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A Constructive Critique of the Foundations of Philosophy

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A CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF

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A CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY

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DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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A CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY

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University of New Mexico, 1970

Philosophy pursues a rational explication of our under-
standing, experiences, and values in terms of objective truth
and reality. Conspicuously, its view of rationality has been
rigid and preconceived. Application of this preconceived
reason in the explication of the essential features of our
world fails and issues in a network of dialectical tangles.
These artificially created tangles pose a unique intellectual
challenge, but the perennial failure to resolve them limits
the intellectual response of philosophers to remaining caught
in the tangles, or to taking intuitively favorable sides, or
to simply denouncing the tangles as meaningless. Each is
understandable.

Superficially, traditional philosophical reason looks
like a correct tool for the explication of our world of com-
mon sense, but its applications to the world result in logi-
cal tangles showing its inadequacy. The philosopher's faith
in such reason ends up in one of two positions: abandoning
our world in the interests of such reason, or embodying it-
self in the world through a special form of reason. Classi-
cally, Plato took the first and Aristotle the second position.
My analysis shows that Plato failed to explicate the relation
between his world of Forms and our world of particulars, and,

more importantly, between the Forms and the intuitive reason which grasps them. Aristotle, in my analysis, cannot conceal that the law of noncontradiction is a mere exhortation and has no descriptive necessity with respect to thought, things, or meaning. We also find such dialectical difficulties in Augustine, Hume, and Strawson.

"Microphilosophical feasibilism" is our proposal for the best treatment, if not the definitive solution, of these problems. Instead of separating philosophical method into logic, epistemology, axiology, and metaphysics on the one side, and partitioning the projected results of philosophizing into validity, truth, valuation, and reality on the other, we need to start philosophizing with a general distinction between "method employed" and "intended result." This distinction is not pre-colored by claims to ultimate verities. It is a direct aid to understanding. I consider the basic inevitable paradox that a philosopher should explain not only our understanding of experience but also his philosophizing itself. The circularity between "method employed" and "intended result" needs to be admitted as an initial fact about reason rather than circumvented by an implausibly claimed capacity of philosophical reason to formally transcend everything including this circularity.

Presuppositions are reduced to a minimum inevitable number. Being our primary microphilosophical criteria, they are reason, experience, and value in their minimal sense. They cannot be plausibly substituted or further reduced.

They cannot be preferred one or more to others arbitrarily.
We show how, in microphilosophy, they coincide or synchro-
nize. Jointly and basically, they form the minimal method
employed. The initial, basic, intended result is called
minimum feasibility. The fundamental circularity between
method and result leaves no way out but to ground self-
reference in such a manner that method and result "logico-
genetically" coincide. Two extreme situations are avoided:
"the logical zero-situation" where nothing is true or real,
and "the credulous open situation" where everything is true
or real. Finding a mean manifests a basic value. If the
meaning of truth and reality is to be preserved, the basic
value must have a clear impact and express descriptive
rather than revisionary reason.

Several other stringent demands are raised as condi-
tions which microphilosophy should fulfil to achieve feasi-
bility. The final, joint, outcome of both "method" and
"result," in the thesis of microphilosophical feasibilism,
is formulated thus: Self refers freely and symbolically to
itself, own person, own body, material bodies, other persons'
bodies, other persons, and other selves.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PHILOSOPHICAL LOGICISM AND MICROPHILOSOPHICAL FEASIBILISM:

THE THEATER AND DRAMAS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE LIFE AND

EXPERIENCES OF OUR UNDERSTANDING

> Let me say, my friend, that I have engaged in this
> fairly long, even if condensed, historical exposition
> solely for the sake of promoting understanding of my
> position. As I have already indicated, I did not
> originate the main figures that play their parts in my
> theory of knowing. I tried the experiment of transfer-
> ring the old well-known figures from the stage of
> ontology to the stage of inquiry. As a consequence of
> this transfer, the scene as it presented itself to me
> was not only more coherent but indefinitely more instruc-
> tive and humanly dramatic.

John Dewey, _Knowing and the Known_.[1]

> No philosophical argument ends with a Q.E.D. However
> forceful, it never forces. There is no bullying in phi-
> losophy neither with the stick of logic nor with the
> stick of language. . .
> All the proofs in a good book of philosophy could
> be dispensed with, without losing a whit of its
> convincingness.

F. Waismann, "How I See Philosophy."[2]

> It is of the essence of the dialectical or reflective
> method that we should recognize that proof, in philos-
> ophy, can be nothing more at bottom than persuasion.

C. I. Lewis, _Mind and the World Order_.[3]

The Western tradition of intellectual philosophy is a magnificent theater where, most often, dramas of lasting interest are staged. Our everyday world is its proscenium whose essential decor is an aesthetic appeal to rationality. The enduring theme of the dramas is marked by a movement towards objectivity. The philosophers who run the business of the theater are no mere entertainers. They are sincerely motivated to search, develop, and produce world-pictures of real value. Their occasional failures and shortcomings are no great defects. Their great achievement consists in presenting many refined and successful dramas whose popularity lasted for a considerable time. Their immense capacity for self-improvement and flexibility enabled the production of dramas with plots as diverse and appealing as life itself. The variety of plots has also been a function of the philosophers' amenability to influence from the periodically successful theaters of religion, science, and cultural milieu. But, despite all this, the business of the theater of philosophy has come to be thought of as hazardous. Its proprietors have lately become very modest and cautious to the extent of proposing a suspension or even closure of the business. While external conditions like fierce competition may be factors in leading to the current cautiousness, they do not perhaps represent the whole picture of the causes that make for the hazards to which the business of philosophy is continually exposed.

My thesis is that there are some built-in factors in the
theater itself, which are in part responsible for keeping the
business open to certain hazards. Fortunately, these factors
can be remedied, so that at least some significant sources of
the susceptibility to hazards may be removed. Unfortunately,
the remedy uncovers certain peculiar limitations not recognized
so far. The silver lining is the realization of the limits that
can, hopefully, set the business of philosophy on a concrete and
viable footing by discovering, inter alia, certain tendencies
towards ad hoc speculations. The main burden of this chapter,
however, is an exposure of the internal trouble-spots in the
theatrical equipment of philosophy. A remedial measure is also
suggested in an outline form.

I do not suggest that the theater has become old-fashioned
and needs a mere gloss of renovation; and hence, renewal in
terms of the idiom of the drama, as proposed by P. F. Strawson,[4]
is not likely to be sufficient. I suggest that the stage, decor,
and habitual theme need structural modifications. At some
places they even need redesigning, not just to enhance the
effectiveness of the philosophical dramas, but also to attain
basic suitability of presentation. What goes by the name of
self-revision in philosophy, I hold, does not go far enough.
Most meta-philosophy is characterized by such a lack of far-
reaching self-revision. Not that philosophers never possessed

an intuitive ability of seeing far enough in the direction of
self-criticism. The point is that the dependence on some great
philosophers' occasional insights needs to be overcome by an
explicit and systematic pursuit of self-revision that goes
sufficiently far and deep. This does not entail doing descrip-
tive metaphysics; it entails laying suitable foundations for
descriptive metaphysics.[5] Such a laying of foundations I call
"microphilosophy."

Strawson's descriptive metaphysics is not unprincipled.
But it is a descriptive metaphysics. If we have to reach a
guideline for the descriptive metaphysics, we need to do some
choosing from the alternatives possible and available. I
propose that it is the job of microphilosophy to systematically
explore the right principles of selection. In this I do not
share the view, such as G. J. Warnock's, oriented through the
later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, that the philosopher
cannot choose[6] and should confine his activity to elucidating
what he and everyone else has actually chosen, namely, the
world of ordinary language. For, "choosing" is my sense does
not involve a reductive restriction or distortion of the rich
complexity of natural language. Such a world is effectively
shared by most individuals and the fact of such sharing implies
a principled structure though not necessarily a rigid fixation.
We need not despair of the richness of this structure.

Philosophical nihilism or aversion to philosophical theorizing, characteristic of later Wittgenstein, can hardly lead in a definite direction. But, since traditional philosophy is reductive, it does not have the conceptual equipment necessary to systematically reveal the rich, complex structure of our day-by-day world. This point in the later Wittgenstein must be conceded. In order, however, to elucidate this structure in a systematic and undistorting manner, we need to do a kind of philosophy that is nontraditional and unrestrictive and goes far and deep enough. This, I propose, is microphilosophy.

Philosophers have so far taken for granted the stage where traditional philosophical dramas are enacted. As I said, this stage is our work-a-day world of experience. With rationality as the main decor and objectivity as the recurrent theme, traditional philosophy habitually seeks to transform this stage, the general world of daily experience, into a respectable magic effect of another, supposedly better, and more appealing world. Normally, the drama starts with a surprise "refutation" of what is labelled as "naive realism." I replace the latter term by the less undignified--and not also glorifying--term "normalism." The philosophy behind normalism I call "philosophical work-abilism" or "philosophical feasibilism."

Now, it does not really matter whether the traditional drama aims at a total or a partial magic effect. How far it

seeks to propose a revision of the work-a-day world is not of

great consequence. As Strawson points out, all conventional

metaphysics is not revisionary or other-worldly. Some of it

is descriptive. One may indeed admit degrees here rather than

a tight division. The point to stress, any way, is that, in

the traditional drama, the importance of rationality and

objectivity is played up in such a thorough manner that even

an honestly unreplacing, this-worldly, descriptive world-view

is maintained and sought to be secured, to say generalizingly,

as rational and objective rather than as just articulated and

elaborated in a straightforward exposition. This way, while

an other-worldly traditional philosophy like Platonism ends

up in replacing the day-by-day world, a this-worldly traditional

philosophy like Hume's[7] amounts to substituting the work-a-day

vision. The latter substitution may have a relative advantage

over the former replacement, but either case fails to enlighten

us, it only succeeds in pampering our intellectual conscience.

It is not meant that no revision whatever is necessary in

terms of either world or vision. Nor is there an intention to

run down the due significance of rationality. The case is that

the principled structure of the work-a-day world needs, first,

to be described honestly for what it is, in order, next to

prepare the stage for any advocacy of revision, one way or the

other, provided, further, that the necessity for revision is

established. Whatever may be the extent to which rigid rationality does not exist in this world, it is not an a priori truth that we can remedy the lack by a speculative or reconstructive rationalization. There is scarcely a prima facie case that a gloss of coherence can take us to a real, better world or give us an undistorting vision. The likelihood in such an assumption is rather that we may end up in an abstract affectation of how the things are and we may remain far from knowing the way they are. But once we have understood the everyday world of experience for what it is without twisting it through rationality, we can hopefully be prepared to discover the right and real place of rationality in this world. We can, then, also be on solid ground for any revision, if necessary, in terms of world or vision.

In effect, three alternative philosophies are shown to be inadequate by the view being taken here. These may be called (1) the world-replacing, speculative rationalism, (2) the vision-replacing, reconstructive rationalism, and (3) the non-replacing, descriptive nihilism. All the three views begin with the normal world of experience and thus share a common stage. They also share a common decor in the sense that they are concerned to secure or assume some sort of rationality and objectivity each in its own way.

