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Crisis, Cooperation, and Coercion: Migration Diplomacy in Europe, 2014-2017

Jessica L. Jones
University of New Mexico - Main Campus

Jessica L. Jones

Candidate

Political Science

Department

This dissertation is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication:

Approved by the Dissertation Committee:

Christopher Butler

Chair

William Stanley

Chair

Cassy Dorff

Member

Leanne Powner

Member

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by

Jessica L. Jones
B.A., University of Tulsa, 2009
M.A., Political Science, University of New Mexico, 2011

DISSERTATION

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to
Harry, Janet, Joseph, Madie, John, and Vicki.
For showing me the way.

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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation I ask when and how states employ migration diplomacy – and its coercive and cooperative variants – during the European Migration Crisis, 2014-2017. I use a multi-method approach to answer these questions. I argue that states use migration diplomacy to minimize the costs of migration crises. Therefore, states are more likely to use migration diplomacy when either the incurred or anticipated costs of migration crises are greater, when they are less powerful, and when anti-migrant domestic political pressures are higher. I use a quantitative statistical approach to understand how these factors influence state use of migration diplomacy. Results from my multivariate logistic regression analyses support my expectation that states are more likely to engage in migration diplomacy when the incurred or anticipated costs, in terms of migrant arrivals, are higher. I find some evidence to support my hypothesis that less powerful states are more likely to engage in migration diplomacy.

To understand how states employ migration diplomacy, I use a combination of text analysis methods and a case study of the 2016 EU Turkey Deal. In my text analysis, I examine the semantic underpinnings of coercive and cooperative variants of migration diplomacy, in particular how the concepts can be distinguished. I find that coercive migration diplomacy is more often characterized by state actions, while cooperative migration diplomacy is more often identified using the setting within which states interact. I also demonstrate that coercive and cooperative variants are not always

easily distinguishable and occur with greater frequency than the existing literature on migration diplomacy would indicate. In my case study of the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal, I challenge the common characterization of Turkey's approach as coercive by demonstrating that Turkey engaged in a combination of coercive and cooperative migration diplomacy actions.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

> *"For us, refugees are specific people, individuals, who expect our help. There are forces around us however, for whom the wave of refugees is just dirty business or a political bargaining chip...We are slowly becoming witnesses to the birth of a new form of political pressure, and some even call it a kind of a new hybrid war, in which migratory waves have become a tool, a weapon against neighbours..." – Donald Tusk*[1]

In late 2015, the European Union (EU) was negotiating an arrangement with Turkey to decrease the volume of new migrant arrivals at the Union's southern borders, which topped one million that year. This dramatic increase from typical levels of migration from the Middle East and North Africa, paired with the failure of migration management systems in European states, resulted in the so-called "migration crisis" of 2015-2016. The humanitarian consequences of the crisis escalated in 2015. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), which attempts to catalog migrant deaths, estimated that globally over 5,350 migrant died during their journeys in 2015. Of those, 3,771 migrant deaths occurred along the various Mediterranean routes that led to Europe.[2] The most prominent incidents included a shipwreck off the coast of Libya in which more than 700 migrants perished and the now infamous drowning of Aylan Kurdi, a three-year old Syrian boy whose body washed ashore in Turkey after the small smuggler's vessel he and his family were on capsized (Kingsley, Bonomolo, and Kirchgaessner, 2015; Smith, 2015b). On land, the bodies of 71 migrants were discovered inside an abandoned lorry on the side of an Austrian highway (Harding, 2015). Migrants were also subjected to beatings and other abuses at Hungarian bor-

[1] Donald Tusk is the Former President of the European Council (2014-2019). Quoted in Holehouse (2015).

[2] International Organization for Migration. (January 5, 2016). *IOM Counts 3,771 Migrant Fatalities in Mediterranean in 2015*, accessed October 29, 2021, https://www.iom.int/news/iom-counts-3771-migrant-fatalities-mediterranean-2015

der crossings that year.[3] The pressure on European states to come up with a solution was intense, as both the humanitarian and political costs of the crises escalated.

In the course of negotiating a deal with the EU, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey had threatened to stop preventing migrants from crossing its borders to Greece, Bulgaria, and beyond. Donald Tusk, then President of the European Council, claimed this was a new political bargaining strategy, but it was not the first time the EU was faced with threats of this nature. Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi notably employed a similar coercive strategy, threatening to encourage African migrants to make the journey from Libya's shores across the Central Mediterranean to Italy (Tsourapas, 2017). Yet states also used migration as a means of producing cooperation during the crisis period. Egypt pursued cooperation with Germany, offering to accept migrant returns and develop counter-smuggling programs in exchange for aid, trade, and enhanced security cooperation (Pancevski, 2016).[4] EU Candidate and Potential Candidate states in the Balkans offered to work with the Union in response to rising migrant arrivals from 2015-2016, in hopes of garnering support for their membership bids. Even Turkey, prior to issuing threats, made cooperative gestures toward the European Union that provided the foundation for later negotiations. *Migration diplomacy* is the phenomenon of states utilizing migration as a tool for conducting their foreign policy, whether coercive or cooperative.

Despite plentiful examples of states utilizing migration diplomacy, we know little about when and why states incorporate this tool into their diplomacy repertoire. For example, Turkey's use of migration diplomacy was surprisingly sparing prior to 2015. This is puzzling, as displaced Syrians began crossing its borders in extraordinary numbers in 2011. Why would a state like Turkey experiencing extreme migration pressure not look to its neighbors for support? The nascent literature on migration diplomacy

[3]Human Rights Watch. (July 13, 2016). *Hungary: Migrants Abused at the Border*, accessed October 12, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/13/hungary-migrants-abused-border

[4]Egypt also requested that Germany and the EU support Egypt in negotiating better terms on International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans.

has yet to address this question directly. Instead, it focuses on identifying cases of migration diplomacy (Greenhill, 2010; Tsourapas, 2017; Adamson and Tsourapas, 2019; Norman, 2020) and the factors that make migration diplomacy strategies more successful (Greenhill, 2010; Tsourapas, 2018, 2019). To the extent that an explanation for why states employ migration diplomacy can be gleaned from this literature, it amounts to states 'use it when they believe it will be useful.' This is unsatisfactory given the implications of migration diplomacy for understanding state approaches to coercion and cooperation as well as international relations around migration more generally. If leaders increasingly recognize migration diplomacy as a useful tool of foreign policy, as Donald Tusk stated, it is likely that more states will begin to use this tool to suit their needs. Therefore, in this dissertation I explore when and how states employ migration diplomacy in both its coercive and cooperative variants during the European Migration Crisis, 2014-2017.

Case Selection

The European Migration Crisis of 2014-2017 is an appropriate case for examining when and how states utilize migration diplomacy for several reasons. First, the crisis affected a number of states either through migrant arrivals, political ties, or both. Migration during the crisis generally moved from South to North, utilizing several routes across the Mediterranean and across the land bridge from Turkey. These routes linked states in both the Middle East and North Africa to states in Southern Europe and beyond. The EU and Schengen Area also create political ties between states across the continent, and the Union's engagement with neighboring non-Member States extends these ties beyond Europe proper. In other words, the potential for migration diplomacy during this crisis was high, as was the number of states directly and indirectly affected by the crisis.

This diversity of state actors also provides a rich environment within which to

explore the factors that affect states' use of migration diplomacy. The focus of the literature on migration diplomacy has largely been on states in the global South. This focus is warranted, as the vast majority of global displacement occurs and remains in these countries. However, our understanding of when and how migration diplomacy is employed by states is limited by this focus. The European Migration Crisis affords an opportunity for me to observe migration diplomacy in a group of states that vary with respect to how many migrants they received as well as their wealth and political power, institutional affiliations, and geo-strategic circumstances and interests. Such an environment is ripe for observing how states navigate their competing interests with respect to the crisis.

The prominence of this case and its implications for migration governance elsewhere, also justifies my focus on the European Migration Crisis. In the early days of the crisis, when this project was initiated, there was a sense that the EU should produce a collective response. The supranational institution's mandate for migration governance had recently been expanded, and the history of cooperation among Member States suggested the possibility of collective action (Bauböck, 2018). The regionalization of migration governance is a global trend, and migration scholars and practitioners alike were hopeful that the EU – as the world's most advanced regional integration project with an emphasis on protecting human rights and upholding international law – would provide a shining example for how regional collective action in response to migration could work. Instead, the Union's response was stymied by political conflicts and many states resisted burden-sharing proposals. Those hoping for a collective response overestimated both the extent of the Union's power with respect to migration governance and states' willingness to incur costs associated with migration. Without an authority guiding their responses, states were largely left to respond to the crisis as they saw fit, which for many involved migration diplomacy.

Finally, the European Migration Crisis also contains an oft-cited example of migra-

tion diplomacy, the EU-Turkey Deal. The nascent literature on migration diplomacy identifies the negotiation of this deal as an instance of coercive migration diplomacy from Turkey, as it threatened to send migrants toward Europe in hopes of extracting various concessions (see Tsourapas (2017); Adamson and Tsourapas (2019)). I explore this case in greater depth, arguing that Turkey's migration diplomacy was more nuanced than this characterization suggests.

Migration Terms and Concepts

Migration is a diverse phenomenon with an associated complex terminology. With an overlapping web of migration terms carrying both legal and discursive weight, it is important for me to clarify at the outset the meanings I attribute to the terms I use in this dissertation. Throughout the dissertation, I use the terms "migration" and "migrants" to refer to individuals who have left their home states and intend to remain in another state for an extended period of time. Therefore, these terms exclude individuals leaving their home state for temporary stays or tourism purposes. In addition, my focus on the European Migration Crisis narrows the meaning of these terms as I use them here. The Migration Crisis in Europe was not one of labor migration, whereby individuals obtain a visa to move to a state for employment purposes.[5] Instead, mixed-migration flows were the prominent source of pressure during the migration crisis. These are migratory flows composed of people in need of international protection (fleeing persecution and violence) and others who do not likely qualify for protected status but are seeking better opportunities abroad (without obtaining state permission).

Many of these migrants hoped to apply for asylum (i.e., to become a refugee) upon reaching European territory. Asylum status allows refugees to remain in European

[5]Although a lack of legal pathways for non-EU nationals to access the Union labor market and other protected statuses prior to making their journeys certainly contributed to the crisis. I discuss this in Chapter 2.

states for an extended period of time, possibly permanently. Those who were not granted asylum were considered to have irregular status and could be removed by state authorities. Given the myriad barriers European states have in place to prevent migrants from accessing their territory without permission, individuals were forced to travel by ground and over seas, often engaging the services of smugglers. In the dissertation, when I use the terms "migrant(s)" or "migration," I am referring to those who migrate in this manner and who may or may not receive refugee status.

In addition, there are terms commonly applied to states that I want to recognize from the outset. I may refer to receiving, transit, or sending states in the dissertation. Receiving states are the end points of migrant journeys. Sending states are those from which migrants originate. Transit states are those between sending and receiving states that migrants traverse in the journeys. The specific combination of states, and which category a state falls within, vary by migrant, but in the aggregate migratory patterns often reveal general patterns of receiving, sending, and transiting. When I use these terms in the dissertation, unless I explicitly apply them to a specific state, I am referring to the general forms above.

Plan of the Dissertation

The goal of Chapter 2 is to provide context on the case of the European Migration Crisis. The chapter begins by describing the antecedents of the crisis. I outline the drivers of migration in key sending states, as well as the regional dynamics prior to 2015 that facilitated migration at an extreme scale to Europe from 2015-2016. Then I provide an overview of migration dynamics during the crisis. I describe the primary routes utilized by migrants on their journeys to Europe. I pair this with a comparison of the number of asylum claims lodged in European states to highlight the differential effect of the crisis. In the second half of the chapter I explore the EU's responses to the migration crisis. To ground this discussion, I outline the core

components of the Union's migration governance structure. I then describe the EU's proposals for utilizing these components in response to the crisis, as outlined in the *European Agenda on Migration* (2015). Finally, I provide a high level summary of what happened during the crisis in light of these plans. This chapter demonstrates that the Union's response to the crisis was largely circumscribed to external border management and engagement with third countries. Member States and other states in the region were left to determine their responses to migrants unilaterally, many of which opted to employ migration diplomacy. This chapter's contribution comes from providing a comprehensive review of the goals set by the European Agenda on Migration, relating these to the broader system of migration governance within the EU, and describing their implementation and effects, if any, on migration related to the crisis.

Chapter 3 begins by defining migration diplomacy and its primary variants, coercive and cooperative. I distinguish migration diplomacy from domestic migration management and other political-strategic uses of migration. I argue that migration diplomacy provides a useful frame for exploring state responses to migration crises from an international relations perspective because it centers states as actors, acknowledges a politics of migration among states outside of international regimes, and does not require migration to be treated as a security issue. Having defined migration diplomacy and distinguished it from similar phenomena, I develop expectations about when states are likely to employ (i.e, "initiate") migration diplomacy. I assume that state leaders experiencing a migration crisis are interested in minimizing costs associated with the crisis and utilize migration diplomacy when it provides them with a means for doing so. Therefore, I expect states to be more likely to utilize migration diplomacy when the costs and expected costs of migration rise, when they are less able to unilaterally decrease costs, and when domestic political audiences are less willing to absorb migration-associated costs. This chapter constitutes the first attempt

to develop theory-based expectations about when states are likely to use migration diplomacy. I finish with a brief discussion of plan for analysis in Chapter 4.

Chapter 4 contains my quantitative analysis of migration diplomacy initiation. This chapter contributes the first attempt to quantitatively measure and statistically model factors associated with migration diplomacy. I begin the chapter by describing my novel approach to systematically collecting data on migration diplomacy. This involved a combination of supervised machine learning to identify relevant sources of information and human coding of instances of migration diplomacy from a large corpus of news documents covering the crisis period, 2014-2017. I then describe my operationalization of migration diplomacy initiation, my dependent variable, and my four independent variables, proxy measures for the four theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter 3. I translate my theoretical expectations from Chapter 3 into testable hypotheses. Then, I perform a multivariate logistic regression analysis (and several robustness checks) on my dependent variable, independent variables, and additional theoretical variables. I find mixed support for my hypotheses and discuss the implications of these findings.

My goal in Chapter 5 is to provide an empirical and operational critique of the current literature on migration diplomacy. From an operational perspective, the literature provides conceptual definitions of migration diplomacy, as well as cooperative and coercive variants, but the application of these concepts is heterogeneous. Scholars in this literature have applied coercive and cooperative migration diplomacy classifications to single-instances of behavior (e.g., a single coercive threat issued by a state), an entire series of interactions (e.g., the negotiation of the EU-Turkey deal), international agreements (e.g., the Schengen Area), and even periods of time (e.g., decades of Libyan foreign policy).[6] I argue that by operationalizing migration diplomacy based upon state behavior rather than outcomes within a fixed period of time, a more ac-

[6]A wide variety of examples are offered in Greenhill (2010), Tsourapas (2017), and Adamson and Tsourapas (2019).

curate representation of state use of migration diplomacy is gained. I describe my behavior-based measures of cooperation and coercion, and utilize text analysis methods to observe the types of behaviors associated with these categories. I find that the lexical summary of coercive migration diplomacy involves expected unilateral behaviors, while that of cooperative migration diplomacy centers less on behavior and more on cooperative settings. This suggests that cooperative migration diplomacy is more difficult to identify utilizing behavior-based definitions. Utilizing my behavior-based measures of coercive and cooperative migration diplomacy, I re-examine the case of the EU-Turkey Deal, which is a frequently cited example of coercive migration diplomacy. I find that in reality the negotiation of the deal was a mixture of cooperative and coercive actions. I discuss the implications of these operational and empirical issues for the study of migration diplomacy.

I conclude the dissertation in Chapter 6 by summarizing the findings of the dissertation and discussing their implications for the study of migration diplomacy. In sum, it appears that states' use of migration diplomacy is driven more by concerns with anticipated costs from migration than incurred costs. The types of migration diplomacy states employ are also varied, suggesting that future work on coercive or cooperative migration diplomacy needs to account for more complex strategies.

Chapter 2: The European Migration Crisis in Context: Sources and Responses

The goal of this chapter is to provide context on the case of the European Migration Crisis and demonstrate that migration diplomacy was an option available to states despite the overarching supranational structure of the EU. I begin the chapter by describing the antecedents of the migration crisis. I outline the drivers of migration in key sending states, as well as the regional dynamics prior to 2015 that facilitated migration at an extreme scale to Europe from 2015-2016. I then provide an overview of migration dynamics during the crisis, including the primary routes utilized by migrants on their journeys to Europe. I pair this with a comparison of the number of asylum claims lodged in European states to highlight the differential effects of the crisis. Next, I explore the EU's response to the migration crisis as outlined in the *European Agenda on Migration* (2015). To ground this discussion, I outline the core components of the Union's migration governance structures that were engaged in this response. Finally, I provide a high-level summary of how these structures were utilized based on the EU's plan. This chapter demonstrates that the Union's response to the crisis was largely circumscribed to external border management and engagement with third countries. The Union was not successful in addressing asylum policy deficiencies and their associated distributional inequities. Member States resisted attempts by the Union to create burden-sharing mechanisms and to increase integration. It is within this environment that states had to decide whether to utilize migration diplomacy in determining their individual responses to the crisis.

Migration to Europe Prior to the Crisis

Instability in states across the Middle East, South Asia, and the Saharan to Sub-Saharan region of Africa drove unusually high numbers of individuals to leave their



Figure 2.1: Alluvial diagram of first-time asylum applications registered in European states by origin state, 2014-2017.

homes and head toward Europe beginning in 2014. Protracted conflicts and associated displacement of civilians in states like Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and most recently Syria led to new displacements but also secondary displacements of individuals from other states in the region who had taken shelter in these states. Neighboring states Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, with histories of hosting refugees, became overwhelmed by the sheer volume of new arrivals. Unable to access assistance in these neighboring states, many migrants began to look farther afield in Europe. In this section, I review the processes that led to the European Migration Crisis, with emphasis on both migratory and political factors.

Figure 2.1 reveals the overall trend in new asylum seeker applications lodged in European states during the crisis period, as well as the proportion attributed to key sending states. Not all migrants apply for asylum, so the number of new asylum applications provides an under count of migrant arrivals during the crisis. Also, the number of new asylum applications includes some individuals who arrived in states in previous years but waited to file an application. Despite these limitations, the number of new asylum applications captures both a shift in the number of migrant arrivals during the crisis period and the stress placed on European domestic migration

management systems.

Afghans, Iraqis and Syrians constitute the largest proportion of first-time asylum applications in the EU for the crisis period, 2014-2017. I discuss the events that facilitated such a large number of individuals to leave each of these states.

First, the conflict in Syria began in the Spring of 2011, as the government opted for violent repression in response to anti-government protests, associated with the "Arab Spring" movement, emerging and spreading from the epicenter of Dar'a (De Juan and Bank, 2015). The Free Syrian Army, composed of defectors from security forces and civilians, formed in response and challenged the regime of President Bashar Al-Assad. The government responded with increasingly violent tactics, including the use of chemical weapons (Jenkins, 2014). In 2013, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (or Syria, hereafter ISIS), bolstered by strongholds in Iraq, moved into Syria and began seizing territory. By mid-2014 ISIS declared the establishment of a caliphate, including control over the city of Aleppo in the Northwestern corner of Syria. International actors also helped fuel the conflict. Russia and Iran have supported the Al-Assad regime, while the United States and other Western forces have largely focused their energy on the elimination of ISIS, supporting the rebels in this effort. Air strikes from international forces were a prominent cause of displacement across the conflict.

Given the multitude of violent actors located across the country and the brutal tactics they employed, the Syrian Civil War was a perfect storm for displacement. The United Nations Human Rights Council has evidence that forces on all sides have committed human rights violations and hundreds of thousands of Syrians have died in this extremely bloody, protracted conflict (*Oral Update of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic*, 2014). Millions of Syrians fled into neighboring states Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, and roughly half of the population of Syria (22 million est. in 2011) has been displaced during the

conflict: 6.6 million externally and 6.7 million internally (as of June 2020).[7] Syria also hosted hundreds of thousands of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees from past conflicts in the region. When the conflict reached these areas, secondary displacements were triggered as these individuals were forced to flee West or North alongside Syrian nationals (and in some cases back into Northern Iraq).[8]

States contiguous with Syria saw refugee arrivals soon after the conflict began and host the vast majority of displacees from the country. Turkey opened a refugee camp within months of the Syrian civil war's onset in 2011 and by the end of 2014 hosted roughly 1.5 million Syrian refugees and 100,000 Iraqi refugees. Lebanon hosted 1.2 million Syrian refugees by the end of 2014 and Jordan more than 620,000.[9] While all three states were initially welcoming to Syrians, by late 2014 governments felt the strain of the rapid pace of refugee arrivals and feared more arrivals as ISIS gained ground (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2017). None of these states applies formal refugee status to displacees.[10] UNHCR partners with the governments of these states to register and care for refugees, but the organization's budget was and remains significantly underfunded given the scope of regional displacement.[11] Domestic rules restricting refugee access to government services and widespread border closures were put into place by all three by the end of 2014 (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2017; İçduygu, 2015; Janmyr, 2016; Francis, 2015).[12] These barriers encouraged secondary move-

[7]UNHCR. (2020, November 17). *Syria Refugee Crisis.* USA for UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency. Accessed here: https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/syria/.

[8]UNWRA. (2021, September 12). *Syria 10.* United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Accessed here: https://www.unrwa.org/syria-crisis.; UNHCR. (2021, September 12). *Iraq Refugee Crisis.* USA for UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency. Accessed here: https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/iraq/.

[9]UNHCR. (2020 November 17). *Operations.* Global Focus: UNHCR Operation Wordwide. Accessed here: https://reporting.unhcr.org/operations. These statistics include registered individuals. The true numbers of displaced Syrians are likely higher.

[10]Turkey is party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, but not the 1967 protocol which lifted the geographic limitations from individuals displaced from Europe, while Jordan and Lebanon are not signatories. UNHCR relies upon invitations from these states to operate on their territory.

[11]Ibid.

[12]While the Turkish government rejected suggestions that it had a formal policy of closed borders, there are indications that Turkish border crossings were limited in 2014, as reports often note that borders are being opened to new arrivals (implying they are otherwise closed). This is my own

ments of individuals fleeing unrest in the region, who began to look farther afield toward Europe for hope of protection.

A significant contribution to migration pressure during the European Migration Crisis was also made by those fleeing ongoing conflict and instability in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Afghanistan presents one of the largest protracted displacement situations in the world. Decades of war, occupation, and violent insurgency have created a desperate security situation in the country. In 2014-2015, despite the end of NATO combat missions and a draw-down of American troops, violence escalated across the country, with 2014 declared Afghanistan's "deadliest year" (Johnson, 2015). The Islamic State made its appearance and captured territory in the eastern part of Afghanistan, and the Taliban engaged the Islamic State and Afghan security forces simultaneously, leading to high numbers of civilian casualties and displacement. Across the border, Pakistani security forces continued to engage the Taliban in North Waziristan in 2014, displacing tens of thousands of Pakistanis and creating secondary displacement of Afghan refugees hosted in the region (Ahmed, 2014). The impact of ISIS was also felt in Iraq in 2014. The insurgent group captured a significant amount of territory in the northwestern and central portions of the country, including the cities of Mosul and Tikrit, displacing hundreds of thousands internationally.[13] Facing the same constraints to finding protection near home as their Syrian counterparts, many Afghan, Pakistani, and Iraqi asylum-seekers sought refuge in Europe.

Primary Routes to Europe

There are a variety of ways in which individuals attempt to reach the territories of potential host states, at which point they may request asylum. Historically, Europe has seen a relatively large share of asylum seekers enter by international flights. However,

observation from review of news articles at the time, but it is also noted by İçduygu (2015).

[13]Fleming, M. (2014, September 13). *Press Briefing at the Palais des Nations in Geneva* [transcribed text]. UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency. Accessed here: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2014/9/54214cfe9/sharp-increase-iraqi-refugees-fleeing-isis-jordan-turkey.html.

in the last two decades the paths by which individuals attempt to reach Europe have diversified. Both land and sea routes are now commonly used. Frontex, the Union's border security agency, maintains data on illegal border crossings and has categorized the primary routes by which individuals attempt to reach Member States.[14] In this section, I briefly describe the primary routes utilized by migrants during the crisis period, 2014-2017, which are are depicted in Figure 2.2.

There three primary routes across the Mediterranean Sea: the Eastern Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean, and Western Mediterranean routes. The Eastern Mediterranean Route refers to the water route leaving from Turkey to Greece (via the Aegean Sea) or Cyprus (via the Mediterranean). This Greek island of Lesvos is within 10 miles from the coast of Turkey, and this island has borne a considerable portion of migrants attempting to reach the European mainland via the Eastern Mediterranean Route. The Central Mediterranean Route refers to the water route between North Africa and Italy. The small island country of Malta lies directly between Libya and the Southern tip of Italy along this route. The Italian island of Lampedusa sits between Malta and Tunisia, and like Lesvos has born a disproportionate burden in terms of migrant arrivals. The Western Mediterranean Route is the stretch of sea between Morocco and Spain, but also refers to the land route created by the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla located along the Northern coast of Morocco, which migrants attempt to enter on foot. During the migration crisis, the number of irregular border crossings reported to Frontex were relatively low, remaining under 10,000. However, in 2017 traffic along the route increased significantly to just over 23,000 individuals.

There are two primary land routes identified by Frontex. The first, the Western Balkan Route, runs from the Turkish land border with Greece and Bulgaria through the states of the Balkan Peninsula to the northern borders of Croatia and Hungary.

[14]Frontex. 2019. Migratory Routes. Accessed here: https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/.



Figure 2.2: Map of European Continent with Primary Migratory Routes, 2014-2017.

This route is fed by the Eastern Mediterranean route; the two tend to fluctuate together. Also, it has the additional complication of including several non-EU states, meaning that migrants entering through Greece or Bulgaria (unless they cross through Romania) must exit EU Member States and re-enter a secondary external border at Croatia or Hungary to the north. The second, the Eastern Borders Route, refers to the more than 3,700 miles-long border between the EU's easternmost Member States and their contiguous neighbors Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. This route has the lowest migratory traffic by far, with flows never in excess of 2,000 individuals detected crossing the border per year since 2008. Most individuals crossing into Member States from this route are nationals of the bordering states listed above.

State policies have the ability to impact routes, temporarily and even permanently shifting sections of particular routes or making them largely impassable. However,

migrants exhibit fortitude and ingenuity in the face of obstacles that states often underestimate. During the migration crisis (but not unique to the crisis), migrants set sail on precarious craft, despite the high potential for dangerous waters in the Mediterranean. They packed into trucks for hours and even days on end, with no access to facilities and sometimes without access to fresh air. When they met border fences, some tried to scale them; others pressed on to find terminal points or holes in the fence. They also made quick use of opportunities to take new or temporary routes. In 2015, Frontext notes that between October and December an "Arctic route" opened through the land borders between Russia and Norway and Finland. During this time, an estimated 6,000 asylum applicants were counted, mostly from Afghanistan and Syria. The flow abated when the Russian government began requiring Schengen visas for travellers to enter the country.[15]

Receiving States: End Points for Migratory Flows

Some states in Europe are more popular destinations for migrants than others. The states that saw the largest number of new asylum applications during the crisis include both traditional receiving states and states located along key migratory routes to Europe. Traditional receiving states share certain characteristics. They tend to be wealthier, to respect the physical integrity, social, and political rights of citizens, and to be historically popular destinations for migrants. States located along key migratory routes feature higher numbers of asylum applications due to their location (i.e., they are easier to reach) but also because of the Dublin Regulations of the EU, which require the first state a migrant arrives in to process that migrants' asylum application.

The number of new asylum applications from 2010-2017 in the ten most popular receiving states (i.e., "hosts") are featured in Figure 2.3. It is clear that even

[15]Frontex. 2019.*Migratory Routes: Eastern Borders Route.* Accessed here: https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/.



Figure 2.3: Alluvial diagram of first-time asylum applications registered in European states by Top 10 Host States, 2014-2017.

among the top receiving states, there are significant differences in migratory pressure. Germany is the most prominent state, with the highest number of asylum (and largest proportion) of asylum seekers for the period beginning in 2013. Germany's high number of new asylum applications is in part due to its history of migration and strong economy. However, Germany's decision in 2015 to process Syrian asylum seeker claims, regardless of whether asylum seekers travelled through other EU states first, also made Germany a popular destination for migrants (Holehouse, Huggler, and Vogt, 2015). Sweden, another popular destination during the crisis has a long history of welcoming policies toward refugees. Sweden began calling for other European states to help share the burden of asylum seekers in 2014, but maintained its welcoming stance through most of 2015. By November 2015, however, Sweden began to reintroduce border controls and closures with Denmark, noting that it was overwhelmed by thousands of daily new migrant arrivals (doc 1428). Other popular destination states maintained similar numbers of asylum applications across the period, like France and the United Kingdom.

States located along key migratory routes are also featured in Figure 2.3. Greece and Italy, bordering the Mediterranean Sea at the Southern edge of Europe, received

migrant arrivals by the thousands per day at the height of the crisis. Many migrants, however, continued their journeys from these states to other states further north in Europe, like Germany. I discuss the role these states played in the EU's response to the crisis later in the chapter. However, it is worth noting here that the asylum seeker application counts for these two states are a significant under count of the true pressure these states faced during the crisis. For these two states, and others like Hungary, the count of new asylum seeker applications is also influenced by decisions by leaders to only process a certain number of asylum seeker applications. In June 2015, for example, Hungary began refusing to take back Dublin transfers from other states (i.e., asylum seekers that entered EU territory first through Hungary) and declared that it would build a fence along its border with Serbia, a key thoroughfare on the Western Balkans route (Charter, 2015). This was all to prevent Hungary from being responsible for providing protection for asylum seekers. While not ideal, the count of new asylum applications remains the only source of systematic data on migrant arrivals in states across Europe. The distribution of new asylum seeker applications reveals that the crisis had unequal impacts on European states.

European Migration Governance

In this section, I discuss the state of migration governance in Europe leading up to the crisis, in terms of general trends in the direction of governance and existing mechanisms for responding to influxes of migrants. At the highest level, the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009, consolidated the EU's mandate over migration at the supranational level.[16] This mandate includes "offer[ing] its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention

[16]European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01.

and combating of crime."[17] It also weakened the decision-making power of states by instituting qualified majority voting in the Council of the EU with respect to migration-related matters, removing unilateral veto power from Member States.[18] On paper, this meant that the EU now had broader powers to legislate on migration and its ability to pass such legislation was strengthened (Hampshire, 2016). However, as I describe below, the Union's ability to pass migration-related legislation in practice remained limited.

The EU's mandate with respect to migration governance is essentially broken down into two fields. The first is governance of *mobility*, or the internal movement of EU nationals among Member States. The free movement of labor imagined during the early days of the European Economic Community in the mid-20th century has evolved to constitute a "zone of free movement" after the incorporation of the 1985 Schengen Agreement into EU law - what is now the *Schengen acquis*. The second field is governance of *migration*, or the movement of third country nationals (TCNs) into EU Member States. Accordingly, the Union's Migration governance is a multi-faceted space, consisting primarily of mechanisms related to immigration and asylum, border control at the Union's external borders, and cooperation with non-EU countries to control migration and combat human smuggling and trafficking. In the following sections, I outline the components of migration governance within these three areas. I discuss their historical development briefly, to provide a sense for where things stood prior to the migration crisis.

I also review the EU's response to the migration crisis within each of these fields, as

[17]This quote is taken from Article 3(2) of the *The Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* (TFEU). Governance in the EU is based on two core documents, collectively referred to as "The Treaties." The *Treaty establishing the European Economic Community* (1957; hereafter Treaty of Rome) and the *Treaty on European Union* (1992; hereafter Treaty of Maastricht) which established the European Economic Community and European Union, respectively. The Lisbon Treaty consolidated the Treaties into the competencies and structures that govern the Union at present, and the revised Treaty of Rome is now referred to as the TFEU and the revised Maastricht as the *Consolidated Treaty on European Union* (TEU).

