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A SURVEY OF BRAZILIAN PHILOSOPHY

by

Allan S. Gnagy

A Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Philosophy

The University of New Mexico

1966

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This thesis, directed and approved by the candidate's committee, has been accepted by the Graduate Committee of the University of New Mexico in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Arne Rosenthal
DEAN

DATE

April 29, 1966

A SURVEY OF BRAZILIAN PHILOSOPHY

by

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PREFACE

Growing awareness of the interdependence of North and South American cultures, economically, politically and ideologically, makes it imperative that North Americans increase their understanding of the culture, history and philosophies of South American countries. The importance of the role of Brazilian philosophers in reflecting cultural developments has been too long neglected by North American philosophers. Since very little has been written in English about the philosophical environment in Brazil, a need exists for filling this gap. My own combination of abilities, an interest in philosophy and some facility with Portuguese and Spanish, makes the undertaking of the present project a fitting one.

Acknowledgement of indebtedness is due the following.

First, I owe to my wife, Justina da C. B. Gnagy, appreciation for her initial awakening in my mind of an interest in Luso-Brazilian thought and for her continuing encouragement of my endeavors; to her I dedicate this dissertation. My thanks are due also to Professor Luis Washington Vita, Professor Cruz Costa, and Dr. Ivan Lins for their good will in supplying some helpful works. I also wish to thank Dr. Hubert G. Alexander, Dr. Archie J. Bahm, and Dr. James A. Snedden for their constant guidance and helpful suggestions during the writing of this work.

All translations of quotations from Portuguese, Spanish and Italian authors are my own.

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General Influences
Influences on and Characterization of the
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Opinions
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Concluding Remarks

INTRODUCTION

The history of philosophy reveals a fundamental ambivalence, a process of oscillation, between two poles of interest, that of the universe and that of the human being himself. Many philosophical movements leading up to and including this century reveal the agony of this ambivalence, and especially the desire to find some point of reconciliation, some ligament of concrete reality, between the self and his universe. Ever since Kant posed the impossibility of direct knowledge of the thing-in-itself, men have tended to emphasize the reality of one or the other (subject or object), often in detriment to one of the two. In view of this, many philosophers have concerned themselves with finding a basis for reconciliation of subject and object, and the result in many cases has been a renewed concern with the nature of human reality. Thus, much philosophy has become anthropocentric and value-centered, and has undergone a process which may be called one of humanization and personalization and which has brought forth a new array of philosophies, such as philosophical anthropology and existentialism. Thinkers have turned from rationalistic and scientific metaphysics, from the scientific search after primordial substance and cosmological principles to the study of man. The Protagorean dictum, "man is the measure of all things," is no longer a souvenir of an early period in Greek philosophy, but a present standard.

The philosophical thought of Brazil has participated in this humanization and personalization of philosophy, and has to this end made use of such Germanic thought as that of Nicolai Hartmann, Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, and many others. A study of Brazilian philosophy reveals a movement away from rationalism to a reaffirmation of the emotive, valuative, and volitional aspects of man in his day-to-day existence.

The aim of the present dissertation is to demonstrate through a survey of Brazilian philosophy how humanization and personalization of philosophy coupled with a disillusionment with metaphysical systems occurred in Brazil. My conclusions will be compared with those of Prof. Cruz Costa, of the University of Sao Paulo, a specialist in the history of Brazilian philosophy, who also has characterized Brazilian philosophy as anti-metaphysical and pragmatic.

PART I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Chapter I. The Colonial Period

In the year 1500, the Portuguese explorer, Cabral, swung his ships too far west in his voyage toward India, following Vasco da Gama's route, and happened upon the vast territory of South America which juts out into the Atlantic. The Treaty of Tordesillas provided that the Spanish explorers were to have the rights to all territories west of a given north-south line in the Atlantic, and the Portuguese were to colonize whatever they discovered to the east of that line. Thus, the Portuguese king, Dom João III, ordered colonizers to begin exploitation at once.

The philosophy of Brazil began as a child of the Jesuit educational system. The Jesuits were put in full charge of education, and the first colleges in Brazil were thus begun by the Society of Jesus in 1533.¹ These colleges were attended first by the families of settlers who were fast becoming wealthy from the new resources, especially from the sugar cane industry.

It is pointed out by several writers that a peculiar characteristic of the Portuguese has always been a certain

¹João Cruz Costa, Esbozo de una Historia de las Ideas en el Brasil (translated into Spanish by J. L. Paez, Tierra Firme, Mexico, 1957) p. 19.

"utilitarian outlook,"² a "lived pragmatism,"² and that this is a prominent aspect of Brazilian thought as well. Indeed, Guillermo Francovich declares this pragmatic tendency to be characteristic of all South American philosophy.³ Cruz Costa makes the statement that both the colonizers and the Jesuits were motivated by the utilitarian drive.⁴ Be that as it may, whether or not there was a pragmatic influence originating in the Portuguese homeland, it is to be expected that the utilitarian motive be strong in a new land where there is less time and need for pure speculation than there is in an older, long-established culture such as that of Europe.

In the first century and a half, then, the Jesuit system of education was a duplication of that on the continent, with the purpose of establishing and extending the Portuguese rule and culture and the dominance of the Roman Catholic Church. The majority of names of educators and thinkers of this period are those of priests. Portugal officially subscribed to the orthodoxy of the Council of Trent in 1564, and with the added difficulty of obtaining books in the colony at all, to say nothing of those which were on the index, we have a picture of

²Costa, op. cit., p. 18, and Francovich, Filósofos Brasileños (editorial Losada, S.A., Buenos Aires, 1943) p. 17.

³Francovich, op.cit., p. 17.

⁴Costa, op. cit., p. 18.

education narrowly religious and sectarian.

The eighteenth century was, as for so many other colonies, a time of gradually-acquired intellectual and political independence. With the discovery of gold in Minas Gerais, urbanization began to take place, in the interior as well as on the littoral. There began a surge of intellectual and political desire for escape from the tutelage of Portugal. The examples of the French and American revolutions and their accompanying ideas took hold of the imagination of a few people, especially of the middle class. Luis Washington Vita notes that the Enlightenment in Brazil was, as in Portugal, peculiarly reformist and pedagogical, essentially Christian and Catholic, but not revolutionary nor anti-religious, as was the case in France.⁵ This is evident in the reforms of the enlightened despot, the Marques de Pombal in Portugal, who rejected the Company of Jesus, expelling them from the country in 1759, and took many books off the Index, including the works of Descartes. It was a very short time, however, before Pombal again put the censorship on Descartes and others, much in line with the Catholic Index. Luis Washington Vita states that on the whole, the pedagogical reforms made by Pombal's administration were a rejection of Jesuit methods, but not of the general content

⁵Luis Washington Vita, "Panorama da Filosofia no Brasil," in Monólogos & Diálogos (Conselho Estadual de Cultura, São Paulo, 1964) p. 112.

of their philosophy.⁶

When the Jesuits were expelled from Portugal, the whole educational system of the Company of Jesus in Brazil became disorganized, and the Jesuits were gradually replaced in teaching positions by "priests, clerics, and other lettered persons."⁷ The result of this change in the educational personnel, in the last half of the eighteenth century, was that Brazil began to throw off the Portuguese influence, and turned to France for her intellectual orientation. One of the early examples of the French influence is the Brazilian Matias Aires (1705-1763), who, after living the first eleven years of his life in Sao Paulo, went to Portugal to study in the University of Coimbra, where he received the licentiate in arts. From there he went to Paris (1728), where he studied the natural sciences, Hebrew and mathematics. Two of his works have survived, which illustrate something of his liberation from the Catholic, theological frame of reference; Reflections on the Vanity of Men (1752) and Problems of Civil Architecture (published posthumously in 1770). The series of essays in Problems of Civil Architecture has nothing to do with architecture, since this was only a misleading title given the work,

⁶Vita, loc. cit.

⁷Francovich, op. cit., p. 22.

to allow it to get past the censors. It is rather an exposition of the physico-chemical theories currently popular in France. The work, Reflections on the Vanity of Men, is an analysis of reality in three essential terms; Providence, Nature and Man. Aires meditates on 1) the irremediable and complete corruption of human nature, 2) the vanity of social life, and 3) the irresistible power of Providence and of its temporal manifestations. Aires concludes that vanity is the source of good as well as evil, on the order of the Stoic resignation to human nature as it is. Although Aires uses the concept of Providence, it is easily seen that he has an interest in the natural sciences and in the study of man. In this connection, it may be said that he seems to represent a transition, or a crude eclecticism between the theological, the scientific and the humanistic interests of the times.

The Enlightenment which took place in Spain through the French Encyclopedists also had its counterpart in Brazil, and Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau and Montaigne became known among the intellectuals. The Social Contract idea became well known, but the revolutionary, democratic ideologies of the Encyclopedists did not take hold. The 'good savage' idea of man had its adepts through familiarity with Rousseau and Montaigne, but the general influence of the Jesuits and the Catholic Church prevented any practical consequences of this and other anthropocentric ideologies.

By the start of the nineteenth century, there were the beginnings of reaction against encyclopedism, revealed in particular by the priest, Francisco Mont'Alverne, who was born in Rio in 1784, and became a renowned orator, whom multitudes came to hear. Guillermo Francovich finds the written works themselves "tiresome," but nevertheless Mont'Alverne was quite popular. He used Victor Cousin's eclecticism in his philosophical writings, and believed that four fundamental tendencies existed in philosophy. They were Materialism, Spiritualism, Mysticism and Scepticism. With Cousin he saw that truth and error were more or less equally distributed among these tendencies, and that in order to do philosophy, one must collect and put together the truths which they possessed.

Early in the nineteenth century, the pressure put on by Napoleon's conquests and a constitutional movement in Portugal forced the royal court of Portugal to take refuge in Rio de Janeiro. This brought greater opportunities for cultural growth in Brazil, for the king, Dom João VI, immediately set about creating, with the help of the Count of Barca, an Academy of Fine Arts in Rio, for which he imported a group of French artists. He promoted the study of the natural sciences, and the first act which he performed upon arriving in Rio was to open up the ports of the colony to trade from all countries

as trade until then had been restricted to Portugal only. However, the changes in the intellectual climate in the colony were much slower, as many of the members of Dom João's government had been educated in the conservative University of Coimbra, and of course had control of the situation.

With the increase in the French influence, there was a certain amount of eclecticism, as already noted, and the scientific theories of the French and the sensualist psychology of Condillac became quite popular. There also arose a type of literary and romanticist nationalism, which was begun by the writer, José Gonçalves de Magalhães, at the start of the nineteenth century. It is worth noting that much of the eclectic philosophy of the day was used by the monarchy to justify itself in the face of the revolutionary ideas of France and North America.

It was at the beginning of the nineteenth century also that Germanic thought was introduced into Brazil. Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira delivered a series of lectures in Rio, 1811-12, which were later published as Philosophical Prelections concerning the Theory of Discourse and Language, Aesthetics, Righteousness and Cosmology. Though Ferreira was not in agreement with the Germanic thinkers, such as Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, he was responsible for their introduction into the

colony. Romanticism found popularity in Brazil early, and was the general influence on an academic society in São Paulo called "Philosophical Essay," which published a monthly review. German Transcendentalism was the philosophy of Álvares Azevedo, whom Luis Washington Vita sees as a romanticist. Vita feels that German Idealism and Romanticism are in agreement in principle in their common view that the task of philosophy is to reconcile contraries and to fuse all aspects of reality into some single principle.⁸

In spite of the fact that French and German ideas had found their way into the Brazilian colony, it is worth noting that their influence was made among the middle class and the governing classes, among the intellectuals, who were few, and who had never had serious inhibitions from the Catholic Church. The middle classes did not take seriously the revolutionary ideas of France, though they were in favor of independence from Portugal and the opening up of free trade with other nations. They were rather reluctant to educate the lower classes to the possibilities of revolution and republican government. The Catholic Church, furthermore, had control of the minds of the common people, and so they were not touched by these new trends. Brazil therefore gained her independence from Portugal, not as a radical changeover to democracy, but

⁸Vita, op. cit., p. 117.

rather by the decision of the prince, Dom Pedro, who was left to rule the colony when the king, Dom João VI, returned to Portugal. The coming of the court of Dom João to Brazil had paved the way for Brazilian independence through the opening up of the ports to trade from England and other countries, and though the wealthy traders of the colony were opposed to the competition from other countries, the force of the middle class and disturbances which were pushing toward reform and constitutional government was greater than the strength of the wealthy traders and the landed aristocracy. Dom Pedro therefore was forced to declare Brazil independent under his rule, and the weakness of Portugal at the time, due to trade hegemony from other countries, especially England, and the domestic difficulties provoked by Napoleon and the constitutionalists, made it a quite peaceful break.

The constitution which arose from this political break with Portugal was far from democratic, and established a veritable dictatorship of the middle class and the landed aristocracy, with the franchise based on property and wealth, and with full sanction by the government of slavery. Thus the independence of Brazil in 1821 was a mere severance of official relations with Portugal, making an accomplished fact into positive law, but with no apparent change in the political and social status quo.

Chapter 2. The Nineteenth Century

The end of the colonial period in Brazil did not result in any immediate changes or rapid development of philosophical thought, and it was not until about 1870 that things began to happen, which were seriously to threaten the position of the Catholic Church and to shake the foundations of the monarchy. Two movements were to influence Brazil greatly; Positivism and German Idealism. The former appeared earlier, and so we shall deal with it first.

A. Positivism

It was about 1850 that the first Positivist literature appeared in Brazil, and in 1853, the Military School in Rio de Janeiro began to use it in its curriculum. In 1865, Francisco Brandão, Jr., perhaps one of the first Brazilians to become familiar with and to propagate Positivism, wrote an attack on slavery. In 1873, Benjamin Constant Botelho de Magalhães, one of the more important professors in the above mentioned Military School, publicly declared his adherence to the Positivist philosophy, whereupon it began to receive wider acceptance. Magalhães, together with Miguel Lemos and Teixeira Mendes, founded the first Positivist society in 1876.

1. Miguel Lemos and the Apostolado Positivista

Miguel Lemos was drawn to the Positivist thought of both

Comte and Littré, especially to the latter, and in 1879 traveled to Paris to study with his chosen master. Lemos' meeting with Littré was disappointing, to say the least, as he found the French professor to be a dry intellectualist, withdrawn and reticent in his study, and having none of the youthful zeal which Lemos must have pictured as belonging to the modern scientific reformer. Lemos then was "converted" to the orthodox Comtean Positivist religious sect, and soon returned to Brazil, where he in turn converted Teixeira Mendes and others, becoming the most influential of the leaders of this little humanist church.

The "Apostolado Positivista," as the sect was called, joined the ranks of the abolitionists, against the practice of slavery, which was still officially sanctioned and protected by the monarchy. In 1880 Lemos published Notes for the Solution of the Social Problem in Brazil, an anti-slavery tract. While Lemos and Mendes did attack the slave problem, it is worthy of mention that they did little else. The Positivist Apostolate, from the moment it got under way under Lemos' leadership, lost relevance, prestige, and membership because of its peculiar religious character. Not only did the religious manifestation of Positivism meet with colossal opposition from the Catholic Church, and from those who other-

wise would have embraced wholeheartedly the cause of such a science-oriented and progressive type of thinking; but the Apostolado isolated itself, by its own strangely austere, other-worldly practices, from the very power structures of the times which might have given it tremendous impetus and prestige, enabling it to be highly effective. Ivan Lins, the foremost exponent of a Positivistic orientation in Brazil today, writes that

Miguel Lemos truly felt that it would be obligatory, for any positivist and not merely for the systematic interpreters of the doctrine, not to belong to the congregations of official teaching, not to occupy political responsibilities, not to collaborate in the press, nor become affiliated with scientific and literary societies.⁹

This odd, paradoxical withdrawal from the living currents may be traced to August Comte, and whatever its repercussions may have been in France, it was the one crucial and fatal mistake of the Positivist movement in Brazil. We shall have more to say concerning this matter when we come to a discussion of Ivan Lins and his conception of positive philosophy. Cruz Costa attributes the rapid decline of Positivism to a "lack of religious concern" in Brazil,¹⁰ but as seems evident, the situation is more involved than this.

On the fifteenth of November, 1889, there was a military

⁹Ivan Lins, História do Positivismo no Brasil, (Companhia Editora Nacional, São Paulo, 1964) p. 557.

¹⁰Costa, op. cit., p. 47.

revolt apparently without a great degree of previous planning and it was completely successful in overthrowing the monarchy. According to Cruz Costa, the sudden appearance of a republic was as unexpected by republicans generally as it was by the monarchists. The Positivists of the Apostolado were of a broadly-conceived republican point of view, but of a special, not-so-active, type.¹¹ Such personalities as Ruy Barbosa, who stepped in to take practically full charge of making decisions of immediate practical importance and of drawing up a constitution, had been mere liberals, favoring a simple reform and the formation of a constitutional monarchy, rather than a full-fledged democratic republic. Barbosa and other of these liberals formed a major part of the new government, and resigning themselves to the loss of the monarchy, they began from scratch to form a republic. The Positivists of the Apostolate, on the other hand, were in favor of the continuation indefinitely of the military dictatorship, which then existed merely as a provisional government. They believed that the effective application of the Positivist formula, "order and progress" could only be carried out through such a dictatorship. It is for this reason that the participation of the Apostolate in the revolution itself and subsequent building of the new government

¹¹Ibid., p. 48.

was small indeed. Costa goes so far as to say that the revolution itself was none of their doing. Ivan Lins feels that Positivists had more than this to do with it, especially through the influence of Positivists who were outside of the little religious group. This is so, of course, but then there were many others, such as Barbosa, who were not Positivists, and yet who were republicans. There is also no doubt that Positivism was influential in that many of the officers who took part in the military coup must have been trained in the Military School in Rio.

As it was, the orthodox Positivists publicly recognized and indicated adherence to the new republic two days after the revolution, and brought forward their program, which proposed the following:

Our constitution should combine the principle of the most absolute freedom with the principle of authority. Such a combination would become assured in the following way: a. Perpetuity of the dictatorial function, accumulating the executive power, comprehending in the latter the judicial power, with the legislative and transmission of the power to a successor freely chosen by the dictator, under the sanction of public opinion conveniently consulted; b. Separation of Church and State; suppression of official teaching except for primary instruction; full liberty of meeting and discussion, under the sole condition of the signature of the writers (?) and complete professional freedom, by means of the abolition of all scientific, technical and industrial privileges; c. One assembly only, elected openly, not numerous, and destined exclusively to vote on taxes and to supervise spending.¹²

¹²Francovich, op. cit., pp. 42f.

This strange and contradictory document fortunately was not well-received, and the only thing that the Positivists did achieve in the new government was separation of Church and State,¹² which might very well have come about without their particular efforts. The Positivists did, however, exert strong influence in the creation of a system of public education. Teixeira Mendes was assigned to design the new flag of the republic, and so the Positivist motto, "order and progress" ("Ordem e Progresso"), was incorporated into the Brazilian banner. Criticism against the Apostolate was strong, from the non-religious Littréists and evolutionists as well as from the Catholic Church. Sylvio Romero, critic and analyst, attacked them violently in his book, Doutrina contra Doutrina (1894), making fun of their Positivist government "with its dictatorship and its fifty thousand whatnots."¹³ He wrote that it was "the fatuous pretension of the Comtist fanatics to carry in their hands the huge tablets of a new law, a new philosophy and new politics."¹⁴

I have dealt with the Positivist Apostolate first, because it appeared first historically, but it must be our task now to turn to one of the more level-headed and practical-minded figures in the Positivist movement outside of the

¹³Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁴Ibid.,

Apostolate, and perhaps in the long run the more distinguished and influential of them, as a representative of the most progressive of these thinkers, Luís Pereira Barreto.

