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### American Indian Movement (AIM)

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Social Control of an Insurgent Social Movement:  
A Case Study of the American Indian Movement

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## Introduction

Each year, our white intruders become more exacting, oppressive, demanding, and overbearing. Wants and oppressions are our lot. Are we not being stripped day by day of the little that remains of our ancient liberty? Unless each tribe unanimously combines to give a check to the avarice and oppressions of the whites, we will become conquered and disunited and we will be driven from our native lands and scattered like Autumn leaves before the wind.

- Tecumseh, 1812

Tecumseh's dream of a united Indian confederacy which would halt the westward advance of settlers, and give birth to a national, rather than tribal consciousness, perished with his death in the Battle of Fallen Timbers in the War of 1812. Although various regional tribal alliances were successful for brief periods in the years following Tecumseh's death<sup>1</sup>, it would be another 156 years before anything approaching the scope of Tecumseh's confederacy would again challenge the U.S., and its policy of "Manifest Destiny".<sup>2</sup>

In July 1968, descendents of the Objibway<sup>3</sup> who had fought with Tecumseh, and who would refer to themselves as "modern day warriors", formed the American Indian Movement (AIM) in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Although AIM's earliest goals were shaped by their urban environment, by 1972 the goals of self-determination and recognition of Indian peoples as sovereign entities, which has always been the root of Indian resistance, had come to the fore front.

AIM soon spread to other urban centers with "Indian ghettos," such as Denver, Cleveland, Los Angeles, and eventually to various reservations. At it's height, AIM claimed the existence of 79 chapters internationally. The widespread mobilization of AIM, coupled with it's choice of confrontation tactics quickly drew a governmental response which paralleled the same social control and repressive actions as those which had confronted Tecumseh. This paper will examine the antecedent or conditional factors which determine whether a government intervenes in a social movement to facilitate it, or to repress the movement. Next, and most important, the paper will examine the form of intervention, i.e., the tactics used, and suggest why certain tactics are used more often than others by examining the case of the American Indian Movement (AIM). Special attention will be paid to the U.S. domestic intelligence agency, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Although previous social movement theorists have concluded that such agencies have little affect on a movement (See Oberschall, 1978, and Marx, 1979), I will demonstrate that in the case of AIM, FBI actions had very real and significant effects on the movement.

This will entail an examination of several movement characteristics. I will propose several continuums on which we can place movement goals and tactics in a effort to characterize a movement as being reform or revolutionary in nature.

Next, I will consider the range of potential responses available to a government, and the constraints and limitations which directly impinge on the response taken in a pluralistic,

democratic society. Special concern is paid to the government's need to maintain legitimacy.

Then the actual governmental response to AIM between 1968 and 1979 is examined by looking at a number of the specific social control tactics implemented by the government against AIM. Special attention is given to the role of the "informer/agent provocateur".

In summation, several conclusions will be drawn regarding the fluid relationship between movement characteristics and governmental response to a social movement. Finally, I will conclude with several observations and questions regarding the effects of domestic intelligence operations, and the ability of these agencies to escape the constraints and limitations placed upon them, and the implication this poses for protest in a democratic society.

First, however, an overview of AIM is necessary in order to inform those who are unfamiliar with the movement. In order to escape, or lesson some of the methodological constraints and shortcomings of a case study, the AIM challenge is divided into three chronological time frames. This will provide some degree of variability when comparing governmental response to AIM against movement characteristics, both of which change over time.

### Emergence of Indian Activism

The American Indian Movement had by the early 1970s emerged as the most visible and vocal Indian protest organization. AIM

confronted many Americans for the first time with a people and issues which had been relegated to some past romanticized era in American history. While AIM was fairly successful in capturing the media's and public's attention, it is important to realize that AIM was part of a larger Indian movement which predated the emergence of AIM. The roots of this movement must first be examined in order to gain a better perspective on AIM's mobilization.

Day (1972) points to two major national organizations as the root of modern Indian activism. The first of these organizations, the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), was formed in November, 1944. The NCAI was primarily a lobbying group in Washington which sought to influence the Congress, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the Department of the Interior. It's goal was to assure the formation and passage of fair policies and legislation for all Indians: reservation - nonreservation, rural - urban, recognized - unrecognized.<sup>4</sup> It's tactics were exclusively legal, including lobbying and use of the courts. It's effectiveness has varied greatly depending on it's leadership, and the scope and nature of any given threat felt by the groups it represents.

The second organization, the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC), was composed almost entirely of young university students. Mel Thom, one of the original leaders, explains:

We were concerned with direct action: Indians moving out and doing something. The younger Indians got together in the Youth Council because they didn't feel that the older leadership was aggressive enough. And we felt that Indian affairs were so bad that it was



time to raise hell (Steiner, 1968:40).

The NIYC engaged in more "direct action" than any Indian group since the end of the Indian Wars. Most notable was their support and involvement in the Northwest Coast fishing rights struggle beginning in 1964 (COIBFC, 1979:281). Also, a few members of the NIYC were involved in an attempt led by Russell Means and other AIM members to make a citizens arrest of John Crow, Deputy Commissioner of the BIA, on September 22, 1971.<sup>5</sup> In addition, the NIYC held "protest pow wows" on reservations to educate tribal members about events affecting the Indian community.

While these two groups represent the earliest organizational attempts at mobilization, other actions and protests were more spontaneous and occurred at both the individual and tribal level. These events, each significant in their own manner, include: the Hopi, the Six Nations, the Oklahoma Cherokee, Mad Bear Anderson, the Northwest Coast Fishing Rights struggle, and other actions.<sup>6</sup> These examples are indicative of an observation made by Forbes:

It is clear that Native American resistance to colonialism and oppression is becoming more intense with each month that passes. But it is equally clear that there are no "new Indians" as such, and clear the "Indian revolt" was not born in the 1960s. More people of Native American background have come to identify with the resistance movement, that is true, but its roots go back deep into the past (1972:22).

A number of factors help explain the emergence of greater Indian activism since the 1940s and 1950s. These factors will not be dealt with in this paper, although it is important that

they be noted. First, there are the demographic changes in the Indian population. This includes the growing birth rates, and increase in the proportion of young to old members of Indian descent.<sup>7</sup>

Second, the number of Indians obtaining higher education increased dramatically. During the decade between 1950 and 1960, the number of Indian high school students increased from 24,000 to 57,000. Also, during the same period, the number of Indian students obtaining at least one year of college increased from 6,500 to 17,000 (Steiner, 1968:31).

Third, the policy and legislative agenda of the BIA and the Congress played an important role in the emergence of Indian activism. This agenda includes the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, relocation, and termination. These causal factors will be mentioned at appropriate points in the remainder of this paper.<sup>8</sup>

Other, more general, factors were significant in one way or another. As a result of WWII and the Korean War, many Indians joined the military where they gained leadership skills, but also a sharper sense of the discrepancy between the extreme poverty found on Indian reservations and urban centers in contrast to the relative affluence of the surrounding white society.

The black Civil Rights movement no doubt provided an impetus for mobilization. However, few Indians ever participated in the Civil Rights Movement, since they conceived their own goals to be very different. The belief that change was possible, even probable, increased after Nixon's July, 1970

message on Indian affairs in which he promised greater "self-determination" for Indian people (Philip, 1986:202).

Less tangible, but no less important was the belief that action was necessary. As Mel Thom, NIYC leader stated:

Awareness of our situation had brought out anger. With anger and concern "hope" was born. We were aware [that] if we did not take action, in our time, future generations of Indians would be denied the right to share our own heritage... (Steiner, 1968:26-27).

This sense of necessity, of urgency was probably even more acute among that segment of the Indian community which gave birth to the American Indian Movement.

#### AIM July 1968 - August 1972

World War II saw the gradual exodus of many Indians from their tribal reservations as they either joined the military, or went to work in the war factories.<sup>9</sup> This exodus was encouraged by the BIA through it's "relocation" program. It is estimated that as a result of the relocation program begun by Dillon S. Myer, Secretary of the Interior under Eisenhower, 250,000 Indians could be found living in the slums and ghettos of Chicago, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Denver, Rapid City, Santa Fe, Los Angeles, San Francisco-Oakland, and Seattle (Meyer, 1971:87). It was in one of these locations, the Twin Cities area of Minnesota, where the first AIM chapter was formed in 1968.

The Indian community in Minneapolis-St. Paul originally mobilized around the differential law enforcement experienced by the community. An AIM produced "fact sheet" describes AIM's

founding on July 28, 1968 by Dennis Banks, Clyde Bellecourt, George Mitchell, and others.<sup>19</sup>

A catalyst for AIM in 1968 in the city of Minneapolis was the pervasive police harassment of Indian people. While Indians[sic] represented only 10% [sic, less than 1%] of the cities population, 70% of the inmates in the city jails were Indian. To divert Indians from the jails, AIM formed the ghetto patrol, equipped with two-way radios which monitored the police radios. Whenever a call came over involving Indians, AIM was their first, and for 29 consecutive weekends prevented any undue arrests of Indian people. The Indian population in the jails decreased by 60%. And out of the patrol evolved the federally funded Legal Rights Center, where established attorneys donated up to 80% of their time to serve poor people (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on the Judiciary, 1976:90).

The success of the patrol boosted AIM's standing in the Twin Cities area Indian community. It was not long before the organization began to address other social problems which plagued the urban Indian community. The Articles of Incorporation for the Minneapolis chapter filed in 1968 state that:

The purpose of the organization shall be to solicit and broaden opportunities and general welfare for the urban Indian in order that he may enjoy his full rights as an urban citizen of these United States, also his special rights as an Aborigine (FBI Files Reel 15 Vol.55 p.907).

An enumeration of these opportunities and improvements in general welfare sought by AIM were provided by Clyde Bellecourt, and included: "housing problems, Indian youth, employment, educating industry, community relations, and responsibility of the Indian citizen to his community" (Minneapolis Star, May 7 1969).

During the years of 1969 and 1970, AIM concentrated on addressing these local issues, and starting new chapters. The diffusion of AIM chapters occurred several ways. The most common method of diffusion was by means of the "moccasin telegraph". Word of AIM's success in Minneapolis would find its way over the Indian's communication infra-structure, which was rapidly developing during the same time period, to other Indian communities. Someone from these communities would then travel to an established AIM chapter, or meet an AIM leader at an Indian conference, and then return to their own community and form a chapter. The formation of Cleveland-AIM is an example of this method of diffusion. Russell Means, "as head of Cleveland's Indian Center in 1970...went to Minneapolis for an Indian conference; upon his return he established Cleveland AIM" (Matthiessen, 1983:38).<sup>11</sup>

The other method of diffusion occurred when AIM sent organizers to various locations at the request of local interested individuals to help organize a chapter. An example is the Denver, Colorado chapter where organizer, Vernon Bellecourt was sent to help organize a chapter which was incorporated on January 11, 1971 (FBI Files, Reel 3 Vol.6 p.377). As the number of AIM chapters multiplied, the need for a more defined organization became necessary.

AIM's first national convention was held on October 14, 1971 at Camp Gwendigo, Minnesota in an effort to develop some kind of coordinating body. A slate of national officers was formed at the meeting, apparently over the objection of George

Mitchell, one of the original cofounders (Burnette & Koster, 1974:280). Elected to positions of national leadership were Russell Means, national coordinator, and Dennis Banks, acting executive director (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.3 no.8 1971).<sup>12</sup> The movement at this point had 18 chapters.

Theoretically, AIM intended it's structure and operation to be different from most organizations. It described itself as follows:

Unlike other organizations and agencies dealing with Indian affairs, AIM uniquely begins with people and pyramids to a national organization. It is the chapter which direct and dictate priorities to the national officers, who in turn create and guide AIM in the long range strategy to meet those priorities. Each chapter is independent and autonomous (Hearing, exhibit #6 p.90).

Probably, the most important reason underlying this particular organizational form was the cultural orientation of the movement's constituency. Historically, few tribes had rigid organizational or political structures. Leadership was more often based on respect for an individuals achievements and wisdom than hereditary, or structurally delineated position. The Euro-American pattern of a formal hierarchy of leadership was foreign to most tribes. This cultural tradition of fluid leadership was also reinforced by a general disdain for bureaucracy. One individual associated with AIM describes this important fact:

...people who were recognized as leaders always did stress the thing that we are a movement, we are not an organization. We are not a bureaucracy. I mean Indians deal with so much bureaucracy through the BIA, and all the earlier organizations that addressed Indian

needs had mostly got caught up in bureaucracy too. There was a real responsibility felt, a real response to all the bureaucratic stuff that Indians got mixed up in, to avoid it (Hamilton,1987).<sup>13</sup>

One consequence resulting from the creation of the national leadership, perhaps unintended, was the targeting of these individuals by both the government for social control, and the media as spokesmen. Regardless of the original intent, AIM became synonymous with a few personalities, especially Russell Means and Dennis Banks, and to a lesser extent Vernon and Clyde Bellecourt.

The period between 1971 and June of 1972 saw a continuation of the same movement tactics used the previous year. These tactics consisted of the "symbolic" demonstration, such as the take over of the Mayflower Two in Plymouth Harbor on Thanksgiving Day, and the "occupation" of abandoned and surplus government property. These events served several functions.

One function accomplished by both tactics was to increase awareness of Indian grievances among the public and government officials.

Another function was to increase mobilization of both the Indian community and sympathetic whites, particularly those who could support the movement financially.

Perhaps the most immediate goal was to actually obtain possession of the various properties which were occupied for community purposes. For example, when an abandoned Coast Guard Station was occupied by Milwaukee-AIM on October 14, 1971, the site was eventually turned over to AIM to house a alternative

"survival school" and alcohol program (FBI Files, Reel 15 Vol.55 p.921; Mason, 1983:68; Matthiessen, 1983:51).

One element which set these "occupations" apart from similar student anti-war and civil rights sit-ins was the fact that AIM members were inclined to meet forceful eviction with resistance. This resistance appears to have been handled purely as a police function until the occupation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs building in Washington, D.C. in November, 1972.

#### AIM July 1972 - May 1973

July found most of the AIM leadership gathered on the Rosebud Reservation in South Dakota for the Sun Dance (Burnette & Koster, 1974:195; Deloria, Jr., 1974:43). The revitalization of Indian heritage as evidenced by the participation of these young urban Indians in this religious ceremony, and the pride and hope it created, was paralleled by a tremendous level of frustration and anger over the general state of Indian-White affairs, including several shooting and beating deaths of Indians throughout the country in the preceding months.<sup>14</sup> Due to these conditions, a demonstration was called for in the Nation's Capitol in early November. The event was named the "Trail of Broken Treaties". Word of the proposed march in Washington, D.C. quickly spread throughout Indian country. It was hoped that the timing of the event would put enough pressure on the Nixon administration to promise greater changes and concessions in his Indian policy (Deloria, Jr., 1974:47). Seven national Indian organizations, including AIM, were involved in



planning the event. In addition, four other organizations endorsed the concept and purpose of the "Trail".<sup>15</sup>

The event in Washington, D.C. was intended to be a nonviolent, peaceful week long protest to inform political leaders and the public of Indian grievances. However, Trail leaders and participants quickly found their plans thwarted. The Army denied them permission to hold a religious memorial service at the graves of Ira Hayes and John Rice, two Indians buried at Arlington Cemetery, to honor their war dead due to it's "political" nature (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.1 1973 p.5)<sup>16</sup>

Organizers who had been in town for weeks found offers of food and housing withdrawn by area Catholic and Jewish groups. St. Stephen's Episcopal Church, which did not withdraw it's offer, was infested with rats due to the food preparation that had been going on in anticipation of the caravan arrivals (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.1 1973 p.5; Burnette & Koster, 1974:203-204).

With hundreds of people lacking shelter, caravan leaders, including Russell Means, Clyde & Vernon Bellecourt, Sid Mills and Hank Adams, and a number of grass roots participants went to the Bureau of Indian Affairs building where they hoped to arrange alternative housing. As the leaders were upstairs in the office of Louis Bruce, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, a new shift of security guards entered the building at 4 p.m.. Some of the new guards apparently decided to clear their area of Indians. The Indians refused to leave until negotiations were completed upstairs, where upon an order was given and the guards

attempted to forcefully evict the Indians. Instead, the security guards were removed and the building was fortified against further possible eviction attempts (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.1 1973:5-6). Suddenly, what had been intended as a constructive attempt to educate Washington regarding Indian grievances, became a major five day confrontation.