[18]The Council is on equal legislative footing with the European Parliament. Prior to Lisbon, decision-making in the Council was based on consensus.

outlined in the Commission's grand agenda-setting document, *A European Agenda on Migration* (EAM). Released in May 2015, this plan was designed to provide immediate relief for Member States facing large numbers of migrant arrivals and to outline a sustainable system for effective and efficient response to future crises. The plan largely focuses on responding to the situation in the Mediterranean, where migrants were arriving by the thousands per day and shipwrecks and drownings led to a rising death toll and increased public scrutiny.

The Common European Asylum System

The European Union has worked for more than two decades on developing a "common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection" referred to as the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). [19] The primary goals of the CEAS are to establish uniform standards for asylum and other forms of international protection for the Union as a whole, as well as to develop rules for responsibility sharing among states in terms of hearing asylum claims. In the following sections, I describe the primary components of the CEAS and discuss how the EAM builds on these components in responding to the migration crisis.

Uniform standards for asylum and other forms of protection

To create uniform standards across the EU for asylum applicants, the Union has passed several pieces of legislation that create rules for qualifying for asylum, the process of applying for asylum and other statuses, and how states are to treat asylum seekers after arrival. The Qualification Directive, passed in 2004, established minimum standards throughout the Union for individuals to qualify for refugees status,

[19] This project was set in motion by the Tampere (1999) program and is now an explicit component of the Union's mandate under Article 78 of the *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* (TFEU).

subsidiary protection, or international protection.[20] The Asylum Procedures Directive, passed in 2005, creates minimum standards for Member States' granting and withdrawal of asylum.[21] These rules create obligations for both states and asylum seekers with respect to the process of applying for asylum. Finally, the Reception Conditions Directive, passed in 2003, outlines what Member States must provide for asylum seekers on their territory including: informing them of their rights; providing appropriate identification documents; providing adequate standards of living and housing; and allowing them access to education, health care, and labor markets.[22] These directives were revised in 2013 to try to achieve the levels of policy harmonization aspired to in the original documents. Despite these efforts, in the years prior to the crisis it was clear that asylum standards across the EU varied widely (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012; Hampshire, 2016).

With the onset of the crisis, EU leaders saw an opportunity to try once again to bring the asylum procedures and policies of Member States into alignment. The EAM proposed changes not only to the legislation but also to the EU's oversight functions in this realm. The Union would develop a process for monitoring states application of asylum rules, provide more active guidance to Member States, and more readily consider infringement procedures for states unwilling to conform. One specific area of focus for harmonization was on safe country lists for Member States to share. These lists provide information on country conditions in states from which migrants originate, which can be used by asylum officials in Member States to determine the likelihood that an individual qualifies for protection. Safe country lists are intended to make asylum application procedures more efficient and less variable across Member

[20] *Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted* (OJ 2004 (L 304) 12).

[21] *Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status* (2005 OJ (L326) 13).

[22] *Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers* (2003 OJ (L 31) 18).

States by lowering variability in the information available to states and allowing them to process applications from asylum seekers from safe countries more quickly.[23]

The European Asylum Support Office (EASO), another facet of the CEAS, is tasked with supporting the harmonization of state asylum practices through trainings, information exchanges, and assisting when state migration management capacity is challenged.[24] Member States have made good use of technical support from EASO since its inception. For example, Luxembourg requested emergency training support after an influx of asylum-seekers required hiring new staff in 2012. That same year, Italy requested support from EASO and other Member States in discovering ways it could improve its asylum process and reception conditions (*EASO Annual Activity Report 2012*, 2013). EASO played a central role in the implementation of immediate action items from the EAM and is a key player in the longer term development of a common asylum system.

As promised in the EAM, the EU proposed reforms to these directives in mid 2016. Under the proposal, the Asylum Procedures, Qualification, and Receptions Conditions directives would all be amended with the goal of establishing a "single common asylum procedure" for the Union.[25] Under the proposal, EASO would also receive a broader mandate to evaluate Member State performance, determine safe countries lists, and take action when Member States face future crises. The Dublin Regulations and Eurodac, discussed in detail below, were also included in these proposed reforms. However, these reforms have yet to be adopted.

An additional mechanism under the CEAS that received relatively little attention

[23]Safe country of origin and safe third country designations may provide a mechanism for harmonizing decisions on asylum claims across states. However, the practice is questionable in light of states commitments under international law, which provides for a right to individual adjudication of asylum claims. Safe country lists can result in blanket rejections of asylum claims without attention to the individual circumstances of the asylum seeker.

[24]*Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office* (2010 OJ (L 132) 11).

[25]European Commission, Towards A Reform Of The Common European Asylum System And Enhancing Legal Avenues To Europe, 6 April 2016. Accessed here: https://www.refworld.org/docid/576024d04.html.

is the Temporary Protection Directive.[26] The third task set out in TFEU Article 78(2) is to create a common system of temporary protection to be used "in the event of a massive inflow." Temporary protection is a group-based status used to provide immediate relief to those in need of humanitarian protection. It often has strict temporal limits (with options for extension) and is granted to alleviate pressure on national asylum systems, either because individuals do not qualify for asylum (e.g., fleeing generalized instability in their home countries) or because the adjudication of individual asylum claims would be an extraordinary burden for the potential host state. The impetus for this directive comes from the war in Kosovo in the late 1990s, which generated a massive influx of displaced persons into the EU (at that time, the largest influx since World War II). Member States applied their various standards for temporary protection, which produced imbalances in flows of asylum seekers to those states with more generous policies. The Directive stresses the need for such uniform policies to ensure appropriate burden-sharing among Member States. Despite individual Member States having experienced massive influxes, especially during 2015-2016 when total migrant arrivals well-surpassed those from the Kosovo War, the Temporary Protection Directive has yet to be activated. In fact, this mechanism has never been activated, despite calls from some states (e.g., Italy and Malta made requests in 2011). This appears to be due to a lack of clarity in the legal definition of massive influx used in the directive, as well as the cumbersome negotiation process required to activate it (Beirens et al., 2016).

Relocation and resettlement

TFEU Article 78(3) provides an additional mechanism for supporting Member States in the event of a large influx of migrants. Under this article, the Council can adopt

[26] *Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof* (2001 OJ (L 212) 12).

provisional measures for Member States "confronted by an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries." Prior to May 2015, this mechanism had also never been utilized. As part of the immediate actions proposed in the EAM to relieve pressure on frontline Member States, in particular Greece and Italy, the EAM outlined two mechanisms. The first was a relocation scheme, whereby asylum seekers would be distributed from frontline states to other Member States who would process their claims. The second mechanism was a resettlement scheme, which would involve the EU working with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to identify individuals located in non-EU states in need of international protection.[27] In both cases, the number of asylum seekers or refugees, respectively, that each state would take in is based on a weighted distribution key to ensure fairness.[28] This distribution mechanism reflects the Union's goals of creating a uniform asylum status for the bloc, as individuals would be relocated only if Member States recognize the asylum decisions of other states as valid. The EAM also notes that these mechanisms could be made permanent in preparation for future influxes.

In September 2015, an emergency, voluntary relocation scheme was announced. It was intended to transfer 40,000 migrants in need of international protection from Greece and Italy to other Member States as new migrant arrivals surged.[29] However, the volume of migrants arriving continued to increase, and the proposal was updated less than two weeks later to increase the total proposed relocations to 160,000 and to include Hungary as a frontline state from which relocations could be arranged.[30] Participation in this larger relocation scheme was also mandatory. States demon-

[27] The argument there is that resettlement would have an indirect impact on frontline Member States by decreasing the number of new arrivals in the longer term.

[28] The key is based on state GDP, population size, unemployment rate, and the number of asylum seekers received in the past.

[29] *Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece* (2015 OJ (L 239) 146).

[30] *Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece* (2015 OJ (L 248) 80). The termination date of the act was September 27, 2017.

strated mixed levels of support for relocation. Frontline states like Greece and Italy, as well as others receiving high levels of migrants like Germany, argued in favor of the scheme. Others took a strong stance against the mandatory nature of the scheme, like the Visegrad Four (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), who expressed anti-migrant sentiments and viewed the scheme as an overreach of European authority.

Unsurprisingly, this mixed reception led to slow implementation. In November 2017, two months after the original termination date of the relocation scheme, less than a third of the total number of migrants in need of relocation from Italy and Greece had been effectively moved.[31] Hungary and Slovakia, with support from Poland, challenged the scheme in the Court of Justice of the European Union in December 2015. The judgment in September 2017 was not in favor of the states; additionally, in 2016 and 2017 the Commission brought infringement procedures against the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland before the Court of Justice for their continued derogation from their commitments to relocate migrants.[32] The Court ruled against the three states but failed to follow up with financial penalties. In light of the absence of enforcement, state resistance continued, and by November 2020 infringement procedures against Hungary had been used five times related to the migration crisis (*Hungary: Facing Fifth Infringement Procedure Related to Asylum Since 2015*, 2020).

Resettlement has been practiced by some Member States for decades, so the proposed resettlement mechanism was less controversial. Prior to 2015, EU Member

[31] As a component of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan of November 2015 and the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, 54,000 of the 160,000 relocation slots under Council Decision 2015/1601 were to be allocated to relocating Syrian refugees from Turkey to EU Member States. Therefore, the relocation slots from Greece and Italy were paired down to roughly 106,000. See *Council Decision (EU) 2016/1754 of 29 September 2016 amending Decision (EU) 2015/1601 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece* (2016 OJ (L 268) 82).

[32] The EU's use of infringement procedures against states in the area of migration rapidly increased as a result of the migrant crisis. Lang (2020) provides a detailed summary these trends.

States infrequently resettled refugees and acted unilaterally upon request from the UNHCR when the organization identified individuals in need. In 2009, the Commission proposed a voluntary resettlement scheme with financial incentives to boost participation by Member States. This Joint EU Resettlement Program was established in 2012.[33] Under the program, Member States are given lump sums per person effectively resettled from Union funds. Despite these financial incentives, resettlement was relatively underutilized prior to the Migration Crisis. In July 2015, Member States agreed to a resettlement scheme for 22,000 persons. This scheme was more successful than the Relocation Scheme; by November 2017 Member States had resettled 81 percent of individuals, primarily from Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey (*Resettlement: Ensuring Safe and Legal Access to Protection for Refugees*, 2017). Non-EU, Schengen participating states Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland also agreed to participate in the scheme by resettling just over 4,000 individuals.

A separate resettlement program was established by the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016. Under the agreement, Greece and Turkey established a 1:1 exchange of one irregular migrant detained in Greece for a Syrian asylum seeker from Turkey. Syrian asylum seekers were prioritized for resettlement as the largest group of migrants in Turkey, and unlike migrants from other states, the conflict in Syria made it hard to deny their need for protection. As of November 2017, 11,354 Syrian refugees had been resettled in 15 Member States (*Resettlement: Ensuring Safe and Legal Access to Protection for Refugees*, 2017). Encouraged by the success of both the more general resettlement scheme and the EU-Turkey Statement, in July 2016 the Commission submitted a proposal for the creation of a permanent Union Resettlement Framework within the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund.[34]

[33] *Decision No 281/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 March 2012 amending Decision No 573/2007/EC establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of the General Programme 'Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows'* (2012 OJ (L 92) 1).

[34] *Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Union Resettlement Framework and amending Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament*

The Dublin Regulations and Eurodac

The second task set by TFEU Article 78(2) is for the EU to create a system for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an asylum application. The Dublin Regulations, established under the Dublin Convention (1990), are the most prominent rules the Union has for making this determination.[35] The Dublin Regulations were developed in concert with the zone of free movement (see below) as questions would inevitably arise regarding which state is responsible for processing asylum applications when asylum seekers can move freely. Dublin established that the state by which an asylum-seeker first enters the Union is responsible for processing the asylum claim. The Convention entered into force in 1997 and soon thereafter, the Eurodac Regulation (2000) was formulated to assist states in determining which Member State is responsible for processing a claim.[36] Eurodac (European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database) contains fingerprint data from migrants and asylum seekers, which states may use to verify that individuals claiming asylum on their territory did not first enter the EU elsewhere.

The Dublin Regulations state that individuals claiming asylum in a Member State where they have either a family members or a visa (or other form of residence) should have their claim assessed by that state. Otherwise, individuals' asylum claims should be adjudicated by the state they first entered within the Union boundaries. States can initiate transfers of asylum seekers back to their state of first entry in this circumstance. While the regulations created rules to standardize responsibility for assessing asylum claims, in practice it has created a dramatic imbalance in the number of asy-

and the Council (COM (2016) 468). The proposal establishes Article 78(3)(d) and (g) as its legal basis. While the point on common procedures is frequently referenced, 78(3)(g) is rarely referenced but instructs the Council and the Parliament to facilitate partnership and cooperation with third countries for managing inflows.

[35] Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities, June 15, 1990, 2144 U.N.T.S. 435.

[36] *Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention* (OJ 2000 (L 316) 1).

lum claims for which states are responsible. States on the external borders along primary migration routes, like Greece and Bulgaria, bear the brunt of new migrant arrivals, and have lower capacities for processing asylum claims. Prior to the crisis, Dublin transfers were halted or circumscribed with respect to frontline states due to poor conditions (e.g., Greece) or poorly functioning asylum systems (e.g., Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy) (Trauner, 2016). These prompted a revision of Dublin in 2013 (Hampshire, 2016). The revised regulations, "Dublin III," allow states to consider conditions in the first Member State a migrant enters prior to returning migrants, with the hope that states will not return migrants to precarious conditions. Dublin III also created an "early warning, preparedness and crisis management mechanism" to assist states with dysfunctional national systems or facing a large influx of asylum-seekers.[37]

The 2015 EAM acknowledges that despite the revisions in 2013, Dublin was still inadequately implemented by Member States. Transfers were often delayed or simply not initiated. Family reunification rules were often ignored, and states were not using the discretionary rules to assist their neighbors experiencing significant increases in migrant arrivals. The EAM proposes that the EASO establish a network of specialized Dublin units to assist states in applying transfer rules and ensuring migrant fingerprints are taken. In addition, the EU would propose another revision to the regulations in 2016 (discussed below).

The Dublin regulations have played a large role in the 2015-2016 Migration Crisis, impacting actors at every level. The disproportionate burden placed on Southern European Member States, particularly Greece and Italy, to process asylum claims has created tensions among Member States. The persistence of the notion that there is a single state responsible for processing applications – the state of first entry – stymied attempts at creating new burden-sharing mechanisms. In June 2015, the

[37] *Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person* (2013 OJ (L 180) 31).

Italian government threatened to allow migrants on its territory to travel north into other European countries unless EU Member States agreed to adopt the emergency Relocation Scheme. The French government responded that the Dublin rules needed to be applied and migrants who arrived in France from Italy would be returned (Samuel, 2015). By September 2015, considering continued disagreement over relocation, Italy's Prime Minister called for Dublin to be scrapped, as it was a "masterpiece" for those opposed to redistributing migrants (Perrone, 2015). One of these states was Hungary. In June 2015, Hungary unilaterally halted Dublin returns to its territory, citing the unusually high number of migrant arrivals (Nowak and Ultsch, 2015). Yet, a few months later in September 2015, Hungary alongside the other three Visegrad states called for "rigorous implementation" of the Dublin Regulations in protest against a proposed mandatory redistribution scheme (Winning and Pop, 2015). Despite its intent as a burden-sharing mechanism, states not on Europe's front lines have utilized the Regulations as a means of shifting (or maintaining) those burdens elsewhere (Thielemann, 2018).

To correct these inadequacies, the EU proposed an update to the Dublin Regulations (Dublin IV) in May 2016. The proposal contains a "corrective allocation mechanism" that seeks to alleviate the imbalance of asylum claims frontline states must process. Under the mechanism, when a state reaches the number of asylum-applications in excess of their calculated quota (based on a key similar to that for the Relocation Scheme), new asylum applicants will be transferred to states that have not yet hit their quota. A recast version of the Eurodac regulations was also put forward that month, as the systems for fingerprinting and tracking migrants broke down in the face of overwhelming numbers of migrants.[38] The proposal includes expanded

[38] *Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person] , for identifying an illegally staying third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data*

obligations for states to fingerprint all third-country nationals or stateless persons illegally entering a Member State (not just those applying for asylum), as well as to take pictures of migrant faces to facilitate the development of facial recognition programs at the border in the future. While the corrective allocation mechanism is a promising development, frontline states would still bear the administrative burden of collecting biometric data for Eurodac. Like the rest of the new legislative proposals for the CEAS, these remain under negotiation as of late 2021.

Managing Internal and External Borders

In general, the governance of migration by the European Union falls within two domains. The first domain is that of free movement between Member states of the European Union, often referred to as *mobility* or internal movement. The free movement of labor imagined during the early days of the European Economic Community in the mid-20th century has evolved to constitute a "zone of free movement" after the incorporation of the 1985 Schengen Agreement into EU law - what is now *Schengen acquis*. The second domain is that of *migration* governance, which concerns the movement of third country nationals (TCNs) into an EU or Schengen Member State. These two domains are related. The breakdown of borders to form the internal Schengen Area required a shift in focus to the external borders of the EU, as individuals entering one Schengen state may easily travel to others. In this section, I discuss the Schengen Area and its relationship to the migration crisis. Then, I shift focus to the EU's management of its external borders and how this evolved in response to the crisis, again with reference to the EAM.

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by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes (recast), COM/2016/0272 final - 2016/0132 (COD).

The Schengen Area

The notion of a zone of free movement began in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome, the treaty that established the European Union's predecessor, the European Economic Community (EEC). While free movement was seen as a critical component of economic integration, the expansion of mobility rights in the EEC proceeded slowly owing to "endemic conflict between supranational impulses and intergovernmental resistance" (Kostakopoulou, 2009, 47). That is, supranational actors within the EEC pushed for further integration, including removing barriers to free movement, while Member States resisted these impulses – over time resulting in incremental change. For example, debates in subsequent years on *mobility* concerned discrimination against worker-nationals of other Member States; their rights of residency, political representation and voting, family reunification; and the development of a uniform passport for European citizens. However, the focus remained on the free movement of those with employment, and many states refused to abandon policies favoring their own nationals (Groenendijk, 2014, 316). As economic integration continued and membership in the EEC expanded, states became increasingly interested in lowering barriers to free movement to reap the economic benefits. By the mid-1980s, a small group of states built enough momentum to attempt a zone of free travel, resulting in the Schengen Zone of Free Movement, which forms a critical component of migration governance in the EU today. The Schengen Agreement was signed in 1985 and its associated convention in 1990. At the heart of Schengen is a free movement area without border controls on goods or individuals moving between participating countries. Participating states agree to: the abolition of border checks, participation in a uniform visa system, collection of data in the Schengen Information System on external border crossings, and enhanced cooperation on law enforcement and judicial matters related to the external border.[39] Interest in participation grew steadily

[39]The development of the Schengen Area took place outside the auspices of what was then the European Economic Community (the Union would be formed in 1992). Initially, the multilateral

Figure 2.4: Map of the European continent indicating which countries are Members the European Union, Schengen Area, or Candidate States for Membership.

among other states in Europe. By the time of its entry into force in March 1995, nine of the 12 EU Member States were participants. Schengen was brought within the scope of the EU law by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, and the associated body of law and regulations are now referred to as *Schengen acquis*.

Figure 2.4 displays the EU and Schengen statuses of states in Europe during the crisis period. For the 2014-2017 period, 22 of the 28 EU Member States participated in Schengen. Several states maintain opt-outs (i.e, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom[40]), while new Member States Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Cyprus are waiting to join. Within Europe, four non-Member States participate in the zone of

agreement was between the Benelux states (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), France, and Germany. Schengen was not the first agreement on free movement in Europe. Schengen incorporated the Benelux Common Travel Area and the open frontier agreement between France and Germany (Andreas and Snyder, 2000, 21-23). A common travel zone between the United Kingdom and Ireland was established in the early 20th century. The Nordic Union also featured a common passport and travel zone without internal border controls (Money and Lockhart, 2018, 55-56).

[40]The United Kingdom (UK) held a referendum to decide whether to leave the EU in 2016. Voters opted to leave the Union, and the UK spent the next several years negotiating its exit from the Union. The UK officially left the EU in January 2020. For the purposes of this project, I refer to the UK as a member of the Union.

free movement through the European Free Trade Association: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. The first three of these have an agreement maintaining free movement for their nationals and EU citizens through the 1992 *Agreement on the European Economic Area*, which provides for their participation in the EU's common market (and thereby the zone of free movement).[41] The EU and Switzerland negotiated a separate treaty in 1999, the *Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons* (AFMP).[42]

Articles 23-26 of Schengen Borders Code provide states the option to reintroduce border controls "where there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security."[43] States participating in Schengen are obliged to notify other Member States and the European Commission when reintroducing border controls, the latter of which maintains a list of notifications. My examination of these notifications revealed that, prior to September 2015, border closures were infrequent and were primarily used when Schengen states hosted international conferences or other public events, citing security concerns. Beginning in September 2015, however, states began to reintroduce border controls more often and for increasingly long periods of time in response to large "influx[es] of persons seeking international protection" or "illegal migrants."[44] Austria, Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia even constructed fences and other physical barriers to deter or direct migrants at their borders. Eventually, the EU stepped in to provide guidance and supervise border closures under Schengen (Guild et al., 2016).

Apart from border closures, Schengen has also created tension between Eastern and Western Member States that influenced the Union's responses to the migration

[41] Agreement on the European Economic Area, May 2, 1992, 1793 U.N.T.S 3.

[42] Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons, Jun. 21, 1999, 2227 U.N.T.S. 3

[43] *Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code)* (2006 OJ (L 105) 1).

[44] European Commission. Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control. Accessed here: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/schengen-area/temporary-reintroduction-border-control$_en$ September 19, 2019.

crisis. The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU added Member States from the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean that were less wealthy, and many older Member States were concerned that citizens from the new Members would migrate *en masse* in search of jobs or access to welfare systems. This tension has also led to Romania and Bulgaria being denied Schengen membership despite their status as EU Member States and having met the technical requirements (Hampshire, 2016).

While post-accession migration did occur, it was relatively modest (Barrell, Fitz-Gerald, and Riley, 2010). Concerns about the fairness of internal mobility regulations continued to affect the Union. The United Kingdom's exit from the EU, which proceeded alongside the migration crisis, was dominated by anti-migrant political discourse and concerns about welfare system abuse by migrants from poorer Member States. Western Member States opposed Brexit, but some were sympathetic to concerns about internal migration abuses (Hampshire, 2016). States with a vested interest in gaining Schengen status, like Bulgaria and Romania, engaged cooperatively, attempting to leverage the EU's response to the crisis to gain membership (*Bulgaria Still Seeking Schengen Membership by Air Border*, 2015; *Romanian Minister Says Joining Schengen to Strengthen EU's Border Security*, 2016). On the other hand, debates about internal mobility fueled the resistance of Eastern states like Poland to measures like the relocation scheme. The same concerns about mobility abuses surfaced in some Western bloc states during negotiations for the EU-Turkey deal in 2016, as they feared visa liberalization would lead to a wave of emigration from Turkey.

A common visa policy

In the previous section, I discussed the role of internal mobility as enacted through the Schengen Area. In this section, I briefly cover the EU's approach to the regulating labor migration of third country nationals from outside the Union. This is relevant here for two reasons. First, the European Union recognizes the need for regular mi-

gration pathways and has been working to develop a common visa policy. The EAM acknowledges the Union's need for labor migration. The increasingly specialized labor needs of the economy paired with demographic decline in many Member States means the Union needs to recruit international laborers. However, states maintain control over how many residence visas are issued and to whom. The EU may issue temporary stay visas for business or travel purposes, but long-term stay remains the responsibility of states. The EAM proposed the creation of a common visa policy to be paired with the common asylum policy discussed above.

The second reason that labor migration governance is relevant to the crisis is that it contributes to the volume of mixed migration flows like those during the crisis. Considering the diversity of domestic visa rules and generally high standards for residency, labor migration to Member States through regular means is limited to a small number of high-skilled laborers. The Union has made travel to the EU difficult by requiring Member States to enforce penalties against transportation companies who transport individuals without proper paperwork onto Member State territory. Individuals wishing to migrate to Europe are then left with the choice of not migrating or opting for irregular routes like those utilized in the crisis.

External Border Controls for the EU

Management of the external border of the EU is a joint endeavour between Union agencies and Member States. Border management activities include receiving migrants and processing applications for asylum as well as search and rescue and interdiction and interception measures in the Mediterranean. The agency tasked with coordinating border control efforts is Frontex. The first iteration of Frontex was created in 2004 via Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004.[45] Then titled the European

[45] *Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union* (OJ 2004 (L 349) 1).

Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, its headquarters was established in Poland, one of the ten new members to accede to the Union that year.[46] In 2007, the agency's mandate was expanded to include the deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams to assist states with situations, "where Member States are faced with the arrival of large numbers of third-country nationals trying to enter the territory of the Member States illegally."[47]

The mandate of the agency continued to expand in subsequent years, with an eye toward building a fully integrated border management system at the Union level. In 2013, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) was created as a means for Member States and Frontex to centralize information sharing and coordination activities, "for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants."[48] The number of migrants traveling along the dangerous Mediterranean routes was increasing, as was negative media attention on increases in the number of migrants drowning while attempting the journey. The following year, the mandate of Frontex to facilitate border management was formally extended to "operations at sea."[49]

In responding to the crisis, the 2015 EAM takes a tripartite approach to addressing border management during the crisis. The first proposed area of work involves

[46]This could be described as both a political move and symbolic gesture. Having the agency tasked with border surveillance located in a new Member State at a time when the external border of the Union was expanding vastly is both a signal from the EU to Poland that it is viewed as a responsible party, while also signaling to existing Member States that the accession states are serious about their commitments to the Union.

[47]*Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers* (2007 OJ (L 199) 30).

[48]*Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur)* (2013 OJ (L295) 11).

[49]*Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union* (2014 OJ (L 189) 93).

search and rescue activities in the Mediterranean. In addition to expanding Frontex's mandate to missions at sea, the EU in 2014 had created a successor mission. The dire situation of migrant drownings in the Mediterranean was the result not just of increased migratory pressure but also of ill-intentioned smugglers taking advantage of migrants' desperation. Migrants took to sea in makeshift vessels, often overloaded as smugglers tried to maximize their profits per trip. Italy established its search and rescue operation *Mare Nostrum* in October 2013 after a particularly deadly shipwreck off the coast of Lampedusa in which hundreds of migrants drowned. After pressure from Italy, which largely unilaterally funded the mission, the EU established its own successor mission, Operation Triton, though it was significantly smaller in manpower and scope. The EAM proposed to immediately triple the budget for Operation Triton and another operation run by Frontex, Poseidon, which carries out border surveillance in the Greek islands and Aegean Sea, recognizing that these missions remained under-resourced. Nevertheless, thousands of individuals are estimated to have lost their lives at sea during the Migrant Crisis since 2014 (Robins, 2018). In response to increased international normative pressures, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency was created in 2016.[50]

The second area of border management addressed by the EAM involves strengthening the filtering and reception capacities of states. Filtering involves identifying and sorting migrants, and serves both an immediate function, discerning migrants who should be let in from those who should be kept out, and a deterrence function, discouraging migrants from making the journey by increasing the probability that they are denied entry (Fitzgerald, 2019). To enhance filtering capacity, the EAM proposed a new 'smart' borders initiative that would integrate data from Eurodac

[50] *Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC* (2016 OJ (L 251) 1).

on asylum applications, the Visa Information System, and the Schengen Information System, as well as explore further biometric identification technologies. In November 2017, a consolidated Entry/Exit System was created to fulfill this goal.[51] With respect to improving reception conditions, the EAM proposed emergency funding to support frontline states with receiving and providing healthcare for migrants.

In addition, the EAM proposed a new 'hotspot' approach. Hotspots are sites where the EASO, Frontex, and Europol (the European Union's law enforcement agency) operate in conjunction to, respectively: receive migrants and process applications; coordinate migrant returns for those who arrive irregularly but do not meet the requirements for asylum or other protected statuses; and to investigate potential smuggling and trafficking issues. Five hotspots were planned for Greece, strategically placed on islands along the Mediterranean route, and six were planned for Italy's southern border (Neville, Sy, and Rigon, 2016). As the crisis proceeded, hotspots became locations for identifying individuals in need of relocation as well as arranging returns to Turkey under the EU-Turkey Deal (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5). The evidence suggests that hotspots improved filtering activities in Greece and Italy, at least with respect to fingerprinting and returns, but staffing problems led to underperformance in processing asylum applications. Non-governmental organizations also complained of poor reception conditions and abuse of migrants at some hotspots (Neville, Sy, and Rigon, 2016; Niemann and Zaun, 2018). The hotspots also provided opportunities for migration diplomacy. After opening its first hotspot on the island of Lampedusa, in September 2015 Italy issued a warning to the EU that it would not set up additional centers until migrant relocations began in earnest and more resources were provided (Politi, Robinson, and Spiegel, 2015).

[51]Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011, OJ L 327, 9.12.2017, p. 20–82.

The third and final area of border management addressed by the EAM is fighting human smuggling and trafficking. It proposed the development of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to identify, capture, and destroy smuggling vessels. As a component of this, the EAM proposes that Europol identify and request removal of illegal internet content used by smugglers and that Frontex develop profiles of vessels that could be used for smuggling.[52] In June 2015 the EU launched Operation SOPHIA, a naval mission engaged in both search and rescue and counter-smuggling and trafficking operations. Italy was charged with commanding the force and working in cooperation with Libyan authorities. SOPHIA appears to have successfully reduced the number of migrants using the Central Mediterranean route (Niemann and Zaun, 2018). Yet, in spite of SOPHIA's emphasis on humanitarian practices like search and rescue (SAR), it appears the mission has done relatively little in the way of SAR when compared to *Mare Nostrum* and the SAR efforts of non-governmental organizations in the Mediterranean. In addition, SOPHIA unintentionally reproduced dangerous conditions for migrants in two primary ways. First, by destroying smuggling vessels, SOPHIA drove smugglers to use less seaworthy vessels and to rely increasingly on SAR activities to intercept migrants rather than attempting to get them to European soil, resulting in drowning deaths. Second, SOPHIA relied on Libyan coast guard authorities (who have fewer restrictions) to interdict vessels, but the Libyan fores were less willing to engage in SAR missions and in some circumstances engaged in violence to prevent vessels from embarking (Cusumano, 2019).

In addition to the EU's naval operation, in February 2016, at the request of Germany, Greece, and Turkey, NATO created a mission to counter smuggling in the Eastern Mediterranean (*Turkish Paper Looks into NATO Mission in Aegean to Combat Illegal Migration*, 2016). This mission is primarily an information gathering exercise,

[52]The focus of the migration studies world has largely been on migrants' use of technology to enable their journeys, but the states' use of technology in its efforts to prevent migration is also notable (see Longo (2017) for a discussion of data collection efforts by border security agencies.)

with the goal of providing real-time reporting on potential smuggling activities in the Mediterranean to Greece and Turkey. The mission also sends information to Frontex in support of its counter-smuggling efforts.[53]

Managing Influxes in Cooperation with Third Countries

Finally, the EAM proposed that the EU work with third countries – that is, non-EU countries that produce migrants or through which migrants transit on their way to Member States – to decrease migratory flows. Three mechanisms are mentioned in the EAM. The first involves the EU deepening its support for countries in the global South, which host most of the world's displaced, through contributions to Regional Development and Protection Programs. These programs were already operating in regions like the Middle East and North Africa that are primary sources for migrants in Europe. The second mechanism involves the development of localized protection and resettlement opportunities in third countries in concert with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNHCR and authorities in third countries. Finally, the EAM proposes that migration become a component of the CSDP, which operates missions in third countries to bolster border management capacities of, promote stability in, and develop cooperative relations with migrant-producing or transit third countries.