2. Luis Pereira Barreto (1840-1923)

Luis Pereira Barreto traveled to Belgium in his youth to study medicine, and it was there that he made close contact with European Positivists, returning to Brazil in 1874, where he took up medical practice in Jacareí, near Sao Paulo. It was there, in that little village, that he began work on a trilogy, As Três Filosofias, which was to deal with the three stages of humanity, corresponding to the three stages in human development, according to Comte's analysis of the history of world-views. The three stages are: 1) the theological (infancy), 2) the metaphysical (adolescence) and 3) the positive (maturity). Barreto finished the first volume quickly, giving it the title A Filosofia Teológica. After fifteen years of work, he produced the second volume, A Filosofia Metafísica, which Francovich characterizes as "polemic." Barreto was a republican, and served on the first Brazilian senate, but quickly became disillusioned, and joined the opposition.

Basically, Barreto adopted Comte's philosophy, but could not stomach the religious aspect. He also drew generously

on the work of Littré. He saw the Roman Catholic Church as obsolete and effete. It was because of his disagreement with religious Positivism that Barreto had a violent and increasingly bitter battle with Miguel Lemos, who accused him of plagiarism in the writing of A Filosofia Teológica, of having stolen whole passages from Littré without footnoting them. Lemos attacked the book as "a quilt of patches scandalously filched here and there."¹⁵ Ivan Lins states that Lemos was unjust, since Barreto made it clear publicly that there was not one single idea in the book which was his own, and besides, the second volume on metaphysical philosophy revealed erudition and a broadened outlook, incorporating a good deal of the ideas of Locke, Berkeley, Kant and Hartmann. Furthermore, Barreto was a good physician, and became very famous and popular for his ability and progressive thinking, enough so, at least, to be elected easily to the first senate. When the microbe theory of Lister and Pasteur was published, Barreto accepted its proofs, which most of the doctors of Brazil did not, and he took it as evidence of the evolution of Positive thinking itself, while Teixeira Mendes rejected the idea as not being in agreement with Comte's system, which seemed to attribute most diseases to social evils.

¹⁵Lins, op. cit., p. 53.

Barreto was a leader in the field of experimentation in many areas of life, and was ever publishing articles on all sorts of subjects, and discovering new theories to overcome problems of one kind and another which touched upon the life of the nation and her economy. He was one of the very first who began the use of vaccines and sanitation in Brazil. He traced the incidence of yellow fever to the anopheles mosquito, and submitted a report to that effect before he had heard of the theory of Dr. Carlos Finley of Cuba, and five months before the United States performed the yellow fever experiments confirming the mosquito to be the carrier. It was Pereira Barreto who was responsible for the discovery of the plant parasite which killed off young grapewines before they could bear fruit, and so paved the way for the tremendous wine industry which Brazil has today.

In these and many other ways, Luis Pereira Barreto, who had begun his career as a Positivist pure and simple, and had even belonged to the Positivist Society of Brazil, though later expelled by Lemos for his "irreligiosity," spent his life in ever-expanding activity, declaring that Positivism was a philosophy which covered all areas of life. He was forward-looking, flexible in admitting new truths to change his theories, and not cutting the truths to fit the theories. He was the kind of man who did not take "it can't be done"

for an answer, and proved time and again that "it could be done." He sought always the positive, scientific answers to problems, and they were always problems closely related to the fundamental things in life. In the cases of the agronomical discoveries which he either made or caused to be made, they were always to the benefit of the growing republic as well as to science in general. He became a better doctor through his alertness to new discoveries and his willingness to give them all a try. If Barreto offered nothing new in his Positivist philosophical writings, he did at least reveal this same openness and scholarship in his wide readings in philosophers other than Positivists. Perhaps it is for this reason that he just never got around to finishing his trilogy with the final volume, which would have been A Filosofia Positiva, precisely because his interests had broadened out too much, or also because of the disrepute into which the Positivist philosophy had fallen as a result of the bizarre activities of Miguel Lemos and the Positivist Apostolate, with which he surely did not wish to become associated in anyone's mind.

B. Germanic Thought: German Idealism

1. Krausism

The ideas of Karl C. F. Krause, so popular in Spain, also became widely used in Portugal and Brazil. In Portugal,

Krausism was adopted by a certain professor of law at the University of Coimbra, named Ferrer, and the compendium which he made of it was long used by the law students as a main supporting curriculum.

Krause himself was one of the successors to the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, and, like most of the Idealists who followed the master of Königsberg, he claimed himself as Kant's true disciple, and condemned such as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel as "philosophers of the vogue," the "Universitätsphilosophen."¹⁶ His avowed purpose was to effect a unity of the subjectivism of Kant and Fichte with the absolutism of Schelling and Hegel.¹⁷ He believed he had found this unity in the concept of God, or Being, creating a sort of theosophy in this union of theology and ontology. According to Juan López Morillas, he "used Kant's analytics, Fichte's reforming and humanitarism aspirations, Schelling's pantheism and the system of ultimate universal notions--categories--of Hegel."¹⁸ In good Kantian style, he approached his problem both analytically and synthetically; analytically, he began with the analysis of the individual self-experience and its basic

¹⁶Juan López Morillas, El Krausismo Español, (Fondo de Cultura Economica, Mexico, 1956) p. 30.

¹⁷Ueberwegs, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, (E. Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, Berlin, 1916) p. 91.

¹⁸Morillas, op. cit., p. 31.

duality (of self-consciousness) with its perception of finitude. In a somewhat Cartesian manner, he reasons that the awareness of finitude implies an infinite ground for such perception. This infinite ground is the Urwesen, or God. Both spirit (human reality) and Nature are finite essences which postulate the infinite Ground. Declaring Kant in error at the point of relegating the realities of God, Freedom and Immortality to the nonconstitutive status of postulates of action, Krause claims that they must belong somehow to ontology. Krause was averse to the free rein which Herder and others gave to the role of the emotions in revealing truth, and attempted to return to rational ontology, getting away from semi-mystical intuitionism.

Many accuse Krause of being a pantheist, but he himself repudiated the pantheism of Schelling, and rather formulated the concept of "panentheism," the "All-in-Gott-Lehre," the idea that the world was developing "in" God., i.e., that it was neither identical with, nor independent of, God. Krause saw history as a movement toward the unity of all humanity, and that the social perfection of man was identical with the increase and perfection of the rational understanding of God, especially through the example and ethics of Jesus. The synthetic part of his philosophy, rather than reasoning from the

experience of the self, reasons from the concept of the Urwesen to the self, creating a classification of the "sciences" into a hierarchy, the last science of which is Vereinwesenlehre, or the theory of the basic unity of the self, anthropology.

From this brief outline, it may be seen that Krause was a rationalist, a Christian ethicist and a theologian, basically. It is not surprising in view of this theologically-oriented thought, that Krause should be quite popular with the peoples dominated by a theological frame of reference, such as that of the Roman Catholic Church. The expression of the dominant role of Christian ethics lent itself admirably to the Catholic system, especially with the emphasis on the rational understanding of God. Vita notes that Krausism in its Portuguese expression was conservative and traditionalist, and Miguel Reale, professor of law at São Paulo, boldly declares that Krause is the logical successor to the ideas of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.¹⁹ Luis Washington Vita makes the observation that

In the Lusitanian world Krausism was adopted due to the fact that it would have been, of all the philosophical systems derived from German Idealism, that which precisely was best suited to the scholastic and Catholic tradition, corresponding also

¹⁹Miguel Reale, Momentos Decisivos e Olvidados do Pensamento Brasileiro, quoted by Luis W. Vita in "Panorama da Filosofia no Brasil," in Monólogos & Diálogos (São Paulo, Conselho Estadual de Cultura, 1964) p. 119.

to a spiritual need strongly felt among the Lusitanian thinkers of the second half of the nineteenth century and, by reflex, among the jurists of São Paulo.²⁰

2. Tobias Barreto (1839-1889)

Tobias Barreto was born in 1839 in the village of Sergipe, in the North of Brazil, and his life was one continual struggle for existence, which some suppose to be part of the reason for his speculative nature, especially in his seeming "escape" into the philosophies of Germany, far removed from the life of the Brazil which gave him such a hard life. Barreto never was nor cared to be a practical man, and retained his honesty at high cost to himself. He became a teacher of Latin, and started to go to the seminary, but quickly gave the latter up. He became familiar with Victor Cousin, Victor Hugo and other poets, and finally studied law at Pernambuco. After receiving his degree, he practiced law for ten years in the village of Escada. From there he moved to Recife, to occupy the chair of law, where he remained until his death in 1889, at the age of fifty. During his lifetime he made many enemies, but one of his greatest defenders was the critic, Sylvio Romero.

Barreto had begun as an exponent of French eclecticism, but about 1868 he became interested in Positivism, and labeled Cousin "frivolous." In 1871 he turned to the monistic

²⁰Vita, op. cit., p. 118.

philosophy of Ludwig Noiré. His philosophy can be understood only as a reaction against several different currents, particularly the German materialism of the times, and the French frivolity, as well as against the scientism of Positivist thought. Several writers note that in turning away from the French vogue and to the heavy ideas of the Germans, Barreto isolated himself from his environment. Many explain this conscious desire for isolation by the fact that he was a mulatto of ugly appearance, and was seeking escape from the hardships of the Brazilian atmosphere. He was influenced greatly also by Schopenhauer, Eduard von Hartmann and Haeckel. He, like the later German idealists, attributed greatness to Kant's investigation of the structure of human reason and phenomenalism. He believed, however, that Kant's scepticism had since been partially overcome, and that there was a sense in which one could have knowledge of and say something about the essence of reality. Using the concept of Will elaborated by Schopenhauer, he conceived of the world as being composed of Will and Force; force he identified with the phenomenal and will with the noumenal. The will is the spiritual principle of reality, itself irrational and alogical. He posited not only efficient causes, but final causes as well, and these two aspects of causality reciprocally complement each other.

The insistence on final causes was contrary to the scientism of the times, for Barreto was thus neither a materialist nor a mechanist. His thought may be summed up more as a vague semi-religious spiritualism, for he held in respect the religious sentiment, as a legitimate way of at least attempting an approach to the noumenal, and he held that science could never know nor help to make known the final causes, which were the type of causes associated with the noumenon. The knowledge of final causes was open only to religious souls.

In this spiritualist philosophy, God was only knowable through irrational knowledge, or pure intuition; God was always for him the "obscure, the unknowable God."²¹ He made fun of the Positivist claim that religion was not deeply-rooted and that it would one day disappear. Barreto also rejected, however, the Roman Catholic Church and the scholastic approaches as being unable to penetrate to the noumenon, calling Catholicism "less tragic than comic,"²² and more demonological than "theological."²²

Tobias Barreto believed firmly in the fact of freedom, calling it a stubborn, experienced fact, seemingly in contradiction to Kant, for whom freedom was precisely a part of

²¹Francovich, op. cit., p. 67.

²²Ibid., p. 69.

the noumenon, and consequently not knowable, though a postulate for practical reason. Because of his conviction of the fact of freedom, Barreto ridiculed the new Positivist-born science of sociology with its pretensions to finding laws for the collective human life, calling it a mere "sociomania" and "sociolatry." Since sociology is based on the scientific assumption of efficient causes, which do not dominate in real human life, characterized by Barreto as governed by final causes rooted in freedom, there can be no "laws of conduct."²³

Culture, Barreto recognized, could degenerate into mere formalism and become empty. The natural animal forces of man are necessary to prevent the crystallization of culture into dead forms. Culture and Nature are constantly at war with one another: "It is natural that the woman be the slave of the man, it is cultural that she be equal; it is natural that the weak be beaten by the strong, it is cultural that they be helped."²⁴ The elements which man has at his disposal for fashioning culture are Law, Ethics, Religion, Sciences and Art. Barreto, the professor of law, of course concentrated upon law in his work. There is no essential difference for Barreto between law and ethics, for they correspond to the distinction between state and society, which of course have

²³Ibid., p. 72.

²⁴Ibid., p. 73.

the same group of people as their subject. He attacked the old idea of natural law because of its absolutism, calling it the "Ptolemaic theory of law." He rather saw rights and laws as mutable, changing, for he recognized the relativity of life itself. Rights therefore were for Tobias Barreto a product of human culture, a creation of man himself in his freedom, and not depending on any absolute given laws in or behind the universe. Barreto never joined in the attacks on slavery, nor did he have any particular zeal for republicanism, though he was not uncritical of the Emperor, Dom Pedro II.

Thus we have in Tobias Barreto one of the spiritualist reactions to materialism, the influence of Kant, Schopenhauer, and others who, following Kant's lead as to the possibility of the noumenal, but the unknowability of it, disregarded his warning that it cannot be known, and intrepidly set about scaling its airy heights. It is all right for other mystics to bask in the effusive superlatives of the inexpressible ecstasies of the mystical experience, but it is philosophically doubtful for me whether we are not dealing in contradictions when we speak of "knowledge" of God and the thing-in-itself through "irrational knowledge." For Kant especially, this is questionable, and I must agree with him here that there is no knowledge that is not acted upon by the categories of reason. The spiritualist philosophers are going to have to

coin some other word than "knowledge," for it seems a plain contradiction to speak of "irrational knowledge."

3. Farias Brito (1862-1917)

In Farias Brito, we find in a sense the continuer of some of the germinal ideas of Tobias Barreto's philosophy, and what I see as a trend toward an existentialist type of thought.

Farias Brito was born in 1862 in a small town in the state of Ceará, and at 17 he entered the Liceu in the city of Fortaleza, earning his living by tutoring mathematics. He matriculated into the University of Pernambuco, graduating at the age of 22. He had a short career in public office and as secretary to the governor of the state of Ceará, wrote an unsuccessful book of verse, lost in an election campaign for a seat as representative in the Constituent Assembly, and from there on wrote philosophy. He wrote three volumes of a work entitled A Finalidade do Mundo, another book, A Base Física do Espírito, and a third, O Mundo Interior. Like Tobias Barreto, his life had been full of hardships, and his philosophy, no doubt, is partially shaped by this fact.

Brito held an anguished preoccupation with the meaning of death, which he finds to be (in O Mundo Interior) the only solution to the problem of life. Here is the germ of a familiar contemporary existentialist theme; but even more, his thought was dominated by a pessimism, as shown in the following

passages:

The picture of Schopenhauer becomes very pale indeed in comparison with reality. We live in pain and we have to die: behold here the supreme truth.²⁵

To live is to be a slave to necessities, to desire, to suffer. The first cry of the creature that is born is a cry of pain, and the whole of life, even the most cheerful and adventurous, is a tragedy.²⁶

For Brito, then, all is crisis and agony, which can breed only a thirst for order in the face of the irrationality of death and non-being. Unlike Tobias Barreto, who claimed that the realm of philosophical ideas was not for the common people, Brito declared that he wrote for the people, i.e., for those who suffered. The role of philosophy for Brito is not to obtain pure knowledge, but to create faith. For these thoughts he was used by the "spiritualists" and the Catholic Church for their ends. At the same time, his denial of the profitability of the search after pure knowledge alienated him from many other philosophers.

Bruto saw philosophy as the most primitive and deep of the activities of the human spirit. Man's very nature requires that he "interpret." Religions, he says, are interpretations of philosophies for popular use. He looked, however, to a future, universal religion, a synthesis of oriental and occidental religions, guided and directed by philosophy. The

²⁵Francovich, op. cit., p. 84.

²⁶Costa, op. cit., p. 71.

sciences, he said, would get together and be incorporated into one system, but they would never take the place of philosophy which would be the foundation of the future religious synthesis. There will always be the element of the mysterious in that which science seeks to understand; and furthermore, scientific knowledge is only fragmentary, never exhausting reality. Kant's thing-in-itself can never be known through ordinary or scientific observation, but only through "internal observation". Science has only led to the knowledge that the world is mutable and ephemeral, and hence has only revealed the fact of "nothingness." The result of this is despair and the dissolution of values. The knowledge of nature and the universe can be had only by looking within, as with the Socratic self-examination, for it must come through the knowledge of the essence of man.

Bodies, says Brito, are only experienceable from without, and so we can never know the essence of them, as Kant said. But there is something in bodies which we can know, which is of their internal substance or energy; it is their resistance; it is through the resistance of a body that we know that the body is real. Through analysis, the element which remains of this body after abstraction is its resistance, or force. Yet still this force is only known by its effects, and so is a phenomenon, not a thing-in-itself. But there is one force

which we can know in its internal meaning, directly, and it is of an intellectual nature. Since this intellect, or rationality, is perceived directly, and we may know it fully, we must use it analogically for reference to exterior reality. Thus "all force is an idea or thought." Thought then is the universal category, not limited to humans or organisms, but is of all things. This concept is akin to Berkeley's idealism, except that Brito seems to make no attempt to reduce thought to force or force to thought in any strict manner, but he leaves them open, not positing any external consciousness (Berkeley's God) to behold this one element called "thought" as either force or thought or something else. Thus he is able to say that "thought is force in us,"²⁷ "but we must add at the same time that force is thought outside of ourselves."²⁷ In this way Brito attempts to avoid both materialism and objective idealism by leaving a certain duality of force and thought, if only a duality of the point of view from which they are observed, and yet by recognizing their ultimate unity. The Soul consists in the rationality of the human being, and this intellectual soul is the positive force in human nature. The essence (thing-in-itself) of consciousness is not Will alone, but is a combination of many psychological aspects.

²⁷Farias Brito, excerpts from O Mundo Interior, in La Filosofia Latinoamericana Contemporanea, ed. by Anibal Sanchez Reulet, (Washington, D. C., Union Panamericana.) p. 119.

Will, moreover, is not an ontological concept at all, as it was with Schopenhauer, but rather a negative aspect; for to wish, or to want, is to indicate a lack. Will, then, is no more than "consciousness of a need."²⁸

In the thought of Farias Brito, we have a number of influences: 1) a reaction against materialism, 2) a continuation of the preoccupation stemming from Kant with the thing-in-itself, and like Tobias Barreto, Brito identifies consciousness with the thing-in-itself, and exterior objects with phenomena. Schopenhauer's concept of Will figures prominently in the thought of both Barreto and Brito, whether positively or negatively. Brito starts from the reality of death, and moves from it to a rationalism which is the attempt to overcome the "disorder" existent in the fact of death. In identifying thought and force, Brito is seeking a unified principle of existence, but in making the point of view important for the distinction between the two, he seems still to be saying that the phenomenon of force is not really knowable, and so in this sense he has not surpassed the solution which Kant set forth.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, then, we see two main streams of thought arising; that of Positivism and a type of Germanic thought originating in Kant and drawing

²⁸Ibid., p. 127.

upon the work of the "intuitionist" German idealists, who seem to step off into the empty space of the noumenal to explore the experience of existence in a world without categories. I deem it necessary to say once again that the kind of exploration into the noumenon which is here represented is quite useless as philosophy, for it posits a contradiction (which I do not think is resolved by calling it paradox) in supposing that there is "knowledge" in irrationality. If the categories of understanding cannot be applied to God, or to any ultimate noumenal reality, then I find it difficult to accept some mystical experience of these (in philosophical works) being tagged with the name of "knowledge."