The reason for the Trail's difficulty in obtaining housing and other problems soon became apparent. While White House and Interior officials had publicly extended their cooperation to the Trail organizers, they were working behind the scenes to undermine the event. A copy of a memorandum dated October 11 and directed to Louis Bruce, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, from Harrison Loesch, assistant secretary of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, was leaked to the Trail leaders. It read:

Subject: No direct or indirect assistance to American Indian Movement demonstration in Washington in early November. This is to give you very specific instructions that the Bureau is not to provide any assistance or funding, either directly or indirectly. (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.1 1973 p.5).

Robert Burnette, co-chairman of the Trail, and a moderate Indian leader, alleged that a similar effort by Harrison Loesch's office was behind the withdrawal of support by the Catholic and Jewish communities (Burnette & Koster, 1974:203). In addition, a similar clandestine effort by Interior officials might have figured in the Army's refusal to allow the Trail to hold religious ceremonies in Arlington, a decision which was

eventually overruled by a court (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.1 1973 p.5).

The settlement which ended the occupation provided \$66,659 for transportation of the participants back to their respective homes, and the recommendation by White House aids Frank Carlucci and Leonard Garment that "there be no prosecution for the seizure and occupation of the BIA building"(Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 No.1 1973 p.11).

While Trial participants, including AIM, came out of this experience relatively unscathed in terms of physical violence and legal charges, the cost to the movement would take another form. Even before the occupation had ended, the government had embarked on a plan to discredit the participants in the eyes of the public, and their base constituency - other Indians. The government's strategy is evident in a statement made by the Interior Secretary, Rogers C.B. Morton on November 6:

...For the honor and dignity of the 480,000 reservation Indians, all Americans should understand that the protesters are a small splinter group of militants. They do not represent the reservation Indians of America. The National Tribal Chairman's Association composed of the duly elected officers of each tribe, has advised me through it's Executive Director, Mr. William Youpee, that this illegal intrusion has no meaningful support in the Indian community....It is obvious too, that the seizure and continued occupation of the building are nothing more than a form of black mail by a small group who seek to achieve through violence objectives which are not supported by a majority of reservation Indians (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.1 1973:12).

Encapsulated in this statement are two important elements of social control. First, there was the attempt to discredit the participants, especially the leadership. The

means used to accomplish this goal took several forms. One effort involved taking the press through official tours of the building to witness the destruction to the building. One official had even taken the time to display in museum fashion the implements the occupants had fashioned to protect themselves against riot Police. One thoughtful observer of the scene remarked:

If nothing else, the display proved that the rank and- file people in the caravans didn't come to Washington expecting a fight, for better weapons could be found in a locker check of any urban high school (Burnette & Koster, 1974:218).

This point was lost on most observers who swallowed the official outline of events.

The governments public relations officials in a further effort to discredit the leadership leaked to the press that most of the Trail leaders had past criminal records. This action put AIM on the defensive. Vernon Bellecourt was forced to call a press conference to confirm the charges which were already known by most of the Indian participants (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.1 1973:18).

However, the more effective strategy of social control employed at this time was the use of the National Tribal Chairman's Association (NTCA). The NTCA was formed in April of 1971 to represent reservation Indians. Bill Youpee, Chairman of the Ft. Peck reservation in Montana, explained:

Washington is prone to listen to the wrong Indian voices. It is time that we had Indians in Washington who are reservation-oriented Indians who share our feelings... and who represent what we want done on our reservations (Forbes, 1981:48).

It is not clear just what role the Nixon administration played in the NTCA's formation. However, it is clear that it was quickly accepted as the "legitimate" spokes group for Indians. By May, the NTCA had become part of the policy making apparatus of the Bureau through it's "National Advisory Committee of Tribal Chairmen." William L. Rogers, Deputy assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs hoped this group "would bring tribal input into the Interior Department's policies..." (American Indian Press Association (AIPA) release M091, May, 1971 in Forbes, 1981 p.130). It should be noted that this was an "advisory" committee and as such exercised no real power.

An unofficial role of the NTCA appears to have been established early on following it's inception. A July meeting of the NTCA in Albuquerque was followed by a reception at the home of an FBI agent (Forbes, 1981 p.49). Perhaps this was just coincidental, but this author's examination of thousands of pages of FBI reports indicate that at least some Tribal officials were acting as informers for the FBI in regard to AIM activities on their respective reservations.

Secretary Morton was able to backup his statement of November 6 by producing a sheaf of telegrams sent by a minimum of thirty one Tribal Chairmen or other elected Indian officials.<sup>17</sup> This ploy by Morton was only partially successful. Peter MacDonald, chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council and member of the National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO), under the office of the vice president, stated that many of the Tribal Chairmen had been "pushed into making statements"

(Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.1 1973:19). A similar charge was made by Charles E. Trimble, executive director of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.1 1973:19).

As the Trail participants left Washington, so did boxes of BIA files. The AIM leadership thought an examination of these files would reveal the existence of wide spread corruption within the BIA. While some unsavory activity on the part of BIA and Interior officials was uncovered and printed in Jack Anderson's column, the document heist proved more interesting in indirectly revealing the presence of government infiltrators in the movement.

Upon discovering the missing files, government officials began a nation wide search to recover the stolen papers. Trail vehicles were stopped and searched in various parts of the country. It soon became clear that the government intended to arrest individuals on stolen property charges if found in possession of any files.<sup>18</sup> In addition, a Whitehouse spokesman informed the Trail leaders that there would be no discussion on the Twenty Points until "all questions regarding stolen government property are settled" (Akwesasne Notes, 1973 Vol.5 no.1:20).

In an effort to move the process along and provide a way the files could be returned instead of being destroyed by individuals fearing prosecution, Hank Adams<sup>19</sup> remained in Washington to return the files when AIM was through copying them. He had already delivered two batches of papers and office

machines, when on his third delivery, he was arrested along with Les Whitten, an assistant to newspaper columnist Jack Anderson (Deloria, Jr., 1974:59-60).

Originally, Adams had planned on returning the files with the help of Johnny Arellano, who had brought the papers to Adam's apartment from the D.C. bus station. When Arellano failed to show, Adam's contacted Jack Anderson. Anderson dispatched his assistant with a car to aid in returning the papers. As they were loading the car, they were arrested by FBI agents (Deloria, Jr., 1974 p.59-60). This incident revealed positively the presence of operatives working within the ranks of AIM.

When the Trail members returned to their respective reservations and homes, many held meetings to present their view of what took place at the BIA. Russell Means returned to the Pine Ridge Reservation where he attempted to speak at a meeting of the Oglala Sioux Landowners Association of which he was a member. He was arrested by BIA special officer Delmar Eastman before he could speak. Means was unaware that Richard Wilson, the recently elected Chairman of the Tribal Council, had obtained a court order from the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court which prohibited any AIM member from attending or speaking at any public meeting on the reservation (Burnette & Koster, 1974:220; Mason, 1983:90).<sup>20</sup> Thus, the tone was set between the "legitimate" representative of the Pine Ridge Reservation and AIM.

This uneasy situation continued to grow more critical. On November 21, Tribal Chairman Richard Wilson fired Vice Chairman Dave Long for publicly condoning the American Indian Movement (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs, 1974:25). In December, an organization called the "Inter-District Council" was formed which called for the resignation of Wilson and Stanley Lyman, BIA Superintendent of Pine Ridge (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:16).<sup>21</sup>

Wilson responded to the growing political opposition by forming a "auxiliary" police force (so designated by the BIA Superintendent) which quickly earned the title of the "goon squad" because of its harshness and brutality toward any political opposition of Wilson, especially AIM. The official purpose of this auxiliary force was to protect Tribal buildings against an AIM threat. The sixty-two thousand dollars used in creating the force were provided by Wyman Babby, BIA Director of the Aberdeen Area office, and Stanley Lyman from federal highway funds originally designated for a "Highway Safety Program" and "Tribal Rangers" (Matthiessen, 1983:62; Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:19; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs, 1974:12). The auxiliary police force became a frequent source of contention on the reservation.

During the weekend of January 13 & 14, 1973 many AIM leaders were gathered in Scottsbluff, Nebraska for a Chicano Indian Unity Conference to discuss an "informal alliance on dealing with mutual problems" (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.2 1973:4). An incident with police early Sunday morning resulted



in a scuffle in which Russell Means and several others were arrested. Over the next several days, additional incidents resulted in at least thirty Indians being arrested (Mason, 1983:91). Actions by the police through out the week enabled Native American Rights Fund (NARF) attorneys to obtain a restraining order from Judge Urbom of the U.S. District Court of Nebraska. The order "prohibited interference with the civil rights of American Indians and Chicano Indians in Scottsbluff county. It also prohibited the arrests of the plaintiffs by discriminatory law enforcement, and prohibited the use of force except as a last resort" (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.2 1973:5).

Shortly after the event in Scottsbluff, a twenty year old Indian named Wesley Bad Heart Bull was found lying in a street in Buffalo Gap, South Dakota with a knife in his chest. A whiteman, Darold Schmitz was charged with second degree manslaughter and released on \$2,500 bond the same day. Around the same time, Harold Withorne, an Indian, was charged and held without bail in the murder of a white woman whose body was found north of Rapid City (Mason, 1983:91; Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.2 1973:5; Burnette & Koster, 1974:221). The appearance of differential law enforcement greatly angered and frustrated many Indians.

Dennis Banks, field director for AIM, declared February 6 a "day of mourning" and called for people to assemble in Custer, the county seat for Buffalo Gap. A meeting was arranged between Hobart Gates, the Fall River County State's attorney and AIM representatives Russell Means, Dennis Banks, and David Hill, an

AIM leader from Utah (Burnette & Koster, 1974:221; Churchill & Vander Wail, 1988:137).

While AIM leaders were negotiating with Gates in an attempt to have the charge against Schmitz changed to murder, a fight broke out between Police guarding the Courthouse and the 200 or so assembled protesters waiting in the chilly 7 degree afternoon. The riot which ensued resulted in the Chamber of Commerce building being burned to the ground. Two police cars were overturned and the Courthouse was damaged. In all some 37 Indians were arrested. Means and 17 others were taken to Rapid City 45 miles away, nine were held in Custer, and the remainder were released on bail (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.2 1973:5-6).

Dennis Banks was originally questioned and released, but then, a few days later according to Banks, he was charged with "arson, burglary, and malicious damage to a Public building...not because I had broken any laws but because I was a leader of AIM" (Matthiessen, 1983:4).

A few days later, a confrontation in Rapid City resulted in forty-one Indians being arrested on rioting charges. State officials responded to these events by sending 100 National Guardsmen to Custer. In addition, volunteers were recruited from police agencies throughout the state. According to Ted Muenster, executive assistant to the governor, the presence of the guard was needed "to reassure the local citizenry" (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no2 1973:7). By late February, the tensions had eased somewhat in Rapid City, Custer and surrounding white communities. Withorne, the Indian man charged

with the murder of the white woman mentioned earlier, had bond set at \$15,000. A new Civil Rights Working Committee composed of Indians was formed to work with the local clergy in a coalition board in Rapid City, and Dennis Banks even addressed the South Dakota State legislature (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.2 1973:8-10).

However, on the Pine Ridge Reservation events continued to escalate. In early February, the Oglala Sioux Civil Rights Organization (OSCRD) was formed to "combat Wilson's harassment of local Indians. The organization grew as many women joined and began protesting in front of the Tribal office and BIA building" (Ellen Moves Camp in Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:16).

When Wilson failed to call the full Tribal Council into session in January as required by the Tribal Constitution, and instead began conducting Tribal affairs through the executive committee,<sup>22</sup> three tribal councilmen filed impeachment charges. The impeachment proceedings were scheduled to begin on February 14 (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:16).

On February 11, at the request of Wilson and the executive council, the U.S. Marshals service moved approximately 70 Special Operations Group (SOG) troops onto the Pine Ridge Reservation. Wayne Colburn, group leader established a command post at the BIA building, which included a machine gun installation on the roof (Weyler, 1982:72; Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:22; Mason, 1983:95). An FBI team composed of agents

Jim Dixand and Bruce Erikson also arrived to work with Colburn's SOG unit (Weyer, 1982:72).

On February 14, the day of the scheduled impeachment proceeding some 300 anti-Wilson supporters arrived in Pine Ridge. Wilson citing "road and weather conditions" postponed his own impeachment hearing until February 22. Angered OSCRO members then proceeded to the front of the BIA building to protest. Lou Bean one of the participants recalls the scene:

Goodness, there was about 300 of us....And those marshals they were all standing there...and one marshal, he had a Southern accent, he said, "Us marshals, us 75 marshals could whip you 300 Indians very easily." Well, that's all it took! Cause we told them to go ahead and come over - we was all fired up...But they wouldn't lay a hand on us....We were willing to fight...All they had to do is lay down their guns and come in and I think us women could whip'em" (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:23).

Gladys Bissonette, another participant recalled that most of the demonstrators were women because the "men were afraid of being arrested" (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:22). During the intervening days before the rescheduled impeachment hearing, the SOG unit began training the BIA police in "riot formation, gas training and basic firearms instruction" (U.S. Marshals log in Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:24).

During this time, except for the local reservation AIM members, most of the AIM leadership and members remained in Rapid City in the Mother Butler Center, a Catholic run community center. However, Aim was observing the events on Pine Ridge very closely. On February 16, Clyde Bellecourt speaking on behalf of AIM announced at a press conference that "if the

Oglala people request our support, we stand ready to offer our full support" (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.2 1973:11).

On the day of the impeachment proceedings, some 400-600 Indians had gathered at the Billy Mills Hall where the proceedings were to be piped in on closed circuit T.V. A demand from OSCRO resulted in the proceedings being moved directly to the Community Hall. Although the proceedings had been scheduled to begin at 11:00 a.m., they were again postponed until 2:00 p.m. so Wilson could show a film entitled, Anarchy, USA (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:26).<sup>23</sup> The Tribal Council then voted to proceed with the impeachment charges which included: nepotism, managing the Tribe without a budget, misuse of tribal funds, use of tribal vehicles for private needs, failure to call the Tribal Council into session, ignoring the eight member tribal housing authority board, and false arrest of a councilman. Instead of waiting a customary ten to twenty days to have a trial, Wilson demanded the trial be held the following day.

The following day in a impeachment hearing presided over by a Wilson appointee, the charges were dropped by a 14 - 0 vote. Gladys Bissionette, an OSCRO member who was present described the meeting:

Well, they had this judge they called him a referee. They bought him off the night before, is our understanding. Now, there was a puppet if there ever was one. Dick Wilson stood behind him and he did everything Dick Wilson told him to. Dick Wilson acted as Chairman of the Tribal Council, and his own attorney, and his own prosecutor.

She continued to describe the continuing abuse of justice at the impeachment trial of Richard Wilson:

Now these complaining witnesses stood up to make their speech and this judge would jump up and just allow them three minutes and take the mike away from them and hand it to some of the members that were on the Dick Wilson side some of the bought off members....and they just cut them three council members to threads until finally Hobart Keith jumps up - he was one of the three - he jumped up and says, "I'll take this to Federal Court" (Voices From Wounded, 1974:26).

The Tribal Council vote vindicated Wilson in the eyes of officials, while it only served to increase the frustration of OSCRO members and their supporters. Severt Young Bear, a resident of the Porcupine district, was especially frustrated since the Porcupine district had sent resolutions to their two tribal council representatives asking that Wilson be impeached. Instead, the two councilmen both voted in favor of Wilson. In Young Bear's analysis, Wilson received 14 votes because of "threats and money and promise of high paying jobs" (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:17). This analysis has a high degree of probability given a situation where over one-half of the 46% employed on the Reservation were dependent on BIA and Tribal employment, in addition to the example given by Wilson in suspending Dave Long, Tribal vice-President for supporting AIM (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:12).

For the next several days, OSCRO supporters met in the Calico Community Hall to decide what to do next. In their eyes they had exhausted all "legitimate" means of seeking redress of their grievances. The impeachment attempt (the fourth) had failed, and the BIA refused to do anything about the obvious corruption. On February 26, the traditionals and OSCRO supporters requested that Russell Means return to the

reservation. Means returned to the reservation and on the afternoon of the 27th went into Pine Ridge where he was attacked, along with Gary Thomas, a non-Indian legal aid representative, by individuals they identified as members of the "goon squad". Their complaint to the BIA police resulted in no action against the assailants.

That evening when the OSCRO supporters and traditional leaders gathered at the Calico Community Hall, they decided on a symbolic confrontation at Wounded Knee (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:31). One of the important aspects about this decision was its endorsement by the leading "traditional" chiefs and medicine men, including: Frank Fools Crow, Peter Catches, Ellis Chips, Edgar Red Cloud, Jake Kills Enemy, Morris Wounded, Severt Young Bear, and Everette Catches. According to Ellen Moves Camp, it was the chiefs who finally said, "Go ahead and do it, go to Wounded Knee. You can't get in the BIA office and the Tribal office, so take your brothers from the American Indian Movement and go to Wounded Knee and make your stand there" (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:31).