The first view chooses to dramatize the theme that such a work-a-day world is too irrational to exist and hence needs to be replaced by one reached speculatively through reason. The second view prefers to dramatize the theme that the work-a-day world, the stage, must as such be rational, and the irrationality it seems to exhibit must be due to our way of seeing it. What we need, therefore, is a proper, rational vision in order to see or describe the same world. The last view dramatizes the futility of both the other views by holding that everything in the work-a-day world or on the stage is so richly rational in its own way that there is no need to stage a dramatic replacement of any kind. On the stage, one may pick at random any thing and show how a statement about it has a logic of its own, exhibited in its use; or, he may alternatively, refuse to do anything on the stage. In a general way, the first view is often linked with idealism and rationalism, and may be designated as the Metaphysical School; the second is connected with realism and empiricism, and may be named as the Formal Language School in view of its contemporary situation. The third is a contextual relativism or philosophical nihilism, and may be called the Ordinary Language School.[8] It belongs to later Wittgenstein who, according to Bertrand Russell, debased himself before common sense.[9] It turns the usual appeal to rationality into one to the richness of rationality, in such a way that it

has difficulty in finding irrationality anywhere except in traditional philosophy. The latter has been doing almost the reverse so far, finding irrationality everywhere except in itself. Brand Blanshard has made the mentionable charge that the Ordinary Language School is amorphous and unable to distinguish philosophically between the trivial and the important.

The view being taken here is that both, the search for the locus of abstract irrationality and the attempt to remedy existing irrationality by some kind of rationalizing replacement, do not illuminate. If any kind of substitution is necessary, it should project or impress its necessity through concrete rationality, the nature of which is to be discovered by doing microphilosophy on the normalist world. The structure of principles behind the latter, called microphilosophical feasibilism, constitutes the proper stage for philosophical drama.

The everyday world as it is unreflectively seen, is too gross to be a stage for the philosophical drama. I do not wish to suggest that conventional philosophizing is unreflective. That would, indeed, be scandalous. What I wish to maintain is that its reflection is initially misplaced and that the resulting handicap is not--and perhaps cannot fully be--retracted later. Conventional philosophizing tries to enforce a particular notion of reflection on the world rather than attempts to discover and

judge the implicit reflective philosophy already existing at the

back of our conception of the day-by-day world which, though,

apparently looks naive and uninformed by reflectivity. This,

of course, is a generalization, but it amounts to saying that

at least a large part of the conventional, reflective drama of

philosophy is staged on an unreflectively seen world. It took

twenty-five centuries of philosophizing and the personality of

Wittgenstein, to make the traditional hero (philosopher) realize

that the inveterate presupposition that the conventional villain,

the ordinary man using the natural language, has no craft, logic,

of his own, has no real foundations.

Broadly, for the three views criticized, the drama consists

in rational reflection on the gross stage.[11] In the present

view, the gross stage is thought good only for rehearsals with-

out make-up, and reaching the level of full-dress rehearsals

means appreciative reflection on--amounting to discovering the

reflection informing--the gross stage. The drama, as distin-

guished from rehearsal, should be presented only on the refined

stage, and it involves a furtherance of earlier appreciative

reflection. This view does not mistake a premature rehearsal

for a presentable performance. In fact, its back-stage artistry

and experience enable it to reconceive and suitably modify the

decor and the theme. The other views of philosophical drama are

bereft of this advantage and have to plod through a decor and a
theme which are dogmatic and inflexible.

The question which naturally arises for the present view
is How exactly can or does it reveal through "microphilosophy"
the "philosophical workabilism" behind "normalism," particularly
in distinction from the methods of other, traditional views. In
order to see the point in its answer, it is important, first, to
review the general methodology of the latter views. Very
briefly, and hence precariously, the whole matter may be put
as follows.

In traditional philosophy, the customary thematic movement
towards objectivity is through the decor of rationality on the
accepted stage of the world of our everyday experience. Initial
acceptance of the stage as constituting the basis for the
philosophical discourse does not mean, as we saw, that it is not
to be criticized or revised at a later stage. In fact, reason
is most often taken to be the criterion for such criticism or
revision. It is also the rational orientation which reveals
many of the problems of philosophy, which, then, reason attempts
to solve by reason itself. The rational reflection on the stage,
the everyday world of experience, exposes several deficiencies
in the world in terms of coherence. The aim, therefore, takes
its usual form in achieving coherence which is also expected

to yield objective truth about the world, or about a revisionary
world, in case the everyday world is found too incoherent for a
full or real rehabilitation of rationality in it.

Many reasons are found to ground the faith that truth or
reality has to be rational in some way. One of them, for exam-
ple, is that an irrational world is not likely to be or even
cannot be objectively and impersonally a true picture of reality.
Another is that no irrationality is intelligible and enlighten-
ing, mainly because a self-contradiction is a self-cancellation.
One of the most perplexing puzzles is whether experience or
reason has the ultimate primacy in the matter of the basic
concepts that constitute and the root principles which govern
the world-stage. The importance of this problem was fully
realized in modern philosophy after Descartes executed the
epistemological turn on the philosophical enterprise that was
earlier beset mainly with ontological concerns.

I submit that the epistemological turn in modern philosophy
constitutes a step towards microphilosophy, though it does not
quite land the philosopher in the microphilosophical discourse.
Most philosophy before Descartes was concerned with First
Principles or, in other words, with discovering through reason
the universal and necessary predicates of Being. The concept of
Being as the essence of reality was arrived at by stripping the
world-stage of all specific and contingent predicates and by

visualizing Being as the name for the foundation-subject (or
the basic logical subject) for which no specific, contingent
predicates were held to be appropriate. But neither analytic
nor synthetic statements could be made with the definitionally
vacuous Being as such foundation-subject, especially by inflict-
ing rationality as the criterion for the propriety of such
statements in terms of philosophical grammar. At least, no
agreement could be reached on finding the analytic or synthetic
predicates sought after.

It was time then to ask whether the whole seeking was a
feasible enterprise. The question, in consequence, turned on
the nature, process, and limits of human knowledge. The change
of essential concern from the all-encompassing, general Being
or reality to the individual, knowing agent was a shift of
attention from a pseudo-macrophilosophy towards[12] microphilos-
ophy. Apart from the socio-cultural factors which influenced
the change, in philosophy itself, the change can be seen to be
a result of a major insight into the basics of philosophy. A
general preoccupation with Being in total or partial disregard
of the foundations for the knowledge of Being was rightly seen
to be inadequate. Of course, there are still some thinkers who
advocate a restoration of ontologism. Gustav Bergmann, for
instance, holds that ontology is the heart of philosophy and

epistemology is but an ontology of the knowing situation.[13] I
submit, however, that the primacy of epistemology has come to
stay and reverting to the old game of ontology as such can only
be a retrograde step.

But, while the primacy of epistemology has exercised a
necessary check on the cosmic ambitions of philosophers, it
still has not succeeded in putting the business of the philo-
sophical theater on a sound basis. The reason-experience
tangle which it has brought to the forefront, indeed, manifests
a profound insight into the basics of all philosophy. Yet, the
reason why epistemologism has not been successful in reaching
an agreed world-picture or even knowledge-picture is that it has
not liberated itself from the old, preconceived form of the
drama. The stage, the decor, and the habitual theme of the
drama remain the same; only the cosmic intentions are (hopefully)
given up. Even repeated failures of the different, modern dramas
presented so far--by Hegel, Spencer, and, recently, the logical
atomists, for example--have failed to set the movement for a
suitable revision of the three elements in the form of drama
presentation. Edmund Husserl's glorious attempt to suspend or
"bracket" the stage did not succeed, because it failed to
suspend the decor and the theme at the same time. His enterprise
eventually ended up in a vacuous transcendental ego. The
general existential-phenomenological man-in-the-world theme, on

the other hand, secured a "gross stage" by suspending the decor

and the theme. Wittgenstein, in an unusual step, asked to close

the whole business. Though he did not find the "refined stage,"

he intuitively moved towards one and saw that the old dramatis

personae were not fit to work on it. But he thought that what

they needed was not a course of training in dramaturgy but

rather a psycho-therapeutic treatment.

After the epistemological turn, we need to execute the

microphilosophical turn now. This means securing the refined

stage in a systematic manner. Refining the gross stage would

automatically direct changes in the theme and in the decor which

are to be suspended for the time being, to be modified and

reinstated when the refinement is complete. But what is the

microphilosophical turn and what does it involve?

Let us reverse Plato for the sake of understanding and

gravitating to the key point. Let the world of sensation or

ordinary experience in which we place our habitual belief be,

as a whole, visualized as the Form of reality which particular

thought systems or traditional philosophies try to imitate but

which they distort in order to participate in them. The only

plausible explanation of their failure to achieve or approach

the Form appears to be that they see the Form through colored

glasses and still hope to see it in the original colors. The

colored glasses are the decor and the theme which are superimposed

upon the gross stage. Achieving the refined stage, therefore,
means rehearsing or working through the gross stage and, then,
arriving at a decor and a theme suitable to the refined stage
worked through.

F. H. Bradley's note-book contained the statement that
"Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe
upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an
instinct."[14] Then a period of a vigorous repudiation of meta-
physics ensued, and, almost at the end of this period, Strawson
said about his "essay in descriptive metaphysics," "So if meta-
physics is the finding of reasons, good, bad, or indifferent,
for what we believe on instinct, then this has been meta-
physics."[15] The enormous hold of the decor is quite obvious in
both the statements from these Oxford philosophers. The reli-
gious faith in the decor of reason will die hard. Even if it
is repeatedly seen that the decor can be bad, the hope that a
good one of the same type can be found keeps the drama going.
But, now, I propose that what we need is not the decor of the
gross stage, namely, a bunch of reasons for what we believe
upon instinct, but refinement of the gross stage, a systematic,
descriptive, rediscovery of our world of workable belief. The
secondhand activity of taking the whole stage for granted and
then putting a gloss of decor on it severs us from the world
rather than draws us near it. Philosophical logic and

traditional epistemology are in large part involved in such
activity.

But the epistemological turn, as I stated, was a move
somewhat towards microphilosophy. We may strain the turn fur-
ther in order to reach the discourse of microphilosophy. Epis-
temology asked whether ontologism was a feasible enterprise.
It made the decision that the issue can be decided only when
the knowledge situation, which is basic to any knowledge of
Being, was fully analyzed. Now, microphilosophy may ask whether
epistemologism is a feasible enterprise and whether this question
can be answered only in view of an analysis or elucidation of
the epistemological act which epistemologism has turned into
the essence or paradigm of philosophizing. More generally, we
need to ask the question How can philosophizing be equal to the
task of philosophy. From the standpoint of the primacy of
epistemology, the question is How epistemologizing can reveal
to us the nature, process, and limits of knowledge. Micro-
philosophically, we must examine philosophizing in order to
determine its philosophical efficacy.

To those who would readily declare that philosophy has
already been asking this question, the answer is obvious in
view of what I have been saying. It is that the question which
philosophy has been asking in this respect proved to be abortive
under the strangle-hold of the old, distorting decor. The

question I propose to ask is different in that it does not
necessarily admit rationality as the sole, self-appointed,
final court of appeal in answering the question, as, for
example, in an important sense, in Kant's first critique.

An interesting reply to such criticism of the methodolog-
ical use of the old decor as exemplifyingly directed to Kant
comes from A. C. Ewing. The reply is perhaps representative of
the old guard (decor) and is therefore mentioned here. The
epistemologicist concept of philosophy as a rational investi-
gation of the human faculties of knowledge is thought question-
able as involving the use of the faculties themselves as the
instrument of the investigation. Ewing says, that Kant admits
the question but maintains that the faculties can still be
rationally examined in their working. Kant's criticism of
knowledge does not come from outside, but from a higher inside,
so to say. A part of knowledge is held to be giving a criterion
for criticizing the rest of knowledge. Kant does not test his
vision by looking at his own eyes, Ewing goes on to defend, but
compares clearly seen things with dimly seen ones and "explains
the difference by a theory of vision."[16]

But no argument is detectible in Ewing's defense here, for,
what he says just amounts to an indirect assertion that what is
seen through reason is clear and the rest is only dimly seen.
The real question as to how Kant knows at all that he is seeing

clearly or dimly is eschewed. Even the less generally involved

question as to how the splitting of knowledge into rational,

which is higher and criterial, and nonrational, which is lower

and criticizable, is effected and justified, is left unanswered;

and this lack of answer leaves the splitting unsubstantiated.