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PART II. CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS

Chapter 3. Literary Nationalism

As the republic developed after 1889, there arose a movement to break the ties with the Old World more completely, and this seems to have been first reflected in the literary works of the period. There was, however, and continues to be to this day, an attraction for the French literary style and subject-matter. The break with the French as well as the Portuguese vogue was made by a few writers in the early 20th century, the most notable of which were Euclides da Cunha and Graça Aranha. We note them here because the philosophers of the present take their aims seriously, or at least try to do so, and pay them homage for their efforts to turn the attention of the intellectuals to their own country, its struggles and its possibilities. As we shall see, the efforts of these writers were directed toward creating a truly national spirit and directing attention to within their boundaries, in order to create some sense of identity for the Brazilian people. There is a clear and marked concern with the feeling of strangeness and novelty in the vast land of jungle and rivers on the part of those who, coming from European

stock and imbued with European patterns of thought, as they turned their attention to an entirely new situation, in which they were now left virtually alone. We will deal briefly with some of the themes found in the works of Euclides da Cunha and Graça Aranha.

1. Euclides da Cunha

The best known of the writings of Euclides da Cunha is his novel, Os Sertões, now in an English translation with the title, Rebellion in the Backlands. The story deals with psychological forces and the sociological structure of the peoples of the hinterland jungles of Brazil, and the rise of a popular messiah who led a revolt, which was put down by the military after a great deal of trouble. The main theme seems not to be, however, the need for a rebellion or reform, but rather the above-mentioned psychology of the people of the jungle, entirely unknown to the intelligentsia of the cities and the littoral. Besides treating of such a national theme, da Cunha developed a style which was a departure from the French one so much in vogue at the time.

In essence, da Cunha was a lone voice in the desert appealing to the intellectuals of his time to turn their attention to the New World, rather than the Old, and this was the

avowed intention which he expressed in other writings and speeches. He was entirely opposed to the importation of philosophy from Europe, and because of this he made extravagant criticisms of leading names in European philosophical history, rejecting Comte and Spinoza, condemning Kant with the epithet of "a spoiled Aristotle."²⁹ He could not abide the endless debates about theories and "system."³⁰ For this reason, Cruz Costa claims that da Cunha was not a philosopher, but something wholly other.³¹ Joaquim Pinto Nazário brings up this criticism in order to make a case for the fact that Cunha was indeed a philosopher, though this was not his principal aspiration. He points out with effectiveness some of da Cunha's other writings, especially two essays, "A Verdade e o Erro" and "A Idéia do Ser," in which da Cunha criticizes the efforts of formal logicians in abstracting from reality and then legislating that reality can not take place in any other way but according to such formal propositions. Da Cunha declared that logic should be strictly inductive, and he had a natural aversion to apriorism of any kind.³² He looked at existence as ever becoming, mobile,

²⁹Costa, op. cit., p. 114.

³⁰Loc. cit.

³¹Costa, op. cit., p. 115.

³²Nazário, Joaquim Pinto, "Euclides da Cunha e a Filosofia no Brasil," Anais III Congr. I.B.F. (São Paulo, 1959), in footnotes, pp. 82ff.

and truth as relative. He was completely anti-metaphysical, or better, anti-ontological, for he rejected the possibility of any theory of Being: "One cannot understand any science of things-in-themselves, any science of being. One understands sciences of relations."³³

Beyond this polemic discussion, Nazário sees a philosophical basis in Os Sertões, with reference to the problems which the Brazilian culture was encountering. According to Nazário, da Cunha founded the following concepts:

- a) Brazilian society accepted and observed as a unity was really fragmented, dissociated, atomized.
- b) The concept of cultural time explained the main internal conflict of human groups, of dominant common culture and varied ethnic origin, which constituted the population of the country.
- c) The Brazilian intelligence expressed a process of alienation.
- d) For this Brazilian cultural situation there was a dilemma, which was translated into a destiny, not metaphysical, but humanistic and pragmatic.³⁴

In short, Euclides da Cunha saw the tremendous social and intellectual problems of his country as due to the coexistence of two societies, anachronistically out of phase with one another, entering into natural conflict because of their proximity in one place and time. Nazário points out that da Cunha, far ahead of his time, was not so much in opposition to the philosophy in Brazil, but was critical of the absence

³³Ibid., p. 84 (footnote).

³⁴Ibid., pp. 85f.

of any philosophy (i.e., any Brazilian philosophy as such), and presented a socio-philosophical problem to which thinkers ought to turn their attention, rather than parroting and leaning on the abstractions of the Old World. Nazário and others point out that all great literature is great because it has a philosophical point of view, or at least exposes a fundamental philosophical problem. This is, in my opinion, quite true, and to see this, one needs merely to contrast the greatness of the literary and dramatic works of Sartre and Camus with the superficial literature of our day, which can formulate no point of view, but is published for a generation of people with no point of view.

2. Graça Aranha

Graça Aranha was born in São Luis do Maranhão in 1862, and at the age of thirteen and a half went to Recife to study law, where he met and became an ardent disciple of Tobias Barreto. He wrote several works, the most popular of which was Canaan (1902), which dealt with the aesthetic enthrallment with the vast and terrifying aspect of the jungle. Its theme is "the absorption of the German colonizers, sons of northern Europe, by the barbarous nature of the tropics."³⁵ The main character of the novel is Milkau, "an aesthete seeking a promised land for his spirit." The chief idea which Aranha wished to get

³⁵Francovich, op. cit., p. 100.

across is expressed in Milkau's words:

Here the spirit is abashed by the stupendous majesty of nature. We are dissolved in contemplation. And he who loses himself in adoration is the slave of a hypnosis: the personality flees to be diffused into the soul of everything.

The jungle in Brazil is sombre and tragic. It has in it the tedium of eternal things. The European jungle is diaphanous and fleeting, it is transformed infinitely by the touches of death and resurrection, which in it follow like the days and nights.³⁶

Aranha was, as we see, fascinated by the overpowering majesty of Nature in his country. In this vast wilderness the primitive had lived in "peaceful abandon" until the moment when he became conscious of himself, and from this moment on his Golden Age vanished, and the jungle became his mortal enemy, a monster devouring his individuality, and "cosmic terror" arose within him. He then proceeded to create a world of fantastic beings; the European settlers had experienced this terror, and the Africans had brought their terror already from the African jungles. This fear is the source of the Brazilian temperament of vague terror, of "feeling a stranger in the world of his destiny."³⁷ Thus arose the Brazilian imagination, inertia, melancholy. Aranha had received much influence, through Tobias Barreto, from Schopenhauer,

³⁶Ibid., p. 101.

³⁷Ibid., p. 103.

Haeckel, Nietzsche, Ludwig Noire', and others. He looked upon the world as a "spectacle," a "divine hallucination," a succession of images.³⁸ The essential function of the human spirit was for Aranha aesthetic, and only by the aesthetic method can one find an explanation for the world. The tragedy of the Brazilian lay in his keen sense of being a spirit in an alien land which he knows to be beautiful, but as "a transplanted being who languishes in a singular nostalgia."³⁹

Aranha's conception of ethics follows three fundamental principles, that of Resignation to the cosmic unity, which is abandonment to the process of perpetual transformation of things, that of Incorporation to the earth, or recognition of man as an expression of his physical surroundings, even in the fact that the molecules of his body are the same as those of the earth, and finally, Linkage to other men, an affirmation of the solidarity of humanity amid the changes of life and death. Aranha's purpose in developing this theme is to challenge man (Brazilian man) to confront the terrors of Nature which overwhelm him, and to conquer them, and thus find "serenity before life and death."⁴⁰ The primitive state

³⁸ Ibid., p. 103.

³⁹ Costa, op. cit., p. 148.

⁴⁰ Francovich, op. cit., p. 100.

of unity with Nature thus has to be restored culturally, by the means of Religion, Art and Philosophy (note the similarity of method for the construction of culture with the ideas of Tobias Barreto--Cf. p. 23), but they in themselves are not sufficient, since finally, only the aesthetic faculty in man is able to establish that unity on the individual level.

In 1922, Graça Aranha became a standard-bearer for the Modernist movement in Brazil, attempting in this manner to carry out in practical ways the establishment of a culture and a technology through which the Brazilian spirit could throw off its vague debilitating fears and melancholic lethargy, in order to find serenity and unity in the life which was given to it in the new and wild land. He made a great effort to institute a program of "Brazilianization" of the nation so torn apart by cultural and racial pluralism, and looked forward to the political union of Brazil with Portugal and her colonies. Paradoxical as it seems, we may surmise that such a union would be on the basis of a dominance of Brazil's new culture. Aranha proposed to the universities a program to promote Brazilianization of the literature and language, purging from these all classicisms, archaisms and Portuguesisms. This proposal was rejected, however, and he exerted no lasting influence, nor is he remembered apart from his novels and other literature. Cruz Costa sees Aranha as

a "transition" figure into a new era.⁴¹

3. Conclusions

It cannot be denied that both Euclides da Cunha and Graça Aranha, more than being mere voices in the wilderness or transition figures, did indeed call attention to an important aspect of Brazilian life, i.e., that there was need for a national consciousness, a sense of self-identity. This was no superficial xenophobia, but a genuine desire to look within the new land and within the self-as-part-of-the-new-land, and thus to put the society and culture on a valid basis. It is disputable how much the general feeling of a lack of a national consciousness has affected subsequent philosophy in Brazil, and this matter we will leave for our final chapters, but it is sufficient to say at this point that, at least, such a consciousness is very much in evidence, regardless of whether or not an "indigenous philosophy" has truly appeared.

⁴¹ Costa, op. cit., p. 148.

Chapter 4. Two Roman Catholic Apologists

1. Jackson de Figueiredo (1891-1927)

Jackson de Figueiredo was born in Sergipe in 1891, and took part of his secondary school study in a Protestant Colégio, that of a certain W. E. Finley, and from there he went, in 1909, to Bahia to study law. He seems at first to have been submerged in all the "monisms, mechanisms, and evolutionisms"⁴² of the day, and led a somewhat bohemian existence. In 1913, he graduated with the law degree, and moved to Rio de Janeiro, where he met Farias Brito, and began to do some writing, having previously published, at the age of 19, a book of melancholy verse, called Zingaros. While in Bahia, he had come to know and admire Carlyle, Pascal and Nietzsche, and found profound meaning for himself in Carlyle's words: "The purpose of man is to do works, not to think." Thus Figueiredo found a basis for action as his mode of being, finding also in Pascal a welcome reaction against the rationalism of Descartes.⁴³

Through Figueiredo's acquaintance with Farias Brito, he grew to admire the latter, and devoted a book, his most significant, to a study of Brito's philosophy. This book is

⁴²Costa, op. cit., p. 150.

⁴³Francovich, op. cit., p. 120.

entitled Algumas Reflexões sobre a Filosofia de Farias Brito. It seems to have been through the spiritualistic thought of Brito that Figueiredo was brought near to the Catholic teachings, and so in 1918 he was converted to Catholicism, on a near-deathbed with the influenza.⁴⁴ In the national elections of 1921-22 Figueiredo strongly defended the dictatorial incumbent against the great mass of public opinion against the latter. From that time forward he became a fervent and indefatigable defender of the Roman Catholic Church. Figueiredo died at the age of 39, through an accident in which he fell from a rock into the ocean while fishing.

In the book, above cited, of reflections on Farias Brito's philosophy, Jackson de Figueiredo attempted to find a supra-rational justification for faith. He admired and used Brito, whom he labeled as a "rationalist mystic," but wished to surpass the intellectualistic and rationalistic system of Brito. The point of rationalism in Brito's thought which Figueiredo attacks is the aspect of the former's thought which he summarizes as the idea that "God is thought, and men divine ideas."⁴⁵ Figueiredo called himself a "neo-Kantian" in that he accepted the noumenon-phenomenon distinction, but he interpreted this by an emanation theory like that of neo-Platonism. That is,

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 117.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 121.

God was the unknowable, the noumenon, but for him the world of phenomena was an emanation, a derivation from the noumenon. The status of the world as inferior emanations from the divine is the neo-Platonic parallel to the Biblical concept of the Fall of man...the fallen world is moving steadily back toward absorption into the divine essence.⁴⁶ The essence of life, therefore, due to this crises of the Fall and Redemption, is "pain," which is a manifestation of the divine in man.⁴⁷ The function in human life of Faith is constitutive of the very mode of being of the soul itself. "We believe because we exist."⁴⁸ There is thus an equivalence of Existence and Faith for the human being; man is homo credens, not homo rationalis. Faith is the basis of all knowledge, not simply religious knowledge.

Figueiredo was always a fighter, an enthusiast, a violent and yet sensitive spirit, though thoroughly orthodox within the Catholic framework. He feared all forms of socialism, and Bolshevism especially, believing the Catholic Church, its faith, and its authoritarian rule to be the only capable bulwark against the onset of revolution. He was thus reactionary,

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 123.

⁴⁷Loc. cit.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 124.

though he did not neglect to criticize the Catholic Church for its tepid moral atmosphere and he attempted to reform it from within as well as to defend it from without. He represents the first Roman Catholic reaction against socialism which appeared in Brazil following World War I.⁴⁹

In speaking of and to the Brazilian people, Figueiredo claimed that they had always been essentially religious, and demonstrated this by referring to Tobias Barreto, who, though a caustic critic of Roman Catholicism and other credal Churches, held high regard for the religious sentiment (Cf. p. 23). He tried to make a case for the fact that even Positivism had its greatest expression in a religious temperament, in the Positivist Apostolate. Figueiredo felt that the anti-Catholic spirit had come from outside of Brazil, i.e., from such ideas as "universal suffrage and other revolutionary lies."⁵⁰ In this way, it seems evident, Figueiredo wished to appeal to the nationalistic spirit of the Brazilians, and to use xenophobia for the ends of the Church.

Jackson de Figueiredo was basically authoritarian, condemning individualism as "the fundamental error of the modern world."⁵¹ He was inspired and greatly influenced by Maurras

⁴⁹Costa, op. cit., p. 152.

⁵⁰Francovich, op. cit., p. 128.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 129.

and the writers of Action Française,⁵² and without doubt would have lauded the Laval and Vichy governments, had he lived to see them. He constantly fought for a nationalistic and authoritarian government in Brazil. He condemned individualism and said that freedom could only be possible in total chaos, citing as scientific the concept that everything, after all, only works, brings results, to the extent that it submits itself to a law or discipline.⁵³

In Jackson de Figueiredo we find a certain contradictory personality, i.e., a mixture of religious and national zeal. His fervor for the Catholic Faith seems to be in detriment to any clear formulation along scholastic-Thomistic lines, and the curious attraction for Pascal filled a need for an irrational vital drive, a Romantic preoccupation with activity, which, one might assume psychologically, could have found some other channel of expression. Philosophically, he leaves much to be desired...Farias Brito called Figueiredo an "existentialist,"⁵⁴ but I believe one is justified in saying no more than that he was a reactionary zealot who used philosophical concepts for his ends. There is the germ of a philosophical point of view in his idea of Faith as the essence, the mode

⁵³Loc. cit.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 122.

of being, of the spirit, but there is no development of this idea. Rather, there is only the translation into action of an authoritarian, anti-libertarian enthusiasm.

2. Leonel Franca

In Leonel Franca we encounter a "less polemic and more understanding" ("compreensiva"--can also signify "comprehensive")⁵⁵ apologist for the Roman Catholic traditions than Jackson de Figueiredo. Franca is solidly in the Thomistic, or neo-Thomistic, current, and is faithful to the "spirit" of Aquinas rather than to the "letter," according to Lima Vaz, S.J.⁵⁶ Leonel Franca, an ordained priest and philosophical writer, was schooled in "the most progressive currents of European Thomism,"⁵⁷ and claims to have greater dialogue and sympathy with post-Aquinas thinkers, at least in the sense of being willing to deal with the questions and problems of modern philosophy, rather than retreating into mere parroting of Medieval doctrine. He writes that "human thought does not progress nor is enriched except in the contrast of discussions."⁵⁸

In true scholastic fashion, Franca thinks it necessary to discern sharply Philosophy from philosophies, the "true system"

⁵⁵Luis Washington Vita, "Panorama da Filosofia no Brasil," in Monólogos & Diálogos, (São Paulo, Conselho Estadual de Cultura, 1964) p. 153.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 153.

⁵⁷Loc. cit.

⁵⁸Loc. cit.

from the erroneous ones. There are three criteria for this task of discernment: 1) the speculative order, 2) the practical order, and 3) the historical order. The Speculative order is that criterion in which the theoretical and rational values of a philosophy are judged; the evidence for the "right way" is "brilliance" and "splendor." The disciplined and logical intelligence can easily find the logical contradictions in false philosophies. In the Practical order, which is less rigorous, but much-used and ready-to-hand, is that criterion which judges a system by its ethical consequences, as reasoned out beforehand. Since "all systems have moral consequences," we need merely to reason out what such consequences will be; "Any philosophy which logically brings destruction to law and morality, the extinction of virtue and heroism, the dissolution of the family and society is not true."⁵⁹ The Historical criterion is the after-the-fact judgment which history itself makes upon all systems; philosophy is like a great river; the philosophies of particular times and places appear and are again swallowed up by the river, as tributaries. That is, true doctrine is perennial and progressive, indestructible, while the false philosophies, "deprived of the sap which gives life to thought, decline in time and end in self-negation, in

⁵⁹
Ibid., p. 154.

universal scepticism."⁶⁰

Leonel Franca is best known in Brazil, not for the above type of thought, but rather for his work in the area of "Christian cultural philosophy," best seen in his book, A Crise do Mundo Moderno. There, in sum, he says that the crisis of the modern world consists in the fact that with all of the material progress so much a mark of the twentieth century, the deepest demands of the human spirit have not been satisfied. In the perfecting of means through technology, we have lost sight of, and entirely forgotten, the End, the final, divinely-ordained purpose of human life. In the face of material progress, the modern world has arrived at a new low, a state of decadence, which Christianity alone is able to counteract. Though the theme is not new, Franca has attempted to deal with the questions which concern the twentieth century, and at least in part to answer them in contemporary terminology. This is of course the function of the apologist, as it has always been understood.

3. Conclusion

We have looked briefly at two of the outstanding Catholic apologists of the contemporary scene (my criterion for "contemporary" being whatever follows the first World War); Jackson de Figueiredo, volatile, sensitive, fiercely active for the concern with faith in Brazil, and nationalistic; and Leonel

⁶⁰Loc. cit.

Franca, thoroughly versed in the logic of Aquinas, more willing to demonstrate appreciation for non-Catholic thought, but ever seeking to make clear the claim of the superiority of the Christian faith. Franca's insistence upon presupposing the existence of a "true" philosophy in opposition to all other, false ones, and the analogy of the ever-flowing, irresistible river of truth, is a familiar theme, encountered in Catholic apologetics for centuries. The criteria which Franca sets up for the task of judging the true from the false, which task he characteristically deems necessary, corresponds to those set up by the Council of Trent, though in a somewhat abbreviated form. It must be pointed out that there are weaknesses in these criteria, which scholastics and neo-scholastics have never faced up to. For example, the justification of speculative systems on the basis of their "brilliance" and "splendor," recommended by Franca, appears to be a rather vacuous way of arriving at truth. It is difficult to know whether Franca is referring to the "aesthetic" brilliance of systems, or whether he means the "intellectual" brilliance of a thinker's organization, insight and deductive force. One could, in either case, point to many non-Catholic and atheistic systems which would qualify as "brilliant" in either of these two senses. The criterion of logical coherence is subject to the same criticism, and it is the everlasting weakness of the Scholastic tradition

to make logical validity and coherence a test of truth.

The criterion of the "practical order," which is used by Franca in the judging of systems on the basis of their moral consequences, is guilty of the fallacy of reductionism, of truth to morals. It is more or less true that all systems of thought have moral consequences, but these consequences are not capable of being made the criteria of truth. Franca puts in the position of absolute judgment on truth such moral abstractions as "virtue," "heroism," "family" and "society." One may rightfully demand of Franca that he tell us what the a priori foundation is for these arbitrarily-chosen moral values; and since they are abstractions, they are subject to radical alteration and become relative in historical situations. In short, they are formal concepts which, when filled with human, psychological, historical, and relational, situational content, they lose their meaning as referring to reality. History will rather judge them, and not the opposite, as Franca would wish.