Discussion

Migration governance in the EU has expanded rapidly in the last few decades, initiated by the creation of a zone of free movement among Schengen members. As Schengen members lowered their border controls, the importance of regulating the external border between members and non-members intensified. Integration stretched beyond the realm of economic mobility into the political and social realms, where

[53]NATO. ($May 17, 2021$) Assistance for the refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea. Accessed from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics$_1$28746.htm

policy harmonization sought to bring EU Member States' policies into alignment with respect to liberal democratic values and international human rights law. EU multi-year programs focused on bringing about a supranational system of migration governance expanded the institution's authority in the realm of asylum in particular. Given these developments, there was a sense that the EU ought to be leading a response to the crisis. Calls for a collective European response to the migration crisis can be found from migration experts, advocacy organizations, media commentators, and even EU members themselves. However, this response was difficult to produce and limited in scope, as the Union was plagued by collective action problems and EU Member States by sovereignty concerns. States demonstrated that they were willing to reimpose border controls when faced with the prospect of atypically large migrant arrivals, threaten the Schengen regime of open borders, and violate the human rights of asylum seekers and migrants by restricting access to their territories and protection. Despite expanded EU authority in the area of asylum, inter-governmental practices of decision-making dominated, creating barriers to collective action early in the crisis. A formal divide between front line and interior EU Member States created by the Dublin regulations exacerbated these tensions. Additionally, the EU Commission's desire to pursue longer-term institutional goals (i.e., integration in asylum matters) simultaneously with short-term crisis response measures complicated negotiations and amplified sovereignty concerns in Member States where nationalist movements had been growing in strength.

In response to the crisis, the EU worked to implement a multifaceted plan, the *European Agenda on Migration*, with three goals: to address asylum policy deficiencies among Member States, to enhance border management and security at the external borders of the Union, and to cooperate with neighboring states to decrease incentives for migrants to travel to Europe. The Union was largely successful on the latter two of these three initiatives. The EU's border surveillance and enforcement capacities were

significantly enhanced through the strengthening and centralization of data collection, expanding the mandate of the Union's asylum agency, EASO, and by expanding cooperative initiatives to states in the Middle East and North and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the Union was not successful in addressing asylum policy deficiencies and their associated distributional inequities. Member States resisted attempts by the Union to create burden-sharing mechanisms (i.e., the Relocation Scheme and Dublin corrective allocation mechanism), and to increase integration within the Common European Asylum System. It is within this environment that states had to decide whether to utilize migration diplomacy in determining their individual responses to the crisis.

The European Union drew heavy criticism for its "scattered, halting" response the Migration Crisis (Erlanger and Smale, 2015). Much of the criticism, and rightly so, was framed as a concern for migrants' welfare, as the dire humanitarian consequences associated with the crisis escalated. However, when viewed in light of the Union's historical development around migration governance, these critiques start to look both misplaced and naive. These critiques are misplaced because collective action problems are not a new phenomenon in European migration governance. The primary area of inaction with respect to the migration crisis in 2015 had to do with burden-sharing arrangements. Yet, as I demonstrate in this chapter, calls for burden-sharing mechanisms go back nearly 30 years. Both the Balkans crisis in the early 1990s and the Kosovo crisis in 1999 prompted calls from some EU states for distributing both the physical and monetary burden of hosting refugees among Members, including proposals that are very similar to those put forward in response to the crisis in 2015 (Thielemann, 2003). These initiatives failed due to the same collective action dynamics that stymied the development of the relocation mechanism in 2015. However, this time around the Union managed to garner enough support to impose the mechanism through a majority vote. Still, states continued to resist burden-sharing in the

implementation phase.

Also, these critiques of the EU's response to the Migration Crisis appear naive for expecting Member States with institutional mechanisms that promote free-riding (i.e., the Dublin Regulations) to opt for burden sharing in an era with growing anti-migrant and anti-Europe sentiment. Since 2008, the EU has experienced what has been described as a "conglomerate of crises" (Falkner, 2016). This group includes the European iteration of the 2008 global financial crisis and subsequent economic crisis, as well as what Falkner describes as an external relations crisis that includes the increase in migration triggered by the Arab Spring but also accounts for the Russian annexation of Crimea and ensuing conflict, and an identity crisis for Europe in an increasingly multipolar world. The East-West tensions over labor migration within the Schengen zone added to these frustrations, the culmination of which was the United Kingdom's exit from the Union (Niemann and Zaun, 2018). States have always been reluctant to surrender their sovereignty when it comes to migration, but in such an environment many states defaulted to resisting further EU encroachment on their autonomy.

Conclusion

EU responses to the Migration Crisis were largely focused on reinforcing the external borders in states where migrants entered the EU, primarily Greece and Italy, and engaging key non-EU states in preventing more migrant arrivals, like Turkey. This left states largely free to respond to the migration crisis as it suited them. States along the Western Balkans route, for example, developed their own *ad hoc* coordination mechanism outside of the EU when guidance from the Union was not forthcoming (Collett and Le Coz, 2018). From an international relations perspective, states generally have the choice to 'go it alone' and pursue unilateral domestic responses or to work with another state or as a group of states to design bilateral or multilateral re-

sponses (Gruber, 2000). In the next chapter, I develop theoretical expectations about when states are likely to engage in migration diplomacy during migration crises.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Expectations for Migration Diplomacy Initiation

The previous chapter set the scene for the European migration crisis, demonstrating the array of mechanisms available to European states for responding to migration and outlining the initial call for collective action prepared by the EU, which was ultimately ineffectual. In the absence of coordination at the regional level, states were left to negotiate their responses with their neighbors. What do we know about interstate relations around migration? How does this translate to the crisis context? This chapter outlines the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of diplomatic relations between states regarding migration, or migration diplomacy, and applies them to the European Migration Crisis context.

In this chapter, I begin by defining migration diplomacy and distinguishing it from related concepts. I describe the primary sub-types of migration diplomacy identified in the current literature, coercive and cooperative, and explore variants within each. I then develop expectations for when states are expected to initiate migration diplomacy, with explicit attention given to how the crisis context shapes these processes. I argue that in deciding whether to utilize migration diplomacy, state leaders are attentive to migration-related costs and anticipated costs, their ability to mitigate these costs unilaterally, and the willingness of domestic political audiences to absorb migration-related costs. I expect that states are more likely to initiate migration diplomacy when the costs or expected costs associated with migration rise, when they are less able to unilaterally act to decrease costs, and when domestic political audiences are less willing to absorb migration-related costs. Finally, I summarize my plan for testing the theoretical expectations developed in this chapter.

Migration diplomacy: definition and related concepts

Migration is an inherently international phenomenon. Scholars have long acknowledged that migration plays a role in the foreign policies of states, whether the objective is economic, political, security or ideologically based (see Teitelbaum (1984); Weiner (1985, 1992); Dowty and Loescher (1996)). However, trends in the international relations (IR) scholarship pushed a focus on the role of migration in international relations to the background. IR scholars saw migration as a potential cause or consequence of conflict (Salehyan, 2008), a niche area international human rights law, a product of political repression (Davenport, Moore, and Poe, 2003), and an issue space within which to study the development of international regimes (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999), but its role in foreign policy was only occasionally addressed. In the last decade, however, the rising salience of migration in interstate diplomacy generated a small but growing literature refocused on questions of how states engage with one another around migration, or migration diplomacy.

The increasing salience of migration can be attributed to several factors. While the global proportion of migrants has increased by less than a percentage since the mid-twentieth century, the overall number of migrants moving per annum has grown by over 100 million. This trend is partially driven by substantial increases in forced migration and displacement, particularly in the last decade (McAuliffe, Khadria, and Bauloz, 2019). The magnitude of these displacements impacts states in the immediate region, and most displacement remains in the global South. Increasingly migrants are finding their way farther afield, placing pressure on the previously insulated states in the global North, as we see in the case of the Syrian Civil War and gang violence in Central America. Alongside trends in migration, domestic political environments have become less friendly toward foreign nationals. Incidents of international terrorism, particularly in Europe and North America, have triggered a push for increased border

security and prevention of migrant arrivals (Koslowski, 2011; Longo, 2017; Fitzgerald, 2019). This framing has been co-opted by far-right leaning groups in these regions, who have enjoyed recent electoral success by incorporating anti-migrant stances into their platforms (e.g., Alternative für Deutschland in Germany). Paired with the narrative of 'bogus' refugees – individuals utilizing asylum systems to gain access to labor markets (Neumayer, 2005) – migration of all kinds is increasingly framed as a socio-economic threat. Accordingly, the pressure placed on leaders to regulate migration is rising, and where domestic measures fail to produce results, leaders are forced to look to their counterparts in other states for assistance.[54] In other words, they adopt strategies of migration diplomacy to achieve their migration related goals.

Migration diplomacy is "the use of diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures to manage cross-border population mobility, including strategic use of migration flows to obtain other aims and use of diplomatic methods to achieve goals related to migration" (Tsourapas, 2017, 2370). Migration diplomacy involves a minimum of two states engaged in bilateral or multilateral interactions, with at least one of the states focused on achieving a migration-related foreign policy goal. Migration diplomacy may also include unilateral migration-related actions taken by one state that are directed at another. For example, a state may desire to negotiate a readmission agreement with a neighboring state. Prior to making an offer to its neighbor, the state desiring an agreement may announce this in an international forum as a way of signaling interest and gauging the interest of its neighbor. Migration diplomacy then, involves both position-taking and taking action.

Migration diplomacy involves states using migrants to achieve two types of goals,

[54]Of course, leaders are also engaged in a careful balancing act, as economic and normative factors create incentives to remain open to some migration. Declining birth rates in many Western states incentivize leaders to allow migration to avoid population decline and associated economic contraction. Certain economic sectors in these states also rely on irregular migrant labor, like agriculture, construction, and hospitality or other service industries. So, while outwardly discouraging migration, leaders have incentives to allow some irregular migration. In addition, normative and legal commitments to the provision of asylum mean that states are obliged to provide individuals at risk of experiencing harm in their home country with protection.

migration-related and non-migration related. First, the use of diplomacy to achieve migration goals includes: the calibration and composition of migrants arriving in a state, changes to migration policies or practices of other states, and even changes to international law or norms surrounding migration. The importance of controlling migration for state sovereignty has been addressed by scholars. Hollifield (2004) points to the centrality of regulating migration for the modern nation state, which he labels the "migration state." Insights from border politics scholars also demonstrate that control over who enters and exits the state has become central to understandings of state sovereignty (e.g., states experiencing higher levels of cultural, economic or other anxieties investing the most in a physical presence at their borders) (Simmons, 2019; Simmons and Kenwick, Forthcoming). Migration diplomacy facilitates the extension of territorial boundaries to prevent the arrival of unwanted migrants, as states look to increase their influence in the border regions of their neighbors and establish processing centers in other sovereign states increasingly far from their borders (Longo, 2017; Fitzgerald, 2019).

Apart from extending their own policies outward, states also seek to change the policies of their neighbors through migration diplomacy. An agreement between Italy and Libya to facilitate development of border security at Libya's northern and southern borders, with the ultimate goal of slowing irregular migration to Italy, is an example of this.[55] In a migration crisis, the policies and practices pursued by one state can have immediate impacts on the number of migrants received by its neighbors, providing an even stronger incentive for migration diplomacy. Finally, states may also seek to influence international and regional rules governing migration through migration diplomacy. Negotiations within the EU on migration governance as well as at the global level fall within this space.

[55]See *Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the fields of development, the fight against illegal immigration, human trafficking and fuel smuggling and on reinforcing the security of borders between the State of Libya and the Italian Republic.* (2017). Odysseus Network.

The second method of migration diplomacy involves states leveraging their migrant populations in negotiations regarding another issue. Issue linkage is the simultaneous negotiation of two or more distinct issues, and it is a focus of the scholarship on migration diplomacy. Issue linkage can occur both within the issue-area of migration or outside of it and can be used to pursue coercive or cooperative diplomacies. Tsourapas (2018) examines a case of migration diplomacy wherein Jordan linked access to Egyptian natural gas to the status of Egyptian migrant workers on its territory, threatening to expel the workers if access to natural gas were not reestablished after interruptions associated with the 2011 Arab Spring unrest. In this case, two distinct issues, energy security and labor migration, were negotiated simultaneously. Issue linkage does not require coercion, however. Tsourapas (2017) describes how the Libyan state tied cooperation on labor migration to Gaddafi's goal to establish a federation of Arab states in North Africa. In this case, cooperation on migration was tied to larger political and ideological objectives of the Libyan state. Yet issue linkage can also occur between migration-related issues. The multifaceted European Agenda for Migration, described in Chapter 2, brought together several related migration issues for states to negotiate (e.g., relocation and border security). When states will attempt to link migration issues versus other issues is an open question, but likely related to the amount of pressure a state feels with respect to migration and its relative bargaining strength. I discuss these in greater detail below.

Migration diplomacy does not involve domestic migration policy-making and practices that are not related to foreign policy goals (Adamson and Tsourapas, 2019). Decisions to alter the benefits migrants receive, to open or close reception centers, or changes to administrative procedures like visa application and restrictions, among many others, may all be made at the domestic level without being factored into diplomacy. That said, the boundaries between domestic and international migration governance are difficult to define outside of context, as migration policy or practice

changes at the domestic level may be made with an eye toward migration diplomacy or larger foreign policy goals (Adamson and Tsourapas, 2019; Meyers, 2004). Some unilateral actions involving alterations to domestic policies or practices around migration may be designed to incentivize another state to change its behavior around migration. For instance, a state may close its borders temporarily to signal to its neighbor a preference for reduced migration flows. Additionally, subnational actors may be involved in migration diplomacy at the international level. The mayor of Calais, France, the French town where the English Channel tunnel begins, is an active participant in discussions regarding border security with the United Kingdom. These nuances complicate empirical work on migration diplomacy; however, their inclusion provides a richer understanding of how migration diplomacy operates. I expand upon this potential in developing my expectations below.

Along the same lines, some strategic uses of migration by states skirt the line between domestic practice and migration diplomacy. Greenhill (2008, 8) outlines four examples of strategic migration behavior. Dispossessive migration occurs when states employ migration to claim territory or remove unwanted populations. To the extent dispossessive migration is undertaken by states on their own, uncontested territory, this does not qualify as migration diplomacy but domestic migration practice.[56] When migration is utilized strategically in international territorial disputes, however, dispossessive migration becomes migration diplomacy. In the early 1960s, for example, the Chinese government encouraged its citizens to settle on the USSR side of their shared border to pressure the Soviet Union to negotiate their unresolved territorial claims (Wiegand, 2011, 229-234). Posen (2000, 52-54) suggests that the dispossessive migration (i.e., ethnic cleansing) campaign Serbian forces pursued in Kosovo in 1999 perhaps had an additional, diplomatic motive. Milosevic hoped that Macedonian

[56]I employ neutral language here as my point is in emphasizing the domestic versus international nature of state use of dispossessive migration. However, internal displacement remains by far the leading type of forced migration in the international system, and the human consequences of these displacements are massive, affecting tens of millions of individuals each year.

fears of large number of Kosovar Albanian refugees fleeing across its border would incentivize the country to take a moderate posture, pushing for a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

The second type of strategic migration noted by Greenhill (2008, 8) is exportive migration – that is, state use of migration to consolidate political power by removing adversaries or bolstering coalitions. Purely domestic exportive migration may involve relocating individuals who are not co-partisans to ensure a stronger voting bloc or expelling an entire group from the country, as Greenhill notes was the objective of Cambodia in the mid-1970s. Exportive migration enters the realm of migration diplomacy when populations are exported internationally and used by the exporting state to engage others in interstate relations. For instance, states may demand the return of political opponents who flee after periods of unrest.[57] Relatedly, diaspora communities can be valuable to sending state regimes, as sources of income via remittances, lobbying by way of interest groups (e.g., the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee), and as a direct source for political support at home via voting populations (Adamson, 2016). Relations with the receiving state determine the ability of the sending state to leverage these opportunities.

Militarized migration, the third type from Greenhill (2008, 8), occurs when groups of migrants are used tactically in conflict contexts, whether to bolster fighting regiments or to disrupt the activities of an adversary. Steele (2017) notes that armed actors in Colombia (both insurgents and counter-insurgents) used displacement and re-population to bolster their own community support while weakening that of their opponent. International variants include the literature on so-called "refugee warriors," in which refugees serve as resource and recruitment bases in some conflicts, spread civil conflict to neighboring states, or trigger militarized interstate disputes between neighbors (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Salehyan, 2008). While the use of

[57]Turkey attempted to negotiate with Germany and Greece for the return of several of Erdoğan's political opponents after they fled following the 2016 attempted coup.

migrants and refugees to bolster or weaken fighting forces is not migration diplomacy, these actions may trigger diplomatic interactions that qualify.

The final type of strategic migration listed by Greenhill (2008, 8) is coercive migration, wherein migratory flows are used as a threat by a state to force another state to take action or make concessions. This type of strategic migration is by definition a form of migration diplomacy as it involves interstate interactions related to migration. Yet international relations is not limited to coercive interactions; cooperative approaches are also available to states engaged in migration diplomacy. I define and elaborate upon these two forms of migration diplomacy.

Why a migration diplomacy framework?

I employ a migration diplomacy framework for several reasons. First, a migration diplomacy framework centers sovereign states in migration governance. Such a framework also assumes an international politics of migration outside of the international migration regime. Finally, it provides an opportunity to examine international relations around migration without employing a strictly security-focused lens. I elaborate on each of these points below.

First, while other international actors certainly play a role in migration governance, states maintain sovereign control over how many and which individuals access their territories.[58] In areas where states have less control (e.g., where they are constrained legally or normatively by *nonrefoulement* obligations), they still exercise broad discretion. Yet migration diplomacy is not exclusive to states. International and supranational organizations, for example the UNHCR and EU respectively, may engage in migration diplomacy. Zeager (1998) highlights the role the UNHCR plays

[58]The discussion of EU migration law governing asylum in Chapter 2 notes that states maintain control over the number of individuals and who among them are allowed entry or residency. International organizations tasked with implementing international asylum law or monitoring migration more generally (e.g., UNHCR and IOM), despite their mandates, require the permission of states to operate on their territory regardless of whether the state is a signatory to appropriate treaties.

in negotiating repatriation or resettlement agreements between states experiencing displacement crises, and the EU's pursuit of migration-related foreign policy goals with states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is explored by Geddes (2009) among others. Therefore, I approach these questions with a framework that focuses on states but acknowledges and characterizes the foreign policy behavior of key non-state actors.

Second, a migration diplomacy framework appropriately frames migration as a transnational phenomenon with an accompanying international politics of migration that is not confined to interactions within the international migration regime. Relevant actors and points of influence include a growing number of international institutions (e.g. international organizations, supranational and regional organizations); non-state actors (e.g., non-governmental organizations and transnational advocacy networks); and international, regional, and bilateral agreements, treaties, and normative declarations (e.g., bilateral readmission agreements, the Lisbon Treaty of the EU, and the global 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees). These actors and rules in many ways structure the context in which migration diplomacy takes place among states. These overlapping actors and institutions create a competitive environment for international institutions, who often must adapt to remain relevant, and provide states with multiple venues from which to choose (Betts, 2009b; Alter and Meunier, 2009). For instance, the UNHCR, a key organization supervising the implementation of international law around displacement, is funded by voluntary contributions from states, and states earmark funds strategically to suit their interests (Roper and Barria, 2010). The overriding priorities of the UNHCR are susceptible to manipulation by states, as we see with its shift toward prioritizing repatriation of migrants and protection in the home region. Both of these shifts are driven by developed states interested in lowering the number of refugees for which they are responsible (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). In addition, the roles of the UNHCR and the International

Organization for Migration (IOM), another key organization responding to humanitarian crises, are more circumscribed in Europe, where states have high capacity for emergency response and established immigration and asylum systems.

Finally, a migration diplomacy framework also allows me to address the security-relevant components of migration and its international relations without treating migration primarily as a security issue. To argue in favor of migration's importance in international relations, Weiner (1992) outlined how various forms of migration can be considered issues of national security. Other scholars picked up this mantle, exploring: whether and how migration impacts national security; the relationship between migration and the balance of power in the international system (Rudolph, 2003; Adamson, 2006); and the role of refugees in civil and international conflict dynamics and peace processes (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Salehyan, 2008; Betts, 2009a; Milner, 2010). A sizeable literature from critical security scholars explores the "securitization" of migration, that is, the discursive framing of migration as a threat to national or international security (see Messina (2014) for an overview). My intention is not to dismiss the importance of a security perspective for understanding how states respond to migration, but to suggest that adopting a security perspective limits our ability to understand the full scope of interstate relations around migration. Migration offers challenges and opportunities across economic, social, and political domains as well as security, and a migration diplomacy framework allows for the variety of state motivations to be explored.

Migration Diplomacy versus Foreign Policy

Migration diplomacy is a sub-type of diplomacy, where diplomacy constitutes the "processes by which states. . . represent themselves and their interests to one another" and interact, often through negotiations (Murray et al., 2011, 709). States have varied interests around and within migration as an issue-area, which sometimes are

represented by simple position-taking while others require interaction with states and other actors. As a subtype of diplomacy, migration diplomacy may also overlap with other sub-sets, especially economic diplomacy. Tsourapas (2018) highlights the utilization of migration diplomacy with respect to labor migrants, wherein receiving states are able to coerce sending states into compliance with demands by restricting labor and remittance flows. Bernhard and Leblang (2016) provide another example, arguing that a second Greek bailout in the sovereign debt crisis of the early 2010s was advocated for and secured by German politicians to avoid increased migration from Southern Europe.

Migration diplomacy is also not equivalent to migration-related foreign policy. Foreign policy is "the sum total of decisions made on behalf of a given political unit (usually a state) entailing the implementation of goals with direct reference to its external environment" (Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne, 2016, 497). Diplomacy is both an input and an output of foreign policy (Murray et al., 2011, 716). Therefore, migration diplomacy is utilized to achieve foreign policy goals, specific to migration and otherwise, but is also impacted by the pursuit of other foreign policy aims. The United States' recruitment of Soviet immigrants and bias toward accepting refugees from the region during the Cold War is an example of migration diplomacy utilized in the service of long-term foreign policy goals. Historically, migration crises elevated migration-related issues from economic considerations to 'high' politics concerning national security and associated foreign policy considerations Teitelbaum (1984). While crises create challenges for states, they also opportunities to leverage migration diplomacy in pursuit of migration-related and other foreign policy goals.

Additionally, migration diplomacy distinguishes an issue-area within which diplomatic exchanges take place and posits that interactions within this space may function as they do in other strategic contexts. It does not assume a style of diplomacy unique to migration. In other words, the "tools, processes, and procedures" utilized by

states in their migration diplomacy vary across states and issue areas, and over time (Tsourapas, 2017, 2370). I assume that states use the specific methods of diplomacy (i.e., who talks to whom, when, where, and by what means) that they deem optimal in a given context.

Types of Migration Diplomacy

Migration diplomacy is a broad term, encompassing a variety of different diplomatic methods. The literature on migration diplomacy thus far has taken a rationalist approach, viewing interactions between states around migration as strategic interactions. The two primary types of migration diplomacy outlined thus far, coercive and cooperative, are presented as bargaining strategies. In this section I define these categories of migration diplomacy and describe what we know about how they operate based on existing research.

For both coercive and cooperative migration diplomacies, I refer to two types of states: initiators and targets. The initiating state selects a coercive or cooperative approach and reaches out to the target state. If we think of migration diplomacy as directed activity, the initiator is taking the action, while the target receives the action. While cumbersome, these labels provide me with a means for discussing the actors in migration diplomacy while avoiding jargon that overlaps in a confusing way with key migration terminology, especially 'sending' and 'receiving' states. In context, the initiator or target state may be either a sending, transit, or receiving state.

Coercive Migration Diplomacy

Coercive migration diplomacy consists of threats by states to alter migration flows (or the alteration of these flows) to or from a target state, unless the target state acquiesces to a demand (Tsourapas, 2017, 2370-2371). This form of migration diplomacy is utilized to extract concessions from target states. As such, it is a zero-sum bargaining

strategy which is expected to benefit only the state issuing the threat (Adamson and Tsourapas, 2019, 124).

There are several paths by which coercion can occur. The first is for a state to threaten to overwhelm a target state with migrant arrivals unless concessions are granted. Greenhill (2010) refers to this strategy as *capacity swamping*, where the threat relies upon the resource and political costs that will accrue for the target when it attempts to prevent or process new migrant arrivals. Tsourapas (2019) also observes this behavior, which he calls *blackmailing*, among refugee host states. Libya is a prominent example of a state that readily employs a coercive blackmailing or capacity swamping strategy. In the early 2000s, Gaddafi threatened to significantly increase Italy's new migrant arrivals and was successful in getting a European arms embargo lifted. In subsequent years, Libya was also able to secure a formal apology from Italy for its violence against Libyans during the colonial period and billions in infrastructure development investments (Tsourapas, 2017, 2376-2377).

Capacity swamping and blackmailing center on coercive migration diplomacy driven by emigration. However, coercion is also a strategy available to states receiving immigrants. Tsourapas (2018) examines the coercive behavior of such states with respect to the sending states of labor migrants, but the behaviors he notes are not limited to labor migration or to receiving-sending state pairs. He outlines two strategies. The first is *restriction*, which involves restricting remittances, or monetary transfers, and strengthening border controls, which restricts access to the receiving state (and preventing future remittances). The latter component of restriction is the most likely tool of strategic restriction we are likely to observe in migration crises, given the limited involvement of sending states versus transit states in the European Migration Crisis context. The second strategy is *displacement*, which involves forcefully expelling migrants from the initiator to a target state. In both cases, the tactics amount to capacity swamping or blackmail in reverse; the target state is going to

receive migrants from or be unable to send migrants to the initiator state engaged in this type of coercion.

Another path by which coercion occurs is through what Greenhill (2010, 3-5) refers to as *agitation*, or "norms-enhanced political blackmail," where the willingness of target states to accept new migrant arrivals is targeted by agents of the initiating state through manipulation of hypocrisy costs – symbolic political costs generated by disparities in the behavior of states toward migrants versus their commitments to liberal, normative protection goals. Agitation relies upon target states valuing their international reputation or responding to pressure from pro-migrant domestic interest groups; therefore, liberal democracies are expected to be more vulnerable to agitation. The 1980 Mariel Boatlift, in which tens of thousands of Cubans were encouraged to migrate to the United States, is an example of agitation (combined with capacity swamping). Fidel Castro sought to exacerbate the perceived costs of new migrant arrivals to the American public by declaring that migrants were criminals and other social "undesirables" (Greenhill, 2010, 89-94).

Cooperative Migration Diplomacy

Cooperative migration diplomacy is the promise by an initiator to alter migrant flows to or from a target state as a reward for the target acquiescing to a demand (Tsourapas, 2017, 2371). This type of migration diplomacy is considered a positive-sum bargaining strategy, as both the state making an offer and the target state are expected to benefit if the target accepts the offer, though the benefits need not be equally distributed (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019). Cooperative migration diplomacy does not exclude formalized arrangements between states but does not require them either. States may simply coordinate their responses to migration or on another issue without making legal or long-term, binding commitments.

The forms of cooperative migration diplomacy are relatively understudied and

consequently underspecified. In essence, this form of migration diplomacy involves states making offers to a target or rewarding a target to encourage behavior in alignment with the cooperator's interests. These offers may include resource transfers (e.g., aid) but may also include offers to change policy stances or to behave in a manner that helps a target state achieve other goals. For example, states looking to join the EU may be willing to alter their migration behavior in exchange for support from key EU members states for their accession efforts, while states without interest in this political incentive may be uninterested in offers apart from aid or developmental assistance. Tsourapas (2019) describes a form of cooperative migration diplomacy he calls *backscratching*, wherein an initiator state offers to maintain refugee populations if compensated by a target state.[59] States are expected to engage in backscratching when they have a large population of migrants but relatively low geo-strategic importance. In this context, target states are viewed as wanting to avoid potential migrant arrivals and to support humanitarian protection. Tsourapas (2019) argues that Jordan and Lebanon engaged in back-scratching strategies during the Syrian migrant crisis because of their low geo-strategic importance (i.e., they were unable to credibly threaten a target with shifts in migratory flows) and large refugee populations. This form of cooperative migration diplomacy, similar to the agitation coercive strategy, relies upon the commitment of other states to provide protection to displaced individuals or to contribute to humanitarian missions.

In a related cooperative migration diplomacy strategy, initiator states seek to enhance relations with target states. While these states also expect to accrue shorter term gains, cooperative strategies are also seen as a means to bolster relationships with other states and achieve longer-term foreign policy goals. Norman (2020) at-

[59]Both blackmail and backscratching strategies are described by Tsourapas (2019) as strategies employed by refugee "rentier" states. These are states who utilize refugee populations to extract financial resources from the international community and other states. Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, among others, are noted as falling into this category. The refugee rentierism category is difficult to apply to European states, as little of their national incomes are derived from hosting refugees, of which they host relatively few compared to the global South.

tributes domestic migration policy reforms in Morocco and Turkey, in large part, to diplomatic considerations. With respect to the EU, these states were able to leverage offers reform their domestic migration policies that would benefit the EU (by slowing transit migration) to achieve economic concessions and strengthen political ties with Europe (e.g., mobility partnerships and accession talks). With respect to Morocco, the state also had an interest in demonstrating favorable conditions for migrants from other West African states, as it sought more influence in the region (Norman, 2020, 1168-1169). Similarly, Libya's Gaddafi attempted to link labor migration to the state from Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia to his broader goal of a Federal Arab Republic (Tsourapas 2017). Libya received financial gains in the short term from regularizing these labor migration channels but hoped that these relationships would be a foundation for further political integration. While Gaddafi was ultimately unsuccessful, these attempts nevertheless demonstrate that cooperative migration diplomacy is a means for states to attempt or achieve concessions in the absence of aggression.

Other forms of cooperative migration diplomacy can be gleaned from examples provided by scholars. Agreements that promote the free movement of labor fall into this category, including regional arrangements like the Schengen Zone (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019). States within the free movement zone benefit, though to varying degrees, from the freer movement of people, goods, and services across borders. An example of cooperative migration diplomacy exhibiting issue linkage is that of the Cuban-Venezuelan "oil for doctors" agreement that brought tens of thousands of Cuban doctors to staff Venezuelan hospitals in exchange for increased oil exports to Cuba (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019). Longer-term foreign policy goals can also be tied to migration. Cooperative migration diplomacy does not always result in formalized agreements. Sometimes cooperative approaches are unsuccessful, while at other times they result in ad hoc coordination (i.e., short term cooperation) rather than long-term formalized arrangements found in the previous examples.

Migration Diplomacy Initiation

In this chapter I have defined migration diplomacy and described the primary variants, coercive and cooperative. In this section, I develop expectations for when we might observe states engaging in migration diplomacy. The burgeoning literature on migration diplomacy is largely focused on cataloging instances of diplomacy and their efficacy. From this body of work, two factors identified by Tsourapas (2019) characterize effective migration diplomacy. First, political elites must accurately perceive the geo-strategic importance of their state relative to the target state (Tsourapas, 2019), where geo-strategic importance is a defined by proximity to the target (or co-location on a predictable migratory route) or the initiator has leverage on some other political issue dimension important to the target (i.e., an issue to be linked). Second, the initiator must have a credible ability to alter migrant movements to or from a target state. This might involve the presence of large enough migrant populations to make credible coercive threats, but it could also involve the initiator's position in international institutions that can alter migrant movements (e.g., the EU). When states accurately assess their geo-strategic importance and can credibly alter migrant movements, they are more likely to be successful in their migration diplomacy attempts.

One might argue that the conditions for successful migration diplomacy are easily translated into preconditions for initiation of migration diplomacy. It seems reasonable to assume that states would not engage in migration diplomacy if they did not perceive a reasonable chance for success. However, Greenhill (2010) provides evidence that coercive migration diplomacy, while relatively successful, still results in a fair number of failures. Gaddafi's failure to leverage labor migration as a means of producing high level political integration in North Africa is a specific example of a cooperative migration diplomacy failure (Tsourapas, 2017). So, miscalculation is

possible and empirically observed. States are driven to engage in migration diplomacy even when their chances of success are not high.

I argue that to understand why states initiate migration diplomacy we have to look at state-level factors that affect leaders' incentives for opting for migration diplomacy versus focusing on domestic responses. Migration crises provide a unique opportunity for observing these pressures in action during a condensed period of time. In the following sections, I develop theoretical expectations about the role that four factors play in state initiation of migration diplomacy: (1) the costs of a migrant crisis to a state; (2) a state's appraisal of future crisis-driven costs; (3) how powerful a state is; and (4) the domestic political pressures state leaders experience. I discuss each of these and associated expectations in turn.

