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THE EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD
OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

BY
WALTER R. WOOD

A THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS IN PHILOSOPHY

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LIST OF ABBREVIATED TITLES

ABBREVIATED TITLES OF THE MOST FREQUENTLY CITED WORKS OF SARTRE AND OTHER SOURCE MATERIAL ARE LISTED BELOW TO FACILITATE BREVITY OF FOOTNOTES. SEE BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR DETAILS OF EDITIONS CITED.

- TE THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EGO (1937)
- PI THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IMAGINATION (1940)
- BN BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: AN ESSAY ON
 PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY (1943)
- I IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE
 PHENOMENOLOGY (EDMUND HUSSERL)
- PPR JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL AND
 PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION

EXISTENTIALISM, IN POST WAR YEARS, HAS ACHIEVED NOT ONLY AN INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL STANDING, BUT IN ADDITION HAS MADE ITSELF FELT IN A MULTITUDE OF CONTEMPORARY AFFAIRS - FROM PSYCHOLOGY AND LITERATURE TO POLITICS AND SOCIAL ETHICS. A LARGE MEASURE OF THIS PROPAGATION OF EXISTENTIALISM HAS BEEN DUE TO THE VARIED ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. AS A FORCEFUL INTELLECTUAL, SARTRE CONTINUES TO AROUSE SUPPORT AND CONTROVERSY FOR HIS RADICAL AND DRAMATIC IDEAS IN EVERY FIELD HE APPROACHES; YET AT THE HEART OF ALL THIS ACTIVITY IS THE MAN'S PHILOSOPHY. ALTHOUGH SARTRE HAS CONTRIBUTED IN MAJOR WAYS TO PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE, THERE IS BY NO MEANS A COMMON AGREEMENT AS TO THE PROPER DESCRIPTION OF HIS THOUGHT BEYOND "EXISTENTIALIST." RATHER THAN GIVE THE AUTHOR CREDIT FOR HIS OWN CONCEPT OF HIS PHILOSOPHY, COMMENTATORS HAVE SOMETIMES IGNORED SARTRE'S REFERENCES TO PHENOMENOLOGY AND HAVE PREFERRED THEIR DESCRIPTIVE TERMINOLOGY SUCH AS "CRITICAL MATERIALISM," "POSTULATORY ATHEISM" OR OTHER TERMS WHICH ARE OFTEN MISLEADING. THIS INABILITY TO DECIDE UPON SUITABLE TERMS FOR WHAT IS GERMANE TO SARTRE'S EXISTENTIALISM INDICATES THE RADICALISM OF HIS THOUGHT AND THE DIFFICULTY OF ADEQUATELY REPRESENTING IT; BUT EVEN MORE, THERE IS AN IMPLICATION THAT THE SCHOLARS AND CRITICS HAVE OFTEN BEEN MORE INTERESTED IN THE PRESENTATION OF THEIR OWN INSIGHTS CONCERNING SOME ASPECT OF SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY THAN THEY HAVE BEEN IN ACHIEVING SOME PERSPECTIVE TOWARD THE ORGANIZED WHOLE OF HIS WORK.

BECAUSE FEW WRITERS HAVE SERIOUSLY ATTEMPTED THE TASK OF PRESENTING THE SCOPE OR SYSTEM WHICH SARTRE HAS PRESENTED IN BEING AND NOTHINGNESS, HAZEL E. BARNES'S COMMENT IN HER "TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION" SEEMS PERTINENT:

SARTRE IS ONE OF THE VERY FEW TWENTIETH CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS TO PRESENT US WITH A TOTAL SYSTEM. ONE MAY ACCEPT OR REJECT THIS SYSTEM, BUT ONE IS NOT JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING ANY OF ITS PARTS IN ISOLATION FROM THE WHOLE.¹

JUSTIFIED OR NOT, BOTH CRITICS AND SCHOLARLY INTERPRETERS HAVE FOUND IT EXPEDIENT TO DEAL WITH SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY IN PART, USUALLY A PART WHICH PERTAINS TO SOME LARGER THEME ENCOMPASSING OTHER PHILOSOPHERS. ENLIGHTENING AND HELPFUL THOUGH THESE STUDIES ARE, THEY DO NOT USUALLY REFLECT THE FULL SUBSTANCE AND MEANING OF SARTRE'S INSIGHTS; AND THEREFORE, THEY MISREPRESENT. AND PERHAPS MISREPRESENTATION IS UNAVOIDABLE; HOWEVER, IF THIS GENERATION OF PHILOSOPHERS AND STUDENTS CAN BENEFIT BY A CONSCIOUS COMPREHENSION OF THE GUIDING THOUGHTS OF THEIR TIME, ATTEMPTS MUST BE MADE TO FIND WAYS TO APPROACH THOSE THOUGHTS WITH AS LITTLE MISINTERPRETATION AS POSSIBLE. IT IS HOPED THAT THE FOLLOWING THESIS WILL BE ONE SUCH ATTEMPT TO BEGIN A WAY OF APPROACH TO AN ADEQUATE PICTURE OF SARTRE'S EXISTENTIAL ONTOLOGY.

CONSIDERING WAYS TO BEGIN A GENUINE APPROACH TO SARTRE'S MAJOR BODY OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT THERE IS STRONG ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF INVESTIGATING HIS METHODOLOGY. SARTRE HAS STATED HIS AIMS, HIS CONCLUSIONS, AND SOME OF HIS REASONS FOR HIS STUDY OF ONTOLOGY IN CLEAR AND UNDERSTANDABLE STATEMENTS, BUT JUST "HOW" HE CARRIES OUT THIS STUDY IS NOT SO CLEAR. IT COULD BE MAINTAINED THAT IF SARTRE HAD PRESENTED A PRECISE METHODOLOGY IN EQUALLY CLEAR TERMS, A GREAT DEAL OF MISREPRESENTATION WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. IT IS THEREFORE, THE PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS TO DETERMINE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SARTRE'S METHOD AND TO ANALYZE THE BASIC CONDITIONS OF THE BEING OF

¹BN, p. ix.

CONSCIOUSNESS SET FORTH BY SARTRE IN LIGHT OF THE METHOD USED TO REVEAL THOSE CONDITIONS.

THE PRIMARY AIM OF THIS WORK IS TO ANALYZE THE METHODOLOGY USED BY SARTRE IN HIS FIRST MAJOR PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRIBUTION, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS. AN ATTEMPT, IT IS HOPED, THAT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE CLARIFICATION AND ADD MORE PERSPECTIVE TO THAT WORK. AS A METHODOLOGICAL STUDY, THIS THESIS HAS ITS OWN WAY OF PROCEEDING SUGGESTED BY THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED IN ATTEMPTING TO DERIVE SARTRE'S METHOD AND TO ANALYZE IT. IT IS THEREFORE THE PURPOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THIS STUDY TO "DERIVE" THAT METHODOLOGY BY FIRST, CLARIFYING THE WAY IN WHICH THE TERM "METHOD" WILL BE USED IN THE STUDY. DUE TO THE BROAD FRAME OF REFERENCE IN COMMON USAGE OF THE TERMS "METHOD" AND "PHILOSOPHIC METHOD," LIMITING THEM WILL AVOID UNNECESSARY AMBIGUITY AND CONFUSION. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE DERIVATION OF SARTRE'S METHODOLOGY WILL CONSIST OF A DISCUSSION OF A PREDECESSOR OF SARTRE'S WHOSE METHOD IS RECOGNIZED TO HAVE HAD A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT UPON HIM. THERE ARE MANY OTHER PHILOSOPHERS TO WHOM SARTRE OWES A GREAT DEAL OF HIS METHOD, BUT NONE ARE CONSIDERED BY MOST COMMENTATORS AND SCHOLARS TO BE AS IMPORTANT TO THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF METHOD AS HUSSERL. HUSSERL'S METHOD IS TAKEN IN OUTLINE FORM TO INDICATE THAT EXAMPLE OF A METHOD FROM WHICH SARTRE HAS ABSTRACTED SOME OF HIS MAJOR STEPS.

THE FINAL PHASE IN THE DERIVATION OF SARTRE'S METHODOLOGY IS A STUDY OF THE STEPS WHICH SARTRE AND HIS INTERPRETERS HAVE INDICATED ARE USED EITHER THROUGHOUT HIS ENTIRE PHILOSOPHY, OR PARTICULARLY IN BEING AND NOTHINGNESS. THIS COMPILATION OF CHARACTERISTIC STEPS AND PROCEDURES HAS VALIDITY ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF THE ACCURACY OF THE SPECIFIC SOURCES, AND THE REASON GIVEN FOR THE USE OF THOSE STEPS.

PART ONE

THE EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

CHAPTER I

THE MEANING AND ROLE OF METHOD

CLARIFICATION OF THE USE OF METHOD

OF IMMEDIATE NEED FOR THE STUDY OF SARTRE'S METHOD IS AN OBJECTIVE AND WELL-AIMED APPROACH THAT WILL PROVIDE THE PERSPECTIVE AND ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND NECESSARY FOR THE PRELIMINARY METHODOLOGY. THE PROBLEMS ENTAILED IN PROVIDING WORKING DEFINITIONS OF THE TWO TERMS: "METHOD," AND "PHILOSOPHIC METHOD" ARE CENTERED AROUND THE FACT THAT BOTH TERMS ARE COMMONLY USED WITH A VARIETY OF CONNOTATIONS WHICH CAN CAUSE CONFUSION WHEN APPLIED TO MORE TECHNICAL OR SPECIFIC USAGES. THE INTENT OF THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WILL BE TO LIMIT THESE TERMS TO THE SENSE IN WHICH THEY ARE EMPLOYED IN THIS STUDY.

THERE ARE TO BEGIN WITH, TWO MAJOR DENOTATIONS OF THE TERM "METHOD" WHICH, IF USED INTERCHANGABLY MAY CAUSE SOME AMBIGUITY. METHOD CAN REFER TO A "SET OF RULES" OR A BODY OF INSTRUCTIONS SERVING AS CONDITIONS TO FOLLOW IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A PREDICTABLE RESULT. ALTHOUGH THIS USE OF METHOD SUGGESTS AN OBJECTION THAT METHOD IS NEVER A MERE "RECIPE" TO BE BLINDLY FOLLOWED, EVEN WHEN THIS USE IS BROADENED TO "A SET GENERAL GUIDES OR PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED WHEN CARRYING OUT SOME TASK OR PROCEDURE," THERE IS A LACK OF AN EXPLANATION AS TO WHY THE LATTER IS NOT ALSO A MERE "RECIPE." THIS METHOD-RECIPE CONFUSION THAT PERTAINS TO THE CASE WHEN THERE IS SOME EXPRESSED "WAY OF GETTING THE RESULT," HAS A BEARING UPON THE CASES IN WHICH METHOD REFERS TO THE PATTERN OF SOME ACCOMPLISHED

PROCEDURE FOR WHICH THERE IS NO PREESTABLISHED "SET OF RULES." IN THIS SECOND USE OF THE TERM "METHOD," THERE IS ALSO SOMETHING LACKING BY WAY OF EXPLAINING HOW METHOD CAN BE RECOGNIZED TO BE SUCH IN LOOKING AT A PROCEDURE THAT HAS A PATTERN, IF METHOD IS NOT JUST A RECIPE. THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF THE DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF "METHOD" IS INTENDED TO CLARIFY THESE CONFUSING ASPECTS OF THE TWO USES OF METHOD.

SPEAKING IN TERMS OF THE CONDITIONS WHICH CHARACTERIZE A METHOD, THERE IS FIRST, A RECOGNIZABLE NEED OR PURPOSE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED WHICH NECESSITATES THE USE OF A METHOD, THEN THE NEED TO ACCOMPLISH IT USING SOME SORT OF ORDER IN EMPLOYING PAST EXPERIENCE TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. MORE SPECIFICALLY, METHOD INVOLVES THE SELECTING OF THE BEST AVAILABLE STEPS OR PROCESSES TO SOLVE EACH PROBLEM OR HINDERANCE IN THE WAY OF GAINING THE DESIRED RESULT. THESE CHARACTERISTICS WILL BE DISCUSSED IN TERMS OF: PURPOSIVENESS; REPETITION, ELASTICITY; TECHNIQUE AND TACTICS.

METHODIC ACTIVITY HAS A DISTINCT GOAL OR AIM AS ITS MOTIVATION, AS OPPOSED TO RANDOM ACTIONS, MAKING IT A TYPE OF PURPOSEIVE AND PROGRESSIVE FUNCTION. NOT ALL PURPOSEIVE ACTIVITY NEED TO BE METHODICAL; PERHAPS BY CHANCE AN INTENDED RESULT COULD BE ATTAINED. AS A KIND OF PURPOSEIVE ACTIVITY, METHODICAL DOING ALSO HAS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF REPETITION AND FORMULATIVE ORGANIZATION OF STEPS. METHOD IS REPEATABLE IN THE QUALIFIED SENSE OF THERE USUALLY BEING SOMETHING ABOUT THE ACTIVITY THAT IS RECOGNIZABLE AS AN ORDERED PROGRESS TOWARD A GOAL. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, REPEATABLE ACTS WHICH ARE NOT METHODICAL IN THE LEAST, WHICH INDICATES THAT THERE IS MORE TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF METHOD THAN THIS.

THIS GENERAL ABILITY TO REPEAT METHODICAL ACTS IMPLIES, TO SOME DEGREE, THE ABILITY TO REALIZE THAT THE PERFORMANCE OF THOSE ACTS WILL PRODUCE SIMILAR RESULTS TO THE LAST TIME THAT THE ACTIONS TOOK PLACE.

THERE IS THEN A FOREKNOWLEDGE INVOLVED IN THE REPETITION OF AN ACT: IN KNOWING THAT THERE IS A REGULARITY OF CAUSE AND EFFECT BETWEEN THE OBJECT AND ITS PRODUCT. MOREOVER, THERE IS AN INDIRECT EXTENSION OF THAT IMPLICATION WHICH LEADS TO THE ELEMENT OF THOUGHT INVOLVED IN DOING A METHODICAL ACTION, IN KNOWING THE REASON WHY THE ACT CAUSES THE EFFECT. INTRODUCING THOUGHT INTO THE DEFINITION OF METHOD MUST BE DONE IN A VERY QUALIFIED WAY, BECAUSE THERE ARE METHODS THE PROCEDURE OF WHICH ARE IRRATIONAL. PHENOMENOLOGY, A CONTEMPORARY METHOD WHICH IS SIGNIFICANT TO THE STUDY OF SARTRE, HAS BEEN CALLED AN "IRRATIONAL METHOD"² DUE TO ITS VALUING OBSERVATION AND DESCRIPTION ABOVE LOGICAL CONFORMITY. INDICATIONS ARE THAT, EVEN IN THE CASES OF IRRATIONAL METHODS, THERE IS USUALLY A DISCERNABLE REASON FOR THEIR BEING IRRATIONAL. THE CHIEF REASON WHY REFERENCE TO THOUGHT IS INVOLVED IN THE DEFINITION OF METHOD IS TO DISTINGUISH THE TERM FROM MERE FORMULA.

IT IS OFTEN TRUE THAT THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS OF A METHODICAL PROCEDURE IS DEPENDENT UPON THE DEGREE OF THE PROCEDURE'S ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLE OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF ACHIEVING ITS END. THUS, METHODICAL PROCESSES MUST BE ABLE TO BE ALTERED, OR EVEN CHANGED RADICALLY IN ORDER TO OVERCOME POSSIBLE HINDERANCES. THIS NEEDED ELASTICITY INDICATES A FORESIGHTEDNESS ON THE PART OF THE PERSON WHO UNDERTAKES A METHODICAL PROCESS.

REVISION SUGGESTS EITHER A BROAD CHANGE OF TECHNIQUE OR A TACTICAL CHANGE REGARDING SOME PARTICULAR ORDER OF PROGRESSION, OR WITHIN A SINGLE STEP. OFTEN THE USE OF TECHNIQUE AND TACTIC ARE CONFUSED WITH THE MEANING OF METHOD AND NEED SOME CLARIFICATION TO BE USED AS PART OF A DEFINITION OF METHOD. TECHNIQUE COMMONLY PERTAINS TO THE ABILITY WITH WHICH SOME PARTICULAR ACT IS CARRIED OUT; IT IS THE KNOW-HOW OF DOING. METHODICALNESS MAY BE

²MARVIN FARBER, THE FOUNDATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY, (CAMBRIDGE, MASS: HARVARD U. PRESS, 1943), P. 324.

CARRIED OUT WITH A SUCCESSFUL OR AN INADEQUATE AMOUNT OF TECHNIQUE, AND MAY NOT BE DEPENDENT UPON THE ADEQUACY OF THAT TECHNICAL SKILL FOR ITS OWN SOUNDNESS. NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABOVE RELATION OF THESE TWO TERMS, IT IS OFTEN A PERPLEXING DISTINCTION TO MAINTAIN THE STRICT USES IN CONTEXT. IN SOME CASES "TECHNIQUE" REFERS NOT ONLY TO THE ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH A METHODICAL ACTIVITY BUT ALSO TO A PART OR ALL OF THAT ACTIVITY ITSELF. SINCE TECHNIQUE HAS COME TO MEAN A PART, PHASE OR THE WHOLE OF A METHOD AS A BODY OF INSTRUCTION, IN ITS NOUN FORM THERE IS NO AVOIDING A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONFUSION OF THE TWO TERMS.

ANOTHER CLOSELY RELATED TERM TO METHOD AND TECHNIQUE IS "TACTIC."

JUSTUS BUCHLER HAS DISTINGUISHED TWO SENSES OF THIS TERM "TACTIC";

THE ONE EMPHASIZES A FUND OR STORE OF TECHNIQUES WHOSE FUNCTION IS ANTICIPATORY, THE OTHER EMPHASIZES RESOURCEFUL PRACTICE PRECISELY IN THE FACE OF THE UNANTICIPATED.³

THESE TWO SENSES STRONGLY RELATE TO THE MEANING OF METHOD, FOR WITHOUT A STORE OF TECHNIQUES, OR ABILITIES, METHOD WOULD BE DENIED THE NECESSARY FORESIGHTEDNESS AND INVENTIVENESS TO OVERCOME OBSTACLES. THE SAME IS TRUE OF THE SECOND SENSE OF TACTIC, IN THAT, MEETING THE UNEXPECTED THERE MUST BE THE ABILITY TO ADAPT THE PROCESS TO NEW CONDITIONS. A LACK OF TACTICS WOULD REDUCE METHOD TO A STAGNANT MACHINE, CARRYING ALWAYS THE WEAKNESSES INHERENT IN ITS INCEPTION.

THE PRESENCE OF THESE CONNOTATIONS OF TACTICS SUGGESTS THE FURTHER EXTENTION THAT IF METHOD IS TO BE A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION BOTH TECHNIQUE AND TACTICS ARE NEEDED WHICH ARE THE WAYS TO CONTROL THE BEHAVIOR OF METHODICALNESS. IN "DOING METHOD" THAT IS, IN DOING SOMETHING IN A METHODICAL WAY, THERE IS SOME CONTROL EXERTED IN THE WAY OF ACTING (TECHNIQUE)

³JUSTUS BUCHLER, THE CONCEPT OF METHOD, (NEW YORK: COLUMBIA U. PRESS, 1961), P. 34.

AND CONTROL EXERTED UPON WHAT IS BEING METHODICALLY APPROACHED (TACTIC). EVEN THE "REPETITION" OF METHOD IS AN INDICATION THAT AN AMOUNT OF SELECTIVITY IS REQUIRED, BECAUSE IN ORDER TO REPEAT AN ACTIVITY, THERE OUGHT TO BE A VIRTUE RECOMMENDING IT AS THE BEST SELECTED WAY OF PROCEEDING FOR SOME PURPOSE. SELECTIVITY IS A MEANS OF CONTROL, BUT THIS NEED NOT INDICATE THAT EITHER CONTROL OR MANIPULATION SHOULD BE ARBITRARY. METHOD IS "CONTROLLED ACTION" AND, ALTHOUGH THIS REVEALS LITTLE, THERE IS DISTINCTLY AN ELEMENT OF POWER OR ABILITY RELATING TO THAT CONTROL IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH AN END.

FROM THE PREVIOUS CONSIDERATIONS A PRACTICAL AND GENERAL MEANING OF THE TERM CAN NOW BE INDICATED. METHOD, IN ITS MOST RELEVANT CONNOTATION TO THIS STUDY, IS A CONTROLLED, PURPOSEIVE PROCESS UNDERGONE TO ACHIEVE AN END. METHODIC BEHAVIOR CAN BE REPEATED WHEN NECESSARY, BECAUSE IT IS A SELECTIVE ACTIVITY IN WHICH SOME THOUGHT IS EMPLOYED. METHOD IS CLOSELY RELATED TO TECHNIQUE BOTH AS ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH METHODICAL TASKS AND AS AN INDIVIDUAL STEP OR PHASE IN A PARTICULAR METHODICAL PROCESS. TACTICS ARE USED IN METHOD IN TWO WAYS: FIRST AS A FUND OF DEVICES, TACTICS MAY BE DRAWN UPON TO ANTICIPATE FUTURE PROBLEMS WHICH MAY IMPEDE PROGRESS, AND SECONDLY, TACTICS MAY BE CALLED FOR DURING THE METHODICAL PROCESS. IT MAY BE NOTED THAT THESE CHARACTERISTICS ARE EMPHASIZED IN THEIR RELATION TO METHOD, WHICH THE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM HAVE NOT BEEN EXPLORED. HOWEVER, THE ACTUAL "HOW" OF THESE INTERRELATIONS CAN MORE CLEARLY BE SHOWN IN THE PARTICULAR, THAT IS IN THE STUDY OF SARTRE'S METHOD.

ALTHOUGH THE PRECEEDING DISCUSSION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF METHOD ELUCIDATE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN A RECIPE AND METHOD, THERE STILL REMAINS THE PROBLEM OF BEING ABLE TO RECOGNIZE AN ACTIVITY OR AN EVENT TO HAVE A "METHOD." THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN RECOGNIZING THE METHOD USED IN AN

ACTIVITY WHEN IT IS PREFACED BY AN EXPLICIT EXPLANATION OF THE METHOD TO BE USED, BUT, IF NO SUCH EXPLANATION EXISTS, THEN IT IS POSSIBLE TO MERELY APPLY THE CHARACTERISTIC CONDITIONS OF "METHOD" TO DISCOVER IF A METHOD WAS USED IN THE ACTIVITY. AN AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WOULD DEPEND UPON THE LIKELIHOOD OF A CERTAIN EVENT BEING INTENDED TO HAVE THOSE CHARACTERISTICS RATHER THAN HAVING THEM AS A MATTER OF CHANGE. BY DEFINITION, IF THE PURPOSIVENESS OF THE ACTIVITY IS EVIDENT, THEN THE INTENT OF THE ACTIVITY TO BE METHODICAL WOULD BE PRESENT.

OFTEN THE PURPOSIVE QUALITY OF A METHOD IS NOT STRESSED STRONGLY ENOUGH, WHICH LEADS TO A PURELY FORMAL CONCEPT OF METHOD. GRANTED, THE METHOD OF AN ACTIVITY IS OFTEN REFERRED TO AS ITS "FORM," E.G. (THE ORDER OF STEPS IN THE DEVELOPMENT TOWARD A DESIRED END), BUT THE FACT THAT ITS "DESIGN" IS SOLELY TO FUNCTION FOR THAT END IS AS IMPORTANT. THIS PROBLEM, WHICH TENDS TO DIVIDE THE METHOD USED FROM THE OBJECTIVE TO BE ACHIEVED, IS A PERSISTENT ONE IN THE FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE. THE FOLLOWING THREE EXAMPLES OF WELL-KNOWN METHODOLOGIES IN PHILOSOPHY WILL SERVE AS PRECAUTIONS AGAINST DEFINING METHOD AND, IN PARTICULAR, PHILOSOPHIC METHOD, ONLY IN TERMS OF ITS FORMAL QUALITIES WHICH SEPARATES IT FROM THE INTENT OR PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS DESIGNED.

CHAPTER II

THREE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS IN MODERN METHODOLOGY

IT IS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS STUDY TO ATTEMPT AN EXHAUSTIVE STUDY OF THE MANY POLICY-MAKERS ON PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD. NOR IS IT FEASIBLE TO ENTER INTO A DETAILED DISCUSSION ON A FEW OF THE DOMINANT THEORIES ON METHOD AND THEIR APPLICATIONS TO INDIVIDUAL PHILOSOPHIES. THERE ARE ADVANTAGES, HOWEVER, TO CHARACTERIZING THREE OF THE OUTSTANDING THEORETICIANS IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY AS CRITERIA FOR MAKING SOME FURTHER ILLUSTRATIONS CONCERNING THE NATURE OF METHOD WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO THIS STUDY.

DESCARTES'S USE OF MATHEMATICAL METHOD

IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY, DESCARTES SET FORTH A MOST DEFINITE STATEMENT OF METHOD IN HIS DISCOURSE. DESCARTES WAS NOT CONCERNED WITH THE THEORY OF METHOD ALONE, BUT WITH ONE PARTICULAR METHOD, ALTHOUGH HE INDICATES THAT HIS METHOD IS THE MOST VALUABLE FOR PHILOSOPHIZING.

BY METHOD I MEAN CERTAIN AND SIMPLE RULES SUCH THAT IF A MAN OBSERVE THEM ACCURATELY, HE SHALL NEVER ASSUME WHAT IS FALSE AS TRUE AND WILL NEVER SPEND HIS MENTAL EFFORTS TO NO PURPOSE.⁴

THERE ARE, HOWEVER, MANY METHODS WITHIN THE PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION THAT HAVE NOT SUBSCRIBED TO "RULES" OF ANY EXPLICIT AND ARTICULATED NATURE, THEREFORE, IT CANNOT BE CLAIMED THAT "RULES" IN A STRICT SENSE ARE NECESSARY TO A METHOD. IN ADDITION, DESCARTES'S METHOD FOR PHILOSOPHY WAS AN APPLICATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL METHOD HE DEvised, AND NOT A METHOD

⁴R. DESCARTES, "DISCOURSE ON METHOD," THE AGE OF REASON, ED. STUART HAMPSHIRE, (NEW YORK: 1961, MENTOR SERIES), P. 119.

UNIQUELY FOR PHILOSOPHY.⁵ DESCARTES'S THEORY, RADICALLY AND RIGIDLY FOUNDED AS IT WAS, HAD GREAT SUCCESS FOR HIMSELF AND THE WHOLE WESTERN TRADITION. IMMANUEL KANT, HOWEVER, RECOGNIZED A MAJOR PROBLEM IN THE CARTESIAN METHOD IN THAT THE METHOD FOR MATHEMATICS CANNOT BE APPLICABLE TO PHILOSOPHY - WHOSE SUBJECT MATTER IS SO VAST AND DIFFERENT. THE FUNCTION OF MATHEMATICS IS TO DEFINE, DEVELOP AXIOMS, AND DEMONSTRATE; THESE FUNCTIONS ARE NOT ONLY USELESS, BUT HARMFUL TO METAPHYSICS.

KANT'S BIFURCATION OF METHOD AND PHILOSOPHY

KANT CONCEIVED THE SOLUTION TO CONSTITUTE A DIVISION WITHIN PHILOSOPHY OF CRITICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE REALMS. THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHER'S TASK IS TO DEVELOP A SOUND METHOD TO INTRODUCE AND GUIDE THE SUBSTANTIVE PHILOSOPHY.

"I MEAN BY TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD THE DETERMINATION OF THE FORMAL CONDITIONS OF A COMPLETE SYSTEM OF PURE REASON."⁶ BY THIS GENERAL STATEMENT OF WHAT PHILOSOPHIC METHOD SHOULD BE, COLLINGWOOD SUGGESTS KANT COULD NOT REINTEGRATE THE PRINCIPLES OF TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD WITH THE SUBJECT MATTER OF HIS PHILOSOPHY TO FORM A UNITARY SYSTEM.⁷

KANT'S SOLUTION FOR DEVISING A METHOD FOR PHILOSOPHY SEEMS ONLY TO HAVE SEPARATED MORE WIDELY THE RIFT BETWEEN METHOD AND ITS SUBJECT MATTER. THERE IS NO WAY TO DEVELOP A SYSTEM ARCHITECTONICALLY, THEN FILL IT IN WITH METAPHYSICAL MATTER. TO LEND SUPPORT TO THIS BIFURCATION OF PHILOSOPHY, KANT CLEARLY STATES: "IF ANYTHING IS TO RECEIVE THE TITLE OF METHOD, IT MUST BE A PROCEDURE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRINCIPLES."⁸ THE PRECISE MEANING OF "PRINCIPLES" IN THIS CONTEXT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, TAKING THE USUAL MEANING

⁵R. G. COLLINGWOOD, PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD, (OXFORD: CLARENDON PRESS, 1933), p. 18.

⁶IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, ED. NORMAN K. SMITH, (NEW YORK: THE HUMANITIES PRESS, 1950), p. 585.

⁷COLLINGWOOD, p. 22.

⁸KANT, p. 592.

OF PRINCIPLE IN KANT'S WORK AS "A PROPOSITION OF A FOUNDATIONAL KIND," THERE IS A CERTAIN CONNOTATION OF HAVING A CRITERION OF SPECIFIC 'RULES' IN A SYSTEMATIC SCHEME, INTO WHICH EVERY METHOD MUST FIT. AGAIN, AS IN THE FIRST QUOTATION, THERE IS A SENSE OF A SEPARATION OF PHILOSOPHY INTO TWO DISTINCT REALMS. BUCHLER COMMENTS THAT SUCH A REQUIREMENT IS NOT ONLY ARBITRARILY LIMITING AND INTELLECTUALISTIC, "IT ALSO TENDS TO CONFUSE POSSIBLE SELF-SCRUTINY ON THE PART OF METHOD WITH THE PURPOSIVENESS OF METHOD."⁹ THIS CONFUSION IS IN TREATING METHOD AS A WAY TOWARD AN END AND, AT THE SAME TIME, ATTEMPTING TO USE METHOD AS A FORMULA TO DEMONSTRATE A PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED END. "METHOD" AS A RIGID FORMULA HAS NO REAL PLACE IN PHILOSOPHICAL ACTIVITY. IF THE ACTIVITY OF METHOD IS BROAD ENOUGH TO INCLUDE NO MORE THAN A WAY TOWARD AN END ON ONE HAND, AND A RIGID CRITERION OF SPECIFIC RULES OR PRINCIPLES ON THE OTHER, THEN IT BECOMES A NEARLY SELF-CONTRADICTIONARY TERM.

DEWEY'S ATTEMPT TO RECTIFY THE BIFURCATION

JOHN DEWEY'S MAJOR CRITICISM OF PREVIOUS PHILOSOPHIC METHODS IS REVEALED IN THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE:

THE CHARGE THAT IS BROUGHT AGAINST THE NON-EMPIRICAL METHOD OF PHILOSOPHIZING IS NOT THAT IT DEPENDS UPON THEORIZING, BUT THAT IT FAILS TO USE REFINED SECONDARY PRODUCTS (OF EXPERIENCE) AS A PATH POINTING AND LEADING BACK TO SOMETHING IN PRIMARY EXPERIENCE.¹⁰

THIS CHARGE MAY BE CHARACTERIZED AS A CRITIQUE THAT PHILOSOPHY HAS FAILED TO BE SCIENTIFIC ENOUGH TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN CARRYING OUT ITS GOALS. IN THIS OPINION, DEWEY IS VERY CLOSE TO HUSSERL AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL AIM WHICH WILL BE LATER DISCUSSED. BUT, IN ADDITION, DEWEY'S OPINION OF THE NATURE OF

⁹BUCHLER, P. 87.

¹⁰JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, (NEW YORK: W. W. NORTON & CO., 1929), P. 6.

SCIENTIFIC METHOD IS PERTINENT AND APPLICABLE. FOR DEWEY, THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD IS THE MOST BASIC ATTITUDE IN HUMAN NATURE; THAT "EXPERIENCE PRESENTS ITSELF AS THE METHOD, AND THE ONLY METHOD, FOR GETTING AT NATURE, PENETRATING ITS SECRETS."¹¹ CHARACTERISTICALLY, THEN, DEWEY INDICATES THAT THE PROPER APPROACH TO EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, OR OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS, IS BASICALLY A SCIENTIFIC, EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH. METHOD, ACCORDINGLY, SHOULD BRING SUCCESS TO SYSTEMATIC THINKING AND, IN DOING SO, RELATE INSTRUMENTALLY TO PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS.

ALTHOUGH DEWEY'S APPROACH HAS A DISTINCT ADVANTAGE IN SOLVING THE METHOD-SUBJECT BIFURCATION IN PHILOSOPHY, MARVIN FOX CHARGES DEWEY WITH NOT APPLYING HIS OWN METHOD TO HIS PHILOSOPHY: "DEWEY'S FAITH IN EXPERIMENTAL METHOD IS NOT DERIVED EXPERIMENTALLY . . . BUT, RATHER IT IS THE . . . RESULT OF CAREFUL DIALECTICAL REASONING," AND BECAUSE OF THIS RESULT, FOX STATES THAT "DEWEY PROVES TO HIMSELF THAT THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD CANNOT ANSWER ULTIMATE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF SUCH PHENOMENON."¹²

FOX PRESENTS CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CASE AGAINST DEWEY, AND, IN DOING SO, CASTS A SHADOW ON DEWEY'S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD. BUT, WHETHER DEWEY WAS OR WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL, HIS IDEA FOR THE INTEGRATING OF METHOD AS A BASIC HUMAN APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS REMAINS AN IDEAL; AND WHETHER IT CAN BE ACHIEVED VIA AN EXPERIMENTAL METHOD, OR SOME OTHER WAY, IS ONE OF THE MAJOR CONCERNS OF METHODOLOGY TODAY.

THE CHARACTERIZATIONS OF DESCARTES, KANT, AND DEWEY, HAVE REVEALED SOME OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH PHILOSOPHIC METHOD, AND, FOR THE

¹¹DEWEY, P. 2A.

¹²MARVIN FOX, "ON THE DIVERSITY OF METHOD IN DEWEY'S ETHICAL THEORY," PPR, XII, (SEPT. 1951), P. 124.

PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY, THEY INDICATE THAT PHILOSOPHIC METHOD SHOULD BE
DISCUSSED IN ITS FUNCTION OF SUPPORTING THE PURPOSE AND AIMS OF PHILOS-
OPHIES.

CHAPTER III

CHARACTERISTICS OF PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON METHODOLOGY INDICATE THE SIGNIFICANCE INVOLVED IN SEPARATING PHILOSOPHIC METHOD FROM PHILOSOPHY.

SCIENTIFIC METHOD IS OFTEN TREATED IN ABSTRACTION, QUITE APART FROM ANY SPECIFIC SCIENCE, BUT RARELY IS PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY STUDIED AS A SEPARATE, UNIVERSAL DISCIPLINE. IT MAY BE THIS SINGULAR TENDENCY TOWARD THE UNITY OF METHOD AND SUBJECT-MATTER THAT FORMS THE MOST DISTINCTIVE QUALITY OF ANY PHILOSOPHIC METHOD. EVEN TO SPEAK OUT OF CONTEXT OF THE "SOCRATIC METHOD," THERE IS A DEPENDENCE UPON THE CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF PLATO IN ORDER FOR THAT METHOD TO BE UNDERSTOOD. INsofar AS PHILOSOPHIC AIMS CAN BE DISCUSSED GENERALLY THEN, TOO, THE ASPECT OF ITS METHOD CAN ALSO BE DISCUSSED, (IF THE UNITY OF THE TWO HOLDS). IF IT CAN BE GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT "UNDERSTANDING" IS USUALLY THE AIM OF PHILOSOPHY, THEN PHILOSOPHIC METHOD IS GUIDED BY THE KIND OF UNDERSTANDING DESIRED.

QUESTIONING

OF THE GUIDES WHICH HAVE BEEN EVOKED TO ATTAIN, OR AT LEAST APPROXIMATE THE AIM OF PHILOSOPHY, QUESTIONING OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER HAS GAINED HISTORICAL AND SENSIBLE AGREEMENT AMONG PHILOSOPHERS. TO ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROBLEM UNDER EXAMINATION, LEADS TO CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE QUESTIONS; HOW THEY SHOULD BE FORMED AND WHAT ONES ARE FEASIBLE IN RELATION TO THE OBJECT OF CONSIDERATION BEING ASKED. DETERMINATION OF THE NATURE OF QUESTIONS ENCOMPASSES A BROAD SPECTRUM OF

PHILOSOPHIC MOTIVATION FOR, AS PHILOSOPHY IS CONCERNED NOT ONLY WITH FACTUAL MATERIAL, BUT WITH THE ATTITUDE TOWARD THAT MATERIAL, THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATION IS WIDENED THEREBY. QUESTIONS REFLECT ATTITUDE AND THEREFORE, CONSIDERATIONS OF HOW THAT ATTITUDE WILL BE REFLECTED IN THE POSSIBLE ANSWERS MUST ALSO BE INCLUDED.

ANALYSIS

DUE TO THIS NECESSITY OF UNDERSTANDING WHAT IS INVOLVED IN ASKING QUESTIONS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ENDEAVOR HAS BECOME DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH THE MEANING OF QUESTIONS AS WELL AS ANSWERS. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE MEANINGS INVOLVED WITH THE PROPER SUBJECT-MATTER OF PHILOSOPHY HAS TAKEN ON THE ASPECT OF A CENTRAL THEME. THE EXPLORATION OF MEANINGS COULD EVEN BE CONSIDERED AS THE AIM OF PHILOSOPHICAL ACTIVITY IF ONE INTERPRETS UNDERSTANDING AS "MEANINGS." THERE ARE MANY SPECIAL WAYS OF EVALUATING AND INTERPRETING THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS, LOGICAL SIGNIFICATIONS, LANGUAGE, HERMENEUTICAL INTERPRETATION OF THEORIES AND CONCEPTS ARE A FEW OF THE MOST POPULAR WAYS OF PURSUING MEANINGS TODAY. ALL OF THESE EXAMPLES HAVE THE COMMON CHARACTERISTIC OF BEING ANALYTICAL, THAT IS, OF LOOKING INTO THE SUBJECT-MATTER AND DISCOVERING THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS AND THEIR RELATION TO EACH OTHER IN MAKING THE SUBJECT WHAT IT MEANS, OR SHOULD MEAN.

TWO PROMINANT REASONS FOR INTERPRETIVE AND EVALUATIVE ANALYSIS BEING DEVELOPED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF PHILOSOPHY ARE FIRST, THAT WORDS AND THEIR RELATIONS NEED CLARIFICATION FOR MORE LOGICAL AND ENCOMPASSING COMMUNICATION. SECONDLY, ANALYSIS IS NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE PHILOSOPHER TO WIDEN AND DEEPEN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCEPTS, REVELATIONS AND WORDS. THROUGH ANALYSIS, DEEPER RELATIONS, BETWEEN CONCEPTS CAN BE REVEALED AND MADE A PART OF THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE WHOLE FIELD UNDER EXAMINATION. THIS EXAMINATION THROUGH ANALYSIS ALSO LEADS TO ANOTHER CHARACTERISTIC OF THE

METHOD, WHICH IS THAT ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDES, CONCEPTS, WORDS AND RELATIONSHIPS BRING THE PHILOSOPHER TO A SOUND BASIS UPON WHICH TO BUILD A BETTER PERSPECTIVE TOWARD THE SUBJECT.

SPECULATION

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANALYSIS AND SPECULATION IS A NECESSARY LINK IN THAT ANALYSIS PROVIDES OR REVEALS THE MORE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND LEADS TO THE POSSIBILITY, THROUGH SPECULATION, OF GAINING A TOTAL COMPREHENSION OF THAT SUBJECT MATTER. IN THIS WAY, ANALYSIS AND SPECULATION BRING ABOUT FINDINGS ON THEIR OWN ACCOUNT AND ARE AT THE SAME TIME CAPABLE OF LENDING THOSE FINDINGS TO THE PROCESSES OF THE OTHER. THERE IS, IN MANY PHILOSOPHIES, AN INTERRELATING OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE PROCESSES WHICH SERVES TOWARD THE END OF GAINING A KIND OF SYNOPTIC SCOPE, A WORLD VIEW, ORGANIZED IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT PROVIDES VALID ORIENTATION TO INVESTIGATIONS OF ALL OTHER AREAS OF HUMAN ENDEAVOR. MOREOVER, THESE TWO KINDS OF DIRECTION PROVIDE THE THINKER WITH MEANS TO CRITICIZE AND MODIFY HIS WAY OF PROCEEDING THROUGH QUESTIONING BY EACH CORROBORATING THE RESULTS OF THE OTHER, IN A SORT OF DIALOGUE. A DIALOGUE, IN A MANNER OF SPEAKING, IS A QUESTIONING-ANSWERING AND QUESTIONING PROCESS WHICH, IN PHILOSOPHY, OBTAINS BETWEEN ONE POINT OF VIEW AND ANOTHER; AS IN THE CASE ABOVE, THE FINDINGS OF ANALYSIS MAY BRING UP QUESTIONS FOR SPECULATION AND CONVERSELY SPECULATION'S CONCLUSIONS MAY EITHER BE IN NEED OF ANALYSIS OR ANALYTIC ANSWERS. THE DIALOGUE BRINGS ABOUT THE CONSIDERATION OF ANOTHER CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PROCESS OF INTERROGATION.

