The Mutual Compatibility of Whitehead's God and Actual Ocacasions With Respect to Temporality and Subjective Aim in Process and Reality

G. John Lucas
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THE MUTUAL COMPATIBILITY OF WHITEHEAD'S GOD AND ACTUAL OCCASIONS WITH RESPECT TO TEMPORALITY AND SUBJECTIVE AIM

IN PROCESS AND REALITY

G. John Lucas

Candidate

Philosophy

Department

Brian E. O'Neill

Dean

August 1, 1967

Date

Committee

Paul F. Schmidt

Chairman

M. F. Evans

R. A. Alexander
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BY

G. JOHN LUCAS

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I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Professor Paul F. Schmidt whose seminar in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead first brought to my attention the problem which is the topic of this thesis. As a result of this seminar, I became interested in an exciting intellectual problem. The pursuit of the solution to this problem has made this thesis a challenging and rewarding intellectual experience rather than the academic drudgery which it might have been.
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ABBREVIATIONS

In accordance with the standard notation for Whitehead's philosophical works, all references to *Process and Reality*, after the initial reference, will denote that work simply by PR.
INTRODUCTION

The inquiry into Whitehead's philosophy of which this thesis is the result began with the first reading of *Process and Reality*. Although the issue which is the center of concern here is quite different from the difficulty which characterized the initial stages of the inquiry, the two have much in common since the former has grown out of the latter. The initial difficulties with the position of *Process and Reality* have undergone successive modifications as a greater understanding of that position was achieved, and the final modification and formulation of these initial difficulties are the subject of this thesis.

The inquiry begins and ends with an attempt to understand and evaluate Whitehead's assertion that "the description of the generic character of an actual entity should include God, as well as the lowliest actual occasion, though there is a specific difference between the nature of God and that of any occasion."\(^1\) The task is to determine whether Whitehead makes good this claim; that is, whether the specific differences between God and actual occasions are compatible with their common generic character.

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There are several features which have characterized the discussion at all stages:

1) The discussion is confined to Process and Reality.

2) The principal aim is an internal critique of that work.

3) The fundamental approach is to assume that Whitehead makes good his claim in Process and Reality, and to test this assumption in terms of the demands which Whitehead sets in that work.

4) The primary source of difficulty is the fact that God and actual occasions mutually prehend each other.

The initial decision to limit the discussion to Process and Reality was grounded in the limited aim to understand that one work. However, this initially arbitrary limitation has been retained for reasons which arise from the broader features of Whitehead's philosophy and the position of Process and Reality in his philosophy. The result is that problems which arise in Process and Reality must also find their solutions in that work.

The principal aim at all stages has been directed towards understanding rather than criticism. The discussion is, therefore, internal; that is, it proceeds in the same terms and scope as Process and Reality. Those demands which serve as the guidelines of both understanding and criticism are those which are inherent in the position set forth in Process and Reality. The understanding of this philosophical scheme is best served by such an internal treatment. Furthermore, such criticism as
might result in such a discussion would, in Whitehead's terms, constitute a refutation rather than an abandonment of the philosophical scheme. ²

It is assumed at the outset that Whitehead does make good his claim that God and actual occasions are alike actual entities. The implications of this assumption are worked out in an effort to understand the meaning of this assertion in terms of the position in Process and Reality, and these implications are then tested against the demands of Whitehead's position.

This discussion is limited in its approach to the compatibility of God and actual occasions. Those aspects of this problem which are of concern here are those which arise from the mutual prehensions which God and actual occasions have of each other. In particular, the issue centers about those aspects of these mutual prehensions which involves temporality and subjective aim.

²PR, p. 9.
THE SOURCES

The initial decision to limit this inquiry to the text of Process and Reality was based upon the limited aim of understanding that work rather than the broader features of Whitehead's philosophy. Although this limitation might be retained on the same basis, there are certain features of Whitehead's philosophical development and the place of Process and Reality in that development which suggest that the problems which arise in the scheme of Process and Reality must be resolved within the scope of that work before the discussion can be expanded to the relevant texts in Whitehead's other works. Of particular importance for this discussion is the relationship of Process and Reality to Science in the Modern World, Religion in the Making and Adventures of Ideas.

Process and Reality occupies a central position in Whitehead's philosophy. With respect to the earlier works, it is the final stage in the later phase of his philosophical writings. It is the "admitted culmination" of Whitehead's "earlier speculation," and it contains "the material derived from years of meditation." With respect to the later


4PR, p. x.

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works, Process and Reality also occupies a central position. Adventures of Ideas for example, deals with essentially the same position as Process and Reality. Although it may elaborate on this position, the fundamental elements are unchanged since "after PR [Process and Reality] no novel departures occur in Whitehead's system of philosophy." Thus, Process and Reality represents the final stage in the development of Whitehead's philosophy of organism. The central position which Process and Reality occupies in the development of Whitehead's thought has given rise to two widely divergent approaches to his position.

One point of view is that "the clearest approach to Whitehead's work in Process and Reality is by way of the earlier speculation upon which it is founded." This approach entails the fundamental disposition that the assumption that a reasonable amount of philosophical training constitutes sufficient preparation and license for appraising Whitehead's philosophy... is not only unwarranted; it is, in my opinion, wholly in error. The correlative assumption that one need not acquaint oneself with the works produced by Whitehead before Process and Reality in order to read that work competently is also in error.

Thus, in Lawrence's view the discussion in Process and Reality can be understood only after the position in Whitehead's earlier works has been

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6Lawrence, p. xix.

7Ibid., p. xiv.
mastered. He founds his position in two features of Whitehead's philosophical development; that is, that *Process and Reality* is both "the great expansion and revision" of the earlier works.  

*Process and Reality* stands as the last step in a series of successive revisions in Whitehead's position. His successive works exhibit a true development; that is, his position gradually evolves from work to work. Some elements change, but others remain constant as the problems which Whitehead confronts gradually shift from their initial simplicity to their final complexity in *Process and Reality*. Thus, the chronological treatment of Whitehead's philosophy is not to be regarded as a mere history, therefore, but rather as a genuine introduction, a method of approach to a complex problem, beginning with a treatment of the problem in its most elementary form.  

This development of Whitehead's position is accompanied by its expansion. The scope of *Process and Reality* is greater than that of the earlier works. In Lawrence's opinion this makes these earlier works a valuable aid in the interpretation of *Process and Reality* since these works present 

Whitehead's views in the period of inception, when the scope of his interests was smaller than it was in *Process and Reality*, and when the presentation of his views was correspondingly less difficult to penetrate.  

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8Ibid.  
9Ibid., p. xix.  
10Ibid., p. xv.
Thus, Lawrence observes that the earlier works are more elementary and less complete treatments of the issues in *Process and Reality*, and from this he argues that *Process and Reality* can only be understood by way of these earlier works.

On the other hand, it has been maintained that *Process and Reality* is "the magnum opus central to an understanding of Whitehead's mature metaphysical position."\(^{11}\) In particular "SMW [Science and the Modern World] and RM [Religion in the Making] do not constitute an adequate introduction to Whitehead, but rather, depend upon a prior knowledge of PR [Process and Reality]."\(^{12}\) Although "we should accept at face value Whitehead's statement... that he is endeavoring to 'compress the material derived from years of meditation,'"\(^{13}\) *Process and Reality* "must remain the indispensable book."\(^{14}\) Among Whitehead's works only *Process and Reality* "states the ideas in their theoretical completeness."\(^{15}\) It is "the full metaphysical scheme" which follows his earlier works.\(^{16}\)

Although both approaches to *Process and Reality* have certain advantages, the latter approach which takes *Process and Reality* as

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\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 2.

\(^{13}\)Lowe, in Schilpp, p. 91.

\(^{14}\)Ibid., p. 118.

\(^{15}\)Ibid.

the point from which one must begin has been found to be the most helpful for the particular point which is in question here. The decision to opt for this approach to *Process and Reality* rather than Lawrence's reflects the fundamental difference between the problems of Lawrence's thesis and this one.

This thesis centers around the relationship of God and actual occasions as like members of the category of actual entities within the Categoreal Scheme. The fundamental assumption here is that those works which do not deal with the fundamental notions; God, actual occasion, actual entity and the Categoreal Scheme, are not useful in resolving problems which arise in a position which presupposes these notions. Therefore, the discussion is limited, at least, to works after *Science and the Modern World* since the notion of God is not introduced prior to that work.  

Further, the discussion is limited to *Process and Reality* since only this work deals with the Categoreal Scheme. Thus, this thesis is just such a "final evaluation" which "should be made with respect to *Process and Reality*."  

Lawrence, on the other hand, is concerned with a wider issue which by its nature entails the full scope of Whitehead's work. His concern is primarily with Whitehead's development. *Process and Reality* is the final stage in this development. It is, therefore, appropriate that Lawrence should find that, for his purpose, the proper

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approach to *Process and Reality* is through the earlier works. For Lawrence's purposes *Process and Reality* is understood when it is seen as the final revision and expansion of the persistent problems which give rise to the development of Whitehead's philosophy.\(^{19}\)

Thus, although Lawrence's approach to *Process and Reality* is no doubt appropriate for his thesis, the nature of the problem here requires a different interpretation of Whitehead's development. The position here is that the general features of Whitehead's development tend to isolate the works from one another. The relationship of *Process and Reality* to *Science and the Modern World, Religion in the Making* and *Adventures of Ideas* is particularly important here, and it has been found that none of these works is particularly valuable for resolving problems which arise in *Process and Reality*. There are three broad features of Whitehead's development upon which this position is founded.

Even within the limited scope of *Science and the Modern World, Religion in the Making* and *Process and Reality*, Whitehead's philosophy exhibits a true development; that is, the fundamental notions in his position persist although they undergo successive revisions and modifications from work to work. The notion of God undergoes just such an evolution in Whitehead's works, and it is particularly important for this discussion to take account of the development of Whitehead's notion of God.

\(^{19}\)Lawrence, pp. xiii-xix.
Although Whitehead introduces the notion of God prior to Process and Reality, the final formulation which appears in that work represents a significant departure from the notions of God which appear in the earlier works. Although both Science and the Modern World and Religion in the Making contain significant stages in the development of Whitehead's God, neither work deals with this notion in the complete form which appears in Process and Reality. Both works fall short of the complete exposition of the consequent nature of God which appears in Process and Reality.  

Thus, although the position in Process and Reality is grounded in the positions of the earlier works, these positions are not the same. The greater the extent that Process and Reality has gone beyond the position of the earlier works, the greater the difficulty in applying the various discussions in these earlier works to Process and Reality and

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20 Lowe, in Schilpp, p. 98.

conversely. Thus, Whitehead's development tends, in this case, to isolate *Process and Reality* from his earlier works.

