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A Study Of The Role Of The United Nations And The United States In The Lebanon Crisis Of 1958.

Lawerence Brisker

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by

LAWRENCE BRISKER

A Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Government and Citizenship

The University of New Mexico

1965
This thesis, directed and approved by the candidate's committee, has been accepted by the Graduate Committee of the University of New Mexico in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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PREFACE

This paper is concerned with the Lebanese Crisis of 1958 as a
case study dealing with the interaction of United States' action and
United Nations actions, and with the effect of United Nations member-
ship upon United States foreign policy making. This paper does not
pretend to give a detailed descriptive account of the crisis in its
entirety. Instead, I have placed emphasis upon those factors in the
Middle East that had an effect upon American policy-making, and upon
action taken respectively by the United States and the United Nations
during the crisis. However, before we become involved in discussing
some of the questions raised by the crisis, let us find out what Ameri-
can interests were at stake in the Middle East. The first interests
were oil and military bases. Another was the over-riding need to
prevent this strategic part of the world from becoming dominated by the
Soviet Union. Why? Because the Arab East contains almost indispensable
sea, air, and land routes for western trade with the world east of Suez.
In re-emphasis, Russian control of Arab oil would place in constant
jeopardy the West's supply of Middle East oil, important to the United
States and vital to Britain and Western Europe. However, there is one
other interest of paramount importance. That interest is the United States'
desire for peace and stability in the Arab world, so that American bases
can remain there.

I have attempted to find answers to the following important
questions raised by the crisis.

Was the United Nations, in this instance (and having in mind the United States' national interest at stake), a useful tool or a hindrance?

To what extent was the United States forced to adjust its policies to the facts of United Nations action?

What was the importance of the debates in the United Nations?

To what extent did usefulness of the United Nations (from the point of view of the United States' national interest) depend on initiative taken by the United States in Lebanon?

What effect did these events have on the development of the United Nations as an institution?

What effect did the crisis have upon the United States' long range interest of building an effective United Nations?

What effect did these events have upon the development of international law?

In spite of the fact that the United Nations depends upon the United States for aid and policy support, these questions are important in that they will help to evaluate future usefulness of the United Nations. Since the present objectives of American foreign policy are the preservation of peace and the prevention of the spread of international Communism, this study is concerned with how American foreign policy makers will view the future usefulness of the United Nations in obtaining these objectives.

My method of research consisted mainly of reviewing and analyzing United Nations and United States documents pertaining to the Lebanon crisis. For guidance in interpreting these documents, pertinent
secondary studies, contemporary newspapers and periodicals were relied upon.

I am indebted to a number of people who assisted me in various ways in writing this paper. First and foremost, I should like to acknowledge the late Dr. Howard J. McMurray, whose political philosophy has had a major effect upon my thinking about international politics. I am also indebted to Dr. Frank Reeve of the History Department and to Dr. Edwin C. Hoyt, Chairman of the Department of Government and Citizenship for their guidance and direction.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND OF CRISIS

World attention and concern was focused on the Lebanese Crisis of 1958 when it was learned that the United States was willing to risk a third World War to protect the independence and integrity of Lebanon. At first, the Crisis took the shape of an internal conflict involving dissident politicians. However, it later turned into an international incident when Lebanon accused the United Arab Republic of attempting to overthrow its government by interfering in its internal affairs. Lebanon appealed to the United Nations and the United States for help. The United States responded by sending troops. The question which immediately comes to mind is, what events in the Middle East caused the United States to become directly involved in the affairs of Lebanon? Many factors caused the United States to view with concern developments in the Middle East. The most important factors were the high correlation between American national security and a need for a stable Middle East; the decline in British influence; the rise of Soviet influence; and the rise of Arab Nationalism.

Decline of British Influence

For years the British government was able to maintain peace and stability in the Middle East by bringing power to bear in that area. The objective of Britain's Middle Eastern policy up to 1947 was to protect India, to promote British trade, to safeguard the lines of communi-
cation and transportation between England and the Empire, and to protect oil resources of the Middle East. During the nineteenth century, Britain attained these objectives by preventing Russia and Germany from encroaching upon the Ottoman and Persian Empires, and by the acquisition of such strategic outposts as Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Cyprus, and [the control of] the Suez Canal. The need to protect her interest in the Suez Canal led to the occupation of Egypt in 1882. However, when her supremacy was threatened by Germany and the Ottoman Empire during World War I, Britain fought to destroy the Ottoman Empire. She exercised direct control over the Middle East through mandates over Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. She held on to Egypt as a protectorate.\textsuperscript{1} Britain met the early threats of Arab Nationalism by granting political independence to Iraq and Egypt in exchange for military arrangements. The challenge to Britain's supremacy by Germany and Italy during World War II was put down by allied victory. A revival of Arab nationalism through the guise of Pan-Arabism was met by the acceptance and encouragement of the League of Arab States. Britain had hoped to use the Arab League as an instrument of her national policy in the same manner as she used the old Ottoman Empire. Finally, Britain fortified her control over the Middle East by easing the French out of the Levant (Lebanon and Syria).

In spite of Great Britain's desire to continue as a major Middle Eastern power, she could no longer play this exclusive role for several reasons. First of all, World War II had drained off much

\textsuperscript{1}Royal Institute of International Affairs, British Interest In the Mediterranean and Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 5-25.
of her economic resources, and thus made it impossible for her to main-
tain troops in the Middle East and other parts of the Empire. Further-
more, the upsurge of Zionism and Arab nationalism (in conflict with each
other) was a source of irritation to the British people. There seemed
to be no solution to this problem. Finally, the new Arab Nationalists
were more vehement in their demands for independence. They were demand-
ing self-determination for every entity in the Arab world from Iraq to
Morocco. The British were viewed as an obstacle to their demands.

In 1947, Great Britain began her retreat from the Middle East
when she delegated the responsibility for Greece and Turkey to the United
States. In Palestine, British troops were withdrawn, subsequently
leaving that situation to be settled by the Arab-Jewish war. Conse-
quently, the United Nations was given the responsibility for finding
a solution to the Palestine problem. Britain had hoped that the United
States would help "shoulder" some of the responsibility for settling the
Palestine question. She had complained that the United States offered
solutions without pledging power to implement those solutions.\(^2\)

The failure of the British in the Suez Crisis further attested
to the decline of British influence in the Middle East. Although Colonel
Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal was a countermeasure to
United States policies, it was Britain and France that felt the weight
of his decision. As a result, Britain and France took action against
him. Britain felt that she could no longer "appease" Nasser. The
Suez Canal was one of the last symbols of British power and a vestige

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of her control over the Middle East. On the other hand, the French were bitter toward Nasser for supporting nationalistic movements in North Africa as well as for taking control of the canal. Hence, when Israel attacked Egypt, France and Britain also moved against her. They acted under the pretense of protecting passage rights through the canal from obstruction by the Israel-Egyptian conflict. However, these moves were calculated to regain lost prestige, to reassert lost power, to regain control of the canal, and to eliminate Colonel Nasser.3

These ends were not realized because of pressures brought by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations to end the crisis. Britain's position on the Middle East was at its lowest peak. Her relations with most of the Arab countries were strained (with the exception of Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon). The decline of Britain's power in the area left a political vacuum which the Soviet Union and the Arab Nationalist were eager to fill as rapidly as possible.

Arab Nationalism

Arab Nationalism developed out of a common desire for self-determination and Arab unity. It was backed by a common tradition, common language, and religion. It was nursed on an intense hatred of Zionism, Colonialism and Imperialism. It had as its objective the establishing of a powerful, politically neutral, unified Arab state. Most Arab Nationalists looked to Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt for fulfillment of this dream. However, to say that Nasser was the leader of Arab Nationalism in the sense that he originated it or directed it would

3 Ibid., pp. 99-120.
be a mistake. He was the symbol of the movement and its most successful spokesman.

It was after Nasser became Egypt's Prime Minister, and later its President, that he became popular in the Arab world. His rise in popularity was paralleled by a rise of Soviet influence in the Middle East. Most of his success can be attributed to two incidents: his arms deal with Czechoslovakia in 1955 and his nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. When the United States hesitated in concluding an arms deal with him, he turned to the Soviet Union and purchased Czechoslovakian arms from them. Within Egypt and throughout the Arab world, Nasser had become a great hero who had turned Egypt from the domination of the West. The United States had contributed to the development of the Suez crisis when, uncertain of Egypt's ability to finance its share of the Aswan Dam project, disturbed over Nasser's tirades against Iraq and the Baghdad Pact, and alarmed at Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia, it withdrew its offer to help finance the Aswan Dam. Nasser retaliated by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company. According to him, revenues from the Canal were to be used for the Aswan Dam project.

After the Suez Crisis, Nasser emerged more popular than ever before. He felt that he was fulfilling a role ascribed to him by destiny, "a role in search of a hero," as he spoke of it in his book, Philosophy of the Revolution. He also equated Arab nationalism with Egyptian leadership of the Arab world. He once stated, "the aims of

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the revolutionary government are to make the Arabs a united nation. The problems of the Arabs are also the problems of Egypt." Hence, Egypt tended to dominate the League of Arab States, and used it as an instrument of national policy. Nasser utilized Cairo's radio, "Voice of the Arabs," to carry his views throughout the Arab world. Then, too, Cairo newspapers are read in large quantities in most major cities in the Middle East. He once criticized the United States' foreign policy for not being anti-colonial. According to him the real danger in the Middle East was colonialism and Zionism, not communism. He had this to say about colonialism:

There would not be any communist infiltration in any part of the Middle East and Africa if the United States could develop a courageous policy—and the only morally correct one—of supporting those who are anxious to get rid of foreign domination and exploitation. Real independence would be the greatest defense against communist or any other type of infiltration or aggression. Free men are the most fanatical defenders of their liberty. Nor do they lightly forget those who have championed their struggle for independence."

Syria was the first Arab country officially to sanction the views of Nasser. Syria also had received large quantities of Soviet arms and aid. On February 1, 1958, Syria and Egypt joined to form the United Arab Republic. Executive authority was to be vested in a President, aided by Executive Councils in the Syrian and Egyptian regions. Legislative authority would rest with a President appointed by an assembly consisting of both Syrian and Egyptians. Nasser became the first President of the Union. On March 8, 1958, Yemen also became

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associated with the United Arab Republic under the title of United Arab States. 8

Many Arab leaders were fearful of Nasser's achievements because of his rising popularity within their countries. This was particularly true of King Hussein of Jordan, Premier Nuri es-Said of Iraq and President Chamoun of Lebanon. All of them had been subjected to incessant attacks by Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs" for their pro-western tendencies. Consequently, they saw subversion supported by President Nasser as the greatest threat to their positions. This view was expressed by Mr. Jamali of Iraq as follows:

Now what is Nasserism? Is it a fiction or a reality? It is the designs of President Nasser to dominate the Arab World; or at least to turn the Arab States into satellites of Egypt. President Nasser applies practically the same communist methods of subversion as those used in Eastern Korea and Vietnam. An Arab State has to choose either to obey Nasser's policies and dictations, and be reduced to a satellite, or be subjected to violent attacks and subversion from President Nasser. 9

Iraq had a different view of the formation of the United Arab Republic. She has long rivaled Egypt for the leadership of the movement toward Arab unity. For years Iraqi leaders have dreamed of a "Fertile Crescent Union" consisting of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq under Hashimite control. Therefore, the formation of the United Arab Republic was a setback to Iraq's aspirations. Nevertheless, prompted at least in part by a desire to counteract the popular effects which the proclamation had upon its people, Iraq announced the formation

8Keith Wheelock, op. cit., pp. 175-183.

