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TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS OF THE MEXICAN LEFT WITH THE CHICANO MOVEMENT, 1960S-1970S

By

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DISSERTATION

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Dedication

For my parents
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ABSTRACT

My dissertation analyzes the nature of the transnational solidarity movements established between Chicana/o and Mexican activists through the 1960s and 1970s in the midst of the Mexican Dirty War, the Chicana/o Movement, and Third World Solidarity movements. These claims of political solidarity between these two groups rested on ideas of a shared sense of cultural, historical, ethnic, and political origins.

Through the combination of a wide range of archival sources and oral interviews collected in nine archives across Mexico and the U.S., this dissertation reconstructs the historical process of these solidarity movements from a variety of perspectives, including urban students activists, intellectuals, theater performers, Mexican government officials, and a Mexican rural Maoist armed movement. Moreover, a transnational approach allows me to rethink notions of political solidarity, and ideas of citizenship and belonging between Chicana/os and Mexicans by shifting the coordinates of analysis that traditionally privilege the U.S. as the center of the conversation and instead setting the analysis in Mexico itself.
Both, Chicana/os and Mexican activists expressed a narrative of political solidarity against a perceived shared experience of oppression and struggles for liberation. I contend, however, that both groups saw the source of their oppression and forms of resistance through different lenses. Chicana/o activists identified racism, discrimination, and cultural erasure with oppression and the retrofitting of Mexican nationalism with political radicalism. In contrast, Mexican activists celebrated Marxist ideologies as radical political resistance against an increasing authoritarian government and associated Mexican nationalism with state repression and political manipulation. Further complicating Chicana/o-Mexican relations were issues of discrimination, classism, and prejudice between them, which I argue had a greater impact in shaping their claims of political solidarity than their perceived sense of Mexicanness.
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Introduction

"I [Octavio Paz] felt solidarity with the mistreated Mexicans, with the Pachucos, who are now called Chicanos. I felt myself to be a Chicano, and I thought that the Chicano was one of the extremes of the Mexican. I realized that the Mexicans had the possibility of becoming like the oppressed, marginal being that is the Pachuco."¹

These are the words of the celebrated Mexican writer Octavio Paz more than 20 years after he first published The Labyrinth of Solitude in 1950, which included his controversial essay “The Pachuco and Other Extremes.” Paz offered the first literary analysis describing the Mexican American youth rebel culture to Mexican audiences.

In the 1950s, Paz, like Mexican intellectuals José Vasconcelos and Manuel Gamio, clearly criticized Mexican Americans for speaking bastardized Spanish and denying their Mexican origins.² In his essay “The Pachuco and Other Extremes,” he described Mexican Americans as feeling “ashamed of their origin; yet no one would mistake them for authentic North Americans.”³ He then continued to describe the Mexican abnormality that evolved to become the Mexican American’s “lack of spirit.”⁴ Paz described these young people as pachucos, “instinctive rebels…[who] do not attempt to vindicate their race or the nationality of their [Mexican] forebears…The pachuco does not want to become Mexican again; at the same time he does not want to blend into the life of North America.”⁵ Paz cautioned Mexican audiences, “[w]hether we like it or not, these persons are Mexicans, they are one of the extremes at which the Mexican can arrive…[t]he pachuco has lost his whole [Mexican]

¹ Octavio Paz and Julián Ríos, Sólo a dos voces (Barcelona: Editorial Lumen, 1973), 5.
³ Octavio Paz, “The Pachuco and Other Extremes,” in The Labyrinth of Solitude: And the Other Mexico; Return to the Labyrinth of Solitude; Mexico and the United States; The Philanthropic Ogre (New York: Grove Press, 1985), 13.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., 14.
inheritance: language, religion, customs, beliefs.” In the 1970s, however, a new generation of Mexican intellectuals, political activists, government officials, and rebel youth became not only supporters of Mexican Americans—who went by the name of Chicana/os, but they praised them for their Mexicanness.

A few years later, Mexican writer Carlos Monsiváis wrote similarly to Paz’s later work that “[t]o comprehend the Chicano process is a need of first order for the incipient, weak, and chaotic Mexican civil society.” In the 1970s, Mexican intellectuals and leftist activists were critical not only of the Mexican governing forces, but also of the absence of a socialist revolution among the popular classes. Young urban Mexicans embraced anglicized or slang Spanish terms like simón, nel, alivianarse, role, and friquear, among many other words characteristic of Chicana/o youth culture from Mexico-U.S. border cities like Tijuana and Los Angeles as part of their own counterculture movement. La onda chicana, as the countercultural movement came to be known, was characterized by the fusion of Mexican and foreign musical styles that stood as representative of Mexican rock in the late 1960s.

While Chicana/os struggled in the United States for liberation through cultural nationalism, la onda chicana in Mexico used the same symbols of Mexicanness combined with English to represent Mexican rock.

Chicana/o culture was also influential among Mexican cultural groups with militant approaches towards politics. “It has been a long time since we have seen our Mexican values and symbols defended vigorously and without demagogy in the way Chicanos are now doing

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6 Ibid., 14–15.
9 Ibid., 175–177.
it,” wrote Mexican theater director and leftist political activist Mariano Leyva in support of Chicana/os in the 1970s. In 1976, Mexican President Luis Echeverría said, “Mexico calls on [Chicana/o students] to preserve and enrich the patrimony of our history, which is also theirs: to find in its heroes—in Hidalgo, Morelos, and Juárez—the strength, tenacity, and inspiration for the struggle to preserve its language and its traditions as an irrevocable legacy…” Likewise, in 1976 an armed Maoist Mexican rural guerrilla movement connected its own experience with oppression with the history of imperial domination experienced by Chicana/os: “Imperialism uses its military force to invade our territories and control our countries…culturally deforms our history, it robs us of our origins like the domination imposed by the United States over the Chicano community…” While left-leaning students and activists saw political and historical connections between their struggles and those of Chicana/os, others, like President Luis Echeverría, saw a new opportunity to advance Mexican interests within the United States.

Similarly, Chicana/o activists also expressed their sense of solidarity towards Mexicans in Mexico. Chicano student José Armas wrote about Paz’s analysis of the pachuco, “The voice of the Mexicano mirrors another picture of ourselves…What the Mexicano thinks of us is important. We are part of the same people. We are the northern region of a nation of 400 million MESTIZOS: the bronze nation. We are hermanos in blood, culture, and in language.” Others like Chicano leader José Ángel Gutiérrez recognized a more

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10 Chicano Studies Research Center, University of California, Los Angeles (hereafter CSRC/UCLA), Teatro Campesino Folder, El Teatro Newspaper, summer 1970.
contradictory Chicana/o-Mexican relation: “The rich and upper-middle-class Mexicans don’t think about [Chicana/os] at all. To members of these social classes, Chicanos are an embarrassment because we don’t speak Spanish, don’t know Mexican history, and often, are poor imitations of gringos. Many Chicanos don’t like Mexicans because they remind them of how assimilated we really are as Mexican Americans.”¹⁴ Likewise, Chicano historian David Maciel wrote, “My first reaction was a great disillusion—like many of my countrymen when we confronted an unexpected Mexico—I realized that also on this side of the border reigned strong prejudices and false premises about Chicanos, a certain level of discrimination and contempt against them.”¹⁵

These excerpts highlighted above illustrate a historical moment in which Chicana/o and Mexican activists, politicians, and intellectuals were open to establishing new forms of transnational solidarity despite a long history of Mexican American exclusion from the Mexican historical, political, and cultural narratives. These quotations lead me to propose three key questions about Mexican-Chicana/o relations in the 1960s and 1970s. What was different about the historical moment of the 1960s and 1970s that allowed for Chicana/os and Mexicans to envision the possibility for political collaboration? What was fundamental to the political and cultural identity of Chicana/os and Mexicans at this historical moment that allowed them to establish solidarity movements? And finally what led to the transformation of the nature of solidarity between these two groups?

This dissertation traces the new forms of solidarity established between Mexican American (Chicana/o) activists and members of the Mexican left during the 1960s and 1970s.

The revitalized sense of *mexicanidad* and internationalism inspired Chicana/os to collaborate with leftist and left-leaning Mexican students through intellectual, cultural, and political venues. These newly-shared forms of consciousness coincided with the Mexican “Dirty War,” Third World solidarity movements, the collision of cultural nationalism with the rise of Marxism, Mexican President Luis Echeverría’s Third World politics, and the civil rights movement within communities of color in the United States. Although these groups had different political visions, social backgrounds, languages, and struggles, they came together under the banner of shared cultural, ethnic, and national senses of belonging.

**Historical Background of Mexican-Mexican American Relations**

The relations between Mexicans and “*El México de Afuera*” [“Mexico Beyond”], as José Vasconcelos once referred to the Mexican community during his 1929 presidential campaign, have varied greatly since Mexico began to lose territory to the U.S. As José Ángel Hernández explains, “At different times and in various contexts, this population has been termed ‘lost’ or ‘forgotten’ by various Mexican and American intellectuals…” However, during periods of conflict like those of the Mexican Revolution in 1910 and the entrance of the United States into World War I pushed and pulled Mexicans across the U.S.-Mexico border seeking refuge and employment while creating networks of collaboration across both nations. The porous and largely unregulated nature of the border at that time

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17 Ibid.

allowed for the free flow of people, events, and ideas, making the United States a harbor for radical Mexican reformers such as Ricardo Flores Magón, Leonor Villegas de Magón, and Sara Estela Ramírez whose anarchist and left-wing political ideologies influenced political thought across both nations. However, the increasing presence of immigrants, the rise of political radicalism, racism, and fears of foreign infiltration led to a xenophobic discourse against Mexicans and Mexican Americans in the United States.

Following the upheavals of the Mexican Revolution, Mexico began the process of reconstruction and the formation of a new sense of nationalism, *Mexicanidad*, which was imagined, constructed, and articulated on the basis of a glorious indigenous, Spanish, and *mestizo* identity. The re-imagining of old meanings, symbols, and forms of expression about Mexican revolutionary ideas by the state sought to bring national unity. The popular sectors like the peasantry, indigenous peoples, and workers, which had previously been excluded and despised by political and intellectual elites, became an integral part of Mexican revolutionary identity. Mexico wrestled with the need to establish national unity, national sovereignty, and national pride not only among the diverse communities within its territory,
but also among the Mexican communities living in the United States. Through the use of patriotic rituals and education programs, the Mexican government and its diplomats in the United States promoted a discourse of Mexicanidad exalting the success of the Revolution and modern nation among Mexicans and its descendants.

The Mexican government and its consulates in the United States organized and financed the celebrations of patriotic festivities for Mexican Americans while, at the same time, Mexican politicians and intellectuals like the minister of public education José Vasconcelos described Mexican Americans as Pochos or “ungrateful Mexicans.”

Ironically, the Mexican government promoted cultural campaigns led by Vasconcelos, who studied both in Mexico and the United States. The cultural and education programs promoted by Vasconcelos and his supporters in Mexico upheld an idealized Mexican national identity and historical past that privileged European culture. One of the targets of Vasconcelos educational programs was to assimilate indigenous peoples into a Hispanic mestizo identity. Vasconcelos promoted the idea of “cosmic race,” which endorsed a Hispanic

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22 For more detailed study on the approach by President Alvaro Obregón towards Mexican immigrants and their descendant after the Mexican revolution see the work of Hall, “Creating a Schizophrenic Border: Migration and Perception, 1920-1925.”

23 Vasconcelos’s description of the Pocho or pochismo “Palabra que se usa en California para designar el descastado que reniega de lo mexicano aunque lo tiene en la sangre y procura ajustar todos sus actos al mimetismo de los amos actuales de la región. / Word used in California to designate the ungrateful Mexican, who denies his Mexican background although he carried it in his blood, and in his acts tries to ape the present masters of the region.” Vasconcelos is writing at the time of the Mexican Revolution when factionalism, regionalism, personal interests, and mere survival forced people into switching sides constantly. Vasconcelos was writing in the midst of the Mexican revolution when factionalism, regionalism, personal interests, and mere survival forced people into switching political sides. His description of pochismo reflects the attitude at that time of Mexicans toward those who self exiled or abandoned the country. José Vasconcelos, Obras Completas, Coleccion Laurel (Mexico: Libreros Mexicanos Unidos, 1957), 781. Other works that explored the Mexican and Mexican American communities living in the United States includes Rodolfo O. de la Garza, “Chicanos and U. S. Foreign Policy: The Future of Chicoano-Mexican Relations,” The Western Political Quarterly 33, no. 4 (December 1, 1980): 575. Tatcho Mindiola and Max Martinez, eds., Chicano-Mexicano Relations (Houston: Mexican American Studies Program, University of Houston--University Park, 1986), 3.

24 Vasconcelos was a contradictory figure as on one side he condemned the Holocaust and Nazism in Europe, but at the same time he was a staunch anti-Semitic and adapted ideas of racial-superiority in his promotion of Mestizaje. “A Nazi Fifth Column and Communist Allies Are Active in Mexico,” LIFE, June 10, 1940, 52; Ilan
mestizo identity by transforming the “Indian” into an idealized source of national pride.\textsuperscript{25} Vasconcelos’ ideas of homogenized Mexican indigenous identity would later be taken as a political banner by Chicanos in the 1960s to celebrate the recovery and preservation of their indigenous identity while rejecting assimilation into the Euro-American society.

At the same time that the Mexican state promoted ideas of \textit{Mexicanidad} among the Mexican American and Mexican communities in the United States, they were wrestling over issues of citizenship and cultural belonging. Although Mexican Americans were under the jurisdiction of the United States government, the Mexican government and its consulates commonly pledged their symbolic and sometimes material support in defending their rights.\textsuperscript{26} Through the 1920s-1950s, the promotion of acculturation and assimilation for Euro-American ideals became one of the most prominent political strategies by Mexican Americans to deal with racial discrimination and segregation, while more radical strategies like those of labor organizer Emma Tenayuca who aligned with communist ideology were persecuted.\textsuperscript{27}

In the process of negotiating between Mexican cultural origins and U.S. citizenship, some Mexican Americans distanced themselves from “the dirty Mexican” immigrants whose

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{25} William B. Beezley, “Creating Mexico’s Revolutionary Culture: Vasconcelos, Indians, Anthropologists, and Calendar Girls” (University of New Mexico, November 8, 2011).

\textsuperscript{26} Douglas Monroy, \textit{Rebirth: Mexican Los Angeles from the Great Migration to the Great Depression} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 63, 202.

\textsuperscript{27} The \textit{League of United Latin American Citizens} (LULAC) is one of the major Mexican American organization that sought to promote voting registration, end Mexican American segregation from public spaces, and gain political representation for Mexican Americans. Founded in 1929 in Corpus Christi, Texas by primarily middle-class Mexican Americans who sought integration within the U.S. social and political model rather than Mexico. LULAC’s membership required English as the official language, U.S. citizenship, and promoted cultural assimilation through education, hard work, and citizenship. See Cynthia Orozco, \textit{No Mexicans, Women, or Dogs Allowed: The Rise of the Mexican American Civil Rights Movement} (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009); David Gutiérrez, \textit{Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity / Joseph J. Baca Collection} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 79.
\end{footnotesize}
lack of U.S. citizenship, poor education, and low social class eroded their efforts to been seen as white. The adoption of anti-immigrant attitudes by Mexican Americans toward Mexican nationals was linked to the strategy of being accepted as U.S. citizens. In the end, Mexicans and Mexican American communities found themselves caught between two national projects that sought to impose meanings, forms, and ideas about their identity.28

By the 1940s, the onset of World War II and its economic, social, and political pressures generated the proper conditions for a new alliance between Mexico and the United States around issues of trade and security.29 Mexico became a reliable war ally and source for labor and natural resources. Just few months after Mexico’s official entrance into the war, the U.S. and Mexico announced the creation of the Emergency Farm Labor Program, which came to be known as the Bracero Program (1942-1964).30 For the United States, the aim of a temporary contract labor program with Mexico was to help solve labor shortages, maintain better control of the entrance of Mexican migrants, and safeguard the local wages and working conditions of U.S. citizens. For Mexico, the war conflicts gave them the opportunity to negotiate and address the longstanding issues of undocumented migration into the United States, racial discrimination, and labor abuses against its citizens.31

Ironically, neither Mexico’s war alliance with the United States nor the participation of Mexican Americans in both combat and on the home front did anything to lessen discrimination and racism against them.32 One pointed example of racial conflicts that

28 Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American, 108–125.
29 Monica A. Rankin, ¡México, La Patria!: Propaganda and Production during World War II (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 4.
30 The initial agreement of the Bracero Program guaranteed the protection of Braceros from racial discrimination, appropriate wages, working conditions, basic living expenses, and the travel back to Mexico at the end of their contract. Gutiérrez, Walls and Mirrors, 133–134.
31 Ibid., 134.
generated transnational responses within the United States and Mexico was the Zoot Suit Riots in 1943. The disturbances involved Mexican American youth who called themselves “Pachucos” and white marines and sailors who harassed them for almost a week while the police looked the other way. Pachucos or Zoot suiters got their name from their characteristic high-waisted, wide-legged, tight-cuffed trousers and long coat with wide lapels and wide padded shoulders. Although the Zoot suit was also constructed and embraced within African American and Filipino communities, nonetheless, Mexican Americans became the iconic ethnic group identified as Zoot suiters. The distinctive cultural and racial identity of Pachucos clashed with American ideas of conformity and stability toward the national war effort. Similarly, the Pachucos’ flamboyant dress style and language (Caló)

33 For more detail on the international implications of the week-long attacks against Mexican, Filipino, and African American youth conducted by U.S. sailors and marines in the street of Los Angeles known as the Zoot Suit Riots see, Richard Griswold del Castillo, “The Los Angeles ‘Zoot Suit Riots’ Revisited: Mexican and Latin American Perspectives,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 16, no. 2 (July 1, 2000): 367–91.
34 The Zoot Suiters dress, speech, and attitude pushed the boundaries of respectability across racial, social, and transnational borders. Through the use and adaptation of racial slurs and stereotypes to construct their own subculture. For instance, in the United States the term of “greaser” was used against Mexicans and Mexican Americans as a racial slur. The term likely has its origins back in the nineteenth-century when many Mexicans worked greasing the axles of mules. Zoot Suiters dress style challenged the racist term of “greaser” by incorporating it within their characteristic hairstyle, duck tail, that was heavily greased and long. Mexicans both living within the United States and in Mexico looked down on Mexican Americans for their bastardized use of Spanish and their lost of Mexicanness. In the case of the Zoot Suiters or Pachucos, the use of bastardized Spanish and English was central to their own subculture. For further detail on the Zoot Suits riots see Ibid.; Mauricio Mazón, The Zoot-Suit Riots: The Psychology of Symbolic Annihilation (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010); Eduardo Obregón Pagan, Murder at the Sleepy Lagoon: Zoot Suits, Race, and Riot in Wartime L.A. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 2003).
35 The fashion and lifestyle of “Pachucos or Zoot Suits” was not limited to men, as young Mexican and Mexican American women also embraced the use of baggy and tapered pants, long jackets, bright colors, speech, and lifestyle of Pachucas. These young women were also called “Malinches” in reference to the Aztec Indian slave that served as translator and lover to Hernán Cortés and was seen as a traitor for Mexicans. In a contradictory way while the use of “Pachuco slacks” was condemned on Mexican young girls, fashion critics praised the femininity of “slacks” by Euro-American female Hollywood stars. Found in JPL/UTSA Microfilm Reel: AN2.S3P74: La Prensa, 4 Julio 1943
36 Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American.
collided with the sensibilities of the Mexican and Mexican American establishments that sought to exalt the image of European refinement.\textsuperscript{37}

Initially, the Mexican government and its consulates protested against the events that they thought targeted Mexican citizens. However, once it was noted that most of the Pachucos were “sons of the United States,” the Mexican consulates limited their intervention to condemnations without making official complaints.\textsuperscript{38} Discrimination and disdain against Pachucos also pervaded within the Mexican American and Mexican communities across both countries. The Mexican American establishment saw Pachucos as a cultural aberration and a setback in their battle for recognition as white Americans. The same newspapers that criticized the racism and discrimination from Euro-American against Mexicans also described Pachucos as “disoriented youth,” “hybrids of cockatoos,” “featherless bipeds,” “weirdoes,” and “a plague.”\textsuperscript{39}

Similarly the Mexican intelligentsia also disdained the Pachucos for their bastardization of their Mexicanness. Ironically, the image of the Pachuco gained great popularity among Mexican masses through Mexican comedian Germán Valdés’s movie persona of Tin Tan.\textsuperscript{40} Valdés was born in Mexico City in 1925, and in 1927 moved with his family to Ciudad Juárez where he grew up in the barrio among Tirilones, a term used in the

\textsuperscript{37} Caló refers to the Spanish and English slang used by pachucos, which is said to have originated among the poor, uneducated, and criminals in Mexico City and brought to the United States Southwest by Mexican migrants. Rafaela Castro, Chicano Folklore: A Guide to the Folktales, Traditions, Rituals and Religious Practices of Mexican Americans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 33.

\textsuperscript{38} Found in JPL/UTSA Microfilm Reel: AN2.S3P74 La Prensa, (11 June 1943) and (28 Jun 1943).

\textsuperscript{39} This article describes the women who adhere to the “Pachuco” fashion and lifestyle as “Malinches.” “The ‘malinches’ are the feminine element of the species. The majority forms ‘gangs,’ well armed with jackknives or other objects and they have adopted significant names, the mostly insulting to decent people, such as the gang from Palo Verde called “Black Widows.” The name was taken from a woman of wretched background, dealer of whites and whose acts sent her to the penitentiary of Tébanchapi.” Found in JPL/UTSA Microfilm Reel: AN2.S3P74: La Prensa, “The origins of ‘Pachucos’ and ‘Malinches’” (1943).

\textsuperscript{40} Carlos Monsiváis, “De México y Los Chicanos, de México Y Su Cultura Fronteriza,” in La Otra Cara de México, El Pueblo Chicoano, ed. David Maciel, Colección Fragua Mexicana ; 29 (Mexico: Ediciones El Caballito, 1977), 1–19; Durán, “Nation and Translation.”
Mexico-U.S. border region to describe someone who “has an accent when speaks English’ and ‘talks Spanish and English at the same time’…’carried a [key] chain’ as part of a zoot suit’…‘Somos tirilones. Somos gente bajos.’ (We are tirilones. We are a low-class people).”

In the 1940s, Valdés arrived in Mexico City and soon after he made his cinematographic unveiling of his classic character Tin Tan in the movie *Hotel de verano* (1943), the archetype of the *Pocho, Tirilón, or Zoot Suiter* in the context of Mexico City.

The idiosyncrasy (Americanization) of Tin Tan’s character was not without contestation, especially by those who subscribed to the “purity” of *Mexicanidad*. Such was the case of Mexican writer Salvador Novo who accused him of corrupting the Spanish language, an indictment that incited other Mexican intellectuals to request the prohibition of Tin Tan’s movies by the Mexican Secretary of Education because they degraded Mexico.

The intellectual opposition to Tin Tan’s speech ultimately led to the *Mexicanization* of his caló. By the 1950s, Tin Tan’s movies like *Simbad, el mareado* (1950) and *El Revoltoso* (1951) showed him as someone from a barrio in Mexico City rather than Los Angeles or Tijuana.

The image of Tin Tan as a dweller of Mexico City brought the negative characteristics of the Mexican American home to be part of the Mexican popular classes.

However, the most recognized condemnation of Pachucos’ bastardized identity came from Mexican writer Octavio Paz. Paz’s essay, *The Pachuco and Other Extremes* described

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41 As quoted in the linguistic study of the *Caló* (slang) used by Mexican and Mexican American youth in the U.S.-Mexico border region in the 1970s. Coltharp, “Pachuco, Tirilón, and Chicano.”


*Pachucos* as Mexicans caught in a world of ambivalence between their inescapable Mexicanness, their unwillingness to be Mexican, and their inability to assimilate into U.S. culture. According to Paz, what was characteristic of the Pachuco was the rebellious attitude, fashion, and speech toward the United States society that refused to accept him. Paz’s work became the iconic description and critique of Mexican American character for Mexican audiences. Later in the 1960s, Chicana/os would challenge Paz’s work for its lack of historical contextualization of the Mexican American experience and his clownish description of the *Pachuco*.45

In the decades following WWII, ideological conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union evolved in a complex phenomenon known as the Cold War. National liberation and decolonization movements emanated across the Third World. In the case of Mexico, Cold War ideology collided with traditions of mass mobilization, revolutionary nationalism, anti-U.S. sentiment, and the search for economic growth. For Mexican American communities in the United States, Cold War ideologies collided with struggles for racial equality, community organizations promoting assimilation, anti-communism, and anti-immigration policies.


Chicana/o-Mexican Relations

Following the frustrating and limited advancements of Mexican American organizations and individuals seeking social justice and the examples of radical politics from the African American civil rights and Third World liberation movements, young urban Mexican Americans began a more confrontational activism in the 1960s. The Chicana/o Movement (or Movimiento), sprouted across Mexican American high schools, college campuses and barrios. Chicana/o students became the leading voice for the movement as they connected their deep-seated traditions of political mobilization with Mexican nationalism and Third World internationalism to demand social justice with great passion. They manifested their political activism through school walkouts, sit-ins, marches, voter registration drives, campaigns for political office, and civil disobedience. Interestingly, Chicana/os demanded equality as U.S. citizens by deploying reimagined Mexican nationalist rhetoric and symbols. The strategy of retrofitting historical, cultural, and political markers of Mexican culture became one of the characteristics of the Chicana/o Movement.

One of the watershed events for the Chicana/o movement happened in March 1968, when thousands of Chicana/o students walked out of East Los Angeles high schools demanding equality in education. The walkouts set in motion a chain reaction of similar activities across the United States Southwest and Midwest. Chicana/o students demanded the reform of poor school conditions, the firing of prejudiced teachers and administrators, the institution of bilingual education, the hiring of Mexican American teachers, the end of corporal punishment, and the redrafting of curricula to include the contributions of Mexican
The U.S. government responded by sending FBI agents to aid Los Angeles police in arresting more than a dozen of the main leaders and charging them with criminal conspiracy, and school administrators responded with the expulsion of hundreds of protesting students. The message of the U.S. government against political dissidence was one of zero tolerance. Unlike the indiscriminate violence unleashed against Mexican students, however, the police brutality against Chicana/o activists was rather tame in comparison, although it was repressive and arbitrary nonetheless.

Mexican society in the 1960s and 1970s experienced the radicalization of urban youth espousing Marxism, the escalation of armed struggle, a demographic upsurge, rising costs of living and declining wages, and a more authoritarian form of governance. In this polarizing climate, young middle-class Mexican students grew ever more frustrated with the absence of social equality and political liberty. Political institutions and structures like government, family, class divisions, national identity, and the memories and legacy of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) came under the scrutiny not only of political activists, but also of intellectuals. The ideas of *mexicanidad* and national unity that had been promoted by the Mexican state contrasted with the reality of a fragmented society and a declining economy. Carlos Monsiváis among others criticized the official historical narrative of patriotic ideals

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47 Ibid., 45.
48 Student political protest in Mexico has traditionally focused on the 1960s, especially the Tlatelolco Student Movement of 1968, as the inception of student mobilization and state repression. The work of Jaime Pensado, however, shows that 1960s Mexican student mobilization was part of a longer history of political culture among young urban middle-class students that goes back as early as the mid-1950s. Jaime Pensado, *Rebel Mexico: Student Unrest and Authoritarian Political Culture During the Long Sixties* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).
and “authentic” Mexican identity by a state power that simultaneously oppressed the same classes that those ideals claimed to represent.  

Through the 1960s, the Mexican state increased the use of state-sponsored violence against political activists in what is now known as the Dirty War. The most symbolic event of the Dirty War was the repression of the 1968 student movement in Mexico City, which started as a street fight after a football game between students from rival high schools. The Mexico City riot police responded by violently seizing one of the preparatory schools and killing some of the students in the process. In response, students organized against the violence by state forces, leading to a series of student protests and rallies across Mexico City during the summer of 1968. Unlike Chicana/o students who made demands directly related to education, the Mexican students focused on political freedom: liberty for political prisoners; freedom for the imprisoned students; suppression of the Riot Police; abolishment of the anti-subversion law; removal of the generals most responsible for the repression; and

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51 The Mexican Dirty War took place under the one-party regime of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI), which combined authoritarianism with some level of political freedom, which allowed Mexico to avoid the indiscriminate use of disappearances, murders, torture, and detentions of other Latin American nations. It was not until 2000, when the PRI was replaced by the Partido de Acción Nacional (National Action Party, or PAN) under the administration of President Vicente Fox Quesada, that the term Dirty War was officially recognized as a definition to this period of Mexican history. Under Fox’s administration a special office was established to investigate human rights violations committed during the PRI administrations of Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964), Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970), Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970-1976), and José López Portillo (1976-1982). These administrations exemplified the overriding narrative of the Pax priista, which claimed the uncontested hegemony of the PRI and a period of widespread economic modernization. However, Vicente Fox’s administration sought to present a different view of the PRI years to highlight the difference of rule under the PAN. One of the main purposes of the Special Prosecutor for Social and Political Movements of the Past (FEMOSPP) was to produce a governmental report establishing the existence of a Mexican “Dirty War.” An uncensored version was released to the National Security Archive in 2006 and can be viewed at: “Official Report Released on Mexico’s ‘Dirty War,’” Archive, The National Security Archive, (November 21, 2006), http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB209/index.htm#informe.
indemnification for the injured and their families.\textsuperscript{52} But the use of state repression by the government sent a message of no tolerance and no negotiation to the students. The student movement culminated just ten days before the opening of the 1968 Summer Olympics in Mexico City, when the Mexican army clashed with protesters at the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in the Tlatelolco housing project on October 2. This event resulted in the deaths of approximately 300 people and unknown numbers of injured and disappeared.

While the East L.A. walkouts are considered a key historical moment in Chicana/o historiography, in modern Mexican historiography, scholarship dealing with Chicana/o social activism is absent for the most part. In contrast, the Tlatelolco massacre that became a symbol of political martyrdom for the Mexican left also became a symbol of political solidarity for Chicana/os with Mexicans. In the words of Chicano historian Rodolfo Acuña, “Tlatelolco added to the anger and experiences of Chicano youth, who identified with Mexican youth.”\textsuperscript{53} In the case of Mexican activists, there is no equivalent symbol of solidarity or recognition for the walkouts in the U.S. or for any other watershed Chicana/o political event.

Further complicating the Chicana/o-Mexican relations in the 1970s was the interest of Mexican president Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) in the Chicana/o and Mexican American communities in the U.S. Echeverría had been at the center of the Tlatelolco controversy as the secretary of the interior under president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970). Despite his role in ordering the military attack against the students, in 1970 he became president of


\textsuperscript{53} Rodolfo Acuña, \textit{Occupied America; the Chicano’s Struggle toward Liberation} (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1972), 322.
Mexico. As president, Echeverría began to use a populist rhetoric indicating a leftist ideology and support for marginal groups like the peasantry, urban workers, and students. However, within a year of his inauguration, on June 10, 1971, a new confrontation took place between student demonstrators, police and paramilitary forces. At the end, hundreds of demonstrators lied dead and the police arrested many more. The incident known as the Corpus Christi massacre highlighted the growing violence affecting Mexico alongside with emerging urban and rural guerillas. In response to these domestic problems, Echeverría pursued a more active international policy that transformed his domestic populism into a defender of Third World interests through anti-U.S. rhetoric, anti-Zionism, and support for Cuba and Chile.

Echeverría’s administration coincided with that of U.S. President Richard Nixon and the heyday of Chicana/o activism. Echeverría’s Machiavellian political style was best exemplified in his relations with Chicana/os. During his first official visit to the United States on June 15, 1971, Echeverría met with Nixon to discuss preferential tariffs for Mexico and the issue of the communist threat in Latin America. As part of his negotiations, Echeverría used Chicana/o activism to warn Nixon of his own homegrown communists who were collaborating with their counterparts across the southern hemisphere. During the same visit to the United States, Echeverría publicly praised Chicana/os’ sense of Mexicanness, invited them to visit Mexico, and offered them his support in their quest for equality. Thenceforth, Echeverría’s administration offered assistance to Chicana/os in the form of scholarships, libraries, funding for cultural events, and intellectual exchanges. However, his support became a source of contention between Chicana/o groups aligned with the Mexican left who
identified Echeverría with Mexican authoritarianism. The other extreme saw Echeverría’s support as an opportunity to raise Chicana/os’ visibility and importance in Mexico.54

Chicana/os and Mexicans saw the source of their oppression and forms of resistance through different lenses. Chicana/os identified their oppression and cultural erasure with their experience of racism and discrimination by the “gringo,” while the narratives and symbols of mexicanidad were seen as expressions of political radicalism. In contrast, Mexican leftist activists and intellectuals identified Mexican nationalism as part of the narrative that justified the power of the elites, or what Carlos Monsiváis referred to as a “fictional nation imposed from above by a few.” That is not to say that intellectuals, activists, and the very people supposedly manipulated by the Mexican state did not engage directly with the ideas and symbols of Mexican nationalism to advance their own agendas. Just like Chicana/os who used symbols of Mexicanidad to generate a sense of political solidarity, Mexicans across class and political lines used the same symbols to demonstrate their nationalism and reimagined its meanings. While Chicana/o political activists were looking for an idealized Mexico, they were confronted instead with a paradoxical Mexico which both imitated Chicana/o “Americanness” and at the same time ridiculed their Mexicanness; it praised their politicization of Mexican nationalism and criticized their lack of political militancy; it supported their struggles against racism and imperialism while it discriminated against them for their working class origins.

Chicano, Chicana/o, Chican@, or Mexican

Throughout this work I use key terms like Chicana/o, Mexican American, Mexican, and Mexican nationals, all of which require clarification of my usage. The plethora of labels

used to identify the diversity of identities, regions, and historical processes within the communities of Mexican descent in the U.S. is very confusing for anyone outside of (and sometimes, even within) these communities. These labels include: *Mexican, Mexican American* (non-hyphenated), *Mexican-American* (hyphenated), *Indo-Hispano, Chicano, Chicana/o, Chican@, Xican@, Hispanic, and Latin@*. Each of these labels represents a specific historical moment and at times specific political identity or challenge. In the case of the general term *Chicano*, its etymology continues to be debated. However, in the 1960s it became a signifier of political consciousness and cultural identity for young Mexican Americans. Before its explicit politicization in the 1960s, the term Chicano was primarily used as a pejorative term to indicate people of Mexican descent in the U.S. Southwest who were of lower social class or economic status, in contrast to the middle class Mexican-Americans, who commonly used this term, with or without a hyphen, to identify themselves.

In the 1960s, African Americans began to identify as *Black* and reject the “chaining” of their identity to the European-dominated “America” found in the term *African-American*

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55 The term of Indo-Hispano was coined by Reies Tijerina from New Mexico during his struggle for land grants, the end of violence, and discrimination from Anglos, “…used it often to represent the racial/ethnic nationalism of Mexican Americans and Latina/os…as a “new breed” or race similar to the notion of a Raza Cósmica).” Josue David Cisneros, *The Border Crossed Us: Rhetorics of Borders, Citizenship, and Latina/o Identity* (University of Alabama Press, 2014), 66. The term Xican@ has been adopted among writers and performers who wish to highlight their indigenous roots and in the words of Xicana writer Cherrie Moraga, “it is a site of conflict and resistance, revolt, but not revolution. Cherrie Moraga, *A Xicana Codex of Changing Consciousness: Writings, 2000–2010* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 35.

56 A common idea about the etymological origin of the word Chicano is its association of with the colonial Spanish pronunciation of the X in *Mexica* as a *sh*, which evolved into *Mexicano*, pronounced as Me-shicano. However, that theory has being challenged by scholars as to simplistic and inaccurate, but there appears that the word Chicano does have pre-Columbian origins in southern Mexico and overtime brought into what is today the U.S. Southwest. See Arnoldo C. Vento, *Mestizo: The History, Culture, and Politics of the Mexican and the Chicano: The Emerging Mestizo-Americans* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1998), 221.

57 Anna Maria D’Amore, *Translating Contemporary Mexican Texts: Fidelity to Alterity* (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 63–64.
Young Mexican Americans followed the lead of the Black Power movement and re-appropriated the term Chicano to assert a cultural and political consciousness (frequently associated with activism) to challenge their exclusion from mainstream U.S. society. The self-identification of Mexican Americans as Chicano or Chicana in the 1960s and 1970s had a militant connotation that celebrated both indigenous and Mexican roots while rejecting assimilation or “Americanization,” all as expressions of political activism. Traditionally the term Mexican-American (hyphenated) referred to individuals born and/or raised in the United States who had assimilated to the “American outlook” but maintained a cultural link with their Mexican roots. Chicanos followed the lead of Blacks and objected to the hyphenation of Mexican-American because it “inferred a second-class citizenship,” and it was replaced by the term Mexican American (non-hyphenated) or the more militant Chicano identity.

Beginning in the 1970s, women in the Chicana/o Movement (most of whom were from middle class backgrounds) raised their voices to demand gender equality as a rightful goal within the struggle towards racial and ethnic fairness. Chicana feminists pushed for more inclusive label such as Chicana/o or Chican@ rather than the male centered term Chicano. Therefore, this paper uses the term Mexican American (non-hyphenated) as an

58 Ibid., 63.
59 The strategic re-appropriation of an oppressive or exclusionary term by the same group that the term aims to exclude is seen as a form of post-colonial resistance. For more details see Jane E. Anderson, Law, Knowledge, Culture: The Production of Indigenous Knowledge in Intellectual Property Law (U.K: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), 192–193.
60 Many older and more conservative Mexican Americans, however, repudiated the term Chicano although today Chicano or Chicana is widely used interchangeably with the term of Mexican American. Ernesto Chávez, “¡Mi Raza Primero!” (My People First!): Nationalism, Identity, and Insurgency in the Chicano Movement in Los Angeles, 1966-1978 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 8.
61 Many Chicanos criticized Chicanas for their “feminist” demands that were seen as part of the white dominant culture that sought to divide the Movement. However, Chicanas where opposing internal issues of male chauvinism, sexual harassment, exclusionary politics, and oppressive masculine culture. Blackwell, Chicana Power!, 8.
inclusive term to identify the Mexican American community at large before the emergence of the Chicana/o Movement as well as those individuals and organizations who chose not to identify as Chicana/os.

In the case of Mexico, in the 1960s and 1970s the term Chicano (in its masculine gendered form) was commonly used in general to identify people of Mexican descent living in the United States as well as Mexican nationals who were perceived as “assimilated” or who did not want to identify as “Mexican.” The significant political radicalism that the term “Chicana/o” carried within the historical context of the United States was not widely understood in Mexico beyond a modest number of intellectual circles. The terms Chicano, Pocho, and Mexican American were used interchangeably and independently of political affiliation, gender politics, or citizenship status, and the meanings of these terms ranged from pejorative to celebratory, depending on the context.

Throughout this work I use the term Chicana/o (with a forward slash) to recognize that both women and men participated side by side in the political activism of the Movement. Even though much of the archival material, especially those documents produced in Mexico, refers to “Chicanos” (in the masculine form) as an inclusive term, I try to recognize those who did not identify as such. Also, I use the term Chicana/o to indicate a specific political vision that asserted a cultural and political consciousness. In addition, the terms Mexican national and Mexican are used in this work as inclusive terms intended to identify Mexican immigrants (individuals born in Mexico, but residing in the United States and who continue to identify as Mexican) and individuals born, raised, and residing in Mexico.
The Transnational

Today the term *transnational* is found across all kinds of scholarly texts, in popular culture, in political discourse, and even in postings for academic jobs. In recent years a number of books and articles on Chicana/o activism and its “transnational” connections with Third World liberation movements have been published.62 In the literature of the Chicana/o Movement, memoirs by former Chicana/o leaders, chronicles, and testimonies continue to be the most common. However, the larger discipline of Chicana/o studies engages in cross-disciplinary and international research. Historian Elliot Young has noted that Chicano studies has been at the forefront of pushing scholars to deal with issues of race, class, and gender, to conduct multi-national archival research, and to move beyond the constraints of the nation-state framework.63 The application of a transnational framework in the historiography of the Chicana/o movement has meant excavating the global connections of Chicana/o political activism and knowledge production.

Yet the increasing deployment of the term *transnational* as a category of analysis has pushed scholars across disciplines to differentiate the national, the global, the international, and the bi-national from the transnational framework to mean more than simply “the crossing

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of national borders.” In this work, transnational refers to the circular processes of articulating a sense of political, cultural, and ethnic link between Mexicans and Chicana/os that has been produced, adapted, and reiterated across geographical spaces and political boundaries. The migratory flows of people, ideas, products, and identities across both sides of the border have linked together “distinct national localities,” while at the same time creating new spaces of collaboration.

The use of a transnational framework in the Chicana/o Movement historiography has been a crucial corrective towards the tendency to limit the significance and connectivity of Mexican migrants to the confines of the United States and the U.S.-Mexico border region. Today, Chicana/o and immigration historiographies are at the forefront of unearthing the transnational relations established between Mexican and Mexican American (Chicana/o) communities in both nations. An example is Alicia Schmidt Camacho’s Migrant Imaginaries: Latino Cultural Politics in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands. Her work looks at the conflicted relations between Mexican migrants and Mexican Americans in the United States. Schmidt Camacho shows how notions of political expressions, citizenship, and the nation-state have been reconfigured through what she calls “transborder mobility.”

Schmidt Camacho’s work engages with the issue of Mexican migration as part of global economic integration, one of the most pressing historiographical debates concerning immigration. By rooting the relations of Mexican nationals and Mexican Americans within historical U.S. capitalist expansion, the narrative will continue to flow from south to north.

While the transnational framework has disrupted the centrality of the nation state, this

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64 Joseph E. Taylor III, “Boundary Terminology,” Environmental History 13, no. 3 (July 1, 2008): 455.
66 Schmidt Camacho, Migrant Imaginaries, 2008.
economic expansion continues to make the United States the center of the conversation, pushing Mexico to the periphery of the debate. This economic and narrative flow often overlooks the internal dynamics affecting Mexico, beyond the Mexican-U.S. border, as a contested terrain on which Mexican nationals and Mexican Americans (Chicana/os) have struggled over the signification of culture, politics, authenticity, race, and *mexicanidad*.