The Costs of Migration Crises

Migration crises are often portrayed as exogenous shocks that impact a group of states equally, but these large-scale people movements are rarely evenly distributed among affected states. Referring to the European Migration Crisis as such implies, at least semantically, that the crisis was felt by all European states, but as noted in Chapter 2 this is not the case. In reality, the number of migrants each state receives is likely to differ based upon historical migratory patterns as well as the preferences of migrants themselves for routes and receiving states.[60] In the case of the European Migration Crisis, Greece and Italy received many migrants while others received relatively few, like Portugal and Spain, despite their shared position at the Southern rim of Europe. This variation creates differential pressure across states to

[60] A spate of studies on the push-pull factors underlying migratory patterns in the international system were published in the mid-2000s. These authors looked at sending and receiving country characteristics – those that "push" migrants out of states and "pull" them into others – as predictors of dyadic migration patterns. Migrants were found to prefer states in Europe and elsewhere with greater wealth, a shared dominant language with their home or past colonial ties with their home states, better human rights conditions, and the presence of other migrants from their home state (see Neumayer (2004, 2005); Moore and Shellman (2007)).

engage in migration diplomacy.

There are two mechanisms through which migrant arrivals during a crisis affect state responses. The first is by overwhelming the capacity of domestic migration management systems to process new arrivals. The institutions and people tasked with monitoring and implementing immigration laws, like most bureaucracies, lack flexibility in response to the rapidly changing conditions that characterize a crisis. Staffing, facilities, and rules are structured around status quo levels of migration. When migrants begin to arrive in atypically high numbers, these systems may be able to cope for a period of time but eventually begin to falter under the strain. Of course, leaders are aware of the level of stress placed on these migration management systems. Resources can be injected into the system to bolster it temporarily. New immigration officers can be hired to speed up processing of asylum claims. Temporary holding and detention centers can be created to house migrants while they wait for their applications for protection or other legalized status to be processed. Border patrols and check points can be increased to deter or prevent new migrant arrivals to give the system time to cope. The latter two approaches were taken by many European states during the crisis. Yet the volume of new migrant arrivals was such that domestic migration management systems, even in countries with highly resourced systems, began to buckle. When these domestic actions are no longer effective, or states perceive that their efficacy is waning, we are more likely to see more states engage in migration diplomacy.

The second mechanism by which crises directly affect state initiation of migration diplomacy is through the arrival of large numbers of migrants, which as previously discussed can alter the geo-strategic environment within which a state operates (Tsourapas, 2019). Viewed through a strategic interaction lens, migrants present challenges for states but also opportunities. That is, migrants can serve as a form of bargaining power which states leverage through migration diplomacy to achieve

foreign policy outcomes.[61] The levers that states utilize in their migration diplomacy actions vary based on their geostrategic context. For some initiating states, proximity or predictable migratory routes to a target may allow for migrants to be used as a cudgel to compel compliance. Turkey's geo-strategic importance as a transit state to Europe (being co-located on a migratory route and geographically proximate) played a role in its use of coercive migration diplomacy (Tsourapas 2019). For others, institutional connections with target states can be used to leverage the presence of migrants. Germany tried to use increasing migrant arrivals to promote the broader European Agenda on Migration via cooperative migration diplomacy, for example. Hungary opted to use migrants transiting its territory as an opportunity to push back against the larger integration agenda of the EU. In these cases, the presence of migrants increased the likelihood of migration diplomacy by shifting states' perceptions of their bargaining power in their geostrategic environments.

In the literature on migration diplomacy, authors focused exclusively on either coercion or cooperation expect increasing costs to increase the likelihood of states employing migration diplomacy. With respect to coercive migration diplomacy, the availability of large pools of migrants makes capacity swamping threats or blackmailing more likely (Greenhill, 2010; Tsourapas, 2019). Most displacees come from and remain in the global South; therefore, past empirical explorations of coercion are primarily made of cases where developing states attempt coercion against developed states (Greenhill, 2010; Tsourapas, 2017, 2019). In the European case, developed states are faced with an unusually high number of migrant arrivals. Particularly for states located along the central and eastern Mediterranean and the Balkan corridor, the number of migrant arrivals is described by states and media coverage as extraordinary. In addition, as the number of migrants increases, straining migration

[61]States' skill at translating resources into bargaining power, however, is a separate question. Greenhill (2010, 66-69) is primarily interested in whether coercive migration diplomacy is effective, finding that weaker states tend to be more successful. Geographic proximity and the number of migrants used to threaten targets varied similarly in both successful and unsuccessful uses.

management systems, the number of new migrants necessary for capacity swamping threats decreases. Thus, the conditions for capacity swamping coercive migration diplomacy are met and likely to increase over the course of the crisis as migrant arrivals increase. At the same time, migration crises can compel states to negotiate cooperative agreements. Money and Lockhart (2018) emphasize that migration crises serve as exogenous shocks to receiving states, shifting status quo migration levels. The *status quo* with respect to migration levels likely reflects the preferences of typically wealthier and more powerful receiving states, so these shocks compel them to initiate negotiations with other states to bring migration levels closer to their ideal point. The backscratching strategy described by Tsourapas (2019) provides an additional example of a cooperative strategy used by refugee host states, made available by the presence of a large number of migrants. In light of these competing expectations in the literature with respect to coercion and cooperation, I am left with the more simple expectation that:

> *Hypothesis 1: All else equal, states more affected by migration crises are more likely to initiate migration diplomacy of any type, relative to states less affected by such crises.*

The Crisis to Come: Anticipated Costs

While the direct impacts of the crisis on states are likely to contribute to initiation of migration diplomacy, states are also likely to look beyond their immediate situation to the broader crisis context. The number of migrants a state receives at any point in time is a function of the number of migrants moving in the direction of that state and the responses of other states along the migration route before the state. To anticipate future migrant arrivals and prepare accordingly, states have incentives to monitor what is happening down the 'chain' of states along the migratory route. States with developed immigration management systems often produce annual estimates

of expected migrant arrivals and use this to inform policy and rule-making for the next year (e.g., number of visas issued or asylum resettlement slots made available). Domestic border authorities also collect information and coordinate with authorities in other states Longo (2017). In Europe, states were able to estimate the number of migrant arrivals on their territory using not only their domestic capacities but the vast surveillance system put into place by Frontex to monitor border crossings and integrate information from domestic border authorities. The number of individuals crossing the Mediterranean and the land route from Turkey in particular were used as indicators of future migrant arrivals.

Given the abundance of information available to states, I assume that they initiate migration diplomacy in anticipation of future migrant arrivals. I am agnostic, however, to the form that this migration diplomacy takes. Existing studies of both coercive and cooperative migration diplomacy demonstrate states taking action in anticipation of future migrant arrivals. For Money and Lockhart (2018), the predictability of migratory flows between states is one of the key mechanisms driving bilateral cooperation, as states must be able to identify sources of migrants (i.e., sources of additional costs) to target with cooperative arrangements. Similarly, predictability of flows is central to coercion. For example, states may issue capacity swamping threats in anticipation of receiving more migrants because the presence of these migrants will lend credibility to the threat (and increase the chances of concessions from a target) or because the state hopes to coerce others into taking action that will decrease the number of actual new arrivals.[62] Whether with the goal of coercion or cooperation, I expect that:

[62]Greenhill (2010) notes that states engaging in coercive migration diplomacy often send some number of migrants to their targets to bolster the credibility of their threats. Targets in this context may utilize migration diplomacy to preempt threats or to ameliorate the costs of punishment when it cannot be avoided.

Hypothesis 2: All else equal, states who expect higher costs from migration crises in the future are more likely to initiate migration diplomacy of any type, relative to states who anticipate costs from migration crises in the future.

State Power

The relationship between state power and initiation of migration diplomacy is complicated. Evidence from current studies of migration diplomacy is mixed. Money and Lockhart (2018) characterize strong states as those most likely to initiate cooperative migration diplomacy when migration crises shift the *status quo*. These powerful states, having had a hand in the creation of status quo conditions by virtue of their strength, adopt cooperative migration diplomacy as a means of shifting migration back closer to their preferred levels. At the same time, the evidence suggests that weaker states are more likely to engage in coercive migration diplomacy strategies. Tsourapas (2018) finds that Libya and Jordan were able to coerce stronger-state Egypt into, respectively, extraditing political opponents and increasing natural gas provision through restricting remittances and expelling (or threatening to expel) Egyptian labor migrants. Greenhill (2010) goes so far as to call coercive migration diplomacy a "weapon of the weak" due to its relatively high success rate when utilized by sending or transit states against their stronger receiving state counterparts. The common thread is that weaker initiator states are able to leverage migration to their advantage by threatening to damage domestic political support for target state leaders. This mixed evidence suggests that the role of power is ambiguous in the initiation of migration diplomacy.

I propose that the source of this confusion in the existing literature is a misspecification of the role of state power in the initiation of migration diplomacy. In part, this confusion is generated by a focus by previous authors on strategic interac-

tions between states. In such a framework, state power is translated into bargaining power, which necessitates that scholars think about relative power differentials in trying to understand cooperative or coercive outcomes. My focus is not on outcomes, but the choice to use migration diplomacy as a component of a state's response to the crisis. Therefore, my conception of power needs to incorporate the material conditions that matter for state responses to crisis levels of migration. In this context, power in terms of material resources translates into the ability to manage unusually large migratory flows. More powerful states, simply put, are more likely to have the capacity to respond effectively to larger numbers of migrants than less powerful states.

The capacity of more powerful states is based on a number of factors. More powerful states have more developed migration management systems. These states have historically been receiving states for migrants and have therefore developed the systems to manage arrivals, status decisions, and access to critical services for migrants. Their administrative capacity can be bolstered with additional resources in the event of a crisis. For example, Austria and Germany both have developed systems for processing new migrant arrivals and distributing them geographically so that no area of the country is overburdened. Additionally, the strong economies and larger population sizes of more powerful states provide greater absorption capacity for migrants. In other words, the costs of incorporating more individuals into the population are lower for more powerful states. In contrast, less powerful states, lacking such capacity, must find alternative ways to lower the costs of increased migrant arrivals during a crisis. I propose that they pursue migration diplomacy to alleviate these costs. They may use migration diplomacy to alter the number of migrants present on their territory or they may engage in issue linkage strategies via migration diplomacy that provide gains in other areas to offset these costs.

Hypothesis 3: All else equal, less powerful states are more likely to initiate migration diplomacy of any type relative to their more powerful counterparts.

It is possible that the effect of power on initiation of migration diplomacy as I propose here is diminished over the course of a crisis. Powerful states have higher capacities to absorb the costs of migrant arrivals, but their ability to do so is not unlimited. Migration management systems can be strengthened with additional resources and rule changes can provide flexibility, but at some point the capacity of the system to process new arrivals is reached. This 'breaking point' varies across states. When capacity is reached, I expect more powerful states to initiate migration diplomacy to alleviate costs just like their less powerful counterparts.

Domestic Political Pressure

My discussion of power above emphasized the *ability* of states to absorb migrants when confronted with increased arrivals during a crisis, but in this section I shift focus to the *willingness* of states to do so. States may have the ability to absorb more migrants but be constrained in their ability to do so by anti-migrant political pressures (or encouraged to do so by pro-migrant camps). Domestic political influence on migration diplomacy is described by Greenhill (2010) as one mechanism through which coercion is successful. States may threaten to send migrants to a target, but they are more likely to be successful when they combine this threat with a strategy of political agitation – mobilizing domestic anti-migrant interests in the target state to pressure their leaders against receiving more migrants. Research on public opinion toward immigration suggests that negative opinions toward migrants, and asylum seekers in particular, are driven by perceived threats to national economic outcomes and cultural shifts, rather than individual level comparisons (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Hangartner et al., 2019). The unusually high number of migrant

arrivals during a crisis – or increased media attention to them – could activate these concerns.[63] Recent evidence from natural experiments in the Greek islands suggests that direct exposure to migrants increases hostility toward migrants and associated religious or ethnic groups (e.g., Muslims) and increases support for anti-migrant, far-right political ideologies (Hangartner et al., 2019; Dinas et al., 2019). The salience of migration during crises can bring increased public scrutiny and turn public opinion against migrants, but increased salience does not have to increase anti-migrant sentiment. The "Refugees Welcome" movement in Germany in 2015 reveals that public opinion can shift in a positive direction when the salience of migration increases.

However, I argue the direction of attitudinal changes matters for the likelihood of a state initiating migration diplomacy. Public opinion that is largely favorable toward migrants is less likely to lead to migration diplomacy. In this context, states have incentives to welcome migrants, the process of which is largely driven by domestic migration management systems. In contrast, public opinion that is largely negative toward migrants is more likely to lead to migration diplomacy. The public in this context is less tolerant of new migrant arrivals, which incentivizes states to engage in migration diplomacy, whether cooperative or coercive, to lower the costs of a crisis. The state may engage in migration diplomacy in this context because its domestic capacity is stretched, but it may also view migration diplomacy as an opportunity to demonstrate action to anti-migrant constituents (Massey, 1999).[64] Here, migration diplomacy provides leaders a means of taking action that appeals to constituencies upset by the domestic situation as a result of the migrant crisis, but that may or

[63]Berry, Garcia-Blanco, and Moore (2015) examine variation in media coverage of the migrant crisis in 2014-early 2015 period in Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. They find variation in the extent, tone, and presence of polarized views in articles on migrants during this period. I observed this variation in my own data collection efforts. Here my claim is simply the salience of migration as an issue in the media, rather than the tone of coverage, is theoretically linked to domestic political pressure.

[64]This latter process is similar to foreign policy substitution or diversionary use of force (see Clark (2001)). In both cases leaders opt for foreign policy actions that distract from domestic issues.

may not provide an effective solution.[65] In other words, migration diplomacy may provide leaders facing anti-migrant political pressures with both a political solution, by providing a way to demonstrate to action (regardless of efficacy) to anti-migrant constituencies, and a means to solve a problem, by decreasing the costs of crisis-related migration and thereby assuaging anti-migrant constituencies. Given these incentives for states facing negative public opinion on migration, I expect that:

> *Hypothesis 4: All else equal, states with greater anti-migrant domestic pressures are more likely to engage in migration diplomacy of any type relative to states with lesser anti-migrant domestic pressures.*

Conclusion

In the next chapter, I perform a quantitative analysis of when states engage in migration diplomacy during the crisis period. I describe the process of collecting data for my dependent variable, migration diplomacy actions taken by states. I gather data to construct independent variables for each of the concepts outlined here: crisis effects, anticipated effects, state power, and domestic political pressure. I construct testable hypotheses based upon the four expectations I outlined in this chapter in terms of these measures. Then, I employ a logistic regression analysis to find evidence for or against these testable hypotheses. I find mixed evidence for my hypotheses and discuss practical and theoretical reasons for these results.

[65] Much of immigration policy-making may involve this kind of signaling (i.e, a disconnect between rhetoric, policy making and implementation). The "gap" hypothesis – the fact that irregular migration continues despite states enacting restrictions or public opinion favoring restriction – drives vigorous debate amid scholars of migration policy (Joppke, 1998; Bonjour, 2011).

Chapter 4: Quantitative Analysis of Migration Diplomacy Actions during the European Migration Crisis

In the previous chapter I introduced the concept of migration diplomacy and developed expectations for when states are likely to initiate migration diplomacy. My goal in this chapter is to look for evidence of a relationship between the initiation of migration diplomacy and those factors outlined in the previous chapter. I do so by performing the first multivariate statistical test of state initiation of migration diplomacy. Before doing so, I describe my process for creating a novel dataset on state responses during the European Migration Crisis, which involved a combination of machine learning (i.e., automated coding) and human coding of information contained in a corpus of news documents. I then outline my process for measuring initiation of migration diplomacy within this collection of state responses to the crisis. I also discuss the operationalization of my four focal independent variables and several control variables. Finally, I perform a multivariate logistic regression analysis on my measure of initiation of migration diplomacy and discuss my results.

Collecting Data on Migration Diplomacy

In this section, I describe my process for collecting data on and operationalizing migration diplomacy during the European Migration Crisis. Recall that the conceptual definition of migration diplomacy is "the use of diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures to manage cross-border population mobility, including strategic use of migration flows to obtain other aims and use of diplomatic methods to achieve goals related to migration" (Tsourapas, 2017, 2370). No systematic data have been collected on migration diplomacy actions to date, as the existing literature focuses on case studies limited to the Middle East (Tsourapas, 2017, 2018, 2019; Adamson and Tsourapas, 2019; Norman, 2020); or, when cataloging historical instances of migra-

tion diplomacy, focuses exclusively on instances of coercion or cooperation (Greenhill, 2008, 2010; Money and Lockhart, 2018). Therefore, I construct a dataset capturing migration diplomacy actions by all states in continental Europe and their immediate neighbors to the East and South for the years 2014-2017. I utilize a combination of machine learning and human coding procedures on a collection of approximately 80,000 news articles and wires produced by European papers to identify instances of migration diplomacy related to the migration crisis for this period. The following sections describe this procedure and my coding rules.

Building a Corpus of Source Materials

News media sources provide a means of examining variation in state behavior with respect to migration that is easily accessible. I utilized the ProQuest online content-management database to identify news articles or wires and download those determined relevant.[66] I performed keyword searches to identify articles that were broadly relevant to migration in countries of interest for each month from January 2011-December 2017.[67] I opted for broad search criteria to capture the range of migration related behavior for the period, and to avoid bias based on variation in author preferences or outlet style rules (e.g., United Kingdom sources often use the term "immigration" to include both voluntary and forced migrants).

Table 4.1 contains the list of sources, countries, and keywords I used in ProQuest

[66]Initially, LexisNexis was selected because it provided the most comprehensive coverage in terms of spatial and temporal media sources. Source collection began in Spring 2016 utilizing this service, but access was lost due to the University's decision to end its subscription in the Fall of that year. ProQuest presented a viable alternative to LexisNexis, and source collection proceeded using this service from March–August 2018. Unfortunately, the sources and access to archived content were not consistent across the two sources, so source collection began anew after this switch. However, much was learned from working in the LexisNexis archives for the months that it was available, and these learnings informed the process for source collection in ProQuest, thereby making it more efficient.

[67]This period was selected to include a longer pre-crisis period for comparison and to align with the spring 2011 onset of the Syrian Civil War, which fueled much of the crisis period migration. Source collection and machine learning procedures were conducted on the full 2011-2017 sample, but as is noted later human coding of migration diplomacy actions covers only the 2014-2017 period of interest around which the project is framed.

KEYWORDS:	"asylum", "immigr", "migra", "refugee"
SOURCES:	BBC Monitoring Africa – Economic*, BBC Monitoring Africa – Political*, BBC Monitoring European, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, BBC Monitoring Media, BBC Monitoring Newsfile, Financial Times, Interfax: Russia & CIS General Newswire, Sunday Times, Telegraph, The Christian Science Monitor, The New York Times, The Times (London), Wall Street Journal (end Sept. 2017), Xinhua News Agency*
COUNTRIES:	Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina ("Bosnia"), Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kosovo, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom

Table 4.1: Keywords, sources, and countries used in ProQuest searches for migrant crisis related articles.
(*) Sources were included in ProQuest searches but no articles from these sources made it into the final corpus of documents.

searches. Sources in the table are those I identified in test searches as reputable – prominent sources of fact-based reporting – and appearing with relatively high frequency. I limited the number of sources to keep the project manageable and estimate that roughly 10-15% of documents in my search results were from these sources. Additionally, the "BBC Monitoring" sources afforded me the opportunity to access English-language translations of pieces reported by national newspapers across geographies, which are often excluded. I generated a list of 53 countries encompassing the European continent as well as Eurasian and North African states located along key migratory routes to Europe. I performed a search for each country for every month, January 2011-December 2017, using temporal filters built into the search engine. After search results were returned, I used ProQuest filters to cursorily eliminate inappropriate items (e.g., editorials and repeated items).[68] I then downloaded the

[68]The efficacy of these filters was questionable, so I relied much more heavily on my machine learning process described below to eliminate duplicates and irrelevant materials.

first 1,000 articles returned by each search into a text file.[69] This resulted in a total of 335 text files containing 148,526 articles.[70]

Because of the broad search parameters, as well as idiosyncracies of the ProQuest database structure, there is a high potential for the inclusion of duplicate and irrelevant documents. I deduplicated documents using a two-stage procedure. ProQuest databases create unique identification numbers for articles within each media database; I used two of their databases, the Global and European newstreams. For this first stage of deduplication, duplicates were eliminated by comparing ProQuest identification numbers within each database. This lead to the exclusion of 69,320 duplicate documents (approximately 47%), leaving 79,206 documents in the corpus. Among these remaining documents, however, may be duplicate articles with: (a) different ProQuest ID numbers across databases; (b) republications of the same article across newswires or sources and as new information is added by reporters over time; or (c) articles from different sources capturing the same event. Some of these duplicates are not relevant and will be removed during the machine learning stage; others require more complex methods of removal, discussed later.

The distribution of the approximately 80,000 documents in the corpus by publication date is in Figure 4.1. The number of articles published featuring my keyword terms varies over time. If the coverage of migration increases in accordance with migratory flows, I expect to see a seasonal trend in the data. Historically, migrants using the Mediterranean Route face a more perilous journey in the winter months, so

[69]One thousand articles was a practical limit. The download function within ProQuest did not allow selections larger than 1,000 items per search from news media databases. Downloading all articles returned from a query would have taken a considerably longer amount of time. In addition, I scanned the titles or abstracts of the first thousand items for many of my searches and observed that beyond the first few hundred articles repetition of stories increased while relevance declined. This decision creates the potential for selection bias. However, if they were to be included, I believe the vast majority of the items beyond the first thousand (perhaps even beyond the first few hundred) would be eliminated by de-duplication processes or eliminated for irrelevance.

[70]The number of text files is slightly lower than expected (371, from multiplying 53 countries by seven years), because some countries had so few items returned by individual year search, that all articles for the 2011–2017 period could be downloaded at the same time without exceeding the 1,000-item limit.



Figure 4.1: Count by month of articles included in the document corpus, downloaded from ProQuest databases, 2011–2017.

flows tend to be larger in the summer months, smaller in the winter. Such a pattern is exhibited – though weakly – prior to the last quarter of 2014 in the corpus, with coverage falling off in the cold months and spiking mid-year. I also anticipate significant increases (i.e., "spikes") in the number of articles in my corpus when significant influxes of migrants occur or migration-related events capture the attention of the media and public. For example, spikes can be seen in these years prior to 2015 in March 2011, when an influx of migrants triggered by the Libyan crisis reached the Italian island of Lampedusa, and again in October 2013, when a ship carrying migrants sank, killing hundreds – again, near Lampedusa. Of course, the number of articles featuring my keywords increases significantly after 2015. The spike in September 2015 likely reflects both the large influxes of migrants at the Southern EU border as well as attempts by European states and the EU to get a handle on the growing crisis.

While media sources provide a rich source of information, it is important to acknowledge their limitations. Scholars working in the field of event data, which often utilizes such sources, point to several. First, there is the potential for selection bias,

wherein the focus of reporters and published articles does not represent what is happening in the real world (Chojnacki et al., 2012). While this is certainly possible, given that media from wealthier states are overrepresented in my sample, it is also the case that media sources were paying attention to migration prior to May 2015, as demonstrated by the patterns following the smaller "crises" noted in the previous paragraph. Due to the salience of migration during this period, it is likely that higher level government actors were involved in decision-making and thereby likely to generate more media coverage. Additionally, migration as an issue-area is diverse, overlapping with other concurrent, prominent issues in Europe including the United Kingdom referendum on leaving the EU, mobility governance within the Schengen Area, and EU accession discussions with non-Member States. I take the "media portfolio" approach suggested by Woolley (2000), incorporating a variety of sources, in hopes of ameliorating this selection bias. The second potential limitation is description bias, which is the extent to which articles accurately portray information (Chojnacki et al., 2012). My media portfolio approach also allows for multiple sources to cover the same event, which I consider in my substantive coding procedures described below.[71]

Identifying Relevant Documents within the Corpus

Within the corpus are a mixture of relevant and irrelevant documents, human processing of which would take considerable time. For this *classification* task, machine learning provides an efficient, practicable approach for completing this task. Machine learning is an umbrella term for methods that seek to improve the performance of computer programs with experience (Mitchell, 1997; Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman,

[71]I am also less constrained by the traditional event data structure, which relies on media to identify 'who did what to whom, when and where,' often succinctly. My migration diplomacy coding procedures allow me to assess information provided throughout an article and to seek corroborating information where necessary, whereas automated event coding procedures lose such detail and may thereby omit an event.

2009). "Experience" in machine learning amounts to iteratively running a program on different sets of data (varying in size, sample, etc.), with the goal of improving performance. Supervised machine learning methods use information from the researcher on the outcome of interest and features from a sub-set of the data to predict out-of-sample outcomes.[72] This is akin to predictive statistical modeling familiar to most social scientists. The relationship between dependent and independent variables is estimated via a statistical model on a sub-set of available training data with outcome labels; evaluated on a separate sub-set of validation data with outcome labels; and once acceptable levels of accuracy are reached, this model is used to predict outcome values for testing data for which outcome labels are unavailable. I utilize a supervised machine learning procedure to train an algorithm that estimates whether each article in my corpus of 79,206 document is "relevant," or related to domestic or international responses to migration associated with the crisis.[73] In this section, I describe the process I used to create my machine learning pipeline. In short, this involves the following: (1) selection and coding by hand of a "training" set consisting of irrelevant and relevant articles; (2) conversion of articles from text files into data that can be utilized for modeling; (3) training the machine learning algorithm to predict relevant and irrelevant articles with an acceptable degree of accuracy; and finally, (4) classifying the relevance of remaining documents. In the next two sections I describe these steps in more detail.

[72] Alternatively, unsupervised machine learning is used when information on outcomes is unavailable. Prediction is no longer the goal – only feature information can be utilized to produce information about the data, for example via cluster analysis. See Chapter 10 in James et al. (2013) for more information.

[73] An oft-used alternative, dictionary methods as described by (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013), was not a good option. This method would require the creation lists of keywords – people, places, organizations, actions, etc. – that would separate documents into "relevant" and "irrelevant" categories. I did not think creating such a dictionary *a priori* was possible, given that data on migration-related actions at this level had not been collected before so existing dictionaries or developing one of my own did not seem feasible. Grimmer and Stewart (2013) also note that validation of supervised learning models is an easier process.

Building the Training Dataset

As noted above, supervised machine learning methods require information from the researcher on the outcome of interest. In my case, the classification algorithm needs a sub-set of the corpus of documents with binary outcome labels specifying whether articles are relevant (coded "1") or irrelevant (coded "0") to migration associated with the crisis. This training dataset needs to represent the larger corpus of documents so that the within-training-sample accuracy is approximated by the "relevant" prediction algorithm in testing-sample documents. Accordingly, I used a systematic random sample of documents from the larger corpus to create 529 "batches" of 150 articles each to constitute the training set.[74] I selected 15 batches of the 529 to label as relevant or irrelevant, constituting my training set. I read and assigned outcome labels to each article in the 15 batches, resulting in 2,245 hand-coded articles, approximately three percent of the total corpus. I chose this number of batches to provide enough information for the relevance algorithm while accomplishing my task in an reasonable amount of time.[75]

As I proceeded with coding for relevance, I engaged in iterative performance checks. Once I finished the first hand-coded batch, I divided it into two sub-samples, training and testing. I used the training sub-sample to predict relevance in the testing sub-sample and evaluated performance of the relevance algorithm. Once I coded the second batch for relevance, I then combined the sub-samples from the first batch into a single training sample, used this training sample to predict relevance in the second

[74]Some batches contained 149 articles, as 150 does not cleanly divide 79,206. Batches with 149 articles were randomly dispersed throughout, including those utilized for hand-coding.

[75]The number of documents needed for supervised learning depends upon the coding scheme and thereby the complexity of the task the machine is performing. Grimmer and Stewart (2013) note that accuracy is the general rule driving this decision instead of setting a threshold value based on corpus size. A common standard in computer science applications seems to be around 10 percent of the corpus size, but such projects often rely on teams of coders. Hopkins (2010) offer a range between 100–1000 articles based on simulation work; however, the Hopkins was focused on predicting aggregate categorizations (e.g., percentage of relevant documents in the corpus) instead of accurate individual-document classification which is the task at hand here. I side with Grimmer in this case and focus on accuracy as the deciding factor.

batch, and evaluated performance of the relevance algorithm by comparing hand-coded relevance scores in the second batch to predicted relevance scores. Evaluation metrics are discussed in greater detail below. Each time I finished hand-coding a new batch, the previous testing batch was added to the training batch, the algorithm was re-trained with this larger training set, and then performance was evaluated on the new hand-coded testing batch. In this way, the machine accumulated a larger training set from which to "learn" and I could actively assess where under-performance was occurring. This process was repeated 15 times to achieve a sufficiently representative training set, as described above.

Articles were coded as relevant based on the types of migration issues discussed within. In Chapter 2 the distinction between mobility and migration governance was discussed. I use this as a guide for relevance, including articles that discuss migration matters at all, while excluding articles that focus solely on mobility.[76] Therefore, I code a document as relevant if it contains migration behavior associated with forced or mixed migration. Documents with significant sub-national actors responding to migration-related issues or referencing the national government in decisions regarding related migration behavior were also included. Actions taken on the part of the European Union on migration, as well as actions taken by states related to European mixed or forced migration behavior, were also considered relevant. Actions range from simple statements, informal declarations, or meetings by national representatives to more formalized actions including border restrictions, international agreements, and non-compliance or resistance to EU migration rules. I opted for these broad rules for relevance to ensure a higher false-positive rate (i.e., predicted as relevant when

[76]A particularly prominent mobility theme that emerged in articles were descriptions of negotiations between the United Kingdom and the EU in an effort to avoid the former leaving the Union. Leaders in the United Kingdom were concerned that current mobility rules allowed too many workers from less wealthy states – Poland is often mentioned explicitly – and hoped that renegotiating the terms of mobility arrangements could avoid Brexit. In the majority of these articles, migration is not even mentioned and they are excluded. However, when it does appear, such an article received a relevant code.

not) than a false-negative rate to provide a greater chance that relevant events are captured during the substantive coding process. I assigned a relevant outcome label to 587 of the 2,245 total hand-coded articles (approximately 26 percent) based upon these rules.

I coded the 1,621 remaining articles irrelevant for a variety of reasons. Most often, they focused on mobility-related migration without any ties to mixed or forced migration. Additionally, the broad keyword search approach I used in the ProQuest database brought in unrelated articles about "migration" of data systems in certain sectors of the economy, historical articles on past migration crises (e.g., many were related to refugees from World War II), human interest pieces on individual immigrants or refugees or their descendants, reviews of television shows or feature-films including migrants, and a particularly large group of commentaries that often mention immigration (e.g., many editorials were written about Britain's exit from the EU, mentioning immigration in passing as a motivation for anti-EU sentiment). Another large subsection of irrelevant articles reported on the rise of right-wing, anti-immigrant groups and parties across Europe, only mentioning migration as a component of their manifestos.

Converting Text to Data

To predict relevance, the machine learning algorithm requires information about the articles – in machine learning parlance *features*, or in statistical parlance *predictors*. To estimate relevance, one could utilize the metadata from articles (e.g., paper or newswire, author, date of publication, etc.), but these features are not likely to predict with a high degree of accuracy whether an article is relevant for my purposes. Instead, such a model would likely predict relevance based upon the number of publications in each database and not the content of the articles. Using information from the text of the articles to estimate relevance is a better solution. To do so requires

converting text into a form of information that can be fed into a mathematical or statistical model. Text-as-data (TAD) methods provide a means of converting written characters or strings into quantitative information (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). One common TAD structure is the *document term matrix* (DTM). This is equivalent to a dataset where the unit-of-analysis is the article and each variable represents a unique word from the corpus of documents.[77]

To process my article text files into numerical data, I used the *spaCy v.2.1* natural language processing library in Python 3 (Honnibal et al., 2020).[78] I took several steps to prepare the text files for conversion to data. First, I removed all non-unicode or other unusual characters (e.g., "new line" symbols). I then tokenized each article by breaking the text into a list of words and other characters. The spaCy natural language processing tool utilizes spaces to demarcate the beginning and ending of each token; therefore, my initial token list includes words but also remaining punctuation, symbols, and white space. I removed non-word characters from the list of tokens first. I then removed stop words, words that occur frequently enough in the English language that they provide little predictive power, using a validated English language dictionary contained in spaCy. These stop words include articles (e.g., "the"), conjunctions, numbers, and prepositions. Finally, I lemmatized the remaining words, meaning that words are reduced to their root form.[79] This reduces the number of

[77]Values of these variables can be binary, indicating the presence or absence of a word in articles, or continuous, providing a count of the number of times a word appears in each article or various other mathematical transformations of word counts. A common continuous measure is term frequency-inverse document frequency or TF-IDF. The choice of values for variables in the DTM is often based on maximizing predictive accuracy and the researcher's goal. My choice to use counts of word frequency as variable values was based on their utility in estimating relevance (versus binary values) and the fact that I did not need to account for how common terms were across my corpus for predicting relevance as my documents are unrelated, so TF-IDF was not appropriate.