The theory or treatment of vision, in the circumstances, is

better given over to an ophthalmologist, the microphilosopher,

rather than to a split personality of the patient himself.

The charitable question that philosophy has been asking

about its own adequacy may be called an exercise in "meta-

philosophy" to be distinguished from "microphilosophy." Micro-

philosophy involves sharpening of the philosophical tools in a

way which is not available to metaphilosophy. A microphilosopher

is like a microbiologist examining a microbe through a micro-

scope. His is a microvision. Metaphilosopher, on the other

side, is like an ordinary man looking at another ordinary man

who is looking at a microbe through gross vision. His is an

unavailing metavision. The sharpening of philosophical tools

means reaching the most feasible extreme in the direction of

philosophic presuppositionlessness. Hence it is that the

philosopher has to loosen the self-imposed strangle-hold of the

decor for the sake of his own philosophical life. Presupposi-

tionlessness as such may safely be described as a myth in which

intellectualist philosophy forces itself by way of a hardened
habit. In explicitly supporting the myth, Husserl was only
doing what others have been doing more or less implicitly.
The religious faith that reason does not involve any presup-
positions is so strong that it needs to be exposed and exploded
repeatedly. A detailed criticism of the foundations of both
intuitive and formal reason, aimed at an eventual, modified,
resuscitation of the feasible conditions of the very possibility
of reason will be a major burden of the present work as a whole.

Now, since we have seen the nature, relevance, and impor-
tance of the question asked by the microphilosopher, it is time
to ask him how he can go about answering it. The question to
ask him is How can philosophizing be examined and tested for
philosophical efficacy. The answer, I submit, is that the act
of philosophizing is examined and tested by the logic of
philosophizing. The latter logic needs to be carefully dis-
tinguished from the old decor in which it does not necessarily
and fully participate. In fact, it is this logic which is
programmed to lead to a suitably revised concept of decor itself.

The act of philosophizing need not be thrown overboard as
meaningless. Fortunately, logical positivism has lost its
fashionable look and cannot obstruct us effectively or detain
us unnecessarily. As to what is the meaning of the act of
philosophizing, it can be stated that it is a reflective

activity which involves a form and a content, that the form works conceptually upon the content, and that in this way a philosophical judgment, right or wrong, is arrived at in respect of the content. This, I think, is a fair, broad description of what would or should happen in a representative act or unit of philosophizing, which a philosopher, who knows his business, would not, for the most part, disavow. What may be disputed seriously is the range allowed to the form and the content. But, again, determining the range in this context is itself an act of philosophizing, because, philosophy by definition includes all that goes in the name of metaphilosophy.

What is of interest to a microphilosopher is not meta-philosophy in this sense. He is not primarily concerned with the specific nature or direction of either a philosopher's or a metaphilosopher's act of philosophizing. He is concerned to discover and determine what is the act of philosophizing in both these (philosophical and metaphilosophical) kinds of philosophizing. The next step after ascertaining the ingredient concepts and principles of the act of philosophizing can either be positive or negative. Or, the positive can advantageously follow the negative.

Positively, a microphilosopher would go about devising a method of proceeding towards the refinement of the gross stage. The concepts and principles as commonly ingredient in all act

of philosophizing are what he should strive to remain consistent with. For, if philosophizing is philosophically efficacious, the most efficacy can be attained only by remaining most faithful to it, or, in other words, by adhering to the logic of philosophizing. This does not necessitate fidelity to a particular traditional philosophizing. It just involves consistency with the principles and concepts of philosophizing as such. At the same time, in these concepts and principles the microphilosopher has reached what I called the most feasible extreme in the direction of philosophic presuppositionlessness. They give him the minimum presuppositions, because they are the outcome of his effort to find the most common kernel of what is involved in philosophizing. They are also the right philosophical presuppositions, for the reason that they are the conditions of all engagement in philosophical theory.

Now, the methodological strategy for the microphilosopher's back-stage artistry is clearly set. What he needs to do in order to realize his goal of refining the gross stage, that is, of rediscovering or systematically discovering the principle structure of the world of ordinary experience, is to develop his set of minimum presuppositions in the direction of this world. Since his presuppositions involve both concepts and principles, he has in them not only some doctrine to remain consistent with, but also some canonics to guide his way to his

goal. The gross stage, as Wittgenstein has told us, hides a
very rich and complex logic and to reveal it can be a nerve-
breaking enterprise for the traditional philosopher. Our only
hope, then, is to proceed with the microphilosopher. The
latter has the advantage of the logic of philosophizing which
can work as the paradigm for the rich and complex logic of the
gross stage. When he needs to add anything to his apparatus for
reaching the gross stage, he will do it cautiously in harmony
with the paradigm logic.

He will work on theory development till he sees the gross
stage in sufficient fullness. He need not exhaust himself in
seeing all the trivial details of the stage (thus avoiding
criticism such as Blanshard's, pointed out on page 9 above),
for his concern is with the principled structure of the stage.
Because he is acquainted with the stage by instinct and habitual
belief, he will not have difficulties in proceeding towards and
identifying it. When he has reached his goal, he will have
sufficient background experience to tell him what to do with
the archaic decor and theme. His systematic reaching of the
gross stage entails the refinement in the sense I have been
talking about. On refinement, microphilosophy (or pre-perform-
ance back-stage artistry) ends and philosophy (or actual drama
presentation) begins. If philosophy, too, then keeps in mind
both the paradigm logic and the rich stage logic, it will not,

hopefully, be susceptible to repeated failures as it has been.
Any way, its major, internal, dialectical troubles would have
been straightened out.

Alternatively, or negatively, the microphilosopher may
examine whether and to what extent particular (mostly tradi-
tional) acts of philosophizing are consonant with their out-
comes or judgments and move towards refining the gross stage.
This amounts to examining a philosophy's worth by turning all
philosophy's basic, implicit presuppositions against such a
philosophy's explicit presuppositions, processes, and conclu-
sions. Such particular, negative, critical analysis would be
the microphilosopher's subordinate theme, while the foregoing
outline account of the counterpart, positive, constructive
methodology indicates his principal theme. The former can
serve as a background for elaborating the latter. It need not
be pointed out how important it is to undertake, first, an
illustrative, critical enterprise and, then, to proceed towards
the actual construction. The former enterprise forms essen-
tially the auxiliary theme, but in various ways it can help
the latter construction. The philosophical giants, to be sure,
have done their construction in this way only. In fact, there
may indeed be much to learn from both their achievements and
shortcomings.

The execution of the whole program would be, of course, an ambitious and strenuous enterprise, open to judgment by consequences. What I can say in conclusion of the above discussion is that an endeavor in this direction looks like it would be worth-while and that we can decipher a signal to proceed on a note of confident suspense.

So far I have been describing philosophical logic or reason in relation to microphilosophical workabilism or feasibilism in terms of the fiture of theater or the metaphor of dramas. I will now abandon the figure or metaphor and attempt an explication of microphilosophical feasibilism as contra-distinguished from philosophical rationalism or logicism. The explication will still remain confined to initial clarifications in this chapter. I hope, however, that contrasting this feasibilism with the abstract reason of traditional philosophy (decor) will serve the important purpose of showing the importance of the relatively new and useful concept and function of philosophy that is envisaged in the idea of exploring the grounds of feasibility. I will start with a nonmetaphorical unpacking of what philosophy usually does and then I will converge on what it should rather do.

Is philosophy no more than a controversial word capable of exciting strong and conflicting emotions? The latter may be incidental to the utterance of the word "philosophy" rather

than relevant to the import of the word. But the emotional excitement is perhaps natural, because, traditionally, philosophy has claimed to pronounce ultimate judgments on the basis of all that the human life stands for. The excitement is heightened by the added claim of philosophy to judge all possible, general standpoints of human life from a uniform, objective standpoint. The latter standpoint would remain an unrealized ideal in philosophy, if genuine and significant differences in the former standpoints are allowed to persist. To the extent that such differences project themselves in the ideal philosophical standpoint, philosophy remains infested by conflict and controversies.

General standpoints of life are more or less subjective or objective. Their conflict due to the just-referred strife may become a regular feature of the human intersubjectivity, of the actual interpersonal discourse. On the face of it, it is difficult to rule out subjectivity or objectivity altogether. Yet, an exploration of the possibilities of minimizing the conflict and the adverse effects of the conflict on the human society does not, prima facie, appear to be a foredoomed or unjustified endeavor.

Then let philosophy be such an endeavor. Thus interpreted, philosophy's ulterior effect would be to minimize the strong and conflicting emotions incidental to the public

utterance of the words cognate with "philosophy." But the
proximate and the main task of philosophy would be to minimize
the conflict among the basic standpoints of human life, regard-
less, so far as possible, of the logical, empirical, valua-
tional, or other causes of the conflict. Viewed thus, philos-
ophy would be an attempt at the minimization of the conflicting
standpoints of human life. The minimizing of the strong con-
flicting emotions usually attached with the public exercise of
philosophy would then be only incidental to the larger issue of
reducing the conflict of standpoints in general.

It is plausible that no other science or branch of
knowledge can be thought of as more fundamental and comprehen-
sive than philosophy, for this can be seen to follow from the
very definition of philosophy. It has been claimed for philos-
ophy that it is the highest form of knowledge, dealing with
"reality" as against "appearance" and comprehending all being
and knowledge. Traditional philosophy, especially metaphysics,
has certainly attempted to arrive at such knowledge, but judged
by the results the claim is hardly sustainable. Perhaps,
instead of reducing the existing conflicts it has created a
complex network of its own internal conflicts of polar differ-
ences of views, methods, and conclusions. One can hardly get
two philosophers to agree on all important points. With this
it has also to be said that the historical failure of philosophers

to reach their aim does not in itself warrant the adverse anti-philosophical, nihilist conclusion that there are no philosophical statements at all. Not only that we can turn the meaning of the word "philosophy," which is but too comprehensive to be clear, against the anti-philosopher in order to make his view appear as philosophical scepticism or nihilism rather than anti-philosophism; the anti-philosophical conclusion in its respectable form is also a theoretical standpoint and hence does not stand demonstrated by an imperfect induction from a practical failure of philosophers which, though frequent, is finite and not really conclusive. There seems then nothing in itself that can be said a priori to be wrong with the philosophical aim and purpose.

What is wrong then? Why the repeated failure? One reason at least seems obvious; it is an impatient lack of moderation. Philosophers have persistently tried to run over all error and falsehood and to remove all doubts for ever in order to have an absolutely certain truth or reality. As in the other fields of knowledge, so also in philosophy or metaphysics, the human mind desires to skip over rather than consider the subjections and commitments to which it lies bare, and then attempt in haste and eventually in vain to reach an unconditioned and uncommitted truth and to know the absolute, certain, and ultimate reality. Stages are ignored quite often and middles are excluded for all

practical purposes. The polar extreme of logic is held paramount and sovereign. Unfortunately again, the anti-logicist alternatives tried are equally extremist and do not attempt to examine seriously the root of the trouble. They, on the contrary, arrest themselves by resting on intuitions based (that is, when based, if at all) on rhetoricism (Henri Bergson?) and mysticism (St. Francis of Assisi?). They are also overpowered by those views which adhere to rationality as the operative criterion, for they are anxiously, though negatively and by way of reaction, concerned to disparage rationalism. An examination of the exact conditions and the actual commitments involved in the very activity of philosophizing is hardly carried out without some preconceived imbalance and partiality.