Chapter 5. Philosophers of Science

1. Ivan Lins

Ivan Lins is one of the few remaining "orthodox" Positivists in Brazil today, remaining quite close to the general system and method of August Comte, even to the detriment of the contributions of later, neo-Positivists. Francovich sees him as too close to the French scientific thinker,⁶¹ though Francovich wrote the work referred to here in 1943, and it is possible to detect some slight softening from a rigorous Comtean orientation to an admission of some weaknesses in the founder of the Positivist movement in France, as we shall presently see.

Ivan Lins has had a long writing career, and possesses an impressive list of publications and unpublished writings, ranging from works on the Middle Ages, Thomas More, Descartes, Erasmus, etc., and of course a large number of studies on aspects and personalities related to Positivism. His most recent book, História do Positivismo no Brasil, published in 1964, reveals a less dogmatic approach, being principally a history, with the express purpose of countering the disdain of and the minor role attributed to Positivism by the historian of ideas, João Cruz Costa.

It will be helpful first to glance at a portion of Lins'

⁶¹Francovich, op. cit., p. 148.

work, on the subject of religion, in an address to the fourth National Congress of Philosophy, sponsored by the Brazilian Institute of Philosophy in Fortaleza, Brazil, in 1962. In this address, Lins puts the question thus: "With the transformations of human mentality, will religion one day disappear from the social scene?" The answer to the question is quite orthodox and also highly polemic: essentially, the answer will be "yes" or "no," depending upon the definition which one gives to the word "religion." If we understand religion as a practice and doctrine involving a relationship with God, with the divine, there is no doubt in Lins' mind that religion will disappear some day. This is made clear according to the Comtean analysis of history as a becoming process of maturing, in which ideas proceed through a development of three stages, i.e., the Theological, the Metaphysical and the Positive. Such a development seems inevitable and incontrovertible, and it is borne out, according to Lins, in the tremendous scientific achievements of this generation.

However, claims Lins, if we go back to the very roots of the Latin word, "religio," we find, as has often been pointed out by others, that the root meaning is the verb, ligare, basically, "to connect," "unite," "join together." He further claims that this was the original meaning, in the sense of the uniting of human beings together. The etymology is correct,

of course, but the historical meaning which Lins gives the word is purely conjectural, and he can give no proofs for it. I counter with the conjecture that it meant a "means of entering into relationship with the gods." At any rate, the Positivist complaint is that later theistic dogma corrupted the term, to refer to a relationship with deity. The reason for this was that the ideal of human solidarity being obviously false in experience, and in fact unattainable, this unity was pushed into the realm of the ideal, hence the divine. Nevertheless, all efforts, religious or otherwise, tend toward the goal of uniting all mankind.⁶² Further study will reveal, says Lins, that the many religions of the world, under careful examination, lead one to conclude that there is really only one religion (an Urreligion), which is found in its many adaptations to social situations. He cites Diderot's concept of a "Natural Religion" as this basic primordial religion. As to the much-discussed "conflict" between religion and science Lins states that the only thing which is really incompatible with science are the metaphysical and theological teachings. In order to save humanity through the process of unifying it, science is the instrument to do this, and in this

⁶²Ivan Lins, "Com as Transformações da Mentalidade Humana, Desaparecerá um Dia, do Cenário Social, a Religião?" in Anais do IV Congresso Nacional de Filosofia, (Instituto Brasileiro de Filosofia, São Paulo, 1962) p. 532.

sense is the only truly "religious" pursuit, since science itself is "universal" in its method and content. Therefore, Lins turns the tables and states that supernatural concepts are less than truly religious, and often even "anti-religious," to the obvious point of being a main dividing element in human society.

From this theoretical presupposition, Lins, in typical polemic Positivist style, calls our attention to the many outrages which have been committed by the most religious of all people and organizations; the holy wars, the Crusades, the immoral Popes, the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, etc. From these examples, the conclusion is drawn that religious conviction, no matter how deep, is generally of secondary importance in determining the moral and rational actions of men.

For further support, Lins uses quotations, and it should be noted here that the writers quoted are those who would never agree with Lins, and they are used out of context, and given the tacit interpretation which would support the Positivist concept of religion as universal brotherhood through science. He uses such writers as Renan, thus:

Religion will never disappear. It will be the eternal protest of the spirit against brutal and systematic materialism (sic), which undertakes to close man off in the lower region of earth-to-earth life.⁶³

⁶³Ibid., p. 535.

It is intriguing how a scientific materialist can use a passage from a diatribe against materialism for support! Lins further dares to use a quotation from a past president of the Brazilian republic, Getulio Vargas, which appeared in a speech before the Senate, to the effect that abstractions such as "God, freedom, democracy, people" were meaningless, and that the representatives of the republic should not heed the demands of the Church and religious people. Thus quoted out of context, we are not told what the historical situation of Vargas' speech was, but it is enough to know that he was one of many notorious dictators, who wished to "unite" people through force.

Ivan Lins points out in this essay that the discoveries and inventions of the twentieth century have served to bring men closer together; in spite of the evidence of our two great wars, man is "day by day becoming more unified, creating a universal home," becoming one humanity.⁶⁴ Comte's dictum is seeing its glorious realization: "Love by principle (the word "principio" has the double meaning of "principle" and "beginning."), and order as the basis; progress in the end (the word "fim" has the double meaning of "purpose" and "termination.")"

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 536.

This slogan is the very password of the Positivist movement. In conclusion, Lins quotes Farias Brito, who was, as we have seen, one of the greatest opponents of materialism and scientism, and in favor of a mystical, spiritual, quasi-theistic religion:

In truth religions are dead, but what cannot die is religion itself, that is, the religious sentiment, because it constitutes the very essence of human nature, from which follows, as an unavoidable consequence, the need for the creation of a new religion. And this will come. It may be that it will come out by evolution from among the very ruins of Catholicism. ⁶⁵

It seems in this article that Lins has overstepped himself in presenting quotes from people who hold the very opposite of his point of view, in order to muster support for Positivism. Anyone who knew Renan and Farias Brito must have felt uncomfortable on hearing these words so used.

The second part of this same speech to the fourth Congress of Philosophy is concerned with the action of the Positivist religious sect of Brazil, and it is here that Lins clarifies the Positivist position with regard to theism and atheism. The Positivists, he claims, do not enter into the eternal debates between theists and atheists, and in no way condone atheism. The reasoning behind this posture is that the atheist who rants and raves and preaches his atheism is not emancipated

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 536, quoted from Finalidade do Mundo, by Farias Brito, 1st Vol. of edition of the Instituto Nacional do Livro, (Rio de Janeiro, 1957), pp.176-79.

from the second stage of human development, the Metaphysical. In other words, to become embroiled in the question of the existence of God is to remain on the level of the theologians, and Comte himself wrote that atheism alone was very insufficient intellectual emancipation.⁶⁶ "Obstinate atheists are the most inconsequential of theologians."⁶⁷ In more exact philosophical terms, Lins says that "atheists concern themselves with demonstrating the inexistence of a creative principle, which is as impossible as the proof of the inverse thesis."⁶⁸

After this consideration of Lins in his more dogmatic aspect, in which he follows very closely the doctrinal system set forth by August Comte, we turn to his most recent work, História do Positivismo no Brazil, which attempts to be chiefly historical, and in which Lins sets a somewhat more conciliatory mood. The book is voluminous, 661 pages, including numerous appendices and an immense bibliography, which he terms "very incomplete," of Brazilian writers who have dealt with Positivist ideas. The work goes back to the first contacts of Brazilians with the French Positivists, and traces the movement all the way down through Luis Pereira Barreto (Cf. Chapter 2), to whom he devotes liberal space. He then takes the major part of the

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 537.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 538.

⁶⁸ Loc. cit.

book to demonstrate the number of Positivists who have worked or written in the different states of the republic throughout Brazil's history. The main thrust of the study is to demonstrate that even though the religious Positivists in Brazil were always few in number, and made crucial errors in the Positivist Apostolate, Positivism has lived on vigorously and effectively in persons outside the Positivist church, a point, he says, that Cruz Costa and others have entirely neglected in dealing with Brazilian Positivism. The concept of Positivism in this work is broader than that demonstrated in the above-mentioned speech, for Lins is concerned here to identify any progressive, scientific, empirical attitude and spirit with the Positivist outlook. Thus he is able to praise Pereira Barreto highly as "a Positivist facing the Brazilian reality" (the title of one of his chapters), and to bring together massive material in countering the idea that Positivism is dead. He takes the position of seeing in Comte an "incomplete" and "perishable" aspect, i.e., the religious one. Alongside this aspect, however, there is a tremendous treasure, Positivism's one great contribution which will live on, i.e., its method, applicable to many areas, social as well as physical. This aspect he terms "Positivism" per se. Lins cites the large contribution of Brazilians to the science of sociology, which

was indeed the child of Comte's creative application of the scientific method. The sociological approach to questions in many fields is a characteristic of the Brazilian mind, he says. Lins concludes his work with a listing of a few of the things which Comte foresaw and which are becoming realities, and of certain indications (of a general nature) which signalize a living Positivistic attitude:

1. Comte's idea that "capital, being social in origin, should be so also in its destiny." That is, Comte was against laissez faire economics, and believed in the necessity of state intervention.

2. Property also should be a public function. Comte saw the inhumanity of laissez faire, and was opposed to child and women labor, bad conditions in labor, and price fixing. He therefore favored unions and strikes.

3. The anti-war concepts of Comte (international organizations).

4. The disuse of theological solutions to problems is a commonly accepted condition today, and therefore Positivism is permeating our attitudes.

5. The increase in the commemoration of people of the past as people, on the basis of their humanity and their human virtues is a sign of the Positivist attitude.

6. Automation has confirmed Comte's prediction that one day human labor would be replaced by natural forces, leaving to men more leisure for cultural improvement.

7. The progress foreseen by Positivism, in the way of scientific and technological improvement is a proof of the Positivist claim for progress through science.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Ivan Lins, Historia do Positivismo no Brasil, (Companhia Editora Nacional, São Paulo, 1964) pp. 526-568.

One must admire a man such as Ivan Lins for his tireless labors in compiling evidence for his point of view, though he may be somewhat isolated and perhaps scorned for trying to defend a once-vital orthodoxy. There is no doubt that many of the things for which Comte and other Positivists struggled have come to pass. It is quite another thing to infer that this is incontrovertible evidence of a natural historical process, on the order of the Marxian concept of the evolution of history. The advent of socialistic forms of economics and politics is a fact, but this does not make a case for the fact that it will always be so. All philosophies and religions which have looked to a culmination of history within history, the creation of a Utopia ("positive or "negative"), to which man will attain, thenceforth never to fall away from, have been disappointed. Ivan Lins, with a rather narrow type of viewpoint, has in this "apologetic" work attributed so much to the vitality of his gospel, that it appears to have lost its force. There are too many other factors in history besides the thought of Comte (which itself grew out of an early glimpse of the possibilities of the physical sciences for technology and society), that it seems impossible validly to reduce all progress to Positivism as such. It seems to the writer that Ivan Lins could well take a page from the book of his best

example, Pereira Barreto, who, in his maturity, turned to non-Positivist philosophers, and thereby strengthened and broadened his scope without losing the quality of openness to the innovations and discoveries of the sciences. In recognizing the weaknesses in the system of Comte as dogmatics, Lins has already taken the first uncertain step toward this broadening, but he has not yet emancipated himself from those weaknesses.

2. Euryalo Cannabrava

For several years, in the early part of his career, Euryalo Cannabrava served on the staff of a Brazilian newspaper, "O Jornal," as editor in charge of a section called "Letras Estrangeiras," which Francovich calls "the most interesting tribune of philosophical diffusion in Brazil."⁷⁰ Through this work, Cannabrava did a first-rate job of scholarship, rendering the service of making known to his country the philosophical currents which were flowing outside of its boundaries. It has only been in the last decade and a half that he has published his own work. It has been commented that Cannabrava is flighty and changeable, moving from one philosophical position to another. Especially prominent in his thought have been the questions of aesthetics and science,

⁷⁰Francovich, op. cit., p. 144.

the latter of which seems now to be his main concern.

According to Francovich, Cannabrava was never, from the very outset, sympathetic toward rationalism, which he called "a masking of one's preferences and aversions in the domain of ideas, with a supposed submission to the march of objective rationalism."⁷¹ This is the substance, we may note, of Nietzsche's attack on rationalism in Beyond Good and Evil. Rationalism for Cannabrava ignores the irrational forces in man and nature, and leads only to exaggerations and Utopias, e.g., Marxism. But he does not swing over, like Nietzsche, to the other extreme of vitalisms and biologisms. He regards Nicolai Hartmann, Max Scheler, and Martin Heidegger as the highest representatives of contemporary thought, having aspects which may lead us to "the rediscovery of the spirit."⁷² These words were recorded in 1943, and since then Cannabrava has concerned himself much more with the problems of science and scientific language, including symbolic logic.

Much of Cannabrava's efforts have been devoted to polemics, i.e., to the destruction of philosophical prejudices, and in relation to this, he has been close to the Vienna Circle movement of the early Wittgenstein and the logical positivists

⁷¹Ibid., p. 145.

⁷²Ibid., p. 146.

generally. The philosopher's task, as he sees it, is to

...elaborate the metalanguage appropriate to run through scientific knowledge, taken as a language-object...to establish formal criteria for the justification of scientific theory.⁷³

Being anti-metaphysical, Cannabrava sees that the subordination of science to philosophy is not possible, but rather he must establish the scientific foundation of philosophy.⁷⁴ In his book, first published in 1948, Elementos de Metodologia Filosofica, he attempts "to reduce speculative activity to method, and method to language."⁷⁵ Thus the philosopher of science must "investigate the background of concepts and the structure of scientific theories."⁷⁶ By this method, scientific theory is converted into analytic and synthetic propositions,⁷⁷ and here lies the difference between science itself and the philosophy of science, that science works with techniques of empirical observation, while scientific philosophy does not pass the limits of the world of discourse.⁷⁸

⁷³Luis Washington Vita, "Panorama da Filosofia no Brasil," in Monólogos & Diálogos, (Conselho Estadual de Cultura, Sao Paulo, 1964) p. 149.

⁷⁴Loc. cit.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 150.

⁷⁶Loc. cit.

⁷⁷Loc. cit.

⁷⁸Loc. cit.

In a paper prepared for one of the National Congresses of Philosophy, entitled "What is Scientific Philosophy?" Cannabrava explores the status of ontology with regard to empirical observation. In the first part of this paper, he seems to make the terms "Metaphysics" and "Ontology" equivalent, but then distinguishes them at the end. In sum, the general theory of Being, or ontology, lies at the basis of science, and in fact every art.

Empirical disciplines such as physics, biology, and sociology can never do away with the conception of reality. This explains the ambitious statement according to which the groundwork of science is laid by ontology and not by logic or epistemology. The general notion of Being, on the other hand, is formulated in purely metaphysical and not scientific terms; this corroborates the idea already advanced, viz., positive knowledge is based in the very conception of reality.⁷⁹

The classical concept of basic matter is now gone, replaced by that concept of energy, which finally outgrew itself also, and reached unreality through further experimentation. Maxwell's field theory calculus as to the structure of the electromagnetic field seems to have gotten closer to the heart of the matter than these other concepts of an "underlying principle." This fact does not, however, make a case for the predominance of reason, because the use of calculus is in this case an epistemological principle, and not a metaphysical one. The question

⁷⁹Euryalo Cannabrava, "What is Scientific Philosophy?", an article presented to one of the South American Philosophical Congresses., p. 2.

which concerns Cannabrava here is the relative priorities of the two areas, metaphysics and science.

Since traditional metaphysics has sought and claimed absoluteness, it is not possible for relative knowledge, which characterizes science, to be based on any absolute knowledge. Therefore, metaphysics cannot be the foundation of empirical science. The argument exists also that "every cognitive activity implies certain philosophical precepts as its starting-point," but Cannabrava denies such an implicative relationship; p implies q, but ontology does not imply science, i.e., science cannot be deduced from a general theory of Being. Cannabrava notes that the new mathematical logic has helped to dispel many metaphysical myths, but that it has also begun to be constructive for scientific philosophy.

In his treatment of the concept of truth, Cannabrava first distinguishes between truth and validity, and draws the conclusion from this distinction that science, which is inductive, cannot depend on logic, but must have at its basis something more, something "extra-logical," which he identifies through the philosophical position of Critical Objectivism, which aims at maintaining the possibility of both concrete and abstract truth without detriment to either one. The clarification of these two kinds of truth must be done on the level of method, that is, by the use of the critique of language.

Most of Cannabrava's contributions, then, have been on the level of language criticism, i.e., the careful untangling of words and their referents, which he considers to be the task of all philosophy.

As an example of the sort of thing which Cannabrava is doing, we may look briefly at an article which he had published, in 1947, in Papers and Abstracts from the Second Inter-American Congress of Philosophy at Columbia University in New York. The article, entitled "Convention, Nature and Art," concerns itself with the philosophical task of establishing "some basis criteria which may be used to characterize and distinguish two types of communication: the scientific and the aesthetic."⁸⁰ In distinguishing between these two areas of philosophy, Cannabrava states that the type of language pertinent to science will be logic (note that he makes no mention in this early writing of the question of the concrete aspect of science) and the language of aesthetics will be "the critique of poetic language and of all the means of forms of artistic expression."⁸¹ He then makes the observation, in order to distinguish between these two languages, that while logico-scientific language is capable of reversibility, i.e., it can be run through all the transformations of formal logic, aesthetic language is never

⁸⁰ Euryalo Cannabrava, "Convention, Nature and Art" in Papers and Abstracts of the Second Inter-American Congress of Philosophy. (American Philosophical Association, 1947) p. 136.

⁸¹ Loc. cit.

thus transformable.⁸² What I can gather from this is simply that aesthetic experience, or aesthetic discourse, is not logical, and there should be no demand to try to make it so. This in effect tells us what aesthetics is not, but not what it is. Francovich writes that Cannabrava regards art as a deep form of direct contact with the universe, closer to religion than to science.⁸³ Therefore, at the time of the writing of this last article, it would seem that Cannabrava held science and art to be equivalent to the deductive and inductive types of logic, since art as a form of "direct contact with the world" is certainly an inductive form. In his book, published a year later, however (Elementos de Metodologia Filosofica), as we have seen, he gives more stress to science as inductive and related to the concrete, divorced from servitude to logic. Therefore, he has developed in the direction of a closer relationship between art and science, with regard to their relationship to the "concrete," the presupposed reality which can never be done away with by science.

3. Caio Prado Junior (1907-)

Caio Prado Junior, born in 1907 in São Paulo, is Professor of Political Economy at the University of São Paulo, and he takes the position of an "orthodox Marxist." Because of the

⁸²Loc. cit.

⁸³Francovich, op. cit., p. 146.

want of a better place to include him, and due to the generally "scientific" orientation of Marxism, I include Prado in this Chapter on "Scientific Philosophers."