[78]The spaCy library is an accessible, widely used tool for performing simple text-as-data conversion. For my purposes, spaCy provided an easy method of importing my text files and converting them to a DTM, as it contains a validated English language model used to automatically analyze texts. While the goal of text-as-data methods is to reduce the complexity of spoken language, to do so requires leveraging language models to identify key components.

[79]Another common form of reducing DTM complexity is to use word stemming. Stemming reduces words to their root form, but does so without context. For example, the lemmas of the words migrant and migrate are distinct because of they are different parts of speech. However, the stem of migrant

Document Identifiers		Document Term Matrix with N-gram Count Features							Feature
Filename	Document	Refugee	Asylum	Migrant	Europe	Germany	UNHCR	Border	Relevance
Germany2015.txt	1	4	1	2	4	1	1	6	1
Germany2015.txt	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
Germany2015.txt	3	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Italy2014.txt	1	1	5	2	3	0	1	3	1
Italy2014.txt	2	0	2	4	1	1	4	2	1
Italy2014.txt	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria2013.txt	1	3	1	2	2	0	0	1	1
Bulgaria2013.txt	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria2013.txt	3	0	1	3	5	0	0	1	1

Figure 4.2: This is an example structure of a Document Term Matrix (DTM), not a depiction of DTMs utilized in the project, which contain many more features. This DTM structure utilizes n-grams, specifically unigrams, as features, except for the "relevance" feature which contains binary hand-coded or predicted values indicating whether each document is related to the migrant crisis. Each n-gram feature is a single word, with values representing the number of times that word appears in a document. Index values are preserved across data frame objects in Python. This DTM data structure is the same in training, testing, and predicted data sets, though which n-gram features and their values will vary across datasets.

features in the DTM and in my case improved performance of the machine learning model.[80] These reduced word-forms or lemmas are utilized to create the DTM. Figure 4.2 contains an example DTM to clarify the data structure.

Both training and testing data utilized in the machine learning process are converted to DTMs. Just as predictive statistical modeling requires a dataset to develop the predictive equation (e.g., coefficient values in a regression equation) and a second dataset of values to input into the equation to produce predicted values, the set of articles that constitute the training set are transformed into a DTM as are the set of articles for which relevance values are being predicted. These two DTMs will share many features in common, but they will also contain features unique to their sub-set of articles.

and migrate would be "migra," stripped its context.

[80]I ran the machine learning models with both non-lemmatized words and lemmatized words. In this case, lemmas enhanced or maintained predictive performance of the model while reducing computation time by decreasing the number of features in the training data.

Teaching the Machine: Algorithm selection and performance

The "canonical" algorithm utilized in classification problems is the Naïve Bayes Classifier (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). The Naïve Bayes Classifier estimates the probability that a given document belongs in a category based upon the information in the DTM and uses these probabilities to predict the outcome of interest in unlabeled documents – in my case, whether a document is relevant or irrelevant. [81] To perform my machine learning tasks, I used the *Scikit-learn* machine learning library in Python 3, which is a popular package for machine learning and other statistical modeling exercises (Pedregosa et al., 2011). I chose the Multinomial Naïve Bayesian Classifier (hereafter "the classifier"). This classifier is appropriate for integer (i.e., discrete) feature counts and by default utilizes Laplace smoothing to allow lemmas not present in the training set (but present in the testing set) to have non-zero probabilities during estimation.[82]

Next I selected hyperparameters of the classifier. For my purposes, two hyperparameters were most important: the ratio of training-to-validation data and the number of features used to train the classifier. I divide the hand-coded relevance data serving as my training into two sub-samples, the data used to "train" via the classifier and the data used evaluate the performance of the classifier against my own relevance codes (i.e., the validation set). The number of features in the DTM for my training set numbered in the hundreds of thousands. The inclusion of too many or too few features can drive the quality of the classifier higher or lower. The selection process is inductive, as the goal is to find the model that performs best at predicting

[81] The Naïve Bayes Classifier is critiqued for assuming that features are produced independently of one another, an obviously false assumption for text-as-data applications (thus its naieveté). Yet it performs well in classification exercises, is relatively simple in implementation, and therefore is a popular choice for applied classification problems (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013; Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman, 2009).

[82] Among the options for Bayesian classifiers, the choice of algorithm is determined by the structure of feature variables. My features are counts of the number of times a lemma appears in an article, therefore making the Multinomial Naïve Bayesian Classifier the most appropriate.

relevant articles, rather than the most appropriate model for inference given a theory about the data generating process. Practically, this amounts to running different versions of the classifier with different training-to-validation set balances and different maximum feature boundaries. The highest performing specification utilized 25 percent of the hand-coded data for training, the other 75 percent of hand-coded data for validation, and was limited to 10,000 features.

For each set of hyperparameters, I examined several evaluation metrics, including the models' false positive and false negative rates. My goal was to achieve a balance between false negative and false positive rates; the lower the former, the more I can be confident that relevant articles are included, while the lower latter, the fewer excess articles I spent time reading while coding for migration diplomacy actions. In other words, I decided to strike a balance between including as much relevant information as possible, while not including so much irrelevant information that substantive coding is impeded.

I used several other evaluation metrics, which I hoped to maximize alongside the balance between false positive and false negative rates. *Accuracy* measures how much of the validation set was labelled correctly by the algorithm as relevant or irrelevant. *Recall* measures number of times the algorithm correctly labeled an article as relevant in proportion to the number of articles that are actually relevant based on my codes. *Precision* captures the number of articles correctly labeled relevant by the algorithm in proportion to the total number of articles the algorithm labeled as relevant. For my purposes, maximizing accuracy and recall were priorities. Accordingly, the model I selected had an accuracy score of approximately 0.80, a recall score of 0.82, a precision of approximately 0.60. The false negative rate was 0.18, and the false positive rates was approximately 0.21, for a difference of approximately 0.03.[83]

[83]All evaluation metrics range from zero to one, where a score of "1" reflects the best possible performance.

Predicting Relevant and Irrelevant Documents

With my classifier and hyperparameters selected, I was ready to predict relevance in the uncoded document corpus (n=79,205). After removing documents from the training set (2,245 articles), the resulting testing set consisted of 76,960 articles for which the classifier predicted relevance labels.[84] The classifier labeled a total of 28,865 documents relevant (approximately 38 percent of the testing set) and the remaining 48,095 articles irrelevant.[85]

My final step prior to coding migration diplomacy actions involved more intense de-duplication of the 28,865 documents marked as relevant. As noted above, due to non-unique ProQuest IDs and reprints of articles, duplicates remain in the relevant corpus. To remove these duplicates I utilize the *corpustools* package in R, which provides a simple de-duplication tool that utilizes natural language processing to identify substantively similar blocs of text (Welbers and van Atteveldt, 2021). The process of specifying which documents were removed was also iterative, and I settled on a procedure that removes duplicates of a document if they are published within 48 hours and reach a similarity score higher than 90%.[86] After running the deduplication procedure on my list of relevant documents, I was left with 13,897 documents spanning the period 2011-2017.

[84]I used a secure external server through Amazon Web Services to run the classifier on the testing set. I did this to ensure enough memory was available and to decrease program running time, which still took roughly four hours. This inexpensive option provided a much-needed respite for my aged MacBook Air.

[85]I attribute this roughly ten percent increase in the proportion of relevant articles in the testing set versus the training set to two factors. First, the false positive rate of the algorithm is high enough that I should see an increase in testing positives relative to training positives. Second, the number of duplicate articles in the training set was low, but the number of duplicate articles remaining in the testing set is much higher. Assuming the algorithm correctly assigned relevant codes to most duplicates, the number of relevant codes will be inflated. Deduplication procedures during substantive coding help bring this final count of relevant articles in closer alignment with the expected proportion.

[86]The process for preparing documents for similarity score estimates is similar to the one I described above for relevance prediction. Text are converted to data and cosine similarity measures are used to determine how distinct the features are between two or more documents.

Transition to Substantive Coding

The next stage of data collection was the transition from gathering primary source materials to coding substantive information from these documents. My data collection strategy was much broader than the focus on migration diplomacy the dissertation now reflects, as described in Appendix A. A soft test of my coding procedures revealed that it would take me an inordinate amount of time, given project constraints, to read through 13,897 articles and code the many state responses to migration within them. I decided to narrow the subset of documents that I would code in two ways. First, I decided not to code the first three years, 2011-2013, for substantive data collection, which eliminated 3,662 documents. Based upon time spent reading and coding for relevance many of the articles from this period, their relevance is less reliable and the focus of reporting around migration is more heterogeneous. This excludes some events that observers of European migration developments may find problematic to have excluded (e.g., the death of hundreds of migrants by drowning in an October 2013 shipwreck near Lampedusa, Italy). However, my primary interest is on the crisis period so I believe substantively coding from 2014-2017 provides me with information on the crisis period as well as years when migration pressures were lower in 2014 and 2017.

To further narrow the scope of articles, my second approach was to sample from the 10,235 remaining documents in the 2014-2017 period. To ensure my sample of documents was representative of the relevant batch of articles, I use a random sampling strategy stratified by month to identify 2,600 documents. Based upon my coding soft test, I determined this number of documents provided a reasonable sample size for substantive coding given my time constraints. Figure 4.3 reveals the distribution of documents across the full corpus (n=79,250), the batch of documents predicted to be relevant (n=13,897), and the sample of relevant documents for substantive coding (n=2,600). The distributions are similar in their shape over time, and the crisis period



Figure 4.3: Number of Documents in Corpus, Batch of Relevant Documents, and Substantive Coding Sample by Month, 2014-2017

from 2015-2016 is especially prominent in the Relevant and Sample distributions.

Dependent Variable: Measuring Migration Diplomacy

With my sample of documents selected, I moved to substantive coding. As noted above, the collection of data on migration diplomacy was a subset of a larger data collection process on state responses to migration 2014-2017, described in Appendix A. My process involved reading each article, identifying state responses to migration – the range of actions and positions states take in response to international migration or actions and positions of other entities with respect to migration – within each document in my sample, and recording these in my dataset. I then coded variables capturing the level of analysis of responses (monadic, dyadic, or n-adic); the actors involved, including both the states responding and the target of their responses; and the specific migration issues involved (e.g., border control, protection statuses, access to housing, etc.). The distribution of responses to migration by level of analysis can be seen in Figure 4.4.

Documents contained a mixture of relevant and irrelevant information, and a vary-

ing number of state responses to migration. Responses sometimes had the structure of an actor taking an action related to migration within a sentence. However, more often they spanned multiple sentences or even paragraphs, requiring rich context to identify. Therefore, I decided to hand-code my substantive variables instead of using an automated event data approach.[87] That said, I relied upon the wealth of literature on event data coding procedures to inform my own.

Three common issues with event data helped me establish coding rules (Chojnacki et al., 2012). The first issue I faced involved actor differentiation – the ability to identify who is acting – in defining who counts as the State. I decided that to count as a state response, an event described in a document had to involve an individual serving in a high-ranking government position, often in the executive branch or administrative bodies working closely therewith, who has a role in decision-making with respect to migration (e.g., presidents, prime ministers, foreign or interior secretaries, their spokespersons, and those with appointments supervising migration or asylum within the state administration). The second issue, temporal inaccuracy, I handle by assuming that events discussed in present tense occur on the date of article publication. Events discussed in past tense without explicit dates are not coded, nor are anticipated events or those discussed in future tense. Finally, I avoid event localization issues – identifying where an event took place – by requiring specific information about the location and target of a response. For any piece of information related to a response that was unclear, I looked for corroborating information in other media and reports. Absent this information, such responses were excluded from my data.

[87] Automated event coding systems identify actor-action-target relationships in text sources, but this is at the expense of rich context, which I required for my coding procedures. Automated event coding systems additionally were developed for studying international conflict or were designed to work well within particular regional contexts (Hanna, 2017). A potential candidate for automating migration diplomacy event coding is made available by the GDELT project, which contains vast historical event data collections based on newspaper sources from 1979 to the present (see: https://www.gdeltproject.org/about.html). A means of operationalizing migration diplomacy through GDELTs existing coding scheme could be developed relatively easily using dictionary or supervised machine learning methods, leveraging the data I have collected.

I coded 937 state responses to migration from my sample of documents, from which I created my migration diplomacy dependent variable. This is a binary variable indicating whether a state initiated a migration diplomacy action (or actions) in a state-month for the 2014-2017 period. I consider migration diplomacy, as the use of diplomatic tools to manage international migration, to include obvious bilateral and multilateral international interactions. Bilateral migration diplomacy includes both dyadic and directed-dyadic actions. When states are engaged in a dyadic interaction – most often a meeting where the migrant crisis or other relevant migration topics are discussed – I code this as both states having initiated a migration policy response. For directed-dyadic interactions, on the other hand, I include only the state that took action, not the target of an action.[88] For example, when France offers to take 1,000 migrants from Germany and process their asylum applications, I code France as having initiated a migration diplomacy action and Germany as the target of that action. Similar to the non-directed dyadic case, all states engaged in an n-adic interaction are considered to have initiated a migration diplomacy action. These most often include multilateral meetings, for instance when the Visegrad Four – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – meet to strategize their opposition to the EU relocation scheme. I code each state as having initiated migration diplomacy in this example.

The literature on migration diplomacy is ambiguous in its treatment of unilateral actions, emphasizing the obvious international interactions, bilateral and multilateral, described above. However, states engage in a variety of targeted unilateral actions that I argue ought to be considered in a conception of migration diplomacy. Diplomacy also includes actions taken by states to improve their bargaining position or to reveal their preferences. Therefore, I include in my dependent variable instances of states taking unilateral targeted actions toward another state (or group of states),

[88]The state toward whom action is directed is included in my theoretical variable capturing whether a states is the target of a migration diplomacy action, which is described in detail in my discussion of covariates below.



Figure 4.4: Number of State Responses to Migration by Level of Analysis for each year, 2014-2017.

where an action is targeted if the initiating state explicitly identifies another state in its actions. These unilateral targeted actions often involve a state imposing border restrictions on the part of its border that is shared with a target. In contrast, if a state were to impose border restrictions at all borders without explicitly identifying another state or states as a target, I do not consider this a migration diplomacy action.[89] Another common unilateral targeted action involves a state announcing a position. For example, Austria criticizes Hungary's decision to transport migrants across its territory by train in September 2015. Austria's position is directed toward Hungary, but does not involve a direct exchange of views, which would be considered a directed dyadic action in my coding scheme.[90]

[89]For this first attempt at incorporating unilateral actions, I think this is a reasonable assumption. In my coding process, if a state were to close its borders and then attempt to leverage this move in migration diplomacy targeting another state (or international organization) explicitly, this action would be included in my data. While some instances may be excluded based on this rule, they are likely excluded due to incomplete or absent media coverage rather than based upon this rule.

[90]The boundaries between unilateral targeted actions and unilateral actions on the one hand and directed-dyadic actions on the other, are fuzzy. I estimate models including and excluding this class of actions and discuss in the section on robustness checks below.

International organizations such as the EU, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), or the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are also engaged in migration diplomacy during the crisis period. My focus for this project is on the behavior of states, so I excluded international organizations as actors from my analyses *as actors*. However, when states initiate migration diplomacy that targets international organizations, these actions are included in my dependent variable.

Migration Diplomacy Actions

Excluding unilateral non-targeted responses (n=242) leaves me with 695 unilateral targeted, dyadic, directed-dyadic, and n-adic responses. For each, I identified the actor(s) at each level of analysis as discussed previously and created a count of the number of times they initiated migration diplomacy from January 2014-December 2017. The total number of initiations of migration diplomacy (hereafter "migration diplomacy actions" or MDAs) identified through this process is 790. Approximately 42% (n=330) of the MDAs are unilateral targeted, 15% (n=119) are dyadic, 17% (n=133) are directed-dyadic, and 26% (n=208) are n-adic. When coding state responses to migration, I also recorded information about the specific migration-related issues featured in MDAs (see Appendix A). Figure 4.5 displays the proportion of MDAs pertaining to each migration issue. MDAs could be related to multiple migration related issues at once. For example, states often referenced their positions on the EU Relocation agreement in relation to their need for border restrictions.

Border-related issues are by far the most common migration issue featured in MDAs in Figure 4.5. Border-related MDAs include states taking positions on higher level debates about the operation of Europe's external border and internal border controls in the Schengen Area. States coordinated opening and closing their borders (e.g., Germany and Austria), deployed troops or built fences along their borders with certain neighbors (e.g., Hungary's fence targeting Serbia), and took positions on the



Figure 4.5: Proportion of Migration Diplomacy Actions (MDAs) within each migration issue. MDAs may pertain to multiple migration issue types, so each bar in the plot should be treated as an independent proportion of the total MDAs (n=790) related to a particular migration issue.

border operations of other states (e.g., Macedonia criticizing EU members for closing borders), among other actions. Relocation was the second most common migration issue featured in MDAs, though significantly less common than border issues. This is attributable to the centrality of the EU Relocation Scheme in debates about collective responses to the crisis. The remaining migration related issues are featured at roughly similar levels in MDAs. The distribution of issue types mirrors that in Figure 4.5 across levels of analysis as well.

To convert these MDAs into a dependent variable with an appropriate state-year unit of analysis for my statistical models, I first create a time-series cross-sectional dataset containing all my states (n=52) and an observation for each state for each month 2014-2017 (t=48). I then create a variable that counts the number of MDAs a state engages in each month across the four years and merge it into this data skeleton. The MDA count variable is highly right-skewed, with the majority of state-months

having no MDAs, and states initiating MDAs most frequently engage in just one per month. I created my dependent variable, *MDA dummy*, by collapsing the values of the MDA count variable above zero into a single category with a value of "1" indicating that the state engage in migration diplomacy in a month.[91] Descriptive statistics for this variable are in Table 4.2. The mean for this binary variable indicates that approximately 15% of state-months contain MDAs. The rate of MDAs is slightly higher in the model samples (see Table 4.3).

Independent Variables

In this section I describe measures for my four focal independent variables and several additional theoretical variables. My variables and associated descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4.2. *MDA dummy* is my binary dependent variable. *Asylum seekers per capita*, *Asylum seeker count*, *GDP per capita*, and *Percent negative opinion* are my continuous independent variables. I also employ two binary, theoretical variables to capture meaningful variation: *Target of MDA* and *Schengen member*. I discuss my data sources and measurement procedures for each variable below, and reformulate my theoretical hypotheses from Chapter 3 as testable hypotheses in terms of my measures.

[91] I considered a two-stage model to predict in the first stage a state's decision to engage in migration diplomacy and in the second stage how many MDAs a state initiates. Lack of variation in the second stage due to the skewed nature of the count variable hampered this effort. Also, the Inverse Mill's Ratio did not indicate the presence of selection in the first stage in the Heckman Selection model.

Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for Full Sample

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
MDA dummy	2496	0.149	0.356	0	0	0	1
Asylum seekers per capita	1766	0.141	0.284	0	0.011	0.162	4.747
Asylum seeker count	1766	2.411	6.981	0	0.047	1.77	92.117
GDP per capita	2496	26.73	31.101	2.124	5.487	40.603	178.864
Anti-migrant opinion	1064	60.667	14.346	24.93	51.38	72.55	86.34
Target of MDA	2496	0.077	0.267	0	0	0	1
Schengen member	2496	0.481	0.5	0	0	1	1

Asylum seekers per capita$_{t-1}$

I expect that states more impacted by the crisis will be more likely to initiate migration diplomacy than those that are less impacted. I measure the impact of the migrant crisis on states with the number of new asylum seekers registered in a state for each month, 2014-2017, per 1,000 members of a state's population.[92] Asylum seekers are individuals who have asked for humanitarian protection (most often refugee status) but whose status has not yet been determined. The speed with which individuals apply for asylum after arriving on a state's territory varies both across states and by individual within a state. Some domestic migration management systems are set up to process asylum applications faster than others (e.g., through expedited procedures at the border). Over the course of the crisis, these systems also adapted, resulting in variation in state capacity to process applications within states as well. Migrants' choices regarding when to apply for asylum also affect the count of new asylum applications, as not all individuals chose to file claims immediately upon arrival. So, the count of new asylum applications, while serving as a proxy for new arrivals, also contains asylum applications from migrants who arrived in previous time periods and

[92]The number of new asylum seekers in a given month is a small number, certainly relative to annual population counts. In addition to making coefficients small in my models, the impact of one asylum seeker relative to the total population artificially deflates the effect of a new arrival on migration management system capacity. For example, 100,000 new asylum seekers in a month are just a little more than a tenth of a percent of the German population of approximately 80 million Germans. However if the German migration management system is acclimated to monthly arrivals around 80-90% smaller than this, new arrivals of that size may quickly overwhelm it.

does not contain information on individuals who arrived through other statuses or chose to remain "irregular" by not applying for status.

I lag this variable by one month in my models to capture the costs of migrant arrivals in the previous month on states' use of migration diplomacy in the current month. The number of asylum seekers per capita in the current period is a count of the number of new applications filed at the end of a given month, but states utilize migration diplomacy within that same month, prior to knowing what the monthly total of asylum applications will be. Since my goal is to measure the costs of the crisis, I use a lagged indicator to capture the cost of migrant arrivals known to states, the number of asylum applications per capita in the previous month.

The data for this measure come from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Population Statistics Database, which combines information from its own record keeping in states outside of the EU with data from Eurostat, the EU's data collection warehouse.[93] To create a per capita measure of new asylum seekers, I use annual data on state populations from the World Bank.[94] Data availability on monthly new asylum applications is limited to a sub-sample of countries, leading to a loss of approximately 29% of the observations (n=1,766, down from 2,496) from my data in my statistical models. The observations lost are those from states on the Eastern border of Europe and those in the Middle East and North Africa: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Russia, Tunisia, Ukraine. However, these are the only monthly data available, so I opt for the loss of data rather than running a model on annualized data that fails to capture more frequent shifts in crisis dynamics.

The *asylum seekers per capita* measure captures two paths by which the migrant

[93]UNHCR, Population Statistics Database (2019). *Asylum Seekers (monthly)*. The Population Statistics Database of the UNHCR is now inactive and was replaced by the Refugee Data Finder which can be accessed here https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics-uat/download/.

[94]The World Bank, Health Nutrition and Population Statistics (2021). *Population, Total*. Retrieved from https://databank.worldbank.org/source/health-nutrition-and-population-statistics/.

crisis affects states. First, it is a proxy measure for the volume of migrants crossing into a state's territory in each month. As previously noted, the nature of mixed migration flows is such that some migrants qualify for international protection while other do not. Asylum seekers include individuals from both groups. Data on monthly irregular migration, which would be a more direct measure of migratory pressure, is not systematically available. Second, the number of asylum seekers captures the pressure a state's migration management system is under. Asylum seeker counts are based on the number of applications filed to migration management entities. Applicants include individuals who arrived in previous time periods alongside those who arrived in the current month, but regardless of when the individual arrived, new applications must be processed by authorities in direct communication with leaders about their ability to cope with application volumes. Therefore, my first testable hypothesis is:

> *Hypothesis 1: All else equal, states with a higher proportion of asylum seekers per 1,000 population in the previous month are* ***more*** *likely to engage in migration diplomacy action in the current month, relative to states with a lower proportion of asylum seekers per 1,000 population in the previous month.*

Asylum seekers count

As a proxy measure for the effect of states' expectations for migrant arrivals in the future, I use a count of the number of new asylum applications in a state in the current month. In Chapter 3 I argued that states have a variety of sources of information that allow them to generate expectations about the number of asylum seekers they will receive in the near future, and that they opt to use migration diplomacy when they expect more migrants to arrive. I initially considered using a lead of the number of new asylum applications, which would have captured the number of new asylum

applications that a state receives in the month immediately following the current time period. However, in doing so, I am assuming that decision makers have access to perfect information about the future. Use of the number of new asylum applications makes a similar assumption – that is, states know how many new asylum applications they will receive in the current month and make their decisions during a given month regarding migration diplomacy accordingly. However, it is more reasonable to assume their predictions about the number of asylum applications that will be lodged in the current month is more accurate than their predictions for a month in the future.

In terms of construction, I also divide this variable by 1,000, so that it indicates how many thousands of asylum seekers the state expects to receive in the current month. The effect of one or several more expected asylum applications is likely small. States are more sensitive to changes of a larger magnitude, particularly in a crisis where the number of asylum seekers arriving in 2015 sometimes grew by tens of thousands month-to-month. Hypothesis 2 in testable form is:

> *Hypothesis 2: All else equal, states that receive a higher number of new asylum applications in the current month are* ***more*** *likely to engage in migration diplomacy action in the current month, relative to states that receive a lower number of new asylum applications in the current month.*

GDP per capita

I expect weaker states to engage in migration diplomacy more often than their stronger counterparts. To measure state power, I use gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, a standard measure of relative state power in quantitative international relations research. The data for my measure of GDP per capita (in current US dollars) come from the World Bank's Development Indicators database.[95] GDP per capita is

[95]The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2021). *GDP per capita (current $US).* Retrieved from https://databank.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/1ff4a498/Popular-Indicators.

measured annually and available for all states in my sample for the four-year period, so it is available for all 2,448 observations in my data (see Table 4.2). Values of GDP per capita are collected annually, so they do not vary within a year. I extend the annual value to all 12 months in each of the four years in my data. Year-to-year variation is relatively low for GDP per capita, so my measure primarily captures across state variation in power. I also divide GDP per capita by 1,000 to avoid small coefficients, but I argue this also provides a more reasonable interpretation, as increases by thousands in GDP per capita provides a more reasonable estimate of the effect of state power on the likelihood of initiating migration diplomacy. I restate Hypothesis 3 in terms of my variables:

> *Hypothesis 3: All else equal, states with higher GDP per capita (in $1000 US) are* ***less*** *likely to initiate migration diplomacy of any type in the current month, relative to states that have lower GDP per capita.*

Anti-migrant public opinion

I expect states with less friendly domestic environments toward migrants to be more likely to engage in migration diplomacy than states with friendlier domestic environments. I measure the strength of anti-migrant interests in a state by way of public opinion data on migration. My data come from semi-annual Eurobarometer surveys administered in June and November in all 28 EU Member States.[96] Beginning in November 2014, the standard Eurobarometer instrument contains the following question: "Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: Immigration of people from outside the EU." Respondents are asked to say whether they feel "Very Positive," "Fairly Positive," "Fairly Negative," or "Very Negative." For my measure of opinion on migration, I use the per-

[96]European Commission. Eurobarometer: Standard Eurobarometer 82-88, November 2014-November 2017. European Union [distributor]. Accessed August 23, 2021 here: https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/browse/all/series/4961.

centage of individuals expressing negative opinions about migrants, including those who respond in the negative, whether "fairly" or "very."

The Eurobarometer surveys are administered twice a year, which leaves me with only two data points per year (minus the June 2014 observation, which did not include a question on international migration). In lieu of losing these observations in my models, I decided to carry forward values from each June measurement period to October of the same year, and to carry forward values from November to May of the following year.[97] Even with this stepwise approach, there is a surprising amount of variation across and within EU states over the four year period, as can be seen in Figure 4.6. Some states experienced dramatic changes – Poland had a more than 20 point increase in the percentage of respondents with negative feelings toward migrants from late 2014 to early 2017 – while others were relatively invariant – Germany maintained between 50-60% of the population exhibiting negative feelings toward international migrants. I restate Hypothesis 4 in terms of my variables:

> *Hypothesis 4: All else equal, states with a higher percentage of the population with negative feelings toward international migrants are* ***more*** *likely to engage in migration diplomacy action in the current month, relative to states that have a lower percentage of the population with negative feelings toward international migrants.*

[97] I also tried linear interpolation of the values between survey administrations, which introduces artificial variation across months. Inclusion of this version of the variable did not alter model results.



Figure 4.6: Percentage of individuals reporting negative feelings toward international migrants by state over time, 2014-2017.

Theoretical Variables

I include two theoretical variables to capture additional meaningful variation. The first, *Target of MDA* is a binary variable indicating whether a state was the target of any migration diplomacy actions by other states. I include this variable based on a simple logic: states that are targets of migration diplomacy are more likely to subsequently engage in migration diplomacy. This variable takes a value of "1" if a state is identified as the target of one or more migration diplomacy actions by any other state in the current month and "0" otherwise. States can be targets of migration diplomacy actions in a variety of ways.[98] They may be the subject of unilateral targeted action. For example, if Germany closes its border with Austria, the former is taking a unilateral targeted action, which is captured in my dependent variable, while the latter is the target of migration diplomacy. Both states engaged in a dyadic interaction (non-directed) are both captured in my dependent variable, but occasionally these dyadic actions are targeted at a third actor (e.g., a joint position statement by Germany and France on Hungary's refusal to participate in the EU Relocation Scheme). The third actor would receive a value of "1" on this variable (Hungary in this example). For directed dyadic actions, the state initiating migration diplomacy is captured in my dependent variable, while the state an action is directed toward is captured in this variable. Finally, similar to dyadic actions, n-adic actions may be directed toward a third party, for which the third party would receive a value of "1" on this variable. This variable relies on the rich context approach taken when identifying state responses to migration during my substantive coding procedures.

The next control variable, *Schengen member*, is a binary variable that indicates whether a state in my sample is a participating member of the Schengen Area. States who are Schengen members take a value of "1" for the entire crisis period and a value

[98]Reciprocity in migration diplomacy – that is, states targeting one another for migration diplomacy in sequence – occurs regularly in my data. I recorded more than 200 "episodes" of migration diplomacy actions, wherein states were interacting on a particular migration issue over time.

of "0" otherwise. Schengen members have agreed to lower border controls to allow for free movement of goods, services, and people across borders. The Schengen Area is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. For my purposes, this variable captures whether states engage in migration diplomacy more or less readily as a result of their membership. I suspect that Schengen Member States will be more likely to engage in migration diplomacy relative to non-members, as they have lowered barriers to cross border travel, and therefore were less prepared to cope with large numbers of third country national migrant arrivals. In addition, the externalization of European borders also leads me to believe that Schengen Member States are more likely to engage in migration diplomacy, as they have experience and interests in regulating migration outside of their own territories. Of the 37 states in my model, 12 are not Schengen members, including several EU Member States: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia (and Kosovo), Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

Statistical Analysis

My data are recorded at the state-month unit of analysis, resulting in a time series cross sectional dataset for 51 countries for 48 months (n = 2448).[99] Summary statistics are available for my dependent and independent variables in the full sample and model samples in Table 4.3. Recall that my data on new asylum applications per month are available only for a subset of states, which restricts my maximum model samples to 37 states (n=1766). In addition, I run separate models for *asylum seekers per capita* and *asylum seeker count* due to concerns with collinearity.[100] Inclusion of the lagged

[99]I lose two states, Kosovo and San Marino, in constructing the dataset. Kosovo is lost as most international data collection efforts continue to group Serbia and Kosovo together as a single entity. So, my independent variables contain information for both states combined. I identified one instance where Kosovo engaged in an MDA in my data, which falls from the analysis. San Marino has no MDAs or independent variable values available, so I exclude it from the analysis.