One root of the whole trouble then seems to lie mainly in the assumption of philosophical logicism[17] that the laws of logic are independent and underived,[18] and that consistency is neither subject nor committed to anything whatever. Alternatively it would lie in the anti-logicist assumption that some privileged intuition[19] or experience is in itself sufficient for human understanding, and not only that it does not need a logical justification but it also transcends logic and is consequently immune to all logical criticism. Anyone who tries some other way ends up usually in a mess of logicism and anti-logicism, and is forced to make the mess acceptable or

respectable through dialectical sophistry or rhetorical mysti-
cism.   This whole situation is describable as the theoretical
imbroglio of traditional philosophy.

But no appreciable impact of this theoretical imbroglio is
felt on the practical human life.   (This is one point emphasized
in Wittgenstein's later philosophy.)   This is probably because
the human mind has secured its safety through building around
itself the practical imbroglio of naive realism, better called
normalism, to avoid its unpleasant traditional metaphysical
impressions.   Theorists of philosophy, for the large part, make
simple, standard, adverse pronouncements upon naive realism.
But they cannot help this realism in practice and then in effect
lead a self-discrepant life, thinking that there is no contra-
diction in their life because they claim an abstract distinction
between theory and practice.   On the other hand, the normalist
castle, at first sight at least, seems to be made up of mere
conceit and simple complacence.   But it works admirably.   Accord-
ing to the theorists it is a bundle of inconsistencies and a
mess of theoretical oversights.   Apparently there is a theoreti-
cal imbroglio behind it.   The question is whether this particular
workable imbroglio is not philosophically better or more accept-
able than the general unfeasible one referred to above by the
phrase "the theoretical imbroglio of traditional philosophy."
The value judgment is obviously in its favor; and, for example,

G. E. Moore did this favor. Apart from favoritism, the first

question of philosophic methodology develops this form: Why

is the particular theoretical imbroglio at the basis of

normalism translatable into feasibility while no such other

imbroglio seems to be so translatable? Is it just so, without

any reason? This is the microphilosophical problem of the

grounds of feasibility.

The paramountcy of the problem of the grounds of feasi-

bility is obvious from the fact that feasibility can never be

transcended even by an extremist theorist. The theorist's life

remains discrepant with his unverifiable theory. Such self-

discrepancy is not reconcilable with the spirit of theorizing.

No philosophical theorist appears to have a clear answer to the

question why he has not seriously tried to search and examine

the grounds of feasibility. There is scarcely an appreciable

attempt even to find a suitable excuse for this omission, except

that sometimes a self-righteous value is claimed for arm-chair

engagement in theory.

We saw above that the philosophical effort is best directed

towards the minimization of the human conflict in general. It

is plain that neither the theoretical imbroglio nor the self-

discrepancy attached to it can in itself do it, for the stand-

points of human life cannot be monopolized by the theorists

alone because there are untheorized standpoints after all. In

fact, material conflicts usually arise on workable and hardly
on unworkable points. Then any metaphysical theory which
neglects the grounds of feasibility looks insufficient and
lopsided, for it fails to take cognizance of any material point
of conflict with the necessary background context, let alone the
question of reducing or minimizing the conflict in such context.
The examination of the grounds of feasibility thus assumes a new
dimension of importance and makes the problem paramount and
primary. The philosophy which considers the grounds of feasibil-
ity as a methodologically basic and paramount point of inquiry
we call "microphilosophy." The ground-structure of feasibility
may be called "philosophical feasibilism." We shall distinguish
other philosophical theories inclusively and negatively as
"nonfeasibilist."[20] Let us now consider some possible important
objections from the standpoint of nonfeasibilist theorizing.

The theorist[21] may say that since feasibility or normalism
is a bundle of ignorant inconsistencies, so also must be its
grounds and the latter then cannot be anything other than an
incompetent theoretical imbroglio. But after having spent
centuries in exercising his competence (which is not doubted),
what he has arrived at is no more than an array of unfeasible
theoretical imbroglios, whose unavailing internal conflict is
affective more than effective. The normalist or feasibilist
is successful perhaps by sheer chance, but this needs to be

established and it would be the case only if he is identified

with the naive realist who is not torn by anxieties to know his

own grounds. The job of the feasibilist is the examination of

these grounds which no nonfeasibilist thinks of transcending in

actual practice. If we make insanity as definitionally the

only alternative to a conscious and willful transgression of the

concepts and principles of minimum feasibility, no collection--

however big--of unfeasible but so-called competent theoretical

imbroglios would be a proper substitute for the single feasible

though so-called incompetent theoretical imbroglio behind the

minimum human feasibility. Since sanity is a clear precondition

of rationality, the latter would also be self-defeating in ignor-

ing the conditions of the former, that is, the grounds of minimum

feasibility.

The nonfeasibilist may then strike another blow. According

to him there are at least two inconsistencies apparent in the

view that philosophy should first of all examine the grounds of

minimum feasibility. In the first place, to hold that the

problem of the grounds of feasibility is paramount in philosophy

together with or on the basis of the conviction that feasibility

can never be transcended is a patent, hopeless, and self-

destructive contradiction. He may ask how the feasibilist has

suddenly transcended the feasibility just in order to know and

assert its paramountcy and inevitability. In the second place,

he may charge the feasibilist with another contradiction in that
while remaining within the feasibility the feasibilist is able
to examine not only itself but also its grounds.

Now, the different ways out for the feasibilist to dislodge
the non-feasibilist from this critical view are to show that
(1) the non-feasibilist is himself inconsistent in showing these
inconsistencies, (2) he is always inconsistent and self-losing
through his insisting upon the independence, self-sufficiency,
and self-evidence of consistency, and (3) consistency is a
child and not the father of minimum feasibility as he appears
to be thinking. On the success of this three-pronged attack on
the theoretical nonfeasibilist then finally depends the present
typical view that philosophy is primarily concerned with a
consideration of the grounds and sources of the minimum human
workability.[22] Though the nonfeasibilist is likely to conclude
that such an attack is foredoomed because it involves a challenge
to the unchallengeable sovereignty and independence of logic and
to the universality of the application of its laws, it will seem
not only that the attack can succeed but also that the so-called
sovereignty, independence, or universality of logic based on
self-consistency is no more than a hypothesis of feasibility
applicable only in set contingencies.

In short, with the conclusion of the three-pronged attack
on non-feasibilism, one can plausibly conclude the justification

of microphilosophy or philosophical method of considering first

the grounds of feasibility for the eventual and better-grounded

philosophical consideration of the everyday world of experience.

The latter consideration, however, would be a positive effort

at construction which is better strengthened by a negative and

illustrative, though not exhaustive, support in the form of

showing that some of its important alternatives are untenable.

The important alternatives mainly belong to nonfeasibilism.

So philosophical feasibilism is eventually led to justify its

reply to the nonfeasibilist's second reason against considering

the grounds of feasibility; that is to say, it must be shown

that important nonfeasibilist theories are theoretical imbroglios.

This is already though quite imperfectly shown by the historical

failure of nonfeasibilism and also by its unending internal

conflicts, but its systematic, substantial demonstration from

the point of view of philosophical feasibilism is a different

matter and is separately necessary. However, before turning to

specific, important, nonfeasibilist alternatives, we should

briefly examine some general nonfeasibilist claims.

As a matter of convention, the nonfeasibilist theorists

claim that their theorizing or metaphysics is an intellectual

pursuit which (1) is uniquely self-critical, (2) does not

leave anything unquestioned, and (3) proceeds without any

assumptions whatever.[23]

First. An attitude of self-criticism is surely desirable
in general to the extent that it leaves sufficient scope for
correction, improvement, and development within itself. But
it would scarcely be so in particular when a unique attitude
of self-criticism leads repeatedly to failure in its construc-
tive aspects, and eventually tends to establish itself as self-
immolatory rather than self-critical. In brief, the self-
criticism which cannot transcend itself in order to achieve a
standpoint for itself that cannot be easily criticized is self-
defeating and reduces its self-glorification to a self-discrep-
ancy unable to yield a lasting and concrete construction.

I am aware that this way the argument may not lead to
feasibilism only. It may alternatively lead to full-blooded
scepticism or philosophical nihilism. But the latter is no
peaceful refuge. In fact the argument persists and follows the
sceptical nonfeasibilist in order to question the source of his
negatively certain knowledge.[24] It would appear, then, that
one is justified in denouncing this unending and self-cancelling
self-criticism, whose uniqueness seems to consist in the fact
that it can criticize unterminatingly all attempt to construct
--and also not to construct!--positively. Actually, it yields
no constructive principle. This conclusion may, however, be
viewed as a hasty generalization from the historical failure
of nonfeasibilism to arrive at an agreed construction. So, it

must be strengthened by providing a theoretical demonstration in its support. But this is better treated as a part of positive construction.[25] Here we restrict ourselves to negative dissection, being an attempt to show the feasibilism-connected reasons for the fialure of important nonfeasibilist theories.[26]

Second. To be sure, the nonfeasibilists indeed try to leave nothing unquestioned. But unfortunately they, or at least their critics and successors who fall in the same line, include their answers also among their questionable points. Hence their position that they continue to ask questions or answer questionably. Apparently, there is no anxious concern to find out the root of the trouble. This is probably in the hope that some time someone will find unquestionable answers. So far the hope is not fulfilled. The adverse conclusion of feasibilism should not be a mere generalization from this negative failure, but since our immediate concern does not exceed to positive construction, only two points will be made.

Firstly, the nonfeasibilists (rather helplessly) leave out one principle unquestioned, and it is the principle of questionability itself.[27] Question this principle and then question nothing. Faced with this dilemma they unavoidably surrender to the convenient and favored side. But in consequence their resultant standpoint remains lopsided. They seem to be omitting to inquire into that which probably dooms the principle to an

inevitable lopsidedness and consequently to an incurable internal

inconsistency. If they were ready to face any unpleasant situa-

tion in the interests of reason (as they so proudly claim), they

would have questioned the principle of questionability itself.

With this microphilosophical questioning, the philosophical

enterprise eventually takes the feasibilist turn, and it does

not, as is sometimes supposed by nonfeasibilists, degenerate

into a futile, endless game merely.[28]

Secondly, to balance or make for a basic contradiction one

presumably needs or runs into more contradictions at further

stages of construction. Here then lies a self-imposed though

unpremeditated limit of the nonfeasibilist self-criticism expos-

ing a fatal inconsistency. Is this not at least one of the

reasons why nonfeasibilist theoretic construction is found

ultimately to be a theoretic mess unacceptable to the rational

conscience of the theorist himself? A double-dealing seems

evident. The theorist for long overlooks a basic contradiction.