Therefore, in this work the term *transnational* refers to the process of shifting the coordinates of analysis from a unidirectional, south to north trajectory back towards Mexico itself. I therefore ask in this dissertation, to borrow the words of Chicana historian Emma Pérez: “by going outside in order to come back in with different kinds of inquiries, can I confront the systems of thought that produce [Chicana/o and Mexican] history?” As a Mexican national and an immigrant in the United States, my personal experience and work has emerged from Mexico, to “the other side,” and now goes back into it to explore the dynamics that surrounded Mexican-Chicana/o relations in the 1960s and 1970s.

By emphasizing discrete international historical moments—the emergence of Third World liberation movements, the Mexican Dirty War, and the Chicana/o Movement—in which Mexican-Chicana/o relations operated, this work explores the nuances of Mexican-Chicana/o solidarity movements. The return of a Mexican revolutionary nationalism after its reformulation and reconstitution through Chicana/o cultural nationalism revealed a more complicated picture than simply one of solidarity; it also revealed the discordance between cross-border alliances recognizing Mexico as “a contested, contradictory, and interrupted space.”

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Historiography

At the height of Chicana/o activism, Mexican and Chicana/o intellectuals, activists, and media informed Mexican audiences about the political origins and struggles of the Chicana/o Movement through newspaper articles, conferences, art exhibitions, theater, and other media. On the one hand, this activity increased the awareness in Mexico about the perils of Mexican immigrants and their descendants in the United States. On the other hand, this phenomenon did little to change the negative stereotypes and attitudes Mexicans held towards Mexican Americans in general. The growing interest in Chicana/os and their origins, political activism, and struggles among Mexican audiences was a short-lived phenomenon.

Thus, the term Chicana/o continued to be used in Mexican publications, although the term was used as synonymous with Mexican American, not necessarily with the political origins or connotations of the Movement. To offer a more comprehensive history of Chicana/o-Mexican relations, this dissertation explores the solidarity Chicana/os expressed as they confronted “un Mexico inesperado” [an unexpected Mexico], filled with prejudices,

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70 One of the great deceptions experienced by Chicana/os in their search for their “idealized Mexico” and political solidarity with Mexicans was the negative attitudes by Mexicans against their language skills, working class background, and strong ethnic features. Some works that addressed some of these issues are, Maciel, El bandolero, el pocho y la raza, 17; Monsiváis, “De México y Los Chicanos, de México y Su Cultura Fronteriza,” 16–17; Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Claudio H. Vargas, “¿Paisanos, Pochos O Aliados Políticos?,” Revista Mexicana de Sociología 53, no. 2 (April 1, 1991): 185–206; Garza, “Demythologizing Chicano-Mexican Relations”; Mindiola and Martinez, Chicano-Mexicano Relations.
discrimination, misunderstandings, and stereotypes about Chicana/os. The works produced during the pinnacle of Chicana/o and Mexican relations focused in great part on informing one another about their struggles and on establishing the historical, political, and cultural connections that existed between them but often only superficially mentioned their internal conflicts.

The production of Chicana/o historiography for Mexican audiences came mostly from Chicana/o activists and Mexican intellectuals who had some direct experience with the situation of Mexican immigrants in the United States. One of those intellectuals is David R. Maciel, a former history professor at the University of New Mexico, who in the 1977 published an edited volume of articles by Chicana/os for Mexican audiences. La otra cara de México: el pueblo Chicano [Mexico’s Other Face: The Chicano People] included Chicana/o writers like Juan Gómez Quiñones, Evelina Márquez, Margarita Ramírez, and Jorge Huerta with an introduction by Mexican writer Carlos Monsiváis. The book served as a corrective to the lack of information in Mexico about the experiences of Chicana/os in the United States by Chicana/os themselves. The narrative of the book focused on the experience of racial discrimination, cultural nationalism, and Marxist tenets of class oppression, which was representative of the literature at the time.

Another important work was that of Mexican sociologist Jorge A. Bustamante, who graduated from the University of Notre Dame in the United States at the apex of the Chicana/o Movement. As a graduate student in the United States, Bustamante experienced

71 Maciel, El bandolero, el pocho y la raza, 17.
72 The work was published in Spanish by a Mexican editorial in Mexico City with 3500 copies printed. David Maciel, ed., La Otra Cara de México: el pueblo chicano (Mexico, D.F: Ed. "El Caballito, 1977).
73 The work of David Maciel for Spanish speaking audiences has focused on the history of Chicana/os in the United States helping to challenge the negative views of Chicana/os in Mexico. Ibid.; Maciel, El México olvidado; Maciel, El bandolero, el pocho y la raza.
firsthand the struggles of undocumented migrant workers when he posed as one and crossed the U.S.-Mexico border as part of his research work. Bustamante’s insightful work was instrumental in connecting the administration of Mexican president Luis Echeverría (1970-976) with leaders of the Chicana/o Movement. He also was fundamental in bringing awareness to Mexican audiences (particularly university students) about Chicana/os and Mexican immigrants in the U.S. The publication of his works both in Spanish and English helped not only to bridge U.S. and Mexican academia, but also to highlight the connections between immigration and the Chicana/o movement.

Mexican sociologist Arturo Santamaría Gómez also lived in the United States during the upheavals of the Chicana/o Movement and participated directly with the United Farm Workers (UFW) under the leadership of César Chávez. In the mid-1990s, Santamaría Gómez published *La Política Entre México y Aztlán: Relaciones Chicano Mexicanas del 68 a Chiapas 1994*, which is one of the most comprehensive works written for Mexican audiences to delineate the relations between Chicana/o activists, Mexicans, and the Mexican government. Santamaría Gómez’s work is of great relevance for the historiography of Mexican studies because it looks at the relations of Mexicans and Chicana/os from the Mexican side. In his commitment to support the struggles of Chicana/os in the U.S.,

74 Mindiola and Martínez, *Chicano-Mexicano Relations*, 4.
76 This information is disclosed in the cover of his book, Arturo Santamaría Gómez, *La política entre México y Aztlán* (Culiacán Rosales, Sinaloa, México: Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa, 1994).
77 Ibid.
Santamaría tends to depict the relations between these groups as part of a continuous and unproblematic cultural and political connection.

My dissertation also enters into dialogue with the current historiography of Mexican political activism of the 1960s and 1970s, which focuses in great part on the internal political upheavals of the Mexican “Dirty War.” Since the official acknowledgement of the existence of a Mexican Dirty War, a plethora of scholarship has been published about it with the Tlatelolco student massacre at the forefront of it. While the Tlatelolco massacre was not the first use of indiscriminate force by the regime against political dissent, the fact that it occurred in a highly populated urban space and in full view of the international media, combined with the educated and middle-class origin of many of its victims, led to it being remembered as a watershed moment in Mexican history. More recent scholarship in Mexican studies has decentered the Tlatelolco Student Movement as the watershed event of

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78 The term Dirty War (Guerra Sucia) was first coined by the Argentinian military in reference to their fight against guerrillas during the 1970s. Patricia Marchak and William Marchak, God’s Assassins: State Terrorism in Argentina in the 1970s (McGill-Queen’s Press - MQUP, 1999), 109.

social activism by tracing the effects and processes of the Dirty War in rural areas back to the 1950s.

Most of the recent historiography dealing with the Chicana/o Movement continues to recognize the significance of the Tlatelolco massacre as part of transnational student political activism. Mexican studies of the Dirty War have a tendency of limiting their focus to the boundaries of the Mexican nation. Even though the influence of the U.S. within Mexico is undeniable, these studies do not include the political activism of Chicana/os in their analyses. One recent exception is Alan Eladio Gómez’s “Por la reunificación de los Pueblos Libres de América en su Lucha por el Socialismo: The Chicana/o Movement, the PPUA and the Dirty War in Mexico in the 1970s.” In this essay, Gómez explores the international relations established between radical Chicano activists and Mexican armed movements during the period of the Mexican Dirty War.
repression by the Mexican state and the ideals of revolutionary solidarity. His work is a necessary contribution to decentralizing Mexican Dirty War studies from the confines of national borders. Gómez’s work reinscribes the political collaboration established between Mexican and Chicana/o activists within the context of the Mexican Dirty War and as part of the long history of transnational solidarity movements. However, his work continues to presume that the source of rupture between these attempts for political solidarity came mostly from state forces, whereas issues of prejudice, discrimination, misunderstanding, and divergent political aims between groups are ignored because of the desire to highlight political solidarity.

Another important historiographical category that informed Chicana/o-Mexican relations was the Third World politics used by Mexican President Luis Echeverría Álvarez. The Mexican left constructed Echeverría’s image as the symbol of the Dirty War because of his involvement in the Tlatelolco massacre in his capacity as Secretary of Government under the administration of President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970). Recently, however, a number of books and articles on Echeverría’s administration and the consequences of his “populist style” have been published. 83 The focus from these works is on the national and

regional dynamics of his policies. While insightful, this literature has not yet fully engaged with the deployment of Echeverría’s populism in international arenas.

Echeverría’s tercermundismo [Third-Worldism] combined Marxism, Mexican revolutionary nationalism, and notions of Third World liberation for political leverage in his campaign for the position of Secretary General of the United Nations. Echeverría’s administration and its collaboration with Chicana/os set a new standard for the relations between the Mexican state and “el México de afuera.” Drawing from the historiography on the Mexican Dirty War, Chicana/o studies, and Echeverría’s presidency, this dissertation argues that the Chicana/o-Mexican solidarity movements not only were expressions of a long history of transnational activism, but also were a manifestation of wider global political dynamics. At one level, Chicana/o-Mexican relations established new forms of intellectual, cultural, and political collaboration between activists across both nations. At another level, Chicana/o collaboration with Echeverría had a direct impact on the shifting attitudes of the Mexican state towards Mexican and Mexican American communities in the U.S.

**What I Set Out to Find and What I Found? (Sources and Methodology)**

The argument of state repression and surveillance either by the FBI in the United States or by agents of the Mexican government through the Dirty War is very prominent in the literature and narratives of Chicana/o and Mexican political activists.\(^{84}\) Therefore, when I

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started this project to research the nature of the solidarity movements between Mexicans and Chicana/os, I expected to find state repression as the main cause that led to the decline of their collaboration. However, through the sources I found that state repression and surveillance played a lesser role in shaping the dynamics of solidarity between Mexican activists and Chicana/os. So what sources did I use and what is it that I found?

I used interviews and a variety of documents from Mexican and U.S. archives. The majority of the interviews developed from my research on the political activism of Mario Cantú and his connections to Mexican guerrilla leader Florencio “El Güero” Medrano during the 1970s. Other interviews, such as the one with Chicano leader José Ángel Gutiérrez, served as key catalysts for shifting the direction of analysis as a circular process. Because my initial focus for this project was on the relation between El Güero and Cantú, the interviews that I collected were around that relation. However, their testimonies about struggles with solidarity was valuable nonetheless—some people chose to talk with me informally rather than being formal participants of this project, which helped me to rethink this project. And because the initial focus of my project was on Chicana/o-Mexican relations through an armed movement, the male perspective has been overrepresented in this project. However, that is not to say that women did not play an important role within Chicana/o-Mexican relations. On the contrary, women played instrumental roles in establishing solidarity networks not only with Mexicans, but also as part of larger international solidarity movements. One of those instances was the celebration of the International Women’s Year (IWY) in Mexico City in

1975, where Chicanas and Mexicanas came together to share their experiences. Women were also politically active as part of the Fifth Festival of Teatros Chicanos and as recipients of the Echeverría’s scholarship programs. Further excavation for sources to denaturalize the male-centered narrative of these solidarity networks is required and will be part of a future book manuscript.

Focusing on historical actors who served as political leaders, such as the Mexican President Luis Echeverría and Chicano leader José Ángel Gutiérrez, was a deliberate decision on my part. At one level, the goal was to investigate a highly contentious and fundamental political relation that shifted the reputation of Chicana/os in Mexico. Chicana/o leaders captured most of the attention from the Mexican media, government, activists, and intellectuals, which tilted the historical narrative their way. At another level, focusing on prominent Mexican authors like Carlos Monsiváis and Octavio Paz to stand as a narrow representative voice of a larger Mexican intellectual community is important because their analyses influenced the opinions of activists across national boundaries. Finally, an aim of this research is to trace the ideological, political, and cultural forces that shaped the diverse expressions of solidarity. The use of well-known figures like Chicano theater director Luis Valdéz alongside Mexican director Mariano Leyva Domínguez helps to open a rich discursive public archive of the 1970s that illustrates the interplay of political and cultural discourses of solidarity between Chicana/os and Mexicans.

Mexican and Chicana/o newspapers were particularly important in documenting the diverse expressions of solidarity and its formulations across national borders. Activists in both countries formulated, readapted, and deployed claims for shared political, historical, and

cultural roots. However, the contextualization of those deployments through a transnational framework compels us to recognize the political contestation over signifiers of culture and national belonging. Equally important to connect the significance of Chicana/o-Mexican relations as part of Third World solidarity movements was the use of diplomatic communications, including reports relating to the Echeverría administration’s support for Chicana/o activists, as well as U.S. government documents produced primarily in response to his *tercermundista* foreign policy.

The same is true for the consultation of Mexican police and military reports produced by personal of the Dirección Federal de Seguridad (Office of Federal Security, or DFS) and the Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (General Directorate of Political and Social Investigations, or IPS). This documentation, which has been available since the early 2000s after the change in political administration under the leadership of President Vicente Fox, has allowed me to trace the effects of the Mexican Dirty War over the policing of political activists, solidarity rhetoric, and expressions of militancy.\(^\text{87}\) The use of sources from IPS and DFS, as well as other sources show the Janus-faced political strategies used by the Echeverría administration around cooptation and suppression of political dissent. On the one hand, he openly declared his support for Chicana/o activism as a representation of Mexican nationalism, while on the other hand he simultaneously warned the Nixon administration of the danger of “communists” among Chicana/os.\(^\text{88}\) Moreover, these documents include ample evidence of the authoritarian and repressive nature of the Mexican

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\(^{87}\) “Official Report Released on Mexico’s ‘Dirty War.’”
government against its own political dissidents, which affected the nature of political mobilization, goals, and attitudes among Mexicans in contrast to those used by Chicana/os.

**Chapterization**

Chapter one examines the historical moment of the 1960s and 1970s, as members from the Chicana/o Movement reached across class, borders, and ideologies to proclaim a sense of Third World political solidarity with Mexicans. It shows, in fact, a moment when a retrofitted form of Mexican nationalism boomerangs back to Mexico itself. While Chicana/os adapted Mexican revolutionary nationalism as part of their own cultural nationalism to resist cultural erasure and racism, Mexican leftists identified those same ideals with government repression.

Chapter two investigates a fundamental political connection between Chicana/o activists and Mexican nationals—Mexican President Luis Echeverría and Chicana/os—and provides analysis on interconnections between Mexican revolutionary nationalism and notions of Third-Worldism. Echeverría’s populist style and strategies greatly resonated with the political goals and idealism of some Chicana/o activists who sought greater international recognition for their movement.

In chapter three, I trace the expressions of political solidarity through another key event for the Chicana/o-Mexican relations—the Quinto Festival de Teatros Chicanos y Primer Encuentro de Teatros Latinoamericanos in 1974. By looking at the dynamics that developed between Mexicans, Chicana/os, and Latin Americans at the Fifth Chicano Theater Festival that took place in the Mexico City in the summer of 1974, we begin to better understand some of the tensions that affected their sense of political solidarity.

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89 AGN/DFS: Exp. 11-204-74 H-34 L-2
Chapter four looks specifically at one attempt to solidify the sense of political solidarity between Chicana/o activists and Mexican radical leftists in southern Mexico. Led by Mexican Maoist leader, Florencio “El Güero” Medrano and Texan Chicano activist Mario Cantú, landless indigenous peasants and young activists for a brief moment sought to gain the support of Chicana/o activists following the assumption of a shared sense of political, cultural, ethnic, and oppression.  

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90 MSC/UCSD) “Armed Revolution Organizations in Mexico,” MSS 523 Reel 8 Folder 27
Chapter 1: The Roots of Chicana/o-Mexican Relations

In the decades following WWII, the long-standing antagonisms between the United States and the Soviet Union were exacerbated on a global scale and came to be known as the Cold War.91 As the Cold War began to envelop the globe, the rhetoric, symbols, and idealism that became characteristic of “Capitalism” and “Communism” intersected with preexisting the social, political, and economic conflicts of local societies. In the case of Mexico, Cold War ideology intersected with traditions of mass mobilization, revolutionary nationalism, anti-U.S. sentiments, and the search for economic growth. For Mexican American communities in the United States, Cold War ideologies collided with struggles for racial equality, community organizations promoting assimilation, anti-communism, and anti-immigration policies.

The Cold War struggles framed movements for national liberation against colonialism such as the Cuban and Chinese revolutions, both of which gained significant influence on the development of political activism. By the 1960s, the Cold War rhetoric had set the framework for a political entanglement described in the words of Max Elbaum’s as, “both a ‘Marxist moment’ and a ‘nationalist moment.’” He went on to say that “it was not easy (especially for newly radicalized youth) to distinguish between a Marxist project in which national liberation for the moment played the pivotal role and a nationalist project that utilized important elements of socialist theory or rhetoric.”92 Third World liberation rhetoric that emerged from the struggles of the Cold War served as the framework for a moment of

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91 The beginning and end of the Cold War, as most historical events, depends on the parameters and values used to analyze the event. In this case, the Cold War is identified with “the overt and covert antagonism which existed between the Soviet Union and the United States, between socialism and capitalism, between a collectivist planned society and the pluralistic values of a market economy, then the Cold War began in October 1917 and ended with the collapse of the USSR in 1991.


political solidarity between urban Mexican leftists and the emerging Chicano/a movement in the United States.

In the U.S., young Mexican Americans grew disillusioned with the limited possibilities of assimilation as a path to end racism and became attracted to the growing militancy of African Americans and Third World liberation movements. The need of Mexican Americans for cultural recovery and political solidarity gave rise to the Chicana/o generation in the 1960s. Yet, in the case of Mexican activists who were confronted with the increasing state repression of the Mexican Dirty War, Mexican nationalism was filled with contradictory symbols that embodied revolutionary legacies and state repression.

In this chapter, I explore the development of the Chicano Movement in the United States and the radicalization of Mexican activism within the backdrop of Third-World liberation rhetoric, which served to frame the activism and political collaboration between Mexicans and Chicana/os in the 1960s and 1970s. First, I look at the Mexican American activism that arose in the aftermath of World War II and the emergence of Third World liberation movements, which led to the rise of the Chicana/o Movement. Through the late 1940s and 1950s, the political activism of most Mexican American organizations became entangled with the xenophobic, patriotic, and anti-communist attitudes taking hold of the United States. Political accommodation and cultural assimilation were seen as the paths towards equal status in a racist society. However, a new generation of young Mexican Americans grew disillusioned with the limited accomplishments of assimilation and became attracted to the growing militancy of African Americans and Third World liberation movements. By the 1960s, young Mexican Americans developed a new cultural and political identity that gave rise to the Chicana/o generation.
Second, I explore the disillusionment of young Mexicans with their own Mexican nationalism promoted by the revolutionary ruling party and set it in contrast to the vibrant energy surrounding Chicana/o cultural nationalism as a tool for radical transformation. Like Mexican Americans, Mexican activists of leftist leanings also were influenced by international ideas for political mobilization, which fit with their own traditions of mass mobilization. However, unlike Chicana/os, Mexican activists did not celebrate Mexican nationalism, but rather were ever more critical of the revolutionary ruling party and its repressive force.

Finally, as Chicana/o organizations and activists gained more prominence across the United States, Mexicans also became more intrigued with their political activism and cultural identity. In the effort to re-connect with their Mexican cultural roots, Chicana/os established collaboration networks with Mexicans; however, the relationships between them were a mixed experience. Language, class barriers, and chauvinism alongside admiration for Chicana/o political activism were some of the complex attitudes surrounding the interaction of Chicana/os with Mexicans in Mexico.

**Part I: From Mexican American Activism to Chican@ Militacy**

Following World War II, Third World liberation movements organized against colonial forms of oppression and domination around the world. Characterized not only as part of a search for political independence. They also sought to reconceptualize an alternative, anti-imperial, and anti-racist world view. In the United States, ideas for Third World liberation became enmeshed with political mobilization for racial and ethnic
equality. Throughout the conflicts of WWII, Mexican Americans participated across the armed forces, and at the end of the conflict they returned home armed with the rhetoric of liberal democracy.

Mexican American veterans organized the American G.I. Forum (AGIF) in 1948 focusing on issues of civil and social rights, especially issues of segregation. Through the advocacy for participation in the political process and recourse to the courts to defend civil rights, the AGIF became one of the most important pressure groups for Mexican American organizations. The AGIF’s strategy was to promote knowledge of the patriotic commitment of Mexican Americans as U.S. citizens and to ideals of American democracy. Along with the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the AGIF was at the forefront for the protection of the civil rights of Mexican Americans.

The fears of a Communist penetration into United States society by the government led to the practice of making accusations of disloyalty, subversion, leftist radicalism,

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espionage, and treason against all kinds of people, especially political activists.\textsuperscript{96} In the face of Cold War dynamics and the continuation of racism and social inequality, Mexican American activism became entangled with ideas of patriotism and anti-communism. The battles against alleged Communists spread across various arenas, including immigration policy seen as a matter of national security.\textsuperscript{97} As undocumented migration and the Bracero Program continued to bring Mexican nationals to the U.S., fears about the Mexicanization of the Southwest and communist infiltration from the south continued to grow.\textsuperscript{98} In response, the U.S. Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Act in 1952, which called for immigration quotas based on national origin arguing that the “native born…[were]…the most loyal Americans, especially whites of British and North European descent, and the foreign-born…[were]…subversive.”\textsuperscript{99} Although Mexico was not part of the quota system, nonetheless, the McCarran-Walter Act was used to persecute and deport undesirable Mexican such as activists Luisa Moreno and Josefina Fierro de Bright.

Luisa Moreno was born in Guatemala and raised in Mexico, but later immigrated to the U.S., where she got most of her education. In the 1930s, Moreno help organized garment workers in New York, and then moved to organizing agricultural workers in the beet, cotton, canning, and pecan shelling industries in Texas and by 1941 in southern California.\textsuperscript{100} Josefina Fierro, immigrated to the United States as a child with her mother during the

\textsuperscript{96} This period is also know under the term “McCarthyism” referring to the anti-communist tactics that Republican U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy used against people suspected of being Communist or sympathizers of communism.


\textsuperscript{98} Lorena Oropeza, \textit{Raza Si! Guerra No!: Chicano Protest and Patriotism During the Vietnam War Era} (Berkley: University of California Press, 2005), 42.

\textsuperscript{99} Ngai, \textit{Impossible Subjects}, 237.

upheavals of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, and later as a teenager she married Hollywood screenwriter and Communist Party (CP) member John Bright.\textsuperscript{101} Through the 1930s and 1940s, Fierro like Moreno continued her activism, defending the civil rights of Mexican Americans. In the redbaiting years of the 1950s, the foreign birth of both Moreno and Fierro alongside their leftist political views made them natural targets for the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Both were accused of being subversives and under the terms of the McCarran-Walter Act, they were deported as undesirable aliens.\textsuperscript{102}

Two years after the approval of the McCarran-Walter Act, another immigration policy was implemented under the Cold War logic of protecting the United States from foreign communist infiltration. Operation Wetback (1954-1955) was a massive roundup and deportation of undocumented Mexican immigrants through the use of intimidation and force.\textsuperscript{103} In the process of the dragnet of undocumented immigrants, officials routinely expelled U.S. citizens. Despite the deportations Mexican immigrants continued to cross border and after the bracero program was terminated a decade later, in 1964, undocumented immigration became the most viable method to enter the U.S. Despite the continuous racism and discrimination experienced by Mexican American communities, most people believed in the “powerful mythology of equal opportunity and the good intentions of liberal democracy in the United States.”\textsuperscript{104} Not unexpectedly, the civil rights strategy used by Mexican American organizations like LULAC and the AGIF was to have an anticommunist stand

\textsuperscript{102} Ruiz, \textit{From Out of the Shadows}, 84.
promoting an idealized patriotic image of Mexican Americans while distancing then from recent immigrants.\textsuperscript{105}

Furthering the U.S. perception about communism in Latin America was the successful overthrow in 1959 of U.S. backed Cuban president Fulgencio Batista by a group of young revolutionaries in the Cuban Revolution. The young leaders of the revolution, Fidel Castro and Ernesto “Che” Guevara, became iconic symbols of social protest and anti-imperialism across Latin America and particularly Mexico. Inspired by the Cuban example and disillusioned with the fulfillment of the Mexican revolutionary ideals, Mexican students arose to challenge the state’s institutionalization of 1910 Mexican Revolution.\textsuperscript{106} The culture of global protest and resistance that emanated from Third World liberation movements influenced Mexican student activism to challenge the increasing authoritarianism of their state.

In contrast, the events that took place in Cuba did not get the attention of Mexican American organizations and only a small number of young Mexican Americans in the early 1960s had a sense of the significance of the Cuban Revolution or its iconic leaders.\textsuperscript{107} However, by the mid and late 1960s, Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution became an idealized symbol of Third World liberation movements that offered an alternative vision to the United States system. As Cold War struggles continued to envelop the developing world, the articulation of ideas and processes towards decolonization that sought to end with centuries of Eurocentric domination continued to intensify.

\textsuperscript{105} Oropeza, \textit{Raza Si! Guerra No!}, 2005, 42–43.
\textsuperscript{107} Mariscal, \textit{Brown-Eyed Children of the Sun}, 99.
Within the anti-Communist and xenophobic atmosphere of the United States against immigrants, the political activism of Mexican American labor leader and WWII veteran César Chávez emerged in the early 1960s. Chávez’s labor activism throughout exemplifies the balancing act that Mexican American groups had to create in order to distance themselves from accusations of subversion, communism, and foreign infiltration. With the help of activists like Dolores Huerta and Larry Itliong, Chávez founded a labor union of farm workers called the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) in 1962, and, by 1965, led a labor strike of grape pickers seeking higher wages that followed Mohandas Gandhi’s and Martin Luther King, Jr.’s ideas of nonviolence. The NFWA combined Mexican state sponsored revolutionary nationalism such as the image of Emiliano Zapata with religious icons such as the Virgin of Guadalupe as cultural anchors to promote a sense of unity in the struggles for labor and civil rights. The agricultural labor activism led by Chávez in the early 1960s stood in sharp contrast to the agricultural labor activism that was taking place across the Mexican countryside, where nonviolent demonstrations routinely were confronted with state violence. As Chávez was espousing ideas of nonviolence, young Mexican activists were beginning to espouse ideas of an armed socialist revolution.

Alongside the activism of Chávez as a Mexican American labor activist was the emergence of Mexican-born and Protestant minister Reies Lopéz Tijerina’s movement to

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109 The United Farm Workers of America (UFWA), which later came to be known as the United Farm Workers (UFW), arose from the merging of Mexican and Filipino labor unions. The Agricultural Workers Organization Committee (AWOC) was led by Larry Itliong, a Filipino labor organizer that join forces with the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) led by César Chávez. For more detailed information see Susan Ferriss and Ricardo Sandoval, The Fight in the Fields: Cesar Chávez and the Farmworkers Movement (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1998); Brenda Haugen, Cesar Chávez: Crusader for Social Change (Minneapolis, MN: Compass Point Books, 2007).
recover lost land grants in New Mexico. Following the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty, Mexicans living in the area acquired by the U.S. who chose to stay were promised that their rights would be protected, particularly in matters of land ownership. However, those rights were routinely violated and a long battle for the restoration of land grant rights developed in northern New Mexico. In 1963, Tijerina organized the Alianza Federal de Mercedes to draw attention to the issues of land grants claimed by descendants of Mexican and Spanish settlers, which led to an ongoing conflict with the district attorney, Alfonso Sánchez. In mid-1967, Reies Tijerina and his followers descended to the courthouse of Tierra Amarilla, New Mexico, claiming a citizen’s arrest. After a short standoff with law officers, Tijerina and his followers fled, only to be captured shortly after. The Tierra Amarilla incident was initially seen by some as the beginning of a Chicana/o revolutionary or guerrilla activism, but at the end it did not amount to an armed movement.\footnote{For further information on Reies Tijerina see Rudy V. Busto, \textit{King Tiger: The Religious Vision of Reies López Tijerina} (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005); Lindy Scott, “Reies López Tijerina: The Visions and Obedience of a Pentecostal Activist,” in \textit{Los Evangélicos: Portraits of Latino Protestantism in the United States}, ed. Juan F. Martinez and Lindy Scott (Eugene, OR.: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2009); Reies Tijerina, \textit{They Called Me “King Tiger”: My Struggle for the Land and Our Rights} (Houston: Arte Publico Press, 2000).}

By the mid-1960s, a new generation of Mexican Americans became exasperated with the failure of assimilation as a strategy to end the racism and oppression of their communities. The mixing of working class experience of Mexican Americans, the influence of third world movements, the effects of racial discrimination, and the inspiration from the political mobilization and demands of other communities of color across the United States set in motion the Chicana/o Movement: “A diffuse movement cross-cut by regional, gender, and class issues, the Movimiento…was a mass mobilization dedicated to a wide range of social projects, from ethnic separatism to socialist internationalism, from electoral politics to
institutional reform and even armed insurrection.”

The Chicana/o Movement sought to develop a sense of national, racial, and ethnic pride among Mexican American communities by looking back to their own great cultural traditions and to create a sense of communal empowerment. “A political ‘consciousness’ of being mexicano in the United States gave rise to a militant ethos…[that] sought to synthesize the problems of the Mexican American community…to combat racism, discrimination, poverty, and segregation, and to define itself politically and historically.”

The Chicana/o Movement evolved from a long history of community based movements among Mexican American communities connecting the need of new generations for a sense of belonging, place of origin, and unity.

To identify as a Chicana/o signified a new political awakening that challenged earlier forms of political mobilization promoting assimilation. Although Chicana/os were critical of the pro-assimilationist politics of earlier generations, nonetheless, they stood on the shoulders of the long history of community organization build by groups like LULAC and AGIF. The Chicana/o Movement promoted a different sense of empowerment, working class political base, and cultural pride than earlier groups. Within the United States the Movement was radically different as Chicana/os relied on elements and symbols that had been sources of “otherness and exclusion” from mainstream United States such as the use of Spanish and various symbols of ethnic pride. At the same time, the Movement was also part of a complex

111 Mariscal, Brown-Eyed Children of the Sun, 3.
113 The classic work that describes the Chicana/o Movement as part of the long process of political resistance against Anglo-American domination is Rodolfo Acuña, Occupied America; the Chicano’s Struggle toward Liberation (San Francisco, CA: Canfield Press, 1972).
114 García, Chicanismo, 4.
web of national and global forces of the Cold War and its political stages in South East Asia and Latin America.115

Influenced by personal experiences and cross-cultural, cross-racial, and international forces, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, Chicano (not Chicana) cultural nationalism became the dominant ideology. From its inception the narrative of the Chicano Movement was constructed as a male experience only, where women and their contributions were erased from the legacy of the Chicano Movement. Chicana feminists challenged the male-centered narrative of the Chicano Movement by connecting gender issues with issues of racism and colonialism, especially by the mid-1970s.116

However, in the 1960s the need for unity and cultural recovery led to the construction of a narrative that reduced the complexity and diversity of the strands that gave form to the Chicana/o Movement in favor of cultural survival. The assumption that a shared cultural background would “naturally” lead to political harmony and solidarity became one of the central limitations of cultural nationalism. Nonetheless, Chicano cultural nationalism in the late 1960s became the most important ideological platform, “…the key to organization [that] transcends all religious, political, class and economic factions or boundaries.”117 As a consequence the labels of vendido (sellout), Tio Taco (Chicana/o version of Uncle Tom), and Malinche for women (indigenous woman blamed for helping Hernán Cortes against the

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115 On the national and global forces that shaped the political mobilization of the Chicana/o Movement see Mariscal, Brown-Eyed Children of the Sun; Lorena Oropeza, Raza Si! Guerra No!: Chicano Protest and Patriotism During the Vietnam War Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).


Aztecs) became a common accusations against those who challenged mainstream Chicano narrative.

The need for Chicana/o solidarity was articulated in March 1969 in Denver, Colorado, at the first National Chicano Youth Liberation Conference through a manifesto of Chicana/o nationalism called *El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán* (The Spiritual Plan of Aztlán).\(^{118}\) The plan expressed the growing nationalist consciousness of Chicana/o youth and raised the concept of Aztlán, the homeland of Chicana/os.

> In the spirit of a new people that is conscious not only of its proud historical heritage but also of the brutal ‘gringo’ invasion of our territories. *We, the Chicano, inhabitants and civilizers of the northern land of Aztlán…We do not recognize capricious frontiers on the bronze continent. Brotherhood united us,…Before the world, before all of North America, before all our brothers in the bronze continent, we are a nation, we are a union of free pueblos, we are Aztlán.*\(^{119}\)

For Chicana/os, Aztlán referred to the mythical homeland of the Aztecs located in the United States southwest and expressed the need to reclaim the Chicana/o homeland as a free and sovereign nation. This homeland of Aztlán became the symbol for glorious indigenous past and a history of resistance and survival that gave origin to the Chicana/o people. The adoption of a mythical indigenous land for Chicana/os was a symbolic act of decolonization that represented a historical and political process of liberation from oppression. The contradiction of Chicana/o cultural nationalism was embodied within the narrative of cultural preservation and unity described in *El Plan* as it celebrated decolonization and colonization at the same time. First and foremost, *El Plan* sought to defy the process of colonization brought by the “‘gringo’ invasion” upon the new Chicano consciousness. Second, in the


name of “brotherhood” (not sisterhood or community), Chicanos unconsciously celebrated their own colonization over indigenous peoples by declaring themselves as the “civilizers of the northern land of Aztlán.”

While the 1910 Mexican Revolution became a key historical process that shaped the political dynamics of twentieth-century Mexico, for Chicana/os the Mexican-American War gave rise to their identity as neither Mexicans nor Americans.

...a water stream, a river does not separate people. This land [U. S. Southwest] always is going to be Mexico...here we are and always going to be Mexicans. ‘In 1848, a treaty between both nations suddenly made us residents on this side of the border; since then we have been strangers in our land, but we have always felt part of [Mexico]...Well, now we are Chicanos.'

The “War of the North American Invasion” for Mexicans left a deep-seated anti-U.S. sentiment that would be expressed through anti-U.S. imperialism during the Cold War. The United States context did not provide the conditions to give rise to armed struggles like those taking place across Latin America; however, racial segregation opened the doors for a nationalist drive. Chicana/os activists recognized that their identity was neither Mexican nor Euro-American: they still claimed an unbreakable umbilical cord that united them to Mexico, their indigenous ancestors and the rest of Latin America’s “Bronze People.”

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120 For critiques of sexism, colonialism, and ideological strands of Chicano nationalism found in El Plan Espiritual de Aztlan see Blackwell, ¡Chicana Power!, 92–96.
121 Found in Biblioteca Miguel Lerdo de Tejada (hereafter BMLT), Revistas de Revistas, “CHICANOS: Extraños en ‘el paraíso,’”
122 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) Article VIII “Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico, and which remain for the future within the limits of the United States, as defined by the present treaty, shall be free to continue where they now reside, or to remove at any time to the Mexican Republic...Those who shall prefer to remain in the said territories may either retain the title and rights of Mexican citizens, or acquire those of citizens of the United States. But they shall be under the obligation to make their election within one year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty; and those who shall remain in the said territories after the expiration of that year, without having declared their intention to retain the character of Mexicans, shall be considered to have elected to become citizens of the United States.” “Transcript of Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848),” Archive, Our Documents, accessed March 21, 2013, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=26&page=transcript.
The Chicana/o sense of political activism relied on the emergence of cultural and ethnic pride rooted in part on the nationalist project promoted by the Mexican government and its institutions from the 1920s on. Ironically, the racial project of mestizaje that the Mexican state promoted did not aim to protect the cultural survival of indigenous communities, but rather to Europeanize indigenous peoples in the service of the state.

Furthermore, while Chicana/o cultural nationalism grasped onto the notion of mestizaje as a way to celebrate their cultural and political identity in the United States, the Mexican state excluded (and continues to exclude) Chicana/os from its historical and cultural narrative. In 1977, Mexican writer Carlos Monsivais reflected in one of his essays about the contradictory uses and meanings of *Mexicanidad* between Chicana/os and Mexicans. He was surprised to see the apparent need of Chicana/os for the search for and connection to Mexican nationalism despite the imminent presence of the American way. In contrast, he criticized the bastardization of *Mexicanidad* in Mexico itself.

For those in power, *Mexicanidad* has fundamentally become an obstacle to the foreign education of their children and their faithful reproduction of an American behavior. In the alliance between the middle and working classes, *Mexicanidad* in the cultural realm is not so much a rejection of *Americanization*; rather it is a reflection of the uncertainty towards our own tradition. At the political level is an urgent rejecting of imperialism...As an economic, political, or social system of defense, *Mexicanidad* serves to protest against the salinity of the Colorado river or the struggle to obtain adequate legislation for the maquiladoras...The political needs...for “national unity” in the countryside...cultural nationalism...continues to celebrate external symbols of history and tradition that give vitality to the Mexican Revolution.  

Cultural nationalism was relevant for the creation of a sense of unity among Chicana/os, but for Mexican intellectuals like Monsivais *Mexicanidad* had lost its political meaning and instead it had become a conglomeration of meaningless symbols and practices.

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In the case of Mexican activists, they saw the use of nationalism as a tool of oppression by the ruling party. A report by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) titled *The Role of Public Opinion in Latin American Political Stability* described the Mexican internal situation:

Mexico’s ruling Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI)…exercises effective control over the formation of opinion as well as the expression of it. Extreme leftist opinion in Mexico is articulated and has many forums including the entire educational system, most intellectual circles, some widely read magazines, and the PRI-government complex itself. Expression of the radicalism is regarded as legitimate and even desirable to give the sense of ‘continuing revolution’ in Mexico. However, it and most other activities are closely supervised and curbed before they pose a threat to stability.¹²⁴

Mexican nationalist narratives of unity based on the construction of a revolutionary triumphalism was seen as a tool to manipulate and oppress people while perpetuating power in the hands of the so-called revolutionary family. Therefore, the attitude towards the Mexican nationalist narrative of unity was rather different for Chicana/os than for Mexicans. For Chicana/os the selective appropriation of Mexican nationalism that ranged from a glorious Aztec mythology to a triumphalist Revolution served to frame the construction of the new political movement. While Chicana/os proudly referred to images of Zapata and Villa as symbols of their political struggles for a sense of place and origin, Mexicans listened to U.S. rock ‘n roll while parading cardboard coffins with labels of Mexican revolutionary heroes to indicate that the revolution was dead.

Chicana/os reconciled their experiences of class struggles, racism, and cultural erasure through the framework of internal colonialism and theorized that “the Mexican American community was a conquered people subjected to the conditions of a colonial society: discrimination, a dual wage system, the cooptation of its elites and ruthless

violence.”

The Chicana/o movement was presented as the collective struggle of “a
colonized working class nation” against Euro-Americans with the aim of creating a sense of
collective identity within the United States and across the Third World.

Chicana/o activism lacked a single ideological focus and instead borrowed from a
great variety of ideological, symbolic, and cultural strands including cultural nationalism.
The conditions of exclusion of Chicana/os from both the United States and the Mexican
national narratives shaped in part the creation of political and cultural discourse around ideas
of mythical origins. Mexican American communities had a history of shared experiences of
discrimination and racism through vicious stereotypes, segregation, and violence by a hostile
Euro-American society. While most Chicana/os saw “Nationalism as the key to organization
[that] transcends all religious, political, class, and economic factions or boundaries…[as] the
common denominator [for] all members of La Raza…,” most young middle-class Mexican
political activists armed with Marx and Mao were far from identifying as “Indios” to indicate
political consciousness.

The Chicana/o Movement’s use of “mythic” features like Aztlan
was amusing to Mexican activists and seemed irrelevant to their political atmosphere. The
struggles of Chicana/os with cultural disintegration, discrimination, racism, and inadequate
social services had more in common with the experience of Mexican indigenous
communities than those of middle-class urban Mexican activists. Whereas, the political and
social conditions in Mexico pushed people into the use of armed struggles as an alternative to
bring political change, the United States did not have the same conditions for a similar armed

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125 García, Chicanismo, 147. And the classic work on the paradigm of internal colonialism in Chicana/o
historiography is Acuña, Occupied America: the Chicano’s Struggle toward Liberation.
126 Yves Grandjeat, Charles. “Nationalism, History and Myth: The Masks of Aztlan” in Confluencia (vol. 6, no.
1, 1990) 20.
127 Valdez, Luis and Stan Steiner, “Aztlan” in An Anthology of Mexican American Literature (New York:
Random House, 1972), 403
struggle. Instead, Chicana/os used nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric to reform the United States. Through street protests, electoral politics, communal organizations, ethnocentric discourse, and to a lesser extent the use of sabotage, Chicana/os confronted their historical status of exclusion in the United States.

Part II: The Rise of Leftist Rebellion in Mexico

Given Mexico’s territorial size and geographical proximity to the United States, it was of great importance for the U. S. government to help maintain Mexican economic, social, and political stability for its own internal security. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1951 explained,

Mexico is strategically important to the US because of geographic, political, economic, and military factors…potentially an active war participant on the side of the U.S. Mexican territory includes sites that might be valuable for [military] bases. In addition, US-Mexican relations have an important bearing on US relations with other Latin American republics.  

Mexico’s ability to limit the military and covert intervention of the United States within its internal politics was rooted in part to its strategic importance in the U.S. relations with the rest of Latin America. Also, the willingness of the Mexican government to cooperate with the United States during the Cold War through an exchange of surveillance information from suspected “communists” and unfriendly governments was useful. The Mexican government became characterized by the use of a two-fold policy in relation to the United States and to other Latin American nations; it denounced the United States intervention in Latin America while cooperating with U.S. surveillance.