A 54 car caravan then proceeded to Wounded Knee where they arrived about 7:30 P.M.. One of the first actions taken was to "loot" the white owned trading post. The similarity to the selective looting of white owned business during the black ghetto riots of the late 1960s is inescapable. One resident of Wounded Knee who joined in the looting remarked, "It sort of belonged to us anyway - we were the ones who had made them rich" (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.2 1973:12). Sometime after 10:00 John

Terronez, a field representative for the U.S. Department of Justice, Community Relations Service exited Wounded Knee and presented the Oglala's and AIM's demands to Joseph Trimbach, Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Minneapolis area office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The demands included:

- I. Senator William Fullbright to convene Senate Foreign Relations Committee immediately for hearings on treaties made with American Indian Nations and ratified by the Congress of the U.S.
- II. Senator Edward Kennedy to convene Senate Sub-Committee on Administrative Practices and Procedures for immediate, full-scale investigation and exposure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Department of the Interior from the Agency, reservation offices, to the area offices, to the central offices in Washington, D.C.
- III. Senator James Abourezk to convene the Senate Sub-Committee on Indian Affairs for a complete investigation on all Sioux Reservations in South Dakota (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1973:34-35).

That evening roadblocks were established by the FBI, U.S. Marshals, BIA police and the goon squad on all roads leading to Wounded Knee. Within hours, the community was completely sealed off, including eleven "hostages" being held by AIM. What had been intended as a symbolic confrontation to draw attention to the Oglala's grievances became a 72 day armed conflict. To describe the events surrounding Wounded Knee is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will focus on a few substantial issues because of their impact on AIM.

Wounded Knee was in many ways the result of legislation known as the "Indian Reorganization Act" or the "Howard-Wheeler Act" passed in 1934. This legislation represented the efforts



of a liberal minded reformer, John Collier then BIA Commissioner of Indian Affairs. It was intended to correct some long standing abuses in Indian affairs and policy. Part of the reform effort involved returning a greater degree of self governance to each tribe by allowing them to organize under a Tribal constitution or corporate charter.<sup>24</sup> Although Collier had good intentions, he created a permanent rift among tribal constituencies. Tribal constitutions were adopted by a simple majority of those who voted.<sup>25</sup> Voter turnout in these elections was horribly low in many cases. Those more likely to participate were the more "progressive" or "mixed-blood" members of the tribes. Many "traditional" or "full-blood" tribal members simply boycotted the elections. They already had their traditional governmental structures (Deloria, Jr., 1974:200).

Roos, et.al., has identified three main interest groups among the Oglala. "Cultural nationalists" are those individuals who place a "heavy emphasis on historical grievances, on the sovereignty exercised by the tribes less than one hundred years ago, and on the practice and revitalization of cultural distinctiveness" (1980:93).

The next interest group is the "cultural pluralists". This faction represents a relative recent deviation from the cultural nationalists. It is composed of the "relatively young and well educated" who are "concerned with cultural revitalization" and "economic improvement" (Roos, et.al., 1980:93). Together, these two groups represent about one-half of the tribe. In the

present discussion, they correspond to OSCRO members, inter-district leaders, and the traditional chiefs and medicine men.

The last group can be characterized as non-Lakota speaking "mixed bloods" who are not concerned with historical grievances or their cultural heritage. Instead, they aspire to a "respectable lower middle-class lifestyle" (Roos, et.al., 1980 :93). They're also the earliest holders of BIA and Tribal jobs.

The discontent between these constituencies which surfaced under the term of mixed-blood Tribal Chairman Richard Wilson can be explained by several factors.

Rapid economic change was taking place during this time. During the two previous administrations (Enos Poor Bear, 1968-70; Gerald One Feather, 1970-72) the Tribal budget had increased from \$100,000 to over \$3 million (Roos. et.al., 1980 :93). In addition, total Federal expenditures on Pine Ridge from the BIA and other agencies increased from \$8,655,000 in 1969 to 14,728,000 in 1972 (U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs, 1974:184).

Whereas the two previous administrations had been sympathetic to the needs of the districts where most of the traditional full blood people resided, Wilson, a mixed blood, redirected the expenditures of these resources to Pine Ridge, the administrative center of the reservation. Those sympathetic to AIM and vocal in their opposition to Wilson were fired from their jobs (Voices from Wounded Knee, 1974:20; Matthiessen, 1983 :66). When one reservation resident was asked if Wislon had done anything for the Reservation, s(he) replied:

No, not so far....We had OED monies that are funded to go out in the districts to promote more jobs or more help to people, and it's all used up in Pine Ridge [village] before it gets into the districts. They got some new positions created. There's more high-paid salary right in Pine Ridge village and very little of that money is going out into the districts where the people really need it (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:19).

In addition, the rather blatant acts of nepotism, including hiring his wife as director of Head Start, \$15,000 to his brother for "consultant" fees, and raising his own salary by \$10,000 a year angered many reservation residents where the average yearly income for families from all sources was estimated at \$7,160 (U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs, 1974:183). As the people began to organize and mobilize to combat this corruption, they were unprepared for the degree of resistance they encountered. Geraldine Janis, a former Director of the Community Health project until she was fired for demonstrating against Wilson made these remarks:

He keeps getting away with it because people are afraid for their jobs. See, he has the power as Tribal Chairman. We never knew until we start fighting him how much power a Tribal Chairman has. We never cared about the Tribal elections or how we voted. We just thought they couldn't hurt us. We didn't pay much attention to politics (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:21).

AIM's choice to aid OSCRO and the traditionals in this case was not based on Wilson's corruption, as much as it was on the Federal and BIA support of the corrupt administration. One AIM leader explained:

We had promised not to involve ourselves in the politics or policies of any Indian nation and this looked at first like that's what it was. But when we came down here we realized that the struggle was not at all with Oglala Sioux

people - it was with the Federal Government and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:64).

Although Aim had been requested by OSCR0 and the traditionals, and was acting in a supportive role,<sup>24</sup> the takeover was labeled a AIM action by the press and Federal authorities.

Support for Wounded Knee mobilized rapidly around the country. AIM sent word to each local chapter to aid in anyway possible. However, it was not only AIM members who responded to the calls for help. Non-AIM Indians responded, as did a few whites, blacks, asians and chicanos. The government became concerned enough about this mobilization effort that the Attorney General issued orders to arrest individuals heading towards Wounded Knee on charges of violating the Rap-Brown anti-riot laws. Using this legal tactic, agents of social control arrested individuals with bails ranging from a few hundred dollars to as high as \$16,000 while they were hundreds of miles from Wounded Knee (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:124; Weyler, 1982:93).

On March 11, 1973, the Oglalas at Wounded Knee declared themselves a sovereign Nation under the terms of the Treaty of 1868. On March 16, citizenship was granted to those in the village under one of three categories: 182 Oglalas, 160 Indians from other tribes, and 7 whites<sup>27</sup> were granted citizenship, dual citizenship's, and naturalized respectively (Voices From Wounded Knee, 1974:81). These figures are important because they demonstrate that AIM was a minority at

Wounded Knee despite government efforts to characterize occupation members as a group of outsiders.

Finally, on May 5, an agreement was negotiated which brought the occupation to an end on May 7, 1973. The siege of Wounded Knee resulted in at least 2 ION/AIM deaths and fifteen wounded. One FBI agent, Curtis Fitzgerald was wounded, and U.S. Marshall, Lloyd Grimm was shot and paralyzed from the waist down (Akwasasne Notes, Vol.5 no.2 1973:32,45). However, the real costs to AIM and their supporters was just beginning.

#### June 1973 - February 1979

AIM's immediate preoccupation following Wounded Knee was raising bail money and obtaining legal council for those arrested. They were aided in this effort by the Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Committee<sup>29</sup>. Stan Holder, AIM's security director at Wounded Knee was held on a \$32,000 bond. Leonard Crow Dog, AIM's spiritual director had bail set at \$38,000, and Russell Means had bail set at \$150,000. Dozens of others were held on lesser bonds (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988:170). At the same time the organization tried to carry on with it's normal affairs.

From July 25 through August 5, AIM held their annual National Convention at White Oak, Oklahoma which had been postponed due to Wounded Knee. At the convention, Dennis Banks was elected National Executive Director. Carter Camp and John Trudell were chosen as Co-Chairman, while Larry Anderson of Arizona, and Carol Stubbs of California were elected National Treasurer and National Secretary respectively (Akwasasne Notes,

Vol.5 no.5 1973; FBI Files Reel 6 Vol.12 p.869; FBI Files Reel 9 Vol.24 p.518).

On August 8, 1973 ten armed members of the Des Moines AIM chapter occupied the second floor of the Grimes State office building. Prominent in the planning and execution of this action was a relative new comer, Doug Durham. AIM first became acquainted with Durham during Wounded Knee where he was covering the event for Fax Today, a radical Midwest tabloid (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on the Judiciary, 1976:11). Unknown to AIM at the time was the fact that Durham was working for the FBI.

Just a few days latter on August 27, Clyde Bellecourt an AIM leader was shot on the Rosebud Sioux Reservation by Carter Camp, recently elected National co-chairman (FBI Files Reel 10 Vol.29 p.221). Although the cause appeared to be mostly personal, recent bad-jacketing had effectively raised tensions among the AIM leadership (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988:212-13; Matthiessen, 1983:86). Camp was relieved of his duties as National co-chairman. No legal action was taken against Camp because Bellecourt refused to press charges and testify in a white court (Weyler, 1982:127). However, the shooting did cause the National Council of Churches to revoke Camp's bond from his Wounded Knee charges (Burnette & Koster, 1974:262).

In September 1973, Banks facing a new indictment stemming from the Custer Courthouse riot fled to Canada until the full amount of his bail could be raised ( U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on the Judiciary, 1976:136). He returned to

the U.S. in time to be tried along with Russell Means on a eleven point indictment (based on the Wounded Knee occupation) in St. Paul, Minnesota on January 9, 1974. On September 17, 1974 the trial ended when Judge Nichol dismissed the charges against the two men. In his Memorandum decision, Judge Nichol stated:

I am forced to conclude that the prosecutor [U.S. Attorney for South Dakota] acted in bad faith at various times throughout the course of the trial and was seeking convictions at the expense of justice....In deciding this motion, I have taken into consideration the prosecution's conduct throughout the entire trial....The waters of justice have been polluted, and dismissal, I believe, is the appropriate cure for the pollution in this case (quoted in Matthiessen, 1983:99).

Judge Nichol also had strong words for the FBI, "It's hard for me to believe that the FBI, which I have revered for so long, has stooped so low" (Waldron, 1974:1,12). Some of the FBI's tactics and actions which caused Judge Nichol to express this opinion will be examined latter.

AIM's attempt to work within the system appeared to be thwarted at every point. On February 7, 1974 in a run-off election between Russell Means and incumbent Tribal Chairman Richard Wilson, Means lost by a vote of 1,714 to 1,514 (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1974:1). An investigation by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights discovered numerous irregularities with one third of all votes cast (1974:3). In addition, the Commission questioned why the "BIA chose not to act on the allegations of massive irregularities", and recommended that the most appropriate course of action would be for the Tribal Council to "order a new election as the

Commission viewed the current results invalid (U.S. Commission On Civil Rights, 1974:24,28). No further action was ever taken by the BIA or any other Federal agency regarding the Commission's report.

Meanwhile, Wilson continued his harassment and repression of AIM and OSCRO on the Pine Ridge Reservation despite the continued presence of FBI agents and U.S. Marshalls. Candy Hamilton, a WKLD/OC worker documented sixty-one unsolved political murders on the Reservation between the end of the Wounded Knee occupation and the Spring of 1976 (Weyler, 1982 :209).

In Sioux Falls, S.D. on April 30, 1974 most spectators in the courtroom refused to stand when Judge Bottum entered to begin proceedings against several defendants on charges stemming from the Custer Courthouse riot. Included among the spectators were members of the League of Women Voters, 15 clergymen of the American Lutheran Church (including four bishops), 3 members of the press, and 25 Indians. Judge Bottum reacted to this act of civil disobedience by ordering the Courtroom cleared, and then withdrew into his chambers. Although members of the Federal Community Relations Service and the Bishops tried to talk with the Judge and diffuse the situation, 24 members of a riot-control tactical squad moved in with mace and riot baton. While no white spectators were injured, ten Indians required hospital treatment, including the only AIM defendant, David Hill, AIM coordinator for Utah (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.6 no.2 1974:14). On May 6, an AIM spokesman issued a statement saying



that it considered South Dakota a "zone of war" and urged tourists to boycott the State (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.6 no.2 1974:15).

In June of 1974, the most important organizational and tactical change since the founding of the Movement occurred during a meeting held June 8-16 on the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. At the meeting attended by some 3000 delegates representing 97 Indian Nations, the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) was formed (Ortiz, 1977:199). The IITC became the "international arm of AIM" (Ballenger, 1988).<sup>29</sup>

The occupation of government buildings and facilities declined dramatically following the seizure of Wounded Knee. Although several more occupations did take place, such as the occupation of the Alexian Brothers Novitiate in Gresham, Wisconsin by the Menominee Warrior Society in which AIM exercised a small supportive role, the primacy of the tactic had come to an end (Brand, 1978:105).

While the IITC and Gresham occupation were basically positive, not all events were so conducive to movement growth. In October, AIM's reputation on the West Coast was shattered when two AIM Members, Paul Durrant "Skyhorse" and Richard (Mohawk) Billings were charged with the brutal murder of a cab driver. Although AIM denied any part in the murder and refused to lend any support to the two individuals charged with the murder, West Coast AIM estimated it lost 95% of its financial support in California (Matthiessen, 1983:115).

AIM's reputation continued to decline when on June 26, 1975 two FBI Agents were killed on the Pine Ridge Reservation outside a camp where a number of AIM members were staying. Although surrounded almost immediately by BIA police, FBI Agents, U.S. Marshalls, State Troopers, and SWAT teams, the occupants of the camp managed to escape. During the following months in a massive man-hunt, the civil and constitutional rights of the Oglala Sioux people were repeatedly violated by illegal search and seizures, harassment, and intimidation. A U.S. Civil Rights Commission report would later call the "ResMurs"<sup>30</sup> investigation "an over reaction which takes on aspects of a vendetta" (quoted in Matthiessen, 1983:211). Eventually, three AIM members were charged with the killings of the FBI agents.

Again, AIM was faced with a round of costly court cases which put a severe strain on resources. With many leaders in jail, or facing court proceedings, or neutralized in one way or another,<sup>31</sup> local AIM chapters continued on with their work the best they could. The International Indian Treaty Council had by 1977 gained "Non-Governmental Organizational" status at the United Nations. Beginning in February, AIM was part of the "Longest Walk" from California to Washington, D.C. The purpose of the "Walk" was to draw attention to some legislation being introduced in Congress which would have been detrimental to the Indian community (Matthiessen, 1983:597). In spite of these accomplishments, organizationally National AIM was in disarray.

Events for National AIM came to a head in February when the family of John Trudell, AIM National Chairman were killed in a

suspicious fire at their home on the Duck Valley Reservation on the Nevada/Idaho border. Coincidentally, the fire occurred only 12 hours after Trudell had given a speech and burnt an American flag in front of the FBI building in Washington, D.C.. With this terrible event, the positions of Co-Chairman and other national offices came to an end. I would argue that by this time, so had much of AIM's effectiveness. Although AIM would continue to be a significant actor in individual communities, the movement had moved, or been forced from an aggressive confrontational stance which made the Federal government sit-up and take notice, to a more passive position struggling for survival. It is clear from FBI documents, that by 1979 the FBI (and one would assume other Federal bodies) no longer considered AIM a significant threat. The remainder of this paper will examine the relationship between social control and movement decline.

#### Movement or Challenger Characteristics

Any government when confronted with a social movement contender must exercise one of two options. The government must either choose to facilitate the movement, or to repress the social movement (Tilly, 1978:100). For present purposes, I will borrow Tilly's definition of a contender as "any group which, during some specified period, applies pooled resources to influence the government"(1978:52). A contender may already be a member of the polity, i.e., a group which has "routine, low-cost" access to resources controlled by the government, or it

may be outside the routine structures of influence (Tilly, 1978:52,54). Those groups existing outside the bounds of the polity will be referred to as "challengers". A challenger is a group which seeks redress of a particular grievance or set of grievances which would require a change in polity actions or policy, especially the government and it's various agencies.