9Official Record of the Security Council (thirteenth year), 824th Meeting, p. 41.
of the Arab Federation. This Union bound the two Hashimite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan in a federal bond under Iraqi control. Other Arab states were invited to join.

It goes without saying that President Nasser was displeased by the formation of the Arab Federation. He stated that "it would be scattered like the winds," ¹⁰ and stepped up his propaganda broadcasts to Iraq and Jordan.

Arab nationalism has without question eased the path of Soviet advancement into the Middle East. However, this has not resulted from any inherent likeness between Arab nationalism and communism. It is true because the obstacles to Arab nationalism and the obstacles to Soviet penetration are identical. Nasser sees his main opposition in the Middle East coming from those who support the West. Since Nasser's victories have been at the expense of the West, they have been met with joy in the Soviet Union.

Nasser does not see himself as an agent of communist Russia. In fact, he outlawed the Communist Party in Egypt. His basic aim is to Egyptianize the Middle East. Consequently, he views anyone who stands in his way as an enemy to the cause. He once declared,

We say that we are in an Arab revolution which established . . . Arab unity and raised the flag of Arab Nationalism. So any person attempting to side-track this revolution must be corrected and any person who steps out of this revolution is an outsider, since he has turned his back on the principles and doctrines for which this Nation fought. . . . However, we will realize our goals and we will trample on anybody who stands in our way in this respect. This is our policy, fellow citizens, and neither Imperialism nor the imperialist stooges, American dollars, English sterling pounds, nor the stooges of Imperialism throughout the Arab world will be able to defeat us. This is true due to the fact that we represent a nation

which knows its path and a people which are aware that this strenuous path is the one which will lead to liberty, dignity and glory.\textsuperscript{11}

The Aims of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East

The Soviet Union’s desire is to control the Middle East and to use it as a wedge toward world domination. In carrying out this aim, she has used diplomatic, military, economic, and ideological weapons according to the needs of the moment. Defensively, the Soviet Union views western bases in the Middle East as a great danger and a menace to its security. Offensively, she knows that the control over the oil-rich area would tilt the balance of power in her favor. For Western Europe depends upon the Middle East for about ninety per cent of her crude oil.\textsuperscript{12} Hence, if the Soviet Union controlled this supply of oil, despite the fact that these countries are dependent upon Western Europe for their market, she would have Western Europe at a disadvantage. She could deny oil to these NATO countries in a time of crisis. This could bring about chaotic military and economic conditions, thus forcing them into submission. Furthermore, it would not be long before uncommitted countries of Asia and Africa submit to Soviet control. As a result, the balance of power would be in Russia’s favor.

In support of these aims, Russia’s policy in the Middle East has consisted mainly of projecting herself as the true friend and protector of Arab rights. Consequently, she had been able to make gains

\textsuperscript{11} Roy C. Macridis, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 358. \\
in the Arab world because the same targets of the militant Arab nationalists were also objects of vehement Soviet propaganda. She did this by redirecting toward the Soviet bloc much of the trade previously transacted with the West, and by supplying Egypt and Syria with Soviet bloc weapons and equipment. Less tangible but highly significant was Russia's support of Nasser during the Suez Crisis. This, of course, had a far reaching psychological effect throughout the Arab world. The Nasserists saw the Soviet Union as a champion of their cause. Despite these gains, however, Russian policy makers faced the problem of whether to support Nasser or the Communist party in Egypt. As we mentioned before, Nasser had openly attacked the Communist party. The Soviet rulers, seeing in Nasser a long term realization of their goals for the Middle East, continued to aid him at the expense of their Communist comrades. At any rate, the Soviet Union had gained a foothold in the Middle East by the time of the Lebanon Crisis.  

Heretofore, Middle Eastern interests were protected by Great Britain. However, the dangerous power vacuum created by the decline of British power forced the United States to take a more active part in Middle Eastern Affairs. As a result, the United States formulated three policies for the Middle East between 1947 and 1957. They were known as the Truman Doctrine, the Baghdad Pact, and the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine was a proclamation by President Truman on March 12, 1947, pledging American financial aid for military and economic support to Greece and Turkey. This was aimed at preventing the spread of Communism to the Middle East at the expense of these two states.

\[13\text{Campbell, op. cit., pp. 185-200.}\]
The Baghdad Pact (an American idea) was in a sense an extension of the Truman Doctrine. It was formulated in 1955 for the purpose of strengthening the "northern tier" in the hope of providing a defense system for the entire Middle East. Unlike the Truman Doctrine, it was a military alliance consisting of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, and Great Britain. The United States did not join the pact for fear of alienating Nasser of Egypt. Nasser opposed the Pact because it was western-sponsored. Then, too, Nasser knew that to join the Baghdad Pact would have meant giving up a position of pre-eminence for one of subordination.

Until Secretary Dulles and the British proposed the Baghdad Pact at the beginning of 1955, American-Egyptian relations went relatively smooth, with the United States beginning to extend the economic aid which Nasser sought and needed. Publically, since the beginning of his visible assumption of power, Nasser had lashed out at the West, including the United States, whenever he felt his "positive neutrality" was being subjected to pressure. Thus, it was then that the image of an anti-Western Nasser began to rise among the people of the West.

The Baghdad Pact proved to be inadequate in halting Soviet advances in the Middle East mainly for two reasons. First, the Pact was unpopular with the Arabs who saw "Western Imperialism" as a greater threat than Russian domination. Second, instead of confronting the Middle East with military force, Russia bypassed the northern tier defense by making considerable gains in the heart of the Arab world. She did

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14 The Middle East Journal (Spring, 1955), p. 177.
15 Campbell, op. cit., pp. 63-73.
this by aiding, trading, supplying arms, and identifying herself with
the hopes and aspirations of the militant Arab Nationalists.

It was Nasser's intrigues in other Arab states which began
the deterioration of American-Egyptian relations. Mr. Dulles was con-
vinced that Egyptian Agents were attempting to embarrass the Pro-Western
governments of Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan. In the eyes of the Secretary
of State, Nasser had become the man who had introduced the Soviets
to the Middle East, thereby undercutting Dulles' efforts to keep
them out.16 Because of Nasser's flirtation with the Soviets and his
hostilities toward the West, the United States withdrew its offer to
help finance the Aswan Dam Project. This marked a change in United
States policy toward Nasser. From this point up to the Crisis of 1956
the United States was willing to watch Nasser flirt with the Soviet
Union in the hope that experience would show him the danger of becom-
ing involved with Russia. However, after the Suez Crisis of 1956, the
United States became thoroughly disillusioned with Nasser and would
liked to have seen him ousted. Yet, the United States was unwilling to
use force for fear of losing the entire Middle East.17

Nevertheless, concerned over the spread of Soviet influence in
the Middle East, and alarmed over hostilities of the Arab Nationalists
toward the west, President Eisenhower came forth on January 5, 1957 with
a fundamental policy statement. This statement which came to be known
as the Eisenhower Doctrine, was intended to warn the Soviet Union against
encroachments in the Middle East, and to assure those Arab countries

17Campbell, op. cit., pp. 73-79.
subjected to communist aggression of American help. He stressed the
economic and strategic importance of the Middle East, and asked Congress
for funds designed to assist in the development of economic strength
to undertake a program of military assistance. Through this program,
Eisenhower asked Congress to authorize the use of American troops to
"secure and protect the territorial integrity and independence of such
nations requesting such aid against overt aggression from any nation
controlled by international communism."18 Congress responded by voting
two hundred million dollars to implement the President's program. The
joint resolution passed by Congress stated:

The United States regards as vital to the National interest and
world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of
the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President de-
termines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use
armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations re-
questing assistance against armed aggression from any country con-
trolled by international communism; provided that such employment
shall be consistent with the treaty obligations of the United Na-
tions and with the Constitution of the United States.19

An evaluation of the Eisenhower Doctrine shows that there
were many inherent weaknesses in it. For one thing, there was the sup-
position that Russia would either openly attack the Middle East or
sponsor attacks by one Arab nation against another. This assumption
was negated by the fact that the Soviet Union had made inroads in the
Arab world by using political strategy rather than violence. Further-
more, the doctrine implied that the Arab nations were also fearful of
Soviet domination, while the Arabs regarded Zionism and colonialism as

18Council of Foreign Affairs, Documents on American Foreign
the President's message to Congress.

the real threats to their independence. Consequently, they viewed the Eisenhower Doctrine as an attempt to stop movements of liberation and Pan-Arabism. Yet, not all Arab states shared this view. Iraq and Saudi Arabia did not disapprove of the Doctrine, while Lebanon accepted it before it was formally approved by Congress.

Despite its weaknesses, the Eisenhower Doctrine had many strong points. By making its presence felt, through the enunciation of the Doctrine, the United States had shown its willingness to fill the vacuum created by the decline in British power. Although some Arabs believed that the safety of the Middle East should be the sole concern of the Arab countries, the fact remained that they were too weak to successfully defend themselves. Therefore, the Eisenhower Doctrine served as a warning to Russia that any Soviet miscalculations in the Middle East would be met by force. Finally, it laid the framework in which the United States could take action in the event that Russia did commit aggression in the Arab world.

The resolution (H. J. Res. 117, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.) was approved by the House on January 30, 1957 by a vote of 355 to 61. The Senate, however, amended it as public law No. 85, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., March 9, 1957. This resolution was approved by the Senate on March 5, 1957 and by the House on March 7, 1957.
CHAPTER II

THE CRISIS AND THE UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS

Now that the overriding issues in the Middle East affecting the Lebanon situation have been introduced, it becomes necessary to bring them into perspective and show how these issues, coupled with the complex internal politics of Lebanon, forced the crisis into the United Nations for a solution.

