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The Argentine Labor Movement in Comparative and Historical Perspective

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in Comparative and Historical Perspective

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by

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THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

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The political alienation of peronism has been a major obstacle to social integration in Argentina since 1955. This paper traces the historical causes of that conflict and offers a comparison of the growth of peronism with the political development of labor in three modern integrated societies, England, Russia, and the United States.

The politicization of labor is viewed as one universal consequence of the industrialization process. In each of these societies the political drive of labor was met with both public and private opposition, making it for a time an alienated political interest group in the society. Each country witnessed a period of mal-integration broadly similar to Argentina's current stage of political development.

The thesis developed here is that war and the imperatives of national defense mollified the political struggle of industrial labor in England, Russia, and the United States by making social integration a necessary condition of national survival. The contingencies of war and national defense initiated a trend toward state wide economic planning and collectivism that eventually led to labor's integration and full participation in the body politic of each nation. A relationship is therefore advanced between mal-integration in Argentina and that nation's historic non-involvment in international conflict.

The entire analysis is conducted within the general theoretical framework of systems analysis, more specifically as it has been applied to political science by David Easton.

INTRODUCTION

As a nation of Latin America Argentina has always seemed to attract the special interest of the democratically inclined social analyst. The pervasiveness in its society of those conditions most often correlated with the democratic system is in itself something of a rarity in Latin America, and Argentina has thus maintained a traditional claim to exceptional national maturity and continental prestige. It ranks especially high in terms of its educational and communication facilities. It is predominantly an urbanized nation, composed of a people with a high degree of political participation and entrepreneurship. It is cosmopolitan, "technologically progressive", and racially homogeneous; a nation, consequently, free from many of the formidable cultural obstacles that plague much of the under-developed world. Moreover, and perhaps most atypical of developing countries, Argentina's rate of population growth ranks among the lowest in the world; a factor that not only insures it a comparatively high level of per-capita wealth at present but one that will safeguard against the most irreparable potential drain on its long range economic growth.

In short, the country's striking cultural proximity to the more advanced nations of the world suggests its comparison more with the United States or some Western European society than with any of its neighboring Latin America republics. It is not altogether for chauvinistic reasons that Argentina has in fact historically prided

itself as being the "United States" of Latin America. "The Argentine people," Ortega y Gasset concluded long ago, "are not content to be one nation among many; they require an exalted destiny, they demand of themselves a proud future, they have no taste for a history without triumph and are determined to command." And though, "they may or may not succeed, it is extremely interesting to witness the historical trajectory of a people so called to empire."[1]

It is to a large degree because of this image of potential national greatness and because the raw materials of democracy and the impressive resources for political and economic development generally are so in abundance that academic inquiries into the contemporary state of the nation rarely emerge in an optimistic light. For in spite of its remarkable facade of modernity Argentina has writhed in a state of economic stagnation for over a decade, ". . . an economic crisis of such a nature that," to Albert Weisbord, "it is practically impossible for Argentina to emerge from it without revolutionary methods."[2] Politically, it has for this same period resided in an equally dangerous state of limbo, ". . . a deep political crisis manifesting clearly that the ruling classes of that country are so split up that the government is held together by only the most stringent military dictatorship."[3]

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[1] José Ortega y Gasset, Obras de José Ortega y Gasset, Vol. I, 661, cited by Julio Fernández, "The Nationalism Syndrome in Argentina," Journal of Inter-American Studies, October, 1966, 553.

[2] Albert Weisbord, Latin American Actuality (New York: Citadel Press, 1964), 91.

[3] Ibid.

This familiar emphasis on grave social crisis with its overlay of pessimism seems but a logical response to the irresolute paradox the country presents--a country where dynamic growth within a democratic context seems so attainable and yet where practically the opposite extreme prevails. Indeed, the confrontation of normative ideals with the far grimmer Argentine reality has often led many observers to believe in the existence of a kind of singular social villain or unique obstruction that has somehow subverted the country's more "natural" and more desirable social evolution.

A good deal of emphasis has been placed on institutions (the army, the church, the "concordancia") which in light of their undemocratic posture and rather static resistance to change have been obvious obstacles to Argentina's development. Others have stressed the obstructive and destructive effects on society of certain cultural phenomena--personalism, peronism, "la pereza criolla". Some observers, the native intellectual and philosopher in particular, see the sociological and psychological attitudes that have given rise to those phenomena as the more basic problem. Their major concern has thus been with the profound alienation and complete lack of national perspective displayed by the common majority. Yet another popular view holds that certain international forces--the pervasive economic influence of the United States and the inequality of international trade patterns--are the more identifiable source of the Argentine quandary. Indeed, rarely has there been an explicit acknowledgement

of the very multidimensional nature of the country's crisis with an attempt to analyze it in that context.[4]

The military for example, has often been cited as the greatest single obstacle to democratic development in all Latin America. In the eyes of North Americans especially, being accustomed to the primacy of the body politic over the soldier, the growth of a more democratic Argentina (which if taken less euphemistically is often to mean a more "United States-like" Argentina) would seem to hinge on a radical transformation or, more preferably, complete dissolution of the military complex. But to adopt such a view of Argentine society, one that has emjoyed perhaps as much academic as journalistic popularity, is essentially to pose the problem too narrowly. Certainly any attempt to interpret the dynamics of Argentina politics in terms of a single institution, even as ubiquitous a one as the military, is bound to run a high risk of superficiality. Or as Kalman Silvert has written: "To content oneself with the statement that military interventionism is the sickness of Argentine--and also Latin American politics--is really to make little contribution beyond feeling the patient's forehead."[5] The military's current political role seems best explained by Andrzejewski's comment that "if there is no agreement on the right to command or the duty to obey, either because of

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[4]Gino Germani, Política y Sociedad en Una Época de Transición (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1962), 233.

[5]Kalman Silvert, The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America (New Orleans: Hanover Press, 1961), 79.

ethnic heterogeneity or in consequence of internal schism," naked force will logically remain "the argument of last resort."[6]

Argentines themselves, especially the more philosophical and literary minded, have attempted to look beneath the country's institutional behavior in analyzing its social problems. The philosopher-intellectual has invariably criticized the unique Argentine psychology or national character as being the decisive factor in the country's social maldevelopment. Adopting Silvert's metaphor in a much more literal vein he has, through a variety of literary forms, personified the nation more often as a type of mental patient and his preoccupation with the Argentine's enigmatic national character or national psychology has seemed to produce more of an overstatement of the society's problems than a clearer understanding of their causes. With so animate a desire for social harmony the intellectual has tended to view both an extreme diversity in national social values and the prevalence of conflict as contradictions to the very existence of a nation.[7] Moreover, there is in Argentina and Latin America as a whole a particularly strong tradition of hypercritical national auto-analysis.

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[6]Stanislaw Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Kegan, Paul, 1954), 128.

[7]As one historian has written: "In modern times we expect the intellectuals to disagree with the non-intellectuals, the vulgar, the Philistines, the Babbits, the "Booboisie"--or whatever other name the intellectuals may coin for them. They are to a large degree committed by their function to take a critical attitude toward the daily routine of human affairs. Lacking experience of action under the burden of responsibility, they do not learn how little new action is usually possible or effective. An intellectual as satisfied with the world as with his ideas and ideals would simply not be an intellectual." Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Random House, 1965), 42.

The native intellectual's concern for the Argentine's lack of cooperation-mindedness or community spirit is for the most part a modern day version of the once popular and extreme view that Argentine society--like Latin American society in general--suffers from certain intrinsic defects that make political and economic development altogether impossible. "We may be a people," exhorted Rojas, "but we are not a nation."[8] "A problem of the community," the philosopher Hector Murena was tempted to say.

> But I know I ought not to, for I know the problem is precisely the lack of community. There has never been a community in Argentina, hence, we do not form a body though we may form a conglomeration. We behave as if each were unique, and as if he were alone, with the unfortunate consequences which result when that is the situation. The hand knoweth not what the head thinketh, the mouth ignoreth, etc. When a situation cannot be resolved within the framework of a community then there must be a revolution in order to modify that framework. Is there any more succinct definition of sickness?[9]

The distinct lack of an enlightened national ethos, the low status of respectable cultural values, the Argentine's own lack of civism, these factors have constituted to Murena and others the very essence of Argentina's social crisis.[10]

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[8]Ricardo Rojas, Las Restauración Nacionalista, cited in William Rex Crawford, A Century of Latin American Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944), 101.

[9]Hector Murena, Historia de un Día, cited in Lewis Hanke, South America (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1959), 150.

[10]Ricardo Rojas, Hector Murena, Eduardo Mallea, and Julio Cortazar are perhaps a few of the more notable contributors to the Argentina literary tradition of "self-incrimination" inspired by Sarmiento, Alberdi, and Bunge. See Delfin Leocadio Garasa, "Como Somos los Argentinos," Journal of Inter-American Studies, July, 1965, 376-368.

The intellectual's social commentary is thus a kind of reformist dogma based on a comparison of certain Argentine cultural characteristics with a personal idealized image of what they might more properly be. In the area of political analysis his culturally based views have been criticized as being particularly vacuous. Almond writes:

> Political culture is not the same thing as the general culture, although it is related to it. Because political orientation involves cognition, intellection, and adaption to external situations, as well as the standards and values of the general culture, it is a differentiated part of the culture and has a certain antonomy. Indeed, it is the failure to give proper weight to the cognitive and evaluative factors, and to the consequent autonomy of political culture that has been responsible for the exaggeration and over simplifications of the "national character" literature of recent years.[11]

And as Weber noted:

> The very significance of the concept "nation", is usually anchored in the superiority or at least the irreplaceability, of the cultural values that are to be preserved and developed only through the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group. It therefore goes without saying that the intellectuals . . . are to a specific degree predestined to propagate the "national idea", just as those who wield power in the polity provoke the idea of the state.[12]

The attempt to explicate the full gamut of Argentina's socio-political and economic ills in terms of one of its more infamous institutionalized members or modes of behavior has of course been the more obvious tendency of the lay social analyst--the journalist, the

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[11]Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," The Journal of Politics, XVIII (1956), 392.

[12]Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Part III, Chapter III, cited by C. W. Mills and H. G. Gerth, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 176.

philosopher, the ideologue--than those representative of the various social science disciplines. Many economists and political analysts however, while not consciously provoking some personal prescription for society, have often arrived at similar normative and somewhat narrow conclusions. Many economists for example in viewing the economy as the primum mobile of the social system have, through an intense intradisciplinary specialization, often ignored fundamental political and sociological determinants of economic development. Many have failed to recognize that "the central phenomenon of the world of post-traditional societies is not the economy--and whether it is capitalist or not--it is the total procedure by which choices are made."[13] As one prominent economic historian has pointed out: "Relatively few economists have had the courage to attempt a systematic theory of development which would incorporate strategic sociological, cultural, and psychological forces."[14]

The most notable example of a strictly economic based interpretation of the Argentine quandary can be found in the doctrine of the United Nations Economic Commission of Latin America.[15] More

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[13] W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, (Cambridge University Press, 1960), 150.

[14] "Outstanding among these few," Higgins notes, "is Everett Hagen, who has constructed a theory of entrepreneurial motivation which merits close attention." Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development, (New York: Norton and Co., 1960), 295.

[15] "Economic Survey of Latin America," (United Nations, 1950); "Theoretical and Practical Problems of Economic Growth," (United Nations, 1951); "Commercial Policies in the Underdeveloped Countries," American Economic Review, XLIX (May, 1959), 251-273.

specifically, Raúl Prebisch through the voice of E. C. L. A. has argued quite persuasively that the root cause of the country's social dilemma is its historically "peripheral" position in the international economic community. Such a position, Prebisch contends, has been consciously maintained by "the center", a collective term referring to the have nations but one more commonly used in calumnious reference to the United States. Being the most representative nation of the center complex, the United States has, in fact, also been popularly portrayed as the ultimate source of Argentina's widening crisis. This conviction has grown not from a complete analysis of how United States influence has pervaded every realm of the Argentine social order but rather is based on the idea that the United States is uniquely responsible for the deteriorating economic state of the country. It is the latter which is seen ultimately as the principal determinant of the country's social order.

With its characterization of the center as a kind of external conspiratory enterprise dominated by the United States, the objectivity that does exist in the Prebisch thesis has been consistantly overshadowed by its rather militant and ideological tone. Albert Hirschman has written:

> The arresting feature of E. C. L. A. is that it possesses attributes not frequently encountered in large international organizations: a cohesive personality which evokes loyalty from the staff, and a set of distinctive beliefs, principles, and attitudes, in brief an ideology, which is highly influential among Latin America intellectuals and policy makers. To a considerable degree, this achievement is due to E. C. L. A.'s director, Dr. Raúl Prebisch the author of that

> veritable E. C. L. A. manifesto, The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems.[16]

Or as another economist has written:

> A certain sense of frustrated helplessness has substantial justification to be sure, in hard economic realities: the dependence of most Latin American economies on a very few export commodities; the vulnerability of these products in world markets, and the gradual decline in their prices over the past few years; the rise of new producers and substitutions further weakening Latin America's market position; the preponderant importance of the United States as customer and source of capital; U. S. domestic price support and surplus disposal policies coupled with opposition, in general, to international commodity stabilization measures; and so on. But this basic economic theme is reinforced and complicated by political overtones that strike an even more responsive chord in Latin American popular sentiment.[17]

The popular acceptance of the Prebisch thesis as the explanation of Argentina's--and Latin America's--social problems is therefore understandable. Its polemical portrait of "center versus periphery" is highly complementary to an already prevalent anti-U. S. anti-foreign sentiment. Its description of the country's social problems in concrete economic terms allows for a simplistic and more coherent definition of their causes and cures.[18] But in Argentina, as in other emerging countries,

> The record of development policies makes it clear that problems of implementing a development plan now need to receive even more attention than problems of formation. The fact that a development plan may meet the tests of efficiency and consistency on paper, only to fail in practice is due in large measure to deficiencies in political and administrative requirements. For without sufficient

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[16]Albert Hirschman, Latin American Issues (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), 13.

[17]Cited in Hirschman, 54.

[18]Gerald Meier, Leading Issues in Development Economics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 562.

> political leadership and authority a government is unwilling and unable to act upon the plan.[19]

In political science as well, the lack of a verifiable conceptual framework or general theory for the discipline as a whole has had important effects on the political analysis of Argentina. There has been a logical exaggeration of the significance of certain political institutions, not only in terms of their influence in the political system itself but in terms of the degree to which they determine the character of society as a whole. Thus the para-political role of the military, the dominance of personalism, executive power, the oligarchy, the legacy of Perón, and the inexorable force of peronism are some of the more commonly cited "sources" of the Argentine political and social conflict. It is in the aggregate, of course, that they are all important causal factors and what has seldom been employed is a framework whereby their relative importance could be ascertained. As David Easton has written:

> There have been efforts to develop partial theories about such selected and presumably coherent areas of political life as parties, organizations, interest groups, legislative behavior, decision making, or coalitions. But . . . the effort to fit each of these partial theories into a larger logical or theoretical whole . . . has been left indeterminate, . . . ambigious, and inconsistent.[20]
>
> An integrated conceptual framework . . . is vital if we are to establish the limits in subject matter. Concepts point to the variables that may be included as relevant to some ultimate theory. If it will do nothing else, such a conceptual structure would at least indicate first, the part of reality to be included within a systematic study of

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[19] Ibid.

[20] David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1967), 8.

> political life and second, those elements of this broad area that ought to command our prior attention if we are to understand the major determinants of political behavior. If concept formation does nothing else, it at least provides certain criteria of political relevance to guide us in the distribution of our attention to matters of theoretical, and thereby, of explanatory and ultimately, of practical importance. At the very least it helps to promote the preliminary description of what are selected as significant phenomena.[21]

It is the availability of this type of conceptual framework that is of particular importance here.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to an understanding of Argentine politics by analyzing a specific political element of the society and attempting to determine its special relevance to the political system as a whole. The analysis is conducted within the general theoretical framework derived from systems analysis, more specifically as it has been advanced by David Easton.[22] It is felt that there is an added value in this approach to the study of Argentine politics in that it offers a more valid basis for determining what the country's prospects are for a democratic future.

> The perspectives of a systems analysis of political life . . . help us to prevent research from remaining exclusively and narrowly occupied, at least implicitly, with one type of system, namely, democracy as it has developed in the West. The primary motivation of scholarship today including most theorizing, is to know more about democratic systems and the way in which they come about, with the fundamental and virtually unquestioned assumption that the quickest and best way

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[21] Ibid., 12.

[22] Ibid.; David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965); David Easton, The Political System (New York: Knopf, 1953).

> to do this is to study democratic systems directly as a type or to examine other systems with democracy as a latent model. But even if we were to adopt this assumption explicitly and organize theory around it as the dominant value of a normative theory . . . we might still wish to question whether we can ever secure the most reliable understanding of how democracies emerge and function unless we are able to invent a conceptual framework that applies to a much broader range of system types. As in many efforts at scientific explanation, it may be that the longest route home will ultimately prove to be the quickest.[23]

The impossibility in physical terms alone of one observer analyzing the total procedure by which "values are allocated authoritatively for society" is of course obvious. The individual researcher is inevitably confronted with a question of priorities as to which politically relevant aspect of society--some subsystem or portion of the total political system--will command his immediate interest.[24] The central focus of this paper is on interest group behavior and more specifically the political involvement of Argentine labor.[25] The utility of labor politics as a specific unit of analysis lies in its concrete and observable nature. The distinct value orientation of organized labor in terms of the total Argentine political environment, its differentiated role and "displaced" status[26] with respect to the larger social system, its internal and structural cohesiveness, and its collective-class identity are all factors which make its

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[23] Easton, Systems Analysis of Political Life, 15.