Consequently, when the compensating contradictions pile up to an

alarming number, at too late a stage he becomes aware of the

malady he has got into. But instead of reviewing the founda-

tions of his edifice in order to detect and rectify the basic

mistake by examining his preconceived reason, he goes on

shuffling and reshuffling the superstructure in vain. Wittgen-

stein was perhaps right in aiming at destroying such shufflings,

"houses of cards" in his words,[29] but all-round destruction here

is unrealistic in terms of human nature and to disclaim a

foundation at any stage or kind of structure is unfeasible.[30]

Third. It is not correct to say that the nonfeasibilistic

philosophy dispenses with all assumptions whatever, for, as seen

above, it takes, for example, the principle of questionability

for granted. This principle needs to be assumed, for, other-

wise, conventional nonfeasibilist philosophy would not be

possible. If it is argued that the principle is indispensable,

the reply would be that, even if it is so, its cost has to be

paid in terms of giving up consistency in a basic issue.[31] The

nonfeasibilist philosophy, particularly its intellectualist

strand insisting on discursive reason, is not till date really

convinced of a logic which does not exclude all middles. Even

the "ordinary language philosophy" emphasizes a high temperature

of argument and revels in making, rather than directing, rich

though subtle distinctions. If an uncompromising rigidity of the

logic of excluded middle is the essense of strict consistency,

its unquestioned surrender in a basic issue like the starting-

point principle of questionability--it is basic because discur-

sive inquiry cannot start without it--would appear to be a

symptom of theoretic laxity hardened by habit[32] but rooted in

preserving the value vested in a particular, preconceived logic.

Again, every nonfeasibilist theory has its basic truth-criterion which has to be presupposed as self-evident, at least implicitly, if not in express theory statements. But self-evidence may vary from self to self; Descartes' "I" and Hume's challenging denial of its occurrence, for instance.[33] A proposition which is self-evident to one may not be so to another; and there is also no self-evident reason why it should be so for all. Broadly, either one or more of the three, that is, experience, reason, and value, in general or their specifications in particular are adopted variously as such criteria. It is hard to see how a process can start without any assumptions whatsoever, for something has to start and that which starts the process or that with which the process starts cannot be reduced to nothing, because otherwise nothing can result from such process or inquiry and eventually no philosophy would consequently be possible. Reductions to "everybody-presupposes-so-what?" kind of truism and consequently to "if-you-can't-be-wrong-you-can't-be-right-either" kind of meaninglessness are also suspect in this context for achieving nothing though not for destroying wrong arguments. So also, appeals to "the established principles of inquiry"[34] are excuses to continue in a hardened nonfeasibilist habit.

The ancient Greek principle that nothing can come out of nothing or that being cannot come out of nonbeing is plausible

not only in ontology but also in philosophic method or in inquiry determining our commitments. The very first specific justification in any philosophy needs to presuppose at least one comprehensively applicable standard of justification which of necessity goes unexamined. So, certain basic and material assumptions seem inevitable and the task is to reduce them to the minimum that is possible and feasible and not either to proliferate them or to assert with a conventional rationalist or with a Husserl that one has avoided all of them. A finite activity, such as a conscious discourse of philosophy, cannot start with nothing if it has to end with something, positive (Platonic revision or Strawsonian description) or negative (Buddhist nihilism or Wittgensteinian anti-philosophism). The philosophical truth-criterion--or presuppositions of rational discourse[35]--and the primary material that may survive the application thereof are the methodologically indispensable assumption-tools. The third nonfeasibilist claim of an unassuming method does not, therefore, appear to be either feasible or provable.[36]

Intellectualist nonfeasibilism claims to be accepting only those propositions whose denial is impossible or whose acceptance is involved in their attempted denial. This standpoint reduces to the proposition which can be worded as "presumption in attempted denial yields truth." The proposition

is of course an extension of the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle on which it exclusively rests. The point is that you are inconsistent in denying a proposition which exemplifies this proposition. Here, the possibility of excluding everything in any denial or negation goes unexamined and is assumed inadvertently without serious consideration. There is no such possibility in microphilosophy or the most fundamental issues of philosophy, and it is its repeated observation in many nonfundamental issues that seduces its almost universal assumption in all nonfeasibilist intellectualism.

A detailed demonstration of this view is a part of positive construction, but something must be said, though in the present context it is likely to appear categorical. This is one of the root-causes of much theoretical imbroglio.[37] Nor is the scope of negation uniform. It varies according to the status or category of the subject of negation (and not to the "richness" of ordinary language which, though, may represent it with varying fidelity). Feasibilism is not only committed to this view, it also carries with it a more or less clear understanding of the scope in a hierarchy of most frequent and recurring categorial situations. I will confine myself to one immediately mentionable point.

Is not self-undeniability a contradiction in itself? For, a self-undeniable statement of doctrine or entity either transcends negation and then gets everything denied of it including

self-deniability. And even if it is possible, does it not then

challenge the universality of the application of the laws of

logic? Wherein then lies the peculiarity of all those things

or matters by virtue of which they are able to transcend their

own denial and are thus immune to any attempted negation of

themselves? Are not all matters deniable at least in theory?

When even the denial itself is deniable, to yield a positive

assertion ($- -\underline{p} = \underline{p}$), what may possibly prevent a particular

positive assertion from getting denied? And then, should not

undeniability be construed as immunity to logic? Does not the

acceptance of the possibility of undeniability mean the admission

of matters which can skip over logic itself? Logic cannot apply

to any matter that cannot be denied. Again, when the logicist

admits the truth of an undeniable entity, does he have any

logical ground therefor, or is his admission just seduced or

kidnapped by a feeling of overawe due to the ability of the

entity to escape the so-called application of the laws of logic

or due to his unability to stand the self-imposed inconsistency

resulting from his denial of undeniability?

Alternatively, do the undeniabilities include their own

negation within themselves rather than transcend or escape them?

If they include their own negation, they are self-contradictory,

and if they do not, it is hard to see how they cannot then be

denied if at all logic is universally applicable. In case logic

does not apply to them, they cannot be justified on any logical ground. Strangely, such justification is, however, usually claimed by the nonfeasibilism of the intellectualist cadre. Even if no such claim is made, it is difficult to construe sheer immunity to logic as truth, unless a positive and specific nonlogical criterion is adopted. But the latter is hardly specified in practice, and one is asked to endorse the truth of statements on the mere negative basis of their undeniability. The issue finally exposes the nonfeasibilist intellectual as an escapist, for facing a situation where either his theoretical act of denial is inconsistent or the entity is inconsistent for his failure to act, he prefers to ensure his consistency at the cost of that of the innocent entity (or statement - this differ- ence is not important here) whom, then, he seeks to flatter by glorifying its "deniable" inconsistency and elevating it to truth even without the operation of any specific criterion. But why should the poor entity suffer and ratify his self-discrepancy? He perhaps has a way out, but his unquestioned endorsement of outright and uncompromising consistency does not permit him to look for it. In such situations he would better immediately go out to examine the very foundations of negation and consistency to determine what it is that leads to the unescapable inconsis- tency in such recalcitrant and inconvenient cases.

A point is sometimes sought to be made in support of non-feasibilism by stating that the latter has effectively and significantly contributed to a number of aspects of civilization and hence its claims ought to be taken seriously. The civilization is perhaps not the effect or result of nonfeasibilism but of feasibilism, and it has kept a safe place for nonfeasibilism to translate itself into feasibilism, and, by our definition of minimum feasibility, it is the lunatic asylum. It is indeed outrageous to impute insanity to all nonfeasibilism,[38] but to the extent that its results are in direct consequence of a disregard of feasibility, in the name of theory or logical discourse or whatever, it is hard to say that they do not frustrate the very nature of meaningful life-activity. Otherwise, by no stretch of the imagination can the effective and significant contribution to civilization by itself be regarded as an adequate, absolute, and universal standard to pronounce competent philosophical judgments on the truth and value of the nonfeasibilist philosophy in general, for the simple fact that philosophy is definitionally wider in scope than civilization and deals with the very foundations of civilization and of many other matters. Also, perhaps only a naive feasibilist viewpoint may regard the success or progress of civilization to be in itself a criterion of philosophical truth; a nonfeasibilist view, any way, would not be consistent in making such an effort.

I have not denied that there can be a theoretical imbroglio

of a mixture of feasibilism and nonfeasibilism. To the extent

that such a syncretic mess is based on feasibilism it may work,

but then its workability can scarcely be attributed to its non-

feasibilist statements. To show the whole point at least some

instances must be pointed out. Advocates of nonfeasibilism may

cite, as relevant examples, the indication of the possibility of

mathematical physics in Plato's _Timaeus_, the Cartesian interpre-

tation of life in mechanical terms, and the great influence of

Hegelianism on the study of history and sociology. It will seem

that feasibilism is quite flexible and would accordingly endorse,

of course, within the limits of feasibility, all the three

influences, namely mathematical physics, a mechanicism of life,

and a Hegelian sociology. This endorsement is always hypotheti-

cal and subject to the condition that the influences operate and

behave properly within the limits of feasibility. Later

Wittgenstein has made it clear that nonfeasibilism cannot claim

to have significantly influenced feasibilism. Or else, normalism

would not have survived the long ages of continual attacks of

conventional philosophy. This fact in itself evidences the

power of feasibilism and spells caution against the acceptability

of nonfeasibilism. This enduring power of feasibilism, remarkable

in contradistinction against a diversity of nonfeasibilist

theories, appears to make microphilosophy's task of examining the

grounds of feasibility a promising and plausible enterprise.

Let us examine a rather negative defense of nonfeasibilism from the considerations of scientific method. The nonfeasibilist philosophers or some revisionary metaphysicians are sometimes described or psychologically "explained" away as disgruntled occult-lovers or habitual mystery-mongers. Plato, to instance, is lined up with them because he postulated Forms which are quite remote from all sensual experience and all physical Heraclitian change. But there is no similar denunciation of, say, the physicist postulating unobservable elementary particles or the economist positing the economic men. Examples can of course be multiplied. The scientist here is supposed to escape the charge because his postulation is construed as a legitimate act of explanation of the actualities with which he is concerned. The nonfeasibilist metaphysician is on the other hand subjected to the charge for quite similar attempt at explaining the actualities.

Now, the comparison is perhaps not altogether legitimate, even apart from the consideration that one should not always be led away by a sort of popular pragmatic criticism like this, particularly if one has fully ensured his own sincerity against easy seductions. The nonfeasibilist metaphysician seeks to explain all possible actualities which are infinite in number and unlimited in variety, and this attempt of his is exactly one of the forces that leads him to nonfeasibilism. He wants

to explain our immediate sensual world, but his law of excluded
middle prevents him from using the terms of the fleeting sensory
world, and he is then per force committed to attributing super-
sensible qualities to it in the name of the ultimate reality
behind the sensed world. In his view such an attribution is
ultimately inevitable and then this view contaminates and per-
vades his entire vision.

The scientist has, on the contrary, a limited field, and
not only that his field is usually within the range of feasi-
bility but he can also feel free to operate it from without
though still remaining within the conditions of feasibility.
But the moment he is not able to explain the events in his
field within these conditions he must go out of the latter
though with great reluctance and utmost caution. Even in such
unhappy moments he tries his best to stick to the principles of
feasibility and restricts the scope of speculation to the
minimum.

On the other side, the nonfeasibilist, worrying through an
intuitively self-righteous two-valued logic which is impossible
in his field, is ex hypothesi and from the beginning of his
discursive enterprise committed to speculative attribution of
unfeasible qualities to the feasible world. The difference in
the attitudes of the nonfeasibilist and the scientist is indeed
great in terms of self-sincerity and fidelity to evidence; it is

also sufficient to relieve, to a great extent, the scientist,

but not the nonfeasibilist, of the disparaging charge of being

a mystery-monger. The scientist's challenge for a better

explanation remains wide open to all, and any theory explaining

the actualities in relatively greater consonance with feasibilism

as compared to others is likely to be endorsed as against the

others. Moreover, the scientist is consciously unhappy about

his reluctant nonfeasibilism, while the nonfeasibilist, due to

his idiosyncratic notion of sincerity, relinquishes conscience

in this sense, and is led to thrust his workings on the common

man who not without reason retorts with the charge of mystery-

mongering.