Lebanon's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union are easier to discern than her relations with her Arab neighbors. Lebanon had shown on many occasions a desire to cultivate friendship with the United States. The American University in Beirut, American oil companies and air lines in Lebanon served as important links between the two countries. Other evidence of Lebanon's pro-Western orientation was the fact that she refused to recognize some of the Soviet Satellite regimes in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, she endorsed the United Nations' stand against North Korea as well as other pro-Western policies. Lebanon's representative, Dr. Malik, went on record as favoring a Middle Eastern defense against international communism. Furthermore, we recall that she was the only Arab country to formally accept the Eisenhower doctrine.1

1When the Baghdad Pact was introduced to the Middle East in 1954-1955, Lebanon was exposed to many pressures and embarrassments. Consequently, she would have welcomed the economic and military assistance from the West. However, fearful of a tourist and investment boycott by Egypt, she refused to join the Pact. Yet, she later accepted the Eisenhower doctrine because of strained relations with Syria.
As for her relations with her Arab neighbors, Lebanon is motivated by the same two factors which influence her dealings with the big powers; mainly her essential Arab character and her Christian majority. The fact that she is an Arab country with many Arab traditions and customs, Lebanon is generally in agreement with other Arab states on "Arab issues" such as the Palestinian controversy. On the other hand, the Christians, fearful of their Moslem neighbors in the Middle East, opposed plans of Pan-Arabism that threatened Lebanon's independence. This explains why she supported a weak Arab League on the one hand and opposed a Greater Syrian Union scheme on the other. The same fear has caused the Christians to view the West as their hope to protect Lebanon's sovereignty.

Some Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria, resented Lebanon's pro-Western attitude. Most violent in her criticisms was Syria. The troubles between Syria and Lebanon were deeply rooted. To many Syrian and Lebanese Moslems, the separation of the two countries was a French attempt to perpetuate Christianity in the Middle East. Thus, they believed that it was only a matter of time before the two states would be reunited under Syrian control. During the latter part of the 1950's, Syria chose to follow the lead of Nasser toward closer relations with Russia and Pan-Arabism while Lebanon chose the West. Relations between the two countries became severely strained when political refugees from Syria (particularly members of the National Socialist party) were allowed to use Lebanon as a base for their operations. At the same time, many Sunni-Moslems in Lebanon looked to Syria for leadership.

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2Campbell, op. cit., pp. 290-292.

Internally, Lebanon's political and economic life was complicated by the same religious division that conditioned its international relations. Although the Christians have a slight majority, the Moslems are more unified. Nevertheless, the President of the Republic is, without exception, always a Christian, and the lesser position of Prime Minister is held by a Moslem. While the constitution of Lebanon made no provision for the religious affiliation of the President, a tradition grew that he should be Maronite Christian, his prime minister a Sunnite Moslem, and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shiite Moslem. Seats in the Chamber were distributed among the various religious denominations in proportion to their numerical strength. As a result of this arrangement, the Christians usually got most of the political patronage, the higher positions in the army and the best cabinet posts.⁴

Although the religious division was a source of irritation, other internal factors also contributed to the unrest in Lebanon. Many political leaders became disillusioned with President Chamoun. Camille Chamoun had come to power in a bloodless revolution in 1952, generally referred to as the "Inkibal" (Overtur). He was under attack by the Moslem leaders for not pursuing a neutral foreign policy. As it has been pointed out, the Moslem community regarded Nasser as their champion and hero.⁵ Hence, they became outraged when Chamoun refused to break off diplomatic relations with France and Great Britain during the Suez Crisis. They could barely restrain themselves when Chamoun accepted the

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⁴Ibid.

⁵The Christians considered public display of Nasser's portrait an insult to the idea of Lebanese independence and on some occasions reacted by violently removing them. New York Times (May 9, 1968), p. 18.
Eisenhower Doctrine.

Many Christians showed concern over Chamoun's pro-Western tendencies. They believed that Chamoun had taken Lebanon too fast and too far into the Western camp. They felt that it was unwise to overtax the patience of their Moslem brethren. Most influential among Chamoun's Christian dissenters was the Patriarch of the Maronite Church, Paul Msouchi. Then there was a report that President Chamoun planned to manipulate the system of proportional representation so as to gain a two-thirds majority in order to amend the constitution to allow himself to run for a second term. By the Constitution, the President, who is elected by Parliament, is limited to a six-year term. Chamoun had succeeded in gaining a solid majority in the election of 1957. In the process, he had also succeeded in ousting certain pro-Nasser Moslem leaders such as Abdullah Yafi, Kamal Jumblatt, Ahmad Asad and Saeb Salem. 

Chamoun believed that he had to maintain control of the government in order to keep the Pan-Arabists from joining forces with Nasser. By this time, however, Pan-Arabism had scored a victory with the Union of Syria and Egypt in the United Arab Republic. Finally, Chamoun had antagonized many of those who had supported him during the "Inkilab" by not carrying out his promises of radical social and economic reforms.

The spark that eventually led to open conflict was the assassination of Nassib Metni, owner of an anti-Chamoun newspaper, on May 8, 1958. During the same day, homes of officials of Chamoun's government were

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6 These men were tribal and religious leaders as well as politicians. For instance, Kamal Jumblatt was the spiritual leader of the Druze tribe which extended across the border of Lebanon into Syria.

7 James S. Raleigh, op. cit., p. 10.
riddled by machine gun fire and bomb blasts. The day after these incidents took place, the United States Information Service Library in Tripoli was sacked and burned by anti-Chamoun terrorists. Within a matter of days, fighting had become widespread, and an armed insurrection had become a fact.

Who was fighting whom? For the most part, the rebel leaders consisted of a loose coalition of those men who had lost the election in 1957, a few pro-Nasserists in Bekaa Valley and a few Christians, noticeably René Muawad in Northern Lebanon. On the side of the government were the Christian Maronite party (Phalanges Libanaise) and the National Socialist Party (P.P.S.).

Reports began to come into the American Embassy in Beirut stating that Syrians were infiltrating into Lebanon by the hundreds. The Lebanese government stated that at one time at least one hundred and twenty Syrians of the Druze tribe had crossed the border to aid the rebel leader Kamal Jumblat.9

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Charles Malik declared flatly that the United Arab Republic was responsible for the conditions in Lebanon.10 Subsequently, he sent a letter to the United Arab Republic charging it with massive interference in Lebanon's internal affairs. These charges were described by Sayed Fahmi, Deputy Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic as "mere unjustifiable allegations."11 At this juncture in the crisis, the United States Department of State announced that the

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9Ibid. (May 12, 1958), p. 15.
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean would be reinforced and that, at the request of the Lebanese government, it was rushing shipments of police equipment to that country. In support of these measures, the State Department issued a statement declaring that the United States government "has profoundly admired the valiant efforts of Lebanon in recent days to minimize its internal security, and defend its national integrity." On May 18, the Soviet News Agency, Tass, accused the United States of interfering in the internal affairs of Lebanon, and scoffed at the charges that the United Arab Republic was supporting the rebels against the government. It further stated that "Western activities would have serious consequences for Lebanon and the Middle East."

As world concern began to take shape, the fighting in Lebanon continued. However, the nature of the fighting, to some extent, reflected the perplexed political and religious division of the country. While fighting went on in many parts of the country, especially in Bekaa, Tripoli and Basta, there was peace and serenity along Beirut's Gold Coast. The army played mostly a referee's role. They fired only when fired upon, held phone conversations with the rebels, transported wounded rebels, and allowed their leaders to move about freely in order to transact business. The army permitted the bulk of the fighting to be carried on by armed civilians backed by a few gendarmes. The

14This fact was confirmed by the United Nations Observation Group. In a report to the Secretary Council, it stated that "a well armed regular army could wipe out the ill-organized opposition force at will." It further stated that "the Lebanese Army was not going all out to end the conflict." U. N. Doc. S/4069 (July 30, 1958).
reasons it played such a strange role are many. First of all, most of the rebels were Moslems. General Fuad Chihab, the army’s commander, feared that an all-out offensive against the rebels would lead to a hard-fought war that would split the country down the middle between Christians and Moslems. Secondly, President Chamoun did not appear to have the popular support of more than one-third of the country at any time during the crisis. Finally, General Chihab himself probably hoped to become a compromise presidential candidate. He had played a similar role during the 1952 revolution and was chosen President then only to step down and let Chamoun take over.

Meanwhile, according to the United States Department of State, the rebels were receiving large supplies of arms and munitions from the United Arab Republic by way of Syria. This was made possible by the fact that the rebels controlled more than ninety per cent of the long boundary between Syria and Lebanon.\textsuperscript{15}

Was Nasser aiding the rebels? It is not certain whether the initial intervention orders came from Cairo or Damascus. Nevertheless, it was clear that Nasser disliked Chamoun and wanted him out of the way. The United States had irrefutable evidence that the rebels were receiving aid from Syria. Mr. Dulles stated in a news conference,

There is irrefutable evidence of the intervention through radio and press--government controlled radio--in the internal affairs of Lebanon and inciting of the people to violence. Also there is increasingly coming evidence that that violence is abetted by the actual supply of military equipment and ammunition.\textsuperscript{16}

Consequently, it was felt in Washington that if Nasser did not initiate the action against Chamoun, he had encouraged it and was doing nothing to

stop it.\textsuperscript{17}

At any rate, Chamoun, disturbed over the turn of events, began to take drastic measures. He deported almost one thousand Syrians and appealed to the Arab League and to the United Nations for help. The Arab League met for six days, and could not agree upon anything except that there should be harmony among the Arab States. It ended its consideration of the Lebanese complaint after the Lebanese delegation rejected a resolution requesting her to withdraw her complaint from the United Nations' Security Council. Lebanon knew that the Arab League would be ineffective in dealing with the matter because it was dominated by Egyptian influence.\textsuperscript{18} Nevertheless, she wanted the United Nations to know that she had exhausted all other possibilities before bringing the matter to the Security Council for its consideration.\textsuperscript{19}

**Debate in the Security Council**

Addressing the Security Council, Mar. Malik of Lebanon explained that while the Arab League delayed action on the matter, and appealed for Arab harmony, the situation was becoming more intense. He proceeded to state Lebanon's claim against the United Arab Republic. According to him the United Arab Republic was guilty of "massive and unprovoked intervention in the affairs of Lebanon." He presented to the Security Council what he called "six sets of facts" to substantiate his claims. They were as follows:

\textsuperscript{17}Tbid., p. 17.


\textsuperscript{19}Official Record of the General Assembly (thirteenth year), 823rd meeting, p. 4.
(a) The supply of arms on a large scale from the United Arab Republic to subversive elements in Lebanon.

(b) The training in subversion on the territory of the United Arab Republic of elements from Lebanon and the sending of these elements back to Lebanon to subvert their government.

(c) The participation of United Arab Republic civilian nationals, residing in or passing into Lebanon, in subversive or terrorist activities in Lebanon.

(d) The participation of United Arab Republic governmental elements in subversive and terrorist activities, and in the direction of rebellion in Lebanon.

(e) The violent and utterly unprecedented radio campaigns conducted by the United Arab Republic against the government of Lebanon.