[24] David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 228.

[25] A more complete definition will appear later in the paper.

[26] Gino Germani, Estructura Social de la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, 1962), 240.

political import more readily observable. But it is not this observational convenience alone that recommends it here as a valuable starting point of analysis.

Labor is one of the major protagonists in the contemporary conflict of values in Argentine society. Germani has written that "there are essentially two types of masses in Argentina: the popular, referring above all to industrial labor; and the great middle class, particularly white collar employees, small commercials, small industrialist . . . etc."[27] The full significance of labor's political stance is that it is at variance not only with this vast middle sector but with virtually every significant coalition and interest group in the society, including large scale industrialists, the military, and an agriculture based elite. The political conflict surrounding what Germani has termed "el proceso de proletarización"--the recruitment and structuring of an industrial work force--may be viewed as one logical and universal consequence of the industrialization process. As Kerr and Siegel have written:

> The process of industrialization involves the setting and enforcing of rules concerned with the recruitment of a labor force, with the training of that labor force in myriad skills required by the advanced division of labor, with the locating of workers in some appropriate pattern of geographical industrial, and occupational dispersion, it involves the setting of rules on times to work and not to work, on pace and quality of work, on method and amount of pay, on movement into and out of work and from one position to another. It involves rules pertaining to the maintenance of continuity in the work process (so intimately related to the maintenance of stability in the society)--the attempted minimization of

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[27]Germani, Política y Sociedad en Una Época de Transición, 240.

> individual or organized revolt, the provision of views of the industrial order. The structuring of this web of rule must be undertaken regardless of the form of industrialization, in Russia and the United States alike. Industrialization can thrive only as there is developed a compatible structured reign of law and order in the productive sector.[28]

In light of these universal social imperatives the disruptive political conduct of labor in Argentina may be taken, at the present stage of the country's development, as a rather natural occurrence. Indeed, in every modern industrialized society the implanting of a "structured reign of law and order in the productive sector" brought the growth of a divergent social and political philosophy that reflected in Hoxie's words "a consciousness among the workers of common needs and aims, a common outlook on life, and a common program for the betterment of their lot."[29] Or as Easton has pointed out:

> Where changes in the economy have led to fundamental shifts in the balance of power within a social structure, the prevailing political system could not continue unchanged. The old authorities will be seen as unresponsive to the wants and needs of the new social groups. In time, the newly emergent groups begin to lose confidence not only in the authorities but in the old institutions themselves within the matrix of which the old authorities have asserted their control. At the same time, if changing social conditions provide some free-floating human resources that can be mobilized behind the discontented new leadership, the conditions are ripe for an assault upon the old system.
>
> In effect, this generalizes the experience of many new systems as they have emerged from old ones. It reflects, for example, the pattern of political change in early modern Europe. In the process of industrialization there sprang up a new kind of peasantry and a new urban working class, both freed from feudal ties. This transformation . . . not only gave birth to a new pool of free labor but opened up a new

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[28]Clark Kerr and Abraham Seigel, "The Structuring of the Labor Force in Industrial Society," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, January, 1955, 155.

[29]Robert Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United States (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1917), XV, XVI.

> reservoir of manpower that could be mobilized for political purposes. And what is true of early modern Europe applies with equal force to developing nations today.[30]

As the labor historian G. D. H. Cole noted:

> The modern Labour Movement though its structure and policy differ from country to country, has thus, in all industrialized countries essentially the same form. This form is dictated to it by the conditions, everywhere fundamentally the same, which have called it into being. It is the child of modern capitalism out of the Industrial Revolution, and its essential basis is the modern class of wage workers--the proletariat--among whom it arises as the expression of an essential community of class, interest, and experience.[31]

The significant fact, of course, is that while every modern industrialized nation has witnessed a certain radical nonconformity on the part of labor, each has somehow accomodated or assimilated the deviant political philosophy and conduct inherent in a national labor movement.[32] The characteristic pattern of mid-twentieth century Western democracies, for example, is that

> they are in a "post-politics" phase--that is, there is relatively little difference between the democratic left and right, the socialists are moderates, and the conservatives accept the welfare state. In large measure this situation reflects the fact that in these countries the workers have won their fight for full citizenship. Representatives of

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[30] Easton, Systems Analysis, 155, 156.

[31] G. D. H. Cole, A Short History of the British Working Class (London: Allen and Unwin, 1952), 6.

[32] F. X. Sutton has described two important characteristics of modern industrial societies as follows: 1. The predominance of universalistic, specific, and achievement norms. 2. The prevalence of associations, i.e., functionally specific, non-ascriptive structures. F. X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York: Free Press, 1963), 71.

> the lower strata are now part of the governing groups, members of the club. The basic political issue of the industrial revolution, the incorporation of the workers into the legitimate body politic, has been settled.[33]

The most fruitful approach to a study of the Argentine labor movement would seem to lie, then, in a method of comparative analysis. "Hypotheses that grow out of peculiar conditions in one country can then be tested against other bodies of experience, and reconciliation sought in differences among the determining factors."[34] This paper analyzes the political development of labor in three modern industrialized countries: England, Russia, and the United States. The historical observations derived from each case study will serve as a basis of comparison in analyzing the political development of labor in Argentina. The precise structure and organization of labor's political involvement has, of course, varied considerably from country to country, but the main emphasis here is on the broad functional uniformities reflected in the political development of labor in each country.

Chapter One outlines the origins of industrialization in all four countries and describes the conditions in each that led to the formation of an industrial proletariat. It shows how in all four countries labor's initial political response to the emerging industrial order was largely undirected; constituting a stage of protest,

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[33]Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 82.

[34]Walter Galenson (ed.), Comparative Labor Movements, (New York: Prentice Hall, 1955), X.

characterized by violence and sabotage, and reflecting the values of the traditional, agrarian, preindustrial society. Utopian alternatives to the role of labor in the new social order becomes prominent, but labor itself, though representing a functionally homogeneous stratum in the economic system, lacks at this early stage of industrialization the structural and organizational requisites for the conversion of wants to political demands.

> Somewhere at the outset of its career, before a demand first appears as such, it is preceded by a general opinion, preference, interest, ideology, motive, or the like--what I have denoted generically as a want--which may or may not be articulated in some form. If a want is to pass from this stage and become transformed into a demand, a person or group must be brought to the point of giving voice to the idea that the members charged in the responsibility for making binding decisions ought to act so as to fulfill this want. When this happens, we shall say that the want has been converted into a demand and it has therefore been put into the political system. The want has been politicized.[35]

Chapter Two traces the conditions that bring about a growth in labor's organizational status and examines the effects that its emergence as a viable interest group has on the political system. Chapter Three identifies those conditions in England, Russia, and the United States that brought about a moderation of the volume of labor's political demands and its assumption of a more supportive role vis-a-vis the respective national authorities, community, and regime.

In Chapter Four the current political role of labor in Argentina is considered in direct relation to the comparative historical observations on England, Russia, and the United States.

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[35]Easton, A Systems Analysis, 80.

CHAPTER I

"The essence of the industrial revolution in England," Arnold Toynbee wrote, "was the substitution of competition for the medieval regulations which previously controlled the production and distribution of wealth."[1] The triumph of economic liberalism and the acceptance of free competition in eighteenth and early nineteenth century England, in effect, signaled the replacement of one social system by another. The modernization of techniques and organization in industry, the growth of the factory system, the rapid rise in international trade, and the systematic enclosure of land and mechanization of agriculture changed a traditionally agrarian oriented British society into a predominantly urbanized industrial one. One important social consequence of that transformation was the creation of an urbanized industrial proletariat, a nascent working class which was defined economically by the Poor Law Reform Act of 1834 (excluding laborers from relief by distinguishing them from the pauper) and politically by the Parlimentary Reform Act of 1832, which denied them the right to vote.[2]

In Russia the official downfall of the system of serfdom in 1861 has also been cited as a similar "conventional line of demarcation separating two eras of economic development: the era of serfdom

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[1]Arnold Toynbee, Lectures on the Industrial Revolution (Rivington, 1884), 85.

[2]John W. Derry, A Short History of Nineteenth Century England (London: Blandford Press, Ltd., 1963), 118-119.

and the era of industrial capitalism."[3] Although remnants of a feudal-serfdom political order prevailed well into the twentieth century in Russia,

> . . . with the Reform of 1861 the way was cleared for a final consolidation of the conditions necessary for industrial capitalist development. For, the Reform itself was not only a "Peasant Reform", but, having freed ten million serfs from personal bondage and from a substantial part of the land belonging to them, it thereby also resolved the major problem of industrial capitalism--the demand for manpower.[4]

In the thirty years between 1861 and 1890 the production of textiles in Russia more than doubled and the production of metals trebled; in the twenty years between 1870 and 1890, the three hundred thousand textile workers doubled and the two hundred thousand metal workers increased to five hundred thousand.[5] Rostow has written:

> With 1861, and the freeing of the serfs, the process of creating the preconditions for take-off accelerated: both technically--in the build-up of social overhead capital and the bases for modern industry--and in terms of the ideas, attitudes, and aspirations of various groups of Russians. Then, by 1890 or so, the Russian take-off begins.[6]

Thus, as in England in the first half of the nineteenth century, in Russia in the latter half, "cadres of permanent, freely-hired workmen began to grow and even to predominate . . ., feeding the growing towns and comprising by 1890 nearly seven million persons."[7]

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[3]Peter I. Lyashchenko, History of the National Economy of Russia (New York: Macmillan Co., 1949), 403.

[4]Ibid., 418.

[5]Edmund Wilson, To the Finland Station (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1940).

[6]W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 65-66.

[7]Lyashchenko, 420

Early signs of industrial growth in the United States appeared from 1815 to 1840 and by 1850 the value of manufactured goods exceeded for the first time the value of agricultural products. Between 1850 and 1860 the value of manufactured goods nearly doubled and while in 1820 only six percent of the population lived in cities of three thousand or more, by 1860 the figure had risen to twenty percent. In 1860 New York passed the one million mark in population and even smaller cities like Newark, Lowell, and Lynn were transformed into almost totally industrial centers.[8] Similar to enclosure in England and the Reform in Russia, the American Civil War heralded the demise of a traditional agrarian dominated majority, constituting in a sense, the political climax of the transition from a static staple exporting economy to a rapidly industrializing one. High protective tariffs, the formation of a national banking system, the development of a transcontinental railroad, supported by government land grants and loans, and the fact that only a portion of war costs were paid for by taxation were all signs of the over-whelming trend toward industrialism.[9]

One major effect of the growing concentration of production in larger and larger industrial units was, again, the decline of a tradi-

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[8]Douglas C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States.

[9]"The armed conflict," Beard wrote, "was only one phase of the cataclysm, a transitory phase . . . At bottom the so called Civil War, or the War between the States, in the light of Roman analogy, was a social war, ending in the unquestioned establishment of a new power in the government, making vast changes in the arrangement of classes, in the accumulation and distribution of wealth, in the course of industrial development, and in the Constitution inherited from the Fathers." Charles A. and Mary Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York: Macmillan Co.), Vol. II, 53.

tional artisan class and the rise of a growing new working class of permanent wage earners. For, "inhering in the onward flow of stubborn facts which shook to pieces the planting aristocracy and assured the triumph of business enterprise was the inevitable factor forseen by southern statesmen--a growing army of wage workers haunted by poverty . . . ."[10] As early as 1856 George Fitzhugh

> had been troubled by the "White Slave Trade", by "slaves without masters", in the industrial North. He had contrasted this so called "free labor" unfavorably with Negro slavery. "The men without property, in a free society and dependent on those who have property," he wrote, "are theoretically in worse condition than slaves. Indeed, they have not a single right or a single liberty unless it be the right or liberty to die."[11]

Somewhat differently from the experience of England, Russia, and the United States, the initial growth of industry in Argentina did not occur in the wake of or at the expense of a declining traditional landed aristocracy. It was, in fact, the transformation of the pampa and the accelerated growth of agricultural production in the interior that inspired the early development of large scale export-oriented processing industries, including meat packing, brewing, flour milling, tanning, wineries, and a great variety of food processors. By 1890 the prevailing economic doctrine of Argentina was a kind of protectionism in reverse, or representing, at best, a malevolent neutrality toward the development of domestic

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[10] Ibid., 211.

[11] Cited in A. T. Mason & Richard Leach, In Quest of Freedom: American Political Thought and Practice (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1959), 351.

industry. The initial growth of an urbanized concentrated proletariat was moreover, not the result of a great internal migration, forced or otherwise, but was linked instead to massive waves of immigration. But in spite of these differences in Argentina's early industrial development (its external nature and its complementarity to the interests of a traditional agrarian elite) it nevertheless had the similar effect of erasing old artisan and domestic forms of production and giving rise to a growing new body of wage earners. And while the majority of this newly formed proletariat was foreign in composition it was, as in the case of England, Russia, and the United States, made up almost entirely of men who had previously known only a traditional agricultural way of life.[12]

In Argentina then, as in England, Russia, and the United States, the initial growth of industrialization led to the formation of a major new social element--industrial labor. Its mere existence as a homogeneous economic group, however, did not mean that in all four societies it constituted a decisive new political force. As David Truman has written:

> We are all familiar with declarations that begin with such phrases as "Business expects . . .," "Doctors protest . . .," "Labor demands . . .," "The veterans insist . . .," and the like. Even when such declarations are, or can be made meaningful, they involve hidden assumptions, assertions, or conclusions about the political life--and particularly the unity--of the interest groups designated by such labels. In effect such expressions take it for granted that the degree of cohesion in these groups is perfect. But such an

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[12]Germani, Política y Sociedad, 190.

> assumption is unrealistic, for the degree of cohesion is of critical importance in determining the effectiveness with which the group operates.[13]

The chief characteristic of labor as it appeared in the new industrial context in all four countries was its almost total lack of political consciousness, organization, and unity. In each country labor's early social conduct was largely undirected, reflecting a bitter opposition to any form of organized contact with the new and changing social system, and reflecting as well, an inability to influence through individual or collective action its future course. One sees in labor at this stage not a cohesive well-knit interest group with a high degree of political solidarity, but an aggregate of human beings bound only by their common economic function and close geographical proximity. As a member of the political system the newly recruited proletarian was, by virtue of his very makeup, the least equipped for participation. For, what the initial onrush of industrialization did to the individual laborer

> was to disrupt his society, tear him loose from a traditional family and communal mooring and throw him upon his own resources. The persistent individualization and isolation of the individual . . . made men not merely free, equal, and independent, but, by destroying the social texture into which their lives had been woven, made them economically helpless and morally adrift.[14]

Indeed, the rare unity of thought and action that did prevail during the incipient stages of the labor movement in each country was based

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[13]David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: A. Knopf, 1962), 111-112.

[14]Frank Tannenbaum, "Social Function of Trade Unionism," Political Science Quarterly, June, 1947, 163.

almost entirely on the workingman's desire to extricate himself somehow from the new industrial environment and to revert to a more traditional form of social organization. It was this objective that determined nearly every phase of his early social conduct and there is a certain uniformity in the political thought and conduct of labor as it made its relentless and inevitable drive toward unification in each country.

Initially one witnesses a half-conscious alliance on the part of labor with a countervailing ideology to the liberal creed of the ascending bourgeoisie. Utopian in nature and glorifying the traditional "natural" state of man, it is aimed primarily at a restoration of the pre-industrial status of the working man. But while labor early became the focal point for a variety of anti-industrial intellectual and philosophical movements, their source (and really the source of all inspiration for questioning the essence and direction of the new capitalist order) was, in each country, a disenchanted element of the middle class itself. In all cases, labor lacked, in the early stages of industrialization, the essential unity for effective political action.

In early nineteenth century England for example,

> there is a peculiar touch about the undirected excitements, the fumblings and blunders of a nascent class . . . . For some time the industrial working-class-to-be was uncertain whether its salvation did not lie after all in a return to rural existence. Its endeavors were focused on the stopping of the free use of machinery either by the enforcement of the apprenticeship clauses of the Statue of Artificers or by direct action as in Luddism. This backward-looking attitude lingered on as an undercurrent all through the Owenite movement till the end of the forties, when the Ten Hours Bill, the eclipse of Chartism, and the beginning of the Golden Age

> of capitalism obliterated the vision of the past. Up to that time the British class *in statu nascendi* was a riddle unto itself.[15]

Or as G. D. H. Cole has written: "The growth of a clearly articulated Labour Movement in England is by no means a single continuous process." Initially, there is

> a period which is chiefly one of revolt--a succession of uprisings, using different means and forms of organization, against the new industrial conditions . . . . During this phase the movement was largely looking backwards, and kicking in vain against the pricks of a new system to which it felt an instinctive hostility. Up until 1848 the wage earner had not wholly ceased to be a peasant at heart. He was not so much seeking to control the new capitalist order, or to build his position within it, as he was half-consciously seeking to destroy it, and to revert to the way of life from which he had been forcibly driven.[16]

There is a similar reactionary response on the part of labor in Russia. From 1861 to 1890 the rise of industrialism over the ruins of traditional institutions infused the proletariat in that country with a similar mood of confusion and despair. The Revolutionary Populism of the sixties, the great People's Will Movement of the seventies, and the "Legal Populism" of the eighties and nineties all reflect "the reactionary idea of the "artificiality" of Russian capitalism, of the possibility of avoiding capitalism in the development of Russia's national economy, and of the possibility of "turning the wheel of history" backward."[17] The works of N. G. Chernyshevsky,

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[15]Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 166-167.