NOT ONLY IS IGNORANCE PRESUPPOSED BY THE PROCESS OF QUESTIONING, BUT IT IS EQUALLY EVIDENT THAT THE THINKER, WHOSE AIM IS TO PHILOSOPHIZE, IS IGNORANT OF THE EXACT NATURE OF THE UNDERSTANDING HE SEEKS TO ACHIEVE.

THUS, THE AIM OF PHILOSOPHY IS NOT SPECIFIC AND NEEDS THE LATITUDE AND RELATIVE FREEDOM THAT THE DIALOGUE JUST DESCRIBED PROVIDES AS A GUIDE. THE PHILOSOPHER MUST TAKE THE SITUATION OF IGNORANCE INTO ACCOUNT AT THE START OF HIS TASK AND MAKE THE BEST USE OF IT HE CAN. MERLEAU-PONTY DESCRIBES THIS SITUATION IN TERMS OF AMBIGUITY WHEN HE SUGGESTS:

WHEN (THE PHILOSOPHER) LIMITS HIMSELF TO ACCEPTING AMBIGUITY, IT IS CALLED EQUIVOCATION. BUT AMONG THE GREAT IT BECOMES A THEME, IT CONTRIBUTES TO ESTABLISHING CERTITUDES RATHER THAN MENACING THEM. THEREFORE, IT IS NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH GOOD AND BAD AMBIGUITY . . . WHAT MAKES A PHILOSOPHER IS THE MOVEMENT WHICH LEADS BACK WITHOUT CEASING FROM KNOWLEDGE TO IGNORANCE, FROM IGNORANCE TO KNOWLEDGE AND A KIND OF REST IN THE MOVEMENT.¹³

IF THIS IS THE TASK OF A PHILOSOPHER, THEN THE METHOD HE USES CANNOT BE A WELL CALCULATED, EXACTLY DIRECTED, AND A PREPLANNED SCHEME FOR ACHIEVEMENT. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE AN ERROR TO ALLOW VAGARY TO GO TO AN EXTREME OF OBSCURITY, ALTHOUGH IT MAY ALLOW METHOD AN AMOUNT OF ELASTICITY, INVENTIVENESS, AND HONESTY; THERE IS DANGER IN ABSTRUSENESS AND THE LOSS OF THE ORIGINAL GOAL OF UNDERSTANDING. IT SEEMS, FROM THIS NEED OF AN ALLOWANCE FOR VAGUENESS, THAT THERE MUST ALSO BE THAT OF CONTROL AND MANIPULATION.

THE CHARACTERISTICS THEMSELVES, OF COURSE, DO NOT DISTINGUISH PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY FROM ANY OTHER TYPE, PERHAPS BECAUSE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PART OF PHILOSOPHY IS THE PRE-FORMULATIVE THOUGHT WHICH CAUSES THE IMPETUS FOR CONTINUING WITH THAT THOUGHT IN A DISCIPLINED MANNER. THE ATTEMPT OF THE ABOVE LIST OF CHARACTERISTICS WAS NOT ACTUALLY TO EXHAUST ALL OF THE POSSIBLE QUALITIES OF ANY PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD AS MUCH AS IT WAS TO GIVE A COMBINATION OF THE MORE UNIVERSAL TENDENCIES WITHIN PHILOSOPHIC METHODOLOGY. THESE TENDENCIES CARRY OVER INTO THE DISCUSSION OF SARTRÉ'S METHOD AND WERE MENTIONED PRIMARILY FOR THAT REASON.

¹³ MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, IN PRAISE OF PHILOSOPHY, (TRANS. H. L. DREYFUS; EVANSTON, ILL.; NORTHWESTERN U. PRESS, 1964), PP. 4-5.

CHAPTER IV

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALISM

JEAN PAUL SARTRE IS A SELF-AVOWED EXISTENTIALIST AND, IF IT IS ONLY BECAUSE OF THE SUBTITLE TO HIS MAJOR WORK, HE HAS BEEN LABELED A PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXISTENTIALIST. IF THE TITLE IS UNFORTUNATE, IT IS BECAUSE OF THE DICHOTOMOUS CONNOTATIONS OF THOSE TWO TERMS. "PHENOMENOLOGY HAS BEEN USUALLY UNDERSTOOD TO BE PRIMARILY A METHOD, AND A VERY RIGOROUS ONE AT THAT."¹⁴ THIS JUDGMENT MAY NOT BE PARTICULARLY COMPREHENSIVE OF THE TRUE SCOPE OF PHENOMENOLOGY, BUT IT IS TRUE THAT HUSSERL CERTAINLY INTENDED HIS PHENOMENOLOGY TO BE A METHODOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY. "EXISTENTIALISM HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN THOUGHT OF AS PRIMARILY NON-METHODIC; THIS ATTITUDE IS ALSO A PREJUDICIAL ONE DUE TO THE STYLE OF REBELLION AGAINST SYSTEM SO EVIDENT IN KIERKEGAARD AND NIETZSCHE."¹⁵ IN TRUTH, THERE IS ACTUALLY A STRONG ANTI-SYSTEMATIC ATTITUDE INHERENT IN EXISTENTIALISM, THOUGH THIS IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM ASSUMING EXISTENTIALISTS TO BE ANTI-METHODIC. YET SEVERAL CRITICS INTERPRET SARTRE TO BE HIGHLY SYSTEMATIC AND HEAVILY METHODIC. GASTON BERGER'S OPINION IS REFLECTIVE OF THIS UNDERSTANDING OF EXISTENTIALISM AS SYSTEMATIC AND SYNTHETIC:

¹⁴MARVIN FARBER, THE FOUNDATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY, (CAMBRIDGE, MASS: HARVARD U. PRESS, 1943), P. 560.

¹⁵EXISTENTIALISM FROM DOVSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE, ED., WALTER KAUFMANN, (NEW YORK: MERIDIAN BOOKS, INC., 1960), P. 21.

FROM A METHODOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW, THE MOVEMENT (HEIDEGGER AND SARTRE PRIMARILY) IS DISTINGUISHED BY THE REMOVAL FROM THE CARTESIAN ATTITUDE, AND BY A GREAT SUSPICION OF ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES . . . THE AVERSION TOWARD CARTESIANISM IS JOINED WITH A RETURN TO HEGELIANISM AND DIALECTICS TAKES THE PLACE OF ANALYSIS.¹⁶

THE SCHISM BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALISM PRESENTS SUCH STRIKINGLY DIFFERENT EMPHASIS REGARDING THE METHOD THAT IT COULD BE ASSUMED THAT HAVING NO METHOD, SARTRE MERELY LIFTS THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL, FORMAL METHOD AND APPLIES IT TO AN EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGIC THEME.

THESE ASSUMPTIONS CANNOT BE BORN OUT BY CLOSE INVESTIGATION. ON THE ONE HAND, SCHOLARS SUCH AS SPIEGELBERG INDICATE AN APPROACH TO EXISTENTIALISM (OF THE CONTEMPORARY VARIETY) AS A SUB-SCHOOL OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT. WHILE ON THE OTHER HAND, CRITICS SUCH AS WILLIAM EARLE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY CANNOT BE PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND STILL BE EXISTENTIAL.¹⁷

BOTH OF THESE VIEWS COULD ONLY ARISE FROM A MISCOMPREHENSION THAT THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF HUSSERL IS SO RIGID AS TO ALLOW NO MODIFICATIONS WHATSOEVER AND THAT SUCCESSFUL METHOD DOES NOT NECESSARILY HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE SUBJECT MATTER OR AIMS OF PHILOSOPHIES. IF COLLINS IS CORRECT WHEN HE OBSERVES, "EXISTENTIALIST OPPOSITION TO THE IDEALISTIC ASSUMPTION OF A MONISM OF METHOD IS EXTENDED TO A SIMILAR CLAIM LYING BEHIND NATURALISM,"¹⁸ THEN IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT EXISTENTIALISTS WOULD BE OPPOSED TO A MONISM OF METHOD IN THEIR OWN FIELD. IT IS NOT IN THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHIES OF EXISTENCE TO BAND TOGETHER IN UNITY OF SCHOOL, METHOD, OR SYSTEM. THEREFORE, THE APPELATION OF "PHENOMENOLOGY" ATTACHED TO EXISTENTIALISM WOULD

¹⁶GASTON BERGER, "EXISTENTIALISM," PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES, ED. M. FARBER, (BUFFALO, N.Y.: UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO PUBLICATIONS, 1950), P. 92.

¹⁷HERBERT SPIEGELBERG, "PHENOMENOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALISM," JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, VOL. LVII, NO. 2 (JANUARY, 1960), P. 68.

¹⁸JAMES COLLINS, THE EXISTENTIALISTS: A CRITICAL ESSAY, (CHICAGO: H. REGNERY CO., 1961), P. 217.

TEND TO RECTIFY THIS "ANTI-UNIT" SENTIMENT EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO NEED FOR SUCH A UNITY.

SARTRE'S OPINION OF HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY

BEFORE PRESENTING A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE HUSSERLIAN METHOD AS BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR SARTRE'S METHOD, IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO REFER TO A FEW OF THE COMMENTS SARTRE HAS MADE ABOUT HUSSERL'S METHOD AND HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD IT. SINCE THESE COMMENTS ARE SCATTERED AND FEW, NO MORE THAN A GENERAL IMPRESSION OF SARTRE'S THOUGHTS CONCERNING HIS PREDESSOR'S METHOD CAN BE PRESENTED.

IN HIS ESSAY, TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EGO, SARTRE EXPRESSES WHAT HE UNDERSTANDS AS THE KEY TO HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY, AS A "SCIENTIFIC, NOT A CRITICAL STUDY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. ITS ESSENTIAL WAY OF PROCEEDING IS BY INTUITION."¹⁹ RATHER THAN CRITICIZE THE AIM AND USE OF THIS METHOD BY HUSSERL, SARTRE MENTIONS INSTEAD THAT:

WE FIND ADMIRABLE ALL OF HUSSERL'S DESCRIPTIONS IN WHICH HE SHOWS TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS CONSTITUTING THE WORLD BY IMPRISONING ITSELF IN EMPIRICAL CONSCIOUSNESS.²⁰

FIRST, BY HIS SPECIALIZED DEFINITION OF PHENOMENOLOGY, AND, SECONDLY, BY HIS SUPPORT OF ONE PHASE OF HUSSERL'S METHOD, IT IS LEARNED THAT SARTRE INTENTIONALLY FOLLOWS HUSSERL TO SOME DEGREE. BUT THE DEFINITION AND REFERENCE TO THAT PARTICULAR PHASE OF DESCRIPTION CARRIES A DIFFERENT ORIENTATION WHEN PRESENTED BY HUSSERL HIMSELF:

PURE OR TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY WILL BE ESTABLISHED NOT AS A SCIENCE OF FACTS, BUT AS A SCIENCE OF ESSENTIAL BEING (AS "EIDETIC" SCIENCE); A SCIENCE WHICH AIMS EXCLUSIVELY AT ESTABLISHING "KNOWLEDGE OF ESSENCES" AND ABSOLUTELY NO FACTS.²¹

¹⁹TE, p. 35.

²⁰I, p. 191.

²¹I, p. 40.

TO LEARN THAT "SCIENCE" IN THIS SENSE IS ANOTHER SORT THAN WHAT IS USUALLY REFERRED TO AS SCIENCE CASTS A TOTALLY DIFFERENT LIGHT ON THE NATURE OF PHENOMENOLOGY THAN THE IDEA WHICH SARTRE CONVEYED. THE PHASE OF METHOD FOR WHICH SARTRE HAS GIVEN SUPPORT IS RELEGATED TO A LESSER STATUS WHEN ONE READS HUSSERL'S INTENTION: "AS CONCERNS PHENOMENOLOGY, IT AIMS AT BEING A DESCRIPTIVE THEORY OF THE ESSENCE OF PURE TRANSCENDENTAL EXPERIENCES."²² THE AIM IS NOT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS IMPRISONED IN THE EMPIRICAL CONSCIOUSNESS, BUT IT WOULD SEEM TO AVOID THE EMPIRICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN FAVOR OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL.

IN THE SEVERAL BRIEF REFERENCES SARTRE MAKES ABOUT HUSSERL'S WAY OF PROCEEDING, THERE IS A CONTINUED IMPLICATION THAT SARTRE REJECTS THE "IDEALISTIC TENDENCY" OF HUSSERL; THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLES MARK THIS ATTITUDE:

HUSSERL FOR THE LENGTH OF HIS PHILOSOPHICAL CAREER WAS HAUNTED BY THE IDEA OF TRANSCENDENCE AND SURPASSING. BUT THE PHILOSOPHICAL TECHNIQUES AT HIS DISPOSAL, IN PARTICULAR THE IDEALIST CONCEPTION OF EXISTENCE, REMOVED FROM HIM ANY WAY OF ACCOUNTING FOR THAT TRANSCENDENCE.²³

SO, IT IS PERHAPS SARTRE'S OPINION THAT HUSSERL HAD NO OTHER CHOICE THAN TO BE A TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALIST. SARTRE DOES NOT LIMIT HIS OPINION MERELY TO HUSSERL'S GENERAL TENDENCY, BUT EVEN MORE DEFINITELY, HE RENDERS A VERY INSTRUMENTAL ASPECT OF HUSSERL'S FINDINGS TO A VERY INSIGNIFICANT AND LIMITED ROLE IN HIS OWN PHILOSOPHY WHEN HE STATES THAT:

WE CAN SEE THAT WHAT HUSSERL CALLS CATEGORIES (UNITY, MULTIPLICITY, RELATION OF THE WHOLE TO THE PART, MORE AND LESS, ETC.) - THESE ARE ONLY THE IDEAL MIXING OF THINGS WHICH LEAVES THEM WHOLLY INTACT . . . THEY MERELY INDICATE THE INFINITE DIVERSITY OF THINGS, WAYS WHICH THE FREEDOM OF THE FOR-ITSELF (HUMAN REALITY) CAN REALIZE THE INDIFFERENCE OF BEING.²⁴

²²1, p. 191.

²³BN, p. 109.

²⁴BN, pp. 191-192.

THE PASSAGE DOES NOT DENY THE USE OF HUSSERL'S CATEGORIES, BUT THERE IS CERTAINLY A CASUAL AIR WITH WHICH SARTRE DEALS WITH SUCH A MAJOR PART OF THE HUSSERLIAN SCHEME.

FINALLY, SARTRE IS QUITE REVEALING OF HIS ATTITUDE IN A REFERENCE IN THE BEGINNING OF PART III OF BEING AND NOTHINGNESS AFTER A HERMENEUTIC DISCUSSION OF PREVIOUS THEORIES AGAINST SOLIPSIISM.

HUSSERL REPLIES TO THE SOLIPSIIST THAT THE OTHER'S EXISTENCE IS AS SURE AS THAT OF THE WORLD, AND HUSSERL INCLUDES IN THE WORLD MY PSYCHO-PHYSICAL EXISTENCE. BUT THE SOLIPSIIST WILL SAY THE SAME THING. . . . BECAUSE HUSSERL HAS REDUCED BEING TO A SERIES OF MEANINGS, THE ONLY CONNECTION WHICH HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH BETWEEN MY BEING AND THAT OF THE OTHER IS A CONNECTION OF KNOWLEDGE. THEREFORE, HUSSERL CANNOT ESCAPE SOLIPSIISM ANY MORE THAN KANT DID.²⁵

THERE SEEMS TO BE A CORE OF DIFFERENCE EXPRESSED IN THE LAST QUOTATION. HUSSERL AIMS AT PROCEEDING TOWARD HIS ONTOLOGY THROUGH EPISTEMOLOGY. THAT IS, THROUGH THE INVESTIGATION OF MEANINGS, THE EIDETIC REALM. SARTRE, ON THE OTHER HAND, DOES NOT BEGIN WITH THE CONSIDERATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE AND MEANINGS, BUT INSTEAD, HE DESCRIBES CONCRETE EXPERIENCES - FOLLOWS THESE DESCRIPTIONS WITH SPECULATIVE CONDITIONS FOR BEING AND UPON THESE FINDINGS HE BASES HIS EPISTEMOLOGY. THE TWO PHILOSOPHERS BUILD THEIR THEORIES IN "OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS" ACCORDING TO ALFRED SCHEUTZ.²⁶ RONALD GRIMSLEY MORE EXPLICITLY STATES THAT SARTRE USES PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPTS, BUT IN A HIGHLY SELECTIVE WAY:

IN THIS WAY SARTRE HOPES TO HAVE AVOIDED THE PITFALL OF IDEALISM WHICH MEASURES BEING BY KNOWLEDGE, FOR THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO REALLY CONCERNS THE QUESTION OF BEING RATHER THAN KNOWLEDGE.²⁷

²⁵BN, p. 235.

²⁶ALFRED SCHEUTZ, SARTRE'S THEORY OF THE ALTER-EGO, (PPR, VOL. IX, No. 2, DEC. 1948), p. 183.

²⁷RONALD GRIMSLEY, EXISTENTIALIST THOUGHT, (CARDIFF, U. OF WALES PRESS, 1955), p. 94.

THE OPINION OF NATANSON MAKES A DIFFERENT EMPHASIS AS IF FROM SARTRE'S POINT OF VIEW: "SARTRE IS ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE IF PHENOMENOLOGY IS COMPETENT TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF ONTOLOGY."²⁸ IT SEEMS THAT ALTHOUGH NATANSON MAY BE RIGHT IN A SENSE, THE REAL ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER PHENOMENOLOGY IS COMPETENT FOR ONTOLOGY, BUT WHETHER IT IS ADEQUATE TO BEGIN WITH A STUDY AND DESCRIPTIONS OF BEING AND FOUND A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE UPON THE DISCOVERIES, RATHER THAN THE OTHER WAY AROUND. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SUCCESS OF THIS ATTEMPT TO START WITH BEING, COLLINS SUGGESTS THAT SARTRE USES PHENOMENOLOGY AS A DEVICE TO PRODUCE AN ONTOLOGY AND:

THIS JUXTAPOSITION OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY SUGGESTS THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SARTRE'S SPECULATION. IT IS LOCATED IN THE TENDENCY TO WORK OUT ONTOLOGY ON PHENOMENOLOGICAL GROUNDS, A PROJECT WHICH HUSSERL, SCHELER AND HEIDEGGER DEVOTED THEMSELVES. SARTRE AGREES WITH THIS PROGRAM AND CLAIMS THAT, WHERE HIS ILLUSTRIOUS GERMAN PREDECESSORS FAILED, HE CAN SUCCEED.²⁹

THIS EXPLANATION, ADDED TO THE NEW DIRECTION SARTRE'S THOUGHT TAKES, PROPOSES THE IDEA THAT SARTRE FELT THE BASIC METHOD OF PHENOMENOLOGY TO BE AN ACCEPTABLE PROCEDURE AND BY SHIFTING THE INVESTIGATION FIRST TO ONTOLOGY, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME THE WEAKNESSES HE FELT WERE PRESENT IN THE PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO DESCRIBE BEING. WHAT THIS REORIENTATION AMOUNTS TO GENERALLY IS EXPRESSED BY SPIEGLEBERG AS A:

TACIT DROPPING OUT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIMENSION, WHICH CONSTITUTES THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN SARTRE'S VERSION OF HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY. THIS IS THE TURNING POINT AT WHICH PHENOMENOLOGY BECOMES A PHENOMENOLOGY OF HUMAN EXISTENCE CONCERNED WITH PHENOMENA AS THEY OCCUR IN CONCRETE HUMAN EXPERIENCES.³⁰

ALTHOUGH THE EXACT OPINION SARTRE HOLDS TOWARD HUSSERL'S METHOD CAN ONLY BE APPROXIMATED AT PRESENT, IT IS UNQUESTIONABLE SARTRE STYLES HIMSELF

²⁸ MAURICE NATANSON, A CRITIQUE OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY, (LINCOLN, NEB.: U. OF NEB. SERIES, 1951), P. 13.

²⁹ COLLINS, P. 43.

³⁰ HERBERT SPIEGLEBERG, THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT, VOL. II, (THE HAGUE: MARTINUS NIJHOFF, 1960), P. 481.

AS A PHENOMENOLOGIST AS WELL AS AN EXISTENTIALIST. AS SPIEGELBERG ALSO STATES, "PRESUMABLY HE (SARTRE) LOOKS UPON HIS OWN PHENOMENOLOGY MERELY AS A TOOL FOR HIS ONTOLOGICAL EXISTENTIALISM."³¹ BUT THE COMMENT IS ALSO MADE THAT:

IN VIEW OF THE SUBTITLE OF THE WHOLE WORK (BEING AND NOTHINGNESS) THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT SARTRE DID NOT MEAN TO RESTRICT PHENOMENOLOGY TO THESE PORTIONS (THE CONCEPT OF NOTHINGNESS AND OF TIME DIMENSION), BUT CONSIDERED IT AS A BASIC TO HIS ENTIRE ONTOLOGY.³²

IN THE LIGHT OF THESE RENDITIONS OF SARTRE'S OPINION OF HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY AND OTHERS' CONJECTURES OF WHAT THAT OPINION MIGHT LIKELY BE, HOPEFULLY WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY GUIDE TO PRESENTING A SURVEY OF HUSSERL'S METHOD.

³¹ SPIEGELBERG, THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT, P. 449.

³² SPIEGELBERG, THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT, P. 472.

CHAPTER V

OUTLINE OF EDMUND HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD

THE HUSSERLIAN METHOD, WITH ITS EPISTEMOLOGICAL EMPHASIS, WILL BE DISCUSSED LARGELY IN TERMS OF THE MAJOR STEPS WHICH HUSSERL DEVELOPED TO LEAD TO HIS INTENDED SCIENCE OF "TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECTIVITY." THE AFOREMENTIONED REFERENCE TO PHENOMENOLOGY AS NOT BEING CONCERNED WITH "FACT," SUGGESTS THAT INITIALLY THE SCIENCE BEING SOUGHT IN THIS PHILOSOPHY IS A HIGHLY ABSTRACT DISCIPLINE, WHICH IS TRUE, ALTHOUGH IT PRESUPPOSES THE REASON WHY THE PHILOSOPHY IS OF SUCH AN ABSTRACT NATURE. FROM THE INITIAL OUTLOOK TOWARD FACTS BY HUSSERL, THAT ALL EMPIRICALLY INTUITED FACTS ARE OF A CONTINGENT NATURE, CAN BE FORMED AN IMPLICATION THAT TO SAY SO IS ALSO TO SAY THAT THERE IS SOMETHING NECESSARY IN HUSSERL'S WORDS:

NOW WHEN WE STATED THAT EVERY FACT COULD BE "ESSENTIALLY" OTHER THAN IT IS, WE WERE ALREADY EXPRESSING THEREBY THAT IT BELONGS TO THE MEANING OF EVERYTHING CONTINGENT THAT IT SHOULD HAVE ESSENTIAL BEING.³³

BY MEANING THEN, FACTS AND ESSENCES ARE INSEPARABLE CORRELATES, AT LEAST IN A LIMITED SENSE. ACCORDING TO HUSSERL, THE CONTINGENT FACT HAS A BEARING UPON ESSENCE AS AN "INDEX" OF THE ESSENTIAL CATEGORY OF WHICH IT IS A REPRESENTATIVE. AND CONVERSELY, ESSENCES ARE, IN THIS RESPECT, NECESSARY CATEGORIES DERIVABLE FROM THE EMPIRICALLY GIVEN.³⁴ THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HUSSERL'S ANALYSIS OF FACT AND ESSENCE IS THAT IT POINTS OUT TWO ASPECTS

³³1, p. 47.

³⁴FR. PETER KOESTENBAUM, THE PARIS LECTURES, (THE HAGUE: MARTINUS NIJHOFF, 1964).

WHICH GO TO MAKE UP THE COGNITIVE WORLD, THAT IS, THESE CORRELATIVES INDICATE TO THE PERCEIVER "WHAT" AN OBJECT IS. THE NECESSARY ESSENCE OF AN OBJECT CONTRIBUTES AS MUCH TO THE OBJECT AS "WHAT IS KNOWN" AS DOES ITS CORRELATE OF CONTINGENT FACT, ITS SITUATION IN TIME AND SPACE. SUCH ANALYSIS LEADS TO THE FOLLOWING INSIGHT ABOUT THE NATURE OF ESSENCE:

THE ESSENCE (EIDOS) IS AN OBJECT OF A NEW TYPE. JUST AS THE DATUM OF AN INDIVIDUAL OR EMPIRICAL INTUITION IS AN INDIVIDUAL OBJECT, SO THE DATUM OF ESSENTIAL INTUITION IS A PURE ESSENCE.³⁵

HUSSERL'S PARALLEL DESCRIPTION OF FACT AND ESSENCE PROVIDES FOR AN ELEMENTARY APPROACH TO THE NATURE OF HIS MEANING OF ESSENCE, BUT IT CANNOT BE EXTENDED ANY FURTHER THAN THE PASSAGE ABOVE. TO AUGMENT THIS INDICATION OF HUSSERL'S USE OF ESSENCE, IT MAY BE ADDED THAT HIS CONCEPT OF EIDOS INTENDS TO PRESERVE THE KANTIAN CONCEPT FOR IDEA, WHICH ACCORDING TO KANT "A CONCEPT FORMED FROM NOTIONS AND TRANSCENDING THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPERIENCE IS AN IDEA OR CONCEPT OF REASON."³⁶ HUSSERL HAS EXPANDED THE KANTIAN USE OF EXPERIENCE TO INCLUDE EVERY CONSCIOUSNESS OF AN OBJECT, WHETHER THAT OBJECT IS AN EMPIRICALLY EXISTENT OR A PURELY IMAGINARY ONE. ON THE BASIS OF THIS USE OF EXPERIENCE, HUSSERL CAN REFER BACK TO KANT'S DEFINITION OF IDEA AS BEING ABLE TO TRANSCEND THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPERIENCE "WHICH NOW IS NOT NECESSARY TO BE APPLIED TO EIDOS IN THAT EIDOS IS A TYPE OF TRANSCENDENT OBJECT, BEYOND THERE MERELY EMPIRICAL."

THE MOST STRIKING CONTRAST BETWEEN THIS NEW OBJECT AND AN EMPIRICAL ONE IS ITS IMMINENCE. THESE IMMINENT ESSENCES ARE APPREHENDED THROUGH ESSENTIAL INTUITION WHICH DIFFERS IN "PRINCIPLE" FROM THE INTUITION OF MEDIATE OBJECTS OF THE EMPIRICAL TYPE. AN EMPIRICAL FACT "CANNOT BE GIVEN AS REALLY IMMINENT IN ANY POSSIBLE PERCEPTION OR GENERALLY IN ANY

³⁵1, p. 49.

³⁶KANT, CRITIQUE, p. 314.

POSSIBLE CONSCIOUSNESS."³⁷ ACCORDING TO HUSSERL THEN, PART OF THE REASON WHY "FACTS" ARE CONTINGENT IS BECAUSE ANY ONE APPREHENSION OF A FACT NEVER GIVES A "REAL THING" IN ALL OF ITS COMPLETENESS, BUT IT MERELY GIVES ONE ASPECT OF A THING IN EXPERIENCE. HUSSERL THEREFORE POINTS OUT THAT FACTS ARE NOT IMMINENT TO A SINGLE CONSCIOUSNESS, BUT IN FACT TRANSCEND THAT INSTANCE TO OTHER INTUITIONS OF APPEARANCES OF THE OBJECT TOWARD INFINITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, HUSSERL'S ESSENTIAL INTUITION GIVES ESSENCES IN AN IMMINENT WAY AS THE OBJECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. THIS LATTER INTUITION PRESENTS A COMPLETE OBJECT NOT AS A GROUP OF APPEARANCES, BUT OF THE "LINK" THAT CONNECT ALL OF THOSE APPEARANCES.

BUT AS IDEA (IN THE KANTIAN SENSE), THE COMPLETE GIVENNESS IS NEVERTHELESS PRESCRIBED - AS A CONNEXION OF ENDLESS PROCESSES OF CONTINUOUS APPEARING, ABSOLUTELY FIXED IN ITS ESSENTIAL TYPE, . . . CONSISTING IN ALL ITS PHASES OF APPEARANCES OF THE SAME DETERMINABLE X, SO ORDERED AS A CONNECTED SYSTEM AND SO DETERMINED AS TO ITS ESSENTIAL CONTENT THAT ANY ONE OF ITS LINES . . . GIVES A HARMONIOUS SYSTEM OF APPEARANCES . . .³⁸

BECAUSE OF ITS UNIQUE NATURE, THE IDEA CAN BE GRASPED IN A SINGLE CONSCIOUS EVENT AND, IN FACT, IN ANY SUCCEEDING CONSCIOUS EVENT COMPLETELY THE SAME, SINCE IT DOES NOT REQUIRE ANYTHING OUTSIDE ITSELF TO COMPLETE IT. SUCH IMMINENCE OF INTUITION, HUSSERL FEELS, MUST BE CONSISTENTLY PURSUED AND THE ESSENCES WHICH ARE GIVEN BY IT MUST BE ACCURATELY DESCRIBED, BY THE BEST DEVISED MEANS POSSIBLE TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

THE HUSSERLIAN EPOCHÉ

IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE WHAT HUSSERL INTENDS TO BE A TYPE OF "TRANSFER OF EMPIRICAL DESCRIPTIONS" INTO THE "NEW DIMENSION OF THE EIDETIC";³⁹ HE

³⁷1, p. 120.

³⁸1, p. 366.

³⁹E. HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY. (TRANS. DORIAN CAIRNS; THE HAGUE: MARTINUS NIJHOFF, 1960), p. 15.

PROPOSES A SERIES OF REDUCTIONS WHICH ARE COLLECTIVELY CLASSIFIED AS THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EPOCHÉ¹. THE EPOCHÉ¹ IS SIMILAR TO THE MATHEMATICAL USE OF "BRACKETING" FROM PRESENT CONSIDERATION SPECIAL AREAS OR PROBLEMS, IN REGARD TO HUSSERL'S AIM, ALL THE AREAS OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE WHICH ARE NOT UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY. THEREFORE, THIS REDUCTION HAS THE SAME EFFECT AS THE "CARTESIAN DOUBT" WITHOUT THE DRAWBACK, ACCORDING TO HUSSERL, OF BEING PUT INTO ANY POSITION WHATEVER CONCERNING "REAL EXISTENCE."⁴⁰ THE MAJOR INTENT OF HUSSERL'S SYSTEM OF REDUCTIONS IS TO CARRY OUT THE BRACKETING OF ALL AREAS OF EXPERIENCE WHICH ARE NOT CONDUCTIVE TO THE INTUITION OF "IDEAS" OR, MORE BRIEFLY, TO ENABLE THE ATTAINMENT OF THE "PUREST" PRESENTATIONS IN CONSCIOUSNESS.⁴¹

THE HUSSERLIAN PRINCIPLE OF EPOCHÉ¹ HAS PRESENTED PROBLEMS TO BOTH HIS FOLLOWERS AND TO THOSE WHO ATTEMPT TO INTERPRET HIS PHILOSOPHY. AS SPIEGELBERG POINTS OUT:

HUSSERL HIMSELF NEVER SUCCEEDED IN FORMULATING THE MEANING AND THE FUNCTION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION IN AN UNAMBIGUOUS AND DEFINITIVE FASHION, NOT EVEN IN A WAY THAT SATISFIED HIM PERSONALLY.⁴²

ALTHOUGH MOST SCHOLARS ARE AGREED THAT IT IS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EPOCHÉ¹, HUSSERL CARRIED OUT HIS PHILOSOPHY (EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF NEVER ARRIVING AT A POINT TO REINTRODUCE THE AREAS WHICH HAD BEEN BRACKED OUT), THERE ARE THOSE WHO QUESTION THE NEED FOR THE CONSISTENT USE OF THE EPOCHÉ¹ OR IN FACT TO USE IT AT ALL. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THEN THAT THERE IS LITTLE AGREEMENT AMONG HUSSERL'S INTERPRETERS CONCERNING THE PROPER ORDER AND TERMINOLOGY OF THE SPECIFIC REDUCTIONS THEMSELVES. MANY SCHOLARS FIND IT EXPEDIENT TO MENTION ONLY TWO MAJOR REDUCTIONS (FARBER), WHILE OTHER,

⁴⁰1, pp. 13-21.

⁴¹1, p. 103.

⁴²SPIEGELBERG, PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT, p. 690.

MORE THOROUGH-GOING INTERPRETERS LIST AS MANY AS SIX (KOESTENBAUM, LAUER).

IN AN ATTEMPT TO CORRELATE THE VARIOUS LISTS IT CAN BE GENERALLY SAID THAT THREE OF THE PRELIMINARY REDUCTIONS ARE, FOR THE MOST PART COMMON TO MANY OF THE THINKERS WHO FOLLOW A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PHENOMENOLOGICAL AIM. THESE SO CALLED REDUCTIONS CAN BE FOUND IN MANY POST-KANTIAN THINKERS IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER. THE FIRST REDUCTION IS THE SETTING ASIDE OF ALL PREVIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONS REGARDING THE NATURE OF REALITY AND THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF IDEALISM AND REALISM. THIS REDUCTION "CLEARS THE GROUND FOR RADICAL AND PRESUPPOSITIONLESS THINKING." IN THE SAME RESPECT A SECOND REDUCTION PUTS OUT OF OPERATION THE "NATURALISTIC THESIS" UPON WHICH THE SCIENCES ARE BASED, THAT IS THE EMPIRICAL DATA IS REPRESENTATIONAL OF ACTUAL OBJECTS EXISTING IN NATURE. SUCH AN ASSUMPTION, HUSSERL ARGUES, LIMITS ALL THAT EXPERIENCE WHICH IS OF THE IMAGINATION AND FANCY AS WELL AS BEING NAÏVE IN REGARD TO THE REAL OBJECTS WHICH ARE ONLY ASSUMED TO BE THERE.⁴³

MORE SIGNIFICANT TO THE MAIN INTENT OF APPREHENDING THE "EIDETIC FIELD," THE THIRD REDUCTION IS THE FOCUSING UPON THE INTUITIVELY GIVEN INDUBITABLE FACT ABOUT WHICH THERE CAN BE NO PRESUPPOSITIONS AND WHICH CAN SERVE AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE ENTIRE INVESTIGATION; THIS IS THE COGITO. THE COGITO OR THE AWARENESS IN CONSCIOUSNESS OF BEING AWARE IS "SUBJECTIVITY" OF WHICH NO PART IS OBJECTIVE, AT LEAST UNTIL IT IS "OBJECTIFIED" BY BEING REFLECTED UPON. THIS SUBJECTIVITY IS THE RESULT OF A REDUCTION WHICH CAN BE CALLED PHENOMENA, DUE TO ITS EFFECT OF RENDERING THE PHENOMENA INTO A PURELY SUBJECTIVE CONTEXT. FROM THIS EPOCHÉ IN THE PROCESS OF HUSSERLIAN THOUGHT, THERE IS NO MORE CONCERN FOR THE SUBJECT-OBJECT DICHOTOMY; THERE IS ONLY THIS IMMINENTLY GIVEN AWARENESS TO EXPLORE AND "PURIFY."

⁴³1, pp. 82-83.

ONCE THE PHENOMENA ARE APPREHENDED AS BEING IMMINENT IN CONSCIOUSNESS, THERE IS NO LONGER A QUESTION AS TO THE REALITY OR EVEN THE SUBJECTIVITY OF ESSENCES. ESSENCES MUST BE "SEEN" AND DESCRIBED STRICTLY IN THEIR NECESSARY AND UNIVERSAL ASPECTS. IN RIGIDLY ADHERING TO ONLY THE UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY, HUSSERL PERFORMS ANOTHER REDUCTION TO RULE OUT OF CONSIDERATION ALL WHICH IS NOT CLEARLY GIVEN AND PERTINENT TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF ESSENCES IN TERMS OF THEIR SPECIES AND GENERA. QUENTIN LAUER EXPRESSES THE MEANING OF THIS REDUCTION IN ANOTHER WAY: "THE SUBJECT (COGITO) ATTAINED IN THE FORMER REDUCTION IS UNIVERSALIZED BY BEING OBJECTIVATED."⁴⁴ THERE DEFINITELY SEEMS TO BE MORE INVOLVED IN THIS EIDETIC REDUCTION THAN THE UNIVERSALIZATION OF THE COGITO ACCORDING TO KOESTENBAUM, AS MENTIONED ABOVE, THERE IS THE UNIVERSALIZATION OF ALL ESSENCES FOUND TO BE IMMINENT IN THE APPREHENSION OF THE COGITO.⁴⁵

THE CONCERN, AFTER THESE REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT BY HUSSERL, IS TOTALLY WITHIN THE ACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN ITS PRIMORDIAL FORM OF THE COGITO, WHICH LEADS, FOR HIM, TO THE FINAL REDUCTION. CHIEF PRINCIPLE AMONG THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS IS INTENTIONALITY BECOMING, THROUGH THE LAST MENTIONED REDUCTION, AN IDEALLY IMMINENT AND UNIVERSAL OBJECT AS CONSTITUTED IN CONSCIOUSNESS. THROUGH STUDYING THIS INTENTIONALITY (BY STUDYING THE CONSTITUTION IN CONSCIOUSNESS OF INTENTIONS), THE ESSENTIAL RELATION BETWEEN SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY CAN BE KNOWN, BECAUSE THAT INTENTIONALITY IS THE REVEALING OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AS THE PUREST SUBJECTIVITY WHOSE NATURE IS THE RUBRIC FOR ALL EXPERIENCE AND THUS, FOR ALL OBJECTIVITY. ALTHOUGH THESE CHARACTERIZATIONS OF HUSSERL'S MAJOR USES

⁴⁴QUENTIN LAUER, PHENOMENOLOGY: ITS GENESIS AND PROSPECT, (NEW YORK: HARPER & ROW CO., 1965), P. 54.

⁴⁵E. HUSSERL, PARIS LECTURES, PETER KOESTENBAUM, (THE HAGUE: MARTINUS NIJHOFF, 1964), P. LVIII.

OF THE EPOCHE ARE BRIEF AND AT TIMES AMBIGUOUS, THEY INDICATE AT LEAST THE APPROXIMATE DIRECTION AND PROCEDURE OF HUSSERL'S METHOD IN ITS PERTINENCE TO THE PRESENT STUDY.

OUTLINE OF HUSSERL'S METHOD

THE GENERAL GUIDE-POSTS HUSSERL PROVIDES APPLIES TO EACH REDUCTIVE PROCEDURE AS WELL AS APPLYING TO THE ENTIRE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD; IN SUMMARY, HE STATES THEM ACCORDINGLY:

1. IT HAS TO PLACE BEFORE ITS OWN EYES AS INSTANCES CERTAIN CONSCIOUS EVENTS;
2. TO BRING THESE TO COMPLETE CLEARNESS, AND WITHIN THIS ZONE OF COMPLETE CLEARNESS;
3. TO SUBJECT THEM TO ANALYSIS AND THE APPREHENSION OF THEIR ESSENCE;
4. TO FOLLOW UP THE ESSENTIAL CONNECTIONS THAT CAN BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD;
5. TO GRASP WHAT IS MOMENTARILY PERCEIVED IN FAITHFUL CONCEPTUAL EXPRESSIONS.⁴⁶

HUSSERL REFERS TO THE USE OF THIS OUTLINE OF METHOD AS UNDERTAKING "THE FUNCTION OF A GENERAL AND LOGICALLY RIGOROUS METHODIC GROUNDING."⁴⁷ THERE IS A DEFINITE NEED TO EXPOSTULATE THE TERMS INVOLVED IN THE PRECEEDING DISCUSSION OF HUSSERL'S METHODOLOGICAL STEPS IN DEVELOPMENT OF HIS PHILOSOPHY. WHAT AFTER ALL ARE "CERTAIN PURE CONSCIOUS EVENTS?" WHAT ARE IN THIS METHOD "SUBJECTED TO ANALYSIS AND GIVEN 'CONCEPTUAL EXPRESSION'?" ACCORDING TO HUSSERL, THE ACTUAL "DETERMINATE METHOD . . . IS A NORM WHICH SPRINGS FROM THE MAIN REGIONAL DIVISION OF THE SPHERE IN QUESTION (THE SPHERE OF PHENOMENOLOGY) AND ITS GENERAL STRUCTURAL FORMS, AND THEREFORE, IN ITS EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECT, IS ESSENTIALLY DEPENDENT ON THE KNOWLEDGE

⁴⁶1, p. 174.

⁴⁷1, pp. 174-175.

OF THESE STRUCTURES."⁴⁸ ACCORDING TO THIS STATEMENT, WHAT IS LACKING IS THE STRUCTURES WITHIN THE SPHERE OF PHENOMENOLOGY TO ENABLE THE PHENOMENOLOGIST TO METHODICALLY DESCRIBE THE ESSENCES PRESENTED IN PURE CONSCIOUSNESS.