(f) The violent and utterly unprecedented press campaigns conducted by the United Arab Republic against the government of Lebanon.²⁰

Mr. Loufti of the United Arab Republic repudiated these claims, contending that the government of Lebanon was attempting to divert world attention from the domestic problems of that country. The cold war cleavage clearly manifested itself in the debate that ensued. The representatives of Britain, France, and the United States supported Lebanon, while the Soviet Union supported the United Arab Republic. The delegates from Canada, Guatemala, Japan and Sweden expressed concern over the matter, but declined to comment on the substance of the issue. They felt that the Arab League Council had not given sufficient information about its

²⁰Official Record of the Security Council (thirteenth year), 823rd meeting, p. 4.
handling of the case. Mr. Lodge of the United States reported that his
country hoped that the Security Council would help bring an end to the
intervention by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of
Lebanon. He further stated:

... it was clear that there had been outside interference in the
internal affairs of the Republic of Lebanon and that this inter-
ference has been dedicated to promote civil strife and to impede
the efforts of the constituted authorities to restore order and
tranquility, and that the interference has occurred from the
territory, via the facilities of the United Arab Republic.21

Summing up his country's views on the issue, Mr. Sobolev of the
Soviet Union stated that the matter was purely an internal problem only
to be dealt with by the Lebanese people themselves. He also claimed
that there was nothing substantial to the charges presented by the
Lebanese representative to illustrate a problem of international magni-
tude.

Mr. Jamali of Iraq attributed the chaotic condition in Lebanon
to the Soviet Union's quest to gain a foothold in the Middle East through
"Nasserism." According to him:

The situation in Lebanon is not an internal question at all.
It is true that there may be dissatisfied opposition. It is true
that some Lebanese do not wish the President to be re-elected. But
that in itself would not have caused the magnitude of disorders
and bloodshed which it has were it not for the working of external
forces. I submit that the trouble in Lebanon is essentially an
international problem. It reflects the influence of the Soviet
Union and its work through the United Arab Republic to have a foot-
hold in the Middle East. After all, it is the Soviet Union that is
inspiring President Nasser's domination over the Arab world. It
was the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, who told
President Nasser on May 16, 1958, 'We desire the unification of
the Arab people under your leadership and to achieve these ends
you will receive all necessary assistance from us to make you
affirm it.' Mr. Khrushchev simply voiced what President Nasser

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21 Ibid., p. 47.
and his followers are dreaming of achieving.\textsuperscript{22}

The Security Council was faced with the immediate task of preventing the situation from worsening more so than pointing out the guilty parties. Consequently, on June 11, a draft resolution submitted by Sweden, which authorized the sending of an Observation Group to Lebanon, passed by a vote of sixteen to none. The operative paragraph of this resolution was as follows: "The Security Council . . . decides to dispatch urgently an Observation Group to Lebanon so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese border."\textsuperscript{23}

The Soviet Union abstained from voting on this resolution because Lebanon and the United Arab Republic did not object to it. Since the United Arab Republic was claiming to be an innocent bystander, she obviously had no other choice but to go along with the resolution. However, the Soviet Union would have preferred that the United Nations stay out altogether. On the other hand, the United States welcomed this move to stabilize the situation. Furthermore, the United States had hoped that the United Nations' Observation Group's report of infiltration would provide the basis for further action by the United Nations or by individual members.\textsuperscript{24} Other members of the Security Council believed that this resolution would do two things. First, it would discourage support of the rebels, thereby leaving the Crisis in the

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., p. 37.


hands of the Lebanese government. Secondly, it would prevent the big powers from intervening. At any rate, the task of organizing the Observation Group was left with the Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld.

Observation Group

Mr. Hammarskjöld played an important part on behalf of the United Nations. Immediately after the resolution was passed authorizing the Observation Group, he appointed Mr. Galo Plaza of Ecuador, Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal of India, and Major General Odd Bull of Norway as its top three administrators. He further saw to it that the Group had the necessary equipment and set about recruiting other personnel to serve with it. In addition to this, he reported to the Security Council on the progress of the group.\textsuperscript{25} On June 16, 1958, in his first report to the Security Council, Mr. Hammarskjöld announced that Major General Odd Bull was appointed executive member in charge of the United Nations Truce Supervision force in Palestine. Major General Von Horn was requested to transfer ten United Nations Military observers from truce supervision in the Gaza Strip to the Observation Group. Field stations were established at Tripoli, Baalbek and Marjouyoun. The observer teams were each composed of two observers with a communication jeep painted white with United Nations insignia. The government of Lebanon had helped to facilitate the efforts of the Observation Group by designating a minister to be in charge of relations between the government and the Group.\textsuperscript{26}


\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., Annex I.
giving the members of the Group diplomatic privileges and immunities.\textsuperscript{27} The report also stated that the Group began active reconnaissance on the morning of June 13 in Beirut and its surrounding areas.

Mr. Hammarskjold held a press conference on June 26, and passed on the following information about the progress of the group. The group met on June 19 and designated Mr. Galo Plaza as its chairman. As of June 26, ninety-four officers from eleven countries were serving as military observers in Lebanon. Also, a fully operational radio and communication system had been installed for contact between group headquarters, observation outstations and jeeps circulating within the area assigned for observation.\textsuperscript{28}

After being selected chairman of the group, Mr. Galo Plaza stated that the mission of the group was observation and not police action. Its objective was "to stop infiltration by spotting it and exposing it to world opinion."\textsuperscript{29}

The group made its first official report to the Security Council on July 3. In a section covering observations made by the Group it was stated:

The arms that were seen consisted mostly of a varied assortment of rifles of British, French, and Italian makes. Some hand grenades were also seen at various places. Occasionally opposition elements have been found with machine guns. Mines seen near the Baalbek area were of British and French makes. It has not been possible to establish where these arms were acquired, but in this connection the remarks in paragraph eleven of this report must be borne in mind.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., Annex II.


\textsuperscript{29}New York Times (June 25, 1958), p. 2.

\textsuperscript{30}Paragraph 11 of this report emphasized the complex border situa-
armed men observed had infiltrated from outside; there is little doubt, however, that the vast majority were in any case Lebanese.31

Mr. Galo Plaza added that the observers considered the situation in Lebanon a Civil War, although "a civil war might be of foreign inspiration."32 Mr. Hammarskjold was also quoted as having said: "The phrase 'massive infiltration' was unwarranted to the best of my knowledge."33

Conclusions of the Observation Group aroused much criticism in Lebanon and in western countries. The government of Lebanon wrote a letter to the Secretary-General protesting what it called the Observation Group's inadequate report. Lebanon stated three theses: first, the Group's report that it had been impossible to establish if any of the men who had infiltrated from outside was "either inconclusive or misleading and unwarranted." There were not enough observation outposts or observers (by August) and no patrols were carried out at night. Thirdly, the Observation Group did admit directly or indirectly that there existed illegal infiltration of men and arms.34

31 Ibid.,
33 Ibid., p. 2.
What had the Observation Group accomplished? At this point, the Group had functioned inadequately because it could only patrol the small border area held by the government. Furthermore, the fighting continued inside Lebanon in the presence of the group. However, the Observation Group did act as a buffer between Syria and Lebanon and probably discouraged any invasion attempts by the United Arab Republic.\textsuperscript{35} The Secretary General had stated that the objective of the Observation Group was to patrol the border and not to stop the fighting. Nevertheless, the Chamoun government complained that the situation had worsened and appealed to the United States for help under the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Observation Group's report had caused the State Department to question the usefulness of the United Nations in the crisis. Now the United States was faced with the prospect of damaging the image of the United Nations by by-passing it and sending troops to Lebanon.

\textsuperscript{35}New York Times (July 4, 1958), p. 5.
CHAPTER III

THE CRISIS AND THE UNITED STATES

The United States Intervenes

The fall of the pro-Western government in Iraq on July 14 greatly affected the crisis in Lebanon. Fearing the same fate for Lebanon, the United States sent troops to help protect that area. The United Kingdom sent forces to Jordan for the same reason. These measures caused a deadlock in the Security Council. At the same time, Prime Minister Khrushchev proposed a summit conference to discuss the situation in the Middle East.

The coup d'etat in Iraq was accomplished by a group purportedly friendly to Nasser and the Soviet Union. Its leaders were Brigadier General Abdel Karim al Kassim and Lieutenant General Naquib el Ribeii. King Faisal II, Crown Prince Abdul Illah (Faisal's uncle), and Premier Nuri-al-Said were all massacred. The coup was staged at a time when King Faisal was about to meet with the Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact. At first, the fate of the king was not known. Later, it was learned that a mob had stormed the palace, had murdered King Faisal, and had dragged his body through the streets. The rebel government, upon coming to power, proclaimed that it had liberated the country from the domination of a corrupt group which had been installed by "Imperialism to lull the people."1 It also proclaimed that it would work to preserve

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Iraq's unity and to maintain brotherly ties with the other Arab countries. In keeping with this proclamation, the new government abandoned the Arab Federation and announced its recognition of the United Arab Republic. (The former government had refrained from such recognition.) It then suddenly announced that it wanted to preserve friendly ties with the West, and that all foreign persons and private property would be protected. The new rulers pointed out that they had no intentions of nationalizing the oil companies within Iraq. As for the Baghdad Pact, the new Minister of the Interior, Mohammad Aref, stated that Iraq would continue to remain in it so long as it would serve her purpose.  

What did the coup mean to the United States? And how did it fit into the Lebanon crisis? The revolt in Iraq was a blow to the prestige of the West and of the United States primarily because of the Baghdad Pact. Iraq's Nuri al-Said had been the West's choice to counteract Nasser's militant nationalism in the Middle East. Now with Nuri al-Said gone, it was hard to believe that Iraq would remain in the Baghdad Pact, despite the new regime's announced intentions to do so. Consequently, as the United States labored incessantly to prevent Lebanon from falling, a much larger country of more strategic value fell unexpectedly. The West feared that the fall of Iraq meant another step toward Nasserism and eventually more ground gained by Russia. It was also generally believed in the Western world that with Iraq gone it was only a matter of time before Lebanon and other friendly states would succumb to the same fate.

The coup had a profound effect upon the internal situation in Lebanon. The rebels received encouragement from the news at a time when

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2 Ibid., p. 2.
it was believed that they were ready to submit to a compromise. Meanwhile, President Chamoun and his cabinet decided to appeal to the United States for troops. Mr. Dulles, the Secretary of State, had stated previously, when asked if the United States would send troops to Lebanon, that it would be a last resort.\footnote{Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX (July 21, 1958), pp. 105-106. The news conference was held July 1, 1958.} Up to this point the United States had been sending Lebanon arms and financial aid. Now it appeared time to take more decisive action.

In making his decision to send troops to Lebanon, President Eisenhower had to weight the alternatives and consequences of such a decision. How would Nasser and Khrushchev react to American troops in Lebanon? Would this be the prelude to complete deterioration of stability in the Middle East, and a third World War? What effect would intervention have upon the integrity of the United Nations and international law, and upon the relations between the United States and other members of the United Nations?

On July 15, President Eisenhower had dispatched warships and troop transports of the Sixth Fleet to Lebanon. (They had been in that area since the middle of June.) The United States landed troops in Lebanon up until August 5. By this date, it was reported that over 14,000 American marines and seventy-five tanks were landed there. There were never any engagements involving the marines and the rebels.