A similar conclusion has been arrived at from the observation that *Process and Reality* has a greater scope than any of Whitehead's other writings. In the case of his earlier works their incompleteness is accompanied by the development mentioned above. The earlier works are, therefore, not related to *Process and Reality* as parts to a whole. However, even if there were no development of the position and a work were related to *Process and Reality* as a part to the whole, the latter would still be the primary source. *Adventures of Ideas*, for example, contains "no novel departures" from the position of *Process and Reality*. Only *Process and Reality* "states the ideas in their theoretical completeness," and therefore, it "must always remain the indispensal book." 22

A further consideration in approaching *Process and Reality* is Whitehead's tendency towards neologisms. The resulting language of *Process and Reality* is, in itself, an obstacle to the reader. 23 However, it gives rise to further difficulties when one attempts to relate to the discussions in his various works. The language of *Process and Reality* is unique to that work, and the reader who wishes to bring other of Whitehead's works to bear on a discussion is faced with the difficulty of "translating" one of the two texts in order to make the comparison

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22 Lowe, in Schilpp, p. 118.  
23 Sherburne, pp. 2-3.
intelligible. In *Science and the Modern World*, for example, some of the terminology of *Process and Reality* begins to appear; however, "Whitehead has not yet, at this point, got his labels fixed," and only with *Process and Reality* "a determinate terminology is introduced."\(^{24}\)

Thus, the language of *Process and Reality* also tends to isolate that work from the others. Although it is possible to overcome this difficulty with the language of the various works, the manner in which the terms in *Process and Reality* function must be determined before the equivalent terms in other discussions can be uncovered.

There are, therefore, three aspects of Whitehead's development which tend to isolate *Process and Reality* from his other works. The three are closely related since they each reflect some aspect of this development; however, it is sufficient for this discussion to deal with them as separable. The difficulties which are raised by these features of Whitehead's development are certainly not insurmountable, but the fundamental position here is that the difficulties which arise in *Process and Reality* must be resolved in terms of that work as a first step in overcoming these difficulties. Therefore, *Process and Reality* must itself be understood before its position in relation to the other works can be determined.

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\(^{24}\) Lowe, in Schilpp, p. 97.
Thus, the expansion of the discussion of God to works other than *Process and Reality* could be accomplished only if *Process and Reality* were without difficulties at this point. However, it is at just this point that the Categorial Scheme has been judged as inadequate.\(^{25}\)

The coherence of God has also been challenged in terms of the Categorial Scheme, and a modification of the notion of God presented in an attempt to achieve greater coherence.\(^{26}\) This thesis will attempt to resolve certain of the difficulties with Whitehead's God with a minimum of departure from the position of *Process and Reality*.

\(^{25}\text{Lowe, p. 37.}\) \(^{26}\text{Cobb, pp. 176-177.}\)
A NOTE ON THE TEXT

The reader of Process and Reality must always cope with the difficulties imposed by the language resulting from Whitehead's tendency towards the use of neologisms. However, this thesis encounters a further difficulty with the language of Process and Reality. The distinction between actual occasions and actual entities is crucial to the topic of this thesis, and in many instances Whitehead's treatment of these two notions tends to foster ambiguity.

This difficulty has its foundation in the introduction of the terms actual entity and actual occasion in the Categorical Scheme. Although the two terms are used almost synonymously, a strict identification of the two would provide a solution to the problem of this thesis which is clearly at odds with Whitehead's intentions. The difficulty lies in the ability to discern which passages apply to both actual occasions and actual entities by virtue of the similarity of the two resulting from the participation of the former in the latter, and which passages apply only to actual occasions by virtue of their being something more than actual entities.

\[27\text{Sherburne, pp. 2-3.} \quad 28\text{PR, p. 32} \quad 29\text{PR, p. 28.}\]
Whitehead makes specific reference to the conditions which govern the use of the terms actual entity and actual occasion at two points in the text:

The term 'actual occasion' is used synonymously with 'actual entity;' but chiefly when its character of extensiveness has some direct relevance to the discussion. 30

and,

In the subsequent discussion, 'actual entity' will be taken to mean a conditioned actual entity of the temporal world; that is, an actual occasion unless God is expressly included in the discussion. The term 'actual occasion' will always exclude God from its scope. 31

The former remark is by far the more significant of the two. It provides valuable information about the specific categorial relationship of actual occasions to actual entities, and it provides, therefore, one of the most explicit criteria for determining whether a particular discussion is applicable to all actual entities or only to actual occasions. The latter remark, on the other hand, contains no specific information about the categorial relationship of actual entities and actual occasions, but rather imposes a rigid textual division on Process and Reality. However, there are several features of Process and Reality which make it very difficult to take this rigid division of the text seriously.

The nature of Whitehead's exposition is decidedly not linear. Topics are not treated in serial order. Rather, the scheme is

30PR, p. 119. 31PR, p. 135.
developed in the successive recurrence of topics previously treated with each recurrence throwing some new light on the scheme and the particular notions in it. The unity, meaning and relevance of the philosophical scheme is to be found in these various repetitions and elucidations of the fundamental notions which arise from their "confrontation with the various topics of experience." 32

If the text were divided in the fashion suggested by Whitehead, a linear element would be imposed upon it. Although it is possible that Whitehead might have made such a division, it hardly seems likely since the whole texture of Process and Reality suggests a "radial" rather than a "linear" treatment. 33 This view is also substantiated by various specific passages which appear on either side of this attempted division of Process and Reality.

For example, the Categories of Explanation attribute concrescence or process to actual entities. 34 In a later passage it is made clear that concrescence applies to God and actual occasions alike. 35 However, the most complete discussion of concrescence appears in Chapter X of Part II, Process. 36 Although God is not "expressly included in the discussion," this discussion is certainly applicable to

32 PR, p. vii.
33 Lawrence, p. xx.
34 PR, pp. 33-36.
35 PR, p. 54.
36 PR, pp. 317-328.
God. This, like other discussions of actual entities, must be evaluated in terms of the relevance of extensiveness to the discussion, or more generally, in terms of the difference between actual occasions and actual entities in order to determine whether it is applicable to God. Thus, each discussion of actual entities and actual occasions must be evaluated to determine whether it applies to God regardless of where it appears in the text, unless God is explicitly mentioned in connection with the discussion.

Thus, the inelegance in Whitehead's terminology which arises from the largely synonymous use of the terms "actual entity" and "actual occasion" must be dealt with in terms of the difference in the fundamental notions represented by these two terms, rather than by any arbitrary division of the text.
THE GROUNDS OF COMPATIBILITY

The aim of this thesis is an internal critique of Whitehead's notion of God as a member of the first category of existence, actual entities. The grounds on which the compatibility of God and actual occasions within this category will be judged must, therefore, be those which Whitehead articulates in Process and Reality. This is taken to mean that both God and actual occasions must satisfy the demands of the category of actual entities, and in so doing satisfy the other categorial demands of the Categorial Scheme and the demands of speculative philosophy.

Whitehead describes four demands which a scheme of speculative philosophy must meet. "The philosophical scheme should be coherent, logical, and, in respect to its interpretation, applicable and adequate," where "interpretation" means that every item of experience "shall have the character of a particular instance of the general scheme."[37] The concern here centers about the first two of these requirements; that is, the "rational side" of Whitehead's cosmology "which is expressed by the terms 'coherent' and 'logical'."[38] Thus, the compatibility of God and actual occasions is taken here to mean

37 PR, p. 4.
38 PR, p. 5.
that the "interpretation" of God and actual occasions as actual entities must be both coherent and logical with respect to the philosophical scheme which must also exhibit these properties.

The demand that the philosophical scheme be coherent holds at all levels in that scheme. "'Coherence,' as here employed, means that the fundamental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that in isolation they are meaningless." 39 Coherence also means that "the process, or concrescence, of any one actual entity involves the other actual entities among its components." 40 Thus, the demand of coherence requires not only that there be no "arbitrary disconnection of first principles," 41 but also that there be no isolated or disconnected existents, actual entities.

The second demand of rationality is that the philosophical scheme be logical. Like the demand of coherence, this demand also applies both to the first principles of the scheme and to the particular actual entities. The fundamental notions of the Categorial Scheme must be logical, where "the term 'logical' has its ordinary meaning, including 'logical' consistency, or lack of contradiction." 42 Further, particular actual entities must exhibit self-consistency and lack of contradiction. Nothing which is actual can be inconsistent. An actual entity must be consistent both with respect to those elements which function in its own

39PR, p. 5.  
40PR, p. 10.  
41PR, p. 9.  
42PR, p. 5.
self-determination, The Category of Subjective Unity, and with respect to the function of an actual entity's functioning in the determination of other actualities, The Category of Objective Unity. That is, an actual entity must be free from contradiction both as a subject and as an object. 43

The compatibility of God and actual occasions involves the demands of coherency and logical consistency at the most specific and the most general levels of the philosophical scheme. The notions of God and actual occasion must be both coherent and logical. Further, they must be coherent and logical as members of the category of actual entities.

These demands involve the entire Categorical Scheme since the Categorical Scheme itself must be coherent and logical. Further, since the category of actual entities requires the entire Categorical Scheme by virtue of the coherence of that scheme, the participation of God and actual occasions in the category of actual entities cannot involve any violation of either the logical consistency or the coherency of the Categorical Scheme.

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43 PR, p. 39.
THE METHOD OF INQUIRY

The aim of this thesis is to deal with the notions of God, actual occasion and actual entity in a manner which preserves, to the greatest extent possible, Whitehead's position and intent in Process and Reality. Thus, the goal is an interpretation of these notions which will not compromise either the Categorial Scheme, or the common "generic character" of God and actual occasions.\textsuperscript{44} The principal concern is whether the common generic character of God and actual occasions can be maintained without contradiction within the Categorial Scheme. The primary source of difficulty is taken here to be the notion that God and actual occasions are both actual entities. The Categorial Scheme and the demands of speculative philosophy are not themselves questioned, but rather they are used as the standard by which the notions of God, actual occasion and actual entity are judged.\textsuperscript{45}

Thus, the Categorial Scheme is assumed to be coherent, logical, applicable and adequate at the outset, and this assumption is not questioned here. Further, the account of God and actual occasions is taken here to be accurate. The appeal here is to the demands of speculative philosophy and the Categorial Scheme, and not to experiential evidence

\textsuperscript{44}PR, p. 168. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{45}See above, pp. 18020.
concerning God or the other notions relevant to this discussion. Any difficulties which arise from Whitehead's notions of God, actual occasion and actual entity will, therefore, be resolved by an interpretation of these notions which is consistent with both the demands of Whitehead's position and his explicit remarks about these notions. If such an interpretation is not possible, then the objection which stems from these difficulties must stand.

It should be noted that in approaching this aspect of Whitehead's position no priority is assumed among the notions God, actual occasion and actual entity. All three are taken to be equally suspect. Any one of the three may be the source of difficulty. "The only conclusion to be drawn, when a contradiction issues from a train of reasoning, is that at least one of the premises involved in the inference is false. It is not to be ... rashly assumed that the peecant premise can at once be located." 46 This is particularly important in this discussion since there are several features of Whitehead's position which incline one to attribute difficulties primarily to the notion of God.

It has already been noted that Whitehead uses the terms "actual entity" and "actual occasion" in a rather inelegant manner. 47 His largely synonymous use of these terms presents a strong temptation to identify the two. However, if the two notions are identified, the notion

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46 PR, p. 12.  
47 See above, pp. 14-17.
of God must be excluded from the first category of existence since "the term 'actual occasion' will always exclude God from its scope." If this position is taken, it is natural to attempt to reconcile the difficulty solely through a modification of the notion of God since the other two notions are taken to be wholly compatible.

A similar bias can be founded in the numerical dominance of actual occasions in the category of actual entities. There are many actual occasions and only one God. God is the singular opposite to the multitude of actual occasions in the temporal world. This too provides a natural temptation to attribute difficulties with the compatibility of God and actual occasions as actual entities to the notion of God.

The approach here denies the validity of either of these arguments, and maintains that each of the three notions is equally suspect. The notion of God cannot be singled out as the source of difficulty either because of the inelegance of certain passages in *Process and Reality*, or because actual occasions are more numerous than God. The decision as to which notion is the source of difficulty must be made in terms of the demands of speculative philosophy and the Categorial Scheme.

