

University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository

Latin American Studies ETDs

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Spring 4-9-2021

Congress and the Fall of Jacobo Arbenz: A Narrative of Cold War Fears and Redemption

David Erik Lindwall

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/ltam_etds



Part of the [Latin American Languages and Societies Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Lindwall, David Erik. "Congress and the Fall of Jacobo Arbenz: A Narrative of Cold War Fears and Redemption." (2021). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/ltam_etds/61

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Latin American Studies ETDs by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact disc@unm.edu.

David E. Lindwall
Candidate

Latin American and Iberian Institute
Department

This Thesis is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication:

Congress and the Fall of Jacobo Árbenz: A Narrative of Cold War Fears and Redemption

Approved by the Thesis Committee:

Dr. William Stanley, Ph.D., Chairman

Dr. Judy Bieber, Ph.D.

Dr. Luís Herrán Ávila, Ph.D.

Congress and the Fall of Jacobo Árbenz: A Narrative of Cold War Fears
and Redemption

By

David E. Lindwall

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science
University of Texas at Arlington 1978

THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Latin American Studies

University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico

May, 2021

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the counsel and encouragement of my Advisor and Chairman of my Thesis Committee, Dr. William D. Stanley, Ph.D. His profound knowledge of Central America inspired me to undertake the Master's Degree program at the University of New Mexico, and his advice throughout my years at UNM kept me focused on my research into the full range of factors that contributed to the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz in 1954.

I want to express my deepest appreciation to my Thesis Committee members, Dr. Judy Bieber, Ph.D. and Dr. Luís Herrán Ávila, Ph.D., for their patience with me in the many classes of theirs I participated in and for their guidance on researching and writing history. Their thoughtful review of this thesis and of the many reports I wrote for their classes contributed immeasurably to shaping my writing style and made this thesis a more compelling narrative. They also taught me to look for historical meaning in unexpected places.

Dr. Ronda Brulotte, Associate Director for Academic Programs at the Latin American and Iberian Institute (LAI), patiently worked with me on the early draft of my thesis and guided me through the process of turning my research material into a cohesive story. For that and for her constant encouragement I will always be grateful.

There is no one I bothered more during the writing of this thesis, and throughout my time at UNM, than LAII Associate Director for Program Development Krista Savoca. I would not have completed my degree program on time without Krista's generous guidance on classes, process, forms, websites, resources, and more. Her imperturbable manner and unfailingly sound advice lowered my anxieties and always provided the answers I needed to move to the next step.

My research would not have been as successful without the help of numerous librarians at the Zimmerman Library of the University of New Mexico who were always professional, knowledgeable and helpful. I am especially grateful to Dr. Tomas Jaehn, Director of Special Collections at the University of New Mexico Libraries, for his valuable assistance in securing access to research material from the papers of Senator Dennis Chávez (D-NM). I would also like to thank Director Thelma Porres at the CIRMA research center in Antigua, Guatemala, Kevin Bailey at the Eisenhower Presidential Library and Liza Talbot at the Johnson Presidential Library for their invaluable assistance in getting copies for me of documents during a time when all the libraries were shut down because of COVID-19. Their extraordinary efforts enabled me to introduce previously undocumented primary material into the understanding of the role of the United States Congress in the overthrow of Árbenz.

And to Jonatan, my loving spouse, my eternal gratitude for his patience and understanding as I neglected so many other important things to pursue this research.

Congress and the Fall of Jacobo Árbenz: A Narrative of Cold War Fears and Redemption

By

David E. Lindwall

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science

Master of Arts in Latin American Studies

ABSTRACT

This thesis will examine the statements and actions of U.S. Congressmen and Senators between 1945 and 1996 to understand how they influenced White House policy towards the regime of Jacobo Árbenz. It will show how legislators equated growing communist influence in the Árbenz regime to Cold War struggles going on in Korea, Indochina and Eastern Europe, and how Congressmen from both parties drew on those fears to pressure Presidents Truman and Eisenhower to "neutralize the threat," leading to Árbenz's fall. When violence erupted again in Guatemala in 1960-1996, Congress reinterpreted the story of Árbenz as Republicans and Democrats were polarized by Reagan's controversial Central American policy. This thesis will examine comprehensively for the first time the significant role Congress played in the fall of Árbenz in 1954 and in his redemption as a morality tale against U.S. intervention in Central America 29 years later.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	page
Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1 A Historiography of Congress’s role in the 1954 Revolution in Guatemala	7
Chapter 2 Congress and the Cold War	13
Chapter 3 Arévalo and the Making of Jacobo Árbenz	19
Chapter 4 Congress Pressures Truman and Eisenhower to do Something about Árbenz	28
Chapter 5 Senate Resolution 91	56
Chapter 6 The Postmortem	66
Chapter 7 The McCarthy Effect	82
Chapter 8 Congressional Views of Jacobo Árbenz in the Early Years After His Fall: A Symbol of the Perils of Communism and the Need for U.S. Action (1954-1961).....	86
Chapter 9 The Period of Bipartisan Questioning of the Árbenz Legacy (1961-1983).....	99
Chapter 10 The Period of Partisan Polarization – The Reagan Effect (1983-1996).....	111
Conclusion	117
Bibliography	120

Introduction

As the Korean War and brewing hostilities in Indochina focused America's attention on communist expansionism as a potentially existential threat to the homeland, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations began to see the increasing influence of communist advisors over the government of Guatemala — first under President Juan José Arévalo and then more directly under Jacobo Árbenz — as having pressing security implications for the United States and all of the Western Hemisphere. The story of United States involvement in the revolution that overthrew Árbenz in 1954 has been extensively documented, and the declassification of CIA and State Department files from that era has enabled scholars to plumb in great depth the role of the Executive Branch in developments in Guatemala. The role of the United States Congress, on the other hand, has received considerably less attention, leaving the impression up until this study that Congress was not a significant player in the actions of the United States government to overthrow Árbenz. While it is difficult to establish the exact weight of Congressional pressure on Truman and Eisenhower to remove Árbenz, it is clear from the reading of statements by American legislators in the Congressional Record and to the press that Congress played a consistent and significant role in the formulation of policy towards the Árbenz regime. Seldom does the White House act alone in implementing foreign policy, and in the case of the overthrow of Árbenz, pressure from Congress was a factor that has long been underestimated.

What role did the United States Congress play in the overthrow of Árbenz and in his vindication 30 years later as violence once again consumed Guatemala? What factors forged a bipartisan consensus that Árbenz presented a security threat to the United States in the 1950's and why did

that consensus fall apart in the 1980's when the Árbenz narrative became a convenient trope for the American right and the left in their disagreements over Ronald Reagan's Central American policy?

This study will show that in the first half of the 1950's, the United States Congress was seized with what legislators perceived as a growing communist threat in the hemisphere from the Guatemalan regime, that threats to American business interests in Guatemala (specifically in this case the United Fruit Company) had implications for American investment throughout Latin America, that on a bipartisan basis they called on both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to take action to neutralize the threat, and that in the aftermath of the fall of Árbenz, Congress worked directly with the CIA to persuade the American people that the Árbenz government had been moving Guatemala in the direction of violent, Godless communism and that America was safer now that the communist threat to the hemisphere had been excised. It will also show how that understanding of the historical Árbenz persisted in Congressional discussions of Central America for nearly three decades until the climax of Guatemala's bloody internal conflict in the early 1980's forced a reevaluation of Árbenz's legacy. Whether this reevaluation was the product of a reappraisal of Árbenz's record while he was in power or primarily a political argument used to hold the Reagan administration accountable for its support for military regimes in Central America in the 1980's that were violating human rights on a large scale is still a subject of debate. I will draw on secondary sources to show how historians have described Congress's role in the existing literature, and will use primary sources — the Congressional Record, transcripts of Congressional committee hearings, declassified CIA and State Department documents, National Security Council minutes

from the Eisenhower Library, and news accounts — to demonstrate that Congress was not simply a bystander in the overthrow of Árbenz.

Congress expressed concern about the expansion of communist influence in Guatemala even before Árbenz was inaugurated as President. The treatment of American investment in Guatemala — particularly the United Fruit Company (UFCO) and its subsidiary the International Railways of Central America (IRCA) — generated special concern from the Congressional delegation of Massachusetts (where UFCO had its headquarters). After the nationalization of American oil interests in Mexico and Bolivia in the 1930's, protecting American direct investment overseas was an interest of both Republican and Democratic legislators. Under both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, Congress did not believe the State Department was taking the threat from communism in Guatemala seriously enough, and legislators from both parties proposed concrete measures to be taken against the government of Guatemala for its perceived role in global communist expansion. American legislators used their bully-pulpit to hold the Truman and Eisenhower administrations accountable for protecting U.S. interests in Guatemala.

The evidence shows that Congressional pressure influenced both President Truman and President Eisenhower's decisions in regard to policy towards the Árbenz administration. The extraordinary interest of Congress in Guatemala and strong, bipartisan calls for more vigorous U.S. action can only be seen as enjoining and empowering Eisenhower to use the tools at his disposal to overthrow Árbenz.

The principal historical accounts written about the fall of Árbenz were produced between 1980-1995 when the internal conflict raging in Guatemala polarized American politics around Central America and put an end to the bipartisanship that had long characterized U.S. policy towards the isthmus. The traditional historiography of the fall of Árbenz, thus, largely obscures the fact that the Republicans and Democrats worked closely together in the 1950's to pressure the White House to remove Árbenz. There has long been a debate in the literature regarding the relative influence of Cold War concerns and the protection of the investment of the United Fruit Company as primary motivating forces in the U.S. decision to remove Árbenz. While both were, doubtless, important to American Congressmen, some of the early literature tends to overstate the role of concern for the investment of American companies in Latin America. There is no debate, however, that the public relations work of the United Fruit Company in bringing to the attention of the American public developments in Guatemala which stoked fears of communist expansion close to the borders of the United States had a major impact on how the Árbenz administration was viewed.

Historians frequently link the CIA's involvement in the overthrow of Árbenz in 1954 with its success in removing reformist Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh from power in Iran in 1953. Doubtless the success in Iran emboldened both the CIA and the Eisenhower administration to believe that covert means could be used to remove Árbenz without too much exposure and public outcry. But where the United States Congress was relatively uninterested in Mosaddegh — indeed, the matter of Mosaddegh's expropriation of British oil interests in Iran only came up once in a Senate Foreign Affairs Committee hearing (April 23, 1952) and a handful of statements in the Congressional Record in 1951-1953 mostly relating to U.S. access to

Iranian oil — U.S. legislators began raising concerns about Árbenz even before he was sworn-in as President and didn't stop until decades after his fall in 1954. A total of 93 interventions were made by Congressmen and Senators in the Congressional Record between 1950-1954 expressing deep concern over the expansion of communist influence in Guatemala and nine separate committee hearings were called on Guatemala, one of which lasted six days and produced 296 pages of testimony. This illustrates the extraordinary interest Congress had in the situation in Guatemala and suggests the Eisenhower administration, in particular, had reason to weigh Congress's concerns carefully in developing the policy that ultimately led to Árbenz's forced resignation.

While Árbenz's overthrow had unchallenged bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress during Árbenz's presidency (1951-1954), the understanding of Árbenz after his fall from power and following the failed Bay of Pigs invasion and the controversial Central American policy of Ronald Reagan was reinterpreted by American legislators over the years to fit diverging partisan agendas. An examination of the Congressional Record from 1955-1996 shows that President Jacobo Árbenz was a figure that emerged frequently in discussions of U.S. policy towards Guatemala, Central America and Latin America more broadly. Guatemala was referenced in 497 floor interventions and 80 committee hearings during that time period, and many of the interventions referred to the Jacobo Árbenz story to buttress their arguments.

This paper will look at how United States Congressmen and Senators reimagined the Árbenz legacy between 1955 (right after his removal from office) and the 1996 Peace Accords (that put an end to Guatemala's long-running internal conflict) in ways that supported their increasingly

diverging positions on how the United States should confront Cold War challenges in Latin America. Using statements by American legislators on the floor of Congress contained in the Congressional Record and minutes of Congressional committee hearings, this study will map out the evolution of the constructed identity of Árbenz from communist villain to progressive icon. This study will also demonstrate how the U.S. media's interpretation of Árbenz evolved during the same period in ways that mirrored the changes in how American legislators used Árbenz. Árbenz became a symbol for the right and the left in the partisan battles that raged in the U.S. Congress in the latter years of the Cold War.

Chapter 1: A Historiography of Congress's role in the 1954 Revolution in Guatemala

The U.S. media began covering statements on Guatemala by US legislators as early as 1950 when Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Alexander Wiley (R-WI) and others began asserting to the press that President Arévalo's perceived anti-American actions were being driven by communist advisors.¹ Over the ensuing five years, American Congressmen frequently expressed their concerns over communist influence in Guatemala to the U.S. media, and much of what the early historians wrote on the role of the U.S. Congress in the removal of Árbenz is drawn from those press accounts.

Daniel James, in his 1954 book *Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Interlude*, is one of the first authors to write about the role of Congress in the overthrow of Árbenz. James, who was a respected American journalist in Guatemala,² had consistently advocated for concrete U.S. action to deter communist influence in the Árbenz regime. In his book he accuses Congress of being too distracted by Cold War challenges in other parts of the world — Eastern Europe, Korea, Indochina — to focus on the threat from communism in Guatemala. He notes that Senators Alexander Wiley (R-WI) and Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (R-MA) and Representatives John McCormack (D-MA) and Joseph Martin (R-MA) made statements about the “gathering storm below the Rio Grande” from time to time, but suggests that a peaceful solution to the expansion

¹ “Guatemala Break is Urged by Wiley,” *New York Times*, April 28, 1950, p. 11; “Trouble in Guatemala,” *Washington Post*, May 8, 1950, p. 8; “Reds Few in Guatemala, Arévalo Tells Brewster,” *New York Times*, June 23, 1950, p. 3

² Gleijeses, Piero, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 197

of communist influence in Guatemala could have been found if Congress had only gotten involved sooner.³

James criticized Senators Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA) and Theodore Green (D-RI) from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who were part of the U.S. delegation to the Organization of American States (OAS) Conference in Caracas (March, 1954), for grandstanding in Caracas without proposing any effective measures that would have reined-in Communist influence in Guatemala, while praising Senator George Smathers (D-FL) for proposing a foreign assistance grant for economic development in Latin America. James noted, however, that the \$10 million program proposed by Senator Smathers was totally inadequate to the needs of combatting communism in Guatemala, much less the hemisphere.⁴

Freda Kirchwey in *the Nation*, the only paper critical of U.S. actions against Árbenz, said that “right-wing Senators backed the Eisenhower administration to the hilt” on Guatemala, citing Senator Wiley’s argument that a communist “octopus” had taken over the Guatemalan state.⁵ She leaves out the fact that Democrats also fully backed removing Árbenz and it was Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX) who introduced the resolution following Castillo Armas’s invasion of Guatemala calling on the U.S. Government to use all means at its disposal to ensure that communism didn’t establish a beachhead in the Americas.

³ James, Daniel, *Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude*, New York: The John Day Company, 1954, p. 295-6

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 318

⁵ Kirchwey, Freda, Guatemala Guniea Pig, *The Nation*, Vol. 179, No. 2, July 10, 1954, p. 21-23

While most historians rely on the media record to document U.S. Congressional reaction to the situation in Guatemala, Richard Immerman and Piero Gleijeses also drew on statements by legislators contained in the Congressional Record. Immerman, in his 1982 book *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, describes how Congress began pressing the Truman Administration to take forceful action against the expansion of communist influence in Guatemala and that by 1954 the growing crescendo of Congressional calls on the Eisenhower administration to do something about Guatemala before it became a communist bastion led the White House to leak information suggesting such action was in the works. Congress had “grown impatient with the official policy of sympathy, fact-finding and consultation,”⁶ Immerman concludes.

Piero Gleijeses, in his book *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, argues that Congress first noticed Guatemala on February 14, 1949 when the Massachusetts Senate delegation, headed by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA), suggested that communists in Guatemala were making life difficult for the United Fruit Company (UFCO) and that as a result the U.S. should reconsider the foreign aid it provided to Guatemala through the Point 4 assistance program. Gleijeses goes on to document the increasingly shrill Congressional rhetoric regarding the situation in Guatemala over the next five years and implies that the coordinated bipartisan attack on Árbenz was a result of UFCO’s successful propaganda campaign aimed at Congress. He describes the virtually unanimous approval of the June 25, 1954 Johnson Resolution as “Republicans and Democrats sang the appropriate chorus in

⁶ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, p. 153

impressive bipartisan harmony.”⁷ Gleijeses calls the one dissenting vote, that of Senator William Langer (R-ND), the “sole call for restraint” in the five-year Congressional campaign against Arévalo and Árbenz. While Gleijeses attributes Langer's objection to principle, saying that Langer complained that all the facts regarding Árbenz were not known,⁸ he ignores Langer's statement to the press that never mentions Árbenz and says that he voted against the Johnson Resolution solely because it raised the specter of the U.S. sending “thousands of our boys into another foreign war.”⁹

Nick Cullather, in his book *The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala 1952-1954*, discusses Congress's response to the arrival of Iron Curtain weapons in Guatemala quoting Representative William Lantaff (D-FL) as saying that if Paul Revere were around, the arrival of weapons to Guatemala would be a “signal to ride.” He goes on to quote House Speaker John McCormack (D-MA) saying that the arrival of weapons was “like an atomic bomb planted in the United States' back yard.”¹⁰ Cullather concluded that Congress truly believed that there was a link between Guatemalan communists and Moscow, and the fear of communism in Guatemala was not “some McCarthyite paranoia” but rather “a fear shared by liberals and conservatives, academics, journalists and government officials that a Soviet conspiracy aimed to strike America in its own back yard.”¹¹ Statements by Congressmen and Senators on the floor of Congress

⁷ Gleijeses, Piero, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 367

⁸ Ibid., p. 367; William Langer (R-ND). “Personal Statement by Senator Langer.” *Congressional Record* 100 (1954-0628) p. 9065. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: January 28, 2020.

⁹ Langer Clears up Lone Vote on Guatemala, *Chicago Daily Tribune*, June 29, 1954, p. 2

¹⁰ Cullather, Nick, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1999, p. 79

¹¹ Ibid, p. 26-7

between 1949 and 1954 support Cullather's theory that bipartisan Cold War fears of communist expansion globally were the primary driving force for actions by the White House and support from the Congress to remove Árbenz. This, however, does not negate the argument that the United Fruit Company's propaganda effort was an element in stoking Cold War fears.

Newsweek journalists Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger in their book *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, describe the U.S. Congress as working hand in glove with the Eisenhower Administration to remove Árbenz. They claim that Secretary Dulles revved up a Congressional offensive against Árbenz, enlisting Charles Kersten (R-WI), Chairman of the House Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression, to prepare for an inquiry on Guatemala and Senator William Jenner (R-IN) to hold a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. Without citing their sources, Kinzer and Schlesinger claim that the State Department drafted speeches for Senator Alexander Wiley (R-WI) and Senator George Smathers (D-FL) comparing the threat from Guatemala to the burgeoning conflict in Indochina.¹² The documentary evidence, however, suggests that the relationship between Congress and the State Department in addressing the situation in Guatemala was more adversarial than collaborative.

What is evident from the historiography of Congress's involvement in the Guatemalan revolution of 1954 is that all the historians have a different interpretation of what role Congress actually played, though none suggest Congressional pressure had an important impact on the Eisenhower Administration's decision to go through with the overthrow of Árbenz. While some historians

¹² Kinzer, Stephen and Schlesinger Jr., Arthur, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. p. 163

describe Congressional action as being uniformly supportive of the Eisenhower administration's efforts against Árbenz and others describe Congress as impatient with Eisenhower's slow and non-transparent chess moves to corner Árbenz, none attribute Congressional pressure to having a decisive influence in pressuring Eisenhower to remove Árbenz. There is no smoking gun linking Congressional pressure to Eisenhower's decision to engage in a covert operation to remove Árbenz, but primary sources referenced in this study, such as statements by legislators contained in the Congressional Record, minutes of committee hearings, statements by legislators to the media, and declassified documents referencing private communications between the White House, State Department, CIA and members of Congress, make it clear that Congress played an unrelenting and active role between 1950-1954 in pressing the Administration to remove Árbenz. At a minimum, this gave the White House support for using covert action to remove Árbenz. The extent of Congress's involvement in the overthrow of Árbenz has long been understated.

Chapter 2: Congress and the Cold War

Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, the fall of China to the communists and the development of atomic weapons by the Soviet Union and China seized the attention of the American public and policy makers in the first ten years after the end of World War II. Representing the fears of their constituents, United States Congressmen and Senators engaged regularly in the public debate over the growing adventurism of the Soviet Union and China and its implications for United States security. While many Republican legislators pressed President Truman to be more assertive unilaterally in standing up to Soviet aggression and Democrats wanted to see Truman rely more on multilateral instruments like the United Nations and the Organization of American States, partisanship was not the only divide impacting foreign policy.¹³ Both the Republican and the Democratic parties in Congress were split over support for President Truman's containment policy, forcing Truman to rely on a loose coalition of internationalists from both parties to advance his foreign policy agenda in Congress.¹⁴

Though the Constitution gave the President the predominant role in foreign policy, Congress was able to exercise significant influence through its appropriations role, regulation of trade, and shaping public opinion through resolutions, on the record statements and public hearings. Between 1950-1954, individual legislators would propose using all of these tools in their campaign against Árbenz. In addition to public statements, Congress exercised influence over foreign policy through its behind the scenes interaction with the State Department and the White

¹³ Blomstedt, Larry, *Truman, Congress and Korea: The Politics of America's First Undeclared War*, Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2016, p. 221

¹⁴ Johnson, Robert David, *Congress and the Cold War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. xvi

House.¹⁵ Presidents Truman and Eisenhower consulted regularly with Congressional leaders on foreign policy matters, including concerns over communist influence in Guatemala, resulting in an executive-legislative partnership that enabled Truman and Eisenhower to take greater foreign policy risks without the fear of being undermined by Congress. Through this often informal consultation process, Congress was by and large satisfied that it was fulfilling its role of holding the Executive Branch accountable on foreign policy. The President's unique access to information and intelligence gave the Executive Branch an advantage over Congress in the execution of foreign policy,¹⁶ and in the case of the overthrow of Árbenz it is clear that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations were able to avoid potential Congressional opposition by withholding information. While there are numerous suggestions in the public record that Eisenhower assured selected legislators on the eve of Operation PBSuccess that action was impending regarding Árbenz, there is significant evidence that most if not all legislators were kept in the dark about the CIA's role in arming rebels and coordinating psychological operations even after Castillo Armas's rebel forces had crossed the border into Guatemala.

Unlike Truman, Eisenhower was elected by a large majority of voters and maintained high approval ratings throughout his two presidential terms. This, and his lack of a deep partisan identification, made it easier for Eisenhower to secure bipartisan support for his foreign policy endeavors.¹⁷ Eisenhower established the first Congressional liaison office in the White House to

¹⁵ Johnson, Robert David, *Congress and the Cold War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 12

¹⁶ Robinson, James A., *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative*, Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962, p. 22

¹⁷ Conley, Richard, *The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government: A Post-War Assessment*, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002, p. 28

maintain daily contact with legislators on both domestic and foreign policy issues.¹⁸ He met regularly with Democratic Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson and Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn to keep them apprised (and on board) with his foreign policy decisions.¹⁹ This, doubtless, contributed significantly to Eisenhower's ability to have a collaborative relationship with Senator Johnson (who was Minority leader in the summer of 1954), facilitating the introduction and passage of Senate Resolution 91 on the eve of Árbenz's fall legitimizing U.S. actions to remove Árbenz.

In 1953, President Eisenhower presented Congressional leaders with a blueprint for his national security policy which he called "the New Look." The national security strategy, which was later formalized in NSC directive 162/2, relied heavily on the nuclear umbrella and covert operations, and downplayed conventional warfare.²⁰ The successful CIA operations to remove Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh (1953) and Jacobo Árbenz (1954) were cited frequently by Administration officials in justifying Eisenhower's "New Look" national security strategy.²¹

Even after the Democrats won back control of the House and Senate in 1954, "Congressional deference to the President, Eisenhower's strong institutional position, and joint policy moderation between the branches precluded the development of an expanded contested agenda,"

¹⁸ Collier, Ken, "Eisenhower and Congress: The Autopilot Presidency," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Volume 24, No. 2, Spring 1994, p. 310

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 317

²⁰ Johnson, Robert David, *Congress and the Cold War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 56

²¹ Heiss, Mary Ann, Hogan, Michael, Best, Katie, *Origins of the National Security State and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman*, Kirksville, Missouri: Truman State University Press, 2015, p. 110

according to historian Richard Conely.²² This detente that legislators of both parties had in their dealings with Eisenhower explains in part why there was very little questioning in Congress of the United States role in removing Árbenz. Most of the questioning of Eisenhower's Guatemala strategy came from Republican hawks, not the Democratic opposition.