INTENTIONALITY

THE FIRST STRUCTURE TO THE PROCEDURE OF DESCRIBING IN THE EIDETIC FIELD IS THAT OF "REFLECTION." HUSSERL PLACES IT IN RESPECT TO ITS IMPORTANCE BY SAYING THE "PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD PROCEEDS ENTIRELY THROUGH ACTS OF REFLECTION."⁴⁹ FOR HUSSERL, THE CONDITION FOR STUDYING ANY CONSCIOUS EVENT IS ONLY WHEN "A REFLECTIVE ACT OF THE EGO IS DIRECTED TOWARDS IT AND IT NOW BECOMES AN OBJECT FOR THE EGO."⁵⁰ AS AN OBJECT FOR THE EGO IT IS CAPABLE OF BEING STUDIED ACCORDING TO THE OUTLINE OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD PREVIOUSLY QUOTED. MAINTAINING THIS POSITION IN CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS, HUSSERL CONCEIVED IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBSERVE CONSCIOUS EVENTS AS THEY ARE HAPPENING. PHENOMENA OR EXPERIENCE AS THEY ARE LIVED, AS HUSSERL EXPLAINED, CANNOT BE DIRECTLY ANALYZED, NOR DESCRIBED, UNTIL THERE ARISES SOME WAY OF SEEING THEIR MEANING OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS EXPERIENCING OBJECTS COULD BE GRASPED AS "ACTS" REFLECTIVELY. AS MARVIN FARBER STATES:

ACTS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE THE EXPERIENCES OF MEANING AND THE ELEMENT OF MEANING IN EACH SINGLE ACT IS SUPPOSED TO BE THE ACT-EXPERIENCE IN THAT WHICH MAKES IT TO BE AN INTENTIONAL EXPERIENCE, THAT IS, DIRECTED UPON OBJECTS.⁵¹

REFLEXION "HAS THE CHARACTER OF A MODIFICATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS" WHICH MEANS FOR HUSSERL THAT "REFLEXION BRINGS AN EXPERIENCE UNDER THE SELF DIRECTING OF THE EGO."⁵² REFLEXION IS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL TOOL FOR

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1, p. 197.

491, p. 197.

501, p. 197.

51 FARBER, p. 333.

521, p. 203.

HUSSERL'S METHOD WHICH ENABLES THE PHENOMENOLOGIST, THROUGH MODIFICATION OF EXPERIENCE, TO OBSERVE THE INTENDED OBJECT OF THE EGO.

ANNA MARIE TYMIENIEKA HAS STATED: "THE STRICT CORRELATION BETWEEN THE OBJECT OF COGNITION AND THE ACT OF CONSCIOUSNESS ACHIEVED IN TERMS OF INTENTIONALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS, IS THE PIVOTAL POINT FOR HUSSERL'S FOUNDATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY."⁵³ THIS INTENTIONALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS CAN ONLY BE FULLY EXPLORED THROUGH REFLEXION. INTENTIONALITY IS A MAJOR FACTOR IN HUSSERL'S USE OF HIS METHOD. WHAT INTENTIONAL EXPERIENCE REVEALS IS, FOR EXAMPLE, "IN MEMORY, AFTER REDUCTION, WE FIND THE REMEMBERED AS SUCH; IN EXPECTATION THE EXPECTED AS SUCH; IN IMAGINATIVE FANCY, THE FANCIED AS SUCH."⁵⁴ IN OTHER WORDS, HUSSERL IS STATING EXACTLY THAT INTENTION IS THE REVEALING "GIFT OF THE MEANING" OR ESSENCE OF EACH OBJECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

EVERY INTENTIONAL EXPERIENCE, THANKS TO ITS NOETIC PHASE, IS NOETIC, IT IS ITS ESSENTIAL NATURE TO HARBOR IN ITSELF A MEANING OF SOME SORT, IT MAY BE MANY MEANINGS, AND ON THE GROUND OF THIS GIFT OF MEANING AND IN HARMONY THEREWITH, TO DEVELOP FURTHER PHASES WHICH THROUGH IT BECOMES THEMSELVES 'MEANINGFUL'.⁵⁵

THE USE OF THIS TERM "NOESIS," FROM THE GREEK "NOUS" (MIND) BY WHICH HUSSERL DISTINGUISHES EXPERIENCE OF ESSENCES AS THE "ESSENTIAL" ASPECT OF EXPERIENCE OF PERCEPTION. THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS A PARTIAL RESTATEMENT OF THE FIVE STEPS OF HUSSERL'S METHOD, BUT IT IS ALSO A REFINEMENT OF THOSE STEPS. BRINGING TO COMPLETE CLEARNESS, AS STATED BEFORE, HERE IS EXPRESSED AS DISCOVERING ITS GIFT OF MEANING.

THE STRICTNESS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES

THE REVERSAL OF THE REALM OF BEING AS SELF-SUFFICIENT CONSCIOUSNESS, AS OPPOSED TO THE REALM OF OBJECTIVITY AND THE USE OF INTENTIONAL

⁵³A. T. TYMIENIECKA, PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCE, (NEW YORK: FARRAR, STRAUSS, CUDAHY, 1962), P. 8.

⁵⁴, P. 245.

⁵⁵, P. 237.

EXPERIENCES AS A MEANING TOWARD THE PRESENTATIONAL OBJECT REFLECTED ON BY THE EGO, ARE THE KEY POINTS TO WHICH SARTRE OBJECTED IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY. YET, THE POINT AT WHICH THEY DIFFER MOST BASICALLY, INTENTIONALITY, IS A DIVERGENCE OF OPINION WHICH BRINGS ABOUT MAJOR METHODOLOGICAL CHANGES.

THE CRITERIA FOR NAMING A METHOD PHENOMENOLOGICAL WOULD INCLUDE HUSSERL'S FIVE STEPS OF DESCRIPTION OF CONSCIOUS EVENTS OR INTENTIONAL EXPERIENCES AND WOULD BE A RADICAL CLEARING OF PRESUPPOSITIONS. BUT AS FAR AS METHOD IS CONCERNED, WOULD IT BE NECESSARY TO HAVE OR MAINTAIN HUSSERL'S CONCEPT OF BEING AND REALITY? THERE IS APPARENTLY NO NEED TO DO SO FOR HEIDEGGER, DILTHEY, SCHELER, ETC., ARE ALL AGREED UPON BY "TO CARRY OUT THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD IN THEIR WORK BUT DO NOT MAINTAIN HUSSERL'S METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTS."⁵⁶ THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL PRINCIPLES IS ADHERED TO BY SARTRE AS WELL AS ALL THESE OTHER THINKERS.

⁵⁶ SPIEGELBERG, P. 310.

CHAPTER VI

SARTRE MODIFIES HUSSERL'S COGITO AS THE KEY FOR CHANGING PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD

THE FIRST PUBLICATION CONCERNING BOTH THE EXTENT AND THE FIRST MODIFICATIONS IN WHICH SARTRE EMPLOYS THE AIMS ARE FOUND IN THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EGO, A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ESSAY. SARTRE'S DISCUSSION OF THE THEORY OF THE FORMAL PRESENCE OF THE "I" EMPHASIZES THAT KANT'S STATEMENT THAT THE COGITO "MUST BE ABLE TO ACCOMPANY ALL OUR REPRESENTATIONS" IS A CONDITION OF VALIDITY AND NOT A FACTUAL CONDITION. WHERE PHENOMENOLOGY IS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, IS IN WHAT IS ACTUALLY THE CASE,

PHENOMENOLOGY IS A SCIENTIFIC, NOT A CRITICAL STUDY OF CONSCIOUSNESS . . . WE MUST RECOGNIZE, THEREFORE, THAT PHENOMENOLOGY IS A SCIENCE OF FACT . . . PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE RELATIONS OF THE "I" TO CONSCIOUSNESS ARE THEREFORE EXISTENTIAL PROBLEMS.⁵⁷

BUT THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT WHAT HUSSERL DESCRIBED AS PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD. HUSSERL'S WHOLE DISCUSSION OF THE "ABSTAINING FROM BELIEF" IN ORDER TO GRASP THE "EIDETIC SPHERE" IS INVOLVED WITH HIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE EVERYDAY LIFE OF FACT AND THE OBSERVATION OF ESSENCE. WHY SARTRE WOULD CHOOSE TO INTERPRET HUSSERL AS A SCIENTIST OF FACT AND AS PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH THE EXISTENTIAL RATHER THAN WITH THE ESSENTIAL AT HIS FIRST MENTION OF HUSSERL, MAY BECOME CLEAR AS THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO IS ANALYZED.

⁵⁷TE, P. 35.

SARTRE'S CRITICISM OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

SARTRE'S ARGUMENT BEGINS WITH THE QUESTION "IS NOT THIS PSYCHIC AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL ME ENOUGH?" AND NEED ONE DOUBLE IT WITH A TRANSCENDENTAL "I," A STRUCTURE OF ABSOLUTE CONSCIOUSNESS? THE NEXT STEP IN THE ARGUMENT IS TO COMMENT ON THE RESULTS OF NOT POSITING A TRANSCENDENTAL "I":

1. THE TRANSCENDENTAL FIELD BECOMES IMPERSONAL, OR IF YOU LIKE, PRE-PERSONAL WITHOUT AN "I."
2. THE "I" APPEARS ONLY AT THE LEVEL OF HUMANITY AND IS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF THE ACTIVE ASPECT.
3. THE "I THINK" CAN ACCOMPANY OUR REPRESENTATIONS BECAUSE IT APPEARS ON THE FOUNDATION OF UNITY WHICH IT DID NOT HELP TO CREATE; RATHER, THIS PRIOR UNITY MAKES THE "I THINK" POSSIBLE.
4. IS PERSONALITY A NECESSARY ACCOMPLISHMENT TO CONSCIOUSNESS?⁵⁸

THE EGO AS UNIFIER AND INDIVIDUALIZER

SARTRE OBSERVES THAT HUSSERL NEEDN'T HAVE POSITED THE "I" AS A STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS HAD HE LOOKED FOR OTHER CAUSES FOR THE FACTS OF UNITY AND INDIVIDUALITY. AS FOR UNITY THROUGH THE USE OF TRANSCENDENTAL "I," SARTRE STATES:

BUT IT IS PRECISELY HUSSERL WHO HAS NO NEED FOR SUCH A PRINCIPLE. THE OBJECT IS TRANSCENDENT TO THE CONSCIOUSNESS WHICH GRASPS IT AND IT IS IN THE OBJECT THAT THE UNITY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS IS FOUND.⁵⁹

SINCE OBJECTS ARE TRANSCENDENT OF ANY CONSCIOUS ACT OF INTENTION AND CAN BE INTENDED AGAIN BY THE USE OF "TRANSVERSAL INTENTIONALITIES," THEN IT IS THE OBJECTS WHICH UNIFY CONSCIOUSNESS AND NOT THE PRESENCE OF A TRANSCENDENTAL "I." THEN THERE IS NO NEED FOR A TRANSCENDENT "I" OF THE COGITO TO BE PRESENT FROM ONE ACT OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF THOSE OBJECTS TO ANOTHER.

⁵⁸TE, P. 36.

⁵⁹TE, P. 38.

SARTRE DEALS BRIEFLY WITH THE CAUSE FOR CONSCIOUSNESS BEING INDIVIDUAL OR HAVING A QUALITY OF INWARDNESS:

THE INDIVIDUALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS EVIDENTLY STEMS FROM THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. CONSCIOUSNESS CAN ONLY BE LIMITED BY ITSELF, THUS, IT CONSTITUTES A SYNTHETIC AND INDIVIDUAL TOTALITY ENTIRELY ISOLATED FROM OTHER TOTALITIES. THE TRANSCENDENTAL I, THEREFORE, HAS NO RAISON D'ETRE.⁶⁰

THIS ARGUMENT DOES NOT APPEAR TOO SATISFACTORY IN PURELY PHENOMENOLOGICAL TERMS, BECAUSE IT IS NOT A DESCRIPTION BUT A LOGICAL CONSTRUCT. SARTRE, IN ADDITION, DOES NOT STATE WHETHER HE IS CONSIDERING HUSSERL'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN IMMEDIATE AND INTENTIONAL EXPERIENCES. AS FARBER STATES:

HUSSERL'S CONCEPT OF AN EXPERIENCE DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE POPULAR ONE, WHEREBY THE DISTINCTIONS WHICH HE DRAWS BETWEEN THE IMMEDIATE AND THE INTENTIONAL PLAYS A ROLE . . . WHAT IT FINDS IN ITSELF AS IMMEDIATELY PRESENT ARE ACTS OF PERCEIVING, JUDGING, ETC. TO EXPERIENCE OUTER OCCURRENCES MEANS: TO HAVE CERTAIN ACTS OF PERCEPTION DIRECTED UPON THEM, ETC.⁶¹

IMMEDIATE OR INTENTIONAL CONTENT

SARTRE DOES NOT POINT OUT WHETHER HIS ARGUMENT FOR OBTAINING THE NEED OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AS A UNIFIER, AND PARTICULARLY AS AN INDIVIDUALIZER, OF CONSCIOUSNESS CONSIDERS JUST IMMEDIATE CONTENT OR INTENTIONAL CONTENT. THE IMMEDIATE CONTENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS ACCORDING TO HUSSERL, DOES NOT SEPARATE INTO THE EXPERIENCING AND THE EXPERIENCED.

BUT MY EMPATHY AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN GENERAL IS GIVEN IN A PRIMORDIAL AND ABSOLUTE SENSE, NOT ONLY ESSENTIALLY BUT EXISTENTIALLY. THE PRIVILEGED POSITION HOLDS ONLY FOR ONESELF AND FOR THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS TO WHICH THE SELF IS RELATED. HERE ONLY IS THERE, AND MUST THERE BE, ANYTHING OF THE NATURE OF IMMEDIATE PERCEPTION.⁶²

IT IS WITH THIS CONCEPT OF IMMEDIATENESS THAT HUSSERL HAS FOUND THE NEED TO PLACE EGO AS THE SOURCE FOR THE TRANSCENDENTAL RUBRIC OF STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS WELL AS A SOURCE FOR INTENTIONALITY. INTENTIONALITY IS THE

⁶⁰TE, PP. 39-40.

⁶¹FARBER, P. 337.

⁶²I, P. 130.

MODE OF PRESENTATION BY CONSCIOUSNESS OF AN OBJECT OR EVENT, THE RELATION BETWEEN, FOR EXAMPLE, AN "EXTERNAL EXPERIENCE" AND THE OBJECT EXPERIENCED. SARTRE HAS FOUND A WAY OF AVOIDING THE "I" ON THIS LEVEL, BUT HE HAS NOT MENTIONED THE ABSOLUTE INWARDNESS OF IMMINENT CONSCIOUSNESS (WHERE HUSSERL COULD FIND NO OTHER SOURCE THAT THE "I" FOR ABSOLUTE REALITY) OPPOSED TO THE CONDITIONAL REALITY OF THE WORLD.⁶³

THE EGO AND "PURE CONSCIOUSNESS"

THIS DEVELOPMENT RESOLVES INTO ANOTHER QUESTION: DOES HUSSERL CONCEIVE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AS AN OBJECT? SARTRE INSISTS THAT EVERY OBJECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS MUST BE OUTSIDE CONSCIOUSNESS OR IT WOULD BECOME A "SORT OF CENTER OF OPACITY."⁶⁴ BUT HUSSERL HAS STATED: "WE SHALL NEVER STUMBLE ACROSS THE PURE EGO AS AN EXPERIENCE AMONG OTHERS WITHIN THE FLUX OF MANIFOLD EXPERIENCES; IT MANIFESTS ITSELF BY 'SHOOTING FORTH' AFRESH WITH EACH NEW EXPERIENCE AS IT COMES AND DISAPPEARING WITH IT. BUT THE EGO REMAINS SELF-IDENTICAL."⁶⁵

HOWEVER ILLOGICAL THIS DESCRIPTION IS, IT IS DESCRIPTION AND NOT DEDUCTION. IF, HOWEVER, IT IS ACCEPTABLE THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR OBSERVATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS THROUGH THE COGITO, THE "I THINK," THEN THE DESCRIPTION MIGHT BE VERY DIFFERENT. THE COGITO, TIED TO REFLEXION BY ITS VERY NATURE CAN NEVER OBSERVE A PRESENT OR ACTING CONSCIOUSNESS EVEN THOUGH IT IS ONE ITSELF. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COGITO IS IRREVOCABLE IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF HUSSERL AS BEING THE ONE APODICTIC FACT WHICH THE WHOLE METHOD RESTS UPON. SARTRE IN ATTACKING THE EGO, ATTACKS THE HUSSERLIAN COGITO AT THE SAME TIME.

⁶³1, p. 131.
⁶⁴TE, p. 41.
⁶⁵1, p. 156.

IT IS NECESSARY TO SHOW THE REASONS FOR THE USE OF A TRANSCENDENTAL
EGO BY HUSSERL:

ONLY THROUGH ACTS OF EXPERIENCING AS REFLECTED ON DO WE KNOW
ANYTHING OF THE STREAM OF EXPERIENCE AND OF ITS NECESSARY
RELATIONSHIP TO THE PURE EGO.⁶⁶

.....
NOW IF PHENOMENOLOGY ALSO HAS NO EXISTENTIAL JUDGEMENTS TO MAKE
CONCERNING EXPERIENCES . . . IT MAKES NONETHELESS, A FUNDAMENTAL
CONDITION OF ITS POSSIBLY POSITIVE AFFIRMATIONS CONCERNING UNRE-
FLECTIVE EXPERIENCES. THESE IT OWES TO REFLEXION.⁶⁷

HUSSERL ANSWERS THOSE WHO DOUBT THAT REFLECTION IS VALID KNOWLEDGE OF
CONSCIOUSNESS IN AN ACCURATE WAY, THAT THE DOUBT OF REFLECTION'S ACCURACY
AND VALIDITY IS ABSURD SINCE ONE MUST USE REFLECTION TO MAKE THE STATEMENT
OF DOUBT. IF SUCH DOUBT WERE NECESSARILY MAINTAINED, "THERE WOULD NOT
REMAIN THE SLIGHTEST JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CERTAINTY THAT AN UNREFLECTIVE
EXPERIENCE OR A REFLEXION EXISTS OR CAN EXIST AT ALL."⁶⁸ SINCE THIS DOUBT
RESOLVES INTO COMPLETE SKEPTICISM AND THE CLEAR INTUITION OF THE COGITO DOES
NOT ALLOW THIS POSITION, THEN HUSSERL FEELS JUSTIFIED IN MAKING THE FOLLOW-
ING CATEGORICAL STATEMENT: "EVERY COGITO, EVERY ACT, IN A SPECIALLY MARKED
SENSE, IS CHARACTERIZED AS ACT OF THE EGO, PROCEEDING FROM THE EGO, ACTUALLY
LIVING IN IT."⁶⁹

AND BECAUSE THE EGO IS SO INTRINSIC TO CONSCIOUSNESS OR UNAVOIDABLE
IN THIS SENSE, HUSSERL FINDS NO DISCONNECTING CAN REMOVE THE FORM OF THE
COGITO AND CANCEL THE "PURE" SUBJECT OF THE ACT.⁷⁰ IN EFFECT, HUSSERL MAKES
THE "I" AS ABSOLUTE AS CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE SO, SINCE HE SAYS
THE "EGO IS STILL NOTHING THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN FOR ITSELF AND MADE INTO AN
OBJECT OF INQUIRY ON ITS OWN ACCOUNT . . . IT IS IN AND FOR ITSELF

⁶⁶ |, p. 203.

⁶⁷ |, p. 209.

⁶⁸ |, p. 209.

⁶⁹ |, p. 213.

⁷⁰ |, p. 214.

INDESCRIBABLE."⁷¹ YET, AFTER THIS DOGMATIC STATEMENT, HE THEN DESCRIBES THE FUNCTION OF THE EGO IN THIS WAY, "A GLANCING RAY FROM THE PURE EGO IS DIRECTED UPON THE OBJECT OF THE CORRELATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS, AND ENJOYS THE TYPICALLY VARIED CONSCIOUSNESS OF IT."⁷² THE PROBLEM OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL "I" IN PHENOMENOLOGY CONTINUES TO MAKE PROBLEMS IN HUSSERL'S DESCRIPTIONS, PROBLEMS THAT SARTRE SOUGHT TO AVOID IN WRITING HIS CRITIQUE IN THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EGO.

A SUMMARY OF THE CRITIQUE

SARTRE AGREES TO THE APODICTICITY OR UNQUESTIONABLENESS OF THE COGITO, "IT IS INDEED FROM THE COGITO THAT EGOLGY MUST TAKE ITS POINT OF DEPARTURE."⁷³ SARTRE REACHES HIS POINT OF DEPARTURE WITH THE COGITO IN A MODIFIED FORM AFTER A FEW BRIEF OBSERVATIONS: "ALL THOSE WHO HAVE DESCRIBED THE COGITO HAVE DEALT WITH IT AS A REFLECTIVE OPERATION" AND IN THIS OPERATION "THERE IS AN INDISSOLUBLE UNITY OF THE REFLECTING CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE REFLECTED CONSCIOUSNESS . . . ONE OF WHICH IS CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE OTHER." THEN, SARTRE STATES, THE REFLECTING CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT AN OBJECT FOR ITSELF, BUT "WHAT IT AFFIRMS CONCERNS THE REFLECTED CONSCIOUSNESS . . . ALL REFLECTING CONSCIOUSNESS IS, INDEED IN ITSELF UNREFLECTED, AND A NEW ACT OF THE THIRD DEGREE IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO POSIT IT (THE I)."⁷⁴ UPON INVESTIGATION OF THE COGITO TO ANSWER THE QUESTION: IS THE "I" GIVEN FULLY IN THE REFLECTED CONSCIOUSNESS? SARTRE CLAIMS THE "I" IS NOT GIVEN AS A CONCRETE MOMENT, A PERISHABLE STRUCTURE OF MY ACTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS. ON THE CONTRARY, THE "I" AFFIRMS ITS PERMANENCE BEYOND THIS CONSCIOUSNESS AND ALL CONSCIOUSNESS.⁷⁵ THEN, FOR THE MAIN POINT SARTRE CONCLUDES:

⁷¹I, p. 214.

⁷²I, p. 273.

⁷³TE, p. 43.

⁷⁴TE, p. 44.

⁷⁵TE, p. 50.

THE 'I' OF THE COGITO IS AN OBJECT GRASPED WITH NEITHER APODEICTIC SINCE BY SAYING 'I' WE AFFIRM FAR MORE THAN WE KNOW. IT IS NOT ADEQUATE, FOR THE 'I' IS PRESENTED AS AN OPAQUE REALITY WHOSE CONTENT WOULD HAVE TO BE UNFOLDED.⁷⁶

THIS SHARP CRITICISM DOES NOT ANNIHILATE THE "I" ABOUT WHICH SARTRE MAKES THE FOLLOWING DESCRIPTION:

FIRST, THE 'I' IS EXISTENT. THE 'I' GIVES ITSELF AS TRANSCENDENT. SECOND, THE 'I' PREFERS ITSELF TO AN INTUITION OF A SPECIAL KIND WHICH APPREHENDS IT, ALWAYS ADEQUATELY. THIRD, THE 'I' NEVER APPEARS EXCEPT ON THE OCCASION OF THE REFLECTIVE ACT. FOURTH, THE TRANSCENDENT 'I' MUST FALL BEFORE THE STROKE OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION.⁷⁷

AT THIS STAGE IN SARTRE'S DEVELOPMENT, HE WOULD NOT STATE THAT THE TRANSCENDENTAL "I" OF THE "I THINK" DID NOT BELONG TO ANY CATEGORY OF EXISTENCE. YET, HE ASSERTED, "WE HAVE TRIED TO SHOW THAT AN 'I' IS NEVER PURELY FORMAL, THAT IT IS ALWAYS, EVEN WHEN CONCEIVED ABSTRACTLY, AN INFINITE CONTRACTION OF THE MATERIAL "ME."⁷⁸ IT IS A BASIC TASK OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD TO BE ABLE TO DESCRIBE AND ANALYZE CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT THE NEED FOR A TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AND, EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, ACCORDING TO SARTRE, TO USE THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO DOOMS PHENOMENOLOGY TO ULTIMATE FAILURE. JOHN WILD COMMENTS ON THIS DIRECTION OF WHAT HE CALLS "NEW" PHENOMENOLOGY, OF PRESENT, NOT REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUS ACTS:

WE ARE NOT AWARE OF OURSELVES AND THE WORLD WHICH WE INHABIT, BUT RATHER OF A CERTAIN OBJECTIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THINGS WITHIN THE WORLD. WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN RECENT PHENOMENOLOGY IS THE INTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THAT GERM OF SELF CONSCIOUSNESS WHICH WE ANALYZE NOT AFTER THE ACT, BUT IN THE VERY ACT AS IT PROCEEDS.⁷⁹

THE METHODOLOGICAL NEED FOR THE EGO

THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM, WHICH SEEMS NOT TO HAVE BEEN STRESSED, APPEARS TO BE METHODOLOGICAL IN NATURE. HUSSERL, AS A TRANSCENDENTAL

⁷⁶ TE, p. 51.

⁷⁷ TE, p. 51.

⁷⁸ TE, p. 54.

⁷⁹ JOHN WILD, "CONTEMPORARY PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE PROBLEMS OF EXISTENCE," PPR, XX, (SEPTEMBER, 1959), PP. 163-178.

PHENOMENOLOGIST, INSTITUTED THE PURE EGO ON THE BASIS OF HIS METHOGENIC NEED FOR IT IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER: FIRST, THE CARTESIAN COGITO ALWAYS INVOLVES REFLECTIVE AND, AS A MATTER OF "ESSENTIAL INSIGHT," THE "I" ALWAYS ACCOMPANIES THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF OBJECTS REVEALED IN REFLECTION. EXPLAINING THE PRESENCE OF THIS EGO, ONCE IT IS DESCRIBED AS NECESSARILY BEING IN THE REFLECTED CONSCIOUSNESS AS A PART OF THE REFLECTIVE METHODOLOGICAL TECHNIQUE, IS NOT PURELY OR SIMPLY DONE ON A DESCRIPTIVE LEVEL. CONSEQUENTLY FOR HUSSERL IT MUST BE ESTABLISHED THAT THE PURE EGO IS SELF-IDENTICAL INVOLVES AN INFINITY OF PURE EGOS TO BE JUSTIFIED AS A SECOND REASON FOR ADVANCING PURE EGO. IF THE EGO IS SELF-IDENTICAL, THEN THIRDLY IT SURELY CANNOT BE CONSTITUTED BY CONSCIOUSNESS EACH TIME THE COGITO IS INVOLVED, SO IT MUST BE TRANSCENDENT. THE TRANSCENDENCE CANNOT BE THE SAME KIND AS THE OBJECTIVE WORLD BECAUSE, AS THE IMMINENCE OF THE EGO, IT HAS THE CHARACTERISTIC OF "ALWAYS BEING THERE" WHEN REFLECTION OCCURS. IT IS MAINTAINED BY MARVIN FARBER THAT THESE REASONS FOR ESTABLISHING THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO ARE PRIMARILY DUE TO THE METHODOLOGICAL AIMS OF HUSSERL AND ONLY SECONDARILY DOES IT SERVE HIS EPISTEMOLOGICAL AIMS. FURTHER, FARBER COMMENTS THAT EVEN "TRANSCENDENCE IS A TERM WITH WHICH TO CONJURE . . . WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRICTLY A METHODOLOGICAL TERM BEFORE LONG BECOMES A TERM OF DISPARAGEMENT FOR A MERELY NATURALISTIC OR FACTUAL REALM."⁸⁰ THE POINT TO EMPHASIZE IN FARBER'S OPINION IS THAT THERE IS A DEGREE OF METHODOLOGICAL REASON FOR THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO BEING DEVELOPED IN HUSSERL'S WORK. FARBER POINTS OUT THE DANGER OF DEVELOPING A METHODOLOGICAL STEP AND THEN FORGETTING THAT IT IS METHODOLOGICAL.

THIS "PREDICAMENT" IS NOT APPRECIATED AS SUCH BY SARTRE'S REPLY OR CRITIQUE OF IT, WHEN HE FAILS TO RECOGNIZE IT IN HIS WRITING AS A PROBLEM

⁸⁰ MARVIN FARBER, NATURALISM AND SUBJECTIVISM, (SPRINGFIELD, ILL.: C. C. THOMAS Co., 1959), p. 263.

OF METHOD. TO THE EXTENT THAT HE DEALS WITH A CRITIQUE OF THE TRANS-
CENDENTAL EGO AS A METHODOLOGICAL ISSUE, SARTRE SEEMS TO BE SUCCESSFUL;
BUT THE ESTABLISHING OF THE NEW HYPOTHESIS THAT "THE TYPE OF EXISTENCE OF
CONSCIOUSNESS" IS TO BE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ITSELF, DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE AS
WELL FOUNDED. THE PREMISE IS A BASIC STATEMENT OF THE EXISTENTIAL THEME
OF AWARENESS OF EXISTENCE, PRIOR TO ESSENTIAL UNDERSTANDING, WHICH SARTRE
MUST UTILIZE IN AMENDING THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES TO SUIT HIS OWN
AIMS IN PHILOSOPHY. HOWEVER, SARTRE DOES NOT EVALUATE THIS PREMISE IN
ITS METHODOLOGICAL IMPORT, BUT STATES IT AS A SELF-EVIDENT FACT. NEITHER
DOES SARTRE GIVE AN INDICATION THAT THIS IS THE SAME DEGREE OF SELF-EVIDENCE
AS THAT ON WHICH THE COGITO OF HUSSERL IS BASED. SARTRE HAS NOT FOLLOWED
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS "TRUTH" AS HE HAS
DONE IN HIS SUPPORT OF HUSSERL'S SELF-EVIDENCE OF THE "I THINK." HE DOES
NOT MAKE OF THE PROPOSITION, "CONSCIOUSNESS IS BY ITS NATURE SELF-AWARENESS,"
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL OBJECT TO STUDY. SINCE MERE AWARENESS IS NOT A POSITION
FROM WHICH OBSERVATION AND DESCRIPTION CAN OCCUR, THERE IS A VITAL PROBLEM
AREA IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SARTRE'S NEXT STEP IN HIS METHOD.

CHAPTER VII

THE COGITO AS A FOUNDATION FOR THE MODIFICATIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

PHENOMENOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES APPLIED TO EXISTENTIALISM

IN THE ESSAY, SARTRE'S DESCRIPTION OF THE EGO AS NECESSARY FOR CONSCIOUSNESS REVEALS THE SIGNIFICANCE HE PLACED ON INTENTIONALITY. SARTRE STUDIES THE EGO AS AN INTENTIONAL OBJECT AND, IN EFFECTING THE COGITO, FINDS THAT:

THIS 'I' IS A FORM OF IDEAL CONNECTION, A WAY OF AFFIRMING THAT THE COGITO IS INDEED THE SAME FORM AS DOUBT . . . THE COGITO IS GIVEN AT ONCE AS THE LOGICAL RESULT OF DOUBT AND AS THAT WHICH PUTS AN END TO DOUBT.⁸¹

THE COGITO HAS BECOME, FOR SARTRE, AN INTENTIONAL OBJECT BUT, IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM WHAT VANTAGE POINT THE REFLECTIVE ACT CAN BE STUDIED WHEN IT IS MAINTAINED AS THE STARTING POINT. SARTRE ANSWERS THIS QUESTION WITH A TECHNIQUE SUPPOSED TO REPLACE THE REFLECTIVE METHOD:

CONSCIOUSNESS MUST NOT BE POSITED AS AN OBJECT OF REFLECTION. ON THE CONTRARY, I MUST DIRECT MY ATTENTION TO THE REVIVED OBJECTS, BUT WITHOUT LOSING SIGHT OF THE UNREFLECTED CONSCIOUSNESS, BY JOINING IN A SORT OF CONSPIRACY WITH IT AND DRAWING UP AN INVENTORY OF ITS CONTENTS IN A NON-POSITIONAL MANNER.⁸²

OF THIS TECHNIQUE JOHN WILD SAYS THAT IN THE CONSCIOUS ACT, "UNFORTUNATELY IT HAS BEEN CLEARLY SHOWN THAT IN MY PERSONAL EXISTENCE, I AM A LIVING BIAS, OPENING INTO A MOVING WORLD HORIZON THAT IS FILLED WITH

⁸¹TE, p. 92.
⁸²TE, p. 46.

AMBIGUITY . . . AND THEREFORE, BEARING WITH IT A CERTAIN RISK."⁸³ TO AVOID AN EXTENSION OF THAT RISK, THE GERM OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS MUST BE MEANT IN A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT WAY THAN THE TERM USED BY HUSSERL. FOR THIS, SARTRE HAS TAKEN THE FIRST, MOST CRITICAL STEP, IN HIS ADJUSTMENT OF METHOD WITH THIS NEW NON-REFLECTIVE RECLAMATION OF THE COGITO. CAN THERE BE A REAL JUSTIFICATION ON EITHER A METAPHYSICAL OR EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS FOR THIS NEW STEP UPON WHICH THE MAJOR CHANGE FROM PHENOMENOLOGY TO EXISTENTIALISM COULD BE SAID TO TAKE PLACE? AN ANALYSIS OF THE FOUNDATIONAL PASSAGE FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS BOTH AS THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO AND AS A NON-THETIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF AN OBJECT WILL REVEAL SARTRE'S TWO-FOLD ATTEMPT TO BASE THIS CONCEPT UPON ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL GROUNDS.

SARTRE FIRST ARGUES AGAINST THE "ILLUSION OF THE PRIMACY OF KNOWLEDGE," WHICH CAN ONLY LEAD, ACCORDING TO HIM, EITHER TO THE SUBJECT-OBJECT DUALISM OF THE KNOWER-KNOWN, CONTINUALLY INVOLVING A THIRD "NON-SELF-CONSCIOUS REFLECTION" OR TO EVOLVE AN INFINITE REGRESS OF KNOWER-KNOWN, KNOWER-KNOWN, ETC. SINCE THIS ARGUMENT ON THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL LEVEL CANNOT BE INITIALLY SUCCESSFUL, SARTRE PROPOSES TO START WITH "AN IMMEDIATE NON-COGNITIVE RELATION OF THE SELF TO ITSELF." THIS RELATION IS ONLY HALF OF THE POSTULATE WHICH SARTRE IS PROPOSING. THE NON-COGNITIVE RELATION OF SELF TO ITSELF, NEITHER ONTOLOGICALLY NOR EPISTEMOLOGICALLY ORIGINATED, BUT MORE ACCURATELY, SARTRE FINDS IT ON THE ONTIC OR CONCRETE-EXPERIENCE LEVEL. NEXT, SARTRE ATTEMPTS TO SATISFY THE ONTOLOGICAL POSTULATING OF THIS RELATION BY REPHRASING IT THUS: "EVERY POSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF AN OBJECT IS AT THE SAME TIME A NON-POSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF ITSELF."⁸⁴

⁸³WILD, P. 168.

⁸⁴BN, P. 1.

IN AN ATTEMPT TO REACH THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS, TO ESTABLISH FURTHER THE DEFINITION THAT SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IS A PRE-CONDITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOMETHING, SARTRE REINFORCES HUSSERL'S STRICTEST DEFINITION OF INTENTIONALITY: "THE BEING OF THE INTENTIONALITY CAN ONLY BE CONSCIOUSNESS" AND "PLEASURE CANNOT BE DISTINGUISHED--EVEN LOGICALLY--FROM CONSCIOUSNESS OF PLEASURE."⁸⁵ THESE STATEMENTS REITERATE THE MOTTO: "BACK TO THE THINGS THEMSELVES" AND THEY LEAD TO A FOLLOW-THROUGH OF HUSSERL'S CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY. INTENTIONAL OBJECTS ARE NOT MERE REPRESENTATIONS OF SUBSTANCES AND CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT JUST A REVEALING QUALITY OF OBJECTIVE REALITY. AGAIN, PLEASURE, FOR INSTANCE, "IS THE BEING OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THIS SELF CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE LAW OF BEING OF PLEASURE."⁸⁶ THIS STATEMENT IS CERTAINLY NOT ONE OF IDENTITY AND IS IN FACT CLOTHED IN AN OPACITY FOR IT LATER BECOMES EVIDENT THAT THE "LAW OF THE BEING OF PLEASURE" MEANS THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE CONDITION FOR REVEALING SELF-CONSCIOUS PLEASURE. BEING IS REVEALED THROUGH EXISTENCE OF THE NON-POSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS. FURTHER, IN THE WORDS OF GRIMSLEY:

NOW THROUGH THIS SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS HAS A BEING OF ITS OWN, IT CAN BE CONSTITUTED AND REVEALED TO ITSELF ONLY BY REFERENCE TO A PREVIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS DIRECTED OUTWARD ON TO A REALITY OTHER THAN ITSELF."⁸⁷

SEVERAL OF HUSSERL'S MOST BASIC CONCEPTS HAVE BEEN ALTERED IN SARTRE'S DISCUSSION SO FAR. INTENTIONALITY, WHICH WAS AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISTINCTION FOR HUSSERL, HAS BEEN CHANGED BY SARTRE TO THE SELF-CONSCIOUS-CONSCIOUSNESS-OF (OBJECT) SYNDROME: ONTOLOGICAL, INTENTIONALITY IS FOR SARTRE A CONDITION OF THE BEING OF ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. ANOTHER DISTINCTION HAS GROWN OUT OF SARTRE'S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL'S USE OF THE COGITO, BESIDES

⁸⁵BN, P. IIV.

⁸⁶BN, P. I.V.

⁸⁷GRIMSLEY, P. 95.

THE REFLECTIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE COGITO AS BEING CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOMETHING, THERE IS NOW ANOTHER ONTOLOGICALLY NECESSARY PART OF CONSCIOUSNESS CALLED THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO WHICH HAS BECOME THE "CONDITION OF THE CARTESIAN COGITO." NOT ONLY IS THE PRE-REFLECTIVE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS A PRECONDITION, BUT ALSO THE OBJECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS (INTENTIONALITY) IS A PRE-CONDITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

SARTRE'S ALTERATION OF INTENTIONALITY TO BENEFIT MORE EXPLICITLY THE ONTOLOGICAL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE STRUCTURES OF CONSCIOUSNESS HAS ITS GENERATION IN SARTRE'S METHODOLOGICAL INTENT. BUT THERE REMAINS ONE MAJOR STEP IN THE METHOD OF HUSSERL THAT HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED IN ITS PERTINENCE TO SARTRE'S DEVELOPMENT, ESPECIALLY THE HUSSERLIAN USE OF EPOCHÉ¹ OR REDUCTION.

THE ISSUE OF EPOCHÉ¹ IN EXISTENTIALISM

WILFRID DESAN COMMENTS THAT ALL OF THE MAJOR EXISTENTIALISTS REJECT THE PRINCIPLE OF EPOCHÉ¹ BECAUSE "EXISTENCE IS THERE AS A BACKGROUND IN ITS BRUTAL FACTICITY, IT OUGHT NOT EITHER TO BE PROVED OR PUT BETWEEN BRACKETS, BUT SIMPLY CLOTHED WITH MEANING AND SIGNIFICATION."⁸⁸ BUT THIS STATEMENT ITSELF INDICATES A REDUCTION TO THE "BACKGROUND." ACTUALLY, SARTRE'S FIRST STATEMENTS, IN THIS INTRODUCTION, INDICATE THE USE OF REDUCTION, EVEN THOUGH THESE STATEMENTS ARE NOT PRESENTED AS A PART OF METHOD PER SE.

LET US UNDERSTAND INDEED THAT OUR THEORY OF PHENOMENON HAS REPLACED THE REALITY OF THE THING BY THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE PHENOMENON AND THAT IT HAS BASED THIS ON AN APPEAL TO INFINITY.

COLLINS NOTES THAT:

CONTRARY TO HUSSERL, SARTRE DOES NOT REGARD THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION AS A HIGHLY SPECIALIZED TECHNIQUE, LIMITED TO A FEW

⁸⁸ WILFRID DESAN, THE TRAGIC FINALE: AN ESSAY ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, (NEW YORK: HARPER, 1960), P. 7.

EXPERTS AND BASED MAINLY ON AN INTELLECTUAL DISCIPLINE. IT IS A MATTER OF HAVING THE COURAGE TO FACE WHAT LIES BEHIND THE SELF, AND SUCH COURAGE IS WITHIN THE GRASP OF US ALL.⁸⁹

THIS EVALUATION OF SARTRE'S OPINIONS ABOUT REDUCTION BEARS SIGNIFICANTLY UPON NATANSON'S CRITICISM IN REFERENCE TO THE USE OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE. BY WAY OF CLARIFICATION, COLLINS EXPLAINS THAT THERE IS INDEED A TYPE OF "REDUCTION" INVOLVED, EVEN THOUGH USED IN A BROADER SENSE, ONE OF EXISTENTIALLY REALIZING THE IMPERSONALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. ACCORDING TO HIS ARGUMENT, IT IS IMPLIED THAT SARTRE INTENDS THAT A FACING OF PREPOSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS IS A FOCUS OF CONCENTRATION SIMILAR TO HUSSERL'S STEPS TO REACH THE "EIDETIC REALM." IN A FOOTNOTE, HOWEVER, COLLINS REFERS TO NATANSON'S THESIS THAT SARTREAN METHOD IS NOT HUSSERLIAN, AND SUPPORTS THE OPINION:

THERE IS AN UNRESOLVED TENSION IN SARTRE'S THOUGHT BETWEEN AN EFFORT TO MAKE AN EVEN MORE RADICAL AND 'PURIFIED' ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS THAN DID HUSSERL AND EQUALLY STRONG DESIRE TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ADVANTAGE OF ORDINARY PERSPECTIVES.⁹⁰

NATANSON CLAIMS THAT SARTRE'S PROOF OF THESE POINTS ARE NOT PHENOMENOLOGICAL BUT ARE:

PSYCHOLOGICAL, NEARLY MYSTICAL, AND ONTIC SORT OF DEMONSTRABILITY. THIS FORM OF DEMONSTRATION IS QUASI-PHENOMENOLOGICAL, INsofar AS IT STEMS FROM THE HUSSERLIAN THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY, BUT IT IS NON-PHENOMENOLOGICAL INsofar AS IT TAKES ADVANTAGE OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE AS ITS PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION.⁹¹

THIS CRITICISM POINTS OUT SEVERAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING WHAT CAN BE LEGITIMATELY TERMED PHENOMENOLOGY AND WHAT CAN BE CALLED METHOD, AND HOW BROADLY THESE TWO TERMS CAN BE USED.