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48 *PR*, p. 135.
THE ROLE OF IDEAL OPPOSITES

Much of the difficulty with Whitehead's assertion that God and actual occasions are alike actual entities arises from the fact that Whitehead couples this assertion of categorial similarity with the assertion that the two have specific differences within this category. The common generic character of God and actual occasions, the World, must be reconciled with their relationship to each other as "ideal" or "final opposites." This has been, perhaps, the most difficult with the ideal opposites, God and the World; however, the problem is by no means unique to the category of actual entities.

Whitehead lists several other pairs of ideal opposites in his discussion of that notion which also find their place in the Categorial Scheme. The final opposites "disjunction and conjunction -- that is to say, the many in the one" are fundamental to the category of The Ultimate which is "the ultimate metaphysical principle, . . . the advance from disjunction to conjunction" presupposed in the other categories.

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49 See also Appendix 1, pp. 87-89.  
50 PR, p. 188.  
51 PR, p. 518.  
52 PR, p. 518.  
53 PR, pp. 32-33.
and the ideal opposites would be sufficient to establish the notion of ideal opposites as a central doctrine in Whitehead's organism by virtue of the fundamental place of the Category of the Ultimate in his position. However, there are other pairs of ideal opposites which are represented in the Categorial Scheme and, therefore, lend support to this view.

The ideal opposites "freedom and necessity."\(^{54}\) are taken here as the Category of Freedom and Determinism.\(^{55}\) The ideal opposites "flux and permanence"\(^{56}\) can be variously attributed to several of the Categories of Explanation. The "flux" is taken here to be the process of concrescence by which an actual entity becomes; the "permanence," the satisfaction which is the result of this becoming. This pair of ideal opposites could be dealt with in terms of many of the Categories of Explanation which deal with these aspects of actuality. The best choice is, perhaps, the eighth Category of Explanation which requires two descriptions of an actual entity.\(^{57}\)

These particular ideal opposites have, therefore, a rather important role in the Categorial Scheme; however, this notion is taken here to be far more important than its brief treatment in Process and Reality\(^{58}\) and its role in the Categorial Scheme would seem to indicate.

\(^{54}\)P\(R\), p. 518. \(^{55}\)P\(R\), p. 41. \(^{56}\)P\(R\), p. 518.

\(^{57}\)P\(R\), p. 34. \(^{58}\)P\(R\), pp. 512-518.
The notion of ideal opposites is taken here to be a fundamental element in Whitehead's metaphysical position. It is this notion which enables Whitehead to deal with the perennial philosophical antitheses, and it is, therefore, a principal feature of his "basic metaphysical orientation." 59

God and the World are, therefore, but one of many pairs of ideal opposites. The fact that God and actual occasions exhibit both categorial similarity and specific differences simply reflects their character as ideal opposites. Although the difficulties inherent in the notion of ideal opposites must be resolved in the case of God and the World, it is not unique to that pair of ideal opposites. It must be faced throughout the Categorial Scheme. The notions of God and the World can be grasped in their proper perspective only when these notions are seen to be a particular instance of the general notion of ideal opposites.

The ideal opposites exhibit both of the characteristics which insure a philosophy's rationality; they are both logical and coherent. The poles of the traditional antitheses which form the basis for the ideal opposites are reconceived in such a manner as to require each other; that is, in such a manner as to be coherent. 60 The ideal opposites also differ from the traditional notions in that the ideal opposites are free from contradiction. 61

59Lowe, p. 58. 60Lowe, p. 58. 61Lowe, pp. 255-258.
As Lowe points out, Whitehead's notion of ideal opposites is subject to certain difficulties. However, the "standing danger" which accompanies the notion of ideal opposites is not inherent in Whitehead's position. This danger is taken here to stem from the importation of the traditional notions into Whitehead's reconceived ideal opposites. The concepts which Whitehead couples as ideal opposites are not the traditional notions but rather his reconception of these notions. The principal danger in this approach arises from the fact that the traditional concepts might be carried over into Whitehead's ideal opposites; thus, attributing characteristics to the ideal opposites which more properly represent the traditional antitheses. This importation of traditional notions is a great danger to both the consistency and coherency of the ideal opposites.

This problem is particularly acute in the case of the ideal opposites, God and the World. In a philosophy already crowded with neologisms, it is unfortunate that Whitehead retains the term "God." It might easily have been a greater help than a hindrance to substitute a term less highly charged with meaning as he did in substituting the "more neutral term 'prehension'" for perception.

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63 PR, p. 81.
THE TEMPORAL PROBLEM

The general question of the categorial compatibility of God and actual occasions as actual entities is a good deal wider than the concern here. This larger issue is discussed in some detail by Christian, \(^6^4\) and his treatment is taken as fundamental for this discussion. \(^6^5\) This thesis is concerned with the more particular issue of compatibility with respect to time and subjective aim. This section will deal only with the first of these, temporal compatibility.

The aim of this section is to demonstrate that time or temporality is not a categorial differentia; that is, that although actual occasions are temporal and God is non-temporal, the differences resulting from these two relationships to time do not amount to a categorial difference.

It should be noted that a complete treatment of Whitehead's theory of time is not required here. Although the place of time in the


\(^6^5\)It should be noted that although Christian's more general remarks are generally accepted here, there are points of fundamental disagreement in his treatment of God and time. Each of these points will be dealt with as they arise in the treatment of Whitehead's position.
philosophy of organism is of paramount importance for this discussion, certain details of his treatment such as the metrics of space and time are not germane to this discussion. A more complete treatment of Whitehead's theory of time is found in Hammerschmidt's work on the subject. 66

In the next section another aspect of time will be considered in conjunction with subjective aim. That discussion will deal with the manner in which the non-temporal entity, God, provides relevant possibilities for the temporal entities, the World.

The Categorial Scheme

Before proceeding with the more detailed arguments, it is instructive to follow Whitehead's lead and make an "anticipatory sketch" of the results by examining the Categorial Scheme.

The categorial compatibility of God and actual occasions as actual entities with respect to time clearly depends upon four notions: actual entity, actual occasion, God, and time. If this compatibility is to be maintained, it is a necessary, although perhaps not sufficient, condition that of these four notions only the notion of actual entity be represented in the Categorial Scheme.

Actual entities certainly have the status of a category in the Categorreal Scheme. However, the status of actual occasions in the Categorreal Scheme is somewhat more problematical. Although actual occasions are introduced in the first Category of Existence with actual entities, the notion of actual occasions is not seen here as constituting a category. The synonymous use of actual entity and "actual occasions" is for the most part "only an inelegance in use of terms."  

The notions of God and time are not introduced in the exposition of the Categorreal Scheme. Rather, they are derivative notions. God is systematically introduced as a derivative notion. Time is also taken to be a derivative notion by virtue of its relationship to extension which is a derivative notion. Actual occasion is also taken to be a derivative notion by virtue of its relationship to extension and the derivative character of this extension.

Thus, actual entities constitute a category, but actual occasions, time and God are derivative notions which do not have the status of categories. This position is implicit in the Categorreal Scheme in the case of God and time which are not mentioned in this most systematic exposition.

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67 PR, p. 32. 68 See above, pp. 14-17. 70Christian, p. 300. 71 PR, pp. 30-42.
69 PR, p. 32. 72 PR, p. 46. 73 PR, pp. 442-443. 74 PR, p. 53.
75 PR, p. 119.
of Whitehead's position. The subsequent discussion will have the purpose of justifying this position in the larger context of Process and Reality.

As is apparent from the above examination of the Categorial Scheme, the most difficult task is to properly interpret the relationship between actual entities and actual occasions. Much of the subsequent discussion is, therefore, directed towards the interpretation of these notions. The notions of actual entity and actual occasion are examined in an effort to determine the differentia which distinguishes these two notions. The nature of this differentia is shown to be such that it does not constitute a categorial differentia, and the notions of extension and time are related to this differentia in such a manner as to deny categorial status to both time and extension.

**Time and Extension**

The notion of extension plays a major role in Whitehead's treatment of actual occasions. Extensiveness is a principal feature of an actual occasion's being in the World.

The extensive relations . . . represent the systematic scheme which is involved in the real potentiality from which every actual occasion arises. This scheme is also involved in the attained fact which every actual occasion is.\(^76\)

\(^{76}\)PR, p. 441.
That is, the character of extensiveness is evident in an actual occasion as subject and object. The actual occasion arises from a world which has extension and takes its place as an extended being in that extended world.

Extension appears in Whitehead's treatment as the principal differentia between actual occasions and actual entities. 77 Extension is a characteristic of actual occasions but not of actual entities. This notion must, therefore, be examined to determine whether or not it amounts to a categorial differentia.

It has been noted above 78 that extension is introduced as a derivative notion which follows from the nature of the world and not from the Categorial Scheme. 79 This position is grounded in the nature of extension. Extension is not a primative term in Whitehead's organism. The origin of extension is now examined in an effort to demonstrate that it is indeed not a categorial notion.

An actual occasion's extensiveness is characterized by the divisibility of its satisfaction. It is the "divisibility" of the "concrete satisfaction" which "constitutes" the "extensiveness" of an actual occasion. 80 Although it may entail some distortion of Whitehead's position, the divisibility of the concrete satisfaction of an actual occasion might be termed a necessary condition of its extensiveness.

77PR, p. 119.  
78See above, pp. 29-31.  
80PR, pp. 107-108.
Whitehead distinguishes three sorts of division in *Process and Reality*. There is the division of the extensive continuum by actual occasions, 81 and there are the two ways of dividing the satisfaction of an actual entity; genetic division and coordinate division. 82 The division by virtue of which an actual entity is extensive is the division of the satisfaction. This division must, therefore, be either genetic or coordinate division rather than the division of the extensive continuum.

The genetic division of an actual entity is the division of the actual entity in its character as an instance of "becoming." It exhibits the actual entity in its character as a process. This sort of division treats the actual entity as a concrescence and shows it to be "a growth from phase to phase." 83

Coordinate division, on the other hand, is concerned with the actual entity in its character as an instance of "being." "Coordinate division is division of the concrete." 84 Since it is the division of the "concrete satisfaction" which gives rise to its extensiveness, 85 it is coordinate divisibility which results in the extensiveness of actual occasions. Thus, "the extensive continuum is derived from this coordinate divisibility." 86

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81 PR, p. 124.  
82 PR, p. 433.  
83 PR, pp. 433-434.  
84 PR, p. 433.  
85 PR, p. 108.  
86 PR, p. 469.
Thus, it is the "creature" which is extensive while "its act of becoming is not extensive." Where the creature is taken here to be the actual entity in its character of concrete satisfaction, and its act of becoming is taken here to be the actual entity in its character as a process of concrescence. Coordinate division applies to the former; genetic division, to the latter.

Although extension is not mentioned in the Categorical Scheme, there is an explicit reference to division in the tenth Category of Explanation. Further, the eighth Category of Explanation describes two sorts of descriptions of actual entities which might be construed as the two sorts of division of actual entities. If coordinate division is, in fact, implicit in either of these categories, its correlate, extension, would also share this categorial status. The relationship between coordinate division and these two categories must, therefore, be examined.

There are two interpretations of division which would be compatible with the assertion that extension is not a categorial notion. First, it could be allowed that division, including coordinate division, is represented in the Categorical Scheme, but that coordinate division is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for extension. Second, it could be allowed that division is represented in the Categorical Scheme, but that

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87PR, p. 433. 88PR, pp. 34-35.
this categorial reference does not include coordinate division. The
decision here has been to opt for the latter point of view.