In the 1952 elections, the Republican Party was split between defense hawks, headed by Senators Robert Taft (R-OH) and Alexander Wiley (R-WI), and isolationists including prominent figures like Senator Joe McCarthy (R-WI). Eisenhower was caught between the two factions and often relied on Democrats to advance his foreign policy initiatives in Congress. As Republican hawks in the Senate were excoriating Eisenhower for not doing enough to take on Árbenz, isolationists in the President's party were trying to undermine his powers in the area of national security. Under the leadership of Republican Senator John Bricker (R-OH), isolationists in the Senate came very close to passing a constitutional amendment in 1953 that would have effectively stripped the President of most of his war-making powers. Only a last-minute parliamentary maneuver by Minority Leader Lyndon Johnson managed to derail the initiative by one vote.²³

To understand the theoretical framework for bipartisan Congressional support for Truman and Eisenhower's attempts to remove the freely elected government of Jacobo Árbenz by covert means, two political scientists have offered a useful theoretical framework to explain why bipartisan Congressional intervention took place on the matter of Guatemala. The first is political scientist Paul E. Peterson's critical issue theory that asserts that conflict between the

²² Conley, Richard, *The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government: A Post-War Assessment*, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002, p. 97

²³ Caro, Robert A., *The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Master of the Senate*, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2002, p. 327-341

President and Congress in matters of foreign affairs is more often than not limited because the outcome of foreign policy decisions (unlike most domestic policy decisions) has the potential to have devastating national security consequences.²⁴ To explain why Congress supported the overthrow of Árbenz in the 1950's only to resurrect Árbenz as a misunderstood reformer in the 1980's one can look at political scientist Marie Henehan's pendulum (or cyclical) theory that states that "when a critical foreign policy issue arises, congressional activity and attempts to influence foreign policy increase. Once the debate is resolved and one side wins, a consensus emerges and Congress settles into a more passive role. If the policy fails, Congress can be expected to reassert itself."²⁵ However, this case diverges from Henehan's model in that Congress did not become passive during the period leading to the removal of Árbenz.. The emergence of political violence throughout Central America in the 1980's and the Reagan administration's support for repressive governments in the region woke Congress from its 30-year acceptance of the Eisenhower administration's use of covert action to overthrow Árbenz.

Congress was not a passive actor in foreign relations during the Cold War. Indeed, the large number of statements by Congressmen and Senators regarding the situation in Guatemala and the threats to cut off foreign assistance and restrict trade with the United States suggest that American legislators from both parties believed their constituents wanted to see Truman and Eisenhower be more assertive in confronting a potential communist beachhead in the Western Hemisphere. Historian Kyle Longley writes that individual legislators have a formidable ability to "affect foreign affairs by changing the way policymakers and the public think about

²⁴ Henehan, Marie T., *Foreign Policy and Congress: An International Relations Perspective*, Kalamazoo: University of Michigan Press, 2000, p. 13

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5-7

international questions.”²⁶ In the statements Congressmen and Senators made on the floor of Congress, their frequent remarks to the American press and their behind-the-scenes consultations with the State Department and White House, individual legislators played an important role in bringing about the fall of Jacobo Árbenz.

²⁶ Longley, Kyle, “Silent Partner? Congress and Foreign Policy in the Cold War,” *Diplomatic History*, Volume 31, p. 787-791, Wilmington, Delaware, 2007, p. 787-8

Chapter 3: Arévalo and the Making of Jacobo Árbenz

Guatemalan history and politics have long been defined more by its leaders than by its institutions. To understand President Jacobo Árbenz's confrontation with the United States Congress and the Truman and Eisenhower administrations which led to his downfall in 1954, it is critical to examine the circumstances that led Guatemalan voters to elect social reformers like Árbenz and his predecessor Juan José Arévalo. Since colonial times, indeed, archaeologists would say since the beginning of the Mayan civilization, Guatemala has been characterized by gross economic inequality with a large mass of poor, landless workers and a very small economic establishment comprised of landowners and the commercial and industrial elite.

Perhaps at no time in Guatemala's history was this contrast between rich and poor more evident than during the 13-year dictatorship of Colonel Jorge Ubico (1931-1944). Ubico's authoritarian rule clashed with the burgeoning democratic expectations of the population as more Guatemalans joined the middle class and had access to world news, and as dictatorships fell in other Latin American countries in the final years of World War II.²⁷ In the face of growing popular unrest, Ubico resigned in July 1944 and his hand-picked successor, General Federico Ponce Vaides, was overthrown in a popular revolution 100 days later. The "October revolution," as it is known today and still celebrated as a national holiday, was a major turning point in Guatemalan history as the young military officers and civilians who overthrew the Ubico dictatorship had a vision for a profound social transformation of the country. Within days of taking power, they called for

²⁷ Grieb, Kenneth, *Guatemalan Caudillo: The Regime of Jorge Ubico*, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1979, p. 273

national elections and encouraged the formation of political parties. One of the new political parties, Renovación Nacional, recruited Juan José Arévalo (a Guatemalan professor teaching at that time at the University of Tucumán, Argentina) to be its standard bearer, and quickly other parties agreed to support his candidacy as part of a national front (the “Frente Popular Libertador”). Arévalo was well known in Guatemala due to the many years he worked as a teacher and education administrator and because of his extensive academic writing.

Some questioned whether Arévalo would be a big enough break from the Ubico dictatorship as Arévalo had edited Ubico’s propaganda magazine during the election of 1930 that catapulted Ubico to power and had been rewarded with a senior position in Ubico’s Ministry of Education.²⁸ His years of self-exile in Argentina and his advocacy of progressive social reforms, however, persuaded Guatemalan voters to elect him overwhelmingly and on March 15, 1945 Arévalo became the first democratically elected President in Guatemala in many decades.

Arévalo brought the protagonists of the October Revolution into his government, naming then-Major Jacobo Árbenz Minister of Defense, Colonel Francisco Arana Head of the Armed Forces (“Jefe del Estado Mayor”), and Jorge Toriello Minister of Finance. Arévalo used his legislative allies to secure passage of major social reforms, most notably a groundbreaking labor law that legalized strikes and set up labor courts, and the creation of a social security institute. He also initiated a land reform program that began distributing to landless peasants some of the property seized during World War II from German plantation owners.

²⁸ Pitti, Joseph Apolonio, *Jorge Ubico and Guatemalan Politics in the 1920’s*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1975, p. 202

While some in the United States Congress cautiously embraced Arévalo's reforms and his stand against international fascism,²⁹ most withheld judgment. Almost from the beginning of Arévalo's presidency, the American press reported on how the Arévalo government used questionable claims of coup attempts to clamp down on the opposition and muzzle the press, creating the impression for the American public and Congress that Arévalo's commitment to democracy was nominal.³⁰ One New York Times article, only three months after Arévalo assumed power, went so far as to quote regional sources labeling Minister of Defense Jacobo Árbenz and Minister of Finance Jorge Toriello as anti-democratic influences on Arévalo.³¹

As Arévalo's invective against the large American companies that had considerable economic power and political influence in Guatemala became more strident, the American media and members of Congress began to see Arévalo as undermining hemispheric comity (or American hegemony, depending on your point of view). On November 5, 1946, Arévalo met Mexican President Manuel Ávila Camacho in the border city of Tapachula and told journalists afterwards that he viewed Mexico's expropriation of foreign oil companies as a "continental guide" for how Latin American governments should assert national sovereignty.³² Setting the stage for future

²⁹ John M. Coffee (D-WA) *Congressional Record* (1945-0216) p. A1029. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020; Olin E. Teague (D-TX) *Congressional Record* (1947-0613) p. A2848. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

³⁰ "60 Arrested in Guatemala," *New York Times*, October 4, 1945, p. 8; Shelby, Robert, "Revolt-Swept Guatemala: Intrigue Duels with Policy," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 21, 1949, p. 13

³¹ "Guatemala is Criticized: Honduran Paper Implies New President is not Democratic," *New York Times*, July 2, 1945, p. 7

³² "Foreigners Worried by Guatemalan View," *New York Times*, November 6, 1946, p. 19

nationalizations, on September 18, 1948, Arévalo signed a law providing for the expropriation of private property “for the national good.”³³

Almost as soon as Arévalo assumed office, labor unions at the American-owned United Fruit Company (UFCO) and its subsidiary the International Railroads of Central America (IRCA) began work stoppages and strikes in pursuit of better wages and working conditions. Since labor actions had been outlawed under Ubico, the labor troubles came as an unwelcome jolt to American investors. Arévalo’s sympathy for the strikers and his passage of major labor reform legislation on May 1, 1947 were taken as evidence by many in the United States and in Congress that American investment in Guatemala was imperiled, with some going so far as to suggest that Arévalo was a communist.³⁴ Senator Henry Cabot Lodge argued before the Senate in early 1949 that Guatemala should be excluded from the Truman administration’s proposed Point 4 foreign assistance program as its “communist inspired” labor code was targeted specifically at the United Fruit Company and was discouraging the type of foreign investment the Point 4 program was designed to incentivize. He accused the Arévalo government of being under “communist influence.”³⁵

On February 17, 1949, Senator Lister Hill (D-AL) added to Senator Cabot Lodge’s arguments against providing foreign assistance to Guatemala saying that foreign aid should be a product of “mutuality.” It should not be provided to governments that discriminate against U.S. interests.

³³ “Expropriation Law Signed,” *New York Times*, September 19, 1948, p. 42

³⁴ Shelby, Robert, “Revolt-Swept Guatemala: Intrigue Duels with Policy,” *Christian Science Monitor*, April 21, 1949, p. 13

³⁵ Cabot Lodge Jr. (R-MA) *Congressional Record* (1949-0214) p. 1172. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

He went on to argue that there was no distinction between the actions of Guatemalan labor unions and President Arévalo as the unions were “mere pawns” of Arévalo.³⁶

In the House of Representatives, opinions regarding Arévalo were as negative as in the Senate. Representative John McCormack (D-MA) accused Mexican labor activist Vicente Lombardo Toledano of stirring up trouble for American companies in Guatemala, and argued that official Guatemalan collaboration with the United States in international fora had turned into hostility under Arévalo.³⁷ Representatives Christian Herter (R-MA) and Mike Mansfield (D-MO) similarly argued on the floor of Congress that U.S. assistance should not be given to Guatemala because of its discrimination against American companies.³⁸

The year 1950 was pivotal in the relationship between Congress and Arévalo. In March 1950, Arévalo asked the White House to recall Ambassador Richard C. Patterson Jr., who he accused of interfering in Guatemala’s internal affairs. When the White House refused, Arévalo responded that he could not ensure Ambassador Patterson’s safety, which was interpreted in Washington as a threat against the American Ambassador’s safety and led immediately to Patterson’s departure, provoking a tirade of vociferous complaints in Congress.

³⁶ Senator Lister Hill (D-AL) *Congressional Record* (1949-0217) p. 1353-4. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

³⁷ Rep. John McCormack (D-MA) *Congressional Record* (1949-0221) p. 1464. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

³⁸ Rep. Christian A. Herter (R-MA) *Congressional Record* (1949-0224) p. 1496. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020; Rep. Mike Mansfield (D-MT) *Congressional Record* (1949-0224) p. 1498. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

Between April and July, Representative John McCormack (D-MA) and Senator Alexander Wiley (R-WI) made a series of statements on the floor of Congress and subsequently to the press to the effect that communists were taking over Guatemala.³⁹ They argued that “discriminatory” treatment of American investment, the passage of labor reform, public statements by Arévalo that were interpreted as “anti-American,” and the participation of “communist” advisors around Arévalo were signs that Guatemala was coming under the influence of the Kremlin.

On May 5, Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote the Embassy in Guatemala City to urge them to convince “moderates like Árbenz” to put an end to the anti-American public statements of the Arévalo government. He instructed the Embassy to bring to the attention of Árbenz and other “moderates” that Arévalo’s anti-American statements had a negative impact on the U.S.

Congress and were reflected in Senator Wiley’s (R-WI) public statements.⁴⁰ The State Department was clearly concerned that hostility towards Arévalo by outspoken critics in Congress would limit the Administration’s options for addressing the conflict with Guatemala.

On June 2, 1950, a now-declassified memorandum for the record of the Under Secretary of State’s weekly policy meeting suggests that participants took seriously Senator Wiley’s expressions of concern over the Guatemalan government’s virtual expulsion of Ambassador Patterson, and recommended that the State Department’s Bureau of American Republics Affairs

³⁹ John McCormack (D-MA) *Congressional Record* (1950-0425) p. A2983. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020; Alexander Wiley (R-WI) *Congressional Record* (1950-0427) p. 5879. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

⁴⁰ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Vol. II. Document 454* <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v02/d454>, accessed January 21, 2020

(ARA) “take Wiley’s words to heart” in preparing a response to the Guatemalan action.⁴¹ This document illustrates how statements by individual Congressmen had an impact on shaping Truman’s policy towards Guatemala.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops invaded South Korea unleashing the Korean War and sounding the alarm about communist adventurism around the globe. Arévalo’s social reforms and his tolerance of communists in his government were seen and interpreted in the context of growing communist aggression in Korea, Indochina and Eastern Europe. In American news magazines, articles on the increasing role of communists in Arévalo’s government were side-by-side with articles on military defeats in Korea and Indochina. Members of Congress who believed U.S. interests in Guatemala had eroded seriously under Arévalo began to fear that the election of a new President in 1950 might not bring a change in the Government of Guatemala’s increasing alignment with countries outside the U.S. orbit. After the violent death under controversial circumstances of right-wing presidential frontrunner Col. Francisco Arana in July 1949, Col. Jacobo Árbenz was widely viewed as Arévalo’s political heir and probable next President of Guatemala. Representative John McCormack (D-MA) introduced into the Congressional record on June 30 an article from the Washington Star by Dorothy Thompson in which she says that “Árbenz is ruthless, amoral and of extreme leftist views.” She accused him of murdering Francisco Arana on orders of Moscow, through their regional headquarters in Mexico City. “Árbenz is the candidate of the Communist front organizations.” She asserted that Árbenz (then Minister of Defense) was replacing Arana-loyalists in the Army with

⁴¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Vol. II.* <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v02/d460>, accessed January 21, 2020

Communists.⁴² Representative McCormack made it clear that he did not support a policy of simply waiting out Arévalo and believed that Guatemalan hostility towards U.S. interests was sure to continue after the 1950 elections since the right wing candidate had been murdered.

In late July, Senator Alexander Wiley, a Republican and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, accused the Truman State Department of doing nothing about Guatemala and said on the floor of the Senate that even as American soldiers were dying in Korea, the State Department was “twiddling its fingers” over Guatemala with its policy of wait and see. He argued that Truman should expel the Guatemalan Ambassador (in response to the removal of U.S. Ambassador Patterson) and should make it clear to Guatemalans and the Guatemalan Government that “we will not sit by while internationally directed sabotage undermines US companies”⁴³ (a reference to increased labor unrest on United Fruit Company plantations).

In the middle of the spiraling controversy, some legislators tried to find common ground between the United States and Guatemala. Senator Dennis Chávez (D-NM) made two trips to Guatemala in the fall of 1950 in which he tried to focus attention on shared interests of Guatemala and the United States while avoiding getting drawn into the growing confrontation between Arévalo and Washington. During an unofficial CODEL October 8-10, 1950, Chávez met with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Education to talk about student exchanges. A draft press statement written by Reuters reporter Marshall Bannell notes that on departing Guatemala, Chávez thanked

⁴² John McCormack (MA). “Extension of Remarks.” *Congressional Record* (1950-0630) p. A4862. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: January 28, 2020

⁴³ Alexander Wiley (R-WI). “Extension of Remarks.” *Congressional Record* (1950-0719) p. 5237-8. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: January 28, 2020

the Government of Guatemala for supporting the United States position on communist aggression in Korea at the United Nations General Assembly in September 1950. While not mentioning Arévalo by name in his farewell remarks, Chávez said “I believe that the Executive Department of this nation has done and is doing well in carrying out the fundamental principles of freedom.” Guatemalan newspaper *Diario de la Mañana* reported on October 11 the parting statement by Chávez thanking the people and Government of Guatemala for their courtesies, but left out the line that could have been viewed as an endorsement of Arévalo. On November 25, Chávez led an official three-Senator CODEL to Guatemala to discuss plans for building the Pan American Highway. The official newspaper *Diario de Centro América* reported his visit, where Chávez spoke about the economic importance of the Pan American Highway but stayed away from any comments that could be seen as a reference to Arévalo.⁴⁴

Despite goodwill visits and the many areas where Guatemala and the United States continued to cooperate, the relationship between Arévalo and the United States Government — both the legislative and the executive branches — deteriorated markedly in the final year of Arévalo’s presidency.

⁴⁴ Dennis Chávez Papers (Part 1) 1930-1962 (MSS 394), Box 21, Folder 21, Center for Southwest Research and Special Collections, University of New Mexico Library

Chapter 4: Congress Pressures Truman and Eisenhower to do Something About Árbenz

Col. Jacobo Árbenz was sworn-in as President of Guatemala on March 15, 1951, and the following day the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, summoned Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward Miller Jr. to ask what the United States should expect from Árbenz. The relationship with Arévalo had been the most conflictive relationship the United States had in the Western Hemisphere, and Congressmen wanted some reassurance from the Truman administration that the change of Presidents in Guatemala offered a positive way forward for U.S. interests, or that to the contrary, the Truman administration was prepared to increase pressure on the Guatemalans. Miller said unequivocally that the State Department's assessment was that Árbenz would be more moderate than Arévalo. "The situation in Guatemala is going to improve in our favor. Árbenz is a much less wooly-headed man than Arévalo. He has heritage," Miller told the Congressmen,⁴⁵ implying that the fair skinned and blond Árbenz would surely sympathize more with U.S. positions than his swarthy predecessor. He noted, however, that Árbenz would have a hard time bringing the communists in the government under control. He opined that Árbenz was likely to take the government back towards the center⁴⁶ and that American concerns about communist influence would cease to be a major irritant in the bilateral relationship. Assistant Secretary Miller's judgement that Árbenz's racial characteristics made him more reliable for U.S. interests parallels statements by other U.S. officials in that period suggesting that the Mayan indigenous heritage of

⁴⁵ U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Witness Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward Miller Jr.; Date March 16, 1951, p. 392-3. Text in: ProQuest® *Congressional Hearings Digital Collection*; Accessed: March 10, 2020

⁴⁶ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, p. 106

most Guatemalans was a factor in Guatemala's failure to grasp the enlightenment of a strong relationship with a democratic United States. Unfounded racial biases undoubtedly played an important role in how American officials responded to the challenge of a government in Guatemala that did not respect historic U.S. hegemony in hemispheric relations.

With the Korean War taking up all the oxygen in the room, Congress paid little attention to Guatemala in 1951. There were only two statements about Guatemala on the floor of Congress in all of 1951 — one by Representative Monroe Redden (D-NC)⁴⁷ in April (four weeks after Árbenz took power) arguing that Guatemalan communists were linked directly to Moscow, and a statement by Representative John McCormack (D-MA) in August arguing that the Korean War should be a wake-up call to what was going on in the Western Hemisphere with the expansion of communism in Guatemala.⁴⁸

The year 1952 was a presidential election year in the United States and with a stalemate on the Korean battlefield, Congress's attention turned once again to Guatemala. Secretary of State Dean Acheson testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 14 that despite U.S. hopes in Árbenz, he had given communist advisors more influence than Arévalo had.⁴⁹ "The Guatemalan situation is a very troublesome one," Acheson reported. "It really gets down to around three or four hundred people who live around Guatemala City. I think that the

⁴⁷ Monroe Redden (D-NC). "Confirmation Hearings." *Congressional Record* (1951-0412) p. 3803-4. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: January 28, 2020

⁴⁸ John McCormack (D-MA). "Extension of Remarks." *Congressional Record* (1951-0810) p. 9808-9. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: January 28, 2020

⁴⁹ Gleijeses, Piero, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States*. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 226

vast Indian population of Guatemala hasn't any more idea about Communism than they have about aviation, but there is a small group of people around Guatemala City who became fellow travelers, and some of them, I believe, are probably Communists.”⁵⁰

In January and February of 1952, a Guatemalan Congressional committee was working long hours to complete the first draft of major land reform legislation.⁵¹ American companies (especially the United Fruit Company) were following developments in the Guatemalan Congress with concern. On February 29, the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs again called Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward Miller Jr. to testify before the committee about the situation in Guatemala. He told the committee members that he could not say if Árbenz was a communist himself, but that the communists had clearly expanded their influence under his presidency. Miller said that the Truman Administration’s hopes that Árbenz would turn Guatemala towards a more centrist policy direction had been dashed. “We were hopeful that Árbenz, of Swiss-German ancestry, would be an improvement. Our hopes were completely wrong and the situation has become worse under Árbenz. The communists have a much greater degree of influence.”⁵²

⁵⁰ Executive Session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 14, 1952 (Historical Series) Volume 4, p. 28, text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 27, 2020.

⁵¹ Sabino, Carlos, *Guatemala, la Historia Silenciada (1944-1989), Revolución y Liberación, Tomo I*, Guatemala: Fondo de Cultura Económica de Guatemala, S.A., 2007, p. 173

⁵² U.S. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Witness Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward Miller Jr.; Date February 29, 1952, p. 397-405. Text in: ProQuest® *Congressional Hearings Digital Collection*; Accessed: March 10, 2020

Throughout 1952, Republican and Democratic Legislators from Massachusetts (home state of the United Fruit Company) made several statements on the floor of the House of Representatives arguing that Guatemala had become “Soviet Guatemala” and urged the Administration to ensure the integrity of U.S. investments in Guatemala.⁵³ They were joined by Congressmen and Senators of both parties from all across the United States expressing concern over the rise in communist influence in Guatemala and the consequent threat to American investment. In total, nine different Congressmen spoke up on the floor of Congress in 1952 expressing concern that Guatemala could become irreversibly “Red.” Several cited the Korean conflict as a reason to take the communist threat in Guatemala seriously. While most did not phrase their concern as partisan criticism, some used it clearly for electoral advantage. Representative John Saylor (R-PA) accused the Truman State Department of not doing enough about the communist threat in Guatemala even as “casualties from Korea should make us think twice about the threat from Guatemala.”⁵⁴ What is clear is that by 1952 the situation in Guatemala had become a concern to a broad range of American legislators and was no longer the sole province of the traditional hawkish right or the representatives of the United Fruit Company.

While there are no opinion polls to show how the American public felt about Árbenz and the situation in Guatemala in the early 1950’s, it is evident that Congressmen and Senators were under a lot of pressure from their constituents to do something about what was increasingly perceived as a growing communist threat only miles from the United States border. A number of Congressmen submitted for the record letters from constituents complaining about communist

⁵³ John McCormack (D-MA). *Congressional Record* (1952-0225) p. 1335-8. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: January 28, 2020

⁵⁴ John Saylor (R-PA). Extension of Remarks. *Congressional Record* (1952-0303) p. A1426. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: January 28, 2020

infiltration in Guatemala as well as anti-Árbenz articles from their hometown newspapers. These news articles from the heartland of America uniformly expressed concern about the communist tilt in Guatemala and many called for the White House to take action. They came from newspapers from all over the country: the La Cross Register, the Santa Monica Evening Outlook, the Nashville Tennessean, the Memphis Democrat, the San Diego Union, and the Newark Star Ledger, just to name a few.

The Truman Administration was under a lot of pressure, not least from Congress and the U.S. media, to curb communist influence in Guatemala. In 1952, Truman authorized the CIA to begin planning for a clandestine operation to remove Árbenz from power. The operation, codenamed PBFortune, drew on logistical support from the Somoza Government in Nicaragua and from the United Fruit Company (UFCO). There is no evidence that the Truman Administration ever briefed Congress on this operation which was eventually scrubbed, but there can be no doubt that mounting pressure from Congress to do something about Árbenz at a minimum convinced Truman he would not have opposition from Congress if U.S. involvement in the operation became public.

The United Fruit Company carried out a large-scale publicity campaign against the Government of Guatemala beginning in 1947 when Arévalo first introduced basic labor rights legislation. Much of the early public relations work of the UFCO involved inviting American journalists to visit Guatemala and giving them the UFCO's spin on political developments. UFCO handlers would show the journalists how average UFCO Guatemalan employees lived and then show them how average Guatemalan peasants lived. The contrast was striking. The UFCO's basic

argument was that the UFCO had done a lot to improve the lot of Guatemalan workers, paid the highest wages in the country and provided public services (hospitals, railroad and telegraph communications) that benefited all Guatemalans. At the same time, they accused the Arévalo and Árbenz regimes of undermining the UFCO because of their increasing embrace of communism. By 1953 the UFCO publicity effort became much more aggressive with a program to send regular news bulletins to the media and to Congressmen, followed by lobbying on Capitol Hill. While there is little evidence of how this campaign influenced the U.S. media and Congress, historians have asserted that UFCO's propaganda was pivotal in generating the anti-Árbenz sentiment that pervaded public opinion in the United States.⁵⁵ Letters in the files of Senate Minority Leader Lyndon Johnson from UFCO's Washington DC lobbying firm Corchran, Youngsman and Rowe show that UFCO had a close enough relationship to some legislators that it would even draft remarks for them to make on the floor of Congress, though there is no evidence that Senators or Congressmen actually used draft remarks provided by UFCO.