[100]The two variables are correlated at r=0.45, which is high enough to produce concerns for including both variables in the same model. In addition, the variables are constructed with the same base

Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for Model Samples

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
Model 1 sample							
MDA dummy	1766	0.183	0.387	0	0	0	1
GDP per capita	1766	34.753	33.168	3.952	13.09	46.297	178.864
Asylum seekers per capita$_{t-1}$	1729	0.142	0.287	0	0.011	0.165	4.747
Asylum seeker count	1766	2.411	6.981	0	0.047	1.77	92.117
Target of MDA	1766	0.093	0.291	0	0	0	1
Schengen member	1766	0.677	0.468	0	0	1	1
Model 2 sample including *Public Opinion*							
MDA dummy	1059	0.234	0.424	0	0	0	1
GDP per capita	1059	31.959	20.956	7.055	16.508	44.178	118.823
Asylum seekers per capita$_{t-1}$	1059	0.161	0.339	0	0.015	0.183	4.747
Asylum seeker count	1059	3.031	8.598	0	0.091	2.251	92.117
Target of MDA	1059	0.111	0.315	0	0	0	1
Schengen member	1059	0.787	0.41	0	1	1	1
Anti-migrant opinion	1059	60.645	14.365	24.93	51.38	72.55	86.34

asylum seekers per capita variable results in the loss of one year of data for each state, resulting in a model sample size of n=1729 in Model 1. I also estimate versions of both models with and without the presence of the *Public Opinion* variable, given that it substantially restricts the model sample size (n=1059). This results in the four models in Table 4.4.

I opt for a logistic regression model to test the relationship between my binary dependent variable, initiation of migration diplomacy, and my mixture of continuous and binary independent variables. My data are times series cross sectional, which when combined with my dependent variable constitute binary time series cross sectional data so I follow the procedures outlined by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). This involves adding cubic splines to model the potential serial dependence of my dependent variable (i.e., the underlying hazard rate).[101] I explored several other model

data, the count of new asylum seekers applications in each state month. However, for the curious reader, I include versions of my models with both variables in Table B.1 in Appendix B.

[101]Following the authors' recommendations, I first estimate a logistic regression model with dummy variables for each time period and perform a likelihood ratio (LR) test to see if the inclusion of temporal effects improves model fit. The LR test revealed significant improvement in model fit, suggesting that the baseline hazard of a state engaging in migration diplomacy is not uniform over time as a model without temporal effects would assume. The authors note that the use of time dummies is sufficient, but they prefer the spline version. Therefore, I select the latter; results of my model are robust to both specifications.

Table 4.4: Logistic Regression Results

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
A.S. per capita$_{t-1}$	1.1353***	1.0868**		
	(0.3050)	(0.3433)		
A.S. count			0.0467***	0.0327**
			(0.0114)	(0.0107)
GDP per capita	−0.0087*	−0.0066	−0.0074*	−0.0044
	(0.0034)	(0.0053)	(0.0033)	(0.0052)
Anti-migrant opinion		−0.0034		−0.0019
		(0.0073)		(0.0073)
Target of MDA	2.1780***	2.1032***	2.2413***	2.1341***
	(0.2017)	(0.2436)	(0.2011)	(0.2445)
Schengen member	0.0546	−0.0891	0.0458	−0.0988
	(0.1684)	(0.2176)	(0.1666)	(0.2184)
Constant	−0.8109***	−0.4000	−0.9732***	−0.4954
	(0.1656)	(0.5306)	(0.1638)	(0.5299)
Spline 1	−9.6764***	−7.7907***	−8.4630***	−7.6472***
	(1.2282)	(1.4577)	(1.1988)	(1.4557)
Spline 2	22.6075***	14.5525**	20.0936***	14.7266**
	(4.7901)	(5.5366)	(4.6764)	(5.5211)
Spline 3	−45.9647**	−28.5504	−40.7075**	−29.9690
	(14.6831)	(16.2071)	(14.2646)	(16.2524)
AIC	1293.9020	924.9469	1319.4713	928.0978
Area under ROC	0.8088	0.7991	0.8034	0.7976
Log Likelihood	−638.9510	−453.4735	−651.7357	−455.0489
Deviance	1277.9020	906.9469	1303.4713	910.0978
Num. obs.	1729	1059	1766	1059

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

A.S. = "Asylum Seekers"

specifications, outlined in the section on robustness checks below, but determined this specification to be best fit, balancing simplicity of specification with accounting for possible temporal dependence.

The results of my logistic regression analysis are in Table 4.4. Models 1 and 2 include the lagged *Asylum seekers per capita* variable, while models 3 and 4 include the contemporaneous *Asylum seekers count* variable. Models 2 and 4 include the *Anti-migrant opinion* variable. All four models perform relatively well at classifying instances of migration diplomacy action with area under the Receiver Operator Curve (ROC) scores hovering around 0.80.[102] I discuss my results for each variable below.

[102]The area under the ROC curve (AUC) provides a measure of model classification performance.

I exponentiate the coefficients produced by the logistic regression models (e^{β}), which allows me to discuss a change in the odds produced by the variables (rather than the less intuitive changes in the log-odds provided in Table 4.4).

The coefficients for *Asylum seekers per capita*$_{t-1}$ are positive and significant at p<0.001 in both Model 1 and Model 2. All else equal, for each new asylum application per 1,000 population in a state in the previous month, the odds that a state engages in migration diplomacy significantly increase by a factor of 3.11 ($e^{1.1353}$) in Model 1 and by a factor of 2.96 in Model 2. This provides support for Hypothesis 1, that states are more likely to engage in migration diplomacy when the costs of migration crises increase in the form of more migrant arrivals.

The coefficients for *Asylum seeker count* are also positive and significant at p<0.001 in both Model 3 and Model 4. All else equal, for each additional 1,000 asylum seekers per capita arriving in a state in a given month, the odds that the state engages in migration diplomacy significantly increase by a factor of 1.05 in Model 3 and by a factor of 1.03 in Model 4. This provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 2, that states anticipating higher costs in the future from migration crises are more likely to engage in migration diplomacy.

The GDP per capita variable is included in all models. However, the coefficient for this variable is only significant at p<0.05 in models 1 and 3, those with the larger sample size. In Model 1, all else equal, for every $1000 increase in GDP per capita, the odds of initiating migration diplomacy decrease by a factor of approximately 1.01. The effect is slightly smaller in Model 3, but when exponentiated is approximately the same magnitude at a factor decrease of 1.01. The coefficients for *GDP per capita* are insignificant in models 2 and 4. In the smaller sample of states in these models there is no evidence of a relationship between GDP per capita and initiation of migration

The AUC ranges from 0.0 to 1.0; a model that classifies all observation correctly has an AUC of 1.0. The AUC can be thought of as the probability the model scores a random positive observation closer to 1.0 than a random negative observation.

diplomacy. This provides partial support for Hypothesis 3, that more powerful states are less likely to engage in migration diplomacy.

Inclusion of the *Anti-migrant opinion* variable narrows the sample size in Model 2 and Model 4 to EU Member States only (n=1059). This excludes observations for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, and Turkey. The coefficients for the *Anti-migrant opinion* variable are insignificant in both models. There is no evidence that anti-migrant domestic political pressure influences states' use of migration diplomacy and Hypothesis 4 is rejected.

Regarding my theoretical variables, the coefficient for *Target of MDA* is significant at $p<0.001$ and positive in all models. In the larger sample in Model 1, all else equal, if a state was the target of an MDA, the odds of the targeted state initiating migration diplomacy increase by a factor ranging from 8.19 on the low end (in Model 2) to 9.41 on the high end (in Model 3).[103] On the other hand, the *Schengen member* variable is insignificant in all models. There is no evidence that a state's participation in the Schengen Area affects the likelihood of initiating migration diplomacy.

Robustness Checks

I engaged in several types of robustness checks of my results from Table 4.4. I compared other common specifications of logistic regression models against my choice to use the Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) cubic splines. Two of the most common alternative logistic regression specifications are: (1) to use standard errors clustered by country but no explicit temporal controls; and (2) to utilize polynomial functions of time in lieu of splines, per Carter and Signorino (2010). The results of these models are in Table B.3 in Appendix B. The signs and significance of the coefficients for these

[103] I also run my models with a lagged version of *Target of MDA*. The coefficients for the lagged variable are smaller in magnitude, but remain positive and significant. My other findings remain unchanged.

models mirror those in my main models. In other words, my findings are robust to common alternative specifications for logistic regression models employing time-series cross-sectional data.[104]

Given the time-series cross-sectional nature of my data, I also ran a version of my models with country fixed effects. The inclusion of fixed effects eliminates between state variation from omitted variables by including dummy variables for each state in the logistic regression models. The results of Models 1-4 with fixed effects are in Table B.4 in Appendix B. I had to remove the *Schengen member* variable because it does not vary over time and was therefore collinear with the country dummy variables. After removing time-invariant heterogeneity between states, the Asylum seekers per capita$_{t-1}$ and Asylum seeker count variables are no longer significant. Interestingly, GDP per capita is now significant across all four models, but remains negative, supporting Hypothesis 3. Finally, the Anti-migrant opinion variable is positive and significant in Model 2 and Model 4, as I proposed in Hypothesis 4. Overall, the results of this model suggest that the variables measuring migration-related costs (current and anticipated) are capturing variation of some other factor across states during the European Migration Crisis. Once this factor (or factors) are accounted for, migration-related costs are no longer a significant factor in states' choices to engage in migration diplomacy. In addition, once this unknown source of variation is accounted for, state power and anti-migrant domestic political pressures play a greater role.

I also ran versions of my models excluding elements of migration diplomacy that are novel to my dependent variable. I run a version of my model with unilateral targeted actions excluded from my dependent variable, which reduces the number of state-months with MDAs from 371 to 273. I also ran the models with a version of the dependent variable with n-adic interactions excluded (again, the number of

[104]In Table B.3 I report only results from Model 1 and Model 2 due to space constraints, but the results for Model 3 and Model 4 also do not change.

state-months with MDAs is reduced to 273).[105] N-adic interactions may be driven by supranational or other international institutional processes. These meetings and interactions may be part of annual meeting programs, for example, so state interactions here are less driven by my four proposed mechanisms. The results of these specifications for Model 1 and Model 2 are in Table B.5 in Appendix B. Only Models 1 and 2 saw any changes when unilateral targeted or n-adic MDAs were excluded from my dependent variable.[106] The first of two changes in the results is that Asylum seekers per capita$_{t-1}$ is no longer significant in Model 2 when unilateral targeted MDAs are removed from my dependent variable. Model 2 is the sample limited to EU Member States by the *Anti-migrant opinion* variable, so this suggests that unilateral targeted actions by EU Member States, many of which involved border closures or openings, may be driving the effect I find for this variable in my main models. The second change is that *GDP per capita* is no longer significant in Model 1 when n-adic MDAs are removed from the dependent variable.

Finally, anticipating questions about the pronounced spike of both asylum seekers and MDAs in September 2015, I also ran a version of my models including a control for this month. The *September 2015 dummy* takes a value of "1" during the month of September 2015 and is coded "0" otherwise. Alongside migrant arrivals, this month witnessed EU negotiations on several components of the European Agenda for Migration, the relocation scheme in particular as discussed in Chapter 2. Unsurprisingly, the coefficient for this variable is positive and significant in the models, but the results from my main models in Table 4.4 otherwise do not change.

[105]This is a coincidental matching of the number of reduced state-month observations with "1"s on the dependent variable when unilateral targeted or n-adic MDAs are excluded. The distribution of the counts of MDAs shifts, but when converted to a binary variable, both have 273 state-month observations.

[106]The results from models 3 and 4 in my main results do not change at all as a result of excluding these MDAs, so I do not report them.

Discussion

In Chapter 3, I outlined four theoretical expectations with respect to state initiation of migration diplomacy. In this chapter, I find mixed support in my statistical analyses for these four hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 proposed that states that have incurred higher costs from migration crises are more likely to engage in migration diplomacy. The significant, positive coefficient for the lag of *Asylum seekers per capita* in Models 1 and 2 supports this hypothesis. This aligns with expectations from the literature on migration diplomacy. Money and Lockhart (2018) posit that shifts in the status quo costs of migration brought about by migration crises drive receiving states to initiate negotiations with sending states. Similarly, Tsourapas (2019) attributes a state's use of migration diplomacy to shifts in its geo-strategic salience brought about by influxes of migrants. Such an influx empowers states to engage in the capacity swamping threats described by Greenhill (2010). Migration crises can generate significant costs for states, and migration diplomacy provides an avenue for decreasing or offsetting these costs.

Hypothesis 2 proposed that states that anticipate higher costs from migration crises are also more likely to engage in migration diplomacy. The significant, positive coefficient for the *Asylum seeker count* variable in Models 3 and 4 supports this hypothesis. This aligns with an unfortunate trend in state behavior toward migrants more generally, which involves deterring or preventing new migrant arrivals (and associated requests for asylum).[107] Increasingly, states work with their neighbors and those farther afield to create administrative and physical barriers for migrants attempting to reach their territories (Longo, 2017; Fitzgerald, 2019). Within the EU this process is explicitly tied to the externalization of refugee policies. The Italians

[107]Spontaneous arrival asylum are those made by an individual when they reach the territory of a state. In contrast, many states also have refugee quotas that are filled via resettlement, often in coordination with the UNHCR. Migrant crises feature far more claims for spontaneous arrival asylum.

working with Libyan authorities to establish coast guard patrols and detention centers for migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean is one example.

Hypothesis 3, which proposes that more powerful states are less likely to engage in migration diplomacy, receives partial support. The coefficient for the *GDP per capita* variable is negative and significant only in Models 1 and 3. This suggests that power differences among states help explain variation in the use of migration diplomacy under certain conditions or missingness on my *Percent negative opinion* variable is eliminating critical variation. I believe the latter is certainly at play. As noted previously, non-EU Member States are removed from the sample used in Model 2 and as a result the range of the *GDP per capita* variable is also narrowed. Albania, Bosnia, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, and Turkey are removed from Model 2. These states range from those with the highest GDP per capita in the sample (Liechtenstein) to those with the lowest GDP per capita (Albania) and from states who engaged in migration diplomacy often (e.g., Turkey) and those who engaged in migration diplomacy sparingly (e.g., Switzerland). The loss of this variation produces similar distributions of GDP per capita for observations in which migration diplomacy action is taken and those where no action is taken. Table 4.3 reveals that the range of GDP per capita narrows for Model 2, particularly on the lower end.

Finally, Hypothesis 4 proposes that states with greater anti-migrant domestic pressure are more likely to engage in migration diplomacy. However, I find no support for this hypothesis in my models; the coefficient for *Anti-migrant opinion* is insignificant in Models 2 and 4. I suggested that leaders may utilize migration diplomacy when they feel anti-migrant public opinion grows either to ameliorate the costs of the crisis or to distract the public's attention from these costs. However, it appears that leaders are responsive to future direct costs in terms of the number of migrant arrivals rather than to the potential political costs of negative public opinion related to the crisis. It

may be the case that leaders are less sensitive to bi-annually measured public opinion at the national level, as I measure it here. Instead, they may be more receptive to public opinion (and thereby more likely to engage in migration diplomacy) during periods when the salience of migration is directly linked to political outcomes (i.e., elections). Also, some sub-sections of the population may have more influence than others. The Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, is a member of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany party (CDU), which is in an alliance with the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), a state in the Southeast of the country which was particularly hard hit by migration during the crisis period. Declining support for migrants from this area exerted significant political pressure on Angela Merkel, causing Germany to increase deportations of individuals not qualifying for asylum and to accuse its neighbor Austria of pushing migrants across its border (Barkin, 2015).

Limitations

My approach is not without limitations. My statistical results are robust to common specifications for logistic regression models employing time-series cross-sectional data (e.g., clustered standard errors and polynomial temporal controls), but not to the application of country fixed effects. In the fixed effects specification, the variables capturing incurred and anticipated costs of migration crises are no longer significant. Instead, my measures for state power and anti-migrant domestic political pressures are significant and aligned with expectations in Hypotheses 3 and 4. As I note above, this suggests that the two variables constructed based on new asylum applications were capturing some form of between state variation unaccounted for in the models. For example, I do not control for states' locations along primary migratory routes into Europe (see Chapter 2), which may be the states most likely to engage in migration diplomacy given their likelihood of receiving more migrants. By controlling for

migratory pressures, I believed that also controlling for states' location along routes would not be necessary.

However, as I have noted above, there are several sources of potential measurement error in using new asylum application counts. The most critical of these in this circumstance would be an under count of true migratory pressures due to the exclusion of individuals who do not apply for asylum (or are prevented from doing so by the state). Technically, asylum seekers are only a portion of the newly arriving migrant population during a crisis. Migrants may face obstacles to applying for asylum in a state or delay their applications intentionally. In this case, the monthly count of new asylum seekers may include individuals who have been present in the country for some time, while excluding a potentially large proportion of new arrivals. Therefore, this measure may not capture the true extent of pressure domestic migration management systems face in a given month. An alternative may be produced by parsing the literature produced by Frontex, the International Organization for Migration, or through non-governmental organizations operating on the ground in affected states to look for estimates of border crossings, which would include both asylum-seekers and other migrants. This data collection project is beyond the scope of this project but offers an avenue for future research. Another option would be to estimate the accumulated number of asylum-seekers based on the asylum seeker counts available through the UNHCR. Effort would need to be taken to establish a baseline from which monthly totals shift, though the same measurement issues with asylum application counts noted above would remain.

Another potential limitation is associated with my construction of the dependent variable. I include unilateral targeted, dyadic, directed-dyadic, and n-adic MDAs in my dependent variable in Models 1-4. However, unilateral targeted and n-adic MDAs may have distinct data generating processes from their dyadic counterparts, as noted above. In my robustness checks, in Model 1 the $Asylum\ seekers\ per\ capita_{t-1}$ variable

is no longer significant when unilateral targeted MDAs are removed. I note above that the vast majority of unilateral targeted MDAs involve border closures or restrictions. This suggests that the effect for the lagged count of new asylum applications in my main models is driven by unilateral targeted incidents at the borders. In other words, states are acting to close or restrict their borders in response to increases in asylum seekers. This makes intuitive sense, but also calls into question the diplomatic nature of these MDAs. They may simply be responses to migration pressure, rather than an attempt to signal preferences or improve a state's bargaining position relative to others. This relationship warrants further exploration, which may produce a more refined understanding of the role that unilateral targeted actions play in migration diplomacy.

Finally, the results of my analysis may be geographically limited. As noted above, the monthly data on new asylum applications is restricted to just 37 of the 51 states I use to construct my dataset. These 37 states include most of the EU and Schengen Area Member States as well as the Balkan states and Turkey. Eastern European, Middle Eastern, and North African states, none of which are EU or Schengen Member States, are excluded. Summary statistics on my dependent and independent variables, apart from the asylum application-based variables, for these states are in Table B.2 in Appendix B. The average for my dependent variable, *MDA dummy* for the excluded states is approximately 0.07, indicating that roughly seven percent of state-months in the excluded observations contain MDAs. This is more than two times lower than the rate of MDAs in the model sample, which is approximately 18 percent. Excluded states are also less likely to be targeted by MDAs in the excluded sample, with a rate of approximately 0.04 (versus 0.09 in the model sample). These excluded states are also much poorer on average than those included in my models. The average of *GDP per capita* in my model sample is approximately 34.75 (thousands of dollars), while the average for the excluded states is approximatley 7.02 (thousands of dollars).

The maximum of GDP per capita is also approximately 40.47 for the excluded states, while it soars to approximately 178.86 in my model sample.

While I do not have monthly data on asylum applications for the excluded states, annual data are available from the UNHCR. Figure B.4 in Appendix B reveals that while the distribution of the average annual number of asylum seekers for the excluded group is similar to that of the model sample, the number of asylum seekers in the excluded group is overall lower. Some of these asylum seeker numbers are dramatic undercounts, like those for Jordan, Lebanon, and Libya, but this again highlights limitations of the asylum seeker data available through the UNHCR. For Jordan and Lebanon, where I know the number of refugees to be quite large, only applications processed by UNHCR are included in the data, and the organization's scope of action is limited by state preferences. For Libya, the number of migrants transiting the state far surpasses the number of asylum applications filed. However, without systematic data collection on migrant arrivals, this data remains one of the few options for approximating migratory pressures during crises. In addition, my primary focus in this analysis was on understanding how states in Europe responded during the Migration Crisis; so, while biased, my sample largely includes states of interest.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I address my first research question: when do states employ migration diplomacy during the European Migration Crisis, 2014-2017? In Chapter 3 I developed four theoretical expectations, which I test using logistic regression analyses here. I find mixed support for my hypotheses, and results are somewhat sensitive to specification. Overall, states' decision to engage in migration diplomacy during the European Migration Crisis appears to be driven by the incurred and anticipated costs from migrant arrivals, and in some circumstances, weaker states are more likely to engage in migration diplomacy. In Chapter 5, I move to my second research question:

how do states employ migration diplomacy during the European Migration Crisis? In this chapter, my dependent variable was a simple binary outcome capturing whether states utilize any form of migration diplomacy; in the next chapter I use text analysis methods and a qualitative case study to explore states' use of coercive and cooperative variants of migration diplomacy during the crisis.

Chapter 5: Coercive and Cooperation Migration Diplomacy: An Empirical Critique and Case Study of the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal.

In the previous chapter I tested several hypotheses regarding the initiation of migration diplomacy. This is an important first step in understanding why states choose migration diplomacy as a component of their foreign policy during crises. However, the construction of my binary dependent variable required that information on the frequency with which states engaged in migration diplomacy and the type they opted for was lost. In this chapter, I explore in greater depth the type of migration diplomacy states engage in, whether cooperative or coercive, and how these different types of migration diplomacy were utilized by states over time during the crisis.

A key contribution of this dissertation is the first systematic collection of data on migration diplomacy actions taken by states. In defining my variables, I draw an important distinction between the process of migration diplomacy and the outcomes resulting from it. This distinction is not clear in the literature on migration diplomacy and results in conceptual fuzziness, as I discuss below. In the previous chapter, I explored the initiation of migration diplomacy using a binary dependent variable.

In this chapter, I bring the nuances of migration diplomacy back into focus, highlighting variation in coercion and cooperation described in Chapter 3. I begin by highlighting the measurement issues that come from equating migration diplomacy processes with outcomes and discuss how I worked to overcome this issue in my measurement of migration diplomacy. Next, I describe my operational definitions for coercive and cooperative migration diplomacy and provide summary statistics on their frequency of occurrence. I then use text analysis methods to explore the conceptual boundaries of cooperative and coercive migration diplomacy. Finally, I engage in a brief case study of Turkey's use of migration diplomacy in negotiations leading up

to the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016. This case is often characterized as an example of coercive migration diplomacy, but I demonstrate that both coercive and cooperative migration diplomacy actions (MDAs) are utilized by Turkey during this period. The conceptual and measurement issues I identify make cooperative MDAs harder to identify relative to coercive MDAs. I end by discussing the implications of this for research on migration diplomacy.

Migration Diplomacy: Actions vs Outcomes

An inconsistency exists in the current literature on migration diplomacy as to what constitutes an instance of migration diplomacy. Cases explored by scholars in this area range from single observations of coercion or cooperation occurring in relatively condensed periods of time to multi-year periods – even decades – of foreign policy by states. This inconsistency is driven by both conceptual and empirical issues. On the conceptual side, the definition of migration diplomacy provided by Tsourapas (2017) does not provide us with an obvious way of delineating a single act of migration diplomacy from another. This definition is meant to describe a general class of behavior, in which both state and non-state actors engage, for undefined lengths of time.

On the empirical side, this conceptual fuzziness leads to both outcomes and diplomatic gestures being described as instances of migration diplomacy. This is especially true when it comes to cooperative migration diplomacy, where the presence of an agreement dealing with migration is characterized as cooperative diplomacy but many of the actions taken by states in the negotiation of that agreement are not addressed, some of which may be more appropriately characterized as coercive. Similarly, the presence of coercive threats may lead some to characterize negotiations as coercive when cooperative methods may have been attempted previously. Baldwin (1971) highlights this issue in his discussion of negative and positive sanctions: "Today's reward may lay the groundwork for tomorrow's threat, and tomorrow's threat may

lay the groundwork for a promise on the day after tomorrow" (24). The EU-Turkey Agreement, negotiated from mid-2015 to early 2016, is characterized by Tsourapas (2017) as an instance of coercive migration diplomacy. He argues that the deal was ultimately secured by a coercive, capacity swamping threat from Turkey. Yet over the course of negotiations, one can observe multiple instances of migration diplomacy initiated by Turkey, both coercive and cooperative. I examine these dynamics in greater depth in the case study below.

To avoid these conceptual traps in my measure of migration diplomacy, I chose to constrain the time period under examination and focus on measuring behaviors rather than outcomes. That is, in lieu of looking for agreements around migration and identifying how they were produced, I attempt to cap crisis-related migration behaviors by states during the crisis period. It may be the case that states' actions are easily characterized as coercive or cooperative over the period, but to require such is to eliminate variation that may help us better understand the international relations of migration. In the case of the European Migration Crisis, negotiations surrounding the EU response to the crisis take place throughout the period. States take a variety actions with respect to the EU and each other in this process, engaging in both coercive and cooperative migration diplomacy.

By fixing the period of time under examination, I also limit the extent to which outcomes drive the identification of instances of MDAs, as these are relatively sparse over just the four year period. Similar to the study of economic sanctions, another foreign policy tool, if we focus only on instances of migration diplomacy associated with an easily identifiable outcomes, we risk mischaracterization of the phenomenon and coming to incorrect conclusions about its use.[108] If we hope to understand the true

[108]Drezner (2003) critiques the study of economic sanctions for its focus on measuring the imposition of sanctions rather than threats to impose sanctions (i.e., punishments rather than threats). He argues that the focus on imposition of sanctions led to the incorrect conclusion that economic sanctions are ineffective, and demonstrates that the threat of sanctions may be enough to change a target's behavior.

prevalence of migration diplomacy, this type of move will be required. In addition, I avoid equating migration diplomacy with outcomes by specifically operationalizing migration diplomacy as an action. Using the approach described in Chapter 4 and in Appendix A, I identified actions taken by states in response to the migration crisis 2014-2017, a subset of which I classify as MDAs. These actions include taking positions, bilateral meetings, multilateral negotiations, making demands, and delivering rewards and punishments. Agreements may result from these actions, but do not form the item of interest in my coding; the actions do.

Measuring Coercive and Cooperative Migration Diplomacy

To capture the presence of different types of migration diplomacy in my data, I constructed several variables. I used a series of four variables to measure whether states engaged in coercive of cooperative migration diplomacy based on the definitions of these concepts in existing literature. I also created a variable to capture coercive and cooperative behaviors that I observed but fell outside the bounds of these definitions. I discuss the four definition-based variables first. Recall that Tsourapas (2017, 2370-2371) defines coercive migration diplomacy as threats by states to alter migration flows (or the alteration of these flows) to or from a target state, unless the target state acquiesces to a demand, while cooperative migration diplomacy is the promise by an initiator to alter migrant flows to or from a target state as a reward for the target acquiescing to a demand. I characterize these definitions as containing four primary actions: threats, punishments, offers, and rewards. These variables were only coded for directed-dyadic MDAs, and MDAs could only be classified with one of the four codes or none (i.e., MDAs could only be a threat, punishment, offer, or reward rather than qualifying for multiple categories).[109]

On the coercive side, my *threat* variable captures instances of states issuing de-

[109]More information on these variables is available in Appendix A.

mands ("1") with implied costs of inaction for a target or quid-pro-quo threats ("2") with explicit costs to a target mentioned if concessions are not granted to the initiator. For example, the United Kingdom and France negotiated a new arrangement for shared management of border security at the Calais tunnel, but before it was finalized, France demanded that the United Kingdom provide more money toward border security (Samuel and Barrett, 2015). This constitutes a demand ("1") as there is no explicit quid-pro-quo component. Threats were the most common MDAs among this set of four variables. I identified 37 instances of a threat, 9 (24%) of which are demands and 28 (76%) of which have a quid-pro-quo structure. The *punish* variable captures instances of states punishing targets for non-compliance with demands and is a simple binary variable, with "1" indicating the presence of a punishment. Some forms of punishments are directed at groups of states, as when Austria stopped processing asylum applications on the eve of an EU summit of Interior Ministers, after previously issuing demands that other EU Member States take in more asylum asylum seekers (Hall, 2015). Others are directed at a single state, as when Serbia banned Croatian cargo traffic in response to Croatia closing its borders to migrants (Sobczyk, 2015). Punishments were rarer than threats; I coded just eight instances across the four year period.

On the cooperative side, the *offer* variable captures instances of states signalling a willingness to reward other states for changing their behavior around migration, while the *reward* variable is a state rewarding a target for altering its behavior. Both are simple binary variables, taking values of "1" when an offer or reward is present. I coded 17 instances of offers being made. Some offers were more generally cooperative – Turkey saying it is willing to work with the EU in response to the migration crisis (*Turkey Urges EU to Join Efforts to Solve Refugee Crisis*, 2015)– while others are more specific – Poland offers to take in refugees if the EU will seal its external borders (Wagstyl, 2015). Finally, I identified just two instances of states providing rewards in

my data. One was a full concession. Italy deployed two warships to assist the Libyan coast guard with preventing migrants embarking across the Mediterranean (Sanchez and McKenna, 2017). The other was a partial concession, as Greece encouraged migrants to move from camps at its borders with Macedonia after the latter demanded Greece forcibly remove the migrants (*Macedonia Reports No New Refugee Arrivals at Border with Greece*, 2016).

While coding state responses, I noticed that there were migration diplomacy actions that did not qualify for one of my four literature-based variables. These MDAs were not explicit threats, punishments, offers, or rewards, but reflected the more general coercive or cooperative *dispositions* of states.[110] Among these MDAs are instances of state officials meeting to discuss migration issues related to the crisis, which I argue are cooperative MDAs that do not necessarily result in explicit offers or rewards. Along the same lines, states praising each other, issuing calls for collective action in response to the migration crisis or conceding to calls for action are also considered generally cooperative. In this category examples include: Greece on several occasions calling for cooperative solutions at the EU level in response to the crisis; France working bilaterally to issue joint position statements and proposals for EU member cooperation on migration; and Italy conceding to normative pressure to recover migrant bodies and give them a formal burial after a shipwreck caused hundreds to drown (Willan, 2015).

On the coercive side, I observed state officials criticizing the moves of other states, refusing to participate in (or withdrawing participation from) burden-sharing mechanisms, or otherwise engaging in obstructionist tactics. Hungary's generally intransigent stance toward participating in burden-sharing arrangements or assisting its neighbors during the crisis (including *ad hominem* attacks on other leaders) resulted

[110]These behaviors also do not fall neatly into the positive-sum and zero-sum migration diplomacy types outlined by Adamson and Tsourapas (2019), who focuses on states' use of zero-sum and positive-sum bargaining strategies in migration diplomacy interactions.

in several MDAs in this category. Therefore, I created a variable that captured whether MDAs reflected a coercive ("-1"), cooperative ("1"), or neutral ("0") disposition, where the latter includes both MDAs that are a combination of coercive and cooperative behaviors or neither.[111] This variable was coded for a subset of monadic targeted, directed-dyadic, and n-adic MDAs (n=300).[112] I identify 230 MDAs with cooperative dispositions (77%), 21 MDAs with neutral dispositions (7%), and 449 with coercive dipsositions (16%).

While coding, I observed that coercive dispositions, threats, and punishments were in general easier to identify than their cooperative counterparts. I suspect that this is due to a combination of factors. First, there is likely an inherent imbalance between coercion and cooperation on the need for public attention. Whereas cooperation may be better facilitated outside the public eye, coercive threats may in fact be bolstered by public attention. Second, particularly in Europe, I suspect that the overarching institutional environment is one that defaults to cooperative endeavours prior to coercion. That is, cooperation is so commonplace that it may appear more like neutrality and be described in a more neutral fashion in reporting. To better understand the conceptual boundaries of coercive and cooperative migration diplomacy and how they function during the crisis, in the next section I employ text analysis methods on my measures of these varieties of migration diplomacy.

Distinguishing Coercive and Cooperative MDAs in Text

As a first pass at understanding what sorts of actions fall into coercive, cooperative, and neutral categories, I analyze the words used to describe incidents in these categories. To do so, I utilize the text analysis tools in the *quanteda* package in R (Benoit et al., 2018). First, I generated the word cloud in Figure 5.1. Word clouds

[111] More information on the "Disposition" variable can be found in Appendix A.