[16]Cole, *British Working Class Movement*, 4.

[17]Lyaschenko, 427.

V. Voronstov, and Nikolayon,[18] with their populist idealization of the common man, violent reactions and utopian solutions to the "plague of proletarianism", and the political philosophies and platforms of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Bakunin, are all remarkably similar to the basic foundations of the Luddite, Owenite, and early Chartist movements in England. Dostoevsky's idealized program Pochvenichestva, for example, (from Pochva--soil), held that "Russians were losing their identity and hindering their spontaneous development because they had lost touch with their native soil. They had substituted abstract, harmful ideas . . . for their native heritage."[19] And Chernyshevsky emphasized in 1870 that

> the pattern toward which the West is now striving by so tortuous and long a road is still in existence among us Russians in the mighty national habits of our rural life. We see that grevious consequences were bred by the loss of communal land ownership in the West, and how difficult it is to restore that loss to the Western people. The example of the West must not be ignored here.[20]

In America, labor's reactionary response to the new industrial order was even more closely intertwined with a strong, middle-class philosophical movement of opposition; a movement that saw America from 1830 to 1860 as "a cold, unfeeling civilization bred by commercial interests and isolation, a negative moderation, an excess of prudence, and compromise. It offered employment to no one but the decorous and complacent. It was timid, imitative, tame: worse, it

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[18]The nom-de-plume of N. Danielson, the first Russian translator of Capital.

[19]Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1960), XIV.

[20]Quoted in Lyashchenko, 430.

was mean and cruel."[21] "The invasion of Nature by Trade with its money, its Credit, its Steam, its Railroad," Emerson wrote, "threatens to upset the balance of man and establish a new Universal Monarchy more tyrannical than Rome."[22] From 1830 to 1860 there flourished in America at least a dozen Owenite communities, many Fourierist phalansteries (including Brook Farm in its second phase and the North American Phalanx of New Jersey); the Oneida community of John H. Noyes, sectarian communities, Christian communities, communities aimed at pure communism of property and profit, and communities like the Marlboro Association of Ohio which grew out of "a lack of faith in those who had the funds and lack of funds in those who had the faith."[23]

> Through the records of the American labor movement [to 1880] stalk German refugees, English chartists, Italians of Garabaldi's red-shirt army, Irish Fenians, French communards, Russian nihilists, Bismarks exiles, and Marxian socialists bent on nothing less than world revolution, philosophers of every school mingling with those hard headed craftsmen who were indifferent to utopias and principally concerned with matters of fact--shorter hours and better wages.[24]

The political unification and organization of labor in mid-nineteenth century America was, for all practical purposes, non-existent.

> None of these political idealists understood the real mechanics of social change nor could they forsee the inevitable development of the system which they so much detested. They could only devise imaginary systems as antithetical to the real one as possible and attempt to reconstruct models of these, assuming that the model would be contagious.[25]

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[21] Van Wyck Brooks, The Flowering of New England: 1815-1865 (New York: E. P. Dutton Co., 1941), 181.

[22] Quoted in Mason and Leach, 287.

[23] Wilson, 101-102.

[24] Beard, Vol. II, 215.

[25] Wilson, 101.

"The pre-history of American labor before 1881, with all its valorous chapters of struggle, represented a fumbling for a stable and characteristic form."[26] Indeed, up until 1880 the only significant labor organization to appear was the National Labor Union and

> not really sure whether they accepted the wage system or not, some of its leaders tried to start producers' cooperatives and made vague commitments to socialism. Others were interested in greenback inflation and other non-labor causes. Its energies scattered, the N. L. U. ceased to exist after 1873.[27]

In short, to meet any sort of crisis labor was ill prepared.

> Only a few of the standard crafts were organized into unions, amalgamated on a national scale and able to lay down terms in the market place. More than that, there was among the unions so organized no common association to operate throughout the country, no federation of all organized labor to give solidarity to opinion and power to demands.[28]

In Argentina labor's discontent and reaction to industrialism were also initially reflected through a middle class intellectual movement of protest. In 1889 a company of lawyers, minor politicians, and intellectuals formed, behind Leandro Além, La Unión Cívica de la Juventud, "an organization which pleaded eloquently for honest government, equitable taxation, protection of civil rights, protection for fruitful enterprise, and an end to the speculative orgies from which political parasites enriched themselves."[29] Labor's own

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[26]Max Lerner, America as a Civilization (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), Vol. I, 318.

[27]Charles Sellers and Henry May, A Synopsis of American History (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), 230.

[28]Beard, Vol. II, 213.

[29]Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (New York: A. Knopf, 1964), 659.

political life in Argentina however was even more retarded than it was in England, Russia, and the United States. The earliest semblance of a unified labor movement appears in 1890 in the form of la Federación Obrera Argentina. Organized by the Comité Internacional Obrero, the FOA was an amorphous collection of anarchists, socialists, and Marxists. Although at the time of its second annual congress in 1892 it counted a membership of nearly ten thousand, the organization never really matured due to lack of working class support and internal disunity.[30]

The greatest reason for the retarded nature of Argentine labor's early political development lies unquestionably in the fact that labor in Argentina was not only deprived of a legal right to vote, but in not speaking the Spanish language was deprived of the most basic media of communication and social participation. The urban proletarian's immigrant status, therefore, strongly reinforced his already displaced socio-economic position. His revulsion to the new industrial based social system was intensified, moreover, by his desire to maintain allegiance to the national culture and government from which he came. His educational deprivation, his complete rejection of the opportunity or idea of becoming an Argentine citizen, and his urban concentration by native language greatly inhibited the growth of a national unified labor organization. The great difference in the early Argentine proletariat is that his socialization proceeded more along his own native-cultural lines than those of Argentina.[31]

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[30]Victor Alba, Historia del movimento obrero en América Latina (Mexico D. F.: Libreros Mexicanus Unidos, 1964), 341.

[31]Germani, 190.

One witnesses then, in the early political life of labor in each country a definable stage of protest and reaction; a period in which the often violent response by labor to the new industrial order, its attraction to anarchist, populist, and utopian sentiments, and the prevalence in its ranks of an overall mood of helplessness dramatize its discontent with the rise of industrialism and the passing of traditional communal society. It is a stage, above all, in which the newly formed proletariat lacks the essential unity of organization and purpose, the political identity and solidarity, that characterizes a veritable interest group. Conceptually, it lacks the bare requisites for effectively converting its collective wants into political demands. For, "wants do not appear on the political scene as demands in some mysterious or inexplicable way. Members of the system must do the converting. They must give voice to a want in such a way as to indicate that they feel it ought to be handled through the formulation of binding decisions."[32] The early proletariat lacked the means whereby a successful conversion of his wants to demands could take place. For,

> in all but the simplest political systems, intra-system structural differentiation is such that there are a number of kinds of roles functionally distinct from that of "general member" of the system. Such components of a political structure as parties, interest groups, legislators, . . . represent elements of political structures that have many and varied consequences for the operation of a system. Among them, however, the expression of wants as political demands plays an unmistakable part.[33]

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[32] Easton, Systems Analysis, 85.

[33] Ibid., 86.

From a general overview of the political system in each country, however, one can see that it was not only a structural deficiency on the part of labor that prevented the effective voicing of its political demands, but that there were strong inhibiting forces inherent in the political system itself.

It has been noted that with the rise of industrialization the traditional centers of authority in each country were drastically altered by the accession of a new industrial bourgeois element. In the case of England and the United States the traditional agrarian plantocracy was virtually displaced and, in Russia and Argentina, forced into alliance with the emerging industrial sector.[34] In all cases, the rise of this new governing bourgeois element brought with it imposing limitations on the political life of labor. In England, the Whigs feared popular movements as much as the Tories and the Benthamite radicals had little time for organizations such as trade-unions. "The hour of danger to property had passed but the fear of Jacobinism was not yet dead."[35] The antagonism of the upper-classes toward working-class movements was obvious for they bitterly opposed

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[34] In fact, in all four countries traditional agrarian interests were not totally displaced in the classical marxian sense. As Cairncross has written: "There is no reason to suppose that agriculture has ever completely fulfilled its required role in advance of the spurt of growth that Rostow calls take-off or that social overhead capital has to reach some definite stage before take-off. On the contrary, the experience of most countries has been that whether agricultural expansion started earlier or not, it continued into the period of industrialization and constituted a large portion of total growth." A. K. Cairncross, "Essays in Bibliography and Criticism: 'The Stages of Economic Growth'," Economic History Review, April, 1961.

[35] Derry, 127.

anything which savoured of conspiracy in restraint of trade."[36] To an even greater degree,

> the Russian proletariat learned its first steps in the political circumstances created by a despotic state. Strikes forbidden by law, underground circles, illegal proclamations, street demonstrations, encounters with the police and with troops--such was the school created by the combination of a swiftly developing capitalism with an absolutism slowly surrendering its positions.[37]

In the United States, the only country in which labor had the right to vote, the democratic process itself for a long period of time delayed labor's political participation.

> Democracies, under conditions of structural differentiation such as we find in industrialized societies, present a type of system that falls somewhere between the least inhibited expression of demands typical of small non-literate systems and the severely restricted range in dictatorial systems. Although nominally each person may be able to cry out politically when the shoe pinches, in fact only certain kinds of persons or groups are likely to do so. Even where the rules impose few formal restrictions upon conversion, whether it be a small intimate or a mass democracy, the political structure is likely to create differential opportunities. Some roles will provide greater power over the conversion process than others. Furthermore, it is utopian to believe that each member in a democracy is interested enough in politics, sufficiently well-informed, and aware of what is possible to desire to express his wants as political demands or to feel able to do so. The number of persons able to voice demands is undoubtedly drastically lower than those entitled to do so.[38]

In Argentina as well

> there was an ambivalence with respect to the effective extension of political rights, an ambivalence which was applied as much to the immigrant as it was to the native Argentine.

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[36] Ibid.

[37] Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1932), 33.

[38] Easton, Systems Analysis, 93-94.

> With respect to the former, he found himself confronted with a paradox: a country in which sixty to eighty per cent of its urban population lacked the right to vote and were governed by a minority of twenty to forty per cent.[39]

In short, from Czarist Russia to democratic United States

> the proletarian had no training and, even when he came to organize trade unions and to oppose the employer effectively, no tradition of the kind of responsibility required of a governing class. He knew little about the history of society, little about the rest of the world; and he had little opportunity to learn. The men who employed him had an interest in keeping him ignorant. By virtue of his very position, he was deprived of the things that would enable him to rise to a higher status.[40]

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[39] Germani, Política y Sociedad, 204.

[40] Wilson, 320.

CHAPTER TWO

The year 1850 marks the arrival in England of the "Golden Age" of capitalism, a period in which industrialism became the permanent and undisputed basis for the country's social order. The widespread dislocation brought by the initial onrush of industrialization and the juxtaposition of two conflicting themes of social values--Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft--gradually subsided as labor began to internalize the norms of the new productive organization and social system: equity, trust, confidence in money and credit arrangements, mutuality of contractual obligations, etc. As it became acclimated to the new industrial order, labor's political life also became more unified and positive in direction.

> Up to 1848 the story of the British workers had been one of successive waves of revolt against the rising capitalist order. Against the developing strength of the new employing class one wave after another had been shattered in vain. The Luddites had broken the hated new machines, only to be broken in their turn. The working class radicals had threatened revolution as the alternative to Manhood Suffrage. The great Trades Union, under Owen's millennial guidance, had vainly tried to strike its way to the Co-operative Commonwealth. And finally the Chartists, reviving the old cry of Manhood Suffrage had found themselves beaten off the field of propaganda . . . and reduced to an impotent sect out of tune with the new spirit of the times. Revolt had failed.[1]

From an initial stage of protest, revolt, and random political activity, labor in England entered a period of consolidation. The effects of its growing solidarity were felt economically: first

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[1]Cole, British Working Class Movement, 139.

through the Co-operative movement, then the Friendly Societies, and finally through the growth of trade-unionism. As Galenson has written:

> That England was the classic land of trade-unionism and her labor movement the model wherever workers began to organize, lay in early industrial primacy and the thoroughness with which the Industrial Revolution transformed the English economy. This is not to say that there were no trade-unions prior to industrialism proper. The cigar makers, the painters, the tailors . . . were often organized in societies still within the grip of medievalism; but the rise of trade-unionism as the major economic institution of our time had to wait upon the emergence of the factory system and the creation of an urban industrial working class.[2]

The gradual amalgamation of labor's interests in the economic sphere and their eventual expression through trade-unionism led inevitably to a growth of labor's political influence. The ever-increasing geographical concentration of the workers, together with the overall rise in literacy, communications, and organizational techniques produced a recognition on the part of labor of more effective means for converting its generalized wants into political demands.[3] But while British labor entered a decisively new and more politically potent stage of development after 1850, these same factors produced a similar growth in the solidarity of other definable interest groups throughout the society, the most important of which--business--asserted itself from a position of much greater power and respectability than did labor. The increasing solidarity of the

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[2] Galenson (ed.), Comparative Labor Movements, X.

[3] "It is evident," Hoxie wrote, ". . . that workers similarly situated economically and socially, closely associated and not too divergent in temperament and training, will tend to develop a common interpretation of the social situation and a common solution to the problem of living." Robert Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United States, 58.

working class was, in other words, an inferior manifestation of the overall political development taking place in British society at the time. Thus, though labor gained the right to vote in 1867, its political leadership for two decades tended to come more from sympathetic elements of the Liberal party than from its own ranks. As Wilson has written:

> The bourgeoisie, before they had won their ascendancy, had already possessed property and culture, their right to which they had only to vindicate; but certainly the English proletariat had to fight hard to get any of either, and when by exception they succeeded in doing so, it brought with it the middle-class point of view.[4]

During the 1870's and early 1880's the English proletariat was little more than an auxiliary of the left wing of the Liberal party. Throughout the "Lib-lab" era "working class candidates desired to run as Liberals, and, if elected, to sit as members of the Liberal party. For, many Liberals, including John Stuart Mill, had expressed the desire to see some workingmen in Parliament to put forth the working class point of view . . ."[5] Hence, the principal aim of organizations like the Labour Representation League was "not so much the return of workingmen to Parliament as the influencing of Liberals to support working-class claims for fear of the new working-class vote."[6] Even as late as 1888 "the aim of the Labour Electoral Association was not to create a Labour Party, but to receive the adoption of its candidates by local Liberal and Radical Associations so that they not only sat, but stood, as Liberals."[7] At times

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[4]Wilson, Finland Station, 101.

[5]Cole, 211.

[6]Ibid., 211.

[7]Ibid., 231.

Conservatives attempted and often succeeded in attracting the growing political sentiment of labor.[8] After 1890, however, this indirect form of political expression, for the most part via the Liberal party, underwent a decisive change. With the rise of a 'new model' unionism, there came a growing sentiment for more independent political action. "In these circumstances the leaders of the 'new' unions aimed above all at the creation of a powerful working-class political party, ready to pursue an independent policy based on Socialist ideas. Out of the Socialist propaganda of the 80's came the New Unions; and out of the New Unions, came a new political movement."[9]

By the turn of the century the steady advance of industrialization in Russia had given to historians in that country "a sufficient basis for abandoning the legend of Russian backwardness and retarded growth."[10] Indeed, by 1900 large-scale enterprises had already concentrated one half of the country's workingmen where twenty years earlier they had accounted for only one third.

> During the last decade of the nineteenth century, industrial capital, displacing small-scale production, routine technology, and backward social relationships, was rapidly advancing Russian industry. To be sure by volume of production in specific industries Russian industry still lagged far behind the advanced nations of the period. In the course of

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[8] Pro-labor measures under Conservative rule included: the Trade Union Act of 1871; the Employer's Workmen Act of 1875; the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875; and the Trade Union Amendment Act of 1876. G. D. H. Cole, British Working Class Movement, Chapter VI.

[9] Ibid., 247.