By "orthodox Marxist," Caio Prado means that he understands the value of Marxism, or rather "dialectical materialism," as a valid method for the utilization of knowledge for human conduct. Thought, rather than a transcendental relationship to supra-historical principles, is an organic function of the human being, which makes knowledge out of experience. In his theory of the "dialectic of knowledge" (the title of a book which he published in 1952), he sees action resulting from knowledge, and this action yields the amplification of the formerly-held knowledge. Experience is thus gained through action, and hence knowledge, which becomes the basis for further action. There is no determinable point of departure in this dialectical cycle, except, perhaps, in the genesis of man himself, which is presently unknown to us. Knowledge implies former knowledge, and consequently also a world view, or perspective.⁸⁴

The universe, i.e., all which is outside of the observer, can be visualized from two points of view; as divided and as unitary. From the viewpoint of the division of the world into separate and distinct parts, action is possible, for if the

⁸⁴Vita, op. cit., p. 142.

parts of the world were not so distinguishable, then no choices would be possible, and action would therefore be unfeasible. This is the analytic function of philosophy, upon which metaphysics will be based. In the unitary conception of the universe, the mind is able to connect up the parts (the synthetic function) by means of logic. At bottom, all things are so interconnected that they are indistinct, and it is only for the purposes of action that we distinguish them.⁸⁵ The dialectical method of knowledge, then, involves a view of the universe under these two aspects, as a unity in multiplicity and as permanence in transformation, corresponding to the categories of Space and Time.⁸⁶ The process by which thought is achieved is that of relating, a logical process. With regard to his materialism, Prado affirms that matter is moved, not by mechanical, but by dialectical laws, and nothing transcends this process, called nature. The only sense in which we can speak of a transcendence is in the projection to the future of an immanent perfection of humanity, and thus the dialectical movement is toward socialism.

⁸⁵Loc. cit.

⁸⁶Ibid., pp. 142f.

Chapter 6. The Concrete Historicism of Miguel Reale

There is widespread agreement among Brazilian philosophers that Professor Miguel Reale of the Faculty of Law of the University of São Paulo is the dean of contemporary Brazilian philosophers, and he is referred to frequently by other writers as "o mestre de São Paulo," the master. He is held in high esteem by all, and it is therefore right and necessary that we should take time to examine his thought carefully and appreciatively. We shall have occasion to discuss in the conclusions of this dissertation the general judgment made by Cruz Costa and others that one outstanding characteristic of Brazil's philosophy is its close relationship to practical matters, and a tendency to avoid speculative philosophy for the sake of speculation alone; but it is enough to point out here that, to the extent that this is true, it is not surprising that we see one of the more original and complete systems of thought in the area of the philosophy of law, as with Miguel Reale. One must recall also that the most speculative of philosophers of the nineteenth century, Tobias Barreto, was nevertheless a professor of law, and he applied his thought in that field.

In order to set forth the system of thought of Miguel Reale, I shall begin this chapter with an analysis of his most basic and definitive work, Filosofia do Direito (Philosophy

of Law), followed by a discussion of the more central and relevant characteristics of the position which he takes. The footnotes refer to the Italian translation by Bagolini and Ricci.

Reale begins with the problem which Positivism gave to philosophy in general, that is, the problem of the independence or distinction of philosophy from the physical sciences. Since Positivism reduced all knowledge to the question of method, and proclaimed that the only valid method for any kind of knowing was that of the physical sciences, i.e., the empirical method, philosophy is thus reduced to being an "encyclopedia of the sciences," being incapable of adding anything to the concepts of the exact sciences. Philosophy in this understanding is nothing more than a repetition of everything that the sciences have already said. Reale's initial question therefore is whether these sciences are in fact able to offer the very criteria for their own validity. Reale is willing to admit initially that philosophy is a critique of science, i.e., it is an attempt to find a unitary view of science. But a fundamental distinction which he proposes to expand upon is that of explaining and comprehending, or understanding. Philosophy is a critique of scientific certainty, but more than science, it implies an axiology a "theory of value, to begin from the problem of knowledge in

general."⁸⁷ "When we philosophize, we are always investigating the value of something."⁸⁸ Even science itself employs an axiological principle of sorts, but strictly a priori and therefore outside of its proper boundaries, only as a regulative principle, when it chooses "to delimit the field of its results."⁸⁹ That is, when the biologist agrees to cease his investigations at a certain point, for example, where atomic physics is encountered, even though the two fields deal with the same object, the human body, then he is making a judgment of value which is regulative of the limits of his investigation, but has no bearing upon the data which he gathers. This question of value is therefore a philosophical one, and not strictly "scientific."

The field of endeavor of the philosopher is, then, in its first thrust, to elaborate a theory of general knowledge, which can be subdivided into two other categories, the formal and the real, or those of logic and gnoseology. Later, we shall see his reasons for it, but we may note now that Reale prefers the term, "ontognoseology" to simply gnoseology, and he relegates the latter to a special aspect of the former. Ontognoseology is not the theory of what is, but rather the

⁸⁷Miguel Reale, Filosofia del Diritto, trans. into Italian by Luigi Bagolini and Giovanni Ricci, (G. Giappichelli, Torino, Italy, 1956) p. 28.

⁸⁸Loc. cit.

⁸⁹Loc. cit.

question of correlation between thought and reality in general, between the cognizing subject and anything which is known. It is, in short, "the doctrine of being as known, and of the adequateness of consciousness to its object."⁹⁰

This, then, is the situation to the moment, which can be formulated thus:

The value of knowledge	{	In itself and in its structure: logic
		In relation to objects { subjective objective

Reale wishes to clarify his usage of terms at this point, with regard to the commonly-employed word, "epistemology." He notes that many philosophers, the Anglo-Saxon ones especially, use the term, "epistemology" to refer to this theory of general knowledge. This is all right, except that Reale prefers to use the word, "gnoseology" for the scope of knowledge in general, and defines "epistemology" as referring to the theories of knowledge within specific scientific fields. Thus there is an epistemology of physics, an epistemology of biology, and one of sociology, etc.; in his own work, he refers in his later chapters specifically concerned with law, to juridical epistemology, and not juridical gnoseology. One thing Reale wishes to make clear is that this status of independence and a priori concern of philosophy in relation to

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 28.

the sciences is no way meant to claim the superiority of the former over the latter. One final note in this introduction to Reale's philosophy is that science, in the positivist sense, is totally unable to deal with the problem of duty, of conduct, i.e., values.

In the second section of his book, on Gnoseology, Reale first makes the observation that classical and Medieval philosophy was generally concerned with being, while subsequent, modern philosophy concerns itself more with the problem of knowledge. Therefore, it is a characteristic of the most recent philosophy, now on the opposite swing of the pendulum, to be returning to a renewed interest in the "object".⁹¹ Dilthey had seen the history of philosophy as pendular movement, between the two termini of the concepts of the I and the universe. Reale notes especially the work of Husserl, Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann. Reale's concern here is to find a solution which will take into account both subject and object, without detriment to either one. The total field, called ontognoseology, contains both terms in the very name, and its subdivisions are gnoseology (the subjective) and ontology (the objective), which are distinct but inseparable, in a dynamic relationship. Reale considers it important to form some kind of gradation, or hierarchy, in kinds of knowledge, and to this end he distinguishes between common sense

⁹¹Ibid., p. 41.

and scientific knowledge. Common sense is simply defined here as unverified knowledge; not necessarily "wrong" knowledge, but simply unverified, and therefore not scientific. What is needed for verified scientific knowledge is a three-fold discipline, or method, consisting of typology, laws, and principles. Each science is able and duty-bound to form its own typology, set of laws, and principles, as regulative for its particular discipline; in the case of the jurist, "laws" will be better conceived as "normative,"⁹² and not as strict natural law, for which we shall find the reason later. It is not possible to reduce all fields, therefore, to one such set of criteria, but rather one must admit of the existence of "regional sets of principles," each applying only within its own field.

Reale now returns to the matter introduced earlier, to the definition of philosophy as "axiological," and as therefore distinct from science, which abstracts from all considerations of value. He begins by reminding us of the Medieval distinction between the general and the universal; science is the search for that which is general, while philosophy is the seeking after that which is universal. Since the Middle Ages, this has been borne out by the discovery that empirical science can never reason from the particular to the universal,

⁹²Ibid., p. 46.

but only to statistical probability, which is equivalent to generality. We note that value, by its very nature, is universal, for in declaring that a thing is good, we do so unconditionally. Scientific knowing, on the other hand, besides being only general, i.e., based only on probability, is devoid of and blind to value, and is unable to deal with it. Scientific endeavor is postulated on the condition of complete depersonalization, while philosophy is never completely divorced from the philosopher, never entirely objective.

Another way of showing the distinction between philosophy and science is through an analysis of the distinctions among the sciences themselves, e.g., the sociologist, the historian and the jurist study the same object (human reality), but each one comes to this object asking different questions, with different purposes, and therefore its results will be different from all the others, but not necessarily contradictory. Thus, there is a formal difference among the sciences, or among their formal objects, and this is precisely the difference between the sciences generally and philosophy. Reale believes that it is difficult and fruitless to distinguish between them by the old idea that "science deals with efficient causes and philosophy with final ones."⁹³

⁹³Ibid., p. 64.

Reale pays great homage to Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, but objects, first, that Kant's analysis of knowledge failed to take into account the mutability of the perceiving subject, i.e., that the subject is dynamic and changing according to the socio-historical situation. But this is not a strong argument against Kant, as one may claim that the possibility of knowledge in its a priori structure does remain the same. More important for Reale seems to be the objection of such men as Husserl, Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, to the subjectivism and formalism of Kant's analysis, since they wish to put more emphasis on the "object."⁹⁴ Such modern thinkers prefer, rather than to analyse the a priori forms in the subject, to speak of the a priori forms of the object. That is, they tend toward an ontological a priori rather than a gnoseological one. The argument is simply that the object must possess form in some sense, in order to be captured by the mind. It is this idea, which Reale terms "neo-realism," which is implicit in his own concept of ontognoseology.

At this point, Reale wishes to introduce certain considerations of his own by a defense of the position of Hegel in regard to rationalism; in short, he states that Hegel was

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 77.

not at all the thoroughgoing rationalist that everyone makes him out to be. Rather, in saying that "that which is real is rational and that which is rational is real," he was simply restating Kant's dictum that anything empirical which is not rational or anything rational which is not empirical lacks sense.⁹⁵ Because Reale is to draw upon aspects of Hegelian concepts, though with a slightly different twist of meaning, he wishes to pay homage to the dynamic nature of Hegel's dialectic, pointing out that the process of synthesis is a recurring theme in modern thought, both oriental and occidental. As we shall see, however, Reale's concept of dynamic process is not precisely the same as Hegel's. Another aspect which Reale wishes to use is the concept of the "objective spirit," as seen in human culture and society.⁹⁶ The rationalism of Hegel, then far from being an abstract, purely logical and formal rationalism, is rather a "concrete rationalism," which is thoroughly acceptable, having its fruition in human society and not on any transcendent plane above history.

As a part of this analysis of the concept of knowledge, Reale asks the question of what it is that is known in the

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 79.

⁹⁶ Loc. cit.

process of knowing, i.e., is it knowledge of the "real world," of things as they are? He disclaims the position of idealism, i.e., the position that Being is idea, or thought being (essere pensato), and includes the phenomenism of Kant, as being a type of idealism also, insofar as the phenomena known by the subject are mere ideas. Reale adheres rather to the conception of Nicolai Hartmann, that "knowledge is knowledge of something."⁹⁷ He further agrees with Hartmann in the crucial concept that subject and object are correlative termini of a single essential relationship. That is, one cannot speak of a subject which is not one through an object, nor is it possible to think an object without a subject. This position, called "critical realism," posits a relationship of polarity between subject and object, i.e., that they mutually imply one another, and though they are distinct, they cannot be conceived apart from one another. With Hartmann, Reale deems it absolutely necessary to conceive of a structure in Being which corresponds to the logical structure of the mind. As he defines it, "knowing is a construct of an ontogeneseological nature."⁹⁸ "Thought has the power to put logical structures in function of ontic structures."⁹⁹

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 87.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 88.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 89.

Reale wishes to clarify the type or form of knowledge which he considers the more important; that is, he sees the rational process of knowing as mediate (mediated through the categories, etc.), but adds that the truest kind of knowing is the immediate, the intuitional, the emotive. It is that "spiritual" apprehension of the essences of things by which the spirit can "penetrate into the core of things, putting itself in contact...with the intimate essential and existential reality of the objects."¹⁰⁰ Reale declares indebtedness to Scheler, who is "one of the most profound thinkers of our time who put in evidence the importance of the emotional factor as a means of comprehension of axiological essences."¹⁰¹ He quotes Dilthey also, who saw that it is the Will which finally "resolves the mystery concerning the origin and legitimacy of our conviction about the reality of the outside world."¹⁰² Corresponding to the two correlates, of subject and object, Reale states that deduction and induction are also reciprocally-implicative correlates, inseparable in their dynamic relationship. Reale now states that his method of approaching the philosophy of law is the "historical-axiological" method, by which is meant that there are no pure

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 97.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 99.

presuppositions (i.e., abstract and devoid of valuation), but only ontological and axiological ones. The method thus adopted is a dynamic dialectic, but obviously not in the same sense as Hegel's, which posits the creation of a synthesis through opposites. Thus we have a dialectic of values, positive and negative, concrete and abstract, static and dynamic, etc. There is a constant maintenance of a "unitary tension of the spiritual process."¹⁰³ Thus Reale admits of the relativity of reality, but maintains that there is a transcendental and axiological principle, or a constant process of valuing. This does not in any way support the concept of a transcendent natural law, or natural right, only of a transcendental condition for the creation of positive law.¹⁰⁴

Reale now proceeds to clarify and attempt a classification of the concepts of Being and of value. His ontology is on the level of the formal, that is, the form in the "object of consciousness," by which he does not mean the phenomena, such as in Husserl's thought, but rather "the theory of objects... the end of which is to determine what is the nature or the structure of that which is susceptible to being put forth as an object of knowledge."¹⁰⁵ Thus we see that an ontology


¹⁰³Ibid., p. 111.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 121.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 123.

would be the search for the structure of things in themselves, which he believes possible.

Psychic reality is to be admitted as a part of the realm of natural objects, though distinct from concrete natural objects (which exist in both space and time); the psychic objects are temporal but non-spacial. He wishes to guard against the reductionism of the field of law to the area of psychic reality found in some writers. He points out that the emancipation of logic from any reductionism to psychology is applicable to the science of law also. Thus, concrete and psychic objects exhaust the field of natural objects; there are also ideal objects, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. Many thinkers have included the realm of values within this area, since values also are non-temporal and non-spatial. But values differ significantly from ideas, though they are both outside of the spatio-temporal realm, in several ways. In the first place, ideas can be quantified, while values cannot; there is no way one can give quantity, or the property of proportion, to values. Thus, values are not in the region of "Being;" rather their "being" is "valuing." The esse of values is valere. Value is related to being, however, in the sense that all valuing can be reduced to the concept of "should be." (dover essere) This analysis we can schematize in the following way:



These two positions, either of being or of valuing, are exhaustive of all possible positions of the spirit, and they correspond to the two causal concepts, i.e., efficient cause and final cause.

The characteristics of value are the following:

1. **Bipolarity:** This is the source of the dynamics of law. Law itself exists because of the negation of values in the committing of a crime. Value and disvalue are polar in their relationship.
2. **Mutually implicative:** Value and disvalue reciprocally imply one another, and in the same way as subject and object, they cannot be conceived separately, though they are distinct.
3. **Vectorality:** The polarity of valuing implies and gives direction to a man, in the same way as iron filings will arrange themselves in a particular direction, when placed in a magnetic field.
4. **Preferability:** The meaning here is that values admit of a hierarchical ordering; they will be arranged in vertical order according to their relative values, and ends will thus

be distinguished from means. Reale notes one final characteristic of value, and that is that one cannot move from the plane of Being to the plane of valuing, but one can move from the plane of valuing to that of being. That is, one cannot derive what should be from what is, but from what should be, one can move in the direction of the realization of that value, for if they could not be realized, values would be meaningless.

Values have a historical and cultural basis, simply in that they arise from the fact that man himself is what values, and it is man alone who is able to establish anything new in the order of nature, by the injection of values.¹⁰⁶ This phenomenon of the new in nature, i.e., culture, is the "objective spirit" referred to earlier. Values do not exist in and of themselves, but they receive their existence from beings which create them,¹⁰⁷ i.e., they are revealed in human history, and on no other plane. But they do possess objectivity insofar as they are existent in history and are related to reality. Values do not reduce to individual preference, and in this sense they are limited to the historical plane, but are not entirely relative and without objectivity. Insofar as man exists, values exist, for "man is fundamental value, that which is worthy by itself, since his being is identified

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 143f.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 145.


with his value."¹⁰⁸ Therefore, the study of man must be the beginning of the study of value, and this is the meaning of the fundamental difference between science and philosophy, or of "explaining" and "understanding," (Cf. p. 73) for understanding involves value; it is the understanding of a phenomenon in relation to what it means for man.¹⁰⁹

In his analysis of culture, Reale asks the question whether or not there is any continuity in the development of history between different epochs, for we find that there is much variation in the ordering of values into their hierarchies, from one period to the next. He rejects Spengler's idea that each historical epoch is like a living organism, living and dying unto itself, and therefore incommunicable to the others. Rather, there are always constants, and human experience increases through historical development, held together by these constants. However, there is no movement of ethics toward an apparent goal, i.e., there is no ethical progress through history, for each individual and society must make his own choices and creates his own values. These constants are discovered by both the formal analysis and the material: in the formal analysis, we find that there are always "constellations" of values, in which there are end values (stars, which give

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 146.

¹⁰⁹ Loc. cit.

of their own light) and instrumental values (planets, receiving their light from the others). By means of the material analysis, we find that there are two basic types of value, that is, the sensible and the spiritual; sensible values are those commonly called hedonistic, vital and economic, and the spiritual ones are the theoretical, the ethical, the aesthetic, and the religious. Reale proposes a tentative hierarchical scheme of values as follows:¹¹⁰



Reale notes here that beauty is understood as a way to truth, and therefore it is not put on the same level as truth, as Plato puts it. On the other hand, it is not reducible to anything else.¹¹¹

Reale has now laid the foundations for a theory and a science of culture, which is denominated as "objectivated

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 160.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 161.

spirit," also known by the various names of "the world of spirit", "historical world," "objective spirit," or "objectivated human life." It is declared, following Vico, that the science of culture is a "new science," with its own logic, its own regional set of principles, laws, and typologies.¹¹² Reale acknowledges indebtedness to Dilthey, Weber and Spranger for the distinction between natural and cultural sciences given in the distinction between "explanation" and "comprehension," or understanding. It is the difference between "being" and "valuing," between "causality" and "finality." "Culture is none other than the concretization and actualization of freedom, of the power which man has of reacting to natural stimuli in diverse ways."¹¹³ Culture, through the injection of values into nature, transforms it; science does not transform nature, but rather merely tries to capture and reproduce it in material things; eliminating the personal, individual coefficient. Science says that S is P, while culture says that S should be P. Science then corresponds to the analytic function of logic, and culture to the synthetic, by the introduction of the ad hoc affirmation of value. Therefore, the concept of "law" (*legge*) in culture and in philosophy of law is not possible, since the concept of law as lex involves

¹¹²Ibid., p. 164.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 166.

necessity, upon which it depends for its existence. On the contrary, the juridical concept of law (diritto), as we have seen, depends for its existence on the fact of its constantly being violated. For the purposes of juridical law, we will speak rather of norm, which is the result of the introjection of value, and for which fact is not sufficient reason. Law in this sense "shines most" when it is violated.

The concept of norm, then, is the result of the action of value upon fact;

The norm comprehends the fact, values it, measures it in its meaning, determines it in its consequences, tutors it in its content, realizing precisely a mediation between value and fact.¹¹⁴

Whereas the concept of natural law does not imply the existence of a sanction (a lawgiver), the concept of norm does. The spheres of the physical and the valuative are connected only insofar as values exist in things and arise from beings (i.e., man).