IN REPLY TO NATANSON, IT COULD BE MAINTAINED THAT: HUSSERL USED PSYCHOLOGICAL PROOFS; SOME OF HIS DESCRIPTIONS ARE MYSTICAL; IN IDEAS, HE

⁸⁹ COLLINS, PP. 53-54.

⁹⁰ COLLINS, P. 255.

⁹¹ MAURICE NATANSON, A CRITIQUE OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY, (LINCOLN, NEBRASKA: UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA STUDIES, NEW SERIES, 1951), P. 105.

CONTINUALLY COMPARES HIS POINTS WITH THE NATURAL ATTITUDE. ONE CAN FIND NO PLACE IN SARTRE'S PROLOGUE WHERE HE DEPENDS FOR PROOF UPON THE NATURAL ATTITUDE AS DEFINED BY HUSSERL.

THE STRIKING DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SARTREAN AND THE HUSSERLIAN EPOCHE¹ DOES NOT NECESSARILY RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR BOTH BEING PROPER STEPS IN A PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD. THE LATTER ABSTENTION CALLS FOR THE PHENOMENOLOGIST TO GIVE UP HIS "NATURAL ATTITUDE" AND REDUCE THE BASIS OF BELIEF TO THE MOST BASIC SELF-EVIDENT FACT - THE COGITO. FROM THIS COGITO, THE STUDY OF INTENTIONALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS GOES THROUGH REFLECTION, AND ACHIEVES THE EIDETIC REALM. SARTRE'S REDUCTION CALLS FOR THE SAME PRE-SUPPOSITIONLESS ATTITUDE, PLUS ONE FURTHER REDUCTION TO THE APPREHENSION OF THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO. NEXT, SARTRE'S METHOD REQUIRES A REDUCTION FROM THE BELIEF IN THE PRIMACY OF KNOWLEDGE, AND THE APPREHENSION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS IMPERSONAL, SPONTANEOUS EXISTENCE WHICH IMPLIES ITS OWN MODE OF BEING. THERE IS CERTAINLY JUSTIFICATION IN MAINTAINING THAT THIS REDUCTION IS MORE RIGOROUS THAN THAT OF HUSSERL, IN THAT IT GOES ONE STEP FURTHER IN THE PROCESS. THE PROBLEM IS NOT THAT SARTRE MAKES NO PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION, BUT THAT HE NOWHERE STATES THAT HE DOES. WITH ONLY A CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL'S REDUCTION, IT COULD BE QUITE EASILY ASSUMED THAT NO REDUCTION WOULD BE USED BY SARTRE.

THE DIFFICULTY IS NOT WHETHER SARTRE FOLLOWS HUSSERL, BUT WHETHER HIS MODIFICATIONS ARE PHENOMENOLOGICAL IN THE STRICT MEANING OF THE TERM. APART FROM COLLINS'S SUGGESTION THAT SARTRE CANNOT RESOLVE THE TENSION BETWEEN RIGID PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE NATURAL ATTITUDE, THE ISSUE INVOLVES, MORE BASICALLY, THE INDICATIONS FROM THE COMPILED EVIDENCE OF CHANGES IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES SARTRE MAKES AND, IF THESE CHANGES ARE

BASIC ENOUGH, IT WOULD BE TO WARRANT OSTRACIZING SARTRE FROM THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRADITION.

IN HIS COMPACT ARGUMENT FOR THE MODE OF BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS, SARTRE'S SERIES OF CONCLUDING COMMENTS REVEAL MUCH OF HIS METHOD: "THUS, BY ABANDONING THE PRIMACY OF KNOWLEDGE, WE HAVE DISCOVERED THE BEING OF THE KNOWER AND ENCOUNTERED THE ABSOLUTE . . ." ⁹² THE USE OF THE WORDS "DISCOVERED" AND "ENCOUNTERED" HAVE AN EXTREMELY SIGNIFICANT IMPORT IN REFERENCE TO METHOD. HAD SARTRE USED "DEDUCED," "INFERRED," "EVOLVED," ETC., HE COULD NOT POSSIBLY JUSTIFY HIS ARGUMENT. BY USING THESE TERMS, INDICATING THE REVELATORY NATURE OF HIS THEORY, SARTRE HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO EMPHASIZE THE REDUCTION HE HAS USED TO FOUND THE FIRST MODE OF BEING IN HIS ONTOLOGY AS HE SAYS, "THE ABSOLUTE HERE IS NOT THE RESULT OF A LOGICAL CONSTRUCTION ON THE GROUND OF KNOWLEDGE, BUT THE SUBJECT OF THE MOST CONCRETE OF EXPERIENCES." ⁹³ THAT EXPERIENCE IS THE APPEARANCE OF PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS AS EXISTENT, IS ACHIEVED BY ENTERING INTO A TYPE OF CONSPIRACY WITH IT. WHAT MUST BE BRACKETED IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THIS SORT OF EXPERIENCE IS THE PRIMACY OF KNOWLEDGE, THE COURAGE TO REALIZE WHAT LIES BEHIND EGO, THE FOCUS UPON PURE SUBJECTIVITY.

SARTRE MAKES THE FORMAL STEPS OF HUSSERL'S METHODOLOGY, PRIMARILY THOSE OF "INTENTION" AND "REDUCTION," CONFORM TO SUPPORT THE ONTOLOGICAL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO AS THE "REVEALER" OF BEING. THE NATURE OF "ONTOLOGICALLY REVEALING" AS A METHODOLOGICAL "FUNCTION," OR "TACTIC" IS ALSO A HUSSERLIAN EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEVICE WHICH SARTRE EMPLOYS FOR DESCRIBING THE CONDITIONS OF MODES OF BEING.

⁹²BN, p. 1111.

⁹³BN, p. 1vi.

CHAPTER VIII

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DERIVATION OF ONTOLOGIC PRINCIPLES

THE USE OF REVELATION OF METHOGENIC TECHNIQUE

THE DISCOVERY OF THE MODE OF EXISTENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO, OR FOR-ITSELF, IS A METHODOLOGICAL DEVICE TO BE USED TO REVEAL THE MODES OF BEING IN SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY. SO IT SEEMS, A REDUCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS TO ITS PUREST FORM REVEALS THAT ALL CONSCIOUSNESS OF APPEARANCES ARE ALSO SELF-AWARE THAT THEY ARE CONSCIOUS; AND, BECAUSE THEY ARE SELF-AWARE, THEIR FUNCTION OF APPREHENDING EXISTENCE THROUGH THE INTENTION OF OBJECTS IS THE REVELATION OF BEING. THE DIFFICULTY IN USING THE FOR-ITSELF AS THE "REVEALER" OF BEING IS THE FOUNDING STEP OF REVELATION OF THIS PRE-COGNITIVE SELF-AWARENESS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. SARTRE HAS SIMPLY STATED SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS WAS, IN THE VERY DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS, COUPLED WITH THE INTUITIVE SELF-EVIDENCE OF THE COGITO. THIS FOUNDING OF SELF-AWARENESS IS ACTUALLY BROUGHT ABOUT BY A METHOD QUITE DIFFERENT THAN THE METHOD THIS SELF-AWARENESS IN TURN BRINGS ABOUT. THE FIRST METHOD LIES IN AGREEMENT WITH COGITO'S SELF-EVIDENCE, A BORROWING FROM RATIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF DESCARTES AND HUSSERL BUT STRESSING THE EXISTENTIAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THAT APPREHENSION, RATHER THAN ITS ESSENTIALITY. THE EXISTENTIAL CLARITY OF THIS IMPERSONAL SUBJECTIVITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS GRASPED EXISTENTIALLY, BUT IT IS THEN GIVEN MEANING, ESSENCE, AS A MODE OF BEING WHICH SARTRE NEVER MAKES METHODICALLY CLEAR. CONSCIOUSNESS IS ALSO "REVEALED" AS THE REVEALING-REVEALED PROCESS.

THE BEING OF THE PHENOMENON

HAVING PLACED EVERYTHING OUTSIDE CONSCIOUSNESS BECAUSE CONSCIOUSNESS IS SPONTANEOUS AND "TRANSLUCENT" ACTIVITY, SARTRE NEXT SEEKS TO DISCOVER THE MEANING OF BEING IN THE INTENTIONAL OBJECT, THE PHENOMENA. THE DILEMMA WHICH HE CONFRONTS IS PRESENTED AS AN INABILITY TO FIND THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ONTOLOGICALLY ESTABLISHED CONSCIOUSNESS AND OBJECTIVITY. ON ONE HAND, SUBJECTIVITY IS ALL ACTIVITY AND SPONTANEITY AND "CANNOT ACT UPON ANYTHING," BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, PHENOMENON IS PASSIVE AND, BEING PASSIVE, CANNOT PERFORM ANY RELATING TO SOMETHING OTHER THAN ITSELF, WHICH WOULD IMPLY THAT CONSCIOUSNESS AND PHENOMENON MUST BE COMPLETELY ISOLATED. TO SUM UP:

THE PERCEIVED BEING IS BEFORE CONSCIOUSNESS AND, AS THE PERCEIVED BEING IS CUT OFF FROM CONSCIOUSNESS, IT EXISTS CUT OFF FROM ITS OWN EXISTENCE."⁹⁴

THE PRECISE MEANING OF THE PASSAGE WOULD PROVIDE A GREAT DEAL OF MATERIAL FOR SPECULATION IF SARTRE HAD NOT ADDED A FURTHER STATEMENT TELLING WHAT IT MEANT. HE CONCLUDES, "THE TRANSPHENOMENAL BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS CANNOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR THE TRANSPHENOMENAL BEING OF THE PHENOMENON."⁹⁵ SARTRE PROPOSES A PROOF THAT THE ABOVE CAN BE COUNTERED AND DISPROVED AND ACHIEVED ALTHOUGH IN A NON-IDEALISTIC WAY: THE USE OF THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO AS A REVEALER. THERE ARE ONLY TWO ALTERNATIVES IN INTERPRETING THE MEANING OF "CONSCIOUSNESS IS CONSCIOUSNESS OF SOMETHING," SARTRE CLAIMS, AND THE FIRST "CONSCIOUSNESS IS CONSTITUTIVE OF THE BEING OF ITS OBJECT" WHICH LEADS TO IDEALISM OR TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM. THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE IS THAT "CONSCIOUSNESS, IN ITS INNERMOST NATURE, IS A RELATION TO A TRANSCENDENT BEING" WHICH SARTRE MAINTAINS IS THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION. IT IS IN THE DEFINITION OF THE INTENTIONAL NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS TO BE "BORN

⁹⁴BN, p. IX.
⁹⁵BN, p. IX.

SUPPORTED BY A BEING WHICH IS NOT ITSELF."⁹⁶ IN OTHER WORDS, SARTRE DISCOVERED THAT THE MEANING OF THE COGITO AS AN EXISTENT WAS IN ITS REVELATORY FUNCTION. SUCH A FUNCTION CAN ONLY BE CONTINGENT UPON WHATEVER IT REVEALS AS BEING; THEREFORE, WHAT IT REVEALS MUST BE A TRANSCENDENT BEING OF WHICH IT IS CONTINGENT. THE SIMPLE KNOWLEDGE THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS REVELATION, THAT ITSELF REVEALS THE BEING OF THE PHENOMENON. TO SARTRE, REVEALING BEING AND GIVING IT MEANING ARE DISTINCTLY SEPARATE ACTIONS. IN ONE PLACE SARTRE INDICATES THAT CONSCIOUSNESS HAS, THROUGH HIS PROOF, REVEALED THE BEING OF PHENOMENA OR APPEARANCES AND, IN ANOTHER PLACE, THAT IT HAS REVEALED THE TRANSPHENOMENAL BEING-IN-ITSELF.

YET SARTRE STATES THAT IT IS THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS TO "PASS BEYOND THE EXISTENT, NOT TOWARD ITS BEING, BUT TOWARD THE MEANING OF THIS BEING."⁹⁷ IT SEEMS THAT SARTRE'S STATEMENT VERY SIGNIFICANTLY INTRODUCES THE EIDETIC FIELD BASED, IN THIS NEW APPROACH, UPON EXISTENTIAL SELF-AWARENESS, WHICH IS A REVERSAL FROM THE HUSSERLIAN TACTIC OF REDUCING EXPERIENCE TO THAT FIELD. SARTRE'S METHOD OF REACHING ESSENCES THROUGH THE "REVEALING NATURE OF PRE-REFLECTION" DOES NOT NECESSARILY CALL FOR ABANDONING THE DESCRIPTION OF ESSENCES THROUGH REFLECTION. ALTHOUGH SARTRE MAKES NO EXPLICIT STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS IS A STREAMLINED REPLACEMENT FOR REFLECTION AS AN OUTMODED FORM OF GRASPING ESSENCES IN THEIR PRIMORDIAN GIVENESS, THERE IS A GENERAL INDICATION THAT SARTRE SEES REFLECTIVE INTUITING AND THE WHOLE HUSSERLIAN SYSTEM OF REDUCTIONS AS CUMBERSOME FOR HIS PURPOSES. DOING AWAY WITH THE RATHER SUPERFLUOUS METHODOLOGY OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTIONS LEAVES OTHER METHODOLOGICAL STEPS, WHICH HAD BEEN RULED OUT BY THE REDUCTIONS, AGAIN

⁹⁶BN, p. 1xi.

⁹⁷BN, p. 1xiii.

AVAILABLE. SARTRE, BY DISCARDING THE FORM OF REDUCTIONS PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED, IS FREE TO EXPAND UPON OTHER USEFUL TECHNIQUES. A SIMPLIFICATION OF THE METHOD USED TO ESTABLISH BOTH THE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE BEING OF PHENOMENON IS, LARGELY IN THE "PURSUIT OF BEING," A STRICT ANALYSIS OF THE MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS. BUT, IN ADDITION, THE ANALYSIS HAS A GREAT DEAL TO DO WITH THE PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES OF THE PAST, AND A CLOSE CRITIQUE ON MAJOR POINTS IN HUSSERL,⁹⁸ BUT THE BASIC FOUNDING INTUITIONS PRESENTED SEEM TO BE DERIVED DEDUCTIVELY FROM DEFINITION RATHER THAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION. NATANSON'S STATEMENT THAT THE INTRODUCTION IS ALL THAT IS PHENOMENOLOGICAL IN BEING AND NOTHINGNESS, DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE BORN OUT BY EVIDENCE. SARTRE SPEAKS OF HUSSERL'S KEY TERMS AND ESTABLISHES HIS OWN, BUT WITH VERY LITTLE PRACTICE IN THE INNOVATED PHENOMENOLOGY ITSELF.⁹⁹

IN STUDYING THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS, ESPECIALLY IN TERMS OF HIS USE OF THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO, SARTRE COULD DESCRIBE ITS MODE OF BEING IN A SOMEWHAT PHENOMENOLOGICAL WAY IF HE PRESENTED A METHOD BY WHICH EACH READER COULD PROJECT SIMILAR INSTANCES. THE PRESENTATION, INSOFAR AS IT DEVELOPED THIS INTUITION, GRANTING CERTAIN REDUCTIONS BE PERFORMED, WAS CONCRETE, AND LITERARY IF SIMONE DE BEAVOIR IS CORRECT WHEN SHE STATES, "SARTRE CAN, IT SEEMS, AMALGAMATE THESE TWO IN HIS ONTOLOGY AT TIMES WHICH INDICATE A UNIQUENESS IN METHOD."¹⁰⁰ THE REMAINDER OF HIS PHILOSOPHICAL WORK ACHIEVES AT TIMES THE SUCCESSFUL USAGE OF THIS REFORMED PHENOMENOLOGY. THE FOLLOWING PERTINENT STATEMENT ELUCIDATES JUST WHAT THE SUBJECT FOR AN

⁹⁸ SPIEGELBERG, THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT, P. 603.

⁹⁹ NATANSON, CRITIQUE, P. 70.

¹⁰⁰ DESAN, P. 47.

ONTOLOGY IS AND HOW IT IS TO BE DEALT WITH:

THERE IS NO BEING WHICH IS NOT THE BEING, A CERTAIN MODE OF BEING, NONE WHICH CANNOT BE APPREHENDED THROUGH THE MODE OF BEING WHICH MANIFESTS BEING AND VEILS IT AT THE SAME TIME. CONSCIOUSNESS CAN ALWAYS PASS BEYOND THE EXISTENT, NOT TOWARD ITS BEING, BUT TOWARD THE MEANING OF THIS BEING.¹⁰¹

HERE IS AN EXAMPLE OF SARTRE'S STYLE OF AMBIGUITY ABOUT WHICH MORE WILL BE DISCUSSED LATER, BUT THE FIRST SENTENCE IS ENTIRELY CLARIFIED BY THE SECOND, CONSCIOUSNESS DOES NOT ACTUALLY "MANIFEST BEING" BUT REVEALS THE "MEANING OF THE BEING." THE AMBIGUITY OF SARTRE'S EXPLANATIONS PERHAPS MIGHT BE JUSTIFIED AS JEAN WAHL JUSTIFIES HIS PHILOSOPHICAL PREDECESSORS AT THE COLLEGE DE PARIS IN HIS INAUGURAL SPEECH, CITED EARLIER.

IN SARTRE'S RADICAL APPROACH TO ONTOLOGY, AMBIGUITY IS PRESENT MORE AS A FORM OF STYLE THAN IT IS AN INSTRUMENTAL PART OF METHOD AS THE ABOVE QUOTE INDICATES. THE MAJOR AMBIGUITIES WILL BE BROUGHT OUT AS THE DISCUSSION OF ONTOLOGICAL METHOD PROGRESSES. IT IS CLEAR THAT IN THE ABOVE QUOTED EXAMPLE, SARTRE COULD EQUALLY AS WELL HAVE DESCRIBED THE RELATION OF THE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS TO THE BEING OF PHENOMENON IN A CLEAR MANNER SINCE, IN THE SECOND SENTENCE, HE CLARIFIED THE FIRST. IT MAY BE PREMATURE TO EVALUATE THIS USE OF AMBIGUITY IN SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY, BUT IT MAY BE NOTED THAT IT ALLOWS, EVEN CALLS FOR, DELIBERATION BY THE READER AS TO ITS PRECISE MEANING. THERE IS A QUALITY IN THIS AMBIGUITY THAT TRANSCENDS STRICTLY LOGICAL THOUGHT, THEREFORE IT MAY POSSIBLY BE A WAY OF PREPARING THE READER FOR MANY OF THE ONTOLOGICAL STATEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT LOGICALLY FOUNDED BUT ARE EXPRESSIONS OF THE PRIMORDIAL INTUITIVE AWARENESS OF BEING WHICH SARTRE SEEKS TO REVEAL.

¹⁰¹BN, P. 1XIII.

ON FRENCH INFLUENCE

ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN ABSENT FROM THE PREVIOUS DISCUSSION. WHILE HUSSERL'S METHOD HAS BEEN CRITICIZED AND CHANGED IN ITS MAJOR CONCEPTS BY SARTRE, IT WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO STATE THAT THE BASIC PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH IS THE ONLY METHOD SARTRE UTILIZES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS METHODOLOGY. OTHER PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED TO THE EFFECT THAT SARTRE FOLLOWS THE FRENCH TRADITION MORE CLOSELY THAN IT HAS BEEN GENERALLY RECOGNIZED. HERBERT SPIEGELBERG CONNECTS THE GERMANIC AND GALLIC INFLUENCES IN THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

SARTRE'S BOOK REFLECTS THE VOGUE OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY IN FRANCE IN THE MIDDLE '30s. HOWEVER, IN SARTRE'S CASE IT AFFECTS MORE HIS FORMATIONS THAN HIS SUBSTANTIAL CONCLUSIONS, MUCH AS HEGELIAN MOTIFS CAN BE SPOTTED FOR INSTANCE IN HIS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE PERIOD.¹⁰²

NOR IS THE HEGELIAN INFLUENCE THE ONLY ONE ATTRIBUTED TO SARTRE'S BACKGROUND. THE FRENCH SPIRITUALISTS, FOR INSTANCE, DEALT EXTENSIVELY WITH THE ONTOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS, USING CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEO-CARTESIAN METHOD. YET IT IS ALSO CLEARLY STATED THAT, "SARTRE CERTAINLY CANNOT BE CLASSED AS A SPIRITUALIST." HOWEVER, THERE ARE REASONS FOR SEEING A SIMILARITY:

BECAUSE HIS METHOD IS REFLECTION OF THE MIND UPON ITS OWN ACTIVITY; BECAUSE, LIKE OTHERS (SPIRITUALISTS), HIS EMPHASIS IS STRONGLY PSYCHOLOGICAL; AND BECAUSE HE IDENTIFIES BEING PRIMARILY WITH ACTIVITY, AN AUTONOMOUS MOVEMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS WHICH FULFILLS ITSELF ONLY THROUGH THIS SELF-ACTIVITY.¹⁰³

THESE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SARTRE AND THE FRENCH SPIRITUALISTS COULD BE PARTIALLY COINCIDENTAL IF SARTRE HIMSELF HAD NOT MADE A DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE SAME TRADITION IN A MORE INDIRECT AND GENERAL WAY IN HIS CONCLUSION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IMAGINATION:

¹⁰² SPIEGELBERG, THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT, p. 473.

¹⁰³ JEAN T. WILDE, THE SEARCH FOR BEING, ED. WILDE AND KIMMEL, (NEW YORK: TWAYNE PUB., 1962), p. 17.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION CAN DISCOVER, FOR INSTANCE, THAT THE VERY STRUCTURE OF TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS IMPLIES THAT THIS CONSCIOUSNESS IS CONSTITUTIVE OF A WORLD. BUT IT IS EVIDENT THAT THEY WILL NOT TEACH US THAT CONSCIOUSNESS MUST BE CONSTITUTIVE OF SUCH A WORLD.¹⁰⁴

POINTING OUT THE WEAKNESS OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD IN THIS WAY, SARTRE INDICATES THAT MORE IS NEEDED TO DERIVE A WELTANSCHAUUNG, A TOTAL PHILOSOPHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS BEING IN THE MODE OF REVEALING BEING-IN-THE-WORLD. THE ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES SARTRE EXPRESSLY REFERS TO IN THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE INDICATE THE BROADER SCOPE OF HIS LATER WORK IN BEING AND NOTHINGNESS:

BUT SINCE THE IDEA OF EIDETIC INTUITION IS STILL REPUGNANT TO MANY FRENCH READERS, WE SHALL RESORT TO A SUBTERFUGE, THAT IS, TO A METHOD SOMEWHAT MORE COMPLEX . . . TRY TO DEVELOP (THE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS) BY THE USUAL PROCEDURES OF CRITICAL ANALYSIS, THAT IS BY A REGRESSIVE METHOD.¹⁰⁵

ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT STATE EXPLICITLY THAT THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD IS INADEQUATE, OR THAT CRITICAL ANALYSIS IS MORE SUITED TO THE SUBJECT OF ONTOLOGY, SARTRE INDICATES THAT THE USE OF THIS OTHER METHOD WILL DERIVE THE SAME CONCLUSIONS AS WOULD THE USE OF "EIDETIC INTUITION." MUCH MORE OF THIS IMPLEMENTATION OF CRITICAL ANALYSIS TO FOUND THE CATEGORIES OF BEING WILL BE INVESTIGATED IN REFERENCE TO BEING AND NOTHINGNESS LATER IN THIS WORK. BESIDES THE USE OF THIS OTHER METHOD TO SUPPORT HIS POSITION, SARTRE IS CHARGED WITH NOT BEING PHENOMENOLOGICAL FOR OTHER REASONS BY ORTHODOX REPRESENTATIVES OF PHENOMENOLOGY.

CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY WITH EXISTENTIALISM

PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXISTENTIALISM, IN THE SARTREAN SENSE, MAY BE HELD TO BE NEITHER PHENOMENOLOGICAL NOR EXISTENTIAL IN METHOD AS WELL AS IN CONTENT. WHEN A PHILOSOPHY IS DEVELOPED UPON THE FOUNDATIONS OF OTHER PHILOSOPHIES

¹⁰⁴p1, p. 259.
¹⁰⁵p1, p. 260.

HISTORICALLY ANTECEDENT TO IT AND HAVING ITS OWN SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT APPROACH TO A UNIVERSAL PROBLEM, OR SET OF PROBLEMS, THEN THE CONTEMPORARY REPRESENTATIONS OF THE PRIOR PHILOSOPHIES CANNOT FAIL BUT TO CRITICIZE IT FOR NOT BEING WITHIN THEIR SCHOOL OF THOUGHT OR NEGATIVELY FOR MISUSING THEIR IDEAS. MARVIN FARBER REPRESENTS PHENOMENOLOGY IN THIS SENSE WHEN HE CRITICIZES THE PHILOSOPHIES OF HEIDEGGER AND SARTRE,

THE EXISTENTIALISTS DRAW STRENGTH FROM THE METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY. A COVERT SUBJECTIVISM TAKES THE PLACE OF A METHODOLOGICAL SUBJECTIVISM.¹⁰⁶

FARBER'S POSITION IS THAT THE METHOD IS USEFUL IN PHENOMENOLOGY, BUT IT IS ONLY USED AS A RUSE BY THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXISTENTIALISTS. OF COURSE, IF FARBER'S STATEMENT IS JUSTIFIED, THEN THE EXISTENTIALISTS USING PHENOMENOLOGY ARE SIMPLY THE SECRET SERVICE OF IDEALISM. BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE SOME ULTERIOR MOTIVE ATTACHED TO A DISHONEST USE OF PHENOMENOLOGY WHEN THE METHODS OF PHENOMENOLOGY APPLIED TO EXISTENTIAL ONTOLOGY HAVE A GOOD DEAL OF SUCCESS.

ANOTHER APPROACH IS REPRESENTED BY HERBERT SPIEGELBERG, AN AUTHORITY ON PHENOMENOLOGY, WHO IN THE OPINION OF WILLIAM EARLE, WOULD HAVE THE EXISTENTIALISTS DEVELOP A MORE ORTHODOX PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE HUMAN REALITY.¹⁰⁷ PROFESSOR SPIEGELBERG BELIEVES PHENOMENOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALISM TO BE COMPATIBLE PHILOSOPHIES AND THAT THE ONLY DIFFICULTY SEPARATING THEM IS LACK OF "PHILOSOPHICAL SOLIDITY, INTEGRITY AND HUMILITY WHICH BOTH PHENOMENOLOGISTS AND EXISTENTIALISTS STILL HAVE TO LEARN OR RELEARN."¹⁰⁸

SPIEGELBERG'S CASE IS BASED ON WHAT HE BELIEVES TO BE SARTRE'S INADEQUATE ATTEMPT TO PLACE THE EGO OUTSIDE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS ANOTHER TRANSCENDENT OBJECT. DOUBTLESS, THERE IS ROOM FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF

¹⁰⁶FARBER, NATURALISM AND SUBJECTIVISM, P. 333.

¹⁰⁷PPR, LVII, JAN. 1960, PP. 62-64.

¹⁰⁸PPR, LVII, JAN. 1960, PP. 62-64.

THIS SUBJECT AND MANY OTHERS WITHIN SARTRE'S PRESENTATION; HOWEVER, TO SUGGEST THAT THERE OUGHT TO BE BASIC CHANGES MADE IN EXISTENTIALISM, TO ALLOW IT TO AGREE MORE WITH THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRADITION, IS TO OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT EXISTENTIALISM HAS DEVELOPED INTO A DISTINCTLY AUTONOMOUS PHILOSOPHY IN ITS OWN RIGHT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE REVERSE EVALUATION THAT EXISTENTIALISM OUGHT TO REVERT TO THE KIERKEGAARDIAN-NIETZSCHEAN PHILOSOPHY AND DENY ANY CONTACT WITH PHENOMENOLOGICAL INFLUENCES, ADVOCATED BY WILLIAM EARLE, IS FOR THE SAME REASON RATHER HOPELESS AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT. FROM THE EVIDENCES OF THE MANY DIFFERENT CRITICS OF SARTRE'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXISTENTIALISM, IT SEEMS THAT THE HIGHLY UNUSUAL ANALOGY WHICH IS MADE BY MOLINA IS REALLY MORE SENSIBLE:

THE HISTORICAL ROLES PLAYED BY THOMAS AQUINAS AND JEAN-PAUL SARTRE HAVE SIMILARITIES THAT MAKE IT WORTH OUR WHILE TO PUT THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRIBUTIONS ALONG-SIDE EACH OTHER . . . BOTH AQUINAS AND SARTRE BOUND TOGETHER INTO IMPOSING MONOLITHIC STRUCTURES MANY OF THE INTELLECTUAL BUILDING BLOCKS THAT WERE AVAILABLE TO THEM IN THEIR TIME. AND YET NEITHER CAN BE CONSIDERED A MERE CRAFTSMAN IN THAT FINISHED PRODUCT.¹⁰⁹

MOLINA MAY BE MAKING A VERY FLATTERING COMPARISON FOR SARTRE, BUT HE IS ACTUALLY RECOGNIZING SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY AS BEING DISTINCT FROM ALL OTHERS WHILE USING PREVIOUS PHILOSOPHIES AS A BASIS FOR HIS OWN. WHEN THE METHODOLOGY FROM ONE OF THESE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IS ADAPTED FOR THIS NEW PHILOSOPHY, CERTAIN CHANGES ARE UNDERGONE, YET IT RETAINS THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ITS ORIGINAL STRUCTURE.

THE SARTREAN METHOD, IT HAS BEEN SHOWN, IS AN ADAPTATION OF HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD WITH AN INDICATION OF FURTHER METHODOLOGICAL ELEMENTS WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED TO ADD TO THIS BASIC PHENOMENOLOGY. WHETHER OR NOT THE ADDITIONS ARE INTEGRATED IN A SATISFACTORY AND COMPLIMENTARY WAY IS THE SUBJECT OF CONCERN.

¹⁰⁹FERNANDO MOLINA, EXISTENTIALISM AS PHILOSOPHY, (NEW JERSEY: PRENTICE HALL, 1962), p. 87.

CIRCULAR DIALECTIC OR "DYADICISM"

OF THE MANY CRITICS AND INTERPRETERS OF SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY, THERE ARE SOME WHO INDICATE THAT HEGELIAN METHODS OF DIALECTIC ARE USED. AMONG THESE PHILOSOPHERS AND SCHOLARS, NATANSON, MARCUSE, A STRIKING SIMILARITY BETWEEN HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND AND SARTRE'S DESCRIPTIONS OF THE BEING-FOR-ITSELF HAS BEEN SUGGESTED AND, WITHOUT ANY INTENSIVE COMPARISON IN DETAIL TO PROVE IT TO BE TRUE. THERE IS A DIALECTIC IN SARTRE AS DISTINCTIVE A PART OF HIS METHOD AS PHENOMENOLOGY, BUT IT IS A MISNOMER TO LABEL IT HEGELIAN. THE DIALECTIC USED IS MORE APTLY DESCRIBED BY GUSTAV MUELLER: "THE DIALECTICAL STRUCTURE OF HUMAN EXISTENCE SERVES AS A KEY AND INGRESS TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIALECTICAL STRUCTURE IN EVERY OTHER DIMENSION."¹¹⁰ THIS STATEMENT PRESUPPOSES THAT THE NATURE OF HUMAN EXISTENCE IS DIALECTICAL, AND IT IS A CONCEPTION OF SOME EXISTENTIALISTS THAT IT IS. MARCUSE, THOUGH HE IS CONVINCED THAT SARTRE IS HEGELIAN, CAN STILL STATE:

THE CIRCLE OF ONTOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATIONS IS THUS CLOSED; IT COMBINES BEING AND NOTHING, FREEDOM AND FRUSTRATION, SELF-RESPONSIBLE CHOICE AND CONTINGENT DETERMINATION. THE COINCIDENTIA OPPOSITORIUM IS ACCOMPLISHED NOT THROUGH DIALECTICAL PROCESS, BUT THROUGH SIMPLE ESTABLISHMENT OF ONTOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS.¹¹¹

IF INTUITION REVEALS SUCH STRUCTURES AS A DIALECTIC, THEN, IN THE SAME WAY, THEY ARE EXPRESSED DIALECTICALLY CIRCULAR. IDENTIFICATION OF THIS DIALECTIC AS HEGELIAN CANNOT BE MADE SINCE THERE IS NO THESIS-ANTITHESIS-SYNTHESIS PROGRESSION INVOLVED. SARTRE'S DIALECTIC IS EXISTENTIAL IN CHARACTER; IT HAS A BASIS IN THE CONSTANT TENSION BETWEEN EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE:

THOUGHT HAS A FUNCTION IN THE CONCEPTION OF EXISTENCE, SINCE THERE IS A KIND OF TENSION BETWEEN THOUGHT AND EXISTENCE, BETWEEN WHAT WE

¹¹⁰GUSTAV MUELLER, DIALECTIC, (NEW YORK: BOOKMAN ASSOCIATES, 1953), P. 113.

¹¹¹HERBERT MARCUSE, EXISTENTIALISM: REMARKS ON J. P. SARTRE'S LE ETRE ET NEANT, PPR, (VOL. XX, MARCH 1948), P. 316.

MIGHT CALL EXISTENTIAL THOUGHT AND EXISTENCE AND IN A CERTAIN SENSE THIS TENSION AND STRUGGLE DEFINES EXISTENCE.¹¹²

OTHER CRITICS, HOWEVER, DO NOT ENTIRELY AGREE WITH PROFESSOR WAHL, THAT SARTRE IS CONCERNED WITH THE TENSION BETWEEN "THOUGHT AND EXISTENCE," BUT ATTRIBUTE SARTRE'S DEALING WITH OPPOSITES AS AN INFLUENCE OF HEGELIAN METHOD OF "THESIS, ANTITHESIS, WITHOUT THE HOPE OF SYNTHESIS,"¹¹³ AND BECAUSE THERE IS NO SYNTHESIS, THESE CRITICS MAINTAIN THE PHILOSOPHY IS WEAK. THERE IS ALSO THE POINT OF VIEW THAT THE TWO CATEGORIES OF BEING FORMING THE DYAD IS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF FICHTE. HELMUT KUHN, FOR INSTANCE HOLDS THIS OPINION.¹¹⁴ JOHN WILD, ON THE OTHER HAND, AGREES ESSENTIALLY WITH WAHL, BUT HE CHARGES SARTRE WITH NOT DEALING WITH THIS TENSION PROPERLY: "THE DISTINCTION HAS BEEN SLURRED OVER BY SARTRE IN SOME OF HIS DIALECTICAL ATTEMPTS TO REGARD THE POUR-SOI AS A SORT OF CREATIVE HEGELIAN NOTHINGNESS."¹¹⁵ WHETHER OR NOT SARTRE USES THE METHODS AND CONCEPTS OF OTHER PHILOSOPHERS IS NOT OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE IF IT TELLS NOTHING ABOUT THE SINGULARITY OF HIS APPROACH.

SARTRE'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF EXISTENCE IS EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF DYADS OF BEING, AS WILL BE SHOWN LATER, AND THESE DYADS ARE NEITHER THESIS-ANTITHESIS RELATIONS NOR ARE THEY POLARITIES. THE DYADIC NATURE OF BEING CORRELATES WITH THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION, OR RATHER THAT DESCRIPTION IS THE BASIS FOR SARTRE'S CRITICAL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONDITION FOR BEING. SARTRE DISCOVERS THAT CONCRETE EXPERIENCE "REVEALS ITSELF" AS EXISTING IN TERMS OF TENSION-CAUSING DUALITIES, DESCRIBES THEM AS SUCH, AND SEEKS TO EXPLAIN THE CONDITIONS FOR THIS DUAL NATURE USING DIALECTICAL APPROACH.

¹¹² JEAN WAHL, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WAY, (NEW YORK: OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, 1941), p. 44.

¹¹³ H. HAWTON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ("THE PHILOSOPHER," VOL. IV, JUNE 1952), p. 39.

¹¹⁴ H. KAHN, ENCOUNTER WITH NOTHINGNESS, (HINSDALE, ILL.: HENRY REGNARY Co., 1949), p. 144.

¹¹⁵ JOHN WILD, THE CHALLENGE OF EXISTENTIALISM, (BLOOMINGTON, IND.: INDIANA UNIV. PRESS, 1955), p. 195.

OUTLINE OF SARTRE'S METHODOLOGICAL ELEMENTS

ATTEMPTING TO SUMMARIZE ALL OF THE TECHNIQUES OF METHOD INDICATED IN AND DISCUSSED IN THE PRECEDING CHAPTERS, SARTRE'S METHOD COULD BE SAID TO BE PARTIALLY ECLECTIC; YET THERE IS ALSO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF ORIGINALITY IN BOTH HIS ORGANIZATION AND USE OF TECHNIQUES. FOR INSTANCE, HUSSERL'S CONDITIONS FOR CARRYING OUT THE PROPER PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION HAVE BEEN CHANGED IN SOME RADICAL WAYS BY SARTRE DUE TO HIS DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH SOME OF HUSSERL'S CONCEPTS UPON WHICH THESE CONDITIONS WERE BASED. NOTWITHSTANDING THESE VARIATIONS, SARTRE CLAIMS THAT HIS MAIN APPROACH TO EXISTENTIAL ONTOLOGY IS PHENOMENOLOGICAL. IT HAS BEEN DISCOVERED THAT SARTRE DOES INDICATE THAT PHENOMENOLOGY ALONE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEVELOP A COMPLETE ONTOLOGY, AND THEREFORE, THE USE OF THE CRITICAL AND HERMENEUTIC METHODS MUST ALSO BE IMPLEMENTED. MOREOVER, SARTRE INDICATED, IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IMAGINATION, THAT ALTHOUGH CRITICAL ANALYSIS GOES "BEYOND DESCRIPTION," EACH METHOD SHOULD SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE OTHER. EXACTLY HOW THESE TWO BASICALLY DIFFERENT METHODS ARE SUPPOSED TO SUPPORT EACH OTHER IS NOT OUTLINED BY SARTRE, BUT IT CAN BE ASSUMED THAT IF THEY DO NOT CORRELATE THEN THE EVIDENCE OF THEIR LACK OF ADHERENCE TO EACH OTHER WILL BE APPARENT. SARTRE'S METHOD COULD BE OUTLINED IN TERMS OF THE FOLLOWING TECHNIQUES WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED:

1. SARTRE BEGINS WITH THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO, AND, IN ORDER TO START WITH THIS LEVEL, SARTRE MAKES TWO DIFFERENT, BUT CLOSELY RELATED REDUCTIONS. THE FIRST "REDUCTION" IS THE ASSUMPTION THAT PHENOMENA REVEAL BEING, THAT THERE IS NO A PRIORI REALITY, BUT THAT BEING-IN-ITSELF SIMPLY IS THERE AS IT APPEARS. THE SECOND REDUCTION IS THE STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE CONCEPT OF INTENTION; THAT IS, CONSCIOUSNESS MUST BE AWARE OF ITSELF AS BEING AWARE OF AN OBJECT AND NOTHING MORE.

2. WITH THESE REDUCTIONS PERFORMED, SARTRE PROCEEDS AS HE INDICATES IN HIS PSYCHOLOGY OF IMAGINATION, IN RELATION TO IMAGES, BUT WHICH COULD EQUALLY APPLY TO ALL EXPERIENCE: "WE PRODUCE IMAGES, REFLECT UPON THEM, DESCRIBE THEM; THAT IS, ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE AND TO CLASSIFY THEIR DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS."¹¹⁶

3. IN GOING BEYOND THE DETERMINING OF EXPERIENCES THROUGH DESCRIPTION, IT HAS BEEN INDICATED THAT CRITICAL ANALYSIS CAN THEN BE USED TO REACH THE ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURES OF BEING. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO PRECISE DEFINITION OF THE TECHNIQUES USED IN THIS METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH, SARTRE HAS TERMED IT A "REGRESSIVE METHOD" AIMED AT AN ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS IN DESCRIPTIONS OF CONCRETE EXPERIENCES. THIS CRITICAL ELEMENT LENDS A GREAT DEAL OF ELASTICITY TO THE WHOLE OF SARTRE'S METHOD. IN HIS INTRODUCTION TO BEING AND NOTHINGNESS, SARTRE HAS NOT STATED THAT THE COMBINATION OF THESE TWO METHODS WILL SUCCESSFULLY BRING ABOUT AN ONTOLOGY, IN FACT, THERE IS A MARKED LACK OF ANY REFERENCE TO METHOD AT ALL.

THE USE OF THE TERM "CRITICAL ANALYSIS" IN THIS THESIS IS CONSIDERED AS A GENERAL CATEGORY FOR SEVERAL SPECIFIC TACTICS USED BY SARTRE, BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE AN EQUIVALENT HEADING FOR ALL THAT IS "NOT PHENOMENOLOGICAL" IN SARTRE'S METHODOLOGY. SARTRE'S DISCUSSION OF THE CONCEPTS OF NOTHINGNESS HELD BY HEGEL AND HEIDEGGER¹¹⁷ FOR EXAMPLE, ARE HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATIONS WHICH SPIEGELBERG POINTS OUT AS BEING SIMILAR TO HEIDEGGER'S HERMENEUTIC;¹¹⁸ BUT ARE IN THIS STUDY AND GENERALLY CATEGORIZED AS BEING A TACTIC OF CRITICAL ANALYSIS. OTHER SPECIFIC TACTICS EMPLOYED BY SARTRE ARE NOT COMPLETELY COMMENSURATE WITH HIS GENERAL METHODOLOGICAL SCHEME; RATHER, THEY HAVE THE EFFECT OF BEING ADDITIONAL SUPPORT MATERIAL FOR HIS CONCEPTS.