Further, the scientist does not proclaim his nonfeasibilism

to be a properly verified truth. Nonfeasibilism is by defini-

tion unverifiable, because it is not possible to see it at work.

It is "irrefutable" but it is not perhaps without immunity

against a reductive operation to meaninglessness through a

slogan[39] of ordinary language philosophy, namely, "if you can't

be wrong, you can't be right either." The scientist, in dis-

tinction, posits his nonfeasibilism as a hypothesis. He is fair

and cautious enough to do this even when he is well within

workability. The nonfeasibilist metaphysician, on the other

hand, recalcitrantly posits his speculative discoveries as

absolute, certain, and uncommitted truths illuminating the

ultimate reality of the universe. An ancient argument of his

against this is that, since he has to explain everything, his

explanation cannot be expected to be in terms of anything, and

he has, per force, to transcend everything. My principal objec-

tion, probably unlike the logical positivist objections, is that

his tacit unquestioned assumption that he can so transcend

everything in his speculations is ill-evidenced and hence

unfounded.

Since my critique of some important nonfeasibilist doctrines

and presuppositions is to be in terms of the principles of

philosophical feasibilism, some description of the latter must

be made, although an elaborate justification is not in place

here and now. By expressions such as "grounds of feasibility"

or "principles of minimum workability" I mean those conditions

and assumptions which almost every normal human being per force

takes for granted in all of his meaningful dealings with his

environment. This does not impute an elaborate metaphysical

theory to him, but I wish to suggest that he at least works

through such implicit grounds or principles even if he does not

want or need to express them in theory statements. In fact, if

called upon, he may not be able to recognize them philosophically

or to make cogent theory statements about them, but his lack of

metaphysical training does not hinder the workings of his

implicit theory whose essence consists in feasibility and

neither in determinate intelligibility nor in rigid consistency.
"Normalism" implies that the human being's environment in
general is workable, that is, at least amenable and available
to his understanding. I must reject imputation of close affinity
of this view to traditional pragmatism, practicalism, or natur-
alism, for the reason that these latter are varieties of post-
feasibilism and hardly attempt even a post mortem of feasibility.

What I mean is this. Feasibilism in general and in practice
may vaguely include some post-feasibilism near the boundary line,
but the job of the feasibilist philosophical method is to hold
top priority for the examination of minimum feasibility. By
minimum feasibility I mean those conditions of man's environment
which make the "types" or root concepts of the latter understand-
able, applicable, and usable.

Pointing out some concrete instances will help to clarify
this. A normal human being takes for granted, in his kind of
sense which may not always or necessarily coincide with the
requirements of a metaphysician's critical discourse, his own
self, cognitions, emotions, intentions, purposes, mind, thought,
memory, imagination, knowledge, belief, number, time, space,
substance, qualities, relations, change, causality, matter,
material bodies, uniformity of nature, physical laws, other
persons' bodies, life, communicability of his understanding and
experience, and then other persons' selves, cognitions, emotions,

etc. on the lines similar to his, leading ultimately to a common "independent" world. (This may be a plea for ordinary thought or understanding, but not for ordinary language which may, though, represent or work for and, at times, cloud and confuse it.) Whatever he thinks or does, he takes at least some of these types to be granted. By the phrase "principles of minimum workability" then I mean the minimum of these types that is absolutely required to be able to escape lunacy.

Accordingly, philosophical feasibilism would mean a clarification and examination of those principles of a human being's normalcy which, when denied, should be immediately symptomatic or otherwise indicative of lunacy. I am not suggesting that insanity can result from such denial and from nothing else either jointly or separately, nor am I implying that in all lunacy all the principles of minimum workability are constantly violated. Also, the contrast with lunacy, though helpful for the sake of understanding, is not intended to be construed literally and with strick rigidity, for flexibility or adjustment is the very essence of feasibilism. Evidently, denunciation of these principles or of their flexibility can hardly be sincerely proclaimed either by way of sophistry in the name of strict logic or for the sake of unbridled intuition in the name of revelation. Any such disparagement can, in the conceptual framework of the present view, be admitted only on a

nonfeasibilist foothold, and "explaining" the principles on such

footing is not admissible as a genuine and earnest explanation.

Not requiring a philosophizer, normalism is obviously self-

contained and consequently, no normal human being feels the need

of getting his environment or the so-called ultimate reality

behind the latter understood or explained through anything which

his normalism does not take for granted, that is, through any-

thing extraneous to the environment itself as comprehended

through the principles of minimum workability. In pragmatism,

generally, what works in any particular stage of practice is

individually true, while in minimum workability only that with-

out which no practice whatever is possible is feasibly true.

Pragmatism would, on this account, be a complacent after-

play. Philosophical feasibilism, on the other hand, would

maintain that there are such principles as not only make minimum

workability possible and normal experience real, but also allow

themselves to be known within their own range, in their own terms,

without involving any real--the apparent one is quite obvious--

contradiction. It would also think that to disparage the real

normal experience as mere appearance--compare Bradley, for

example--is untenably self-discrepant. Of course, nonfeasi-

bilism has, through a number of centuries, attempted to convince

the normal human being of just the reverse, that is, to think

that the apparent ordinary experience is real is hypocritical

or illogical.

This is no Johnsonian kicking of a stone nor Moorean raising
of a hand. This is also not a popular appeal to common sense,
nor a Wittgensteinian assemblage of reminders. The value-choice
between the two opposing charges or persuasions is of course in
favor of feasibilism, for the latter at least allows us some-
thing while nonfeasibilism rather robs us of everything that we
commonly cherish except perhaps a "rational" appetite. Further,
feasibilism survives and still thrives over many a buried non-
feasibilist theory. But it is not such a surface consideration,
nor a sophisticated variant of it in terms of Moorean analytical
subtleties, that has prompted me to undertake the present work.
My problem belongs to philosophic inquiry or discourse proper.
I wish to lay feasibilism open to a discursive or dialectical
examination, though the present part of my work is confined to
criticizing some vital aspects of nonfeasibilist dialectic both
on the latter's own and feasibilist grounds.

But I must state my problem. The question which I
originally asked myself is this: What exactly is it in our
imperfect and incoherent ordinary world and understanding that
forcibly kidnaps our sense of reality, persistently refuses to
admit anything extraneous to repair or compensate its imperfec-
tion and inconsistency, thrivingly survives the suggestions of
any alternatives without getting dissatisfied with its defects
and losing self-confidence on that account at any stage, and

dooms all our efforts to have a glimpse of the real postulated
as the perfect and the consistent, reducing thereby such
traditional philosophical endeavors to hypocrisy?

I must decline to consider as adequate such ad hoc,
evasive, offhand, vague, and perhaps unthinking answers as that
it is our instinct, craze, habit, intellectual insincerity,
arbitrariness, conservativism, muddle-headedness, love of the
sensual, certain vested values, or unexamined life, which is
responsible for this. Some such answers are often the bottom-
excuses for much discursive metaphysics, for the typically
Western intellectual turn in philosophy. On the other hand,
theological stories like sin, guilt, or corruption of the soul
are also out of question as even approximately correct answers.[40]
But I have no doubt about the relevancy or even the centrality of
the question in philosophy and I hold that the question is not
yet satisfactorily answered within or without philosophy. I
hope this will be clear as I proceed further. But I think it is
plain that, if the question is the right one to be asked, philo-
sophical feasibilism would probably be its sole satisfactory
answer.

Notes: Chapter I

[1] Boston, 1949, p. 328.

[2] Contemporary British Philosophy, Third Series, ed.
H. D. Lewis (London, 1956), pp. 480-482.

[3] New York, 1929, p. 23.

[4] Individuals (Garden City, New York, 1963), xv.

[5] The term "descriptive metaphysics" is Strawson's.
By the term "prescriptive metaphysics" I mean roughly what
Strawson intends by "revisionary metaphysics." See Straw-
son, xiii.

[6] G. J. Warnock, English Philosophy Since 1900 (Oxford,
1958), part reprinted in Human Experience and Its Problems,
ed. Alexander N. Tsambassis (Belmont, California, 1967), pp.
209-210.

[7] Cf. Hume's treatment of self and causality, for example.
Also, see Warnock's discussion of Waismann's view of metaphy-
sical "vision" in which (the latter) "what is decisive is a
new way of seeing and, what goes with it, the will to trans-
form the whole intellectual scene." Warnock's criticism in
his English Philosophy is reprinted in Tsambassis, pp. 206f.

[8] Strawson describes it as the English School, in dis-
tinction from the American School which is his term for the
Formal Language School of Rudolf Carnap and W. V. Quine.
See his "Construction and Analysis," reprinted in Tsambassis,
p. 32.

[9] My Philosophical Development (New York, 1959), p. 214.

[10] Reason and Analysis (La Salle, 1962), pp. 339, 380-381.

[11] The continuing fidelity to the gross stage (and to the
old decor) is well-reflected in such prominent thinkers as
Strawson, Wittgenstein, Austin, and Kant whose uniform ap-
proach in this regard is concisely brought out and together
by Strawson in Philosophical Logic (Oxford, 1967), pp. 3-4.
For fidelity to decor, cf. R. A. Markus, who brings out the

"modern" concept of philosophy in distinction from Augustine's
concept of philosophia in this way: "In modern usage, 'phi-
losophy,' in whatever way we may wish to characterize this
activity more closely, means an intellectual activity, an
effort of understanding and analysis, a work of man's ratio-
nal mind." "Augustine," A Critical History of Western Philo-
sophy, ed. D. J. O'Connor (London, 1964), p. 80.

12 "Towards," and not quite "to."

13 Logic and Reality (Madison, 1964), p. 13: "In philo-
sophy as elsewhere, the most attention is not always given to
the most profound. Ontology, during the last three hundred
years or so, is a case in point." P. 126: " . . epistemology
is merely the ontology of the knowing situation."

14 Appearance and Reality (Oxford, 1969), xiv.

15 Individuals, p. 257.

16 A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
(Chicago, 1967), pp. 12-13.

17 By "philosophical logicism" I mean the doctrine widely
prevalent in the tradition of Western philosophy that ultimate
problems of philosophy are best treated through logic, or,
more vaguely, through "reason." It reduces philosophical cri-
teria to discursive reason. The analogy with Fregean-Russel-
lian logicism with respect to the foundations of mathematics
may be noticed. It may also be noted that "philosophical lo-
gicism" cuts across the controversy between rationalism and
empiricism, for empiricists are scarcely anti-rationalists,
though, unlike rationalists, they do not elevate "reason" to
vainglorious heights. The doctrine is typically reflected in
Bergmann's unqualified characterization: "Philosophy is dia-
lectical," Meaning and Existence (Madison, 1960), vii.
    Also cf. John Passmore, "Philosophy," Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (New York, 1967), vol. 6, p. 221: " . . the cen-
tral problems of philosophy—although not all problems of
philosophy—turn around the analysis of critical discussion.
. . . peculiarity of philosophy as a form of critical discus-
sion lies in its being a critical discussion of critical dis-
cussion. Elsewhere, he rejects deductive metaphysics in view
of the contemporary situation in philosophy; at the same time
he retains deductions in metaphysics. He appeals to the crea-
tive refinement of philosophical reasoning due to the practise

of deductive metaphysics. See his _Philosophical_ _Reasoning_
(London, 1961), p. 18.