Upon taking office in January 1953, the Eisenhower Administration had to expend considerable political and diplomatic capital on the negotiations for the Korean armistice, distracting its attention from the situation in Guatemala. In the 1952 Republican Primary, Eisenhower had defeated the candidate of the Republican right wing (Robert Taft), but the Republican candidates for Congress and Senate were overwhelmingly from the hawkish right. In 1953 and early 1954 they accused Eisenhower of being weak on communism and equated the Korean Armistice to appeasement. They called on Eisenhower to "sterilize the Red infection" in Guatemala.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Kinzer, Stephen, Schlesinger, Stephen, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 79-97

⁵⁶ Grow, Michael, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War*, Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 2008, p. 24

Eisenhower was under pressure from the right wing of his party, especially in Congress where the Republicans had a slim majority, to carry through with his campaign promises of rolling back communist adventurism around the globe.

As U.S. attention was increasingly distracted by the growing hostilities in Korea and Indochina, the situation in Guatemala was getting more precarious. In June 1952, the Guatemalan Congress approved a major land reform law (Decree 900) that would have a portentous impact on foreign investment in Guatemala and, ultimately, on the fate of the Árbenz government.⁵⁷ A court challenge and the drafting of implementing regulations delayed its enforcement until 1953. Early in 1953, the Árbenz government seized over 200,000 acres of idle United Fruit Company land under the provisions of the new Agrarian Reform Law unleashing a torrent of lobbying and press releases by the United Fruit company.

The extensive seizure of private agricultural land also led domestic opponents of Árbenz to increase their resistance activities. Dissident military officers, former military officers and university students staged a large-scale, though ultimately unsuccessful, rebellion in the Department of Baja Verapaz, briefly taking over the provincial capital of Salamá.⁵⁸ Their intention was to seize a base of operations, move to cut the rail link between Guatemala City and the Atlantic coast and spark a widespread popular rebellion. The population, however, did not rise up and join the rebellion, which quickly failed. Many of the insurrectionists were shot, while others were left to languish without trial in the Salamá jail for the next two years. The

⁵⁷ Sabino, Carlos, *Guatemala, la Historia Silenciada (1944-1989), Revolución y Liberación, Tomo I*, Guatemala: Fondo de Cultura Económica de Guatemala, S.A., 2007, p. 173

⁵⁸ "Movimiento Armado Contra el Gobierno Estalló en Salamá," *Prensa Libre*, March 30, 1953, headline and p.1

Salamá rebellion led Árbenz to crack down on suspected members of the opposition and to shut down some independent media.

Perhaps as an indication of the limits of UFCO's success in lobbying Senators and Congressmen, Congressional reaction to the confiscation of UFCO property and other dramatic developments in Guatemala was uncharacteristically muted. None of the legislators from Massachusetts made any representations on the floor of Congress or to the press in 1953 to complain about the seizure of UFCO property. Between April and May, Representative Franklin Roosevelt (D-NY) made three statements for the Congressional Record regarding the situation in Guatemala, each time entering for the record articles by Daniel James from the New York Herald Tribune that discussed the growing confrontation within Guatemala between the Árbenz government and the opposition movement.⁵⁹ Representative Mike Mansfield (D-MT) and Senator George Smathers (D-FL) were the only other legislators to register concerns about Guatemala on the Congressional Record in 1953. Mansfield introduced a press article claiming that "the ultimate goal of international communism in Guatemala is to drive the United States out of the Panama Canal, first destroying America's economic influence in Central America."⁶⁰ Smathers introduced an Associated Press article saying that Guatemalan communists in the Árbenz

⁵⁹ Franklin Roosevelt (D-NY). *Congressional Record* (1953-0421) p. A2243. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020 Franklin Roosevelt (D-NY). *Congressional Record* (1953-0428) p. A2245. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020; Franklin Roosevelt (D-NY). *Congressional Record* (1953-0507) p. A2455-6. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: January 28, 2020

⁶⁰ Rep. Mike Mansfield (D-MT) *Congressional Record* (1953-0526) p. A2940. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

government were generating concern among Guatemala's neighbors and that while Árbenz himself might not be a communist, he is "allowing communists to run his government."⁶¹

On May 22, 1953 the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere received testimony from the Eisenhower Administration's new Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, John M. Cabot, and R. G. Leddy, the Officer in Charge of Central American and Panamanian Affairs at State Department. Assistant Secretary Cabot told the Congressmen of his recent visit to Guatemala and long meeting with Árbenz. He said that Nicaragua and El Salvador were fearful that Árbenz would use "the region's largest army" to attack or subvert them, but that the State Department didn't have evidence suggesting that the Soviets were arming the Guatemalans. All in all, Cabot was cautious. He was clear to point out that Árbenz had no interest in reducing the dominant influence communists had in his government, but at the same time Cabot argued that Árbenz and his cabinet are not communists themselves.⁶²

On August 12, 1953, the National Security Council recommended to President Eisenhower that the CIA be authorized to undertake a covert operation to remove President Árbenz.⁶³ Four weeks later, on September 11, 1953, the Deputy Director of Plans at CIA forwarded to the Director of the CIA a Top Secret memorandum outlining in great detail all the elements

⁶¹ George Smathers (D-FL). *Congressional Record* (1953-0627) p. A3895. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

⁶² U.S. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Witness Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John M. Cabot ; Date May 22, 1953, p. 423-7. Text in: ProQuest® *Congressional Hearings Digital Collection*; Accessed: March 10, 2020

⁶³ Cullather, Nick, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 129

(including a budget) of a plan to remove Árbenz from power.⁶⁴ There is no evidence that this plan was shared with anyone in Congress either before or after the operation.

Unaware that the Eisenhower administration was preparing a covert operation to remove Árbenz from power, members of the U.S. Congress continued to press for effective action to check what they viewed as growing communist influence in the Americas. In the fall of 1953, Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA) made an official trip through Central America and when he came back to the U.S. he told the *Washington Post* that the situation in Central America undermined U.S. national security and demanded more attention from the U.S. Government. He argued that the “communist encroachment in Guatemala presents a serious threat,”⁶⁵ and implied that the Eisenhower administration was not taking it seriously enough. The CIA thought Hickenlooper’s public statements had significant propaganda value and tried to exploit them. An internal CIA memorandum of November 25, 1953 urges CIA Stations around Latin America to use their contacts with local media to place articles citing Senator Hickenlooper’s statements about the threat of communism in Guatemala. The memo also urged the U.S. Military mission in Guatemala to discuss the Hickenlooper statement with Guatemalan military officers so they would better understand how the Árbenz regime was seen in the United States.⁶⁶ The CIA also exploited Senator Hickenlooper’s statements to influence public opinion in the United States regarding Árbenz. A January 21, 1954 memo from CIA official Stanley Grogan to the Director

⁶⁴ “Guatemala - General Plan of Action,” Top Secret memorandum to the Director of the CIA from the Deputy Director of Plans, September 11, 1953, DNSA Collection: Guatemala and the U.S., Text in *ProQuest Digital National Security Archives*; Accessed October 16, 2020

⁶⁵ “Hickenlooper Sees ‘Serious’ Central American Red Control,” *The Washington Post*, November 24, 1953, p. 3

⁶⁶ CIA Reading Room on-line document, “Sen. Hickenlooper’s Statement on Guatemala,” https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000914709.pdf

of the CIA reports that he was able to get Senator Hickenlooper an appearance on Philadelphia radio WTTG Chanel 5 News program on January 22, 1954 to discuss the situation in Guatemala.⁶⁷ Another document dated December 28, 1953 implies that Senator Hickenlooper asked “Sheldon” (a member of the CIA Deputies Committee) for information on Guatemala before appearing on Fulton Lewis’s TV program.⁶⁸ The CIA understood that the Guatemalan Army was very uncomfortable with the communist tilt of the Árbenz government and used every opportunity to undermine residual support for Árbenz in the military. At the same time, the CIA wanted to influence Latin American leaders, the Latin American public and public opinion in the United States against Árbenz and saw the Hickenlooper statements as a way to remind those key audiences that the Congress of the United States thought Árbenz was a communist threat.

The year 1953 had been a tumultuous one in world affairs with the Soviet Union detonating its first nuclear bomb, the Korean War coming to an unsatisfying end, and hostilities in Indochina heating up. The situation in Guatemala was not foremost on American legislators’ minds. If 1953 had been a year in which Congress was relatively disengaged from the situation in Guatemala, that all changed in January 1954. On January 14, Senator Alexander Wiley (R-WI) gave a speech before Congress titled “Communism in Guatemala - A Menace to Hemispheric Security” which got significant attention in all the major American newspapers. In it, Wiley famously listed “22 facts” which he argued pointed to communist control in Guatemala and

⁶⁷ CIA Reading Room on-line document, “Memorandum for the Director, January 21, 1954,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP74-00297R000900090108-8.pdf>

⁶⁸ CIA Reading Room on-line document, “Deputies’ Meeting, December 28, 1953,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R002300140017-6.pdf>

challenged Árbenz to dispute those facts. Wiley reminded his colleagues that this “communist beachhead” was only “a few hundred miles” from the U.S. border.⁶⁹ In an internal memo dated May 25, 1954, the State Department comments that Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Senator Wiley’s speech was “particularly effective” in shaping public opinion in Latin America regarding the communist threat from Guatemala.⁷⁰

On January 26 the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, held a special hearing with Ambassador to Guatemala John E. Peurifoy and State Department Guatemala Desk Officer John W. Fisher as witnesses. Peurifoy, who had only been in Guatemala for eleven weeks, told the Committee that the Árbenz government had given the communists significant influence and resources, while using the secret police to crack down on the opposition. “If we don’t do something, in six months we will have a Soviet satellite between the Texas oil fields and the Panama Canal.” While not recommending an embargo on Guatemalan coffee exports to the U.S. or suspending oil shipments to Guatemala at that time as some in Congress had suggested, Peurifoy acknowledged that any future decision to take drastic measures would “undoubtedly lead to the fall of the communists in Guatemala.”⁷¹

⁶⁹ Alexander Wiley (WI). “Communism in Guatemala - A Menace to Hemispheric Security” *Congressional Record* (1954-0114) p. 248. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

⁷⁰ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Guatemala*, eds. Susan Holly and David Patterson, Washington (Government Printing Office, 2003), document 8

⁷¹ U.S. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Witness U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John Peurifoy; Date January 26, 1954, p. 463-86. Text in: ProQuest® *Congressional Hearings Digital Collection*; Accessed: March 10, 2020

With domestic opposition not letting up and growing political and economic pressure from the United States and neighboring countries, Árbenz was becoming increasingly isolated. He and his advisors were alarmed by growing foreign involvement in the confrontation inside Guatemala. On January 29, the Guatemalan Government issued a public statement accusing the United States, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Venezuela of preparing to invade Guatemala, and that same night the secret police began arresting suspected opposition figures.⁷² Dismissing Árbenz's argument that the political opposition was a foreign creation, New York Times correspondent Sydney Gruson, resident in Guatemala, wrote that "the Guatemalan government's accusation of an international plot to overthrow it follows the predictable plot lines of restless exiles, ambitious neighbors, and an evil empire. Guatemala's fragmented opposition views it as an excuse to round up the usual suspects."⁷³ Forty-eight hours later, Árbenz ordered Gruson's expulsion from the country along with Marshall Bannell of Reuters and the National Broadcasting Company.⁷⁴ On February 3, the Foreign Ministry announced the expulsion of an American priest (Father Sebastian Buccellato) whom it accused of meddling in local electoral politics in a small town near the border with El Salvador. These two actions, reported in all the major American media, angered the American public and drew Congressmen into the Guatemala debate who had previously sat on the sidelines.

⁷² James, Daniel, *Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude*, New York: The John Day Company, 1954, p. 243; "Guatemala Reported on Alert for Revolt," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 25, 1954, p. 3

⁷³ Gruson, Sydney, "Guatemala Story of Plot Scouted: Conspiracy Talk is Called Move to Frighten Opposition," *New York Times*, January 31, 1954, p. 23

⁷⁴ Dubois, Jules, "Guatemalans Oust Two Writers for U.S. Papers," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 3, 1954, p. B8

Congresswoman Frances Bolton (R-OH) made a speech on the floor of Congress on February 2 in which she said that the expulsions of the two journalists were drawn from a typical communist playbook and showed to what extent the Árbenz government was in the hands of the communists.⁷⁵ Bolton became a regular critic of Árbenz in the months that followed. More than most U.S. legislators, Bolton must have gotten under Árbenz's skin as the Guatemalan secret police claimed in June 1954 that it had found evidence following a raid on an opposition safe house in Guatemala City suggesting that Bolton was aware of a planned insurrection against Árbenz and the date it was to be launched.⁷⁶ Despite the claims of the secret police, there is no reason to believe that Congresswoman Bolton, or other U.S. legislators for that matter, had been informed of the impending invasion by Castillo Armas's rebels.

Congressman Donald Jackson (R-CA), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, was similarly shocked by the expulsions of Gruson, Bannell and Father Buccellato and called for the White House to respond by withdrawing the U.S. military advisory mission that had been operating in Guatemala since the beginning of World War II.⁷⁷ Jackson argued that to continue supporting the Guatemalan military was to strengthen a military that "approves and supports the actions of the Red-dominated government."⁷⁸ The advisory mission provided training and weapons to the Guatemalan Army, but also maintained a liaison function with senior

⁷⁵ Frances Bolton (R-OH). *Congressional Record* 83-2 (1954-0202) p. 1257-8. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: July 3, 2019

⁷⁶ James, Daniel, *Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude*, New York: The John Day Company, 1954, p. 280

⁷⁷ Gleijeses, Piero, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 263

⁷⁸ Donald Jackson (R-CA). *Congressional Record* (1954-0225) p. 2306. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: July 3, 2019

Guatemalan military leaders that in the final weeks of the 1954 rebellion proved invaluable in undermining their support for Árbenz.

Responding to the expulsions, on February 8, Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME) introduced a bill (Senate Resolution 211) calling for a ban on the importation of Guatemalan coffee “until the communists were out of power.”⁷⁹ She argued that a recent increase in prices for Guatemalan coffee had been orchestrated by “communists in the Guatemalan government” and was having a negative impact on the cost of living of average Americans. Senator Smith’s proposal to ban Guatemalan coffee drew alarmed reaction from Guatemala where one of the leading daily newspapers, *Prensa Libre*, headlined on February 9, 1954 “U.S. Senator Proposes Boycott of Guatemalan Coffee.”⁸⁰ While her resolution didn’t prosper, Smith became a frequent and public critic of the Árbenz regime. In March she told the *Newark Star-Ledger* that communists in Guatemala had “begun their assault on freedom in the hemisphere” and said “it’s time to stifle Guatemala’s Reds.”⁸¹

Senator Margaret Chase Smith had been a confrontational opponent of Senator Joseph McCarthy who attacked her during her Senate electoral campaign in 1948 for not being in his estimation sufficiently anti-communist.⁸² She responded by telling journalists that McCarthy’s hearings had turned Congress into “a forum of hate and character assassination, sheltered by the shield of

⁷⁹ Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME). *Congressional Record* (1954-0208) p. 1475. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: July 3, 2019

⁸⁰ “Boycot a Café de Guatemala Propone Senadora de EE. UU.,” *Prensa Libre*, February 9, 1954, headline and p. 2

⁸¹ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, p. 151

⁸² Gallant, Gregory Peter, *Margaret Chase Smith, McCarthyism and the Drive for Political Purification*, Doctor of Philosophy, University of Maine, 1992, Unpublished Thesis, p. 15-18

Congressional immunity.”⁸³ According to Smith’s biographer, in the 1954 elections McCarthy’s criticism led her to feel she had to prove herself more anti-communist than others.⁸⁴ McCarthy even financed a primary challenge against Smith, which failed spectacularly.⁸⁵ Smith was upset when the State Department objected to her bill proposing to boycott Guatemalan coffee exports to the United States.⁸⁶ She argued on the Senate floor that the US Ambassador to Guatemala had thanked her for introducing the resolution which she claims he said “put pressure on the Reds,” and she thought the State Department’s objections showed their “mamby-pamby” attitude towards communist threats.⁸⁷ Smith told the press that it was time to do something about the growing communist influence in Guatemala before the United States was faced in Guatemala with another “tragedy like in China, Korea and Indochina.”⁸⁸

Another implacable opponent of the Árbenz regime was Senator Thomas Dodd (D-CT). His views on Árbenz were defined as much by his Catholicism as his anti-communism, according to his biographer Derek Lipman. He was a Cold War liberal Democrat, ardent Catholic, and the lead prosecutor in the Nuremberg Trials.⁸⁹ He had been a strong supporter of Col. Castillo

⁸³ Johnson, Robert David, *Congress and the Cold War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 47

⁸⁴ Gallant, Gregory Peter, *Margaret Chase Smith, McCarthyism and the Drive for Political Purification*, Doctor of Philosophy, University of Maine, 1992, Unpublished Thesis, p. 137-9

⁸⁵ Caro, Robert A., *The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Master of the Senate*, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2002, p. 553

⁸⁶ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. IV, Guatemala*, eds. Susan Holly and David Patterson, Washington (Government Printing Office, 2003) Document 426

⁸⁷ Gallant, Gregory Peter, *Margaret Chase Smith, McCarthyism and the Drive for Political Purification*, Doctor of Philosophy, University of Maine, 1992, Unpublished Thesis, p. 174-5

⁸⁸ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, p. 151-2

⁸⁹ Lipman, Derek R., *Connecticut Cold War Warrior: Senator Thomas J. Dodd, the United States and the World 1945-1971*, Master of Arts, Trent University, Petersborough, Ontario, Canada 2010, Unpublished thesis, p. 2-3

Armas in the Senate, and from 1957-8, when Dodd was no longer in the Senate, he became a lobbyist for Castillo Armas.⁹⁰ Senator Dodd's personal papers at the Thomas J. Dodd Research Center in Storrs, Connecticut show that the Guatemalan government paid him an annual retainer of \$50,000 to lobby on their behalf when he was no longer in the Senate.⁹¹

The Organization of American States (OAS) was scheduled to hold the 10th Inter-American Conference of Foreign Ministers in Caracas, Venezuela in early March 1954. While the conference was called originally to address economic matters, the Eisenhower administration saw it as an opportunity to build a hemispheric consensus against communist encroachment in the Americas. As the State Department and White House began focusing their Guatemala strategy on securing support for a resolution at the upcoming OAS Conference, Congress also began focusing its energies on preparations for the Caracas Conference. The State Department invited members of Congress to accompany the United States delegation to Caracas as a means of demonstrating to the other nations of the hemisphere and the American public the bipartisan resolve to keep Guatemala from becoming a beachhead of international communism in the Americas. The Congressional Research Service was tasked to produce an analytical paper on the state of communism in Guatemala.⁹² This report followed closely the lines of Senator Wiley's (R-WI) statement of January 14 laying out the 22 "proofs" substantiating the dominant role communists had in the Government of Guatemala.

⁹⁰ Lipman, Derek R., *Connecticut Cold War Warrior: Senator Thomas J. Dodd, the United States and the World 1945-1971*, Master of Arts, Trent University, Petersborough, Ontario, Canada 2010, Unpublished thesis, p. 93

⁹¹ Streeter, Stephen M., *Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961*, Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies Ohio University, 2000, p. 126

⁹² Stone, W.T. (1954). Communism in Latin America. Editorial research reports 1954 (Vol. 1). Washington D.C.:CQ Press. Retrieved from <http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearch/cqresrr1954030200>

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles led the U.S. delegation and lobbied his hemispheric counterparts to sign on to the U.S. declaration which said, among other things, “the domination or control of the political institutions of any American state by the international communist movement...would constitute a threat” to the entire hemisphere and would “require appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.”⁹³ Despite their concerns over Árbenz’s communist drift, most Latin American Foreign Ministers didn’t want to get caught in a fight between the United States and one of their neighbors. There was much wrangling over the language of the resolution, but ultimately Dulles came away with a resolution that constituted hemispheric resolve to keep communism from establishing a foothold in the Americas. Only Guatemala, which was not named specifically in the resolution but was the object nonetheless, voted against it.

Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA) was part of the official U.S. delegation to the Caracas Conference, and following adoption of the U.S. resolution, Hickenlooper told reporters that by voting against the resolution, Guatemala was showing that it was a “virtual ally” of the Soviet Union.⁹⁴

Between March 16 and April 9, the House and Senate Committees on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held three briefings on the situation in Guatemala and the achievements of the Caracas Conference. Secretary of State Dulles told Congressmen on

⁹³ Kinzer, Stephen and Schlesinger Jr., Arthur, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 142

⁹⁴ Dubois, Jules, “The Americas Condemn Red’s Movement, *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, March 14, 1954, P. 3

March 23 that “while communists have significant control in Guatemala, their control is not complete like it is in Eastern Europe.”⁹⁵ At an April 9 committee hearing, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry F. Holland said that the United States had persuaded all the OAS members except for Guatemala to subscribe to the U.S. resolution against communism in the Americas, and now it was up to the U.S. government to demonstrate that communist influence in Guatemala had crossed that line.⁹⁶ Congress not only supported the Eisenhower administration’s interpretation of the Caracas Declaration, but gave it legitimacy through the committee hearings and the statements of individual Congressmen.

As the internal conflict in Guatemala deepened, the Catholic Church became one of the most vocal opponents of Árbenz and what they saw as Godless communism. Beginning in January 1953, Archbishop Mariano Rossell y Arellano took a bronze copy of the statue of the Black Christ of Esquipulas, Guatemala’s most venerated saint, for a series of “pilgrimages” around the country which went on for the next 16 months. He used every stop to call on the overwhelmingly Catholic population to turn to God and reject secular materialism and communism.⁹⁷ To many, Archbishop Rossell y Arellano became the public face of popular opposition to the growing influence of communism in the Árbenz regime. Rossell y Arellano’s anti-communist crusade came at a time when communist regimes in Eastern Europe were

⁹⁵ U.S. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Witness Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; Date March 23, 1954, p. 499-500. Text in: ProQuest® *Congressional Hearings Digital Collection*; Accessed: March 10, 2020

⁹⁶ U.S. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Witness Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry F. Holland; Date April 9, 1954, p. 521-33. Text in: ProQuest® *Congressional Hearings Digital Collection*; Accessed: March 10, 2020

⁹⁷ Sabino, Carlos, *Guatemala, la Historia Silenciada (1944-1989) Tomo I, Revolución y Liberación*, Guatemala: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2007, p. 198; Sabino, Carlos, *Árbenz: Una Biografía*, Guatemala: GRAFIA ETC., 2019, p. 213

clamping down on Catholic voices of dissent, including the arrest and torture of Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty in Hungary and the arrest of Polish Primate Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski in 1953.