The goal(s) of the challenging group may range from mild reform measures to a "radical" or "revolutionary" alteration in the current power structure. Because of the ambiguity in the concepts of "radical" and "revolutionary", and their perspectival nature, I would prefer to follow the classification scheme proposed by Cornell (1988). Instead of the concept of "radical" or "revolutionary" goals, this end of a goal continuum will be referred to as "transformative" goals (p.152). In this study, reformative goals are goals which do not seek a fundamental change in the structure of Indian-White relations. Rather, they require a redistribution of services, resources, and rewards within the current structure.

Transformative goals propose not only a redistribution of rewards, but also a fundamental reordering of Indian-White relations (Cornell, 1988:152). These two goal orientations can be classified along an additional "integrative - segregative" continuum. This results in a four fold goal cross-classification scheme or typology as seen in Diagram #1.

Integrative goals accept the dominant Euro-American economic and political institutions and participation in them. Segregative goals generally dispute the validity of these

Diagram # 1  
 Goal Classification Scheme

integrative goals

segregative goals

reformative goals

<p>appointment of Indians to BIA posts          expansion of reservation social services          attracting jobs and industry to the reservation</p>	<p>null set</p>
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transformative goals

<p>efforts to enlarge the exclusive powers of tribal government          efforts to place control of Indian economic resources fully in Indian hands          efforts to extend federal Indian programs to urban Indians</p>	<p>opposition to commercialization of reservation economies (refusing coal, oil, and other leases on reservation land)          efforts to replace IRA governments with more traditional methods of collective decision making          resurrecting treaty making between the federal government and tribes</p>
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(Table adapted from Connell, 1988: 154-155)

institutions for the Indian community in favor of a anti-assimilationists and anti-aculturational position (Cornell, 1988:152-53). I propose that the closer the goals of a social movement are towards the transformative-segregative end of the continuum, the greater the degree of government repression.

Diagram #2

In responding to a social movement challenge, governments not only consider the goals of the movement and how they conflict with their own interests, but also the tactics implemented by a social movement in pursuit of it's goals. Tactics can be classified on a continuum with end points of "legal actions" at one end and "illegal nonprovoked use of violence" at the other end.

Diagram 3

The choice of tactics used by a social movement are closely related to the type of resources or assets available to a movement. The fact that AIM was composed of a group with a negatively privileged status, and a small constituency (less than 1% of the total U.S. population) which was scattered geographically with few resources, greatly limited their tactical repertoire. Because the movement was trying to preserve the few inducement resources it might have mobilized, such as water, mineral, and grazing rights, and since persuasion and moral arguments were ineffective, AIM resorted to the use of constraint tactics and resources. Constraint resources are similar to Etzioni's "coercive assets" (19 : ).

Diagram # 2  
Goal Continuum

reformative  
goals

transformative  
goals

redistribution  
of poverty  
monies


extending of  
Indian benefits  
to urban  
Indians

greater power  
for local  
Indian leaders

dismantling  
the BIA

establishment  
of Indian  
reservations  
as U.S.  
protectorates

**Diagram # 3**  
**Tactical Continuum**





Constraint tactics include; weapons, armed forces, strikes, manipulative technologies, hostage taking, etc. The use of constraint resources by a social movement invites a greater degree of social control. This relationship between tactics and social control is influenced by at least two factors. First, there is the general expectancy on the part of the majority of the citizenry that illegal acts will be dealt with accordingly by the governments agents of social control (Oberschall, 1973 :252). This is the point where government's do their best to "criminalize" the actions and actors of a social movement (Wilson, 1977). If the actions of a social movement are defined as criminal by the public then the government can engage in legitimate social control measures. However, if the government fails to criminalize the actions and actors of a social movement, and the social movement is successful in defining their actions as political in nature rather than purely criminal, the government comes under closer scrutiny by the press, the bystander-public and potential conscious constituents of the social movement.

Second, constraint tactics are a more immediate threat to the normal functioning of the social system. This threat may be measured by the level of violence and the strength of the denial regarding the State's legitimacy presented by the protestors (Balbus, 1973:26). The potential disrupting ability of certain tactics necessitate a firm response. Successful disrupting protest on the part of a social movement has the potential of mobilizing other dissatisfied groups in the society. Therefore,

a social movement will experience greater social control as it's tactics approach the use of illegal, unprovoked violence.

The two previous propositions can be combined to provide a prediction of the direction of a governments intervention into social movement affairs. The closer a social movements goals and tactics approach the transformative-segregative and illegal, unprovoked violent action ends of the respective continuums, the more social control they will experience.

### Government Constraints and Limitations

Governments and their agents of social control operate within an environment which places constraints and limitations on how they respond to a social movement. For Example, even the most tyrannical or authoritarian government has resource limitations, and usually cannot afford to totally disregard public opinion. However, these constraints and limitations are greater in pluralistic democratic societies.

Democratic governments, while often possessing the same repressive power of totalitarian/authoritarian governments, are constrained from abusing this power due to the multiplicity of power centers (such as, the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government) which act as a check and balance system. In such a situation, effective social control measures are dependent on "the extent to which other centers of power back up and support the actions of the state's agents of social control" (Oberschall, 1973:249).

In addition there are internal constraints on agencies of social control. Judicial permission for search warrants, the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Attorney General, agency rules and guidelines, and other elected members of the polity all serve as constraints on the use of certain control measures.

External constraints on the use of certain control measures include public opinion and the press. When a government violates the constitutional rights of social movement members, such as free speech and assembly, it is primarily these two groups which serve as monitors of government actions. In addition, the basis of any democratic governments claim to legitimacy ultimately resides on it's acceptance by these two groups. Within these constraints, a government must decide on which social control measures and strategy will be most effective.

### Agents of Social Control

Governments have many agents of social control. In the broadest sense, even those institutions which socialize members of a society, such as the school, the church, the family, etc., all have a social control function. However, I am interested in those institutions and agencies which have a specific mandate to exercise social control in a nation state. I refer to the various law and order, justice, and investigative agencies which exist in a given society. This paper is most concerned with the role of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). However, it should be recognized that most, if not all, nation's

have their own counterpart to the FBI whether it is the British M15 or Canada's intelligence unit of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

The FBI's origin stems from instructions issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on May 8, 1934 to investigate potential connections between the Nazi movement in the United States and German diplomatic and other official representatives in this country (U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, 1976:1021). This directive was expanded in August, 1936 by President Roosevelt in instructions to then FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain "general intelligence information" concerning "subversive activities" in the U.S. (1976:1021). In testimony before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, 94th Congress, James B. Adams, then assistant to the Director, FBI described the objectives of FBI "domestic intelligence" operations:

Thus, the objective of FBI domestic intelligence investigations is to obtain information concerning activities which are intended to undermine or overthrow the Government of the United States, incite domestic violence or rioting, or deprive individuals of their civil rights. The FBI investigates these threats to domestic security both to develop evidence for legal proceedings and to provide the Attorney General with information upon which to make assessment and policy recommendations pertaining to specific, nonpenal aspects of the Nation's domestic security program which are administered by the Department of Justice (U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, 1976:1021).

Investigations are based on the fact that a crime has taken place, or on the assumption that it is highly probable that a crime will take place. Thus, you have the difference between

what the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations has called "pure intelligence" versus "preventive intelligence" (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, Book II 1976:30-31).

While, the FBI was responsible for the major intelligence and investigative role in the case of AIM, the police functions fell to a number of other agents. These include: the U.S. Marshalls Service, including Special Operations Group (SOG) counter-insurgency forces, the Bureau of Indian Affairs police, State and local police, and a private militia funded by BIA money which became known as the "goon squad".

Other agencies or individuals which at one time or another exercised some social control function in the case of AIM include: the U.S. attorney general, assistant attorney general, U.S. Immigration service, U.S. Postal service, Director of OEO programs, U.S. attorneys, Internal Revenue Service, BIA, U.S. Army, CIA, National Guard, various State governors, and the media to name a few examples. These agents did not always work together. For instance, Governor Jerry Brown of California, refused to extradite Dennis Banks to South Dakota against the wishes of Governor Janklow of South Dakota and the FBI. However (except perhaps for the first 3 - 4 years after AIM's founding) most agents were cooperating with each other, in what I suggest resulted in an effective social control apparatus.

#### Strategies of Social Control

Gamson (1968) has identified three general strategies of social control. First, authorities can attempt to regulate the movements access to and mobilization of its potential resources. Second, authorities can alter the costs of participation in the social movement by making rewards and punishments contingent on attempts to influence, i.e., participation in social movement demonstrations and activity. Third, they can attempt to change the goals of the movement by altering movement members attitudes towards the target(s) (Gamson, 1968:116-117). I would expect that the most effective strategy would use this three pronged approach simultaneously as long as they are not incompatible with each other.

#### Typology of Social Control Tactics

There are a variety of specific tactics available to governmental agencies assigned the role of social control in carrying out the previous strategies. Marx (1979) has identified a number of these tactics. They include:

- \* litigation against movement leaders and members, including both criminal and civil charges
- \* administrative harassment, e.g. the loss of tax exempt status, tax audits, etc.
- \* disinformation campaigns directed towards the media and funding sources
- \* wire tapping and other surveillance methods
- \* cooptation attempts
- \* the use of informants and agent provocateurs
- \* encouragement and funding of counter or alternative movements and groups

\* bad jacketing (author's addition)

These tactics can potentially produce a number of debilitating results, including:

- \* inhibiting the capacity for corporate action
- \* directing the energies & resources of the movement to defensive maintenance
- \* create an unfavorable public image
- \* inhibit the supply of money and man power
- \* damage morale
- \* encourage internal conflict
- \* destroy or displace leaders

and a variety of other damaging effects (Marx, 1979:96). The question to presently answer is why the government chooses certain tactics over others.

In preparation for answering this question, I propose that specific tactics first be classified or categorized along three dimensions I think important. These three dimensions can each be thought of as existing on a continuum.

The first dimension is whether the social control tactic is done actively, or conversely whether those agencies responsible for social control fail to take action. While positive application of a specific tactic is usually identifiable, failure to take action is a less obvious form of social control. An example would be the failure of police to protect members of a social movement against opposing social movement members, or other antagonists.

The second classification categoric ranges from the use of legal tactics to the use of illegal tactics by agencies of social control. While most tactics are clearly either-or, there is an area where the letter of the law is not broken, but the intent of the law is violated. This area can prove damaging to both a social movement and agencies of social control.

The last dimension is whether the tactics are covert or overt. I propose that covert tactics while often neglected or considered ineffective are important social control measures, especially in smaller social movements which enjoy less public sympathy and attention. An especially important covert tactic is the use of informants and agent provocateurs. I will now consider why certain tactics are used.

#### Factors Conditioning Choice of Social Control Tactic

I propose that the tactics used by agencies of social control are conditioned or determined by:

















1. The social movement itself
2. The current historical environment
3. The utility of the particular tactics in terms of both degree and range of effectiveness.

Of these three factors, I propose that the utility of the tactic is the primary consideration.

The social movement conditions the form or type of tactics used by agencies of social control by its structure, goals, and tactics which make certain social control tactics more appropriate than others. Also, it should be recognized that the



Diagram # 4  
Social Control Tactics and Strategy Function

Tactics	Strategy #1	Strategy #2	Strategy #3
administrative harassment			
wire tapping			
disinformation			
cooptation			
counter movements			
litigation			
bad jacketing			
informants/ agent provocateurs			



= manifest intention



= indirect or latent intention



= no significant intention

**Strategy #1:** This strategy attempts to restrict the access to, and mobilization of movement resources.

**Strategy #2:** This strategy attempts to increase the costs, or punishments associated with participation in social movement activity.

**Strategy #3:** This strategy attempts to redefine movement member's attitudes toward the target group from a negative to a positive view.

application of certain social control tactics by agents of social control can change the structure, goals and tactics of the social movement, thereby leading to further adjustment of social control tactics in an ongoing interactive process. For instance, a movement which uses illegal protest tactics opens itself to litigation as a control tactic on the part of government. This has the potential of raising the costs of such activity to the point where the use of illegal tactics on the part of a movement are discontinued.

Similarly, a movement with a loosely knit organizational structure, such as AIM, with no specific membership guidelines makes infiltration by government informers much easier than a movement which has a rigid bureaucratic structure.

The historical environment surrounding a movement can condition a governments choice of tactics in several ways. One important item is the degree to which a system of social control is already in place. The fact that AIM followed on the heels of the anti-war, civil rights, and black power movements found the government with a well equipped and experienced social control apparatus already in place.

However, I suggest the most important factor affecting choice of tactic is the utility of each tactic. Utility can be measured by their usefulness in each of Gamson's three strategies, and their usefulness in producing each of the negative outcomes for a movement identified by Marx (1979:96).

Diagram(#4) indicates the author's view of the association between social control tactic and strategy it addresses.

Diagram # 5

Social Control Tactics and Movement Outcome

Tactics	Outcome						
	inhibit corporate action	defensive maintenance	creation of a unfavorable image	inhibit supply of money	damage morale	create internal conflict	displace leaders
administrative harassment		shaded		shaded			
wire tapping			shaded		shaded		shaded
disinformation			shaded				
cooptation					shaded		shaded
counter movements	shaded		shaded				shaded
litigation	shaded						
bad jacketing	shaded				shaded	shaded	shaded
informants/ agent provocateurs	shaded					shaded	shaded



= The shaded area indicates the potential outcomes a specific social control tactic is significantly likely to produce.

Diagram #4

As the chart indicates, certain tactics are more important strategically than are other tactics, i.e., they are useful in more than one strategy. This observation becomes clearer when the association between specific tactics and negative outcomes is further examined in Diagram #5.

Diagram #5

The author realizes that these rankings are somewhat subjective. In an effort to further substantiate the above claims, the use of these social control tactics will be examined by looking at the case of the American Indian Movement.

#### Administrative Harassment

A variety of administrative harassment techniques are available to agents of social control. However, the use of these techniques are not always readily available since they often involve the cooperation of agencies usually residing outside the normal law enforcement network. These agencies include the Internal Revenue Service, Immigration Service, various social programs, such as the Office of Economic Opportunity, the Postal Service, etc. Several of these agencies cooperated in the social control of AIM.

One of AIM's primary means of communication to the Indian community was the Indian newspaper, Akwesasne Notes. Although published by the Mohawk Nation at Akwesasne and not directly associated with AIM, the newspaper first published in 1969 grew

with AIM as it covered the growing Indian movement. Harassment against the paper began when the editor of the paper, Rarihokwats (Jerry Gambill) a Canadian citizen, had deportation charges brought against him for unauthorized "employment" as editor of Akwesasne Notes in October 1972. The proceedings against him were later dropped in January (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.1 1973:2).

Then in January 1973 the second class postage rate for Notes was cancelled by its publisher (sponsor) Wesleyan University. It appeared that both the elected Tribal Council and the BIA were involved in obtaining this action. An editorial in Akwesasne Notes noted that this action occurred during one of the "most critical periods in Indian history for many years". Covered in the issue which was delayed was the occupation of the BIA building and the Twenty Points presented by the Trail of Broken Treaties in Washington, D.C. (Akwesasne Notes, vol.5 no.2 1973:2).

Other acts, such as the withholding of DEO funds destined for three AIM Survival schools also occurred immediately after the occupation of the BIA building (Anderson, 1972:1A,4A).

It should be noted that in each of the above incidents things eventually worked out to the advantage of the movement. Gambill's deportation was dropped. Akwesasne Notes eventually found another sponsor, and the DEO funds were eventually released. Their effectiveness as a social control tactic lies primarily in their timing during a "critical" period to the movement, and the expenditure of sparse resources in court.

## Wire Tapping

Wire tapping or other forms of electronic surveillance are one of the least used methods of social control. A study conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) using a random sample of domestic intelligence cases found that electronic surveillance was used in only 5% of the cases (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 1976:13)

The limited use of electronic surveillance tactics is partially related to the rather stringent guidelines regarding their use compared to other social control tactics. In March 1965, then Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach issued a new requirement that any FBI intelligence operation had to obtain the written approval of the Attorney General prior to the implementation of any microphone surveillance (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 1976:105). This was followed by the Omnibus Crime Control Act passed by Congress in 1968 which established warrant procedures for wiretapping and microphone surveillance. However, the act did not limit the power of the President to issue warrantless electronic surveillance measures in the cases of "national security" and "domestic threats" (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 1976:106). It was not until 1972 when the Supreme Court decided that the President did not have the "constitutional power" to issue warrantless electronic surveillance in the case of a

domestic threat. This decision eliminated a broad loop hole in the Omnibus Crime Control Act (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 1976:107).