¹¹⁶PI, p. 3.

¹¹⁷BN, pp. 12-20.

¹¹⁸SPIEGELBERG, THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT, p. 477.

ONE SUCH OUTSTANDING INSTANCE OF BRINGING IN ADDITIONAL MATERIAL AS EVIDENCE OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS CONCEPTS IS SARTRE'S FREQUENT REFERENCE TO THE FINDINGS OF THE GESTALT SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY.

AN ADDITIONAL OBSERVATION IS CONCERNING THE SARTREAN METHODS IN ORDER. IF THESE TWO WIDELY VARYING APPROACHES ARE TO BE USED EFFECTIVELY, THERE CAN ONLY BE ONE PRIMARY APPROACH, LEAVING THE OTHER TO THE TASK OF SUPPORT. IF THE TWO APPROACHES WERE OF EQUAL WEIGHT, THEN IF THEY DIFFERED IN RESULTS, THERE WOULD BE NO CRITERION TO JUDGE WHICH WAS CORRECT. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT SARTRE MAINTAINS THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO BE PRIMARY IN REVEALING TRUTHS, WHICH MAKES THE CRITICAL ANALYSIS A SUBSEQUENT PROCEDURE, SUPPORTING AND CARRYING OUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THOSE TRUTHS. WITHIN THE CRITICAL PHASE THEN, THERE MUST ALWAYS BE A DIRECT REFERENCE BACK TO DESCRIPTION AS CRITERION. IF THE CORRELATION OF THESE TWO APPROACHES IS EFFECTIVELY CARRIED OUT, THEN IT COULD BE SAID THAT IN A SENSE, EVEN SARTRE'S METHOD IS DYADIC IN NATURE, BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH BOTH PROCESSES ARE DISTINCT, THEY WOULD FORM A UNITY OF METHOD.

THE PRECEDING SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGICAL ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN DERIVED FROM WHAT SARTRE AND OTHERS HAVE INDICATED AS BEING PRESENT IN BEING AND NOTHINGNESS HAVE NO OVERALL FORMAL, INTERCONNECTED RAISON D'ETRE WHICH WOULD CAUSE THEM TO TAKE ON THE ASPECT OF BEING A "METHODOLOGY." THESE ELEMENTS, OR TACTICS, NEED TO BE INTEGRATED THROUGH A COVERING OF THEIR WORKING RELATIONSHIPS TO EACH OTHER AND TOWARD THE END FOR WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN USED. THE PURPOSE OF THE SECOND PART OF THIS STUDY IS TO DETERMINE FIRST, IF THESE ELEMENTS ARE INDEED EMPLOYED BY SARTRE IN THE FIRST TWO PARTS OF HIS WORK, AND IF THERE ARE EVEN MORE THAT HAVE NOT BEEN YET BROUGHT TO LIGHT. SECONDLY, BY ANALYZING A SEGMENT OF SARTRE'S WORK, THIS STUDY INTENDS TO DISCOVER HOW THE TACTICS HE DOES USE CONTRIBUTE TOWARD A METHODOLOGICAL

SCHEME, I.E., HOW DOES SARTRE EMPLOY THEM TOWARD SUBSTANTIATING AND CONTRIBUTING TO BOTH, EACH ELEMENT IN RESPECT TO THE OTHERS USED, AND TOWARD THE END OF DESCRIBING THE BEING OF THE CONDITIONS FOR HUMAN REALITY.

IT MAY BE BEST ADDED BEFORE COMMENCING THE ANALYSIS THAT THE PLAN OF PROCEDURE FOR THIS ANALYSIS, IN KEEPING WITH ITS AIMS, WILL FOLLOW SARTRE'S STEP-BY-STEP DEVELOPMENT OF CONDITIONS FOR THE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT REGARD TO ANY ULTERIOR VALUATION OF WHAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE IMPORTANT TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SARTRE'S OWN END OF DERIVING THOSE CONDITIONS FOR BEING. THEREFORE, THE ANALYSIS FOLLOWS SARTRE'S OWN DEVELOPMENT AS HE HAS PRESENTED IT.

PART TWO

THE EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD
OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

CHAPTER IX

THE DESCRIPTION OF THE NEGATION IN EXPERIENCE

IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF HIS INTRODUCTION, SARTRE PROPOSES, IN TERMS OF QUESTIONS, THE AIMS OF HIS WORK:

WHAT IS THE ULTIMATE MEANING OF THESE TWO TYPES OF BEING, HUMAN REALITY AND BEING-IN-ITSELF? FOR WHAT REASONS DO THEY BOTH BELONG TO BEING IN GENERAL? WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THAT BEING WHICH INCLUDES WITHIN ITSELF THESE TWO RADICALLY SEPARATED REGIONS OF BEING?¹¹⁹

ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS INVOLVE INTERRELATED ANSWERS WHICH EVOLVE AS THE DISCUSSIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF VARIOUS SUBJECTS TAKE PLACE. THE FIRST SPECIFIC QUESTIONS PROPOSED TO SHED LIGHT ON THESE GENERAL QUESTIONS ARE: (1) WHAT IS THE SYNTHETIC RELATION WHICH WE CALL BEING-IN-THE-WORLD? (2) WHAT MUST MAN AND THE WORLD BE IN ORDER FOR A RELATION BETWEEN THEM TO EXIST? THESE QUESTIONS DIRECTLY ORIENT THE PURSUIT TOWARD THE MEANING OF EXISTENCE, TOWARD THE CONCRETE EXPERIENCE AS IT IS CARRIED OUT IN LIVING. SARTRE LAYS DOWN THE CONDITION OF APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF BEING EXPRESSED IN THE QUESTIONS ABOVE, THAT WE ENVISAGE THESE FORMS OF CONDUCT AS REALITIES, AS OBJECTIVES APPREHENSIBLE, AND NOT AS SUBJECTIVE EFFECTS WHICH DISCLOSE THEMSELVES ONLY IN THE FACE OF REFLECTION.¹²⁰ THIS BASIC APPROACH IS EXACTLY THE CHARACTERISTIC OF WHAT HAS BEEN STATED IN THIS STUDY AS SARTRE'S "REDUCTION," THAT PHENOMENA BE APPREHENDED IN THEIR CONCRETENESS.

¹¹⁹BN, p. xii.

¹²⁰BN, p. 4.

INTERROGATION AS NEGATION

SARTRE PROCEEDS IMMEDIATELY TO A DESCRIPTION. HE MAKES THE OBSERVATION THAT HE IS DESCRIBING A CONCRETE EVENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND NOT A GENERAL REFLECTIVE CONSTRUCTION, AS IF CATCHING, OR BECOMING AWARE OF WHAT HE HAS ACTUALLY DONE. IN ASKING THE TWO QUESTIONS ABOVE, SARTRE DISCOVERS THAT HE "STANDS BEFORE BEING IN AN ATTITUDE OF INTERROGATION." IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ATTITUDE OCCURS IN THE PRE-REFLECTIVE AND THEREFORE PRE-POSITIONAL LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS WHICH MEANS THAT TO THE EXTENT THAT A PARTICULAR "I" IS NOT INVOLVED, IT IS A UNIVERSAL ATTITUDE WHICH IS BEING DESCRIBED. THE DESCRIPTION REVEALS THAT IN ORDER FOR THE ATTITUDE TO EXIST AT ALL, THERE MUST BE A POSSIBILITY OF ONE OF THE TWO ANSWERS EXPECTED FROM THE BEING QUESTIONED, I.E., POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE. THE DESCRIPTION HAS REVEALED A DYAD, THE DYAD EXISTING BETWEEN BEING AND NON-BEING AS POSSIBILITIES OF ANSWERS TO THE INTERROGATIVE ATTITUDE. SARTRE EXPLAINS THE REVELATIONS OF THIS DYAD IN A DIALECTIC MANNER. IF THE REALITY OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEGATIVE ANSWER OR NON-EXISTENCE OF WHAT IS EXPECTED IS THE ANSWER, IF IT IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE REAL, EXISTENT AS BEING, THEN THE WHOLE REALITY OF ANY REPLY AT ALL CANNOT EXIST. IN ADDITION TO THIS DIALECTICAL DESCRIPTION IS ANOTHER TYPE OF NON-EXISTENCE WHICH IS JUST AS REAL, BECAUSE IT IS ITSELF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF KNOWLEDGE WHICH CAUSES THE ATTITUDE TO OCCUR. BY THE USE OF THE FOUR BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS METHOD, SARTRE HAS DISCOVERED THAT NEGATION EXISTS AND IT IS TO A FULL DESCRIPTION AND ELUCIDATION OF THIS CATEGORY OF EXISTENCE HE TURNS HIS ATTENTION.

REFUTATION OF NEGATIVE JUDGMENT

SARTRE BEGINS HIS DESCRIPTION OF NOTHINGNESS BY ANSWERING THE CONTENTION THAT NOTHINGNESS IS ONLY A MODE OF JUDGMENT, AND, AS SUCH, A "PURELY

SUBJECTIVE QUALITY" AND NOT A SEPARATE MODE OF BEING.¹²¹ AFTER INDICATING NEGATIVITIES IN CONCRETE EXPERIENCE SUCH AS INTERROGATION, DISTANCE AND DESTRUCTION, SARTRE DESCRIBES AN EXPERIENCE OF ABSENCE. IN A SITUATION AS COMMON AND CONCRETE AS LOOKING FOR A FRIEND IN A CAFÉ,¹ NEGATION IS REVEALED AS A PARTICULAR MODE OF EXISTENCE WHICH CANNOT BE SAID TO BE MERELY SUBJECTIVE. SARTRE DESCRIBES EACH PART OF THE ACT OF DISCOVERY THAT THE FRIEND IS NOT THERE. THE SITUATION OF THE SEARCH FOR THE FRIEND IN THE CAFÉ¹ IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE A PRE-POSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS WHICH INTENDS THE WHOLE CAFÉ¹ SITUATION AS A "FULLNESS OF BEING," A COMPLETE ASSUMPTION THAT WHAT APPEARS IS ACTUALLY THERE IN A VAGUE APPREHENSION OF IT. THUS, THE FIRST TWO CONDITIONS OF THE METHOD ARE PRESENTED. SARTRE'S DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION INVOLVES A REVELATION BETWEEN BEING AND NON-BEING. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE FULLNESS OF BEING OF THE CAFÉ¹ AND EVERYTHING IN IT PROVIDES A "GROUND" UPON WHICH CONSCIOUSNESS EXPECTS A FIGURE TO APPEAR. THIS GROUND, IN NOT BEING THE AIM OF THE INTENTION, IS "AN ORIGINAL NIHILATION," IN THE SENSE THAT EVERY OBJECT IS CONSTANTLY ATTEMPTING TO PRESENT ITSELF, BUT DOES NOT SUCCEED DUE TO ITS NOT BEING WHAT IS SOUGHT BY CONSCIOUSNESS. THE DYAD HERE IS THAT THE CAFÉ¹ IS BOTH, IN A SENSE, FULLNESS OF BEING, AND A NIHILATION OF BEING IN THAT IT CONTINUALLY EMERGES AND FALLS "BACK ONCE MORE INTO UNDIFFERENTIATION." THERE IS ALSO THE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT DYADIC RELATION BETWEEN THE INTUITION OF THE FRIEND BEING THERE AND THE INTUITION OF HIS NOT BEING THERE. SARTRE'S DISCOVERY INVALIDATES THE CONCEPT OF NEGATION AS MERELY A JUDGMENT QUALITY BY THE RECOGNITION THAT IF PRESENCE CAN BE INTUITIONAL, THEN ABSENCE ALSO MUST BE INTUITIONAL IN THE CONCRETE EXPERIENCE. THIS DISCOVERY IS NOT A DEDUCTION, BUT TAKES PLACE IN EXPERIENCE, AS SARTRE SAYS OF THE INTUITION OF

¹²¹BN, pp. 6-8.

ABSENCE:

THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT I DISCOVER HIS ABSENCE IN SOME PRECISE SPOT, IN THE ESTABLISHMENT. IN FACT, PIERRE IS ABSENT FROM THE WHOLE CAFE; THE CAFE REMAINS GROUND . . . IT PURSUES ITS NIHILATION.

BUT PIERRE, THE ABSENT FRIEND AS A

FIGURE WHICH SLIPS, CONSTANTLY BETWEEN MY LOOKS AND SOLID, REAL OBJECTS OF THE CAFE IS PRECISELY PERCEPTUAL DISAPPEARANCE, IT IS PIERRE RAISING HIMSELF AS A NOTHINGNESS ON THE GROUND OF NIHILATION OF THE CAFE.¹²²

THE DYADIC NATURE OF BEING AND NEGATION AS A REAL EXISTING INTUITION HAS BEEN DESCRIBED IN THIS PASSAGE TO AN EXTENT THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SAY THAT THE EXPERIENCE WAS NOT AS IT WAS DESCRIBED. IN THAT, AS JOHN WILD POINTS OUT, "THE MEANING OF NEGATION IS APPREHENSIBLE WITH CERTITUDE TO ANY-SELF IN THE WORLD."¹²³ HOWEVER, SARTRE HAS DESCRIBED THE BEING OF THE CAFE AND ITS NIHILATION IN A WAY THAT HAS NOT QUALIFIED THE EXACT NATURE OF THE NIHILATION. IT IS DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE TWO SENSES OF THE FULL BEING OF THE GROUND AND AT THE SAME TIME, THE NIHILATION OF IT.

THE TECHNIQUES OF THE METHOD OF REVEALING THE CATEGORIES IN A CONCRETE SITUATION INVOLVING NEGATION THROUGH ABSENCE HAS TAKEN PLACE. THE REALITY OF NEGATION HAS BEEN DESCRIBED IN AN EXISTING SITUATION AND THE REFUTATION OF NEGATION AS A QUALITY HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. HOWEVER, THE READER HAS BEEN LED TO THE POSITION OF HAVING TO ENTERTAIN TWO DIVERGENT ELEMENTS IN A VAGUELY CONFLICTING RELATION WHICH IS NOT RESOLVED AT ALL. IT IS NOT AN EASY CONCEPT TO PERCEIVE, AND AN IMPOSSIBLE IDEA TO CONTEND WITH IN ABSTRACTION. SARTRE DOES NOT ENTERTAIN A PLAN TO MAKE THE DIFFICULTY DISSOLVE INTO A BROADER UNDERSTANDING, BUT CONTINUES TO STRAIN THE CONCEPT WITH SUCH

¹²²BN, p. 10.

¹²³WILD, CONTEMPORARY PHENOMENOLOGY . . ., p. 171.

STATEMENTS AS:

NEGATION IS A REFUSAL OF EXISTENCE. BY MEANS OF IT A BEING (OR A WAY OF BEING) IS POSITED, THEN THROWN BACK TO NOTHINGNESS . . . NEGATION MUST BE LIKE A FREE DISCOVERY, IT MUST TEAR US AWAY FROM THIS WALL OF POSITIVITY WHICH ENCIRCLES US. IT IS AN ORIGINAL AND IRREDUCEABLE EVENT.¹²⁴

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING
NEGATION AND NOTHINGNESS

THESE STATEMENTS DO LITTLE TO ORGANIZE THE NEGATION IN TERMS OF ITS CHARACTERISTICS; FOR SARTRE, THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE TROUBLE WITH THE CONCEPT REVEALED AS REAL, BUT THERE IS DIFFICULTY IN ITS EXISTING AS A WAY OF BEING "NOT BEING"; IN SHORT, AS AN ABSURDITY IN THE REAM OF ESSENCES. IT IS AN ABSURDITY IF IT IS CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF THE QUESTION ASKED BY SCHRAAG: "CAN IT BE POSSIBLE TO APPREHEND NOTHINGNESS, IF BY THAT CATEGORY THERE IS ONLY AN ABSOLUTE MEANING TO IT?"¹²⁵ SARTRE'S CONCERN IS TO FIND THE ORIGIN OF NOTHINGNESS, BUT WHETHER AS AN EPIPHENOMENAL APPEARANCE, OR A FUNCTION, HE DOES NOT YET INDICATE. IT SEEMS NECESSARY TO AGREE THAT THERE IS A SENSE IN WHICH CONSCIOUSNESS EXPERIENCES NIHILATION PARTIALLY, BUT THIS EXTENT MUST BE CLARIFIED AND DETERMINED. THIS LAST EXAMPLE SARTRE HAS USED TO INDICATE NEGATION IN EXPERIENCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY ILLUSTRATE THAT "NEGATION TEARS US AWAY FROM" POSITIVITY COMPLETELY.¹²⁶ THERE IS SOMETHING RADICAL IN THE CHANGE OF BOTH METHOD AND AIM OF THE INVESTIGATION AT THIS PARTICULAR JUNCTURE. THE INVESTIGATION UP TO THIS POINT HAS FOLLOWED SARTRE'S PHENOMENOLOGICALLY MODIFIED METHOD IN ALL OF ITS ELEMENTS, BUT SUDDENLY THE PATTERN OF INVESTIGATION CHANGES OR RATHER DISAPPEARS WITH THE INTERLUDE OF A BRIEF CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S NON-BEING CONCEPT AND THE DESCRIPTION OF NOTHINGNESS OFFERED BY HEIDEGGER.

¹²⁴BN, p. 11.

¹²⁵C. O. SCHRAAG, "JOHN WILD ON CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY," PPR, XX, (JANUARY, 1962), PP. 61-62.

¹²⁶A. R. MAUSER, "SARTRE AND LE NEANT," PPR, XXXV, (MARCH, 1964), P. 186.

SARTRE HAD BEEN DEVELOPING AND UNFOLDING THE NATURE OF NEGATION ON THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL-EXISTENTIALISTIC LEVEL OF LIVED EXPERIENCES, WHICH HE LEAVES BEFORE IT IS ENTIRELY CLARIFIED; AND WITH NO EXPLANATION, BEGINS A CRITIQUE OF ANOTHER PHILOSOPHIC CONCEPT OF ANOTHER MATTER, THAT OF NOTHINGNESS. THE CHANGE SARTRE MAKES IS FROM EXISTENTIAL TO THE ONTOLOGICAL LEVEL, FROM REVELATION OF NEGATION TO A STUDY OF DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN A TRADITIONAL CATEGORY OF ONTOLOGY. IT IS JUST AT THIS POINT OF DEVELOPMENT THAT SARTRE MUST GIVE INDICATION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE EXISTENTIAL FRAME OF REFERENCE AND THAT OF HUSSERL'S EIDETIC REALM, WHICH HE GIVES NO EVIDENCE OF DOING. THE PUZZLE PRESENTED BY SARTRE'S LACK OF EXPLANATION OF JUST HOW HE INTENDS TO PROCEED TO THE "MEANING OF WHAT HAS BEEN EXISTENTIALLY DESCRIBED" SEEMS TO BE A GREAT ONE. REFERRING BACK TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IMAGINATION, IT IS RECALLED THAT SARTRE THERE PROPOSED TO FOLLOW PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION WITH CRITICAL ANALYSIS RATHER THAN USE EIDETIC INTUITION, BUT AT THIS POINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEGATION, IT IS NOT APPARENT THAT EITHER ANALYSIS OR INTUITION WILL BE THE FOLLOWING TACTIC USED.

AS HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED BRIEFLY, THERE IS NO RULE OR PRINCIPLE WHICH RESTRICTS METHOD TO A PARTICULAR MOLD. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR METHOD TO BE ABLE TO BE MODIFIED, REVISED, AND IMPROVISED. IN THE CASE OF SARTRE'S SUDDEN CHANGE OF TACTICS, HIS METHOD HAS CHANGED RADICALLY, SO MUCH SO THAT THERE IS LITTLE CONTINUITY OBSERVABLE. HOWEVER, METHOD HAS ANOTHER CHARACTERISTIC JUST AS IMPORTANT, WHICH IS ITS REPEATABILITY. SARTRE MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE SUCH RADICAL TRANSITIONS AGAIN, BUT WITHIN THE DICTUM OF COMMUNICATION, IT DOES SEEM TO BE INCONSIDERATE TO AN AUDIENCE NOT TO EXPLAIN THE TRANSITION.

THE CONSIDERATION OF WHETHER THE CHANGE IN DIRECTION AND IN METHOD MAKES AN IMPORTANT CHANGE IN THE FUNDAMENTAL AIM OF SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY IS A

CONSIDERATION WHICH WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS EARLY STAGE OF ANALYSIS. IT IS CERTAIN THAT ALTHOUGH THE DEGREE OF ACHIEVEMENT AT THE GOAL WILL DEPEND UPON THESE AND ALL CHANGES AND ADOPTIONS OF NEW LINES OF SPECULATION. HOWEVER, IF THE CHANGES ARE UNCLEAR OR MYSTIFYING, THEN THAT GOAL WILL BE VITIATED IN ITS EFFECT TO THE SAME DEGREE. FOR INSTANCE, SARTRE HAS MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT THE DIRECTION OF HIS INVESTIGATION IS, AS HUMAN REALITY IS, A MOVEMENT FROM ONTIC TO ONTOLOGICAL, AND IT HAS BEEN ASSUMED THAT THE COURSE OF THIS DIRECTION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A PHENOMENOLOGICAL WAY. AN ABRUPT CHANGE FROM ONE LEVEL TO ANOTHER IS NOT A RECOMMENDED CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD ACCORDING TO JOHN WILD.¹²⁷

SARTRE'S CHARACTERIZATION OF HEGEL AND HEIDEGGER

TO FURTHER ILLUSTRATE THE NATURE OF SARTRE'S RADICAL CHANGE IN METHOD, THE HIGHLY CURSORY TREATMENT OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY IS AN EXAMPLE:

HEGEL'S WHOLE THEORY IS BASED ON THE IDEA THAT A PHILOSOPHICAL PROCEDURE IS NECESSARY IN ORDER AT THE OUTSET OF LOGIC TO REDISCOVER THE IMMEDIATE IN TERMS OF THE MEDIATED, THE ABSTRACT IN TERMS OF THE CONCRETE ON WHICH IT IS GROUNDED. BUT WE HAVE ALREADY REMARKED THAT BEING DOES NOT HOLD THE SAME RELATION TO PHENOMENON AS THE ABSTRACT HOLDS TO THE CONCRETE.¹²⁸

THIS ONE ELEMENT OF SARTRE'S CRITICISM REPRESENTS ADEQUATELY HIS WHOLE APPROACH TO THE CRITICISM OF PREVIOUS IDEAS REGARDING NOTHINGNESS. AS AN EXISTENTIALIST, IT IS EXPECTED THAT SARTRE WOULD CRITICIZE HEGEL AS KIERKEGAARD HAD DONE, BUT AS A PHILOSOPHER HE ALSO HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO FOLLOW THE HISTORY OF THE SUBJECT OF INQUIRY IN A MORE ACCURATE MANNER IF HE WISHES TO USE PREVIOUS IDEAS AS A FOUNDATION ON WHICH HE PLANS TO BUILD HIS OWN CONCEPT. TO WILLIAM EARLE, THE WAY SARTRE CHARACTERIZES HEGEL'S THOUGHT AND INDIVIDUAL THEORIES DOES NOT FIT HEGEL IN ANY RESPECT.¹²⁹ SARTRE DERIVES A CONSEQUENT CONCLUSION FOR HIS OWN CONCEPT THROUGH HIS

¹²⁷ WILD, THE CHALLENGE OF EXISTENTIALISM, P. 193.

¹²⁸ BN, P. 13.

¹²⁹ WILLIAM EARLE, "HEGEL AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHIES," PPR, XXX, (MARCH, 1960), P. 361.

CRITICISM OF HEGEL CITED ABOVE. IF HEGEL'S APPROACH (PROCEEDING FROM PHENOMENON TO ESSENCE) LEADS HIM TO THE POSITION THE "BEING AND NOTHINGNESS" ARE EMPTY ABSTRACTIONS AND ONE IS AS EMPTY AS THE OTHER."¹³⁰ THEN SARTRE WISHES, ON THAT BASIS, TO PROCEED IN A DIFFERENT WAY ENTIRELY. THEREFORE, SARTRE CRITICIZES HEGEL SAYING, "BEING IS EMPTY OF ALL OTHER DETERMINATION THAN IDENTITY WITH ITSELF, BUT NON-BEING IS EMPTY OF BEING . . . BEING IS AND NOTHINGNESS IS NOT,"¹³¹ AND THE CONCLUSION IS THAT "BEING HAS LOGICAL PRECEDENCE OVER NOTHINGNESS," RATHER THAN THOSE STRUCTURES HAVING A LOGICALLY CONTEMPORARY POSITION. SUCH TACTICS DO NOT REFLECT THE SPIRIT NOR THE LETTER OF ANY PHENOMENOLOGY, NOR DO THEY SEEM CONSISTENT WITH AN EXISTENTIAL APPROACH. IF THERE IS NO BETTER REASON FOR COMING TO A CONCLUSION THAN ON THE UNSATISFACTORY APPROACH OF ANOTHER THINKER, THEN NO CONCLUSION SHOULD BE DERIVED. GASTON BERGER HAS A VERY APT COMMENT WHEN HE STATES THAT "SARTRE BORROWS FROM HEGEL ONLY COVERTLY."¹³²

THE ONLY IMPLICIT REASON SARTRE OFFERS THE READER FOR HIS ABRUPT ENTRY INTO AN HERMENEUTIC, OR MORE ACCURATELY AN EXEGESIS, OF HEGEL'S AND HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPTS OF NOTHINGNESS IS IN THE PRECEEDING QUESTION HE ASKS: "WHAT IS THE ORIGINAL RELATION OF THE HUMAN BEING TO NOTHINGNESS?"¹³³ THE QUESTION INDICATES THAT INTUITIVELY GIVEN NEGATION, HAVING BEEN DESCRIBED, THE NEXT TASK IS TO DISCOVER ITS ORIGINAL, "ESSENTIAL" CONDITION FOR EXISTING AS IT IS EXPERIENCED. THEREFORE, TO BRIEFLY ILLUSTRATE THESE PREVIOUS IDEAS ABOUT THE ESSENTIAL ORIGIN OF THAT EXPERIENCE WILL ACT AS A GUIDE FOR SARTRE'S OWN FORMULATION OF THAT ESSENCE.

¹³⁰BN, P. 13.

¹³¹BN, P. 15.

¹³²BERGER, P. 94.

¹³³BN, P. 12.

IN A DISCUSSION OF HEIDEGGER'S ELUCIDATION OF THE STRUCTURE OF NOTHINGNESS, SARTRE ASKS:

WHAT IS THE USE OF AFFIRMING THAT NOTHINGNESS PROVIDES THE GROUND FOR NEGATION, IF IT IS MERELY TO ENABLE US TO FORM, SUBSEQUENTLY, A THEORY OF NON-BEING WHICH, BY DEFINITION SEPARATES NOTHINGNESS FROM ALL CONCRETE NEGATION?¹³⁴

THE QUESTION SEEMS AS CRUCIAL TO SARTRE AS IT IS TO HEIDEGGER, YET THERE ARE OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH SARTRE IS ATTEMPTING TO ANSWER. SARTRE HAS NOT FORMED A THEORY OF NON-BEING SEPARATING NOTHINGNESS AS A CATEGORY FROM NEGATIONS, NOR HAS HE DISCOVERED AN EXISTENTIAL CONNECTION FROM NEGATIONS TO NOTHINGNESS.

DISTANCE AS AN EXAMPLE OF NEGATION

IN THE NEXT DESCRIPTION IN SARTRE'S PRESENTATION, THE DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH IS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT. THE EXPERIENCE OF DISTANCE IS NOT PRESENTED AS THE EXPERIENCE AS ABSENCE WAS, RATHER IT IS A DESCRIPTION OF THE "CONDITIONS" OF PERCEIVING DISTANCE. WITHOUT THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE FIRST TWO CONDITIONS OF HIS USUAL METHODIC APPROACH, SARTRE MAKES THE DESCRIPTION OF ANALYZING THE GENERAL EXAMPLE OF A LINE BETWEEN TWO POINTS. ON THE ONE HAND:

WE CAN IN FACT GIVE THE SEGMENT AS IMMEDIATE OBJECT OF INTENTION, IN WHICH CASE THE SEGMENT REPRESENTS A FULL CONCRETE TENSION OF WHICH THE LENGTH IS A POSITIVE ATTRIBUTE AND THE TWO POINTS A AND B APPEAR ONLY AS MOMENTS OF THE WHOLE. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE DIRECT OUR ATTENTION TO THE TWO POINTS A AND B, THEY ARISE AS IMMEDIATE OBJECTS OF INTUITION ON THE GROUND OF SPACE.¹³⁵

THE SEGMENT DISAPPEARS AS A FULL CONCRETE OBJECT, IT IS APPREHENDED IN TERMS OF TWO POINTS AS THE EMPTINESS WHICH SEPARATES THEM.¹³⁶

WHAT IS REVEALED IN THIS PASSAGE IS THE DYADIC NATURE OF NEGATION VIEWED FROM THE REFLECTIVELY ANALYZABLE APPROACH. THE ASSERTING OF THE SEGMENT AS POSITIVE MAKES THE LIMITS NEGATIVE AND VICE VERSA, SO THAT THE POSITIVE

¹³⁴BN, p. 19.

¹³⁵BN, p. 20.

¹³⁶BN, p. 20.

ASPECT ALWAYS REFLECTS A NEGATIVE QUALITY ON OTHER OBJECTS. EXPERIENCES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO THIS DYADIC CONDITION SARTRE CALLS NEGATITES.

THE SIMILARITY OF SARTRE'S DESCRIPTION OF NEGATITE TO THE EIDETIC DESCRIPTION OF HUSSERL IS STRIKING. OF THE TWO DESCRIPTIONS SARTRE PRESENTS OF NEGATION, THE ABSENCE, ON ITS CONCRETE LEVEL, FAILS TO REVEAL ITS "ESSENCE," WHILE THE DESCRIPTION OF DISTANCE MAKES AVAILABLE THE INTUITION OF NEGATION'S ESSENCE. THE REASON THE FIRST FAILS AND THE SECOND SUCCEEDS MUST BE DUE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES BEING DESCRIBED. THE LATTER DESCRIPTION IS AN EXPERIENCE OCCURRING ONLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF AN EIDETIC SCIENCE, IN THE HIGHLY ABSTRACT SITUATION PRODUCED BY GEOMETRY. ALTHOUGH SARTRE COMMENTS THAT WHAT WAS INTUITED IN THIS "EIDETIC REALM . . . WE COULD JUST AS WELL HAVE BROUGHT OUT BY DESCRIBING REALITIES LIKE ABSENCE, CHANGE, OTHERNESS, REPULSION, REGRET, DISTRACTION, ETC."¹³⁷ HE HAS NOT CHOSEN TO ILLUSTRATE THAT ESSENTIAL INTUITION IS POSSIBLE IN THOSE MORE CONCRETE SITUATIONS. BY SEEMING TO EQUATE EIDETIC-INTUITIVE DESCRIPTIONS WITH EXISTENTIAL-INTUITIVE ONES, SARTRE BECOMES SUBJECT TO CRITICISM ON THE CONTINUITY OF STEPS WITHIN HIS METHOD.

SARTRE BECOMES LIABLE TO SERIOUS MISINTERPRETATION. IT IS LIKELY THAT THIS SORT OF METHOD USED IN DEVELOPING HIS CONCEPT OF NOTHINGNESS OPENS THE WAY TO THE KIND OF CRITICISM WHICH PAUL ROUBICZAK LEVELS AT HIM:

IN EXTERNAL REALITY WE CAN ONLY EXPERIENCE SOMETHING; EMPTINESS IS ONLY GRASPED AS SPACE LIMITED BY OBJECTS IN CONTRAST TO THEM . . . THE MISTAKE THAT WE CAN GRASP NOTHINGNESS AS EXTERNAL FACT . . . IS TYPICAL OF SARTRE'S DESCRIPTIONS, GRADUALLY OVERLAPED BY PARADOXICAL ELEMENTS WHICH ARE LOGICAL BUT HARDLY MAKE SENSE.¹³⁸

ANALYSIS OF THIS PARTICULAR EIDETIC TYPE OF DESCRIPTION IS NECESSARY IF SARTRE'S CONCEPTS, MISINTERPRETED IN SUCH A DRASTIC WAY AS ABOVE, ARE TO BE CREDITED WITH A CONSISTENCY OF DEVELOPMENT.

¹³⁷BN, p.21.

¹³⁸P. ROUBICZEK, EXISTENTIALISM: FOR AND AGAINST, (CAMBRIDGE, MASS: CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS, 1964), p. 114.

THERE ARE TWO CONSIDERATIONS WITH EIDETIC DESCRIPTION WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT CONCERNING SARTRE'S METHOD: THE FIRST IS TO FIND IF THE METHOD OUTLINED IS NOT ADEQUATE IN DERIVING ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORIES COMMENSURATE WITH THE INITIAL DESCRIPTIONS PRESENTED; THE SECOND IS TO WEIGH THE EIDETIC METHOD'S CONCLUSIONS WITH THOSE OF THE EXISTENTIAL METHOD.

SARTRE'S USE OF HEGEL AND HEIDEGGER

THE TECHNIQUES OF DESCRIBING STRUCTURES OF BEING ON THE BASIS OF CONCRETE EXPERIENCE IS UNIVERSAL ONLY IN THE SENSE THAT IT IS A DESCRIPTION OF PRE-PERSONAL, PRE-POSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS. YET, THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THAT CONSCIOUS EVENT ALSO PARTICULARIZES AND, IN A WAY, LIMITS UNIVERSALITY, AND CONTAMINATES IT IN PRINCIPLE. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS PARTICULARITY ON THE PART OF THE COGITO, SARTRE ESTABLISHED THE MODES OF BEING IN-AND FOR-ITSELF ON AN ONTOLOGICAL BASIS; IT IS PERPLEXING, THEN, THAT DESCRIPTION OF DISTANCE AND OTHER FORMS OF APPREHENDING NEGATION AS AN ESSENCE CANNOT ALSO BE CARRIED OUT ON THAT BASIS OF EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION. GIVEN THE PREMISES OF APPROACHING ONTOLOGY FROM THE POINT OF THE LEBENSWELT, THE PHENOMENON AS REVEALER OF BEING, AND THE OTHER BASIC CONDITIONS OF METHOD, ETC. SARTRE'S MODES OF BEINGS ARE AUTHENTIC. ONLY THOSE CRITICS WHO SEEM TO REJECT SARTRE'S ORIGINAL POSTULATES OR APPROACH SERIOUSLY QUESTION THE TENABILITY OF THE TWO MODES OF BEING; FOR INSTANCE, LUKACS REJECTS THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD BEFORE HE REFUTES THE MODES OF BEING.¹³⁹ IT IS CLEAR THAT SARTRE HIMSELF HAS NOT FOLLOWED HIS EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH STRICTLY; NOR IS THIS HIGHLY ABSTRACT EXAMPLE OF DISTANCE A FURTHER SUPPORT, AN IMPLICATION, OF A PREVIOUS CONCRETE EXAMPLE. THE CONTENTION MIGHT BE HELD THAT THE "CRITICAL" SECTION OF THE DISCUSSION OF NEGATION AND NOTHINGNESS

¹³⁹GEORGE LUKACS, "EXISTENTIALISM," PHILOSOPHY FOR THE FUTURE, ED. SELLERS, MCGILL, AND FARBER (BUFFALO, NEW YORK: UNIV. OF BUFFALO PRESS, 1958), PP. 573-574.

IS JUST A SUPPORTING "ASIDE." IF IT IS AN ASIDE, THEN IT WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE TO BE NON-ESSENTIAL TO SARTRE'S DEVELOPMENT OF NOTHINGNESS AS AN ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORY EXCEPT IN BEING A MODIFICATION OF WHAT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND, IF NON-ESSENTIAL, THEN THERE SHOULD BE NO ESSENTIAL CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM IT, BUT THEY COULD BE CLARIFIED AND SUPPORTED BY IT.

THERE ARE SOME IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE CRITICAL APPROACH. FOR EXAMPLE, SARTRE MAKES A REVERSAL OF HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF NON-BEING:

NOTHINGNESS CAN BE NIHILATED ONLY BY THE FOUNDATION OF BEING, IT IS NEITHER BEFORE NOR AFTER BEING NOR IN A GENERAL WAY OUTSIDE BEING. NOTHINGNESS LIES COILED IN THE HEART OF BEING, LIKE A WORM.¹⁴⁰

A CONCLUSION OF THIS NATURE IS ESSENTIAL TO SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY AND IS DRAWN FROM THE FACT THAT HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF NOTHINGNESS AS OUTSIDE BEING COULD NOT EXPLAIN, (NOR COULD HEGEL'S CONTEMPORANEOUS THEORY OF BEING AND NON-BEING), NEGATITES. AND IF THESE THEORIES FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHAT HAS BEEN OBSERVED IN THE MODE OF REFLECTION AS TRUE OF CONDITIONS OF NEGATION, THEN THE ALTERNATIVE, WHICH SARTRE PROPOSES THAT "NOTHINGNESS MUST BE GIVEN AT THE HEART OF BEING" IS AFFIRMED. IT IS THEN ON THE BASIS OF THE FAILURE OF OTHER THEORIES AND NOT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF REAL NEGATIONS THEMSELVES, PLUS HIS USE OF A LOGICAL RATHER THAN ABSTRACT EXAMPLE OF DISTANCE, WHICH CAUSES SARTRE TO COME TO SUCH A CONCLUSION.

UPON THIS CONCLUSION, SARTRE DISCOVERS MORE CONDITIONS OF THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NOTHINGNESS. NOTHINGNESS IN THE HEART OF BEING CAN NOT BE PRODUCED BY THE BEING-IN-ITSELF. THESE OBSERVATIONS PROMPT SARTRE TO ASK: "BUT HOW CAN THIS BEING BE RELATED TO NOTHINGNESS SO THAT THROUGH IT NOTHINGNESS COMES TO THINGS?"¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰BN, P. 21.
¹⁴¹BN, P. 22.

BEFORE PROCEEDING IN THE ANALYSIS, SEVERAL COMMENTS CONCERNING SARTRE'S METHODOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT CAN BE MADE. FIRST, THE USE SARTRE HAS MADE OF WHAT COULD BE CALLED EXISTENTIAL DESCRIPTION, THAT IS, DESCRIPTION OF AN EVENT OCCURRING ON THE PRE-REFLECTIVE LEVEL SUCH AS THE ABSENCE OF A FRIEND, ESTABLISHED SARTRE'S EXACT MEANING OF NEGATION. NEGATION THEN, LED TO THE EIDETIC OR ESSENTIAL DEFINITION OF NON-BEING AS THE ONTOLOGICAL CONDITION FOR THE EXPERIENCE OF NEGATION. THE DERIVATION OF WHAT MUST BE THE "ESSENTIAL STRUCTURE OF NEGATION" WAS ESTABLISHED BY FIRST, A CONSIDERATION OF PREVIOUS CONCEPTIONS OF NOTHINGNESS, AND, SECONDLY, AN EIDETIC DESCRIPTION WHICH DERIVED EXACTLY THAT ESSENTIAL CONDITION FOR NEGATION TO EXIST.

WHAT HAS YET TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN SARTRE'S MAJOR AIM OF FINDING THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS WHICH LINK THE TWO SEPARATE FORMS OF BEING, IS STILL A METHOD OF INTUITIVELY DESCRIBING THOSE FORMS OF BEING ON AN ESSENTIAL AND ONTOLOGICAL LEVEL CORRELATIVE TO INTUITIVE DESCRIPTION OF THOSE BEINGS ON THE EXISTENTIAL "CONTINGENT" LEVEL.

THE NEW INQUIRY LEADS FURTHER TOWARD THE CORE OF SARTRE'S DESCRIPTION OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE BEING-FOR-ITSELF AND NOTHINGNESS, BUT IT IS AGAIN NOT WITHIN AN ORDERED, OR RATHER EASILY UNDERSTANDABLE METHOD THAT HE PROCEEDS. SARTRE RETURNS TO THE FIRST ISSUE OF HIS TREATISE: THE ABILITY TO QUESTION MEANS THAT CONSCIOUSNESS ACTUALLY BRINGS A "NOTHINGNESS" TO THINGS.

CHAPTER X

HUMAN REALITY AS THE FOUNDATION OF NOTHINGNESS

IF A BEING CAN QUESTION, THEN IT MUST BE THE MODE OF BEING CALLED HUMAN AND THE PRIMARY CONDITION FOR AWARENESS IN MAN BECOMES NEGATION:

IT IS NECESSARY THAT NEGATION RISE UP, NOT AS A THING AMONG OTHER THINGS, BUT AS THE RUBRIC OF A CATEGORY WHICH PRESIDES OVER THE ARGUMENT AND REDISTRIBUTION OF GREAT MASSES OF BEING IN THINGS.¹⁴²

SARTRE HAS PROVIDED NEGATION WITH THE DISTINCTION OF BEING THE CONNECTIVE FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS, ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT USED HIS ORIGINAL METHOD TO ACHIEVE THIS DEFINITION OF NEGATION. FOR SOME REASON THIS ASSIGNMENT OF NEGATION AS THE DETERMINER OF THINGS FOR THE CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE SAME AS SAYING "MAN IS THE BEING THROUGH WHOM NOTHINGNESS COMES TO THE WORLD."¹⁴³ THE PROCESS OF THINKING ON BOTH THE SUBJECT OF NEGATITES AND NOTHINGNESS IS SPECULATIVE DEDUCTION AND HAS LITTLE REFERENCE TO HIS EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION (AND WHAT THAT DESCRIPTION REVEALS OR IMPLICATES AS EVIDENCE).