On May 4, Congressman John McCormack (D-MA), read on the floor of the House a pastoral letter from Archbishop Rossell y Arellano exhorting Guatemalan Catholics to “combat and destroy the forces of communism.” The letter goes on to say that “all Catholics must struggle against communism if they wish to retain their faith.” McCormack argued that it was time to take action “like in Korea, Indochina and Europe” if communism was to be stopped in the Americas.⁹⁸ In addition to promoting the interests of his constituents in the Boston-based United Fruit Company, Representative McCormack was a devout Catholic and was ardently opposed to “Godless communism.” He advocated no compromise with the Soviet communists and castigated Eisenhower for reducing U.S. troop numbers abroad at a time when communist adventurism posed its greatest threat to “America’s Christian democracy.”⁹⁹

Unable to purchase weapons from the West, Árbenz turned to Eastern Europe to refit his Army. Negotiations to purchase weapons from behind the Iron Curtain were carried out in utmost secrecy, though American intelligence operatives discovered the loading of weapons at the Polish port of Gdansk and followed the Swedish freighter *Alfhem* to Puerto Barrios, Guatemala.¹⁰⁰ The arrival of Soviet-Bloc weapons to Guatemala on May 16, 1954 sparked a

⁹⁸ John McCormack (D-MA). *Congressional Record* (1954-0504) p. 5968-9. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

⁹⁹ Gordon, Lester I., *John McCormack and the Roosevelt Era*, Doctor of Philosophy, Boston University, 1976, Unpublished Dissertation, P. 285-88

¹⁰⁰ “U.S. Charges Guatemala Receives Soviet Arms,” *Christian Science Monitor*, May 18, 1954, p. 3

series of alarming speeches on the floor of Congress by representatives of both parties. Senator William Knowland (R-CA) phoned Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on May 18 to ask why the U.S. continued to have a military mission in Guatemala when Guatemala was acquiring offensive weapons from the Soviet Bloc.¹⁰¹ While numerous Congressmen and Senators spoke on the floor of Congress and to the media expressing alarm over Guatemala's stealth acquisition of arms from behind the Iron Curtain, one of the most vocal critics was Senator George Smathers (D-FL). On May 21 he introduced into the Congressional Record a Washington Post editorial of May 21 which argued that the shipment of Iron Curtain weapons to Guatemala should remove any doubt that Guatemala "has become the beachhead for communist designs on the Western Hemisphere. While some Latin Americans believe U.S. concern over Guatemala is solely about the United Fruit Company, that ignores the fact that Guatemala is becoming a communist menace to the region. We can no longer believe that the Árbenz government is just a dupe. Acceptance of these arms denotes active complicity in a Soviet plot. It's time to gather our Latin American allies to take actions to strengthen our mutual security."¹⁰²

Senator Smathers was the quintessential cold warrior. According to his biographer, Brian Crispell, the carnage of the Korean War shaped Smathers' view of the need to contain communism. Smathers saw Latin America as a strategic region where the United States could win the Cold War and he became a life-long promoter of greater U.S. involvement in Latin America. He argued on the floor of the Senate that the unrest Guatemala was experiencing under

¹⁰¹ Gleijeses, Piero, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States*. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 299-300

¹⁰² George Smathers (D-FL). *Congressional Record* (1954-0521) p. 6953. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

Arévalo and Árbenz was a product of U.S. neglect of the region. Smathers saw the Guatemalan troubles as an opportunity to get the United States Government to focus on Latin America, arguing that poverty in Latin America made it a tinderbox for communism.¹⁰³ Smathers believed that the State Department, which provided significant funding for reconstruction of Western Europe but was “uninterested” in spending development assistance in Latin America, was “a drag on American international relations.”¹⁰⁴

In the three weeks after the arrival of Soviet Bloc weapons to Guatemala there were no less than 14 Congressmen and Senators from both political parties who made statements on the floor of Congress calling on the Eisenhower Administration to do something about this growing threat. They viewed the arrival of weapons from behind the Iron Curtain as evidence both of Árbenz’s decision to throw his lot in with the communist bloc as well as of Árbenz’s aggressive intentions towards his neighbors, as Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua had long been claiming.

Richard Immerman suggests that as a result of mounting criticism by Congressmen and Senators of both parties, the Eisenhower administration began leaking indications that it was about to take action in Guatemala. He specifically quotes high level White House and State Department conversations to that effect with Senator William Knowland (D-CA) and Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) in March 1954.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Crispell, Brian Lewis, *George Smathers and the Politics of Cold War America, 1946-1968*, Doctoral Dissertation, Florida State University, 1996, Unpublished Dissertation, p. 152-4

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 154

¹⁰⁵ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, p. 152

The Eisenhower administration's plans to remove Árbenz through a CIA-organized covert operation took on a new urgency after the delivery to Guatemala of weapons from behind the Iron Curtain.¹⁰⁶ In November 1953, the Eisenhower administration had begun covert discussions with Nicaragua and Honduras about using their territory to support an operation against Árbenz.¹⁰⁷ By April 1954, CIA planning for Operation PBSuccess was well underway. Perhaps fearful that Eisenhower would lose his nerve as the White House had done in 1952 when Truman pulled the plug on Operation PBFortune, a CIA internal memorandum of April 15 warned CIA leadership that Congress was expecting the Executive to do something about the growing communist threat in Guatemala, and that if PBSuccess were delayed or modified, Congressmen expecting some kind of action to rein in Árbenz would be disappointed.¹⁰⁸ The CIA viewed Congressional concern over Árbenz as significant to ensuring domestic political support for a covert operation aimed at removing a freely-elected president from power and shared the anxiety of many in Congress that the Eisenhower administration was not taking the threat of a Soviet beachhead in Central America seriously enough.

Congress had long accused the State Department of burying its head in the sand when it came to the situation in Guatemala. On May 24, Representative William Lantaff (D-FL) accused the State Department of ignoring the situation in Guatemala. He argued that the State Department should invoke the Rio Treaty (the mutual defense mechanism of the Organization of American

¹⁰⁶ Gleijeses, Piero, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 243

¹⁰⁷ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, p. 135

¹⁰⁸ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Guatemala*, eds. Susan Holly and David Patterson, Washington (Government Printing Office, 2003) Document 127

States) against Guatemala.¹⁰⁹ In a May 23 interview, Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME) told the *Newark Star Ledger* that it was time for the State Department to do away with diplomatic niceties in dealing with the Árbenz regime.¹¹⁰ Lantaff and Smith believed the State Department's cautious approach bordered on appeasing the Reds. While not discouraging anti-Árbenz outbursts in Congress, the Eisenhower administration tried to restrain resolutions that would tie the Administration's hands. They hinted to select Congressmen that action was on its way.¹¹¹

Throughout his presidency Dwight David Eisenhower held a meeting with Congressional leaders once a quarter to go over both domestic and international matters. One of Eisenhower's biographers says that these bipartisan briefings were short on substance and "input from the members was unwelcome" by Eisenhower.¹¹² The brewing trouble in Guatemala was not broached in any of his meetings with Congressional leaders until May 24, 1954, three weeks before the CIA Operation PBSuccess's invasion of Guatemala was launched. The notes prepared by the NSC staff for President Eisenhower list the following topics to discuss related to Guatemala: "Shipment of arms by Soviet Bloc to Guatemala - A) To prevent further build-up of communist arms in Central America, U.S. Navy will stop suspicious foreign-flag vessels in high seas off Guatemala in order to examine cargo. If such vessels will not voluntarily cooperate, they will be taken forcibly to Panama. B) Action is conformable to UN Charter and Caracas

¹⁰⁹ William Lantaff (D-FL). *Congressional Record* (1954-0524) p. 7016. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

¹¹⁰ Gordon Canfield (R-NJ). *Congressional Record* (1954-0526) p. A3908. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: July 3, 2019

¹¹¹ Gleijeses, Piero, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States*. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 302-303

¹¹² Collier, Ken, "Eisenhower and Congress: The Autopilot Presidency," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Volume 24, No. 2, Spring 1994, p. 317

Resolution, C) Meeting of Organization of American States to be convened as soon as possible, D) Honduras and Nicaragua have asked for US help, E) US will advise Mexico and other friendly countries.”¹¹³ Guatemala was left as the last item of business of the meeting and there is no mention at all of CIA planning for Operation PBSuccess. After the briefing, Representative James Shanley (D-CT) wrote in his diary that the legislators were not assuaged by Eisenhower’s commitment to “move on Guatemala under the Caracas and other agreements.”¹¹⁴ The Caracas Declaration had not had any impact on communist influence in Guatemala and some legislators had expressed concern publicly that the diplomatic track was not producing positive results.

A failed attack by anti-Árbenz partisans against the rail line between the Atlantic Coast and Guatemala City on May 20 led Árbenz to suspend the constitution and crack down on the opposition.¹¹⁵ A wave of arrests of suspected opponents of the Árbenz regime in late May 1954 sparked a new series of Congressional tirades against a “tyrannical communist minority” running Guatemala. “The communist wolves had finally shed their sheep’s clothing.”¹¹⁶ Congress saw the suspension of constitutional guarantees as the final step in the consolidation of communist power in Guatemala.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Box 1, folder “Legislative Meetings 1954 (May-June)(3)” of the Legislative Meeting Series of the collection, *Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961*, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas; Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, p. 159

¹¹⁴ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, p. 153

¹¹⁵ Kinzer, Stephen and Schlesinger Jr., Arthur, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 151

¹¹⁶ Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA) *Congressional Record* (1954-0617), P. 8843, Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: July 3, 2019

¹¹⁷ Gleijeses, Piero, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States*. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 317-8

In response to growing domestic and international opposition to the direction of the Árbenz administration, exacerbated by its acquisition of weapons from behind the Iron Curtain, and the summary arrest of suspected opponents, the Guatemalan Army urged Árbenz to reach an accommodation with the United States and the domestic opposition. On June 7, the high command met with Árbenz and gave him a written ultimatum which essentially told him to break ranks with his communist advisors or not count on the military to support him in the event of a rebellion. They openly questioned why Árbenz had ordered the arrest of so many suspected opponents without presenting evidence, implying that Árbenz was stoking the internal opposition with arbitrary arrests.¹¹⁸ The Guatemalan Army was well aware that the United States was arming rebels under the command of Col. Carlos Castillo Armas on the other side of the Honduran border.

While there was undoubtedly some level of coordination regarding actions against the Árbenz regime going on between the Eisenhower Administration and key members of Congress, there is little evidence of who was informed of the full range of options the Administration was managing. On June 16, 1954 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had a phone conversation with his brother and CIA Director Allen Dulles in which he asked Allen's advice on whether the State Department should ask Senator Hickenlooper (R-IA) to introduce a sanctions bill against Guatemala. Both agreed that a sanctions bill could be useful, but the phrasing would have to be carefully worked out.¹¹⁹ In the end, the sanctions bill was never introduced and it is not clear

¹¹⁸ Villagrán Kramer, Francisco, *Biografía Política de Guatemala: Los Pactos Políticos de 1944 a 1970*, Guatemala: FLACSO, 1993, p. 130-142; Sabino, Carlos, *Árbenz, Una Biografía*, Guatemala: Grafía ETC., 2019, p. 230-231

¹¹⁹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Guatemala, eds. Susan Holly and David Patterson, Washington (Government Printing Office, 2003) Document 189

that Hickenlooper was ever approached to present it. However, the willingness to ask Hickenlooper to introduce sanctions legislation is evidence that the Eisenhower administration saw Congress as a strategic ally in the removal of Árbenz.

On June 17, Castillo Armas's rebel troops crossed the border from Honduras and began their invasion of Guatemala. Operation PBSuccess was underway, though Congress had not been informed of the CIA's decisive role in organizing and supplying the rebel army. Not realizing that the United States was the primary patron of Col. Armas, Representative Charles Kersten (R-WI) wrote the State Department on June 23 to complain that the United States should be aiding Castillo Armas's rebel forces.¹²⁰ Senator Smathers (D-FL), on June 23, made the case on the floor of the Senate for direct U.S. military action to support the rebels in Guatemala saying: "We cannot stay disengaged. We committed troops in Korea. We are taking measures against communism in Indochina. As freedom-loving Guatemalans are fighting for their freedom, is it not absurd that we should have a hands-off attitude? If we fight against communism 10,000 miles away, does it make sense for us to sit on our hands when the threat is 860 miles away? We must be on the side of the freedom-loving people of Guatemala against the Kremlin. Editorials in American papers are losing their nerve and calling for 'restraint.' 'Don't rush into anything.' If we exercise restraint, the Russians will roll all over us. We must make sure that freedom-loving Guatemalans win this battle."¹²¹ Operation PBSuccess was one of the earliest uses by the United States of covert operations to remove a hostile government, and the Eisenhower

¹²⁰ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, p. 153

¹²¹ George Smathers (D-FL). *Congressional Record* (1954-0623) p. 8706-7. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: January 28, 2020

administration had restricted information on the U.S. role to a very small group of senior policy makers. Even the President's allies in Congress had not been informed.

Chapter 5: Senate Resolution 91

In January 1953, Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson (D-TX) was elected by the Democratic caucus in the Senate to become Minority Leader after the Democrats lost control of the Senate in the 1952 elections. The freshman Senator from Texas was not focused on foreign policy and intervened in foreign policy debates mostly as part of his strategy to support Eisenhower, who had difficulty working with his own Republican Senators who were split between hardline anti-communists and isolationists. In exchange for supporting Eisenhower on foreign policy matters, Johnson accrued significant influence with Eisenhower which worked to the benefit of the Democratic Party in Congress on domestic legislation.¹²² While close to a hundred Senators and Congressmen weighed-in during congressional debates on the situation in Guatemala between 1950-1954, Johnson was not among them until days before the fall of Árbenz when he introduced Senate Resolution 91 seemingly out of the blue. In a June 28, 1954 letter to a constituent, Johnson wrote that “Guatemala is of minor significance from a number of standpoints,” noting that he did not know the “names and characters of the rebels in Guatemala.”¹²³ Johnson was interested in American business, however, and was open to lobbying by the United Fruit Company.

On May 21, 1954, Senator Johnson received a letter from James Rowe, one of the partners of Corcoran, Youngman and Rowe (the lobbying firm that represented the United Fruit Company in Washington), offering a draft statement Johnson was encouraged to make on the floor of the

¹²² Caro, Robert A., *The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Master of the Senate*, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2002, p. 540

¹²³ Letter from Senator Johnson to Charles L. Scarborough, June 28, 1954, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Box 297, folder titled "S. Con. Res 91 Guatemala 1954."

Senate arguing for the Eisenhower administration to apply the Monroe Doctrine to the situation in Guatemala.¹²⁴ Johnson did not make the statement and there is no record of Johnson's response to Rowe.

As Castillo Armas's troops moved very tentatively into Eastern Guatemala in mid-June and the Guatemalan military began pressuring Árbenz to reach a deal with the opposition, Congress moved to give the Administration all the political backing it would need for direct intervention in Guatemala. It is not clear if the impetus for Congressional action was the Eisenhower administration (as some historians have suggested)¹²⁵ or if it was from the United Fruit Company. An undated memorandum in the Johnson Presidential Library which appears to have been sent to Johnson by a lobbyist refers specifically to this proposed Senate resolution. It urges Johnson to take the lead on Guatemala policy, arguing that the Republicans are too disorganized, and outlines the two points Johnson needed to make in the resolution: 1) the United States will not tolerate a Soviet incursion in the Western Hemisphere; and 2) the United States will work through the Organization of American States to repel this communist aggression. The memorandum makes it clear that the Resolution must have bipartisan support and that it would be desirable, though not necessary, for it to have White House support.¹²⁶

On June 22, Senate Minority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX) tabled a resolution in the Senate calling on the Eisenhower Administration to take "all necessary and proper steps" to implement

¹²⁴ Letter from James Rowe to Senator Johnson of May 21, 1954, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Box 297, folder titled "S. Con. Res 91 Guatemala 1954."

¹²⁵ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, p. 173-4

¹²⁶ Undated memorandum on S. Resolution 91, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Box 297, folder titled "S. Con. Res 91 Guatemala 1954."

the Caracas Resolution which affirmed action by OAS member states against the threat of communism in the Americas.¹²⁷ He argued that at a recent meeting of the United Nations Security Council, the Soviets had “cynically vetoed OAS action to resolve the Guatemalan civil war.” Despite the Soviet action, the Organization of American States would “assume jurisdiction over the Guatemalan civil war.” The veto only shows the Kremlin’s role in the Guatemala conflict, Johnson asserted. “The gradual Kremlin encroachment in Guatemala has been exposed. The communist takeover of Guatemala has moved from the infiltration phase to a semi-military phase. Communist conquest must not be allowed in this hemisphere.”¹²⁸ Several Senators from both parties expressed complete support for Johnson’s resolution.

The Senate sent a copy of the draft resolution to the State Department for comment on June 22 and received a response from Assistant Secretary for American Republics Affairs Morton on June 24 with minor edits. The “mark-up” by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 25 elicited overwhelming support from Senators of both parties, but also revealed deep seeded concerns on the part of some Senators, mostly but not exclusively Democrats, about U.S. interference in the affairs of Latin American governments.¹²⁹

As the Committee discussed the text of the draft resolution, Senator Walter F. George (D-GA) expressed reservations throughout the mark-up session. He asked if “the resolution means that

¹²⁷ Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX). *Congressional Record* (1954-0625) p. 8922-5. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

¹²⁸ Lyndon Johnson (D-TX) *Congressional Record* (1954-0622) p. 8564, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 22, 2020

¹²⁹ Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Vol. VI Hearing Date: [pub. 1977. Meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations, June 25, 1954, p. 343-48

we go down to Latin America and interfere any time a government is controlled by ‘international communism,’” and asked if there was sufficient evidence to affirm that the Árbenz regime was, indeed, communist.

Senator Theodore F. Green (D-RI), who had been a member of the U.S. delegation to the OAS Caracas Conference in March 1954,¹³⁰ said that the resolution’s language was so broad that it implied that the United States could effectively veto Latin American government officials that the United States suspected of being communists. “To denounce them [suspected communists] connotes that we are saying who they should have in their Cabinets, and that has a bad effect on South Americans.” His experience at the Caracas Conference had, doubtless, convinced him that Latin American governments did not welcome U.S. intrusion in their internal affairs. He added that the language was “almost like we were directing the Latin American countries to do something. That is what they object to down there. It is like saying, ‘Come along boys! Father knows what’s best.’”¹³¹

Senator Guy Mark Gilette (D-IA) said that he was in agreement with the intent of the resolution, but cautioned that “our position in the Western Hemisphere is an unpleasant one as there is skepticism in those countries as to whether the United States is going to assume complete domination of their affairs.” He went on to say that he didn’t want the committee to “be placed in a position where the United States is going to be faced with the idea that we are going to take

¹³⁰ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, p. 146

¹³¹ Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Vol. VI Hearing Date: [pub. 1977. Meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations, June 25, 1954, p. 343-48

unilateral action.” Senator Homer S. Ferguson (R-MI) reassured Gilette that the resolution could not be taken as advocating the sending of the U.S. Army to Guatemala to rid it of communism.¹³²

The only Republican to express concern over the resolution was Senator George Aiken (R-VT) who questioned whether the resolution was intended to establish a formal policy that the United States opposed the right of Latin American people to elect communists to office, and asked if this applied solely to the situation in Guatemala. Chairman Smith assured Aiken that this resolution was limited to applying the Caracas Accord, nothing more.

Senators William F. Knowland (R-CA), Howard Smith (R-NJ), William Fulbright (D-AR), and Mike Mansfield (D-MT) offered alternate resolution language to try to assuage the concerns of their colleagues, but doubts persisted to the end of the mark-up session. Senator Howard Alexander Smith (R-NJ), Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said that the deteriorating situation in Guatemala required action by the Senate that very day and called an end to the debate. While Senator Walter George (D-GA) expressed concerns over the impact of the statement right up to the end of the mark-up session, in the end he voted to approve the text in support of its author, Minority Leader Johnson (D-TX). It passed unanimously in committee and after a 99-1 vote by the full Senate was sent to the House.¹³³ The House passed the same resolution unanimously on June 29.

¹³² Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Vol. VI Hearing Date: [pub. 1977. Meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations, June 25, 1954, p. 343-48

¹³³ Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Vol. VI Hearing Date: [pub. 1977. Meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations, June 25, 1954, p. 343-48

The final text of Resolution 91 as adopted by the House of Representatives reads:

Whereas for many years it has been the joint policy of the United States and the other States in the Western Hemisphere to act vigorously to prevent external interference in the affairs of the nations of the Western Hemisphere; and

Whereas in the recent past there has come to light strong evidence of intervention by the international Communist movement in the State of Guatemala, whereby government institutions have been infiltrated by Communist agents, weapons of war have been secretly shipped into that country, and the pattern of Communist conquest has become manifest; and

Whereas on Sunday, June 20, 1954, the Soviet Government vetoed in the United Nations Security Council a resolution to refer the matter of the recent outbreak of hostilities in Guatemala to the Organization of American States:

Therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate {the House of Representatives concurring} That it is the sense of Congress that the United States should reaffirm its support of the Caracas Declaration of Solidarity of March 28, 1954, which is designed to prevent interference in Western Hemisphere affairs by the international Communist movement, and take all necessary and proper steps to support the Organization of American States in taking appropriate action to prevent any interference by the international Communist movement in the affairs of the states of the Western Hemisphere. Agreed to June 29, 1954.

The Johnson Resolution, as Senate Resolution 91 came to be called, was seen as a litmus test of where Congressmen and Senators came down on authorizing more aggressive U.S. action against the Árbenz regime. While there had been a spirited debate with some Senators questioning if the United States' Latin American neighbors would view the resolution as unnecessarily intrusive, in the end, only one Senator voted against it — Senator William Langer (R-ND) who told reporters after the vote that he could not in good conscience vote for a measure that risked sending American troops back into a foreign war.¹³⁴ Langer was known in the Senate as a contrarian. He

¹³⁴ “Langer Clears up Lone Vote on Guatemala,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, June 29, 1954, p. 2

regularly filibustered Supreme Court nominees solely on the basis that they were not from his home state of North Dakota.¹³⁵

Senator Dennis Chávez (D-NM) had expressed opinions on the floor of the Senate earlier in 1954 to the effect that American businesses had done nothing to address grinding poverty and social injustice in Guatemala, and that that had contributed to the appeal of communism to many Guatemalans. While not supporting Árbenz and the role international communism was believed to have in the Árbenz regime, Chávez was nonetheless uncomfortable with Resolution 91. He was not present for the floor vote (though he later added his name to the roster of *Yeah* votes) and told his colleagues on June 25 that he missed the vote solely because the roll call bell failed to ring in his office. In his June 25 statement on the floor of Congress he introduced an article for the record from the June 24, 1954 *Washington Post and Times Herald* titled “Poverty and Communism” which argued that “however questionable the origin of the Castillo Armas insurgent movement, it can’t be denied that Árbenz has become a vehicle for Soviet imperialism. But it is symptomatic of an underlying discontent throughout Latin America driven by pervasive poverty. Poor Latin Americans are resentful of the profits American companies take out of their countries. The US must support needed social reforms and economic development.”¹³⁶ There was a lot of pressure - from the American public and other members of Congress - to not appear weak on communism, but at the same time Chávez felt compelled to make sure that Resolution 91 didn’t obscure the profound social inequities that had led to the situation in Guatemala.

¹³⁵ Johnson, Robert David, *Congress and the Cold War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 57

¹³⁶ Dennis Chávez (D-NM) *Congressional Record* (1954-0625), p. 8921-7. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 22, 2020

Castillo Armas's forces had failed to take over much territory in their first ten days of operations, but daily bombing runs by rebel aircraft targeting military positions in Guatemala City were generating significant tension in the capital and pressure was growing on Árbenz to reach an accommodation with the United States or leave. On June 27, Árbenz resigned under pressure from the Guatemalan Army. The Army leadership, which was always uncomfortable with Árbenz's communist advisors and policies, saw Castillo Armas's forces as little more than a proxy for the United States and did not want to get into a fight they could not win against the American colossus.¹³⁷ The White House briefed Republican Congressional leadership the following day.¹³⁸ In the days and weeks that followed, Senators and Congressmen made arguments on the floor of Congress as well as to the press to the effect that unless the United States did more to address economic inequities and social injustice in Latin America, the appeal of communism would only increase in the region. Few offered concrete proposals, but several pointed out how the Marshall Plan had saved Europe from Communism and that Latin America needed similar attention. Ambassador Peurifoy, Eisenhower's envoy in Guatemala City, was hailed by a number of Congressmen as the architect of the American victory against communism in Guatemala. There was no mention in any of the speeches contained in the Congressional Record or statements to the press of the role the CIA played in Árbenz's downfall.