The concept of the Good, for Reale, is the ordering force of ethics; the good of the individual is the dominant goal, the intrinsic value, and the good of the totality of society is the instrumental good for the achievement of this end. He declares with Unamuno that a man is worth more than all humanity.¹¹⁵

"Axiology in general has as its source the value of the human

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 176.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 183.

person, and every juridical axiology has as its source and goal the value of justice," understood here as "the harmonic coexistence and freedom of persons according to proportion and equality."¹¹⁶ In sum, then, "juridical experience" is:

1. An historico--cultural experience,
2. of an ethical order,
3. normative, and
4. having value as founding the social good of ordered living together, or the value of justice.¹¹⁷

The concept of morality pertains to the individual aspect, and that of justice to the social. The concern of juridical philosophy then is that of the social.

Juridical philosophy must deal with the concept of person as personality, meaning the person in relation to other persons:

The idea of the person represents an ethical element which is revealed only when the individual enters into relation with the other individuals, and affirming himself is led likewise to recognize the value of the others and to surpass the bio-psychical limits of his individuality. Thus as the relation of subject and object is the foundation of gnoseology, the relation of one self to another self is the foundation of ethics.¹¹⁸

Hence, Reale makes the distinction between morality as individual and ethics as interpersonal, and the same relation

¹¹⁶Loc. cit.

¹¹⁷Loc. cit.

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 187.


of reciprocity and mutual implication which exists between subject and object exists also between subject and subject in society. The concepts of Being and of Value come together only in man, who is the only creature in which value is identified with being, in which "ontology and axiology flow together, since only he is while he must be, and must be by being what he is."¹¹⁹

The moral aspect, belonging to the individual level of existence, is unilateral, while the ethical, being social, is bilateral. The outcome of Reale's concept of law is a tridimensional one, in which fact, value and norm are the three functions of juridical experience. Most jurists, according to Reale, recognize these three aspects, but they do not have a unitary view of their interconnectedness. In his thought, they are connected by a dynamic dialectical process, which may be likened to the action of a ray of light upon a prism; that is, the light, which is value, shines on the prism, which is a concrete historical fact of any kind, and the light of this value is refracted in such a way as to yield various different possibilities for norms, from which one must finally choose (again through the action of value); when the choice has been made, the norm is created, product of both the human

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 347.

process of valuation and the existence of historical fact.

The process may be diagrammed as follows:¹²⁰



Conclusions:

As may be seen from this, Reale's intention is to find a path between the two extremes of a pure rationality which would make law an absolute, to be followed to the letter, and a relativity which would make nonsense out of all positive laws for society. The path which he proposes would make it possible for the jurist to "consider the positive laws as 'given' in the measure of their meaning and of the utility in the totality of the circumstances, but without denying that they are, in themselves, a moment or expression of the objective spirit in which their contingency is resolved."¹²¹

Thus, with no need to posit value and reason on a transcendent level above history, in some absolute realm, Reale puts them on the level of human history and in relation with concrete

¹²⁰Miguel Reale, "A Crise do Normativismo e a Exigência de uma Normatividade Concreta", a paper delivered at one of the South American Congresses of Philosophy., p. 9.

¹²¹Reale, op. cit., p. 90.

reality, without reducing them to pure subjectivity or relativity. Insofar as the concrete is objective, so also the values which arise from it and refer to it are concrete and objective. This objectivity is founded in a dynamic relationship between subject and object, and hence value and being, in this relationship of reciprocal implication and polarity, is the means by which the gap between pure and practical reason, as posited by Kant, is bridged.

We see in Reale the overall influence of the phenomenological method, from Kant to Husserl, in his insistence upon examining the nature of reality as known, but also the desire to get beyond Kant in the influence of Nicolai Hartmann, Scheler and Dilthey, by supposing a structure of reality itself which can be known, and by his favoring intuitive knowledge and the role of the emotions in the process of knowing. He draws upon the Italian school of Philosophy of History from Vico to Croce. There is a concerted effort to return to a concrete philosophy of history and culture, recognizing that philosophy is indeed personal, and arises from the human situation, rather than being impersonal and divorced from the point of view of the philosopher.

Miguel Reale has rendered a service to philosophy in making his system a truly dynamic one, and pointing out the

virtue of Hegel's dynamic philosophy of history. It is a difficult problem, however, to understand precisely how he is able to distinguish philosophy from the sciences by the assertion that the former is through and through axiological. In admitting that philosophy is personal and not impersonal, he is certainly in step with a great part of contemporary thought, and he of course carries it further than as a mere admission; he rather points it up as a valid starting point and a virtue to be pursued. But such a position of involvement of the philosopher in his thought is not at all universal, and there have been many thinkers who have at least attempted to divorce their speculations from personal involvement without trying to follow a method explicitly "scientific" in the modern, empirical sense of the word. The area of axiology has only been a part of the whole field of philosophical endeavor, and only recently has it been carefully differentiated from the rest of philosophical thought. Why is it not possible to argue from the point of view that the relationship of polarity and mutual implication which Reale finds characteristic of values is in reality a logical relationship, and not axiological at all? Therefore, Reale has not yet demonstrated that all of philosophy is axiological by nature.

Chapter 7. The Existentialism of Vicente Ferreira de Silva

Vicente Ferreira da Silva, considered the foremost Brazilian existentialist, was, before the outbreak of the World War II, assistant to Willard O. Quine, and published his first book in 1940, Elementos de Lógica Matemática. Since that time, however, da Silva moved toward the existential thought of Martin Heidegger, carrying a great deal of influence from Schelling. His point of departure is that of Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, which

Places the world not as an objective correlate of an act of transcendent knowledge, but as the design of an infinite experience. This thesis makes impossible any philosophy of the object in detriment to a philosophy of the subject. The object of philosophical reflection is, therefore, always and only, human action in its internal dialectic and in its developments.¹²²

With this man-the-measure concept, the only properly philosophical disciplines are philosophical anthropology and existential ontology. He is in agreement with Fichte's dictum, that "philosophy is an extenuated analysis of the infinite content of human freedom."¹²³ Further, as we shall see presently, da Silva's thought is highly colored by religious considerations, and from Schelling he got the concept

¹²²Luis Vita, "Panorama da Filosofia no Brasil" in Monólogos & Diálogos (Conselho Estadual de Cultura, São Paulo, 1964) p. 139.

¹²³Ibid., p. 139.

that "consciousness has its evolution determined in everything and through everything by theogonic forces." "The gods are the true creative forces in culture and history."¹²⁴ He interprets the Heideggerian Entwurf (pro-ject) in terms of the creative forces of "the gods," who are the un-veiling powers which create individuality and specific tasks for men. As we shall see also, his thought bears a resemblance to the elan vital concept of Henri Bergson, except that this basic force is interpreted as primordial Will. To see the way in which he does this, I shall offer some examples from his writings. Note the extent to which Da Silva uses the concepts of Greek mythology.

In an essay on "Race and Myth" Da Silva begins by the assertion that the concept of race is a valid one, that races do exist, "in spite of UNESCO, scientific research and Positivist-humanistic-bourgeois conclusions." He points out that the refusal to admit the concept of race goes back to the brotherhood concepts of Stoicism and Christianity, which put truth beyond appearance into the realm of the inner and invisible spirit.¹²⁵

The human body and Race are similar in that they are

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 140.

¹²⁵Vicente Ferreira Da Silva, "Raça e Mito", an article in Anais do III Congresso Nacional de Filosofia, (Instituto Brasileiro de Filosofia, São Paulo, 1959), p. 542.

"representations" of a primordial "pulsional" dimension of willing, which he terms 'primordial wanting' (Ur-Wille). He uses another figure to show what he means, i.e., the Dionysiac concept of a pre-corporeal, subliminal wave-like "Blood," which is true Being. Here we have the pre-Apollonian, pre-formal concept dealt with by Nietzsche in Birth of Tragedy, an underlying force which is without form, and only later becomes crystallized into form by the Apollonian, ordering, form. The individualization (my own word) of this force is brought about by the unveiling (Heidegger's Verschlossen), and the corporeality which results in animalitas, a part of the Heideggerian pro-ject.

An aspect of this unveiling is the presence of emotion, which accompanies the in-the-world condition of the body, or person, as a passional seizure (arrebato, equivalent to Heidegger's Ergriffenheit). Thus in personality, we have the experience of a tropico-suggestive force being liberated in forms of the desirable; that is, the primordial Will is differentiated into particular forms (tropisms) which are 'suggested' out of the multiplicity of possible forms. Another term for such forms of desire is 'modulations of the Will'. Thus 'desirability' is the exterior correlate of the corporeal being itself, an attractive field in which the body,

the form of desirability, exists. Thus, the ausser Sein, being-outside-of oneself, of Heidegger becomes interpreted in terms of a field of desirability containing a form of desire. Thus the body is an "undertaking" of the plexus of possible undertakings in the world.

From this analysis of personal experience, Da Silva states that

Our body is something consigned and offered by a primordial offering power. We designate that offering dimension as the transcendental dimension of the Suggestor...This initiating power of the Suggestor is documented and affirmed in the mythological process.¹²⁶

Further concerning the gods he states that

The gods must not here be thought of as theoretical representations, as an intellectual fruition, but as tropical occurrences, as presuppositions of passional tides. These passional waves constitute the foundation of particular ethnic diversifications.¹²⁷

The Blood comes from the gods and in the immemorial sacrifices of peoples it is offered anew to the divine powers. In that ritual circulation of the Blood is hidden the seal of an unfathomable truth, the truth of the hidden source of visible forms. The Blood comes forth from the original mythical Matrix and all ritual of sacrifice is a continual affirmation of that belonging.¹²⁸

In an essay on "Religion, Salvation and Immortality," Da Silva points up the fact that differing religions have

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 544.

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 545.

¹²⁸Loc. cit.

differing concepts of what is "savable" in man, and hence different concepts of immortality exist, according to the gods which one serves. He notes the fact that the Platonic concept of immortality is that it is essentially the mind which is the indestructible part of humanity, and that Platonic theology and religion is based on the concept of logos; in detriment to the material, corporeal part of man. The Judaeo-Christian religion brought in the concept of the will, but retained the disvaluing attitude toward the body. Da Silva then proceeds to put forth the argument that mythology has the real answer to the question, since the gods are the originating, un-veiling forces of existence, and actually supply the stuff of life, whereas the logos can only deal with that which is already given by them. The real orientation of life exists in the gods themselves, therefore, and

Each god or each world perspective constitutes a scene of undertakings, actualization and accomplishments, a theatre of fruitions and beatitudes which opens itself out as a form of eternity.¹²⁹

Our heart reveals itself then in its totality as a chip off the savage heart of the divine and in it (the divine) we are and remain forever.¹³⁰

Thus, for Da Silva, "the gods are origins, primordial un-veiling powers, which command the inbreaking of a theatre of

¹²⁹Vicente Ferreira da Silva, "Religião, Salvação e Imortalidade" in Anais do IV Congresso de Filosofia, (Institute Brasileiro de Filosofia, São Paulo) p. 493.

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 495.

meanings,¹³¹ and therefore myth has primacy over Being, implying "the opening of Being over the whole sphere of the intelligible, of the knowable through knowing. The logos binds us to the already-offered, myth transports us to a primordial un-veiling realm."¹³²

Here we have in nuce, the thought of Vicente Ferreira da Silva, whose reflections show much of the influence of Martin Heidegger, Schelling and Nietzsche. The emphasis upon mythology is strong and I believe expresses an attempt at viewing human existence from the perspective of a naïve experience of mystical awe, attempting to avoid intellectualization of the phenomena of such experience. The concept of the divine as a "Suggestor," an originator of differentiated and individualized forms of primordial desire, or points of will, is original and suggestive of Hindu philosophy. The lack of emphasis upon aspects of French existentialism, such as that of Sartre and Camus, is also notable.

¹³¹Loc. cit.

¹³²Loc. cit.

Chapter 8. Luis Washington Vita

Luis Washington Vita, associate professor of philosophy of law at the University of São Paulo, has applied himself to many areas of philosophy, with particular attention to the history of philosophy and to aesthetics. Especially evident is his vast scholarship, research of wide interests in a large variety of philosophers. One of his greatest contributions to the field of philosophy is, I believe, his more recent work, published in 1964, Introdução a Filosofia, which combines clarity with a monumental piece of historical research. His strength seems to lie in faithful commentary and astute critique of the work of other writers, and in this book, there is no attempt to state a dogmatic position or to develop a "system" of his own. What there is of a system of thought is anthropocentric and pragmatic, historical and axiological. Among the many obvious influences upon his thought, there is this aspect, much in agreement with the views of Miguel Reale. This may be seen in the first chapter of Introdução a Filosofia, where he writes:

Philosophy, insofar as it has reality, concentrates on human life and must be referred always to the latter to be fully understood, since only in human life and in relation to it does it acquire its effective being.¹³³

¹³³Luis Washington Vita, Introdução a Filosofia, (Edições Melhoramentos, São Paulo, 1964) p. 20.

Thus, he agrees with Dilthey that "a world view is an intuition which results from the interior of one's very own life."¹³⁴ The function of this philosophical activity of man is pragmatic:

World views are a collection of intuitions which dominate not only the theoretical particularizations of a human cultural type and condition all knowledge, but as well take in, in particular, normative forms, making of the worldview of norm for action.¹³⁵

The human activity of philosophy, then, is a function of the human being, as it were, a necessity to create views of the world.

From this introduction to the nature of philosophy, Vita goes on to elaborate on it by discussions of the different areas of philosophy, by chapters. The first of these is logic; next is gnoseology (the outlines of this are like those of Miguel Reale--Chapter 6), which he defines as the question of material truth, i.e., the faculty of knowing, as opposed to the formal aspect, i.e., logic, that is to say, he defines gnoseology as:

That important part of philosophy which deals with the theory of knowledge, i.e., of the origin, nature, value and limits of our faculty of knowing.¹³⁶

In this discussion, he treats first of the possibility

¹³⁴Ibid., p. 17.

¹³⁵Ibid., p. 20.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 91.

of knowledge, and in this includes the various attitudes which have appeared in history, of dogmatism, criticism, relativism, perspectivism, historicism, pragmatism, fictionalism (Vaihinger's "As If" school), and scepticism. In the section on the origin of knowledge, he discusses the alternatives of rationalism, empiricism, intellectualism and a priorism. In the section on the essence, or nature, of knowledge, he discusses objectivism, subjectivism, realism, idealism, and phenomenism.

The next chapter is a discussion of Epistemology, which Vita considers (with Miguel Reale) as a separate discipline from gnoseology, in that it is a critical investigation of the form of knowledge in particular sciences, a posteriori, "the theory of scientific knowledge or theory of knowledge, critical investigation about science or the sciences."¹³⁷ The stress here is upon the fact that while gnoseology studies the question of material knowledge, but a priori, Epistemology studies the form of knowing of the particular sciences, a posteriori.

Next, Vita deals with the field of Axiology, and pays tribute to Nietzsche especially for having made values an area of concern apart from questions of being and reason

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 118.

alone. After a careful analysis of the work of such as Windelband and the Baden school, Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, Lotze and others, Vita concludes with an analysis of values ontologically; values do not possess "being," but their "being" is "valuing." They possess objectivity in that they are not dependent upon any one individual for their existence, yet they are at the same time non-independent, for they are always related, or attributed, to some kind of reality. They exhibit polarity (value and dis-value), their special characteristic is quality, rather than quantity, for they cannot be quantified, but they can be arranged hierarchically. Values can be divided into three classifications, which are the logical, the ethical, and the aesthetic. Vita makes a special point of bringing in Reale's analysis of values, especially in that they are bipolar and mutually implicative, which is not true of mere reality. That is, a triangle or a circumference simply are, and there is nothing which is necessarily set in opposition or contradiction to them. This Vita suggests is the one main and distinguishing characteristic of values as such.

Vita deals next with Ethics, which he defines as "the science which busies itself with moral objects in all their forms, or philosophy of morals."¹³⁸ He points out further

¹³⁸Ibid., p. 147.

that the essential problem of ethics is the source of the power which is felt as "oughtness" (obrigatoriedade), i.e., whether from within or from without, and the diverse ethical systems seem to revolve about the various interpretations of the source of that power.

Chapter VII, dealing with Aesthetics, discusses the evolution of the concept of the Aesthetic from the mere idea of "feeling" or "intuition" to the more exact definition of Aesthetics as the study of art and beauty. Vita considers that art is to be thought of always in relation to its historical basis, and every art object is itself at the same time an historical event. Art is at the same time formal-normative and expressive-emotive. It is Vita's point of view that the emotive must be stressed as more important than the formal. He gives this emotive concept the further definition of the German Einfühlung, translated to the Greek "endopathy" meaning "feeling within," by which he means that one must project his feelings, emotions, and attitudes into objects; it is the activity of putting oneself into any "alien situation, objective or subjective, real or imaginary, such that he appears 'within' it."¹³⁹ Vita does not mean by this, however, that such

¹³⁹Ibid., p. 182.

endopathy is the same as identification, which would mean the annihilation of the observing self. He is concerned also to make a careful distinction between "beauty" and "art", in order to avoid the idea that only what is beautiful is art or only what is art is beautiful. Man finds beauty in nature by an act of his own, that is, nature has no beauty in itself, but rather, "nature is silent, and man gives it a voice."¹⁴⁰ Art, then, is a movement away from nature, and becomes part of the doing of man.

Vita deals with Philosophy of Religion, followed by a discussion of Cosmology, the science of "inorganic" being, and a final chapter on Philosophical Anthropology. He considers Philosophical Anthropology as a median point between the positive natural sciences and metaphysics, with the task of understanding the fundamental nature of the human being, apart from all of the physico-natural interpretations of him as a part of the cosmos. Philosophical Anthropology, or Anthroposophy, naturally assumes an "anthropomorphic" attitude, and this is to be accepted. He therefore defines it as

...the doctrine which determines the essence and structure of the human being in his integrity and unity, his place in the universe, his relation with ultimate metaphysical reality and his meaning in existence, as much individual as historical and social.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰Ibid., p. 169.

¹⁴¹Ibid., p. 233.

Vita draws strongly on José Ortega y Gasset in the dynamic, processual concept of man as eternal happening, rather than as having a fixed nature.

In Luís Washington Vita, we have a man of consummate scholarship, devoted to the sympathetic understanding of the work of other philosophers, and also to the education of his own country in the work of other men. He does not avoid stating his own views, which are generally expressed in terms of other men, but he does not take a dogmatic position in relation to his own ideas. He seems to be willing and able to learn and to teach. His Introdução à Filosofia deserves consideration, I believe, for an English translation, because of its clarity and its twofold thrust, i.e., of presenting clearly the fundamental problems of philosophy, and of tracing the history of the ideas dealt with. It seems to me that this book could be helpful in the orientation of beginning philosophy students. Its level is neither too high for comprehension nor too low for consideration.

Chapter 9. Summary and Conclusions

After this survey of the philosophical environment in Brazil from the beginning of the colony to the present, it is now our task to bring together the data which we have gathered, and to make some observations from which we may draw definite conclusions with respect to the general picture. To this purpose, I shall begin by noting the broad influences which seem to have played upon the intellectual life of Brazil, and move from there to the more direct and specific considerations by which we might characterize that life, and attempt to outline some of those factors to which this characterization may be attributed.