THE EXPERIENCE OF NEGATION

THE LACK OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN STATEMENTS ABOUT THE NATURE OF NEGATITES AND STATEMENTS ABOUT ONTOLOGICAL NOTHINGNESS IS AT THIS POINT IN SARTRE'S DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBJECTS, COMPLETELY DEFINITE. IN HIS INTRODUCTION SARTRE SET FORTH EVIDENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PHENOMENON OF BEING COULD NOT BE REDUCED TO THE BEING OF THE PHENOMENON; HOWEVER IT IS CLEAR

¹⁴²BN, p. 24.

¹⁴³BN, p. 24.

THAT A LACK OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN NEGATION AND NOTHINGNESS IS JUST SUCH A REDUCTION. NEGATION, OR MORE EXACTLY NEGATIVE¹ IS A PHENOMENON OF BEING, AN ESSENCE OF AN EXPERIENCE IN LIVED REALITY, TO EQUATE THIS ESSENCE WITH THE ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORY OF NOTHINGNESS (THE ULTIMATE CONDITION FOR THE BEING OF THE PHENOMENON) IS TANTAMOUNT TO MAKING THAT FORBIDDEN REDUCTION BECAUSE IT DENIES THE TRANSCENDENTAL CHARACTER OF THE BEING OF PHENOMENON BY GIVING IT A SINGLE INTUITION. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF HIS DEVELOPMENT MAY REVEAL THAT NO CONFLICT OR ERROR HAS BEEN EFFECTED; EVEN IF THIS IS THE CASE, THERE WOULD BE NO WAY TO JUSTIFY THIS MARKED DISPARITY.

THE INTERLUDE IN SARTRE'S BASIC METHOD WHICH HAS JUST BEEN DISCUSSED PROVIDES A REAL ADVANCEMENT IN HIS THEORY ON THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN BEING. IT IS NOT COMPLETELY UPON PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION THAT SARTRE ESTABLISHES CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE BEING BY WHICH NOTHINGNESS COMES TO THINGS. BUT, FROM THIS VIEWPOINT HE RETURNS AGAIN TO THE ORIGINAL METHOD. BECAUSE OF NOTHINGNESS AT THE CORE OF MAN'S BEING, SARTRE STATES MAN CAN "DISENGAGE HIMSELF FROM BEING."¹⁴⁴ THIS DISENGAGEMENT ON THE PART OF MAN IS WHAT SARTRE CALLS FREEDOM. TO BEGIN HIS INVESTIGATION OF FREEDOM HE DESCRIBES ANOTHER APPREHENSION OF ABSENCE AND AN EXPERIENCE OF "ANGUISH." THESE TWO DESCRIPTIONS ARE OF EVENTS IN WHICH IT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT APPEARANCES ARE REVELATIONS OF BEING AND WHAT IS APPREHENDED AND DESCRIBED HAPPENS ON A PRE-REFLEXIVE LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

THE METHOD OF REVELATION OF NEGATION

SARTRE INGENUOUSLY COMBINES A PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF ABSENCE, A CRITIQUE OF THE PLATONIC THEORY OF IMAGES, AND THE HUSSERLIAN THEORY OF EMPTY INTENTIONS TO SET FORTH THE CONDITIONS OF THE NEGATIVE MOMENT AND ON

¹⁴⁴BN, p. 26.

THAT BASIS HE CAN STATE SOUNDLY THAT:

WHATEVER MAY BE THE EXPLANATION WE GIVE IT, PIERRE'S ABSENCE, IN ORDER TO BE ESTABLISHED OR REALIZED REQUIRES A NEGATIVE MOMENT BY WHICH CONSCIOUSNESS, IN THE ABSENCE OF ALL PRIOR DETERMINATION CONSTITUTES ITSELF AS NEGATION.¹⁴⁵

THE HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION OF THE TWO PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS, BY WHICH SARTRE HAS LENT SUPPORT TO HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE APPREHENSION OR INTUITION OF NEGATION STILL DO NOT LEND ABSOLUTE NECESSITY TO THAT MOMENT OF NEGATION; THEY ONLY RENDER HIS DESCRIPTION MORE UNDERSTANDABLE. THE MOST CURIOUS STATEMENT IN THIS PASSAGE IS THE EXACT MEANING OF "ALL PRIOR DETERMINATION." IT IS QUESTIONABLE, ACCORDING TO WILD, THAT THERE CAN ACTUALLY BE A LACK OF ALL PRIOR DETERMINATION.¹⁴⁶ ASIDE FROM WILD'S ISSUE, NOT HAVING ANY PRIOR DETERMINATION AS A FURTHER REQUIREMENT FOR EXPERIENCING NEGATION SEPARATES EVEN FARTHER APART THE CONCRETE INTUITION OF NEGATION AND THE EIDETIC INTUITION OF THE NEGATITES.¹ IN ORDER TO EXPERIENCE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN A AND B, ALL OF THE PRIOR DETERMINATIONS OF GEOMETRIC THOUGHT ARE PRESENT TO THAT SITUATION AND ARE REQUIREMENTS FOR THAT EXPERIENCE. SARTRE HAS PROVIDED NO BRIDGE FROM THE CONCRETE EXPERIENCE TO THE EIDETIC ONE.

THE BEARING OF TIME AND CAUSALITY UPON NEGATION

SARTRE FURTHER ELUCIDATES THE REMARKS BY EXPLAINING THAT IN ORDER TO APPREHEND AN ABSENCE IN THE APPEARANCE OF THE ROOM, THE ROOM MUST SINK INTO BACKGROUND FOR THE POSITING OF THE IMAGE OF PIERRE TO APPEAR. BUT THE APPEARANCE OF THE IMAGE IS UNREAL, HAVING A QUALITY OF NEGATION TO IT AND ALSO INTENDING THIS ILLUSION AT THE SAME TIME, PULLS FOCUS AWAY FROM REAL APPEARANCES OF REVEALED BEINGS IN WHAT HAS BECOME BACKGROUND. ABSENCE-APPREHENSIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED THROUGH DISENGAGEMENT; PULLING CONSCIOUSNESS

¹⁴⁵BN, p. 27.

¹⁴⁶WILD, CONTEMPORARY PHENOMENOLOGY . . ., p. 167.

OUT OF ITS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD. SARTRE MAY BE CORRECT ABOUT ONE CONSCIOUS MOMENT CONSTITUTING A NEGATION AND THAT THIS NEGATION IS A WITHDRAWAL FROM THE BEING REVEALED THROUGH APPEARANCES, BUT HE DOES NOT CONTINUE TO STATE THAT THE VERY SAME CONSCIOUS MOMENT AT THE SAME TIME MUST BY DEFINITION ALSO GO FROM A PRE-REFLECTIVE LEVEL TO A REFLECTIVE ONE. SPONTANEOUS CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE ONLY LEVEL WHICH HAS BEEN SAID TO BE "IN-THE-WORLD" OR ENGAGED IN BEING. THE UNREFLECTED CONSCIOUSNESS CANNOT DO ANY DISENGAGING FROM BEING, BECAUSE THEN IT IS NOT ANY LONGER UNREFLECTED. IF SARTRE IS SPEAKING OF THE REFLECTIVE COGITO, THEN THE WHOLE ISSUE OF SPONTANEOUSNESS CONSCIOUSNESS BEING REVEALED IS LOST, AND HE IS NO LONGER EXISTENTIAL. IT IS UNUSUAL THAT SARTRE DOES NOT EXPLAIN SUCH A DILEMMA, BECAUSE UPON THIS DESCRIPTION RESTS SARTRE'S REPUDIATION OF CAUSALITY, ESSENTIAL TO THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM, AND HIS THEORY OF TEMPORALITY. JEAN WAHL ALSO REALIZES THE PROBLEM OF DISENGAGEMENT ON A SUPPOSEDLY UNREFLECTIVE LEVEL AND ACCOUNTS FOR IT BY CALLING THE LIFE FROM WHICH CONSCIOUSNESS IS DISENGAGED A "FICTICIOUS PRESUPPOSITION."¹⁴⁷

IN THIS FURTHER DESCRIPTION OF ABSENCE INVOLVING DISENGAGEMENT, THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL-EXISTENTIAL METHOD IS NOT TRULY CALLED FOR; INASMUCH AS DISENGAGEMENT IS NOT, AND CANNOT BE, AN ACTIVITY OF THE PRE-REFLECTIVE, PRE-POSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS. SARTRE CRITICIZED HUSSERL'S EPOCHE AS UNNECESSARY, DUE TO THE PRE-REFLEXIVE CONSCIOUSNESS BEING AVAILABLE FOR DESCRIPTION IN A NON-THETIC RECOLLECTION; BUT IF HIS REJECTION IS ADEQUATE, HE HAS NO GROUNDS FOR THE DESCRIPTION JUST OUTLINED. THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY IN A CRITIQUE OF SARTRE'S DESCRIPTION IS THAT HE DOES NOT SUCCINCTLY STATE THAT INTUITION OF NEGATION TAKES PLACE ON THE UNREFLECTIVE LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS, BUT THERE IS IN EVIDENCE NO OTHER WAY TO INTERPRET THE DESCRIPTION, UNLESS IT IS ONE FROM THE UNREFLECTED TO THE REFLECTIVE LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND SUCH A TRANSITION IS NOT INDICATED.

¹⁴⁷ WAHL, P. 44.

SARTRE AIMS, IN THIS NEXT PASSAGE, TO DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF TIME AND CAUSALITY IN TERMS OF STRUCTURES OF BEING-FOR-ITSELF. THE FUNCTION OF NEGATION IS BASIC TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOR-ITSELF. IT IS THROUGH THIS FUNCTION OF NEGATION THAT CONSCIOUSNESS DETERMINES APPEARANCES, ARRANGES BEING. TWO OTHER EFFECTS OF NEGATION ARE PASTNESS AND A LACK OF CAUSATION, ISOLATING EVERY CONSCIOUS MOMENT IN ITS SPONTANEITY. PRIOR CONSCIOUS MOMENTS ARE STILL RELATED TO THE PRESENT AS BEING PAST. "ON THE BASIS OF THIS ESSENTIAL RELATION, IT (PAST MOMENT) IS PUT OUT OF THE GAME, BETWEEN PARENTHESIS, EXACTLY AS IN THE EYES OF ONE PRACTICING THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL EPOCHE."¹⁴⁸ SARTRE FURTHER MAKES A STATEMENT WHICH CLEARLY INDICATES THAT HE UNDERSTANDS NEGATION TO TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIC LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS:

THUS THE CONDITION ON WHICH HUMAN REALITY CAN DENY ALL OR PART OF THE WORLD IS THAT HUMAN REALITY CARRY NOTHINGNESS WITHIN ITSELF AS THE NOTHING WHICH SEPARATES ITS PRESENT FROM ITS PAST.¹⁴⁹

THERE IS NO INDICATION IN THE STATEMENT INDICATING A PASSAGE FROM PRE-TO PAST-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE STARTING PLACE FOR SARTRE IS HUMAN REALITY ON THE LIVED, PRE-REFLECTIVE "I THINK" LEVEL CALLED BEING-IN-THE-WORLD. THE THEORY HAS DEVELOPED INTO A TYPE OF PARADOX. THE NATURE OF HUMAN REALITY IS SUCH THAT IT CAN BOTH BE IN-THE-WORLD AND AT THE SAME TIME, IT DISENGAGES ITSELF FROM THE WORLD THROUGH NOTHINGNESS. SARTRE DEDUCES THAT NOTHINGNESS SEPARATES PAST FROM PRESENT AND, THEREFORE, CAUSE FROM EFFECT. THE ALTERNATIVE TO THIS PARADOX IS THAT ALL CONSCIOUSNESSES ARE A PRESENT CONTINUUM UNTIL CONSCIOUSNESS REFLECTS, BUT SARTRE DOES NOT INDICATE SUCH AN IDEA. HIS EXPLANATION IS THAT:

NOTHINGNESS . . . IS THE GROUND OF NEGATION . . . BECAUSE IT IS THE NEGATION AS BEING. IT IS NECESSARY THEN THAT CONSCIOUS BEING CONSTITUTE ITSELF IN RELATION TO ITS PAST AS SEPARATED FROM THIS PAST

¹⁴⁸BN, p. 28.
¹⁴⁹BN, p. 28.

BY NOTHINGNESS. IT MUST BE CONSCIOUS OF THIS CLEAVAGE IN BEING, BUT NOT AS A PHENOMENON IT EXPERIENCES, RATHER AS THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS WHICH IT IS.¹⁵⁰

THE EXPLANATION IS NOT A SUCCESSFUL ONE FOR SEVERAL REASONS: FIRST, IN GIVING GROUNDS FOR THE SEPARATION OF PAST FROM PRESENT CONSCIOUS MOMENTS AS IS SHOWN BY THE PHRASE: "CONSCIOUSNESS CONTINUALLY EXPERIENCES ITSELF AS THE NIHILATION OF ITS PAST BEING."¹⁵¹ HOWEVER, THIS "EXPERIENCE" IS ALSO A REDUCTION OF PAST, "A PUTTING BETWEEN PARENTHESES OF THE PAST," WHICH IS SOMEHOW THE SAME AS AN "EXPERIENCE" OF NOTHING. THE EXACT MEANING OF THIS EXPERIENCE IS RELATED AS THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ONTOLOGICAL LEVEL OF FREEDOM, WHICH IS NOTHING MORE THAN APPREHENDING PAST AND FUTURE CONSCIOUSNESSES IN THE MODE OF NOT BEING THEM NOW. BUT DEVELOPING THE MODE OF EXISTENCE CALLED FREEDOM STILL LEAVES UNEXPLAINED THE FACT THAT EXPERIENCE OF THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT SUPPOSED TO BE APPREHENSION OF A PHENOMENON.

USING TERMS WHICH ARE UNCLARIFIED IN THEIR SPECIFIC CONTEXT CREATE AMBIGUITIES SUBJECT TO MISINTERPRETATIONS SIMILAR TO THE ONE WHICH A. J. AYER MAKES:

IN PARTICULAR SARTRE'S REASONING ON THE SUBJECT OF LE NEANT SEEMS TO BE EXACTLY ON PAR WITH THAT OF THE KING IN "ALICE THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS" . . . "THE POINT IS THAT WORDS LIKE NOTHING AND NOBODY ARE NOT USED FOR NAMES OF SOMETHING UNSUBSTANTIAL AND MYSTERIOUS."¹⁵²

AYER'S CONCLUSION IS UNDERSTANDABLE, BECAUSE THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SARTRE USES TERMINOLOGY THAT IS NOT ALWAYS CONSISTENT WITH HIS DEFINITIONS OF CATEGORIES IN HIS ONTOLOGY, AS IN THE USE OF "EXPERIENCE" IN THE ABOVE DISCUSSION.

IN REFERENCE TO SARTRE'S USE OF THE TWO METHODS, IT IS CLEAR, IN THE EXPERIENCE OF THE STRUCTURE OF NOTHINGNESS, THAT THERE IS A DISPARITY IN HIS

¹⁵⁰BN, p. 28.

¹⁵¹BN, p. 29.

¹⁵²A. J. AYER, "NOVELIST-PHILOSOPHERS V. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE," HORIZON, XII, (1945), pp. 18-19.

ATTEMPT TO DERIVE THE ONTOLOGICAL CONDITION OF NEGATION OF PAST AND FUTURE FROM HIS PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF NEGATION. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NEED FOR CRITICISM TO DEVELOP THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION IS GREAT BECAUSE SARTRE BASES HIS DESCRIPTION OF FREEDOM UPON THIS SEPARATION OF PAST FROM PRESENT. THE FAILURE OF THE SUPPORTING TECHNIQUE OF CRITICAL ANALYSIS IS ONE OF AMBIGUITY OF A BAD KIND, FOR IT MYSTIFIES RATHER THAN CONSTRUCTS.

PASTNESS AND ANGUISH

ANGUISH, ACCORDING TO SARTRE, IS A RECOGNITION OF UNDESIRED POSSIBILITIES AS BELONG TO THE EGO AS THAT INDIVIDUAL'S POSSIBILITIES:

IN SHORT, TO AVOID FEAR WHICH REVEALS TO ME A TRANSCENDENT FUTURE STRICTLY DETERMINED, I TAKE REFUSE IN REFLECTION BUT THE LATTER HAS ONLY UNDETERMINED FUTURE TO OFFER . . . YET I AM ALREADY THERE IN THE FUTURE . . . I AM THE SELF I WILL BE IN THE MODE OF NOT BEING IT.¹⁵³

A FULLER EXPLANATION IS DIFFICULT TO FOLLOW, BUT IT HAS VALUE IN THAT IT ILLUSTRATES SARTRE'S USE OF DYADIC DESCRIPTIONS:

THE SELF WHICH I AM DEPENDS (FOR ITS SURVIVAL) ON THE SELF WHICH I AM NOT YET TO THE EXACT EXTENT THAT THE SELF WHICH I AM NOT YET DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE SELF WHICH I AM.¹⁵⁴

ALL OF THESE "NOTS" AND "NOT YETS" ARE, FOR SARTRE, AN EXPERIENCE OF NOTHINGNESS OR THE EFFECT OF NEGATION APPLIED TO PAST AND FUTURE. NEVERTHELESS, THE EXPERIENCE TAKES PLACE IN THE REFLECTIVE MODE OF CONSCIOUSNESS, AND IN LIGHT OF SARTRE'S CRITICISM OF THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM DESCRIPTIONS OF STATES IN THAT MODE OF CONSCIOUSNESS, IT DOES NOT SEEM TO LEND ANY STRENGTH TO HIS ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, IN THE MIDST OF THE DISCUSSION ON ANGUISH, SARTRE INCLUDES AN AFFIRMATION OF HIS INITIAL POSITION, "CONSCIOUSNESS OF BEING IS THE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS."¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³BN, p. 32.

¹⁵⁴BN, p. 32.

¹⁵⁵BN, p. 33.

TWO IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS ARISE IN THE DISCUSSION OF ANGUISH THAT SEEM TO BE NEITHER CONCLUSIONS NOR SUPPORTING STATEMENTS FOR THE CONCEPT UNDER STUDY. THE FIRST CONSIDERATION ARISES THAT:

NOTHINGNESS WHICH IS THE CONDITION OF ALL TRANSCENDENT NEGATION CAN BE ELUCIDATED ONLY IN TERMS OF TWO OTHER ORIGINAL NIHILATIONS; (1) CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT ITS OWN MOTIVE INASMUCH AS IT IS EMPTY OF ALL CONTENT. THIS REFERS US TO A NIHILATING STRUCTURE OF THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO, (2) CONSCIOUSNESS CONFRONTS ITS PAST AND ITS FUTURE AS FACING A SELF WHICH IT IS IN THE MODE OF NOT BEING.¹⁵⁶

IF IT IS A FACT THAT THESE TWO CONDITIONS MUST BE CONSIDERED BEFORE ANY TRUE ELUCIDATION OF NOTHINGNESS CAN BE BROUGHT FORTH, THEN THERE SURELY CAN ONLY BE A TENTATIVE VALUE TO ALL THE STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE STRUCTURE OF NOTHINGNESS WHICH PRECEDED THIS DISCUSSION.

MAN'S SEPARATION FROM ESSENCE

ANOTHER CONSIDERATION WHICH SEEMS TO BACK-TRACK SARTRE'S THEORIZING IS A NEW DEFINITION OF HUMAN REALITY.

THIS SELF, WITH ITS A PRIOR AND HISTORICAL CONTENT IS THE ESSENCE OF MAN. ANGUISH AS THE MANIFESTATION OF FREEDOM IN THE FACE OF THE SELF MEANS THAT MAN IS ALWAYS SEPARATED BY NOTHINGNESS FROM HIS ESSENCE . . . THAT CONTINUALLY CARRIES WITH HIM A PREJUDICATIVE COMPREHENSION OF HIS ESSENCE, BUT DUE TO THIS VERY FACT HE IS SEPARATED FROM IT BY A NOTHINGNESS.¹⁵⁷

THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCE OF THIS STATEMENT HAS A GREAT EFFECT ON WHAT HAS BEEN DISCOVERED SO FAR ABOUT BEING-FOR-ITSELF. THE BEING-FOR-ITSELF AND ITS STRUCTURES ARE THE FUNDAMENTALS OF HUMAN REALITY AS AN ESSENCE, AND THIS ESSENCE IT IS NOW DISCOVERED, IS SEPARATED FROM THE PRESENT AS "HAS BEEN," MAN CANNOT DISCOVER WHAT HE IS IF ESSENCE IS BY DEFINITION A PAST FUNCTION. WILFRED DESAN FINDS A GREAT CONTRADICTION IN THIS NOTION OF THE ETERNAL PASTNESS OF ESSENCE, AND CHARGES THAT SARTRE "DOES NOT REALLY SUCCEED IN

¹⁵⁶BN, p. 34.

¹⁵⁷BN, p. 34.

EXPLICITLY ELIMINATING THE NOTION OF HUMAN REALITY OR OF ESSENCES PRECEDING (LOGICALLY) EXISTENCE."¹⁵⁸ HE CITES PASSAGES FROM EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM TO SUPPORT HIS CHARGE THAT SARTRE SPEAKS FREELY OF HUMAN ESSENCE:

WHAT MEN HAVE IN COMMON IS NOT A NATURE, BUT A CONDITION AND ENSEMBLE OF RESTRICTIONS AND COERCIONS . . . AND THIS CONDITION IS . . . THE ENSEMBLE OF ABSTRACT CHARACTERS COMMON TO ALL SITUATIONS.¹⁵⁹

THE PRIMARY DIFFICULTY OF DESAN'S ATTACK IS NOT WHAT SARTRE SAYS, BUT WHAT HE DOES NOT SAY. AN "ENSEMBLE OF ABSTRACT CHARACTERS" AS THE CONDITION FOR BEING IS CERTAINLY EQUIVALENT TO ESSENCE, HOWEVER, SUCH AN ENSEMBLE COULD VERY WELL BE A NON-CONCLUSIVE ESSENCE. IT IS POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN AN ESSENCE WHICH IS NOT ALL INCLUSIVE, BUT IS SIGNIFICANT IN AS FAR AS IT IS ESSENTIAL. THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTION TO SARTRE'S PLACEMENT OF ESSENCE AS FOREVER PAST IS THE FUTILITY OF ANY EFFORT IN ONTOLOGY FROM THE INITIAL POINT OF VIEW THAT "EXISTENCE PRECEDES ESSENCE." IT SEEMED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REAL PROBLEM IN DISCOVERING REAL ESSENCES, BUT A CLOSER LOOK AT THAT PROPOSITION DISCOVERS THE SOURCE IN WHICH EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE CAN NEVER COINCIDE - SO THAT SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS NEVER REALLY IS BUT ALWAYS HAS BEEN AND WILL BE. DESAN USED THE CONDITION OF LOGICAL PRECEDENCE FOR EXISTENCE TO ESSENCE, BUT BASED UPON SARTRE'S JUDGMENT AS TO THE SEPARATION OF THESE TWO, IT IS NOT ONLY LOGICAL BUT PRACTICAL AS WELL. FUNDAMENTALLY, SARTRE HAS MADE AN ATTEMPT TO SEPARATE EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE ON A PRACTICAL LEVEL WHICH, AS HAS BEEN SHOWN, HE ACCOMPLISHED BY PROVIDING THE LACK OF RELATION BETWEEN THE APPEARANCE OF NEGATION AND THE ABSTRACT NOTION OF NOTHINGNESS, A GAP WHICH HE FAILED, METHODICALLY, TO BRIDGE. HOWEVER, THE WEAKNESS OF HIS JUDGMENT ABOUT THE INACCESSIBILITY OF ESSENCE DEPENDS ON THE DESCRIPTION ON THE

¹⁵⁸DESAN, P. 162.

¹⁵⁹J. P. SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM, TRANS. B. FECHTMAN (NEW YORK: PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY, 1947), P. 447.

SEPARATION OF PAST FROM PRESENT AND THAT DESCRIPTION WAS NOT EXISTENTIAL; IT HAS ALL THE CHARACTERISTICS OF BEING OBSERVED FROM THE REFLECTIVE MODE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

FREEDOM AND ESCAPE

FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE NATURE OF THIS NIHILATION AS CREATING PAST AND FUTURE, SEPARATED FROM THE PRESENT, LEADS SARTRE TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THIS SEPARATION IS THE PROVISION FOR THE PERVADING CONCEPT OF FREEDOM. FREEDOM, THROUGH THIS NEGATIVE ASPECT, IS THE "NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE TRANSCENDING APPREHENSION OF NEGATITES; AND ITS EXPRESSION IS ALSO A "TRANSCENDENCE IN IMMINENCE." THEREFORE, SARTRE UNDERTAKES AS THE NEXT SUBJECT FOR INVESTIGATION TO FIND "IN THE PURE SUBJECTIVITY OF THE INSTANTANEOUS COGITO . . . THE ORIGINAL ACT BY WHICH MAN IS TO BE HIS OWN NOTHINGNESS."¹⁶⁰ THE ORIGINAL ACT HAS BEEN INDICATED BY THE DISCUSSION OF ANGUISH WHICH, IN HIS DESCRIPTION, SARTRE HAS SAID THAT IT IS SOMETHING TO AVOID AND, IN AVOIDING IT SINCE IT IS IMMINENT OR SUBJECTIVE TO CONSCIOUSNESS, THE APPREHENSION OF ANGUISH IS ALWAYS PRESENT EVEN WHILE AVOIDING IT: "ANGUISH IN ORDER TO FLEE ANGUISH." THIS CONDUCT OF AVOIDANCE AND FLIGHT SARTRE CALLS BAD FAITH. BAD FAITH IS, HOWEVER, NOT YET THE IMMEDIATE REVELATION OF BEING FOR ITSELF IN RELATION TO IN-ITSELF, BUT A CONDUCT:

WHICH WILL LEAD US TO THE THRESHOLD OF IMMINENCE AND WHICH REMAINS STILL SUFFICIENTLY OBJECTIVE SO THAT WE CAN OBJECTIVELY DISENGAGE ITS CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY.¹⁶¹

BEFORE ANALYZING THE "CONDUCT," IT MUST BE REMARKED THAT THE DIRECTION INDICATED IN SARTRE'S INQUIRY ON BAD FAITH SEEMS OPPOSITE TO THE CONCEPT POSTULATED AT THE BEGINNING, THAT IS, TO PROCEED FROM THE CONCRETE TO THE ABSTRACT CONDITIONS OF BEING. SARTRE HAS PROCEEDED FROM AN INITIAL

¹⁶⁰BN, p. 40.
¹⁶¹BN, p. 45.

PRESENTATION OF NEGATION AS EXPERIENCED EXISTENTIALLY TO AN ONTOLOGICAL ORIENTATION OF NOTHINGNESS IN HUMAN REALITY, AND THEN TO ANGUISH, AND NOW A STEP CLOSER TO CONCRETE EXISTENTIAL EXPERIENCE AGAIN. THERE IS LITTLE TO DISAPPROVE OF IN THE DIRECTION OF THE INVESTIGATION, SINCE MUCH OF IT HAS BEEN AN ELUCIDATION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER; THE DISQUIETING ASPECT OF THIS DIRECTION IS THE GENERAL LACK OF PROVIDING SOUND REASONS FOR SUCH VACILLATING. REASON FOR CHANGE IS CLEARER IF IT GROWS OUT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE SUBJECT AND CAN THEN BE CLEARLY ARTICULATED.

NOTHINGNESS AS A REQUIREMENT FOR SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY

THE ELUCIDATION OF BAD FAITH RESTS SOUNDLY ON SARTRE'S FORMULATIONS CONCERNING "PASTNESS" AND "ANGUISH" AS NEGATIVE EXPERIENCES. THE NEW ADDITION TO NEGATIVE EXPERIENCES WHICH IS FOUND IN BAD FAITH AS A HUMAN CONDUCT IS THAT THERE EXISTS A TWO-FOLD APPREHENSION OF BEING AND NEGATION, NOT IN THE SENSE OF ONTOLOGICAL BEING, BUT A DESIRE EITHER NOT TO BE WHAT A PERSON IS IN ESSENCE OR A DESIRE TO BE SOMETHING WHICH A PERSON IS NOT. THE DISCUSSION OF THE DYNAMICS OF THIS HUMAN CONDUCT IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT SARTRE HAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED A CHANGE IN HIS ORIGINAL DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS. THE CHANGE IN MEANING IS FOR,

A BEING SUCH THAT IN ITS BEING, ITS BEING IS IN QUESTION INsofar AS THIS BEING IMPLIES A BEING OTHER THAN ITSELF . . .

TO AN INCLUSION OF THE CATEGORY NOTHINGNESS;

A BEING THE NATURE OF WHICH IS TO BE CONSCIOUS OF THE NOTHINGNESS OF ITS BEING.¹⁶²

IN TERMS OF THE ORIGINAL METHOD, THIS RESTATEMENT CANNOT BE ALLOWED AS A VALID AMENDMENT SUCH AS "THE QUESTION" ONLY REVEALED NEGATION - "NOT NOTHINGNESS"; SARTRE'S TESTIMONY TO THE VALIDITY OF THIS CHANGE GIVES

¹⁶²BN, pp. 46-47.

A NEW PERSPECTIVE TO HIS WHOLE PRECEEDING DISCUSSION OF NOTHINGNESS:

IN LIGHT OF THE REQUIREMENTS WHICH WE HAVE ESTABLISHED IN THE PRECEEDING CHAPTERS, WE MUST NOW RESUME THE DESCRIPTION WHICH WE ATTEMPTED IN THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS WORK, THAT IS, WE MUST RETURN TO THE PLANE OF THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO.¹⁶³

NOWHERE IN HIS "INTRODUCTION," OR IN HIS "FIRST PART" DID SARTRE INDICATE THE NEED FOR CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO A STUDY OF THE PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS AS A MODE OF BEING. IF IT WERE A NECESSITY TO ESTABLISH ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS FOR MORE ACCURATE DESCRIPTIONS OF THIS ONTOLOGICAL LEVEL OF BEING FOR ITSELF, THEN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED IN THE BEGINNING THAT SUCH CONDITIONS ARE NECESSARY BEFORE THAT LEVEL CAN BE APPROACHED. SARTRE DOES NOT OFFER A POST HOC EXPLANATION OF THE NEED OF THESE CONDITIONS AND A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE METHOD BY WHICH THEY WERE DERIVED. SARTRE'S FAILURE TO ACCOMPLISH A PERSPECTIVE FOR HIS READERS OF HIS DIRECTION RESULTS IN A CONFUSION ON WHETHER HE IS BEING PHENOMENOLOGICAL OR ANALYTICAL UP TO THIS POINT. REFERRING BACK TO THE BEGINNING OF PART ONE, IT CAN BE SEEN THAT PERHAPS THE REASON SARTRE HAS TRIED TO FOUND NOTHINGNESS IN THE HEART OF HUMAN REALITY IS TO SOLVE THE "IMPASSE" OF THE LACK OF ANY RELATION BETWEEN THE TWO REGIONS OF BEING. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT OFFER THE STUDY OF NEGATIONS WITH THAT EXPLANATION, NOR DOES HE CONCLUDE WITH IT.

¹⁶³BN, p. 73.

CHAPTER XI

BAD FAITH: THE FOUNDATION OF NOTHINGNESS AS HUMAN REALITY

ON THE BASIS OF HIS OPENING REMARK QUOTED ABOVE, IT IS INDICATED THAT THIS "SECOND PART" IS ACTUALLY THE BEGINNING OF TRUE EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY. SARTRE DIRECTS HIS ATTENTION TO THE IMMEDIATE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS ON THE PRE-REFLECTIVE LEVEL. RESTATING THE NATURE OF THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO AS SELF-AWARENESS INTENDING THE OBJECT, CONSTITUTED BY THAT SELF-SAME CONSCIOUS MOMENT; SARTRE ADDS THAT IT IS, IN A SENSE, ITS OWN WITNESS. AND, IN THIS SENSE, "THE COGITO INCLUDES THIS NULLIFYING CHARACTERISTIC OF EXISTING FOR A WITNESS."¹⁶⁴ IT COULD CERTAINLY HAVE HELD THAT SARTRE PROCEEDS TO ATTRIBUTE TOO MUCH SIGNIFICATION TO THE NULLIFYING EFFECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS BEING A WITNESS FOR ITSELF. IN HIS EXPLANATION OF THE ORIGINAL NULLIFICATION, HE CHOOSES TO USE "BELIEF" ONCE MORE AS THE OBJECT CONSTITUTED BY THE CONSCIOUSNESS:

THUS BY THE SOLE FACT THAT MY BELIEF IS APPREHENDED AS BELIEF, IT IS NO LONGER BELIEF . . . IT IS TROUBLED BELIEF.¹⁶⁵

SARTRE DOES NOT PAUSE TO WEIGH WHETHER OR NOT THE OBJECT "BELIEF" CAN BE CONSTITUTED AS SUCH ON A PRE-POSITIONAL LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS. THE IDEA OF BELIEF, APPREHENDED AS "MY BELIEF" IS DIFFERENT THAN STRAIGHTFORWARDLY BELIEVING IN SOMETHING. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT SARTRE DOES NOT HOLD THE DOXIC CONCEPT OF BELIEF "WHICH ARE THETIC ACTS, ACTS WHICH POSIT BEING." HUSSERL PROPOSED RATHER BELIEF IS "ADHERENCE OF BEING TO ITS OBJECT WHEN

¹⁶⁴BN, p. 74.

¹⁶⁵BN, p. 74.

THE OBJECT IS NOT GIVEN OR GIVEN INDISTINCTLY."¹⁶⁶ ACCORDING TO THE DEFINITION, BELIEF IS AN ATTITUDE HELD TOWARD A CERTAIN TYPE OF OBJECT, IT IS AN ATTITUDE OF ASSUMPTION OF EXISTENCE OF THAT OBJECT.¹⁶⁷

BAD FAITH, SARTRE SAYS, IS A TYPE OF LIE EXCEPT IT IS "FROM MYSELF THAT I AM HIDING THE TRUTH," THEREFORE, ON THE PRE-REFLECTIVE LEVEL THERE MUST BE AWARENESS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF BAD FAITH. SINCE BAD FAITH IS AWARE OF ITSELF, IT SEEMS IMPORTANT TO INVESTIGATE THE MEANING OF FAITH, OR, IF FAITH HAS TO DO WITH BELIEF, THEN TO DISCUSS FAITH AS THE ACT OF BELIEF, WILL BRING TO LIGHT ITS NATURE. HOWEVER, THE IMPLICATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS CONSCIOUSNESS OF AN OBJECT RENDERS BELIEF IN THE SAME CONDITION AS THE FOR-ITSELF, IN THAT SARTRE HAS DEFINED THEM IN THE SAME WAY SO THAT BELIEF, IN ITS VERY NATURE IS A QUESTIONING OF ITS OWN MEANING.

IN SARTRE'S WORDS:

TO BELIEVE IS TO KNOW THAT ONE BELIEVES AND TO KNOW THAT ONE BELIEVES IS NO LONGER TO BELIEVE. THUS, THE NON-THETIC CONSCIOUSNESS-BELIEVING IS DESTRUCTIVE OF BELIEF. EVERY BELIEF IS A BELIEF THAT FALLS SHORT, ONE NEVER WHOLLY BELIEVES WHAT ONE BELIEVES.¹⁶⁸

WHAT IS TRUE OF THE NATURE OF BELIEF, FOR SARTRE, IS TRUE OF THE NATURE OF FAITH, BOTH GOOD AND BAD. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THESE VALUES BEING THAT BAD FAITH IS TO FLEE BEING BY TAKING REFUGE IN "NOT BELIEVING WHAT ONE BELIEVES." WHILE GOOD FAITH IS TO FLEE THE NATURE OF BELIEF AS NOT BELIEVING WHAT ONE BELIEVES BY TRYING TO FIND WHAT ONE BELIEVES. IT IS IN THE LIGHT OF THIS DEFINITION OF BAD FAITH THAT SARTRE ATTEMPTS TO SHOW, THROUGH ITS ILLUSTRATION, THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS A BEING THAT CAN APPREHEND, BOTH BEING AND NOTHINGNESS SIMULTANEOUSLY. SEVERAL DIFFICULTIES ARISE IN SARTRE'S ATTEMPT IN TERMS OF HIS METHOD. THESE EXAMPLES, USED BY SARTRE, FOR INSTANCE, ARE NOT IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH THE ARCHETYPAL DESCRIPTIONS

¹⁶⁶ I, p. 67.

¹⁶⁷ BN, pp. 74-75.

¹⁶⁸ BN, p. 69.

OF THE ACTIVITY OF PRE-REFLEXIVE CONSCIOUSNESS TREATED IN HIS INTRODUCTION; RATHER, THEY ARE PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE HISTORIES, DESCRIPTIONS OF OBJECTIVE EXAMPLES OF BAD FAITH. THESE EXAMPLES SERVE TO CLARIFY WHAT IS MEANT BY BAD FAITH, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT ACTUALLY SHOW AN UNREFLECTED CONSCIOUS MOMENT APPREHENDING ITSELF AS CONSTITUTING A BEING (WHICH IT ACTUALLY IS NOT) IN ORDER TO AVOID ANGUISH IN THE RACE OF FREEDOM.

ALTHOUGH HE HAS GIVEN NO DESCRIPTION CAPABLE OF BEING INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT OF HIS PROPOSED METHOD, SARTRE INSISTS RIGOROUSLY THAT:

THE CONDITION OF THE POSSIBILITY FOR BAD FAITH IS THAT HUMAN REALITY IN ITS MOST IMMEDIATE BEING, IN THE INTRA-STRUCTURE OF THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO, MUST BE WHAT IT IS NOT AND NOT BE WHAT IT IS.¹⁶⁹

THE STATEMENT IS OF A PRESCRIPTIVE NATURE IN THAT SARTRE SETS FORTH A CONDITION WHICH MUST EXIST IN ORDER FOR BAD-FAITH TO BE STRUCTURED IN THE WAY THAT IT IS. WHAT IS KNOWN TO SARTRE AND ANY OBSERVER IS THE PHENOMENON OF BAD-FAITH WHICH DOES REVEAL MANY CONDITIONS ABOUT ITSELF, BUT TO STATE THAT THIS PHENOMENON OPENS THE WAY TO GRASPING THE ESSENCE OF THE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS MAKING A METHODOLOGICAL STEP WHICH STRAINS THE CONSISTENCY OF THE PROCEDURE. THE STEP FROM A DESCRIPTION OF BAD-FAITH TO CONSTRUING IT TO MEAN THAT THE INTERSTRUCTURE OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS MUST BE WHAT IT IS NOT, REQUIRES, OR AT LEAST WARRANTS CLOSER SCRUTINY THAN SARTRE GIVES IT. FOR INSTANCE, THERE IS A QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT BAD-FAITH IS APPREHENDED UPON AN EIDETIC OR CONCRETE LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE. THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENT INDICATES ANOTHER SUCH LACK OF DISTINCTION WHICH SARTRE HAS FAILED TO DRAW.

THE DEPENDENCE OF BELIEF UPON REFLECTION

TO ASSUME THE BEING OF AN OBJECT, CONSCIOUSNESS, AS IT IS BEING-IN-THE-WORLD WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENT TO THAT OBJECT IN ONE MANNER OR ANOTHER,

¹⁶⁹BN, p. 74.

INCLUDING IMAGE AND ILLUSION. IT WOULD SEEM COMMENSURATE WITH SARTRE'S INITIAL STANDPOINT TO STATE THAT: ASSUMING AN OBJECT IS CONSTITUTED EITHER POSITIVELY OR NEGATIVELY, IT WOULD BE THE NATURE OF THE NON-POSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS TO BE AWARE OF BEING AWARE OF THE OBJECT. BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THAT CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD NOT BE AWARE OF BEING AWARE OF THAT OBJECT AS "ASSUMED"; ONLY WHEN IT IS IN SOME WAY BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS DOES A PERSON STOP AND RECOGNIZE THAT "I HAVE ASSUMED THAT OBJECT TO EXIST." THE CHANGE IS FROM THE LIVING-IN-THE-WORLD LEVEL OF SELF-AWARENESS TO THE REFLECTIVE LEVEL. CERTAINLY THIS DESCRIPTION WOULD ALSO APPLY TO BELIEF AS OBJECT, NOT BELIEF IN AN OBJECT. THUS, TO CONSTITUTE BELIEF, A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF ABSTRACTION MUST OCCUR AND, IN THIS OCCURRENCE, CONSCIOUSNESS GOES FROM THE PRE-REFLECTIVE TO THE REFLECTIVE LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS, A DISENGAGEMENT IN THE ACT OF BEING-IN-THE-WORLD. DESCRIPTION OF SOME OTHER OBJECT CONSTITUTED BY A PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD NOT HAVE THE SAME EFFECT AS DOES THE EXAMPLE OF BELIEF. IN A PASSAGE CITED EARLIER CONCERNING THE NATURE OF BELIEF, SARTRE CONCLUDED THAT BELIEF IS SO CONNECTED WITH SELF-KNOWLEDGE THAT BELIEF IS REDUCED TO ONLY A BELIEF, NOT A CERTAINTY AT THE MOMENT WHEN IT IS RECOGNIZED. DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT BELIEF CANNOT BE RECOGNIZED AS SUCH ON A PRE-REFLEXIVE LEVEL, SARTRE CONCLUDES HIS PRESENT ARGUMENT THAT BELIEF "OWING TO THE VERY FACT THAT IT CAN EXIST ONLY AS TROUBLED EXISTS FROM THE START AS ESCAPING FROM ITSELF."¹⁷⁰ ALL OF WHICH MAY BE VERY TRUE OF BELIEF ON THE REFLECTIVE LEVEL, BUT IT IS NOT TRUE OF PHENOMENON OF BEING-IN-ITSELF, SUCH AS A LIGHT FIXTURE, OR BELIEF IN AN OBJECT. BELIEF THAT WATER WILL BOIL FOR INSTANCE IS NOT TROUBLED, AT LEAST UNTIL ONE READS DAVID HUME'S ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND STOPS TO CONSIDER THAT IT IS ONLY A BELIEF THAT WATER WILL BOIL. SARTRE IS DESCRIBING THE

¹⁷⁰BN, p. 75.