[112] The full number of MDAs was 695 out of a total of 937 state responses to migration, as described in Chapter 4.

provide high-level summaries of the most often used words in a text, with word size increasing for words used more frequently. Rather than use entire documents for this analysis as I did for the machine learning procedures in Chapter 4, I use only the fragments of text I extracted that contain an MDA. These fragments vary from a single sentence to several paragraphs; I captured as much detail as was provided in by the document's authors. I follow a cleaning process similar to that described in Chapter 4 to prepare the text for analysis, first removing frequently used words (i.e., stopwords), punctuation, and numbers, and then creating a document-term matrix containing counts of the number of times each word is used in each MDA fragment. The corpus of fragments contain 4,247 unique words (i.e., features).[113] I use the 200 words with the highest counts across the three categories of interest to create the word cloud, which is then grouped by category.[114]

The word cloud in Figure 5.1 reveals that of the 200 most frequently used words, most fall into the neutral category, as the yellow words on the left side of the screen form a larger part of the cloud. This category also contains the most frequent words from the fragments, including "refugees" and "values" (i.e., discussions about European values) as topics pertaining to the migrant crisis and Germany and Hungary as actors who frequently engaged in or were the targets of MDAs. Reflecting the composition of the "neutral" category as including MDAs whose coercive or cooperative nature could not be determined or included a mixture of both, the words "attacked" and "challenge" are about as common as "sympathy" and "share." A state that engaged in a mixture of cooperative and coercive MDAs over the course of the crisis, Serbia, is also present (also "serbian").

In Figure 5.1, the categories for coercive actions on the top-right in red and cooperative actions on the bottom-left in blue contain fewer of the top 200 words. However, the groups of words still reflect expected distinctions between the categories. With

[113]All words are converted to lowercase during this pre-processing phase as well.

[114]This threshold was chosen to include as many words as possible while maintaining readability.



Figure 5.1: Word cloud comparing top word (n=200) frequencies for cooperative, coercive, and neutral migration diplomacy actions.

respect to coercive MDAs, the words "closed," "threat[ened]," and "unacceptable" reflect circumstances where states are taking unilateral actions – closing borders, threatening other states, or signaling to others that their migration responses are not acceptable. States identified in coercive MDAs include Libya and Turkey, two of the most prominent states with a history of coercive migration diplomacy. Yet states like Austria and Hungary are also commonly mentioned, suggesting these states engaged in coercive MDAs and were the targets of such actions. Also, in contrast to the prominence of refugees in the neutral category, the most prominent migration-related term in the coercive bin is "migrants," followed by "asylum" and "seekers."[115] The prominence of these terms reflects a preoccupation in coercive MDAs with the dis-

[115]Hyphenation of the term "asylum-seekers" can cause issues in the pre-processing phase of text analysis. I specified that hyphenated characters be treated as a single feature in anticipation of this issue with asylum-seekers specifically. However, punctuation idiosyncrasies in the MDA text fragments led to a separation of the two words in the Coercive bin.

tribution of migrants, including asylum seekers, and their associated costs. This is also reflected in the prominence of the term "quotas" which many states engaged in coercive MDAs rejected due to distributional concerns.

With respect to cooperative MDAs, an apt prominent word is "cooperative" along with "meeting" and "support." The EU facilitated cooperative MDAs, based on the prominence of terms like "commission" and "ministers" alongside several synonyms for multilateral meetings (e.g., "summit"). States frequently occurring in the cooperative MDA bin are Italy and – surprisingly, given its prominence in the coercive MDA bin – Turkey. Turkey's migration diplomacy with respect to the migrant crisis is described as coercive for the period I examine (Tsourapas, 2017; Adamson and Tsourapas, 2019). However, this suggests that Turkey's behavior is more complex when migration diplomacy is measured at a more fine-grained level. Italy's prominence in the cooperative MDA bin also suggests that not all states under heavy pressure from new migrant arrivals opted for coercion. Finally, "migration" and "crisis" are migration-related terms frequently occurring in cooperative MDAs. This suggests that in cooperative MDAs the focus was on ways of addressing the migration crisis at a higher level, rather than myopic concerns about the distribution of migrants. If EU-driven multilateral meetings feature prominently in these MDAs, this is not surprising, given that the distribution of migrants was largely addressed in the context of establishing a relocation mechanism.

The word cloud analysis provides a high level summary of what cooperative, coercive, and neutral MDAs contain, but does not make direct comparisons between the text fragments falling within each category. Keyness analysis is a strategy for identifying statistically significant differences between a text of substantive interest and a reference category (Culpeper, 2009). I utilize the keyness measurement tools in *quanteda* to calculate keyness (via chi-squared statistic) for each of my three categories against the others and to plot those words that are statistically distinct from



Figure 5.2: Keyness plot comparing the most frequent words associated with coercive and cooperative migration diplomacy actions.

each comparison. Figure 5.2 contains a keyness plot comparing words from the text fragments for coercive MDAs against those from cooperative MDAs. Comparisons between these categories and the neutral category were less informative and are located in Appendix B.

The keyness plot in Figure 5.2 indicates several patterns that distinguish the coercive and cooperative dispositions of states. The first has to do with the types of actions that generally fall into each space. When states take a coercive disposition, they threaten, warn, and levy accusations at one another. In contrast, when states take a cooperative disposition, verbs reflect states coming "together" to meet, conference, discuss, and generally engage in "cooperation." This semantic division between coercive and cooperative dispositions is intuitive but has implications for the coding

of my literature-based definitions of coercive and cooperative MDAs. The first is that coercive threats are easier to identify than cooperative offers, and this was my experience of coding these variables. Threats, particularly quid-pro-quo threats, were fairly easy to identify, whereas offers were less obvious and often difficult to distinguish from simple position-taking. For example, states often publicly announced their stance on cooperating at the EU level to tackle the crisis – often simply stating they are willing or unwilling to work with the EU – but this rarely came in the quid-pro-quo type of form that identifying a formal offers requires (e.g., the offer by Poland noted above). This imbalance is also reflected in the fact that I identify more instances on my *threat* variable versus my *offer* variable, and I identify far more MDAs reflecting cooperative dispositions than coercive ones. It may be that cooperative offers are in reality less common, but it may also be that cooperative offers are more prominent in private settings (e.g., in the negotiations that take place behind closed doors in conferences), relative to coercive threats, which potentially benefit from public knowledge through enhanced credibility and the potential for political agitation (Greenhill, 2010; Fearon, 1995, 28-30).

The keyness plot in Figure 5.2 also demonstrates the ways in which coercive and cooperative dispositions feature in the case of the European Migration Crisis. Similar to the word cloud, migration issues that distinguish coercion from cooperation in the keyness plot are those having to do with borders. The prominence of border issues is noticeable in verbs like "closed," "suspended," and "crossed" as well as the "[D]ublin" regulations. On the cooperative disposition side, more general "migration" and "crisis" references emerge as significantly distinct from coercive MDAs, alongside words that invoke the centrality of EU processes for cooperative MDAs like "european," "defence," "council," and "tusk" (a reference to then-President of the European Council, Donald Tusk). This centrality of the EU in cooperative MDAs dovetails with my impressions while coding. While there were occasional instances

of bilateral cooperation that went beyond meetings to discuss the migration crisis, the focus of reporting was on EU driven collective action in response to the crisis. To the extent that outside options were explored by states, the EU was still successfully inserted itself in these processes (e.g., Balkan states, both EU Members and Non-Members, meeting to discuss the crisis), or states simply met outside of the EU auspices to decide on strategies for negotiations on EU responses to the crisis (e.g., the Visegrad Four – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – collectively opposing mandatory participation in migrant relocation and resettlement schemes).

The presence of certain actors here is also informative for distinguishing these two categories from one another, and points to potential issues with characterizing periods of foreign policy as coercive or cooperative based upon the presence of threats or offers alone. Hungary and its leaders are prominent in MDAs with coercive dispositions. The word "hungarian" most distinguishes coercive MDAs from coopertive MDAs, in fact, and "hungary" itself is also featured. Also, "orban" referes to the Prime Minister of Hungary, Victor Orbán, and "szijjarto" refers to Hungary's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Péter Szijjártó. Interestingly, Hungary is prominent in MDAs with a coercive disposition, but I record only one instance of Hungary utilizing a coercive *threat* on that variable. In contrast, Austria is not a distinguishing word for coercive MDAs but the name of it's Interior Minister, Johanna Mikl-Leitner, is second only to "hungarian." This suggests that MDAs featuring the Interior Minister are more likely to feature a coercive disposition than those featuring other leaders or just mentioning the state's name.[116] Austria is among the most frequent utilizers of migration diplomacy over the course of the crisis, but it employs a mixture of coercive threats and cooperative offers.

[116]Mikl-Leitner serves as the Governor of Lower Austria, a state in the Northeast part of the country bordering the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. Traiskirchen in Lower Austria is home to one of the largest refugee camps in the EU, and was the subject of controversy in Austria over the course of the crisis. As Austria attempted to expand capacity at the camp, human rights organizations were heavily critical of living conditions (Troianovski, 2015)

On the cooperative side, words distinguishing cooperative MDAs from coercive ones include "german" and "merkel," indicating a notable cooperative disposition for Germany. This makes sense given Germany's prominent role in European diplomacy, including its work to secure the EU-Turkey deal in 2015-2016. At the same time, similar to Austria, Germany also engages in a mixture of coercive threats and cooperative offers over the course of the crisis. Finally, Macedonia is an unexpected prominent distinguishing trait of cooperative MDAs. The small state was often at odds with its southern neighbor, Greece, over the course of the crisis, and I record no cooperative offers from Macedonia during the crisis (and just one coercive threat). Nevertheless, Macedonia lobbied states at EU summits and coordinated with Greece to push for collective solutions to the crisis. In sum, the coercive and cooperative *dispositions* of states captured in this variable provide critical context for understanding how states utilize migration diplomacy that is not fully captured by the presence of coercive threats or cooperative offers alone.

Revisiting the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal

The EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 is touted as a political victory for Turkey. Turkey was able to negotiate an additional three billion euros in assistance for supporting Syrian refugees as well as the acceleration of talks on Turkey's accession to the EU and visa liberalization for Turkish citizens wishing to travel to participating EU Member States. The deal also included a 1:1 readmission scheme. Under the scheme, migrants arriving after March 2016 in Greece from Turkey, who do not receive asylum, would be returned to Turkey. For each returned migrant, the EU would resettle one Syrian refugee from Turkey in a Member State. In exchange, Turkey agreed to step up border controls to migrants from continuing to Europe.[117] This statement

[117]EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, in European Council Press Release 144/16 of 18 March 2016. Available here: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/.

was the culmination of a process between Turkey and the EU begun in May 2015 to try to mitigate the effects of the crisis.

While the deal is itself an example of international cooperation, within the migration diplomacy literature it is classified as an instance of coercive migration diplomacy (Tsourapas, 2017). While I agree that the negotiation of this agreement and its subsequent implementation feature examples of Turkey engaging in coercive migration diplomacy, I hope to demonstrate here that the deal was achieved through a mixture of coercive and cooperative MDAs. I utilize information from my *disposition* variable to explore Turkey's general approach toward migration diplomacy, and information from my four variables capturing threats, punishments, offers, and rewards to demonstrate Turkey's mixture of migration diplomacy types. I argue that this points to the need for more work on conceptualizing and measuring migration diplomacy. In addition, this case allows me to explore the relationship between my four independent variables and states engaging in migration diplomacy in a specific case.

As previously discussed in Chapter 2, Turkey felt the effects of the Syrian migrant crisis far earlier than European states. From the beginning, Turkey declared that it would maintain an 'open borders' policy toward Syrians, and by the end of 2013, Turkey was already hosting roughly one million Syrian refugees. In January 2014, when my data collection begins, Turkey issued a call for the international community to provide more support (*Turkey Launches New Aid Campaign as Syrians Battling Cold*, 2014). As ISIS pushed further into Syria during the year, hundreds of thousands of Syrians arrived at Turkey's borders. Having already spent billions of dollars supporting Syrians for three years since the conflict began, by December 2014, Erdoğan called specifically for European states to open their borders to Syrians (*Turkish Leader "Appeals to Europe's Conscience" over Syrian Refugees Issue*, 2014). Through the first half of 2015, the number of Syrians arriving at Turkey's borders continued to rise, and by the second half of 2015 the number of migrants arriving on

European shores was beginning to get the attention of political leaders. In September 2015, I record my first instance of Turkey making a cooperative offer. Meeting with Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, the Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that Turkey was willing to work with Europe to address the migration crisis and that they should adopt a common strategy (*Turkey Urges EU to Join Efforts to Solve Refugee Crisis*, 2015). Discussions on the contents of cooperation between the EU and Turkey were initiated soon thereafter.

European and Turkish officials held a series of meetings over the next few months, negotiating the terms of a deal in response to the growing crisis. During this time period, Turkish officials continue to insist on the importance of an open door policy toward Syrians and to call for Europe to do more. In September 2015, Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister pledges that Turkey will not reopen its borders with Greece and Bulgaria, as well as promising to cover the costs of relocating refugees from Turkey to European states willing to take them (Peker, Abdulrahim, and Bouras, 2015). While the promise not to open borders is not a cooperative offer per se, it is a reassuring signal of the desire to continue purusing cooperation with the EU (if threats to close borders are considered examples of coercion). However, by October 2015 concerns were growing in Turkey that Russian airstrikes paired with a campaign to retake territory by pro-Assad forces would create new influx of Syrians hoping for protection (Squires, 2015). It is here that Turkey began to integrate coercive migration diplomacy into its repetoire. After the EU offers an initial readmission deal, Turkey threatens to walk away if visa liberalization for Turkish citizens is not part of the deal (Gultasli, 2015). EU leaders responded by offering a new deal that included visa liberalization, reopening EU accession talks, and more aid money to cover the costs of hosting Syrian refugees. In response, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan rejected the EU deal, threatening to walk away if the EU offered anything short of full membership (*Turkey Urges EU to Join Efforts to Solve Refugee Crisis*,

2015) and to flood Europe with refugees (Akkoc and Holehouse, 2016). Erdgoan's gambit was not well received, and still hoping for a deal, the countries proceeded with intense negotiations into November 2015.

By the end of November 2015, the EU and Turkey had negotiated the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. In the plan Turkey agreed to provide temporary protection to Syrians in need, increase readmissions of irregular migrants, increase its land and sea border monitoring and prevention of migrant crossings, including working with Greece and Bulgaria. In November and December 2015, Turkish officials met with their counterparts in Greece and Bulgaria, respectively, and reiterate their desire to maintain cooperation with respect to migration management (Christie-Miller, 2015; *Premier Says Turkey, Germany in Full Cooperation Against Terror*, 2016). For its part the EU agreed to provide three billion euros to support Turkey as a host to millions of Syrians, to assist Turkey's capacity for combating smuggling and returning migrants, as well as supporting Turkey in its attempts to meet the requirements for visa liberalization.[118]

Over the next few months, Turkish officials continued to insist that Turkey maintained an open door policy to Syrians, and to try to apply normative pressure to the international community for support (*Premier Says Turkey, Germany in Full Cooperation Against Terror*, 2016). The pro-Assad forces in Syria, supported by Russian operations, continued to gain ground and produce large displacements. The pressure at Turkey's Southern border continued to grow, as Turkey pressed for the establishment of "Safe Zone" inside of Syria where internally displaced Syrians could be cared for without entering Turkey's territory (*Turkish Deputy Premier Denies Refugees Massing Across Syrian Border*, 2016).[119] By February 2016, Erdoğan began criticizing the EU for not delivering the promised funds to support refugees in

[118]European Commission. (2015) EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan: Implementation Report.

[119]Turkey argues for the formal establishment of a safe zone throughout the 2014-2017 period, but none was formally established.

Turkey, including publicly recalling his threat to release large numbers of Syrian migrants on Europe (Akkoc and Holehouse, 2016). Russian airstrikes in Aleppo early that month drove tens of thousand of new displaced Syrians toward Turkey's border. Faced with a growing humanitarian crisis at the Syrian border, the EU alongside the UNHCR and various humanitarian organizations requested that Turkey open its borders (Soguel, 2016). The European Council decided to host a summit in early March with Turkey, in light of continued migratory pressures (Holehouse, 2016). The resulting EU-Turkey Statement from this summit was described at the beginning of this section, but importantly, Turkey managed to secure another three billion euros and the opening of further accession talks, while the EU secured the 1:1 readmission arrangement for Greece as pressure mounted due to border closures throughout the Balkans.[120]

Discussion

In this chapter, I provide an empirical and operational critique of the current literature on migration diplomacy. On the operational side, the literature does not provide a clear explanation for what constitutes an instance of migration diplomacy. In operationalizing coercive migration diplomacy, authors emphasize state actions, like issuing threats, whereas operational examples of cooperation are more identified based upon the presence of cooperative outcomes (e.g., an agreement between states). Accordingly, my lexical summary of cooperative and coercive MDAs reveals that coercion is more often described using actions while cooperation is more setting-based and refers to collections of states. This suggests that measuring cooperative migration diplomacy may require a broader definition (beyond a focus on offers) like the

[120]Interestingly, Cyprus threatened to bloc the EU-Turkey arrangement, demanding that Turkey recognize Cyprus in their decades-long territorial dispute in exchange for Cyprus removing its objection to components of Turkey's EU accession process (Pop and Peker, 2016). To overcome the deadlock, the EU secured the removal of France's veto to a different accession chapter (Gkildakis, 2016).

one I employ in measuring state dispositions.

On the empirical side, the inconsistent application of operational definitions leads to misapplied labels and a loss of the true nuance and extent of states use of migration diplomacy. The EU-Turkey Deal is a prime example. While the ultimate outcome of negotiations was a cooperative arrangement between the two actors, this episode is classified as coercive based on Erdoğan's use of capacity swamping threats against the EU. My case study of the EU-Turkey Deal also reveals that migration diplomacy is more nuanced than the literature acknowledges, as does the fact that Turkey is not a distinguishing feature of either cooperative or coercive MDAs based on text analysis of my *disposition* variable. My expanded conception of coercive and cooperative MDAs allowed me to capture more instances of these variants than expected in this and other examples. For instance, many actions took place between states along the Western Balkan route during the crisis that did not amount to noteworthy outcomes. In September 2015, Croatia accused Hungary of being in violation of international law when it refused to process asylum applications, and Hungary retorted that Croatia's Prime Minister was "pathetic" and the state "was unable to handle refugees for even a day" (Smith, 2015a). Without my expanded definition of coercion as captured in my *disposition* variable, this heated exchange between Croatia and Hungary would not have qualified as migration diplomacy. That same month, Croatia closed most of its border crossings with Serbia. The latter responded by banning Croatian cargo traffic. Croatia then refused entry to Serbian vehicles trying to cross onto its territory (Sobczyk, 2015). The dispute ended when the Presidents of these states met on the sidelines of a United Nations meeting in New York and agreed to meet to try to find a cooperative solution (*Cypriot, Danish Foreign Ministry Officials Discuss Bilateral Relations*, 2016). Again, without my *disposition* variable, the cooperative end of the interaction between Croatia and Serbia would not have been registered, and this episode would be classified as a coercive one based on punishment strategies these

states employ.

In implementation, my literature-based definitions for coercion and cooperation – the *threat*, *punish*, *offer*, and *reward* variables – also made coercive threat and cooperative offers difficult to distinguish. Based on definitions provided by Tsourapas (2017), coercive migration diplomacy involves threats to alter migration flows unless a target acquiesces to a demand, while cooperative migration diplomacy involves promises to alter flows as a reward for acquiescence. When Turkey threatens to walk away from the negotiating table if it does not receive full EU membership, it is unclear whether context or semantics should drive the classification of this example. In context, Turkey is negotiating a cooperative deal with the EU and has offered to keep migrants at bay in exchange for EU membership. However, as written this event is described as a threat to walk away and allow migration to continue unabated unless the EU concedes to Turkey's demand for membership. I chose the latter, but the reliability of semantics in coding these instances is questionable.

In another case, Germany proposed an EU tax on petrol to fund external border security operations and said it would join with other willing states if consensus among Member States cannot be found. At the same time, Germany threatened to close its borders if the EU's external borders are not made more secure (Huggler, 2016). In this instance, cooperative and coercive MDAs co-exist. If either action were taken divorced from the other, they would be clear instances of cooperation and coercion using the literature-based measures. However, this combination may constitute a third type of migration diplomacy strategy. I observed the pairing of coercive and cooperative MDAs often when coding my *disposition* variable as well. Future work should focus on identifying whether these co-occurrences ought to be considered distinct forms of migration diplomacy and whether the use of these combined MDAs differs from coercion or cooperation used individually.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I ask how states employ migration diplomacy during crises. I demonstrate that coercive and cooperative migration diplomacy, as currently defined and described in the literature, suffer from empirical and operational issues through the use of text analysis and a case study of the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal. Instances of coercive MDAs typically focus on state actions, while instances of cooperative MDAs focus more on settings and are more difficult to identify. Additionally, states may use both coercive and cooperative MDAs to achieve a diplomatic goal, sometimes simultaneously. This study shows that further conceptual development for the variants of migration diplomacy is fertile ground for researchers. In the next chapter, I conclude the dissertation by discussing the implications of my findings for scholars of migration diplomacy as well as opportunities for future research.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

In this dissertation I explore when and how states employ migration diplomacy, and its coercive and cooperative variants, during the Europe migration crisis, 2014-2017. The nascent literature on migration diplomacy has largely focused on defining the phenomenon conceptually and identifying historical instances both inside and outside of crises. I attempt to move this literature forward on two fronts. The first consists of theorizing about when states are likely to initiate migration diplomacy and using quantitative methods to find evidence for my propositions. The second front involves exploring how states utilize coercive and cooperative variants of migration diplomacy using a qualitative approach.

In doing so, I make several contributions. In Chapter 2, I outline the EU's multi-faceted proposal for responding to the Migration Crisis, the *European Agenda on Migration*, and describe how this plan was implemented over the course of the crisis. I challenge critiques of the EU's inability to generate consensus among Member States in response to the Crisis by demonstrating that the structure of supranational migration governance limited the Union's ability to determine states' responses to the crisis. Instead, the European environment was one in which states were largely free to determine their responses, including the use of migration diplomacy.

Next, in chapters 3 and 4, I attempt to move the literature on migration diplomacy beyond its current tautological conclusion, that states use migration diplomacy when they think it is useful. In Chapter 3, I formulate theoretical expectations about when states are likely to initiate migration diplomacy. I posit that states are sensitive to the political and resource costs that migration crises produce, and they use migration diplomacy to minimize or offset these costs.

I test my propositions in Chapter 4 by engaging in the first quantitative statistical analysis of state use of migration diplomacy. To do so, I use a novel dataset I created

of migration diplomacy actions (MDAs) during the European Migration Crisis, 2014-2017. The collection of this data involved the creation of machine learning pipeline to identify news articles relevant to the migration crisis, a novel application of this method. I find that states are more likely to engage in migration diplomacy when past and anticipated migrant arrivals increase. I also find that weaker states are more likely to engage in migration diplomacy, though this finding is limited to the sample including both EU Member States and non-Members.

I then turn my attention to the second part of my dissertation question – that is, *how* do state utilize migration diplomacy. In Chapter 5, I explore variation in the forms migration diplomacy takes. In doing so, I make two contributions. First, I engage in empirical and operational critiques of the current literature on migration diplomacy using text analysis methods. To demonstrate this point, I compare my novel measures of states' cooperative and coercive dispositions during the crisis to measures I derive from the literature using text analysis methods. Second, in a case study, I demonstrate that Turkey's behavior during negotiations with the EU on a deal to lessen migrant arrivals was in fact a mixture of cooperative and coercive migration diplomacy, rather than exclusively coercive, as it is often labeled in the literature.

Directions for future research

I identify several productive directions for future work based on my approach. These largely fall into two groups: (1) potential improvements for measures of concepts explored in this dissertation; and (2) research questions that build upon my work.

Improving measures for key concepts

The measures I use to operationalize my four theoretical expectations could be improved. To measure the costs of migration crises in terms of migrant arrivals, I use a lagged measure of new asylum applications filed per 1,000 people in a state's population. An improved version of this measure would account for not just the number of new applications each month, but the total stock of asylum seekers overall in each month. Increases or decreases in total asylum seeker stock would more accurately capture the level of stress domestic migration management systems are under during crises. However, calculating monthly asylum seeker stocks is more complex than it appears. Annual data on the number of asylum seekers in a state are available from the UNHCR. This stock could be used as a baseline from which to calculate deviations using the monthly data I employ here. However, the researcher would need to account not just for new asylum applications each month, but also the number of applications removed from the stock (e.g., those that were withdrawn, rejected, or accepted).

Ideally, measures of the incurred and anticipated costs of migration crises would measure to the total number of migrant arrivals. As I note in Chapter 4, however, such data is not yet available in dataset form. Organizations involved in monitoring border crossings, like Frontex, release counts of border crossings and produce estimates of expected migrant arrivals (e.g., quarterly). States also produce their own estimates, as I noted in Chapter 3. Of course, such an effort would be limited by the researcher's ability to access documents containing this information. So, collecting this information and systematizing it for use in statistical models is likely a difficult task, but it may offer more accurate numbers of migrant arrivals (i.e., incurred costs) and anticipated arrivals based on the information actually available to states (i.e., future costs).

To measure state power in my models, I use the common but rudimentary metric

of GDP per capita. I argue that this measure sufficiently captures differences between states in terms of their relative capacity. However, GDP per capita does not capture differences in the administrative capacity of states that I argue matters for states' decisions to employ migration diplomacy. A potentially better measure is offered by the Relative Political Capacity scale (Fisunoglu et al., 2011; Organski and Kugler, 1980), which is designed to measure how well governments are able to extract and redistribute resources in pursuit of domestic policy goals. However, while this measure offers a readily available alternative to GDP per capita, it still does not capture the specific capacity of domestic migration management systems. Future research would benefit from the development of measures to capture variation in state's capacity in this vein. Such a measure would need to account for the capacity of the many facets of migration management systems: control, status, and access systems. Control systems include border management and security. Status systems are those that are responsible with making decisions about who is allowed to enter the state and under what terms. Asylum status management systems in particular are important during migration crises. Finally, access systems are those that manage migrants' abilities to access labor markets, educational systems, political participation, welfare, etc. The costs of migration crises will vary based on the performance of systems across these areas.

I did not find evidence of a relationship between anti-migrant domestic political pressures and states' use of migration diplomacy. However, I observe anecdotal evidence to suggest that leaders may have used migration diplomacy to this effect during the European Migration Crisis. For example, Angela Merkel was reluctant to change her open door policy for Syrians in Germany, but after it became clear that domestic attitudes were shifting away from migrants, particularly in the home state of her party's coalition partner, Merkel pressed the EU to establish a bilateral readmission agreement with Afghanistan that would facilitate returns for failed asylum

seekers in Germany. President Erdoğan of Turkey also may have utilized migration diplomacy as a way of scoring a political win in light of a growing domestic political challenge, which culminated in the July 2016 attempted coup. Future work should focus on measuring the different forms of anti-migrant domestic political pressure that may matter. The examples from Germany and Turkey highlight that certain political constituencies may matter more than others.[121] My statistical results along with these examples square with Hopkins (2010) work, which demonstrates that national anti-migrant rhetoric may drive hostility toward migrants in areas experiencing rapid influxes of migrants. Identifying the salience of these areas for national leaders is tricky, particularly in a cross national data collection effort. However, levels of active hostility toward migrants could potentially be captured by data on violence against refugees. For example, the Political and Societal Violence By And Against Refugees (POSVAR) data measures instances of violence against refugees in states around the world, 1996-2015 (Gineste and Savun, 2019). These violent incidents may better capture how tolerant the public is toward migrants, and location information could potentially be leveraged to identify salient sub-national variation in hostility.

My findings in Chapter 5 demonstrate that measurement of the phenomenon of migration diplomacy will be a major challenge for researchers going forward. Cooperative migration diplomacy will be especially difficult to measure, as descriptions of cooperation in media coverage focus more on setting than actions. However, past work on measuring conflict and cooperation in event data may offer a way to improve upon my measures. The conflict and cooperation scale developed by Goldstein (1992) or the tone designations applied to events by the GDELT system may serve as useful guides (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013). Regardless, I recommend that researchers adopt a strategy similar to the one I employ in this dissertation, which focuses on

[121] This is distinct from work on migration policy-making that emphasizes different modes of politics (see Freeman (1995). Instead, this observation aligns more closely with the notion that anti-migrant sentiment among the winning coalition – the group that matters for a leader staying in power (see Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2005)) – drives the choice to engage in migration diplomacy.

state actions as instances of migration diplomacy rather than the possible outcomes of diplomacy.

Research questions for future work

There are a few options for future work to expand upon the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4. The first is to explore the potential for interaction effects among the independent variables. For example, the costs of migration crises, measured in the number of migrant arrivals, are likely to have differential effects on states based upon how powerful states are. In Chapter 3, I note that even powerful states likely have a threshold for migrant arrivals after which they are more likely to pursue migration diplomacy. In addition, existing levels of anti-migrant domestic political pressures may interact with the number of new migrant arrivals to produce pressure on leaders (as I discuss above). The inclusion of interaction effects would be a relatively simple modification for future work.

Also, the results of the robustness check of my statistical models using country fixed effects indicate there are underlying sources of between-state heterogeneity that have yet to be identified. An easy extension of my work in Chapter 4 would be to account for EU institutional effects beyond simple membership. As I note in Chapter 2, the Dublin Regulations create unequal burdens for European states when it comes to migrant arrivals. States' locations with respect to primary migratory flows may be a key factor in their decision to utilize migration diplomacy, with states in the southern and southeastern parts of the European continent more likely to both receive migrants and therefore to engage in migration diplomacy.

A natural extension of this research is to explore how successful states' MDAs are on several fronts. In my data, states often engage in unilateral targeted position-taking, announcing their interest in cooperating around migration or their preferred policy outcomes, as well as unilateral targeted actions like restricting border crossings.

However, these gestures do not always receive responses. Therefore, one manner in which migration diplomacy may be successful in is producing some kind of response from other states. In Chapter 5, I noted that there are roughly 200 episodes of migration diplomacy in my data, which are composed of multiple MDAs by states around the same migration issue during a period time. These episodes could be examined through process-tracing methods to understand how states initiate and respond to migration diplomacy. Variables could also be created to capture which migration diplomacy gestures are reciprocated, and methods like duration analysis could be used to examine the factors that matter for reciprocation.

Additionally, the susceptibility of target states to influence through migration diplomacy presents an interesting avenue for future research. For example, Austria may find a friendlier target for migration diplomacy in Italy than Hungary when it comes to decreasing incoming migratory flows, given the latter's staunch anti-migrant stance. In Chapter 3, I discuss the mechanisms of coercive migration diplomacy outlined by Greenhill (2010), capacity swamping and political agitation. Greenhill argues that democratic states are more vulnerable to agitation because they cannot satisfy both anti- and pro-migrant interests simultaneously. I believe this paints an overly simplistic picture of migration management in developed democracies. States have at their disposal a variety of mechanisms for acting on migration that could be considered 'compromises' between anti- and pro-migrant interests. For example, temporary protected statuses are available for humanitarian protection when refugee status or more permanent settlement is contested. Also, the labyrinthine system of processing applications for immigration or humanitarian protection provides states with plausible ability to claim they will be stricter on migration, assuaging anti-migrant groups, while individuals targeted by pro-migrant groups continue to be processed. Particularly in the case of issue linkage, a state's ability to engage in migration diplomacy may be facilitated or limited by the availability of ways to leverage other issues in its

dealings with a target. The carrot of Schengen or EU membership left some states in the Balkans more open to negotiating with EU members hoping to decrease migrant arrivals from the Balkan routes. Future research should be attentive to the potential for more accurate soures of data and the underlying propensity for some states to prefer interacting with others. An exploration of these and other strategies employed by target states would contribute to our understanding of when migration diplomacy is more likely to be effective, as well as the conditions that make states more interested in cooperation with respect to migration.[122]

Other outcomes of MDAs that warrant further exploration include when states are successful in achieving their goal via migration diplomacy, and whether issue linkage attempts at migration diplomacy more successful than those those without a quid-pro-quo component. In addition, an important question is when MDAs result in better or worse outcomes for migrants. The use of migration diplomacy is not inherently good or bad for migrants, but its use can have negative results. In Chapter 4, my results suggest that states opt for migration diplomacy in response to anticipated future costs brought on by continued migrant arrivals. This finding may be specific to the context of a migration crisis where the rapid pace of arrivals means costs can accumulate quickly and have spillover effects. At the same time, this finding squares with the more general trend in migration governance of states working to deter and prevent migrants from reaching their territory (Longo, 2017; Fitzgerald, 2019). For the EU, this process of externalization – developing mechanisms of extraterritorial control of migration – is an ongoing project, tied to the development of the Schengen Area (Lavenex, 2006). Migration diplomacy plays a key role in driving forward this process of externalization. Future research should explore instances when migration diplomacy was leveraged in the service of improved outcomes for migrants.