[10] Trotsky, Russian Revolution, 9.

one decade, however, it had nonetheless progressed substantially, reaching a degree of industrial concentration much higher than most advanced capitalist countries. With respect to its tempo of development during these years, Russian industry outstripped nearly all countries. The smelting of pig-iron during this ten year period 1890-1900, for example, increased in England 18 per cent, in Germany by 72, in the United States by 50, and in Russia by 190, as a result of which Russia became the sixth ranking power in 1890, fifth in 1895, and fourth in 1900. The production of iron during this period increased in England by eight per cent, in Germany by 78, in the United States by 63, and in Russia by 116. The coal industry of Great Britain expanded by twenty-two per cent, that of Germany by 52, of the United States by 61, and that of Russia by 131. Finally, in number of spindles operated in the cotton industry, England made a gain of 3.8 per cent in the course of the same decade, the United States, 25.6, the European continent, 33, and Russia 76.[11]

By 1900 the national economy of Russia

was definitely brought into the world system of capitalist economy as a major national-capitalist entity with vast natural possibilities for development and with capitalist institutions penetrating deeply into the nation's economy. And whereas at the beginning of this period there were still voices which considered it possible to "turn the wheel of history" away from capitalism, by the end of the nineteenth century it was apparent to even the most convinced champions of precapitalist Russia that a retreat from capitalism with all its historically positive and negative elements was impossible. Russia had been decisively transformed into a capitalist country with its own peculiar "national system" of capitalism.[12]

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[11] Lyashchenko, National Economy of Russia, 563. Trotsky writes: "At the same time that peasant land cultivation as a whole remained, right up to the revolution, at the level of the seventeenth century, Russian industry in its technique and capitalist structure stood at the level of the advanced countries, and in certain respects even outstripped them. Small enterprises, involving less than 100 workers, employed in the United States in 1914, 35 per cent of the total of industrial workers, but in Russia only 17.8 per cent. The two countries had an approximately identical relative quantity of enterprises involving 100 to 1000 workers. But the giant enterprises, above 1000 workers each, employed in the United States 17.8 per cent of the workers and in Russia 41.4 per cent!" Trotsky, 10.

[12] Lyashchenko, 564.

Like the working class in England, Russian labor was also compelled to view itself as a permanent and definable aggregate within the industrial social context. By 1900 "one half of the Russian industrial workers had already become 'hereditary proletarians'; whose fathers before them were also employed at the factories."[13] In the metal processing industries, for example, and the Petersburg and Moscow regions as a whole, the percentage of permanent workers (who did not return to the village) had increased to 89 and 97 respectively.[14] From an initial period of reactionary protest and open hostility to the factory system, Russian labor entered a stage of internal unification and organization. Rather than attempting to forestall the onrush of a "new" industrial capitalist order, labor gradually accepted that order as the inevitable if not already existing reality.

The evolution of the Russian proletariat to a point of concerted and unified political action was, for a variety of reasons, exceedingly more rapid in Russia than it was in England and elsewhere. There was under Czarist rule of the nineteenth and early twentieth century no existing channel of political expression open to a newly emergent interest group. A coalition or alliance of labor with some progressive or liberal appendage of an already established political party was impossible since all forms of political bargaining were strictly controlled. Indeed, the separation of economic power from political power was most acutely felt by the emerging industrial

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[13] Ibid., 545.

[14] Ibid., 545.

class itself.[15] There was, moreover, an even greater suppression of labor's own economic organization and collective activity, and, by the state outlawing the growth of trade-unionism the more extreme political alternatives voiced by the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party became an increasingly more plausible course for labor to follow. As Isaac Deutscher has written:

> In suppressing trade unionism, tsardom unwittingly put a premium upon revolutionary political organization. Only the most politically minded workers, those prepared to pay for their conviction with prison and exile, could be willing to join trade unions in these circumstances. But those who were already so politically minded were, naturally enough, more attracted by political organizations. The broader and more inert mass of workers, who were inclined to shun politics but would have readily joined trade unions, were not only prevented from forming unions, but were also gradually accustomed to look for leadership to the clandestine political parties.[16]

Hence by 1906 there had evolved in Russia an explicitly labor-oriented political philosophy and movement which came to dominate even the most basic and spontaneous economic expressions of the Russian proletariat, including the Councils of Workers' Delegates--the Soviets.[17]

America witnessed its own "Gilded Age" of industrial expansion during the last third of the nineteenth century. From the end of the Civil War until 1900, the number of cities of 8,000 or more population increased from 141 to 547 and their total population from five million

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[15] Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution, 31-32.

[16] Isaac Deutscher, Soviet Trade Unions (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 1.

[17] Ibid., 8.

to over twenty-five million.[18] The percentage of people living in such cities increased from sixteen to thirty-two. By the end of the century the United States produced in value of manufactured goods twice as much as all Europe together.[19] Industrialism had become the unquestioned basis of the country's social order. And

> while factory production was increasing by leaps and bounds and railroad entrepreneurs extending their lines at the average rate of 4,500 miles a year, labor, the giant on whose strength and skill all this was based, was beginning to stir. For it was quickly seen that the inevitable growth of big business and the consolidation of wealth in modern capitalist society could only be balanced by a consolidation of labor.[20]

American labor passed then from its initial stage of ill-guided reaction to one characterized more by positive action within the industrial context. The earliest organized attempt to articulate labor's economic interests on a unified and major scale was made by the Knights of Labor.[21]

In contrast to Sylvis' National Labor Union, the underlying philosophy of the Knights of Labor was one of accepting the new economic-industrial order and attempting to build labor's position

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[18] H. A. Faulkner, American Political and Social History (New York: Crofts and Co., 1938), 568.

[19] Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Modern America.

[20] Faulkner, 406.

[21] The Noble Order of the Knights of Labor was originally founded in 1869 but did not emerge as an active organization until the early 1880's. See Philip Taft, Organized Labor in American History (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), Chapter 7.

within it, both by collective bargaining and advancing measures of reform. This fundamental change in attitude toward industrial life marks the Knights of Labor's essential break with the past. Its broad range of interests included the eight hour day, taxes on incomes and inheritance, workingmen's compensation, postal savings banks, appropriation of the unearned increment on land, and government ownership of public utilities. The failure of the Knights of Labor to survive was rooted in three basic factors which in various combinations impeded the early economic and political drive of labor not only in America, but also in England, Russia, and Argentina. Public opposition, which could very nearly be taken as synonymous with business opposition at this point, was perhaps the greatest obstruction to labor's early organized efforts.

> It was not only the corporate empires and their corporate managers that the unions had to meet but also a hostile Congress and state Legislatures, an often hostile set of Federal and local courts, a network of "citizens' committees", a number of company policies, hired thugs, bravados, and "deputy sheriffs". They had against them the overwhelming weight of the press, the almost solid phalanx of the academies and even of the churches. Most of all they had the hostility of farmers and lower-middle-class Americans, fearful of labor's economic power and its strike weapon.[22]

Second, the lack of effective leadership within labor's own ranks also forestalled its emergence as a more potent political interest group. And finally, the lack of unity and low degree of cohesiveness within the labor force itself diminished considerably labor's political bargaining strength. In addition, during the forty year period between 1880 and 1920, there was at work in America a uniquely

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[22]Lerner, 322.

national force--massive immigration--that weakened the potential organizing strength of labor. The American Federation of Labor, the only prominent labor organization of the period, limited itself to organization along narrow craft lines and as late as 1914 could only count among its members ten per cent of the country's total labor force.[23] All of these factors had an obvious effect on the political life of labor.

Similar to the Lib-Lab phenomenon in England, the progressive wings of both major parties in America became a kind of conveyor belt for labor's early political interests and demands. From the coronation of industry in the latter part of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth, labor's case against the Realpolitik of the industrial barons was presented by sympathetic leaders of the Progressive movement. Even into the 1920's "non-labor people continued to fight labor's battles. 'It is significant,' said Abraham Epstein, the champion of social insurance, 'that most of the labor legislation already on the statute books is largely the result of individual efforts of organizations made up of but few union card men and with little or no financial support from the labor movement.'"[24] Significant though the gains were during this period (a Department of Labor was established in 1913, the Clayton Act was passed in 1914 exempting labor from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and in 1916 an eight-hour law

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[23]Taft, 306.

[24]A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), 114.

was passed for interstate railroad employees) by 1922 American labor would begin to move toward a more independent role in the political arena.

> One symptom was the fact that for the first time in its history the A. F. of L. lost rather than gained members during a period of prosperity. Nor could it break through its limits of membership (somewhere around three and a half million) without organizing whole new industries, skilled and unskilled alike, which meant breaking away from the craft-union principle and experimenting with industrial unionism. The A. F. of L. did include some industrial unions . . . but the main issue was that the A. F. of L. leadership was itself part of the craft unions and thus conditioned by its whole life history to resist organization on an industrial basis. Moreover, with the Gompers concentration on trade-union action as against broader political action, there was no clear way for the unions to act in the national political arena to counteract the strategy of corporate power and also to organize a legislative attack upon national economic insecurity.[25]

In contrast to the indigenous forces at work in England, Russia, and the United States, the chief stimulus for sustained industrial development in Argentina was the war-time blockages of international trade. The country's initial industrial expansion of the 1880's and 1890's was rooted almost totally in the processing of primary products for export. From 1914 to 1942, however, the loss of foreign markets gave a great impetus to the rapid development of domestic manufacturing geared to the production of import substitutes. "The result," in Rostow's words, "was not a once over change in Argentina's production functions or in the volume of investment, but a higher proportion of potential innovations accepted in a more or less regular flow, and a higher rate of investment."[26] By 1916 the growing weight of

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[25]Lerner, 323.

[26]Rostow, 37-38.

industrialism in Argentina had become a permanent feature of its national economy. And the second generation labor force, in accepting that irrevocable fact, entered a new stage of political development.

The assumption by Argentine labor of a major political role was, as in England, Russia, and the United States, initially discouraged by certain inevitable forces of opposition. From within, the Federación Obrera Regional Argentina (FORA) and the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), the two principal agents of labor's collective economic interests, were in opposition as to the most effective course of political action. In the ensuing "economism versus politicism" controversy, the FORA maintained strict allegiance to a philosophy of non-involvement in any form of political activity and the UGT adopted early a policy of "rewarding friends and punishing enemies" similar to that of Gompers and the early A. F. of L.[27] In addition, there was the familiar weight of public opposition and strong private interests that competed against labor's political unification.[28]

After labor acquired the right to vote under the Universal Suffrage Act of 1912, its political influence remained marginal for nearly three decades. Its earliest political demands were transmitted via the most receptive existing political body, the Radical Party.[29]

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[27] Alba, Historia del Movimento, 353.

[28] Germani, Política y Sociedad, 243-244; Up to 1930 only 30 per cent of the Argentine population voted, Germani, 227.

[29] As Germani has written: "In place of establishing as sufficiently strong independent political voice, labor relied on the only receptive political expression of the middle class--the Radical Party." This implied "a considerable retreat with respect to the formation of an adequate political organization for labor." Germani, 227.

By 1930, however, it had become clear that "the Radical Party was incapable of expressing the growing political claims of the Argentine proletariat."[30] As a prelude to labor's growing solidarity the more politically conscious Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT) rose over the FORA and the UGT to become the leading labor organization in the country.[31] By 1940, labor constituted in Argentina a veritable political force which, when compared to relative competing interest groups and centers of authority, commanded a position similar to that which labor did in England in 1890, in Russia in 1906, and in the United States in 1922.

In all four countries then, labor passed from an initial stage of protest and internal anarchy to a stage of unification and more effective political action. In England, America, and Argentina, and to a lesser degree in Russia, the early part of this transition was marked by an alliance of labor with some pre-existing political party or more articulate interest group.[32] In effect, this indirect form of political expression pursued by labor underscored its temporarily inferior status as an emergent interest group. For again, in all cases the political development of the labor movement was one inferior manifestation of the overall political development taking place in the society as a whole. As one political analyst has

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[30] Ibid., 228.

[31] Alba, 354.

[32] Although it was publically unstated and lacked formal bonds of organization, an alliance between the Russian proletariat and civil servants, army officers, lawyers, and other professional people in the society did exist. See Brinton, Anatomy, 100.

observed:

> In the succeeding stages of a country's political evolution . . . the ability to use techniques other than those of violence becomes more important in determining the role a group will play in politics. As voting strength becomes substituted for fighting capabilities in measuring a group's bargaining power, numbers assume a new significance. The importance of sheer numbers, however, will be modified by other factors.[33]

The extent to which suffrage is limited, the relative presence or absence of the appropriate skills among the group's leadership, the degree of unity and cohesiveness displayed within the group itself, and the extent to which the group's claims are consistent with the felt imperatives of national interest all help to determine a group's relative political importance.[34]

In each of these four societies all of these forces limited, in varying degrees, the realization by labor of its full political potential. In terms of the general theoretical framework adopted here, one sees that labor, through a variety of structural mechanisms, gradually acquired the capacity to convert its generalized wants into coherent political demands. This marks its essential break with the past. In Easton's words:

> Part of the increase in the conversion of wants in a society arises from the effect on the individual members themselves of their own emerging interest and involvement in political

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[33]Martin Needler, Latin American Politics in Perspective (Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1963), 46-47.

[34]Ibid., 47.

> life. They are now more prone to have opinions about what the government ought to do and to express their opinions as demands.[35]

The emergence of labor as a significant and major source of political demands was for a time in all four societies delayed by a variety of factors.

> Demands do not flow randomly through a system. They represent vector forces with a directionality that derives from the fact that the articulators of demands must orient themselves toward the subsystem that produces authoritative decisions. If they did not do so, the demands would have little chance of being fulfilled. Political desires would be quite ineffectual unless in fact they did find their way ultimately to the authorities. If the demands were not so oriented to the authorities, an air of unreality would surround them. Only if the authorities are somehow aware of them, can the demands be met."[36]

Moreover,

> because of the way in which the political structure of a system has emerged historically, it may prove difficult for the volume of demands with which the system has to deal to move along in a clear and orderly fashion to the points of consideration, decision, and action. The major problems here would be a matter of the number of channels and their carrying capacities, whether there are enough channels along which the demands may move or whether each of the existing ones is capable of handling a large enough load so as to process the total volume entering the system. In transitional societies . . . few effective alternative channels may be available.

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[35] Easton, Systems Analysis, 111; "The rise of demands is a phenomenon clearly associated with the growth of democracy and popular involvement. But it is equally an outcome of the increase in the size of populations in political systems and of the growth in technology and complexity of life through industrialization and its accompanying social and economic interdependence." Easton, 123.

[36] Ibid., 117-118.

> Mass media covering the society as a whole may be non-existent; parties, interest groups, or administrative agencies, which offer competing channels for the flow of demands, may be blocked, restricted or what amounts to the same thing, grossly distorted.[37]

In essence, this summarizes the early phase of labor's entry into the political arena in each country. Its eventual arrival to a point of more independent and thereby more efficient political conduct (i.e. through the satisfying of functional roles of leadership, the formation of an independent political party, a lobbying power, etc.) may be viewed on a larger plane as a logical outcome of the inevitable drive of the political system as a whole to move toward a point of more efficient political interaction. Indeed, the increased solidarity and political specialization displayed by labor, like that of any other major interest group, can be viewed as one universal response whereby a political system is able to persist and hold together in face of dynamic social change.[38] The eventual emergence of industrial labor as a major political protagonist, however, held for these four societies particularly dramatic consequences. Labor

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[37] Ibid., 120-121; "The reasons for a failure to satisfy demands may be quite varied. The resources may not be equal to the task, as is the case in many developing nations of today. But even in those systems in which the means may be available, the authorities may be quite unresponsive to the demands of various politically potent segments of the population. This can be as true of a democracy as of a totalitarian regime. The social origins, ideological perspectives, accessibility to pressure from different social groups in the system and the perceptiveness of the authorities all help to determine the groups to which the authorities will be more likely to make concessions or to whose wishes they will listen more attentively and grant greater consideration." Easton, 57.

[38] See Easton, Chapter 8, especially pages 123-126.

became a source not only of a numerically large number of demands, but also, substantively, of exceedingly more imposing ones.

> Every political system must have some finite capacity with respect to the number of demands it can accept for processing into decisions or consider as a possible basis of choice. When a system is confronted with a situation in which the input of information conveying demands becomes too great for the responsible members of the system to process for possible conversion to decisions, the system cannot help but operate under the danger of collapse. But on the other hand, volume is not the sole characteristic of demands that may induce stress. The kind of demands, as determined by their content, would also have an important bearing upon the capacity of a system to provide for their processing. Not all demands are substantively the same. Some lead to far greater contention among the members of the system or are far more complex in terms of the conditions that their fulfillment would create.[39]

In short,

> Regardless of the type of system demands have the capacity to impose strains on a system by driving its essential variables toward their critical limits. If the flow of demands is so heavy as to require excessive time for processing, or if substantively the demands are of such a kind as to lead to a similar condition . . . this will tend to undermine the capacity of a system to produce its characteristic outputs, authoritative decisions.[40]

The inevitable emergence of labor as a major political contestant introduced in their four nations then a period of intense conflict and social cleavage. In England the period from roughly 1890 to 1914 was one in which labor's political struggle for a share of the society's "limited supply of values" became the chief issue in the country's national political life. In Cole's words it signified

> an age of new tidings. For, out of the deceptive quiet of the first years of the new century we see growing the great unrest. We see trade union membership more than doubled in a few years; strikes unprecedented in number and animated by

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[39] Ibid., 58.

[40] Ibid., 57.