The potential for Judaical criticism of FBI operations in obtaining warrants for electronic surveillance has limited the utility of this tactic, particularly when much of the same information obtained from such measures can be obtained by other tactics not open to the Court's oversight.

The only known instance of wiretapping against AIM took place during the Wounded Knee occupation. Although Joseph Trimbach, area Director for the FBI denied the existence of any electronic surveillance measures against AIM in Federal Court in St. Paul, defense attorneys for Means and Banks produced memos which indicated that not only was Trimbach aware of such measures, but had issued orders based on information obtained from this measure (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.6 no.1 1974 p.20). Although no concrete evidence of damage to the Movement could be produced, the defense charged that the tap had violated attorney-client confidentiality.

### Disinformation

Disinformation is the process by which agents of social control direct information (fact or fiction) about a social movement toward the public, partisan supporters, funding agencies, and other potentially sympathetic groups. The goal of a disinformation campaigns is to discredit the movement and it's members in order to hinder the recruitment of new members, and

the mobilization of additional resources. The use of this tactic is partially dependent upon the duplicity of the press. The danger of the press unwarily reporting government misinformation designed to damage a movement was realized by Malcolm X who noted, "If you are not careful, the newspapers will have you hating the people who are being oppressed and loving the people who are doing the oppressing" (Quoted in BIA, I'm Not Your Indian Anymore, 1972:37).

Government agents of social control are able in effect to use the press in several ways. One manner in which the government is able to "use" the press is by providing the press with information which would prove damaging to the social movement. This information may be distorted, unfactual, or even information which is true but obtained through means not readily available to the press, such as informants and electronic surveillance. Such information may be provided to the press openly at "official" press sessions, given to "friendly" journalists, or leaked anonymously. Whatever the method, the net effect is intended to discredit the movement thereby making recruitment and mobilization of resources more difficult.

Instances of the government providing misinformation to the press abound in the case of AIM. One of the first incidents occurred immediately following the BIA seizure in Washington, D.C. In the ensuing effort to discredit the participants, the government attempted to paint the participants as a "splinter group of militants" who did "not represent the reservation Indians" (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.5 no.1 1973:12). This attempt



was bolstered by bringing in "friendly" Tribal Chairmen to disown the occupation. This measure completely ignored the fact that Trail lists showed 80% of the participants as having Reservation addresses (Deloria, Jr., 1974:57).

Another example of disinformation became known as the "Dog Soldier Teletypes" which were released to the press on June 21 and June 22, 1976 by the FBI. The content of these teletypes is reproduced in full in appendix A. The release of this information may have had both a general, and a very specific purpose. The general purpose was to picture AIM as a militant, terrorists organization thereby creating negative public opinion. The specific purpose may have been to influence jurors in the trial of Dino Butler and Bob Robideau charged with the killing of the two FBI agents on Pine Ridge which was in session at the time the teletypes were released. A few days after the teletypes were released, FBI Director Clarence Kelly testified in the above trial. In response to a question posed by Defense attorney, William Kunstler as to there being "one shred of evidence to support the allegations made by the teletypes?", the Director responded, "I know of none..." (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988:265).

The lack of evidence to substantiate critical charges leveled against social movements is inconsequential to the Bureau. A FBI memo reflects the Bureau's position:

"Purpose of counterintelligence action is to disrupt BPP [Black Panther Party] and it is immaterial whether facts exists to substantiate the charge. If facts are present, it aids in the success of the proposal but the Bureau feels that...disruption can be accomplished

without facts to back it up" (in Counter-Intelligence p.56-57).

Agents of social control "use" the press when they restrict the access of the press, thereby forcing the press to rely on "official briefings" or "press statements". In the case of AIM, the press was restricted in at least two important incidents. The first case was at Wounded Knee, and the second was at the scene of the FBI killings on Pine Ridge Reservation. The case of the FBI killings provides a good example of the results when the press is forced to rely on unconfirmable government information.

For two days following the killings, the press was bared from the scene (Matthiessen, 1983:195). During this period, the newsman's source of information was provided by various Federal and State officials. The initial wire service stories reflected statements provided by these individuals. The UPI wire dispatch released just after midnight on June 27 read:

OGLALA, S.D. --(UPI) TWO FBI AGENTS WERE AMBUSHED AND KILLED WITH REPEATED BLASTS OF GUNFIRE THURSDAY IN AN OUTBREAK OF BLOODSHED APPEARING TO STEM FROM THE 1973 OCCUPATION OF WOUNDED KNEE.  
THE OFFICE OF SOUTH DAKOTA GOV. RICHARD KNEIP SAID THE AGENTS, ON THE OGLALA SIOUX RESERVATION TO SERVE A WARRANT, WERE SUCKED INTO AN AMBUSH, DRAGGED FROM THEIR CARS, AND SHOT UP TO 15 TO 20 TIMES WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS.  
THE FBI CONFIRMED THE REPORT. AN AGENT SAID: "THIS IS A REGULAR COUP DE GRAS [sic] BY THE INDIANS."  
THE AGENTS WERE TAKEN FROM THEIR CARS, STRIPPED TO THEIR WAISTS, THEN SHOT REPEATEDLY IN THEIR HEADS.  
(Weisman, 1975:30).

Newspapers, including the New York Times and the Washington Post both reported the incident as an ambush, and included many of the inflammatory specifics of the "murders" reported in the

wire service dispatches. Unfortunately, it was not until five days latter on July 1 that FBI Director Clarence Kelly cleared up the misrepresentations and inaccuracies in the original official account. The agents had no warrants. They were not ambushed. They sustained a total of seven wounds from six or seven bullets, etc. (Weisman, 1975:31; Weyler, 1982:180).

However by this time, the public's perception and understanding of the event had already solidified. The lesson to be learned from this event, and no doubt recognized by agencies of social control, is explained by Robin Eveleigh:

Anyone who becomes involved with the media quickly learns that the advantage of the first news reports being favorable to one's own side is overwhelming. The first reports are usually the ones generally believed, and it is hard to reverse an unfavorable report (1978:42).

Again the potential damage suffered by a movement from such misinformation is rather obvious. Not only does it hinder mobilization of resources, but in this instance it also served to "legitimate" the wide spread violations of the Oglala's Sioux constitutional rights in the ensuing investigation (Deloria, Jr., 1974: ).

### Cooptation

Cooptation refers to "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to it's stability of existence" (Selznick 1953). The "new elements" who are coopted may come from the social movement organization, or from the potential constituencies of the movement. The cooptation of

movement members (primarily leaders) acts as a derecruitment measure, while the cooptation of potential constituency members is a preventive measure.

Cooptation as a social control tactic has it's price as in the example of the NTCA. The government was very effective in originally coopting the NTCA. This action not only removed a potential ally and leadership resource from the ranks of Indian activists, but it also proved a effective delegitimizing tool against Indian activists including AIM. This is witnessed in the media show of the Tribal Chairman's condemnation of the seizure of the BIA building in Washington, D.C. The government considered this an effective tactic. An FBI memo reveals the same action was again proposed at Wounded Knee:

A suggestion was made by Mr. Sneed [Deputy Attorney General] that the Department of the Interior should use the Intertribal Councils and urge them to make a statement concerning the situation at Wounded Knee which would in effect indicate to the general public that the Indians themselves were not in agreement with the action that was taken at Wounded Knee (FBI Files Reel 19 no.2 p.468).

However, the cost's of increasing representation and inclusion of the Tribal leadership in the polity carried with it the potential for increased influence beyond that desired by the coopting agency. As Cornell (1984) notes, "As the Tribal governments became more independent, however, they became increasingly potent political actors" (p.55). Thus in some cases, cooptation has a immediate social control advantage, but a potential negative long term outcome (See also Gamson 1968 :136-37).

The attempt to coopt individuals directly from the ranks of the social movement is often difficult. Gamson suggests that attempts to coopt leaders occur when other forms of social control have proved insufficient (1968:135). Miller proposes that attempts to coopt leaders will be more successful in movements having powerless constituencies and few skilled activists (in Freeman 1983:281). Of course one cannot ignore the intervening variable of the leadership's commitment to movement goals (Zald & Ash, 1966).

This author is aware of no significant incidence of cooptation of AIM leadership by the government. However, there are several cases of what I will call "turning". I will define turning as, a form of cooptation which occurs when agents of social control use threats of increased costs (usually charges), or offer inducement rewards, such as reduced charges, to obtain desired information or actions from social movement members. The latter form is very similar to plea bargaining. I will review the case of Louis Moves Camp as an example of this process.

Moves Camp was a AIM member and son of Oglala elder Ellen Moves Camp, outspoken critic of the Wilson Tribal administration. He remained active in AIM until July 4, 1974 when he was expelled from an AIM house in Rapid City by the "order" of Dennis Banks for violating house rules regarding drugs, alcohol, and creating disturbances (Matthiessen, 1983:93,94).

On August 16, Moves Camp appeared as a "surprise witness" in the trial of Banks and Means. One defense attorney remarked with astonishment how Moves Camp's testimony "filled in every gap in the prosecution's case, directly connecting the defendants with the alleged offenses" (Matthiessen, 1983:93). However, within a day or two of his testimony, the defense team had introduced evidence which completely discounted his testimony and affidavits. An important element of the defense's refutation of Moves Camp's testimony was the fact that he was not even present in Wounded Knee during some of the actions he claimed to have witnessed (Matthiessen, 1983:94,98).

Also revealed was the fact of Moves Camp's personal animosity towards Banks for his expulsion from the AIM house, and the fact that he was awaiting trial for robbery, assault with a deadly weapon (two counts), and assault causing bodily injury (two counts) (Matthiessen, 1983:94). In addition, just a few days before his testimony, rape charges were filed against him by a white woman while he was in the care of two FBI agents (U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 1981:280-86).

Additional damaging evidence revealed that U.S. Attorney Hurd had requested a lie detector test be administered to Moves Camp to determine whether or not he was a "ringer", i.e. an intentional plant to discredit the prosecution. SAC Trimbach, however, had advised against such a move since "To subject him to a polygraph examination might adversely affect the rapport between him and the government since Mr. Moves Camp was in the

process of signing a series of written statements for the government" (U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 1981:281). Another bit of information revealed that the FBI had paid Moves Camp some \$2,074.50 in expenses and fees for his testimony (Weyler, 1982:119).

Although this case of "turning" proved ineffective and embarrassing to the U.S. Attorney and the FBI, it is important to consider the potential situation where the defense is unable to disprove the blatant lies of a witness obtained under similar circumstances, and the government's role in eliciting the testimony.

An example of the inducement method of cooptation is demonstrated in an account by Robert High Eagle who served a two year sentence for riot and arson arising from the Custer Courthouse incident. High Eagle reported that himself and some 20 other prisoners were removed from their cells in the middle of the night and questioned by FBI agents. During this period, they were offered parole if they would become informers (St. Paul Dispatch, April 1, 1975:8).

Both of the above cases illustrate the advantage agents of social control possess in terms of legitimacy. If their covert methods work, agents of social control experience positive returns for their effort. If their efforts fail, i.e., where evidence from such a source is discounted, or offers of inducement are refused and revealed, agencies of social control remain largely unscathed. The problem of false testimony is

explained away by the admonition that they thought the testimony was factual. Allegations by uncooperative persons in inducement situations are often diffused by the fact that these individuals already lack legitimacy in the public eye due to their previous records. These questions of legitimacy, deniability, and accountability will be considered in the conclusion.

### Counter movement

A counter movement involves the mobilization of sentiments in opposition to a movement, whose actors orient themselves to the actions of the movement in an attempt to directly counter a movement or undo it's effects (Zald & Useem in Zald & McCarthy, 1987:249). I am primarily concerned with counter movements to the degree they are created or facilitated in some form by the government as a means of social control.

Although counter movements, such as, the Concerned Citizens Committee, later renamed the White America Movement, and organizations like the John Birch Society countermobilized in the case of AIM, only the National Tribal Chairman's Association received clear government support (Brand, 1978:104; Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988:280-B1). The National Tribal Chairman's Association enjoyed government and BIA legitimacy from it's founding. Although technically, the organization contained Tribal leaders who were sympathetic to, or supported AIM, the National leadership was definitely anti-AIM. Statements emanating from the National leadership like those of Webster Two Hawk who denounced AIM as a "bunch of irresponsible self styled



revolutionaries" were typical of it's position on AIM (Burnette & Koster, 1974:217).

In 1972 when the NTCA failed to attend a meeting between the NCAI, AIM, NIYC and other Indian groups in an attempt to form an alliance, Vine Deloria, Jr. predicted the effect the NTCA would have on Indian politics:

"If the NTCA does not join the ranks with the other groups it will mean a bad split in the National Indian community in the face of outside forces. It will also enable the BIA to continue to play off one Indian organization against another as it has always done" (I-LIDS Legislative Review Vol.2 no.1 November 1972:20).

Deloria's prediction proved very accurate as evidenced by the way the NTCA was used by both Federal and State governments to counter AIM. For instance when Governor Exon refused to meet with AIM to discuss racists incidents in Nebraska, he reasoned that he had:

...conferred with his sources including Bureau of Indian Affairs officials, and the elected President of the Ogallala Sioux Tribe Richard Wilson of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, South Dakota, and had determined that Bank's and his followers did not represent the general feeling of the Indian Community (FBI Files, Reel 3 Vol.6 p.626).

To this day, the NTCA remains mostly critical of AIM, although it is less the obedient child of the BIA.

### Litigation

The use of litigation is a very effective means of social control because it has utility beyond the particular outcome of a particular case. It is largely a overt tactic which enjoys public "legitimacy". In addition, it places a tremendous strain

on a movement's resources. Referring to the 1960's social movements, Oberschall notes:

The governments strategy appeared to be to tie down leaders in costly and time consuming legal battles which would impede their activities and put a tremendous drain on financial resources regardless of whether the government would be successful in Court (1978:277-78).

Not only does this tactic accomplish the above results, it also typically moderates a social movement. It creates in a movement the fear of placing those in custody or awaiting trial in greater jeopardy, and subjecting more individuals to the same situation.<sup>32</sup>

The success of this tactic is enhanced by the ease of application due to the greater generality of the laws usually used against social movement members, although they are much more difficult to prove. Oberschall cite's the Federal Anti-Riot Act of 1968 and indictments on conspiracy charges as the two legal instruments used against the 1960's social movements (1978:278).

The primary legal instruments used against AIM were the Federal Anti-riot laws and "Interference with a Federal officer during the Performance of His Duties, Title 18 U.S. Code, Section 231 (A) (3). In addition, blanket charges of Burglary, 18 USC S1153 and SDCL S22-32-9; Larceny 18 USC S1153 and S661; and Conspiracy 18 USC S371 were charged against most of the occupiers of Wounded Knee.

The purpose of applying these charges as suggested by Oberschall is confirmed by an FBI memo which states:

It should be noted that these investigations involving militant extremists [AIM members] are of such a nature that they will be tied up in court proceedings and under the courts jurisdiction during the forthcoming summer, and it is felt, [this] will greatly contribute to inhibiting their activities..." (FBI Files Reel 25 vol.25 p.437).

The results of law enforcement investigations and court outcomes also tend to confirm Oberschall's contention's about the strategy behind litigation as social control. A 1974 study conducted by the GAO of 17,528 domestic intelligence investigations of individuals revealed that only 1.3% resulted in prosecution and conviction (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 1976:19). In the case of AIM, the FBI investigated some 2,200 cases around the occupation of Wounded Knee alone. This extensive investigatory process resulted in 562 arrests, which led to 185 grand jury indictments, which produced only 15 convictions. Five of these convictions were on charges of "interfering with federal officers" (Johansen & Maestas, 1979:88; FBI Files Reel 25 Vol.25 p.435).

The impact of these events on AIM is described by Pat Ballanger:

Well first of all, the first years after that [the Wounded Knee occupation] there was the largest trials in the country, the Wounded Knee trials. And that absorbed all our energy for years. It was raising bail for those guys, getting attorneys, raising attorneys fees, developing defense committee's, keeping people involved, at least knowing about what was going on. Moving witnesses from one side of the country to the other side for these trials...(Interview 11/25/88).

The FBI directly contributed this situation with producing a tactical change in AIM:

The movement seems to be changing and appears to be more concerned with perpetuating itself rather than conducting large, costly, violent confrontations. Confrontations keep their leaders in court and saps energy and funds (FBI Files Reel 15 Vol.55 p.946).

In other cases, individuals fearful of not being able to make bail, or of obtaining a fair and impartial trial (especially in South Dakota) would go underground, or flee the U.S. as in the case of Dennis Banks. These actions not only resulted in additional charges (unlawful flight to avoid prosecution) but they also reduced the capacity of these individuals to aid the movement.

