1941-1942, 1949-1950, 1959-1960, 1969-1970.

Secretary of State. State of New Mexico Election Returns, 1942-1970.

Sources on the Politics of New Mexico

Beckett, Paul, and McNutt, Walter L. The Direct Primary in New Mexico. Albuquerque: Division of Government Research, University of New Mexico, 1947.

Goodal, Leonard E., ed. Urban Politics in the Southwest. Tempe: Institute of Public Administration, Arizona State University, 1967.

Holmes, Jack E. Politics in New Mexico. Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1967.

_____. "Party, Legislature, and Governor in the Politics of New Mexico, 1911-1963." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1964.

_____. Science Town in the Politics of New Mexico. Albuquerque: Division of Government Research, University of New Mexico, 1967.

Judah, Charles B. Aspects of Nominating Systems in New Mexico. Albuquerque: Division of Government Research, University of New Mexico, 1957.

_____, and Irion, Frederick C. The 47th State: An Appraisal of Its Government. Albuquerque: Division of Government Research, University of New Mexico, 1959.

Wagner, David A. "Some Effects of Formal Nominating Processes on Recruitment of Candidates, Party Organization, and Election Results in New Mexico." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1957.

Wingfield, Clyde J. Urbanization in the Southwest. El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1968.

Wolf, T. Phillip. "The 1966 Elections in New Mexico." The Western Political Quarterly, XX (Supplement, 1967), 586-592.

_____. "The 1968 Elections in New Mexico." The Western Political Quarterly, XXII (September, 1969), 510-515.

_____. "The 1968 Election from the Perspective of a Nixon State: New Mexico." A paper presented at the Southwest Social Science Annual Meeting, April 5, 1969.

_____. "The Political Role of the Spanish-Speaking Citizen in New Mexico." A paper presented at the Rocky Mountain Social Science Association Annual Meeting, Lubbock, Texas, May 2-3, 1969.

General Sources

Adamany, David. Financing Politics: Recent Wisconsin Elections. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1969.

Alford, Robert R., and Lee, Eugene C. "Voting Turnout in American Cities." The American Political Science Review, LXII (September, 1968), 796-813.

Almond, Gabriel A., and Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966.

Arrow, Kenneth J. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963.

Back, Kurt W. "Decisions Under Uncertainty: Rational, Irrational, and Non-rational." The American Behavioral Scientist, IV (February, 1961), 14-19.

Bain, Henry M., and Hecock, Donald S. Ballot Position and Voter's Choice. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957.

Baus, Herbert M., and Ross, William B. Politics Battle Plan. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1968.

Berelson, Bernard R.; Lazarsfeld, Paul F.; and McPhee, William N. Voting. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954.

Bernd, Joseph L., ed. Mathematical Applications in Political Science, II. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966.

Bone, Hugh A., and Ranney, Austin. Politics and Voters. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963.

Burdick, Eugene, and Brodbeck, Arthur J., eds. American Voting Behavior. New York: The Free Press, 1959.

Campbell, Angus; Converse, Philip E.; Miller, Warren E. "Political Issues and the Vote: November, 1952." The American Political Science Review, XLVII (June, 1953), 359-378.

Charlesworth, James C., ed. Contemporary Political Analysis. New York: The Free Press, 1967.

Coplin, William D. Simulation in the Study of Politics. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968.

Cotter, Cornelius P., ed. Practical Politics in the United States. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969.

Dahl, Robert A. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956.

Deutsch, Karl W. The Nerves of Government. New York: The Free Press, 1963.

Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row, 1957.

Ellsworth, John W. "Rationality and Campaigning: A Content Analysis of the 1960 Presidential Campaign Debates." The Western Political Quarterly, XVIII (December, 1965), 794-802.

Flanigan, William H. Political Behavior of the American Electorate. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968.

Foladare, Irving S. "The Effect of Neighborhood on Voting Behavior." Political Science Quarterly, LXXXIII (December, 1968), 516-529.