In his chapter titled "*Sterilizing a 'Red Infection: Congress, the CIA, and Guatemala, 1954*," David M. Barrett argues that while Congress did not have effective oversight of the CIA in the

¹³⁷ Special Operations Research Office, *Case Study in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala 1944-1954*, American University, Washington, D.C. 1964, p. 90

¹³⁸ "Republicans Reassured," *New York Times*, June 29, 1954, p. 6

1950's, it would be a mistake to absolve Congress of any responsibility for the overthrow of Árbenz. While Congress had limited, informal oversight, it would be incorrect to say the legislators had no oversight. Leaders of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees had always had contact, to one degree or another, with the CIA about ongoing operations. Senator Alexander Wiley (R-WI), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had frequent meetings with both Dulles brothers and had long urged the Eisenhower administration to remove Árbenz.¹³⁹ Even with those contacts, it is unclear how much Congress knew about Operation PBSuccess. Walter Pforzheimer, the first Legislative Assistant of the CIA, said in 1994 that the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the CIA, headed in 1954 by an "aggressive" Congressman, John Taber (R-NY), would have been closely consulted, and there would have been "no holding back of details." However there is no documentary evidence that any Congressional committees were informed of Operation PBSuccess either before or after the operation.¹⁴⁰ Internal CIA documents relating to the FY-1954 budget note that the Congressional Appropriations Committees asked lots of questions about specific operations, though there is no mention of PBSuccess.¹⁴¹ In a weekly PBSuccess planning meeting in March 1954 there is a statement by one of the senior CIA participants that Congressional pressure would continue to grow on the Administration to do something about Árbenz if the situation in Guatemala continued to deteriorate,¹⁴² suggesting that the Eisenhower Administration was responsive to the

¹³⁹ Barrett, David M. *The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy*, University Press of Kansas, 2005, p. 161-170

¹⁴⁰ Snider, L. Britt, *Congress and the CIA: Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Studies Series*, New York: NOVA Science Publishers, Inc., 2009, p. 273-5

¹⁴¹ CIA Reading Room on-line document, "Tab B, Liaison with Congressional Committees," <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP58-00597A000100020003-8.pdf>

¹⁴² Barrett, David M. *The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy*, University Press of Kansas, 2005, p. 161-170; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Guatemala*, eds. Susan Holly and David Patterson, Washington (Government Printing Office, 2003) Document 113

increasing pressure from Congress to take action in Guatemala, and yet unwilling to take a risk of telling even key allies in Congress about the upcoming covert operation. As information about PBFortune, Truman's plan to overthrow Árbenz in 1953, began to leak to the public, Truman felt he had to pull the plug. Eisenhower didn't want to take any risks that could lead to the public finding out about the impending covert operation with the result that the operation would have to be called off.¹⁴³

¹⁴³ Gleijeses, Piero, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 366-7

Chapter 6: The Postmortem

Representative Charles Kersten (R-WI), Chairman of the House Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression, was one of the far-right Republican legislators who believed that the Eisenhower administration wasn't doing enough to confront communist threats in the hemisphere. On June 23, 1954, only days before Árbenz resigned, Kersten wrote a three-page letter to the White House calling on Eisenhower to provide support to Castillo Armas's rebels who by that point had begun their invasion of Eastern Guatemala, evidently unaware that Eisenhower was providing all logistical, psychological operations and intelligence support to the rebels, as well as providing them with a small air force.¹⁴⁴ On August 16, after the revolution had succeeded, Kersten spoke on the floor of Congress to argue that the United States was fighting communism around the globe, but had ignored it in the United States' own backyard. "Árbenz was not just pro-communist, he was Moscow controlled. His decisions were all in accord with the Soviet Union. The paperwork found in Árbenz office after his flight are evidence of his communist proclivities."¹⁴⁵

Earlier in the spring of 1954, in the wake of growing repression of suspected Árbenz opponents, Kersten began preparing for Congressional hearings on Guatemala. He approached the CIA in May, when pressure was building to remove Árbenz, and again in August, after the fall of Árbenz, to ask for documents and intelligence information that he could use in public hearings on the communist threat in Guatemala. A memo from the CIA to the Under Secretary of State

¹⁴⁴ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, p. 153

¹⁴⁵ Charles Kersten (R-WI) *Congressional Record* (1954-0816), p. A6073. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 22, 2020

dated September 24, 1954 describes the meetings between Kersten and senior CIA officials and notes that he was given copies of documents and “atrocities photographs.”¹⁴⁶ The “atrocities photographs” were photographs of mutilated bodies of suspected Árbenz opponents that had been executed in the final weeks of the Árbenz regime and were exhumed from mass graves after the fall of Árbenz. These photographs were circulated widely to the Guatemalan and international press¹⁴⁷ by the Castillo Armas government and were later published in a book on Árbenz-era human rights violations produced by the Anti-Communist University Students Committee.¹⁴⁸ A CIA historical memorandum of October 27, 1954 notes that the CIA turned over to the “Kersten committee” copies of thousands of documents collected in Guatemala in the aftermath of Árbenz’s resignation.¹⁴⁹

After the fall of Árbenz, Representative Kersten delegated the hearings to the Latin America Subcommittee of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives, under the chairmanship of Representative Patrick Hillings (R-CA). Journalists Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger assert that two writers for the anti-communist magazine *The American Mercury* — Patrick McMahon and John Clements — who were also lobbyists for the Castillo Armas government, persuaded Hillings to hold the hearings in September, 1954 in large part to pressure the Eisenhower administration to provide badly needed funding to the

¹⁴⁶ “Memorandum for the Under-Secretary of State, September, 24 1954,” <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91-00682R000300040022-4.pdf>

¹⁴⁷ “Espeluznantes Crímenes Salen a Luz,” *El Imparcial*, July 1, 1954, p. 1

¹⁴⁸ *El Calvario de Guatemala*, Publicación del Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas en el primer aniversario del Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, Guatemala: Tipografía Nacional, 1955

¹⁴⁹ Summary of PBHistory written for “Situation Report”, October 27, 1954, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000920030.pdf

Castillo Armas government.¹⁵⁰ Historian Stephen Streeter writes that Castillo Armas inherited an empty treasury and that promised U.S. financial assistance for the Castillo Armas government had yet to materialize.¹⁵¹ Indeed, Hollings's opening statement as well as other statements throughout the hearing support the assertion that these hearings were designed largely to pressure Eisenhower to break the bureaucratic logjams on financial assistance to the rebel government. As Hillings was in the middle of his own election campaign in the fall of 1954, he decided to hold several days of the hearings in his home constituency of Los Angeles, California. He told the Los Angeles Times that he would hold public hearings to demonstrate to the American people "the danger in their own backyard."¹⁵²

The hearings were not an attempt to produce a balanced understanding of developments in Guatemala, but rather served as a platform for opponents of Árbenz to describe for an American audience the iniquities of the Árbenz regime, and to argue that unless the United States provided financial assistance to the Castillo Armas government quickly, the threat of communism in Guatemala and in the rest of the Western Hemisphere would continue to produce security threats to the United States. What the hearings presented that was new for American audiences was the individual accounts of gross human rights violations committed by the Árbenz regime. The violence against suspected regime opponents in the waning days of the Árbenz government,

¹⁵⁰ Kinzer, Stephen and Schlesinger Jr., Arthur, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 96

¹⁵¹ Streeter, Stephen M., *Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961*, Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies Ohio University, 2000, p. 114

¹⁵² "Hillings Will Head New House Anti-Red Group: Californian Named Chairman of Inquiry on Infiltration in Western Hemisphere," *Los Angeles Times*, August 14, 1954, p. 5

which scared Guatemalans as many had not witnessed mass political killings on that scale, has been minimized¹⁵³ by historians outside Guatemala.

When Congressman Hillings took over the investigation, the CIA offered to give him new documents incriminating of the Árbenz regime as they became available. In preparation for the hearings, Hillings visited Guatemala September 3-5 to gather evidence and to meet with potential witnesses. According to CIA documents, on August 24 the CIA provided Hillings with a significant number of background reports for his committee's work. When Hillings visited Guatemala City a week later, the CIA provided an interpreter for his meeting with Castillo Armas. They offered to help him locate witnesses for his hearings and provided translation of much of the material he took back to the United States with him.¹⁵⁴

A September 10, 1954 memo from the CIA Station Chief in Guatemala City to headquarters gave an account of the visit of Representative Hillings. Hillings asked the Station Chief for Russian documents he could take back as evidence of collusion between Árbenz and the Soviets. The Station had nothing to give him, but when Hillings left Guatemala he had three mail bags full of communist publications and documents, according to the Station Chief. Guatemalan Attorney General Manrique Ríos gave Hillings over 1,000 pages of evidence.¹⁵⁵ It is clear from the CIA internal documents that Hillings did not want the CIA to take over his hearings, but his

¹⁵³ Kinzer, Stephen and Schlesinger Jr., Arthur, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 220

¹⁵⁴ CIA Reading Room on-line file, "Memorandum for the Under-Secretary of State, September, 24 1954," <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91-00682R000300040022-4.pdf>

¹⁵⁵ CIA Reading Room on-line file, "Visit of Representative Patrick J. Hillings," https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000920070.pdf

allowing them to help him select witnesses and his reliance on the CIA for documents, photographs and translations gave the CIA a significant role in the hearings that indirectly justified their actions in Guatemala. The unclassified hearings produced 296 pages of testimony. The role of the CIA in the overthrow of Árbenz never came up in the hearings.

The public hearings took place in Washington DC on September 27, 28, 29 and October 8, and in Los Angeles, California on October 14 and 15. In addition to Subcommittee Chairman Patrick Hillings, Subcommittee members Alvin Bentley (R-MI) (a former Foreign Service Officer) and Michael Feighan (D-OH) participated in the hearings.

Subcommittee Chairman Hillings began the hearings on September 27 saying that Guatemala was only the opening phase of a communist conspiracy to take over Central America and the Caribbean, adding that the overthrow of Árbenz was the first time “the people” have been able to remove a communist government after it came to power. He made a strong pitch for providing financial support to the Castillo Armas government which he argued was running out of money. “We must support Castillo Armas so Guatemala does not slip back into communist control.”¹⁵⁶

President Castillo Armas was next to speak through a tape recording of an interview between him and Chairman Hillings taped in Guatemala City in early September. In response to Hillings’s questions, Castillo Armas outlined the challenges Guatemala faced under Árbenz saying that communism dominated Guatemala “almost completely” before the liberation in June. “They controlled Congress, the government, propaganda outlets, press and radio, labor unions

¹⁵⁶ September 28, 1954, Subcommittee on Latin America of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression House of Representatives, 83rd Congress. Chairman of the Subcommittee is Hon. Patrick J. Hillings (R-CA), p. 2-3

and schools, but they did not control the people of Guatemala. Only a few hundred Guatemalans were communists. How were they able to do that? After the fall of Ubico, the new government brought in communist advisors from all over Latin America and Spain. President Arévalo gave the communists control of many important organizations and spaces such as the Social Security Institute and the official media. The communists were under orders from Moscow,” according to Castillo Armas. They visited Moscow frequently. “Árbenz was the handpicked candidate of the communists and he won the election of 1950 by murdering the leading candidate, Col. Francisco Javier Arana.” Opposition rallies were busted up and ballot boxes were stuffed. The communists had complete control of the election machinery. When Árbenz became president, he gave all of Arana’s murderers high-level jobs.

“When Arana was assassinated, I quit the Army and started organizing a revolt. Our attempt to take over La Aurora Air Base failed and I was imprisoned and tortured, only to escape 7 months later. For three years I organized the rebellion that ultimately overthrew the communists. Now the labor of reconstructing Guatemala begins after the communists looted the treasury and destroyed government files. We need the help of the United States more than ever.”¹⁵⁷

Raul Midence Rivera, member of the Guatemalan Committee for the Defense against Communism and brother-in-law of opposition leader Mario Sandoval Alarcón, testified that the origin of communist influence in Guatemala came with the 1945 election of Juan José Arévalo who was elected “with 90% of the vote because nobody knew he was a communist.” He invited Latin American communists to move to Guatemala. Labor organizer Vicente Lombardo

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 4-7

Toledano was brought in from Mexico and Louis Sallant from France to communize the labor unions. Virginia Bravo Lettelier was brought in from Chile to organize the teachers. Arévalo brought in Abel Cuenca from El Salvador to organize the communist party along with Victor Manuel Gutiérrez. He brought the Chilean writer Pablo Neruda to work with Guatemala's communist intellectuals. Soviet communists invited a lot of Guatemalan officials, teachers, and others to visit the Soviet Block and China. They traveled in large numbers, over 160 teachers in the first half of 1954 alone.

Raul Midence Rivera continued his testimony on September 28 and described the violence against suspected opponents of the Árbenz regime. He showed the Congressional panel a telegram sent in late May by Manuel Monroy (head of the national *campesino* organization) to a mayor near Antigua, Guatemala telling him to kill all "reactionaries" in the event of trouble. A second telegram from police chief Rogelio Cruz Wer dated June 4, 1954 was introduced in which he told the police chief in Escuintla to arrest all non-communist municipal authorities and be prepared to execute them in the event Guatemala was attacked by Castillo Armas's rebel army. Midence says that this message was sent to the police in every major town in Guatemala and that no one knows how many people were killed as a result. The telegram links Cruz, and by extension Árbenz, to the subsequent murder of hundreds of suspected anti-communists.

Chairman Hillings interrupted Midence to say that the execution of hostages was a typical Soviet strategy. They used it in the Baltics. It was part of their standard operating procedure in carrying out a reign of terror. Hillings said that Police Chief Rogelio Cruz Wer went through the prison shooting political prisoners in the last days.

Continuing his testimony, Midence said that many prisoners had their faces slashed by knives and many were castrated. Photographs presented as evidence to the Congressional panel show the bodies of anti-communists exhumed from a mass graves in Antigua, Villalobos, and Jutiapa. Most had their tongues cut out and had their genitals stuffed in their mouths. An account of the mass execution of Árbenz opponents on the night of June 25 in Antigua was read. Midence told the Congressional subcommittee that over 300 bodies of suspected anti-communists had been exhumed around the country and over 150 people were still missing. There were over 1,000 political prisoners set free by the Liberation forces.¹⁵⁸

Lionel Sisniega Otero, one of the leaders of the anti-communist university student organization, told the Congressional panel that while communists did not play a role in the 1944 revolution, Arévalo was quick to introduce them into his government. Arévalo passed labor legislation and appointed communist labor judges that kept non-communist labor unions from organizing. Arévalo appointed communists to head the media organizations. The police, election tribunal, courts and diplomatic corps were also turned over to the communists under Arévalo, according to Sisniega Otero. When Árbenz became president, he passed the agrarian law which gave the government a club to hold over the heads of landowners, getting them to toe the line or have their land confiscated. It also gave the government control over the landless peasants who depended on government-provided land. The popular rebellion against Árbenz began in July 1951 when he tried to remove the nuns who ran the national orphanage and replace them with a Spanish communist. The Catholic people of Guatemala thought that was too much. There was a

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 9-68

huge demonstration organized by the women market vendors that was violently repressed by Árbenz. In the end, the Liberation Army defeated Árbenz because the Army, that had never believed in communism, didn't believe in Árbenz and didn't want to sacrifice their lives for his communist ideals.¹⁵⁹

At the September 29 hearing another university student, Mario López Villatoro, testified. He said that popular resistance to communism began during the Arévalo administration, not in 1951 with the assumption of power by Árbenz. When Col. Francisco Arana was assassinated in 1949 there were popular uprisings all over Guatemala. Many people who rebelled were shot by forces loyal to Arévalo. In July 1951 the market ladies rebelled when the government tried to throw the nuns out of the national orphanage and turn it over to the communists. The market ladies won and forced Árbenz to back down, though some were killed. The courage of the market ladies inspired the university students to rebel, and anti-communist students began to organize resistance. The government reacted by arresting suspected anti-communist students in 1952. On March 23, 1952 thousands protested against communism in front of the palace. The next day Árbenz said that anti-communist demonstrations were subversive and would be repressed by the police. The government became increasingly ruthless and López Villatoro had to flee the country. López Villatoro closed his remarks by making a pitch for immediate financial assistance for the Castillo Armas government saying that “the outgoing government looted the treasury and if we are not able to come up with poverty-alleviation programs, people will look to the communists.”¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 69-93

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 97-112

The hearings continued in Washington DC on October 8. American Ambassador to Guatemala John Peurifoy testified that “the Árbenz government, beyond any question, was controlled and dominated by communists who were directed from Moscow.” He argued that the communist leaders of Guatemala interfered in the affairs of their neighbors in order to overthrow established governments. This communist conspiracy presented a serious threat to the United States. When the Guatemalan Supreme Court struck down parts of the Agrarian Reform law, Árbenz simply had the Supreme Court justices removed and replaced by a compliant court.

According to Peurifoy, Guatemala’s communist party took direct orders from Moscow. Seven out of the 11 members of the party’s political committee traveled to Moscow, and most travelled multiple times. “They used all the tricks in Moscow’s bag.” In order to prepare for their crackdown on the opposition in January (1954), they first put out an elaborate conspiracy theory claiming the U.S. Embassy was working with the opposition to overthrow Árbenz. Alleged “plotters” — free labor leaders, businessmen, radio announcers, decent citizens — were all arrested and many tortured, and some killed, Peurifoy said.

Ambassador Peurifoy went on to say that the Kremlin was prepared to invest all it had — money, weapons, and diplomatic resources — to establish a beachhead in Guatemala. Communism was fought by the Guatemalans alone, Peurifoy said. “They won the battle themselves. Now we need to provide the aid to make them a prosperous and progressive member of the family of free nations.” He argued that the communist threat was still latent in Guatemala and that if the

United States did not come through with financial assistance soon, democratic gains in Guatemala were imperiled.

Referring to the torture and murder of suspected regime opponents in the final months of the Árbenz regime, Peurifoy said that the type of torture that took place under the Árbenz regime had never taken place in Guatemala before. It was much more like what happened in the communist takeovers of Eastern Europe.¹⁶¹

During the first public hearing in Los Angeles on October 14, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico William O'Dwyer told the panel that "the success of Castillo Armas's 250 soldiers against 6,000 Guatemalan regular army is an inspiration to freemen everywhere as well as to the 800 million trapped behind the Iron Curtain. Every nation of the hemisphere is watching to see if we help Castillo Armas out with the economic resources he desperately needs, or if we demure. US foreign policy is on trial. Communism was routed in Guatemala four months ago and we have not sent a penny to help the new government. If we don't provide assistance to Latin America, the social and economic stresses in those countries will empower the communists."¹⁶²

Director of Central American Affairs at the Department of State, Raymond G. Leddy, testified on October 15 that to understand the threat to the United States from communist aggression in Guatemala, it is important to understand the global threat from communism and the role Guatemala played in the bigger picture. "The eruption of international communism into

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 113-140

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 158-194

Guatemala was no isolated event. It was part of the Soviet plan for global domination.”

Arévalo opened the door to communism in Guatemala by inviting leading communists from around Latin America and Europe to come and help design the institutions of the new state after the fall of the Ubico dictatorship, Leddy asserted, adding that communists filled the gap in trained political leadership that was missing in Guatemala after decades of dictatorship.

Guatemalans were eager for economic and social progress, and the communists — posing as nationalists — promised it. They identified themselves with the interests of the poor. While they were never many in number, the communists were formidably well organized. They created their own “Guatemalan way” of taking-over power by infiltrating the state and seizing the national revolutionary movement. Communists in Guatemala used their control of the state to export subversion to Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Panama. If the communists hadn’t been defeated in Guatemala, the other countries of the isthmus would have toppled over like dominos, Leddy argued.

In response to a question from Congressman Alvin Bentley III (R-MI), Leddy said that US assistance funds for the Castillo Armas government were being debated, but no new funds had yet been provided. The funds were being held up by the Foreign Operations Administration that has authority over them. Chairman Hillings expressed disappointment that Harold Stassen, Administrator of the Foreign Operations Administration, has not moved quickly to support the non-communist government of Guatemala and said he was prepared to hold hearings in Washington to see how to free up that money for Guatemala.¹⁶³

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 194-216

The only dissonant voice in the hearings came from Eugene Fuson, a reporter for the San Diego Union. In his testimony on the final day of the hearings, Fuson outlined his view of the hypocrisy of United States policy in Latin America and argued that U.S. policy had done a lot to increase the appeal of communism in the hemisphere. He said that “the ‘Good Neighbor Policy’ - where we preach democracy but uphold dictators like Ubico, Somoza and Trujillo - is resented in Latin America and is the communists’ greatest weapon against us.” Poverty and hunger are the fertilizer of communism, and yet the United States’ Latin American neighbors see the United States dumping millions of dollars into France and Western Europe, while doing nothing about poverty in Latin America. Fuson argued that American diplomats were imperious and detached, and that Latin Americans believe that the U.S. just wanted to exploit them and would do so at every turn. Many Guatemalans joined the communist party not because they shared their ideology, but because they hated the United States.¹⁶⁴

The hearings, which got a lot of coverage in the U.S. media, ended on October 15. The focal point of the hearings was the call for urgent financial support of the Castillo Armas regime, with the threat that communism might rear its head again in Guatemala if Castillo Armas wasn’t able to deliver some measure of social welfare. While the Committee heard testimony and reviewed documentation outlining human rights abuses throughout Árbenz’s presidency, the pivotal evidence linking Árbenz to mass killings of opponents strengthened the case in the public’s imagination that he was just like the repressive communist regimes of Eastern Europe, and implied that the United States had been justified in playing a role in his removal. Photographs of the disinterment of three mass grave sites (Escuintla, Santa María Cauqué and Antigua) showed

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 246-259

how Árbenz's secret police, in the case of Santa María, had taken political prisoners from Guatemala City to this rural area near the capital, castrated them and then shot them and buried them in a mass grave only days before the fall of Árbenz.¹⁶⁵ The massacres in Escuintla and Antigua were carried out by local communist militias. A total of 40 bodies were disinterred at the three sites. One of the Guatemalan witnesses, Raul Midence Rivera, estimated that in the weeks after the fall of Árbenz, Liberation forces exhumed over 300 bodies of suspected opposition members killed by the Árbenz regime in its final hours.¹⁶⁶

Allies of Árbenz acknowledged that the torture and killings took place, though everyone tried to deflect blame. When Arévalo ran for president again in 1963 he wrote an open letter to the people of Guatemala in which he tried to distance himself from the Árbenz legacy and blamed Árbenz for "obligating the police to engage in repugnant torture and committing crimes against the lives of political adversaries."¹⁶⁷ Árbenz's Foreign Minister, Guillermo Toriello, did not try to deny the killings in his 1955 book defending the Árbenz regime. He argued rather that under Guatemalan law treason is punished by death, so these killings could not be considered murders but rather legitimate executions (ignoring the fact that there were no trials). Furthermore, he argued, Árbenz himself never authorized the killings.¹⁶⁸ One of Guatemala's leading journalists, Oscar Clemente Marroquín, wrote in an op ed in *La Hora* newspaper on May 10, 1966, that if

¹⁶⁵ "Espeluznantes Crímenes Salen a Luz," *El Imparcial*, July 1, 1954, p. 1

¹⁶⁶ September 28, 1954, Subcommittee on Latin America of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression House of Representatives, 83rd Congress. Chairman of the Subcommittee is Hon. Patrick J. Hillings (R-CA)

¹⁶⁷ Arévalo, Juan José, *Carta Política al Pueblo de Guatemala al Haber Aceptado la Candidatura Presidencial*, Guatemala: Editorial San Antonio, 1963, p. 7; Ordóñez Jonama, Ramito, *Un Sueño de Primavera*, Guatemala: Universidad Francisco Marroquín, 2019, p. 70

¹⁶⁸ Toriello, Guillermo, *La Batalla de Guatemala*, Ediciones Cuadernos Americanos, México D.F., 1955, p. 198-9

Árbenz himself did not order the execution of suspected opponents, he at a minimum tolerated it. He notes that the prison in Guatemala City where political prisoners were detained was right in the middle of Zone One and that the cries of those being tortured could be heard for blocks around.¹⁶⁹

American journalists reported on the mass killings when the exhumed bodies were taken to Guatemala City in the days after the Liberation Army marched into the capital. Historians outside Guatemala, however, have largely minimized or ignored the torture and killing by the Árbenz regime of suspected opponents. Of the executions, historian Piero Gleijeses says only that the United States Congress exaggerated their importance.¹⁷⁰ Journalists Kinzer and Schlesinger describe them as “allegations” used by the CIA for propaganda purposes¹⁷¹ and argue that “accusations of brutality and repression” by Árbenz were unjustified.¹⁷² Historian Nick Cullather acknowledges that in the final weeks of the Árbenz regime “the police would cast aside scruples and move decisively to suppress the remnants of the opposition,” but he stops short of mentioning the massacres and blames the police brutality on their having fallen for a CIA provocation.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ Ordóñez Jonama, Ramito, *Un Sueño de Primavera*, Guatemala: Universidad Francisco Marroquín, 2019, p. 69

¹⁷⁰ Gleijeses, Piero, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States*. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 318

¹⁷¹ Kinzer, Stephen and Schlesinger Jr., Arthur, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 220

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 203

¹⁷³ Cullather, Nick, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 67

Historian Stephen Streeter did not address the accusations of human rights violations that the Congressional hearing documented, but says that the six-days of hearings didn't achieve their goal as they resulted in an increase of U.S. assistance to Guatemala of only \$1,000,000, not the \$280,000,000 requested by the Castillo Armas government.¹⁷⁴ Richard Immerman similarly does not mention the mass killings of suspected opposition members in the waning days of the Árbenz regime, but does briefly comment on the Congressional hearings of September and October, 1954 to say that they were biased in their treatment of Árbenz.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ Streeter, Stephen M., *Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961*, Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies Ohio University, 2000, p. 115

¹⁷⁵ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982 , p. 180-181

Chapter 7: The McCarthy Effect

The fear that communists had infiltrated the United States government became a major political issue in the late 1920's and resulted in the creation by the House of Representatives in 1938 of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) to investigate allegations of disloyalty and communist sympathies by common American citizens and government officials. Following the model of the HUAC, Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) carried out a relentless campaign to root out suspected communists inside the United States Government while he was Chairman of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, holding dramatic televised hearings that gripped the nation. His confrontational style intimidated all who were summoned to give testimony before his committee.¹⁷⁶ McCarthy's reign of terror, which coincided with the time frame in which the Eisenhower administration was confronting Árbenz, had a profound effect on Congress¹⁷⁷ and undoubtedly influenced the strong, bipartisan stance against growing communist influence in Guatemala. Historian Waldir José Rampinelli wrote that it is impossible to understand the obsession with removing Árbenz from power without taking into consideration the "Cold War hysteria" at the time and the fact that "McCarthyism was at its pinnacle."¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ Lamboley, Christel, *Le MacCarthysme ou la Peur Rouge: La Croisade Américaine Contre le Communisme*, Namur (France): Lemaitre Publishing, 2015, p. 18-19

¹⁷⁷ Caro, Robert A., *The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Master of the Senate*, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2002, p. 543

¹⁷⁸ Rampinelli, Waldir José, "Capitalismo em Regiões Atrasadas: Agência Central de Inteligência, Departamento de Estado e Empresa Multinacional Derrubam o Governo de Arbens na Guatemala (1950-1954)," *Textos de Economia*, Vol 10, Iss 1; Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brazil, *Textos de Economia*, Vol 10, Iss 1, 2007, P. 95

The situation in Guatemala, however, was not high on McCarthy's agenda. McCarthy was one of the leaders of the Republican isolationist bench in the Senate who argued for reduced American involvement outside the country's borders.¹⁷⁹ The Senate Government Operations Committee, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations which he chaired never discussed the Árbenz regime or communist influence in Guatemala. The only time McCarthy raised the issue of communist influence in Guatemala on the floor of the Senate was on May 19, 1954 when he said that United States interests took a serious beating with the fall of Dien Bien Phu (French Indochina) and followed up by stating that Guatemala was under the thumb of the communists and that Moscow wanted to sweep into the rest of Latin America from Guatemala.¹⁸⁰ Without defending Árbenz specifically, Senator Dennis Chávez (D-NM) challenged McCarthy's interpretation of the situation in Guatemala arguing that if only the United Fruit Company would have paid a decent wage to its workers in Guatemala, the country would never have fallen under the influence of communism.¹⁸¹

In 1950, McCarthy accused Deputy Undersecretary of State for Administration John Peurifoy (who would later be U.S. Ambassador in Guatemala City in charge of implementing Operation PBSuccess) of protecting State Department officers of questionable loyalty from the oversight of the HUAC. While Peurifoy didn't back down to McCarthy, some suggest that the accusation

¹⁷⁹ Caro, Robert A., *The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Master of the Senate*, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2002, p. 527-9

¹⁸⁰ Joseph McCarthy (MI). "The War on Communism." *Congressional Record* 83-2 (1954-0519) p. 6817-20. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: July 3, 2019.