In conjunction with his action in sending troops, the President called for an emergency meeting of the Security Council in order to make known the position of the United States. His next step was to
inform the American people. He did this by issuing a statement to the press, by sending a special message to Congress and by addressing the people over radio and television. In his statement, he had this to say:

Yesterday morning, I received from President Chamoun of Lebanon an urgent plea that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon to help maintain security, and to evidence the concern of the United States for the integrity and independence of Lebanon. President Chamoun's appeal was made with the concurrence of all the members of the Lebanon Cabinet . . . In response to the appeal from the government of Lebanon, the United States has dispatched a contingent of United States forces to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese government in defense of Lebanese security and integrity. These forces have not been sent as an act of War . . . The United States believes that the United Nations can and should take measures which are adequate to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. It is apparent, however, that in the face of the tragic and shocking events that are occurring nearby, more will be required than the team of United Nations observers now in Lebanon.  

Throughout his speeches, the President stated emphatically that the United States did not intend to undermine the action taken by the United Nations. He made this point to assure members of the United Nations that the United States still believed that the United Nations has the primary responsibility for keeping the peace. In one speech, he exclaimed: "We reacted as we did within a matter of hours because the situation was such that only prompt action would suffice."  

President Eisenhower had decided that the greatest danger to American interest in the Middle East was to let Nasserism go unchallenged. Consequently, it was believed that the decision to send troops had a greater effect in giving reassurance to small nations that the United States would come to their aid in times of crisis. As for international

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5 Ibid., p. 183.
law, the United States would have to prove that subversion and infiltration from outside was a fact in order to justify its intervention in Lebanon.\(^6\) Under-Secretary of State Herter presented such evidence to Congress.\(^7\) According to P. B. Potter, an authority on International Law, the most plausible ground for the landing of military forces of the United States is found in the invitation of Chamoun, the duly elected head of the Lebanese government. Another plausible basis for intervention is the right to use force for protection of nationals and their property. Finally, there was Article 51 of the U. N. Charter.\(^8\)

What immediate impact did the presence of American troops have upon the crisis? At first, it appeared as though the Observation Group resented the presence of the United States forces. They announced that they were not going to establish any contact or working relations with the United States troops. In an official report to the Security Council, the Observation Group stated that the impact of the landing of United States troops in Beirut caused much difficulty to the operation of the group at that time.\(^9\)

Nevertheless, their appearance served as a much needed shot in the arm to encourage the dispirited Lebanese government. President Chamoun stated in a national broadcast that he was grateful to President Eisenhower for sending troops; and that he had exhausted all other


resources before asking for direct armed support. He added: "The request to the United Nations and the Arab League were ineffective."\textsuperscript{10}

At the same time that Iraq and Lebanon were beset with internal difficulties, Jordan was also plagued with political difficulties. At least sixty army officers had been arrested for an attempt to overthrow the government of King Hussein, cousin to ex-King Faisal of Iraq. Hussein claimed that he, too, had been the victim of Nasserism and outside meddling in Jordan's internal affairs. It must be noted that in 1957 similar troubles had occurred in Jordan.\textsuperscript{11} The presence of the atomic-armed Sixth Fleet in the area, ordered there by President Eisenhower, probably prevented the fall of King Hussein's regime at that time. The President had intended this to be a show of strength. Now King Hussein's throne was again in danger. When the government of Iraq fell, he appealed to both the United States and Britain for help. Prior to making these appeals, King Hussein had announced that he was the head of the Arab Union, and urged the people of Iraq to quell the revolt. Hussein had hoped to use American and British troops to turn the rebels out of Iraq. In response to his request, Great Britain sent about 3,000 paratroopers to Jordan. The Prime Minister of Great Britain justified his action by saying that these steps were taken in order to help maintain stability in Jordan and thus help preserve international peace. Jordan next broke off diplomatic ties with the United Arab Republic and submitted a complaint against her to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11}James S. Raleigh, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 16-20.
The strategy in Washington and London appeared to prevent the fall of Chamoun and Hussein and to back an offensive from Jordan against Iraq in order to restore the monarchy under King Hussein. They feared that the rebel regime in Iraq would soon turn on Jordan. However, such a move might have brought about a violent Soviet protest in the form of troops in the Middle East. Consequently, Great Britain and the United States chose to wait and see in Iraq. Nasser, fearful that any British and American-backed invasion of Iraq would be a prelude to an invasion of the United Arab Republic, sought and got Russia's support. However, he was just as reluctant to have Soviet troops in the Middle East as he was to have Western troops there. Consequently, he urged Khrushchev to wait until the intentions of Great Britain and the United States were clearly manifested before making a final decision.

Britain's intervention in Jordan created the following situation: Now the Security Council was confronted with the problem of keeping the big powers from clashing over the crisis there. In addition to the Lebanese complaint, there was now the complaint of Jordan against the United Arab Republic for similar allegations. It should be noted that at the time when Britain was sending troops into Jordan, the Soviet Union was attacking the United States in the Security Council for sending troops to Lebanon.

Deadlock in the Security Council

The Security Council met in response to President Eisenhower's

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\textsuperscript{13} The United States in World Affairs, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 204-205.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
call on July 15th and stayed in session until August 7. Needless to say, the active participation in the Middle East by two of the Council’s permanent members, over the objection of another made the Security Council ineffective in dealing further with the crisis. The Secretary-General appeared to be displeased with the action taken by the United States. He expressed the feeling that the action taken by the United States was a bit premature. Furthermore, he felt that the Observation Group’s work had been impaired by the presence of American troops.  

Three discernible divisions emerged during this session. Standing somewhat between the irreconcilable positions of the Soviet Union and the United States were Japan and Sweden. Japan disapproved of the presence of American and British troops in the Middle East and felt that the best thing to do was to get them out as quickly as possible. Her dissent was not as vehement as that of the Soviet Union. Sweden felt that the United States had no legal basis for sending troops to Lebanon. Her representative, Dr. Jorring, stated that the action taken by the United States could be proven to be contrary to the spirit of Article 2, paragraph 7, and not within the limits of Article 51 of the Charter.  


16 Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter states: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to the settlement under the present Charters; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

Article 51 of the Charter states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurred against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
He asserted that:

... one condition for Article 51 of the charter to be applicable is that an armed attack has occurred against a member state. The Swedish government does not consider that there is an international conflict in the terms of Article 51. Action now taken by the United States government has substantially altered the conditions of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon and the question is whether in practice, they are able to fulfill their task as set forth in the Council's resolution of June 11. In the opinion of the Swedish government the proper course to take might be to suspend until further notice the activities carried out by the United Nation's Observation group in Lebanon.17

The United States, according to Mr. Lodge, believed that its action was complementary to the Council's resolution of June 11. In his words:

Now I need scarcely say that we are the first to admit that the dispatch of United States forces to Lebanon is not an ideal way to solve present problems, and they will be withdrawn as soon as the United Nations can take over. In fact, the United States government hopes that the United Nations itself will soon be able to assume these responsibilities. We intend to consult with the Secretary-General and with other delegations urgently on a resolution to achieve these objectives. Until then, the presence of the United States troops in Lebanon will be a constructive contribution to the objectives the Security Council had in mind when it passed the June 11th resolution, dealing with the problem.18

Taking the opposite view, the delegate of the Soviet Union vehemently attacked the United States and the United Kingdom throughout this session for what he called "armed intervention." In his attack on the United States, he had this to say:

the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

17Official Record of the Security Council (thirteenth year), 830th meeting, p. 9.

18Ibid., 827th meeting, p. 3.
There is factual evidence that Lebanon had been threatened and is being threatened, not by intervention in its internal affairs by the United Arab Republic, but by direct military intervention by the United States and its Western partners who are trying to maintain in power by armed force a government whose policies and actions are vigorously rejected by the Lebanese people. It is no secret that the United States and other western powers counted on being able to use the United Nations' Observation Group sent to Lebanon to justify their plans for intervention against the Arab people. But their hopes were not fulfilled. The Observation Group took an objective position and rightly appraised the events taking place in Lebanon as a matter of concern to the Lebanese people . . . The Security Council, bearing in mind the responsibilities vested in it by the United Nations Charter in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, must take decisive measures to put an end to armed intervention in the affairs of the Arab States and to ensure peace and tranquility in that part of the world.19

While debating the issues in the Security Council, the Soviet Union threatened a world war if the United States and Great Britain did not withdraw their troops. Khrushchev was hoping that his threats, coupled with world opinion, would force the two countries to pull their troops out of the Middle East. On the other hand, Great Britain and the United States were willing to withdraw their troops, but not because of Khrushchev's insistence. They wanted the United Nations to replace the Observation Group with a fighting force.

Further evidence of the bitterness that prevailed during this session of the Security Council was its failure to agree upon many of the numerous draft resolutions submitted to it for passage (except one calling for an emergency session of the General Assembly.) The Soviet Union laid the groundwork for the stalemate by submitting a draft resolution that asked the United States to "cease armed intervention" in Lebanon and to withdraw its troops immediately.20 The next draft

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19 Ibid., p. 18.

resolution to be submitted was put forth by Mr. Lodge of the United States. It called for the Secretary-General to make use of contingents by other members states "to help protect the integrity and independence of Lebanon."\textsuperscript{21} Before the Council could vote on these two, Sweden submitted a draft resolution that called for the suspension of the Observation Group until further notice.\textsuperscript{22} The representative of Sweden stated that his government had felt all along that the presence of American troops in Lebanon had a negative effect upon the operation of the Observation Group. The Soviet Union submitted a revised draft to the first draft resolution. The revised draft stated:

\begin{quote}
The Security Council:
\hspace{1em}Considering that the action of the United States and the United Kingdom constitutes a serious threat to international peace;
\hspace{1em}calls upon the governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to cease armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab States and to remove their troops from the territories of Lebanon and Jordan immediately.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

Here again, the Soviet Union was trying to portray itself as the champion of the Arab cause. The United States was not going to vote for this resolution. At its 854th meeting held on July 18th, the Council proceeded to vote on the draft resolutions before it. The Soviet Union's revised draft resolution was rejected by a vote of eight to one. Japan and Sweden abstained. Next, the United States' draft resolution received nine votes for and one against; Sweden abstained. The negative vote was a veto by the Soviet Union. The Swedish draft resolution was rejected by a vote of nine to two. Sweden and the Soviet Union were the

only members to vote for it. After the voting, Mr. Lodge submitted another draft resolution which called for the convening of the General Assembly in an emergency special session. It stated that:

Due to lack of unanimity of its permanent members, the Security Council . . . decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly, as provided in General Assembly resolutions 337 (V), in order to make appropriate recommendations concerning the Lebanon complaint.24

Before a vote was taken, on this draft resolution, Japan submitted one that called for an increase in the United Nations Observation Group.25 The Japanese delegate felt that a larger observation group could also be used as a fighting force if the situation warranted it. The Soviet delegate attached an amendment to it which changed it altogether. The amendment called for the withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon.26 This draft resolution and its amendment were defeated. The Soviet amendment was defeated by a vote of eight to one with two abstentions--Japan and Sweden. The Japanese draft resolution received ten votes but was defeated by a Soviet veto.