> an essentially new spirit; a new assertion by the bottom dog of his claim to be considered as good as other men, and of no less account--the outward signs of a great inward change in the make-up of Society.[41]

After the turn of the century,

> The Labor Movement was practically united in demanding State action for the protection of working class conditions and for the uplifting of the bottom dogs. It pressed steadily for the universal application of the legal minimum wage, for the State regulation of hours and conditions of labor through Mines, Factories, and Shop Acts, for a satisfactory system of workmen's compensation, and for an improvement and extension of public education . . . . But apart from plans for nationalization, which were not regarded as immediately practical the Labor Party's primary measure was the Right to Work Bill, the basic principle of which was the duty of the State to find either satisfactory work or, in default of work, adequate maintenance for all its citizens.[42]

In Russia, labor's coming of age politically was marked by an even more militant and indeed, revolutionary fervor.

> The concentration of the workers in colossal enterprises, the intense character of governmental persecution, and finally the impulsiveness of a young and fresh proletariat, brought it about that the political strike, so rare in Western Europe, became in Russia the fundamental method of struggle. The figures of strikes from the beginning of the present century are a most impressive index of the political history of Russia. We cannot refrain from introducing a table of political strikes in Russia for the period 1903-1917.

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[41] Cole, 284.

[42] Ibid., 307; A victorious Labor Party embarking upon bold measures, Laski reasoned, "would create the atmosphere in which revolutionary experiment becomes possible, or indeed, inevitable; and no one who studies the prelude to the English Civil War, or the days before the outbreak of 1848, is entitled to deny the possibility that this may occur. Or the possibilities which confront us, granted the contradiction between the economic and the political aspects of capitalist democracy, this seems the path we shall most likely be driven to tread." H. J. Laski, Democracy in Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1935), 240.

> We have before us a curve--the only one of its kind--of the political temperature of a nation carrying in its womb a great revolution. The strike movement attains such dimensions as it never knew before anywhere in the world. With the weakness of the petty bourgeoisie, the scatteredness and political blindness of the peasant movement, the revolutionary strike of the workers becomes the battering ram which the awakening nation directs against the walls of absolutism.
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> The industrial boom beginning in 1910 lifted the workers to their feet, and gave a new impulse to their energy. The strike figures for 1912-1914 almost repeat those of 1905-1907, but in the opposite order: not from above downwards, but from below up. There are more workers now . . . a new revolutionary offensive begins. The first half year of 1914 clearly approaches in the number of political strikes the culminating point of 1905. But war breaks out and sharply interrupts the process.[43]

In the United States the growing political involvement of labor did not find ultimate expression through a national independent labor party. To be most effectively received its political demands were initially directed toward more local subsystems of authority. As Philip Taft has pointed out:

> The behavior of workers and their organizations at the grass roots in their communities is a much better key to understanding American labor politics than the forensic efforts of Gompers and his close coworkers or of their ideological opponents. It cannot be over-stressed that the decisions of the AFL on the political policies the workers of the United States should follow were not significant in shaping the decisions of the labor organizations in their own 'backyards'. Proponents of an independent labor party have customarily regarded the failure of American workers to embark upon such an enterprise as a sign of the social backwardness of the leadership. But American organized labor has been very active in politics since it was organized. It has been forced by necessity to direct its efforts to gaining relief from many evils to the State legislature. The federations of labor concentrated their political efforts in the state capitols, where the remedies for existing evils were available. Legislators were more responsive to pressures from their local and state sources than to the directives of their own party. The criticism and contempt shown by ideologists for

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[43] Trotsky, 33, 35.

> for this process stem largely from a lack of appreciation of the manner in which legislative bodies operate in the United States.[44]

The unique political character of the maturing American labor movement was thus conditioned to a great degree by the pervasive federalist environment in which it grew. The increasing homogeneity of labor's political interests however, were soon manifested on a national scale.

The growing belief of the necessity for a political voice more national in scope first became evident in 1922. Prior to the mid-term federal elections of that year a Conference for Progressive Political Action was called. The C.P.P.A. soon began to serve as a kind of national political clearing house for local labor organizations and other elements sympathetic to their cause. In 1924 the Conference called a national convention and nominated Robert LaFollett for president and Burton Wheeler for vice president. With the formal support and endorsement of the AFL, the LaFollett candidacy polled nearly five million votes or sixteen and one half per cent of the total.[45] Less than a decade later, with the advent of depression, the political dialogue in America had also become polarized over the labor issue. "It is our duty," declared a group of leading labor leaders to President Hoover in 1932, "to give the constitutional government of the United States full warning. There is a growing

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[44]Taft, 237-238.

[45]Leland D. Baldwin, Recent American History (Ringe, N. H.: Richard Smith Co., 1954), 88.

demand that the entire business and social structure be changed because of the general dissatisfaction with the present system."[46]

In Argentina the rapid rise of the CGT in the late 1930's and early 1940's attested to the growing solidarity of the nation's industrial workers. Membership in the CGT grew from 262,000 in 1936 to nearly a half a million in 1940.[47] As a single dramatic date for labor's emergence as a potent political force one could cite the week of October 9-17, 1945, when the massive general strike engineered by Cipriano Reyes ended Juan Perón's brief exile from power.[48] By 1946 a newly formed Argentine Labor Party emerged as the vehicle of the CGT and thereby of ninety-five per cent of all organized labor in the country. Labor's growing political strength finally became apparent in the 1946 election of Perón to the presidency. The advent of Peron, then, in one sense signaled the climax of labor's drive for political power, but in a larger sense it marked its real beginning. Indeed, the real and lasting significance of the Perón years was not that labor made certain material gains but that it was transformed into a permanent institutionalized political member of the society. It was during this era that the development of bonds of organization, roles of leadership, and well defined administrative structures within the nation's labor movement was accelerated. And

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[46]Schlesinger, 185.

[47]Alba, 354.

[48]Actually Perón was only vice-president at the time. James Scobie, Argentina (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 245.

irrespective of the personal motives of the dictator, once set in motion, this development became irreversible.[49] As the Radical Frigerio has written:

> Peronism was a political and social phenomenon of extraordinary importance and significance. Not even its most embittered enemies deny that fact. Its fundamental contribution to the history of the Argentine republic was the elevation of the workers to a higher plane of social consciousness; infusing the national labor movement with a sense of national awareness; initiating trade unionism on a nationally organized scale, and incorporating the working man into the national body politic and economy. This, in essence, was the dynamism of Peronism and is what makes it an irrevocable feature of the country's history.[50]

It is not surprising then, that since the fall of Peron the political demands of labor have not diminished and have, in fact, even increased in velocity. The essence of peronism the movement was far more significant than the personal predilections of the man from whom it derives its name.

In summary, one witnesses an eventual mobilization and unmitigating drive on the part of labor in each country to an inevitable point of concerted political action; a sustained political movement which, by virtue of the content and velocity of its demands moved the political system in each country to a critical point of imbalance. In England from 1890 to 1914, in Russia from 1905 to 1914, in the United States from 1922 into the late 1930's, and in Argentina from

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[49]Germani has written that while Peron did extend certain material advantages to the working class the more important fact is that "he gave this emergent group the experience (whether fictitious or real) of autonomous and independent political expression." Germani, 244.

[50]See Prologue in Marcos Merchensky, Las Corrientes Ideologicas en La Historia Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorios, 1961).

1945 to the present day the progressive rise in the political claims advanced by labor polarized the political field and marked it as the chief protagonist in a momentous struggle.[51]

In non-particular terms labor's political offensive embodied three general objectives or categories of wants and demands that were broadly similar from one country to the next. There was, first of all, the manifest desire for some fundamental guarantee of security, implying above all governmental efforts at coordination or planning of the nation's economic life. Secondly, there was a desire for greater accessibility to existing centers of authority, implying an enlargement of existing channels of political expression and the formation of specifically labor oriented governmental agencies. Thirdly, there was a desire for a legal recognition of labors' organizational and bargaining status, implying the removal of injunctions and all other measures perceived by labor to be unjust restrictions on its political life. In short, each of these major political aspirations with all of their attendant political demands defined the labor movement in each society as a permanent source of stress on the political system.

The stress that labor's political mobilization imposed on each system stemmed ultimately, from two important directions. In terms

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[51]The United States case differs somewhat from the experience of England, Russia, and Argentina. Political involvement on the part of American Labor in the late 1920's and early 1930's was at a virtual standstill. Thus, while a national political effort by labor was begun during the period 1922-1924 it was not until the late 1930's that it began to constitute a unified political force.

of demands, it has already been suggested that both quantitatively and substantively labor's political awakening was an inevitable stress-inducing phenomenon. But the lack of an immediate or even anticipated long range favorable response to these demands threatened each system with another major source of stress--an impending erosion of labor's support for the national authorities and existing regime.

> The persistence of a political system hinges not only on an appropriate regulation of the inflow of demands but on a second major condition, the maintenance of a minimal level of attachment for . . . the identified political objects (i.e. political community, authorities, and regime.)[52]

> In order to process a demand through to an output, the political leadership requires the support, or at least the acquiescence, of important segments of the politically relevant members. In a democratic system, we are accustomed to hear of the need for a give-and-take attitude in order to find a compromise solution. But we often forget that in dictatorial and totalitarian systems compromise is also normally necessary . . . .[53]

> If the leadership in all systems must depend upon marshaling support from among the politically relevant members, the greater the cleavages among these, the greater the obstacle the leadership must encounter in obtaining working combinations and coalitions of these groups. Cleavage introduces rigidities into the coalition structure available for promoting and processing any proposed output. Hence, we may infer that without some provision to compensate for the dissatisfaction with outputs or to regulate the relationships among actually or potentially conflicting groups, a system would be open to the constant and ultimate danger of disorder and chaos.[54]

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[52] Easton, 220.

[53] Ibid., 240-241.

[54] Ibid., 247.

CHAPTER THREE

By way of a brief conceptual overview it has been shown that the political manifestations of labor in these four industrializing societies England, Russia, the United States, and Argentina, eventually imposed serious stress on the workings of their respective political systems. Labor's political mobilization produced a sudden and dramatic rise in the quantitative input of demands in each system. Moreover, as a result of the highly contentious nature of those demands (and therefore the impossibility of their quick resolution) each system was threatened with a serious erosion of labor's support vis-a-vis the respective authorities, regime, and political community. The more resolutely labor pressed for admission into the strategic economic and political policy making bodies of the society the more its image as a deviant element in the society grew.

One can conceive of two basic types of responses which the political system in each country might have made. One possible response, highly specific in nature, would have had the political leadership of each society bending toward a fulfillment of the demands posed by this newly emergent group. That is, by the generation of certain outputs and authoritative decisions markedly in favor of labor the various national sets of authorities would have been assured of at least the specific support of labor.

> In every system two general categories of responses are constantly available to maintain a minimal level of support for the various political objects i. e. regime, authorities, and political community, <u>specific support</u> and <u>diffuse support</u>. The input of support may flow as a consequence

> from some specific satisfactions obtained from the system with respect to a demand that the members make, can be expected to make, or that is made on their behalf. When support is in this way a quid pro quo for the fulfillment of demands I call it specific support. For example, a trade union seeks a higher minimum wage and persuades the legislature to approve of it. Farmers appeal for a more generous underpinning of the prices for their produce and obtain laws to that effect. A manufacturer argues for, and wins, a higher tariff for his goods. Here the gratifications can all be related specifically to outputs.[1]

It was the overwhelmingly controversial nature of this particular conflict, however, rooted as it was in two divergent conceptions of capital, labor, and ultimately of the political economy, that made this specific pro-labor response, if not impossible, at least extremely unlikely. For again, the great significance of labor's political maturation in each country was that it became much more than simply a movement aimed at securing or vindicating certain specific or what might be assumed to be predominantly economic rights. As was outlined earlier, the truly lasting political impact of organized labor is that when it arrived as a significant system member it became the source of inherently disruptive and far reaching political demands. Its political thrust in England and the United States was predominantly a challenge to the heretofore uncontested political bargaining power of a rival industrial-capitalist class; in Russia and Argentina, where that class had been forced into an alliance with a traditional agricultural based elite, it threatened even greater alterations in the existing arrangements of political power and economic organization.

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[1]Easton, Systems Analysis, 267-68.

Hence, in light of the fact that other powerful and significant members of the political system viewed labor with alarm and mistrust, viewed it, that is, as the provoker of fundamental social change, it is doubtful whether the respective national authorities could have effected a sufficiently pro-labor response even had they deemed it desirable. Indeed, Easton has argued that

> no regime or political community could gain general acceptance and no set of authorities could expect to hold power if they had to depend exclusively or even largely on outputs to generate support as a return for specific and identifiable benefits. Other means of adaption to stress are necessary.[2]

Another type of response within the political systems analyzed here was obviously necessary to mitigate the growing struggle between capital, land, and labor. It may be conceptualized as a generalized response on the part of the contending members themselves. Again,

> a response may take the form of deliberate and calculated actions on the part of a political leadership or some segment of the authorities to meet the conditions conducing to the stress. But a response may also be more diffuse and diversified; it may appear as individual and isolated reactions on the part of the members severally considered. In the aggregate, their actions may lead to a new set of circumstances that can be designated as a generalized response in the system.[3]

Viewing the contemporary state of political affairs in England, Russia, and the United States, exhibiting as they do a modus vivendi of labor and its opposing groups one could argue ipso facto that at some historical juncture this type of response with all the social change it implies manifested itself. Certainly in the modern day there is little to support the view that labor's politics in these

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[2] Ibid., 269.

[3] Ibid., 247.

countries are in sharp conflict with the established regime, authorities, or even with the political pursuits of opposing interest groups. More importantly, labor does not view itself as a distant or alien social group, nor is it perceived as such by other significant members of the political system. It may be argued, then, that the eventual reduction in the social cleavage and stress that the labor struggle produced in these three systems was brought about by a member generated response from within, a phenomenon that Easton has analyzed under the heading of diffuse support.

> As we have seen, specific support flows from the favorable attitudes and predisposition stimulated by outputs that are perceived by members to meet their demands as they arise or in anticipation. But simultaneously, members are capable of directing diffuse support toward the objects of the system. This forms a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants.
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> Except in the long run, diffuse support is independent of the effects of daily outputs. It consists of a reserve of support that enables the system to weather the many storms when outputs cannot be balanced off against inputs of demands. It is a kind of support that a system does not have to buy with more or less direct benefits for the obligations and responsibilities the member incurs. If we wish, the outputs here may be considered psychic or symbolic and in this sense, they may offer the individual immediate benefits strong enough to stimulate a supportive response. Members may get satisfaction, for example, from the promise of future greatness for their system and even some gratification from being made to feel an important part of a larger historic process that calls for present restraint on behalf of future benefits for the political system, an object with which they come to identify in and for itself.[4]

The growth of diffuse support in England, Russia, and the United States offers a general explanation of how the political struggle of labor was mollified and subdued over time until a more

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[4] Ibid., 273-274.

acceptable or convenient resolution of the issues it provoked was possible. It is within the matrix of diffuse support that a crucial balance among powerful countervailing members of a system is made possible. As a concept then, diffuse support embodies all those conditions that lead to the establishment of a widely accepted set of ground rules or outer perimeter of political demands beyond which competing political groups willingly do not stray. It would be important of course, to analyze in more detail the nature and the causes of diffuse support and especially to examine those conditions that led to its growth in the three industrialized societies isolated here. Easton has posed the question succinctly:

> Why should members of a political system be willing to advance support for the political objects even under circumstances where they have to give up any hope of satisfying many vital immediate or even future demands, and especially where they are embroiled in deep cleavages with respect to the division of a system's limited resources? For those members who are politically weak or powerless, we can appreciate that they have no alternative. But if we confine our attention to those members of a system who are politically relevant and of some substantial influence, that is, who count in the system for whatever reason, the question still remains.[5]

From a universal perspective there are two main forces that generate the growth of diffuse support in a political system. Its prevalence is, first of all, linked closely to national sentiments of legitimacy.

> The inculcation of a sense of legitimacy is probably the single most effective device for regulating the flow of diffuse support in favor both of the authorities and of the regime. A member may be willing to obey the authorities and conform to the requirements of the regime for many

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[5] Ibid., 271.

> different reasons. But the most stable support will derive from the conviction on the part of the member that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime. It reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way he sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere.
>
> The strength of support implicit in this attitude derives from the fact that it is not contingent on specific inducements or rewards of any kind, except in the very long run. On a day-to-day basis, if there is a strong inner conviction of the moral validity of the authorities or regime, support may persist even in the face of repeated deprivations attributed to the outputs of the authorities or their failure to act.[6]

Or as Phillip Selznick has written:

> The rule is: those who wield power must establish their right to do so. This is not a pious wish, or a peculiarly democratic canon, but a general political necessity. Every ruling group that presumes to gather perogatives for itself, or to inflict deprivations on others, must identify itself with a principle acceptable to the community as justification for the exercise of power. Such doctrinal tenets are known as principles of legitimacy.[7]

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[6] Ibid., 278.

[7] Phillip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon (New York: McGraw Hill, 1952), 242. The origin and maintainence of sentiments of legitimacy are in turn dependent upon the prevalence of a commonly accepted "belief system" or legitimating ideology for the system as a whole. "Besides operating values, we also find in the political system articulated sets of ideals, ends, and purposes, which help the members of the system to interpret the past, explain the present, and offer a vision for the future. They may be deceptive myths about political life; they may be realistic appraisals and sincere aspirations. But they have the potential, because they are articulated as a set of ethically infused ideals, to capture the imagination. From a manipulative or instrumental point of view they may be interpreted as categories of thought to corral the energies of men; from an expressive point of view we may see them as ideals capable of rousing and inspiring men to action thought to be related to their achievement. Values of this kind . . . that set forth the purposes, organization, and boundaries of political life are ideologies.