PHENOMENON OF BELIEF TO ELUCIDATE THE NULLIFYING CHARACTER OF THE COGITO EXISTING FOR A WITNESS WHICH IS ITSELF, AND HE USES BELIEF RATHER THAN BELIEF IN SOMETHING IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH NOTHINGNESS AT THE CORE OF BEING-FOR-ITSELF. THIS SINGLE CONCEPT MAY WELL BE CONSIDERED AS THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE IN SARTRE'S COMPLETE PHILOSOPHY.

TO USE AN EXAMPLE OF WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO USE BELIEF IN PARTICULAR TO FOUND NOTHINGNESS AS BASIC TO SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY, THE SENTENCE: "THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF BELIEF WHILE IRREPARABLY ALTERING BELIEF DOES NOT DISTINGUISH ITSELF FROM BELIEF; IT EXISTS IN ORDER TO PERFORM THE FACT OF FAITH,"¹⁷¹ SEEMS TO MAKE PERFECT SENSE ACCORDING TO THE NATURE OF BELIEF. HOWEVER, IF ANOTHER SUBJECT OF SARTRE'S DESCRIPTIONS IS USED IN PLACE OF BELIEF, THE SENTENCE WOULD READ:

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF COUNTING, WHILE IRREPARABLY ALTERING COUNTING, DOES NOT DISTINGUISH ITSELF FROM ACCOUNTING; IT EXISTS IN ORDER TO PERFORM THE ACT OF ADDITION.

THIS SENTENCE MAKES MUCH LESS SENSE; COUNTING IS NOT ALTERED BY USE AND SARTRE LEAVES THE SUBJECT OF BELIEF FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE MEANING OF "SELF" AS IT IS USED IN THE TERM "FOR-ITSELF." IN THIS DISCUSSION, SARTRE RETURNS TO THE COGITO AND DEFINES IT AS A DYAD.

SELF FACES SELF

SARTRE OPENS A NEW DISCUSSION BY FIRST PRESENTING A LOGICALLY STRUCTURED DEFINITION OF SELF-IDENTITY: THE NATURE OF THE MEANING OF SELF IS ONE OF "REFERENCE," BUT IT IS A REFERENCE TO ITS OWN SUBJECT; THIS RELATION IS PRECISELY A DUALITY, "THE DUALITY OF INTERNAL QUALITY SUCH THAT, IN BEING A RELATION OF A BEING WITH ITSELF, IT IS A RELATION WITHIN A UNITY."¹⁷² IN THIS DISTINCTION OF DUALITY THERE ARE TWO STATEMENTS WHICH

¹⁷¹BN, P. 75.

¹⁷²BN, P. 76.

MUST BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY FIRST, "THE SELF CANNOT BE APPREHENDED AS A REAL EXISTENT." THE SUBJECT CANNOT BE SELF WHICH WOULD CAUSE THE SELF TO DISAPPEAR INTO IDENTITY. SECONDLY, SARTRE ASSERTS THAT NEITHER CAN IT BE SAID TO BE THAT THE SELF IS NOT ITSELF AS "AN INDICATION OF THE SUBJECT." THUS, SARTRE DERIVES THE "LAW OF BEING" OF THE FOR-ITSELF; TO BE ITSELF IN THE FORM OF PRESENCE TO ITSELF. "PRESENCE TO" IMPLIES A DISTANCE WITHIN THE UNITY OF THE COGITO AND THIS DISTANCE IS THE ORIGIN OF NOTHINGNESS. THE IMPLICATION OF A DISTANCE IS DERIVED FROM DEFINITION OF A TERM AND NOT FOUNDED, AS AN APPREHENSION OF THE COGITO, IN AN INTUITIVE FACTUAL MANNER. SARTRE REINTRODUCES BELIEF AS AN EXAMPLE IN ORDER TO STATE:

THE SEPARATION WHICH SEPARATES BELIEF FROM ITSELF CANNOT BE GRASPED . . . IN ISOLATION. WE FIND BELIEF ONCE MORE AS PURE IMMINENCE . . . THE FISSURE IS THERE APPEARING WHEN WE DO NOT WISH TO SEE IT, DISAPPEARING AS SOON AS WE SEEK TO CONTEMPLATE IT. THIS FISSURE IS THEN THE PURE NEGATIVE. THIS NEGATIVE WHICH IS THE NOTHINGNESS OF BEING AND THE NIHILATING POWER BOTH TOGETHER IS NOTHINGNESS . . . THUS THE FOR-ITSELF MUST BE ITS OWN NOTHINGNESS.¹⁷³

SELF AND BELIEF

BUT BELIEF, AS AN OBJECT TO CONSCIOUSNESS, CAN BE APPREHENDED ONLY IN THE SENSE SARTRE GIVES TO IT IN THE MODE OF REFLECTION. IN REFLECTION THE COGITO LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS ALSO CONSTITUTED AS AN OBJECT; THEREFORE, THE DESCRIPTION OF BELIEF DOES NOT JUSTIFY SARTRE'S CONCLUSIONS THAT THERE IS NOTHINGNESS IN A PART OF THE FOR-ITSELF ORIGINALLY. THE METHOD OF DESCRIBING BELIEF IS CONGRUENT WITH THE TECHNIQUES OUTLINED PREVIOUSLY. BELIEF IS DESCRIBED AS AN APPREHENSION OF BEING ON THE PRE-REFLECTIVE LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS, LEAVING A DYADIC NATURE OF BEING REVEALED, YET ESCAPING A COMPLETE REVELATION IN IMMINENT TRANSCENDENCE. THE DESCRIPTION FOLLOWS THE METHOD PRECISELY, NONETHELESS BELIEF CANNOT BE APPREHENDED ON THE LEVEL OF

¹⁷³BN, p. 78.

THE COGITO; THE DESCRIPTION IS A FICTION. ON THE BASIS OF THIS FICTION, SARTRE CONCLUDES THAT "THIS PERPETUAL ACT BY WHICH THE IN-ITSELF DIS-INTEGRATES INTO PRESENCE TO ITSELF WE SHALL CALL AN ONTOLOGICAL ACT."¹⁷⁴ THEREFORE, THE BEING OF NOTHINGNESS IS AN ONTOLOGICAL ACT WHICH AT EVERY MOMENT ERUPTS BETWEEN THE CONSTITUTION OF AN OBJECT AND THE SELF-AWARENESS OF THE OBJECTS.

SARTRE'S USE OF LOGICAL NECESSITY TO FOUND NOTHINGNESS

ELUCIDATION OF THIS FICTIONAL DISCOVERY OF NOTHINGNESS FOUNDED ON THE FOR-ITSELF, BRINGS SARTRE TO STATE SOME EXCEPTIONAL SIGNIFICATIONS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE FOR-ITSELF AND THE IN-ITSELF. WHILE THE FOR-ITSELF IS THE FOUNDATION OF NOTHINGNESS, SARTRE OBSERVES THAT IT "IS NOT THE FOUNDATION OF ITS BEING." MORE SUCCINCTLY:

EVERY EFFORT TO CONCEIVE OF THE IDEA OF BEING WHICH WOULD BE THE FOUNDATION OF ITS BEING RESULTS INEVITABLY IN FORMING A BEING WHICH, CONTINGENT AS BEING IN ITSELF, WOULD BE THE FOUNDATION OF ITS OWN NOTHINGNESS.¹⁷⁵

THIS RATHER INVOLVED DESCRIPTION OF THE CONDITIONS, WHEREBY PURE BEING COULD HAVE A FOUNDATION, MEANS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE A CONSCIOUSNESS AWARE OF BEING AS HAVING ITS OWN FOUNDATION. THUS THE ESSENTIAL RELATION FOR THE TWO-REGIONS OF BEING ARE, "THE FOR-ITSELF IS THE IN-ITSELF LOSING ITSELF AS IN-ITSELF IN ORDER TO FOUND ITSELF AS CONSCIOUSNESS."¹⁷⁶ THE RELATION BETWEEN BEINGS IS CONTINGENCY, IMPLEMENTED THROUGH THE ACT OF NOTHINGNESS. THE FOR-ITSELF IS REVEALED AS BEING IN THE MODE OF NOT BEING ITS OWN FOUNDATION, BUT IT DEPENDS ON ANOTHER MODE OF BEING WHICH IS FULL POSITIVITY.

TO RECAPITULATE, THESE CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE RELATION OF THE BEING OF PHENOMENON WITH THE HUMAN BEING ARE NOT CARRIED OUT IN THE SAME

¹⁷⁴BN, P. 79.

¹⁷⁵BN, P. 80.

¹⁷⁶BN, P. 82.

VEIN OF DESCRIPTION AS WAS THE PRECEDING DISCUSSION OF THE "PRESENCE TO" THE COGITO. THE DESCRIPTION OF THE COGITO AMOUNTED TO AN INVESTIGATION OF THE MEANING OF THE TERM "SELF-AWARE," WHICH WAS FOLLOWED AND SUPPORTED BY AN EXAMPLE OF CONSCIOUS APPREHENSION OF BELIEF. THE METHOD ESTABLISHED IN THAT PREVIOUS DISCUSSION WAS NOT AS COMPLETELY NON-COMMENSURATE WITH SARTRE'S BASIC EXISTENTIAL METHOD IN THAT IT DID INCLUDE, TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE, THE TECHNIQUES DERIVED FROM SARTRE'S INITIAL STATEMENTS. HOWEVER, THE LINE OF DEVELOPMENT, IN ATTEMPTING TO BRING THE REVELATION OF THIS "FICTIONAL" NOTHINGNESS IN THE IMMINENCE OF THE COGITO TO A RELATION OUTSIDE ITSELF, OR RATHER, RELATION WITH THE "IN-ITSELF" WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED IN A COMPARABLE WAY. SARTRE RESUMES THE SPECULATIVE LEVEL OF CRITICISM WHICH WAS NOTED IN HIS DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONCEPT AND CONDITIONS FOR THE CATEGORY OF NOTHINGNESS. TO STATE THAT BECAUSE A NOTHINGNESS WAS APPREHENDED IN PURE IMMINENCE OF A FORM OF BEING (MAKING THAT BEING CONTINGENT UPON A BEING IN WHICH NOTHINGNESS CANNOT POSSIBLY EXIST) IS NOT TO DESCRIBE, BUT TO LAY DOWN NECESSITIES. HOW THIS ARGUMENT FOR CONNECTION BETWEEN REALMS OF BEING CAN BE SATISFACTORY TO THE GOAL OF EXISTENTIAL DESCRIPTION IS A MYSTERY. THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE SUBJECT OF THE FOUNDATION ON ONTOLOGICAL REGIONS FROM CONCRETE DESCRIPTION AND FROM SPECULATIVELY DERIVING OF NECESSITIES IMPLIED BY DESCRIPTIONS ARE NOT CORRELATIVE.

THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM SARTRE FACES AT THIS STAGE OF HIS DEVELOPMENT IS THE MEANS BY WHICH THE CONCRETE EXISTENT OF IMMINENT SEPARATION BETWEEN SELF AND CONSCIOUSNESS CAN PROCEED TO A NECESSARY AND REALIZED INTER-CONNECTION OF THE TWO BASIC REGIONS OF BEING. IT HAS BEEN POINTED OUT ABOVE THAT THE NATURE OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE REGIONS OF BEING IS THE INTER-CONTINGENCY OF THEIR FOUNDATION. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO SAY, PERHAPS, THAT "IN A SENSE" THE FOR-ITSELF AS BEING MUST DEPEND UPON BEING-IN-ITSELF AND

CONVERSELY THAT BEING-IN-ITSELF WOULD HAVE NO WAY OF BEING ITS OWN FOUNDATION WITHOUT CONSCIOUSNESS TO APPREHEND IT AS HAVING THIS POSITIVE CHARACTER. THESE CONTINGENCIES ARE THE LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF A HIGHLY ABSTRACT NATURE, AND, IN ORDER TO MATCH THE DESCRIPTION OF HUMAN REALITY WITH THESE LOGICAL CONDITIONS, SARTRE EQUATES THE CONTINGENCY WITH FACTICITY. WHAT IS CALLED FACTICITY OF FOR-ITSELF IS WHATEVER "PERMITS US TO SAY THAT THE FOR-ITSELF IS THAT IT EXISTS, ALTHOUGH WE CAN NEVER REALIZE THE FACTICITY."¹⁷⁷ SARTRE FINDS THAT THE SAME STATEMENT WOULD BE MADE IN REFERENCE TO THE TWOFOLD CONTINGENCY FOUNDED BY LOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND THEREFORE IN EQUATING THEM HE HAS BRIDGED THE GAP BETWEEN THE EXISTENTIAL DESCRIPTION AND ONTOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS.

RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE TWO DEMANDS OF SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY IS NOT ACTUALLY INTEGRATIVE TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE IN REFERENCE TO THE EQUATING OF CONTINGENCY WITH FACTICITY. THE MEANING OF CONTINGENCY CHANGES IN SARTRE'S EXPLANATION OF THE TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES WITHOUT HIS RECOGNITION OF THAT CHANGE. WHEN ARGUING THE CONTINGENCY OF FOUNDATION OF ONE BEING IN ANOTHER, SARTRE IS ARGUING ABOUT LOGICAL NECESSITIES. THE NECESSITY OF A BEING, NOT HAVING ITS OWN FOUNDATION, AND THEREFORE DEPENDENT UPON ANOTHER BEING HAVING A DIFFERENT ESSENTIAL CHARACTER FROM ITSELF, IS A LOGICAL ARGUMENT. CONTINGENCY AS LOGICAL DEPENDENCE IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CONTINGENCY IN REFERENCE TO EXISTENCE OR FACTICITY. IN FACTICITY, AS BEING CONTINGENT, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT A FACT IS APPREHENSION OF EITHER BEING OR NOT BEING. THESE ARE NOT EQUATABLE MEANINGS IN THE WAY SARTRE USES THEM. SARTRE CONTINUES: "I CANNOT DOUBT THAT I AM. BUT INsofar AS THIS FOR-ITSELF COULD ALSO NOT BE, IT HAS ALL THE CONTINGENT."¹⁷⁸ TO STATE THAT A BEING IS DEPENDENT UPON

¹⁷⁷BN, p. 83.
¹⁷⁸BN, p. 80.

ANOTHER BEING FOR ITS EXISTENCE IS NOT EXACTLY THE SAME AS STATING THAT BEING APPREHENDS A POSSIBILITY OF NOT BEING. THE MEANINGS ARE CLOSELY RELATED, HOWEVER, THERE IS A DISTINCTION.

THE DESCRIPTION OF THE FOR-ITSELF AS THE FOUNDATION OF NOTHINGNESS IN THE IMMINENCE AND INSTANEITY OF THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO HAS NOT BEEN EXTENDED TO A TRUE FOUNDATION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN FOR-ITSELF AND THE BEING IN-ITSELF IN A SUCCESSFULLY CONSISTENT MANNER. THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF FACTICITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS, THAT IS, THE COGITO INTUITION STILL DOES NOT REVEAL A LINK WITH PHENOMENON AS BEING THE REALITY UPON WHICH THAT INTUITION IS CONTINGENT. BUT THE SARTREAN ANALYSIS OF THE NOTHINGNESS IN THE COGITO BRINGS TO LIGHT ONE MORE ASPECT OF THE NATURE OF THAT NOTHINGNESS. THE NOTHINGNESS OF THE COGITO, ACCORDING TO SARTRE, IS A DETERMINING OF ITSELF AS A LACK OF BEING, I.E., THE LACK OF BEING IS LACK OF BEING-IN-ITSELF. THE LACK OF BEING IS THE NIHILATION OF BEING AND "SINCE THE NIHILATION IS THE NIHILATION OF BEING, IT REPRESENTS THE ORIGINAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE BEING-FOR-ITSELF AND THE BEING OF THE IN-ITSELF."¹⁷⁹ THIS STATEMENT OF SARTRE'S IS PERPLEXING AND YET THE MEANING IT BEARS IS NOT FULLY BROUGHT OUT. THE MODE OF BEING WHICH IS IN-ITSELF STANDS IN A RELATION WITH CONSCIOUSNESS AS A POLARITY, OR AN OPPOSITION IN THE DEFINITIVE SENSE. CONSCIOUSNESS HAS, IN SARTRE'S VIEW, A CHARACTER OF NOT BEING ABLE TO BE WHAT IT IS IN THE STRICT TERMS OF FULL IDENTITY WITH ITSELF; THEREFORE, THERE IS ALWAYS A DEGREE TO WHICH IT LACKS POSITIVE, COMPLETE IDENTIFICATION AND, THUS, IT IS RELATED TO A FULL COMPLETE BEING SUCH AS THE WORLD OF BEING-IN-ITSELF IN THE ATTITUDE OF NOT BEING THAT.

IN ADDITION, SARTRE CONFERS UPON CONSCIOUSNESS A WILL OR DESIRE TO BE THAT WHICH IT IS NOT (EXISTENCE IN THE MODE OF PHENOMENON). A DYNAMIC

¹⁷⁹BN, p. 85.

PROCESS IS CREATED VIA ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT SO THAT, ON ONE HAND "THE IN-ITSELF OF FACTICITY IN ITS FAILURE TO FOUND ITSELF, IS REABSORBED IN PURE PRESENCE IN THE WORLD ON THE PART OF THE FOR-ITSELF." WHILE, "ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MISSING BY FOR-ITSELF OF THE IN-ITSELF IS PURE ABSENCE."¹⁸⁰

IN THIS MANNER, SARTRE HAS DEVELOPED THE CONCEPT OF NOTHINGNESS TO BE A TWOFOLD CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO MODES OF BEING AND, IN DOING SO, NOTHINGNESS TAKES ON FAR MORE SIGNIFICANCE THAN IT HAD AS THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE FOR-ITSELF. NEW LIGHT ON THE CATEGORY OF NOTHINGNESS SHOWS THAT IT IS A SURPASSING OF ONE REGION TOWARD THE OTHER REGION OF BEING. A SUMMARY STATEMENT INDICATES THIS DEVELOPMENT OF THE FUNCTIONS OF NOTHINGNESS.

IF THE COGITO REACHES TOWARD BEING, IT IS BECAUSE BY ITS VERY THRUST IT SURPASSES ITSELF TOWARD BEING BY QUALIFYING ITSELF IN ITS BEING AS THE BEING TO WHICH COINCIDENCE WITH SELF IS LACKING IN ORDER FOR IT TO BE WHAT IT IS. THE COGITO IS INDISSOLUABLY LINKED TO BEING ITSELF . . . AS A LACK TO THAT WHICH DEFINES ITS LACK.¹⁸¹

SARTRE HAS, THROUGH LOGICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF NOTHINGNESS, INVESTED THAT STRUCTURE WITH THE FUNCTION OF TRANSCENDENCE. THE CRUX OF THE DESCRIPTION GIVEN ABOVE IS THE DESIRE CAUSED BY THE NOTHINGNESS SEPARATING THE SELF FROM CONSCIOUSNESS AS A "PRESENCE TO" THAT IN TURN, CREATES A DESIRE FOR A COINCIDENCE OF THOSE TWO ASPECTS OF THE COGITO WHICH IS MANIFESTED IN A SURPASSING TOWARD AN UNATTAINABLE REALIZATION OF ITS OWN BEING. IF NOTHINGNESS WERE NOT IMMINENT AS THE FOUNDATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS, THE GOAL WOULD BE ACHIEVED (ALTHOUGH IN ITS ACHIEVEMENT, CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD BE LOST). SARTRE'S POSITION ON THE DRIVE IN CONSCIOUSNESS TO TRANSCEND EACH INSTANTANEOUS MOMENT OF THE COGITO IS THE DESIRE TO ATTAIN IN AN "IMPOSSIBLE SYNTHESIS OF THE FOR-ITSELF AND THE IN-ITSELF."¹⁸² THE SYNTHESIS IS A BEING,

¹⁸⁰BN, p. 89.

¹⁸¹BN, p. 89.

¹⁸²BN, p. 90.

THE NATURE OF WHICH IS PRIMARILY CONDITIONAL TO APPREHENDING THE COGITO AS "PRESENCE TO" ITSELF, WITH THE INVOLVED NOTHINGNESS EXISTING IN BETWEEN. THE BEING OF THE SYNTHESIS IS INDICATED, NEVER PRESENTED, BY THE FACT THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS CONSTITUTED IN ITS BEING AS A LACK. LACK OF BEING CAN ONLY INDICATE THE SENSE OF BEING WHICH IS CONSCIOUSNESS INTEGRATED WITH THE BEING-IN-ITSELF. THE SYNTHESIS, THEN, IS A BEING CONCEIVED BUT, BY DEFINITION, UNREALIZABLE.

CHAPTER XII

DYADIC NOTHINGNESS: THE BASIS FOR SARTRE'S EPISTEMOLOGY

AMONG THE MANY DYADS OF CONDITIONS AND EXISTENCE UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS IS THE DYAD OF SELF-AWARENESS AS THE "REFLECTING-REFLECTED" PROCESS, INVOLVING ITS "PRESENCE TO" THE CRITICAL CONDITIONS BEING OPPOSED TO WHAT IS EXPERIENCED BY PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS AS IT IS EXISTENTIALLY EXPERIENCED, ARE SOME OF THE EFFECTS OF SARTRE'S DIALECTIC. OF ALL OF THESE, THE LAST CONDITION OF THE FOR-ITSELF'S LACK, HAS BEEN A DYAD SO REMOVED FROM THE CONCRETE COGITO, SO ABSTRACT, THAT THE DIRECTION OF SARTRE AS EXISTENTIALIST HAS BECOME QUESTIONABLE.

RETURNING AGAIN TO VIEW THESE CONCLUSIONS IN TERMS OF METHOD, THE CHARACTERISTIC TRAITS OF SARTRE'S METHOD IN ARRIVING AT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP AND STRUCTURES OF THE TWO REALMS OF BEING ARE: DESCRIPTION OF AN EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENON (SOME TIMES IN REFLEXION); ANALYSIS OF IMPLICATIONS FROM THE DEFINITION OF A BASIC GERM IDEA, ELUCIDATING UPON THOSE DISCOVERED IMPLICATIONS; AND DERIVING REQUIREMENTS OR CONDITIONS FOR THE MODES OF BEING TO FOLLOW.

THE LISTED CHARACTERISTICS HAVE ALL BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE FIRST PART OF THIS STUDY AND HAVE BEEN INDICATED IN THE PREVIOUS EXAMPLES. HOWEVER, THE PRIMARY QUESTION OF WHETHER THESE VARIOUS TECHNIQUES SUPPORT ONE ANOTHER IN THE CONCLUSIONS HAS NOT BEEN CONSISTENTLY BROUGHT OUT. METHODS NEED TO HAVE A RATIONALE FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. THEY REQUIRE A FITNESS TO THE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER INVESTIGATION. THERE HAS BEEN NO RATIONALE PRESENTED BY SARTRE UP TO THE CONCLUSION OF SYNTHETIC BEING AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR

THE BEING-FOR-ITSELF. IF ONE SUCH RATIONALE WERE PRESENTED AT THIS JUNCTURE, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PRESENTED TO SHOW HOW THESE IMPLEMENTED TECHNIQUES ARE NATURAL, JUSTIFIED EXTENSIONS OF THE ORIGINAL AIM. SARTRE OFFERS NO SUCH RATIONALE, INSTEAD, LATER IN HIS WORK HE APPROACHES THE USE OF REFLECTION ON TWO LEVELS WHICH PROVIDES A PARTIAL EXPLANATION OF HIS USE OF REFLECTION AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS TO FOUND HIS ONTOLOGY.

REFLECTION: A CONNECTION BETWEEN ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY

SARTRE LAUNCHES INTO A COMPLEX INTERPRETATION OF THE STRUCTURE OF REFLEXION. TWO QUESTIONS ARE POSED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ARGUMENT. IN REFERENCE TO THE COGITO AS INTUITED BY REFLEXION: "WILL IT KEEP ITS CERTITUDE IF THE BEING WHICH IT HAS TO KNOW IS PAST IN RELATION TO IT? AND, SINCE ALL OUR ONTOLOGY HAS ITS FOUNDATION IN A REFLEXIVE EXPERIENCE, DOES IT NOT RISK LOSING ALL ITS LAWS?"¹⁸³ THESE QUESTIONS ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO THIS STUDY IN THAT THEY REVEAL THAT SARTRE RECOGNIZES THE DEPENDENCE OF HIS WHOLE THEORY OF ONTOLOGY ON REFLECTION, PLUS THE OTHER TURNING POINTS IN ITS DEVELOPMENT (SUCH AS THE OBJECT "BELIEF") WHICH ARE BASED UPON A REFLECTION. SARTRE IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZES THAT "IF FIRST WE CONCEIVE OF REFLECTION AS AN AUTONOMOUS CONSCIOUSNESS, WE SHALL NEVER BE ABLE TO REUNITE IT LATER WITH THE CONSCIOUSNESS REFLECTED-ON."¹⁸⁴ AND IF IT WERE TRUE, THAT THE TWO WERE SEPARATED, THERE COULD NEVER BE AN APODICTIC KNOWLEDGE GIVEN IN THIS SITUATION. SARTRE PROPOSES THAT THE STRUCTURE OF THE REFLECTION IS THE SAME AS DISCOVERED IN THE HEART OF THE FOR-ITSELF, I.E., A DYADIC UNITY. THIS OPINION IS BASED UPON THE NECESSITY THAT: "THE REFLECTED-ON IS THE APPEARANCE FOR THE REFLECTIVE WITHOUT THEREBY CEASING TO BE WITNESS TO

¹⁸³BN, p. 150.

¹⁸⁴BN, p. 184.

ITSELF, AND THE REFLECTIVE IS WITNESS TO THE REFLECTED-ON WITHOUT THEREBY CEASING TO AN APPEARANCE TO ITSELF."¹⁸⁵

IN ORDER TO SOLVE THE SEPARATION OF THE TWO ELEMENTS CONCERNED WITH REFLECTION, SARTRE POSTULATES THAT REFLECTION IS "A NEW MODE OF BEING," A DYADIC UNIT SIMILAR TO THE REFLECTION-REFLECTED UNITY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, WITH NOTHINGNESS CREATING THE "PRESENCE TO" SEPARATION. AND, AS WITH THE PRE-REFLEXIVE COGITO, "REFLECTION REMAINS FOR THE FOR-ITSELF, A PERMANENT POSSIBILITY, AN ATTEMPT TO RECOVER BEING . . . THE GOAL IS TO OVERTAKE THAT BEING WHICH FLEES WHAT IT IS IN THE MODE OF NOT BEING."¹⁸⁶ DUE TO THIS PARTICULAR ANSWER OF SARTRE'S ABOUT THE GOAL OF THE NEW MODE OF BEING, HE ADVISES "THAT THE EFFORT IS ALWAYS A FAILURE, BECAUSE NOTHINGNESS IS ALWAYS MADE TO BE IN BETWEEN THE REFLECTION AND THE REFLECTED-ON." BY INTRODUCING ONTOLOGICAL CONCEPTS DERIVED BY THE ABOVE-LISTED METHOD, SARTRE HAS TO THAT EXTENT INVALIDATED HIS ATTEMPT TO DESCRIBE THE REFLECTIVE MODE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. WHILE CREDIT MUST BE RECOGNIZED FOR THE ATTEMPT TO REVEAL THE NATURE OF REFLECTION AS A NEW MODE OF BEING, THE IRRECONCILABLE ISSUE AT STAKE IS THE ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A TECHNIQUE OF METHOD BY THE USE OF A METHOD WHICH IS UNEXPLAINED IN RELATION TO ITS FITNESS TO THE SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION. THERE IS NO EXISTENTIAL POINT OF VIEW INVOLVED IN THE ABOVE STATEMENT, WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO ESTABLISH REFLECTION AS A PERMANENT POSSIBILITY. THE POINT OF VIEW IS ONE OF A SPECULATOR DEFINING THE ELEMENTS IN AN ARBITRARY GAME. SARTRE'S ATTITUDE IS NOT ALWAYS ARBITRARY, BUT THERE ARE ENOUGH EXAMPLES OF UNJUSTIFIED ESTABLISHMENT OF REQUIREMENTS ON CRUCIAL ISSUES TO WEAKEN THE WHOLE SYSTEM.

¹⁸⁵BN, p. 152.

¹⁸⁶BN, p. 152.

THE REAL ATTEMPT OF SARTRE TO MAKE REFLECTION AN APODICTICALLY INTUITABLE REVELATION OF BEING IS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN "PURE" AND "IMPURE" MODES OF REFLECTION. THE MOST IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTIC OF THE "PURE REFLECTION" IS "THE REFLECTED ON IS NOT WHOLLY AN OBJECT, BUT A QUASI-OBJECT FOR REFLECTION."¹⁸⁷ IT IS A QUASI-OBJECT FIRST, BECAUSE IT IS PRESENT TO REFLECTION IN THE MODE OF NOT BEING WHAT IT IS AND SECONDLY, BECAUSE IT IS TOO IMMINENT TO REFLECTION FOR IT TO BE ABLE TO "TAKE A POINT OF VIEW." SUCH REASONS FOR ESTABLISHING AN EXPLICITLY ANTI-EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENON AS A QUASI-OBJECT SEEM WEAK IN COMPARISON WITH THE EARLIER DISCUSSED REFUTATION OF HUSSERL'S QUASI-REALITY OF THE HYLE, FOR INSTANCE.

EVEN MORE OF A STRAIN ON THE IMAGINATION IS THE INTERPRETATION OF THIS PURE REFLECTION AS THE:

TOTALITY OF THE REFLECTED-ON WHICH THE REFLECTIVE IS IN THE MODE OF NOT BEING, PERPETUALLY OVERFLOWS THE REFLECTIVE, STILL THE REFLECTIVE EXTENDS ITS APODICTIC LAWS TO THE VERY TOTALITY WHICH IT IS.¹⁸⁸

THERE IS NO FOLLOWING EXPLANATION AS TO THE MEANING OF THIS PASSAGE IN SARTRE; IT EXISTS AS SOMETHING OF A CHALLENGE TO COMPREHEND. THE TWO TERMS WERE DESCRIBED AS A DYAD AND THEN SARTRE MAKES ONE "OVER-FLOW" THE OTHER, ALL OF WHICH MUST HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE EXTENSION OF APODICTIC LAWS. AGAIN THERE IS NO PARTICULAR POINT OF VIEW OR RATIONALE BY WHICH SARTRE JUSTIFIES THE EXISTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CONCEPT; IT IS JUST PRESENTED.

SUCH IMMINENCE OF THE "PURE REFLECTION" DOES NOT AID IN EXPLAINING JUST HOW REFLECTION IS KNOWLEDGE. RATHER THAN ATTEMPT AN EXPLANATION OF HOW THIS UNITY CAN BE KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF, WITH NON-BEING AND OVER-FLOWING INVOLVED AS THEY ARE, SARTRE OFFERS THE EXAMPLES OF "I READ," "I DOUBT,"

¹⁸⁷BN, P. 155.

¹⁸⁸BN, P. 156.

ETC., OF WHICH REFLECTION ALLOWS NO DOUBT; THIS IS EVIDENTLY A CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE. WHEN IMPURE REFLECTION ENTERS THE PROCESS OF REFLECTION, IT IS POSITIONAL AND CAN KNOW IN A REGULAR EPISTEMIC WAY, BECAUSE "I AM ON THE PLANE OF MEMORY," WHICH ALSO ALLOWS FOR ERROR. THE CHANGE FROM THE "PURE" TO THE "IMPURE" IN ITS ONTOLOGICAL MEANING, SARTRE EXPLAINS IN THE FOLLOWING:

AS SOON AS IT GETS OUT OF THAT LIGHTNING INTUITION WITHOUT RELIEF IN WHICH THE REFLECTED-ON IS GIVEN WITHOUT POINT OF REVIEW FOR THE REFLECTIVE, AS SOON AS IT POSITS ITSELF AS NOT BEING THE REFLECTED ON, THEN REFLECTION EFFECTS THE APPEARANCE OF AN IN-ITSELF CAPABLE OF BEING DETERMINED, QUALIFIED BEHIND THE REFLECTED-ON.¹⁸⁹

WHEN THE DYADIC UNITY OF THE TWO, REFLECTED-ON AND REFLECTING, IS BROKEN, AND A CONSCIOUS EVENT IS POSITED AS SEPARATE, THEN THE REFLECTION HAS BECOME IMPURE. THE APODICTIC CHARACTER OF KNOWLEDGE IS ACHIEVED ONLY IN PURE REFLECTION, ALTHOUGH SARTRE DEVELOPS THIS MODE SO THAT "PURE REFLECTION IS NEVER ANYTHING BUT QUASI-KNOWLEDGE."¹⁹⁰ ACCORDING TO SARTRE THEN, THE IMPURE REFLECTION WHICH POSITS THE ESSENCE OF THE REFLECTED-ON AS A THING IN ITSELF, IS FULL KNOWLEDGE, BUT IT IS NOT APODICTIC.

THE WHOLE EXPLANATION OF REFLECTION RELATES TO THE FUNDAMENTAL EXAMPLES USED BY SARTRE TO ESTABLISH THE ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF NOTHINGNESS AT THE CENTER OF THE BEING-FOR-ITSELF IN A PERPLEXING WAY. BELIEF, FOR INSTANCE, IS A PURE REFLECTION OF THE SAME ORDER AS THE "I THINK," A QUASI-OBJECT CONSTITUTING QUASI-KNOWLEDGE. RETURNING TO THE PUZZLE OF THE WAY IN WHICH SARTRE PROCEEDED FROM BELIEF, AS A CHARACTERISTIC OF CONSCIOUSNESS, AT THE FOUNDATION OF NOTHINGNESS AS AN ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE FOR-ITSELF, IT IS NOW CLEARER IN LIGHT OF THE NATURE OF REFLECTION. SARTRE STATED THAT: "TO BELIEVE IS TO KNOW THAT ONE BELIEVES AND TO KNOW THAT ONE

¹⁸⁹BN, p. 160.

¹⁹⁰BN, p. 162.

BELIEVES IS NO LONGER TO BELIEVE." THE FIRST PHRASE IS AN EXPRESSION OF PURE REFLECTION WHICH CHANGES INTO IMPURE REFLECTION IN THE SECOND PHRASE. BUT SARTRE'S CONCLUSION IS WRONG IF THIS INTERPRETATION IS CORRECT, FOR HE THEN STATES, "THUS THE NON-THETIC CONSCIOUSNESS (OF) BELIEVING IS DESTRUCTIVE OF BELIEF."¹⁹¹ THAT CONCLUSION COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED IF IT WERE TRUE THAT THE PRIOR STATEMENT INVOLVED TWO SEPARATE MODES OF REFLECTION. IMPURE REFLECTION CANNOT BE A NON-THETIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF BELIEF, ACCORDING TO SARTRE'S DISCUSSION; THEREFORE, THE PRIOR STATEMENT MUST REFER TO "PURE REFLECTION," BUT, IT CANNOT DO SO EXCEPT FOR THE FIRST PHRASE AND STILL REMAIN CONSONANT WITH THE DEFINITION OF "PURE REFLECTION." IN ADDITION, THE PREVIOUS CONCLUSION THAT BELIEF IS REFERRED TO INACCURATELY, BECAUSE THE SIMPLE STATEMENT APODICTICALLY FOUNDED IS: "I BELIEVE SOMETHING" WHICH IS NOT AT ALL INVALIDATED BY SARTRE'S DISTINCTIONS HE MADE CONCERNING REFLECTION.

THE ATTEMPT SARTRE MAKES TO DISTINGUISH THE TYPE OF REFLECTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS THE BEGINNING OF HIS EPISTEMOLOGY, BASED UPON THE ONTOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED PREVIOUSLY. THE CONTINUATION OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY WILL AID, SARTRE BELIEVES, IN FINDING THE EXACT WAYS THE RELATIONS OF THE TWO MODES FOR-ITSELF AND IN-ITSELF ARE EFFECTED. IN HIS THIRD CHAPTER ON "TRANSCENDENCE," SARTRE BRIEFLY DEVELOPS THE APPLICATION OF THE TERMS: "INTUITION," "IMMINENCE," "IMMEDIATE," AND "DETERMINATIONS." THE CLARIFICATION OF THESE TERMS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO ENABLE ONE TO COMPREHEND THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE BEEN HERETOFORE INDICATED AS DISPARITIES BETWEEN SARTRE'S METHOD AND HIS FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS.

¹⁹¹BN, P. 69.

CHAPTER XIII

EPISTEMOLOGICAL RESULTS OF SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY

THE ELUCIDATION OF INTUITION IS CORRECTIVE OF SOME OF THE DISPARITIES CONCERNING SARTRE'S ONTOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF NOTHINGNESS, FOUNDED AT THE HEART OF THE BEING-FOR-ITSELF. THE EXPLANATION OF INTUITION IS BASED UPON THE DESCRIPTION SARTRE MADE CONCERNING THE COGITO AS SELF-AWARENESS. SELF-AWARENESS BY DEFINITION REQUIRES A REFLECTION-REFLECTING DYAD, IF TAKEN LITERALLY, AND IN THE DYAD, "NOTHING" EXISTS BETWEEN THEM. IT IS THIS NOTHING WHICH IS THE SEPARATION WITHIN A UNITY ON THE ONTOLOGICAL LEVEL, A NOTHINGNESS WHICH IS EFFECTED AS A "PRESENCE TO" OBJECTS. THE "PRESENCE TO" AN OBJECT IS ALSO THE MEANING OF INTUITION. THERE IS ONLY INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE, AND, THEREFORE,

KNOWLEDGE IS A MODE INsofar AS THE FOR-ITSELF, IN THE REFLECTION-REFLECTING ASPECT, INDICATES ITSELF AS NOT WHAT IT IS CONSCIOUS OF AS OBJECT (AND POSITIVELY STATED IS 'PRESENCE TO' THE OBJECT).¹⁹²

THE MEANING OF KNOWLEDGE AS A MODE OF BEING IS NOT MADE CLEAR BY SARTRE JUST AS REFLECTION AS A MODE OF BEING DID NOT SEEM TO BE LUCID. KNOWLEDGE IS THE TERM APPLIED TO THE FOR-ITSELF, ITS ATTITUDE OF "NOT BEING" THE OBJECT IT IS CONSCIOUS OF. AGAIN, SARTRE STATES THAT, "THE TYPE OF BEING WE KNOW IS THE ONLY BEING WHICH CAN BE ENCOUNTERED AND WHICH IS PERPETUALLY THERE IS THE KNOWN."¹⁹³ THE KNOWER IS ONLY DETERMINED AS NOT BEING THE THING KNOWN. IT WOULD SEEM TO BE MORE ACCURATE IN LIGHT OF THE TERM EXPLAINED, THAT KNOWLEDGE IS NOT A MODE OF BEING, BUT A NAME FOR THE FOR-ITSELF IN BEING "PRESENT TO"

¹⁹²BN, pp. 173-174.

¹⁹³BN, p. 177.

THE OBJECT (APPREHENDED AS NOT BEING THE FOR-ITSELF). TO MAKE KNOWLEDGE AND REFLECTION "BEINGS," RATHER THAN FUNCTIONS OF A PARTICULAR BEING, MAY AID IN PRESENTING THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF AN EPISTEMOLOGY, BUT THE USE OF MODES OF BEINGS IN THIS WAY HAS THE IMPLICATION OF ONE ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE CONTINUALLY UNDERGOING METAMORPHOSIS WHICH OBSCURES ITS DISTINCTIVENESS AS THAT STRUCTURE.

THE CONSTITUTION OF "KNOWLEDGE" AS A MODE OF BEING

THE ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND, THEREFORE, OF INTUITION IN SARTRE'S DEFINITION INDICATE THE REASON WHY HE MIGHT NEED TO CONSIDER KNOWLEDGE A MODE OF BEING.