Realizing that the Security Council was unable to deal effectively with the crisis, the big powers began to look toward the General Assembly for help. The United States had taken the initiative with its draft resolution to call the General Assembly into special session. Not to be outdone, the Soviet delegate submitted a similar draft resolution, only this draft resolution stated specifically that the General Assembly would be called into special session "in order to consider

the question of intervention of the United States and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Jordan and
Lebanon.\footnote{27}

The Soviet Union opposed the draft resolutions of the United
States calling for an emergency session of the General Assembly because
it mentioned resolution 337 (V). The Soviet Union did not vote for or
approve of this resolution.\footnote{28} Ultimately, an agreement was reached between
the Soviet Union and the United States, in which the Soviet Union did
not demand that a vote be taken on its draft, while the United States re-
vised its draft resolution as follows:

The Security Council, having considered items 2 and 3 of its
agenda as contained in document S/agenda 838, taking into account
the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the 834th and
837th meetings has prevented the Council from exercising its pri-
mary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security, decides to call an emergency special session of the
General Assembly.\footnote{29}

With the passage of this resolution, the Security Council ended its
discussion of the crisis. The matter then rested with the General
Assembly.

Why were the Soviet Union and the United States willing to let
the General Assembly take over? The Soviet Union had aimed to mobilize
world opinion against the western powers. Since India and other neutrals

\footnote{27}{U. N. Doc. S/4057 (July 18, 1958).}

\footnote{28}{General Assembly resolution 337 (V) was the result of action
initiated by the United States (A/1377), referred to as "United action
for peace." In essence the resolution states that an emergency special
session of the General Assembly shall be convened within twenty-four
hours of the receipt by the Secretary-General of a request for such a
session from the Security Council on the vote of any seven of its members,
or upon the request from a majority of the members of the United Nations.}

\footnote{29}{U. N. Doc. S/4083 (August 7, 1958).}
had expressed regret over the use of British and American troops in the Middle East, Russia had hoped to capitalize upon their sentiment. Furthermore, a close vote in the Assembly on a Soviet draft resolution would have put added pressure on the United States and Britain to withdraw their troops. On the other hand, the United States wanted the Assembly to give moral support to the action she had already taken. Furthermore, she wanted the Assembly to either replace American troops with a United Nations contingent or make these troops a part of the contingent.

Proposal for a Summit Meeting

The situation in Lebanon and the entire Middle East had worsened considerably since the inception of the crisis, and was now so explosive that it was believed it could easily have precipitated a third world war. Consequently, there was almost a universal desire that all possible means of bringing about a solution to the Middle East crisis should be exploited. Therefore, when Mr. Khrushchev proposed a summit conference to deal with the matter, this was welcomed in most parts of the world.

Mr. Sobolev of the Soviet Union had referred to the ideas of a summit conference during the debates in the Security Council. However, Khrushchev, on July 19, sent letters to President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan, Premier DeGaulle, and Mrs. Hammarskjold in which he proposed a meeting of the four heads of state, together with Prime Minister Nehru and Mr. Hammarskjold, to discuss the Middle East situation

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and to submit their findings to the United Nations. The letter to
President Eisenhower stated:

The calling of a meeting of heads of the Great Powers with the
view of settling the military conflict which has broken out in the
Near and Middle East would be the wisest step that the governments
of our countries can take in the present circumstances. It would
be an invaluable contribution to the cause of strengthening of
peace and international security. It would offer inconvertible
evidence that the idea of peaceful, not warlike solutions of
problems can and must prevail throughout the world. The cessation
of aggression in the Near and Middle East would be ardently wel-
comed by the people of all countries, whatever their race and
religious or political connections.31

On July 22, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan and Premier
DeGaulle answered Mr. Khrushchev's letters. They all indicated their
willingness to meet as heads of government. However, Prime Minister
Macmillan proposed that the meeting be held within the framework of
the Security Council. He also stated that:

It would not be the intention of His Majesty's Government that
any resolution should be put forward at this meeting of the Security
Council unless they arose out of previous agreements. In other words,
the object would be to reach fruitful agreements rather than register
differences by votes. I hope that this spirit prevails.32

A day later, Mr. Khrushchev sent letters to the heads of govern-
ments accepting the conditions that the meeting take place within the
framework of the Security Council, but insisting that India be invited,
that only heads of governments participate, and that the meeting be held
on July 28th in New York.33

On July 25th, President Eisenhower replied that if the proposed
meeting was to take place:

... it must cover the entire Middle East situation and not merely the Anglo-American intervention in Lebanon and Jordan; that it must be governed by the rules laid down by the Security Council. Therefore, no one except the members of the Security Council and those directly involved be invited.\textsuperscript{34}

President Eisenhower preferred to exclude India from the Summit Meeting for fear that India's support of a Soviet proposal would tip the balance of world opinion in Russia's favor.

In the next exchange of correspondence, Khrushchev accused the United States of not really wanting to alleviate tension in a situation that "is being turned into a powder-keg, which the smallest spark could explode, bringing about a world-wide catastrophe."\textsuperscript{35}

In reply, President Eisenhower insisted that there must be a Security Council meeting limited to the heads of government or foreign ministers, and that August 5th should be the day for such a meeting.\textsuperscript{36} Premier DeGaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan sent similar replies.\textsuperscript{37}

However, on August 5, Mr. Khrushchev withdrew his willingness to meet within the framework of the Security Council and went back to his original proposal of a completely independent Summit Conference. According to him, the Security Council was,

... worse than useless as a forum for the discussion of East-West differences, since it is composed principally of countries allied with the United States, and is therefore incapable of taking any independent decisions.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{34} U. N. Doc. S/4072, Sec. II (July 25, 1958).
\textsuperscript{36} U. N. Doc. S/4074, Sec. III (August 1, 1958).
President Eisenhower did not issue a formal reply to Mr. Khrushchev's letter of August 5th. Instead, he issued a statement that was released through the press. In it, he welcomed Mr. Khrushchev's agreement that the problems they discussed in their exchange of letters should have been placed before the United Nations. However, he expressed regrets that Mr. Khrushchev did not accept the Security Council with the heads of government as the appropriate forum "in view of his alleged concern over the threats to the peace." \[39\]

With this reply the proposed Summit Conference was off.

Why was the proposal for a Summit Conference abandoned? The idea met with little enthusiasm in Washington. It was felt that since the Soviet Union had displayed little interest in a summit parley earlier in the spring when there was no international conflict to arouse world attention, and when the idea was first put forth, she would not be more cooperative at this particular time. Nevertheless, if the United States had refused to attend the summit meeting, she would have been condemned by world opinion for obstructing peace efforts.

Conversely, Khrushchev's interest in a Summit Conference was two-fold. First, he wanted the opportunity to make demands and gain concession from Western leaders through the Conference. Thus, by participating in negotiations concerning the Middle East, he hoped to have a veto over Western policy in the Middle East. Secondly, Khrushchev wanted to portray himself as the protector of the Arab interest and the willing worker for peace. At any rate, it was believed that the sudden

switch in Mr. Khrushchev's attitude toward holding the Summit Meeting in the Security Council came as a result of his secret meeting with Mao Tse-tung, July 31-August 3, 1958. Mao Tse-tung was opposed to having Nationalist China take part in the conference held in the Security Council.  

\*40 Council on Foreign Relations, op. cit., pp. 207-211.
CHAPTER IV

RESTORATION OF ORDER

New Election in Lebanon

A combination of closely-related events brought an end to the Crisis and the restoration of order in Lebanon. Among them were new elections in Lebanon, a joint resolution of the Arab States in the General Assembly, and the personal efforts of the Secretary General. Of these, probably the most significant single event was the new election.

The man given a considerable amount of credit for bringing the dissident politicians in Lebanon together was President Eisenhower's special representative and Under-Secretary of State, Robert Murphy. In Lebanon as the President's special envoy, Murphy worked sincerely and assiduously to end the Crisis on the basis of mutual concession and compromise. He met with most of the leaders of government and the various factions, including President Chamoun, the Phalange leader Pierre Jumayel, Foreign Minister Malik, and rebel leader Kamal Jumblatt. Although most of Mr. Murphy's talks were held in private and no statements were issued afterwards, it was reported that he had been discussing the choice of the country's next president. As a result, he was given credit for persuading Chamoun not to run for re-election, and for mediating the choice of General Chihab, a moderate in his outlook, as a reconciliation candidate. Mr. Murphy later journeyed to Iraq where
he obtained the assurance of the new government that they were not interested in joining the United Arab Republic.¹

Although the general election held on July 31 was the turning point in the Crisis, it did not bring a complete end to hostilities. The election was originally scheduled to be held on July 24, but was postponed when the members of the Chamber of Deputies were unable to agree upon a candidate after General Chihab announced that he would not seek the election. Chihab was still displeased over the presence of American troops in Lebanon. There were many Lebanese who were opposed to having an election. Among them were Premier Sauri es-Sohl and rebel leader Kamal Jumblatt. Jumblatt warned the Chamber of Deputies that agreement upon a president would not bring peace so long as United States troops were in the country. Other rebel leaders were saying that an election would not be held as long as Chamoun was in office. Their complaint was based partly on the fact that the President-elect would not take office until September 23, when Chamoun's term of office would end. In spite of the opposition to the election, it was held and General Chihab was elected President after he had changed his mind and decided to be a candidate. The president is agreed upon outside the Chamber of Deputies by all factions. Only after there is a gentlemen's agreement upon who the president shall be, do the members of the Chamber go through the formality of balloting.

On August 2, President-elect Chihab said in a radio broadcast that his first aim was to rid Lebanon of foreign troops and to bring unity back to the country. One of the first official acts of government

State Dulles and Ambassador Lodge of the United States; Foreign Minister Sobolev of the Soviet Union, and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold.

The debates followed a course similar to that taken previously in the Security Council. The Soviet Union continued its attacks upon the United Kingdom and the United States. On the other hand, these two countries continued to defend their action as necessary and pertinent to international peace.

President Eisenhower, after defending the United States position, offered the Assembly what he called a six-point peace proposal for the Middle East. The six points were stated as follows:

1) The United Nations' concern for Lebanon
2) United Nations' measures to preserve peace in Jordan
3) An end to the fomenting from without of Civil Strife
4) A United Nations peace force
5) A regional economic development plan to assist and accelerate improvement in living standards of the people of the Arab Nations.
6) Steps to avoid a new arms-race in that area.\(^3\)

The call for an Arab development plan was a departure from previous United States economic policies in the Middle East. Heretofore, because of Congressional reluctance, the United States had given only unilateral aid.\(^4\) However, the idea put forth by President Eisenhower would commit American support to a plan beneficial to all Arab states regardless of political orientation.