The first of these two interpretations rests upon the distinction
between division as a necessary condition for extension, and division
as a sufficient condition for extension. The applicability of this distinc-
tion to the notions of division and extension seems highly suspect.

Since "the extensive continuum is derived \textit{from this}
coordinate divisibility"\textsuperscript{39} and "this divisibility is what constitutes
\textit{its} \textit{extensiveness},"\textsuperscript{90} it seems
more likely that coordinate division is both a necessary and a sufficient
condition of extension. If this is the case, the second interpretation is
the only one consistent with Whitehead's position and the derivative char-
acter of extension. However, even if this assumption is in error, the
nature of coordinate division precludes its inclusion in either of the
categorical references mentioned above.

Although the tenth Category of Explanation refers simply to
"division,"\textsuperscript{91} the context in which this "division" is mentioned refers
clearly to genetic rather than coordinate division.

The distinction between genetic and coordinate division is grounded
in the distinction between the satisfaction of an actual entity as con cresc-
ent and the satisfaction as concrete.\textsuperscript{92} Division in its categorial

\textsuperscript{39}\textit{PR}, p. 469.
\textsuperscript{90}\textit{PR}, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{91}\textit{PR}, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{92}\textit{PR}, p. 433.
sense is an "analysis in terms of prehensions" which discloses the actual entity to be a "concrescence [italics mine] of prehensions." Thus, division in its categorial sense is identified here with genetic division alone.

The eighth Category of Explanation notes that there are two descriptions which are required for an actual entity: (a) one which is analytical of its potentiality for 'objectification' in the becoming of other actual entities, and (b) another which is analytical of the process which constitutes its own becoming.

Coordinate division might be likened to the first of these two descriptions; genetic division, to the latter. In the case of genetic division, the parallel seems to be quite accurate; however, in the case of coordinate division, it is not.

The description of an actual entity's potentiality for objectification in other actual entities is not identical with the coordinate division of one actual entity by another. One difference between the two is the difference between potentiality and actuality. The description of an actual entity's potentiality for objectification deals with all the possible objectifications of an actual entity. A coordinate division of an actual occasion, on the other hand, deals with a real potentiality; that is, with a particular actual objectification of an actual occasion.

It might be maintained that the description of an actual entity's potential for objectification is the class of its coordinate divisions.

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93PR, p. 35.  
94PR, p. 34.
However, this interpretation cannot be maintained since it does not take into account the objectification of each actual occasion in God. This will become evident in the discussion of objectification and coordinate division which follows.

The coordinate division of an actual entity is a "generic contrast." The two components of this contrast are the actual entity and a proposition which concerns the potentiality of that actual entity having arisen from an actual world different from the actual world from which it did in fact arise. 95 This proposition arises from the fact that any two actual occasions must have different actual worlds. 96 When a prehending actual occasion coordinately divides a prehended actual occasion the prehending occasion eliminates all those entities in the actual world of the prehended entity which are not in the actual world of the prehending actual occasion. The potentiality of an actual occasion arising from the junction of the actual worlds of the prehended and prehending actual occasions is the proposition which is one element in the generic contrast which is coordinate division. Thus, the objectification of actual occasions entails elimination by means of negative prehensions. 97

The objectification and divisibility of actual occasions are correlates. "The divisibility can thus only refer to its objectifications." 98

95PR, p. 437. 96PR, p. 321.
97PR, p. 364. 98PR, p. 364.
However, this is not the whole story. It is only in the temporal world that objectification requires coordinate division.

Categorically "objectification' refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality of one actual entity is realized in another actual entity. But categorial objectification need not entail coordinate division. Coordinate division is the result of the particular facts of the world rather than any categorial generality.

In the temporal world of actual occasions the ultimate evil is that "objectification involves elimination . . . but there is no reason of any metaphysical generality, why this should be the whole story. Thus, "in the temporal world, it is the empirical [italics mine] fact that process entails loss. This "loss" consists of those feelings in the satisfaction of an actual occasion which are negatively prehended in the objectification of that actual occasion in another actual occasion.

The loss which results from objectification in the temporal world is not without its categorial side. It is a categorial necessity that the objectification of actual occasions in other actual occasions entails abstraction.

This abstraction is required by the categorial condition for compatible synthesis in the novel unity. . . The other feelings are dismissed by negative prehensions, owing to their lack of compliance with categorial demands.

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99PR, p. 34.  
100PR, p. 517.  
101PR, p. 517.  
102PR, p. 102.
However, it must be noted that the empirical side of this issue is the more fundamental.

Given the empirical fact that "no two actual occasions can have identical worlds"\textsuperscript{103} it follows from the Categorical Scheme that the objectification of one actual entity in another must entail loss. That is, the regions or standpoints of all actual occasions are limited. This limited perspective, in conjunction with the Category of Subjective Unity results in the fact that objectification entails loss. Such abstraction is categorically necessary to insure that a novel entity is produced.\textsuperscript{104} Thus, although it is also the result of categorical demands, the primary reason that objectification entails loss is the empirical fact that actual occasions have limited perspectives. In this case it is indeed the exception which proves the rule.

God is the actual entity whose perspective is not limited. Heprehends all actual entities. Further, God'sprehension of an actual occasion does not entail loss. Actual occasions are objectified in God without loss. No feelings are abstracted from the satisfaction. The transfer of feeling is complete.\textsuperscript{105}

Thus, it is the empirical fact that actual occasions have limited actual worlds or perspectives which distinguishes them from actual

\textsuperscript{103} PR, p. 321.

\textsuperscript{104} Christian, p. 346.

\textsuperscript{105} Christian, pp. 346-348.
entities generally, and therefore from God which is the only actual entity which is not also an actual occasion. It is this limitation of perspective which is the differentia between actual occasions and actual entities, and this differentia is empirically, not categorically, founded.

This empirical difference between God and actual occasions is taken here as one instance of the more general observation that "in every respect God and the World move conversely to each other in respect to their process."¹⁰⁶ The limited perspective of actual occasions and the unlimited perspective of God are taken here as a manifestation of the relationship between God and the World which results from their being ideal opposites.

The manner in which an actual occasion's extensiveness, and ultimately its temporality, arises from the fact of its limited perspective will now be examined.

Consider an actual occasion, A, which prehends an actual occasion, B. The objectification of B in A requires that certain elements in the constitution of B be relegated to irrelevance by negative prehensions. "Some [italics mine] real component in the objectified entity assumes the role of being how that particular entity is a datum in the experience of the subject."¹⁰⁷ Thus, only some of the prehended actual occasion is objectified.

¹⁰⁶PR, p. 529. ¹⁰⁷PR, p. 97.
This elimination or abstraction is categorically necessary for the transfer of feeling, objectification, in the temporal world, and it is this abstraction which gives rise to the coordinate division of B by A.

In the temporal world, the world of finite perspectives, some feelings or prehensions of B are eliminated in the objectification of B in A. For example, B's prehension of the actual occasion, C, is eliminated in B's objectification in A. The coordinate division of B by A is not merely this elimination. It is the contrast between the actual occasion B and those elements of B which are objectified in A. The coordinate division is the contrast between an actual occasion, in this case B, and a "potential" occasion, in this case an actual occasion which might have arisen from an actual world which is in every respect identical with the actual world of B except for its exclusion of the actual occasion C.

The extensiveness of an actual occasion arises from this generic contrast, coordinate division. The extensiveness of the actual occasion B arises from the coordinate division of B by A by virtue of the effect of coordinate division upon B's duration. The actual occasion B has a class of contemporary actual occasions such that neither B nor its contemporaries are in each other's actual worlds. The proposition

which is the potentiality that B arose from an actual world which does not include C alludes to an actual occasion which includes C in its duration. The resulting contrast between the durations of the "actual B" and the "potential B" constitutes the extensiveness of the actual B.

Time is founded in the extensiveness of actual occasions. It is a "characteristic of nature which presupposes the scheme of extension."\(^{111}\) Although Whitehead's discussion of the relationship of time to extension states only that extension is presupposed in the notion of physical time, time and these extensive relations have been identified.\(^{112}\) This interpretation seems to be compatible with Whitehead's position. It is helpful to distinguish, as Hammerschmidt does, between space and time, and their properties.

Whitehead points out that the particular facts of time and space "cannot be derived from the sole notion of extension." Extension is neutral with respect to the number of spatial dimensions, the "sheer dimensionality of space," and the "seriality of time, unique or multiple."\(^{113}\) All of these properties of space-time are dependent upon the characteristics of the particular cosmic epoch.\(^ {114}\) However, Whitehead does not seem to question that extension will always be spatialized and temporalized. He states that extension includes "the

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\(^{111}\) PR, p. 443.  
\(^{112}\) Hammerschmidt, p. 87.  
\(^{113}\) PR, p. 442.  
\(^{114}\) Hammerschmidt, p. 87.
'extensiveness' of time and the 'extensiveness' of space, \(^{115}\) and that spatial and temporal extension are forms of extensiveness. \(^{116}\)

Although time and extension may not be related in such a manner that extension always entails its temporalization, time is certainly derivative from extension and by virtue of this fact time shares certain properties with extension.

Whitehead's notion of extension has been traced to its roots in objectification. The notion objectification is itself based upon the prehensions which actual occasions have of each other. \(^{117}\) Prehensions are categorically referred to as the "Concrete Facts of Relatedness." \(^{118}\)

By virtue of its derivation from objectification, and therefore prehension, extension shares this relational character.

Whitehead speaks of the "extensive relations . . . which determine conditions to which all transmission must conform," \(^{119}\) and the "'extensive' relations of the world." \(^{120}\)

Extension as such is a form of relatedness . . . that is, it is the most general scheme or structure exhibited by actualities whereby they stand in relationship to one another. \(^{121}\)

This view is founded in the fact that extension is derived from the prehensive relations of the world.

The relationship between prehension and extension accounts for the fact that it is the "creature" which is extensive and not "its act of becoming."\textsuperscript{122} The creature is the actual occasion in its character of concrete satisfaction. The act of becoming is the actual occasion in its character as a process of concrescence.

However, it is the actual entity in its character of satisfaction which is prehended by other actualities. It is the actual entity in its character as a satisfaction which constitutes what the actual entity is beyond itself.\textsuperscript{123} The actual entity in its character as satisfaction is how that actuality functions in the becoming of other actualities; that is, its objectifications.\textsuperscript{124}

The "act of becoming" of an actual occasion, on the other hand, is the "self-functioning" of that entity in its own "real internal constitution. It is the 'immediacy' of the actual entity."\textsuperscript{125} An actual entity in its 'immediacy,' its character as concrescence, cannot be prehended by other actualities since objectification entails reproduction,\textsuperscript{126} and such "repetition" is "contrary to 'immediacy'."\textsuperscript{127}

Thus, it is the creature which is prehended by other actualities. The act of becoming is not so prehended. By virtue of the fact that

\textsuperscript{122}PR, p. 107. \textsuperscript{123}PR, p. 134. \textsuperscript{124}PR, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{125}PR, p. 38. \textsuperscript{126}PR, p. 364. \textsuperscript{127}PR, p. 234.
extensiveness is founded in such prehensions, it is the creature and not its act of becoming which is extensive.