A. General Influences

Due to the many practical problems which every pioneering society encounters in a new land, and which the Portuguese certainly met at the height of their exploration and exploitation of new territories, both in the East and the West, the question of higher education and of developing the cultural life was of minimum importance in the early years. What mattered was the discovery and conquest of the interior, the subjection of indigenous peoples, the establishment of means to take advantage of the natural resources, effective transportation and trade, and the structure of government to control the new enterprises, far larger than those which had

existed in Portugal before Cabral's discovery. In the Roman Catholic Church and the newly-formed Jesuit order there was already an established structure for elementary education, and of course, the government which then existed lent itself, with some expansion, to administration of the colony. The Jesuits, then, were for a long time sole custodians of the educational system in Brazil, and their influence became deeply rooted in the colony. Education, however, was generally limited at the beginning to the Portuguese settlers, and was long in being extended to the indigenous peoples and the slaves brought from Africa.

When the colony became restless for greater political and economic freedom from the continent, and the administration of the vast and growing land became more and more a burden to the small country of Portugal, and ever-increasing interest in non-Portuguese thought arose; ready at hand were the writings of the French encyclopedists, especially, which inspired such as Matias Aires and Mont'Alverne. However, the French influence did not bring any amount of democratic sentiment, but rather only a taste of freedom from the yoke of the continent. Thus, though Prince Dom Pedro was pressed for constitutional reform and social amelioration, this pressure was not sufficient to bring any radical departure from the Portuguese

monarchical form of government, and only a political break from Portugal occurred, without significant alteration of the type of rule or of the society. The middle class was primarily responsible for bringing about this break, and the monarchy remained in power. Cruz Costa notes that the eclecticism of French thinkers was used principally to justify the political situation.¹⁴²

Associated with the rise of the middle class economy and the burgeoning of the natural sciences was the introduction of the Positivism of Comte and Littré in the second half of the nineteenth century, seen in many circles, but especially exemplified by Miguel Lemos and the "Apostolado Positivista," and by Luis Pereira Barreto, the forward-looking physician of Jacareí, who sought to use the new scientific discoveries for the betterment of Brazil. The Positivists of Brazil exerted some influence on the revolution of 1889, which ended the monarchy, and they struggled continually for the cause of a dictatorship, against the liberal, parliamentary constitutionalists, such as Ruy Barbosa. They did not succeed in attaining this goal, however, and their influence dwindled from that time on.

¹⁴²João Cruz Costa, Esbozo de una Historia de las Ideas en el Brasil (translated into Spanish by J. L. Paez, Tierra Firme, Mexico, 1957), p. 19.

German Idealism also was a strong influence during the nineteenth century, with Krausism in the law faculties, especially at São Paulo, and with Schopenhauer in the law school at Recife, in the person of Tobias Barreto. Barreto's philosophy of irrational will was a reaction against Positivism and the scientism of the time, a spiritualism of mystic overtones, antagonistic to the concept of laws which govern man's behavior; he rather believed passionately in human freedom and the ability of man to construct his own society, ethics, and laws. In Farias Brito we find a continuation of the Germanic type of thought of Barreto, in a philosophy of crisis and the agony of the human condition, reminiscent of religious existentialism, with the exception that Brito finds the essence of the soul, the salvation of man, ultimately in the intellect.

With the new republican form of government of the constitution of 1889, and the continual growth of the country in the early twentieth century, Brazil sought to throw off the yoke of foreign influence more thoroughly and to establish a national identity. This effort is seen clearly in the literature of Euclides da Cunha and Graça Aranha, who attempted to turn the eyes of the intelligentsia away from European thinkers and toward the reality that was Brazil. This nationalistic spirit is seen also in Jackson de Figueiredo, who also reveals the touch of Roman Catholicism and Pascal, as

as he attempted to revitalize and reform the Catholic Church, and to present the claims of the Christian faith in its strong appeal to morality and action.

B. Influences on and Characterization of the Contemporary Scene

The philosophical scene in Brazil is notable for its diversity of points of view, a situation which is no doubt a contributing factor in the despair and even scorn among many Brazilians with whom I have spoken personally, and with whom I have had correspondence. But we must go beyond this diversity to find general trends, and to seek the germ of agreement beyond considerations of doctrine alone.

In Ivan Lins we find the strong influence of the Positivist thought of Comte and Littré, in which the desire not only to take full advantage of scientific research is evident, but also an effort to contribute to the progress and improvement of the society, based on other than theological foundations. In Euryalo Cannabrava there are many influences, generally of an "anti-metaphysical" strain; Cannabrava acknowledges a large debt to Hartmann, Scheler and Heidegger for his orientation (Cf. p. 64), and also to the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, and he believes therefore that philosophy's legitimate scope lies in the critique of discourse, and that philosophy is a discipline which is decidedly more limited than either science or art, the languages of which it is its task to criticize, and which are different ways of approaching

the reality that is the presupposition of both.

In Caio Prado Junior, who has concentrated his efforts on economics, the philosophy of history, and the structure of knowledge, we find the specific influence of Marxism as a method to be applied pragmatically to thought.

Miguel Reale, in his development of the philosophy of "concrete historicism," reveals a phenomenological approach, but with an interest in the structure of reality in the object, i.e., the object "as known." His real aim is to bridge the chasm of Kantian philosophy between the subject and the object, thus rejecting both the older concept of the subordination of the subject to the object, thus rejecting both the concept of man as "legislator of nature." Hartmann has had the greatest influence on him, and he wishes to apply the "axiological" principle of a dialectic of opposites, of reciprocity and mutual implication to the logic of subject and object, in which neither one nor the other is dominant, nor is one conceivable apart from the concept of the other. Since this principle of reciprocity applies both to the logical and the deontological, he is brought to a philosophy of concreteness of values realized in being in history, and in this way he considers that the bridge between pure (cognitive) and practical (ethical) reason has been established.

Vicente Ferreira da Silva demonstrates, in his volitional-pulsional-religious interpretation of human reality and human culture, the great influence of Heidegger, and the mythical-religious thought of Schelling. He asserts the primacy of will over reason, making the distinction that the former is the primordial "given" while the latter is a secondary relationship to that already-given.

In Luís Washington Vita, we find many diverse influences, among the strongest of which are José Ferrater Mora, by his own admission,¹⁴³ and José Ortega y Gasset. He is influenced by the philosophical anthropology of Dilthey, especially the latter's concept of the origin of philosophical endeavors in and through the individual human existence, and the application of ideas to human reality. (Cf. pp.86f.)

On Leonel Franca, the influence is principally that of Neo-Scholasticism and the apologetic function of theology. Franca is considered one of the best expressions of the revitalized Catholic Church in its dialogue with contemporary thinkers in Brazil.

Within the diversity of viewpoints expressed by the thinkers dealt with in this survey, there seems to be a thread of unanimity; not, certainly, in the dogmatic positions stated,

¹⁴³Luis Washington Vita, Introdução a Filosofia, (Edições Melhoramentos, São Paulo, 1964) p. 51.

that is, not in the answers which each philosopher propounds for the questions he asks, but rather in the general agreement which we find with respect to the nature of philosophy, its origins, its legitimate scope, and its possible applications. I am speaking here of a general attitude toward philosophy which seeks to remove it from any supposed throne of detached authority or privilege, and tries to purge it of the illusion of its being the queen of the sciences. In short, there is here a desire to bring philosophy into the realm of human endeavor, to identify it as an integral, functioning part of human life, i.e., as one among many functions of the human organism. This attitude is reflected in the fact that human culture, human reality, the human condition, have become the subjects under investigation. The focus of concern is not upon nature, the cosmos, nor the universe, but man and his efforts to find order in life. These are the questions which are being asked, regardless of the answers which are being given.

In all of this, we can note the predominant influence of the post-Kantian German philosophers, i.e., Dilthey, Hartmann, Marx, Scheler, Schelling, et al., who have turned their attention to man and his part in the universe. The problems which concerned these German thinkers were: 1) the solution to the problem of the dichotomy between subject and object

which Kant had left in a subjectivism from which two alternatives could be followed, that of rational idealism or of arational intuitionism; 2) the avoidance of subordination of either subject or object to the other. At the time of the German thinkers in question, this really meant a return to an interest in the object and the structure of relationships in and among objects, which was approached by Husserl in his investigations into the structure of phenomena, or eidetic ontology; 3) to find reality in values, while avoiding to call them "objective." All of this involved investigation into the reality of the relationship between subject and object, the nature of the reality of human valuative activity, and hence a question of the concreteness of human reality. I believe that just this is the real pursuit of Miguel Reale, Luis Washington Vita, Vicente Ferreira da Silva, Euryalo Cannabrava, etc., and it has its most developed and explicit formulation in the system of thought of Miguel Reale.

To renewed search for the real in and for human life has brought these philosophers to the sobering realization that philosophy is, after all, a function of the human being in his situation, and that the old idea that in order to find truth, one must abstract from his own existence, must seek truth apart from his personal aspect, is sterile and meaningless. This humanization and personalization of philosophy

which began with those late nineteenth century German philosophers reveals, in its renewed concern with values, the dissatisfaction with the subjective predicament left by Kant, and it was the work of Husserl which clarified the need to posit a concept of reality afresh, though on some other basis than that of "objectivity," because it became evident that a purely phenomenological approach, in "bracketing out" the question of the thing-in-itself, also brackets out the possibility of decision and action, which is ever the need of the human being. Action demands some presupposition of a reality beyond the self and appearances which are in the mind of the thinker, and therefore, either one must posit an external reality, which yields again the problem of the subject-object dichotomy, or he must posit and seek after a reality which includes the human self, in order to make decisions and act upon them. It is to this problem that Miguel Reale and others have applied themselves, in the footsteps of those German philosophers to whom they owe so much. Reale has located the nucleus of the problem by seeking to found a philosophy of concreteness and regional reality within human history, in the framework of axiological principles. He has elaborated some solutions to the above-mentioned problems (pp. 98f.) which concerned the Germanic thinkers: he attempts to answer the problem of the knowability of the external world for the thinking self by

affirming, against Kant, that there are structures in objective reality which correspond to our ideas of them, and which we can know; he answers the question of the relative status of subject and object by applying the axiological principle of reciprocity and mutual implication of contraries (value and disvalue, subject and object).

Miguel Reale answers the question of the status of value by; 1) affirming the concreteness of valuation by concept that man, the valuing agent, is at one and the same time the source of value and that which is valued, i.e., that man is value in concrete form; 2) extending the notion of reality beyond the concept of mere being, and over the category of ideal objects and that of values, so that values, ideal objects, and physical objects all possess reality, though they may not possess in common all other identifiable characteristics, nor share equally in the cognitive categories of Space and Time. Values do not possess being, but their "being" is "valuing"; 3) pointing out that, though one cannot derive value from being, man (who is concrete) puts value upon existing things, and realizes his values through being. Out of this Germanic framework, then, and with the application of a dialectical, dynamic process of reciprocity and mutual implication which is drawn from an examination of the characteristics of values, he brings an

axiological-juridical philosophy of three-dimensionalism, where the juridical moments in this dialectical process are fact, value, and norm, which work together to establish positive law, and the concrete reality of a world in which the human self has an integral role to play.

Luis Washington Vita, who is associated with Miguel Reale on the law faculty of the University of São Paulo, is very close to this kind of thinking, if not in complete agreement. Vita's work has been less in the area of philosophy of law than in that of philosophical anthropology, studies in aesthetics, and essays on many authors, especially José Ortega y Gasset. One would have to characterize Vita's work as more than that of a critic than a systematizer; but this is not to say that he is not creative, for some of his critiques of other philosophers' works are of the highest calibre and show a keenness which is hard to match. Again, his critiques show the greatest degree of concern in the field of philosophical anthropology, illustrating the same humanization and personalization of philosophical efforts which I have been pointing up.

Vicente Ferreira da Silva demonstrates for us exactly this same broad tendency by concentrating on the analysis of the structure of individual, personal being, the existence of self-in-the-world. Da Silva then takes this ontological

scheme and injects into it a volitional, vitalistic perspective, using freely the mythological symbolism of ancient Greece, taking seriously the religious insights of the mythopoetic mode of thought, the uncritical belief in the gods, as a clue to the mysterious ways in which human culture, indeed, the very individuality of man himself, arises. Here in Da Silva, then, is a strain of existentialist thought, brought to Brazil through the same philosophers of the late nineteenth century in Germany, who had to struggle with the whole cognitive and practical problem left as a legacy from Kant. Even in Cannabrava, who is close to the logical positivists, and whose main concern at present seems to be the analysis of discourse on the second-level order, we have the admission of his great inspirers being Hartmann, Scheler, and Heidegger, and his assertion that in their kind of thinking lies the hope of the twentieth century for the "rediscovery of the spirit."¹⁴⁴

In thus noting the general prevailing preference in Brazilian philosophy for a man-centered type of thinking, rather than a nature-centered, depersonalizing, abstracting philosophy of science-without-man, I have indicated a debt to the German thinkers of the latter half of the nineteenth century, who had to deal with the subject-object dichotomy left by Kant,

¹⁴⁴Guillermo Francovich, Filósofos Brasileños (Editorial Losada, S.A., Buenos Aires, 1943) p. 146.

and who created the new science of philosophical anthropology, as distinct from the anthropology of the natural, physical sciences. Therefore, though there are exceptions, such as Ivan Lins, I believe that we may characterize the philosophical thought of Brazil in terms of this kind of humanized, personalized philosophizing which is so clearly represented by the work of Dilthey, Hartmann, and the existentialist philosophies. This tendency in the philosophy of Brazil is to be understood, of course, with the broadest possible latitude, for it is necessary to reiterate that there remains a wide diversity in Brazilian thought, which also characterizes much of twentieth-century philosophy.

In his presidential address inaugurating the Third National Congress of Philosophy in São Paulo, 1959, Miguel Reale notes three phases in the development of Brazilian philosophy since the beginning of the colony.¹⁴⁵ He examines the philosophical character of the three periods according to the categories of 1) the purpose of philosophy, 2) the methodological orientation, 3) the meaning of inquiry, and 4) the attitude of the philosophers. In the colonial period, he finds that the purpose of philosophizing was to examine ethical and ontological questions,

¹⁴⁵ Miguel Reale, "A Filosofia no Brasil," in Anais do III Congresso Nacional de Filosofia, pp. 11ff.

not always distinct from theology; with regard to methodology. there was unmeasured confidence in the powers of reason, abstract and formal; the meaning of inquiry was regarded as being a prolongation of an already-established traditional system, of universal and immutable validity; as to the attitude of the philosophers, it was one of confidence in the possession of inconvertible truths, which naturally led to dogmatism, intolerance, and a didactic spirit. Reale sees that the purpose of philosophy in the nineteenth century was one of application to political and social problems, ontology taking a back seat, and that an anti-metaphysical presuppositions prevailed; as for methodology, this was basically one of eclecticism and of reconciling differing viewpoints, such as found in Tobias Barreto and Silvio Romero (not dealt with in this work), who attempted to reconcile spiritualism, naturalism, and the critical philosophy of Kant; in regard to the meaning of inquiry, it consisted in the use, in the particular situation of Brazil, of the diverse systems of thought of other countries in ways which were not intended or foreseen by the original writers, to wit, the use of the work of Krause, who was in a sense a reformer, and whose system was highly speculative, for the justification of the dominance of the Christian faith and the Catholic Church; in the category of the attitude of

of the philosophers, Reale sees that the didactic spirit (catequese) was replaced by a polemical one, as though every system of thought had to be either praised or condemned, as in the case of Tobias Barreto and his vendetta against Positivism, sociologism, and scientism. Concerning the contemporary environment, Reale sees in the purpose of philosophy an expansion, a multiplication of field of inquiry, with diverse and variable perspectives, and hence purposes; as far as methodology is concerned, Reale points up the same type of diversity, growing out of the very forces acting within the society and its culture; as to the meaning of contemporary inquiry, it is intended to apply to the particular community in which it is realized, and the philosopher feels this need so to apply it to his situation as a man in that community; with respect to the attitude of the philosophers, Reale notes that the function of polemics has been replaced by dialogue, which allows full expression of individual views, but with the desire to find reality in whatever form it is presented.

It should be noted at this point that Brazil has seen definite growth in philosophical interest, in that the universities, previously sadly lacking in department of philosophy, have in recent years been adding them to their faculties one by one,¹⁴⁶ and it was largely through the energy of Miguel

¹⁴⁶Ibid., p. 12.

Reale himself that the Instituto Brasileiro de Filosofia was organized in 1949.¹⁴⁷ It held its First National Congress of Philosophy in 1950 in Sao Paulo. The Second Congress took place in Curitiba in 1953. In 1951, the Institute began the publication of its official organ, the Revista Brasileira de Filosofia, in which all writers were encouraged to make contributions, not only philosophers per se, but all those who might be considered philosophers of other fields, i.e., who are investigating and seeking principles in many fields of endeavor, whether law, mathematics, political science, history, etc., in order to stimulate further the interest in and dialogue among these fields. Thus it is that the Revista demonstrates in an especially concrete way the diversity of views and accentuates the new spirit of free inquiry.

C. Opinions

1. Cruz Costa and the Characterization of Brazilian Philosophy

I have purposely omitted a discussion of the work of Professor João Cruz Costa until this point in the present dissertation, and the reason for this is that most of his work has been done in the history of philosophy, and particularly the history of Brazilian philosophy. Costa has not published any systematic view of philosophy, but has spent his energies in examining and studying, for the purpose of characterizing,

¹⁴⁷Ibid., p. 15.

the philosophical work of Brazil.

Costa was born in 1904 and has been for many years Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of São Paulo. He believes that philosophical ideas can best be understood by a detailed examination of how they arise in their historical circumstances, and he sees the importance of the social conditions and political events, along with the literary works produced under these circumstances, for the understanding of these ideas. He has written several books on the subject of Brazilian philosophy, the most recent of which are: Contribuição a História das Ideias no Brasil (an English translation has been published by the University of California Press), 1956, and Panorama da História da Filosofia no Brasil, 1960. Since Costa's work deals principally with the characterization of the philosophy of Brazil. I introduce him here in order to point up certain characteristics which he stresses, and to contrast what he considers the most important aspects of Brazil's philosophizing with those which I have selected, and to attempt to establish a relationship among these aspects.

Costa raises the question, as do Luís Washington Vita, Guillermo Francovich, and others, as to whether there is anything which may be considered a Brazilian philosophy as such. He concludes, after his detailed study, that

there is nothing original on Brazil's philosophical scene, and that what does in fact exist has been imported from abroad. He voices deep discouragement at this situation,¹⁴⁸ and condemns Brazilian philosophy as pure "gloss" and mere commentary on the work of European thinkers. He notes, however, that the ideas which come from outside usually undergo certain changes, transformations, in ways peculiar to the historical and cultural situations at particular points in history, and that such transformation indeed is a necessary function of the process of assimilation. Though he does not illustrate in specific instances this transformation process, he notes that it may be a valid point at which to approach the question of a national philosophy, i.e., to examine the ways in which ideas are transformed, or "deformed," in his parlance, since these changes are significant for interpreting the special philosophical environment of each country. Costa also asks the question (which he leaves unanswered) whether the Brazilians have, indeed, assimilated these imported ideas. Though he says he leaves the question of assimilation open, he really ends up with the tacit answer that the Brazilian people have not really assimilated the contents of the ideas

¹⁴⁸Cruz Costa, in a personal letter to me.

to which they have fallen heir.