"Among other things, a legitimating ideology purveys an image of the purposes, organization, and operation of a system in terms of which obedience to the authorities and acceptance of the regime may be considered right and proper and, therefore, morally binding.

Secondly, the notion or belief of a common or public interest also serves as a vital mainspring of diffuse support.

> An additional source of diffuse support . . . is the conviction that there is something called the interest of the realm, the public, common, or national interest, the general good and public welfare, or the good of . . . "our people". The authorities through the regime are represented as the major spokesmen for this interest. This common interest is viewed as taking priority over local, ethnic, class, or other component interests within a society.
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> Wherever the conception of a general interest actively operates, it helps to regulate or limit the disposition toward devisive behavior on the part of the politically relevant members in general. It accomplishes this basically through the fact that such a belief pushes in the direction of establishing common standards for evaluating outputs. Not that all members will interpret the consequences of outputs in identical terms. But however they may perceive the results of policies or administrative acts, for example, if members assume they are all using a similar standard for judging their desirability--a shared idea of a common good--this will reduce one of the major sources of differences.[8]

The development and growth of sentiments of legitimacy and the belief of a common or national interest are thus two chief sources of diffuse support in a system. But while the concepts are meaningful in a definitive sense, that is, they define more specifically the nature and life blood of diffuse support, they do not in themselves explain how sentiments of legitimacy are inculcated or how the belief of a common or national interest comes to prevail. The proposition that their existence leads to the growth of diffuse

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[7] We may interpret (an idealogy as a variable response through which efforts are made to bring the members of a system to the point of subscribing to the legitimacy of authorities and regime or sustaining that belief once it does exist." Easton, 290-294.

[8] Ibid., 311-312, 131.

support is in no way questioned here. It is with reference to the purpose of this paper, that a more complete understanding of the conditions that produce these two great support inducing phenomena seems vitally important.

The stated objective of this paper is to contribute to an understanding of the political conduct of one important member of the political system--industrial labor. An explanation of how it comes to be instilled with sentiments of legitimacy vis-a-vis the authorities and regime and how, within its ranks, the notion of a common, public, or national interest comes to be widely accepted, these, as well as the specific effects they have on its political life, seem a logical part of this investigation. The argument is not that there was in the case of England, Russia, and the United States a peculiar or unique set of circumstances that infused industrial labor with sentiments of legitimacy and the belief of a national interest; unique that is, among those forces that produced similar responses in other groups and members of the system. The argument here, in fact, is that there are certain universal conditions that make all relevant system members purveyors of legitimating sentiments and propagators of the belief of a transcendent national interest. Thus, while the labor movement is the specific unit of analysis any manifest change in its political conduct growing out of an assimilation of these support inducing forces (i.e. sentiments of legitimacy and the belief of a common national good), could be viewed as indicative of a similar supportive transformation occurring in all relevant members of the system. This is merely to suggest, as Easton has, that there operates in all systems an inverse relationship between

the growth of diffuse support on the one hand and the demand induced social cleavage the system experiences on the other.

In attempting to identify those conditions that transformed labor into a source of diffuse support in England, Russia, and the United States some insight may be gained by looking at the period in each nation's history when labor ceased to be, or at least lost its image of being, a source of divisive political conduct. Such a period in the case of England, Russia, and the United States would be one stretching from the modern day to some point in the past when the political demands of labor assumed an air of moderation, and when it was generally conceded a rightful and what might even be considered popular position on the political stage. To identify such a period, what might in simplest terms be called the period of labor's political integration, is in no way to over schematize the complex picture of history.[9] The concept of integration by its very nature implies degrees of integration and it is therein that lies its usefulness. Perfect or complete integration in the social context is not only impossible to detect in any empirical system but difficult even to conceive. The period of labor's integration would be one in which there is a marked degree of change in the climate of labor's political struggle. Quantitatively, one might expect a reduction in the political demands advanced by labor, but even were

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[9]The many weaknesses of historical stage making are well recognized, the prime one being that such stages can never be made mutually exclusive. Characteristics of earlier stages reappear in later ones and vice-versa.

they to increase, they would substantively, be less apt to inspire a polemical embittered dialogue in the society. They would not connote dramatic social change. Indeed, one obvious criterion for determining labor's integration would be whether it was literally in the government. In short, while no precise lines of demarcation can be drawn in the course of labor's political development an approximation of various stages is possible.

It was in this sense that the period in England from 1890 to 1914, characterized by labor's unification and the rise of the Independent Labor Party, was analyzed apart from the period preceding it. In the same sense, the period from 1945 to the present, which has seen the Labor Party from time to time in actual control of the government, constitutes a third definable stage of development, the stage of integration. Similarly, the period from 1920 to the present day in Russia can be viewed as distinct from that which began in 1905 and ran until 1914. The great revolution of 1917 was not a proletarian revolution but by the same token it was not the beginning of the road that led to labor's serfdom, as many western observers have claimed. While the balance of the argument perhaps lies somewhere in between, the argument itself is totally irrelevant to this analysis. It is not in a democratic or uniquely Western context that labor's role in the political system is being analyzed here. The concepts of integration, legitimacy, common interest, specific and diffuse support relate to characteristics that are universal to all systems, characteristics that are as much a part of Russian political life as America's or England's. Their existence does not depend on

certain normative prescriptions or conditions being met in the society.

In the United States the period from 1922 to 1939, a period which saw the rise of the C.I.O. and the unleashing of labor's full political potential, is far different from the period that stems from 1945 to the present. During the latter period the question of labor's political and integrated status has been beyond dispute.

The interim period separating these latter two stages of labor's political development was, in all three cases, a period of war preparation, actual war, and intensive mobilization for national defense. Each of these nations had, of course, witnessed war before but never on such a threatening scale. The Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Spanish-American War (to cite the most recent conflict of each nation prior to the world wide conflict) were in fact, all characterized as "foreign" wars. Moreover, the classical wars of the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries had never required such enormous outlays of blood and capital. Indeed, the most profound impact of the World War period (1914-1945) came, in England, Russia, and (in the second phase of the conflict) in America, from the realization that for the first time in each nation's history the actual physical existence and survival of the society was at stake.

With reference to England, the period from 1914 to 1945 has been referred to as the "second thirty years war". For though the war had technically ended in 1919 an embittered settlement of the treaties dragged on until 1924. There was a brief six year period (1924-1930) of evacuation and fulfillment, but then followed a period (1930-1939) marked by the failure of the League of Nations, the

failure of the Disarmament Conference and the International Economic Conference, and the formal denunciation by Germany of the Versailles Treaty. It was during this time that the question of national security became the paramount issue in British politics, manifesting itself through isolationist policies and a rigid imposition of neo-mercantilist ideas.

The interim period in Russia (1914-1920) was also characterized by devastating war, war preparation, and frantic efforts to maintain national defense and security. Russia had formally "withdrawn" from the war in 1918 under terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk but in reality the war after that date simply received a new and more sophisticated justification on national defense grounds. The great Civil War (1918-1920), particularly in the Ukraine, the Baltic region, and northern Russia, was inextricably bound with the whole Eastern Front campaigns of the Allied and Central Powers.[10]

The era of war preparedness in the face of aggression, the period of mobilization for national survival and defense, runs its course in the United States from 1938 to 1945.[11] America, being geographically isolated from the ravages of the First World War and entering very late in its course, escaped those forces of xenophobia, chauvinism, and military preparation that engulfed Europe from 1914

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[10]Russia is analyzed here in terms of both its pre and post revolutionary governments.

[11]It, of course, runs its course still. A discussion of that topic appears later.

to 1939. Indeed its isolated position proved to be of enormous economic advantage. In E. H. Carr's view:

> American capitalism was an exceedingly active and powerful growth which reached maturity considerably later than European capitalism, and reaped advantage from the time-lag in the form of higher mechanical efficiency. The First World War, which laid waste the economies of Europe, gave an immense stimulus to American industry. After the war the United States became beyond dispute the leading economic power in the world.[12]

As another historian has written:

> By contrast to the European belligerents the war had affected America but little. It had meant profit and accelerated economic growth, and to the drafted men quite often little more than a fairly pleasant voyage abroad. American casualties were, in comparative terms, insignificant. The American experience in its totality belied the view that there are no benefits in war.
>
> Although the usual description of the 1914 conflict as the First World War is warranted because of the effect it had on the whole world, the war was essentially a European affair. The active participation of the United States in the war lasted less than two years. The United States did not mobilize its manpower on a scale comparable to others; the discrepancy appears even greater if war losses are considered. There is no need of great imagination to appreciate that the American reaction to the experience of the war would have been quite different had some five million American men been killed--a proportionate figure to the French or the German on the comparative basis of populations. The American people did not emerge from the war with an overwhelming sensation of weariness, nor was their confidence impaired by having seen the face of defeat at close range. It is therefore understandable that the United States should come out of the war with a feeling of optimistic confidence in itself, its power, and its future. The circumstances of geography and of history had together conspired to keep the American potential out of the main stream of world affairs, certainly by comparison with the intense activity of the great powers of Europe. Isolation was for America less a theory than an existing condition.[13]

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[12] E. H. Carr, The New Society (London: Macmillan and Co., 1951), 29.

[13] René Albrecht-Carrié, The Meaning of the First World War (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1965), 91, 136-137.

It was the second phase of the world conflict, of course, that affected America profoundly. The invasion of Ethiopia, the remilitarization of Germany, and the formation of a Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis in the mid-thirties, and the Japanese expansion in Asia in the late thirties all worked against strong national sentiments of isolation. By 1942 the moderate and cautious program of rearmament that had begun in 1938 was accelerated and after Pearl Harbor became the major national priority. Thus, in the course of their twentieth century political development, England, Russia, and the United States were faced with the grave prospects (both perceived and real) of external domination and possible national annihilation. Each country was thrust into a period of total mobilization for war, a global conflict that threatened the very survival of the society.

The response of each system to the threat of foreign aggression necessarily gave rise to powerful and irreversible trends toward collectivism. Indeed, the domestic repercussions of war and war preparation, those influencing behavioral patterns within the society, were as momentous as the actual physical effects of the war period itself. The enormous physical requirements for waging war, both in terms of manpower and matériel, and the awesome expenditure of capital, made large scale planning of each nation's economy imperative. The need for centralized control and coordination of the country's economic life became a politically uncontested issue and with the air of emergency surrounding the crisis its wide public acceptance was assured. In addition to the need for large scale economic planning, the war in effect produced a moratorium on all

private political debate in the society. The war in fact had a great homogenizing effect with respect to major domestic political rivalry. The demands of the individual and group became subordinate to those of the State. In the mind of Randolph Bourne the war burgeoning State permitted the individual to

> escape from freedom. A people at war have become in the most literal sense obedient, respectful, trustful children again, full of that naive faith in the all-wisdom and all power of the adult who takes care of them; imposes his mild but necessary rule upon them and in whom they lose their responsibility and anxieties.
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> The gregarious impulse, . . . the tendency to imitate, to conform, to coalesce together . . . is most powerful when the herd believes itself threatened with attack. Animals crowd together for protection, and men become most conscious of their collectivity at the threat of war. Consciousness of collectivity brings confidence and a feeling of massed strength, which in turn arouses pugnacity and the battle is on. In civilized man, the gregarious impulse acts not only to produce concerted action for defense, but also to produce identity of opinion. The slack is taken up, the cross-currents fade out, and the Nation moves lumberingly and slowly, but with ever accelerated speed and integration, towards the great end, towards that peacefulness of being at war . . .[14]

The labor movement was, in each country, particularly susceptible to the exigencies of war. Its political drive for power was among the first to be subdued by a popularly enforced suspension of group rivalry; one that labor itself eventually came to accept with enthusiasm.

In England organized labor was quick to rally to the national cause in 1914.

> The Labour Party, which began by urging the working class movement to concentrate on measures for the relief of distress, was soon involved, jointly with the other political

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[14]Randolph Bourne, cited in Mason, 437.

parties, in a recruiting campaign. The Trades Union Congress issued a strongly worded appeal for soldiers.

Undoubtedly at this stage, and throughout the earlier part of the War, the overwhelming mass of working class, as of other opinion in Great Britain, was strongly pro-war, just as it was in France or Germany, or even Austria-Hungary. Everywhere in Western Europe, the declared Socialist policy of opposition had dramatically collapsed. As the logical sequel to the predominant attitude, a truce to internal disagreements was rapidly declared. In the course of August 1914, the political parties declared a bi-election truce, and the Trade Unions, without awaiting any definite understanding with the employers, proclaimed an industrial truce. Immediately after the outbreak of war, the trade disputes then in progress, including a big building strike in London, were called off.[15]

And again in 1939,

> the overwhelming majority of the British working class was in no doubt at all about the sheer necessity of final victory over the Nazis as a very condition of democratic survival. With the advent of the Churchill-Labour Coalition in 1940 . . . the war effort became truly national; and upon the change of Government followed almost at once the disasters in Western Europe, the collapse of France, the evacuation of the British forces from Dunkirk, and the imminent danger of invasion. The British working classes followed up the achievement of the evacuation with an effort of war production in the factories that proved their whole-heartedness in the struggle.[16]

Mobilization for war in Russia also engendered a patriotic upsurge on the part of the proletariat. Trotsky writes:

> At the first sound of the drum the revolutionary movement died down. The more active layers of the workers were mobilized. The revolutionary elements were thrown from the factories to the front. Severe penalties were imposed for striking. The workers press was swept away. Trade unions were strangled. Hundreds of thousands of women, boys, peasants poured into the workshops. The war--combined with the wreck of the International--greatly disoriented the workers politically, and made it possible for the factory administration, then just lifting its head, to speak patriotically in the name of the factories, carrying with

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[15] Cole, British Working Class, 353.

[16] Ibid., 452.

> it a considerable part of the workers, and compelling the more bold and resolute to keep still and wait. The revolutionary ideas were barely kept glowing in small and hushed circles. In the factories in those days nobody dared to call himself Bolshevik for fear not only of arrest, but of beating from the backward workers.[17]

Even the Bolshevik faction in the Duma "had not risen to the height of its task."

> Along with the Menshevik deputies, it introduced a declaration in which it promised to defend the cultural weal of the people against all attacks wheresoever originating. The Duma underlined with applause this yielding of position. Not one of the Russian organizations or groups of the party took the openly defeatist position which Lenin came out for abroad.[18]

Three years later of course, virtually all support for the existing regime, labor's included, vanished. But while the revolution that began in 1917 eventually displaced the ancien régime of Czardom, the commitment of the workers to the defense of the fatherland simply assumed a new, though at times uncertain, direction. The question that raged throughout the latter days of the provisional government, the latter days of Russia's formal participation in the war, and really throughout the entire civil-war period, was not whether the nation was worth saving or not, worthy of defense that is, but rather which government or governing personalities should be charged with the fulfillment of that responsibility. Lenin had summed the debate up in 1915 when he wrote: "On no account must social democrats participate in a Provisional Government side by side with social chauvinists should be victorious in Russia, we should be against

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[17] Trotsky, History of the Revolution, 36.

[18] Ibid., 37.

their fatherland in the present war."[19] But even after 1920 the anti-war Bolsheviks

> carried on with the system of military communism established during the civil-war. The main features of this were: conscription of all available manpower and wealth; socialization of all industrial property; compulsory direction of labor; strict rationing of consumers' goods and requisitioning of agricultural produce from the peasants.[20]

The need for further militarization and the formation of labor armies even in peace time, was articulated by Trotsky himself and his scheme had the backing of the entire party leadership.[21]

The great question of legal claims to the government was for all practical purposes settled in 1921 with the implementation of the N.E.P. A good indication of the permanency of Leninism-Marxism in Russia was the fact that by 1924 the Bolshevik government had been given de jure recognition by every major power in the world except the United States.[22] During the following two decades the revival of terror under Stalin and the coercive and unifying forces of Marxism that were employed during his rule made the power of the Communist Party absolute. It may well be argued then, that prior to the advent

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[19]Leonard Shapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1959), 145.

[20]Isaach Deutscher, cited by Galenson, Comparative Labor Movements, 502.

[21]Ibid., 503.

[22]William L. Langer, Encyclopedia of World History (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 1034. (The U. S. recognized the U.S.S.R. in 1933.)

of World War Two, Russian society was faced with little of the inter-group rivalry and domestic political conflict that characterized pre 1914 British society and pre 1938 American society.[23] The great

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[23]It is ironic that in his policies toward labor Stalin made use of Trotsky's earlier philosophical and sociological justifications of a totalitarian labor policy. At the third Conference of the Trade Unions in 1920, Trotsky expressed the following: "We know that every labor is socially compulsory labor. Man must work in order not to die. He does not want to work. But the social organization compels and whips him into that direction. The new, socialist order differs from the bourgeois one in that with us labor is performed in the interest of society, and therefore we need no priestly, church-like, liberal, or Menshevik recipes for raising the labor energy of the proletariat . . . . The first way of disciplining and organizing labor is to make the economic plan clear to the widest masses of the toilers. When we transfer a worker from one spot to another, when we call up the peasant for labor duty, those called up should first of all be convinced that they are not being called up for nothing, that those who have mobilized them have a definite plan, that a necessary economic job must be performed at the spot where the labor force has now been placed . . . .