Further, since extension is a necessary condition of time, it is the actual occasion in its character as satisfaction which is temporal. The process of concrescence which is the actual occasion's act of becoming is not and cannot be temporal. Thus, "this genetic passage from phase to phase is not in physical time . . . the genetic process is not the temporal succession: such a view is exactly what is denied by the epochal theory of time."128

The discussion of time has been limited, to this point, to the relationship between time and extension; however, Whitehead mentions time in other contexts, and the import of these uses of time must now be examined.

Time as Causal Efficacy

The distinction between those aspects of time which arise from Whitehead's notion of causal efficacy and those aspects which arise from presentational immediacy is a principal feature of Whitehead's treatment of time in Process and Reality.129 The manner in which time arises from these notions does, therefore, deserve some consideration here.

128 PR, p. 434. 129 Hammerschmidt, p. 15.
Whitehead defines seven loci of occasions which are temporally associated with any actual occasion. These seven loci account for the important temporal notions; the past, the present and the future. The notion of causal efficacy accounts for six of these seven loci.  

Causal efficacy is a relationship which holds between actual entities. An actual entity, say A, is said to be causally efficacious in another actual entity, say B, when A is an element in the constitution of B. This relationship between A and B is fundamentally prehensive. Causal efficacy is but one mode of prehension. The particular sort of feelings which are involved in prehension in the mode of causal efficacy are elsewhere referred to as simple physical feelings.

Causal efficacy is, therefore, a form of objectification. The simple physical feelings which constitute causation involve objectification. In fact, "the objectifications express the causality by which the external world fashions the actual occasion." Although causal efficacy is based upon the categorial notions of prehension and objectification, the manner in which temporal notions are derived from the notion of causal efficacy is based largely upon the empirical observation that certain actual entities, actual occasions, have limited perspectives.

\[130^1\text{PR, pp. 486-487.}\]
\[131^1\text{PR, p. 177}\]
\[132^1\text{PR, p. 246.}\]
\[133^1\text{PR, p. 361.}\]
\[134^1\text{PR, p. 364.}\]
\[135^1\text{PR, p. 489.}\]
With respect to a given actual entity, say A, those actual entities which A prehends are in A's past. Those which prehend A are in its future. Those which neither prehend A nor are prehended by A are in A's present; that is, they are A's contemporaries. The definition of these loci of actual entities clearly requires that the actual entities involved have limited perspectives; that is, that they be actual occasions. If their perspectives were not limited the distinctions between past, present and future would be without foundation. The definitions of the past, present and future in terms of causal efficacy require that a given actual entity prehends and is prehended by only a limited number of other actual entities; that is, that the perspective is limited. If, as is the case with God, the perspective of an actual entity is not limited, then the notions of past, present and future do not apply to the relationships which an actual entity with unlimited perspective has to other actual entities. Thus, it is clear why Whitehead maintains that for "God there is no past."137

Thus, the temporal concepts; past, present and future, are derivative from the empirical fact that some actual entities have limited perspectives; that is, that they are actual occasions. Causal efficacy, like objectification, has temporal import as a categorial result of an empirical fact. The same argument also applies to the three loci defined in terms of the prehensive relationship between durations.

136PR, pp. 188-189. 137PR, p. 134.
The arguments of the preceding section concerning objectification\textsuperscript{138} apply also to causal efficacy since "perception in the mode of causal efficacy is but another name for the process by which the past becomes objectified in the present."\textsuperscript{139}

Time as Presentational Immediacy

The seventh "temporal" locus which is associated with any actual occasion is defined in terms of "presentational immediacy" rather than causal efficacy. The definition of the present in terms of causal efficacy is largely negative. The past and the future are defined by comprehensive relations between actual occasions, while the present is defined by the lack of these relations. In presentational immediacy this emphasis is reversed, and it is the present which is positively defined.\textsuperscript{140}

The nature of the relation which "positively" defines the presented locus of presentational immediacy is not altogether clear. It is evident, however, that this relation is not that of a "unison of becoming." The contemporary duration of an actual occasion is defined by this notion of concrescent union and although the contemporary duration includes the presented locus, the two are not identical since "the two notions, 'presented locus' and 'unison of becoming,' are distinct."\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{138}See above, pp. 31-45.

\textsuperscript{139}Christian, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{140}PR, pp. 189-190

\textsuperscript{141}PR, pp. 189-192.
The notion of presentational immediacy will not be fully explained here. Even a superficial survey of Whitehead's treatment of this notion is sufficient to reveal the nature of the temporal import of this notion.

Presentational immediacy, like causal efficacy, is a mode ofprehension.142 However, the prehensions which are the foundation of an actual occasion's presentational immediacy are not prehensions of its contemporaries. On the contrary, "[presentational immediacy'] deals with the same datum as does 'causal efficacy.'"143 The prehension by any actual occasion of occasions in its presented locus is contrary to the definition of that locus which lie within the actual occasions contemporary duration; a duration which is defined by the lack of such prehensions.144

Presentational immediacy is taken here, therefore, as one mode in which an actual occasion deals with its past actual world. The other mode in which this actual world is handled is causal efficacy. These two modes of prehension are not to be confused with the mode in which an entity is implicated in a concrescent entity. Categorically each entity in the universe of a concrescent entity can be implicated in only one mode. In the case of actual entities the only proper mode of implication is objectification.145 Thus, causal efficacy and presentational immediacy are

142 PR, p. 246.
143 PR, p. 262.
144 PR, pp. 189-192
145 PR, p. 24.
two modes of prehension in which a concrescent actual occasion deals with the objectification of its actual world in its concrescence.

In the case of causal efficacy, the mode of prehension could be distinguished from the temporal loci it defined. In the case of presentational immediacy no such separation seems possible. Thus, presentational immediacy is essentially a temporal notion. However, this temporal nature of presentational immediacy is grounded in empirical fact rather than categorial necessity.

Like causal efficacy, presentational immediacy gives rise to the temporal notion of the present only in a world of actual occasions; actual entities with limited perspectives. Presentational immediacy is the illumination of the contemporary world. This contemporary world is defined by the lack of causal influence between the actual occasion and its contemporaries. Without such contemporary, causally independent, occasions the notion of presentational immediacy would be empty. If an actual entity is to be mutually causally independent of other actual entities it is necessary that the entities involved prehend only a limited number of other actual entities; that is, that the actual entities in question are actual occasions, actual entities with limited perspectives.

It should be noted that causal efficacy is metaphysically more fundamental than presentational immediacy in Whitehead's system.

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146PR, p. 95.  
147Hammerschmidt, p. 92.
This view was implicit in the above argument which required the notion of "causal independence" to define the presented locus of presentational immediacy. Thus, presentational immediacy can also be shown to be dependent upon the empirical fact of limited perspectives because of the formal priority of causal efficacy which is in turn founded upon that empirical observation.

Further, presentational immediacy discloses a potential division of the extensive continuum.\textsuperscript{148} Thus, "presentational immediacy presupposes the notion of the extensive continuum."\textsuperscript{149} The extensive continuum has, however, been shown above to be grounded in the categorial implications of the empirical fact that some actual entities have limited perspectives.\textsuperscript{150}

Thus, the temporal notion of contemporaries as defined in terms of presentational immediacy is also derivative from the empirical differentia between actual occasions and actual entities.

God and Unison of Becoming

Whitehead's definition of durations is in terms of the notion of a "concrereal unison" or a "unison of becoming." In particular, actual occasions which are contemporaries are in a unison of becoming. Any two members of this duration are such that each is the contemporary

\textsuperscript{148}PR, pp. 96-97.  
\textsuperscript{149}Sherburne, p. 103.  
\textsuperscript{150}See above, pp. 31-45.
of the other; that is, no member of the contemporary duration prehends any other member of the contemporary duration. Unison of becoming is then essentially a temporal notion since it presupposes the limited perspectives which give rise to time and the other temporal notions.

Whitehead speaks of God as being "in unison of becoming with every other creative act." This, however, cannot be a rigorous use of this term. Since God prehends every actual occasion and every actual occasion prehends God, the causal independence essential to a unison of becoming is not present in the relationship between God and the world. In this case "unison of becoming" simply means that God, in a sense, "shares with every new creation its actual world." Since God prehends all actual occasions He prehends all the actual occasions which make up the actual world of any given actual occasion. Thus, in a sense He shares the actual world of every actual occasion. However, since God prehends much more than any single actual occasion His actual world is more inclusive than that of any entity of limited perspective. It would be more accurate to say that God, in His consequent nature, includes in His prehensions the actual world of every new creation. This is what Whitehead means when he says God is in a unison of becoming with the World.

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151PR, p. 192.  
152PR, p. 523.  
153PR, p. 523.
The last of Whitehead's references to time to be considered here is the notion of "time as a 'perpetual perishing.'"\(^{154}\) Although Whitehead's remarks about this aspect of the notion of time are far less systematic than his other treatments of time, time as perpetual perishing will be shown to be closely allied to his more systematic treatments of temporality.

Whitehead uses perishing to refer to the transition from an actual entity's immediate process of concrescence to its objective immortality. Although "an actual entity has 'perished' when it is complete . . . the creature perishes and is immortal."\(^{155}\) The notion of perishing refers to "the creature;' that is, the actual entity in its character as a satisfaction.

However, the satisfaction of an actual entity has a dual role. It is both "being" and potential for further "becoming" by reason of the "principle of relativity."\(^{156}\) Thus, it is the nature of actual entities that they are both the result of their own concrescence and the material for further concrescences. Actual entities are therefore both subject and object. They have both subjective immediacy and objective immortality.\(^{157}\)

\(^{154}\)PR, p. 126. \(^{155}\)PR, p. 126. \\
\(^{156}\)PR, p. 33. \(^{157}\)PR, p. 89.
The notion of perishing reflects this dual nature of an actual entity's satisfaction. "The 'perishing' of absoluteness is the attainment of 'objective immortality.'"\textsuperscript{158} This is "the transition from particular existent to particular existent."\textsuperscript{159} It is this fluency which involves the perishing of an actual entity in its transition from subjective immediacy to objective immortality. Thus, an actual entity perishes when it is objectified by other actual entities whichprehend it. Since objectification is concerned with actual entities in their character as satisfaction, perishing also refers primarily to the actual entity in its satisfaction.

It follows from this interpretation that the attainment of satisfaction is not the perishing of that actual entity. Perishing is the perishing of immediacy. The satisfaction of an actual entity is, however, still immediate for that actual entity.\textsuperscript{160} The mere attainment of satisfaction does not constitute the perishing of immediacy. The actual entity "perishes" only when its satisfaction is objectified, prehended by, another actual entity.

Thus, Whitehead's notion of perishing is taken here to be another way of expressing the categorial demands that an actual entity in its character as a satisfaction is objectified in other actual entities. The notion of perishing must now be examined in an effort to determine whether or not it is essentially temporal.

\textsuperscript{158}PR, p. 94. \textsuperscript{159}PR, p. 320. \textsuperscript{160}PR, pp. 24-25.
In all of his various mentions of time as perpetual perishing, Whitehead says very little about the exact relationship between time and perpetual perishing. There are two possibilities which must be considered here. It might be maintained that perpetual perishing is essentially a temporal notion and that the two terms, "time" and "perpetual perishing," are, therefore, synonymous. On the other hand, it might be maintained that time and perpetual perishing are not identical notions and that time expresses something more than perpetual perishing. The latter interpretation has been taken here as offering the most coherent treatment of Whitehead's position.

Perishing is founded upon the actual entity's character of objective immortality. Objectification has, however, been shown to be essentially non-temporal.\textsuperscript{161} Perishing is, therefore, also taken to be a non-temporal notion. Time arises from the perishing of actual entities only when these actual entities are actual occasions. Thus, perishing, like objectification, involves time only in a world of limited perspectives. Although time is perpetual perishing, perpetual perishing is not necessarily time.