128 Center of Southwest Research, University of New Mexico (hereafter CSR/UNM), CIA research reports [Microform] Latin America 1946-1976. Reel 5, Introduction
The Mexican tradition of mass mobilization by the working classes became one of the primary concerns for the United States government as a threat to its national security. “The only foreseeable threat to US security in the Mexican economy is that from labor or saboteurs…Trained saboteurs or Communists agents…-In the event of war between the US and USSR, the Mexican Government could probably break strikes in any strategic industry.”\(^\text{130}\) The Mexican political system under the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) had increasingly become more authoritarian, patriarchal, centralized, and corporatist as it confronted long seated traditions of political mass mobilizations.\(^\text{131}\)

Following the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, Mexico’s president Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964) recognized the government of Castro’s Cuba; however, it did not tolerate the support of political dissidents in favor of Cuba. The Cuban example inspired Mexican youth to protest increasing state repression and to question failed revolutionary promises to build a more egalitarian society. During the early 1960s, Mexican student mobilization was particularly notable; however, despite the attempts to create a united Mexican student front and the incorporation of the working classes, it never formed a cohesive movement.\(^\text{132}\)

At the same time, the Mexican state carefully played the balancing game of political sovereignty in the face of Cold War struggles where “revolutionary” ideals were easily interpreted as communist infiltration. In 1962, President Adolfo López Mateos welcomed with great fanfare the visit of President John F. Kennedy, as he promoted the Alliance for


\(^{131}\) For further information on the political environment and development in Mexico see the work of Roderic Ai Camp, Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

\(^{132}\) Pensado, “Student Politics in Mexico at the Wake of the Cuban Revolution,” 331.
Progress. One of the main issues of discussion for the two leaders was the status of Cuba, as Mexico publicly condemned the U.S. failed operation of the Bay of Pigs. Leading to Kennedy’s visit, Mexican students organized demonstrations in support of Cuba and in condemnation of the U.S.; the Mexican government responded with violence. López Mateos and Kennedy relied on the use of revolutionary rhetoric linked with the Alliance for Progress as a way to advocate for a social revolution in the wake of the Cuban revolution and the rising unrest across Latin America.

While in the United States race relations intersected with political activism, in the case of Mexico, Mexican revolutionary nationalism combined with international ideas of political mobilization, opening the door for Mexican students to emerge as major political actors to identify with leftist organizations of Leninists, Marxists, Trotskyists, Guevarists, Maoists, and Anarchists. The proliferation of political unrest and student movements prompted the Mexican government to intensify its authoritarian response in order to maintain “political stability.” The administration of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) in response became characterized by an authoritarian manner of rule against political dissidents through

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136 José Revueltas illustrates the level of fracture and idealization that characterized the Mexican left in the 1960s and 1970s in his discussion of the *Declaración de los 81 Partidos Comunistas. Mateo y Julio Pliego, Para leer a José Revueltas,* *La Jornada Semanal,* n 290, 31 December 1994.
the use of paramilitary security units ranging from professional military groups to
government-hired hooligans.137

Following the triumph of the Cuban Revolution and the disillusionment of activists
with the failed attempts for democratization inspired young Mexicans to take arms against
the government forces. The first armed attack on September 23, 1965 came against the
Madera military barracks by a poorly armed guerrilla force formed by a dozen teachers, rural
leaders, and students. The assault resulted in the death of most of the guerrilleros, and those
who fled into the mountains were later captured.138 In the left-wing Mexican imaginary, the
failed attack on Madera is considered to be the beginning of Marxist inspired guerrilla
movements in Mexico. Rural armed groups or “bandits,” as government forces referred to
them to delegitimize their aims to organize local communities, were not new in Mexico.

What was new in the 1960s was the connection of rural struggles with the idealism of
young Mexicans whose political awareness had been shaped by revolutionary events taking
place across the world. The triumph of the Cuban Revolution, the rise of Mao Tse Dong as a
Third World leader, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, a greater access to information, and the
rise of anticolonial movements, inspired many leftist organizations to take the Marxist flag.
Third World liberation and Marxism appealed to young Mexican leftists who sought a new
revolutionary framework for social transformation in the face of state repression and the lack
of democratic spaces. The armed political activism that emerged in the 1960s among young
Mexicans (many but not all communists) was the intersection of nationalism with

138 Elizabeth Henson, “Madera 1965: Primeros Vientos,” in Challenging Authoritarianism in Mexico:
Revolutionary Struggles and the Dirty War, 1964-1982, ed. Adela Cedillo and Fernando Herrera Calderón
internationalism in the struggles against colonialism and social injustice. Following the Madera attack, rural and armed urban groups surfaced across Mexico inspired by the Cuban Revolution, anti-imperialism, and a shared sense of political solidarity against political repression with struggles across the developing world. The violent response by the Mexican authorities left these young activists little room to maneuver as they idealized armed activism.

Despite the political mobilizations suppressed by the government like those led by Arturo Gámiz and Pablo Gómez in Chihuahua and Genaro Vázquez in Guerrero, for the Mexican left-wing imaginary the pivotal event of repression came on October 2, 1968. Student discontent erupting in July after a series of student skirmishes between rival preparatorias and vocational school gangs in Mexico City led to the riot police arrest of students. Police violence against students triggered immediate mobilizations bringing together preparatoria, vocational, and university students from Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) and the Polytechnical Institute against police repression. The backbone of the student movement was the Comité Nacional de Huelga (CNH), a student strike committee that worked towards university and government reform. The government responded with disproportionate use of force against student protesters and pushed them into the premises of the San Idelfonso High School, an UNAM-affiliated high school. The arrest and injuries of dozens of students and the unlawful incursion of police

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139 Eric Zolov, Refried Elvis: The Rise of the Mexican Counterculture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 120.
140 Preparatorias are a combination of high-school curriculum with introductory undergraduate programs that prepare students for higher education. Louise Walker, Waking from the Dream, 10.
141 UNAM was officially founded in 1910 and granted autonomy by the government in 1929. In theory, autonomy meant that UNAM would operate with government federal funds, while remaining politically independent from the Mexican government. Robert A. Rhoads, Carlos Alberto Torres, and Andre Brewster, “Globalization and the Challenge to National Universities in Argentina and Mexico,” in The University, State,
forces into San Idelfonso was perceived as a violation of the university’s autonomy, which further inflamed student mobilizations and demands. The rhetoric and political aims of the Mexican student movement of 1968 targeted government authoritarianism, and, to a lesser extent was critical of foreign economic intervention and imperialism.\textsuperscript{142} While the Chicana/o movement in the United States was centered on issues of education reform, the preservation of cultural identity, and social transformation, the Mexican student movement targeted the state’s revolutionary claims of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{143}

Just days before the Mexican government planned to showcase its “economic and political miracle” at the opening of the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City, students pressured the government through a series of protests.\textsuperscript{144} The administration responded to student demands by sending armed forces and armored vehicles to deal with mostly unarmed students, activists, and bystanders. The Tlatelolco Massacre openly demonstrated the indiscriminate use of violence that the Mexican government was willing to use in order to preserve “stability.”

The use of violence by the Mexican government was not new; however, the Tlatelolco Massacre became the watershed event in the Mexican Dirty War. First of all, unlike government violence used against isolated rural communities, the repression in Tlatelolco took place in Mexico City in the presence of international media. Secondly, in contrast to many of the poor and badly educated individuals who experienced abuses across

\textsuperscript{142} Gilberto Guevara Niebla, \textit{La democracia en la calle: crónica del movimiento estudiantil mexicano}, (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1988), 49.
\textsuperscript{144} For an illustrative article on the ways that the Mexican state sought to showcase its “modernity” during the Olympic games see, Eric. Zolov, “Showcasing the ‘Land of Tomorrow’: Mexico and the 1968 Olympics,” \textit{The Americas} 61, no. 2 (2004): 159–88.
Mexico, many of the Tlatelolco leaders and participants were middle class, well educated and with the ability to generate greater attention to their experiences.\(^{145}\) Thirdly, the participants in the Tlatelolco Massacre would construct their own public version of the events and participants surrounding the student movement, which led to a narrative of the virtuousness of the movement and the wickedness of the state. Today there is a growing scholarship on rural and urban political activism across Mexico that continues to question the centrality of the Tlatelolco Massacre and offer a more nuanced image of student movements, but it was unquestionably important in the magnitude and the public nature of the government’s violent response.\(^{146}\)

For young Mexicans of leftist leanings, Tlatelolco became the central symbol for...

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\(^{146}\) Some of the arguments against the centrality of the Tlatelolco Massacre come from works that explore repressive events in rural areas and indigenous communities that have being ignored such as; O’Neill Blacker, “Cold War in the Countryside: Conflict in Guerrero, Mexico,” *The Americas* 66, no. 2 (2009): 181-210; Tanalis Padilla, *Rural resistance in the Land of Zapata: The Jaramillista Movement and the Myth of the Pax Priista, 1940-1962.* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Fernando Herrera Calderon and Adela Cedillo, *Challenging Authoritarianism in Mexico: Revolutionary Struggles and the Dirty War, 1964-1982*, ed. by Fernando Herrera Calderón and Adela Cedillo. n.p. (New York: Routledge, 2012). Also works that explore the gendered definitions of the movement’s leadership within the historical memory have contribute to challenging the notions of male leadership in the ’68 student movement include Lessie Jo Frazier and Deborah Cohen, “Mexico ’68: Defining the Space of the Movement, Heroic Masculinity in the Prison, and ‘Women’ in the Streets,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 83, no. 4 (2003): 617-660 and Carey, *Plaza of Sacrifices*. One of the most recent books that has began to challenge the sacred and uncomplicated image of the student movement by illustrating the internal divisions and ideological strands is Jaime Pensado, *Rebel Mexico: Student Unrest and Authoritarian Political Culture During the Long Sixties* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).
creating a sense of unity across Mexico with Third World solidarity. Tlatelolco generated support for Mexican activism, including manifestations of solidarity from Chicana/os, who themselves were connecting their struggles to those of the Third World. Chicana/o activism, just like Mexican activism, borrowed freely from various strands of political ideologies and tactics from activists across the globe, such as Ho Chi Minh, “Che” Guevara, Franz Fanon, Emiliano Zapata, and Mao Tse Tung, just to mention a few. However, each side adapted their ideological borrowings to their own political context and aims, leading to connections and disjunctions in their sense of political unity.

**Part III: From East L.A. to Mexico City**

Chicana/o political activism was organized around issues of discrimination, equal access to education, political participation, police brutality, the Vietnam War, and regaining the control of the Southwest lost in the Mexican-American War. Building on the legacy of community activism across communities of color, especially with African Americans, young Chicana/os took on more confrontational strategies. In 1967, in East Los Angeles, 18-year-old David Sánchez established Young Chicanos for Community Action (YCCA), which soon became known as the Brown Berets.\textsuperscript{147} The Berets demanded an end to police brutality, equal access to education, and the liberation of the Southwest from Anglo domination.

Distinguished by their militaristic brown uniforms and use of paramilitary watch patrols that resembled the style of the Black Panthers, the Berets claimed to represent “street youth” from East L.A. (el barrio) poor and status as the “Liberation Army” of the Chicano people.\textsuperscript{148} The group was influenced in part by ideals from third world liberation movements,


\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 143.
and, despite their resemblance to the Black Panther Party, the Brown Berets did not follow a Marxist trajectory. On the contrary, the Brown Berets ideological perspective focused on cultural nationalism, linking their political struggle to the nationalist movements fighting for self-determination and autonomy in the Third World.

The Brown Berets led thousands of Chicana/o students to walk out of East Los Angeles high schools in March 1968. The students demanded bilingual education, more Latina/o teachers, better facilities, and the revision of textbooks to include Mexican American history. The walkouts, otherwise known as the “Blowouts,” inspired a chain of similar protests of Chicana/o high school and college students across the Midwest, West, and Southwest regions. Backlash such as disciplinary measures by school administrators, police violence, and the arrest of leaders under criminal conspiracy charges were experienced by the students. However, most Chicana/o and Mexican American organizations rallied in support of the students and their demands, which shaped the Chicana/o Movement and its claims for self-determination.

The East Los Angeles Blowouts can be seeing as the equivalent of the student movement in Mexico City that ended in the student massacre of Tlatelolco. Similarly to the student movement in Mexico, urban students led the Blowouts in Los Angeles that inspired the Blowouts across urban spaces through the Southwest and Midwest. While the success of the Blowouts helped to cement the rhetoric of self-determination in the Chicana/o Movement, the devastation of the Tlatelolco massacre became the perpetual focus of the

149 Elbaum, Revolution in the Air, 79.
Mexican left’s rhetoric against the Mexican state. Both the Blowouts and the Tlatelolco student movement had enormous political repercussions within their communities, but while the Blowouts were a source of inspiration, Tlatelolco was a cautionary tale of the oppressive power of the state. The tragic death of dozens (probably hundreds) of students in Tlatelolco made them into martyrs, while the use of police brutality and arrests of Chicana/o students made them into heroes. Unlike the apathy of the larger Mexican civil society for the excessive use of violence against students, the police force and detention of Chicana/o students generated large support across most of the Mexican American community.

While the Chicana/o Movement was taking shape across the United States and the Mexican state was increasing its repression against political dissidents, Cold War struggles continued to affect the Third World. The Vietnam War was raging in Southeast Asia and color minorities, especially African Americans and Chicanos, were being used as cannon fodder. As thousands of young Chicana/os gained a better understanding of how racism, U.S. foreign policy, and Third World liberation movements were interconnected, their opposition towards the Vietnam War grew. The rationale was that “Chicanos and the Vietnamese were both members of the Third World in that both were non-white people suffering from the exploitative nature of U.S. imperialism and capitalism. [Therefore]…the Chicano claim to the land was an anticolonial struggle similar to the one of the Vietnamese were wagging.”

As Chicana/os drew parallels with the cultural, political, and territorial struggles of Vietnam, they also rejected earlier forms of civil rights activism that exalted American patriotism, whiteness, and value of military service.

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153 Ibid., 82.
In the case of Mexican students, awareness of the Chicana/o Movement was a gradual process as their attention was initially geared more towards promoting better understanding of the Cuban Revolution, and to a lesser extent the conflicts in Africa, Asia, and among communities of color in the United States like the Black Panthers and Chicana/os. Nonetheless, Mexican students and intellectuals, especially those of leftist leanings, became more critical of U.S. imperialist military force with the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic (1965), the war in Vietnam, and increasing racial upheavals that were polarizing the United States. Both Mexican leftist and Chicana/o activists were disillusioned with their societies and endorsed the need for more radical forms of political mobilization. Both Mexicans and Chicana/os idealized political mobilization towards a revolution, although neither was clear in how to achieve it.

Through the late 1960s and 1970s, Mexican and Chicana/o activists travelled across Mexico, Europe and the United States sharing political ideologies and experiences. As Mexicans and Chicana/o activists came into contact in the midst of their political battles, they were able to learn about each other’s struggles. The mutual experiences of repression, the proliferation of political movements by marginalized communities across the globe, and a growing awareness of shared experiences, generated the conditions for political solidarity between Mexican and Chicana/o activists. However, both sides had limited understanding of their political contexts and historical processes.

As the Chicana/o Movement emerged in the United States in the 1960s and began to capture the attention of Mexican activists, the Mexican government also became interested in knowing more about the political upheavals of Chicana/os. The Mexican government was vigilant against any outside influence that could further ignite political instability. The
primary intelligence gathering institution in Mexico, the Dirección Federal de Seguridad (Federal Security Directorate) or DFS, generated a study about Chicana/os titled, “Political and Social Investigation about the Current Principal Problems in the Mexican-Americans (Chicanos) Communities.” The data for the study was gathered from the Centro Cultural Mexicano-Americano, a place where Mexican American university professors from various disciplines contributed to the analysis of Chicana/o communities. The report addressed a series of questions about the nature of the racial, cultural, and ethnic identity, social status, and diversity within Mexican American communities. The recognition of regional, economic, and political diversity did not prevent them from using the label of “Chicano” as synonymous for all Mexican Americans. The study focused around the issue of classifying Chicana/os as an ethnic, racial, or cultural group and the nature of their struggles.

Following a Marxist analysis of class oppression, the report argued, “Mexican-Americans, although they identified as part of the proletariat, are not an oppressed social class, but rather an oppressed ethnic group.” The implication of identifying Chicana/os as an “ethnic group” rather than a “social class,” assessed the potential of Chicana/os to ignite a proletariat revolution. The report concluded, “Mexican-Americans have ideals, material influences, and socialist dreams; but the most important motives that frame their activities are…poverty, social exclusion and persecution.” The report by the DFS provided a broad understanding about the nature of the Chicana/o Movement’s aims, but the use of Marxist

154 AGN/DFS: Exp.11-204-1, File 8-30
155 From the report is not clear where was the Centro Cultural Mexicano-Americano located, the only information mentioned in the report about the center is that it was founded in 1969 and that “prominent university sociologists, anthropologists, and historians of Mexican origin who closely relate to the problems of [Chicana/os] contribute to the development of the center.” Furthermore, the report lacks a date of production, but it took place after 1969 and more likely in the early part of the 1970s. AGN/DFS: Exp.11-204-1, File 8-30
156 My highlight of the words ethnic group. AGN/DFS: Exp.11-204-1 File 8-30
157 Ibid.
analysis to understand the nature of Chicana/os seemed to have been a litmus test to assess the potential of Chicana/os aligning with Mexican communists.

Besides the DFS, Mexican periodicals were also curious about the political upheavals of the Chicana/o Movement. Through the late 1960s and 1970s, various articles informed Mexican audiences about who the “Chicana/os” were, their struggles, and their conditions in the United States. The common denominators across most of these articles were the themes of Chicana/o experience with racism and violent discrimination by “Yankee imperialists,” the effects of the “War of the American Invasion” on their community, and their unbreakable connections with Mexico. In an article titled “CHICANOS: EXTRAÑOS EN ‘EL PARAISO’” (Chicanos: Foreigners in ‘Paradise’), the author described the Chicana/o’s connections to Mexico in part to “The pride in their Indian blood and its dignity is the umbilical cord that unite [Chicana/os] with the Spanish speaking raza’…” Discussion of Chicana/os framing of their connections with Mexico through their indigenous and geographical origins was common among the articles. Racial discrimination was a central part of articles on Chicana/o activism in Mexico. “They call themselves ‘La Raza.’ They are proud of being the Mestizo race from Indian and Spanish and they have also the honor of being the most hated national minority by the North American ‘anglo’…because they carry on their shoulders the hatred of the North American for the Spanish.”

The aim of this article was to expose Mexican audiences to the experiences of Chicana/os by highlighting the experiences of ethnic pride and racial discrimination. Some sectors of Mexicans acknowledged and supported the connections between the Chicana/os and the Mexican struggles. For instance, the leftist Mexican publications like the independent magazine Por qué? offered great support for the

158 BMLT, “CHICANOS: Extraños en ‘el paraíso,’” in Revistas de Revistas
159 Por que? Revista Independiente, Octubre 8, 1970, No. 119.
activism and struggles of the Chicana/o movement in their articles by describing their historical background, supporting the Chicana/o use of cultural nationalism, and recognizing Chicana/os as part of the Third World.

[Chicana/os] are of Túpac Amaro blood, of Quatemozin, of Quetzalcoatl and Jerónimo, of Joaquin Murrieta, of Benito Juárez, of Emiliano Zapata and Francisco Villa, have resisted dissolution…isolated in the vast West, dedicated to agricultural work, the Hispano-Americans did not had a general contact with revolutionary propaganda, leftist groups from industrial cities, with exiles, and students of the ‘third world.’ Therefore, the movements of “Chicanos” are in many cases in a primary stage of their ideological anti-imperialist struggle.160

On the one hand, the article aimed to support Chicana/os in their struggle and make the connections not only with Mexico, but the rest of Latin America. On the other hand, the description of the Chicana/o Movement as having been isolated from “revolutionary propaganda” created the image of the Chicana/o Movement as a peasant rural movement. This inaccurate and condescending description of the political activism of Chicana/os was an example of the limited understanding of Mexicans about Chicana/os. The article aimed to demonstrate support for Chicana/os and their struggles; instead it became a condescending and delegitimizing description of their political efforts. However, the article did try to explain why Chicana/o emphasis on indigenous and revolutionary identities was revolutionary and was connected to the “more revolutionary” struggles taking places among other groups. In the case of this article, an “advance revolutionary ideology” referred to Marxist, Maoist, Trotskyist, or other theoretical ideas of revolution rather than the cultural nationalism of Chicanos evoking a romantic past.

Although some articles tried to be somewhat “supportive” of the struggles and hardships experienced by Chicana/os, there were also those that harshly criticized and

160 Ibid.
despised Chicana/os’ expressions of “Mexicanness.” Such was the case of an article about the distortion of the Spanish language among Chicana/os in the United States.

For those of us who learn the [Spanish] language in our homes…for many generations…it is sad to see with impotence its death on the other side of the border, although, Chicana/os defend it with their teeth and nails. But what can they do? Nothing. Poor illiterate in their great majority! A different thing would be if they were intellectuals…If instead of being Chicanos they had been Germans from Sudetenland or Volga then they would be a pistol pointing at the heart of the United States. But they are not, not even a sling, an arch, or the ax of the Homo erectus of the caves. The end of the Spanish language in [the United States is looming]…First, the impoverishment of their vocabulary will diminish the possibilities to express ideas. And lets not say elevated ideas! Second is the reduction of the space for communication. Third, the borrowing of words from other languages [or pochismos]…and fourth…crac!, the total break…

The working class and rural origins, the bastardized Spanish, and the “indianess” that Chicana/os used for political mobilization were the same things that Mexicans used to discriminate against them. The discrimination used by Mexicans against Chicana/os were extensions of Mexican attitudes used against Indians, working classes, Afro Mexicans, Asian Mexicans, and Arab Mexicans. Although most of the politicized Chicana/os who tried to reconnect with Mexico were university students, nonetheless, they were not seeing as equals by all Mexicans. Language was and continues to be a strong class barrier used by urban middle and upper classes to discriminate against indigenous, rural, and working classes, and it was used against Chicana/os as well.

Mexican intellectuals had strongly influenced the exchanges between Mexicans and Chicana/os in the late 1960s and 1970s. The work of Mexican sociologist Jorge Bustamante, who conducted his graduate work at the University of Notre Dame at the height of the Chicana/o Movement in the 1960s and 1970s, was focussed on Mexican immigration to the United States. My own added emphasis through italicized words, BMLT: El Nacional, 23 Julio 1972.
Bustamante played a leading role in bringing the attention of Mexican scholars and institutions like the UNAM and later to President Luis Echeverría, (see chapter 2) towards issues affecting undocumented migrants in the United States. In the late 1960s, as part of his research work at Notre Dame, Bustamante posed as an undocumented migrant (wetback) in order to get firsthand experience of the lives of migrants crossing into the United States. Through the 1970s, at the height of the Chicana/o Movement, he published various scholarly articles both in English and Spanish in Mexico and the United States: *Los Mojados: The Wetback Story* (1971), “*Don Chano*: Autobiografía de un emigrante mexicano” (1971), and *El espalda mojada: informe de un observador participante* (1973). In 1972, Bustamante returned briefly to Mexico where he taught a class titled “Sociology of the U.S. Minorities-Los Chicanos,” which was the first class at UNAM on the Chicano Movement. In the early 1970s, there was a pronounced interest from Mexican university

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students to learn more about the Chicana/o Movement and to establish intellectual, artistic, and political collaboration.

In 1975, Octavio Paz changed his position away from his infamous essay “The Pachuco and Other Extremes” of the 1950s. Paz echoed the enthusiasm surrounding the Chicana/o Movement among intellectual circles, “…the Chicano movement has impressed Mexicans and they follow it with great deal of attention. Naturally at times we do not have all the information that we should have…And consequently, I believe that although the Chicano movement is seen with interest, it is not as well known as it should be.”

In 1950s, Paz had criticized the Pachucos for their distortion of Mexicanness; however, in 1973 Paz had a more affirmative attitude towards Chicano Mexicanness as he commended them for their ability to preserve their Mexican values in contrast to Mexican urban dwellers. Furthermore, Paz complimented Chicano activism and recognized its internationalism, which he saw as organized “not under aesthetic or social principles, but under political principles.”

Along the lines of Octavio Paz’s recognition of the political activism and the repossessing of Mexican nationalism in service of social transformation rather than at the service of state elites, Mexican writer Carlos Monsivais also acclaimed the Chicana/o Movement.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in 1977 Monsivais wrote the prologue to an edited volume of articles about Chicana/o history created for Mexican audiences, titled La otra cara de México: el pueblo chicano (The Other Mexican Face: The Chicano People). Monsivais not only recognized and celebrated the politization of Mexican nationalism by

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167 Paz, “The Pachuco and Other Extremes.”
168 As quoted in Leal, “Octavio Paz and the Chicano,” 118.
Chicana/os and Mexicans in the living in the United States while criticizing the political apathy of Mexican civil society, but he also recognized the need for solidarity between Mexicans and Chicana/os.

To comprehend the Chicano process is a need of first order for the incipient, weak, and chaotic Mexican civil society. The variety of reasons that ranged from culture to history, from geographic fatalism to racial origins, from shared to discarded myths, from the economy to the folklore, from our ancestors to the braceros. Nothing could be more destructive than to proceed with these politics of indifference, contempt, resentment, or mockery, which has historically being the distinctive sign of our treatment towards the Mexican-American or Chicano community.\footnote{170}{Monsiváis, “De México y Los Chicanos, de México y Su Cultura Fronteriza,” 2.}

According to the editor, David R. Maciel, the basic purpose of the edited volume was to “demystify the wrong and negative concepts commonly accepted in Mexico about chicanos.”\footnote{171}{Maciel, \textit{La Otra cara de México}, 23.} Although this work, along with conferences, academic exchanges, newspaper and magazine articles, was used in an effort to educate Mexican audiences about the historical background and discrimination in the United States that led Chicana/os to lose their Spanish, it was not sufficient to gain respect for the Chicana/o community from most Mexicans.

In the effort to connect with Mexico, Chicana/o activists attended intellectual conferences, traveled in Mexico, and organized cultural exchanges. However, the experience of Chicana/os in Mexico was far from the ideal “Mexico” that they described through their cultural and political expression. In 1971, a number of Chicana/os professors and graduate students attended a ten-week institute in Mexico City; however, people became disillusioned with the Mexico they encountered. “…Chicanos experienced numerous \textit{rechazos}—feelings that they were out of place and that Mexican society was not what they had described to their
students.”¹⁷² Chicana/os expected to find the pristine rural and ideal Mexico that they had created in their minds as part of their political struggles. Instead, the Mexico City of the 1970s was a modern burgeoning capital filled with rigid class structures and social and economic disparities, with people dressing and acting more like the “gringos” than Aztecs of the mythological Mexico of Chicana/o nationalism. A Chicano writer explored the reasons why Chicana/os who attended the institute felt alienated in Mexico City. “[Chicanos] see a [Mexican] society that economically, politically and socially is almost a carbon copy of the United States…The subordination of Chicanos, like that of lower class Mexicans, exists not simply because of their race or culture, but because of the capitalist system in which they find themselves—a system which uses racial and cultural issues as means of economic exploitation.”¹⁷³ This article pointed to the dichotomy in Mexican attitudes towards the United States. On the one hand Mexicans were prompt to criticize the United States and its policies, while at the same time they consumed and adopted its fashions, ideas, music, and language. The author pointed directly to the problematic construction of a Chicana/o cultural nationalism that uncritically generated romantic ideas and expectations about Mexico and Mexicans.

Conclusion

By the 1960s, Mexico was struggling with the emergence of political militancy among its youth who saw Marxist tenets as blueprints towards a new social order. In the United States the fear of homegrown communists became entangled with political activism and race relations. At the time when the United States hoped to stop Communist expansion

¹⁷² UCLA Centro de Estudios Chicanos: Mario T. Garcia, “Chicanos in Mexico” in Raza de Bronzé (San Diego, California, 1972) (pic. 15)
¹⁷³ CSRC/UCLA, Mario T. Garcia, “Chicanos in Mexico” in Raza de Bronzé (San Diego, California, 1972)
and “[c]ivil rights groups had to walk a fine line, making it clear that their reform efforts were meant to fill out the contours of American democracy, and not to challenge or undermine it.” 174 Like Mexican leftist activists who were influenced by Third World liberation and calls for socialist revolution, young Mexican Americans in the U.S. were also influenced by internationalist calls for liberation that gave rise to the Chicana/o Movement. 175 While the Mexican left readily used Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideologies, made calls for a socialist revolution, and challenged Mexican nationalism, the Chicana/o movement mixed Marxism with cultural nationalism to assert their political voice in the United States.

Cultural nationalism rooted in the cultural, historical and political legacies of Mexico and the United States served Chicana/os as a tool to recover a sense of origin, belonging, and unity. In contrast, Mexican activists criticized the use of Mexican nationalism by the ruling party, PRI, as a tool of oppression. In the end, the in-between status of the Chicana/o Movement stood in contrast to other “nationalist movements in history [that emphasized] racial ‘purity’ as the basis for identity; [instead the] new Chicana/o identities were premised on the kind of ‘race mixing’ or amalgamation that had horrified racist thinkers.” 176 These new Chicana/o identities not only rejected the ideas of racial purity, but they pushed the national boundaries of their politicization beyond national borders by connecting with the struggles of the Third World.

Activists on both sides of the Mexico-U.S. border made pragmatic choices around the strategies, rhetoric, and goals for their political activism such as their identification with

175 Elbaum, Revolution in the Air, 42.
176 Mariscal, Brown-Eyed Children of the Sun, 72.
oppression, claims against their political systems, and claims of political solidarity with other
groups experiencing oppression across the globe. However, local traditions as well as
international forces like the Cold War also influenced the strategies and objectives of
political activists leading to ambivalent junctions and disruptions in the search for political
solidarity between Mexicans and Chicana/os.

In the United States, Chicana/o activists used racial and ethnic struggles as their
framework for their political positions and strategies. Race became the framework to
challenge the subordination of people of color within United States society and to connect
their struggles with those of oppressed nations across the globe. The use of race was one of
the main factors that distinguished Chicana/o political activism in the United States from that
of Mexico. The experience of Chicana/o activists with racial discrimination allowed them to
articulate diverse political ideals and strategies centered on a “strategic deployment of key
features of Mexican and Mexican American history and culture in order to fashion individual
and collective subjects capable of asserting agency and demanding self-determination.”

Despite the support advocacy by Mexican intellectuals, rigid Mexican class barriers,
which have served to disguise issues of racial and ethnic discrimination, could not be
removed to accept Chicana/os. The large majority of Chicana/os came from working class
households that left Mexico in search of work and better opportunities. The Spanish from
these families lacked the “refinement” of the educated Mexicans. While the Mexican
American experience of working class problems, police repression, and racism were
important experiences that connected Chicana/o political radicalism with their Mexican

177 Ibid., 45.
counterparts, the working class origins and cultural nationalism of Chicana/os became a source of criticism and rejection by many Mexicans.
Chapter 2: Echeverría, Allende, Nixon, and Chicanos

In the summer of 1972, Mexican President Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) made his first official visit to the United States to meet with President Richard Nixon (1970-1974) and tour United States cities such as Chicago, San Antonio, and Los Angeles with large Mexican and Mexican descendant populations. This visit came just months after Echeverría visited Chile where he proposed the adoption of the *Carta de los Deberes y los Derechos Económicos de los Pueblos* (Chart on the Economic Rights and Duties of States), which became the outline for his *Tercermundista* (Thirdworldism) foreign policy. The Charter’s rhetoric evoked Mexican revolutionary nationalism and Marxist ideologies of class conflict, challenged colonial exploitation, opposed U.S. economic and political pressures, and advocated for the right to national sovereignty. During his visit in Chile, Echeverría met with Chilean mining workers while referring to Mexico and Chile as sister-nations. Echeverría’s political rhetoric praising Mexico’s revolutionary history was not unique, but what was new was the way that he connected Mexico’s revolutionary past with Third World struggles.

Following his visit to Chile, Echeverría visited the United States where he continued using a rhetoric that mixed Mexican nationalism and advocacy for Third World sovereignty. Yet, his political performance had a more ambiguous reception from the Mexican community and its descendants. He arrived in the United States at the height of Chicana/o activism; a time of growing militancy of the Mexican left; increasing solidarity between Mexican leftist

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and Chicana/os, and Cold War politics across Latin America. It was during his tour of San Antonio, Texas, that Echeverría encountered mixed crowds of supporters and opponents shouting “Viva Mexico,” “Viva Echeverría,” “Abajo con el PRI” (Down with the PRI-Mexican ruling political party), and “El Gobierno Mexicano Titere de los Estados Unidos” (The Mexican government is a puppet of the United States). Echeverría responded to these latter criticisms by remarking, “How painful it is...that we should come to defend Mexican interests before the United States Congress and that we should be faced with such a lack of understanding on behalf of a group of Mexican origin.” Still, Echeverría’s advisers had been abreast of the developments of the Chicana/o movement. Despite the criticisms, Echeverría agreed to meet with some Chicana/os, leading to the establishment of their controversial relations.

In this chapter, I explore the way that Echeverría’s adapted his populist style and strategies from the Mexican national stage and plotted them into an international scenario. This came to be known as Echeverría’s Thirdworldism or foreign policy, which mixed Mexican revolutionary nationalism, anti-U.S. rhetoric, Third World solidarity, and Marxist notions of class conflict. First, I look at Echeverría’s populist political strategy and rhetoric within the Mexican context. On the political front, Echeverría pledged a commitment towards an apertura democratica (democratic opening) aimed to integrate marginal classes into the political process. His courting of middle class youth, students and intellectuals, in particular, his denunciation of corruption, and his commitment to social and economic justice

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180 Excelsior, June 1972
181 “Que doloroso es, no por nosotros sino por algunos jóvenes de origen mexicano, que hayamos venido a dar una pelea en el Congreso de los Estados Unidos en favor de intereses mexicanos y que haya actitudes que no entiendan algunos descendientes de mexicanos.” Excelsior, 19 June 1972.
became part of his political performances. Despite Echeverría’s attempts to appease social demands, opposition became more militant, and he resorted to overt and covert use of political repression. The massacres of Tlatelolco, Corpus Cristi, and the Dirty War overshadowed Echeverría’s populist and charismatic legacy and made him the poster child of authoritarian repression in the historical memory and narrative of the Mexican left.

Second, this chapter follows the adaptation of Echeverría’s populist commitment to social justice and economic reforms into the international stage of the Cold War. The use of the Mexican revolutionary historical past, Third World liberation discourses, and anti-U.S. rhetoric served as the basis for Echeverría’s self-promotion as a Third World leader. International platforms like the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN) served as the political stages for Echeverría’s performance of his Mexican populism. Third, I look closer to Echeverría’s performance of his Thirdworldism in Chile. At the onset of his international diplomacy, Echeverría presented his Tercermondista foreign policy in Chile, which connected Mexico’s revolutionary history with the pledge to support Chile’s struggle for sovereignty against foreign pressures, meaning the U.S. At the same time that Echeverría presented himself as a viable leader for the bloc of Third World nations, his government collaborated with the United States to oversee the political climate across Latin America through the exchange of information and manipulation of alliances between political interests like those of Chile.¹⁸³

Finally, this chapter looks at the way that Echeverría’s populist national rhetoric and his Thirdworldism linked him with the political activism of Chicana/os. As Echeverría

became the Mexican president in 1970, the Chicana/o Movement was gaining force across the United States. Echeverría used growing political Chicana/o activism and the fear in the United States of the spread of Communism to negotiate with Nixon for better economic support for Mexico. At the same time, Echeverría’s public support for Mexican Americans and Chicana/os furthered his international image of commitment to social and political activism across the Third World. However, some members of the Chicana/o Movement exposed and challenged the role of Echeverría’s government in repressive politics against their Mexican counterparts, which drew attention to Echeverría’s ambiguous “Democratic Opening” toward social activism both at home and abroad.

Part I: Mexican Populism a la Echeverría

This work does not subscribe to the framework of the “great man or woman” history; however, it is important to recognize the importance of individuals when analyzing political activism. In the case of Mexico, the president is both a symbolic and practical political institution as he serves as the head of the entire nation. Historian and economist Daniel Cosio Villegas wrote, “that given that public opinion in Mexico does not work, nor do the political parties, nor the political chambers, nor the labor unions, nor the media, nor the radio, nor the television, the President of the Republic can then operate, and he does, in a very personal and even impulsive form, without any difficulty.”¹⁸⁴ In the 1960s and 1970s Mexican political activists of leftist leanings directly challenged, mocked, and demanded action from their

¹⁸⁴ “En vista de que la opinión publica no funciona en México, ni los partidos políticos, ni las cámaras, ni los sindicatos, ni la prensa, ni la radio y ni la televisión, un Presidente de la Republica puede operar, y de hecho lo hace, de una manera muy personal y aun caprichosa, sin ninguna dificultad.” Daniel Cosio Villegas, El estilo personal de gobernar (Mexico: Editorial J. Mortiz, 1976), 9. For further discussion on the presidential power in Mexico also see Lorenzo Meyer, “El Presidencialismo: Del Populismo Al Neoliberalismo,” Revista Mexicana de Sociología 55, no. 2 (April 1, 1993): 57–81.
president because they perceived popular mobilization to be a more effective political strategy than electoral politics.\textsuperscript{185}

Starting in the late 1940s, Luis Echeverría rose rapidly through the political ranks within the governing political party, \textit{Partido Revolucionario Institucional} (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) prior to becoming the secretary of the interior in 1964 under President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970).\textsuperscript{186} After the Tlatelolco Massacre of 1968, Echeverría was severely criticized and demonized for his handling of the events that left hundreds of protesters dead, wounded, or disappeared.\textsuperscript{187} Echeverría was appointed president in 1970 at a time when Mexico was experiencing intense political, social and cultural turmoil. On the one side, there was the ruling party and its representatives who actively opposed foreign leftist politics associated with the Cuba, Russia, and Marxism. On the other side, college students and political activists across Mexico were embracing Marxist rhetoric mixed with revolutionary nationalism to challenge U.S. imperialism alongside their adaptation of U.S. counterculture.\textsuperscript{188}

The shadow of the Tlatelolco massacre for which Echeverría bore the brunt of the blame, deeply shaped his political style as a blend of populism and authoritarianism, which he called “revolutionary nationalism.”\textsuperscript{189} Mexican urban youth activism gained prominence

\textsuperscript{189} Smith, \textit{Inevitable Partnership}, 59.
and publicity against Echeverría’s involvement in the Tlatelolco massacre of 1968. At that time Echeverría served as the Secretario de Gobernación (Secretary of the Interior), making him responsible for public order. Two years later when he became president, he argued that his predecessor, Díaz Ordaz, had been responsible for ordering the military attack on students. Nonetheless, he carried much blame in the eyes of Mexican political activists. Scholars of the time have argued that Echeverría’s personal style of governing, which catered to students, workers, and peasants as well as leftist foreign governments were linked to his desire to establish a public image in contrast to his 1968 actions.

University students became one of the most noticeable and vociferous groups across Mexico through the 1960s and 1970s, demanding state accountability for social inequalities, state repression, unemployment, and decreasing standards of living. The social unrest across urban and rural Mexico furthered fractured the “revolutionary” legitimacy of the Mexican government under the command of the PRI, whose political rhetoric rested on revolutionary commitment and success to create a modern democratic nation. Growing dissatisfaction across Mexico furthered pushed Mexican activism to link their struggles with the emerging ideologies of international Third World liberation movements.

190 The violence took place just days before the opening ceremony of the 1968 Olympic games that were being hosted in Mexico City. Under the leadership of Mexican president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, the government had invested massive amounts of money for the preparation of the Olympic games at the same time that the economic and social conditions in Mexico were deteriorating. In addition, the government of Díaz Ordaz enacted various repressive actions against labor unions, farmers, and students. Students from universities and preparatory schools organized protests during the summer of 1968 to advocate for social, education, and political reforms. The student’s demands were: 1) repeal of articles 145 & 145b of the Penal Code, which prohibited public gatherings deemed to threaten public order. 2) Dismantling of the granaderos (tactical police force). 3) Freedom for political prisoners. 4) Dismissal of the chief of police. 5) Punishment of the officials responsible for earlier repressive actions against students. Elaine Carey, Plaza Of Sacrifices: Gender, Power, And Terror In 1968 Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005), 96; Elena Poniatowska, Massacre in Mexico (New York: Viking Press, 1975).
Although Echeverría referred to his style as “revolutionary nationalism,” most scholars described him as a populist president.\(^{192}\) In Mexican history these days, it is common to see a comparison between Echeverría and Lázaro Cárdenas, as they both shared similar approaches towards politics and both sought to gain the support of urban and rural popular communities.\(^{193}\) In this case, I adhere to two descriptions of populism both as political style as proposed by Alan Knight’s article “Populism and Neo-Populism in Latin America, Especially Mexico” and Kurt Weyland’s notion of populism as a political strategy described in his article “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics.”\(^{194}\) Echeverría’s political style, meaning his particular (or the Mexican) way of doing politics, encompassed his public discourse filled with promises such as “democratic openings,” economic reforms seeking to regain the support of people, the promotion of Mexican traditional culture, and policies claiming to integrate marginal populations within the political process.\(^{195}\) His style was part of his political strategy as he sought to recover the support of the popular classes for his government, maintain political stability in the country, and continue climbing the ladder of politics.