Wages under present conditions, must not be viewed from the angle of securing the personal existence of the individual worker; they should above all serve to evaluate what the individual worker contributes to the workers' republic. Wages should measure the conscientiousness, usefulness, and efficiency of the work of every laborer. As long as we are poor, as long as we do not have enough food to satisfy minimum needs, we cannot distribute it equally to all workers, and we shall allocate consumers' goods . . . to essential workers . . . . We are obliged to act in this way for the sake of the country's future and in order to save the working masses."

And in 1921: "The Workers' Opposition has come out with dangerous slogans, making a fetish of democratic principles. They place the workers' right to elect their representatives--above the party, as it were, as if the party were not entitled to assert its dictatorship even if that dictatorship temporarily clashed with the passing moods of the workers' democracy.

It is necessary to create among us the awareness of the revolutionary historical birthright of the party, which is obliged to maintain its dictatorship, regardless of temporary wavering in the spontaneous moods of the masses, regardless of the temporary wavering even in the working classes. This awareness is for us the indispensable unifying element. The dictatorship does not base itself at every given moment on the formal principle of a workers' democracy, although the workers' democracy is, of course, the only method by which the masses can be drawn more and more into political life." Leon Trotsky cited by Isaac Deutscher in Galenson (ed.), Comparative Labor Movements, 505, 517.

legitimating ideology of collectivism that had grown out of the revolution had already been established in Russia as an unquestioned guiding principle when England and America, in the face of crisis, reluctantly moved their respective societies toward faintly similar ends of social organization. But even in post-revolutionary Russia large scale preparation for war had similar important unifying effects. The unique statist philosophy inspired by Russian communism, to which Stalin had given a nationalistic interpretation (an important issue in his clash with Trotsky), was refurbished considerably by the war experience. Leonard Schapiro writes:

> The shock of the German invasion in 1941 was immediately reflected in the forms which party government now assumed. The gravity and suddenness of the emergency compelled a streamlining of the dictatorship, and the cautious intrigues of the second-rank leaders which had hitherto gone on under Stalin became subordinated to the overriding needs of efficiency.
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> On June 30, 1941, after the outbreak of war, the State Committee of Defense, or GOKO, was set up, consisting first of Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, and Beria. This committee was given absolute power and authority over all party, government, military, and other organizations throughout the country. The whole system of balance between the party organizations on the one hand and the Soviet and economic organizations on the other, which it had been found necessary to maintain, however imperfectly, even in gravest emergencies in the past, was thus swept aside.
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> Thus, the impact of the war on the relations of the party with the population over which it ruled was enormous. Of course, the sense of common danger made the people readier to accept the even more stringent control which the new system implied. It was significant that while the danger was gravest, when even the issue of survival hung in the balance, party and socialist slogans virtually disappeared from official propoganda and were replaced by patriotic and nationalist appeals. Thus, a programme of lectures designed for nationwide propaganda by the party organs included not one single reference either to the party or to socialism: the stress was entirely on the fatherland, on national defense, on the heroism of the people, and on similar themes.[24]

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[24]Shapiro, 491, 493, 494.

The American government's task of national unification and full-scale preparation for war was, as in England and Russia, accomplished with relative ease and swiftness. The extension of federal supervision over the nation's economic life had, in great measure, already begun under the New Deal and the American people, its collective consciousness thoroughly aroused by the great depression, was quick to rally in the face of common crisis. Labor specifically, while showing an exceedingly more aggressive attitude toward national politics, was on the verge of the war, closer to the inner circles of government than ever before. Indeed, it found itself catered to by one of the country's oldest and most established political parties and much of the legislation of the first New Deal alluded to even more fundamental charges in the conditions that motivated labor's political movement.[25] But while labor was very much an ally of the Roosevelt administration it protested vigorously the many legislative proposals aimed at limiting its political activity, proposals justified on the grounds of the necessity for uninhibited war production. American labor's relentless drive for a larger political bargaining role was basically a product of the intense competition that had been growing between the AFL and CIO. Comparing the national political life of all three countries, American labor, in the face of national emergency, proved far less susceptible to governmental attempts at coercion than its counterparts in England and Russia. In 1941, Roosevelt declared:

> In this hour when civilization is in the balance, organizational rivalries and jurisdictional conflicts should be

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[25]Galenson, CIO Challenge, 618.

> discarded. Only by united action can we turn back the Nazi threat. The establishment of peace between labor organizations would be a patriotic step forward of incalcuable value in the creation of true national unity.[26]

The AFL "pledged its active and cooperative support with industry and with every appropriate governmental agency having to do with the production and the construction of material for national defense."[27] And although peace between the AFL and CIO was never really affected

> things after 1942 went surprisingly well, due in no small measure to [Sidney] Hillman's skillful administration of the National Defense Advisory Commission, and to his conviction that all partisan considerations would have to give way to the necessities of defense production.[28]

Thus,

> as the months wore on it became increasingly evident that . . . in practice labor's influence was vastly inferior to that of management spokesmen; and as the Office of Production Management passed into history and as defense and then war agencies multiplied, labor's share in the formulation and administration of government defense policy further diminished.[29]

Indeed, in response to further pressure from Congress, Roosevelt created, by executive order, the National Defense Mediation Board and the AFL called upon all affiliate organizations to

> refrain for any reason whatsoever from calling a strike interfering with national defense production until full opportunity has first been given to the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor and to the National Defense Mediation Board to bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute.[30]

Later in the year the AFL renewed its approval of the Board, promising to give it "hearty support . . . in its work to promote our national welfare . . ."[31] Finally Roosevelt created the National War Labor

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[26] Ibid., 618. [27] Ibid., 618. [28] Ibid., 619.
[29] Ibid., 619. [30] Ibid., 620. [31] Ibid., 620.

Board, again by executive order, and an eventual no-strike pledge by labor convinced proponents of restrictive legislation that labor was fully committed to the struggle.[32]

One important consequence of the World War period, then, was that it produced in each society deep seated attitudes and predispositions--internal forms of behavior--that were in the fullest sense supportive. The response exhibited by labor, like that of every other significant member of the political system, with all the immediate sacrifice it implied, was based on the well publicized notion that individual survival was dependent upon collective action. To support the authorities in their prosecution of what Roosevelt termed "a war of survival" (a phrase equally applicable to England and Russia), was therefore only logical.[33] The exigencies of war made the belief in a common national interest a necessary condition of survival, the result of which was the formation of a deep reservoir of diffuse support. Easton writes:

> At its highest level of input, although from the point of view of an ethic of rationality, not necessarily its most admirable form, the reservoir of diffuse support might be fed by a feeling of blind loyalty to the authorities, regime, or community. Such unquestioning loyalty reflects a kind of attachment for which specific benefits are not expected except for the psychic satisfactions of identification with, or subordination to, a higher cause or object.

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[32] Ibid., 621; Some strikes did occur however, and the War Labor Disputes Act was passed in 1943.

[33] "The Second World War was understood by most sensitive observers as a curiously unreal business. Men went away and fought, all over the world; women did whatever was expected of women during war; people worked hard and long and bought war bonds; everybody believed in America and in her cause; there was no rebellion." C. Wright Mills, White Collar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 328.

> If we assume that most kinds of patriotism reflect some degree of deep attachment, such attitudes enable a system to violate the expectations of its members with considerable impunity. The notion of la patrie, in its finest sense, identifies the presence of powerful ties to the political community for itself alone rather than for what the individual expects to derive from it, ties that only persistent failure in outputs would be likely to severe.[34]

The ideology of a common interest then,

> serves as a social sanction or norm to impel members to substitute for their own private or particular wants, a new or different one, that of a higher entity or ideal called the common good.[35]

The norm may be manifested in both a restrictive and a motivating manner, and

> in this way the idea and ideal of a common interest acts to trigger psychological mechanisms which justify acceptance of outputs that might otherwise lead to extreme dissatisfaction with the authorities and even the regime. It contributes to the diffuse support underlying the regime and authorities.[36]

Of greatest significance is the fact that the supportive tendencies that grew out of the war experience in each country have not diminished during the post war period; the most obvious reason for this being that the threat of war itself has not much diminished. Indeed, the need for national defense and security has been translated into a most effectual device for guaranteeing the legitimacy of all post-war governments that emerged victorious from the conflict. The war, being global in scope, was thus a chief inspiration of nationalism in each country. It is essentially in terms of international competition and comparison that the concept derives its

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[34] Easton, 274.

[35] Ibid., 315.

[36] Ibid., 316.

meaning. In that same sense, the threat of war and the felt imperatives of national defense have promoted within these societies an enthusiastic adherence to the national ideology and purpose of the political system. As such, it has served to define the outer limits, so to speak, of political activity. It has become a restrictive as well as motivating principle in each country's political life, one that significant members of the political system hold as inviolate. The labor movement is no exception.

There were in fact, even more compelling reasons that made British, Russian, and American labor particularly avid supporters of their respective post-war governments.

It was pointed out earlier that one of the most important consequences of full scale preparation for war and defense was the nationalization of the country's economic life. In England and the United States this unprecedented move away from a philosophy of laissez faire capitalism toward governmental leadership in the political economy marked the beginning of a great transformation. Before the war, democracy was, in E. H. Carr's words, "the political partner and counterpart of laissez faire capitalism and the responsibility for the workings of the economic system could be rejected as beyond the reach of the political arm."[37]

> Before 1914 nobody had clearly recognized that a war economy differed fundamentally with a peace economy. 'Business as usual' was the slogan under which the first period of the war was conducted in Great Britain. But the course of the First World War settled for all time the question of the indispensability of a planned economy for national efficiency in the war. After 1918 this view sank into the consciousness of all parties in all countries and became uncontroversial.

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[37]Carr, 38-39.

> From this point onward it became an accepted doctrine everywhere that planning could be justified not only by the contingency of war itself, but by the need to prepare for war. The eagerness with which the doctrine has been accepted is illustrated by the present situation in the United States, where measures of economic planning, which would have been rigorously contested if they had been put forward as items of a social programme, win enthusiastic support as necessary contributions to national preparedness for war.[38]

Thus,

> the nineteenth century capitalist order has been transformed by a process of historical evolution into a system where intervention and state planning are imperative. It is a tragedy of our generation that the only purpose for which planning is yet universally admitted as necessary and legitimate is the contingency of war. This choice is obviously the simplest. Any kind of planning involves irksome controls; nearly everyone will accept the inconvenience of controls and restrictions in order to make his nation militarily secure and militarily powerful. It is the choice which is most likely to appeal to the largest and most powerful groups in industry. It provides full employment and can therefore be made acceptable to the worker.[39]

It was not employment alone, however, not even material interests exclusively, that motivated labor's political support in these three countries. The intervention of the government in the nation's economic life under the guise of emergency planning led to the fulfillment of labor's most basic political demands. Those demands were described earlier as embodying above all, a fundamental desire for security, a security that would be guaranteed by some type of governmental policy, which whether recognized or not, implied collectivism at the national level. Secondly, there was a desire for admission to, and an enlargement of, existing channels of political communication and the demand for a greater accessibility to the authorities. Finally, there was the manifest desire for a legal

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[38] Ibid., 35-36.

[39] Ibid., 37.

recognition of labor's political organizing and bargaining status. In each country the fulfillment of these demands was very much a consequence of the world war experience. In England and the United States the war initiated a rapid transition toward economic planning; in Russia it gave untold justification to an already ideologically inspired practice. In England and the United States the war effort literally demanded labor's political integration and union, not only with the various authoritative branches of government but with other major contending groups in the society. In Russia, the war intensified those legitimating sentiments for a regime which had for two decades demanded such integration. And finally, once given de facto recognition in the midst of the crisis, labor, in England and the United States, could not possibly have been relegated to its pre-war ambivalent legal status. While labor in the course of the crisis, was compelled to adopt a moderation in its political views in all three countries it was very much a part of the post-war government. After it had played so instrumental a part in the war effort the proscription of labor's political voice was impossible. In a very real sense the ramifications of the world war period were such that they eradicated the foundations on which labor's political movement in each country was based. To return to Lipset's view:

> The characteristic pattern of Western democracies in the mid-twentieth century is that they are in a post politics phase--that is, there is relatively little difference between the democratic left and right, the socialists are moderates, and the conservatives accept the welfare-state. In large measure this situation reflects the fact that in these countries the workers have won their fight for full citizenship. Representatives of the lower strata are now

> part of the governing groups, members of the club. The basic political issue of the industrial revolution, the incorporation of the workers into the legitimate body politic, has been settled.[40]

Summarizing the British experience specifically, Allan Flanders has written:

> The change in the relationship between the trade unions and the state has come about more by a process of learning from experience than by conscious design. The trade union movement, because it answered a profound need on the part of the industrial workers, possessed an inherent vitality which defied suppression. As it gained in power it compelled both the employers and the state to recognize its existence and to come to terms with it. This development was accelerated by the two World Wars in which the bargaining strength of the workers was greatly enhanced . . . . A century ago, when political power was exercised exclusively by representatives of the moneyed and landowning classes, the Marxist (or Leninist) view that the state was simply and solely an instrument for the domination of one class by another appeared plausible. The extension of the franchise, the creation and growth of the Labour Party, the abandonment of laissez faire in favor of a more planned and controlled economy have altered the picture considerably. Class society may not have disappeared, but it is unnecessary to use dubious and jingoistic arguments to persuade the workers that in this state they have something to defend. Thus their organizations, the trade unions, have no hesitation today in cooperating with the government, even though they retain the right to criticize and where necessary oppose it. Moreover they have been accorded a position of influence in the development of the nation's economic policy and have no need to rely purely on defensive action. The fact that Britain has had a Labour Government from 1945 to 1951 made the relationship more cordial and intimate, but it did not alter its basic character.[41]

Russia may be viewed, of course, as something of a special case. It has been argued here that the effects of war and mobilization for national defense that led to labor's integration in England

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[40] Lipset, Political Man, 82.

[41] Allan Flanders in Galenson (ed.), Comparative Labor Movements, 98.

and America exerted their influence in a more indirect way in Russia. The demands of full scale planning for war, that is, were highly complementary to the existing legitimating ideology of the Soviet political system. In that sense they augmented considerably an already powerful stimulus of diffuse support for the authorities and regime; the proven need for Russian national defense that grew out of the international crisis merely vindicated their revolutionary birthright. That the position of labor in the Soviet political system should appear disturbing to Western democrats does not alter the fact that it is an integral part of that deep seated supportive response. In viewing the great difference between the value preferences inherent in contemporary Russian labor politics and those of Western democracies Isaac Deutscher has written:

> Only in the context of the broad changes that have transformed Soviet society in more than three decades since the revolution can the role and functions of the trade unions be understood.
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> In a nation that had accumulated less industrial and administrative skill and experience than had any medium sized European country, in a nation, furthermore, burdened with the oppressive traditions of inefficient autocracy at its top and of illiteracy and a barbarous way of life below, the arrears in economic and cultural development were so enormous, and the lack of civic responsibility in rulers and ruled alike was so baffling that the techniques of economic planning could be developed in only the crudest and most ruthless forms. This basically determined the place of the trade unions in Soviet labor policy.
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> Thus, social custom and habit and the peculiarities of native civilizations play their part. The traditional outlook of any nation permeates the fabric of any new social organization that nation may adopt and lends to it its own color. Soviet Russia, with its public ownership and planned economy, has absorbed the still fresh traditions of tsarist autocracy and serfdom. In countries with a deep-rooted tradition of liberty, the social and cultural climate should help evolve methods of planning so efficient and humane that by comparison the Russian experiment would appear what

> historically it is--the first barbarously clumsy and costly, and yet profoundly significant attempt of a nation to master the "blind forces" of its economy.[42]

The United States (like England and Russia) has also been thoroughly purged of any political controversy surrounding the social integration of labor.[43] What Barrington Moore has written of

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[42] Isaac Deutscher in Galenson (ed.), Comparative Labor Movements, 572.

[43] "A crucial change in the nature of the American labour movement arises from the shifting composition of the work force. Briefly put, the proletariat is being replaced by a salariat, with a consequent change in the psychology of the workers. The trend arises in part from the fact, as Colin Clark long ago noted, that with increasing productivity, greater output is being achieved with a smaller industrial work force, while the demand for new services, entertainment, education, recreation, and research means the spread of more and new middle-class occupations.

These salaried groups do not speak the old language of labour. Nor can they be appealed to in the old class-conscious terms. Their rise poses a difficult problem for the leadership of the American labour movement.

The labour movement, in its present form, is less than twenty-five years old, and the men on top are the men who built it. But they are no longer young--the average age of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. executive council is in the middle sixties--and they have lost their elan. The organising staffs, too, are old, and there is no longer the reservoir of young radicals to rely on for passing out leaflets at the plant gates.

The real sickness lies in the decline of unionism as a moral vocation, the fact that so many union leaders have become money hungry, taking on the grossest features of business society, despoiling the union treasuries for private gain.

It is quite possible that the labour movement may sink, slowly, slothfully into the market role of being a junior partner to industry. E. Baake, Clark Kerr, and C. W. Anrod (eds.), Unions, Management and the Public (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1960), 631.

mid twentieth century America can be taken as a fairly accurate description of the internal political climate of all three of these modern industrialized societies.