¹⁸¹ Dennis Chávez (NM). "The War on Communism." *Congressional Record* 83-2 (1954-0519) p. 6817-9. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: July 3, 2019.

made Peurifoy determined to prove his anti-communist bonafides and that that impacted his attitude towards Árbenz.¹⁸²

While Eisenhower administration officials took measures to not get on the wrong side of McCarthy, there is no evidence that they consulted him on foreign policy matters. *Newsweek* journalists Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger, in their book *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, write that CIA Director Allen Dulles never informed Senator Joseph McCarthy of the impending CIA operation in Guatemala despite McCarthy's threat on June 2, 1954, less than two weeks before the Castillo Armas invasion, to investigate "communists" in the CIA.¹⁸³

McCarthy is only known to have expressed his views about Árbenz to the press once. On March 7, 1953, McCarthy told the *Chicago Defender* that the United States official radio Voice of America news broadcasts were "watering down" communist influence in Guatemala by describing demonstrators who were protesting against Árbenz as simply "democratic," rather than "anti-communist." But as other Senators and Representatives castigated Árbenz in the press regularly, especially in 1954, McCarthy was uncharacteristically silent.¹⁸⁴

Despite his apparent lack of focus on developments in Guatemala, McCarthy's anti-communist crusade forced Senators and Congressmen to take a harder, less nuanced stance on communist

¹⁸² Kinzer, Stephen and Schlesinger Jr., Arthur, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997., p. 134

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 157

¹⁸⁴ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, P. 115

threats around the world, including Guatemala.¹⁸⁵ Biographers of several Senators and Congressmen note that McCarthyism forced American legislators to prove their anti-communist credentials by taking a hardline public stance against communist adventurism. This undoubtedly impacted the stand of many legislators on Árbenz. No one wanted to be seen as accommodating to a communist-influenced regime less than 500 miles from the Texas border.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 102

Chapter 8: Congressional Views of Jacobo Árbenz in the Early Years After His Fall: A Symbol of the Perils of Communism and the Need for US Action

There was little critical reevaluation by members of Congress of the Árbenz legacy in the first years after his fall. Between 1955 and 1961, Republicans and Democrats agreed that the Árbenz regime had presented a security threat to the United States, that its removal had made the hemisphere safer, and that its successor governments needed to be supported in order to keep communism from rearing its head again in the hemisphere. The Cuban revolution, the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion and the emergence of a Marxist insurgency in Guatemala in 1960, however, led to a gradual if inconsistent reappraisal of Árbenz's role in Guatemala. Between 1961 and 1983 neither the Republicans nor the Democrats had a partisan position on Árbenz. Some Republican and Democratic legislators used the Árbenz story to argue for greater social reforms and human rights protections in Guatemala, while others from both parties used Árbenz as a cautionary tale for what could happen if the United States did not stand up to the Kremlin across Latin America. The election of Ronald Reagan and the implementation of his controversial Central American policy polarized Congress and drove legislators to reconsider the Árbenz regime and the social and economic reforms it had advanced. Between 1983 and 1996, the Árbenz narrative was used (almost entirely by Democrats) as a morality tale for why the United States should not support right-wing military regimes and paramilitary forces in Central America.

Public opinion regarding Árbenz also underwent a significant transition between 1955 and 1996. During this period the New York Times printed 308 articles and editorials that drew specifically on the legacy of Jacobo Árbenz. Between 1955 and 1961, the Times referred to Árbenz or the

Árbenz regime primarily as “communist,” “pro-communist” or “communist infiltrated.” By 1983 the Times had changed their qualifier for Árbenz to “left leaning,” “freely elected,” and “reformist.” The transformation of Árbenz in the Times mirrored his reinvention by the U.S. Congress, reflecting how changing political circumstances influenced journalists and legislators to redefine the Árbenz story to fit contemporary battles over Central American policy.

The evolution of Congressional views and uses of the Árbenz narrative was gradual. During the Árbenz presidency (1951-1954) there was a bipartisan consensus in Congress that the Guatemalan regime was giving communism a beachhead in the Western Hemisphere. Congressmen from both parties pressured the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to do something about it. Árbenz’s fall from power in June 1954 did not remove him from the discussion in Congress over U.S. Latin American policy, however. The government of Col. Carlos Castillo Armas that replaced Árbenz inherited an empty treasury and had limited resources to consolidate its “liberation” of Guatemala. Senator Alexander Wiley (R-WI), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and leader of the anti-communist right wing in the Republican Senate caucus, told his fellow Senators on March 14, 1955 that the United States had been fortunate in the overthrow of Árbenz whose regime had “evolved into a complete Soviet-styled dictatorship,” and that as a result the United States should approve a 5-year, \$100 million aid package of fiscal support, food support, and technical assistance for the Castillo Armas administration.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ Alexander Wiley (R-WI) *Congressional Record* (1955-0314) p. 2819-20. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

Political scientist Susanne Jonas in her 1991 book *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power* argues that shortly after the fall of Árbenz a “Guatemala lobby” emerged that pressured Congress to fund the Castillo Armas government. According to Jonas, this lobby — “a motley band of corrupt U.S. legislators” - was under the influence of “Sunbelt firms” that wanted to invest in Guatemala.¹⁸⁷ Historian Stephen Streeter argues that there is little evidence to support Jonas’s contention that there was a formal, organized private sector lobbying effort, but that it is clear, nonetheless, that in 1955 and 1956 there were a number of Congressmen and Senators who were determined to secure U.S. funding to ensure the success of the Castillo Armas government. He acknowledges that they were lobbied by a number of actors, including anti-Árbenz congressmen, the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, the State Department and firms in the employ of the Guatemalan government, but Streeter tries to draw a distinction between that and Jonas’s description of a large scale American corporate lobbying effort for which he found no evidence.¹⁸⁸

Legislators from both parties, responding to appeals from constituents and the prevailing Cold War ethos, had stuck their necks out to call for the removal of the threat of a communist enclave in the Americas between 1950-1954. They did not want to see the anti-communist successor government fall for lack of financial support. Traditional anti-communist hawks like Senator Alexander Wiley (R-WI) were not the only ones calling on the Eisenhower administration to consolidate its victory in Guatemala by shoring up the Castillo Armas government.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ Jonas, Susanne, *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, p. 32-3, 57-8

¹⁸⁸ Streeter, Stephen M., *Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961*, Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies Ohio University, 2000, p. 109-132

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 137-8

Some academics, however, have questioned why Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. Congress uniformly supported the Eisenhower administration's coup that overthrew Árbenz and persisted in seeing him as a communist in the early years after Árbenz's fall. Historian Piero Gleijeses writes that the U.S. Congress and media, in consistently describing Árbenz as a communist threat, "mistook the aggressor for the villain." He says that Congress and the U.S. media naively "joined in the celebration of what the New York Times called 'the first successful anti-communist revolt since the last war.'"¹⁹⁰ With the stalemate in the Korean war which had cost close to 40,000 U.S. lives and the fall of Dien Bien Phu only weeks before Árbenz's resignation, Congressmen needed a victory against Kremlin adventurism and that undoubtedly influenced their view of the fall of Árbenz as a defeat for international communism.

From the earliest days of the Castillo Armas presidency, the Government of Guatemala was in a dire financial situation requiring significant foreign assistance. The suddenness of the fall of Árbenz coupled with the slow-moving Congressional appropriations process left the Castillo Armas government without significant financial aid well into 1955. Congressional debates over financial assistance to the Castillo Armas government in 1955 and 1956 drew heavily on the concept that hemispheric security had been strengthened by the fall of Árbenz. In April and May 1955, the State Department's Bureau of American Republics Affairs (ARA) decided to ask Congress to greatly increase assistance funds to Guatemala, over and above the White House's

¹⁹⁰ Gleijeses, Piero, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 367-9

initial budget proposal.¹⁹¹ Legislators from both parties were more than happy to support the State Department request.¹⁹²

In the years after the 1954 revolution, legislators from both parties celebrated the fall of Árbenz as a significant blow to the Kremlin and a major development in protecting the United States from the Soviet threat. In June 1955, Representative Robert Sikes (D-FL) commented on the first anniversary of the fall of Árbenz that the date “marked a historic and decisive turning point in the activities of communism in the Western Hemisphere.”¹⁹³ Arguing for greater financial assistance to the Castillo Armas regime, Sikes followed up in February 1956 with a statement arguing that “that courageous little Republic cast off the Communist yoke one and a half years ago. The Communists left her treasury stripped. Guatemala needed prompt and effective help. The help given has been slow and inadequate.”¹⁹⁴

As the Congressional funding debate continued into the summer, Albert Morano (R-CT) told his colleagues on June 5 that “the courage of the present Government of Guatemala in overthrowing

¹⁹¹ Streeter, Stephen M., *Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961*, Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies Ohio University, 2000, p. 122-4

¹⁹² Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII, Memorandum of Conversations, Department of State, Washington, April 28-29, 1955, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v07/d27>, accessed April 2, 2020; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico: Caribbean, Volume VI, Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting, The White House, Washington, March 25, 1955, 9:05-10:45 a.m. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v06/d59>

¹⁹³ Robert Sikes (D-FL) *Congressional Record* (1955-0630) p. 9600. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

¹⁹⁴ Robert Sikes (D-FL) *Congressional Record* (1956-0209) p. 2459. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020; Streeter, Stephen M., *Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961*, Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies Ohio University, 2000, p. 127

the previous Communist regime and in moving effectively to stabilize the security and economy of the country has evoked the admiration of the whole free world. President Castillo Armas is a leader who is determined to make the Guatemala experiment a living reality and an example for the millions of people now behind the Iron Curtain who yearn for freedom and independence.”¹⁹⁵ On the eve of the June 6 vote on funding for the Castillo Armas government, Morano added: “As recently as 1954 we witnessed the successful overthrow of the Communist-supported Árbenz government in Guatemala. This was a government under the domination of international communism, not in the Far East but in our very backyard in Central America. More aid needs to be given to Guatemala.”¹⁹⁶ Seventeen congressmen (11 Democrats, 6 Republicans) spoke up in favor of increasing assistance to Castillo Armas’s Guatemala, and ultimately Congress voted to triple economic and military aid.

In addition to the annual budget exercise, Congressmen spoke up on the floor of Congress from time to time to congratulate Castillo Armas for having removed the “communist” Árbenz regime. Legislators wanted to identify themselves with a foreign policy decision that continued to be very popular in the United States. In February 1957, Senator George Smathers (D-FL) introduced into the Congressional Record an article from US News and World Report of February 8, 1957 showing how Guatemala had flourished economically since throwing out a “pro-communist government.”¹⁹⁷ The success of the Castillo Armas government would justify

¹⁹⁵ Albert Morano (R-CT) *Congressional Record* (1956-0605) p. 9552. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

¹⁹⁶ Albert Morano (R-CT) *Congressional Record* (1956-0606) p. 9697. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 7, 2020

¹⁹⁷ George Smathers (D-FL) *Congressional Record* (1956-0223) p. 3190. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

Congress's role in the overthrow of Árbenz. By the same token, if the Castillo Armas government fell for lack of financial support, it would cast doubt on the wisdom of replacing Árbenz in the first place. Perhaps as a way of justifying his own regular anti-Árbenz statements in the lead up to Operation PBSuccess, in July 1957 Representative Patrick Hillings (R-CA) introduced into the Congressional Record a news article saying that 3 years in, the Castillo Armas government had worked miracles in Guatemala.¹⁹⁸

But even as Republicans and Democrats celebrated the removal of Árbenz and argued for greater assistance to Castillo Armas, there were incipient signs of congressional concern with the lack of reform and growing repression under Castillo Armas. In the months after Castillo Armas took power, thousands of suspected communists were arrested with little or no evidence,¹⁹⁹ and the government tolerated “vigilante justice” against labor union members and peasants, particularly in rural Guatemala.²⁰⁰ In January 1957, Representative Hale Boggs (D-LA) introduced into the Congressional Record an article from the St. Louis Post Dispatch of August 28, 1956 saying that Castillo Armas needs to “implement social reforms and stop arresting the moderate opposition (other than the Reds).”²⁰¹ With economic and social reforms at a standstill, Senators Dennis Chávez (D-NM) and George Smathers (D-FL) got into an argument on the floor of the Senate on June 5, 1957 over the lack of initiatives by Castillo Armas to improve the lot of the poor. Chávez argued that after the fall of Árbenz “the Grace Lines and the United Fruit Co. are doing

¹⁹⁸ Patrick Hillings (R-CA) *Congressional Record* (1957-0719), p. 12209. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 8, 2020

¹⁹⁹ Weld, Kirsten, *Paper Cadavers: The Archives of Dictatorship in Guatemala*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2014, p. 87

²⁰⁰ Streeter, Stephen M., *Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961*, Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies Ohio University, 2000, p. 40-41

²⁰¹ Hale Boggs (D-LA) *Congressional Record* (1957-0128) p. A529-30. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 7, 2020

well; but the Guatemalan woman is still walking from Amatitlán to Guatemala City,” while Smathers posited that the problem wasn’t Castillo Armas, and that the solution was more U.S. economic assistance.²⁰² If Chávez was a consistent advocate in the Senate for social justice, Smathers was an unrelenting proponent of greater economic development assistance for Latin America throughout his time in the Senate to the point where some of his colleagues called him “the Senator from Latin America.”²⁰³

The nascent Congressional debate over human rights violations and the lack of reforms following the fall of Árbenz came to a sudden end on July 26, 1957 when President Carlos Castillo Armas was assassinated. Republicans and Democrats in both houses of Congress read out long eulogies to the man who had kept communism from grabbing a toehold in the Western Hemisphere. Senator Dennis Chávez (D-NM), who had earlier complained about the lack of social and economic reforms under Castillo Armas, introduced a resolution memorializing Castillo Armas which read: “Be it resolved, That the Senate of the United States is shocked and saddened at the murder of Col. Carlos Castillo Armas, President of the Republic of Guatemala, by a political assassin, a most wanton and despicable act that not only has robbed the people of Guatemala of their great leader, but which also has deprived the cause of freedom throughout the world, of one of its most valiant champions; be it further resolved that the Senate of the United States hereby extends its deepest sympathy to the people of Guatemala and to the widow, Señora Odilia Palomo de Castillo Armas, for their tragic loss; be it further resolved, that the Secretary of

²⁰² Dennis Chávez (D-NM) *Congressional Record* (1957-0502) p. 6271. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 8, 2020

²⁰³ Johnson, Robert David, *Congress and the Cold War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 84

the Senate is hereby directed to request the Department of State to forward copies of this resolution as expeditiously as possible to the United States Embassy in Guatemala, to be officially presented to the President of the Republic, the Presiding Officer of the National Congress, and to Señora Castillo.”²⁰⁴

On August 26, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX) followed up on the condolences for Castillo Armas by stating that the United States “must continue supporting Guatemala whose fight against communism kept the Kremlin out of the Americas.” He introduced two press articles saying that withdrawing aid from Castillo Armas’s successor would be a big setback for the global anti-communist fight.²⁰⁵

The assassination of President Castillo Armas led to a period of political instability in Guatemala where political sectors from the extreme right and extreme left jockeyed for influence. The State Department was concerned that “the US public and the US Congress simply would not tolerate supporting a government tainted with communism”²⁰⁶ and urged the U.S. Embassy to warn Guatemalans of the consequences (i.e. Congress cutting off financial assistance) of giving power back to political parties on the left.

²⁰⁴ Dennis Chavez (D-NM) *Congressional Record* (1957-0730) p. 12972. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 8, 2020

²⁰⁵ Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX) *Congressional Record* (1957-0826) p. 15887-8. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 8, 2020

²⁰⁶ “Danger Posed by Lack of Moderate Center in Guatemala,” State Department Secret Cable to U.S. Embassy Guatemala, November 26, 1957, DNSA Collection: Guatemala and the US, Text form *Proquest Digital National Security Archive*; Accessed: October 16, 2020

While the 1955-1961 period was characterized overall by bipartisan support for Eisenhower's policy of removing Árbenz and Congressional concern that events in Cuba could lead Árbenz to try to return to power, there was one Congressman — Representative Charles Porter (D-OR) — who questioned the wisdom of having removed Árbenz in the first place. Though praising the election of Guatemalan President Ydígoras Fuentes, in January 1958 (before Castro's invasion of Cuba), Porter questioned on the floor of Congress whether "the U.S. acted too hastily and with a heavy hand in removing Árbenz." He introduced into the Congressional Record an article titled "Has Intervention in Guatemala Paid Off?" by David L. Graham, from *The New Republic* of September 16, 1957 which argued "Most of the shooting occurred after Castillo took over, when some 250 Arbencistas were executed in 'spontaneous uprisings.' Later Castillo went through the motions of being elected president (by a farcical yes-or-no plebiscite in the Nazi-Communist tradition, with less than 10 percent of the population even voting). But he was our man in Guatemala. Did the Communists have such a grip on the country that it was necessary for Castillo to purge the unions, abolish all political parties, disband Congress, and scrap the constitution? Guatemala is slipping fast toward a stubborn dictatorship that provides grievances for opposition from all quarters, and tries to crush all opponents under the slogan of anti-Communism."²⁰⁷ Porter was alone, however, in questioning U.S. policy in Guatemala in 1958 and his concerns over the removal of Árbenz would not resurface in Congress for many years.

If the assassination of Castillo Armas tempered Congressional concerns over the lack of social reforms and human rights violations in the aftermath of Árbenz's ouster, the fall of Havana to

²⁰⁷ Charles Porter (D-OR) *Congressional Record* (1958-0127) p. A2443. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Fidel Castro's rebel army generated fears that democracy itself was still imperiled in the hemisphere. The Cold War anxieties that had led Congressmen to support the removal of Jacobo Árbenz came back to the surface and displaced concerns that Árbenz's successors had failed to address the core inequalities that had spawned a communist threat in Guatemala in the first place. And Cuba was not the only part of Latin America where the threat of communism was emerging. In early 1959, well-armed Marxist rebels began an insurgent campaign in Eastern Guatemala, leading the Guatemalan military to carry out counter-insurgency operations from their base in Zacapa that included human rights violations against the local population.²⁰⁸ In July 1959, Representative Daniel Flood (D-PA) introduced into the Congressional Record an article from the *Washington Daily News* of July 9, 1959 talking about how the leftists were coming back to power in Guatemala, noting the recent election of Mayor of Guatemala City Luís Galich whose brother Manuel had been a senior advisor to Árbenz.²⁰⁹ In September, Representative Gerald Flynn (D-WI) introduced an article from *Latin American Events* saying: "the communists, under the leadership of Moscow, Montevideo and Mexico City, are trying to overthrow the President of Guatemala, Gen. Ydigoras Fuentes, and intend to replace him with ex-President Árbenz, who is one of the chief Communist leaders in Latin America. All of this could happen, as has been the case in Cuba, with the complete indifference of the remaining countries of the continent, who have not yet decided to enforce the Caracas Declaration, which should be taken more like a preventive obligation than a punitive action."²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ "El Ejército Persigue a los Guerrillos en Zacapa," *Prensa Libre*, February 27, 1959, headline and p. 2

²⁰⁹ Daniel Flood (D-PA) *Congressional Record* (1959-0716) p. A6153-4. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

²¹⁰ Gerald Flynn (D-WI) *Congressional Record* (1959-0915) p. 8264. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

On May 19, 1960, former President Árbenz moved to Havana, Cuba, and began working with the Castro regime in a propaganda effort to overthrow Guatemalan President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes. Árbenz participated in radio programs aimed at Guatemala where he encouraged Guatemalans to take up arms against Ydígoras.²¹¹ This alarmed American legislators who had pressed for the Eisenhower administration to take action against communism in Guatemala in 1954. In June 1960, Representative Robert Sikes (D-FL) warned of “the current effort of the Árbenz Communist group, now associated with Castro in Cuba, to regain a foothold by force in Guatemala.”²¹²

Legislators began to raise the example of U.S. covert action against Árbenz as a model for what could be done to address a similar threat from Castro’s Cuba. In September, Representative Daniel Flood (D-PA) argued that “had we handled Cuba as adroitly as the Árbenz regime in Guatemala, we wouldn’t have these problems with Castro today.”²¹³ In a Congressional debate in March 1961, Flood added “when Árbenz saw that his Red jig was up, he took all the money remaining in the Guatemalan treasury that he could lay his hands on and fled to the protection of Communist Czechoslovakia.”²¹⁴ Flood’s Democratic colleague from Florida added “Can you imagine the repercussions throughout Latin America if the former Communist President of

²¹¹ Sabino, Carlos, *Árbenz, Una Biografía*, Guatemala: Grafía ETC., 2019, p. 285-292

²¹² Robert Sikes (D-FL) *Congressional Record* (1960-0617) p. 13136. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

²¹³ Daniel Flood (D-PA) *Congressional Record* (1960-0902) p. A6746. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

²¹⁴ Daniel Flood (D-PA) *Congressional Record* (1961-0313) p. A1734. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Guatemala, Jacobo Árbenz, should succeed in returning from his exile in Castro's island Red citadel to the presidential palace in Guatemala?"²¹⁵

Like Congress, the U.S. media between 1955 and 1961 continued to view the Árbenz regime as having been a tool of the Kremlin. The adjectives used by the American press to define Árbenz illustrate best how the American media, and public opinion, understood Árbenz. In 1955, articles in the *New York Times* primarily referred to Árbenz and his government as “communist,” “pro-communist,” or “communist dominated.” Between 1956 and 1959, editors at the *Times* switched to calling the Árbenz regime “communist infiltrated,” suggesting that it was not Árbenz but his advisors who were communist, but switched back to “pro-communist” in 1960 when Árbenz showed up in Havana after the fall of Batista and used Cuban radio to call for a revolution in Guatemala.²¹⁶ It wasn't until 1963 that the *Times* dropped the more negative qualifier “pro-communist” and went back to calling the Árbenz regime “communist infiltrated.”

²¹⁵ Robert Sikes (D-FL) *Congressional Record* (1961-0316) p. 4227. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

²¹⁶ Sabino, Carlos, *Árbenz, Una Biografía*, Guatemala: Grafía ETC., 2019, p. 292

Chapter 9: The Period of Bipartisan Questioning of the Árbenz Legacy - 1961-1983

In 1960 a small group of rebellious military officers, trained and equipped by the new Cuban regime, joined Marxist guerrillas already fighting in the mountains of Eastern Guatemala setting the stage for an internal conflict that would last for 36 years and eventually spread to much of the country. They were not looking to restore Árbenz to power, but used his overthrow as the basis to challenge the legitimacy of the Guatemalan government.²¹⁷ Árbenz publicly encouraged the rebels in their fight. The beginning of the Marxist insurgency in Guatemala, the failed Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis heightened the awareness in the U.S. Congress of potential security threats to the United States emanating from Latin America and the fragility of the anti-Communist regime in Guatemala City. The Congressional response to growing repression and human rights violations by a succession of military regimes in Guatemala was tempered by a fear of growing communist adventurism, and the Congressional record between 1961 and 1983 shows that legislators from both parties staked out positions for and against the counterinsurgency campaigns of successive Guatemalan governments. Neither the Republicans nor the Democrats had a clear partisan position on Guatemala policy during this period.