Both his style and strategies developed gradually as he sought to respond to the political, economic, and social needs and circumstances during his presidency. At the same time, people learned to respond and to adapt to Echeverría’s style and strategies as they sought to advance their own interests and find solutions to their needs. As historian Jocelyn Olcott points out,

In Mexico, where a postrevolutionary populist ethos constrained an increasingly authoritarian corporatist state, non-elites used the corporatist governance structures to claim everything from motorized corn mills and ejido plots to political rights and union recognition. Examining the styles and policies of populist regimes offers only a limited sense of the very people supposedly manipulated by populism actually engaged with it.\textsuperscript{196}

Echeverría’s populist style and strategy, however, were not limited only to the Mexican political arena, but also expanded into global politics as he sought to promote himself as a Third World leader.\textsuperscript{197}

Internally, however, Mexico confronted growing sociopolitical mobilization across urban and rural communities that demanded democratization, better standards of living, and a more equitable redistribution of wealth. The increasing socioeconomic and political demands from workers, peasants, and students, which collided with the inability of the Mexican government to provide more equitable wealth redistribution, became exacerbated starting in the 1960s. At the same time, new ideas of revolution and social transformation emerged across the globe, hand in hand with growing Cold War struggles. Mexican activists seized the opportunity to challenge the state, trying to force accountability for a “successful” revolution

\textsuperscript{197} I use the definition used by Brian Clive Smith “…a group of countries which have colonial histories and which are in the process of developing economically and socially from a status characterized by low incomes, dependence on agriculture, weakness in trading relations, social depravation for large segment of society, and restricted political and civil liberties.” Brian Clive Smith, \textit{Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 1.
fifty years after the armed movement ended that would provide land, education, labor rights, and other measures of well being to workers, peasants, youth, and indigenous people.

When president Luis Echeverría came to power in 1970 under the PRI, he announced his political commitment to a more representative, open, and socially progressive government through the integration of the voices of the youth, the poor, workers, and indigenous communities. Echeverría’s rhetoric promised social reform through what he called his “apertura democrática” (democratic opening). Coupled with his slogan “Volver la Revolución a su antiguo cauce” (Return the Revolution to its original course), he sought to revive the rhetoric of Mexican revolutionary ideals, focusing especially on students, the most militant and vocal opposition sector to his government. The expedited release of political prisoners, especially those involved in the Tlatelolco demonstrators, and the official registration of leftist parties were two reforms that aimed to redeem Echeverría’s government from the horrors of the massacre and curtail the increasing militancy of students and leftist opposition.

On the social and political front, Echeverría’s election promises failed as his government continued to rely on the use of repression against the political opposition. An example was the Corpus Christi massacre on June 10, 1971, when the government’s hired hoodlums attacked student protesters while the police looked the other way. As the nation’s security forces persecuted political activists, especially leaders, many individuals headed to

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remote areas across rural Mexico seeking refuge. An unknown number of young militants, disillusioned with the lack of democratic alternatives, saw that becoming armed guerrillas was an alternative to urban confrontation with the government, which had peaked by 1974.

On the national front, Echeverría implemented various practical measures of reform, although in his first year of his presidency his commitment was mostly rhetorical. It was after 1972 that Echeverría’s government expenditures increased, leading him to be one of the big spender presidents alongside his predecessor José Lopéz Portillo (1976-1978). During his presidential campaign he made great promises for better wages, housing, universal healthcare, land distribution, better roads, and social and economic measures. By 1972, Echeverría began to pour money towards programs like social housing provisions, social security coverage, and the augmentation of real wages (by about 40 percent). However, as Echeverría spent, inflation grew, economic growth declined, and Mexico’s foreign debt increased at the same time that political opposition continued to challenge his “revolutionary democracy.” As Echeverría’s populist style and strategies to reestablish political legitimacy, social stability, and economic growth were becoming less convincing on the material side, he took his performance of populism to the global stage. Echeverría’s foreign policy became a direct reflection of his revolutionary approach toward national reforms.

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203 Knight, “Cárdenas and Echeverría: Two ‘Populist’ Presidents Compared,” 32.
Part II: Performing Mexican Populism on the Global Stage

Echeverría’s attitude toward foreign policy, especially towards the United States, reflected a longstanding contradictory love-hate relation between Mexicans and their colossal neighbor on the north. On the one hand, Echeverría’s middle class Mexican education was cemented onto a revolutionary nationalism that celebrated *Mexicanness* while vilifying the United States for Mexico’s ills. On the other hand, Echeverría’s education also embodied the hopes of the Mexican middle and upper classes for foreign training, and he studied with scholarships in Chile, Argentina, Paris, and the United States. Echeverría’s populism at home embodied what Alan Knight calls a loose *lombardismo*, “a kind of simplistic nationalist Marxism, which, while recycling Marxist notions of capitalist exploitation and class conflict, plotted them into an international scenario, in which the United States became a surrogate for the exploitative bourgeoisie and Mexico was a put-upon proletariat.” In a similar way that Echeverría’s populism at home was largely a rhetorical performance, on the global stage he strove for a kind of revolutionary nationalism mixed with Marxist rhetoric espoused by Third World nations seeking emancipation from colonialism.

I use Smith’s definitions of Third World nations as “…a group of countries which have colonial histories and which are in the process of developing economically and socially from a status characterized by low incomes, dependence on agriculture, weakness in trading relations, social deprivation for large segments of society, and restricted political and civil liberties.” In the aftermath of WWII, the Third World, or third alternative, had emerged as an important dominant paradigm that sought to represent the desire to remain neutral within

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208 Knight, “Cárdenas and Echeverría: Two ‘populist’ Presidents Compared,” 24.
209 Smith, *Understanding Third World Politics*, 1.
the conflicts between the United States and the USSR. This “Third” space engulfed most of the world and became associated with a spectrum of ideas ranging from cultural backwardness to revolutionary vanguardism against colonization. Echeverría took his populist rhetoric and brought it in line with the demands and problematic of developing nations. Since the Mexican Miracle of the 1940s, Mexico had become the “exceptional” example of rapid and successful industrialization not only across Latin America, but also to nations in Africa and Asia.

Mexico’s revolutionary past and the successful oil nationalization from U.S. and British companies strengthened the image of the international image of the Mexican state’s ability to assert national sovereignty and engage in radical social reforms. The rhetorical power of Echeverría’s discourses derived from this synergy. And then, in order to bolster his image of radicalism, he appealed to Third World nations struggling to establish more equitable trading relations with the United States by using fiery anti-U.S. rhetoric. Not surprisingly, Echeverría continued to negotiate behind closed doors with the United States for more favorable trade partnerships.

Echeverría’s political image at national and international levels was constructed around the discourse of “apertura” (opening), which at the national level claimed to open the doors of democracy to new voices like those of students, peasants, workers, and indigenous people. Tito from Yugoslavia, Nehru from India, and Nasser from Egypt represented the political leaders of nations that sought to remain neutral during the Cold War conflicts. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as the movement came to be known as one of the Third World response against the Cold War conflicts. Guy Arnold, The A to Z of the Non-Aligned Movement and Third World (Scarecrow Press, 2010), xxix.

The meaning of the Third World also became a pejorative signifier to describe underdeveloped nations mostly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America rather than political neutrality or democratic liberation movements. Vijayan Pillai, Lyle W. Shannon, and Judith L. McKim, Developing Areas: A Book of Readings and Research (Providence, RI: Berg Publishers, 1995), 2.
people as long as they did not challenge the government. At the international level, Echeverría described Mexico’s “aperture,”

Mexico’s foreign policy cannot be disarticulated from its own internal politics…To reinforce our country’s actions in international platforms alongside the Third World is to defend the interests of our own people who are marginalized from the benefits of economic and social development. Mexico needs to increase its bilateral relations with all nations in the struggle against underdevelopment and dependency. Strong defenders of national sovereignty…[our] foreign policy, does not accept nor justifies the dominance of one nation over another, condemns all types of international pressures, rejects all forms of colonialism and maintains that all nations are equal and have the same right to their own form of politics.\(^{212}\)

The importance of the Third World for Echeverría gained force in the context of mounting political dissent across Mexico and the Third World, the failure of developmental policies of import substitution to yield a substantial growth rate, the breakdown of preferential economic relations with the United States, and the ongoing Cold War struggles and social unrest across Latin America.\(^{213}\) On the economic front, Third World politics served Mexico as an instrument to diversify economic foreign relations as the traditional bilateral relations with the United States were weakening.\(^{214}\)

International forums like the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) became Echeverría’s platforms to present his “radical” ideas in support of more equitable economic opportunities for developing nations, his opposition to imperialism from nations like the United States, and his support for the interests of Third World nations

\(^{212}\)“La política exterior de México no puede estar desarticulada de su política interior…Reforzar la acción del país en los foros internacionales agrupado con los países del Tercer Mundo, es defender los intereses de los grupos de su población marginados de los beneficios del desarrollo económico y social…México, no acepta ni justifica el dominio de un pueblo sobre otro, condena cualquier tipo de presión internacional, rechaza toda forma de colonialismo y sostiene que todos los pueblos son iguales y a todos asiste el mismo derecho de integrar libremente su personalidad política.” AGN/LEA, Caja 536 (no date available).


\(^{214}\)Pellicer de Brody, “Mexico’s Relations with the Third World: Experiences and Perspectives.”
including Chile, Cuba, China, and Palestine.\textsuperscript{215} Echeverría sought to redefine the relations of Mexico with the United States, becoming more independent and more divided toward developing nations (Third World), especially in Latin America, as part of the Mexican diplomatic commitment toward ideological plurality and progressive politics.

In the midst of internal social turmoil after the Corpus Cristi student massacre of 1971 and just months after the failure of Echeverría’s administration to negotiate a preferential rate with the United States on Mexican imports, Echeverría began to lay down the new blueprint for his foreign policy. At the General Assembly of the UN held in New York City on October 5, 1971, Echeverría presented the outline of what would become his tercermundista (Third-World) politics.\textsuperscript{216} He began with his controversial support for the diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China and its acceptance as member of the Security Council of the United Nations. Echeverría grounded his support in a Third World unity within Mexican revolutionary nationalism, drawing from Mexico’s historical experience against colonialism and foreign intervention; “Due to our [revolutionary] origins and the difficult circumstances from which we have developed, we are a nation protective of our liberty and that of all nations around the world.”\textsuperscript{217} The use of a Mexican revolutionary nationalism offered the opportunity to illustrate Mexico’s historical commitment against colonial intervention.

\textsuperscript{217} “Por nuestro origen y por las difíciles circunstancias en que nos hemos desenvuelto, somos un país celoso de su libertad y de la de todos los pueblos de la Tierra.” Luis Echeverría Álvarez, “México En Las Naciones Unidas” 21, no. 10 (October 1971) and Luis Echeverría. “Discurso pronunciado ante la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, en su XXVI Periodo Ordinario de Sesiones: Nueva York, N.Y. 5 de octubre de 1971” in
The support for China, however, was not an arbitrary move by Echeverría. A government report on China produced in September 1971, just months before Mexico severed relations with Taiwan, lays out the pros and cons of Mexico’s foreign policy toward China.\textsuperscript{218} In the tense climate of the Cold War, the tension of the Vietnam War, and the dangers of a nuclear war, China appeared to be emerging as a strong third power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The focus of the report was on the diplomatic relations towards China, its opposition to Soviet power, and the consequences of President Nixon’s future visit to China.\textsuperscript{219} The report laid out the pros and cons of the opening of Chinese diplomatic relations with nations like Sudan, Palestine, Vietnam, and what appeared new relations with the United States. The report concluded that China is not just another developing nation; rather, it holds great potential to emerge as the next revolutionary power.\textsuperscript{220} The report highlighted China’s political and diplomatic importance not only among Third World nations as revolutionary symbol, but also as a new political partner for the United States.

In public, Echeverría’s favoring of China along with his revolutionary rhetoric, implied criticism of the United States by presenting an image of independent Third World leader. However, behind closed doors, the Nixon administration had been negotiating with Echeverría so that he would support the United States’s political maneuverings to win China over. Through declassified secret recordings from the Nixon White House, we now know in more detail about the attitude of Nixon and his staff towards Echeverría, Mexico and Latin

\textsuperscript{218} México y el Mundo: Textos internacionales del presidente Luis Echeverría, diciembre 70/agosto 74. (Complejo Editorial Mexicano,1974), 46.
\textsuperscript{219} AGN/LEA Caja 532, China: La política exterior, Dirección General de Documentación e Informes Presidencial.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., 108-109.
America, as well as the negotiations between them.\textsuperscript{221} One of those negotiations was on the issue of the “Two Chinas” at the UN, Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) and mainland People’s Republic of China (PRC). Winning the alliance of the PRC in the middle of the Cold War battles over alliances was an important strategy for the U.S., especially in the face of the Sino-Soviet Split (1960-1989). Nixon wanted to establish closer relations with China, and the General Assembly of the UN served as a political arena to maneuver for support. Mexico became an important ally for the U.S.’s ongoing plans with China while at the same time Echeverría benefited greatly by solidifying relations with China himself, continuing to polish his revolutionary image as a Third World leader, and quietly building goodwill with the United States.

A phone conversation made by President Nixon to President Echeverría to verify the support of Mexico on the issue of whether or not Taiwan could hold a seat in the UN, illustrates the alliances between Echeverría and Nixon. Nixon asked for Echeverría’s support; “…I am relying on the traditional friendship which has existed between our two countries but—and more importantly—the personal relationship between the two of us, which has been a great source of satisfaction to me…to urge you to consider voting with the United States…”\textsuperscript{222} Echeverría’s concluding statement in the conversation noted the mutual cooperation between both administrations.

…I want to reiterate that Mexico and myself personally are friends of the United States and of you, President Nixon, …I would like to reiterate that we have a joint, common cause, we fight for the same causes on many occasions and so there is a political platform and a basis of friendship which is a very solid one, and on this

\textsuperscript{221} “The Nixon Tapes: Secret Recordings from the Nixon White House.”
\textsuperscript{222} Transcript #20: October 23, 1971 11:19 am -11:31 am Conversation No. 12-103, Cassette No. 1176, White House Telephone, Ibid.
basis. I think that we will continue fighting for many of the same causes in the future.”

After intense maneuvering by the U.S., it came to an agreement that Taiwan should lose its seat at the UN in favor of solidifying relations with the PRC. In the end, Echeverría voted according to United States interests, and Nixon saw this support as deserving of a reward. “...I[t] was hard for the Mexicans to vote with us on this, but Echeverría did it, you know, and now he deserves a little credit in my view.”

Echeverría carefully navigated the fragile political game of the Cold War between supporting the interests of the United States, advancing his own political interests, and promoting a radical political image globally.

On November 16, 1971, Mexico severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but ensured strong diplomatic relations with the PRC. On February 14, 1972, China and Mexico established formal diplomatic relations leading to Echeverría’s visit to China in April 1973. These manipulations of politics paid off for both Nixon and Echeverría as both were able to establish strong diplomatic relations with China along with high-profile diplomatic visits. Overall, Echeverría’s revolutionary and democratic rhetoric was a political strategy to gain the support of the Third World block of nations as representative of their political interests while trying to guarantee the support of the United States.

Echeverría used ideas of “decolonization,” “self-determination,” and “Third World unity” to openly criticize the United States for the use of what he called “economic colonization” such as protectionist policies. In addition, he called for world unity for the

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223 Ibid.

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protection of Pakistani refugees in India, dealt with Arab-Israeli conflicts, and support for nuclear disarmament as part of his *tercermundista* politics.\(^{226}\) The use of international forums like the United Nations offered Echeverría the opportunity to criticize the economic policies of the United States, the race for nuclear weapons, and Cold War powers’ colonial policies across the globe.

Echeverría recognized the Cold War dynamics in which Third World nations were valuable and contested ideological, political, and economic terrain between the Cold War super powers of the United States and the Soviets. At the 1971 General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, Echeverría continued to outline his foreign policy that centered on economic development, which he called “economic decolonization.”\(^{227}\) According to Echeverría, decolonization could be achieved through the elimination of economic restrictions imposed on developing nations by more industrialized countries such as the United States.\(^{228}\) Echeverría argued that the problems and marginal condition of the Third World notions irreversibly pushed them toward a process of a Third World integration and solidarity, for which he aimed to be the spokesperson.\(^{229}\)

Echeverría defined the Third World nations as “nations with different levels of developments, with different ideologies and idiosyncrasies and with different interests for the short and medium term, but the problems that they confront and their own marginal conditions, take them, irreversibly, toward a process of integration and solidarity.”\(^{230}\)

Echeverría’s ideas on Third World unity and decolonization were not unique, as Chinese

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\(^{226}\) AGN/LEA Caja 536, Política Exterior: Apertura Exterior

\(^{227}\) Echeverría Álvarez, “México En Las Naciones Unidas.”

\(^{228}\) Ibid.


\(^{230}\) Ibid.
political leader and philosopher Mao Zedong (1893-1976) had made a similar argument. Third World Nations, according to Mao, had the potential to become the most powerful force in the global arena if they followed the “Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” The Third World had the potential to create an even more powerful set of alliances than the United States or the Soviet Union, but unity and strong leadership was the key. In the case of Echeverría, his focus was not about aligning Mexico’s interests with a specific ideology, but rather to using certain ideas as rhetoric to identify with oppression, make claims against certain political or economic systems, and make connections with other groups or nations experiencing similar conditions.

Part III: Echeverría and Latin America

Traditionally Mexican foreign policy on the financial front had revolved around projects for economic development, especially those dealing with bilateral relations with the United States and to a lesser extent relations with neighboring nations across Latin America. However, preferential bilateral accords between Mexico and the United States diminished under the Nixon administration, when in August 1971 a surtax of ten percent was imposed on Mexican imports.

Part of Echeverría’s foreign policy based in his own distrust of the United States was to seek the diversification of economic relations across Latin America and other regions especially Asia. After the U.S. intervention in Guatemala in 1954, Latin America and the

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232 Ibid.
233 Pellicer de Brody, “Mexico’s Relations with the Third World: Experiences and Perspectives.”
Caribbean had become a Cold War political battleground between leftists, rightists, government forces, and U.S. interests. In contrast to most Latin American nations, Mexico seemed to be an exceptional case of revolutionary “success,” economic growth, social stability, and national sovereignty against the pressures of the United States. Echeverría’s *Apertura Exterior* (Foreign Opening) or foreign policy proclaimed Mexico’s alliance with the marginalized nations of the Third World through bilateral relations as a way to oppose pressure from the United States.

In the case of Latin America, Echeverría pronounced the need for solidarity in 1973. “To strengthen regional unity is a necessity for our current international economic relations, where the most important issues are dealt between blocs of nations.” The division of the world into ideological and economic blocs of first, second, and third world were expressed into new forms of political and economic negotiations between blocs rather between individual nations. The search for regional unity or pan-Latin Americanism was not new in Latin America. However, Echeverría articulated pan-Latin Americanism through the promotion of Mexico as a regional leader. Mexico’s revolutionary past, the successful nationalization of its oil and mining industries, its rapid economic and industrialization “miracle,” and the relative political stability that had characterized Mexico since WWII made Mexico an exceptional candidate for leadership in Latin America. In the early 1970s, Mexico and Cuba were the only two Latin American nations to hold the claim of “successful” revolutions and resistance against the United States.

Cuba, however, held a more radical revolutionary image because its charismatic leaders and their epic struggle to take power and stand-up against the pressure of the United

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235 AGN/LEA, Caja 536 VI-11
States. In 1975, Echeverría visited Cuba where he praised the Cuban Revolution: “The Cuban Revolution is a historical lesson for the new emergent world as it develops a society without exploiter or exploited.”

In the face of a global economic system under the control of few powerful nations, the alliance of developing nations could lead to more equitable relations.

As in Mexican national politics, on the international stage Echeverría utilized the rhetoric of revolution, anti-U.S., anti-imperialism, autonomy, self-determination, and so on. His use of the Mexican revolutionary past, and his defiant support for leftist governments like Cuba, Chile, and China despite United States opposition, served Echeverría as political leverage to seek an international role as a Third World leader. Echeverría’s support for the democratically elected Chilean president Salvador Allende Gossens became one of the most important and controversial strategies of his Thirdworldism. Allende’s political platform favored Marxist ideologies and socialist programs that included the nationalization of Chilean mining and banking industries, reform of social services, and the redistribution of land. Allende’s reforms were perceived as an economic and political threat by the Nixon administration, which wanted to protect the economic interests of the United States and feared the spread of Communism through Latin America. Allende’s political platform, however, appealed to young political activists across Latin America who aligned themselves with his revolutionary ideals.

236 AGN/LEA, Caja 536
On April 17, 1972, Echeverría arrived in Santiago, Chile, to attend the Third United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).\(^{237}\) Just five days earlier on April 12, 1972, hundreds of members of the opposition to president Salvador Allende had demonstrated through the streets of Santiago in the *Marcha por la Democracia* (March for Democracy), demanding a political referendum on his government. Before the meetings of the UNCTAD, Echeverría addressed the Chilean Congress, where he expressed his support for and fraternity with Allende and the people of Chile for their democratic commitment shown through their expressions of popular mobilization. “I have to come to Chile…as a brother to see up close its problems and to find in them, and its solutions, which we trust will be effective, the symbol for the future of the liberation of Latin America.”\(^{238}\) He praised the political turmoil affecting Chile as an example of political democracy. He extended his support for the Chilean nationalization of the copper mines and the implementation of an agrarian reform. The Echeverría’s *Tercermundista* strategy developed through the course of his presidency as he adapting to national and international needs, interests, and developments.\(^{239}\)

At the UNCTAD meeting, Echeverría revealed the blueprint of his *Tercermundista* (Thirdworldism) politics by proposing the adoption of the *Carta de los Deberes y los*
Derechos Económicos de los Pueblos (Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States).\textsuperscript{240} He would later describe the Charter as a “synthesis of the basic principles that unite all the nations of the Third World in their struggle to maintain liberty and increase their development against the great poles of power.”\textsuperscript{241} Echeverría emphasized the need for Latin American solidarity in connection to the global struggles of the Third World in order to confront foreign debts, foreign intervention, the influence of transnational companies, and the lack of access to new technologies.

The Charter’s first two articles focused on national sovereignty:

\textbf{Article 1,} Every state has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.

\textbf{Article 2,} Every state has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.\textsuperscript{242}

Reiterating the rights of nations to the free disposition of their natural resources, echoing the struggles of Allende to nationalize the copper mines at the same time, recalled Mexico’s past struggles against the United States to nationalize its oil. For Echeverría, Third World nations’ ability to participate in the decisions of the world community through political rights and Third World solidarity was a means of survival.\textsuperscript{243} Echeverría’s \textit{Tercermundista} politics

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\item[\textsuperscript{240}] Luis Echeverría Álvarez, “UNCTAD: Discurso...ante La Tercera Conferencia, Santiago de Chile, 19 de Abril de 1972” 39, no. 155 (July 1972). Ochoa, \textit{Reportaje En Chile}. (Doc. # 5 found in pg.136-153) and in Luis Echeverría, “Discurso pronunciado durante la Reunión Plenaria del Tercer Periodo de Sesiones de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Comercio y Desarrollo (UNCTAD): Santiago de Chile, 19 de abril de 1972” in \textit{México y el Mundo: Textos internacionales del presidente Luis Echeverría, diciembre 70/agosto 74}. (Complejo Editorial Mexicano,1974) pp. 109-124
\item[\textsuperscript{243}] Ochoa, \textit{Reportaje En Chile}, 125, 150–153.
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presented a stable and pluralistic society good for foreign investment, while he sought to
diminish the accusations of authoritarianism by the Mexican leftist opposition.\textsuperscript{244}

Echeverría engaged in a delicate diplomatic balance between the constraints of
economic dependence in the United States, the need and aspirations to diversify the access of
markets for Mexican products across the globe, the emerging Third World solidarity against
the dominant powers, the increasing militancy of the Mexican left, and the fragile Cold War
politics across Latin America. For him, continental solidarity could offer the opportunity to
negotiate with the United States for more favorable economic arrangements in the region, but
also offered the possibility to put an end to the hegemonic dominance of the United States.\textsuperscript{245}

Echeverría’s foreign policy strategy sought to find a new path of negotiation with the United
States. It was precisely within this fine diplomatic balance that the support for the Chicano
Movement could offer a path of negotiation for Echeverría between the United States, the
Third World, and the Mexican left.

**Part IV: Chicana/o Movement and the Echeverría’s Administration**

On June 15, 1972, just a month after his participation at the UNCTAD and his pledge
of support for Allende’s aspirations for the nationalization of Chilean industries, Echeverría
made his first visit to the United States to meet with President Richard Nixon. As part of the
arrangements for the visit, Echeverría requested stops in Chicago, San Antonio, and Los
Angeles where he planned to meet members of the Mexican American communities. Nixon’s
chief of staff, H.R. “Bob” Haldeman, described Echeverría’s approach towards the United
States as, “…being politically cooperative, he’s moving around the country where we want

\textsuperscript{244} Diana Carolina Ortiz Gutiérrez, “La Política Tercermundista de Luis Echeverría,” *Agora: La Revista de Los

\textsuperscript{245} Pellicer de Brody, “Comentario Sobre la Conferencia de Cancilleres Americamos y la Política de México
Hacia La America Latina,” 626–630.
him to go. He’s meeting with our Spanish-American appointees. He’s doing some stuff in L.A. and Texas and in Chicago, where we’ve got Mexicans and it’ll do us some good.”

Echeverría’s plans to meet with Mexicans and Mexican Americans were seen by the Nixon administration as advantageous for gathering Mexican American support in future elections. However, Echeverría was not simply at the command of the Nixon administration, as he skillfully played the game of politics to maintain good relations with the U.S. while negotiating in favor of Mexico. Furthermore, Echeverría’s negotiations behind closed doors with Nixon allowed him to publicly use what appeared to be harsh language against the United States to gather the support of leftist groups and Third World nations.

During Echeverría’s visit, the focus was mostly around the discussion of bilateral issues affecting both nations. The salinity of the Colorado River, affecting farming in Northern Mexico, was at the forefront of bilateral issues between Mexico and the United States, followed by tariffs on Mexican imports and the problems surrounding Mexican migrants and their working conditions. The issue of the Colorado River salinity involved Arizona and California farmers who used pesticides and other chemicals on their lands, which could mix with Colorado River water used for irrigation, and then return back into the river itself. By the time the Colorado River water reached Mexican farmers in the Mexicali Valley, it had high salinity levels, making it unusable for farming in Mexico. This issue had been one of the most important problems affecting the Mexico-United States border region.

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247 Excelsior, June 21, 1972; Transcript #27: June 15, 1972 10:31 am - 12:10 pm, Conversation No. 735-1, Cassette Nos. 2246-2248 Oval Office Ibid.; AGN/LEA, Caja 536 VII-10
that had been addressed by Echeverría’s predecessor Mexican president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz with no success.

Nixon refused to address the issue of the water salinity with Congress because he felt it would be a waste of time. However, Echeverría pointed out to Nixon the issues of the border were not simply bilateral, but that “…the [Mexico-United States] border is a border between the United States and all of Latin America.” By suggesting that United States policies not only affected Mexico but the entire region, Echeverría was putting to test his ideas of a continental solidarity proposed in Carta de los Deberes y Derechos Económicos de los Pueblos. Nixon’s and Echeverría’s meetings focused mostly around geopolitical issues, as Echeverría seized the opportunity to present himself as the representative of the Latin American Third World. During his interview with Nixon, Echeverría stated, “…if I don’t take [the] flag [of the Third World] in Latin America, Castro will. I am very conscious of this.” According to Echeverría, Latin America needed his leadership or would fall by default to the revolutionary Cuban.

Echeverría’s political shrewdness was demonstrated through his use of anti-communist sentiments, antagonism against Cuba, and the overall ignorance of the United States about Latin America. The United States feared the possibility of the emergence of “other Cubas” in Latin America that could jeopardize their dominance over the region. The support of Fidel Castro for Allende’s government further justified for the United States government the intervention of the CIA to overthrow his democratically elected regime. The Mexican leader used anti-communist fears, antagonism against Cuba, and the social and

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248 Transcript #27: June 15, 1972 10:31 am - 12:10 pm, Conversation No. 735-1, Cassette Nos. 2246-2248 Oval Office, Ibid.
249 Ibid.
political unrest that was taking place across Latin American including inside Mexico and the United States, to make a case for United States economic aid to Mexico as a matter of national security.

Echeverría cynically pointed out that the communist infiltration that was affecting political stability across Latin America was also found within the United States. He said, “This problem in Latin America is reflected within American society itself in the Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans and other racial minority groups. Therefore either we find balanced economic solutions to these issues or [the communists] will gain ground in Latin America and will have repercussions inside your own borders.”

While the Chicana/o Movement utilized ideas and symbols of Mexican nationalism like Emiliano Zapata and Aztec warriors as part of their political strategy, they usually did not seek Mexican citizenship. Chicana/os were United States citizens, making the “communist threat” a homegrown problem for national security. Furthermore, the Mexican leader took the opportunity to point out that Chicana/o activism was not limited solely to the United States, as they had connections inside with U.S. revolutionaries like Angela Davis and outside with leftist groups in Chile and Cuba. The transcontinental connections of the Chicana/o Movement made it of greater risk for the internal security of the United States—“…these events that take place in Latin America have repercussions within the borders of the United States.”

Chicano activism thus served as a tool for Echeverría to argue that economic support to Mexico and Latin America was a matter of national security for the United States and

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250 Ibid.
251 Ibid.
hemispheric stability for Latin America in the face of “Cuban communist” expansion.

Echeverría manipulated and further fueled the anti-communist fears against Chicano activism, without understanding that for Euro-Americans there was not much of a difference between Chicanos, Mexican Americans, or Mexicans. Nixon perceived Echeverría as a key ally for United States interests in the region and also recognized that Mexico was “the bridge between the United States and the rest of Latin America;” therefore he supported the initiative of Echeverría to become the voice of Latin America. Especially, he supported the idea that Mexican stability and openness with the United States would become the model for Latin America rather than the Cuban or Chilean models that rejected United States political involvement in their countries.

The following day, June 16, 1972, Echeverría made an address at a session of the Organization of American States (OAS) Permanent Council held in his honor. Echeverría framed his criticisms against foreign intervention through the lens of Mexican revolutionary nationalism by asserting the right for sovereignty for all nations. References to the struggles of Mexican indigenous president Benito Juárez against French intervention (1862-1867) and those of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 highlighted the Mexican experience against colonialism and foreign intervention, carefully establishing a distance from “communist” influences. At the same time, Echeverría declared his solidarity with Salvador

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253 Ibid.
254 The Organization was established in order to achieve among its member states—"an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence." OAS, “OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development,” August 1, 2009, http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp.
255 Luis Echeverría Álvarez, “President Echeverría of Mexico Calls for Greater Latin American Cohesion” 24, no. 8 (August 1972).
Allende and Chile to administer their own natural resources, allowing him to present himself as the defender of Latin America against the United States.  

Echeverría called for Latin American unity: “The joint action of the countries of the so-called Third World has become necessary vis-à-vis the oligarchical trend that prevails internationally…We are convinced that united we may win a greater share of the fruits of commercial, financial and technological progress.” Echeverría appeared to criticize harshly the United States on its own ground, something that most Third World leaders could not conceive of doing without severe consequences. However, the Mexican President took advantage of the goodwill that he had accumulated with Nixon to showcase his Third World leadership stating that developing nations “are suspicious of the pacts between the great superpowers that ignore the rights and interests of the less developed nations.” This belligerent image that Echeverría portrayed served also to gain support from his leftist critics like those in the Chicana/o Movement who had accused him of being a puppet of the United States.

After his meetings with Nixon and his cabinet, Echeverría began his tour through U.S. cities with large populations of Mexican citizens and their descendants. Starting with Chicago, where he had been invited by Mayor Richard J. Daley, he stated: “We recognize the need for developing to the maximum cultural relations and the promotion of the economic association between Mexico and [Chicago, which] is the center of a large population of Mexicans and citizens of Mexican ancestry.” The visit to Chicago only lasted six and a

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256 AGN/LEA, Caja 536 VII-14-VII15  
257 Echeverría Álvarez, “President Echeverría of Mexico Calls for Greater Latin American Cohesion.”  
258 San Antonio Express, June 14, 1972.  
259 Excelsior, June 1972  
half hours, but upon Echeverría’s arrival crowds of Mexicans and people of Mexican descent lined the streets to welcome him with Mexican flags, choruses of “Mexico, Mexico,” and signs such as “Chicago Says: Bienvenido Señor Presidente” (Chicago Says: Welcome Mr. President). 261

At the Drake Hotel Echeverría attended a reception and luncheon, though a small group of protesters tried unsuccessfully to disrupt his visit. 262 On this occasion, attended by Mexican officials and business community leaders living in Chicago, Echeverría made an appeal in favor of the Mexican community and their descendants to be taken seriously as an economic force and focused on the establishment of commercial links between Chicago and Mexico. 263 After the reception, Echeverría visited Grant Park Band Shell, which the city had decorated with hundreds of Mexican flags, signs welcoming Echeverría along with fireworks. Echeverría told the crowds at Grant Park: “We are proud to be here and proud of you as fellow countrymen of our motherland or as descendants of descendants of the motherland. Always keep her in your heart but always attend to the civic responsibilities of your new land.” 264 Echeverría was well aware of the value of catering, at least rhetorically, to the public support and demands of crowds, more so within the United States as Echeverría was trying to make the case with Nixon about his political ability to become the popular alternative to Castro in Latin America and within the United States itself. At the same time, Echeverría was well aware of the diplomatic tightrope that he was walking. He could not encourage political dissent within the United States territory and most of all among United

261 Excelsior, 19 June 1972
262 San Antonio Express, June 15, 1972
263 San Antonio Express, June 14, 1972
264 San Antonio Express, June 15, 1972
States citizens. Therefore, within his discourses, Echeverría highlighted the need for
Mexicans and their descendants to respect their “new land.”

His next stop was San Antonio, Texas, where his visit generated great enthusiasm not
only among the Mexican American population, but also across the San Antonio business
community. Echeverría’s visit to San Antonio included meetings with the state governor,
business and banking leaders and top-ranking industrial leaders from both Mexico and the
U.S. The main newspapers in San Antonio wrote a welcome note for Echeverría in Spanish,

The San Antonio Express, Evening News, and El Sol, as well as the entire city of San
Antonio, are honored for your kind visit, which will help to consolidate our city as the
threshold of Mexico…Your visit, Mr. President, will further reinforce the friendship
and fraternal connections that unite Mexico and the United States. 265

Local businesses ranging from Mexican bakeries, realtors, national banks, major
grocery stores, funeral homes, and brewing companies ran welcome adds both in English and
Spanish welcoming Echeverría in the name of the entire city of San Antonio. 266 During the
two days of Echeverría’s visit to San Antonio, The San Antonio Express, one of the main
English newspapers ran articles about Mexico and San Antonio’s Mexican heritage with
titles like: “Mexico’s Revolution was Planned in San Antonio,” “Mexican-Style Food
Reflects S.A. Heritage,” “Mexican Art, Culture Alive in San Antonio,” “San Antonio is a
Bilingual City,” “Loyalty Is Strong Trait of Mexican People,” and “Mexican Atmosphere
Makes S.A. Unique.” 267 The enthusiasm for Echeverría’s visit in the local English media

265 “Los Periódicos San Antonio Express, Evening News y El Sol, lo mismo que la población entera de San
Antonio, nos sentimos honrados con su amable visita que viene a consolidar la posición de nuestra ciudad como
el umbral de México…Su visita, Sr. Presidente, reforzara aun mas los vínculos de amistad y confraternidad que
unen a los pueblos de México y los Estados Unidos.” Found in “Bienvenido Sr. Presidente Luis Echeverría,”
266 San Antonio Express News, June 18 and 19, 1972.
267 Ibid.
illustrated not only the importance of the Mexican community in San Antonio, but also the economic importance that Mexico represented for Texas in general.

Mexican immigrants also demonstrated their appreciation for Echeverría. One of the most emotive displays was the dedication of a literary column to welcome the President. A Mexican immigrant, Manuel Ruiz Ibáñez, expressed the nostalgia and respect that Mexicans struggling in the United States felt for Mexico through fragments of a poem by Gabriel Herrera H. titled, Majestic Homeland (Patria Augusta). “…I love you in your Castilian language, sweet like honey. I love you in your corridos, waltzes and huapangos, in the church liturgies, and in the notes of the National Anthem…” Ruiz Ibáñez, expressed the sentiments of Mexican immigrants whose new lives tried to reconstruct and preserve their Mexicanness in the Mexico de Afuera (Mexico Outside). The literary column concluded with an acrostic in which the first letters of each line spelled out LUIS ECHEVERRÍA ÁLVAREZ.

Los mexicanos tienen esperanza
Unánime y sublime en tu ideal,
Ideal democrático que alcanza
Su mayor estructura potencial.

It for this, Sir, that we have come
Conscious in the hours of duty
Filling our souls, which we feel
Looking at the way you strongly work the stoic

Hinchiendo nuestras almas, que sentimos
Estrujando completo nuestro ser,
Viéndote recio trabajar la brega
Esteica, elevando a la nación,
Reiterando sin limites tu entrega
Redentora con todo el corazón:
Intimo patrimonio ciudadano
Al través de tu fe de mexicano.

Mexicans have hope
Unanimous and sublime on your ideal
A democratic ideal that reaches
Its greater structural potential.

It for this, Sir, that we have come
Conscious in the hours of duty
Filling our souls, which we feel
Looking at the way you strongly work the stoic

Struggle, elevating the nation,
Reiterating without limits your devotion
Redeeming with all your heart:
Intimate patrimony of citizenship
Through your faith as Mexican.

Echeverría’s visit to establish economic and cultural relations in San Antonio offered an
opportunity for the city to recognize, celebrate, and honor their Mexican cultural heritage and
the contribution of Mexicans to the city.

The Chicana/o Movement also made its presence felt during Echeverría’s visit to San
Antonio. Delegations from La Raza Unida Party (LRUP) from Cristal City, the United Farm
Workers Organizing Committee, and the Committee to Free All Political Prisoners were able
to meet with the President. The LRUP was formally established in Cristal City, Texas, in
January 1970 following the 1969 high school student walkout in opposition to racist
discrimination. Chicano candidates of the LRUP were elected to the school board and later
won two seats on the city council. The initial success of the LRUP in Cristal City encouraged
Chicanos to launch the LRUP as a statewide political party. The LRUP became an
umbrella structure for a large variety of Chicana/o organizations, rather than a centralized
administration. The organization of chapters quickly spread across the Southwest and
Midwest. However, two main ideological divisions quickly emerged among Chicana/o
organizations. The two camps were: “those who longed for a creation of Aztlán, the Chicano
homeland [cultural nationalism], and those who wanted to use the electoral strategy [not

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269 San Antonio Express News, June 18, 1972.
necessarily in favor of cultural nationalism] as a political arm of the Chicano movement."

Chicana/os of the LRUP sought to organize Mexican American communities into an unified voting block, elect Chicana/o candidates for local and statewide offices, to either win the offices and/or act as counter balance of power from the two-party system.

Ideological and regional divisions quickly became a problem in the political goals of the LRUP. In the San Diego area of California, *El Centro de Acción Social Autónomo* (Center for Autonomous Social Action, CASA) had been formed in 1968 by labor organizer Bert Corona. Marxism was the dominant ideology of CASA, which focused on providing services and defending the rights of Mexican undocumented immigrants. Corona initially was interested in organizing a LRUP chapter as part of his commitment against racial discrimination. However, his main political base were undocumented migrants without political rights. His own Marxist leanings made him a strong critic of cultural nationalism, and he later became a strong opponent of Echeverría’s connection with the LRUP and José Ángel Gutiérrez. In Denver, Colorado was Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzáles, who organized the Crusade for Justice, a civil rights organization for urban youth. In 1970, the Crusade established the Escuela Tlatelolco, a community center named after the Tlatelolco student massacre for which Echeverría was held responsible.

The same year he established the Colorado LRUP, however, issues of personality and ideological leanings led to a bitter struggle for power with José Ángel Gutiérrez. Although the Crusade played a major role in the production of Chicana/o cultural nationalism and

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271 Ibid.
moved towards ideas of class struggle and internationalism, it opposed Echeverría’s connections with Chicana/os. Reies Lopéz Tijerina from New Mexico organized the Alianza Federal de Mercedes, an organization that fought to regain the grant lands from the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Tijerina sought to organize a LRUP chapter in New Mexico as part of his continuous struggle to recover grant lands and for the same reason he also was interested in establishing a relation with Mexico’s government. Still, when Echeverría was Attorney General in 1964, he had ordered the deportation of Tijerina when he had tried to get Mexico’s support for the land grants claims in the U.S.276

A meeting between Chicana/o organizations and Echeverría was arranged. One of main forces behind arranging this meeting was Mexican sociologist Jorge Bustamante, whose academic work on Mexican undocumented immigrants had served as the basis for Echeverría’s interest in Chicana/o activism.277 The Cristal City delegation headed by José Ángel Gutiérrez, the founder of the Raza Unida Party, and accompanied by Raza Unida gubernatorial candidate of Texas Ramsey Muñiz, Cristal City’s Mayor Francisco Benavides, and other three city officials, discussed the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo’s guarantees in the areas of culture, language, and citizenship.278

Gutiérrez said, “We feel that the educational neglect of the Chicano (in the U.S.) is in violation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and [Echeverría] agreed.”279 In response the President pledged medical assistance to Cristal City residents in the nearby Mexican town of

276 Ibid., 236.
278 San Antonio Express News, June 18, 1972; San Antonio Express, June 20, 1972.
279 Ibid.
Piedras Negras; promised to send the Mexican director of industry, Pedro De Coster, to provide technical assistance in establishing an agricultural processing plant in Cristal City; and also agreed to donate Mexican history books for libraries and to start a student exchange program for Chicana/os to attend Mexican universities.\textsuperscript{280} As a sign of respect and in response to Echeverría’s receptiveness La Raza Unida delegation presented a portrait of Emiliano Zapata made by the Chicano artist, Amador Peña.\textsuperscript{281} After the meeting, Gutiérrez reported that Echeverría encouraged the political activity of La Raza Unida Party in the United States. “The president is very interested in the Mexican-American continuing to seek our destinies. He was simply applauding democracy.”\textsuperscript{282} However, Echeverría’s press aide was quick to point out that the president did not “‘interfere’ in internal politics of the United States.”\textsuperscript{283}

However, not everyone welcomed Echeverría to San Antonio with flags and cheers, as he was confronted by a group of disgruntled Chicano activists under the leadership of Mario Cantú. Cantú was a local restaurant owner who had become politicized while serving time in federal prison for drug smuggling. Cantú’s confrontational style and zealous political views made him a lightning rod for controversy. Cantú headed the Committee to Free All Political Prisoners, and his protests were directed against Echeverría for the repression against Mexican students at the time of the Tlatelolco (October 2, 1968) and the Corpus Cristi (June 10, 1971) massacres. Just months after the June 10, 1971, repression of protesting students in Mexico City by government forces dressed as civilians, Mexican

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{280} Ibid.; AGN/LEA, Caja: 536
\item \textsuperscript{281} Interview with José Angel Gutiérrez on August 23, 2012, Arlington, TX.
\item \textsuperscript{282} \textit{San Antonio Express News}, June 18, 1972; \textit{San Antonio Express}, June 20, 1972.
\item \textsuperscript{283} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
activists such as theater director Mariano Leyva and his theater group Mascarones had visited San Antonio.\textsuperscript{284}

Leyva, a Mexican political activist, used theater and art as a medium to create political consciousness among the masses who had participated in the annual Festivales de Teatros Chicanos organized by Luis Valdez and his Teatro Campesino in California. Cantú invited Leyva to participate during the \textit{Semana de la Raza} (People’s Week) in San Antonio, which was a counter celebration of the \textit{Dieciséis de Septiembre} (September Sixteenth) sponsored by the local city authorities and Mexican American businesses. Cantú and others who identified themselves as Chicana/os were critical of the \textit{Dieciséis de Septiembre} celebrations for their lack of political message and their emphasis on commerce. Leyva had previously brought propaganda material that described Echeverría’s government use of repression against Mexican students and the problems that Mexican students protested against.\textsuperscript{285} This material served to fuel the rhetoric used by Cantú and his supporters in opposing the visit of Echeverría to the United States.