The resource discrepancies between the opposing parties in this area are great. While the movement had trouble raising the necessary funds to mount an initial defense, the government staged numerous appeals and counter charges. This discrepancy is best illustrated by the case of Dennis Banks, et. al. The defendants named in this case were all charged with "interstate transportation of explosives and illegal possession of firearms" (Akwesasne Notes Vol.8 no.2 1976:10). In a period of twelve years, this case went before the U.S. District Court in Portland, Oregon three times. In each instance the charges were dismissed, but appealed by the U.S. attorney, including one appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court (Churchill, 1988:347-48). Finally in the Spring of 1988, Dennis Banks, the only individual the prosecution could not directly place at the scene of the

crime, plead guilty to one count in a plea bargain which resulted in the charges being dropped against the others, including his wife (Correspondence with Candy Hamilton, WKLD/QC July, 1988).

The ability of agents of social control to use the court as an arm of social control, separate from it's function as an arbitrator and dispenser of justice, raises serious questions for American jurisprudence. Attempts to prevent harassing and unwarranted prosecution, such as the Federal Grand Jury have largely failed. Indeed, many suggest that the grand jury often becomes nothing more than an "intelligence agency" where the prosecution can gather evidence (Halperin, et.al., 1976:211).

These abuses of the court system confront a social movement with a problem for which there seems to be no effective counter-strategy (Oberschall, 1978: ). This means that social movements composed of poor, negatively privileged groups are seriously limited tactically. If they lack the resources to meet bail and legal costs, they must choose between having their ranks thinned by potential jail sentences, or they are constrained to act within a system dominated by those opposed to their interests.

#### Bad Jacketing

"Bad Jacketing" or "snitch jacketing" is a tactic of social control designed to produce distrust, even violent injury between social movement members, or between members of competing or opposing groups. Bad jacketing usually involves falsely labeling a target as an informant. It appears to be a widely

used tactic of the FBI. A congressional investigation revealed it was used in all five of the Bureau's "domestic counter-intelligence" programs (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 1976:213,216-19). The Committee report went on to reveal that:

Any proposed use of such techniques - for example, encouraging enmity between violent rival groups, falsely labeling group members as informants, and mailing anonymous letters to target's spouses accusing the target of infidelity - were scrutinized carefully by headquarters supervisory personnel, in an attempt to balance the "greater good" to be achieved by the proposal against the known or risked harm to the target (1976:219).

As suggested, snitch-jacketing can be carried out from outside an organization or movement. Anonymous letters, or strategically placed incriminating evidence can lead to someone being suspected of being an informer. However, the most effective method, although paradoxical, is an actual government informer inside a movement sowing suspicion about an innocent movement member (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988:212).

The sowing of distrust from inside a movement was used very effectively in the American Indian Movement. The tactic's results range from factionalism and mistrust to the possible execution of AIM leader Anna Mae Aquash. These effects are described in the following accounts.

We were a new chapter [Lincoln, Nebraska], formed during Wounded Knee, and we were really excited about going to our first national meeting. Arbuckle was our director, had us rolling in high gear...just about the first thing that happened was a bunch of heavy security guys [from AIM] came around and just interrogated the hell out of John [Arbuckle]. It seems that some of the National Leadership had been put on notice that he was

working for the police...he dealt with the questions and everything, but it was real humiliating, you could tell...and from that moment on, there was a lot of mistrust and bad feeling between Lincoln AIM, and some of the National Leadership circles. They were never able to rely on us...and we never really forgave them for the accusations that were made (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988:212).

The source of this accusation was traced to Doug Durham, latter revealed as a FBI informant. Durham also appears to have been partially responsible for a shooting between two AIM leaders. One AIM member recalls:

By this time, we were becoming very suspicious of Doug Durham in Des Moines. But he'd already gotten real tight with Ron Petite [Des Moines AIM chapter leader], and this led him into becoming Dennis' [Banks] body-guard and personal assistant, or something. He'd already moved up from our chapter level to work directly with the National Leadership, so there wasn't a lot we could do. When he bad-rapped people, other people listened...I'm not saying that Durham was responsible all by himself for what happened between Cater [Camp] and Clyde [Bellecourt] [the shooting], but he sure helped things along. And, after that, the unity of the Movement really began to come apart (Aron Two Elk in Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988:214).

One last case, and perhaps the most destructive is the murder of AIM member Anna Mae Aquash whose bad-jacket was begun by Durham, and latter continued by another informer, John Stewart (a.k.a. Daryl Blue Legs). In addition, the FBI agents raised suspicions by their continued questioning of the woman. The effects on the movement, and questions raised by this incident are contained in the following lengthy quote by an AIM member:

I really don't know who pulled the trigger which killed Anna Mae. I doubt very much it was actually David Price or any other agent of the FBI...they're too smart to do it themselves, at least not directly. It was probably an Indian who killed her, and I won't deny it

might have been somebody in AIM. But, I'll tell you this, however it happened, Price and Wood and the rest of the feds were up to their necks in setting it up. They spent a lot of time and energy making her out to be an informer, and because of that, she'd become very isolated within AIM. If the GOONS got her - which is very possible - it was because she was isolated and not receiving the protection and security from our guys that she should have been entitled to as an AIM member. And, if one of the AIM people did it, it was because they'd been led to believe she was a serious threat to the well being of others.

I'm not putting this up as an excuse...There is no excuse for what happened to Anna Mae. But, it's a reason. And AIM has been paying dues on this ever since, regardless of whether or not an organizational member was the guilty party. And maybe that's correct. We don't come off looking very good, no matter how it went down. But what I want to know, what's bothered me all these years, is how these feds...could've just got off scot free. I mean how much more blatant could they have been then they were in this case? And still nothing happened to them (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988 :217).

Questions of government accountability and legality raised by the use of snitch-jacketing and related techniques are indeed very important. Agents of social control who use such tactics are in effect "inciting" movement members to commit crimes, for which similar actions on the part of movement members would subject them to charges of "inciting" and "conspiring" to commit said crimes. These questions become even more salient given the conclusion of the Senate report on the rights of Americans which stated:

It is intolerable in a free society that an agency of the government should adopt such tactics, whether or not the targets are involved in criminal activity. The "greater good" of the country is in fact served by adherence to the rule of law mandated by the Constitution (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 1976:219).

#### Informants & Agent Provocateurs



Informants and agent provocateurs are often a neglected social control tactic and social movement participant (Marx, 1974). The reasons for this lack of research and interest range from the difficulty in obtaining information on the subject, to the more questionable explanation that they have only a limited effect on social movements as suggested by Oberschall (1978:277). I would disagree with the latter assessment and suggest with Marx (1974) that "undercover agents can seriously distort the life of a social movement (p.403). Before I consider this debate, a distinction must be made between "informers" and "agent provocateurs".

Informers are generally thought of as individuals who pass on information about a person or social movement to some agent or agency of social control. They are used at all levels of social control agencies from the local police to the FBI and CIA. A police manual quoted in Marx (1974:402) states, "From the dawn of history, internal law and order has had to depend in greater or less measure on the informer." Their importance to the FBI is shown by a GAO study which found that informers were used in 83% of domestic intelligence cases sampled (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 1976:13).

Agent provocateurs on the other hand actively seek to influence the actions taken by an individual or group. However, the distinction between the informer and the agent provocateur in the field is rather vague and unstable. I would suggest that

any act of covert infiltration by an operative working for an agency of social control should be considered an agent provocateur (See also, Karmen, 1974:218,221). As Marx (1974) notes, even "the most passive informant, of course, has some influence on the setting by his mere presence." Whether it is the mere presence of an infiltrator which makes the movement appear stronger than it actually is, or voting on agendas, or being asked or raising questions, a covert operator alters the environment in some way from the situation which would have existed than had he not been present. An informant is rather peripheral to a movement were an provocateur is more involved in the life of a movement. This distinction will be maintained throughout the remainder of this paper. The concept of "agent provocateur" will be represented by the letters "AP".

Although social control agencies such as, the FBI deny the use of AP's, the reality is quite different (U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, 1976:1039). Robert Hardy, FBI "informant" who helped orchestrate the Camden 28 raid on a draft board office, testified that:

At first the FBI instructed me not to present any new thoughts or ideas to the group. However, after a while they encouraged me to suggest to the group the exact illegal activity about which I had originally come to them...By mid-July I had gained a strong leadership position within the group...I told the FBI ..that this was not quite right. I was no longer a mere informer, but was now a promoter or provocateur (U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, 1976:1050).

Another "informer" in the Klu Klux Klan testified that on a number of occasions he had "beaten people severely, had boarded

buses and kicked people off; had went in restaurants and beaten them with blackjackets, chains, pistols" (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 1976:196).

Although, the FBI has indicated that it is Bureau policy to instruct informants "not to engage in violence or unlawful activity and, if they do so, they may be prosecuted," prosecution appears to be the exception to the rule. FBI Deputy Assistant Director Adams testified that he knew "offhand" about 20 informants who had been prosecuted (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 1976:195). However, even in these cases, I would suggest closer scrutiny is needed. Were these informants prosecuted because they broke the law, or because they became uncontrollable or uncooperative with the Bureau? Evidence, including W. Mark Felt's, the Assistant FBI Director in charge of the Inspection Division from 1964 to 1971, testimony that "There was no instruction to me, nor do I believe there is any instructions in the Inspector's manuals, that inspectors should be alert to see that constitutional values are being protected", and the plethora of evidence about illegal COINTEPRO activities would suggest the latter interpretation of Bureau prosecutions may be more accurate. Given the FBI's reluctance to discipline it's informers, and their widespread use, what is so important about this tactic that the Bureau would risk breaking the law?

The use of APs in the American Indian Movement is an excellent case for demonstrating the effects and importance of APs in domestic intelligence. The first known surfacing of an

AP in AIM followed the BIA building seizure in Washington, D.C. as described earlier. In the proceeding seven years, a number of other AP's and informants were revealed, usually in court appearances.<sup>23</sup> Known APs in AIM include: Doug Durham, John Stewart, Virginia Deluce, Harry Schaffer, Ji Schaffer, Bernie Morning Gun, Stanley Keel, Charles Stephenson, James Northrup, and Lloyd Little Ghost. Other suspected APs include: George Roberts, Bob Morgan, Anna Mae Tanequodle, and Veronica Keene (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988; Akwesasne Notes Vol.6 no.2 1974:10; Vol.6 no.3 1974:11; Vol.7 no.4 1975:9; Vol.8 no.1 1976:6-7).

In addition, the author is able to determine that at least six other APs were present at Wounded Knee under the Minneapolis Division's direction, plus APs from the Detroit, New Orleans, Phoenix, and Portland Division's of the FBI (FBI Files Reel 24 Vol.23 pp.802-03).

The importance the FBI placed on the use of APs in AIM is demonstrated in the following excerpts from FBI files. These excerpts reveal a process which unfolds over time.

Investigative efforts to develop information regarding violence-prone and militant American Indian organizations and individuals were instituted following the November, 1972 Indian occupation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Building in Washington, D.C., at the request of the Deputy Attorney General (FBI Files Reel 19 no.1 p.384).

Extremists matters Investigation of AIM activists and other extremist Indians should be handled in accordance with Manual of Instructions, section 122. Title 18, U.S. Code, section 2383 Rebellion or Insurrection, and 2384, Seditious Conspiracy, among others would be Statutory basis for investigation...Preliminary inquiries limited to indices, informants, and criminal

checks... (FBI Files Reel 2 Vol.4 pp.341-42).

All investigations in conjunction with the intelligence gathering aspect of the American Indian Movement must be most discreet (FBI Files Reel 1 Vol.1 p.72).

The importance of developing informants within violent Indian groups such as AIM has been stressed in the field...Continued efforts to develop informants and effect liaison with tribal leaders opposed to violence and militancy are continuing (FBI Files Reel 19 no.1 pp.384-85).

Whenever possible these situations [interviews with AIM members and supporters under questioning for potential crimes] should be utilized to develop quality informants. In view of possible future disturbances initiated by AIM activists, we should maximize current opportunities to develop quality information and informant coverage (FBI Files Reel 3 Vol.6 p.291).

It should be recognized that since the institution of the "Special" [Wounded Knee] in Rapid City on May 23, 1973, ten extremist informants have been developed. Several of them have agreed to testify in Federal Court in the criminal cases (FBI Files Reel 25 no.28 p.1012).

These photographs [taken from film shot by network T.V. crews] are being prepared for display to sources, informants and law enforcement agencies [for use in potential prosecutions] (FBI Files Reel 25 no.28 p.1010).

The key to successful investigation of AIM is substantial, live, quality informant coverage...when necessary, coverage is supplemented by certain, techniques which would be sanctioned in preliminary investigations (FBI Files Reel 25 no.28 p.947).

Recent investigation regarding AIM has been entirely through the use of informant coverage and the use of established sources [read, friendly tribal chairmen] who are in a position to be aware of AIM activities (FBI Files Reel 17 Vol.61 p.344).

On the basis of the information provided by Minneapolis the full investigation of AIM is being closed... Informants reporting on the activities of AIM should be redirected to report on other organizations and individuals of an investigatory interest to this Bureau (FBI Files Reel 18 Vol.64 p.767).

The previous excerpts are very instructive regarding the importance placed on APs by the major agency assigned the role of social control in "domestic security" cases. The damaging effects on the movement are considered next.

In Diagram #5, I indicated that APs cause or have a role in creating each of the seven negative social control outcomes. It should be obvious by now that these outcomes are intertwined. Seldom does a particular social control tactic achieve a single outcome. For instance, if a social control tactic is successful in creating internal conflict, this in turn inhibits the movement's capacity for corporate action. It is no one tactic, nor any one social control outcome that represses or neutralizes a social movement, but a compounding of tactics and outcomes. In no instance is this more clear than in looking at the role of the agent provocateur.

The revelation that someone you trusted, someone who had access to movement strategies, plans, etc., can cripple a movement. This is seen in the FBI's assessment that "AIM leaders have dispersed, have become extremely security conscious and literally suspect everyone" due to "certain disclosures regarding informants [Doug Durham] (FBI document in Counter Intelligence, 1982:52). The reality of similar adverse effects after the disclosure of government infiltrators is reiterated by a WKLD/DC worker:

Unfortunately, there was an awful lot of, "I don't like the way you're looking at me, you're probably a pig. That can be so destructive. You get mad at somebody, and instead of saying, "I'm mad because I don't think you did this job right, or I'm mad because you took my

boy friend away, or whatever it really was, the reaction was, "I think your a pig," and that's serious. I think that's about the worst thing that you can say about anybody. But, everybody that's been in AIM has had it happen to them. Some people get through it, and some people don't. So that was very destructive (Hamilton, 1987).

APs because of their intimate contacts with the movement and their organic relationship with agents of social control are an effective part of other social control tactics. An example is there use in the courts and litigation. Because the grand jury process is carried out in secrecy, a AP can provide critical evidence that will produce a grand jury indictment without having to worry about any rebuttal to his testimony. In addition, the government then has the option of deciding on whether or not they want the AP to testify which might produce a conviction, but would blow the cover of the AP. Regardless of whether the AP testifies, the movement has to spend the time and resources in preparing a defence for the accused.

It is not unusual in these cases for the government to refuse to prosecute, or to let the case be dropped in order to protect the identity of an AP. Deloria suggested that the reason behind the White House's desire not to prosecute the occupiers of the BIA Building, against the wishes of the BIA and Interior officials, was the presence of APs among the ranks of the occupiers (1974:57).

In another case, Lee Brightman, founder of United Native Americans, was arrested along with Dennis Banks and charged with "harboring a fugitive". When the defense made a motion that the prosecution be ordered to turn over its evidence to the court,

including the names of informers, the U.S. attorney decided not to proceed, and asked that the charges be dropped (Akwesasne Notes, Vol.8 no.1 1976:15).

Many times individual actions by APs accomplish several negative outcomes simultaneously. An example is the "frame-up" of two AIM members for the brutal murder of cab driver, George Aird outside "AIM Camp 13" in California. This example is also a case of APs working together. Doug Durham, Virginia DeLuce and suspected AP, George Roberts successfully orchestrated an event in which two AIM members were charged with murder. The results of the counterintelligence action include: the arrest and alienation of Skyhorse and Mohawk from AIM; the generation of a very unfavorable public image for AIM; and the drying up of contributions to AIM in California which were important to AIM's national legal defense efforts (Matthiessen, 1983:115). An additional benefit was the neutralization of a local AIM chapter. Laura Kadenahe, LA AIM supporter has commented:

After the arrest of Skyhorse and Mohawk, things just fell apart for the movement in LA. We started to call the local chapter "lame" instead of LA-AIM, and said the area was a "black hole" into which organizers were sent, never to be seen again. And I think the trial had a lot to do with the demise of the movement everywhere (In Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988:268).