J. J. C. Smart provides a more typical expression of
contemporary philosophical logicism assimilating all (stipu-
latively) meaningful questions of metaphysics or theology
to logical questions. "Metaphysics, Logic, and Theology,"
New _Essays_ _in_ _Philosophical_ _Theology_, ed. Antony Flew and
Alasdaire Macintyre (London, 1955), pp. 26-27.

[18] Cf. for instance Husserl's categorical and polemical
defense of logic against Brentano's psychologism.

[19] Not that the philosophical logicist's "intuition of
reason" or "rational insight" is not or less privileged.

[20] In view of the foregoing discussion it would seem
that nonfeasibilism can be intellectualistic or nonintellec-
tualistic. In general, however, my attack against nonfeasi-
bilism is particularly directed against its intellectualist
manifestations, either rationalist or empiricist. I do not
take nonintellectualistic nonfeasibilism as seriously as
the intellectualistic one, not at least in microphilosophy.
I regard it as very important to show the limits of intel-
lectualism or philosophical logicism, though I greatly appre-
ciate the measure of impersonal rigor that logician brings
to philosophy. In sum, I wish to maintain that reason needs
to be seriously answered, not just to be presupposed or de-
nounced. I criticize it because I think it rightly deserves
the respect with which it is regarded generally against
philosophical anti-logicism.

[22] I prefer "feasibility" to "workability," but I occas-
ionally use the latter to break the spell of monotony.

[21] It may be objected that my ensuing dialogue with a
nonfeasibilist theorist is addressed to nobody in particular
and is more a monologue than a dialogue. But, though it may
perhaps be a fact that nobody is an extremist or polar nonfea-
sibilist, my dialogue gains meaning, so I submit, by being
addressed to the prominently nonfeasibilist aspects of intel-
lectualist philosophizings.

[23] In W. H. Walsh's list of Plato's claims on behalf of
philosophy occurs this proposition: "Philosophy differs from
other branches of inquiry (e.g. geometry) (a) in taking no-
thing for granted; (b) in its scope, which is universal;

(c) in being fully intellectual, in no way dependent on sense-experience." Plato's kind of nonfeasibilism had of course an unmistakable influence on the history of Western philosophy. Walsh says, "The claims made by Plato recur over and over again in the history of metaphysics." Meta-physics (London, 1963), pp. 35-36.

24 Guarded scepticism, as different from extreme scep-ticism, is generally not so easy to criticize, but this surely depends on the way it is guarded or conditioned.

25 My positive thesis or constructive proposal appears below in the fourth section (on "knowing") of the fourth chapter and, more elaborately, in the fifth chapter.

26 It may be pointed out, incidentally, that my nega-tive critique of the major nonfeasibilist views is extremely important in bringing about the plausibility and convincing-ness of the positive thesis which will follow it. In the succeeding chapters I will critically deal with Plato, Aris-totle, and, in less detail, with Augustine, Hume, and Straw-son. My criticism will raise and imply several demands against these philosophers and show how the demands are not satisfied. The demands are in terms of microphilosophical feasibilism and are directed against those basic doctrines of these thinkers which are related to philosophical logi-cism. In the elaboration of my positive thesis, I will briefly indicate how these and other demands are satisfied by microphilosophical feasibilism. In order, however, to see significantly that these important demands are fully satisfied within my constructive thesis, a prior reading of the negative critique would be necessary for a complete grasp of the thesis.

27 The present and such other objections may look near-sophistical, but, for one thing, the line of demarca-tion between sophistry and good reasoning is not clear, and, for another, the demarcation cannot be a solely nonfeasi-bilist business. Moreover, drawing the line here is not taken to be predetermined at this stage, nor is it to be borrowed solely from nonfeasibilist logics.

28 It would, though, be such a game in a nonfeasibilist, directionless context of abstract, formal logic.

29 Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, 1953), sec. 118.

30 A comparison (or contrast) may be invited with G. J. Warnock's qualified defense of both Wittgenstein and "houses of cards," English Philosophy Since 1900 (London, 1969), pp. 63f.

31 The alternative, evasive procedure of claiming a privilege, in the interests of logical discourse in the main, is hardly impressive.

32 Or by seductive language use? no, no!

33 Cf. Passmore: "Hume's challenge . . very easily degenerates into mere assertion and counter-assertion. 'I experience no inner feeling of an underlying self,' says Hume; 'I do,' say his critics--and there is, at this level, no way of settling the matter. If it can be shown that it is logically impossible to meet with underlying selves in our experience, the whole question is on a different foot- ing. But how can such an impossibility be proved?" Philo- sophical Reasoning, p. 86.

34 Philosophical Reasoning, p. 146.

35 It is not easy to ascertain such presuppositions, specially in a nonfeasibilist context. Cf. Passmore: "So far what we have taken to be presupposed in discourse is always something formal, e.g. that there are true proposi- tions, that these have implications, that they convey some- thing. The self-refuting argument, that is, has been direc- ted only against the most thorough-going sort of scepticism. Controversial questions arise when we try to extend the range of the argument further; or more generally to consider what discourse presupposes. Philosophical Reasoning, p. 77. See his chapter 4 for a fuller treatment--stimulating though nor convincing--of the problem of constructing the conditions of discourse.

36 The upshot is that presuppositionlessness is to be regarded as unacceptably self-refuting.

37 Elsewhere I have shown this in considerable detail in the context of symbolic logic and logical atomism. Cf. my "A Critique of Logical Atomism" (unpublished master's thesis, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 1969), pp. 166-179.

38 It is tempting here to mention the following out of context: "I haven't said that our opponents are mad; at

least they are not any madder than you or I. These 'irres-
tible' illusions are things we all suffer from; sometimes
they're large and sometimes they're trivial. One can hardly
use so alarming a word as 'madness' to describe a phenomenon
so universal." A. N. Prior, "Can Religion be Discussed?"
New Essays in Philosophical Theology, p. 10.

[39] More respectably, "the argument from excluded oppo-
site" or "the principle of non-vacuous contrasts."

[40] More seriously, however, theology tries to assimi-
late philosophy to its ends. Cf. Jacques Maritain: "We
know that theology, rooted in supernatural faith, makes use
of purely rational disciplines and of philosophy as an in-
strument in order to acquire some understanding of the re-
vealed mysteries. For theology, philosophy is a means;
therefore, theology chooses to put to its service the phi-
losophy most useful for its own purposes." The Range of
Reason (New York, 1952), p. 212. But Maritain loses no
time to assert that a theologically useful philosophy has
to be "true" in the sense that it can reach man's souls to
turn them towards God (p. 213).
      Also, Etienne Gilson declares in the Thomistic vein
that philosophy "is unable to direct itself toward the super-
natural order of revealed truth." He says this is true even
of natural theology, for what is really needed is "sacred
doctrine" which "envisages philosophy such as it can be
seen, in a higher light, as a possible help in the great
work of man's salvation." The Elements of Christian Philo-
sophy (New York, 1963), pp. 35-36.

CHAPTER II

FORMS, PARTICULARS, AND INTUITIVE REASON:
PLATO'S LEGACY TO PHILOSOPHY

In respect of the ensuing dissection of some important nonfeasibilist views, I should clarify that I will be concerned to analyze each of the views in connection with its logically related views. Hence, I will not, in the main, keep up a line of distinction, for instance, between Plato on the one hand and some imagined theorists or "Platonists" supposed to be holding on to the logical consequences of what I take to be "Plato," on the other hand. In the critique which is to follow, I do not aim as much to analyze an individual philosopher for the sake of analysis, as to explicate the negative method of showing how major typical alternatives to philosophical feasibilism turn out to be untenable. I will take up only the main alternatives as they appear typical to me and I will occasionally touch upon the auxiliary points. During the dissective process I will need to mention some seemingly peripheral issues whose treatment, leading to digression and forming part of the positive views I will be developing later, will not be taken up. Nevertheless,

the mention of such issues will show the set and kind of inter-

relations I hold to be there among the specific philosophical

problems in question. From the actually attempted discussions

the dissective method will, expectably, become clear by being

seen in operation. Hopefully, then, the method will be capable

of successful application to relatively minor and atypical non-

feasibilist views left out of consideration. In the process of

the critique, by way of corollary, I will also at times supple-

ment the views under examination by logical points or answers not

explicitly intended by the philosophers concerned. In sum, I

have preferred to subjugate my historical feelings to the inter-

ests of dialectic.

My ostensive but historically unintended imputations of

logical supplements to the philosophers considered, I have

hoped, will be taken to desirable for the sake of a more complete

consideration of the logical ramifications of the main alterna-

tives selected for discussion. Far from treating historical

accuracies without reverence, my intention is to explore the

general dialectical strength and to assess the overall theoretic

value of the philosophic theses examined. There is yet, perhaps,

another point where I may need to be excused. I may seem to do

injustice to some thinkers by appearing to criticize them ir-

respective of the possible environmental limits within or through

which they had to work. The point of such criticism is not that

the thinkers concerned failed to prophesy and work through

the future development of thinking or knowledge. My right to

criticize them does not extend beyond indicating their failure

to realize important logical consequences of their presupposi-

tions. While one cannot expect an individual to incorporate

future knowledge in his philosophy, one can rightly expect him

to adhere to the logic of presupposing or philosophizing and to

the logic of that knowledge which is the paradigm of our incur-

ably shared conceptual assets. This knowledge I have called

"minimum feasibility" and have held discoverable by "micro-

philosophy." So my criticism issuing from this vantage point

can only be seemingly unjustified. Also, philosophical criticism

needs to be completely treated in all its logical possibilities

and implications that are at least relevant and not redundant.

Hence, even from the viewpoint of the historical limitations of

the philosopher under criticism, the injustice that may be alleged

would be more seeming than actual, at least to the extent that

the criticism is directed towards exposing the philosopher's

logical oversights or limitations which he could, in theory,

have avoided through greater diligence or further analysis. I

understand, though, that this gesture of self-defense does not

exonerate me from the liability to commit mistakes in deciding

upon the logical implications or implicit presuppositions of a

given case.

Plato[1] was probably the first to stress the difference

between the states of knowledge and of belief (or opinion) as

typical of the philosopher (or mathematician) and the layman

(or Sophist) respectively. A knowing state reveals clear,

certain, real, and desirable entities, a believing state de-

livers only vague, doubtful, unreal, and undesirable ones.

The basis of difference, however, is probably not of kind but

rather of degree. The forms (structural forms, not Platonic

"Forms") of knowledge and belief are perhaps the same for Plato,

but the former yields infallible result, while the latter is

always faulty due to the correspondingly defective conditions

of both the knowing or believing agent and the known or believed

object. In belief neither the believer nor the believed is in

a suitable state for reception or presentation respectively.

I will call the form that is identical in both knowledge and

belief by the name "apprehension." Plato held that with appre-

hension itself there is also provided the criterion in the form

of intuition to judge whether a particular apprehension is knowl-

edge or belief. Naturally, then, to each state of apprehension

which is belief should correspond one which may be knowledge.

Truth and reality, of course, are by definition the monopoly of

knowledge, and error and appearance the liability of belief.

That which is known is, surely, independent of apprehension, but

this independence is simply intuited and cannot further be

explicated. The known also does not coincide with the cor-
responding believed.

But then what happens to the known in belief? How is it
possible for it to be presented differently in an apprehension
that is belief? And wherein does the difference lie? Even
admitting that the difference is that of degree only, the
question remains as to the nature of that of which the degree
differs. According to Plato, the known gets defective, impure,
and imperfect when believed.