Mr. Gromyko of the Soviet Union accused the United States and

\(^3\) Official Record of the General Assembly (Third Emergency Special Session), 733rd Meeting, p. 9.

the United Kingdom of ignoring the United Nations Charter. In his words:

The leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom, who so frequently and readily talked of the devotion to the purpose of the United Nations, have in fact displayed a disregard for this international organization and its charter, by undertaking, behind the backs of the United Nations, an armed invasion of the Near East, designed to consolidate their domination of that region, to retain control over its natural wealth and to reimpose the colonial system upon the people of the Arab countries, who for centuries have languished under foreign oppression.⁵

He submitted a draft resolution that called upon the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw their troops from Lebanon and Jordan; for an increase in the Observation Group in Lebanon and for an observation group to be sent to Jordan.⁶ Previously, the Soviet Union had supported a Swedish draft resolution in the Security Council calling for the withdrawal of the Observation Group in Lebanon. Having failed to gain any propaganda advantages from a Summit Conference, and realizing that tensions in the Middle East were subsiding because of the election in Lebanon, the Soviet Union was making a last effort to embarrass the United States and Great Britain. Furthermore, Western troops were an obstacle to militant Arab nationalism.

Just as President Eisenhower and Ambassador Lodge had done before him, Foreign Minister Lloyd of the United Kingdom defended his country's action in the Middle East. His main contention was that:

Our troops are not in Jordan for any military purpose of their own. Their presence does not constitute a threat to any country. We shall at any time withdraw our troops at the lawful Government of Jordan's request, or if suitable arrangements are made

⁵Ibid., p. 11.

to protect Jordan from external threats and to maintain its independence and integrity.\(^7\)

In conjunction with this statement, Mr. Lloyd had circulated to each delegate a letter he had sent to the President of the General Assembly which stated the purpose for the presence of the United Kingdom's troops in Jordan.\(^8\) The United States issued a similar letter that explained its action in Lebanon.\(^9\)

At this point, the debate was interrupted by the introduction of a seven-power draft resolution sponsored by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Liberia, Norway, Panama, and Paraguay, which provided that:

The Assembly, having noted the declaration of the United States and the United Kingdom, calls on all members to refrain from any threats to the freedom, independence, or integrity of any State and calls upon all member states to observe these obligations and ensure that their conduct in relation to the Middle East conforms to this policy.\(^10\)

Other speakers centered their comments on the question whether or not the United States and the United Kingdom had a legal right to send troops to the Middle East. Of the fifty-five speakers that paraded before the Assembly to express their views, a little more than half were of the opinion that the situation in the Middle East warranted some type of positive action a little stronger than that already taken by the United Nations. However, they were not sure that the United States and the United Kingdom had offered the best solution. A few of the

\(^7\)Official Record of the General Assembly (Third Emergency Session), 73rd Meeting, p. 21.


speakers, such as Mr. Lall of India, felt that this action had caused the situation to take a turn for the worse. 11 Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that many of the speakers disapproved of the action taken by the United States and the United Kingdom, it was very unlikely that the Soviet Union could have gotten the required two-thirds vote to pass its draft resolution.

It is interesting to note that not all of the speakers confined their speeches to the matter at hand. On the contrary, many speakers appeared to speak in a vacuum, paying little or no attention to what the preceding speaker had said. Many felt that this was an opportunity to speak to the world. Many of them simply reiterated their countries' pet grievances. For example, the Saudi Arabian delegate took time to talk about the "evils" of Zionism; the Ghanaian delegate spoke briefly about the faults of colonialism; while the delegates from most of the Communist satellite countries denounced "Western Imperialism."

The high point in the session was reached when Mr. Mahgoub of Sudan submitted a draft resolution co-sponsored by the ten Arab states represented in the Assembly (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the United Arab Republic, Lybia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen). The operational sections of the resolution are as follows:

I.

Call upon all states' members of the United Nations to act strictly in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggression, of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and of equal and mutual benefit, and to ensure that their conduct by word and deed conforms to these basic principles;

11 Official Record of the General Assembly (Third Emergency Session), 738th meeting, p. 67.
II.

Request the Secretary-General to make forthwith in consultation with the Governments concerned and in accordance with the charter, and having in mind Section I of this resolution, such practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purpose and principles of the charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in the present circumstances, and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of foreign troops from the two countries.\textsuperscript{12}

The Arab States were brought together for several reasons. Partly it was through a plea by the Secretary-General that the Arabs themselves were primarily responsible for a solution to the Middle East Crisis, and that the "key to basic improvement" in that area would be a result of their initiative. Secondly, the new elections in Lebanon had brought into power a man who was popular with many of the other leaders of Arab states. Thirdly, all of the Arab States were in agreement that the United States and Great Britain should withdraw their troops. Finally, all of the Arab states agreed to back a joint resolution providing Nasser did not insist upon the unconditional withdrawal of American and British troops.\textsuperscript{13} Nasser agreed. Hence, the Arab resolution became an outward sign of Arab unity.

The reaction to this draft resolution was favorable. Mr. Dulles announced that the United States was pleased with the Arab draft resolution, and pleased to see the Arab states come together in mutual understanding. Mr. Gromyko, after announcing that his government was in favor of the Arab draft resolution, stated that it was a bit inadequate because it did not call for the immediate withdrawal of troops, Mr. Lloyd announced that the United Kingdom was indeed gratified to see this dis-


play of Arab unity, and announced his support for the draft resolution. After a number of other statements in support of the Arab draft resolution, it was adopted unanimously. In light of this, the President of the Assembly felt it was unnecessary to take a vote on the draft resolutions previously submitted by the Soviet Union and the seven powers. Hence, the Third Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly was brought to a successful end. Now it was the duty of the Secretary-General to implement the Arab resolution.

The Secretary-General

The problem, according to the Secretary-General was not to replace British and American troops, but instead to serve during the period of transition after the troops had been withdrawn. The Secretary-General consulted with the Arab States involved in the Crisis as to the kind of practical arrangements acceptable to them. Consequently, he traveled to Baghdad, Amman, Beirut and Cairo, and talked with the Arab leaders. In a report to the General Assembly, Mr. Hammarskjold announced that the following arrangements had been made. The Observation Group in Lebanon would be a practical arrangement facilitating the withdrawal of American troops. As for Jordan, the situation would be a little different. Jordan had expressed a desire not to have the United Nations Observers on her soil, consequently other arrangements were made.\(^\text{14}\) In Jordan, there was to be a special United Nations representative with sub-Offices in Beirut and Damascus. The two officials assigned to Lebanon and the United Arab Republic were to keep an eye on the parties involved and to

\(^{14}\text{New York Times (August 18, 1958), p. 7.}\)
serve as Special Representatives of the Secretary-General's chief subordinate in Jordan. Another special representative of Mr. Hammarskjold was to remain in contact with all of the Arab states. He was, in essence, a "trouble shooter" with duties of a diplomatic nature. The objective of Mr. Hammarskjold in Jordan was to keep the situation under constant surveillance. If trouble should occur, then the machinery was there to assist the Secretary-General. The Field Office in Jordan was to be viewed as an organ of the United Nations.\(^\text{15}\)

Cognizant of those arrangements, the United States announced that it was moving its troops in phases from Lebanon to Turkey. On October 8, the State Department announced that all United States troops would be withdrawn by the end of October.

The press release stated:

The Government of the United States announces that by agreement with the Government of the Republic of Lebanon, it has now been decided to complete withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon. It is expected that, barring unforeseen developments, the forces will be withdrawn by the end of October . . . The steps which have been taken with respect to the situation in Lebanon have led to a substantial improvement in the international aspect of the Lebanese security situation. In view of the progress made toward more stable international conditions in the area, it has been concluded that the United States forces can be totally withdrawn from Lebanon.\(^\text{16}\)

Mr. Hammarskjold reported to the General Assembly that both Great Britain and the United States had made progress toward complying with the Arab joint-resolution of August 21. In regard to the United Kingdom, the report stated:


The Government of Jordan and the United Kingdom are discussing the fixing of dates for the beginning and the completion of the withdrawal of British forces. It is their intention that provided satisfactory progress is being made, the withdrawal shall begin during the month of October and it shall be completed as quickly as the situation of the area allows.\textsuperscript{17}

By the 25th of October, all United States troops were withdrawn from Lebanon. This fact was acknowledged by the Observation Group in its final report on November 17. This report also stated that the Observation Group felt that its job was completed in view of the absence of reports of infiltration of personnel or smuggling of arms. It then asked to be withdrawn from Lebanon:

The recent marked improvement in the General Security situation in Lebanon and the relations between Lebanon and its eastern neighbors, the group has come to the conclusion that its task under the June 11th resolution may now be regarded as completed.\textsuperscript{18}

As a result, the Secretary-General reported that the Observation Group would be completely withdrawn by December.\textsuperscript{19}

Despite progress made in Lebanon, sporadic terrorist activities by the rightists continued against Chihab's government. Nevertheless, the new government felt that the danger of outside interference had disappeared, and that the crisis was over. Hence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lebanon sent a letter to the President of the Security Council in which he requested that the Security Council delete the Lebanon complaint from its list of matters before it. The letter also stated that cordial and close relations between the United Arab Republic and Lebanon had resumed their normal course. In addition, the

\textsuperscript{1}U. N. Doc. A/3934, Annex II (September 29, 1958).
letter stated:

The Lebanese government takes this opportunity to acknowledge once again the important part played by the United Nations in relations between nations and the efforts made by its organs to bring about harmony and cooperation necessary to the attainment of a better world. Consequently, at its 340th meeting, the Security Council agreed, without objection, to delete the complaint from the list of matters by which it was seized.

In summarizing this chapter, we can say that probably the most important single event which lead to the restoration of order in Lebanon was the presidential election of July 31. The election saw Chamoun, an unpopular conservative, replaced by Chihab, a popular moderate. This, no doubt, placated the Nasserist elements of the population who wanted a neutral Lebanon in the Cold War. Consequently, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic were able to renew their friendship. This friendship was manifested in an Arab State resolution before the Third Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. As a result, the United States withdrew its troops, and the United Nations withdrew the Observation Group. The Lebanon Crisis had ended.

\(^{20}\text{U. N. Doc. S/4113 (November 17, 1958).}\)
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

One of the problems involved in attempting to isolate the functions of the United States and the United Nations and to assess them respectively stems from the fact that the United States is one of the most powerful and influential members of the United Nations. Consequently, the United States is usually at the bottom of most of the decisions taken by the United Nations. Therefore, it can be said that the United States played a dual role in the Lebanon Crisis. Acting through the United Nations, she helped to authorize the sending of the Observation Group to Lebanon. Acting on her own, she deployed American Marines and sent a special envoy there. The United States had to play this dual role because of the threat of Nasser to American interest in the Middle East. Thus Nasser had to be stopped and held in check. For it was Nasser's policies of creating unrest in Jordan and Lebanon that brought on the crisis in the first place. It is true that the internal situation in Lebanon was a major factor in the crisis, but the agitation by Nasser's followers brought things to a climax.