Also, APs can directly inhibit the supply of resources to a movement. Doug Durham as head of St. Paul's WKLD/OC office had first access to incoming contributions, and is charged by AIM members with stealing an undetermined amount of contributions (Matthiessen, 1983:123).




Numerous additional examples of AF activity inside AIM could be cited. Instead, I will conclude with the analysis of one AIM member, who relates:

I can't think of any one person who did more damage to AIM than Doug Durham. The kind of pressure the feds were putting on the leadership after Wounded Knee was already causing problems. Some people were beginning to unwrap, Russ and Dennis were continuously tied up in trials, so there wasn't a lot they could do about it. Durham just absolutely destroyed trust inside the organization when he turned out to be a pig... especially when it turned out there were others as well. Nobody could be sure how far it went... This wasn't a joke. The feds were trying to put people in prison on totally bogus charges, remember. And this was for heavy time, like 90 years, or 150 years or more than 200 years in a couple of cases. And people were getting killed right and left. So nobody could afford to be real trusting, if you catch my drift. They were really trying to do us in... The game had become as serious as it gets. The thing with Harvey Major proved that, and the thing with Anna Mae [Aquash], no doubt. And then there was Skyhorse and Mohawk, and the thing with Jancita Eagle Deer, and it just kept comin' down. All of that was Doug Durham. And that's not even to mention all the lies and misrepresentations he put out as an "official AIM spokesman," or the speeches he made for the Birchers, or that bullshit he said to Congress, which got AIM labeled as a "terrorists organization."

You could say that a lot of the spirit went out of the movement around what Durham did. Oh, it wasn't just him. The FBI was doin' a lot of other stuff which contributed too. And AIM made its own mistakes. But Dennis [Banks] was never the same after he got taken in [by Durham]. And a whole lot of that early feeling, the openness of AIM disappeared. It got to be small groups who already knew each other real well, who couldn't give up the resistance, but who were thinking more in terms of survival than anything else. That's what AIM was by 1975 (Churchill & Vander Wall, 1988 :232-33).

The trust which evaporated upon the disclosure of Durham and others in the movement greatly eroded if not ended the ability of the movement to exercise corporate action. Perhaps

**Diagram # 6**  
 AIM & NonAIM Supported Demonstrations



similar circumstances in a well defined bureaucratically structured organization, or a larger mass participation based social movement, such as the Civil Rights or Anti-War movements, would not be as destructive.<sup>34</sup> However, the fact that AIM was such a loosely connected web of local chapters, made trust, especially in the national leadership, absolutely necessary for united action and mutual support. With this trust gone, it became every chapter for itself.

A clear example of the changes in AIM is shown in Diagram #6. This diagram shows the continual growth of confrontational or direct action demonstrations by AIM, and other Indian groups. Of particular interest is the dramatic decline in such demonstrations following the Wounded Knee occupation in 1973. I suggest this is a direct result of the major social control effort mounted by the Federal government following this incident. It was immediately after Wounded Knee that at least eleven informers were developed in the movement, including Doug Durham. Also it was at this time that what can only be described as the "massive" legal assault against AIM began. Prior to 1973, we have seen social control efforts such as administrative harassment, disinformation and countermovements, but nothing like the concerted effort which followed Wounded Knee.

### Conclusion

I hope I have demonstrated the potential degree to which social control tactics in general, and APs in particular can repress and distort the life of a social movement. This does

not mean that social control tactics are the most important factor in movement decline. However, I do want to suggest that social control has greater importance in movement decline beyond the limited attention it has received so far.

Most explanations of movement decline have focused on internal movement characteristics, such as factionalism, or organizational weakness (Oberschall, 1978; Zald & Ash, 1966). What these analyses have apparently failed to recognize is the fact that the very causes of movement decline they identify, are often caused by, or exaggerated by the social control tactics I have presented. So, although factionalism was present in AIM early on in its history,<sup>33</sup> it did not become so disruptive, or greatly hinder the movement until various social control tactics were utilized against the movement, including the agent provocateur. It was at this point that entire local chapters were neutralized, and individual leaders alienated.

It might be argued that AIM is an exception. The fact that it followed the major social movements of the 1960s gave the government and social control agencies time and practice to develop, test, and perfect their strategies and tactics. If this were so we should expect to see more effective social control efforts in social movements of the 1970s and 1980s. The problem in testing such a proposition is both one of availability and evidence. The problem of availability centers on the existence of movements whose interest and goals are clearly in conflict with those of the government. This is particularly true of "mass based" social movements.<sup>34</sup>

I suggest there are smaller smaller social movements, such as the Chicano movement, the Puerto Rican Independence movement, and various opponents of the governments Central American policy in which we can see some of the same negative effects of social control efforts.<sup>37</sup> While an examination of these movements might help us confirm or fail to confirm propositions about specific social control tactics in relation to smaller, less popular social movements, their efficacy in producing greater knowledge regarding the relationship between social control and popular, mass based social movements is less likely.

The second problem in testing propositions about movement decline and social control efforts is one of evidence. Much of what we know about the social control efforts which took place during the 1960s is the result of congressional investigations. No such extensive investigation of U.S. domestic intelligence operations has taken place since the Church committee. The Church committee was to investigate the case of the American Indian Movement but failed to do so when the two FBI agents were killed on the Pine Ridge Reservation in 1975. However, the case of AIM provides a good example of what can be uncovered without the use of a congressional investigation. Through court testimony, the alternative press and aggressive use of the Freedom of Information Act a good, but incomplete picture of government social control efforts has been pieced together.

Regardless, I believe the case of the American Indian Movement clearly suggests that closer attention by social movement theorists to the dynamic relationship which exists between

social control and movement "growth, decay, and change" is necessitated. This includes a reexamination of social control efforts directed against the black Civil Rights Movement and the Student/Anti-War Movement. Social movement theorists must consider what the consequences would have been had the FBI been effective in neutralizing Martin Luther King. What were the costs to individuals because of social control efforts? If government social control efforts weren't effective, why were they not? These and other questions require that we not close the door on the role of social control in the 1960s social movements.

Lastly, there are the questions of government responsibility and accountability in evading or breaking the law. For example, the Church investigation found that some of the tactics used against Dr. Martin Luther King "violated the law and fundamental human decency" (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 1976:219). Similar efforts to create enmity between rival black power groups in an effort to cause "retaliatory action which could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against its leadership", or lying to the court clearly warrant legal action against social control agencies or agents. Yet such action has not been forthcoming. Instead we find examples of verbal rebuke, and the creation of additional limited operational guidelines. The more frequent response to FBI fabrication of evidence, lying and other violations of the law is exemplified by the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court's response to an appeal by WKLD/OC in the case of Leonard

Peltier, AIM member convicted in the killing of the two FBI agents on the Pine Ridge Reservation: "We recognize that there is evidence in this record of improper conduct on the part of some FBI agents, but we are reluctant to impute even further improprieties to them" (Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, *United States v. Leonard Peltier*, September 11, 1986:16). Recommendations for solving some of the abuses by agencies of social control are found in the Church Report and other works.<sup>30</sup>

I believe this paper demonstrates that no social movement can afford to ignore either the overt, or covert social control efforts because of their potentially adverse outcome. The same is true for social movement theorists in their investigations of social movement "growth, decay and change". One must not fear the over exaggeration of these efforts, at the expense of discounting their genuine affect on movement evolution.

### Endnotes

(1) Two of the most successful confederacies were both composed of the Lakota (Sioux), Cheyenne, and Arapaho tribes of the northern Plains states. The first period of success occurred between August, 1865 and November, 1868 in what is known as the "Powder River or Red Cloud's War". The result of this conflict was the Treaty of 1868 which guaranteed large parts of what today is Montana, Nebraska, North and South Dakota and Wyoming. The second example of a successful confederacy was the annihilation of George Armstrong Custer's Command at the Battle of the Little Bighorn on June 25, 1876.

(2) In the case of the United States, it was the belief that white men were preordained to rule this continent due to their superior civilization. This philosophy was expressed by one soldier in the following manner:

The exodus of this whole people from the land of their fathers is not only interesting but a touching sight. They have fought gallantly for years on years; they have defended their mountains and their stupendous canyons with a heroism which any people might be proud to emulate; but when, at length, they found it was their **destiny**, too, as it had been that of their brethren, tribe after tribe, away back toward the rising of the sun, to give way to the **insatiable progress** of our race, they threw down their arms, and, as brave men entitled to our admiration and respect, have come to us with confidence in our magnanimity, and feeling that we are too powerful and too just a people to repay that confidence with meanness or neglect--feeling that having sacrificed to us their beautiful country, their homes, the associations of their lives, the scenes rendered classic in their traditions, we



will not dole out to them a miser's pittance in return for what they know to be and what we know to be a princely realm (in Brown, 1970:31).

(3) Also referred to as "Chippewa". With the advent of AIM, and desire to instill cultural pride, many adopted "Anishinabe" as their tribal reference based on the tribes original name for themselves in their own language.

(4) There exist a number of Indian groups, particularly in the Eastern U.S., which have no formal relationship with the government, i.e., they have no treaty or land reserve. Taylor (1974:254) estimates that over 42% of U.S. Indians are not recognized by the Federal government.

(5) The BIA and BIA officials have been targets of Indian protest as early as 1959 (Cornell, 1988).

(6) Hopi - In 1949, Hopi traditional leaders sent a letter to President Truman in which they asserted the sovereign rights of the Hopi empire, including the right to refusal to lease lands for oil exploration. In addition, some Hopi resisted U.S. selective service laws during WWII (Talbot, 1981:14-15).

Six Nations - The Iroquois were involved in a number of disputes and demonstrations as early as 1911. These included: seeking back taxes from white residents on the Seneca reservation; seeking recognition from the League of Nations as sovereign nations (1922); issuing a "Declaration of Independence" to the State of New York (1939); resisting U.S. selective service laws (1940); sit-ins to prevent the building of Kinzua dam in New York which would flood part of a reservation (1957); and occupation of "traditional land (1957) (Talbot, 1981:14-15).

Mad Bear Anderson - This activist made a trip to Cuba in an effort to enlist Castro's aid in interceding for them in the United Nations, to obtain U.N. recognition as sovereign Nations (1958) (Talbot, 1981:15).

Oklahoma Cherokee - A number of "full-blood" Cherokee take up arms in defense of a man arrested for violating State game laws (Steiner, 1968).

Northwest Coast Fishing Rights - See coverage by the American Friends Service Committee, in Uncommon Controversy: Fishing Rights of the Mukleshoot, Puyallup, and Nisqually Indians. Seattle:University of Washington Press, 1970.

(7) See Thornton, 1987 for a good overview of the reasons for an increased American Indian population, including: birth rates, infant mortality, life expectancy, and the means of identifying "race" in the U.S. Census.

(8) For an excellent explanation of how U.S. policy has effected Indian-White relations and politics, see Cornell, Stephen. The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence, 1988).

(9) Some 40,000 to 50,000 Indians were hired by the war factories (Steiner, 1968:22).

(10) AIM (as were many of the 1960s social movements) was plagued by sexism. AIM first acknowledged this problem at the International Indian Treaty Council in 1974. Women who have been identified as instrumental in the founding of AIM include; Pat Ballanger (Weyler, 1982:36), Mary Jane Wilson (Correspondence with Candy Hamilton, July, 1988), and Elaine M. Stately (Akwesasne Notes 20(2) 1988:27).

(11) Another source identifies San Francisco as the place where Banks and Means met (Weyler, 1982:42).

(12) A complete listing of all AIM chapter leaders is also included in this article.

(13) This same emphasis on "movement" as opposed to "organization" was made to the author in a conversation with Vernon Bellecourt during the Spring of 1988 at the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill.

(14) See Talbot, 1981:60-61; Johansen & Maestas, 1979:200-201; Akwesasne Notes, Vol. 4 no.2 1972:7; Vol. 5 no.3 1973:37).

(15) Organizations involved in planning the "Trail of Broken Treaties" include:

- The National Indian Brotherhood (of Canada)
- Native American Rights Fund
- American Indian Movement
- National Indian Youth Council
- National American Indian Council
- National Council on Indian Work
- National Indian Leadership Training
- National Indian Committee on Alcohol and Drug Abuse

Additional organizations which endorsed the concept and purpose of the Trail included the:

- Native American Women's Action Council
- United Native Americans
- National Indian Luthern Board
- Coalition of Indian Controlled School Boards (Akwesasne Notes, Vol. 5 no.1 1973:3).

(16) Ira Hayes, a Pima from Arizona, was among those who participated in the flag raising over Iwo Jima. Sgt. John Rice,

a Winnebago from Nebraska, was refused burial in a Sioux City cemetery because he was an Indian. It was then he was buried in Arlington by order of Harry S. Truman (Akwasasne Notes, Vol. 5 no.1 1973:5).

(17) Compiled by the author from a list of names in Akwasasne Notes, Vol. 5 no.1 1973:12).

(18) Many Trail participants considered this a violation of the agreement which ended the occupation in which White House recommended no prosecution for actions taken in the occupation.

(19) Adam's had long been an active leader in the Northwest Coast Fishing Rights struggle prior to the Trail of Broken Treaties.

(20) The numerous abuses and problems with the Tribal court system are found in Hearings on the Occupation of Wounded Knee. Among the more important points is the fact that Dorothy Richards, a tribal judge who signed the order for Wilson, was never confirmed according to the procedure specified in the Tribal constitution (1973:230).

(21) The Inter-District was formed in October of 1972 in response to Wilson's abuse of the Tribal Chairman's office. One major area of concern for the Inter-district council was the extension of grazing leases to white ranchers (Hearings on the Occupation of Wounded Knee, 1973:236-239).

(22) The executive committee as specified in the Tribal constitution included five members: the Chairman, vice-Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, and one additional council member. Wilson was operating with just three members. One member, Everitt Lone Hill, quit because of Wilson abuses, and vice-Chairman, Dave Long, was fired by Wilson (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1974:19).

(23) The film was produced by the John Birch Society and dealt with the threat of communism.

(24) Under the Indian Reorganization Act all tribal constitutions and charters required BIA approval. A total of 189 tribes (129,750 Indians) voted to accept the Act's provisions. However, not all those voting to accept the Act's provisions actually adopted a constitution or charter. Some 77 tribes (86,365 Indians) rejected the Act (Shirly Hill Witt in Levine & Lurie (eds.), 1965:102-103).

(25) The IRA did include a provision that a valid vote had to include at least 30% of those eligible to vote (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1974:50).

(26) One AIM member estimated that around fifty AIM members were initially involved in the occupation (Voices from Wounded Knee, 1973:64).

(27) The 7 white supporters were members of the "Vietnam Veterans Against the War" (Weyler, 1982:83).

(28) The WKLD/OC was formed by lawyer Ken Tilsen along with other lawyers on March 27, 1973. It eventually grew to include 30 fulltime members, in addition to a large number of volunteers. Committee members received room and board but no salary (Wounded Knee Press Kit in FBI Files, Reel 18 Vol.64 p.507).

(29) The IITC's main area of work has been in the United Nations, including establishing ties with other "traditional, land-based" peoples.

(30) "ResMurs" is the FBI code designation for the investigation of the killing of the two agents.

(31) Banks spent a period of time in the remote Northwest Territory during which his only connection to the States was undercover informer Doug Durham.

(32) An exception to the general desire of a social movement to keep members out of jail took place in Birmingham, Alabama. Here the strategy was to fill the jails in order to create a crisis which necessitated that the white power structure negotiate with black leaders (Williams, 1987:184-191).

(33) Marx has found that about 60% of informers are exposed during court appearances, when they are neither charged or arrested, or when they are released without bail (1974:425).

(34) Citation from Marx.

(35) See Matthiessen, 1983:51 for one AIM members account of some early frictions within the movement.

(36) The anti-nuclear movement might offer a potential case study since one of it's important goals is the elimination of nuclear weapons.

(37) One of the more recent revelations of Bureau violations are in regard to the "Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES)". See press kit release on 1/27/88 from the "Center for Constitutional Rights". AIM was one of the organizations involved in this FBI investigation. Copy in author's files.

(38) See Churchill and Vander Wall, 1988 Chpt. 14 for some suggestions.