IN THE CASE OF THE RELATION KNOWER-KNOWN, THERE IS NOTHING ON THE SIDE OF THE KNOWER WHICH CAN PROVIDE A SUPPORT FOR THE NEGATION . . . TO SEPARATE THE KNOWER FROM THE KNOWN . . . KNOWLEDGE AND FINALLY, THE KNOWER HIMSELF ARE NOTHING EXCEPT THE FACT 'THAT THERE IS' BEING . . . THE PHENOMENON OF KNOWLEDGE ADDS NOTHING TO BEING AND CREATES NOTHING . . . FOR KNOWLEDGE IS PURE NEGATIVITY.¹⁹⁴

ACCORDING TO THIS PASSAGE, SARTRE RECOGNIZED THAT THE NOTHINGNESS WHICH HE HAS POSITED AS EXISTING IN THE COGITO BETWEEN THE DYAD "REFLECTION-REFLECTING" IS ONLY IMMINENT, EVEN THOUGH LOGICALLY, ONE MUST SAY IT IMPLIES AN OBJECT WHICH IT IS NOT, OR THERE WOULD BE NO BEING NOR NOTHINGNESS FOR IT TO RAISE AS A DISTINCTION TO. THEREFORE, PURE NEGATIVITY EXISTING, NOT ONLY BETWEEN SELF AND SELF IN THE CONNOTATION OF SELF-AWARENESS, BUT ALSO IN THE BEING "PRESENT TO" AN OBJECT, MUST BE GIVEN THE NAME KNOWLEDGE. USING THE TERMINOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE, IT IS EASIER TO CONCEIVE OF PURE NEGATIVITY AS A SELF-SUPPORTING BEING WHICH ENABLES AN AVOIDANCE OF THE LOGICAL INCONGRUITY OF HAVING POSTULATED THE FOR-ITSELF AS "NOT" OR "LACK" AND, WHICH COULD NOT SUPPORT A NEGATION BETWEEN ITSELF AND PHENOMENON. EVEN SO, THIS TRADING OF

¹⁹⁴BN, P. 179.

LEVELS FROM THE CONCRETE DESCRIPTION TO THE LOGICAL NECESSITY TO ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURES CONTINUES TO MULTIPLY THE DIFFICULTIES AT THE CENTER OF SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY.

FURTHER QUALIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE ON AN ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION IS REVEALED BY SARTRE AS THE DETERMINING FUNCTION OF KNOWLEDGE AS "PURE NEGATIVITY."

EVERY REVELATION OF A POSITIVE CHARACTERISTIC OF BEING IS THE COUNTER-PART OF AN ONTOLOGICAL DETERMINATION AS PURE NEGATIVITY IN THE BEING OF THE FOR-ITSELF.¹⁹⁵

THIS SENTENCE IS A TYPICALLY DYADIC SORT WHICH, FOR SARTRE, GIVES EQUAL EMPHASIS TO THE REVEALING OF BEING AND TO THE FOR-ITSELF AS CONTAINING NOTHINGNESS. THE MEANING OF KNOWLEDGE IS PRESENCE -- TO OBJECTS BY CONSCIOUSNESS THROUGH PURE NEGATIVITY. ALTHOUGH THE CONDITION FOR THE "PRESENCE TO" IS THE NEGATIVITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS; SARTRE HAS ACCOMPLISHED DEFINING KNOWLEDGE IN TERMS OF ITSELF AS NEGATIVITY COMING FROM AND DETERMINING THE FOR-ITSELF. NOWHERE IN HIS PREVIOUS WORKS NOR IN THE INTRODUCTION OF BEING AND NOTHINGNESS HAS SARTRE STATED THAT IT IS ACCEPTABLE TO FOUND AN ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE BY DEFINING IT IN TERMS OF ITSELF. SARTRE PHRASES THE GENERAL DIFFICULTY WHICH THIS ANALYSIS FACES BY WRITING:

OUR EXAMPLES, HOWEVER, HAVE SHOWN US A FOR-ITSELF DENYING CONCRETELY THAT IT IS A PARTICULAR BEING. THIS SITUATION ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT WE DESCRIBED THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE BEFORE BRINGING TO LIGHT ITS STRUCTURE OF NEGATIVITY.¹⁹⁶

THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE WOULD NECESSARILY HAVE TO INVOLVE PURE NEGATION TO BE EVEN APPROACHED BY A DESCRIPTION, BUT THE ORIGINAL EXAMPLES ACTUALLY DID NOT INDICATE ANY SUCH NEGATION, AS IT IS BEING DISCUSSED IN THE ABOVE ANALYSIS. THAT RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE MUST HAVE BEEN ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT

¹⁹⁵BN, p.179.

¹⁹⁶BN, p.180.

THAN THE MEANING IT HAS TAKEN LATER ON. JOHN WILD UNDERSTANDS BY PURE NEGATION THAT KNOWLEDGE IS PURE POTENCY "UNLIKE MATTER IN LACKING ALL DETERMINACY, BUT READY TO RECEIVE BEING AS IT IS."¹⁹⁷ BUT SARTRE HAS REJECTED THE NOTION THAT NEGATION IS POTENCY IN ANY RESPECT, WHICH CAUSES WILD'S INTERPRETATION TO BE AT LEAST INADEQUATE. ANOTHER APPROACH IS TO CONSIDER THE CONTINGENCY BETWEEN CONSCIOUSNESS AND PHENOMENON AS A CONTRADICTION, AND THIS CONTRADICTION IS THE ESSENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.¹⁹⁸

A FURTHER OBSERVATION RELATING BACK TO THE ATTITUDE OF INTERROGATION FORCES THE QUESTION: IF INTERROGATION IS ABSENCE OF KNOWLEDGE (OF PURE NEGATION), HOW THEN CAN INTERROGATION COME TO BEING, AND WHY IS IT STILL CHARACTERIZED IN THE NEGATIVE TERM AS ABSENCE?

THERE ARE MANY MORE CONTRADICTIONS CONCERNED WITH SARTRE'S NOTION OF KNOWLEDGE; FOR INSTANCE, THE ANALYSIS OF NEGATIVE FACT AND ITS CONCLUSION AS BEING A DENIAL OF FALSE FACT BY WALKER PERCY.¹⁹⁹ NONE OF THE ABOVE CRITIQUES COMPLETELY INVALIDATE SARTRE'S CATEGORY OF KNOWLEDGE, BUT THEY REFLECT THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN HOLDING THAT VIEW.

THE DYADIC RELATION OF TOTALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY

THE NEXT EPISTEMOLOGICAL STEP SARTRE TAKES IS TO DISCOVER AN ANSWER TO EXACTLY HOW THE FOR-ITSELF IS "PRESENCE TO" BEING-IN-ITSELF; WHETHER IT IS IN TERMS OF ALL BEING OR ONLY IN TERMS OF PARTICULAR BEINGS. ONE PRIMARY CONDITION FOR BEING IN GENERAL IS THAT:

TOTALITY CAN COME TO BEINGS ONLY BY A BEING WHICH HAS TO BE ITS OWN TOTALITY IN THEIR PRESENCE. THIS IS PRECISELY THE CASE WITH

¹⁹⁷ JOHN WILD, THE CHALLENGE OF EXISTENTIALISM, P.192.

¹⁹⁸ MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, SENSE AND NON-SENSE, TRANS. HERBERT L. DREYFUS AND PATRICIA ALLEN DREYFUS (EVANSTON, ILLINOIS: NORTHWESTERN UNIV. PRESS, 1964), PP.72-73.

¹⁹⁹ W. PERCY, "SYMBOL AS HERMENEUTIC IN EXISTENTIALISM," PPR, XVII, (1956), P.526.

THE FOR-ITSELF, A DETOTALIZED TOTALITY WHICH TEMPORALIZES ITSELF IN A PERPETUAL INCOMPLETENESS.²⁰⁰

THIS QUOTATION MAY ANSWER WHAT MUST BE THE CAPACITY OF THE FOR-ITSELF TO FULFILL THE REQUIREMENT OF APPREHENDING ALL BEING IN ORDER FOR SARTRE'S CONCEPT OF TRANSCENDENCE TO BE CONSIDERED. THE NEED, HOWEVER, FOR "DETOTALIZED TOTALITIES" IS AN UNNECESSARY EXPRESSION OF WHAT SARTRE CONSIDERS THE CAPACITY OF THE FOR-ITSELF TO BE, ESPECIALLY WITHIN A LOGICAL ARGUMENT CONCERNING EPISTEMOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS.

SARTRE NEXT POINTS OUT THAT "THE PRESENCE OF THE FOR-ITSELF TO THE WORLD CAN BE REALIZED ONLY BY ITS PRESENCE TO ONE PARTICULAR THING, AND CAN BE REALIZED ONLY ON THE GROUND OF PRESENCE TO THE WORLD."²⁰¹ THUS, IT IS BY IMPLICATION THAT TO BE CONSCIOUSNESS IS TO BE CONSCIOUSNESS OF AN OBJECT CANNOT BE STATED AS SUCH UNLESS THERE IS A TOTALITY APPREHENDED FROM WHICH THIS OBJECT CAN BE MANIFESTED. IT WOULD BE POINTLESS, IN SUCH AN ARGUMENT, TO ASK WHAT THE CONCRETE APPREHENSION OF THIS TOTALITY IS, FOR SARTRE HAS PROPOSED, IN DEFINING CONSCIOUSNESS, THE SIMPLEST "FORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS (OF) AN OBJECT," NOT OF THE WORLD. APPREHENSION MOSTLY BASED UPON THE LOGICAL NECESSITY OF HAVING A GROUND OF UNDIFFERENTIATED BEING AGAINST WHICH AN OBJECT CAN BECOME APPREHENSIBLE.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL NEGATIONS

THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE TOTALITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL OBJECT INVOLVES, ACCORDING TO SARTRE, MAKING DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL NEGATIONS. THE INTERNAL NEGATION IS AN ONTOLOGICAL BOND IN THE SENSE THE "IT IS WITHIN AND UPON THE BEING WHICH IT IS NOT THAT THE FOR-ITSELF APPEARS AS NOT BEING WHAT IT IS NOT."²⁰²

²⁰⁰BN, p.180.

²⁰¹BN, pp.180-181.

²⁰²BN, p.176.

IN SUMMARY, CONSCIOUSNESS OF AN OBJECT IS CONSCIOUSNESS BEING BOTH AWARE OF ITSELF AS NOT THAT OBJECT AND ALSO PRESENT TO IT. IN CONTRAST TO THIS DUALITY THE EXTERNAL NEGATION IS SIMPLY APPREHENDING "THIS OBJECT IS NOT THAT ONE," A NEGATION MAKING NO CHANGE NOR MODIFYING THE OBJECTS APPREHENDED. IN THE CASE OF TOTALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY OF BEING, THE INTERNAL NEGATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS APPREHENDS OR DETERMINES THEM BOTH:

INsofar AS THE FOR-ITSELF MAKES ITSELF BE THE UNITY OF A SINGLE UPSURGE AS ALL WHICH IS NOT BEING, BEING STANDS BEFORE IT AS ALL WHICH THE FOR-ITSELF IS NOT . . . A RADICAL NEGATION.²⁰³

HOW OR WHEN THIS INITIAL AND VAGUE INTERNAL NEGATION TAKES PLACE IS NOT ACTUALLY ELUCIDATED UPON. THE INTERNAL NEGATION DETERMINES INDIVIDUAL BEING AS NOT THE FOR-ITSELF IN THE PRESENT. YET, SARTRE MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THIS LATER NEGATION OF OBJECT IS ENTIRELY DEPENDENT UPON THE FORMER NEGATION OF OBJECT IS ENTIRELY DEPENDENT UPON THE FORMER NEGATION OF ALL BEING. "NEGATION CAN COME TO THE THIS (OBJECT) ONLY THROUGH A BEING WHICH HAS TO BE SIMULTANEOUSLY PRESENCE TO THE WHOLE OF BEING AND TO THIS (OBJECT)." ²⁰⁴ AND BOTH ARE DEPENDENT ON THE APPREHENSION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS. THE OBJECT, DEPENDENT AS IT IS ON THE ENTIRETY OF OBJECTIVITY, IS AN EXTERNAL REFLECTION TO IT NEITHER THE TOTALITY OF UNDIFFERENTIATED BEING OR OF INDIVIDUAL BEING ARE AFFECTED BY THE RELATIONS SARTRE HERE CONCLUDES:

THAT DETERMINATION APPEARS AS AN EXTERNAL NEGATION CORRELATIVE WITH THE RADICAL AND ECSTATIC INTERNAL NEGATION WHICH I AM.²⁰⁵

IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF SARTRE'S CONCLUSION THAT THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL NEGATIONS ARE INTERDEPENDENT, WE MUST APPRAISE HOW THE INTERNAL NEGATION CAN BE FOUNDED IN THE FOR-ITSELF WHILE THE EXTERNAL IS NEITHER FOUNDED IN THE FOR-SELF NOR IN-ITSELF. SARTRE HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT FULL

²⁰³BN, p.181.

²⁰⁴BN, p.183.

²⁰⁵BN, p.183.

BEING IS POSITIVELY INDEPENDENT AND CONTINGENT, ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT IT MUST BE APPREHENDED IN ORDER TO BE BEING (OTHERWISE IT MERELY EXISTS). BEING-IN-ITSELF AS A LEGITIMATE MODE CANNOT SUPPORT ANY RELATION -- NEITHER EXTERNAL OR INTERNAL -- AS IT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY DEFINED, AND CONSIDERING THE FOR-ITSELF AS FOUNDATION FOR ANYTHING EXTERNAL IS DIFFICULT TO APPROACH. IN FACT, BY CONSIDERING THE FOR-ITSELF, THE WHOLE QUESTION OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL NEGATIONS SEEMS ANACHRONOUS. IN THE BEGINNING OF SARTRE'S WORK, HE MADE IT EVIDENT THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY NEED TO CONSIDER INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AS PROBLEM POLARITIES IN PHILOSOPHY. BUT SARTRE IS AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTY THE EXTERNAL NEGATION PRESENTS, FOR HE DEFINES IT AS A RELATION WHICH "CANNOT BE BY ITSELF, IT REFUSES ALL SUPPORTS AND YET IT CANNOT BE REFERRED TO ANY SUBSTANCE. IT IS A NOTHING."²⁰⁶ POSING THE DEFINITION OF EXTERNAL NEGATIVITY (OR AS SARTRE REFERS TO IT, DETERMINATION) IT IS NO MORE THAN AN UNFOUNDED POSTULATE FOR ONTOLOGY, WHATEVER SIGNIFICANCE IT MAY HAVE AS A CONCRETE SITUATION. SARTRE RELATES HOW THE BEING OF DETERMINATION WORKS:

ITS BEING IS TO BE SUMMONED BY THE FOR-ITSELF ACROSS A SYSTEM OF INTERNAL NEGATIONS . . .

BECAUSE

THE INDIFFERENCE OF THE IN-ITSELF AS THE INDIFFERENCE WHICH THE FOR-ITSELF HAS TO NOT-BE IS REVEALED IN THE WORLD AS DETERMINATION.²⁰⁷

EXTERNAL NEGATION AND DETERMINATION

DETERMINATION PRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM TO SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY IN THE SENSE IT IS THE FIRST ISSUE WHICH HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO BE CLARIFIED AS A DYADIC TENSION BETWEEN TWO FORMS OF BEING. THE DESCRIPTION OF AN

²⁰⁶BN, p.185.

²⁰⁷BN, p.186.

APPREHENSION OF TOTALITY, ON ONE HAND, AND APPREHENSION OF AN OBJECT, ON THE OTHER, IS NOT DYADIC IN ANY REAL SENSE WHATSOEVER. THE TWO BEINGS WOULD BE DYADIC IF EXTERNAL NEGATION COULD BE FOUNDED AS AN ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORY IN SOME REAL SENSE; HOWEVER, IT CAN HAVE NO FOUNDATION IN CONSCIOUSNESS, OR IN OBJECTS AS THEY HAVE BEEN DEFINED. THE EXAMPLE OF THE PARTICULAR OBJECT BEING A FIGURE ON THE GROUND OF ALL BEING-IN-ITSELF, EXACTLY EXPLAINS SARTRE'S CONCEPT OF WHAT MUST TAKE PLACE IN EXTERNAL NEGATION OR DETERMINATION, BUT IT REMAINS MERELY AN EXAMPLE AND IS NOT ADEQUATE TO JUSTIFY THE ONTOLOGICAL CONCEPT. NEGATION MUST BE ALL ON THE SIDE OF THE FOR-ITSELF AND THE FOR-ITSELF MUST BE PURE IMMINENCE; UNDER THESE CONDITIONS THERE CANNOT BE ANY MEANING TO AN EXTERNAL NEGATION AND, THEREFORE, TO DETERMINATION.

THE DISCUSSION OF PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF SARTRE'S VIEW OF DETERMINATION DOES NOT RECTIFY THE DIFFICULTY OF HAVING POSITED AN EXTERNAL NEGATION IN THE WORLD. QUALITY, FOR INSTANCE, IS THIS DETERMINATION OF AN OBJECT WHICH IS AN "INDICATION OF WHAT WE ARE NOT AND THE MODE OF BEING ONLY WHICH IS DENIED US."²⁰⁸ ACCORDING TO THIS DESCRIPTION, SARTRE ONLY INDICATES THE INTERNAL NEGATION AS THE DETERMINING FACTOR OF REVELATION OF THE WORLD. THE REVELATION OF BEING TO CONSCIOUSNESS THROUGH QUALITY IS A PRESENTATION OF BEING "IN PROFILE." THIS PROFILE IS NO MORE THAN A RELATION BETWEEN THE OBJECT AND CONSCIOUSNESS, ACCORDING TO SARTRE, AND AS THAT RELATION IT IS:

ABSOLUTE DETERMINATION OF NEGATIVITY FOR IT IS NOT ENOUGH THAT THE FOR-ITSELF, BY AN ORIGINAL NEGATION SHOULD NOT BE USING NOR THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE THIS BEING . . . THE FOR-ITSELF MUST REALIZE ITSELF IN A CERTAIN UNIQUE MANNER OF NOT BEING THIS BEING.²⁰⁹

EXPLAINING THAT ABSOLUTE DETERMINATION OF NEGATIVITY REQUIRES MORE THAN THE SIMPLE NEGATIONS OF TOTALITIES AND INDIVIDUALITIES DESCRIBED ABOVE, BUT ALSO

²⁰⁸BN, p.187.

²⁰⁹BN, p.188.

A UNIQUE MANNER OF CONSCIOUSNESS NOT BEING THE QUALITY OF THE OBJECT APPREHENDED. THIS UNIQUE MANNER OF NOT BEING AN OBJECT IS THROUGH ABSTRACTIONS, IN SARTRE'S DEFINITION, WHICH IS "ALWAYS THERE BUT TO COME. I APPREHEND IT IN THE FUTURE WITH MY FUTURE."²¹⁰ SARTRE REFERS THE MEANING OF THE RELATIONSHIP NAMED "QUALITY" TO AN ABSTRACTION OF THE PHENOMENON INTO THE FUTURE AS A TRANSCENDENT.

DETERMINATION, THEN, HAS NO ONTOLOGICALLY VERIFIED POSITION EITHER IN GENERAL OR SPECIFICALLY. AS EXTERNAL NEGATION, DETERMINATION IS NEITHER BASED IN THE FOR-ITSELF, NOR IN-ITSELF, BECAUSE AS A RELATION BETWEEN OBJECTS, IT NEITHER TAKES NOR GIVES TO THEM AS FULL "MASSIVE BEING"; AND ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT IS EXTERNAL AT ALL, IT CANNOT BE FOUNDED IN IMMINENT CONSCIOUSNESS. QUALITY, AS A CHARACTERISTIC OF THE EXTERNAL NEGATION OF DETERMINATION, FAILS ALSO TO ACHIEVE A FOUNDATION IN BEING AND BECOMES A PROJECTED ABSTRACTION TOWARD THE FUTURE FREEDOM OF THE BEING OF CONSCIOUSNESS.²¹¹

SARTRE'S EPISTEMOLOGY HAS WEAKNESSES RELATED TO HIS METHOD

IN CONSIDERING THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS OF SARTRE'S EPISTEMOLOGY, AN EVALUATION MUST COMPARE THE ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE AND ORIGINAL AIMS OF THAT ONTOLOGY WITH THE LOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS TO ACHIEVE THOSE STRUCTURES AND AIMS. SARTRE ARGUED THAT IT WAS FIRST NECESSARY TO DISCOVER BEING PRIOR TO THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF BEING AND IN DOING SO, EPISTEMOLOGY IS BASED UPON THE DISCOVERY OF BEING. HOWEVER, IN PROCEEDING TO DEVELOP THE CENTRAL THESIS OF BEING, SARTRE HAS LIMITED EPISTEMOLOGY TO AN AREA TOO NARROW FOR A THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING OF ITS REQUIREMENTS. THE

²¹⁰BN, p.189.

²¹¹BN, p.194.

REQUIREMENTS SARTRE HAS PROVIDED ARE CONTRADICTORY AND VAGUE. A GREAT DEAL OF THE CONFUSION OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONDITIONS LAYS IN THE ORIGINAL DIFFICULTY FOUND IN SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY, A LACK OF ADHERENCE TO THE BASIC METHODIC ATTITUDE FIRST OUTLINED.

SUMMARY

THE PRIMARY AIM OF THIS STUDY, MOST SIMPLY EXPRESSED, HAS BEEN TO ATTEMPT AN UNDERSTANDING OF SARTRE'S METHODOLOGY AS HE USED IT IN BEING AND NOTHINGNESS. TO ACCOMPLISH THAT AIM, SOME OF THE ESSENTIAL METHODOLOGICAL ELEMENTS WERE FIRST DERIVED AND THEN, THROUGH THE ANALYSIS OF A SECTION OF SARTRE'S WORK, IT WAS SHOWN HOW THOSE ELEMENTS WERE FORMED INTO PROCEDURES WHICH SERVED SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHICAL AIMS. THE REMAINDER OF THE TASK IS TO CLARIFY THOSE PROCEDURES AND FIND THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THEM WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO MAKING THEM A COHERENT METHODOLOGY.

THE BASIC PROCEDURES WHICH ARE IN EVIDENCE AFTER THE ANALYSIS ARE:

1. EXISTENTIAL DESCRIPTION OF CONCRETE PHENOMENA IN EXPERIENCE OF PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS.
2. EIDETIC DESCRIPTION BASED UPON EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENA IN PRINCIPLE, IS CARRIED OUT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS WHICH TAKES THE EXPERIENCE BEYOND THE CONCRETE TO THE LEVEL OF ESSENTIAL MEANING.
3. HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION ANALYZES BOTH CONCRETE AND ESSENTIAL FACTS, PROJECTING THEM INTO AN INTERRELATED SPECULATIVE SYSTEM.
4. HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION OF PREVIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS IS INTENDED TO SERVE AS SUPPORTING DEDUCTIONS OF THE CONCLUSIONS DERIVED BY THE FIRST THREE PROCEDURES.

THE CATEGORIZATION OF SARTRE'S METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES NECESSARILY BEGINS WITH HIS USE OF EXISTENTIAL DESCRIPTION. BECAUSE THIS PROCEDURE DESCRIBES THE PRIMARY EXPERIENCE OF PHENOMENON FROM THE VIEW-POINT OF THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO, AND SERVES, IN SARTRE'S WORK, AS THE FOUNDATION FOR

ALL SUCCEEDING STEPS TOWARD AN ONTOLOGY OF THE TWO MODES OF BEING. THE DESCRIPTIONS OF NEGATION, ANGUISH AND THE LACK OF EGO ON THE PRE-REFLECTIVE LEVEL ARE EXAMPLES OF THE PRIMORDIAL DATE FROM WHICH SARTRE DREW ESSENTIAL STRUCTURES AND RELATIONSHIPS. THE PARTICULARITY AND CONCRETENESS OF SARTRE'S EXISTENTIAL DESCRIPTIONS FUNCTION AS AN AUTHENTIC FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR THE ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURES WHICH HE DRAWS FROM THEM. HOWEVER GENERALIZED AND ABSTRACTED THE DESCRIPTIONS AND ANALYSES OF MODES OF BEING BECOME, SARTRE CAN REFER BACK TO THE CONCRETE EXPERIENCE FROM WHICH THE BEING WAS DERIVED.

THE SECOND PROCEDURE OF EIDETIC OR ESSENTIAL DESCRIPTION CANNOT ALWAYS BE DISTINGUISHED IN SARTRE'S EXPRESSION. SARTRE'S DESCRIPTION OF DISTANCE, AS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT, IS OF AN EIDETIC INTUITION WHICH FORMS THE FIRST CONDITIONS FOR NEGATION AND; AS SUCH, IT IS A CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE EXAMPLE OF ESSENTIAL DESCRIPTION. AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXAMPLE OF DISTANCE, THE DESCRIPTION OF "BELIEF" IS NEVER INDICATED TO BE AN ESSENTIAL DESCRIPTION, OCCURRING ON A REFLECTED LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS. THERE IS DOUBT WHETHER SARTRE INTENDED THE DESCRIPTION OF BELIEF TO BE EXISTENTIAL OR ESSENTIAL FROM THE WAY IN WHICH HE PRESENTED IT. BUT GENERALLY, SARTRE'S ESSENTIAL DESCRIPTIONS CAN BE DIFFERENTIATED BY HIS USE OF THE "REFLECTIVE" TACTIC OF HUSSERLIAN DESCRIPTION.

BASED UPON THE DESCRIPTION OF EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENA, EIDETIC DESCRIPTION FUNCTIONS TO DISPLAY THE UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THOSE PHENOMENA. OFTEN AT KEY POINTS SARTRE'S ESSENTIAL INTUITION REVEAL THAT THE NATURE OF THE CONCRETE PHENOMENA IS, IN ESSENCE, TWO NOTIONS SO CONTINGENT UPON EACH OTHER THAT THEY FORM A UNITARY CONDITION FOR THE PHENOMENA. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS PROCESS IS THE WAY IN WHICH SARTRE'S DESCRIPTION OF DISTANCE REVEALS THE DYADIC NATURE OF NEGATITES, WHICH IS THE ESSENCE OR ESSENTIAL CONDITION FOR THE EXPERIENCE OF NEGATION. THE CONDITION

OF NEGATITE HAS, AS A PART OF THE LAW FOR THE EXISTENCE OF NEGATION, A POSITIVE AND A NEGATIVE ASPECT: PHENOMENA ARE REQUIRED TO BE THERE IN ORDER FOR OTHER PHENOMENA NOT TO BE THERE. THE LOGICAL CONTINGENCY IS SO EVIDENT IN SARTRE'S EXPRESSION OF HIS DYADS THAT THEY SEEM VERY SIMILAR TO LOGICAL PARADOXES. NEVERTHELESS, THESE DYADS FORM THE KEY ISSUES WHICH ARE TAKEN UP BY THE NEXT PROCEDURE OF HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION.

HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION, AS SARTRE USES IT, TAKES A VARIETY OF FORMS, BUT IN MOST CASES IN WHICH IT FURTHERS THE ACTUAL ELUCIDATION OF HIS ONTOLOGY, IT IS AN INVESTIGATION OF THE FULL SIGNIFICANCE OF ESSENTIAL DYADIC STRUCTURES. THIS INVESTIGATION, TO USE THE EVALUATION OF ITS GOAL STATED BY SPIEGELBERG "IS THE DISCOVERY OF MEANINGS WHICH ARE NOT IMMEDIATELY MANIFEST TO OUR INTUITING, ANALYZING, AND DESCRIBING."²¹² ALTHOUGH SPIEGELBERG NEITHER SUPPORTS NOR ATTACKS THE CONSISTENCY OF USING PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION AND HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION WITHIN A METHOD, HE MENTIONS THAT SUPPORT FOR SUCH USE WOULD NEED TO BE "DEFENDED AS A FURTHER INTUITIVE VERIFICATION OF ANTICIPATIONS ABOUT LESS ACCESSIBLE LAYERS OF PHENOMENA."²¹³ WITH THIS REQUIRED SUPPORT AS A THEME FOR DISCUSSION, FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THE TYPES OF ANALYSIS USED IN SARTRE'S HERMENEUTICS WILL BE CONSIDERED.

ONE FORM OF HERMENEUTICS SARTRE USES IS THE ANALYSIS OF WORDS. A WORD THAT HAS BEEN BROUGHT FORTH IN PRIOR DESCRIPTION WILL BE SUBJECTED TO FURTHER ANALYSIS AND A FULLER MEANING OF ITS ESSENTIAL NATURE IS DERIVED. FOR EXAMPLE, SARTRE HAD ALREADY DISTINGUISHED THAT CONSCIOUSNESS WAS OF A DYADIC NATURE IN HAVING THE SENSE OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF AN OBJECT AND THE SENSE OF BEING AWARE OF ITSELF AS CONSCIOUSNESS OF THAT OBJECT. HE RETURNS

²¹² SPIEGELBERG, P.695.

²¹³ ₁, P.695.

TO THE SELF-AWARE ASPECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS LATER AND, THROUGH ANALYSIS, DISCOVERS IN THE REFLEXIVENESS OF THE TERM A FULLER SIGNIFICANCE IN ITS BEING A SELF-PRESENT-TO-ITSELF WHICH IS THE SOURCE THROUGH WHICH NOTHINGNESS COMES TO THE WORLD. SARTRE'S ANALYSIS IS NOT MERELY EXPANSION UPON AN HYPOTHESIS IN THIS CASE. THE LARGER SIGNIFICANCE OF SELF-AWARENESS HAS AT LEAST AN INTUITIVE CORRELATION TO PREVIOUS INTUITIONS ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS; CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-PRESENT-TO-SELF CLARIFIES THE OBSCURITY OF THE INITIAL DESCRIPTION OF REFLECTION IN THAT THERE IS NOT JUST THE "LOOKING AT" A PAST EVENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS BY ANOTHER CONSCIOUSNESS, BUT AN ACTUAL REFLECTING WITHIN THE SAME MOMENT OF APPREHENSION. SARTRE'S PROCEDURE OF DERIVING THE "PRESENCE TO" MEANING FROM SELF-AWARENESS IS INTERPRETATION OF AN INTUITIVELY GIVEN PHENOMENON RATHER THAN AN HYPOTHESIS, WHICH GIVES THE INTERPRETATION SOME AUTHENTICITY ON A PHENOMENOLOGICAL BASIS.

HOWEVER, ALL OF SARTRE'S HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATIONS DO NOT HAVE THE SAME CREDENTIALS FOR BEING AS CONSISTENT TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL AIMS AS THE EXAMPLE ABOVE. SARTRE'S CLASSIFICATION OF CATEGORIZING KNOWLEDGE AS A MODE OF "BEING," WHICH IS "PURE NEGATIVITY," CAN ONLY BE CONSIDERED TO BE DUE TO EXTRAPOLATION OF THE TERM; "PRESENCE TO" AND NOT A FURTHER SIGNIFICATION OF A PRIMORDIALLY GIVEN FACT. BECAUSE THIS INTERPRETATION IS SO FAR REMOVED FROM THE BASIC FACTS, SARTRE CAN BE CRITICIZED FOR HIS INCONSISTENCY WITH HIS FORMER HERMENEUTICAL PROCEDURES. IN THE FORMER CASE, "PRESENCE TO" WAS INTERPRETED TO BE WITHIN A PRE-EXISTING UNITY OF SELF-AWARENESS. BUT KNOWLEDGE WAS NEVER INTUITED BY SARTRE AS A MEDIATE TERM WITHIN ANY MODE OF BEING AND, IF IT IS ALSO A "PRESENCE TO," IT IS OF A DIFFERENT SORT THAN THE ONE WITHIN SELF-AWARENESS. THE "PRESENCE TO" WAS NOT PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED TO BE A MODE OF BEING, BY SARTRE; RATHER IT WAS A CONDITION FOR THE MODE OF BEING CALLED SELF-AWARENESS. SARTRE REVERSES HIS OWN CONCLUSION ABOUT

"PRESENCE TO" AND PREFERS TO CALL IT "A BOND OF ONTOLOGICAL BEING," RATHER THAN THAT WHICH SEPARATES THE REFLECTION-REFLECTING.²¹⁴ THE WEAKNESS OF THIS SECOND HERMENEUTICAL EXAMPLE LEADS TO A CONCLUSION THAT, WHEN SARTRE REMOVES HIS DISCUSSION TOO FAR AWAY FROM THE BASIC FACTS WHICH HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED, HIS HERMENEUTICAL INTERPRETATION LOSES SOME OF ITS AUTHENTICITY AS A PART OF HIS PHENOMENOLOGICAL AIMS.

THERE IS ANOTHER TYPE OF HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION EMPLOYED IN SARTRE'S WORK THAT MAINLY FUNCTIONS TO SUPPORT THE STRUCTURES HE HAS DESCRIBED BY INTERPRETING PREVIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL POINTS OF VIEW ABOUT THAT STRUCTURE OR BY INCLUDING THE RESULTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES ON THE SUBJECT. THIS TYPE OF INTERPRETATION IS PERHAPS MORE PROPERLY CALLED EXEGESIS. SARTRE'S INTERPRETATIONS OF THE HEGELIAN AND HEIDEGGERIAN CONCEPTS OF NON-BEING, FOR INSTANCE, DO NOT HAVE A VERY ESSENTIAL ROLE IN THE TOTAL METHODOLOGY. WITHOUT THEIR INCLUSION IN THE TEXT, NONE OF SARTRE'S OWN CONCEPT WOULD BE LOST; ALTHOUGH THOSE INTERPRETATIONS SIDE IN RENDERING HIS CONCEPT MORE UNDERSTANDABLE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, SARTRE'S INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS OF GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY BEARS A RESPONSIBLE SHARE OF HIS EXPLANATION OF EPISTEMOLOGY. THE FIGURE-ON-GROUND-THEORY SEEMS TO BE THE MAIN ARGUMENT FOR SARTRE'S CONCEPTS OF "INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL NEGATIONS." BY PERCEIVING BEING-IN-ITSELF, CONSCIOUSNESS HAS THE "UPSURGE AS ALL WHICH IT IS NOT;" THUS SARTRE HAS ASSUMED THAT CONSCIOUSNESS PERCEIVES THE "GROUND" OF THE INTERNAL NEGATION OF ALL BEING-IN-ITSELF. IT MAY HAVE MADE NO DIFFERENCE TO SARTRE'S THEORY IF HE HAD NOT KNOWN OF THE GESTALT THEORY, HOWEVER HIS HEAVILY LEANING ON IT TO ESTABLISH HIS THEORY MUST BE CONSIDERED. HAD SARTRE RESORTED BACK TO THE PRE-REFLECTIVE COGITO IN HIS EXPLANATION, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A

²¹⁴BN, p.177.

GREATER CONSISTENCY AND AUTHORITY TO HIS THEORY. THE HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION OF THE FIGURE-GROUND THEORY DOES NOT HAVE AN EQUAL INTEGRITY WITH PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTUITION WHEN SARTRE SUBSCRIBES TO THE MOTTO: "THE ESSENTIAL WAY OF PROCEEDING IS THROUGH INTUITION." SARTRE'S MANIFESTO ON THE ULTIMACY OF ALL METHODS OF KNOWING LEADING TO INTUITION HARDLY JUSTIFIES THIS TYPE OF HERMENEUTICS; BECAUSE, AS HE STATES: "IN CASES WHERE IT (INTUITION) IS NOT ATTAINED, REASON AND ARGUMENT REMAIN AS INDICATING SIGNS WHICH POINT TOWARD AN INTUITION BEYOND REACH."²¹⁵ THEREFORE, SARTRE'S HERMENEUTIC OF "PRESENCE TO" CAN BE CLASSIFIED AS AN INDICATING SIGN TO AN UNATTAINABLE INTUITION BY HIS OWN CATEGORIZATION. EMPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF HIS THEORIES, SARTRE'S HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATIONS ARE USEFUL; BUT WHEN THEY ARE USED AS THE BASIS FOR THOSE THEORIES, THEY MUST BE CONSIDERED OUTSIDE OF THE PRIMARY METHODOLOGICAL AIM.

²¹⁵BN, p.176.

CONCLUSION

THERE ARE THEN, FOUR TYPES OF INTERRELATED PROCEDURES WHICH COMBINE THE TACTICS TO FORM THE CORE OF SARTRE'S METHOD. THE SUMMARY ABOVE HAS ATTEMPTED TO SHOW HOW THESE PROCEDURES ARE RELATED AND IN WHAT KIND OF INSTANCES THEY ARE USED WITH INADEQUATE RELATEDNESS TO THE OTHER STEPS. IN GENERAL, THE ANALYSIS HAS INDICATED THAT THESE PROCEDURES DEPEND UPON ONE ANOTHER; THEY EITHER SERVE AS A BASIS FOR LATER PROCESSES, OR THEY CONTAIN DIRECT REFERENCES BACK TO PRECEDING PHASES. BUT, TO DESCRIBE SARTRE'S PROGRESS, HIS METHOD IS ONE OF A CONTINUAL GOING BACK TO THE INITIAL FACTS ESTABLISHED AND DRAWING FROM THEM NEW SIGNIFICATIONS ON AN INCREASINGLY ABSTRACT LEVEL.

IT IS EVIDENT THAT SARTRE'S METHOD, AS AN EFFECTIVE WAY OF DERIVING AN ONTOLOGY, HAS A COHESIVENESS, INTEGRITY, AND INDIVIDUALITY THAT CAUSES IT TO BE CONSIDERED DISTINCTIVE AND MAINLY SUCCESSFUL ON THE BASIS OF METHODOLOGICAL CRITERIA AS WELL AS UPON ITS SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING ITS AIMS. THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING REVEALED IN THIS STUDY WHICH WOULD SEEM TO BE AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE TO THE FUNCTIONING OF SARTRE'S METHOD. THE METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS THAT WERE ENCOUNTERED COULD CONCEIVABLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO SARTRE'S OWN MISUSE OF HIS METHODOLOGICAL ELEMENTS AND PROCEDURES, RATHER THAN BEING ATTRIBUTABLE TO AN INHERENT WEAKNESS IN HIS METHODOLOGY. THE MOST OBVIOUS WEAKNESS SARTRE MANIFESTS IN REGARD TO HIS METHOD IS HIS LACK OF TAKING THE OCCASION TO POINT OUT JUST HOW AND BY WHAT MEANS HE DOES INTEND TO PROCEED. IT IS PERHAPS DUE TO THIS "WEAKNESS" THAT MANY OF SARTRE'S CRITICS HAVE FOUND SO MUCH TO CRITICIZE AND HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO MISINTERPRETING MANY OF HIS CONCEPTS.

THE SEVERAL ARGUMENTS GATHERED BOTH FOR AND AGAINST SARTRE'S METHOD OF ONTOLOGIZING; AS TO WHETHER IT IS PHENOMENOLOGICAL, DARKLY HEGELIAN, PSEUDO-EXISTENTIAL, OR HOPELESSLY AMBIGUOUS, WILL GO ON PRECISELY BECAUSE THEY ARE FACTUALLY AND PRACTICALLY INCONCLUSIVE. THE MOST PERTINENT CRITICISM WHICH STILL STANDS IN RESPECT TO SARTRE'S METHOD IS DERIVED FROM THE VERY DYNAMICS AND ORIENTATION OF THE METHOD ITSELF. PERHAPS DESAN HAS STATED THIS CRITICISM BEST WHEN HE COMMENTS:

SARTRE HAS NOT ONLY "CHOSEN" THE BASIC AREAS OF HIS SYSTEM AND ELIMINATED (TOO QUICKLY) THE EVENTUALITY OF OTHER BEINGS, BUT HE HAS ALSO DECIDED ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH BOTH THESE ENTITIES WILL BE EXAMINED AND ANALYZED . . . THESE DESCRIPTIONS WHICH CLAIM TO BE OBJECTIVE ARE VERY OFTEN NOT OBJECTIVE AT ALL.²¹⁶

IN ADDITION, SO FEW EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENA WERE DESCRIBED TO PRODUCE THE WHOLE OF SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY BY BEING UNIVERSALIZED, THAT IT IMMEDIATELY SUGGESTS THE THOUGHT: WHAT OF THE INFINITY OF EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENA LEFT UNDESCRIBED, WOULD THEY LIKewise SUPPORT THE SAME ESSENTIAL INSIGHTS? WOULD OTHER THINKERS, WITH THEIR OWN EXPERIENCES AND USING THE SAME METHOD, COME TO ENTIRELY DIFFERENT ONTOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS?

AT LEAST THREE POSSIBLE WAYS OF APPROACHING AN ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS ARISE. FIRST, AS SARTRE PROCLAIMS - "WHAT IS, IS" MEANING THAT IF THIS CRITICISM IS INDEED A WEAKNESS, IT IS UNAVOIDABLY REAL. IT IS A SITUATION WHICH CANNOT BE CORRECTED, DUE TO THE NATURE OF EXISTENCE AS INDIVIDUAL AND PARTICULAR. SECONDLY, IT COULD BE MAINTAINED THAT SARTRE IS A DISHONEST PHILOSOPHER WHO ONLY CHOSE PHENOMENA THAT SUPPORTED A FOREGONE CONCLUSION, (LIKE HIDING AN EASTER-EGG, THEN ORGANIZING A SEARCH-PARTY TO FIND IT) A MOTIVE WHICH SEEMS RIDICULOUS TO ATTRIBUTE TO ANY SERIOUS THINKER. LAST AND PREFERABLY THIS "WEAKNESS" COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE NOVELTY OF SARTRE'S

²¹⁶DESAN, THE TRAGIC FINALE, . . . , PP.186-187.

APPROACH AND METHOD, THAT THE LACK OF COMPLETENESS IN INVESTIGATING ALL
RELEVANT PHENOMENA IS DUE TO BEING AND NOTHINGNESS SIGNIFYING THE BEGINNING
OF A NEW APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS WHICH IS NOT PERSUED THROUGHOUT
INTELLECTUAL EUROPE'S REACH OF INFLUENCE.

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