The United States felt that a Nasser controlled Lebanon would be a prelude to a Nasser controlled Middle East. This, of course, would have been detrimental to the vital interest of the United States. Why? Simply because the valuable oil reserves of the Middle East in the hands of an unpredictable Nasser would leave our European Allies in a
hazardous position. This would greatly effect American national security. Hence, when the United States decided to send troops to Lebanon, the complications of interaction of national action and United Nations action upon United States policy making became clear. After weighing the efforts of the Observation Group and the efforts of the Secretary-General in the Lebanon Crisis, the United States decided that the United Nations was not doing enough. The United States also decided that the long range goal of building the United Nations as an effective peace keeping institution had to be put aside in favor of the immediate problem of stopping Nasser. She felt that developments in Lebanon demanded quicker action than that coming forth from the United Nations. The United States knew that by being a member of the United Nations, she had to give reasons for acts because the Charter asks all of its members to keep the peace. The United States was hoping to solicit the support of the United Nations for its action. However, in this instance, the United Nations proved to be more of a hindrance than a useful tool.

How was the United Nations a hindrance? United States policy makers have often assumed that if the United Nations were prepared to take action in a crisis, American troops could be used to back up United Nations efforts. The presence of American troops would act as a deterrent to would-be aggressors. This would strengthen the United Nations and keep the peace at the same time. In case the United Nations was blocked by a Soviet veto, the United States could act on its own and later gain approval in the General Assembly. (This kind of reasoning prompted the United States to introduce the Uniting for Peace Resolution in the Assembly in 1950). In the Lebanon situation, the United
States had hoped to receive the support of the United Nations when American troops landed in Lebanon. The United States wanted United Nations approval to show that world opinion was behind its actions. This would also have the effect of softening opposition here at home. The United States wanted United Nations support in the form of either a majority resolution that condoned America's action in Lebanon or a fighting force to have replaced the Observation Group. This support never came because many delegates were divided over the moral and legal rights of American troops to be in the Middle East. However, the United States answered these arguments by stating that they were asked to send troops to Lebanon by the duly constituted authority in Lebanon. As a result of not getting acceptance for their actions in Lebanon and Jordan, the United States and Great Britain had to abandon any plans of an offensive against the rebels in Iraq. Then, too, the United States had to alter its position in Lebanon. Instead of insisting upon keeping Chamoun in power at all costs, the United States sent Murphy to Lebanon to work toward a compromise candidate. The question arises, could the United States have kept Chamoun in power and how would this have served American interest? First of all, Chamoun was, without a doubt, a friend of the United States and the West. He showed this by accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine in the face of strong opposition. With Chamoun in office, the United States knew that it could count on Lebanon being in the Western Camp. Furthermore, Chamoun had been a leader in opposing Nasser's brand of Arab nationalism. He stood as an obstacle to Nasser in the Middle East. Any one who repelled the forces of Nasserism and helped to maintain the status quo in the Middle East served American interests. As long as American
troops were in Lebanon, Chamoun could stay in office.

Another effect of the interaction of national action and United Nations action was the misunderstanding between the Observation Group and the United States. In spite of the failure of the Observation Group to find infiltration, the United States had reports of what it considered absolute proof that infiltration did exist. The Observation Group failure to report infiltration of arms and men gave weight to the arguments of the United Arab Republic that the crisis was a private affair between Lebanon politicians. Many underdeveloped countries had their beliefs reinforced that the United States stood in the way of progress by opposing a legitimate social revolution. Furthermore, the statement by the Observation Group leader that the presence of American Marines hindered the efforts of the group gave the appearance that the United States was actually and deliberately obstructing the work of the United Nations. Even though the United Nations afforded the United States an opportunity to justify and explain its action, the United States was never able to convince the majority of the delegates that it had done the right thing.

On the other hand, the United Nations was a useful tool in that it set up the machinery whereby the United States and the United Kingdom could withdraw their troops and save face at the same time. Meanwhile, the United Nations assumed the responsibility of keeping the peace in the Middle East. Because of the United Nations role in restoring order and tranquility in the Middle East, the United States adjusted its Middle Eastern policies in light of United Nations actions. The United States did not want to be permanently committed in the Middle East for two reasons.
First of all, the United States was reluctant in the beginning to take on the Middle East as a major responsibility. Nevertheless, it was only after Great Britain's power had declined in that area that the United States formulated a Middle Eastern policy. Secondly, the United States knew that because of the erratic nature of Arab politics, this area would be periodically torn by crisis. President Eisenhower's six-point proposal to the General Assembly Special Session was an attempt to adjust policy to the realization of the United Nations' role in the Lebanon Crisis. The New American position was two-fold. First, the President proposed that peace in the Middle East be the responsibility of all the countries. Second, the United States was willing to give aid directly to the Arab people through an Arab development institution. This new proposal was designed to remedy some of the deficiencies of the Eisenhower Doctrine. For the first time, the United States was offering aid to the people of the Middle East without asking for commitments in return. The new approach made American policy more flexible, and emphasized economic well being. In the past, American policy was concerned mainly with military defense.

It can be said that the initiative taken by the United States in sending troops to Lebanon probably saved the United Nations some embarrassment. For, had Chamoun's government fallen, the United Nations would have been blamed for not taking more direct action in the crisis. While Chamoun was demanding that the United Nations do something about the United Arab Republic, the Observation Group was reporting that "no infiltration existed as far as it could tell." According to the United States, however, infiltration did exist. It goes without saying
that the presence of American troops in Lebanon was primarily respon-
sible for preventing the overthrow of Hammoud's government. Whereas
the Observation Group was not a fighting force, the American Marines
were combat-ready. Consequently, Nasser was not willing to risk con-
lict with the United States and a possible World War. Furthermore,
special envoy Robert Murphy of the United States must be given credit
for persuading Hammoud to step down as President. Hence, not only did
the United States help to solve the problem in Lebanon, but by doing
so she also restored faith in the peacekeeping ability of the United
Nations.

The debates in the Security Council were important for several
reasons. For one thing, the debates supported those who had argued
during the hearings on the Eisenhower Doctrine that American policy for
the Middle East should by-pass the United Nations. Had the United States
waited for the Security Council to act upon a proposal to send American
troops to Lebanon, the troops probably would not have gotten there. Also,
the debates pointed out the extent to which the Eisenhower Doctrine was
unacceptable to non-Middle Eastern Nations. Countries like Sweden and
Japan were inclined to believe that the United States had not taken
the right steps in the Middle East. They let it be known during the
debates in the Security Council. This world scrutiny of American for-
eign policy was healthy in the sense that it brought out the deficiencies
and weaknesses of the Middle Eastern policy. An attempt to remedy some
of these weaknesses was made by President Eisenhower at the special
session of the General Assembly. Finally, the debates pointed out the
importance of having the machinery necessary for transferring the
discussion from the Security Council to the General Assembly.

Even though the United States by-passed it, the United Nations emerged from the Crisis greatly respected as a peace-keeping institution. This was due primarily to the efforts of the Secretary-General and the Observation Group. The importance of the Observation Group was manifested mainly by its presence in Lebanon during the period of restoration of order. This presence in Lebanon enabled the United States to withdraw its troops and at the same time, allowed the Lebanese to find a solution to their own problems. In this instance, the United Nations was a help rather than a hindrance. Also, the Observation Group constituted a permanent aid to the resources for peace-keeping and peace-restoration upon which the United Nations may be able to draw in the future. The Observation Group, by its presence in future crises, could be used to hold disputing parties apart while investigatory action could be carried out. For example, when the Observation Group moved into Lebanon, the disputing parties there slowed down their activities somewhat. Thus, infiltration was hard to find. Then, if need be, an Observation Group could be turned into a fighting force. This could be done by using an unarmed detachment of regular soldiers as observers. When the need for a fighting force arises, then the observers could be armed. The United States was willing to support a fighting force during the Lebanon Crisis, and suggested that the observers be replaced by one. Finally, the Observation Group could supervise and restore peace just as it did in the Lebanon Crisis.

The Secretary-General's role was more significant than that of the Observation Group. The growth of the Secretariat was best
illustrated by the freedom of movement and discretion given Mr. Hammarskjöld. Using a vaguely-worded resolution passed by the Security Council, he had the job of organizing, administering and defining the objective of the Observation Group. "Practical arrangement" was the general term of reference laid down by the General Assembly which authorized the Secretary-General to set up a plan to withdraw British and American troops and, at the same time, prevent a recurrence of conditions that precipitated the Crisis. Mr. Hammarskjöld was called upon to be an international statesman and diplomat. The importance of this role of the Secretary-General is best appreciated when analyzed along with the other organs of the United Nations. The Secretariat was the only organ in the United Nations that functioned smoothly. While the Security Council was deadlocked in helpless debate and the General Assembly awaited its call, the Secretary-General was traveling throughout the Middle East talking with various political leaders and trying to find a solution to the crisis. As a result, smooth and fast action was open to the organization that might not have been had Mr. Hammarskjöld waited for detailed instructions. Even though this course of action was unprecedented, it provided a future course to be followed. For example, there may be another time when the Security Council of the General Assembly will not want to spell out in detail its exact course of action. Instead, the Secretary-General may only need a generally worded resolution in which he can work out his own details. This will give the Secretary-General much room in which to bring about an end to a crisis.

As for the question of international law, the question of whether
or not the United States had a legal right to be in Lebanon is still debatable. Yet, the fact that President Eisenhower was honoring a request from President Chamoun seems plausible. However, the United States illustrated that it was willing to forego the principals of the United Nation in this instance. What was the principal in question? The principal involves the ban on the use of all force unless authorized by the United Nations. Consequently, this writer believes that whenever there is a question involving American national interest and adherence to the principals of the United Nations Charter, the Charter will always be interpreted loosely to meet the needs of the moment. Yet, it is the duty of American policy makers to provide for the National security. On the other hand, it is the responsibility of all United Nations members to promote the United Nations and International law.
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UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON

MILITARY ORGANIZATION CHART

GROUP

CHIEF OF STAFF

CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVERS

Deputy Chief of Staff

G1 (Personnel)

G2 (Operations)

G3 (Evaluation)

G4 (Logistics)

Tripoli

* Arida

Halda

* Aziziya

(Aaboudiyé)

Beïno

Notre-Dame-du-Port

Chadra

Sir Danié

Ehden

Baalbek

Hermel

* Koussair

* El Kah

El Laboué

* Arsal

* Maarboûn

* Rás Banibek

Chtaura

Alta el Foukhar

Aïn Arab

Deïr el Aachâyer

Kfar Mechki

Aïn Zebdée

* Masnaa

* Kfar Kouk

Marjayoun

Saïda

Air squadron

El Haouch

Kherouïa

(Mejdie)

Deïr Mınas

Barouk

Jezzine

* Observation and traffic check post.