Appendix A

28 1765Z May 76  
From Director FBI  
To Deputy Attorney General  
Attn: Analysis and Evaluation Unit Assistant Attorney General,  
Criminal Division  
Attn: Internal Security Section U.S. Marshal's Service U.S.  
Secret Service (PID)  
Department of the Interior  
Re: American Indian Movement  
Unclassified

A source, with whom insufficient contact has been made to determine reliability but who is in a position to furnish reliable information, advised as follows on May 21, 1976, "Dog Soldiers" who are pro-American Indian Movement (AIM) members who kill for the advancement of AIM objectives have been training since the Wounded Knee, South Dakota, incident in 1973. These Dog Soldiers, approximately 2000 in number have been training in "The Northwest Territory" (not further described) and also an unknown number have been training in the desert of Arizona. These Dog Soldiers allegedly are undergoing guerilla warfare training experiences (not further described).

The Dog Soldiers are to arrive at the Yankton Sioux Reservation, South Dakota (Wagner, South Dakota) in order to attend the traditional Sioux Sun Dance and International Treaty Conference. The Sun Dance and the conference are to occur on the Yankton Reservation in early June of 1976 and this Sun Dance and conference are to serve as a cover for the influx of Dog Soldiers. (The second biennial International Indian Treaty Conference is scheduled for May 28-June 6, 1976, Yankton Reservation).

At the conclusion of the activities on the Sioux Reservation, the Dog Soldiers are to meet on June 25, 1976, or immediately thereafter, at 20 North Street, Rapid City, South Dakota, the residence of Renee Howell. At this meeting final assignments will be given to the Dog Soldiers for targets throughout the state on the Fourth of July weekend. Currently some Dog Soldiers from the "Northwest Territory" are in the state of South Dakota watching the movements of public employees at public buildings.

The Dog Soldiers' assignments are to be carried out between July 1 and July 5, 1976. Alleged targets are as follows:

1. The Charles Mix County court house, Lake Andes, South Dakota where valves on the heating systems boiler are to be set (including the safety valve) in such a way that the boiler will blow up.

2. State Capitol, Pierre, South Dakota, (no further detail).
3. Ft. Randall Dam, Fickstown, South Dakota, would have turbines blown up, short circuiting power.
4. The Dog Soldiers were "on the line" to assassinate the Governor of South Dakota.
5. Sniping of tourists on interstate highways in South Dakota.
6. Taking action at Mt. Rushmore.
7. To "burn farmers and shooting equipment in the Wagner, South Dakota area.
8. To assault the State Penitentiary at Sioux Falls, South Dakota to assassinate an inmate.
9. To blow up the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA Buildings in the Wagner, South Dakota area).

The Dog Soldiers are allegedly to be armed with M-15s and carbines which are hidden in Porcupine, South Dakota, area, on Rosebud Indian Reservation [sic].

Sam Moves Camp, an acting AIM member, Pine Ridge, South Dakota, allegedly transports the above weapons from Red Man Street, number unknown, Omaha, Nebraska, to the residence of Charlie Abourzek, Porcupine, South Dakota. Abourzek, who is involved with the Dog Soldiers, is the son of a United States Senator James Abourzek, South Dakota. Additionally, Sam Moves Camp allegedly drives an Oldsmobile, four door black over brown, and resides in Isla Vista, Nebraska, (believed to be a suburb of Omaha, Nebraska).

Source learned that dynamite was stored at the home of Tony Zephier, Green Wood, South Dakota, in September, 1975, and dynamite was also stored at the home of Gregory Francis Zephier, Sr., also known as Greg, Wagner, South Dakota, in February, 1975.

Source has learned that Wilburt Provost, also known as Willie, is one of Russell Means' "hit men" and that Wallace Little, Jr., also known as June Little, who is expert with explosives, was once teacher of the Dog Soldiers in the Northwest Territory.

Greg Zephier, Wagner, South Dakota, is listed as the Director of the AIM, South Dakota, according to Janice Stark, Clerk, Incorporation Records, South Dakota Secretary of State, as of July 18, 1975.

A second source advised that Russell Means holds no national office in AIM; however he is member of the AIM central committee, the decision-making body of AIM.

The American Indian Movement (AIM) was founded in Minnesota in 1968, dedicated to improving conditions for the American Indian. AIM led and participated in confrontations with local authorities in Scottsbluff, Nebraska, and the Rapid City-Custer areas of South Dakota. AIM led the takeover and occupation of Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in February-May, 1973 (From mimeograph obtained from Candy Hamilton, WKLD/OC worker).

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RECEIVED FEB 13 1989

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA  
AT  
CHAPEL HILL

Department of Sociology

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  
Hamilton Hall 070 A  
Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514

2-9-1989

LaDonna Harris  
Americans for Indian Opportunity  
3508 Garfield Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20007

Dear Ms. Harris,

It has been quite some time since we corresponded. I am sending a draft of my thesis instead of a final copy because I thought I might benefit from any comments you might like to make. Your intimate involvement in the Indian community places you in a better position to better understand many of the facts and issues involved. Your insight would be appreciated.

You mentioned you were interested in why I choose to focus my attention on AIM. I will try to briefly explain my rationale. First, I certainly don't believe AIM is a perfect organization. It has had many problems. I believe some of these problems have been endemic to the organization or movement. However, I also believe many have been due to the social control efforts directed against the movement. With this said, I believe AIM can take the credit for several significant outcomes.

First, AIM unlike any other Indian organization that I am aware of was able to mobilize a portion of the grass-roots Indian community. Most other Indian organizations have been formed from individuals who already held leadership positions, or who were the most educated, i.e. the elite of the Indian community. I think this is a significant accomplishment.

Second, at the individual chapter level, local AIM leaders have been able to begin a number of programs, and provide services to the local community which might not have been created without AIM's efforts.

Third, although not specific to AIM was the fact that it was a "supratribal" organization. It sought to focus attention on not just individual tribal issues, but also on the broader Indian-U.S. relationship.

Fourth, AIM indirectly contributed to the strengthening of many other Indian organizations. The fact that AIM was considered "militant" and "radical" made State governments, and the Federal government more responsive to more "moderate" Indian organizations.


Lastly, and perhaps the most important, I think AIM can take most of the credit for "consciousness raising" in the Indian community. That is, a restoration of pride in the traditional spiritual and cultural traditions which are the backbone of any people. I think it is important for groups to maintain their distinctiveness - their heritage. This is especially true of language. I am not a "assimilationist" in this sense. I hope these points help explain my focus.

I guess in any project such as this, the inevitable has happened. The direction I will be moving in for my dissertation has changed from my original goal. I will be looking at the founding of AIM in 1968 until the present. This will include examining it's goals, structure, strategies, etc. Along these lines, I would greatly appreciate it if you could put me in touch with Louis LaRose and Reuben Snake since they were very active in AIM. I would like to do a phone interview with them if possible. Please feel free to share the draft of my thesis with them.

Part of this study will include AIM's relationship to other Indian organizations. I'm sure I will be in touch with you again to gain your perspective, and also to find out what you mean when you said, "We contributed to AIM by participating in their national programs."

Thank you for your time and help. It is greatly appreciated.

Best Regards



Timothy Baylor

# "Bring Peltier Home"

P.O. Box 315 Newport, KY 41071

August 19, 1996

Dear Friend:


Dennis J. Banks, American Indian Movement (AIM) National Field Director has agreed to the '97 "Bring Peltier Home" Campaign to free Leonard Peltier from prison. Enclosed you will find a brochure with background of the Peltier case, overview of the campaign and suggestions of events you can organize in your area. Be creative in devising effective ways of gaining local public awareness of Peltier's situation and the need for their support. This is a call to action! Be part of it!

1. Encourage your local community members to call and fax the White House and demand executive clemency for Leonard Peltier. Hot Line: (202-456-1111.) Each call and fax is recorded and does make an impact.
2. Write letters to President Clinton and state senators and representatives urging their support.
3. Organize an event to bring local public awareness of the case.
4. Participate in and be part of a "Bring Peltier Home" event in your area.
5. Already being planned is the June '97 "Bring Peltier Home" Conference in Tulsa, Oklahoma and the "Run for Freedom" from Cincinnati, Ohio to Tulsa. Be part of one or both of these activities.

We'd like to hear what you plan to do in your community and the results of the actions (i.e. petition signatures, letters written and sent, concerts and, runs scheduled, etc.)

"Bring Peltier Home" tee-shirts and bumperstickers designed specifically for this 97 Campaign will soon be available. An order form is enclosed for those interested. Monetary donations can be sent to "Bring Peltier Home" office at the above address. Your contribution goes directly to the Campaign operations as all workers are volunteers. Please feel free to make and distribute copies of this information. We look forward to hearing from you!

Respectfully,

  
Dennis J. Banks  
Campaign Director



# "Bring Peltier Home"

## '97 Campaign Order form

P.O. Box 315 Newport, KY 41071

**Tee Shirt-all tee shirts are \$15.00 except XXL which are \$18.00**

\* AIM-shirts are available in black only. ( Three color design is a hoop with hanging feathers and lettering; "American Indian Movement:Still Strong")

\* "Bring Peltier Home" tees

**Bumper stickers-- \$2.00**

\* AIM

\* "Bring Peltier Home"

**Music/Video**

\* "Still Strong" cassette (By Dennis J. Banks) songs include " The AIM and Peltier Songs" plus more! \$10.00

\* "Still Strong" Musical Video \$20.00

ITEM DESCRIPTION	SIZE	QUANTITY	PRICE

**SHIPPING COSTS**

(Please allow 3-5 weeks for delivery)

Less than \$15.00 add \$2.50

\$20-\$50.00 add \$4.00

\$51-\$120.00 add \$8.00

Over \$120 add 7% to the total

Sub Total \_\_\_\_\_

Shipping \_\_\_\_\_

Tax 6% \_\_\_\_\_

( If outside of USA ) Add \$8.00 \_\_\_\_\_

I also wish to make an additional donation to the "BPH" '97 Campaign \$ \_\_\_\_\_

Total amt. \_\_\_\_\_

Make money order (please no checks) payable to "Bring Peltier Home" mail to P.O. Box 315, Newport, Ky. 41071

**PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY**

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Complete Mailing Address \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Phone (day) \_\_\_\_\_ (eve) \_\_\_\_\_ (fax) \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_



## **97 International "Bring Peltier Home" Conference**

A worldwide gathering of AIM Chapters and Support Groups, LPSG's, and other supporters for Leonard Peltier's freedom will gather in Tulsa, Oklahoma for an Action Conference to discuss their present efforts to assist in the release of Peltier and to set strategy for the next year. In the event of Peltier's release, this conference will be a welcoming home celebration and will discuss specific actions regarding issues of indigenous people

To receive registration information available in December 1996, please send a self-addressed, stamped business-size envelope to the "Bring Peltier Home" 1997 Campaign Office

### **RUN FOR FREEDOM**

#### **"Bring Peltier Home"**

JUNE 1997

**Cincinnati, Ohio to Tulsa, Oklahoma**

Sponsored by the Ohio/N. Kentucky AIM Support Group

For more information: Send SASE to

Bill Boswell

2851 Lindale Mount Holly Road

Amelia, Ohio 45102 tel 513-797-8944

"Bring Peltier Home" '97 Campaign  
Dennis Banks/AIM National Field Director  
P. O. Box 315  
Newport, Kentucky 41071 USA

## **'BRING PELTIER HOME" CAMPAIGN '97**



**Leonard Peltier**

#### Special Assignment


Dennis J. Banks, co-founder of the American Indian Movement and its National Field Director, has agreed to lead the '97 Campaign "Bring Peltier Home."

**"Bring Peltier Home"**

**P.O. Box 315**

**Newport, Kentucky 41071 USA**

**Tel. 606-431-2346 — Fax 606-581-9458**



# "BRING PELTIER HOME" CAMPAIGN 1997

## Goals of the Campaign

1. **Collect 100 million signatures** world wide promoting the release of Peltier.

2. **Encourage international actions** to promote awareness of Leonard Peltier's case.

\* **Running Events**—100 Mile Runs, 1000 Mile Runs, Cross Country Runs

\* **Walks/Petition Drives**—to capital cities world wide, to American Embassies

\* **Community "Teach in's"**— discussions and video showings of documentaries about Peltier's case at schools, churches, cultural centers.

\* **Declarations/Proclamations of Peltier Day** and other announcements and written documents of support from governors, mayors, organizations, churches, tribal nations, and others.

\* **Water Events**—Boating/Canoeing Petitions Drives

\* **Musical Events/Concerts**

\* **Distribution of Peltier Literature**

3. **Bring Peltier Home!**

Send information about the event you organize in your area (press release, flyer, registration, etc.) to the "Bring Peltier Home" Campaign\*P.O.Box 315, Newport, Kentucky 41071 USA OR fax 606-581-9458. The information will be networked to supporters internationally.

# LEONARD PELTIER

## LEONARD PELTIER

Leonard Peltier could be you, me or anyone who stands up for his family, friends, community, and beliefs. Leonard is a Lakota/Ojibwa serving two consecutive life sentences in Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary. He is a political prisoner because he dared to stand up for and defend the rights of his people, their sacred land, and their future generations. He is innocent of the crime for which he was unconstitutionally convicted.

## HISTORY

It was on June 26, 1975 that unknown assailants opened fire on AIM (American Indian Movement) campgrounds near the Jumping Bull ranch in Oglala, South Dakota. The Oglala firefight lasted nine hours, and when it was over, one Native security person and two agents of the FBI lay dead. Following the largest manhunt in FBI history—Dino Butler, Robert Robideaux, and Leonard Peltier were charged with the killing of the agents. Robideaux and Butler were tried in Cedar Rapids, Iowa and found **not guilty** by reason of **justifiable self-defense**.

Meanwhile, under advice from elders, Leonard fled to Canada. There he was arrested and extradited under eyewitness affidavits manufactured by the FBI. The government has since admitted that these affidavits are false.

Peltier was tried in North Dakota before an all-white jury but **was not allowed to use the self-defense theory**. He was also denied use of evidence which pointed to his innocence. This evidence was finally released under the Freedom of Information Act, from the FBI files, seven years after his conviction.

In his summation argument, the U.S. Prosecutor, Lynn Crook, accused Peltier of firing the fatal bullets that killed

the agents. Leonard was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to two consecutive life terms. Seventeen years later, on November 9, 1993, Crook (still the U. S. Prosecutor admitted to the reviewing Court: **"We don't know who killed the agents."** This admission was before the Eighth Circuit Court on Peltier's last appeal. (The Court of Appeals in 1986 stated that FBI misconduct in the case had been a "clear abuse of the investigative process"—coercion of witnesses, the knowing use of perjury, the fabrication of evidence, and the suppression of evidence which would have proven his innocence.)

**Yet, Peltier is still in prison!**

## RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

\* September 1995: Newly discovered radio communications reports show FBI agents in the area of the shoot-out 20 minutes before the time the government and FBI originally said they were present, demonstrates further that the firefight was orchestrated by the FBI and that the agents Coler and Williams had back-up nearby and were not "trapped and alone." A second Freedom of Information Act request was generated.

\* December 11, 1995: A second parole hearing results in Peltier being commended for his good behavior in prison and his work with Native people.

\* March 18, 1996: The United States Parole Commission denies Peltier's bid for parole stating that he has given a specific factual account of his actions "that is consistent with the jury's verdict of guilt." How can an innocent man do this? The denial is currently being appealed.

**FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT  
PELTIER'S LEGAL DEFENSE CONTACT  
LPDC  
P.O. BOX 583  
LAWRENCE, KS 66044  
TEL. 913-842-5774**

## DENNIS BANKS OFFICES

September 4, 1996

LaDonna Harris  
American for Indian Opportunity  
681 Juniper Hill Rd.  
Bernadillo, NM 87601

Dear LaDonna,


It was good to see you and to talk with you after so many years have passed. I hear that you have still been active with AIO and have often wondered where you went after Oklahoma. As you know, AIM did survive the 70's and 80's, and we're still alive and kicking. Unfortunately, one of our warriors still remains in prison, which is the purpose of this letter.

Enclosed is information regarding "Bring Peltier Home" Campaign, of which I am chairing. We are coming through Albuquerque on December 8 and I am wondering and hoping if you could organize a reception for us. We will be traveling in a greyhound bus which we purchased, carrying approximately 15-20 people, including myself.

By organizing a reception, I mean dinner, event, housing, and breakfast the next morning. The tour personnel will include 5 singers and 5 dancers, and we would be willing to do a small drum presentation and a half-hour speech by myself. We will have campaign merchandise: T-shirts, bumper stickers, and other movement merchandise for sale. I am hoping that each site that we visit can guarantee a minimum of \$300.00 for gas expenses.

I realize this is a short notice, but if I remember LaDonna Harris, she gets action from a moments notice. If you are unable to accept this request, perhaps you might steer me in the right direction.

Respectfully,



Dennis J. Banks

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