It should be noted that the "perpetual" aspect of perpetual perishing, does not essentially affect this argument. Categoreally each actual entity must perish. This perishing is "perpetual" because each

\textsuperscript{161}See above, pp. 31-45.
concrescent one becomes part of the many which give rise again to another concrescent unity.\textsuperscript{162} This creative advance of the category of the ultimate insures that perishing is perpetual.

Whitehead distinguishes two species of process, concrescence and transition. He identifies perpetual perishing with the latter.\textsuperscript{163} In order to understand transition, and therefore perpetual perishing, one must realize that concrescence and transition are species of a single process. There is only one process in Whitehead's system.\textsuperscript{164} The genetic process of concrescence is not temporal,\textsuperscript{165} and the process of transition by which one process of concrescence gives rise to another process of concrescence is taken here to be non-temporal also.

Time as perpetual perishing is, therefore, also derivative from the empirical fact that some actual entities are actual occasions. This interpretation is based upon the role of objectification in perishing and the relationship between transition and concrescence as species of a single process. Perishing is identified with objectification as a categorial demand upon all actual entities. Time as perpetual perishing is identified with the "loss" which is categorically necessary given the empirical fact that some actual entities have limited perspectives.

It is a necessary result of this position that God as an actual entity, must perish. This means here simply that God must achieve

\textsuperscript{162}PR, pp. 31-32. \hfill \textsuperscript{163}PR, p. 320. 

\textsuperscript{164}Sherburne, p. 238. \hfill \textsuperscript{165}PR, p. 434.
satisfaction, and be objectified in the World. Categorically God must have a satisfaction if He is to be considered as an actual entity.\textsuperscript{166} Christian argues that although there are certain problems with the notion of satisfaction as applied to God, God certainly does have a satisfaction.\textsuperscript{167} However, certain features of Christian's argument are misleading. At several points Christian seems to attribute temporality to the genetic passage of concrescence by which actual entities pass from their initial to their final phases.

In dealing with the "unity of God's satisfaction" Christian points out that "God is always in concrescence" and that "novel physical prehensions are continually being added to his experience."\textsuperscript{168} Insofar as the terms "always" and "continually" are temporal, this interpretation must be disallowed.

Consider an actual occasion A which prehends an actual occasion B. Since the perspective of A is limited it prehends B as being in its causal past. God in his consequent nature prehends all actual occasions;\textsuperscript{169} therefore, God prehends A and B. It is instructive to determine in this context how it is that God is "always in concrescence."

In prehending God the actual occasion B can have indirect prehension only of its actual world, its past. The indirect prehension by

\textsuperscript{166}PR, p. 38. \textsuperscript{167}Christian, pp. 294-300. \textsuperscript{168}Christian, pp. 294-295. \textsuperscript{169}PR, p. 531.
B of any of its contemporaries or any of the actual occasions in its future is contrary to the definition of contemporaries and future actual occasions. In particular, B cannot indirectly prehend A. Further, an actual occasion C which is in B's future and A's past could be indirectly prehended by A but not by B in their prehensions of God. If these limitations of the prehensions of actual occasions are ascribed to the datum of these prehensions, God, then the paradox that God is "always in concrescence" arises.

The argument is as follows. Since B in prehending God cannot prehend C indirectly and A in prehending God can prehend C indirectly, the nature of this prehended God must have changed between A and B's prehension of God. That is, God has concresced between B's prehension of Him to A's prehension of Him. Further, since the extensive continuum is infinitely divisible and unbounded, this argument can be repeated endlessly for each actual occasion. Therefore, God is always in concrescence. However, this argument cannot be allowed.

Since A and B are actual occasions they admit of temporal notions. The interval between B's and A's prehensions of God is therefore, temporalized. In this temporal interval between B's and A's prehensions of God, God has concresced so that when B prehends Him God has not prehended C but when A prehends Him, God has prehended C. Such

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170Pr, pp. 486-488.
an interpretation identifies the genetic passage with the temporal succession, and such an identification "is exactly what is denied by the epochal theory of time." 171

Further, all actual entities are objects for integration into further actual entities in their character of objective immortality rather than in their character of subjective immediacy. It is the being, the satisfaction or superject, which is the datum for other actual entities. 172 Since an actual entity's satisfaction is "one complex fully determinate feeling," 173 any actual entity, including God offers a single object for prehension by other actualities. Prehensions of an actual entity's satisfaction cannot disclose the actual entity as being in concrescence. The differences between A's and B's prehensions of God cannot, therefore, be attributed to a continuing concrescence of God between these prehensions. God is prehended in his character as a satisfaction, and "the final 'satisfaction' of an actual entity is intolerant of any addition." 174 These prehensions of God by actual occasions will be treated further in the next section in conjunction with subjective aim.

In dealing with "the determinateness of God's satisfaction" Christian notes that actual occasions perish and God does not. He bases this position upon the view that the epochal theory of time demands that

each actual occasion perish at the end of a definite duration. Here too Christian seems to identify the genetic process of concrescence with temporal notions.

The difficulty at this point seems to stem from an erroneous interpretation of the relationship between actual occasions and their extendedness. An actual occasion, $A$, in prehending $B$ attributes spatio-temporal extendedness to $B$ because of its, $A$'s, limited perspective. However, neither $A$ nor $B$ is aware of their own extendedness directly. Extension is founded ultimately in prehension and "no actual entity can be conscious of $\preh$ its own satisfaction." The extendedness of an actual occasion is not, therefore, an element in that occasion's concrescence. This concrescence is not in time and does not expire according to the limits of a temporal interval of which the actual occasion cannot be aware.

In dealing with both the "determinateness" and "the finality of God's satisfaction" Christian expresses concern over the scope of God's prehensions of the world of actual occasions. He notes that since God's objectives are all inclusive His satisfaction cannot be determinate or final in the same way as that of an actual occasion. However, the differences between God's satisfaction and that of an actual entity do not amount to a categorial difference.  

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Although Christian's conclusion is correct, certain features of his argument seem to again import temporality to the non-temporal process of concrescence. The sole difference between God's satisfaction and that of an actual occasion is one of scope. An actual occasion arises from a limited actual world. This distinctness of the actual worlds of actual occasions accounts for their finiteness.\textsuperscript{178} God, on the other hand, has an unlimited perspective; Heprehends all actual occasions.\textsuperscript{179} Christian maintains that because of this difference in scope "God's satisfaction cannot be temporally final." This, he argues, makes God's satisfaction a "telos" but not a "finis" whereas the satisfaction of actual occasions is both finis and telos.\textsuperscript{180} Christian's position on this point rests upon his interpretation of God as always in concrescence. That aspect of Christian's position has already been dealt with and the arguments against that point of view are relevant to this point in Christian's interpretation also.

Although God's actual world is unlimited in its scope, it does not necessarily follow that God's satisfaction is a telos but not a finis. The view that God's satisfaction cannot be a finis seems to depend upon the notion that the potentiality which God envisages in His subjective aim is such that it always (non-temporal usage) admits of addition; that is, that God aims at an unbounded infinity. However, such an interpretation is not warranted.

\textsuperscript{178}PR, p. 321. \textsuperscript{179}PR, p. 531. \textsuperscript{180}Christian, p. 298.
God is ultimately the ground of all real potentiality by reason of his primordial conceptual valuation of all eternal objects.\(^{181}\) Because of God's mediation between the eternal objects and the actual occasions, potentiality is not boundless. Such "boundless abstract possibility" refers to eternal objects when they are abstracted from the intervention of actual entities including God.\(^{182}\) God in His conceptual valuation produces from the boundless abstract possibility of eternal objects real potentiality. Whatever the scope of the resulting real potentiality, it is exhausted by God's conceptual valuation. Whatever potentiality exists in the universe is in God's primordial nature.\(^{183}\) God aims at and realizes in His satisfaction the limits of potentiality. Apart from Him is the nonentity of bare abstract possibility, and such nonentity is nothingness. God is, therefore, both the limitation, and the ground of potential.

In his denial of God's nature as a satisfaction in the sense of a finis, Christian is motivated by his desire to give God "unity and continuity through time."\(^{184}\) However, temporal notions do not apply to God in any sense. Even his prehension of the temporal world is timeless. For God, the World is not past.

Further, it seems that if God's satisfaction were such that it could not be final, it would be unlikely that this unlimited potential

\(^{181}\)PR, p. 46.  
\(^{182}\)PR, pp. 336-337.  
\(^{183}\)PR, p. 73.  
\(^{184}\)Christian, p. 300.
would admit of the integration necessary for it to constitute a subjective aim. However, given "the perfection of God's subjective aim," the finality of His satisfaction should follow almost as a matter of course.

The only other condition which God must satisfy in order to "perish" is that He be objectified in other entities. God is not only objectified in other actual entities; He is objectified in all other actual entities. Each temporal entity must prehend God in order to derive the initial phase of its subjective aim.

The conclusion that God perishes as do actual occasions is at odds with Christian's position and with certain of Whitehead's remarks. The disagreement with Christian on this point is based upon his interpretation of perishing as a temporal notion, and his identification of perishing with the notion of satisfaction as the finis of an actual entity. The reasons for rejecting these elements in Christian's interpretation of perishing have been given above. The disagreement with some of Whitehead's remarks is perhaps more serious.

Although Whitehead mentions that God never perishes, this author believes that there are several reasons why this remark should not be taken seriously.

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185PR, p. 524.  
186PR, p. 46.  
187PR, p. 343.  
188Christian, p. 298.  
189PR, p. 525.
In the first place, this remark is found in the last chapter of *Process and Reality*. This particular section of *Process and Reality* seems to be one of the least systematic and most poetic in Whitehead's exposition.

In his discussion of "perpetual perishing" in this last section Whitehead opposes perishing to the notion of everlastingness. An actual entity is everlasting when it has been objectified without loss in God's consequent nature. That is, everlastingness is objectification without the "loss" which accompanies objectification in the world of limited perspectives. Whitehead's opposition of perishing to everlastingness seems to identify perishing and loss; however, this "loss" consists of those feelings of a given actual occasion which are eliminated in this actual occasion's objectifications in the world of limited perspectives, and this "loss" is not the simple loss of immediacy which is perishing. Everlastingness saves all of an actual occasion which can be saved, but even God cannot save the immediacy of actual occasions.

Actual occasions perish. They cease to exist in the mode of subjective immediacy. Their subjective immediacy cannot be 'saved' as such. They can be saved only by becoming objectified. By becoming objectified for God all the feelings of an actual occasion can be saved. Apart from God some of these feelings would be lost.

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Thus, perishing is not to be identified with "loss." Perishing is the loss of immediacy. This loss of immediacy simply refers to a change of reference point. An entity is immediate for itself but objectively immortal for others. God and all other actual entities are not and cannot be immediate when they function beyond themselves, and categorically all actual entities do function beyond their own immediacy. Although both Whitehead and Christian balk at the notion of God as an actual entity which perishes, this author interprets perishing as a categorial necessity for actual entities. It might be that both Whitehead and Christian refuse to attribute perishing to God because of the presystematic connotations of the term "perish." These pejorative aspects of perishing would indicate its identification with loss.