Unlike Bert Corona who espoused Marxist ideologies and had ties to the Mexican communist movement, Cantú did not claimed to be a Marxist. However, he deployed a combination of Marxist, internationalist, and nationalist rhetoric according to the audience with which he sought to connect. Cantú announced his plans to protest during the main event of Echeverría’s visit, the inauguration of the Instituto Cultural Mexicano (Mexican Cultural Center), which was going to include live TV coverage. He would use the same challenges, style, and criticisms of the Mexican students, who were the most militant opposition groups to Echeverría’s government within his own country. Cantú charged that the Mexican

\textsuperscript{284} Mascarones, October 31, 1972, AGN/DFS, Exp. 63-3-1-72 H-11 L-6
\textsuperscript{285} Mascarones, October 31, 1972, AGN/DFS: Exp. 63-3-1-72 H-11 L-6
government was holding more than 200 political prisoners, and he asked for an investigation into the events that led to the Tlatelolco and Corpus Cristi massacres. Echeverría once again had to maneuver between his international and domestic economic and political interests. Echeverría sought to present a stable international and domestic political image of commitment to social justice, and this image was challenged by Cantú’s questions. As the representative and defender of the Third World of nations such as Chile and groups such as Chicana/os and through Echeverría’s commitment for a “democratic opening” at home, he sought to maintain Mexican stability. Echeverría’s role as the Third World defender was linked to an image of political independence from the colossus of the North and sought support from others challenging it. At the same time, Echeverría continued to aspire to United States investment to improve Mexican economic and industrial growth.

To the press, Cantú appeared as the sole mastermind behind the protests. However, behind closed doors, Cantú and other Chicano activists like Gutiérrez planned to gain the attention of Echeverría for Chicana/o needs on all fronts. After Cantú announced his planned demonstration, Echeverría declared that he had little patience for misinformed critics of his administration and invited Cantú to speak with him. Chicana/os such as Cantú, who connected their political activism with students and grassroots organizations struggling to democratize the Mexican nation, presented contradictory challenges to Echeverría’s international and domestic political goals. Echeverría had to balance the revived fervor of Chicana/o Mexican nationalism in favor of Mexican interests against non-interference in United States internal affairs. He needed to manipulate the United States fears of a

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286 Interview with José Ángel Gutiérrez on August 23, 2012, Arlington, TX.
homegrown “communist” threat while maintaining his rhetoric of commitment to permit political activism.

Although there is not a written record of the discussion between Echeverría and Cantú, both offered extensive interviews to the media in which they expressed their concerns about their meeting. For Cantú, Chicana/os supported the struggles of their Mexican counterparts as a sign of their political solidarity and national unity. Cantú also argued that it was the responsibility of the Mexican government and its consulates to advocate and protect the rights of Chicana/os as well as Mexican immigrants from the United States government’s oppressive policies. The voting power of Chicana/os, Cantú explained, could help to destabilize the political monopoly of the “gringo” and support the interests of Mexico against the United States. It almost appeared that Cantú was aware of the benefits that the support of the Mexican communities and their descendants could mean for Echeverría’s negotiations with Nixon. He understood that unlike his Mexican counterparts, he did not face imprisonment, torture, or even death at the hands of the Mexican government. Cantú was a United States citizen in United States territory, and he took full advantage of his ability to challenge Echeverría to acknowledge Chicana/o struggles.

However, Echeverría also took full advantage of his meeting with Chicanos and the live TV coverage of his visit.\(^{287}\) It took place just hours before the main event, the inauguration of the Instituto Cultural Mexicano where Cantú followed through with his protest even after meeting with Echeverría. The Institute included an extension campus of the National University of Mexico where they would offer multiple levels of Spanish classes,

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\(^{287}\) San Antonio Express, June 18, 1972.
cultural materials, and events about Mexico.\textsuperscript{288} During this event the President went out of his way to shake hands with crews of Mexican and San Antonian workers to thank them for their help in the construction of the Institute, while he smiled at the cameras.

Then he announced that he had invited Cantú to visit Mexico and to learn firsthand about actual conditions. Echeverría argued that his invitation to Chicanos was an example of his open and honest political style.\textsuperscript{289} He explained to a reporter that the responsibility of the Mexican government toward Mexican Americans and Chicanos was purely moral, since they were United States citizens. “We can not ignore that [Chicanos] continue to have cultural linkages and we have the obligation to be attentive to their struggles, without interfering with the internal laws of the US, and to help them with cultural activities.”\textsuperscript{290} Echeverría strongly emphasized the fact that Chicana/os were United States citizens; therefore the Mexican government could not intervene in the internal affairs of the United States to help them.

The choice of cultural and educational support for Chicana/os and other Mexican communities was prudent, so that Echeverría would not be seen as interfering in United States internal affairs. Once again, the use of Mexican revolutionary nationalism safely connected Echeverría with Chicana/o politics. The government of Echeverría, like that of his predecessors, was confronted with the issue of Mexican immigration to the United States and the ill treatment of its citizens. However, unlike other presidents, Echeverría was responsive to the internal political developments of U.S. citizens of Mexican origin. Echeverría attempted to create an image of a dynamic populist president that connected with the issues


\textsuperscript{289} \textit{Excelsior}, 22 June 1972

\textsuperscript{290} Ibid.
of young activists and Third World nations, while at the same time maintaining Mexican internal security and good relations with the Nixon administration. Nonetheless, Echeverría was the first Mexican head of state that attempted to work, support and recognize the political value/power of Mexican American activists, Chicanos.

After his visit to San Antonio, Echeverría went to Los Angeles where supporting and opposing groups of Mexicans and their descendants also welcomed him. However, this time Echeverría followed the established tour, waved to the crowds, and ignored the protesting groups as he boarded his plane to go back to Mexico. Back in Mexico, Excelsior, regarded as an elite newspaper and one of Mexico’s most prestigious, emphasized the demands of the protesters as “unacceptable demands of Chicanos who were United States citizens and had no business confronting the Mexican president.”291 Another newspaper reported that “‘chicanos,’ were far from praising their Mexicanness and exalting the Mexican nation outside of its national borders, as they bastardize our language and personify radical ideologies of foreign nations,” meaning communism.292 Mexican newspapers printed Echeverría’s invitation to Chicana/os to visit Mexico and learn more as a challenge to Chicana/os.

Echeverría followed through with his pledge to support Chicana/os’ efforts to advance their political activism and educational goals. After his return to Mexico, his administration offered economic support for the Seminario Sobre El Movimiento Chicano (Seminar on the Chicano Movement) held at UNAM through the School of Social and

291 Ibid.
Political Sciences on November 21-25, 1972.293 The objective of the seminar was to “expose and analyze the political origins and significance of the Movimiento Chicano in the context of the United States society and the possible repercussions in Mexico.”294 The Chicana/o organizers including José Ángel Gutiérrez requested funds to cover the travel costs and honoraria of Chicano speakers attending the seminar and other organizing costs, which the Mexican administration provided.295 However, despite the economic support of Echeverría for the seminar, Chicanos decided to visit various federal prisons in around Mexico City to follow up with Echeverría’s declarations that Mexico did not have political prisoners.

So while the seminar was taking place, Cantú and other groups of Chicana/os visited Mexico City to appear at a conference at UNAM focused on exposing the struggles that Chicanos and Mexican immigrants confronted in the United States. In the meantime, Cantú took the opportunity to get the attention of the Mexican press by announcing his visit to the Lecumberri and Santa Marta Acatitla prisons to verify that Mexico did not have political prisoners as claimed by Echeverría.296 However, the directors of the prisons did not allow Cantú to enter the prison because they explained; “there are not political prisoners here…no one is imprisoned for the expression or manifestation of their political or social ideas.”297 Cantú declared to the Mexican press that Echeverría’s promise had been broken, and several

293 “Programa para un seminario sobre el Movimiento Chicano organizado por la facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales de la UNAM,” AGN/LEA: Caja 536, 1972.
294 “El objetivo central de este seminario, será el de exponer y analizar la génesis y significado político del Movimiento Chicano en el contexto de la sociedad Norteamericana y las posibles repercusiones en México,” found in “Programa para un seminario sobre el Movimiento Chicano organizado por la facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales de la UNAM,” AGN/LEA, Caja 536, 1972.
295 “El objetivo central de este seminario, será el de exponer y analizar la génesis y significado político del Movimiento Chicano en el contexto de la sociedad Norteamericana y las posibles repercusiones en México,” found in “Programa para un seminario sobre el Movimiento Chicano organizado por la facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales de la UNAM,” AGN/LEA Caja 536, 1972.
296 Excelsior, June 22, 1972.
297 Ibid.
small articles were published about the event. Despite the attempts of Cantú to generate support from Mexicans against Echeverría’s government and bring awareness to the Chicana/o movement, the incident was covered very lightly.

Instead, Mexicans were more interested in the upcoming visit of Chilean president Salvador Allende to Mexico than to learn or support a group of “Chicanos.” Less than a week after Cantú’s mostly unnoticed political performance, Mexican crowds welcomed President Allende to Mexico City. Echeverría expressed his solidarity with Chile and continued to advocate for continental unity, which he labeled as a “social movement” that sought economic development and democratic expression independent from Cold War politics.

In Mexico we desire economic security, but also the freedom to exercise democracy. Just like we oppose the material impositions of capitalism, we are also opposed to the suppression of freedom. We reject the social scheme that reduces all human dimensions to mercantile values, just the same way that we repudiate all forms of totalitarianism. Echeverría’s “democratic opening” at home sought to appease the growing leftist opposition against his government by offering certain concessions to dissident groups, but also by presenting an international revolutionary image by supporting icons like Allende. Echeverría had to be careful in the way that he catered to the demands of Chicana/os and other groups of Mexican origin who might be perceived as “communists”, as they were United States citizens, but also eager to maintain their connection to Mexico.

After Allende’s visit to Mexico and despite the criticisms by Cantú and other Chicana/os who sought to align with the Mexican left, Echeverría’s administration established more formal relations with some Chicana/o groups. La Raza Unida Political Party

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in Texas and the Alianza Federal de Mercedes (Federal Land Grant Alliance) in New Mexico were two groups that identified as Chicana/os and who received Echeverría’s support. Echeverría’s support for Reies Tijerina developed through the funding of the movie *Chicano*, which focused mostly on the struggle for land grants. Also, Echeverría followed through with scholarships for Chicana/o students to study in Mexico City.299 Furthermore, his administration provided several books for Chicana/o libraries and cultural centers. Some of the titles included *Complete Collection of the National Institute of Indigenous Studies*, *Democracy in Mexico* by Pablo González Casanova, *Biographies of Mexican Heroes: Hidalgo, Morelos, Juárez, Zapata, Cárdenas*, and the classic, *México Bárbaro* by John Kenneth Turner.300

Through scholarships, libraries, sponsorship for educational and cultural programs about Mexico, the Echeverría administration maintained an amicable relation with at least some Chicana/os, which helped him to control the harsh criticism from more radical Chicana/os who questioned his sincerity. Echeverría’s support for Chicana/o groups like La Raza Unida became a lightning rod for controversy and provoked accusations against Gutiérrez by other Chicana/o activists. Chicana/o newspapers were prompt to attack Gutiérrez as a “sellout”, “opportunist,” and “caudillo” (strongman).301 Nonetheless, Echeverría’s support for at least some Chicana/os offered an opportunity to negotiate with the United States government and to demonstrate his commitment towards a more democratic state in Mexico.

299 Interview with José Ángel Gutiérrez on August 23, 2012, Arlington, TX.
300 “Libros seleccionados por el Profesor Víctor B. Moheno para la Biblioteca de un Instituto Cultural de Chicanos en Texas,” AGN/LEA, Caja 536, (no date available).
301 Interview with José Ángel Gutiérrez on August 23, 2012, Arlington, TX.
Conclusion

In the 1960s and 1970s, young Mexican Americans embraced their political identity as Chicana/os, utilizing symbols and ideas of Mexican nationalism as a tool to gain more egalitarian access to U.S. society. At the same time, Mexican youth sought to transform the social inequities affecting their society through political mobilization and armed struggles against their government. These events emerged in the midst of Cold War ideological struggles across Latin America between the left and the right, the emergence of a Third World solidarity across the globe, and increased political repression along with more militant responses by political activists. The need for economic development across the region helped to reshape relations between Mexico and the community of Mexicans and their descendants living in the United States.

The use of blunt repression by the Mexican government against unarmed students in 1968 led to a more militant and belligerent opposition that threatened internal stability in Mexico. At a time when social and political order across Latin America was under siege by the struggles between repressive military governments and opposition forces, Mexico was perceived as a model of stability. However, President Echeverría came to power in the aftermath of the 1968 student massacre, with an increasing emergence of armed movements across the nation, and at a moment when the United States pulled back its preferential economic support for Mexico.

Echeverría recognized the need to implement a different approach towards national, bilateral, and international politics in order to maintain internal order in Mexico. Through a difficult diplomatic performance, Echeverría expressed support for international leftist politics while at the same time repressing the Mexican left, took up the leadership of anti-
colonialism in the Third World, publicly criticized the United States while seeking preferential economic relations for Mexico, and supported Chicana/o activism while respecting United States sovereignty over its own citizens and internal affairs. At the end, Echeverría was unable to make any headway with the Nixon administration in favor of more favorable economic policies for Mexico or Latin America. Echeverría was cautious about interfering in U.S. internal matters, but he recognized the potential of Chicano activism for Mexican political and economic interests with the United States, for validating his commitment to *Tercermundismo*, and for curtailing the opposition from the Mexican left.
Chapter 3: Chicanos, Mexicans, and Latin Americans at the V Festival de Teatros Chicanos

In the summer of 1974, Chicana/os, Mexicans, and various Latin American theater groups came together to celebrate the Quinto Festival de Teatro Chicano (the Fifth Chicano Theater Festival) and the Primer Encuentro Latinoamericano de Teatro, (First Encounter of Latin American Theater) in Mexico City.\(^{302}\) In the midst of the Chilean military dictatorship and government repression and Chicano activism in the United States, the aim of the Quinto Festival was to establish stronger cultural and political connections among Mexicans, Latin Americans, and Chicana/os. Theater was seen as a political tool of resistance against oppression and social injustice that could unite struggles in the Third World. International revolutionary ideals were the basis for Mexican and Latin American political discourse directed against United States imperialism, political repression, and poverty-stricken social conditions.\(^{303}\) However, Chicana/o activism developed within the United States itself and focused for the most part on the experience of everyday racial discrimination, cultural erasure, and lack of equal access to social services. Through the rhetoric of political unity and a shared sense of cultural identity, Chicana/os sought to connect their struggles with those of Mexicans and other Latin Americans. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the way that Chicana/os, Mexicans, and other Latin Americans used the medium of theater to envision their struggles and the solutions they desired, as well as to articulate how these struggles and solutions were shaped by their different experiences of politics, culture, and repression.

\(^{302}\) AGN/DFS, “Chicanos,” Exp.11-204-74
First, this chapter offers a broad overview of the emergence of Nuevo Teatro Popular (New Popular Theater) across the Americas as a form of cultural and political resistance. Theater became a powerful tool used by political activists to generate political conscientization and support from the popular classes against injustice and repression. Second, the chapter explores the emergence of Nuevo Teatro Popular in Mexico within the context of the repression of the Mexican Dirty War through the work of theater director Mariano Leyva and his Grupo de Poesía Coral Mascarones de la UNAM (commonly known, as “Mascarones”).\textsuperscript{304} In the 1960s and 1970s, Mexico was confronted by rising clashes between paramilitary forces and leftist activists. In this context, Leyva and his Mascarones group’s use of theater represented a powerful non-violent political alternative against the repressive forces of the Mexican state. Thirdly, the chapter then looks at the emergence of Nuevo Teatro Popular as part of Chicana/o activism in the United States through the work of Luis Valdez and his Teatro Campesino. As the Chicana/o Movement emerged to protest the racial and systematic discrimination endured by their communities, theater became a weapon of resistance and collectivization to create a sense of unity among diverse Chicana/o communities. Fourth, this chapter analyzes the initial artistic and political collaboration established between Mascarones and members of the Chicana/o Movement. As the Chicana/o Movement developed its unique sense of cultural nationalism, it sought to reconnect with its Mexican cultural roots. Both Mexicans and Chicana/os sought to learn more about each other’s struggles. Finally, the chapter examines the outcomes of the collaboration established between Mexicans and Chicana/o theater groups through the dynamics that developed during the Quinto Festival de Teatro Chicano. The aim of the festival was to bring Chicana/os,

\textsuperscript{304} AGN/DFS, “Mascarones,” Exp. 63-1/2-69
Mexicans, and other Latin Americans together to share their political struggles and ideologies, and to claim a sense of political solidarity.

By exploring the Mexican experience as contrasted with that of most of Latin Americans and Chicana/os in the U.S., I will highlight the connections between the Mexican political experience and Chicana/o activism through the use of shared Mexican cultural symbols; the related experiences of political repression between Mexicans under a repressive populist government and Latin Americans under rising military dictatorships; and finally, the ways that different experiences among Chicanos, Mexicans, and Latin Americans functioned as sources of both political fracture and solidarity.

**Part I: Nuevo Teatro Popular**

Historically, theater has served as a cultural and political platform to articulate the struggles between contending groups. At the same time, the policing of theater performances and audiences have also been part of a continuous process to control the ideas and behavior of the masses. Through the 1950s and 1960s, the sociopolitical instability across developing nations that sought liberation from colonialism—whether economic, cultural, political, military, social, or religious—became a driving force behind the emergence of new forms of theater. Teatro popular made a shift from entertainment and political satire to a platform that gave a direct voice to the problems of the masses. A more professional development of teatro popular or Nuevo Teatro Popular rose across Latin America in response to “new industrial and technological developments, the explosion of population in urban areas, the sharp rising contradictions of capitalist and bourgeois models, and, above all, the rising political
consciousness among liberation movements.”\textsuperscript{305} These new theater groups sought to reach the masses “to transform scenic illusion into critical consciousness.”\textsuperscript{306} The earlier forms of teatro popular were created to represent the prevalent conflicts, interests, and needs of certain social groups. The emphasis was on raising a sense of political and social consciousness by offering solutions channeled primarily through Marxist lenses.\textsuperscript{307} Some of the characteristics of Nuevo Teatro Popular in Latin America included a focus on the need for liberation from all forms of colonialism, United States imperialism, and oppression; a tendency toward Marxist frameworks for developing political consciousness and seeking liberation through a socialist revolution; international cooperation and activism between groups that shared similar ideologies and experiences; and direct involvement of audiences within productions using mixed media, including poetry, music, dance, satire, folklore, and innuendo to establish a dialogue with the masses.\textsuperscript{308}

The aesthetics of Chicana/o theater articulated the experience of racial discrimination, cultural erasure, and poverty of their communities as part of their experience with colonial oppression within the United States. Creators of Mexican and Latin American theater also understood their experience with colonial oppression as part of United States imperialism, but for them oppression took the form of military interventions, torture, class struggle, and labor exploitation rather than cultural erasure. While Chicana/o groups concentrated on the issue of cultural nationalism as a tool of political resistance against colonial oppression, Mexicans and Latin Americans saw social revolution guided by Marxist ideologies as an

\textsuperscript{305} Néstor García Canclini, \textit{Arte popular y sociedad en América Latina: teorías estéticas y ensayos de transformación} (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Grijalbo, 1977), 10–11.
\textsuperscript{306} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{308} Canclini, \textit{Arte popular y sociedad en América Latina}, 1977.
expression of political consciousness. Both Chicana/o and Latin American theater artists articulated their struggles as part of colonial oppression. Therefore, it appeared that international cooperation and activism between their communities was a natural step toward resisting subjugation by the United States. Chicana/os and Latin American theater artists sought direct involvement with their audiences as a way to generate political consciousness against oppression. For instance, the early performances of Chicana/o theater emerged among striking farm worker immigrants in California, where Valdez used theater as a tool to organize workers. Similarly, Leyva and Mascarones performed in public spaces like streets, parks, and schools as a way to reach as many people as possible with their ideas.

Nuevo Teatro Popular developed within the context of the ideological and military struggles of the Cold War throughout Latin America and the political enthusiasm generated by the Cuban Revolution. The uses of theater to promote subversive ideas and the policing and repression of these performances by government forces were not new phenomena in Latin America. What shaped the new forms of cultural resistance emerging across Latin America was the repression generated by the paranoia against the spread of communism on the part of the United States government and local ruling elites. The support of repressive military dictatorships, the use of anti-communist propaganda, and the oppression of political dissent shaped Latin American theater.

However, the cultural and political conditions in the United States were different than those in Latin America. Issues of racism, political disenfranchisement, cultural denigration, and lack of access to social services such as higher education and healthcare were central to political activism in the United States. While Marxist ideologies and ideas around armed revolution were prevalent through most countries in Latin America, in the United States
Marxist ideologies were limited to only the most radical groups. The levels of repression experienced throughout Latin American nations under various dictatorships were not found in the United States; nonetheless, police brutality and everyday violence were pervasive forms of repression that ethnic minority groups experienced. In the end, the use of cultural production against the unjust social, political, and economic conditions experienced across Latin American and the United States were similar, although individual cases varied.

Chicana/os in the United States had endured a long history of cultural erasure, such as the prohibition of speaking Spanish in schools (which in some cases led to the complete loss of the Spanish language among new generations along with the emergence of a unique mixing of English and Spanish languages). In contrast, the predominance of Spanish and Portuguese languages across Latin American nations helped in the exchange of political ideas and cooperation between Latin American activists. However, that is not to say that the non-Spanish or Portuguese speaking indigenous communities across Latin America were part of the political exchange, as these communities across the continent also shared the experience of cultural erasure and political marginalization. Still, among leftist political groups in Latin America and the United States there was a strong sense of shared interests that provided the basis for political solidarity.

**Part II: Nuevo Teatro in Latin America, Mexico, and The United States**

In the performing arts arena, Brazilian theater director and activist Augusto Boal was one of the most influential theorists and practitioners of Nuevo Teatro Popular. In the 1960s, Boal started to develop a number of techniques that would form the basis of his book *Theater of the Oppressed*, published in 1970. Here he offered a new method whereby the audience could participate in the performance by portraying their daily experiences. Boal’s techniques
of letting the audience become active “spect-actors,” helped people to imagine, create, and reflect collectively about what the audience conceived of as repressive. For Boal, the theater of the oppressed was “The art of looking at ourselves...all human beings are actors (they act!) and spectators (they observe!). They are spect-actors.”

Boal’s approach to theater was part of the wave of politically committed art—including music, literature, cinema—that focused not only on the reflection of social conditions, but also on providing solutions toward social transformation and the empowerment of people to take action. Boal’s theories and approaches sought not just to develop a collective consciousness of the multiple forms and sources of oppression, but more importantly to allow the direct participation of the oppressed in the transformation of their social conditions.

Enrique Buenaventura, a Colombian playwright, director, and artist, also had great influence across Latin America through his Teatro de Creación Colectiva (Theater of Collective Creation). Buenaventura and his group used theater as an educational tool for social transformation, through the mirroring of society as a way to raise social consciousness toward a revolutionary Marxist change. A more militant approach was Teatro Tupamaro from Uruguay, which served as propaganda for the urban guerrillas known as the Tupamaros, arising in response to Jorge Pacheco Areco’s government (1967-1972) in which torture, brutal repression of political demonstrations, and imposition of martial law were used to control political dissidents.

In general, Latin American Nuevo Teatro Popular was performed in public spaces, factories, labor unions, and schools where the actors could

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present short and simple acts that could allow the performers to run away in case of police intervention.\textsuperscript{313}

Ideologically, Nuevo Teatro Popular followed ideals expressed by revolutionary heroes and ideologues like “Che” Guevara. Their aim was to inspire political consciousness among the people to create a social revolution that would change the structure of society from within, rather than seeking reforms. Within the context of intensified state repression in most Latin American nations, the policing of cultural activities was a regular practice because of their potential to generate political dissent. Many of the individuals who suffered persecution, torture, murder, and exile under repressive dictatorships were musicians, writers, performers, and artists, including Boal himself. In 1971, Boal was arrested, imprisoned, and tortured by the Brazilian military regime, and after his release he first sought refuge in neighboring Latin American nations.\textsuperscript{314}

For a short period of time, Chile was an exception to government repression against the political dissent that was taking place across Latin America. In contrast to most of Latin America, Nuevo Teatro Popular in Chile served as a political and cultural platform for the government. Under the new socialist government of Salvador Allende, culture became an important tool to transmit and rally support for the new government and sense of nationalism.

The program of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity or People’s Unity, also known as the UP), the coalition of left political parties in Chile that supported Allende, described the

\textsuperscript{313} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{314} Frances Babbage, \textit{Augusto Boal} (New York: Routledge, 2004), 16–17.
creation of a “new culture” oriented toward a new politically conscious and educated society.\textsuperscript{315} It was necessary to make this new culture accessible to the masses. Music, literature, poetry, visual arts, and performing arts became important instruments to reach the Chilean masses with ideas of equality, overcoming poverty, anti-imperialism, reviving folklore, support for a socialist revolution, and social justice overall. Singers like Violeta Parra and Victor Jara, along with poets like Pablo Neruda and Nicanor Parra helped to create the Nueva Canción (New Song) movement. This new musical genre also sought to raise political consciousness among the masses and give a voice to the working classes. Songs like Victor Jara’s “Plegaria a un Labrador” (“Prayer to a Peasant”), which described the struggles of the rural masses and their duty to create a new society, became anthems among leftist activists across Latin America.\textsuperscript{316}

Just a few months after Allende took power in Chile, his government sponsored the creation of El Tren Popular de la Cultura (The Popular Culture Train) through the Presidential Cultural Department (Departamento de Cultura de la Presidencia). Musicians, actors, dancers, visual artists, folklorists, and volunteer workers integrated the Tren’s cultural convoy and travelled more than 1500 kilometers across Chile in the summer of 1971.\textsuperscript{317} The purpose of the Tren was to gather support and integrate all Chileans into Allende’s new socialist vision for the nation. Those in the Tren sought to learn more about the problems affecting remote areas in order to offer art and performances that reflected the local realities of places where people had rarely been exposed to the performing arts. The Tren only lasted

\textsuperscript{315} 1973: La Vida Cotidiana De Un Año Crucial, 1. ed, Historia y Sociedad (Santiago de Chile: Planeta, 2003), 99.
\textsuperscript{317} Marcos Fernández Labbé, “Nuestra Forma de Alineación Es Simultáneamente Nuestra Única Forma de Expresión,” in 1973: La Vida Cotidiana de Un Año Crucial (Santiago de Chile: Planeta, 2003), 106.
about a month, but there were also some factories and towns that developed their own theater and music groups, even though they were rather sporadic and isolated occurrences. The Chilean model of progressive cultural production funded by the state was shortlived due to the overthrow of Allende on September 11, 1973. Although these cultural productions continued under the sponsorship of the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, the political aim shifted to serve a conservative neoliberal state project.

Through the 1960s and 1970s, young people around Latin America and the United States sought to establish a series of networks in order to connect their struggles for social justice and liberation as their awareness of the sharp differences between social classes intensified. The belligerent intervention of the United States into the internal affairs of Latin American countries as part of Cold War politics, often in support of violent state repression, added to the radicalization of the leftist opposition across Latin America. The Marxist style of Latin American activism was more in accord with Mexican attitudes and visions of social and political revolutionary transformation than with the cultural nationalism approach of most Chicana/o activism.

**Part III: Nuevo Teatro Popular in Mexico: Mariano Leyva and Mascarones**

Theater, poetry, music, and art were key parts of political rallies across Mexico to show support for their comrades and also to educate and motivate Mexicans about the events taking place around the world. In the Nuevo Teatro Popular movement, Mexico had various groups, but one of the most representative was Mascarones under the direction of Mariano Leyva Domínguez. Leyva grew up in the southern state of Morelos where peasants, workers and student organizations, armed movements, and liberation theology were important parts of

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318 Ibid.
a long historical tradition of resistance.\textsuperscript{319}

Leyva had grown up exposed to the artistic and ritual performance world of indigenous dances, and through his life, he had developed a commitment towards the preservation of these traditions.\textsuperscript{320} In 1954, Leyva graduated with a B.A. in Philosophy from the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). In 1963, five students from the preparatory school No. 6 under his direction founded Grupo de Poesía Coral Mascarones de la UNAM.\textsuperscript{321} This group became known as Mascarones (Masks) because of the masks around the building where they started their theater group. The objective of Mascarones was to recover the oral tradition of indigenous communities and increase the social and political consciousness of people across urban and rural Mexico.\textsuperscript{322}

In 1968, Leyva was an active participant in the student movement in Mexico City that culminated when the Mexican government, under the regime of Díaz Ordaz, launched its violent military attack against the students at Tlatelolco.\textsuperscript{323} As the level of repression by the Mexican government against its political dissidents increased, so did the radicalization of opposition groups, and these latter began to rely on clandestine activities across the country. Mexico’s domestic intelligence service, the Dirección Federal de Seguridad (DFS) infiltrated and reported on Mascarones beginning in 1969, as Leyva’s work with the company


\textsuperscript{321} Mascarones, October 31, 1972, AGN/DFS, Exp. 63-3-1-72 H-11 L-6

\textsuperscript{322} Mascarones, October 31, 1972 AGN/DFS: Exp. 63-3-1-72 H-11 L-6

intensified its confrontational style. Leyva described Mascarones’ revolutionary approach to theater as follows: “We try to ‘put a rifle in the consciousness of the people…’ It is a question of art and politics, for there is no art without politics, no politics without art. Art gives us the charity and politics supplies the conscience. Together they create a bomb to awaken the people…our enemy is Imperialism.” Mascarones sought to reach as many people as possible by offering donation based performances in preparatory schools, on university campuses, in parks, at city halls, in the streets, and at any events that aligned with their political ideologies. In Mascarones’ early years the group received federal financial support through cultural organizations and through their participation in government-sponsored events. After the student massacre, however, Mascarones, like many other student organizations, refused any direct form of financial support from any government groups and sought alternative financing to sustain their revolutionary programs. Their work was thereafter supported through donations, the personal funds and the sale of their own publications and recordings, books about Marxism, and images of heroes like “Che” Guevara and Emiliano Zapata. Most of the money the group collected was used to pay for props, costumes, and travelling expenses, and most members had to work outside jobs to get the money to survive.

Meanwhile, the Dirección Federal de Seguridad (Office of Federal Security, or DFS) was concerned that Mascarones’ performances incited their audiences to rise up against federal and local governments through the promotion of communist ideologies and the

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324 The file on Mascarones at DFS’s archive found at the Mexican National Archive (AGN), starts its detail coverage of Mascarones as a subversive group in 1969.
326 “Nuestra Familia Unida,” *Don Mariano Leyva Domínguez* (Universidad Nahuatl, Ocotepec, Morelos, Mexico, November 16, 2004).
327 Mascarones, October 31, 1972 AGN/DFS: Exp. 63-3-1-72 H-11 L-6
exalting of guerilla leaders like Genaro Vázquez Rojas and Lucio Cabañas from Mexico, and Argentine Ernesto “Che” Guevara in Cuba. The Mexican government sought to maintain its unique national stability in the midst of the Cold War, a time when any suggestion of opposition was labeled as “communist” and as a threat to national security. Mexico also hoped to avoid covert or overt intervention from the United States. The Díaz Ordaz administration became known for its lack of tolerance of political opposition, as highlighted by the Tlatelolco massacre. Within this environment, the work of groups like Mascarones was seen as subversive of Mexican national security, and the DFS kept a close watch on all of their activities, contacts, and resources. These included descriptions of their performances at student events at UNAM, high schools, and teacher-training schools, at which Mascarones would satirize the Mexican government, commemorate the student massacre at Tlatelolco, speak out against the Vietnam War, and present poetry for heroes such as Zapata. The effectiveness of Mascarones in gathering large and enthusiastic audiences during their public performances was the greatest concern for the DFS because of the group’s potential to generate disturbances against the state.

Part IV: Luis Valdés and Chicano Theater

The phenomenon of teatro popular that was emerging throughout Latin America also took roots in the United States among Chicana/os. The aesthetic influence of Latin American dramaturgy had been constant among Mexican and Mexican American communities in the U.S. However, the theatrical style of Chicana/o theater was more profoundly influenced by Mexican troupes who, during the armed conflicts of the Mexican Revolution, toured and settled across the Southwest, performing work about sociopolitical conflicts.

328 Mascarones, October 31, 1972 AGN/DFS: Exp. 63-3-1-72 H-11 L-6
329 Mascarones, October 31, 1972 AGN/DFS: Exp. 63-3-1-72 H-11 L-6
The inception of the Chicana/o theater included the notion of a “worker’s theater, a people’s theater that reflects strictly sociopolitical issues in deference to an aesthetic that is well honed or that comes from any source other than expediency coupled with raw, vibrant talent.” Chicana/o performances evolved among the communities of agricultural immigrant workers with no formal theatrical training; similar to mocking the ruling classes that was commonly used by Mexican popular classes in music, fiestas, and everyday life. This amateur style became one of the main characteristics of Chicana/o theater, which contrasted with the rather more sophisticated and professional style of Latin American and Mexican dramaturgy.

It was in the early 1960s when Luis Valdez and his Teatro Campesino began performances in the on the back of a flatbed truck for striking United Farm workers in Delano, California. Valdez, himself a son of Mexican farm worker immigrants, learned first-hand of their struggles as he travelled with his family around the United States picking crops. Not without difficulty, Valdez was able to finish high school and earn a scholarship to San José State University where he wrote his first play, The Shrunken Head of Pancho Villa. Valdez also had the opportunity to learn first-hand about the Cuban Revolution and its example for the rest of Latin America when he made his first trip to Cuba with the Venceremos Brigade in 1964. His experience with Castro and the Cuban Revolution influenced him to include class analysis. Just a year later, after his return from Cuba, on September 26, 1965, he travelled to his hometown of Delano, California, to participate in a

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331 It is not clear if the Venceremos Brigades in which Valdèz participated were related to the “Venceremos Brigades” that developed later in 1969 by members of the Students for a Democratic Society seeking to challenge the US embargo against Cuba. The information about Valdèz’s participation in the “Venceremos Brigades” is found in Huerta's “The Influence of Latin American Theater on Teatro Chicano.” Ibid.
protest march organized by the newly formed United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC).\textsuperscript{332}

In Delano, Valdez had the opportunity to meet leaders César Chávez and Dolores Huerta and talk about the possibility of organizing a theater company for them. At that time Valdez was apprenticed to the San Francisco Mime Troupe, but through the support of Chávez and Huerta, Valdez began working with a core group of five members, which evolved into the Teatro Campesino. He became the Teatro’s artistic director and resident playwright, relying on the striking farm workers themselves as actors and using physical comedy, farcical timing, satire, and active body movement to create brief sketches called “actos.” Valdez outlined the purpose of the actos as works meant to “Inspire the audience to social action. Illuminate specific points about social problems. Satirize the opposition. Show or hint at a solution. Express what people are feeling.”\textsuperscript{333} The Teatro served as a cultural and political voice for the UFWOC, contesting the living and working conditions of the farm workers, creating political consciousness to stimulate people’s activism, and earning revenue for strike efforts.\textsuperscript{334}

In 1967, Valdez left the ranks of the UFWOC and began to focus fully on his theater career as a playwright. He explored broader issues affecting the Chicano communities in the United States. He began working with a style termed “mito” (myth), which was a more “mystical dramatic” form of the acto. In Valdez’s words, the acto consisted of seeing through the eyes of man, and the mito consisted of seeing through the eyes of God.\textsuperscript{335} The issue of

\textsuperscript{332} CSRC/UCLA, Luis Valdez Folder, newspaper clip from \textit{Evening Outlook}, December 13, 1984.
\textsuperscript{333} Luis Valdez and Teatro Campesino (Organization), \textit{Luis Valdez--Early Works: Actos, Bernabé, and Pensamiento Serpentino} (Houston: Arte Publico Press, 1990), 12.
\textsuperscript{334} Elam, \textit{Taking It to the Streets}, 3.
\textsuperscript{335} Valdez and (Organization), \textit{Luis Valdez--Early Works}, 11.
Chicana/os in the Vietnam War was an important subject for Valdez’s work that materialized in his plays *Dark Root of a Scream* (1967) and *Soldado Razo* (1970), where Valdez explored the motivations and the mythical aspects of Chicanos’ participation in the conflict.\(^\text{336}\) Valdez’s recognition of the need for a more developed dramaturgy led him to the exploration and performance of Chicana/o social struggles through the mythological lens of indigenous culture and knowledge.\(^\text{337}\) This more symbolic style of representation caused a split among Chicana/os; some saw the mito style as indigenous essentialism devoid of social issues. However, there were others who defended this style as part of the political struggle integrating indigenous knowledge.

Chicana scholar Yvonne Yarbro-Bejarano has argued that the use of mythical and religious theater was a distraction from social issues affecting Chicana/os. The *mito*, Yarbro-Bejarano claimed, was a “tendency [that] proves evasive and distracts attention from essential problems…[because] it seems a bit romantic…divorced from reality…[and a] return to the past.”\(^\text{338}\) This critique was also echoed by Marxist Chicana/os who saw the use of religious concepts like the Virgin of Guadalupe and indigenous mythology as inadequate tools for the fight against imperialism.\(^\text{339}\) On the other hand, scholar Yolanda Broyles-González, who was part of the Teatro Campesino troupe, defended the use of mythical work, or what she calls Theater of the Sphere.\(^\text{340}\) According to Broyles-González, critics ignored collective processes needed to create “the intricacies of the scientific, mathematical, and

\(^{339}\) Interview with Jorge Huerta, May 15, 2011, Los Angeles, California.
\(^{340}\) Teatro of the Sphere refers to the long-term process of “collective exploration” used by the ensemble of Teatro Campesino to train, learn, and conceptualize indigenous cultures, religions, and philosophies. Yolanda Broyles-González, *El Teatro Campesino: Theater in the Chicano Movement*, 1st ed (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 120.
astronomical knowledge” behind the work of Theater of the Sphere. Critics also overlooked the fact that the “Teatro Campesino did not perceive indigenismo…as an alternative to anti-imperialist struggle…critics generally disregarded the political and scientific rationale behind the Teatro’s efforts to integrate indigenous knowledge and social struggle…[as an] emancipatory potential.” Despite the criticism, Luis Valdez continued to experiment with various levels of Chicana/o reality, culture, and ideas through the weaving of indigenous beliefs with the everyday struggles of Chicana/os. Through the development of the mito theater style, Valdez sought to include ideas about Chicanos’ indigenous heritage, such the Mayan concept In Lak’ech. The concept of In Lak’ech—which means “You are my other self,” or in Spanish “Tu eres mi otro yo”—was used as a metaphor for social unity among Chicana/os.

**Part V: Chicana/o Connections with Mascarones**

In the meantime, Chicano theater groups continued to emerge (mostly in the U.S. Southwest), and following the lead of Valdez and his Teatro, these artists continued to make use of mythical indigenous themes. In 1970, Valdez invited Leyva of Mascarones to conduct a tour through California and to participate in the Primer Festival de Teatro Chicano in Fresno. This exchange was the first of many between Mascarones and Chicano theater groups in the following years. Leyva emerged from the Festival as an important influence on his Chicana/o counterparts, as Mascarones presented an effective and controlled style of choral poetry that was new for Chicana/o theaters. Also, Leyva arose as an outspoken

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341 Ibid.  
342 Ibid.  
political activist representing the political and social struggles that were taking place across Mexico, capturing the excitement of young Chicana/os.

Furthermore, it was through this visit to California that Leyva and his troupe learned firsthand about the situation of Mexican immigrants and the Chicana/o movement within the United States. On their return to Mexico, Leyva and Mascarones sought to support the Chicano struggle by educating Mexican society about it. On June 10, 1970, the Mexican leftist magazine, *Por Que*, published a letter from Leyva in defense of Chicanos and their movement in response to a previous article published in the same magazine. Leyva's letter was a call for Mexicans, especially those who sought social transformation, to learn more about Chicana/o culture through their literature, art, music, movies, and magazines. Throughout his letter, Leyva highlighted the struggles of Chicana/os as an extension of those in Mexico. He emphasized: “It has been a long time since we have seen our Mexican values and symbols defended vigorously and without demagogy in the way Chicanos are now doing it.”

Leyva was impressed by Chicana/os’ day-to-day efforts to preserve their Mexican cultural identity through demanding the right to speak Spanish and to use symbols like Emiliano Zapata, Netzahualcoyotl (the Aztec ruler), and José María Morelos (a Mexican independence hero) figures whom most Mexicans living in Mexico either took for granted or objected to because of the cooptation of these symbols by the revolutionary state.