Gore, William J., and Peabody, Robert L. "The Functions of the Political Campaign: A Case Study." The Western Political Quarterly, XI (March, 1958), 55-70.

Greenstein, Fred I. "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away the Underbrush." The American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), 629-641.

Hacker, Andrew. "Does a 'Divisive' Primary Harm a Candidate's Election Chances." The American Political Science Review, LIX (March, 1964), 105-110.

Huckshorn, Robert J., and Spencer, Robert C. "Candidate Conceptions of Defeat in the Congressional Elections of 1962." The Western Political Quarterly, XVI (Supplement, 1963), 35-36.

Jennings, M. Kent, and Zeigler, L. Harmon, eds. The Electoral Process. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.

Katz, Daniel and Eldersveld, Samuel J. "The Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the Electorate." The Public Opinion Quarterly, XXV (Spring, 1969), 1-24.

Kelley, Stanley, Jr.; Ayres, Richard E.; and Bowen, William G. "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First." The American Political Science Review, (June, 1967), 359-379.

Kessel, John H. "Cognitive Dimensions and Political Activity." The Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIX (Fall, 1965), 377-389.

Key, V. O., Jr. American State Politics: An Introduction. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963.

_____. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952.

Kingdon, John W. "Politicians' Beliefs About Voters." The American Political Science Review, LXI (March, 1967), 137-145.

Lamb, Karl A., and Smith, Paul A. Campaign Decision-Making: The Presidential Election of 1964. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1968.

Lane, Robert E. "Political Personality and Electoral Choice." The American Political Science Review, IL (December, 1955), 173-190.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F.; Berelson, Bernard; and Gaudet, Hazel. The People's Choice. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944.

Leuthold, David A. Electioneering in a Democracy: Campaigns for Congress. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968.

Lowe, Francis E., and McCormick, Thomas C. "A Study of the Influence of Formal and Informal Leaders in an Election Campaign." The Public Opinion Quarterly, XX (Winter, 1956), 651-662.

McPhee, William N. "Note on a Campaign Simulator." The Public Opinion Quarterly, XXV (Summer, 1961), 184-193.

Merkl, Peter H. "Comparative Study and Campaign Management: The Brandt Campaign in Western Germany." The Western Political Quarterly, XIV (December, 1961), 681-704.

Milbrath, Lester W. "Predispositions toward Voting Decisions." Political Research: Organization and Design, I (May, 1958), 26-29.

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations. 4th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.

Nimmo, Dan. The Political Persuaders: The Techniques of Modern Election Campaigns. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.

Rapoport, Anatol, and Orwant, Carol. "Experimental Games: A Review." Behavioral Science, VII (January, 1962), 1-37.

Riker, William H. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962 .

_____. "Bargaining in a Three-Person Game." The American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), 642-656.

_____, and Ordeshook, Peter C. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting." The American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), 25-42.

Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960.

Schoenberger, Robert A. "Campaign Strategy and Party Loyalty: The Electoral Relevance of Candidate Decision-Making in the 1964 Congressional Elections." The American Political Science Review, LXIII (June, 1969), 515-520.

Schier, Richard F. "Political Fund Raising and the Small Contributor: A Case Study." The Western Political Quarterly, XI (March, 1958), 104-112.

Sears, David O. "Political Behavior." The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. 5, Edited by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson. Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969.

Shubik, Martin, ed. Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964.

Snyder, Richard C., and Paige, Glenn D. "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme." Administrative Science Quarterly, III (December, 1958), 341-378.

Walker, Jack L. "Ballot Forms and Voter Fatigue: An Analysis of the Office Block and Party Column Ballots." Midwest Journal of Political Science, X (November, 1966), 448-463.

White, Howard. "Voters Plump for First on Ballot." National Municipal Review, XXXIX (1950), 110-111.

Wolfinger, Raymond E. "The Influence of Precinct Work on Voting Behavior." The Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVII (Fall, 1963), 387-398.