The failure of post-Árbenz governments to address the problem of grinding poverty and political exclusion in Guatemala was a frequent theme of congressional debates. In late 1961 and 1962 Senator Ernest Gruening (D-AK) and Representative Emanuel Celler (D-NY) argued that the absence of badly needed social and economic reforms in Guatemala under U.S.-supported

²¹⁷ Kinzer, Stephen and Schlesinger Jr., Arthur, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 253

military regimes since 1954 threatened to undermine President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress achievements in Guatemala.²¹⁸ They focused particularly on the resistance of the Guatemalan private sector to pay taxes to fund reforms. Gruening said that Kennedy's Alliance for Progress program was predicated on the notion that Latin America's rich "would prefer to pay taxes now than lose it all to the communists later. That hasn't proven true in Guatemala."²¹⁹

In March 1963, General Enrique Peralta Azurdia overthrew the elected government of General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, leading Republicans and Democrats alike to complain that this ushered in a period of democratic uncertainty. Representative Michael Feighan (D-OH) asked if the right-wing military dictatorship of Peralta Azurdia was any better than the left-wing dictatorship (that was overthrown in 1954).²²⁰ Senator Wayne Morse (R-OR) argued that democracy was deteriorating in Guatemala and that the United States should cut off economic assistance. In 1966, Morse introduced into the Congressional Record a press article describing torture and executions by the Peralta Azurdia government.²²¹ Concerns over the lack of economic reform, democratic backsliding and an increase in human rights violations, however, did not result in a reappraisal of Árbenz, much less regret at his removal.

Senators continued to defend the replacement of Árbenz by a right-wing military regime even in the face of growing bipartisan doubts about the direction Guatemala was heading. In February

²¹⁸ Emanuel Celler (D-NY) *Congressional Record* (1962-0523) p. 9109-10. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

²¹⁹ Ernest Gruening (D-AK) *Congressional Record* (1961-0810) p. 15435. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

²²⁰ Michael Feighan (D-OH) *Congressional Record* (1963-0408) p. A2092. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

²²¹ Wayne Morse (R-OR) *Congressional Record* (1963-1009) p. 19120. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

1964, Senator Thomas Dodd (D-MA) spoke on the floor of the Senate to defend the overthrow of the “pro-communist regime” of Árbenz. He called the coup against Árbenz a success and added that even though “others have criticized the CIA for overthrowing Árbenz, he was moving in the same direction as Castro to turn Guatemala into a communist state.”²²² Ten years after the fall of Árbenz, this was the first statement by an American legislator recognizing the role of the CIA in Árbenz’s overthrow.

In February and March of 1965, amid the expansion of Marxist insurgencies across Latin America and continuing press criticism of repression by the Peralta Azurdia regime, the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held several days of hearings on Latin America. State Department Assistant Secretary of State for ARA Thomas Mann and U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John Bell were two of the key witnesses. Assistant Secretary Mann described how the Guatemalan insurgency was anti-American and had carried out attacks against U.S. government property. When Ambassador Bell was asked by Senator Armistead Selden Jr. (D-AL) if Árbenz’s political mentor, former President Juan José Arévalo, was still popular in Guatemala, Ambassador Bell responded that “the air was all gone from Arévalo’s balloon.” If Arévalo had let the communists in the door, “in the Árbenz regime it is obvious that the communists had taken over control.”²²³ The Cuban missile crisis and Cuban support for Marxist insurgencies around the hemisphere had increased concern in Congress over possible communist take overs of other Latin American countries. In

²²² Thomas Dodd (D-MA) *Congressional Record* (1964-0217) p. 2900-01. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

²²³ Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, February 16 and 25, March 2, 10, 16, 30, 1965, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 2, 2020

that climate, legislators were prepared to turn a blind eye to the excesses of far-right military governments rather than accept new Cubas in the hemisphere.

In 1968 the murder of John Gordon Mein, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala, and two senior U.S. Military Attaché's in Guatemala City renewed concern in Congress that communism in Guatemala was a direct security threat to the United States. Representative John Rarick (D-LA) said that the murder of US Army Col. John Webber and Navy Lt.Cdr. Ernest Munro in Guatemala City gave the United States an "obligation to help Guatemalans stay free from communism."²²⁴ Others, however, drew a different conclusion from the fighting in Guatemala. In February 1968 Senator James Fulbright (D-AR) introduced to the Congressional Record a report from Maryknoll priest Blase Bonpane saying that Guatemala could become the next Vietnam with hundreds of US military advisors, rampant corruption, and "the United States supporting an oligarchy that represents 2% of country."²²⁵ Representative Thomas "Tip" O'Neil Jr. (D-MA) introduced a separate report by Maryknoll sister Marian Pahl in which she says: "there was benevolent rule and a genuine social revolution under Árbenz" which the United Fruit Company pressured the Eisenhower administration to remove.²²⁶ Contrasting views of Guatemala and Árbenz's role in Guatemala began to emerge as violence in Guatemala escalated in the late 1960's.

²²⁴ John Rarick (D-LA) *Congressional Record* (1968-0122) p. 475. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

²²⁵ James Fulbright (D-AR) *Congressional Record* (1968-0205), p. 2054. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

²²⁶ Thomas O'Neil Jr. (D-MA) *Congressional Record* (1968-0423) p. 10389. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

After 16 years of a peripatetic exile that had taken the Árbenz family to Mexico, France, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Uruguay and Cuba, former President Jacobo Árbenz died of a heart attack that caused him to drown in his bathtub in suburban Mexico City on January 28, 1971.²²⁷

There was very little discussion in Congress of U.S. policy towards Guatemala between 1968 and 1976, but the earthquake that devastated much of highlands Guatemala on February 4, 1976 brought hundreds of foreign journalists and aid workers to the stricken country, resulting collaterally in considerable new press attention to the effects of the ongoing counter-insurgency war. Congressmen diverged widely on how they viewed U.S. policy in Guatemala, but the differences did not at that point fall along strictly partisan lines.

The armed conflict in Guatemala, which had been largely playing out in small skirmishes in obscure locations, took a dramatic turn in May 1978 when the Army massacred Kekchí Indian protesters in the Polochic River valley town of Panzós.²²⁸ It was the first of many large-scale massacres of civilians, mostly Mayan Indians, in the five years that followed. Responding in part to the Panzós massacre, the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations held two days of hearings in early June on “the Implications for U.S Policy of Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador.” The witnesses, drawn largely from academia and American civil society organizations working in

²²⁷ Ex-Guatemala President Arbenz Dies,” *Washington Post*, January 28, 1971, p. D6; “Ex-Guatemalan Leftist Leader Dies,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 28, 1971, p. A4; “Ex-President Arbenz of Guatemala Dies,” *New York Times*, January 28, 1971, p. 39

²²⁸ “Zafarrancho en Panzós: 38 Muertos, 35 Heridos,” *Prensa Libre*, May 30, 1978, headline and p. 18

Central America, were critical of U.S. official support for the governments of Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador. Witnesses Reverend William Wipfler (Director for Latin America of National Council of Churches) and Miles Wolpin (Professor of Political Science, University of New York) suggested that the violence in Central America could be traced back to the overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz. Wipfler contended that while “Árbenz’s ‘Communist government’” was the rationale used for the 1954 revolution, the real reason for overthrowing Árbenz was the expropriation of 200,000 acres of United Fruit Company land. When Representative Donald Fraser (D-MN) asked what role the overthrow of Árbenz played in the violence in Central America in the 1970’s, Rev. Whipfler responded that the overthrow of Árbenz was just the visible element of a broader U.S. economic policy towards Latin America. Professor Wolpin blamed the violence in Central America directly on the CIA for overthrowing the “freely elected government” of Jacobo Árbenz in 1954.²²⁹ A reappraisal of Árbenz was beginning.

As more Americans traveled to Central America and got to see the situation in Guatemala for themselves, and as fears that communist adventurism in the hemisphere presented a direct threat to the United States receded, public opinion regarding Árbenz, particularly in academic quarters, began to change in the early 1980’s. At a hearing of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on International Affairs on July 14, 1981, witness Thomas Anderson, Professor of History at Eastern Connecticut State College, said that the great

²²⁹ “Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador: Implications for U.S. Policy”; Subcommittee on International Organizations, Committee on International Relations. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations. June 8-9, 1976, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: April 2, 2020

exploitation of the working poor by military governments in Guatemala began with the 1954 overthrow of Jacobo Árbenz and that the 1954 coup had disrupted the movement towards a better distribution of wealth in Guatemala. When asked by Rep. Michael Barnes (D-MD) “if we had supported the reformists in 1954, would things be different in Guatemala today?” Anderson responded that “we made a fatal decision back in the 1950's. I think the fatal decision was when we sponsored, through the CIA, the overthrow of the Government of Guatemala in 1954. If we had not gone that route, I think today we would find that the aspiration of land reform in Central America would be largely fulfilled for the people of that region.”²³⁰

Not everyone agreed, however, and with the Cold War still capturing the attention of many Americans, most Congressmen were hesitant to make a break with their long-held views of the communist threat to Guatemala and the possibility that Árbenz could have been the first Fidel Castro. Many Congressional hearings on Guatemala continued to be supportive of U.S. actions in Central America and blamed the Árbenz legacy for the ongoing violence. In April and May 1980, the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings chaired by Representative Gus Yatron (D-PA) that heard from representatives of the Guatemalan-American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) and the Concerned American Women of Guatemala. American hotelier Edward Carrette, representing AmCham, said that Guatemala was threatened by Soviet-Cuban terrorism and that if the United States waited to provide assistance to Guatemala until it was a “perfect society,” the Soviets would have taken over long before then. He did not dispute growing allegations of human rights violations by the

²³⁰ “The Caribbean Basin: Focus on Caribbean Development,” Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, July 14, 1981, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 2, 2020

military government, but argued that the alternative of letting the communist guerrillas take over was not a better outcome for democracy or for human rights. Judith Brown, Vice President of Concerned American Women for Guatemala, said that many in the U.S. Congress “seem to regard the ‘so-called’ mistake the United States made in allowing the CIA to assist in the overthrow of Árbenz in 1954. Make no mistake, this was a popular revolution in Guatemala. Árbenz's opponent was murdered during the campaign and Árbenz was unable to raise any popular support when threatened by an invasion from the Castillo Armas forces. The event which precipitated the overthrow was the unloading of Russian (Sic) arms at Puerto Barrios.”²³¹ As violence once again wracked Guatemala, observers on the right and the left frequently brought the argument on U.S. policy towards Guatemala back to their own interpretations of the Árbenz legacy.

Congressional positions on Guatemala and on Árbenz became more polarized in the early 1980's. A hearing on “Human Rights in Guatemala” held on July 30, 1981 by the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs produced dueling perspectives on the role of Árbenz on the contemporaneous human rights situation in Guatemala. In his opening statement, Chairman Don Bonker (D-WA) quoted an Amnesty International report stating that “tens of thousands of civilians have been tortured and murdered by government troops and security forces or their affiliated right-wing ‘death squads’ since the military took over the government in 1954.” Witness Lars Schoultz of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill added that the US-backed Castillo Armas regime had dismantled

²³¹ Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, April 29 and May 20, 1980, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: April 2, 2020

the progressive reforms of Arévalo and Árbenz, and that since 1954 the Guatemalan electorate had become accustomed to an extraordinarily high level of electoral fraud. Witness Lewis Tambs, from the Department of History of Arizona State University, however, argued that the “communist-riddled regime of Jacobo Árbenz” had lost control of Guatemala because it failed to convince the middle class, the church or the army to support its project.²³² Tambs later went on to be appointed by President Reagan as Ambassador to Colombia.

A hearing of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 9, 1983, similarly produced conflicting views on what lessons the Árbenz legacy provides for U.S. policy in Guatemala. Robert Trudiau, Associate Professor of Science and Director of Latin American Studies at Providence College in Rhode Island, argued that as the Eisenhower administration became more and more hostile to the government of Jacobo Árbenz, American influence in Guatemala diminished. Even after the overthrow of Árbenz, according to Trudiau, many sectors of Guatemalan society continued to ignore U.S. views, leading the military to ignore human rights warnings and the private sector to ignore the call for social and economic reform.²³³

At the same hearing, witness Caesar Sereseres of the University of California at Irvine took a different tack on the implications of the Árbenz story for violence in the 1980’s. He said that

²³² “Human Rights in Guatemala,” Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, July 30, 1981, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: April 3, 2020

²³³ “U.S. Policy Toward Guatemala,” Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, March 9, 1983, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: April 3, 2020

“Árbenz’s election was tainted by his participation in the killing of Arana. Although Árbenz was seeking relatively moderate changes in Guatemala's economic and political order, Washington was alarmed by the fact that these changes were accompanied by an increasingly open relationship between Árbenz and the Guatemalan Communist Party and by a foreign policy sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Faced with the apparent threat of an anti-U.S. regime in Guatemala, the Eisenhower administration decided to intervene in 1954. When the Guatemalan Army refused to support Árbenz’s desire to arm the militias, Árbenz had to resign. It is one of the abounding ironies of Guatemala's political history that both General Ríos-Montt and the young radicals opposing him trace their roots to the decade of revolution. The latter claim a special tie with the ‘unfinished revolution’ of President Árbenz. Even though the ‘liberation’ did not return Guatemala to the pre-1944 era, or even undo most of the major legislation of the Arévalo-Árbenz regimes, it created a sense of ‘history denied’ that has shaped the radical consciousness for 25 years. Idealized and romanticized by middle class intellectuals, the decade of revolution and the radical leaders involved in it have provided today's guerrillas with a mythology and a sense of identity.” Sereseres went on to argue that “the great ambiguity of ideological designations in Guatemala since 1954” makes it tempting to oversimplify the ideological positions of the different actors in Guatemala’s post-1954 history.²³⁴

Journalist Daniel James, who had reported on the fall of Árbenz from his assignment in Guatemala City in 1954 and later wrote the first book on the 1954 revolution titled *Red Design for the Americas*, was invited to give testimony before the Subcommittee on Security and

²³⁴ “U.S. Policy Toward Guatemala,” Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, March 9, 1983, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: April 3, 2020

Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Committee at its hearings in February and March 1982. In response to questions about the situation in Guatemala, James argued that Guatemalan military governments since Árbenz had squandered the opportunity to prove to the Guatemala people that democracy could produce social and economic reforms. “The Guatemalan military are so blind, so stupid, so ignorant, so-greedy, that they are going to pave the way for communism. You know, communism was destroyed there back in 1954. I covered that period as a newsman, and it saddens me how they, the Guatemalan military, have wasted the past 28 years. They had ample opportunity to make a delightful country out of Guatemala which has rich natural resources. They have messed it up, and now we are left with the unenviable task of trying to pick their chestnuts out of the fire. That is what it amounts to.”²³⁵

Reflecting the mixed feelings Congressmen of both parties had regarding the situation in Guatemala as late as the early months of 1983, Representative John Seiberling (D-OH) said on the floor of Congress in April that there was little difference between the Árbenz regime and the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro. He went on to lament, however, that the Reagan administration had decided to “look the other way” when it came to human rights abuses in Guatemala.²³⁶

Dissonance within and between the Republican and Democratic caucuses in Congress regarding Guatemala and the meaning of the Árbenz legacy during the 1961-1983 period was reflected by a similar tentativeness in the treatment of Árbenz by the U.S. media. In the 1960’s the New

²³⁵ “Second Session on the Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion,” Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee on the Judiciary, Senate of the United States, February 26, March 4, 11, and 12, 1982, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: April 3, 2020

²³⁶ John Seiberling (D-OH) *Congressional Record* (1983-0428) p. 10445-6. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: April 10, 2020

York Times primarily used “communist oriented” or “leftist” to refer to Árbenz. The few references to Árbenz in the 1970’s generally qualified him as “leftist” or “left leaning,” though the two extremes of “communist dominated” and “mildly reformist” were also used, reflecting the growing lack of consensus over what the Árbenz legacy meant for a U.S. media audience. Congress and the American media were reassessing Árbenz as global economic and political developments made the Cold War fears of the 1950’s largely irrelevant.

Chapter 10: The Period of Partisan Polarization - The Reagan Effect - 1983-1996

If partisan positions on Guatemala had still not crystallized by early 1983, President Ronald Reagan's confrontation with Congress over support for the Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary Contras began the process of driving a wedge between Republicans and Democrats in Congress on Central American policy more broadly. In late 1982, the Reagan administration sought funding for the Contras through the Defense Appropriations Act of 1983, only to see it denied by a Democratic-controlled Congress through the Boland Amendment. This gave rise to a bitter partisan polarization of Central American policy that continued through 1989, when the George H. W. Bush administration negotiated the "Bipartisan Accord" putting an eventual end to U.S. assistance to the Contras.

A critic of Reagan's Central American policy, the journalist Flora Lewis, wrote in 1982 for the New York Times an article titled "Good Guys, Bad Guys" that warned of the dangers of the emerging partisan polarization and used the Árbenz story to illustrate her point. "One side calls attention to evidence of massacres and atrocities by governments that the U.S. officially supports. The other side charges communist conspiracy. The good guy is whatever is opposed to the bad guy. It is easy to fall into the trap of labeling Árbenz a good guy or a bad guy, but in the end we are bound to be left with bad guys on both sides."²³⁷

As the confrontation over support for the Nicaraguan Contras grew, opponents of Reagan's Central American policy appropriated the symbolism of Árbenz as a morality tale of U.S.

²³⁷ Lewis, Flora, "Good Guys, Bad Guys," *The New York Times*, April 8, 1982, p. A23

intervention-in-Central-America-gone-wrong. In July 1983 Representative James Oberstar (D-MN) compared the Reagan administration's support for the Honduras-based Contras to Eisenhower's support for Honduras-based rebels who overthrew the "reformist minded Árbenz government."²³⁸ In the same Congressional session, Representative Richard Ottinger (D-NY) introduced an article from the July 26, 1983 New York Times titled "Reagan's Big Stick" that argued that President Reagan wanted to invade Sandinista Nicaragua with mercenary Contras in a policy that "may prove far more self-defeating than the C.I.A.'s celebrated overthrow of the Árbenz Government in Guatemala 30 years ago."²³⁹

Demonstrating that some Republicans also had concerns about Reagan's Central American policy and viewed Árbenz as cautionary tale, in April 1985, Representative James Leach (R-IA) argued against US support for the Contras saying: "The historical analogies offered by the sorry debacle at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the CIA overthrow of the Árbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954 indicate both the likelihood of failure as well as the long-term counterproductive effects of any short-term successes."²⁴⁰

Critics of Reagan's support for the right-wing regime of Roberto D'Aubuisson in El Salvador also found Árbenz to be a useful symbol in their effort to draw public attention to the perils of U.S. intervention in Central America. In January 1984, Senator Pete Domenici (D-NM) entered into the congressional record an article from the *Albuquerque Journal* titled "D'Aubuisson's

²³⁸ James Oberstar (D-MN) *Congressional Record* (1983-0728) p. 21454. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

²³⁹ Richard Ottinger (D-NY) *Congressional Record* (1983-0728) p. 21546-7. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

²⁴⁰ James Leach (R-IA) *Congressional Record* (1984-0423) p. 9078. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

Fledgling Party Finds a Mentor in Guatemala” (by Craig Pyes) which argued that D’Aubuisson’s ARENA Party was inspired by the “overthrow of reformist President Jacobo Árbenz.”²⁴¹

Senator Chris Dodd (D-MA) (son of former Senator Thomas Dodd, who had been a staunch opponent of Árbenz and one-time lobbyist for Castillo Armas) introduced another article from the *New York Times* written by Stephen Kinzer, that similarly equated ARENA’s ideology to the Guatemalan MLN (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional) that overthrew Árbenz.²⁴² Arguing in May 1985 against Reagan’s policy in both Nicaragua and El Salvador, Representative Henry González (D-TX) said the overthrow of Árbenz demonstrates why the CIA needed more accountability. “When CIA planes started strafing Guatemala City old Colonel Árbenz quit and left, tuck-tailed.” González said the same interventionist story was sadly repeating itself in Nicaragua and El Salvador.²⁴³

During the last eleven years before the signing of the Guatemalan Peace Accords in 1996 several Democratic legislators drew attention to how the Árbenz story should inform U.S. Guatemala policy as the internal conflict was winding down. Representative Michael Barnes (D-MD) addressed Congress in December 1985 and said: “Mr. Speaker, in the dark days of the regime of Gen. Romeo Lucas García, when the killing was at its height, a State Department official was heard to remark, ‘If only we had an Árbenz now. We are going to have to invent one, but all the candidates are dead.’ He was wrong. A candidate survived, and he has just been elected by his people to lead Guatemala out of its nightmare. President-elect Vinicio Cerezo has a heavy

²⁴¹ Pete Domenici (D-NM) *Congressional Record* (1984-0127) p. 683-7. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

²⁴² Chris Dodd (D-MA) *Congressional Record* (1984-0314) p. 5486. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

²⁴³ Henry González (D-TX) *Congressional Record* (1984-0506) p. 10507-8. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

responsibility, and so do we. I know he will meet his; I hope we will meet ours. The United States helped abort Guatemala's nascent democracy by overthrowing Árbenz. I hope we don't miss our chance again. We have an historic opportunity with the election of Vinicio Cerezo."²⁴⁴

In June 1991, Representative Alan Cranston (D-CA) argued that "in 1954, a CIA-organized coup overthrew a reformist leftwing government in Guatemala, setting the stage for a dismal parade of military dictatorships. In the 1960's and early 1970's, our counterinsurgency efforts in Guatemala gave aid and comfort to far-right sectors in the oligarchy and the military. The result was tens of thousands of dead - many of those poor, Indian, and completely unconnected to violent leftwing groups."²⁴⁵

By the late 1980's Congress had become totally divided along partisan lines regarding Árbenz and U.S. policy toward Guatemala. In hearings before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in June 1988 and March 1991, witnesses blamed the 1954 coup against Jacobo Árbenz for the violence in Guatemala that was only then beginning to wane. At a hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in June 1988, Abraham Lowenthal, Executive Director of the Inter-American Dialogue, told Congressmen that "the United States helped to overthrow the democratic government of Jacobo Árbenz, fearing that the Árbenz government was leaning dangerously toward communism. As a result, Guatemala fell once again under military rule, and socio-economic reform was halted."²⁴⁶

²⁴⁴ Michael Barnes (D-MD) *Congressional Record* (1985-1216) p. 12017. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

²⁴⁵ Michael Barnes (D-MD) *Congressional Record* (1985-1216) p. 12017. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

²⁴⁶ "Status of Democratic Transitions in Central America," Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, June 23 and 28, 1988, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 3, 2020

In the same hearing, Rick Nuncio, Senior Advisor to the Inter-American Dialogue, said that “our government was directly involved in the coup that overthrew the elected government of Colonel Jacobo Árbenz in 1954. Since that date military government has followed military government; coups or rigged elections have been the routine means of changing national leaders; and a guerrilla movement founded by young, reformist military officers who supported President Árbenz has persistently challenged the central government. Guatemala's military has had an ambivalent attitude toward the United States since the 1954 coup. Although elements of the military conspired in the 1954 coup, the U.S. intervention affronted military honor and created divisions within the armed forces about relations with the United States and the need for reform.”²⁴⁷

Even as Congress had begun to reevaluate the Árbenz legacy, the American media was also beginning to reinterpret the impact of U.S. intervention to remove Árbenz. Árbenz’s death in 1971 was covered by the *Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times*, and the *New York Times*. At the time of Arbenz's death, the U.S. press was still openly critical of Árbenz. The *Washington Post* obituary referred to him as a “leftist,” the *Los Angeles Times* called his government “communist-leaning”²⁴⁸ and the *New York Times* obituary called him “the Red Colonel.”²⁴⁹ As the confrontation over Reagan’s Central American policy became more controversial and the U.S. media regularly questioned the Reagan administration’s support for authoritarian governments in Latin America, the interpretation of the Árbenz legacy by the U.S. media took a 180-degree turn.

²⁴⁷ Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, March 13, 1991, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: April 3, 2020

²⁴⁸ “Ex-Guatemalan Leftist Leader Dies,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 28, 1971, p. A4; “Ex-Guatemala President Arbenz Dies,” *Washington Post*, January 28, 1971, p. D6

²⁴⁹ “Ex-President Arbenz of Guatemala Dies,” *New York Times*, January 28, 1971, p. 39

By 1983 the U.S. media dropped the use of “communist oriented” in describing the Árbenz regime and replaced it with the more positive “left leaning,” “freely elected” and “reformist.” The constructed imagination of “Árbenz” had come full circle.