Leyva’s experience in the United States allowed him to understand more tangibly the connections between Mexicans and Chicana/os, including the challenges the Chicana/o movement raised against his own political idealism and his efforts to preserve and honor Mexican indigenous roots. Leyva’s support for the Chicana/o movement stood in contrast to

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the attitudes of earlier Mexican intellectuals like José Vasconcelos and Octavio Paz, noted earlier, who had lived in the United States but in different historical and social circumstances. Vasconcelos described with great contempt the people of Mexican descent living in the United States during the Mexican Revolution, calling them “pochos.” He defined pochismo as a concept “used in California to identify individuals without a caste who negate their Mexicanness, although it is in their blood, while they try to adjust their behavior to imitate the current landlords of the region.” Similarly, Paz later analyzed the phenomenon of the pachuco among Mexican American communities in the United States and described them as an extreme form of Mexican identity develop through an exotic lens.

“The Pachuco…[h]is whole being is sheer negative impulse, a tangle of contradictions, an enigma…[t]he purpose of his grotesque dandyism and anarchic behavior is not so much to point out the injustice of a society that has failed to assimilate him as it is to demonstrate his personal will to remain different.”

In contrast, Leyva, who was far from being an elite Mexican intellectual or diplomat and who also travelled and saw first-hand the everyday lives of the Mexican American communities in the United States, had a more sympathetic view of the political activism of Chicana/os. Chicano activism fit within the 1970s political and cultural struggles taking place in Mexico and Latin America. Chicanos, like Mexicans and Latin Americans in general, sought to “use art and culture as powerful weapons against an oppressive and brutal system.”

Leyva’s support for Chicana/os stood in sharp contrast to the contemptuous attitudes of Vasconcelos and Paz, especially in regard to his recognition of the value and centrality of

349 CSRC/UCLA: Teatro Campesino Folder, newspaper clip from El Teatro Newspaper, summer 1970.
cultural nationalism promoted by key Chicano concepts like Aztlán, Raza de Bronce (Bronze Race), and Pueblo del Sol (People of the Sun). Based on an idealized sense of indigenous roots, these ideas became the basis for Chicano/a nationalism that sought to recover and create its own sense of cultural and racial pride. Aztec mythology, like the Mexican Revolution of 1910, served as a basic framework in the process of the construction of a new political identity for Chicana/os. In the process, however, many people were excluded, particularly women and the diverse indigenous peoples who had been colonized by the violent domination of Aztecs and Mayans. By placing as belonging to Aztlán, the mythical place of origin of the Aztecs in the U.S. Southwest, Chicana/os symbolically saw themselves as the political and cultural bridge between the two nations. Leyva defended the use of Chicano concepts mentioned above, not as theories or objects of mockery, but rather as tools of resistance against the oppression of the United States government and the U.S. society more generally.

After decades of racial discrimination, economic oppression, and political disenfranchisement, Chicana/os developed a new sense of cultural pride that presented them “as people with a distinct name, language, history, and culture…seeking a redefinition of their status, as well as new heroes…to place themselves within the family of national groups.” It was within this context that the ideal of a glorious indigenous and revolutionary past served as a tool of resistance and cultural unity for a disenfranchised community.

351 CSRC/UCLA: Teatro Campesino Folder, El Teatro Newspaper, summer 1970
However, in the 1960s Mexican activists were challenging the “myths” that contrasted with the concrete realities of political repression and social and economic inequalities.

Between 1970 and 1973, Chicana/o theater groups and Leyva’s Mascarones shared information and material about their efforts. For instance, in the summer of 1970, Mascarones participated at the “Semana de Repudio a la Farsa Electoral” (Week of repudiation against the electoral farce) in response to the Mexican presidential elections when Luis Echeverría was chosen. During this event, Mascarones presented a one-act play titled *El Movimiento Chicana/o*, that was based the Chicano movie *Yo Soy Joaquin*, protesting against the Vietnam War and United States imperialism.\(^{353}\)

Despite the efforts of groups like Mascarones, Chicano activism and political ideas did not enter very much into the rhetoric of Mexican activists. As Luis Echeverría began his presidency in 1970, political activism opposing the federal government and the deteriorating social and economic conditions in Mexico continued. Icons like Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Lucio Cabañas, and Genaro Vásquez served as revolutionary symbols alongside Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa for Mexican youth struggling against political repression from the government, though the latter two were refashioned to remove them from the control of the Mexican state. Through the conflicts of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, Villa and Zapata had represented different regions, social bases, and political philosophies. Zapata had exerted most of his influence among peasant communities in southern Mexico with a clear agrarian focus in the fight for land and resources. Villa, on the other hand, operated in northern Mexico without a clear ideological center, but with a strong military force.\(^{354}\)

\(^{353}\) “Mascarones,” October 31, 1972, AGN/DFS: Exp. 63-1/2-72 H-158. L-1

nor Zapata died as national heroes. However, by the 1930s, their historical legacy had been coopted by state officials who constructed their image as national heroes to symbolize national unity and used their associations with the masses to legitimize their political rhetoric.\textsuperscript{355}

While Chicano political symbols such as Aztlán, Raza de Bronce, Raza Cosmica, and Pueblo del Sol were sporadically mentioned in the media, they were ignored for the most part by Mexican political activists. An irony was that, while the recognition of the political activism of the Chicana/o Movement was limited among members of the Mexican left, a new wave of distinctly Mexican rock music, \textit{La Onda Chicana} emerged with the name of.\textsuperscript{356} As Eric Zolov writes:

> [W]hile in the United States the Chicano Movement referred to a struggle for political power and cultural self-determination, in Mexico this term was being applied to a countercultural scene characterized by foreign rock influences and performance in English…Thus, while [Chicana/os] scorned ‘modernity’ in the search for Mexican ‘authenticity,’ [Mexicans] rejected presumptions of nationalist authenticity in the search for new meanings to be found in the very same expression of ‘modern culture.’…[Both] were wrestling with the historic and more contemporary legacies of U.S. imperialism in the respective, and at times overlapping, searches for new collective identities.\textsuperscript{357}

Zolov’s incisive discussion points towards the contradictions that characterized the different attitudes by Mexican and Chicana/o youth towards modernity, Mexican nationalism, and their search for an “authentic” identity. While the Chicana/o Movement in the United States represented a form of political radicalism against racism, \textit{La Onda Chicana} in Mexico was characterized by its disengagement with politics in the face of government repression.

\textsuperscript{355} Samuel Brunk, \textit{The Posthumous Career of Emiliano Zapata: Myth, Memory, and Mexico’s Twentieth Century}, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008), 5.
\textsuperscript{357} Ibid., 175–176.
However, both the Chicana/o Movement and La Onda Chicana were “linked [by] the search for [an ‘authentic’] identity in the shadow of United States cultural domination.”

Yet Leyva and Mascarones continued to use theater, poetry, and music to perform the everyday experiences and hardships of Mexicans despite the rather frivolous attitudes of large sectors of the Mexican youth. The call from Leyva and other Mexican leftists was for people to gain consciousness of poverty and disenfranchisement. The Mexican left and the government both publicly argued for the “collective good,” but neither side was clear about what to do about national problems. Meanwhile, in the United States, Chicana/os were also trying to deal with their own internal diversity of opinions, interests, and needs while maintaining a unified front. In the spring of 1971, Luis Valdez and his Teatro Campesino organized the second Festival de Teatros Chicanos in Fresno, California, and invited Leyva and Mascarones to return once again. Chicana/os sought to establish stronger connections with Mexicans, but funding opportunities to visit each other’s countries and communities were unfortunately limited.

Leyva and Mascarones’s travel to the United States and direct interaction with Chicana/o audiences and communities allowed them a rare level of understanding about conditions for Chicana/os that most Mexican activists lacked. At the Second Festival in California, it became clear that Chicana/o theater groups needed more unification and more formal theater training. At the suggestion of Leyva, Valdez helped to create the Teatro Nacional de Aztlán (TENAZ-The National Theater of Aztlán). The anagram in Spanish means “tenacity,” which was suggested by Leyva. TENAZ became a collective

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358 Ibid., 165.
organization of Chicano theater groups that sought to provide a unifying structure and theatrical models.\textsuperscript{360}

Upon his return to Mexico, Leyva helped to organize a similar collective through the organization of Centro Libre de Experimentación Teatral y Artística de la UNAM (CLETA-Center of Free Theatrical and Artistic Experimentation of UNAM). CLETA emerged from the desires of university students to transform the university theater department’s curriculum into a more progressive and revolutionary program.\textsuperscript{361} Some of the members of CLETA included Mascarones, Los Nakos, Los Tupac Amaru, Xocotl, and Roke Nahuatl, among others. These groups focused on experimental theater with political and social criticism against the Mexican government and United States imperialism, and in favor of Marxist and revolutionary ideologies.\textsuperscript{362}

Just a few months after Leyva and Mascarones returned to Mexico City from their visit to the United States, the confrontations between the Mexican federal government and student protesters escalated into another bloodbath. With only six months in power, Mexican president Echeverría was confronted with the need to control angry university student protesters in the northern Mexican state of Nuevo Leon. Student discontent at the Autonomous University of Nuevo Leon in Monterrey (UANL) had been brewing for several months, which led the state congress to change the university bylaws to limit the autonomy of the university. For student activism, the \textit{autonomy} of universities like UANL and UNAM held a political significance in opposition to government repression because in theory \textit{autonomy} meant those universities were politically exempt from the intervention of the

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\item \textsuperscript{360} W. B. Worthen, “Staging América: The Subject of History in Chicano/a Theatre,” \textit{Theatre Journal} 49, no. 2 (May 1, 1997): 106.
\item \textsuperscript{361} CLETA, January 6, 1974, AGN/DFS: Exp. 11-4-74 H-182 L-257
\item \textsuperscript{362} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
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Mexican government. However, economic ties and government interests limited the actual autonomy of the universities, leading to numerous confrontations between students, university administrations, and government forces.\(^{363}\)

Such was the case when in order to implement the new ruling, the state governor of Nuevo Leon sent police forces to occupy the UANL, which led to student outrage across the nation and a call for massive protests. President Echeverría was still seeking to reestablish the legitimacy of the Mexican government among students and other activists after the student massacre of 1968. In response to the volatile situation, Echeverría annulled the congress’s law against the UANL, but it was not enough to calm the students’ anger. In June 10, 1971, about 10,000 students in Mexico City decided to march in support of the struggle at UANL, making this the first major student demonstration since Tlatelolco in 1968. As the march began its course, young men dressed in civilian clothes and armed with batons, chains, and clubs attacked the protesters while the police looked the other way. The march quickly turned into an atrocity that left 25 students dead and dozens wounded.\(^{364}\)

Declassified documents found at the National Security Archive later confirmed that Echeverría’s government hired hoodlums dressed as civilians to attack protesting students.\(^{365}\) This event became known as the Corpus Christi massacre because of the Catholic celebration that took place on the same day.\(^{366}\)


\(^{364}\) The 1971 Corpus Christi Massacre alongside the 1968 Tlatelolco Student Massacre became symbols of martyrdom and state repression of the Mexican Dirty War for the Mexican left. One of the most recent works that directly explores the events and participants around this event is Jaime Pensado, Rebel Mexico (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). Also see Kate Doyle, “The Corpus Christi Massacre,” The National Security Archive, June 10, 2003, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB91/.

\(^{365}\) Ibid.

\(^{366}\) Ibid.
The events further galvanized clandestine activism among urban and rural armed guerrillas while cementing the distrust of Echeverría’s attempts to shape his image as a populist president and his proclamation of a new democratic opening in Mexico. Meanwhile, in the United States, Chicana/o groups were following the events taking place in Mexico City through newspapers and networking they had established with Mexican students and activists traveling or living in the United States. In contrast, neither the Mexican media nor Mexican public at large paid much attention to the events affecting Chicana/os.

Cantú as noted in Chapter 2 was one of the most outspoken Chicano activists regarding Mexican government’s repression of students and other activists. Other Chicana/os focused their criticism against the United States government and society and limited their criticisms towards Mexico. “Mexicans were very critical of the Mexican and United States government, but at least in theater Chicanos only criticized the United States government.”

Just a few months after the Corpus Christi massacre, Cantú invited Leyva and Mascarones to participate in the “Semana de la Raza,” festivities in San Antonio, Texas. The activities surrounding “Semana de la Raza” were centered on the celebrations of the Dieciséis de Septiembre, Mexican Independence Day. According to the Mexican internal security office, Leyva had taken flyers and photographic material about the student protests taking place in Mexico City to be distributed among Chicana/o students in the United States, hoping to rally support for the struggle of Mexicans against state repression among Chicana/os and to force increased accountability on the part of Echeverría.

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367 Interview and e-mail communication with Jorge Huerta, May 15, 2011, Los Angeles, CA.
368 “Mascarones,” October 31, 1972, AGN/DFS: Exp. 63-3-1-72 H-11 L-6
369 Ibid.
play La Represión que existe en México (The Repression that Exists in Mexico), which focused on events like the Tlatelolco and Corpus Christi student massacres.\footnote{Mascarones,” AGN/DFS: Exp. 63-1/2-72 H-160. L-1}

Unlike the relations between Leyva and Valdez, which were mostly focused on the artistic, cultural, and political exchanges within the theater, Leyva’s relation with Mario Cantú was directed to radical and militant revolutionary politics. Through the connections with Leyva, Cantú established relations with Maoist Mexican leader Florencio “El Güero” Medrano and other radical Mexican activists. Just a few months after Mascarones’ performance for the Semana de la Raza, Cantú solicited more material from Leyva for the celebration of a convention of Chicana/os and Puerto Ricans where Reies López Tijerina would present.\footnote{Mascarones,” October 31, 1972, AGN/DFS: Exp. 63-3-1-72 H-11 L-6} Tijerina had become a symbol for Chicano activism after his incarceration for his raid of the Rio Arriba County courthouse in Tierra Amarilla, New Mexico, although his activism was directed more toward religious zealotry than on Chicana/o politics (See Introduction). In his relations with Mexicans, Tijerina focused primarily on getting the support from the Mexican government for his struggle with the land grants, an attempt that failed, rather than on political activism directed at the liberation of Mexican students, workers, and peasantry.\footnote{Found in Center of Southwest Research, University of New Mexico (hereafter CSR/UNM): Reies López Tijerina Papers, Collection # MSS 654 BC, Box 53, Folder 45, RLT: Personal Writings 1956-1967.}

In 1972, Chicana/os, Mexicans, and Latin Americans had the opportunity to participate in two international festivals. First, Teatro Campesino and Mascarones participated at the Théâtres de Minorités Nationales in Paris, France.\footnote{Lopéz Cabrera, Julio César, “El Teatro Campesino y Mascarones: la búsqueda de una identidad” in Casa del Tiempo Vol.VII, No. 86 (Marzo 2006): 36-39} According to Julio César López Cabrera’s article “El Teatro Campesino y Mascarones: la búsqueda de una
identidad,” Mascarones and Teatro Campesino toured France together for about a month, and during that time they collaborated with each other and worked side-by-side with Latin Americans like Colombian theater director Enrique Buenaventura, considered to be the father of Colombian theater and one of the most influential figures of Latin American theater in Chicana/o aesthetics. However, from Lopéz Cabrera’s article it is not clear what the exact nature of the collaboration between Chicana/os and Latin Americans was during the French festival or the reception of the French audience was like.

Although the influence of Latin American theater traditions was present from the beginning in the creation of Chicana/o theater aesthetics, the direct collaboration between professional theater groups from Latin America and Chicana/os did not emerge until the early 1970s. The need to establish greater communication between Latin Americans and the Latina/o communities in the United States was a dual process. Chicana/o theater groups and performers travelled to Latin America to attend festivals at the same time that Latin Americans came up north to present their work. It was through these encounters that “the differences in approach and the lack of information became evident.” At the same time, Chicana/os began to realize the need for greater professionalization for Chicana/o performers and groups, leading to the creation of TENAZ. The need to develop and connect the different political and cultural aesthetics across Latin American communities gave rise to the desire to organize a Latin American theater festival in the United States.

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374 Enrique Buenaventura’s work on collective theater was of great influence across Latin America and Chicana/o Theater. Watson Espencer, “Enrique Buenaventura’s Theory of the Committed Theater,” 101.
Chicana/o theater groups organized the First International Latin American Theater Festival, (October 23 through November 1, 1972) at the University of San Francisco.\textsuperscript{377} The objectives were described in the official rules as intended for artistic collaboration and learning about different aesthetic and cultural styles from Latin America. Some of the organizers explained in an interview that the nature of the Primer Festival Latino Americano was solely artistic and cultural and had no political, religious, or ideological intentions, which was a strategy to appease the concerns of the university’s administrators.\textsuperscript{378} The ultimate aim, according to Marina Pianca, one of the organizers of the festival, was to increase the communication between Latin America and the Latina/o communities in the United States. Perhaps the organizers were trying to ensure the support of the administration of the University of San Francisco and also to limit the surveillance of government agencies like the FBI. However, establishing connections between Latina/os in the United States and other international communities was a political act in itself as they were learning about each other’s political strategies, ideologies, and problems.

The participation of groups in the festival was framed by their aesthetic ability to represent the reality of their countries, but most importantly by their ability to cover the costs of travel to the United States. The participation of Latin Americans was limited to seven countries: Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Representing the United States were six theater groups: Teatro Campesino, Circulo Teatral, American Conservatory Theater, San Francisco Mime Troupe, and Teatro de la Esperanza.\textsuperscript{379} The presence of Chicano theater directors like Luis Valdez and Jorge Huerta, along with

\textsuperscript{378} “Primer Festival Internacional de Teatro Latinoamericano (San Francisco, California): Una Entrevista Con Marina Pianca y Domingo Lo Giudice,” 77.  
\textsuperscript{379} Ibid., 81.
Colombian director Enrique Buenaventura attracted large audiences formed mostly by professors and students from Berkeley, Stanford, Stockton, UCLA, and San Francisco State College.\footnote{Ibid., 83.}

The festival immediately was threatened with cancellation because of the use of nudity in the Brazilian play *El Tercer Demonio*. It was perceived as inappropriate by the administration of San Francisco University, a Jesuit Catholic school.\footnote{Ibid., 82–83.} Furthermore, the Mexican play, *El Conejo Blanco*, presented by Grupo Alicia, was three hours long depicting the political and social conditions in Mexico through abstract symbolism in tarot card reading, Zen Buddhism, and karate. The rather abstract nature of *El Conejo Blanco* raised some concerns about how the Chicana/o audiences would respond to a “subject matter [that] seemed so ‘far-out’ [compared to what Chicana/o] audiences have experienced…”\footnote{Huerta, “Concerning Teatro Chicano,” 16.}

According to Chicano director Jorge Huerta, the Chicana/o audiences connected better with more simple, direct, and uncomplicated messages related to their everyday life, including religious drama where the distinction between good and evil could be clearly drawn.\footnote{CSRC/UCLA: Teatro Campesino Folder, Huerta, Jorge A. “En Torno” in *Chicano Theater One* (San Juan Buatista, CA: Cucaracha Press, 1973), 2-6.} The reason for this assertion by Huerta was not that Chicana/o audiences did not have the capacity to understand abstract representations, but given that theater-going was not part of their culture, they needed first to establish theater through everyday struggles, rather than through more experimental, abstract theater styles that targeted a more sophisticated audience.\footnote{Huerta, “Concerning Teatro Chicano,” 16.}
After the festival in San Francisco, Enrique Buenaventura stated that he appreciated the simplicity and directness of the Chicano theater messages, but he also encouraged them to continue working towards a more complex aesthetic expression of la vida Chicana (Chicana/o life experience) through theatrical representations.\textsuperscript{385} These needed to engage the complexity between indigenous, Spanish, Mestizo, and European-American cultural roots. Theater had the potential to educate and guide Chicana/o audiences through the process of awakening their political, spiritual, and cultural consciousness.\textsuperscript{386} After the festival, the Latin American theater groups stayed to present shows and participate in workshops at various universities and community centers around San Francisco and Los Angeles.\textsuperscript{387} Buenaventura’s group, Teatro Experimental de Cali, participated in a theater seminar alongside Luis Valdez and his Teatro Campesino, which help to cement the collaboration and communication between Latin American groups and Chicana/os.

The positive outcome from the Latin American theater festival in San Francisco and the enthusiasm around solidifying the exchanges between Latin America and Chicana/os continued. The following year, 1973, Chicana/o theater groups and Mascarones once again came together at the IV Festival de Teatro Chicano in San José, California. It was at this festival that Chicana/os and Mexicans planned the organization of the V Festival de Teatro Chicano to be held in Mexico City on June 24 through July 7, 1974. The program included an opening ceremony of the V Festival at the Plaza de la Luna in Teotihuacan, performances at venues in the apartment complex where the infamous Tlatelolco student massacre took

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\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid. \textsuperscript{385}
\item Ibid. \textsuperscript{386}
\item “Primer Festival Internacional de Teatro Latinoamericano (San Francisco, California): Una Entrevista Con Marina Pianca y Domingo Lo Giudice,” 83. \textsuperscript{387}
\end{enumerate}
\end{small}
place in 1968, and the closing ceremony in the Totonaca pyramids in Tajín, Veracruz.\textsuperscript{388} The choices of venues by the Mexican organizers of the V Festival were carefully orchestrated to connect the traditional aspects of Mexican culture with Third World revolutionary struggles. By using indigenous archeological sites for the opening and closing ceremonies, the organizers highlighted and celebrated the indigenous roots that connected Chicana/os, Mexicans, and other Latin Americans through the experience of European colonization. The use of the facilities at the Tlatelolco apartment complex highlighted Mexican experience with repression. As noted in the name of the festival, the twenty-five Chicano theater companies were preponderant, with nine more groups representing Argentina, Paraguay, Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador, and about eight groups representing Mexican theater.\textsuperscript{389}

The festival took place in the midst of great political turmoil across Latin America and within Mexico, as the struggles between state forces intensified against those labeled as subversives or communists. At the regional level, just nine months before the festival, on September 11, 1973, the Chilean military staged a coup against socialist president Salvador Allende. As a result, Chile’s government fell under the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990). Activists across Latin America rallied against U.S. intervention in the region and repressive governments at the same time that the Mexican government opened its doors to Chilean political exiles.\textsuperscript{390} Within the internal context of the Mexican nation, the festival took place during the Mexican Dirty War between state forces

\textsuperscript{388}“Recoded minutes of TENAZ Coordinating Council meeting of May 18-19, 1974” CSRC/UCLA: Teatro Campesino Folder, “ and CLETA, June 24, 1974, AGN/DFS: Exp. 11-204-74 H-34 L-2

\textsuperscript{389}Found in Biblioteca Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Mexico City (hereafter BMLT) El Día, June 23, 974.

and leftist groups, illustrating the political complexity of the Echeverría’s years. Despite the efforts of the Mexican state to deny the presence of guerillas and delegitimize their claims, support for armed resistance increased, particularly among university students. Just three weeks before the festival, there was a high profile kidnapping of a senator and gubernatorial candidate Rubén Figueroa by El Partido de los Pobres (Party of the Poor, PDLP), led by schoolteacher turned revolutionary, Lucio Cabañas Barrientos. On June 2, 1974, Cabañas and his group announced that they were holding Figueroa hostage in exchange for political prisoners and ransom money they planned to use to make “a new revolution that will be socialist.”391 The Mexican state responded with the use of indiscriminate violence, torture, disappearances, and murder of the guerrillas and their supporters and families, as well as anyone they decided was a suspect.

To many young Latin Americans and Mexicans the idea of armed revolution was seen as the only viable option to achieve a radical transformation of society. For Mexican political and cultural arenas, the idea of armed revolution was a part of the central rhetoric of the revolutionary government, party, and society that had emerged from the Mexican Revolution 1910-1920. In contrast, conditions in the United States were not conducive for the emergence of guerrilla groups like those now sprawling across Latin America. Chicana/os sought political and social reform rather than the overthrow of their government. Throughout the festival, the political backdrop of armed activism and intense political repression across Mexico and other Latin American nations framed the dynamics between Chicana/os and Latin American theater groups.

Part VI: Quinto Festival de Teatros Chicanos and the Primer Encuentro Latino Americano, 24 June through 7 July 1974

When Chicano groups arrived in Mexico City, Mexican students and labor union members were waiting for the performers at the train station with signs like: “Visite México y sus presos políticos” (“Visit Mexico and its political prisoners”), “CLETA UNAM por un teatro libre y por la liberación” (“CLETA UNAM for an independent theater and for liberation”), “Obreros en lucha apoyamos a CLETA” (“Workers in struggle support CLETA”). Among the university students and labor organizers in attendance there were also agents of Mexico’s domestic intelligence service, the DFS. Through most of the two weeks of the festival, DFS agents maintained close surveillance and a detailed record of the activities, discussions, participants, and plays at the Festival.

Mexican, Chicana/o, Cuban, and Guatemalan theater groups attended the opening ceremonies at the footsteps of the moon pyramid. The procession was led by the image of Saint John the Evangelist, representing their Catholic identity and the unwavering Christian journey towards heaven, showing the resolution of these young activists to liberate oppressed classes. Chicana/o groups distinguished themselves by red flags with the black eagle symbolic of United Farm Workers organization led by César Chávez in California. The Teatro Campesino performed a ritual dance called Baile de los gigantes (Dance of Giants), a representation of Mayan civilization. Mexican theater groups followed with more acts representing indigenous rituals, cosmology, traditions, symbolism, and language. At the end of the performances, one of the Mexican organizers gave the official welcome in English, Spanish, and Nahuatl to the “hermanos de raza” (brothers of race), indicating all Latin

392 CLETA, Junio 22, 1974, AGN/DFS, Exp. 11-204-74 H-27 L-2
The idealism of comradely and cultural unity that surrounded the opening ceremony was short lived as the festival developed and the groups shared their visions and experiences about political activism and social struggle. After the opening ceremony at the pyramids, the actors went back to Mexico City to continue with more performances through the evening. The festival events took place simultaneously in various theaters around or near UNAM. The evening started with the performance of protest music urging the emancipation of workers. The political music was followed by the Chicana/o group’s performances of Aztec and Mayan indigenous dances that alluded to the hardships of Chicana/os in the United States. The Chicana/os’ performance was followed by someone reading a letter from an unnamed Brazilian woman that informed the audience about the repressive violence in Brazil, which at the time was under the military rule of Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979). According to the speaker, Brazilians were living in extreme poverty and in fear of arbitrary detentions and disappearances under the suspicion of subversion. In between each act, the organizers would use the expression of “luchar por la libertad y por la justicia social” (“to fight for liberty and social justice”). A Chicana/o group, Arte de la vida from San Diego, California, conducted the last block of performances on the first day of the Festival. They used a combination of protest music and short acts in an effort to depict the problems affecting the Chicana/os in the United States. The issues included the negative effects of drug use on individuals and their society, the struggles of women to obtain their liberation, and the Chicana/o experience of repression by the United States immigration police. The night concluded with the Chicanos asking for everyone present to ask the United

394 CLETA, Junio 24, 1974, AGN/DFS, Exp. 11-204-74 H-34-37 L-2
395 Ibid.
States government to grant Chicana/os equal rights, such as equal pay and equal access to social services.  

Throughout the festival, Chicana/o groups presented plays dealing mostly with issues such as the marginalization and police repression of their communities in the United States, the erosion of their traditional Mexican identity, the need for women’s liberation, problems of worker exploitation, and the Vietnam War. They used symbolism from Aztec and Mayan indigenous cultures and the 1910 Mexican Revolution. Mexican groups also presented various plays with indigenous themes, but unlike Chicana/os, Mexican plays were more open in their use of Marxist ideology, anti-imperialist rhetoric, and criticism of Christianity. Non-professional Mexican groups formed by workers and peasants presented plays explaining the land and labor issues in their communities. For instance, the theater group Xicotencatl was formed by Mexican indigenous peasants from San Pedro, Tlaxcala, and the closing part of their play was the Mexican national anthem sung in Nahuatl. Mexican indigenous groups like Xicotencatl sought to integrate their cultural and ethnic identity as part of the Mexican nation and the struggles for social justice that were taking place in urban spaces. On the other hand, plays from Central and South America focused on the evils of United States imperialism, political repression across Latin America, and the need for a socialist revolution. During the first critique sessions, the major concerns were with the use of abstract symbolism that made the plays inaccessible to the general public and the need to create a political consciousness among the masses. These discussions pointed to the need to make theater accessible and not just to the university students who had access to the theater facilities.

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396 Ibid.
397 CLETA, Junio 27, 1974, AGN/DFS, Exp.11-204-74 L-2 H-64-66, H-80-83
On the fifth day of the Festival, UNAM students organized a one-day event to commemorate the Day of the University Worker on June 29. It was celebrated with a combination of theater, music, poetry, comedy, and political speeches. The Mexican theater group, Los Zopilotes (The Buzzards), which was also participating at the Festival, imitated Mexican president Echeverría giving speeches about land grants for the peasantry. Others, like Los Nacos, presented revolutionary music in support of the student movement in Mexico. A few artists from Argentina and Chile represented South American countries, but it was the support for Chile that was the strongest at this event in reference to the recent imposition of military rule and the presence of Chilean exiles in Mexico. Even Mexican agrarian activists paid tribute to Chilean struggles, as in the case of a group representing Campamento Tierra y Libertad, an agrarian movement from the central Mexican state of San Luis Potosi, which presented poetry from cultural icons like Pablo Neruda and Víctor Jara.

After the overthrow of Allende, the Chilean military had gone after Allende’s supporters. Chilean poet, singer, songwriter, theater director, and political activist Víctor Jara had been a strong supporter of Allende’s government with his art. Shortly after the Chilean coup, Jara was arrested, tortured, and killed with machine gun fire. His body was later thrown in the streets of Santiago, Chile. On the other hand, Chilean poet and Nobel Prize winner Pablo Neruda, who had also been a strong supporter of Allende’s ideals, died just days after the coup, possibly from cancer thought his death remains suspicious. He had, interestingly, been granted asylum in Mexico and was awaiting transportation out of Chile at

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398 CLETA, Junio 29, 1974, AGN/DFS, Exp. 11-4-74 L-274 h-53-54
399 Ibid.
400 Ibid.
the time of his death. The music and poetry of Jara and Neruda became like anthems against United States imperialism and social injustice among Latin American students and activists. From the beginning of the Chilean crisis, the Mexican government opened its doors to Chilean exiles. The governments of Echeverría and Allende had pledged political solidarity based on their revolutionary commitments. Similarly, Mexican agrarian, labor, and student activists saw the struggle in Chile as directly connected to their own battles against repression. At the festival of University Workers, students showed signs condemning the coup. “Muera el fascismo Chileno y sus bufones” (“Chilean fascism and its clowns must die”), “Viva la resistencia Chilena, solidaridad latinoamericana” (“Long live the Chilean resistance, Latin American solidarity”), “Visit Mexico and its political prisoners” (in English), “Bienvenidos camaradas, unidos venceremos” (“Welcome comrades, united we will prevail”). The only sign about Chicana/os was one from the Mexican independent labor union announcing the Quinto Festival Chicano y Primer Encuentro Latino Americano de Teatro.

While the events in support of Chile and university workers were taking place at UNAM, and as the festival was happening throughout Mexico City, in the state of Guerrero, Cabañas and his followers continued to hold Figueroa as their captive. Echeverría ordered a military operation to secure the release of the senator at all costs. After the public announcement of the kidnapping by Cabañas and his followers, the military cordoned off the

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404 CLETA, June 29, 1974, AGN/DFS: Exp. 11-4-74 L-274 h-53-54
areas where Cabañas operated, seeking to cut off his supplies and support bases among local communities. The military resorted to aerial bombardments, arbitrary arrests, and the use of clandestine detention centers for suspected supporters of Cabañas. The young activists closely followed the situation in Guerrero, just as did the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. Embassy. It appeared that the issue of Cabañas’ guerrilla groups and their kidnapping of a Mexican senator did not form part of the themes used in the festival, perhaps because it was happening simultaneously. However, the intense political, paramilitary, and military forces that were operating across Mexico shaped the attitudes and responses of Mexican youth regarding political activism and potential solutions that were expressed throughout the theater performances at the Festival.

The activities of the Festival continued in the apartment complex where the infamous Tlatelolco student massacre of 1968 had taken place.406 The use of these facilities symbolically highlighted the Mexican experience with violent repression. The choice of venues by the Mexican organizers of the Festival was carefully orchestrated to connect the traditional aspects of Mexican culture with Third World revolutionary struggles. By using indigenous archeological sites for the opening and closing ceremonies, the organizers highlighted and celebrated the indigenous roots that connected Chicana/os, Mexicans, and Latin Americans.

At the Tlatelolco venue, Chicana/os had the opportunity to give a formal presentation about their fight and answer some of the criticisms that were beginning to emerge. The Latin American and Mexican observers interpreted the Chicana/o plays as representing a cultural nationalism that was devoid of social content. Chicana/os defended the nature of their work

406 CLETA, AGN/DFS: Exp. 11-204-74 L-2 H-89-107
as expressing social and political content that connected with the struggles of the rest of Latin America and the developing world. The accusation against them was that the aesthetics of Chicana/o theater were self-serving simply because they advocated for their survival based on ethnic and historical nationalism rather than making broader political connections with Latin America. For the Chicanos, the struggle for equal rights in the United States was foremost, but this cause lacked urgency for the Latin Americans facing more jarring brutalities. After the formal presentation, Mexican and Chicana/o theaters presented plays to an audience of approximately 300 students and Festival participants. However, much of the audience left during the Chicana/o play because the dialogue was in English, and people could not follow the argument. Language became an issue that limited communication and understanding between Chicana/os, Mexicans, and Latin Americans. Although the majority of the Chicana/o plays were in Spanish or Spanglish, Mexican and Latin American audiences had a difficult time understanding and following the dialogue. On the other hand, the use of Spanglish was method of resistance within the United States where Spanish was either prohibited or used as a source of ridicule against Chicana/o communities. Most Mexicans and Latin Americans, however, were unable to understand the perils of Chicana/o identity, and they also scorned Chicana/os for speaking bastardized Spanish.

At the end of the first week of the Festival, Luis Valdez of Teatro Campesino responded to the critiques against the Chicana/o theater groups. He explained that through his own private conversations with other participants at the Festival it was clear that the only thing that would satisfy the majority of the audiences was the complete rejection of religion

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407 CLETA, July 3, 1974, AGN/DFS: Exp. 11-204-74 L-2 H-99
and traditions. Valdez opposed the possibility of rejecting his Catholic religion or his traditions because they were an essential factor for family unity among Chicana/os. The Festival was seen as a failure in its goal of politicizing the masses because only university students and participants of the festival attended the performances.

Through the rest of the Festival, Latin American and Mexican plays focused on themes of labor exploitation, socialist revolutions, U.S. imperialism, political repression, and torture. Chicana/o theater groups highlighted the uniqueness of the U.S. struggle while trying to make a connection with their Mexican and Latin American brothers/sisters who were seeking universal socialist revolution. Jorge Huerta from Teatro de la Esperanza argued later in an article that within the Chicano community many individuals rejected their Mexican and indigenous heritage because of historical and social conditioning about racial hierarchy. The use of indigenous spirituality and nationalist Mexican cultural identity such as the Virgin of Guadalupe seemed useless for Latin Americans, however, in the context of brutal armed repression in places like Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Neither Chicana/os nor Marxist Latin Americans and Mexicans were able to understand the uniqueness of the other groups’ struggles and political visions. Chicana/os were unaware of or unable to grasp the level of political repression that people across Latin America had been enduring as a result of repressive militarized governments and United States policies. Nor were they able to understand the crucial role that Marxist ideology and socialist revolution had on Mexican and Latin American political ideas.

\(^{408}\) Ibid.
\(^{409}\) Ibid.
\(^{410}\) Ibid.
\(^{411}\) Ibid.
\(^{412}\) Huerta, “Concerning Teatro Chicano.”
Conclusion

Although Mexican and Chicana/o theater groups shared a certain sense of cultural identity through the use of Mexican cultural values, their experience with repression and political mobilization was very different. Chicana/os who had experienced overt and institutionalized racial discrimination shaped their political and cultural discourse around ideas of a romantic past. However, Mexicans and Latin American activists, who had experienced violent repression, advocated for more aggressive and radical approaches to political transformation through armed struggle.

Similarly, Latin American and Mexican Marxists who had never visited the United States or had direct contact with Chicana/os could not understand the uniqueness of the Chicana/o struggle within the context of the United States. The celebration of Mexican cultural indigenous roots was an issue that connected at a certain level the performances of both Chicana/os and Mexicans, but many Marxists could not understand the political value of indigenous culture in the midst of political repression. Marxist Latin Americans and Mexicans were focused primarily on the value of armed revolution. In contrast, for many Chicana/o activists who had been brought up within the paranoia of Cold War politics in the United States against “communism” and a political culture and system were electoral politics where central, the idea of an armed revolution was less appealing and far less viable.

In the end, the Festival highlighted the different conditions and political strategies in each country. However, the disagreements between factions also served to solidify artistic relations and the continuous political crossover of ideas. One of the outcomes of this event was the revived tradition of Latin American and Mexican troupes travelling to the United States, bringing both politics and aesthetics to U.S. barrios.
Chapter 4: In Search of a Chicano-Mexican Revolution: Mario Cantú and Florencio “El Güero” Medrano

The rise of armed guerillas against the Mexican government and the use of state terror against leftist opposition reached its highest point during the presidency of Luis Echeverría (1970-1976). At one level, Echeverría’s political message was directed toward quieting the political upheavals and hostilities against his involvement in the student massacres of 1968 and 1971.\(^\text{413}\) At another level, under Echeverría’s government, the Mexican armed forces carried out a repressive counterinsurgency campaign against political dissidents, especially those operating in the countryside.\(^\text{414}\) It was during Echeverría’s presidency that left-wing activism became increasingly militant through the creation of rural and urban guerrilla groups, mostly with Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideologies. This period of Mexican repression, known today as the “Mexican Dirty War,” took place side-by-side with the uprising of the Chicana/o Movement in the United States.\(^\text{415}\)

However, while Chicana/o youth embraced the use of Mexican cultural nationalism as part of their political collective self-identity, left-wing Mexican youth espoused Marxism to repudiate the state’s construction of Mexican nationalism. Political action in the United States was propelling the struggles and demands of Chicana/os to the national arena, while for most on the Mexican left, the use of democratic political mobilization was destroyed by state repression. Although Mexican and Chicana/o activists articulated and collaborated with each other’s struggles through cultural, intellectual, and political exchanges, there was a


\(^{415}\) Ibid., 283–286.
limited understanding on both sides of the border about the nature of their battles and strategies. The distinctions ranged from different experiences with oppression, contrasting expressions of Mexicanness, different languages, and conflicting pursuits for identity under the shadow of the United States.

This final chapter explores the attempts to establish a Mexican-Chicana/o political solidarity through a peasant-armed resistance in southern Mexico within the context of the Mexican Dirty War. In the early 1970s, Chicano activist Mario Cantú from San Antonio, Texas, tried to rally support from the Chicana/o community for the Partido Proletario de America (PPUA-United Proletarian Party of America). The PPUA was a Mexican Marxist-Maoist guerrilla movement under the leadership of Florencio “El Güero” Medrano, a Mexican peasant who had received some training by the Chinese government. Medrano and his supporters operated mostly in rural areas of southern Mexico, such as the state of Oaxaca, seeking to organize peasants while avoiding capture by the military and the bodyguards of local terratenientes (landowners). Cantú argued that Mexicans and Chicanos not only shared common cultural origins, but also the experience of oppression. Therefore, they needed to unite their efforts against their “common” enemies.\footnote{Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin (hereafter BLA/UT), Dick J. Reavis Papers, “Cantú/Medrano” Box 1.6, Dick Reavis, “Rebel with a Cause,” February 1979.} Respectively, members of the PPUA stated in their general program that one of their fundamental political aims was to initiate a pan-American revolutionary struggle by seeking the support of Chicana/os in the U.S.\footnote{MSC/UCSD, The Register of Armed Revolutionary Organizations in Mexico, Documents 1965-1998, MSS 0523, B: 8.27, Program General del Partido Proletario Unido de America (P.P.U.A)} However, when Cantú tried to rally support most Chicana/os reacted with trepidation about supporting peasant guerrillas in southern Mexico.
Alan Eladio Gómez’s work “Por la reunificación de los Pueblos Libres de América en su Lucha por el Socialismo”: The Chicana/o Movement, the PPUA and the Dirty War in Mexico in the 1970s, also explores the international relations established between Cantú and Medrano during the period of the Mexican Dirty War. Like Gómez’s work, this chapter explores the connections established between Chicana/os and Mexicans within the intersections of the U.S. and the Mexican Dirty War. However, unlike Gómez’s book, this chapter goes beyond the establishment of solidarity networks and examines the dynamics that surrounded those connections, questioning why that solidarity did not materialize into more enduring processes of collaboration between Mexicans and Chicana/os. Gómez focuses on the international nature of Mexican state repression against political dissidents, including Chicana/os and the ideals of revolutionary solidarity, and recognizes that the Cantú-Medrano alliance was an exceptional form of collaboration between Chicana/os and Mexicans. However, at another level, the Cantú-Medrano collaboration not only highlights political solidarity, but also illustrates the cultural, historical, political, social, economic, and racial differences between the activism of Mexicans and Chicana/o activists.

Although this chapter follows some of the sources used by Gómez, it focuses on the limits of the solidarity claimed between Mexicans and Chicana/os and the connection to Echeverría’s Dirty War politics. First, this chapter begins with the historical background of the Mexican Dirty War across rural Mexico during Echeverría’s presidency. One of the outcomes from the indiscriminate use of violence against unarmed students during the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre is that it forced members of the radical left into the countryside where

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they joined forces with disgruntled peasantry leading to the rise of armed guerrilla movements. During his presidency Echeverría instituted a combination of populist and repressive policies to deal with the increasing instability in the countryside. Second, this chapter looks at the politicization of Cantú and his activism within the Chicana/o Movement. Cantú’s social standing and assertiveness allowed him to effectively organize people across the Chicana/o community against racism, political detention, and the lack of social justice for Chicana/os and Mexicans. However, Cantú’s abrasive style of conducting politics made him a controversial figure within Chicana/o activism. Third, this chapter examines the politicization of Florencio “El Güero” Medrano within the context of land struggles in the Mexican countryside and the radicalization of urban activists who embraced Maoist ideologies. After travelling to China and returning to Mexico to carry out a land invasion to establish a Maoist collective in Morelos, Mexico, Güero and some of his close collaborators were forced into the countryside by the military where he organized the PPUA. Finally, this chapter examines the collaboration established between Medrano and Cantú as they sought to generate support from Mexicans and Chiana/os for their armed political activism.