Summary

In this section it has been shown that all of Whitehead's discussion of time and temporal notions are based fundamentally upon the empirical fact that some actual entities have limited perspectives. From this it follows categorically that in the world of limited perspectives the prehensions which are fundamental to objectification are such that "process entails loss." This loss gives rise to Whitehead's various treatments of time.
Since time is based ultimately upon an empirical fact and not a categorial generality, the difference between the temporal status of God and actual occasions does not compromise their status as like members of the Category of Actual Entities.

However, this argument is valid only if a distinction between the "empirical" fact that some actual occasions have limited perspectives, and the categorial demand that no two actual entities have the same actual world\(^{193}\) can be maintained.

The categorial demand that actual entities have distinct actual worlds is neutral with respect to the scope of the universe which is correlated to each actual entity.\(^{194}\) It is not essential to the demands of this category that the perspective of actual entities be either limited or unlimited. The distinctness of the actual worlds of actual entities does not require that they be either limited or unlimited since it is possible for distinct actual worlds to be either limited or unlimited by virtue of the fact that an actual entity cannot be in its own actual world. The nature of an actual entity precludes its satisfaction from functioning as data for the concrescence of that actual entity.\(^{195}\)

Consider two actual entities, A and B, which prehend all other entities. Both A and B prehend a locus of other entities, C, and each other. Thus, A prehends B and C, and B prehends A and C. The actual

\(^{193}\)PR, pp. 33-34.  
^{194}PR, pp. 33-34.  
^{195}Christian, pp. 42-45.
worlds of both A and B are, therefore, both unlimited since they both include all other actual entities, and distinct since A's actual world does not include A while B's actual world does include B, and conversely. However, it is the case in this cosmic epoch that there is only entity with an unlimited perspective, God.

The distinctness of actual worlds is, therefore, possible for actual entities of both limited and unlimited perspectives. Thus, the empirical fact that some actual entities have limited perspectives is distinct from the categorial demand that they have distinct actual worlds. Temporality is, therefore, founded in an empirical fact about nature. The contrast between temporal and non-temporal actual entities is founded in the more complete observation that there are both limited and unlimited actual entities.

In this section it has been shown that all of Whitehead's various references to time point to a single source of temporality. Time is founded in the nature of objectification in a world of limited perspectives. Time results from the categorial implications of the empirical fact of limited perspectives. As such, it is not essentially involved in the categorially necessary process, either as concrescence or transition. Although both sorts of process are essential to temporal notions, time is not a necessary result of either sort of process.

Since process does not admit of temporal notions, it is equally incorrect to say that the process of concrescence is instantaneous as it
is to say that this process takes some finite amount of time. Chappell's objection that a notion of non-temporal becoming is based upon his interpretation of concrescence as instantaneous\textsuperscript{196} is, therefore, unfounded.

Hartshorne's fears that the principle of process does not apply to God because He is non-temporal\textsuperscript{197} are also found to be grounded in a misinterpretation of the place of time in Whitehead's system. Since process in both of its essential meanings is essentially non-temporal, the temporality or non-temporality of any actual entity, including God, is irrelevant to the status of that entity with respect to process.

Conclusion

Since time is founded in an empirical fact rather than a categorial generality, there are no categorial differences between God and actual occasions which result from the temporality of the latter and the non-temporality of the former. No temporal paradox results from the mutual prehensions which relate God and actual occasions because temporal notions do not apply to God, and because the process of concrescence is not itself essentially temporal.


Further, since this issue has been decided within the category of actual entities, the coherence and consistency of the Categorial Scheme is unaffected.
THE PROBLEM OF SUBJECTIVE AIM

This author's first reading of *Process and Reality* gave rise to a question about the place of subjective aim in Whitehead's notion of actual entities. Each "temporal entity" derives its subjective aim from God. The actual occasion's initial phase of its subjective aim is a hybrid physical feeling of God.\(^{198}\) God, on the other hand, does not derive His subjective aim from any actual entity. His subjective aim is derived from his "primordial valuation" of eternal objects.\(^{199}\) In this section the place of subjective aim in Whitehead's position will be examined in an effort to determine whether a categorial difference exists between God and actual occasions by reason of this difference in their derivation of subjective aim.

In conjunction with this discussion the nature of subjective aim will be examined in an effort to explain how the non-temporal entity, God, supplies relevant possibilities to the temporal actual occasions.

The Derivation of Subjective Aim

Actual occasions derive their subjective aim from a hybrid physical prehension of God. This prehension from which the subjective aim

\(^{198}\)PR, p. 343. \(^{199}\)PR, pp. 523-524.
is derived constitutes the initial phase of the occasion's subjective aim. The occasion begins with this initial aim, but the subjective aim is the result of further determinations and modifications of this initial aim. 200 The subjective aim of an actual occasion is the result of a physical prehension of an actual entity.

God, on the other hand, derives his subjective aim from the conceptual experience of His primordial nature. 201 He does not, therefore, derive His subjective aim from an actual entity. It is, on the contrary, derived from the eternal objects.

It must now be decided whether or not the notion of subjective aim categorically admits of this diversity in its origin. It is here deemed sufficient for this issue to elucidate the relationship between the subjective aim and the ontological principle.

The ontological principle dictates that any condition to be satisfied by one actual entity in its process expresses a fact either about the 'real internal constitutions' of some other actual entities, or about the 'subjective aim' conditioning that process. 202

The "subjective aim" of an actual entity is, therefore, a ground in terms of the ontological principle. But it is also a limitation of this principle by reason of its own autonomy. 203 It is not altogether clear

200PR, p. 343.  
201PR, pp. 524-525.  
202PR, p. 37.  
203PR, p. 373.
whether this "limitation" of the ontological principles is such that an actual entity's subjective aim need not be derived from the prehension of another actual entity; however, the place of subjective aim in the genetic process of actual entities would seem to indicate that this is the case.

The initial aims of actual occasions arise in the first phase of the actual occasion's concrescence. This initial aim is the result of a hybrid prehension which is neither genetically prior nor antecedent to the other feelings of this first phase. In the case of actual occasions this primary phase of the genetic process is dominated by physical prehensions. However, in the case of God this initial phase is dominated by conceptual prehensions. Since the subjective aim must be present in all stages of concrescence it is reasonable that the subjective aim of an actual occasion arises from the physical prehensions which dominate its initial phase, while God's subjective aim arises from the conceptual feelings which dominate His initial phase. This is taken here to be a manifestation of the relationship of ideal opposites which Whitehead applies to God and the World. "In every respect [including the derivation of subjective aim] God and the World move conversely to each other in respect to their process."

204PR, p. 314.  
205PR, p. 134.  
206PR, p. 529.
The fact that God originates from the mental pole while actual occasions originate from their physical pole is tied to the empirical fact of the difference in perspective between God and actual occasions. Since God originates from the mental pole His experience is unlimited. God's unlimited perspective is entailed in His origination from conceptual experience which is by its nature unlimited. Actual occasions, on the other hand, originate from physical experience which is by its nature limited, and actual occasions therefore have limited perspectives.\textsuperscript{207}

The difference in the scope of the perspectives of God and actual occasions is empirically rather than categorically founded. The difference in the manner in which God and actual occasions obtain their subjective aim seems to be the foundation of this difference in perspectives and is taken here to be an empirical rather than categorial observation.

Although Whitehead says little which would help decide the issue directly, there is much to recommend this view that the categories do not contain any prescription as to which pole an actual entity originates from. First, there is Whitehead's explicit claim that God and actual occasions share the common generic character as actual entities in spite of their specific differences.\textsuperscript{208} Second, there are Whitehead's various statements about the notions which have been shown to be

\textsuperscript{207}Pr, p. 524. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{208}Pr, p. 168.
derivative from the fact that God originates from the mental pole while actual occasions originate from the physical pole.

The origination of God from the mental pole is virtually identical with the fact that God has an unlimited perspective, and the origination of actual occasions from the physical pole is identified with the fact that these occasions have limited perspectives. The limited perspectives of actual occasions have been shown to be the foundation of the loss which sometimes accompanies objectification. Objectification in this world of limited perspectives is the foundation of extension and temporality. Extension is, however, a derivative notion. Further, the dominance of extension is an empirical fact peculiar to this cosmic epoch. Space and time are even less fundamental, and represent further additions to the notion of extension.

If the fact that God and actual occasions arise from the different poles of actual entities constituted a categorial differentia, it seems likely that the fact that objectification entails loss in the world of limited perspectives would share this categorial status as would the further derivative notions of extension and time. However, since these notions do not have categorial status, and since Whitehead does not make any categorial references to the pole from which an actual entity must arise, this difference between God and the World is taken to be the ultimate empirical observation which accounts for Whitehead's notion of time.

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209 PR, p. 517. 210 PR, p. 53. 211 PR, pp. 441-443.
Further, since there are no categorial demands as to the pole from which an actual entity must originate, the fact that all actual occasions derive the initial phase of their subjective aim from God does not entail any categorial incompatibilities between God and actual occasions.

Thus, the ontological principle establishes the subjective aim as a ground for what an actual entity is, but the subjective aim is not itself essentially grounded in other actual entities. Although actual occasions derive their initial aim from God, there are still decisions to be made by that actual occasion. This initial aim is modified by that actual occasion and the resulting subjective aim is its own reason for what it is. The nature of these decisions and modifications will be made clear in the subsequent discussion of the manner in which God supplies relevant possibilities to temporal actualities.

Non-Temporal God and Subjective Aims

The aim of this section will be to explain how a non-temporal actual entity can supply relevant subjective aims to the temporal World. Although this discussion is not particularly essential to the central theme of this thesis, it is offered as a counter-argument to Cobb's notion of God for which he claims a greater coherence than Whitehead has achieved.

\[\text{212PR, p. 343.} \quad \text{213Cobb, pp. 176-214.}\]
This section is also included because of the insight it provides into this author's interpretation of the fundamental notions of Whitehead's system.

Whitehead tells his reader very little about the content of the initial aim and its relevance to the actual world of the concrescence in question, and this lack of information has left altogether too much room for interpretation. The tendency seems to have been to attribute very specific information to this initial aim; however, this author believes that a more coherent position is achieved if this initial aim is viewed only as the most general sort of real possibility.

Much of the difficulty with Whitehead's notion of subjective aim arises from the manner in which Whitehead treats God. As Cobb points out, Whitehead has an unfortunate tendency to treat God's two natures, primordial and consequent, as "genuinely separable;" that is, as actual entities. His treatment of God's satisfaction also leaves much to be desired. Almost no mention is made of what God's satisfaction is in addition to the sum of the two poles, mental and physical. And in Whitehead's own terms the satisfaction must be something more than the mere addition of God's primordial and consequent natures. This lack of information about the nature of God's satisfaction is particularly important since God is involved in the only prehensions which are

\[214\] Cobb, p. 178.
symmetrical; that is, God prehends every actual occasion and every actual occasion prehends God. The danger in these mutual prehensions lies in the functioning of actual entities in their character as a medium.

Consider three actual entities, A, B and C, such that A prehends B and B prehends C. The actual entity B functions as medium for A's feeling of C. 215 The case which is of interest here is where the actual entities A and C are not distinct. The difficulty arises from the possibility that A in prehending B would indirectly prehend itself through the mediation of B. It is implicit that, in this cosmic epoch at least, either A or B must be God if A and C are not distinct. Thus, an actual occasion in prehending God might have an indirect prehension of itself since God prehends every actual occasion. However, actual entities cannot indirectly prehend themselves since an actual entity in its character of satisfaction "cannot be construed as a component contributing to its own concrescence." 216 Thus, the prehensions which an actual occasion has of God cannot amount to an indirect prehension of that occasion by itself.