In her New York Times article “The Danger of Absolutes,” journalist Flora Lewis wrote that “Jacobo Árbenz, the Guatemalan President overthrown in 1954, turned up later in Prague and openly discussed his ties to the Soviet bloc. But the fact that the CIA arranged the coup to oust him has converted his memory to one of mild liberalism for many who are now shocked by Guatemala’s ruthless right-wing regime. The habit of absolutes makes people imagine that if one side is bad, its adversaries must all be good.”²⁵⁰

²⁵⁰ Lewis, Flora, “The Dangers of Absolutes,” *New York Times*, October 16, 1981, p. A35

Conclusion

Congress was deeply concerned about communist influence in Guatemala and about Árbenz himself even before he was inaugurated president in March of 1951. The level of congressional engagement on Guatemala was orders of magnitude greater than its engagement on the removal of Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh, the parallel most frequently cited by historians. Early objections to Árbenz focused on the treatment — first by Arévalo, then by Árbenz — of the United Fruit Company and other American investments in Guatemala. But this was quickly replaced by a fear that even as U.S. troops were fighting in Korea and military involvement in Indo-China was becoming increasingly inevitable, Moscow was orchestrating the takeover of a country only 500 miles from the Texas oil fields. While some historians dismiss congressional concerns as being little more than the product of the United Fruit Company's sophisticated lobbying apparatus, historian Richard Immerman acknowledges that there was a real Cold War fear by many in the U.S. and Congress that having a Kremlin-aligned government so close to the U.S. homeland was a potentially existential threat.²⁵¹ The fact that U.S. newspapers printed accounts of the latest evidences of communist influence in Guatemala on a regular basis kept Guatemala on the minds of Congressmen and their constituents.

There is no smoking gun directly linking the anti-Árbenz positions of American legislators to the CIA's involvement in the 1954 coup in Guatemala, but as documents are being declassified, there is a growing body of evidence showing that both the CIA and the State Department felt pressure from Congress to take action against Árbenz. President Eisenhower met with

²⁵¹ Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982, p. 115

Congressional leaders in May 1954, to brief them on U.S. policy towards Árbenz (without mentioning Operation PBSuccess). Despite assurances from the White House that something was being done, both Republican and Democratic legislators continued to express concern that the State Department was not taking the situation in Guatemala seriously enough in the months leading up to the launch of Operation PBSuccess. While there were differences of views — as evidenced by the spirited debate over the Johnson Resolution in June 1954 — in the end only one Senator and no Congressmen were willing to oppose action against Árbenz. When Árbenz resigned, Congress congratulated all who had had a role in his overthrow and six days of hearings were scheduled to justify U.S. involvement in the revolution.

The lack of direct evidence that Congressional pressure influenced the decisions of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower in regard to Árbenz has led historians to dismiss Congress as more of an observer than an actor in Guatemala's 1954 revolution. This report shows that Congressional calls for White House action to stem communist influence in Guatemala began before Árbenz's first day in office, that the White House felt the heat from Congressional pressure and responded to it, and that Congress played an active role in convincing the American people — after Árbenz's fall — that democracy was safer as a result of his removal.

In reading the existing English-language literature on the Guatemalan revolution of 1954 (which was mostly written between 1982-1995), it is easy to forget that for many years Jacobo Árbenz was understood as the villain in the morality play of Guatemalan democracy. It wasn't until extreme political violence began wracking Guatemala in the mid-1970's that the prevailing interpretation of Árbenz's legacy was seriously questioned, and not until Ronald Reagan's

unpopular Central American adventures that Árbenz was widely reimagined by Congress and the U.S. media as a misunderstood progressive democrat. The many uses of Jacobo Árbenz in the brief period from 1950-1996 show how historical figures are constructed and reinterpreted throughout history to address contemporary political challenges. The United States Congress was not unique in manipulating the Árbenz story to fit evolving political narratives, nor was Árbenz the sole figure to endure construction and reinterpretation during the divisive public debates in the United States surrounding the Cold War. But the fact that 45 years after he was overthrown and 25 years after his death, Árbenz continued to be used as a cautionary tale by American legislators on the right and the left is a testimony to his enduring legacy.

Bibliography

Arévalo, Juan José, *Carta Política al Pueblo de Guatemala al Haber Aceptado la Candidatura Presidencial*, Guatemala: Editorial San Antonio, 1963

Barrett, David M. *The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy*, Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 2005

Blomstedt, Larry, *Truman, Congress and Korea: The Politics of America's First Undeclared War*, Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2016

Cameron, Bruce P., *My Life in the Time of the Contras*, Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 2007

Caro, Robert A., *The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Master of the Senate*, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2002

Christian, Shirley, *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family*, New York City, Random House Press, 1985

Collier, Ken, "Eisenhower and Congress: The Autopilot Presidency," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Volume 24, No. 2, Spring 1994

Conley, Richard, *The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government: A Post-War Assessment*, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002

Cullather, Nick, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995

El Calvario de Guatemala, Publicación del Comité de Estudiantes Universitarios Anticomunistas en el primer aniversario del Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, Guatemala: Tipografía Nacional, 1955

Gleijeses, Piero, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992

Grieb, Kenneth, *Guatemalan Caudillo: The Regime of Jorge Ubico*, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1979

Grow, Michael, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War*, Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2008

Heiss, Mary Ann, Hogan, Michael, Best, Katie, *Origins of the National Security State and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman*, Kirksville, Missouri: Truman State University Press, 2015

- Henehan, Marie T., *Foreign Policy and Congress: An International Relations Perspective*, Kalamazoo: University of Michigan Press, 2000
- Immerman, Richard, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1982
- James, Daniel, *Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude*, New York: The John Day Company, 1954
- Johnson, Robert David, *Congress and the Cold War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006
- Jonas, Susanne, *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991
- Kinzer, Stephen and Schlesinger Jr., Arthur, *Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997 (Revised Edition of 2005)
- Lacayo Oyanguren, Antonio, *La Difícil Transición Nicaragüense: En el Gobierno con Doña Violeta*, Bogotá, Iprelibros S.A. 2005
- Lambley, Christel, *Le MacCarthysme ou la Peur Rouge: La Croisade Américaine Contre le Communisme*, Namur (France): Lemaitre Publishing, 2015
- Longley, Kyle, "Silent Partner? Congress and Foreign Policy in the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, Volume 31, p. 787-791, Wilmington, Delaware, 2007
- Ordóñez Jonama, Ramiro, *Un Sueño de Primavera*, Guatemala: Universidad Francisco Marroquín, 2019
- Robinson, James A., *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative*, Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962
- Sabino, Carlos, *Árbenz, Una Biografía*, Guatemala: Grafía ETC., 2019
- Sabino, Carlos, *Guatemala, la Historia Silenciada (1944-1989), Revolución y Liberación, Tomo I*, Guatemala: Fondo de Cultura Económica de Guatemala, S.A., 2007
- Snider, L. Britt, *Congress and the CIA: Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Studies Series*, New York: NOVA Science Publishers, Inc., 2009
- Special Operations Research Office, *Case Study in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala 1944-1954*, Washington D.C.: American University, 1964

Streeter, Stephen M., *Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954-1961*, Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies Ohio University, 2000

Toriello, Guillermo, *La Batalla de Guatemala*, México D.F.: Ediciones Cuadernos Americanos, 1955

Vargas Llosa, Mario, *Tiempos Recios*, Miami, Florida: Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial USA, 2019

Villagrán Kramer, Francisco, *Biografía Política de Guatemala: Los Pactos Políticos de 1944 a 1970*, Guatemala: FLACSO, 1993

Weld, Kirsten, *Paper Cadavers: The Archives of Dictatorship in Guatemala*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2014

Newspapers, Periodicals and Academic Papers

“60 Arrested in Guatemala,” *New York Times*, October 4, 1945, p. 8

“Boycot a Café de Guatemala Propone Senadora de EE. UU.,” *Prensa Libre*, February 9, 1954, headline and p. 2

Dubois, Jules, “Guatemalans Oust Two Writers for U.S. Papers,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 3, 1954, p. B8

Dubois, Jules, “The Americas Condemn Red’s Movement,” *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, March 14, 1954, P. 3

“El Ejército Persigue a los Guerrillos en Zacapa,” *Prensa Libre*, February 27, 1959, headline and p. 2

“Espeluznantes Crímenes Salen a Luz,” *El Imparcial*, July 1, 1954, p. 1

“Ex-Guatemala President Arbenz Dies,” *Washington Post*, January 28, 1971, p. D6

“Ex-Guatemalan Leftist Leader Dies,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 28, 1971, p. A4

“Ex-President Arbenz of Guatemala Dies,” *New York Times*, January 28, 1971, p. 39

“Expropriation Law Signed,” *New York Times*, September 19, 1948, p. 42

“Foreigners Worried by Guatemalan View,” *New York Times*, November 6, 1946, p. 19

Gruson, Sydney, "Guatemala Story of Plot Scouted: Conspiracy Talk is Called Move to Frighten Opposition," *New York Times*, January 31, 1954, p. 23

"Guatemala Break is Urged by Wiley," *New York Times*, April 28, 1950, p. 11

"Guatemala is Criticized: Honduran Paper Implies New President is not Democratic," *New York Times*, July 2, 1945, p. 7

"Guatemala Ousts U.S. Military Attaché for Charging Communism," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, May 24, 1948, p. A2

"Guatemala Reported on Alert for Revolt," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 25, 1954, p. 3

"Hickenlooper Sees 'Serious' Central American Red Control," *The Washington Post*, November 24, 1953, p. 3

"Hillings Will Head New House Anti-Red Group: Californian Named Chairman of Inquiry on Infiltration in Western Hemisphere," *Los Angeles Times*, August 14, 1954, p. 5

Kirchwey, Freda, "Guatemala Guinea Pig," *The Nation*, Vol. 179, No. 2, July 10, 1954, p. 21-23

"Langer Clears up Lone Vote on Guatemala," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, June 29, 1954, p. 2

Lewis, Flora, "Good Guys, Bad Guys," *The New York Times*, April 8, 1982, p. A23

Lewis, Flora, "The Dangers of Absolutes," *New York Times*, October 16, 1981, p. A35

"Movimiento Armado Contra el Gobierno Estalló en Salamá," *Prensa Libre*, March 30, 1953, headline and p.1

Rampinelli, Waldir José, "Capitalismo em Regiões Atrasadas: Agência Central de Inteligência, Departamento de Estado e Empresa Multinacional Derrubam o Governo de Arbens na Guatemala (1950-1954)," *Textos de Economia*, Vol 10, Iss 1; Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brazil, 2007, P. 83-99

"Reds Few in Guatemala, Arévalo tells Brewster," *New York Times*, June 23, 1950, p. 3

"Republicans Reassured," *New York Times*, June 29, 1954, p. 6

Shelby, Robert, "Revolt-Swept Guatemala: Intrigue Duels with Policy," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 21, 1949, p. 13

"Trouble in Guatemala," *Washington Post*, May 8, 1950, p. 8

"U.S. Charges Guatemala Receives Soviet Arms," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 18, 1954, p. 3

Welles, Sumner, "Caribbean Storm," *Washington Post*, June 1, 1948, p. 13

"Zafarrancho en Panzós: 38 Muertos, 35 Heridos," *Prensa Libre*, May 30, 1978, headline and p. 18

Published Records From Official Sources

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Vol. II, eds. Ralph R. Goodwin, David W. Mabon, David H. Stauffer, Washington, (United States Government Printing Office, 1976)

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Guatemala, eds. Susan Holly and David Patterson, Washington (United States Government Printing Office, 2003)

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII, Memorandum of Conversations, Department of State, Washington, April 28-29, 1955, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v07/d27>, accessed April 2, 2020

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico: Caribbean, Volume VI, Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting, The White House, Washington, March 25, 1955, 9:05-10:45 a.m. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v06/d59>, accessed April 2, 2020

Stone, W.T. (1954). *Communism in Latin America*. Editorial research reports 1954 (Vol. 1). Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Retrieved from <http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearch/cqresrr1954030200>

Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Vol. VI Hearing Date: [pub. 1977. Meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations, June 25, 1954, p. 343-48]

September 27, 28, 29, October 8, 14 and 15, Hearings of the Subcommittee on Latin America of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression House of Representatives, 83rd Congress. Chairman of the Subcommittee is Hon. Patrick J. Hillings (R-CA), p. 1-296

Documents from the CIA's On-Line Reading Room

"Sen. Hickenlooper's Statement on Guatemala," https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000914709.pdf

"Memorandum for the Director, January 21, 1954," <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP74-00297R000900090108-8.pdf>

"Deputies' Meeting, December 28, 1953," <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R002300140017-6.pdf>

“Memorandum for the Under-Secretary of State, September, 24 1954,”
<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91-00682R000300040022-4.pdf>

“Visit of Representative Patrick J. Hillings,”
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000920070.pdf

Summary of PBHistory written for “Situation Report”, October 27, 1954,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000920030.pdf

“Tab B, Liaison with Congressional Committees,”
<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP58-00597A000100020003-8.pdf>

Unpublished Sources

Box 1, folder “Legislative Meetings 1954 (May-June) (3)” of the Legislative Meeting Series of the collection, *Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961*, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas

Crispell, Brian Lewis, *George Smathers and the Politics of Cold War America, 1946-1968*, Doctoral Dissertation, Florida State University, 1996, Unpublished Dissertation

“Danger Posed by Lack of Moderate Center in Guatemala,” State Department Secret Cable to U.S. Embassy Guatemala, November 26, 1957, DNSA Collection: Guatemala and the US, Text form *ProQuest Digital National Security Archive*; Accessed: October 16, 2020

Dennis Chávez Papers (Part 1) 1930-1962 (MSS 394), Box 21, Folder 21, Center for Southwest Research and Special Collections, University of New Mexico Library, Albuquerque

Gallant, Gregory Peter, *Margaret Chase Smith, McCarthyism and the Drive for Political Purification*, Doctor of Philosophy, University of Maine, 1992, Unpublished Thesis

Gordon, Lester I., *John McCormack and the Roosevelt Era*, Doctor of Philosophy, Boston University, 1976, Unpublished Dissertation

“Guatemala - General Plan of Action,” Top Secret memorandum to the Director of the CIA from the Deputy Director of Plans, September 11, 1953, DNSA Collection: Guatemala and the U.S., Text in *ProQuest Digital National Security Archives*; Accessed October 16, 2020

Katsky, Clay Silver, *Open Secrets: Congressional Oversight of the CIA in the Early Cold War*, Master of Arts, George Washington University, Washington D.C. 2015, Unpublished Thesis

Letter from James Rowe to Senator Johnson of May 21, 1954, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas, Box 297, folder titled "S. Con. Res 91 Guatemala 1954."

Letter from Senator Johnson to Charles L. Scarborough, June 28, 1954, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas, Box 297, folder titled "S. Con. Res 91 Guatemala 1954."

Lipman, Derek R., *Connecticut Cold War Warrior: Senator Thomas J. Dodd, the United States and the World 1945-1971*, Master of Arts, Trent University, Petersborough, Ontario, Canada 2010, Unpublished thesis

Pitti, Joseph Apolonio, *Jorge Ubico and Guatemalan Politics in the 1920's*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico, 1975

Undated memorandum on Senate Resolution 91, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas, Box 297, folder titled "S. Con. Res 91 Guatemala 1954."

Citations from the Congressional Record:

Michael Barnes (D-MD) *Congressional Record* (1985-1216) p. 12017. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

Hale Boggs (D-LA) *Congressional Record* (1957-0128) p. A529-30. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 7, 2020

Frances Bolton (OH). *Congressional Record* 83-2 (1954-0202) p. 1257-8. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: July 3, 2019

Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (R-MA) *Congressional Record* (1949-0214) p. 1172. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

Gordon Canfield (R-NJ). *Congressional Record* (1954-0526) p. A3908. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: July 3, 2019

Alan Cranston (D-CA) *Congressional Record* (1991-0606) p. 7393. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

Emanuel Celler (D-NY) *Congressional Record* (1962-0523) p. 9109-10. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME). *Congressional Record* (1954-0208) p. 1475. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: July 3, 2019

Dennis Chávez (D-NM). *Congressional Record* (1954-0519) p. 6817-9, "The War on Communism." Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020.

Dennis Chávez (D-NM) *Congressional Record* (1957-0502) p. 6271. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 8, 2020

Dennis Chávez (D-NM) *Congressional Record* (1954-0625), p. 8921-7. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 22, 2020

Dennis Chavez (D-NM) *Congressional Record* (1957-0730) p. 12972. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 8, 2020

John M. Coffee (D-WA) *Congressional Record* (1945-0216) p. A1029. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

Alan Cranston (D-CA) *Congressional Record* (1991-0606) p. 7393. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

Chris Dodd (D-MA) *Congressional Record* (1984-0314) p. 5486. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

Thomas Dodd (D-MA) *Congressional Record* (1956-0605) p. 9552. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

Thomas Dodd (D-MA) *Congressional Record* (1956-0606) p. 9694. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 7, 2020

Thomas Dodd (D-MA) *Congressional Record* (1964-0217) p. 2900-01. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Pete Domenici (D-NM) *Congressional Record* (1984-0127) p. 683-7. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

Michael Feighan (D-OH) *Congressional Record* (1956-0606) p. 9673. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

Michael Feighan (D-OH) *Congressional Record* (1963-0408) p. A2092. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Daniel Flood (D-PA) *Congressional Record* (1959-0716) p. A6153-4. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Daniel Flood (D-PA) *Congressional Record* (1960-0902) p. A6746. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Daniel Flood (D-PA) *Congressional Record* (1961-0313) p. A1734. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Gerald Flynn (D-WI) *Congressional Record* (1959-0915) p. 8264. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

James Fulbright (D-AR) *Congressional Record* (1968-0205), p. 2054. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Henry González (D-TX) *Congressional Record* (1984-0506) p. 10507-8. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

Ernest Gruening (D-AK) *Congressional Record* (1961-0810) p. 15435. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Rep. Christian A. Herter (R-MA) *Congressional Record* (1949-0224) p. 1496. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

Senator Lister Hill (D-AL) *Congressional Record* (1949-0217) p. 1353-4. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

Patrick Hillings (R-CA) *Congressional Record* (1957-0719), p. 12209. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 8, 2020

Spessard Holland (D-FL) *Congressional Record* (1956-0718) p. A5634. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 7, 2020

Donald Jackson (R-CA). *Congressional Record* (1954-0225) p. 2305-7. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: July 3, 2019

Donald Jackson (R-CA) *Congressional Record* (1956-0607) p. 9804. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 7, 2020

Lyndon Johnson (D-TX) *Congressional Record* (1954-0622) p. 8564, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 22, 2020

Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX). *Congressional Record* (1954-0625) p. 8922-5. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX) *Congressional Record* (1957-0826) p. 15887-8. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 8, 2020

Charlies Kersten (R-WI) *Congressional Record* (1954-0816), p. A6073. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 22, 2020

William Knowland (R-CA) *Congressional Record* (1955-0315) p. 2871. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

William Langer (R-ND) *Congressional Record* (1954-0628) p. 9065. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020.

William Lantaff (D-FL). *Congressional Record* (1954-0524) p. 7016. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

James Leach (R-IA) *Congressional Record* (1984-0423) p. 9078. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

Patrick Leahy (D-VT) *Congressional Record* (1995-0330) p. 9834-5. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

Rep. Mike Mansfield (D-MT) *Congressional Record* (1949-0224) p. 1498. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

Rep. Mike Mansfield (D-MT) *Congressional Record* (1953-0526) p. A2940. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

Joseph McCarthy (R-MI) *Congressional Record* (1954-0519), p. 6817-20, "The War on Communism." Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020.

John McCormack (D-MA) *Congressional Record* (1949-0221) p. 1464. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

John McCormack (D-MA) *Congressional Record* (1950-0425) p. A2983. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

John McCormack (D-MA). "Extension of Remarks." *Congressional Record* (1951-0810) p. 9808-9. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: January 28, 2020

John McCormack (D-MA). *Congressional Record* (1952-0225) p. 1335-8. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: January 28, 2020

John McCormack (D-MA). *Congressional Record* (1954-0504) p. 5968-9. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

Larry McDonald (D-GA) *Congressional Record* (1980-0310), p. 5143. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

Albert Morano (R-CT) *Congressional Record* (1956-0605) p. 9552. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

Albert Morano (R-CT) *Congressional Record* (1956-0606) p. 9697. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 7, 2020

Wayne Morse (R-OR) *Congressional Record* (1963-1009) p. 19120. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Wayne Morse (R-OR) *Congressional Record* (1966-0719) p. 16180. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Thomas O'Neil Jr. (D-MA) *Congressional Record* (1968-0423) p. 10389. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

James Oberstar (D-MN) *Congressional Record* (1983-0728) p. 21454. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

Richard Ottinger (D-NY) *Congressional Record* (1983-0728) p. 21546-7. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

Charles Porter (D-OR) *Congressional Record* (1958-0127) p. A2443. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

John Rarick (D-LA) *Congressional Record* (1968-0122) p. 475. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Monroe Redden (D-NC). "Confirmation Hearings." *Congressional Record* (1951-0412) p. 3803-4. Text from *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

Franklin Roosevelt (D-NY). *Congressional Record* (1953-0421) p. A2243. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

Franklin Roosevelt (D-NY). *Congressional Record* (1953-0428) p. A2245. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

Franklin Roosevelt (D-NY). *Congressional Record* (1953-0507) p. A2455-6. (Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*); Accessed: January 28, 2020

John Seiberling (D-OH) *Congressional Record* (1983-0428) p. 10445-6. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 10, 2020

Robert Sikes (D-FL) *Congressional Record* (1955-0630) p. 9600. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

Robert Sikes (D-FL) *Congressional Record* (1956-0209) p. 2459. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

Robert Sikes (D-FL) *Congressional Record* (1960-0617) p. 13136. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

Robert Sikes (D-FL) *Congressional Record* (1956-0711) p. 12358. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 7, 2020

Robert Sikes (D-FL) *Congressional Record* (1961-0316) p. 4227. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 9, 2020

George Smathers (D-FL). *Congressional Record* (1953-0627) p. A3895. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

George Smathers (D-FL). *Congressional Record* (1954-0521) p. 6953. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

George Smathers (D-FL) *Congressional Record* (1956-0223) p. 3190. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

George Smathers (D-FL) *Congressional Record* (1957-0211) p. 1829. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 8, 2020

Howard Smith (R-NJ) *Congressional Record* (1957-0729) p. 12862. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 8, 2020

Olin E. Teague (D-TX) *Congressional Record* (1947-0430) p. A2015. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

Olin E. Teague (D-TX) *Congressional Record* (1947-0613) p. A2848. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 20, 2020

Alexander Wiley (R-WI) *Congressional Record* (1950-0427) p. 5879. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

Alexander Wiley (R-WI) *Congressional Record* (1950-0719) p. 5237-8. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

Alexander Wiley (WI). "Communism in Guatemala - A Menace to Hemispheric Security" *Congressional Record* (1954-0114) p. 248. Text from: *Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: January 28, 2020

Alexander Wiley (R-WI) *Congressional Record* (1955-0314) p. 2819-20. Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 6, 2020

Citations from Congressional Committee Hearings:

U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Witness Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward Miller Jr.; Date March 16, 1951, p. 392-3. Text in: ProQuest® *Congressional Hearings Digital Collection*; Accessed: March 10, 2020

Executive Session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 14, 1952 (Historical Series) Volume 4, p. 28, text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: September 27, 2020.

U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Witness Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward Miller Jr.; Date February 29, 1952, p. 397-405. Text in: ProQuest® *Congressional Hearings Digital Collection*; Accessed: March 10, 2020

Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, February 16 and 25, March 2, 10, 16, 30, 1965, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 2, 2020

Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, April 25, May 4, 10, 17, 31, June 7, 1967, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 2, 2020

“Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador: Implications for U.S. Policy”; Subcommittee on International Organizations, Committee on International Relations. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations. June 8-9, 1976, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 2, 2020

Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, April 29 and May 20, 1980, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 2, 2020

“The Caribbean Basin: Focus on Caribbean Development,” Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, July 14, 1981, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 2, 2020

“Human Rights in Guatemala,” Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, July 30, 1981, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 3, 2020

“Second Session on the Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and Subversion,” Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Committee on the Judiciary, Senate of the United States, February 26, March 4, 11, and 12, 1982, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 3, 2020

“U.S. Policy Toward Guatemala,” Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, March 9, 1983, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 3, 2020

“Status of Democratic Transitions in Central America,” Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, June 23 and 28, 1988, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 3, 2020

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives, March 13, 1991, Text from *Proquest Congressional Record
Permanent Digital Collection*; Accessed: April 3, 2020