Part I: Echeverría and the Dirty War in the Countryside

Echeverría came to power in the midst of great political turmoil in Mexico between those who opposed the “communist” wave influenced by the Cuban Revolution, the USSR, China, and those who espoused Marxist ideas as the key to bring social transformation. As discussed above, he was severely criticized for his drastic handling of the 1968 student demonstrations as Secretary of the Interior under the presidency of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, which culminated in the Tlatelolco massacre. As the presidential candidate of the ruling party, PRI, Echeverría’s election was a foregone conclusion; nonetheless, he chose to
conducted an extensive political campaign across Mexico in the face of increasing leftist political opposition. This sign of political disillusionment of the Mexican people shaped Echeverría’s political style, a combination of populism and authoritarianism aimed to calm the opposition to his government, especially by the urban student left. As mentioned in previous chapters, Echeverría declared his commitment towards a more open and progressive political system or what he referred as *apertura democrática* (democratic opening). This new opening was part of his political rhetoric that claimed to reconcile past controversies (Tlatelolco) and led to a social inclusion.  

The passing of an amnesty law in 1971 for the release of political prisoners from the 1968 student movement and the 1958 railroad workers strike was one of the first steps that Echeverría took to validate his populist approach. However, within the same year came the Corpus Christi incident, which revealed the inability of the government to deal peacefully with political dissent. The use of democratic rhetoric alongside state repression was not a new political strategy in Mexico; however, in the 1970s, the repercussions of using state violence in urban spaces had further eroded the political legitimacy of the ruling party.

This use of state violence pushed radical members of the Mexican left into the countryside, where killings, disappearances, and torture tended to be relatively unknown to much of the country, given the lack of media coverage. While radical activists left urban spaces seeking the protection of the countryside from the persecution of the state, state forces sought out the isolation of the countryside to carry out repression with greater impunity. The rise of political violence evolved into Marxist guerrilla activity met by counterinsurgency activities from state forces.

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Moreover, Echeverría’s political rhetoric about a democratic opening began to be directed toward the countryside, as population growth had put a greater pressure on him to address land tenure issues. The struggle for land happened alongside the growing presence of members of the radical left in the countryside, and over time resistance progressed from unarmed peasant demonstrations to an increased number of land invasions across eleven states and armed political mobilization.\footnote{William Beezley, “Gabardine Suits and Guayabera Shirts,” in \textit{Populism in Twentieth Century Mexico: The Presidencies of Lázaro Cárdenas and Luis Echeverría}, ed. Amelia Marie Kiddle and María Leonor Olin Muñoz (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2010), 201.} Echeverría responded with a series of military operations using tactics reminiscent of those used by military dictatorships in Central American and Southern Cone countries. The Mexican government under Echeverría vigorously tried to deny the existence of guerrillas in Mexico and instead attributed the social unrest to problems with “banditry” that lacked political ideology.\footnote{May 27, 1971: \textit{Defense Secretary Denies Existence of Guerrillas in Mexico} U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram. Source: National Archives, RG 59 1970-73 Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2476 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB105/Doc1.pdf (accessed July 22, 13)}

The southern state of Guerrero proved to be one of Echeverría’s most important challenges in dealing with political unrest in the countryside. The Mexican state’s conflict with the guerrillas constituted a test of his populist rhetoric in which he claimed to such reconciliation with the Mexican left. The state of Guerrero was characterized by its large number presence of indigenous people, its poverty, and its land struggles, while at the same time it was an important part of Mexico’s agricultural regions. However, Guerrero had a long tradition of political activism. In the words of Mexican sociologist Armando Bartra “In the history of Guerrero…the people organized again and again to present in a good manner their complaints. However, the response by their leaders and landlords to their pacifist movements
was always with iron and fire…”422 However, after decades of failed attempts through
democratic and bureaucratic venues, people resorted to armed guerrillas as an alternative.

The most notorious armed expression in Guerrero took place through the activism of
Genaro Vázquez Rojas and Lucio Cabañas Barrientos, two school teachers who, after failed
attempts to change a regional and local corrupt political system through democratic venues,
were pushed into taking up arms against the state. Vázquez Rojas group, the National Civic
Revolutionary Association (ACNR), emerged in 1968 and Cabañas’s Party of the Poor
(PDLP) in 1970. Both had a long trajectory of political activism and communal organization
before organizing guerrillas, which helped them to establish a strong regional base of
support.423 These armed movements emerged on the heels of Echeverría’s political campaign
as he travelled across the country embracing peasants, workers, and wide diversity of people,
connecting with more people than any other Mexican president before him. Through his
campaign speeches and later during his presidency, Echeverría laid out his rural platform
promising better jobs, better housing, more land redistribution, social services, road
construction, electricity and everything that was lacking in the countryside.424 However, the
implementation of these promises was sporadic and only began to take place after the
increasing ranks and militancy of the ACNR and PDLP put pressure on his government.425

(Ediciones Era, 2000), 17.
423 Claudia E. G. Rangel Lozano and Evangelina Sánchez Serrano, “Las Guerrillas de Genaro Vázquez y Lucio
Cabañas en Guerrero,” in Movimientos armados en México, siglo XX: Los movimientos de las últimas décadas,
Populism in Southeastern Mexico,” in Populism in Twentieth Century Mexico: The Presidencies of Lázaro
Cárdenas and Luis Echeverría, ed. Amelia Marie Kiddle and María Leonor Olin Muñoz (Tucson, AZ:
University of Arizona Press, 2010), 90.
425 Alexander Avina, “We Have Returned to Porfirian Times’… in Populism in Twentieth Century Mexico:
The Presidencies of Lazaro Cardenas and Luis Echeverria,” in Populism in Twentieth Century Mexico: The
Presidencies of Lázaro Cárdenas and Luis Echeverría, ed. Amelia Marie Kiddle and María Leonor Olin Muñoz
(Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2010), 107.
After the death of Vázquez Rojas in 1972, Cabañas became Echeverría’s most notorious leftist enemy and the main target for military repression. Although Cabañas’s group lacked the economic resources or skills to overthrow Echeverría’s government, nonetheless it was able to establish a strong base of support among local peasantry and rural and urban leftist groups. However, the need for economic resources led to Cabañas’s groups, like many other armed movements, resorting to bank robberies and kidnappings, activities which became their main source of funding. During an interview, a reporter asked Echeverría about what he thought the purpose of the guerrillas were, and his response was: “Their interests seek to evade or interrupt democratic procedures, [which] signify liberty, discussion of ideas, and economic development that contribute to social progress;…murderers, thieves, and kidnappers are transformed into pseudo-revolutionaries without a fundamental ideology;…their intentions are to provoke regressive or conservative tendencies.” The primary response by Echeverría towards the armed mobilization was the use of counterinsurgency campaigns, but even though Cabañas was killed at the end of 1974, his death did not end guerrilla resistance across Mexico. Ironically, Echeverría’s economic policies, such as the emergency wage increases, expanded welfare benefits and support for collective contracts, antagonizing the private sector and leading to accusations that Echeverría was pushing Mexico towards a Cuban or Chilean style socialism. Echeverría fought back, declaring that “there will never be a Pinochet in Mexico.” The support for counterinsurgency tactics against armed rebellion mixed with “economic populism” and

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428 As quoted in Knight, “Cárdenas and Echeverría: Two ‘populist’ Presidents Compared,” 33.
rhetoric to deal with political exigencies became the characteristic of Echeverría’s policies towards the countryside.

At the same time that Echeverría sought to control the Mexican left in the early 1970s, the United States government and society were also in turmoil. The political scandals leading to the resignation of Richard M. Nixon in August 1974, the continuous struggles over race, gender, ethnicity, and sexuality by marginalized groups, the oil embargo of 1973, and the increasing opposition to the Vietnam War across the nation had captured the attention of most people in the United States. Although all these movements shared broader ideas about their political goals, at the ground level they were shaped differently through the contexts of their societies.

Similarly, the Chicana/o Movement in the United States and Mexican movements like the Movimiento Estudiantil (Student Movement) both challenged their governments’ discourses of democracy, political stability, and economic growth. The Chicana/o movement sought to transform U.S. sociopolitical conditions and to gain full citizenship for the Mexican American community. In contrast, the social upheavals that were taking place in Mexico as well as other parts of the Third World saw the U.S. government and corporations as the source of imperialism. Within the climate of Cold War liberation struggles, anti-imperialist sentiment, as well as the repressive government responses, the Chicana/o movement gained international visibility for its struggle for self-determination against the Anglo-American establishment.

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Part II: The Chicana/o Movement and the Chicano Godfather

Chicana/os, like many political activists across Latin America, embraced images and ideals embodied by the Cuban Revolution and its young bearded leaders. The iconic image and legend of Ernesto “Che” Guevara fighting in the jungle of Cuba against the Batista government and emerging victorious served as an inspiration to Chicana/os. Such was the case for theater director and screenplay writer Luis Valdez, who in 1964 travelled to Cuba in solidarity with the Cuban Revolution. In 1961, U.S. imposed travel restrictions to Cuba as part of the U.S. blockade; in response, U.S. student groups traveled to Cuba via Mexico. Upon his return from Cuba, Valdez, like many other students who idealized Castro’s Cuba and its revolution, had a new sense of commitment towards social justice, but not towards armed revolution.432

For Chicana/os, however, no group better illustrated the revolutionary image and attitude in the 1960s and 1970s than the Brown Berets. Established in 1967, the Brown Berets were a community self-defense organization with paramilitary attire and attitudes that were adopted from various political influences, such as the Black Panther Party, the *barbudos* of the Cuban Revolution, and Mexican Revolutionary heroes. The Brown Berets emerged as one of the leading Chicana/o organizations that focused on issues of police brutality, strengthening community, education equality, and cultural pride. However, the Brown Berets, like many other Chicana/o organizations, had diverse ideological strands that ranged from anti-communist positions, like those of their Prime Minister, David Sánchez, to revolutionary factions, like the one led by Cruz Olmeda who was influenced by Mao

However, the Brown Berets came to represent a more militant image, even though their Prime Minister espoused anti-communist ideas. The Beret attire was a symbol of unity and resistance, and it was composed of khaki military clothing, a brown military beret, and an emblem depicting a yellow pentagon with two bayoneted rifles behind a cross and the words *La Causa* (The Cause) above them. The Beret emblem was designed as “…a symbol of guerrillas, and in this case like urban guerrillas.” Unlike the urban and rural guerrilla groups that were operating across Mexico, the Brown Berets did not call for the overthrow of their government. However, like Mexican guerrillas and some other leftist organizations, they grounded their ideology within their own sense of nationalism. For the Brown Berets, this nationalist identity included historical documents like the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Mexican guerillas like the one led by Lucio Cabañas grounded their demands on a combination of Marxist ideologies and Mexican nationalism, with this latter component finding support in the Mexican Constitution of 1917 and the legacy of the Mexican Revolution of 1910.

The Brown Berets were far from being an “urban armed guerilla group” in the way that their Mexican and other Latin American counterparts were. Their image, including a military-style beret and the display of guns by some of its members, evoked the defiance associated with armed revolutionaries across Latin America. However, the support for and participation of Chicana/os in armed guerrilla groups like those that attracted their political counterparts across Latin America was mostly symbolic. All the same, there were some

435 Ibid., 49.
Chicana/os who put their political idealism and commitments into practice through armed activism, as in the case of Mario Cantú.

Cantú was born Mauro Casiano Cantú, Jr. on April 2, 1937, in San Antonio, Texas. His parents, Mauro Cantú and Lucrecia Casiano, owned a small 24-hour grocery store on the West Side of San Antonio. Cantú was the oldest of four children, and he later explained that Mario was his “gringo name” because his elementary schoolteachers could not pronounce Mauro. As a child, Cantú began working at the family grocery store, which was called M. Cantú Super Mercado. Cantú graduated from Tech High School and at the age of 19 married his first wife while working full time at the grocery store. Visionary and ambitious, Cantú convinced his father to turn the family grocery store into a restaurant. Mario’s Restaurant became one of San Antonio’s most popular eateries where people of all backgrounds came together.

In the early 1960s, Cantú got involved in drug dealing across the Mexican-U.S. border, and this activity would ultimately land him in federal prison. During one of his trips to Monterrey, Mexico, U.S. federal agents arrested Cantú for possession and distribution of less than 2 grams of heroin. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 15 years in the federal prison. According to Cantú, receiving such a harsh punishment for his crime made him angry, bitter, and distrustful of the law. During his time in prison, Cantú allegedly met Puerto Rican nationalist Oscar Collazo, whom he claimed influenced him to become a...

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436 BLA/UT, Dick Reavis’ Papers, Box: 2.15, newspaper clipping San Antonio Light, “Mario Cantú: S.A. Activist”
437 BLA/UT, Mario Cantú’s Papers B: 1.2.
438 Ibid.
439 BLA/UT, Reavis’s Papers B: 2.15, newspaper clipping San Antonio Light “Mario Cantú: S.A. Activist”
440 Ibid.
Chicana/o nationalist. Collazo was one of the two Puerto Ricans who attempted to assassinate American president Harry S. Truman on November 1, 1950, to obtain the independence of Puerto Rico from the United States. According to Cantú, the Puerto Ricans knew their attempt was doomed to failure and their purpose was a kind of martyrdom to spark the independence movement in their homeland... [Cantú’s] admiration for Collazo was for the assassination attempt, not for Collazo’s later refusal of an offer to be allowed to go free in exchange for denouncing the Puerto Rican independence movement.

Cantú later explained to another reporter that before his prison experience “[he] had not been politicized.” Prison was where he had started to “think about [his] experiences with the legal system and to read.” After six years in prison, Cantú was released on parole, and he returned to San Antonio in 1969, where he began organizing events in support of the Chicana/o and Mexican communities and became involved with Chicana/o leaders like José Ángel Gutiérrez and Mario Compean from La Raza Unida Party.

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441 BLA/UT, Reavis’s Papers B: 3.3.
442 Puerto Rico struggled for independence from foreign control starting in the mid-1800s when they tried to liberate themselves from Spanish control. In the early 1900s, the United States invaded Puerto Rico and by July 25, 1952, Puerto Rico became a commonwealth of the United States. However, commonwealth status did not satisfy many Puerto Rican nationalists who called for independence and radical elements like Oscar Collazo and his partner Griselio Torresola attempted to take matters in their own hands to liberate Puerto Rico. Furthermore, Puerto Rican nationalism also developed within the United States where it sought social change through the end of racism, self-determination through the ideals of a socialist society, as well as the exploration and resurgence of their history and culture through the Young Lords Movement. For further information see Andrés Torres and José Emiliano Velázquez, *The Puerto Rican Movement: Voices from the Diaspora* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998); Mickey Melendez, *We Took the Streets: Fighting for Latino Rights with the Young Lords* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003); Torres and Velázquez, *The Puerto Rican Movement*.
443 BLA/UT, Reavis’s Papers B: 2.15, newspaper clipping San Antonio Light “Mario Cantú: S.A. Activist.”
444 Ibid.
445 In the book chapter “Por la reunificación de los Pueblos Libres de América en su Lucha por el Socialismo: The Chicana/o Movement, the PPUA and the Dirty War in Mexico in the 1970s” written by Alan Eladio Gómez, he mentions that Mario Cantú served a seven-year prison sentence at Leavenworth, Kansas before he returned to San Antonio. However, the documents and library guide for Mario Cantú’s Papers found at the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas at Austin indicate that Cantú served a six-year sentence at Terra Haute, Indiana. I am using the place and dates found within the Mario Cantú’s Papers archive at the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas at Austin. BLA/UT, Reavis’s Papers B: 2.15
The work of Alan E. Gómez, has traced Cantú’s continuous support for his friends back in the prison through the supply of political material like newspapers, books, and audio recordings. While back in San Antonio, Cantú dived into political activism, mostly around issues affecting Chicana/os and Mexicans, and Latin American issues, through the creation of various organizations. Cantú’s militant attitude and fervent outspokenness on Chicana/o and Mexican issues constantly made him the subject of news headlines in San Antonio. Many people admired Cantú’s passionate involvement in issues like immigration, political prisoners, and other questions of social justice, but many others saw him as an eccentric and irrational man.

For instance, the issue of political prisoners became a controversial subject in Cantú’s activism given his earlier arrest for drug dealing and later for his association with guerrillas and gun trafficking in Mexico. Cantú transformed his earlier imprisonment from criminality to political consciousness when he described how he became politicized by the ideas from the nationalist Puerto Rican Oscar Collazo while incarcerated. The imprisonment of revolutionary and radical activists participating across political mobilizations in the 1960s and 1970s—George Jackson, Raul Salinas, Malcolm X, and Standing Deer—made U.S. prisons centers of political consciousness and radicalization. Also, the release of political prisoners was a fundamental demand of Mexican leftists during Echeverría’s government, which arbitrarily imprisoned student and labor union leaders. The label of political prisoner was used to indicate that individuals had been unjustly put in prison for their political

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446 Gómez, “Por La Reunificación de Los Pueblos Libres de América En Su Lucha Por El Socialismo’: The Chicana/o Movement, the PPUA and the Dirty War in Mexico in the 1970s,” 89–90.
ideology and activities. However, the Mexican state used the label of criminal in an effort to delegitimize the demands of activists and justify their imprisonment. As political activism became more radicalized in Mexico, the title of political prisoner became more controversial, used for those convicted of social crimes against property or people as in the activities of guerillas. Cantú used this rhetoric to link the struggles of Mexicans and Chicana/os while blurring the stigma of his own political activities.

However, cultural activities were also central to Cantú’s activism and promotion of the interconnections between Chicana/o and Mexican politics. Cantú became the chairman of the organizing committee for the activities of “Semana de la Raza” (People’s Week) to commemorate Mexican independence from Spanish rule on September 16, 1810. Cantú explained in the program for Semana de la Raza in 1971 that “[t]he sole purpose of these celebrations is to contribute to the creation of a stronger, well respected, and a more conscious community, conscious of its historical and spiritual richness.”

According to Cantú, neither the geographical divisions nor the brute force of governments (especially the United States government) could erase the connections between Mexico and the American Southwest, or what Chicana/os called Aztlan. “Time has allowed us to see that we are one community; that Mexicans and Chicana/os are one community because we come from the same root and trunk. We also share the same feelings, hopes, and visions.”

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448 BLA/UT, José Ángel Gutiérrez Papers, B:66, Semana de la Raza, 1971.
449 In the Program for La Semana de la Raza, José Ángel Gutiérrez defined Aztlan as “…a Nahuatl word in the Aztec language for the Northwestern region of Mexico and according to Aztec traditions, the place where their tribe originated. Presently this geographical area is described as the Southwest in the U.S.” BLA/UT, José Ángel Gutiérrez Papers, B:66, “AZTLÁN: Chicano Revolt in the Winter Garden” in Program for La Semana de la Raza, 1971, 14.
450 BLA/UT, José Ángel Gutiérrez Papers, B:66, Message by Mario Cantú published in the Spanish version of Program for La Semana de la Raza, 1971.
that any *hermano* (brother) who denied or did not acknowledge that Mexico and Aztlán were the same people would be denying the historical struggles of his ancestors.

Furthermore, in a pamphlet of the Semana de la Raza issued in 1971, Cantú included several letters of support to Chicana/os from Mexican leftist student organizations of the Universidad Autónoma de México (UNAM) to show tangible evidence of unity between the two countries.

Comrades: We are aware of the struggles that you are enduring against racism and exploitation, which are particular signs of a capitalist system...We [Mexicans and Chicana/os] have the same enemy. American imperialists are exploiting us with the same determination, although through different means, therefore, we need to unite our efforts in all aspects and at all levels to win the final victory over imperialism and capitalism.  

Although both sides claimed a sense of unity, each side had a different understanding of the nature of this unity. Chicana/os expressed a cultural and historical connection with Mexico to challenge their social, economic, and political exclusion from the United States.  

Chicana/os articulated their movement for Mexican audiences as part of the larger Latin American struggle against U.S. imperialism, the same political system into which Chicana/os sought inclusion.

Between 1970 and 1976, Cantú organized and helped sponsor the Semana de la Raza celebrations, formed a committee to examine police brutality against Chicana/os, worked with Tu-Casa (Centro de Acción Social Autónoma, an organization to aid Mexican undocumented immigrants to gain legal status within the U.S.), and advocated for the liberation of Mexican and Chicana/o political prisoners. Furthermore, Cantú’s revolutionary

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ideals were also reflected through his alleged family connections to the General Lucio Blanco Fuentes, a revolutionary who during the 1910 Mexican Revolution played an important role in the distribution of land in the northern state of Tamaulipas. Nonetheless, Cantú’s ideals and actions were not free of contradictions. Cantú was a businessperson who ran one of the most successful restaurants in San Antonio, lived in a well-to-do area with his wife and two children, drove a Mercedes, and hired undocumented Mexican immigrants for minimum wage. These contradictions between his “capitalist” entrepreneurship and his bourgeois class status collided with his militant activism in favor of the civil rights of marginalized groups and Mexican guerillas. A newspaper described Cantú’s standing in the San Antonio community: “People know Mario Cantú raises hell…He is a bundle of paradoxes. He must rely on the news media as a messenger…His admirers view him as a gutsy, if lonely, voice from the barrio. His detractors see him as too radical, too threatening.”

Cantú’s militancy and radicalism stood in contrast with the larger Chicana/o Movement that focused on political, social, and economic reforms in the United States rather than armed revolution in a foreign country. Although Cantú was very effective in gaining media attention in rallying against discrimination, police abuse, and in favor of immigrants, his militant and go-it-alone attitude made it difficult for him to maintain long-term support and effective relations with other community organizers. Therefore, when Cantú’s involvement with armed movements in Mexico became public, it was not a great surprise for those who knew of Cantú’s radical attitude.

On October 10, 1975, the Mexican newspaper El Norte published Cantú’s picture with the caption “The Leader of the International Terrorist Alliance is sought in the United

453 BLA/UT, Reavis’s Papers B: 2.15, newspaper clipping of San Antonio Light “Mario Cantú: S.A. Activist,”
454 Ibid.
States.” *El Norte* identified Cantú as the founder and gunrunner of the Partido Proletario Unido de America (PPUA – United Proletarian Party of America), a Marxist guerilla group that operated between southern U.S. and southern Mexico. Cantú seized the opportunity to try to persuade other Chicana/os to join him in helping the PPUA and its leader, Florencio Güero Medrano, to overthrow the Mexican government. Cantú argued that Chicana/os could only advance their sociopolitical status within the U.S. by liberating Mexico from U.S. imperialism, bourgeois domination, and political corruption.

According to Cantú, if marginalized Mexican groups could liberate Mexico from U.S. government and corporations’ domination, then Mexico would be in a position of power to negotiate with the U.S. Consequently, Chicana/os could ally themselves with the Mexican people to gain sociopolitical and economic power within the U.S. Chicana/o support for Cantú’s involvement in armed movements in Mexico was limited to few groups such as CASA in California and for a limited time Corky Gonzales group. For the most part Chicana/os observed Cantú’s media performance with amusement and refrained from expressing support for his activism. Prominent leaders like José Ángel Gutiérrez of La Raza Unida Party and Reies López Tijerina of the Alianza Federal de los Pueblos Libres, distanced their organizations from Cantú’s actions, which they labeled as criminal, and they did not consider him as a good representative of Chicana/o activism. Gutierrez’s denunciation of Cantú’s activism came on the heels of the controversy that his organization had suffered for

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455 BLA/UT, *José Ángel Gutiérrez* Papers, B:7, Chacón Defense Fund Committee.
456 BLA/UT, *Dick J. Reavis’s papers*, B: 3.4.
457 MSC/UCSD, *The Register of Armed Revolutionary Organizations in Mexico, Documents 1965-1998*, MSS 0523, B: 8.27, Program General del Partido Proletario Unido de America (P.P.U.A)
458 BLA/UT, *Mario Cantú’s Papers*, B: 2.11.
receiving economic support from Mexican president Luis Echeverría (see chapter 2). At the same time, President Echeverría referred to “armed movements” as criminal groups.

Cantú’s involvement with the PPUA and Güero was included illicit activities. In fact, Cantú’s involvement with the PPUA came to light following the arrest of Ramón Raúl Chacón and two other individuals at the end of 1975 in Monterrey, Mexico, as they tried to smuggle guns into Mexico in a modified truck.\(^{459}\) Chacón was a native of Texas and had spent five years in prison at Leavenworth, Kansas, for drug trafficking.\(^{460}\) In his declaration to the Mexican federal police, Chacón identified Cantú as a Chicano leader that was involved in political and social activities in San Antonio, Texas, and as the person who had invited him to participate “in the traffic of drugs and guns with Mexican guerillas.”\(^{461}\) During the interrogation process, Chacón identified Salvador Abundes Guzmán, a Mexican national who lived in Nuevo Laredo, as a person who aided Cantú in his revolutionary activities. Following his arrest by the Mexican authorities in Nuevo Laredo, Abundes declared that the U.S. center of operation for the PPUA was in San Antonio, and that Cantú was the leader. According to Abundes’ declaration, Cantú was “in charge of obtaining all the guns either stolen or bought, then sending them from San Antonio, Texas, to Guadalajara and Mexico City to the guerilla group in Mexico.” In addition, Abundes’ declaration stated that he was aware that the leaders of the PPUA wanted to form a “strong following of sympathizers” in the U.S. Southwest where the Mexican population predominated.\(^{462}\)

\(^{459}\) AGN/DFS, Exp. 11-249-75 H-35-41 L-1 P.P.U.A. Partido Proletario Unido de America; La Jornada, “Tratan de Desbaratar el Intercambio Criminal de Drogas por Armamento,” BLA/UT, José Angel Gutiérrez’s Papers, B: 7.

\(^{460}\) The Mexican government files identified Leavenworth, Texas as the place where Chacón purged his prison sentence; however, Leavenworth is located in Kansas. AGN/DFS, Exp. 11-249-75 H-1 L-1.

\(^{461}\) Ibid.

\(^{462}\) Ibid.
The articles in the Mexican media gave the impression that Cantú was the central figure in the PPUA, and that the traffic of guns was a large operation that funded a dangerous, widespread-armed movement in Mexico. However, the descriptions used by the Mexican media were remote from the reality of the conditions under which members of the PPUA and his actual leader, Florencio “El Güero” Medrano operated.

**Part III: Güero Medrano and the Struggle for Land**

El Güero was a light-skinned, blue-eyed peasant from the southern Mexican state of Guerrero, where as a youngster he ran into conflict with the local landlord. He was forced to leave his family and seek work in urban areas like Cuernavaca, Morelos, and Mexico City. In the 1960s and the 1970s, migration from rural areas into urban spaces collided with disillusionment with democratic, peaceful means to achieve social transformation. State repression against peaceful demonstrations by students, workers, and peasants was not a new phenomenon in Mexico. Nonetheless, the increasing level of repression coupled with the growing political awareness of activists towards armed resistance, generated some of the conditions for activists to seek armed movements as an alternative. It was in this environment that El Güero came into contact with students of Maoism, who over time arranged for Güero and others to travel to China in 1969. While there, he received training in Maoist theory, discipline, tactics, and organization.\(^{463}\) Upon his return to Mexico, Güero continued working menial jobs for day-to-day survival while remaining committed to his political work through

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\(^{463}\) Maoism was appealing to revolutionary groups in Third World nations due to “real and alleged parallels between [China’s] past conditions and experiences and those of Latin Americans (e.g., predominantly peasant populations, industrial underdevelopment, and experience of exploitation by "imperialists" and domestic "reactionaries"). [China] encouraged Latin Americans to initiate changes and to examine such Chinese policies and experiments as the united front, the agrarian reform of the early 1950s, the four-class government, the people's communes, and the Great Leap Forward [as examples of revolutionary success].” William E. Ratliff, "Communist China and Latin America, 1949-1972," *Asian Survey* 12 (October, 1972) 848; “Official Report Released on Mexico’s ‘Dirty War,’” 440.
Maoist ideology. Güero knew firsthand the needs that confronted poor Mexican people both in rural and urban spaces, the lack of housing, land, work, access to education, and basic social services.

At the end of 1972, Guero moved to the area of Cuernavaca, Morelos, which was one of the hubs for left-wing activism in Mexico. In the 1970s, Morelos was a prominent center for left-wing politics, and perhaps one of the most noticeable figures was Bishop Sergio Méndez Arceo, also known as “The Red Bishop.” Méndez Arceo was prominent supporter of socialist ideologies, a proponent of Liberation Theology, a spokesman and mediator between government forces and left-wing groups, and a staunch defender of human rights. Shortly after settling in Cuernavaca, Güero became aware of the existence of approximately 80 hectares that had been abandoned in the 1960s and appropriated by family members of the governor of Morelos for the creation of a luxury neighborhood called “Villa de las Flores.”

Guided by Maoist and socialist ideals, Güero understood the need for an enclave as a key building block for the path to educating people and spreading of Maoist ideals. Morelos had a long tradition of land struggles with revolutionary leaders and heroes like Emiliano Zapata (1879-1919) and Rubén Jaramillo (1900-1962). Jaramillo, for example, had fought arduously for the rights of peasants to titles for their communal lands until his assassination by government forces in 1962. Furthermore, through the late 1960s and 1970s, landless people across Mexico, who for decades had followed legal venues to resolve their land conflicts, became disillusioned with government corruption and the bureaucratic

464 Ibid., 439.
465 AGN/DFS, Florencio Medrano Mederos, Exp.100-15-1
466 Ibid.
mazes they had to confront. By the early 1960s, there were approximately 60,000 peasant committees across Mexico demanding solutions from the state and federal governments to solve their land conflicts.\footnote{http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/04/17/cien.html (La Jornada del Campo, 17 abril 2010, no. 31 Cien años de lucha por tierra y libertad...Y ZAPATA SIGUE CABALGANDO by Plutarco Emilio Garcia Jimenez)} Through the 1960s, the illegal settlement of idle land by peasantry increased in size and number of settlers, despite attempts at repression by the state. As Echeverría came to power in 1970, he laid out his “democratic opening” at the same time that opposition organizations used land invasion as a strategy to confront the government. The 1970s became characterized by a wave of land invasions and illegal settlements throughout various Mexican regions.\footnote{Alan Gilbert and Ann Varley, Landlord and Tenant: Housing the Poor in Urban Mexico (New York: Routledge, 2002), 38.}

In early 1973, Güero began to mobilize people to take over Villa de las Flores, just a many other groups were doing in other areas across Mexico. On March 31, 1973, Güero expected a large number of people would show up to take over Villa de la Flores and establish a squatter settlement.\footnote{AGN/DFS, Florencio Medrano Mederos, Exp.100-15-1, newspaper clipping “Cuernavaca: SOLDADOS OCUPAN LA “RUBEN JARAMILLO” in Por que? Revista Independiante No. 276, Octubre 11, 1973, 2-5.} However, on the day planned for the land seizure only a few people appeared. Yet as the word got out that “free land” was being distributed for those who needed it, families began to trickle into Villa de las Flores. Within a few weeks hundreds of people began to settle an undeveloped area devoid of any services filled with thorns, rocks, scorpions, and ants. Following Maoist ideals and practical needs, Güero and his supporters were able to organize Colonia Rubén Jaramillo, named after the local revolutionary hero and politician, into a functioning community. However, just six months after the initial settlement of the Colonia, in the early hours of September 28, 1973, the
Mexican military invaded the Colonia with the pretext of searching for arms and supporters of guerrilla leader Lucio Cabañas.\textsuperscript{471}

Güero and some of his close collaborators were able to escape through fields and ravines surrounding the Colonia, and from that moment on, he lived underground to avoid being captured by the Mexican government.\textsuperscript{472} Left-wing dissident groups had a complex underground system of hiding places, such as the homes of supporters and family members, abandoned properties, and even caves that allowed them to avoid capture while scrambling for survival. After the military’s invasion of the Colonia Ruben Jaramillo, Güero collaborated with the underground network of activists and supporters of left-wing ideologies and groups.

Those who went underground had to rely on the help of comrades, but in many instances family members reluctantly became entangled in the network. The survival of underground left-wing movements was a precarious and contradictory endeavor. On the one hand, activists had to stay themselves underground to avoid capture by authorities. On the other hand, their political actions had to be noticeable to gain the support of the masses, making them and their supporters vulnerable to infiltration and capture. The life of the “guerrillero” was far from the idealized and romantic images of “Che” Guevara in the Cuban mountains. Life underground meant constantly being on the run, hiding from local and federal authorities, struggling to gain support from local communities, having to engage in criminal activities at times just to cover day to day necessities, away from family, and always living in fear of being captured. After the invasion of Colonia Ruben Jaramillo by the

\textsuperscript{471} “Official Report Released on Mexico’s “Dirty War,”” 439.

\textsuperscript{472} Personal interviews with Maria de Ángeles Vence Gutiérrez, Félix Basilio Guadarrama, and Etelberto Benítez Arzate, and Aurelio Bollard, December 1, 2010
military, Güero and his supporters were forced into hiding and took up arms mostly to protect themselves from capture while continuing with their political activities.

**Part IV: Güero and Cantú in Search of a Revolution**

The exact circumstances in which Mario Cantú first made contact with Florencio Güero Medrano and initiated their political collaboration are not clear. However, piecing together information from various archival sources and interviews, it is plausible that Cantú and Güero first met through Mariano Leyva, the founder and director of the theater group Mascarones. When Cantú returned to San Antonio after his release from prison, he became involved in Chicana/o and Mexican political activism. Seeking to “create cultural awareness [among Chicana/os] and to assist activists groups to raise funds for their projects,” they developed “La Semana de la Raza” in 1970. In 1971, the celebrations of La Semana de la Raza included the collaboration of Mexican theater group Mascarones. Cantú became a close collaborator with Leyva and Mascarones as they frequently travelled to the United States to perform for Chicana/o audiences, exchanged political material and news about Mexico and Chicana/os. Leyva was also a close collaborator and supporter of Güero’s creation of the Colonia Ruben Jaramillo, and members of Mascarones performed there. Cantú declared in an interview that he began his collaboration with Güero at the time when he was working with the establishment of the Colonia Ruben Jaramillo in 1973. It was shortly thereafter that the military invaded the Colonia Ruben Jaramillo and ousted Güero and the others forcing them to take arms the most viable alternative for political transformation own survival.

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On September 28 and 29, 1974, Güero and his followers began to organize the Partido Proletario Unido de America (PPUA), officially founded in January 1975.\textsuperscript{474} When the Mexican media exposed Cantú’s involvement with the PPUA after the capture of two of his assistants on October 2, 1975, Cantú seized the media spotlight to generate support for Güero and the PPUA. He transformed the accusation of gun smuggling, drug dealing, and terrorist activities against him into charges of what he called the illegal activities of the FBI and the CIA. He pointed out that

the FBI and CIA have been deeply involved in fabricating false charges against activists in the peace movement, the black movement, the Chicana/o movement…[their activities have included] even the promotion of drugs in the [Chicana/o] movement with federal money.\textsuperscript{475}

Cantú also used the media to call for an investigation into whether CIA officials participated in the torture of prisoners in Mexico.\textsuperscript{476} He called attention to the internal repression against political dissidents taking place in Mexico, and to U.S. involvement in the process. He furthered pointed out some of the ways that Chicana/o activism might connect with Mexico. In the process, Cantú tried to counteract the accusations against him for drug and gun trafficking by transforming his criminal activities into political actions. Cantú’s outrageous behavior made him a regular in the media, which he then used as a vehicle to promote his political causes.

At times Cantú was one of the most caustic critics of Echeverría’s government for its use of repression against political activists. Sometimes, within the same interview Cantú

\textsuperscript{474} MSC/UCSD) The Register of Armed Revolutionary Organizations in Mexico, Documents 1965-1998, MSS 0523, B: 8.27, Program General del Partido Proletario Unido de America (P.P.U.A)
\textsuperscript{475} BLA/UT, José Ángel Gutiérrez’s Papers, B: 7, newspaper clipping, The San Antonio Light, “CIA, FBI Link Seen By Cantú.”
\textsuperscript{476} BLA/UT, José Ángel Gutiérrez’s Papers, B: 7 newspaper clippings “Mexican Torture Probe Pushed,” and The Monitor, “CIA, FBI are Linked to Torture of 2 Men.”
would both criticize Echeverría and then ask him for help by appealing to his commitment to Thirdworldism. A clear example occurred in 1975 during the controversy about his involvement with the PPUA when Cantú criticized the political repression in Mexico and suggested that the accusations against him were part of a right-wing Mexican opposition while at the same time exalting “Echeverría’s friendly stance toward the Third World countries and the U.S. Chicana/o movement.” Cantú bluntly challenged Echeverría’s commitment to his supposed “apertura democrática” within Mexico and to his support for the right to self-determination of Third World peoples. The Mexican government responded through a statement issued by Raúl González Galarza, Consul General of Mexico in San Antonio: “I emphatically state—once again—that Mexico has a very long tradition of liberty and respect for human rights and is well known the world over for its generous hospitality toward foreigners, no matter their race, color or creed.” In the midst of Latin American Cold War conflicts, the rhetoric of Mexico’s legacy as a nation of refugees, democracy, and protection of human rights stood in sharp contrast to the repression taking place across Latin American nation under military rule. However, internally, the conditions of Mexican repression conducted by the state had more commonality with places like Chile and Argentina under military rule than the democratic leftist safe haven that Mexican officials portrayed. The criticism of Chicana/os like Cantú became voices of challenge to Echeverría in the international arena. Although the PPUA and Cantú presented a minor threat to the internal stability of Echeverría’s government, it was Cantú’s ability to create a media

477 Ibid.
478 BLA/UT, José Ángel Gutiérrez’s Papers, B:7, newspaper clippings, “Jail Torture is Denied.”
circus both in the United States and Mexico that made him a problem for Echeverría’s international image.

Mexican officials were not the only ones manipulating the information in their declarations to fit their political agenda. The declarations by Ramon Chacón and Salvador Abundes were obtained under suspicious circumstances and allegations of torture by the Mexican authorities. Cantú used these accusations to further his own revolutionary agenda. Cantú shifted the attention from his illegal activities to the repressive activities used by the Mexican and United States governments, and transformed the issue of torture into an opportunity to gain attention and public support for his struggle for liberation in Mexico. Although Cantú denied involvement with Mexican guerillas when the Mexican press first accused him of complicity in late 1975, by 1977 Cantú was open about his support for Güero and the PPUA.

Theoretically, the PPUA allied itself with struggles of the international proletariat against imperialist forces, particularly those of the U.S. “Imperialism utilizes its military force to invade our territories and control our countries at all levels, using the tactic of divide and conquer.”

The PPUA connected their struggle to the Chicana/o movement through the idea of cultural imperialism that “deformed our history, stealing our culture and separating us from our origins like the domination of the U.S.A. over the Chicana/o people in the land of Aztlán that has being colonized since the unjust wars of 1848-1853.” However, in practice the PPUA’s connection to the Chicana/o movement was limited primarily to its links with

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480 MSC/UCSD) The Register of Armed Revolutionary Organizations in Mexico, Documents 1965-1998, MSS 0523, B: 8.27, Program General del Partido Proletario Unido de America (P.P.U.A), 3.
481 Ibid.
Mario Cantú, whose relations with other Chicana/o organizations was in constant fluctuation due to his explosive personality.

Cantú made the connection between the struggles of the PPUA and Chicana/os through the idea that Mexico’s liberation would lead towards the liberation and empowerment of Chicana/os in the U.S. According to Cantú, “the role of Chicana/os towards Mexico should be like the American Israeli Jews lobbyist with Israel.” American Jews lobbied for Israel in U.S. Congress on behalf of Israel, and Israel advocated for the rights of Jews. Similarly, Chicana/os would lobby on behalf of Mexico and the Mexican government would represent and protect Chicana/os and Mexicans in the U.S. However, Mexico had a reactionary government that needed to be changed by Mexican revolutionaries like Güero who would pave the road towards this transformation.

It was in 1977 when Cantú openly declared to the American and Mexican press his “moral and financial support and, when necessary, arms and explosives” for the PPUA.\footnote{BLA/UT, \textit{Dick J. Reavis Papers}, B:2.15, newspaper clippings “Self-proclaimed revolutionary successful Texas restaurateur,”} However, in a personal letter Güero cautions Cantú about his declarations.

We have read your statements…which in general are correct and encouraging, however, there is something that worries us and that is the grave responsibility that you are taking by saying ‘if the Mexican people asks for money, we will send it to them, if the people ask us for guns, we will send them to them.’ Your support has been taken by other [revolutionary] organizations as a fact rather than a project, as we see it, and organizations have been coming to us seeking help, and this puts us in a quandary because we cannot help them…we will also do everything that is in our power to collect funds.\footnote{BLA/UT, \textit{Dick J. Reavis Papers}, B:2.2, Letter sent to Cantú by Güero Medrano, who used the pseudonym of “El Tio” (Uncle). Güero’s was commonly referred as “El Tio,” which is a common term of endearment and respect in Oaxaca’s rural communities.}

Through his public declarations, Cantú had attempted to gain the support from Chicana/os and Mexicans by showing that a Chicana/o-Mexican revolution was in the making. Instead,
Cantú’s tactics created false hopes among leftist Mexican groups and further alienated him from mainstream Chicana/o groups. Chicana/o leaders such as José Ángel Gutiérrez from La Raza Unida Party declared that Cantú’s talk of a new Mexican revolution was “irresponsible, untimely and inappropriate.” At the same time, Cantú was outraged by Gutiérrez’s economic and political links with Mexican President Echeverría and his successor José Lopéz Portillo. Cantú declared that “[Chicana/os] are an out group in this country…[and] we should ally ourselves with the out groups in Mexico, not with the oppressors.” Cantú was critical of the economic and political support received by organizations like La Raza Unida Party, but at the same time his own economic privilege allowed him to fund his personal revolutionary ideals.