Since God is an actual entity, this limitation applies also to His prehension of actual occasions. In His prehensions of the satisfactions of all actual occasions, God cannot have an indirect prehension of His satisfaction.

215PR, p. 345. 216PR, p. 129.
Because of this dual problem it is quite important to determine just what sort of information is transmitted in the prehension by which actual occasions receive their initial aim from God.

The primary source of difficulty centers about those characteristics of an actual occasion's initial aim which make it "relevant to its actual world." Both Christian and Cobb seem to overemphasize the relevance which the initial aim has to the concrescent entity's actual world.

Christian argues that the actual occasion's derivation of its initial aim presupposes both the consequent and primordial nature of God. God, therefore, shares with each actual entity its actual world, and God supplies, in view of this actual world, the initial aim which provides maximum intensity for each actual occasion. Thus, God takes into account the actual world of each actual occasion by virtue of His consequent nature, and He supplies the initial aim which is relevant to that actual world.

Here again Christian seems to identify God's genetic passage with the temporal succession of the World of actual entities. In his view, Whitehead's God is always in concrescence since God must continually take the actual worlds of actual occasions into account in order to supply them with their initial aims. This interpretation of God as continually in concrescence has, however, already been rejected.

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Cobb’s interpretation of God as a person is motivated by a similar concern. Cobb also balks at the proposition that the initial aims of actual occasions are timeless. He, therefore, proffers a notion of God as a person so that God can achieve a multitude of satisfactions. Each satisfaction would be such as to be the concretion arising from the same actual world of some concrescent actual occasion. Each actual occasion would then obtain its initial aim from the God which shared its actual world.

Although such an interpretation of Whitehead’s God is possible and it does indeed eliminate the problems of the symmetrical prehensions which relate God and the World, it is wholly unnecessary.

The real solution to these dilemmas lies in the content of the initial aim which actual occasions derive from God. This derivation is by way of a "hybrid physical feeling" which the concrescent actual occasion has of God. Since this prehension is a hybrid physical feeling, God is objectified in actual occasions by His own conceptual feelings; that is, His primordial nature. Since this initial aim deals with God’s mental pole the unity of this side of God’s experience must be taken into account. Since the mental pole of any actual entity is

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220Cobb, pp. 218-219.  
221Cobb, pp. 176-214.  
222PR, p. 343.  
223PR, pp. 376-377.
incurably one, the objectification of God in the World is possessed of unity which is not found in the objectifications of actual entities through their physical poles.

The position of this author is that the hybrid physical prehension of God which supplies the initial aim for actual occasions is not such that the data of these prehensions is peculiar to the prehending actuality. Since there is nothing particularly individual to each actual occasion's prehension of God's primordial nature, the modifications of this initial aim takes on greater significance. The subjective aim of an actual occasion undergoes successive modifications. These modifications are necessary if the actual occasion is reconciled to the demands of its actual world with the possibilities supplied by the initial aim.

This interpretation emphasizes God's role as the ground of natural order. God is "the ground of all order," and the function of the initial aim which an actual occasion derives from God is to pass on the "inevitable ordering of things, conceptually realized in the primordial nature of God" to the concrescent actual occasion.

Through the initial aim actual occasions reproduce the conceptual valuation of God's primordial nature. This initial "aim determines the initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects." This initial

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224 PR, p. 436.  
225 PR, p. 343.  
226 PR, p. 164.  
227 PR, p. 373.  
228 PR, p. 374.
aim is relevant to an actual occasion's actual world for two reasons. First, God's conceptual valuation transforms the bare abstract possibility of eternal objects into real potentiality. Second, the actual world of a concrescent actual occasion shares the ultimate ground of order with that occasion.

God's conceptual valuation of eternal objects limits the "boundless abstract potentiality" of eternal objects and transforms it into real potentiality for novel concrescences. This conceptual valuation which each actual occasion inherits through its initial aim is, therefore, relevant to the actual world in a way in which eternal objects alone are not since this conceptual valuation describes real possibilities.

Since all actual occasions derive their initial aim from God, the actual world of any actual occasion is one that was dominated by God's conceptual valuation and its aim towards order. The concrescent actual occasion shares with its actual world a common valuation of eternal objects. Since the actual world of a concrescent occasion manifests the "order" of God's conceptual valuation of eternal objects, this valuation, as it is supplied in the initial aim of a concrescent occasion, is relevant to the actual world of that occasion.

Thus, the initial aim of actual occasions deals only with the conceptual valuation of God's primordial nature. This interpretation

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229PR, p. 336.
gives new meaning to the modifications which effect the occasion's subjective aim in its process of concrescence. In addition, this point of view removes any difficulties which result from the mutual prehensions which relate God and actual occasions.

Since the actual occasion's prehension of God objectifies God in His conceptual nature, there can be no indirect prehensions of other actual occasions through the mediation of God. Conversely, since actual occasions prehend God in His primordial nature, God cannot, in His prehension of actual occasions, violate the genetic priority of His concrescence. Actual occasions in their function as medium can reveal to God only the primordial conceptual valuation by which God is objectified in these occasions, but this primordial valuation is the first genetic phase of God's concrescence. Thus, when God prehends His conceptual valuation indirectly through the mediation of actual occasions, He is prehending that phase of His concrescence which is genetically prior to all other phases of God's concrescence. God's prehensions of actual occasions do not, therefore, entail any contradiction in the order of genetic priority of God's concrescence. Further, these prehensions do not entail the functioning of God's satisfaction as an element in His own concrescence.

\[230^{PR}, \text{p. 46.}\] \[231^{PR}, \text{p. 528}\]
Summary

In this section it has been shown that Whitehead’s categories are neutral with respect to the origination of subjective aim. There is, therefore, no categorial difference between God and actual occasions which results from the fact that God’s subjective aim is derived directly from eternal objects while actual occasions require the mediation of God in this derivation.

An interpretation of the initial aim which actual occasions derive from God was offered in an effort to show how the non-temporal entity, God, can provide relevant possibilities for the temporal world. This interpretation also eliminates any difficulties which result from the indirect prehension which an actual entity might have of itself as a result of the symmetrical prehensions which relate God and actual occasions.

Conclusion

There are no categorial differences which result from the difference in the manner in which God and actual occasions derive their subjective aims.

Once again, the issue has been resolved within the Category of Actual Entities, and the coherence and consistency of the Categorial Scheme is un effected.
CONCLUSION

The primary emphasis in the preceding discussion has been upon the consistency of Whitehead's notions of God and actual occasion. However, the grounds for the compatibility of these notions were shown to include coherence as well as consistency. Something must, therefore, be said about the coherence of the notions of God and actual occasion as actual entities.

In Whitehead's systematic usage, "the coherence which the system seeks to preserve, is the discovery that the process, or concrescence, of any one actual entity involves the other actual entities among its components."232 Thus, God and actual occasions are coherent as actual entities if they are mutually involved as components in each other's concrescence. This is clearly the case in Whitehead's system.

God requires actual occasions by virtue of His consequent nature by which Heprehends all actual occasions. Without these physical feelings God would be deficient in actuality.233

Actual occasions, on the other hand, involve God in their concrescence by virtue of the hybrid physical feeling of God by "which

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232PR, p. 10.  
233PR, p. 521.
each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts. 234

This conclusion was assumed at the outset, and the bulk of the discussion was directed toward the consistency of Whitehead's notions of God and actual occasion as actual entities.

It was shown that Whitehead's categories do not specify which pole an actual entity must arise from in its genetic process. There is, therefore, no categorial incompatibility which results from the fact that God's concrescence begins from the mental pole while that of an actual occasion begins from the physical pole. This difference in origin is the primary differentia between God and actual occasions. It is an empirical fact, and from this difference in origin, a difference in perspective results.

It is in the nature of conceptual experience that it is unlimited. Physical experience is, on the other hand, essentially limited. Thus, God is unlimited because He originates from conceptual experience, and actual occasions are limited because of their origin in physical experience. From this difference in perspective the temporality of actual occasions and the non-temporality of God are derived.

The difference in the temporal status of God and actual occasions is ultimately grounded in an empirical difference between the

234PR, p. 374.
origin of these two sorts of actual entities. There are, therefore, no
categorical incompatibilities which result from the temporality of actual
occasions and the non-temporality of God.

It is the conclusion of this author that the differences which
exist between Whitehead’s God and his actual occasions, both with
respect to time and subjective aim, are founded in the same empirical
fact, and that these differences do not amount to a categorical differ-
entia. Therefore, God and actual occasions are, at least with respect
to time and subjective aim, like members of the category of actual
entities.

... pairs of ideal opposites which Whitehead mentions explicitly, there
are many other notions which can be construed as ideal opposites.
These are notions which were traditionally antithetical to one another,
but have been re-conceived by Whitehead in such a manner that they
require each other. Work of their mutual role. The notions of actual
entities as subject and as object, the mental and physical poles of real
actual entities, being and becoming, actuality and potentiality, and
so forth.

The notion of ideal opposites is, therefore, taken to be a funda-
mental element in Whitehead’s basic metaphysical orientation much like
the demands which he places upon speculative philosophy. The notion
of ideal opposites is seen to occupy a position quite similar to that of
Whitehead’s notion that a philosophical scheme be logical.
APPENDIX 1

It has been suggested by Professor Paul F. Schmidt that Whitehead's notion of ideal opposites might be accounted for in terms of the Eighth Category of Existence, Contrasts. There are several reasons why this author does not believe that the notion of ideal opposites can be accounted for in this manner.

The notion of ideal opposites seems to permeate the whole of Whitehead's position in *Process and Reality*. In addition to the few pairs of ideal opposites which Whitehead mentions explicitly, there are many other notions which can be construed as ideal opposites. These are notions which were traditionally antithetical to one another, but have been reconceived by Whitehead in such a manner that they require each other. Some of these notions are: the nature of actual entities as subject and as object, the mental and physical poles of actual entities, being and becoming, actuality and potentiality, and so forth.

The notion of ideal opposites is, therefore, taken to be a fundamental element on Whitehead's basic metaphysical orientation much like the demands which he places upon speculative philosophy. The notion of ideal opposites is seen to occupy a position quite similar to that of Whitehead's notion that a philosophical scheme be logical.
Although logical notions find their place in a philosophical scheme, Whitehead's demand that philosophical systems be logical is more general than this. He demands not only that logical notions find their place in a scheme of speculative philosophy, but also that this scheme conform to these notions. The notion of ideal opposites is seen to occupy a similar position. Thus, the notion of ideal opposites is not only represented in the philosophical scheme, but it is one of the fundamental notions which condition the structure of that scheme.

Further, contrasts are "Modes of Synthesis of Entities in One Prehension." Because of this categorial relationship between prehension and contrasts, it seems rather unlikely that ideal opposites can be dealt with as contrasts.

Some of the ideal opposites are categories in Whitehead's system, and as such they are not the objects of prehensions. In the case of the ideal opposites, God and the World, there seems to be no entity which canprehend these ideal opposites in order for there to be a contrast since God and the World exhaust the class of prehending subjects, actual entities.

Although the reasons which have been given above for interpreting the notion of ideal opposites as a fundamental, all pervasive element in Whitehead's position are by no means conclusive, they do

\[235\text{PR, p. 5.}\] \[236\text{PR, p. 33.}\]
indicate the fundamental position which this author has assumed in interpreting ideal opposites as a primitive notion in Whitehead's thought, and they indicate the lines upon which a more rigorous justification of this position might proceed.
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