> . . . As we reduce economic inequalities and privileges, we may also eliminate the sources of contrast and discontent that put drive into genuine political alternatives. In the United States today, with the exception of the Negro, it is difficult to perceive any section of the population that has a vested material interest on behalf of freedom . . . . Once the ideal has been achieved, or is even close to realization, the driving force of discontent disappears, and a society settles down for a time to a stolid acceptance of things as they are. Something of the sort seems to have happened to the United States.[44]

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[44] Lipset, 443.

CHAPTER FOUR

It was stated in the introduction to this paper that Argentine society presents a paradox to the democratically inclined political analyst. Economically it is the most advanced nation on the South American continent. It ranks among the fifteen leading trading nations of the world. It has the most extensive transport and communication systems of any American republic outside of the United States. It is almost completely self sufficient in basic food stuffs and mineral and power resources, including crude oil.[1] Its rate of population growth is less than two per cent.[2] It has one of the highest rates of literacy in the Hemisphere; among the voting population illiteracy is less than one per cent.[3] There are nine autonomous universities in the country, all of which are tuition free. With the exception of unemployment insurance, every important type of social security legislation has been enacted in Argentina in the course of the last four decades.[4] Its society is urbanized, sophisticated, and made up of an extremely articulate and political people. In its constitutionalist form of government and its avowed belief in the natural rights concept of man it is firmly grounded in the

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[1] Argentina, (Organization of American States), Washington, D.C., 1966, 42.

[2] G. W. Roberts, "Reproductive Performance and Reproductive Capacity in Less Industrialized Societies," The Annals, January, 1967, 40.

[3] Argentina, 34.

[4] Ibid., 33.

political philosophy and traditions of Western Europe and the United States. In short, that Argentina should find itself at the impasse it does today, one that thwarts the realization of a vast potential for political development, does indeed seem paradoxical.

A major source of its current political crisis is the political alienation of a highly significant and articulate group within the society--industrial labor.[5] This of course, is not a uniquely Argentine problem. It is a controversy rather, that is endemic to the process of industrialization, one that was seen to manifest itself in the course of the development of three modern industrial societies. It was suggested earlier that unless a nation enjoys the commitment and political integration of its labor force it in fact, cannot possibly effect industrial development on an advanced scale.[6] This argument was contained, at least implicitly, in the discussion of the cohesive consequences of diffuse support in England, Russia,

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[5]Of a labor force of about six million, two and a half million workers are organized into the Central Labor Confederation (CGT), composed of two major and one minor groups. The two major groups, which together account for about 95 per cent of organized labor, are the "62-Bloc" of unions controlled by the Peronists, and the Independents, who are not affiliated with any political party. The minor component is the Communist-led Movement of Unity and Union Coordination (MUCS). Another minor group, not affiliated with the CGT, is the "32-Bloc" of unions.

[6]As MacIver has written: "Under all conditions the discrimination of group against group is detrimental to the well being of the community. Those who are discriminated against are balked in their social impulses, are prevented from developing their capacities, become warped or frustrated, secretly or openly nurse a spirit of animosity against the dominant group. Energies that otherwise might have been devoted to constructive service are diverted and consumed in the friction of fruitless conflict." Robert MacIver, The Web of Government, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947), 430.

and the United States. In a more universal context Clark Kerr has written that

> The logic of industrialism requires that many things be done. The . . . society must be on a reasonably large scale, at least as compared with many pre-existing societies . . . . There must be urban centers of some size. An increasingly diverse occupational structure must reflect an increasingly advanced technology. An educational system must be created to feed this occupational structure and advance the technology that lies behind it. A wage structure reflecting the supply of and demand for the various occupational skills must be developed, although it may reflect, of course, more than these forces alone. A labor market mechanism must be established to sort out and distribute and redistribute workers into a myriad of jobs. There must be managers and there must be the managed--those who give the orders and those who obey them; and those two groups must be related by a whole web of rules governing their relations. There must be industrial discipline at the level of the individual worker and of the group; and the imposition of this discipline requires means for handling the inevitable protests which arise in the industrial order. The state must be reasonably strong to govern the industrial order . . . . Finally, the men who live within the industrial order must accept its imperatives--there is no place for anarchy in the logic of industrialism.[7]

In Argentina the absence of a commitment by labor to many of these compelling social norms is rooted primarily in the political crisis of peronism. As one Argentine specialist has written:

> The persistence of peronista political power remains the essential political concern of post-Peron Argentina. This dilemma has never been resolved and its presence affects any approximation of social and political integration. As contemporary peronismo responds to an apparent psycho-social void that has not been filled by any other party or movement, the alternatives today are as they were ten years ago: to allow the peronistas legal political status, to integrate them . . ., or to permanently isolate them.[8]

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[7] Wilbert Moore and Arnold Feldman, (ed.), Labor Commitment and Social Change (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960), 349.

[8] Peter Ranis, "Peronismo Without Perón," Journal of Inter-American Studies, January, 1966, 112.

It appears extremely doubtful that the peronistas can be permanently isolated. Their Union Popular Party combines three formidable bases of support:

(1) The CGT, which under Framini's guidance has controled 95 per cent of all organized labor in the country, including the powerful metallurgical, textile, and railroad unions of the city and province of Buenos Aires;

(2) A sizeable group of professionals, lawyers, and service employees from Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Rosario, led by Raúl Matera and Agust Vandor; and

(3) The neo-Peronistas of Mendoza, Tucumán, and other rural states of the interior.[9]

This is not to say that the political proscription of peronism is the prime cause of the country's social unrest. Nor is it to imply that labor is the historical agency of social change. It would be misleading to minimize the other obvious bases of the Argentine quandry: The malady of militarism; the deep bred attitudes of cynicism and lack of genuine nationalist sentiment on the part of Argentines generally; the decided lack of confidence that pervades the nation's economy, and its logical sequel, stagnation through a lack of private (domestic and foreign) investment, and inflation. All of these factors, in addition to the peronist phenomenon, work to undermine a peaceable and adequate functioning of the political system. Hence, while they may all be analytically separable

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[9] Ibid., 120-122.

phenomena it would be impossible to single out any one of these factors as the ultimate cause of the country's social crisis. It would be equally illogical to expect that their respective solutions could over time, be effected in an independent fashion. They are all inextricably bound together and mutually reinforcing.

The existence of all these divisive forces and the social conflict they collectively produce reflects an extreme scarcity of diffuse support within the Argentine political system, a scarcity of "favorable attitudes or good will that help members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants."[10] In this one sense Argentina casts a most non American or non-European image and it may be argued that the relative absence of diffuse support within its political system is the chief characteristic that marks it as less politically developed than England, Russia, and the United States.[11] But whether the absence of diffuse support is taken as synonomous with political underdevelopment or not has no real bearing on the basic assertion that in Argentina, this type of supportive response is at an extremely low ebb. Within the political ranks of labor it is in fact, virtually nonexistent.

To claim that the Argentine political system exhibits a critically low level of diffuse support is in effect to maintain that

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[10] Easton, Systems Analysis, 273.

[11] The phenomenon of diffuse support is posited here as the most logical criterion for ascertaining the political development of any given society. To formulate a definition of political development in a uniquely democratic or Western context is to unduly limit its value as a universal descriptive concept of political life.

the important stimuli of that response (sentiments of legitimacy and the wide spread belief in a common-national interest) are absent. Argentina's political crisis may well indeed be described as a crisis of legitimacy. Martin Lipset has written that

> a crisis of legitimacy is a crisis of change. Therefore, its roots must be sought in the character of change in modern society. Crises of legitimacy occur during a transition to a new social structure, if (1) the status of major conservative institutions is threatened during the period of structural change; (2) all the major groups in the society do not have access to the political system in the transitional period, or at least as soon as they develop political demands.[12]

Tocqueville offered a classic description of the effect that this type of crisis has on the members of a society. "The citizens," he wrote, have "neither the instinctive patriotism of a monarchy nor the reflecting patriotism of a republic; . . . they have stopped between the two in the midst of confusion and distress."[13] With specific reference to Latin America one specialist has written:

> One obeys a person in authority because he has come by his office in the proper manner; in a manner which is established by precedent of course, but which also is "right" in being based on accepted principles of legitimacy. From this point of view, the features of political life traditionally characteristic of Latin America derive from the existence of what might be called a "legitimacy vacuum". The Latin American states are passing through a period of transition between one set of principles of legitimacy and another; during the period of transition some features have survived from the old way, some have developed as precursors of the new, but for the most part legitimacy does not attach to existent institutions. In the absence of stable patterns of legitimate political behavior, no alternatives exist to the dominance of personality, the absence of public spirit, and the rule of force.[14]

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[12] Lipset, 65.

[13] Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1 (New York: A. Knopf Co., 1945), 251-252, cited in Lipset, 65.

[14] Needler, Latin American Politics, 35.

The absence of a belief in a common-national interest has, of course, also played an unmistakable part in the persistence of the Argentine political crisis. As was outlined earlier, the devastating effects of that particular void have been most often and most eloquently put forth by the native Argentine himself.[15] Again, the importance of this type of sentiment is that

> it keeps the door open for the discovery of some shared principles as a basis of possible negotiation and compromise.
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> We can perhaps better appreciate this tendency if we envisioned a political system in which the members assumed just the opposite, that is, that there was not and could not be a general interest, however it is described. Presumably debate would be formulated exclusively in terms of what would be best for each of the participants. This does not mean that the disputants would necessarily be unable to reach agreement on outputs; self-interest might dictate a strategy of mutual accommodation. But what would be lacking is a prior conviction that a policy could be found that would transcend the demands of any particular group and yet be acceptable to all on the basis of some criterion other than particularistic wants. To the extent that this conviction is absent, it could not help but aggravate the differences.[16]

The chief obstacles to Argentina's political development, then, those that severely limit the capacity of the political system to function in an orderly manner, stem from an unresolved crisis of legitimacy on the one hand and the absence of a belief in a transcendent common good or national interest on the other. Together they have suppressed the growth of that general diffuse type of support characteristic of the British, Soviet, and American political systems. The thesis developed earlier was that war, the threat of war, and the felt imperatives of national defense played a major role in the development of these support inducing sentiments in England, Russia, and the

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[15] See Introduction, pages 5-7.

[16] Easton, 374.

United States. It was during the World War years in these three societies that the notion came to be widely accepted that on the outcome of the crisis hinged the very persistence of the political system itself.

> When we say that a system has persisted over time, what is to be conveyed by this expression? It will help point up the answer if we first look at what is meant by the antithesis: When can we say that a system has, in fact, failed to persist?
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> This outcome is neither impossible nor unusual. It has occurred when the membership of a society has been utterly destroyed through some natural catastrophe such as an earthquake or epidemic, or when the society has failed to reproduce itself biologically, as perhaps in the case of the Mesa Verde Indians.
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> Political systems have also disappeared at moments of social catastrophe when, as the result of civil war, revolution or military defeat, the previously existing political unit has collapsed to be replaced temporarily by independent, law abiding centers, or lawless bands. Historical political systems have disappeared, some permanently, others to recover their integrity, at the hands of conquerors, when they have been absorbed into alien systems.
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> Hence, it appears that nonpersistence points to a condition that involves more than mere change. It suggests the complete breakdown and evaporation of a political system.[17]

The response by the political systems of England, Russia, and the United States when faced with the grave extrasocietal threat posed by the world crisis thus produced "a shared sense of identity with the essential parts of the system," making, that is, each of the various members of the system a source of unconditional support for the regime and authorities. In applying this thesis to Argentina one is introduced to yet another important difference between that country and its European and American counterparts. One of the most distinctive features in Latin America's modern political history is the almost total absence of war and international conflict. Aside

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[17]Easton, Framework, 82-83.

from the Chaco War (1932-1935) armed conflict on the continent has, in the modern day, been chiefly an intra-national political characteristic of the various Latin American republics. Argentina has, from as far back as 1852, been particularly free from foreign aggression and international conflict: The War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870); a minor dispute with Chile over the boundary of Patagonia (1899-1902); and the Chaco War; make up the country's total experience in this regard. Moreover, none of these conflicts were major in scope; none were pursued under the threat of annihilation or conquest at the hands of an aggressor.

There are important reasons for this void of war in Argentine history. To begin with, the country shares with all its immediate neighbors save Brazil a common language and cultural heritage. More important, Argentina, like all of Latin America, has been historically as well as geographically isolated from the major international conflicts as the modern day. Above all, it was spared from playing an active role in the First and Second World Wars. This was partly the result of the United States' felt mission to assume the role of a great protector for the entire Western Hemisphere, a role that, of course, has not been easy to relinquish.[18] But more important is the

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[18]Professor Lieuwen has written: "The actual military contribution made by Latin America to the Allied war effort was of little consequence. Only two nations, Brazil and Mexico, sent forces abroad, and these were token contributions--a Brazilian infantry division was sent to Italy in 1944, and a Mexican air squadron to the Philippines in 1945. Though some air and naval patrol work against axis submarines was conducted by individual nations off their own coasts, the major burden of hemispheric defense fell upon the United States. Washington was obliged to assign more than 100,000 men to the Latin American area during World War II." Edwin Lieuwen, United States Policy in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1965), 79-80.

fact that Argentina was never really committed to either side in either of the great wars of this century. During the First World War it maintained a strict neutrality and during the Second World War it was one of only two nations throughout Latin America to decline Lend-Lease agreements, bi-lateral or otherwise, with the United States.[19] Indeed, to the present day it shares little of the concern America has for the possible threat of foreign domination or aggression. It resides in that unique bloc of third-world nations that are immune from both the experience and the rhetoric of war. As one Latin American has written:

> An important factor in the total political pattern of Latin America is small-state nationalism, with its many defensive characteristics. The relations of many republics with the United States--and the resulting anti-Yankee attitudes--are prominent examples of this position. Such positions are unfortunately deterrents to effectiveness in the general political sense. But the fact must be faced that the republics are small units living in a world dominated by titans who draft the rules.[20]

It is not difficult to visualize how a major threat to the survival of the nation would alter those deterrents to political development which now exist in Argentina. In the first place, the military would be willingly restored to its proclaimed legal function, the defense of the nation from without instead of from within. The State would assume, with full legitimate power and with strong sentiments of support, the authoritative role in the economy and society that it does not now have. Large scale public investment and planning geared to the emergency would necessitate a rise in

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[19] Ibid., 79.

[20] R. A. Gomez, Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Random House, 1962), 112-113.

revenue and would thereby justify a forced alteration of present attitudes toward taxation, investment, and productivity. Present inflationary pressures would be brought under control through necessary or emergency measures of austerity. Confidence in the economy would be restored.

Such a crisis would automatically instill a belief of a common-national interest in the now cynical and aggrieved native Argentine, one that could be defined and even redefined, in terms of international affairs. It would foster that assertive or offensive type of nationalism so characteristic of post-war England, Russia, and the United States. War in the face of national survival would, above all, lay the ground work for the integration of a now isolated, yet highly significant group, industrial labor. This would be the bare significance of a major Argentine war.

CONCLUSION

The thesis that has been developed here has obvious policy implications for the domestic and foreign affairs of Argentina. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to trace those many implications it should be stated that the purpose here has not in any way been to condone or advocate war as a positive solution to Argentina's political crisis. This is maintained in spite of the almost certain fact that a national crisis of the proper magnitude--a war of national survival--would foster the same integrative forces that occurred in England, Russia, and the United States during the first half of the twentieth century. War has universally been, as the American President Madison observed, "the mother of executive aggrendizement" and in the midst of full scale war an overlay of legitimacy would unquestionably be given to the calculated and heretofore frustrated moves of the national authorities toward an ordered and planned Argentine economy and society.

The objection to an expedient or planned war however, far from being based on purely moral grounds, is raised in light of the historical reality in which Argentina finds itself. Briefly put, there are no international aggressors at loose in the world today. There is no great ideological conflict in which Argentina can assume an activist role. There is no great power on the continent or in the world for that matter that looms as a potential threat to the national survival of Argentina. It suffers the peculiar paradox of being a nation at peace with the world and at war with itself.

This explains the rather dismal failure of the military in justifying its political role over the past three decades on the grounds of its existence being necessary to the life of the nation. Indeed, even a "war-like" people embarking upon a frank policy of aggression are in need of some sort of historical justification for their belligerency and Argentina fails to qualify in both of these categories.

From a larger view it does not appear that even war and the imperatives of national defense can offer a lasting basis for the organization of society. As E. H. Carr has written:

> Any kind of state control or state planning automatically raises a number of questions which cannot be dismissed with a vague appeal to efficiency. The questions, Efficiency for What? and Planning for What? become acutely practical; for the answers to them determine our policy . . . . It is a tragedy of our generation that the only purpose for which planning is yet universally admitted as necessary and legitimate is the contingency of war . . . . The dilemma of this choice is, however, its transient and impermanent character. Neither a war economy nor a rearmament economy provides a conceivable basis for a lasting social order. War itself would not solve the problem--except for those whom it annihilated altogether. Whatever was left after the war would have to take up again the planning of a social and economic order directed to some other purpose, and judged by some other criterion, than that of efficiency for war.[1]

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[1] E. H. Carr, The New Society, 36-37.

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