Future work should also attempt to identify the factors associated with uses of

[122]While cooperative outcomes do not guarantee the protection of migrant rights, they are likely to provide a better foundation for such protection.

cooperative and coercive migration diplomacy, and work to improve our measures of these actions as noted above. In this project, I do not theorize about why states opt for coercion or cooperation, but such research would benefit from the migration diplomacy literature's primary focus on these variants, as well as a rich literature from international relations on the role of coercion and cooperation in diplomatic strategy. The focus of the migration diplomacy literature in terms of theory development has also largely been on coercive strategies. We know relatively little about the antecedents for cooperation. Improved measures of the variants of migration diplomacy, as I discuss above, will help drive this vein or research forward.

Future research could draw from this project to examine migration diplomacy in different contexts. The migration diplomacy framework I develop in this dissertation could easily travel to other geographies or be used to examine past crises in Europe. Over the last decade, global displacement totals rose steadily to over 82.4 million in 2020.[123] The scope of displacement is also expanding, with states increasingly looking to develop regional arrangements to get migration under control. States in the Asia-Pacific and Central and South American regions have faced high migration pressures and looked to their neighbors to produce solutions. These cases are ripe for an examination of migration diplomacy and for a comparison to the European experience. Also, outside of the crisis context, states' domestic migration management systems are designed to handle typical levels of migration. A natural next step for this research would be to how migration diplomacy functions outside of crisis contexts.

Finally, I observed two trends while collecting data that are fertile ground for future research. The first was different state leaders employing different dispositions toward migration diplomacy, sometimes in the same month. Turkey's President Erdoğan took a more coercive disposition toward migration diplomacy, while Foreign Minister Cavasoglu was more cooperative in their interactions with European offi-

[123]UNHCR. 2020. *Global Trends in Forced Displacement 2020.* Accessed here: https://www.unhcr.org/flagship-reports/globaltrends/.

cials. German Chancellor Merkel's approach to migrants was much more open and pro-protection than that of her Minister of the Interior, Thomas de Mazière, when engaging in migration diplomacy. Finally, in chapter 5 I find that within Austria a particular actor, Interior Minister, Johanna Mikl-Leitner, is featured prominently in coercive MDAs. This is in contrast to Sebastian Kurz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Austria, who was also very active in migration diplomacy during this period but took a more moderate approach. It is unclear whether these inconsistencies reflect conflicts among state leaders or reflect a larger migration diplomacy strategy.

The second trend is the role that non-state actors play in migration diplomacy. The EU itself is an active participant in migration diplomacy, both with Member States and non-Members in the surrounding regions. The different roles that EU institutions play in migration diplomacy, and how this relates to Member States own migration diplomacy, is an especially interesting question. For example, Germany plays an active role in the EU's migration diplomacy, but it is unclear how its own interests are balanced against the Unions in these activities. In addition, sub-national actors are sometimes very active in migration diplomacy. The Mayor of Calais, France, Natacha Bouchart, was involved in negotiations on border security and how to handle migrants attempting to cross to the United Kingdom through the channel tunnel, even employing coercive migration diplomacy (Barrett, 2014). The Premier of the Bavaria in Germany invited Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban to visit and discuss the Migration Crisis (Bender, 2015). In Spain, the governments of both Barcelona and Madrid pressured the national government to commit to accepting almost 15,000 more migrants in the EU relocation scheme (Kowsmann, 2015). Sub-national actors may have an important role in states choice to employ migration diplomacy as well as the form this diplomacy takes.

Conclusion

In the quote at the beginning of this dissertation, Donald Tusk identifies coercive migration diplomacy at work between Europe and its neighbors, and he claims that this 'weapon' is growing in popularity. While I do not empirically test for the proliferation of migration diplomacy, I demonstrate that the use of migration diplomacy is likely more frequent than the current literature surmises, especially during migration crises. With global displacement rising, it is likely that we will see more instances of states challenged by large scale migratory movements and more 'crises.' We do not know enough about how migration diplomacy operates to draw general conclusions about the normative implications of its use. As a tool of diplomacy, it can be used to facilitate the negotiation of better protection outcomes for migrants, or for self-interested states to skirt their international obligations. The inclusion of migration diplomacy in states diplomatic repertoires warrants further attention from scholars of international relations, in hopes that we can discover more about its use and to promote more compassionate ends.

Appendix A: States Responses to Migration Codebook

In this section, I describe the codes used to capture key information about State Responses to Migration (SRMs) in the midst of the European migrant crisis and the adjoining years. My dependent variables capturing incidences of migration diplomacy are derived from the data set on SRMs described herein.

SRMs are first identified using the criteria described below. Once identified, information about the level and actors involved in SRMs is recorded using the codes in Table 4.5. SRMs are classified based on their level of analysis, using the binary indicators in the *monadic*, *dyadic*, and *n-adic* variables. All SRMs will receive one of these three codes. The state(s) or IGOs involved in the SRM are captured in the *Actor* column, which records the names of states or organizations. The EU flag is used to indicated an EU-affiliated actor is recorded, but given the diversity of institutions a grouping variable is needed to summarize overall EU interactions while preserving which institutions were actors for more fine-grained analysis. The *subnational* variable indicates the presence of significant subnational influence or participation in a national SRM. This can come in several forms, as described in the table below, and can be present in both monadic and dyadic interactions. While this variable can not capture the nuances of subnational processes in SRMs, this will provide a broad overview of the forms they take.

State Responses to Migration

The larger phenomena of interest for this project are what I term *State Responses to Migration* (SRMs), the range of actions and positions states take in response to international migration or the migration responses of other states. Actions include shifts in migration policy and migration management practices and may or may not be accompanied by formal rule changes, while positions are the rhetorical politics of

migration by which states declare their stances on migration or other state SRMs (e.g., signaling their willingness or unwillingness to cooperate in response to migration). The concept of SRM groups together behavior that includes both the politics of migration and migration policies and practices of states, not just actions but the disposition of states toward migration.

SRMs span both domestic and foreign policy realms and can take place at all levels of analysis – subnational, national, international, supranational – and as such can be monadic, dyadic, or n-adic (with three or more states involved). Accordingly, SRMs include a wide variety of actions and positions. In the context of the European migrant crisis this range includes, for example, domestic decisions about where to construct migrant housing to EU Member States positions on establishing a temporary or permanent refugee resettlement program at the supranational level. During crises much of the focus is on migratory flows and management of new arrivals; however, even these two buckets involve a complex array of migration policies and tools, which vary across and within states over time, as outlined in the following sections.

Who counts as the State?

Though migration responses can come from various levels and players within government, my focus is primarily on the behavior of states at the national and international levels. Therefore, I consider SRMs to result from the actions or positions taken by individuals serving in high-ranking government positions. Most often these individuals serve in the executive branch of a state such as presidents, prime ministers, foreign or interior secretaries, their spokespersons, and those with appointments supervising migration or asylum within a state's administration. National legislative and judicial responses to migration also fall within the bounds of SRMs, though these will be relatively rare.[124] The goal is to capture the actions and positions taken by politicians

[124]Judicial and legislative action on migration is more likely to take place at a slower rate than executive and administration responses to migration. Particularly during crises, the slower nature

and appointees with the ability to impact SRMs at the national and international level. This means occasionally capturing subnational SRMs that have national or international impacts, such as the Mayor of Calais demanding changes to security operations at the Channel Tunnel between France and the United Kingdom, as well as SRMs from other international actors beyond states.

The subnational level presents two types of SRMs that I want to capture. The first are SRMs at the subnational level with the potential for national or international impacts, as noted above. Migration through or into states is not uniform,though it is measured at the national level and often modeled as such. Migratory routes will pressure some subnational areas more than others, like Calais in France, Lampedusa in Italy, Bavaria in Germany, and the Aegean Islands of Greece like Kos. Politicians in these subnational areas can impact national SRMs and even engage in international politics around migration. The second subnational SRM type of interests involves migration practice, the implementation of policies on a daily basis. Migration practice is carried out by domestic administrative personnel and in some cases police and other security forces, perhaps border specific units. Examples of migration practice include border crossing procedures, screening procedures and data collection, applications for asylum, and steering migrants to appropriate housing or other service points. Examples of international and supranational migration practice are also readily found. International migration practice includes cooperation among police forces to break up human trafficking rings. Supranational migration practice is featured in the actions Frontex, the EU's border guard force, takes to intercept migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean. My coding scheme is designed to capture incidents of migration practice that have the potential to impact large numbers of migrants and to allow me to distinguish the level of analysis at which migration practice is taking place, given

of these procedures cannot keep pace with the changing landscape of migration on the ground. Nevertheless, these branches can play a crucial role in constraining the range of responses available to the executive. In authoritarian systems, the focus is more so on the executive and does not complicate my coding.

that my focus is largely at the national or state level.

In addition, states may also choose to work through or with international governmental organizations (IGOs) or supranational organizations like the EU in response to migration. Particularly in a crisis, these organizations provide channels for distribution of information and reduce transactions costs for producing coordinated responses. The extent to which these organizations are able to independently influence SRMs is an open question. Actors like the UNHCR can offer states a variety of supports during migration crises, but are nonetheless beholden to states in order to operate on the ground and because its missions are voluntarily funded. I include IGO actions and positions in my data collection efforts to understand more of the role that these organizations play, if any, in determing SRMs.

What counts as a response to migration?

SRMs include both actions and positions taken by states in response to actual migration or anticipated shifts in migration caused by the SRMs of other states. At a high level, this means I look for three things. First, I look for states taking action by creating or updating policies related to migration. Some policies are easy to alter, requiring a tweak to regulations that the executive can directly enact, while others require legislation to shift. Second, I look for states taking action by changing their migration practices. As described above, these are measures taken to implement migration policy and involve the practices migration administrators, police or security forces, and their subordinates operating directly with migrants.[125] Finally, I look for statements made by states about their preferences with respect to migration. These preferences can be in relation to domestic migration concerns or reflect international

[125]It is reasonable to wonder about the extent to which principal-agent dynamics determine the extent to which practice follows policy or even the preferences of the national government. Accordingly, I also record instances of the state monitoring and enforcing migration administrators and their subordinates. This information is critical for understanding how SRMs are produced by the state and may provide the opportunity for examining principal-agent dynamics across states and over time, though not systematically.

migration concerns regarding other states' responses to migration.

The identification of responses is determined in part by what states are responding to. In the case of migration, there are both general and specific concerns that states reference in their actions and positions. General concerns are related to migration as an issue-area. These include concerns about global trends in displacement and migration, impacts of migration on their state or region, shifts in migration flows, and the potential for new migration routes. SRMs also include general positions with respect to global, local, and national migration governance - that is, who should have the power to govern migration and in what circumstances. For example, the United Kingdom may signal a desire to not have European control of asylum governance. Specific concerns move toward immediate political and practical challenges associated with migration governance. To continue with the United Kingdom example, more specific migration concerns revolve around preventing migrants from crossing the English Channel via the Eurotunnel that stretches from Calais, France to Kent in the United Kingdom. These positions, policies, and practices coexist and constitute the United Kingdom's approach to migration at a given point in time, though within this approach their are separate SRMs.

Table 4.5: SRM Level and Actor Codes

Variable	Description	Example
Monadic	A single state making unilateral changes to their domestic or foreign migration policies, practices, or positions without the input of another state.	Government passing new asylum laws, building border fences (or sections of fence in certain areas), declaring its position on an international issue or agreement.
Dyadic	Two states creating or reinforcing existing joint policies, practices, or positions; two states coming into conflict over their preferred or actual SRMs; or a state otherwise taking action explicitly directed at another state.	French and Italian foreign ministers jointly sending letters to EU to request policy change, Austrian FM offering cooperate with Macedonia on managing migration, etc.
N-adic	Migration response by three or more states or the EU including (a) creating, reinforcing, or updating multilateral policies, practices, or positions; implementation may be direct to one state, a subset of states, or implemented similarly across all states; or the migration behaviors of states are in conflict.	Groups of three or more states meeting to discuss their responses to the crisis, options for cooperation, etc. and meetings with multiple states and IGOs (e.g., UNCHR, EU); a pair of states taking a position with respect to a third state's handling of the crisis.
Actor(s)	The actor or actor(s) engaged in a migration response, including international organizations.	Country name(s), international organization names (e.g., EU, UNHCR, etc.).
EU_actor	Takes a value of "1" if SRMs are responses by or targeted at the EU (in general) or a specific institution within the EU.	Migration responses exhibited by European Council, European Parliament, European Commission, European Court of Justice, Directorate General for Home Affairs, etc.
EU_venue	Indicates whether an SRM takes place within the architecture of the EU. Takes a value of "1" if the EU serves as a venue for SRMs or not. The EU may be an actor without being a venue and vice versa.	Migration responses exhibited by European Council, European Parliament, European Commission, European Court of Justice, Directorate General for Home Affairs, etc.
Subnational	Takes a value of "1" if the primary political actor in an SRM is affiliated with a subnational territorial unit, rather than the national government or national institutions or a monadic or dyadic SRM is implemented only within a subnational territorial unit of the state.	The mayor of Calais, France engaged in diplomatic interactions with migration offiicials from the United Kingdom; Turkey opens or closes specific border points.
Targeted	Indicator of migration behavior that is directed at another actor, whether position, practice, or policy; may be monadic, dyadic (directed), or n-adic (two states taking a position via another or an IGO; groups of three or more states engaged in a SRM directed toward another state or organiation, etc.); SRMs may be both subnational and targeted. Targeting must be explicit - there is no intuiting of targets.	**Monadic:** unilateral aid delivery to migrants in another state; construction of border walls between a state and a particular neighboring state, states purchasing advertising or media campaigns in another state to deter migrants from entering; a state declaring another "safe" for migrants. **Dyadic:** A state criticizing or supporting, offering rewards or threatening punishment, or actually providing rewards or meeting out punishments to another state. **N-adic:** Western Balkan states agree not to participate in a relocation scheme unless the EU provides more financial support.

The *targeted* variable is used to indicate when SRMs are directed at another state at any level. For the monadic level, targeting involves the creation of policy that impacts another state without its involvement. For example, in January 2014 Turkey announced an aid campaign for Syrians still inside Syria, who it views as potential refugee (thus qualifying this as an SRM). The consent of the Syrian government is not sought. Additional examples that occur more often are the unilateral construction of border walls along selected sections of a state's border (i.e., targeted at a specific neighbor's migratory outflows) and advertising campaigns by one state (e.g., Hungary) to deter migrants from crossing its borders (e.g., Serbia). These SRMs and others like it involve unilateral action and like in this instance where power or capability imbalances exist, unilateral action by the more powerful state on the territory or at the border with a weaker state is possible. At the dyadic level, targeting is directed-dyadic, wherein states take actions or positions relative to another state. At the n-adic level, directed SRMs take on a variety of actions and positions as well as combinations of states. My coding scheme is designed to capture snapshots of this complexity. Also, targeting must be explicit, meaning that the actor(s) involved in an SRM must name the other actor at whom their SRM is directed (whether policy, practice, or position). An indicator is used to flag the presence of a targeted SRM and another variable captures who the target is.

The next set of variables capture the specific focus of SRMs in terms of fields of migration practice and policy. In general, these variables divide into four sub-sets as seen in Table 4.6. The *control* variables are concerned with SRMs regarding who enters and remains within a territorial unit as well as where individuals are allowed to be within that territorial unit. Primary areas of interest are border security, filtering, detention, and removal policies, practices and positions. The *status* variables are concerned with labels that migrants may receive within the territorial unit or outside the territorial unit that permit them entry, which may be permanent or temporary

and based upon individual or group characteristics. These include protected status, resettlement, and relocation of migrants. Next, *access* variables are concerned with the rights and resources available to migrants within the territorial unit. These resources are often based upon the status that migrants receive, and both status and access are impacted by the control policies and practices states pursue.

Table 4.6: SRM Migration Issue Codes

Variable	Description	Example
General	Migration responses that reference migration as a general phenomenon, including migratory flows, migrants as agents or victims, or general references to "migration" or "refugee" crises. References to migration law or refugee law at domestic, supranational, or international levels also receives a "1" code.	Italy calling for action to be taken in Libya in light of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean; calls by states for EU-level responses to the migration crisis; Bulgarian leaders urging calm as the "migrant stream" likely will not reach the country.
Border	Policies, practices, and positions related to demarcation of the border, border enforcement and/or security	Physical barriers (fences, razorwire and other barricades, walls, etc.), police or troops stationed at the border, interdiction/interception or other moves to block migrants entry to territory, surveillance of border zones (e.g., cameras, drones, patrols, etc.).
Filter	Identifying and sorting migrants as admissible and inadmissible at ports of entry	Border guards, checkpoints, stations and other physical filtering locations; individual identification and active surveillance including documentation requirements and taking/screening of fingerprints or other biometric data, and other identifying information; passive surveillance measures to record border crossings or identify migrants (e.g., facial recognition).
Detention	Use of detention centers, forced encampment or other measures to contain and limit the movement of migrants within the territorial unit.	Police raids of migrant camps and arrests of migrants, rules limiting migrant movement within or outside of camps (e.g., curfews, documentation requirements).
Removal	Measures to remove migrants from a state's territory.	Formal deportation and other legal removal procedures (e.g., repatriation); informal procedures including push-backs at the border and expulsions from the territory; forced or voluntary readmission procedures established between territorial units.
Status	Creation or use of formal status to provide protection to migrants OR refusal to provide status/exclusion of certain groups from status provision.	Refugee, humanitarian, temporary, prima facie statuses, designation of a sending or transit state as "safe".
Resettle	Creation or participation in resettlement program (or resfusal to do so) – the process of bringing migrants with refugee or other humanitarian statuses to a territorial unit for protection from a state outside the territorial unit.	The EU-Turkey agreement contains provisions for resettling Syrian refugees from Turkey (a non-EU state) to an EU Member State.
Relocate	Creation or participation in relocation program (or refusal to do so) – the process of moving/redistributing migrants with refugee or other humanitarian statuses within a territorial unit.	Hungary refuses to participate in the EU relocation agreement; the EU brings infringement procedures against Hungary for refusing to participate; Spain volunteers more than 20,000 relocation slots for refugees from Greece and Italy.

Access	Providing or restricting access to domestic institutions and services.	Opening or restricting migrant access to banking, childcare, education, employment, health care, welfare, etc.
Integration	Emphasis on the incorporation of migrants into the nation in the long-term through measures designed to enhance social and political assimilation (not necessarily cultural).	Receiving state culture and language training, social support systems for migrants, pathways to citizenship or alternative permanent statuses, representation in government, voting etc.
Aid	Financial and other resource transfers to support migrants within or outside the territorial units, including support for IGO or NGO interventions for migrants.	EU providing aid package to Turkey for the support of Syrian refugees on its territory; Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey calling for more international aid to support Syrian refugees; Greece taking action to align its migrant reception conditions with those required for EU aid dispersal.
Other	Category to capture SRMs that do not fall into other bins.	Examples will be available after coding.
Valence	Three point scale designed to capture the impact of SRMs on the human rights of migrants and/or their protection outcomes (i.e., whether migrants receive humane treatment and protection from the cause of their flight) or their ability to exercise their right to free movement. Migrant human rights include freedom of movement, freedom from discrimination and violence, access to asylum, access to domestic institutions and services, etc.: "1" indicates positive protection outcomes are expected, meaning that the human rights of migrants are prioritized over other considerations; "0" indicates a neutral impact on protection outcomes, whether because no change is expected or because a combination of negative and positive outcomes is expected; "-1" indicates negative protection outcomes are expected, meaning that migrants' rights are likely to be violated resulting in negative protection outcomes.	Positive protection outcomes include opening of borders, provision of asylum or complementary statuses, calling for expanded protection or good behavior toward migrants by neighboring states. Neutral protection outcomes include calls for burden-sharing among states or adherence to Dublin procedures, establishing "buffer zones" in Syria to aid migrants but also prevent border crossings, participation in Frontex's Mediterranean operations wherein migrants are rescued when in need but also prevented from reaching European shores, etc. Negative protection outcomes include border closures, restricting access to asylum and not providing alternative status, restricting access to domestic institutions and services, refusing to participate in international programs designed to aid migrants, shaming neighbors for good protection outcomes, etc.
Shift	Binary indicator capturing whether an SRM, whether policy, practice, or position, is a substantial change from the previous approach of the state toward migrants ("1" substantial change, "0" no change). The size of a shift is evaluated qualitatively based on available contextual information.	Militarization of border zones; safe third country designations resulting in large scale asylum application rejections and/or deportations; closure of popular border crossings with potential for negative economic impacts; shift in tone of positions from welcoming to menacing; stopping the provision of benefit checks to migrants while they await status decisions or deportation.

Finally, the last set of variables in the fields of migration group capture other traits of SRMs that are important to understand for observing patterns of responses by states before, during, and after the crisis. First, the *general* variable captures SRMs that do not target specific fields of migration policy and practice. Instead, these positions (more often than policy or practice) reflect states' general positions toward migration as an issue-area and migratory flows or migrants. Additionally, general SRMs include state's preferences for venues of collective action in response to the crisis (e.g., calls for a collective EU response). Second, the*Other* variable is available to capture any SRMs not adequately described by previous categories. The final two variables capture the sentiment of the position, policy, or practice of a state toward migrants. The *valence* variable captures whether an SRM is positive, negative, or neutral in its impact on migrant protection outcomes. This variable starts with the assumption that migrant human rights serve as a guideline for positive protection outcomes; therefore, to the extent that migrant's human rights are respected, positive protection outcomes (i.e., provision of protection in alignment with international human rights laws) is more likely. Finally, the *shift* variable is an indicator capturing "significant" shifts in position, policy, or practice of a state reflected in the SRM. This variable is not intended to provide a scaled measure of change but is used for indicating when changes appear, based upon my assessment, to have potentially large impacts on protection outcomes.

Table 4.7: SRM Migration Diplomacy Codes

Variable	Description	Example
Meet	Takes a value of "1" if two or more states meet to discuss migration or their state's SRMs OR during a more general meeting migration is discussed.	The FM of State A visits his counterpart in State B, and during meetings the two discuss Syrian refugees. Western Balkan states gather to discuss transit migration in the region. EU States meet to discuss a regional relocation program.
Threat	Captures states making threats against targets, where threats are statements of intent to cause harm if the target does not grant concessions to the initiator. Takes a value of "1" for states issuing demands or threats without quid-pro-quo element; takes a value of "2" for quid-pro-quo threats (i.e., State A signals its intent to damage State B, if State B does not take State A's desired action, or to punish State B for past actions). For quid-pro-quo threats, a state may threaten to manipulate its SRMs to impact the flow of migrants in a manner that would damage another OR threaten to punish another for SRMs that do not align with the state's preferences.	The EU threatens to withhold aid from Hungary that the latter needs to deal with a migrant influx if Hungary does not participate in the relocation program; Greece threatens to issue visas to migrants that would allow them to move into other EU states if aid is not sent; Austria threatens to push migrants in greater numbers across its Northern border if Germany stop taking migrants in.
Punish	Takes a value of "1" if a state punishes another, whether by altering the flow of migrants or through another policy or practice that causes damage or goes against the other's preferences.	The EU withholds aid until Hungary changes its behavior; Greece issues visas for migrants to travel North to countries that do not want them; Austria opens its Northern border to allow migrants to flow toward Germany (against Germany's wishes).
Offer	Takes a value of "1" if a state signals a readiness to respond to migration in concert with one or more other states, OR a willingness to reward SRMs taken by other states individually or in concert.	Austria expresses a desire to cooperate with Macedonia on migration control; the EU offers amended asylum policy proposals to Member States;
Reward	Takes a value of "1" if a state follows up on an offer and rewards the other state or states, providing payment, resources, or otherwise changing ones behavior in the manner desired by another state in response to their actions.	The EU replacing Italy's *Mare Nostrum* program with one of its own in response to Italian requests. Greece attempts to persuade migrants camped at the North Macedonian border to move elsewhere after Macedonia requests they be removed.
Disposition	Three point scale designed to capture the cooperative, coercive, or neutral character of state interactions with respect to migration: "1" indicates a cooperative approach or the presence of cooperative action; "0" indicates a status quo preference or a combination of cooperative and coercive actions; "-1" indicates a coercive approach of the presence of coercive actions.	The directed variables for threats, offers, punishments, and rewards capture some aspects of the cooperative vs. coercive approaches states may take, but do not capture all contexts. In particular, the implementation of cooperation is not necessarily mirrored in the reward vs. punishment dynamic (i.e., side payments are not always necessary). Some positions may reflect cooperative or coercive dispositions in the absence of offers or threats as well.

Support	When states take position with respect to other states SRMs, this variable captures whether their position is in support of the other states ("1"), neutral ("0"), or against the action taken by the other state ("-1").	
Issue linkage	Attempts by states to get joint negotiation of two issues ("1") or successful joint negotiation of two issues ("2").	
Issue frame	Where obvious instances of issue framing occur, this indicator captures the content of the frame	Securitization, externalization, burden-sharing, harmonization, etc.

Appendix B: Additional Figures and Tables



Figure B.1: Number of Migration Diplomacy Actions and number of first-time asylum applications over time, 2014-2017.



Figure B.2: Keyness scores for coercive versus neutral MDAs.



Figure B.3: Keyness scores for cooperative versus neutral MDAs.

Table B.1: Logistic Regression Results: Featuring Both New Asylum Application Variables

	Model 1	Model 2
Asylum seekers per capita$_{t-1}$	0.7198*	0.7471*
	(0.3318)	(0.3712)
Asylum seeker count	0.0315**	0.0218
	(0.0116)	(0.0114)
GDP per capita	−0.0085*	−0.0065
	(0.0035)	(0.0053)
Anti-migrant opinion		−0.0021
		(0.0073)
Target of MDA	2.1540***	2.0943***
	(0.2039)	(0.2467)
Schengen member	0.0295	−0.1361
	(0.1699)	(0.2191)
Constant	−0.8746***	−0.4947
	(0.1683)	(0.5356)
Spline 1	−9.2035***	−7.4421***
	(1.2369)	(1.4674)
Spline 2	21.6046***	14.0745*
	(4.8047)	(5.5467)
Spline 3	−43.8457**	−27.8314
	(14.7103)	(16.2369)
AIC	1281.2445	921.1303
BIC	1330.2952	970.7433
Log Likelihood	−631.6223	−450.5652
Deviance	1263.2445	901.1303
Num. obs.	1720	1055

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

Table B.2: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
Model 1 Sample with *asylum-seeker* data							
MDA dummy	1766	0.183	0.387	0	0	0	1
GDP per capita	1766	34.753	33.168	3.952	13.09	46.297	178.864
Target of MDA	1766	0.093	0.291	0	0	0	1
Schengen member	1766	0.677	0.468	0	0	1	1
Sample without monthly *asylum-seeker* data							
MDA dummy	726	0.066	0.249	0	0	0	1
GDP per capita	726	7.019	8.506	2.124	3.519	6.337	40.474
Target of MDA	726	0.037	0.189	0	0	0	1
Schengen member	726	0	0	0	0	0	0



Figure B.4: Average number of asylum seekers by receiving state for the crisis period, 2014-2017.

Table B.3: Logistic Regression Results: Robust Standard Error and Polynomial Models

	Robust SEs		Polynomials	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
A.S. per capita$_{t-1}$	1.5800***	1.5274***	1.0833***	1.1508**
	(0.2962)	(0.3366)	(0.3001)	(0.3506)
GDP per capita	−0.0114***	−0.0071	−0.0105***	−0.0068
	(0.0031)	(0.0050)	(0.0031)	(0.0051)
Anti-migrant opinion		−0.0008		−0.0035
		(0.0069)		(0.0072)
Target of MDA	2.5583***	2.4558***	2.1675***	2.1920***
	(0.1904)	(0.2331)	(0.2006)	(0.2486)
Schengen member	0.0929	−0.1607	0.0778	−0.0844
	(0.1625)	(0.2083)	(0.1678)	(0.2199)
Constant	−1.8058***	−1.4229**	−2.3621***	−2.8355***
	(0.1337)	(0.4955)	(0.1800)	(0.5689)
t_1			47.8882***	100.3030***
			(9.5217)	(19.4483)
t_2			−69.3659***	−112.3954***
			(8.2501)	(16.2028)
t_3			30.0555***	55.6190***
			(6.4920)	(10.2321)
AIC	1381.5614	978.1161	1253.2603	909.6808
BIC	1408.8379	1007.9066	1296.9027	954.3665
Log Likelihood	−685.7807	−483.0580	−618.6301	−445.8404
Deviance	1371.5614	966.1161	1237.2603	891.6808
Num. obs.	1729	1059	1729	1059

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

A.S. = "Asylum seekers"

Table B.4: Logistic Regression Results: Country Fixed Effects Models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
A.S. count			0.0088	0.0035
			(0.0138)	(0.0143)
A.S. per capita$_{t-1}$	0.5989	0.4997		
	(0.3224)	(0.3269)		
GDP per capita	-0.3324^{***}	-0.3381^{***}	-0.3496^{***}	-0.3532^{***}
	(0.0504)	(0.0700)	(0.0508)	(0.0705)
Anti-migrant opinion		0.0371^{*}		0.0353^{*}
		(0.0174)		(0.0173)
Target of MDA	2.2353^{***}	2.1417^{***}	2.2915^{***}	2.2267^{***}
	(0.2097)	(0.2547)	(0.2109)	(0.2573)
Constant	-0.6630	13.3544^{***}	-0.6057	14.3435^{***}
	(0.4892)	(3.3861)	(0.4901)	(3.3689)
AIC	1298.8725	926.7335	1311.5575	929.6405
BIC	1517.0845	1085.6161	1530.6164	1088.5231
Log Likelihood	-609.4363	-431.3668	-615.7788	-432.8203
Deviance	1218.8725	862.7335	1231.5575	865.6405
Num. obs.	1729	1059	1766	1059

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

A.S. = "Asylum seekers"

Table B.5: Logistic Regression Results: Exluding Unilateral or N-Adic MDAs from Dependent Variable

	No Unilateral Targeted MDAs		No N-adic MDAs	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
A.S. per capita$_{t-1}$	0.5760*	0.5006	1.2184***	1.1475**
	(0.2671)	(0.2806)	(0.3169)	(0.3521)
GDP per capita	−0.0081*	−0.0024	−0.0061	−0.0049
	(0.0038)	(0.0055)	(0.0038)	(0.0058)
Anti-migrant opinion		−0.0028		−0.0075
		(0.0079)		(0.0081)
Target of MDA	1.9228***	1.8935***	2.1291***	1.9680***
	(0.1956)	(0.2297)	(0.1992)	(0.2350)
Schengen member	0.1637	0.0036	0.0685	−0.0021
	(0.1858)	(0.2387)	(0.1894)	(0.2437)
Constant	−1.3064***	−1.0165	−1.2479***	−0.6183
	(0.1846)	(0.5755)	(0.1818)	(0.5888)
Spline 1	−9.2627***	−6.9100***	−8.5545***	−6.8872***
	(1.3892)	(1.6007)	(1.3303)	(1.6239)
Spline 2	23.5813***	13.5287*	14.3133**	7.1129
	(5.5952)	(6.3073)	(5.1652)	(6.3760)
Spline 3	−51.0660**	−29.4508	−26.2323	−9.9245
	(17.7298)	(19.1815)	(15.1337)	(18.3239)
AIC	1126.2615	832.0984	1085.1003	786.3828
BIC	1169.9039	876.7841	1128.7427	831.0686
Log Likelihood	−555.1308	−407.0492	−534.5501	−384.1914
Deviance	1110.2615	814.0984	1069.1003	768.3828
Num. obs.	1729	1059	1729	1059

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

A.S. = "Asylum Seekers"

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