In addition to these questions, Costa notes that there is a "pragmatic" aspect which runs throughout the history of Brazilian ideas; that is, all along, ideas have been adopted for, and put into use for, political and social practice. In this connection, Costa uses the word "pragmatic," but it is obvious that he does not intend to refer to the content of the ideas as being of a pragmatic nature; rather he means that there was always a utilitarian attitude by which were chosen the ideas that would suit the particular exigencies of a moment in history. The "pragmatic," then, refers merely to a criterion for the selection of philosophical ideas of all kinds. In order to avoid confusion of the meaning of the word "pragmatic" with some theory of truth and action, I shall use the word, utilitarian, or, if I use "pragmatic" in Costa's sense, it will be enclosed in quotes. Costa sums up the fruit of his inquiries thus:

If we consider the meaning of ideas in Brazil, we will see that they are like tools of action, principally of social and political action.¹⁴⁹

In support of this thesis, Costa points out that eclecticism in the early nineteenth century was used for the justification of the political situation,¹⁵⁰ that Positivism,

¹⁴⁹Cruz Costa, A History of Ideas in Brazil, trans. Contribuição a História das Idéias no Brasil, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1964) p. 274.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., p. 275.

scientific thought, and mathematics were popular and were used in the latter half of the nineteenth century by the rising middle class and for the growth of technology and economic betterment. Spencerianism and evolutionism were used for these same ends. He points out that Farias Brito was seeking moral regeneration for Brazilian society, and that his thought also was used for this same purpose, by exponents of a new spiritualism, especially some Catholic writers.¹⁵¹ He points out what we have already mentioned that Euclides da Cunha, Graça Aranha, and Jackson de Figueiredo were concerned about the spirit of nationalism, and promoted an interest on the part of the educated, coastal city-dwellers to turn their attention away from Europe and toward the reality of the Brazilian situation.¹⁵² Costa refrains from making any categorical judgements about the contemporary scene, but states that up to the time of da Cunha, et al., philosophical ideas had been used for utilitarian ends, and that probably they had not been truly assimilated into the Brazilian mind. Thus he bemoans the fact that Brazil is an "ignorant heir of all cultures and all instincts."¹⁵³ It seems that Costa would

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 199.

¹⁵²Ibid., pp. 230, 256, 261.

¹⁵³Ibid., p. 275.

very much like to see something more original done in Brazil in the realm of ideas, but at the same time, he favors the utilitarian approach which is his, and which he sees ingrained in his country. He says that philosophy in Brazil has moved away from metaphysics, or pure reason, and has attached itself to the historical situation.¹⁵⁴

Philosophy is not exterior to the world. It is not simply an adventure of the spirit, but a human adventure, total, which is expressed frequently in a subtle way, but whose roots are in the earth.¹⁵⁵

Costa sums up the development of ideas in Brazil in four points: 1) most of the ideas have been imported; 2) a thoroughly "pragmatic" attitude toward philosophy prevails; 3) this "pragmatic" (utilitarian) attitude originated with the Portuguese colonizers, who themselves had always been "pragmatic" in their use of ideas; this utilitarian outlook can be seen clearly in the two groups of people who first settled the colony, i.e., the adventurers, who came to the new land for economic gain, and the Jesuit missionaries, whose purpose was to extend the dominion of the Catholic Church; 4) metaphysics is not strong.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴Ibid., p. 275.

¹⁵⁵Luis Washington Vita, "Panorama da Filosofia no Brasil," in Monólogos & Diálogos (Conselho Estadual de Cultura, São Paulo, 1964) p. 148.

¹⁵⁶Cruz Costa, op. cit., pp. 272-277.

Costa, then, favors the utilitarian application of philosophy, and is "anti-metaphysical." He says that Americans too long have been forced to go by a European standard of moral values, which fit badly into the picture in the big, wide, and savage Americas; that therefore we are in need of the creation of new values, and we must look to ourselves for them.¹⁵⁷

2. Remarks on the Foregoing: The "Pragmatic" and the "Metaphysical"

From his researches, Costa concludes that there are two different characteristics of the philosophy of Brazil which go hand in hand; 1) the absence of any "metaphysics," any systems of thought, and 2) the presence of a "pragmatic" or utilitarian attitude toward ideas. It must be noted here that these two terms are highly ambiguous, due to their long and tortuous path through the history of philosophy. The uses which we find here of the terms "metaphysical" and "pragmatic" seem to be equivalent to the bifurcation between theory and practice, which I shall attempt to clarify. Costa does not expand upon, nor give any precise definition of what he means by "metaphysics" other than the idea of "comprehensive systems," but it is fairly

¹⁵⁷ Cruz Costa, "História das Idéias e Valores", a paper delivered at one of the South American Congresses of Philosophy, p. 5.

clear what he means by "pragmatism," i.e., any stress on the utility of ideas; thus "pragmatic" might better be substituted by the term, "utilitarian."

The word, "metaphysics," has a pejorative connotation for Costa, and we should attempt to identify the various meanings which it might have for him in the context of his culture, and then see in what way they are related to his idea of the utilitarian.

a. The Aristotelian-Scholastic Metaphysics

Ever since Andronicus of Rhodes tacked the label, "after the Physics," on the part of Aristotle's writings on pure science, there has been confusion as to what those words were meant to convey. The questions with which Aristotle dealt in those writing were of course those of the establishment of a science of sciences, the search after first principles, and consequently, in a sense, the science of Being itself. This inquiry would deal with the ultimate categories of human reason, and insofar as there might be an Unmoved Mover behind all existing things, the science treating of this ultimate principle would be called Theology.

The Scholastics, putting Aristotle to use, worked to build an ontology, a system in which order became a main consideration, i.e., an eternal, immutable order, expressed in hierarchies and fixed, static models of the universe. Such an ontology was of

course at the expense of Aristotle's own concept of becoming, of process. For the Scholastics, the authority of Scripture was of course absolute, but they expanded greatly the scope of reason, and indeed relied more upon philosophical reason than upon the Scriptures, except where the Bible seemed directly to contradict any particular observation or assumption. John Herman Randall observes that the motivations for the Thomist-Scholastic ontology were not those of our modern natural sciences, i.e., to predict the future of natural events for the sake of control, but rather simply to understand and contemplate.¹⁵⁸

In a Latin country such as Brazil, the Catholic-Scholastic element is very strong, and at times assumes the dogmatism of an institution which claims intellectual as well as spiritual authority, and would be likely to cause a philosophical reaction against its particular metaphysical views. Luis Washington Vita points out the observation of Raymond Bayer (also corroborated by Windelband), that Medieval philosophy identifies value with its concept of static Being; there was no theoretical distinction between axiology and ontology; thus, the more perfect (the more "rational") is Being, the more nearly does it approach the Good, and evil is reducible to some failure to be in the full sense, or a sharing of non-being.¹⁵⁹ Thus, in a

¹⁵⁸Vita, op. cit., p. 129.

¹⁵⁹Loc. cit.

fixed ontology, with the concept of perfect Being identified with perfect value, the imperfect individual feels left out of the scheme; that is, the rational system of metaphysics of the Thomists reduces to inferior significance the human being in his volitional, emotive, and valuative functions, and he is not considered to create value, since value in such a system, like Being itself, is already created, established, complete and perfected, the valuative activity being reduced to the cognitive. Thus, the human experience that tells the man of common sense that he can and does create value, is contradictory to Scholasticism, and many individuals feel the need to break away from the monolithic finality, the rational, emotionless, and static ontology which does not permit the man of carne y hueso to set foot into its cold marbled halls, and he must go and seek a universe into which he may gain entrance, no matter how humble and earthbound it may be.

b. The Newtonian-Mechanistic Metaphysics

In our search for metaphysical systems which might be at the heart of the "anti-metaphysical" spirit cited by Costa, it is necessary to note, besides the Scholastic system, the cosmological world-view which had its beginnings in the mathematical experiments of Galileo and Descartes, and found full expression

in the Newtonian-Mechanistic metaphysics. In the dichotomy which Descartes created between mind and matter and in his conjecture that the "first principles" of the cosmos were of the essence of mathematical principles, he laid the way open for matter to take the lead in the concerns of the natural scientists, and ultimately the outcome was a tyranny of matter over mind; the world was seen to operate entirely through the matter of which it was composed, matter in motion conforming to the laws of physics, which could be put into mathematical and geometric form with precision, and the human self, the mind, the willing, valuing, individual became a mere epiphenomenon of matter in motion, in obedience to laws which he could not control. Thus, the reaction to this view is perhaps what Costa means by "anti-metaphysical" thought. The Newtonian cosmology, exemplified in a peculiar way in the Positivism of Comte and Littré, is a closed system, an ordered conception which takes in certain data and applies them to an overall view of reality; it is a full-blown metaphysics, with a concept of the reality and structure of Being, as well as a set of "first principles" by which it is able to predict the future for practical purposes. There are other metaphysical systems, of course, but this and the Scholastic one are probably the metaphysical world-views which have made the very word,

"metaphysics" an epithet of scorn among many South American philosophers.

c. The "Pragmatic" and the "Metaphysical"

After reviewing both of the above metaphysical views, it seems that the objection to them is that they fail, not so much in being inconsistent within their own systems of logic, nor due to any gross errors in observation which would invalidate them, but rather because they seem not to provide a sufficient place for the human individual, in which he may relate freely to external reality, walk among its beings, play a significant part in it, and feel a unity with it. The reaction among Brazilian thinkers against metaphysics seems to be based upon this implicit sense of alienation of the valuing, emoting, feeling, individual self from the world considered as real. Doubtless there are ethnic and psychological reasons for this kind of attitude on the part, especially, of Latin thinkers, which I shall go into briefly later, but it is sufficient to state here that the goal of philosophy, according to those of the Latin temperament, is to seek truth, unity and plurality, order and disorder, predictability and unpredictability, for the sake, not of finding nor founding a paradise, a heavenly structure, but rather of finding a proper home for man, however commonplace it may turn out to be. Home is where one knows his way around, where one feels he may act, in the confidence

that there is a reality upon which to act, and that his action will bring the desired results. By such a presupposition, every comprehensive system of speculation about the nature of reality will stand or fall on the basis of whether or not it provides a comfortable and realistic place for the self as the self is actually experienced.

After this examination of and reflection upon the types of metaphysics which have come and gone, and after recognizing the type of speculation which is acceptable to a Brazilian thinker, I propose the following definition of speculative thought: Any attempt to order experience, including values, and the careful searching out of unifying concepts and principles, i.e., speculation about the structure of Being, and the final affirmation of a reality beyond the self, which includes the self as an integral and interacting part of it. The concern of the post-Kantian German thinkers, such as Hartmann, Dilthey, Scheler, etc., was an apparent alienation of man from his universe, a hopeless subjectivity which they attributed to Kant; in Husserl we see for this very reason a renewed interest in the structure of the world of objects, though restricted to the phenomenological level. In Heidegger, we find an attempt to bridge the chasm between subject and object through an analysis of Being as Being, from within. In Dilthey and others, we find the concern to turn one's eyes toward man in all of his

creative, valuative, and emotive aspects. The virtue of much of this is evident, so clearly exemplified in Heidegger, of the emancipation of philosophy from the search after essences, natures, or "primordial substances" of Being, and a forceful awareness that the need is to find structures of existence (structures whose elements are relationships).

From this excursion into the questions of metaphysics and the direction taken by Hartmann, Dilthey, Heidegger, etc., I believe the problem of "metaphysics" in the Brazilian context can be approached more easily. According to the above definition of metaphysics which I have formulated, it may be asserted that Reale, Vita, Da Silva, Cannabrava, and others, do have systems; they do have metaphysics. What seems indicated here is that what Costa means by an "anti-metaphysical" attitude is a feeling of distaste for static systems of a rational nature (e.g., Scholasticism), and pseudo-scientific cosmologies which erect concepts of universal order which exclude human reality (e.g., Positivism). Indeed, Positivism holds to an implicit metaphysics in the world-machine sense, and also in the dialectical sense, of a progression of the intellect through three chronological stages of human development. In this sense, of course, Brazil has little in the way of metaphysics, but in the sense of the speculative activity which seeks to find order in reality and to include man in it,

there is nothing that is not also metaphysics. Thus, we need a careful distinction between particular metaphysical systems and the speculative activity itself, which is necessary for action to be performed. One could venture to say that the special characteristic of humanization and personalization of philosophy (e.g., philosophical anthropology) is a pause in speculative activity, in which we are re-examining the reality of human life, and making tentative, groping trials at including this human reality into a more comprehensive system. This seems evident in Reale's work. What is more accurately the case in the writer's view is that speculative activity, rather than disappearing from the scene, has begun to concentrate upon the self, the subject, so that future metaphysical systems may be able to accord him a more fitting place in their structures.

At this point, I believe it necessary to consider the causes of what could be a danger, viz., a prejudice against all speculation, which would destroy, and no doubt has been somewhat of a detriment to, philosophy in Brazil.

1) Positivism was always actively, dogmatically, anti-speculative, and hindered metaphysical efforts, and then it was gradually discovered that Positivism itself had a metaphysical foundation, and tended thus to prejudice thinkers even more than when it was in vogue.

2) There is the factor also, especially in Brazil and South America generally, of the unavailability of disciplined, supervised training in philosophy through a university, because if one wished to study philosophy, he had either to do it in a Catholic institution, which would naturally be restricted in breadth of subject matter and manner of presentation, or else he had to go and get an education somehow on his own, by teaching himself. This situation has been improved in recent years, but it has definitely affected the environment. The self-taught, "armchair philosopher" finds comprehensive systems tiresome. They demand infinite patience in analysis and synthesis, critical detail, painstakingly careful and consistent application of method, and they involve countless distinctions which seem absolutely insignificant to the person undisciplined in that sort of thing. The self-taught philosopher tends to accept ideas less critically; thus he will look upon complex systems as fruitless and time-consuming; they will strike him as "unrealistic," as "ivory tower" existences and he will not have a love and taste for critical intellectual exercises. Instead, the self-taught philosopher is looking for answers to his immediate situation, and is not too concerned about their ultimate validity ("if it works, use it"); the self-taught philosopher is looking for something which will give him comfort in immediate uncertainties, which will take away the

bothersome enigma of some mystery which is disturbing him at the moment.

3) There seems also to be the factor, that in a new land where political institutions and social values are being created afresh, there is the pressing need for application of ideas, and no time nor incentive to seek "knowledge for its own sake," as there is in older, more established societies. It is this fact of the newness of Brazil which I believe to be most decisive in the dual thrust of an anti-metaphysical and a "pragmatic" attitude. I tend to minimize, contrary to what Costa says, the "Portuguese" utilitarian outlook as a main contributing factor. I believe that the same thing would have happened, had some other country which was highly developed in speculative thinking pioneered in Brazil. There is no doubt that the Portuguese settlers and missionaries were inspired by practical motives, but this is secondary to the fact that the settling and developing of a new country, a new government, a new society, demands the application of useful ideas and the neglect of those which cannot be applied.

In this regard, it is significant, I believe, that Brazil has not produced any philosophy of pragmatism, nor adopted any; that is, there has arisen no philosophy which is based on a pragmatic axion as a part of its content (with the possible exception of the Marxist, Caio Prado Júnior), nor

which develops any theory of the primacy of action, or of the relationship of truth to action, such as in the thought of a William James or a John Dewey. Rather, ideas, systems, philosophies, have come and gone, been used or ignored, chosen or rejected, by utilitarian considerations, such as political expediency, nationalistic zeal, etc., and there is no "pragmatism" as a philosophy per se. In this respect, I do not consider Positivism as a philosophy of pragmatism, because it is really, in its logical consequences, an abdication of philosophy to the natural and technological sciences, with a curiously incongruous and contradictory speculative superstructure. It has no worked-out logic of the relation of truth to action which is distinct from that of the experimental sciences.

3. Ethnic Considerations

We should not conclude this study before touching upon the possible reasons for the particular character of the philosophy which is being done in Brazil, which lie in the very ethnic matrix of the society, and whose roots extend far back into the history of their predecessors, and extend far down into the depths of their being. There is, in every country, some identifiable fulcrum from which the social, political, and intellectual life of the people pivots. It may be profitable to look at Brazilian philosophy also from this aspect. Perhaps the one truly influential factor in the case of Brazil is the fact

that it is a relatively new country. If we examine the conditions of any new country, we will immediately realize that one of the most obvious forces at work is the pressure to develop the economy, the political institutions, the social structure, the sense of identity, of the people. We have already touched upon this in relation to Brazil, in our discussion of the question of the anti-metaphysical and the "pragmatic" outlook. But these factors are by no means restricted to Brazil, for the same pressures are at work in any pioneering nation. In the United States of America, the rise of a scientific and technological economy, accompanied by a diminishing religious environment, was paralleled by the growth of a utilitarian attitude, reflected in philosophy by James and Dewey, in their attempt to found a philosophy of pragmatism. Because of this kind of practical concern of a people who are developing their resources, there is always a tendency to lay stress on the practical and to neglect the theoretical. Such a shift of emphasis need not, but often does, create a mentality which draws a distinct separation between theory and practice. Such is always a danger, especially in a society untrained in philosophy, to begin with. The result is a scorn of theoretical matters, the creation of an "ivory tower" contempt for the pure sciences.

In Latin America, this situation is one factor, though by itself, it might not be great, since those countries have been slow in scientific and technological development. But added to it is the prevalence of the Catholic Church, in which theory, i.e., philosophy, is not given free rein, but is bent to the will of religious dogma, and is presented with a good measure of the religious perspective. In addition to this religious inhibition, there is the characteristic of the socio-economic structure, in which the middle class of educated and relatively emancipated intellectuals is smaller than in a society where the Catholic Church is not predominant, or where the economy has made education the rule rather than the exception. Indeed, the number of people who have no resources for gaining an average or complete education is much greater in South America than in the United States, for example. This tends to reduce the number of people who would be teaching and writing, limiting to a degree the philosophical production.

Beyond these historical factors, however, there is also the question of the "philosophy of life" which the Latin thinker inevitably brings to his subject matter. I am speaking here of the broad attitude which stresses the importance of passion, in opposition to the European importance of reason and dispassionate use of the mind. I realize that this is a

matter of degree, and that these generalizations are without documentation, for such a thing is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to document, since general philosophies of life are not always found in books. One may cite, of course, such writers as Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, and many more, but they too have reached a degree of clarity and a certain objectivity in the very fact of having had to write, and thus they themselves unavoidably lose some of the passion, the stress on the emotive, which one must agree can only be expressed through action and not words. In short, the Latin temperament is given to a horror of rationalism, and insists on the efficacy and reality of the "reasons of the heart."

In specific reference to Brazilian philosophy, then, it seems evident that all of the above factors are at work in the contemporary scene. The Latin temperament of passion, the insistence on the reality of the emotive aspect in man, is probably the main contributing factor in the prevalence of the use of Hartmann, Scheler, and the late German idealists generally, among Brazilian writers. One cannot neglect also the obvious appeal which the Germanic philosophers and mystics must have to a people who, though breaking away from the intellectual climate of Scholasticism, nevertheless retain a strong religious sentiment.

4. Concluding Remarks

Throughout this survey, I have attempted to show the important phases of the development of philosophical ideas during the history of Brazil from the founding of the colony itself in 1533, and to show, in contemporary thought, the variety, the diversity of points of view, which exist side by side. But I have tried to point out the areas in which there is a degree of unanimity. The main area of agreement, it seems clear, is in the renewed interest in man, his culture, his relationships to other men, his values, the art which he creates, and the implications of his very situation as an existing being in relationship to other beings, as characteristic of Brazilian thought. There is a hint of an anti-metaphysical spirit in many quarters of South American thought, including that of Brazil. In tracing back, we find that they may be more a reaction to particular systems than to the speculative activity itself, because of the feeling of the failure of those systems to give place to man in the full sense of his humanity, as he seeks free self-expression. The philosophy of Brazil reflects, then, a humanizing and personalizing attitude, in the renewal of the study of man and his culture apart from any considerations of the natural sciences. This anthropocentric character is well-fitted to the "philosophy of life" of the Latins, with their stress on passion, on the emotive, and on value.

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