After Cantú proved unable to rally any significant support from Chicana/os for the PPUA, he modified his approach. Rather than seeking public support for an armed struggle, Cantú came to the conclusion that, in order for Chicana/os to support the PPUA, they first needed to have an understanding of the sociopolitical situation of Mexico. Cantú told to a newspaper, “‘My mistake has been to think that armed struggle was the only way [to overthrow the Mexican government]’…[Cantú] realized that informing Chicana/os about the present Mexican reality could be used as a powerful weapon of consciousness.” Cantú explained that Mexicans had the responsibility of deciding how to conduct their struggle. Since the PPUA was a clandestine group, they had to “operate through an armed struggle to defend themselves.” However, it was necessary to inform Chicana/os about Mexican reality...

484 BLA/UT, Dick J. Reavis Papers, B: 2.15, newspaper clippings “Self-proclaimed revolutionary successful Texas restaurateur.”
485 BLA/UT, Dick J. Reavis Papers, B: 2.15
486 BLA/UT, Dick J. Reavis Papers, B: 3.4, newspaper clippings El Norte “Mario Cantú dice cambiar de idea.”
so they could “defend their Mexican brothers, in a peaceful and legal way.”\(^{487}\) The lack of general knowledge about and firsthand experience with Mexico was an issue that affected the relations between Mexicans and Chicana/os.\(^{488}\)

Educating Mexican immigrants and their descendants in the United States about Mexico had been a political strategy used by Mexican consulates since the 1920s as part of the construction of a Mexican revolutionary nationalism. The celebration of fiestas patrias and cultural events had been one of the most common strategies used to promote Mexican nationalism in the “México de afuera” (Mexico abroad). Echeverría’s administration and policy towards Chicana/os was to cater to the demands of Chicana/os for education. Echeverría’s government provided funds for conferences about Mexican history, donations of books and encyclopedias about Mexican history, and a scholarship program for Chicana/os to study in Mexican universities.\(^{489}\) Many Chicana/os welcomed these opportunities, but rather than accept the curricula authored by the Mexican state Cantú sought to educate Chicana/os about the social and political struggles in Mexico.

As part of his new approach, Cantú sought the help of Dick J. Reavis, a reporter and freelance writer who had made several trips to Mexico to gather information about Cantú, Güero, and the PPUA. Cantú asked Reavis to arrange for an NBC News crew to go to southern Mexico to film a peasant land seizure organized by Güero and the PPUA. In early October 1978, Reavis accompanied NBC correspondent George Lewis and his TV crew to

\(^{487}\) BLA/UT, *Dick J. Reavis Papers*, B: 3.4.
\(^{489}\) BLA/UT, *José Angel Gutiérrez’s Papers*, B: 54, Folder: Mexico 1972/74
Oaxaca to film the event, while Cantú acted as a liaison with Güero and his followers.\textsuperscript{490} Although the Mexican government had warrants out against Cantú and Güero, the presence of the NBC crew allowed them to stage a land seizure while surrounded by Mexican troops.\textsuperscript{491} Güero and his supporters, mainly Chinantec and Zapotec indigenous peasants, planned to take over a 25,000-acre ranch. However, in the process of the land seizure, the peasants took hostages at gunpoint, which led to the intervention of the military, and in the end, the land seizure was aborted while the military arrested and removed the peasants from the property. Güero and other PPUA leaders escaped to the hills, while Cantú returned to San Antonio with the NBC crew.

The NBC report showed the presence of armed guerillas in Mexico, something that the Mexican government had denied in its effort to portray itself as a stable society. After the NBC report, the Mexican military increased its efforts to capture Güero and his followers. The chief of federal security concluded,

El Güero and the PPUA do not represent an effective threat to the internal security of [Mexico] because they have a limited number of followers and an inefficient indoctrination technique among the peasantry. However, it is necessary to begin a plan of action to capture [the leaders of the PPUA] and its followers, to stop them from continuing to carry out criminal activities while misleading the peasantry into opposing the government.\textsuperscript{492}

On the one hand, these conclusions highlighted the difficulties that the PPUA and its followers had in carrying out a land seizure, let alone a revolution. In addition, the need for “a plan of action” against the PPUA by the government also illustrated that the publicized

\textsuperscript{490} NBC News made two TV shows from this event, George Lewis, "Landless Mexican Peasants Seize Ranches and Hostages," (Unites States, 1978). And George Lewis, "Mexican Peasants Initiate Revolt to Recapture Lands Taken by Government," (United States, 1978).
\textsuperscript{491} Dick J. Reavis, "Rebel with a Cause," \textit{Texas Monthly}, February 1979, 131.
\textsuperscript{492} AGN/DFS, Exp. 11-249 L-5.
activities of the PPUA among the peasantry were a powerful threat to perceptions of the legitimacy of the Mexican government at the national and international levels.

In NBC’s coverage, the reporter George Lewis asked Cantú if his public support for Mexican revolutionaries could send him to prison, to which Cantú responded, “There is some risk involved, yes. But I feel justified because I feel consciously this is a struggle that must be supported and it is a struggle of the people.” Soon after Cantú’s return to San Antonio and the national TV release of NBC’s report, a federal court summoned Cantú for a violation of his probation. In 1976, agents of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) arrested Cantú for “harboring illegal aliens” in his restaurant. Although Cantú was successful in using his trial to mobilize activists and community members around the issues of undocumented immigration and of police brutality against Mexicans and Chicana/os, the court eventually sentenced him to five years’ probation. When Cantú appeared on national television supporting the PPUA in Mexico, he was in clear violation of his probation, and people did not react in support of Cantú’s activism, but rather saw this event as another of Cantú’s eccentric stunts. However, rather than appearing in court, Cantú chose self-exile in Europe, where he traveled between Spain, Germany, and France. In Europe, Cantú formed

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493 Reavis, "Rebel with a Cause," 131.
494 Through the 1970s the legal term to refer to people who had come into the United States without the documentation was “illegal.” Today the term “illegal” is a controversial label within the immigration debate. Advocates for immigration reform argued that “illegal immigrant” is a dehumanizing and racialized term and instead used the term “undocumented immigrant” when referring to those without documentation. Throughout this work I use the term “illegal” only when it is a direct quote from primary sources and or refers to the terminology used at that time. For instance in this source the legal charge against Cantú was “harboring illegal aliens.” Otherwise, I use the term “undocumented.” Sonia McKay, Eugenia Markova, and Anna Paraskevopoulou, Undocumented Workers’ Transitions: Legal Status, Migration, and Work in Europe (New York: Routledge, 2012), 50–51.
495 BLA/UT, Mario Cantú’s Papers B:1.9 – B:1.5.
the Comité de Solidarité Avec la Lutte du Peuple Mexicain (European Committee of Solidarity with the Mexican/Chicana/o People) in an effort to internationalize his struggle.\footnote{BLA/UT, \textit{Dick J. Reavis's Papers} B: 3.2.}

Just months into his European exile, Cantú was notified that Florencio “Güero” Medrano had been killed. On March 26, 1979, Güero and some of his followers had sustained gunfire with local gunmen. During the gunfight, Güero endured a fatal bullet wound and hours later died in a small peasant village in the mountains of Oaxaca. The exact circumstances of Güero’s death are unknown. According to the official report of the Mexican Dirty War produced during the Fox administration; “The military and federal police was hounding Florencio Medrano while he was attending a reunion at an ejido in Oaxaca…Florencio Medrano and some of his followers sustained gunfire with the military in an area between the settlements of San Isidro and San Juan Quiotepec. Güero was wounded and died few days later. According to the testimony of eyewitnesses, ‘the soldiers cut off his head, and we never learned what they did with the body.’”\footnote{“Official Report Released on Mexico’s ‘Dirty War,’” 490.} However, supporters that I interviewed believed that Güero died in a confrontation with the guards of local landlords and not with the military. According to his supporters, the military did not show up until three days after Güero’s death and forced people to dig out his body to cutoff Güero’s index finger.\footnote{Personal interview with Félix Basilio Guadarrama and María de los Ángeles Vence Gutiérrez, December 1 and 11, 2010 and January 11, 2011.} It is believed that the military had alternative motives in distorting the facts about Güero’s death to create a perception of Güero’s death as a triumph by the military over the PPUA.

A few days later, the military came to the village and forced the locals to dig up Güero’s grave and cut off his index finger. Within weeks of Güero’s death, the military
began to capture the remaining members of the PPUA. According to government accounts, by mid-1979, the Mexican government had obliterated the PPUA’s leadership. However, while the PPUA disappeared after Güero’s death, many of its followers remained politically active through other groups. The armed struggles of the 1960s and 1970s diminished through the 1980s after the repression of the Dirty War. On the other side of the border, the militancy, nationalism, and political activism of the Chicana/o Movement in the United States were transformed in the 1980s as well, opening the doors for “Hispanic politics” that targeted a middle class business community.

Cantú, returned to the United States in 1980 after his short self-exile in Europe. After his return, Cantú faced probation hearings that required him to serve the rest of his sentence at a halfway house. Cantú’s activism and passion for social justice deteriorated as he became deeply involved in a drug addiction that slowly diminished his mental stability and physical health. On November 9, 2000, Mario Cantú died of complications from cirrhosis of the liver at the age of 63.

Conclusion

The events surrounding Cantú’s aid to Mexican armed movements developed at a time when armed guerillas across Mexico were being demolished by the Mexican armed forces during Mexico’s Dirty War. At the same time, movements of decolonization and national liberation taking place across the Third World inspired Chicana/o community-based organizations to express their solidarity. As this new sense of Pan-Latin Americanism and internationalism was emerging alongside a third world consciousness among Chicana/o

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499 Ibid., 1.
501 BLA/UT, *Dick J. Reavis Papers*, Box 2.17, Folder: “Cantú’s return from Europe” *Austin American-Statesman* (February 20, 1980)
communities, members of the radical Mexican left were employing guerrilla warfare against oppression. Through the 1960s and 1970s, along with other U.S. radicals were inspired by third world revolutions and looked southward to express their solidarity and revolutionary idealism. However, within the Chicana/o Movement there was a different vision of the meaning of revolution and solidarity than that held by the radical Mexican left, who sought to transform their society through armed revolution.

Mexican activists saw their frustrations and experiences with state repression as part of a failed revolutionary legacy that had been co-opted by the ruling political party, the PRI, to legitimize its power. Furthermore, the history of U.S. economic, political, cultural, and military intervention, not only in Mexico but also across Latin America, helped to create a sense of regional solidarity against U.S. imperialism. Chicana/o activists focused their part in that struggle on racial, political, economic, and cultural rights, largely through political activism based on cultural nationalism.

The new senses of internationalism and solidarity that inspired Chicana/os to build transnational alliances, especially with Mexicans, generated new forms of cultural consciousness their own Mexicanness. But the nature of their struggles and political strategies were completely different from others used outside the U.S. and although there was a sense of rhetorical solidarity on both sides expressed mostly through cultural and intellectual exchanges, the more militant forms of collaboration were limited and short-lived. In the end, a sustained Chicana/o-Mexican solidarity movement never materialized. Chicana/os in the United States struggled to gain access to higher education; entrée into the national political arena; and racial, social and economic equality through the reform of the political and social system. In Mexico, the repressive response of the state against peaceful
democratic demonstrations further polarized the Mexican left, leading some activists to take up arms against the government.

Chicana/os and Mexicans operated in different contexts, but political idealism guided them to express a sense of comradery framed through ideas of a shared experience of colonization and historical ancestry. These expressions of solidarity were put to the test when Chicano activist Mario Cantú sought the support of the larger Chicana/o community for guerrillas in Southern Mexico. The establishment of these solidarity networks is as an important component of the long trajectory of activism shared between Mexicans and Chicana/os. Yet there were many fractures that go beyond the geopolitical divisions of the Mexico-U.S. border. Mario Cantú’s inability to mobilize support from Chicana/os for the PPUA and its leader Florencio “El Güero” Medrano highlighted the contradictions and problems in transnational collective action and political solidarity between Mexicans and Chicana/os.
Conclusion

The argument for political solidarity between Mexicans and Chicana/os played out through ideas of a common culture, language, genealogy, experience of colonization, political repression, and *mexicanidad*. The social and political conditions of the 1960s and 1970s shaped emotional investment of activists on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border towards the political meanings of Mexican nationalism (Mexicanidad). Chicana/o activist retrofitted Mexican nationalism to construct a mythical sense of origin in the face of cultural erasure and racial discrimination in the U.S. Mexican activists had a more ambivalent relationship towards the political meanings of Mexicanidad. On the one hand, revolutionary myths served to legitimize the authoritarian and corrupt government that they sought to change. On the other hand, their own revolutionary and political ideals were encrusted in the landscape of an idealized Mexican past.

Although many activists tried, and sometimes succeeded, to connect Mexican political ideas with those of Chicana/o cultural nationalism and vice versa, over time the Chicana/o movement lost its political momentum, and the Mexican left became more polarized. Chicana/os saw their own political solidarity fragmented as their own ideological contradictions became more evident. Chicana/o cultural nationalism evolved into middle-class Hispanic or Latina/o politics.\(^{503}\) In the 1970s, the emergence of middle class business and professional communities among Cuban Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Mexican Americans, led the Nixon Administration to develop the more “inclusive” term of Hispanic

\(^{503}\) The use of the term Hispanic is credited to the Nixon Administration, who sought to work with “all” Mexicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and other Spanish speaking communities as one ethnic coalition. Malvin Lane Miranda, *A History of Hispanics in Southern Nevada* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1997), 150–151.
to court these new groups. The label Hispanic was aimed to encompass ethnic, national, cultural, and linguistic diversity of all the communities from Latin American and Caribbean nations where Spanish was the primary language. At the community organizing level, accepting the term Hispanic rather than Chicana/o meant a shift from the political radicalism associated with community-based organizations among poor populations towards a more liberal, middle-class, business oriented form of politics.

Many from the Chicana/o generation are critical of Hispanic and Latina/o politics today. In the words of Chicano leader José Ángel Gutiérrez, “Hispanics, as a generation, are neither into group ascendancy nor solidarity with one another…Rather than promote ethnic identification and cultural nationalism for persons of Mexican ancestry, as mestizos, [some] Hispanics…want to be identified with the Caucasian peoples and regarded as ‘white Europeans.’” Others, like historian Ignacio M. García, are less critical of Hispanic moderate politics: “Hispanics, although often less than militant in their pursuit of change, no longer see themselves as just Americans. Rather, they are an ethnic group that has a historical notion of itself and whose importance lies within the uniqueness.” As the 1970s progressed, U.S. public opinion became less tolerant of street protests, and the political

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504 Ibid., 151.
505 Like the term Mexican, Mexican American, Chicana/o, and so on. Today the struggle over an all-encompassing “ethnic” name for people from Latin American and Caribbean nations where Spanish is the primary language continues. Latina/o or Hispanic continue homogenized and oversimplify the historical, cultural, and social roots of Latin America. Mexicans might be considered Latina/os or Hispanics, but Brazilians are only considered Latina/os while indigenous communities are neither.
priorities of many Chicana/os shifted away from the more militant perspectives of the Chicana/o Movement.\textsuperscript{508}

As the Chicana/o movement evolved and as middle-class Hispanic and Latina/o politics came to prominence, some elements of their Mexican political counterparts also shifted to more moderate politics, integrating themselves into the same state bureaucracy that they had earlier opposed. After the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre the concern among PRI affiliates was with the militancy that had begun to emerge from middle-class left-leaning intellectuals.\textsuperscript{509} Unlike the vast majority of Chicana/o activist who proudly identified with their working class family origins from the barrios or the agricultural fields, the leftist students from Mexico City came mostly from an urban middle-class background.\textsuperscript{510} The tension generated from this class difference between Mexican and Chicana/o activists is an important part of their story along with their different political visions, cultures, histories, language, and signifiers of mexicanidad. As historian Louise Walker’s recent work on Mexico’s middle class illustrates, the rebellious post-1968 generation of university students and intellectuals belonged to an urban middle class replete with privilege and therefore in tension with poorer classes.\textsuperscript{511} These class privileges were also expressed through the conflicted relations between Mexicans and Chicana/os. Prior to the1960s, Mexicans in Mexico had little awareness of the history, struggles, and political mobilization of Mexican and Mexican American communities in the United States. Several factors, including the controversial Bracero Program and the media attention to the issue of undocumented

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\textsuperscript{508} Miranda, A History of Hispanics in Southern Nevada, 151.
\textsuperscript{510} Ibid., 43.
\textsuperscript{511} Ibid.
immigration, created the stereotype of Mexican Americans (Chicana/os) as people of rural origins. Although the Chicana/o Movement generation was mostly formed by students from urban communities with greater potential for class mobility than their Mexican urban counterparts, negative stereotypes of Chicana/os as Mexican peasants pretending to be gringos was a pervasive image.

As the Chicana/o Movement evolved in the United States, the visibility of Chicana/os in the media spread their images, stories, and symbols across Mexico. The emerging visibility of the Chicana/o Movement across the U.S. generated interest among Mexican intellectuals, activists, and government officials. However, the enthusiasm of the political radicalism of Chicana/os and their movement led to a disregard for the long trajectory of political activism of Mexicans and Mexican Americans before the Movement. Chicana/o activists in the 1960s and 1970s were critical of earlier forms of political activism that had advocated for strategies of cultural assimilation. Another issue was the limited production of texts in Spanish about early Mexican American history, a lack which left in place an incomplete historical narrative about Mexican American communities for Mexican audiences.

The desire to express a sense of solidarity and internationalism by Chicana/os led them to construct an international image of the Movement as a collection of groups and individuals with equal experiences, ideals, goals, and political strategies to their counterparts abroad. However, not everyone in the Mexican American communities in the United States accepted the political identity evoked by the term Chicana/o, especially the older

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conservative generations. Yet Chicana/os longing to establish links across nations, their collective need to assert a new identity, and their struggles for political and cultural sovereignty led them to narrate an ethnic history that overlooked the diversity in the community. This portrayal of political unity and cultural homogeneity by Chicana/os also influenced the Mexican imaginary about the ethnic Mexican community in the United States. Ever since the 1970s, the terms Chicana/o, Mexican American, or immigrant have been used across Mexico as interchangeable synonyms without a thorough understanding of their historical and political nuances.

Chicana/o cultural nationalism served to articulate the struggles of urban and rural Mexican and Mexican American communities in the United States as part of their struggle for civil rights. In Mexico, it was Marxist rhetoric that served to establish a sense of class solidarity across urban and rural communities in which some students became “part” of the proletarian classes while others claimed to be the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat. In the imaginary of Chicana/o cultural nationalism, Mexico embodied a symbol of belonging in the form of an idealized ancestral land. The search for a sense of identity led many Chicana/o activists to visit Mexico, the land of their ancestors, which was imagined as a spiritual journey. However, Chicana/os were confronted by a contradictory Mexico, where modernity was in tension with tradition, where Mexicanness coexisted with Americanization, where the celebration of racial mixing pushed against malinchismo (a preference for foreign

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values), and where the Marxist rhetoric of class struggle harmonized with classism and discrimination.

Members of the Mexicans left were urban and educated and believed Chicana/os to be rural and uneducated. For Mexicans, the children of Mexican immigrants in the United States were associated with rural backwardness, yet their own malinchismo, associated with urban Mexican youth, was both celebrated and condemned. The Spanglish spoken by Chicana/os and Mexican Americans continued to be criticized and labeled as a sign of Chicana/o “rural” origins, while the poorly pronounced and imitated English music by urban middle-class Mexicans was a sign of cultural vanguard. In Mexico the use of “proper” Spanish has and continues to be a class and racial barrier used against not only Chicana/os (Mexican Americans), but more notoriously against rural and indigenous communities. Spanglish for Chicana/os, however, was an act of loyalty to their communities, a sign of political radicalism, a badge of honor from their battles of cultural oppression, and a sign of political solidarity with Mexicans.

From Echeverría to Neoliberalism

From the 1960’s on, as Chicana/os turned to Mexico in search of political, cultural, and intellectual support for their movement, they captured the attention not only of students and intellectuals, but also of government officials. In the 1970s, the administration of Luis Echeverría adopted more proactive policies towards Mexican American and Chicana/o communities in the United States. The traditional policies of the Mexican government towards Mexican nationals in the United States had been the defense of the civil rights of

516 Ibid., 186.
517 Bustamante, “Chicano-Mexicano Relations: From Practice to Theory,” 10–11.
Mexican nationals (documented and undocumented), the promotion of Mexican culture and nationalism, and political support from Mexican nationals. During Echeverría’s presidency, a new relationship was established between the Mexican government and Mexican Americans (Chicana/os) living in the United States. The interest of the Echeverría administration towards these communities focused on three main issues that intertwine with national, bilateral, and international politics.

The first issue was Echeverría’s political reforms designed to appease the most militant sectors of the opposition: were students, teachers, young professionals, and intellectuals. Through his so-called “democratic opening,” he sought to appeal especially to the students and intellectuals who were the most critical of his leadership, many of whom had established links with Chicana/os. In this context, Echeverría’s relationship with Chicana/o activists, who were seeking political, cultural, and economic links with Mexico, served his own political interests. At the same time, the violence and repression of the Mexican Dirty War continued to expose the paternalism, corruption, and anti-democratic aspects of the Mexican state. However, Chicana/o cultural nationalism, which heavily borrowed from ideals and symbols of Mexican nationalism, provided a narrative that extended easily to support the political legitimacy of the official party, PRI.

In the United States, Chicana/o cultural nationalism served to destabilize the political narrative of a democratic, egalitarian, and racially homogenous society. In the context of Mexico, however, Chicana/o cultural nationalism was easily put to the service of the state’s narrative which claimed a successful revolutionary past, an idealized indigenous identity, and

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legitimate governance. However, the legacy of Echeverría’s involvement as Minister of the Interior during the events that culminated in the student massacre at Tlatelolco on October 2, 1968, followed him across the border. Some more radical Chicana/o organization like Center for Autonomous Social Action (CASA) opposed any form of relationship with Echeverría, in solidarity with their Mexican counterparts.\textsuperscript{519} Echeverría’s support for Chicana/os served to underline some of the existing internal fractures that would ultimately be part of the decline of the Chicana/o Movement. It also fit neatly within his own political campaign to recapture the revolutionary legitimacy lost in the face of social unrest, the declining Mexican economy, and international upheaval.

Second, this support for Chicana/o activism also allowed Echeverría to assert his democratic commitment into the global stage of Third World liberation movements. Echeverría’s foreign policy or \textit{Third-worldism} became an extension of his domestic policy of democratic opening, cynical as it might had been, which was mixed with Marxist notions of class conflict, support for Third World liberation movements, and the customary anti-U.S. rhetoric. As Cold War dynamics shaped both national and international politics in the United States and across the southern hemisphere, anticomunist discourse and counterinsurgency tactics were used against political dissidents. Within this context, Mexico became a two-way bridge that both connected and separated the United States from the political turmoil affecting Latin America. Echeverría recognized the unique geographical, historical, and political positionality of Mexico within the region, and he cunningly manipulated it to advance his political interests. He became a public supporter of Chilean President Salvador Allende and Cuban leader Fidel Castro, at the same time that his government closely

\textsuperscript{519} Mario T. García, \textit{Memories of Chicano History: The Life and Narrative of Bert Corona} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 314.
collaborated with the U.S. government to survey the activities in these nations.\(^{520}\) Echeverría used the militancy of Chicana/os, their connections with Mexico, and the bigotry of U.S. leaders for his own political leverage. Echeverría’s public support for Chicana/os sustained his image as a fearless Third World leader who was aligned with oppressed communities and willing to stand up against the colossal power of the United States, despite his secret agreements with U.S. President Richard Nixon.

Finally, Echeverría’s courting of Chicana/os became a new political strategy towards bilateral relations with the United States, particularly in dealing with the needs of undocumented Mexican workers. From the 1920s on undocumented immigration to the United States has been a central issue in Mexico-U.S. relations. Chicana/o activism was mostly concerned with issues of racism and discrimination rather than undocumented immigrants.\(^{521}\) However, the growing political and economic standing of Chicana/os (and Hispanics more generally) brought a new political awareness for their potential in aiding Mexico’s negotiations with the United States.

Echeverría’s line of political rhetoric supporting Chicana/os changed with the new administration of President José Lopéz Portillo (1976-1982). While Echeverría’s political and economic reforms, along with his populist and Third-worldist rhetoric, sought to reach out to marginalized groups, Lopéz Portillo’s policies were more repressive.\(^{522}\)

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like Echeverría, also recognized the importance of Mexican American communities and in particular the decline of Chicana/o activism. His politics centered on strengthening his ties with Chicana/os and other U.S. Hispano groups and individuals in the government and in the business class, rather than with community-based activists. Business and political commissions formed by Hispanic organizations replaced the relationships José Ángel Gutiérrez and La Raza Unida Party had with the Echeverría administration.\textsuperscript{523} The \textit{Comisión Hispana}, as the group of U.S. Hispanic organizations came to be known, included groups like LULAC, the G.I. Forum, and MALDEF, which had been heavily criticized by earlier Chicana/o groups for their “assimilationist” politics. The Comisión’s dealings with Lopéz Portillo took place through the Mexican Secretary of Labor, Pedro Ojeda Paullada.\textsuperscript{524} The focus shifted from grassroots labor organization by workers towards the struggles of official politics and policymaking.

Lopéz Portillo’s presidential term coincided with Jimmy Carter’s administration, which brought different policies towards Latin America—stressing human rights and non-interventionism—and the domestic Hispanic community. A group of mostly Mexican American members of the U.S. House of Representatives established the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) at the end of 1976. The CHC functioned as a political platform to develop and voice national policies related to the Hispanic/Latino community. The administration of Lopéz Portillo expanded Mexico’s relations with the Mexican American community beyond immigration issues, but this was done through mainstream political organizations rather than grassroots community organizations. Chicana/o activists perceived

\textsuperscript{523} Santamaría Gómez, \textit{La política entre México y Aztlan}, 80. \\
\textsuperscript{524} Ibíd., 81.
the shift of policies from Echeverría to Lopéz Portillo towards Chicana/o-Mexican relations as a regression towards normal bureaucratic venues.\textsuperscript{525}

The generous social spending promoted by Echeverría and followed in part by his successor Lopéz Portillo came to affect the Mexican economy at the end of the 1970s. During Echeverría’s administration, the Mexican state borrowed money, especially from U.S. banks as the rising prices of oil was flooding the Mexican economy with petrodollars.\textsuperscript{526} This dollarization of the economy was taking place at the same that the U.S. economy was sinking into an economic recession. By the end of the 1970s Mexico was deeply affected by the grip of “stagflation,” despite the discovery of new oil reserves in the Gulf of Mexico.\textsuperscript{527} By the end of Lopéz Portillo’s administration the support of Chicana/o organizations was replaced by bilateral business and political relations with Mexican American or Hispanic organizations. In the meantime, revolutionary movements affecting Nicaragua and El Salvador became of greater political concern to United States policy makers.

Echeverría and Lopéz Portillos’s strategies of courting political organizations and the Mexican American (Hispanic) business class became the norm for succeeding administrations. The promotion of Mexican cultural and educational programs became one of the primary channels to foster relations with Mexican American and Mexican nationals in the United States without interfering with U.S. political sovereignty. By the 1980s, the Chicana/o Movement had ended, and La Raza Unida Party had been eliminated as a political party. Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) was the new U.S. President and his Mexican counterpart was

\textsuperscript{525} Tatcho Mindiola and Max Martínez, \textit{Chicano-Mexicano Relations} (Mexican American Studies Program, University of Houston--University Park, 1986), 54; Santamaría Gómez, \textit{La política entre México y Aztlán}, 79.
\textsuperscript{527} Stagflation refers to the phenomenon of an economic recession (stagnation) accompanied by the rise of prices or inflation, which lead to the higher rates on the interest rates loans that Mexico had borrowed mostly from U.S. banks. Haber, \textit{Power from Experience}, 59.

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Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-1988). The administration of De la Madrid also followed his predecessors and extended his recognition to the importance of the Mexican American and Mexican communities for the relations between the United States and Mexico.

De la Madrid described the Mexican American community as a “bridge to solidify and enrich a respectful and dignified friendship between Mexico and the United States.”\textsuperscript{528} It was during his administration that the protection of Mexican immigrants in the United States was intensified and placed at the forefront of Mexican foreign policy as a “política de protección” (“politics of protection”).\textsuperscript{529} De La Madrid’s administration also pursued the establishment and support of cultural and intellectual activities linking Mexico and the Mexican American community. At the beginning of his administration the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México held annual conferences (Encuentro Chicano) and seminars (Seminario Permanente de Estudios Chicanos y Fronterizos) aimed to continue the intellectual exchanges between Mexicans and Chicana/os.\textsuperscript{530}

Then in 1984 with the collaboration of UNAM, La Escuela Permanente de Extension de la UNAM (UNAM’s Permanent School Extension, EPESA), established a satellite campus in San Antonio, Texas. The aim of EPESA was to continue educating Chicana/os (Mexican Americans) and other foreigners about Mexican culture and the Spanish language.\textsuperscript{531} In 1986, various Mexican government organizations like the Office for Cultural Dissemination, the General Office of Academic Dissemination, the Center of International Relations of the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{528} “MMH: Los Chicanos Puente Para Afianzar La Amistad Con EU,” La Jornada, June 1987, sec. 1.
\textsuperscript{529} The creation of a special administrative unit within the Office of Foreign Relations dedicated to issues dealing with the civil rights protection of Mexican citizens in the United States starting under the administration of Lopéz Portillo, but put into full practice under De la Madrid’s Presidency. Remedios Gómez Arnaú, México y la protección de sus nacionales en Estados Unidos (UNAM, 1990), 172–173.
\textsuperscript{530} José Angel Gutiérrez, A Chicano Manual on How Handle Gringos (Houston: Arte Publico Press, 2003), 114.
\textsuperscript{531} The creation of this program had its roots in the 1940s when a program for the diffusion of Mexican culture was established in San Antonio, Texas. Ibid.; Axel Ramirez, “Ricardo Aguilar Melantzon: Escritor y Activista Chicano,” Latinoamerica, no. 41 (February 2005): 66.
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School of Social and Political Sciences, and EPESA organized the *Semana de la Sociedad Chicana* (Chicano Society Week) in Mexico City. Later the same year, the Reform and Control Act, also known as Simpson-Rodino Act or IRCA, imposed sanctions on American employers who hired undocumented immigrant workers in the United States. In response, De La Madrid inaugurated the *Segundo Encuentro Chicano* (Second Chicano Meeting) organized at UNAM to discuss the effects of IRCA. The event not only focused on the bilateral effects of immigration reform, but also served as an opportunity to promote Chicana/o films, art, theater, and literature.

The promotion of business relations between Mexicans and the Mexican American community also became an integral part of the economic relations between Mexico and the United States. It was promoted under Echeverría’s administration and further cemented with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Under the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), the Mexican Ministry of Commerce became an essential part of relations with Mexican Americans by hiring Mexican American public relations agencies, lobbyists, and politicians to serve the Mexican government. Continuing the legacy of De La Madrid’s support for cultural and intellectual activities, in 1988 UNAM created a Chicano Studies program as part of their *Centro de Enseñanza para Extranjeros* (Education Center for Foreigners). The goal was to create a systematic study of the political, economic, and socio-cultural aspects of Mexican Americans in the United States and to establish closer relations with them.

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It was under the administrations of Echeverría and Lopéz Portillo that new governmental strategies regarding not only Mexican nationals, but, more importantly, the emerging political and economic power of Mexican American communities, were developed. The promotion and courting of Mexican American involvement in U.S.-Mexican bilateral political and economic relations became new strategies of negotiation with the United States.\footnote{Garcia-Acevedo, “Return to Aztlan: Mexico’s Policies Toward Chicana/os,” 132.} Since such relations were first established between Chicana/os and Echeverría, Mexican governmental discourse has targeted Mexican Americans and Mexican nationals living in the United States as an important component of its relations with the United States. Following the implementation of NAFTA, political activism has brought attention to the influence of global economic processes and their connections with the escalation of immigration to the United States. Furthermore, the increasing number of Mexican immigrants to the United States from the 1990s on has also strengthened the support of the Mexican American population regarding immigration reforms, as advocates for the Mexican political and economic agenda with the U.S., and as political allies for social activism.\footnote{Ibid., 148.}

**From Third World Solidarity to Indian Politics**

The implementation of NAFTA, however, was not the only thing that transformed transnational political activism between Mexicans and Mexican Americans. Following the disenchantment with the possibility of bringing the next socialist revolution after decades of violent repression of the Mexican Dirty War and with the “closing” of the Cold War, activism in Mexico moved away from armed guerrilla activities.\footnote{The fall of the Soviet Union and the opening of the Iron Curtain became the signifier of the end of the idealization of armed socialist revolution as a viable venue for social transformation. Jorge G. Castañeda,} That is, until January 1,
1994, when a poorly armed and mostly Mayan indigenous army emerged onto the national and international political stages. The Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (Zapatista National Liberation Army, EZLN) and their spokesperson, Subcomandante Marcos, a non-indigenous Maya, challenged the implementation of NAFTA, the legitimacy of the Mexican government, and the discrimination of indigenous people.

The dramatic entrance of the EZLN onto the political stage captured international attention and support for indigenous Mexican struggles for decolonization, self-determination, and autonomy, all of which had been part of the long trajectory of resistance among communities around the world, including the earlier Chicana/o Movement.540 The war that the EZLN waged was not limited to war against the Mexican state, but was more broadly a war was against an oppressive global economic and political system. Images, ideas, and words became the most powerful weapons the EZLN used to gain international support for their cause. Revolutionary symbols and themes like Emiliano Zapata, indigenous identity, and land were central to EZLN resistance, which, for many Mexican Americans (Chicana/os), were reminiscent of their earlier activism.

Unlike earlier Chicana/o cultural nationalism that proclaimed a connection to an idealized Aztec Indian history and culture that no longer existed, the EZLN asserted their political strength on the basis of their own struggles and experiences of oppression as

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540 The Zapatista uprising not only attracted political activists, but also scholars across fields seeking to understand the origins, tactics, philosophy, and symbolism of the movement. The characterization of the Zapatistas or Neo-Zapatistas are they are also known, has ranged from Marxist class-based movement to post-modern indigenous movement. A good synthesis of the intellectual debate is found in, Mark T. Berger, “Romancing the Zapatistas: International Intellectuals and the Chiapas Rebellion,” Latin American Perspectives 28, no. 2 (March 1, 2001): 149–70.
Indians. The EZLN, like the Partido Proletario Unido de America (United Proletarian Party of America, PPUA) in the 1970s, also recognized the potential for obtaining the support of Chicana/os (Mexican Americans). In the first communiqué of the EZLN, published in its own newspaper, *El Despertador Mexicano*, on December 31, 1993, their call for help included Chicana/os: “Mexicans; workers, peasants, students, honest professionals, *chicanos*, progressives from other countries; we have started the struggle…” In the 1970s, Chicano activist Mario Cantú made a call to Chicana/os to join the armed struggle of Mexican peasantry in the midst of the Mexican Dirty War and tried to established an ethos of proletarian leadership as central to the Chicana/o Movement. At that time only a few Chicana/os expressed support for Cantú’s call to join an armed revolution led by peasants. Most people were amused by Cantú’s performance in the media, while others harshly criticized him for his criminal activities.

In contrast, the EZLN declared a war against the Mexican government, not to overthrow it, but to demand the fulfillment of rights, “work, land, housing, food, health services, education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice, and peace.” Activists across the globe, including Mexican Americans and immigrants in the United States, manifested their support for the political vision of the EZLN, which mixed Mayan Indian political

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541 The work of Mexican-born poet Alurista, a leading literary figure of the Chicano Movement adapted and promoted Aztec mythology. *El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán*, which uses Alurista’s conception of Aztlán, the mythical Aztec homeland located in the U.S. Southwest as its preamble is one of the most representative Chicana/o political manifestos. Sheila Marie Contreras, *Blood Lines: Myth, Indigenism, and Chicana/o Literature* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), 37; *El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán* (Tucson, AZ: John Brown Party, 1969).


543 MSC/UCSD, The Register of Armed Revolutionary Organizations in Mexico, Documents 1965-1998, MSS 0523, B: 8.27, Program General del Partido Proletario Unido de America (P.P.U.A).

544 Chicano leader José Ángel Gutiérrez was a strong critic of Cantú’s “irresponsible, untimely and inappropriate” activities with the PPUA. BLA/UT, *Reavis’s Papers*, B: 2.15, “Self-proclaimed revolutionary successful Texas restaurateur”

545 EZLN, “El Despertador Mexicano, Diciembre 1993.”
traditions, international ideas of revolution, Liberation Theology, and direct democracy.\textsuperscript{546} The call for solidarity with the Mexican American (Chicana/o) community was reminiscent of those calls expressed by both Mexicans and Chicana/os in the 1960s and 1970s. Like the EZLN’s assertion for political autonomy, more radical activists of the earlier Chicana/o Movement had also resisted cultural erasure and economic oppression through the assertion of an autonomous Aztlán. The EZLN, like earlier Chicana/o activism, articulated a political collaboration in notions of shared historical roots but cemented on global social and economic oppression.

During the heyday of the Chicana/o Movement, activists on both sides also proclaimed shared experiences of oppression under U.S. imperialism.\textsuperscript{547} Leftist and left-leaning Mexican activists framed their ideas of oppression mostly on Marxist notions of class subjugation and their experiences with violent armed persecution from the Mexican state. Chicana/os, on the other side, articulated racial discrimination as their most detrimental experience of oppression. The struggles of Chicana/o activists did not match the experience of many of their urban middle-class Mexican counterparts, who themselves discriminated against Chicana/os as rural and uneducated. In the 1990s, the EZLN and its indigenous support base not only shared experiences of state violence, but also a pervasive social exclusion and ethnic discrimination in their own homeland.\textsuperscript{548}

Like the Mexican government, the EZLN also recognized the potential found in the Mexican American (Chicana/o) community and the activism of immigrant-based

\textsuperscript{546} Kara Zugman Dellacioppa, \textit{This Bridge Called Zapatismo: Building Alternative Political Cultures in Mexico City, Los Angeles, and Beyond} (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 3.


\textsuperscript{548} Contreras, \textit{Blood Lines}, 36.
organizations as political allies. Indeed, many Mexican Americans (Chicana/o and Latina/o) activists flocked to Chiapas attracted by the discourse of Zapatismo, revolution, and indigenous politics. Immigrant and Mexican American (Chicana/o) communities in the United States have been an important source of political support for the Zapatista critique of neoliberal and capitalist repression.

The massive phenomenon of immigration to the United States has placed immigrant and Mexican American communities at the center of the political discourse of the Mexican government and social movements on both sides of the border. However, as in the 1970s, the attitude towards political solidarity with returning Chicana/os (whether immigrant or Mexican American) continues to be fraught with contradictions about their “Americanization.” The “Americanization” of the rural immigrant like the Chicana/o in the 1970s is seeing as a source of ridicule and critique, while the “Americanization” of Mexican urban middle classes is celebrated as a part of modernization. For Mexicans in the 1960s and 1970s, the term Chicana/o was associated not only with “Americanization,” but also with a political movement. However, today the term Chicana/o continues to be widely used across Mexico, but it has lost its political and historical roots, and instead, the term has

549 Dellacioppa, *This Bridge Called Zapatismo*, 3.
550 In recent years immigration coming out of Zapatista communities has presented new challenges to the Zapatista discourse and the local dynamics. Alejandra Aquino Moreschi, “Entre El ‘Sueño Zapatista’ Y El ‘Sueño Americano’. La Migración a Estados Unidos Vista Desde Las Comunidades Zapatistas / Between the Zapatista and American Dreams: Zapatista Communal Perspectives on Migration to the United States,” accessed July 21, 2014, https://www.academia.edu/904224/Entre_el_sueno_zapatista_y_el_sueno_americano._La_migracion_a_Estad os_Unidos_vista_desde_las_comunidades_zapatistas_Between_the_zapatista_and_american_dreams_zapatista communal_perspectives_on_migration_to_the_united_states.
become a synonym for cultural erosion and the transgression of social classes. For instance, a recent newspaper article describing the bleak economic and social conditions of a rural community in the sierra of Veracruz confronted with drug violence reads:

Little by little, the community changed its face; it is not the same community of a decade ago, and now it is threatened, especially by all the “chicanos,” those who are neither from here nor from there, those who come from the United States every time they can, dress with camisa de manta [white cotton shirt], cholo pants, and leather huaraches.552

In the historical moment of the 1960s and 1970s, Chicana/o activists had looked south of the border for political collaboration with urban Mexicans. However, the current neoliberal push and the flow of labor from the southern hemisphere into the United States has reversed the calls for political solidarity and placed the struggle squarely within the cultural, political, and economic terrain of the United States. Current discourses of globalization, as well as debates over immigration and state policing, continue to complicate the idea of an inherent unity between people of Mexican origins dispersed across the hemisphere. These communities also continue to build and expand their vision of justice, solidarity, and ideals like those expressed by the early Chicana/o-Mexican collaboration networks and the current immigrant-based social movements.

Legacy of Chicana/o-Mexican Relations for Our Global Historical Moment

Reflecting on the contested terrain in which Chicana/os and Mexicans developed a new sense of political solidarity in the 1960s and 1970s, we can map out the legacies, shortcomings, and possibilities on which new forms of global solidarity continue to build. The legacy of the Chicana/o-Mexican solidarity movement was not simply about fractures or

the influence of one side over the other, but rather, as expressed by Robin D. G. Kelly, it is a much more important vision:

Unfortunately, too often our standards for evaluating social movements pivot around whether or not they “succeeded” in realizing their visions rather than the merits or power of the visions themselves. By such a measure, virtually every radical movement failed because the basic power relations they sought to change remain pretty much intact. And yet it’s precisely these alternative visions and dreams that inspire new generations to continue to struggle for change.553

The Chicana/o-Mexican relation served as a springboard towards building broader based cultural and intellectual exchanges, the internationalization of struggles for social justice, a greater awareness of the perils affecting both Mexican and Mexican American communities, and a greater awareness of the diversity of Mexican society and culture outside the United States. Events at the end of the twentieth and the start of the twenty-first centuries, moreover, confirmed the continuing relevance of the earlier Chicana/o-Mexican solidarity movements beyond the Mexico-U.S. border region.

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