In the apprehension that is belief the known is presented
along with or mixed with or tainted by that which it is not and
with which it eventually contrasts, and the latter is not only
its contradictory but also its contrary (suggesting here a
difference of kind rather than of degree). Besides, anything
known is one, simple, unmixable, and unchanging, while its cor-
responding object of belief is many, various, mixable, and ever-
changing (in a state of flux, to the extent of losing identity):
and the former is indicative of genuineness while the latter that
of spuriousness. In general the objects of belief are constantly
changing and so also is the sense-organ which apprehends them.
These can never reach their corresponding objects of knowledge.
Belief is, like dream, an unconscious mistake of layman. It is
invalid apprehension as against knowledge which is valid appre-
hension. What is denied in belief is not existence but reality,
that is, validity or correct presentation.

Knowledge is far higher in value than belief, and this
dictates the human ethical goal. The opinionist layman or
believer should become the philosopher or knower. Knowledge
agrees or coincides with morality so that no one who is good at
philosophy can be morally depraved, for he has mastered his
passions through an arduous intellectual discipline in order
to be good at philosophy. Of all the apprehended entities the
soul is in ghe closest affinity with the nature of the known,
meaning the Forms, which are the only true objects of knowledge.
Naturally then the soul is immortal as against the body, and to
reach its own purity it must untangle itself from its body,
neglect bodily appetites, dissociate itself from sense-appearances,
and concentrate on intelligible reality. This ethical code of
Plato for all philosophers is sometimes pointed out to show that
Plato is not committed to the metaphysician's common "hypocrisy"
of preaching without practising.

To dwell somewhat more on Plato's influential view before
proceeding with its analysis. A Platonist justification of the
Forms as the objects of knowledge, sometimes called "the argu-
ment from the sciences," can be stated in this way: Arithmetic
and geometry give us a part of knowledge; similarly the rest of
knowledge must be possible, and to maintain the pattern or rigor
of mathematical knowledge the rest of the knowable must be stable
unlike sensible belief; and since intellect is the only alternative

to sense, its existence must be of the intellectual or intel-
ligible type. Restated as an argument from meaning it would
run as follows: The successful use of common terms implies a
clear understanding of their import (meaning) and entails an
acquaintance with their model instances; since no such model
is found in the senses it must then exist in the intellect and
be of the intelligible type. In brief and to be precise, the
nonsensible intersubjective communicability of the knowable, so
admirably exemplified in mathematical knowledge, must extend to
all the knowable on the same pattern as in mathematical knowledge
This implies a set of intelligible Forms. More than one inter-
pretation of their nature can therefore be imputed to Plato.
Since our present inquiry is not concerned with Plato, the man,
as such, but with the important conceivable alternatives, we may
consider the latter without committing ourselves to Plato's
actual intentions.

Three alternatives are immediately apparent: (1) the Form
is the model or ideal image; (2) it is the standard criterion or
principle; (3) it is the conceptual potentiality. I will discuss
the implications and possibilities of each of these alternatives
in the following dissection of Plato's views.

Plato seems, however, to have at least alluded to his pre-
ferences on these alternatives. His treatment of the possible
relation of a Form with its particulars is suggestive of this,

and is that of resemblance between a prototype and its copies.
In other words, a Form is the original of which the particulars
are the imitations. His preference is then for alternative (1)
above with a tinge of (2). This is (4) the imitation theory of
Forms. Plato also suggests an alternative relation of partici-
pation between one Form and its many particulars. On this ac-
count the particulars are said to participate in their Form.
This participation, as conceived by Plato, seems to be of the
actual and structural type rather than of the potential and con-
ceptual type. This view would seem to eventually entail the
traditional logico-ontological dialectic of the one-and-many
type (a la Parmenides). The view is not based on the successful
communication of concepts but on an explication of the actual
phenomenal occurrences. The argument in the participation theory
would run like this: (5) The immediate experience is fragmentary
and contradictory; it cannot be accounted for in its own terms,
for these are at best only ad hoc -- however faithful and skilfull
-- constructions based on the prisoners' finite familiarity with
the recurring shadows, and are incapable of revealing even the
existence of the Cave, not to speak of helping to escape the
latter (the allegory of the Cave is from Plato's Republic, VII).
Truth, meaning a theoretic account of the immediate experience,
that is, the physical events, must then be deducible from a set
of ultimate elements corresponding to the immediate experience.

Such elements are the Forms or Ideas to whose apprehension only the intellect and not the senses can rise.

The explication is no doubt incomplete for it does not explicate the exact nature of the relation between the ultimate fundamental elements, that is, the Forms, and the immediate experience, that is, the particular physical events or sense-deliverances. More than one construction is possible for the vague proposition (which may be phrased as) "the Forms are participated in by their particulars." The apparent alternatives with respect to the nature of the connection of the Forms to the particulars might be one or more of the following: (6) it cannot be known; (7) the Forms cause the particulars mechanically, (8) teleologically, (9) materially, and (10) formally; (11) the Forms are the force behind the phenomenal particulars. Plato seems to be inclined variously and ambivalently towards (6), (8), (10), and (11). I will consider all these alternatives in the following critique of "Plato."

Obviously, Plato was attracted by the unmistakable sense of certainty attaching to mathematical propositions. But instead of searching for the sources of this certainty he moved in the different direction of admiring it as a paradigm of knowledge in order, as a result, to posit speculatively or on pain of intuitive reason (logos) a similarly certain knowledge corresponding to all nonmathematical propositions. The speculative presupposition

appears to be without ground so far as any possible warrant

for its support can be thought of even in logical terms. What

Plato could have done, or what a Platonist needs to do, was to

examine the nature of mathematical truth and certainty in scru-

pulous detail and, on a proper assessment or ascertainment of

its nature, he should have sought to compare it realistically

with the nonmathematical knowledge (or belief -- doxa -- as he

would call it) in order to determine more definitively where

exactly the uncertainty and other defects of the latter came

from. Instead, he sought unconvincingly to label them vaguely

as imperfect, impure, or inconsistent. Plato was also led astray

by the example of mathematical entities as the unchangeable en-

tities, and without, again, trying to explain or elucidate the

changing character of immediate experience, he attempted rather

to belittle this experience on appeal to a postulated, eternal,

ultimate reality. Neither the form of apprehension nor the

nature of the Forms nor their relation with their particulars is

very clear, specially in the absence of pointing out some related,

publicly understandable, paradigm cases. Mathematics seems to

be too specific a paradigm to serve for our insight into the

general understanding required here. It does not seem very use-

ful to make a virtue of these apparent shortcomings in the name

of Plato's ultimate, critical, dramatized agnosticism which spells

"philosophy" and determines its course as a discursive inquiry

for the future. The reason in the present case is that, to be acceptable or respectable, such agnosticism needs to be demonstrated and not left to be imagined as the probable opinion of the philosopher concerned (Plato here). So, the tradition of glorifying Plato's aversion to decisive or deeper statement of basic and crucial issues remains unsatisfactory; it is rather the continuing reason-intoxicated conviction working through Plato's legacy to philosophy conceived as the ultimately un-decidable rational discourse about the world. It is a part of my thesis in the present work that the idea of undecidability here is an artificial product of a perennial commitment to a preconceived reason.

Plato's distinction between knowledge (episteme) and belief (doxa) appears to be intended to distinguish primarily between the correct and the incorrect apprehension. In knowledge one is supposed to have the correct presentation of the known entity. Belief is then illusory. The criterion, it would seem, is the stability of the apprehended entity. It is hard to imagine how the eternal stability of an entity can be grasped, assessed, or ascertained within the finite moments of the apprehension of the entity or how a finite moment can comprehend such eternity in itself. Eternal stability, clearly, does not, as such, seem to be presentable at all in the momentary apprehension which is our only access to it. Plato would then invite us to benefit by the

powers of intuition. Thus intuition is claimed to give us a ready-made result of the application of the truth-criterion of knowledge. So, it need not present us with the eternal stability of an object, it simply convinces us of the stability in relation to the object. The point is that "eternally stable" simply emerges as a correct predicate of the object in question, the process by which its predication is validated, that is, the application of some criterion, remains hidden behind the intuition which provides us merely with a ratified result.

By the very nature of apprehension the criterion or its operation cannot be presented to the apprehending subject in any case, because the criterion being timeless eternity transcends the finite moments of apprehension. Nor can the whole eternity or, alternatively, the infinite temporal duration, of the known object be in any intelligible manner supposed to devolve on the knower by way of intuition. Both intuition and apprehension are within the range of the finite apparent time, and, unless shown otherwise, it is difficult to understand them as going beyond the same in order to ascertain the validity or reality of the intuited or apprehended entity through an immediate encounter or direct acquaintance. My conclusion is that somehow a mysterious, abstract, and absolutely unknowable communication between the two contradictory entities, namely the finite moment of apprehension and the timeless eternity or infinite temporal duration, needs to

take place at the time of apprehension, and this makes the

further mystical operation of the criterion of truth possible.

Then, of course, the net result -- whether the entity is eternal

and immutable -- is just intuited by the apprehending subject.

The whole account is saturated with unintelligible contradictions.

The method employed is indiscrepant and uncoordinated with the

result achieved. Perhaps this difficulty may be overcome by

Positing a suitable relation between method and result. But

since Plato does not posit and explicate such a relation, the

logical difficulty persists. Apart from the logical difficulty

of any actual (not potential) communication between a moment and

eternity, it is not clear how Plato managed to know anything

about the criterion even in negative terms. In other words,

Plato's thesis does not admit of a coherent formulation or state-

ment and his criterion of knowledge or reality is an attempt to

stipulate rather than elucidate the paradigm-evidence for the

logical paradigm of what actually counts as elementary knowledge

or root reality. (It may be noted that I am not speaking either

of ordinary-language paradigm or formal-language model, for the

former is based on a descriptive psychology of learning and the

latter on a revisionary system of understanding. On the other

hand, I am speaking for a descriptive logic of understanding.)

If nothing but the result of the operation of the truth-

criterion is intuited, no basis or even indication is left to

speculate on its operation. Then the effort to save intuition by positing its uniqueness, impregnability, and unanalyzability looks self-defeating. Apprehension, for which it partly substitutes, has also finally to remain open for such attributes posited. Why then posit intuition at all particularly when it itself is unable to save or clarify apprehension or knowledge, and then falsely claim to have explained the nature of the latter? Intuition is on the whole unnecessary unless it is made specific. Apprehension is not transcended that easily, because the problem of knowledge consists finally in explaining knowledge within knowledge itself. Obviously then no logic avoiding all self-reference and insisting on omnipresent universal self-consistency can perform the task.

The feeling of certainty attaching to mathematical truth held supposedly explainable through something which is neither very definite nor quite understood is a mistake. But can we know the actual cause and nature of this certainty at all? I must answer this question in affirmative, but must postpone its elaboration for consideration later on at the time of discussing my positive thesis.

In the apprehension that is belief it is thought that the illusion results because both the apprehender and the apprehended become impure, imperfect, defective, or contaminated by their contradictory characters. If by "apprehender" is meant the cognitive

subject, then clearly the present account is not consistent
with the earlier one where, thanks to the service of the ready-
made intuition, the subject does not have to exert himself in
order to be sure of truth. It is then to be pitied if it has
to become defective in order to be sure of error or falsehood.
The intuition of falsehood of the believed is still valid,
while both the believer and the believed have gone astray! It
remains unclear how it is that the apprehender is always good
enough to receive any intuitions (whether revealing truth or
falsehook of that which is apprehended) but at the same time he
becomes defective to properly receive that which is believed.
Suitability for receiving or apprehending is conveniently and
circularly stipulated away by the thesis. It only seems redefined
in terms of supposed truth. Further, if the subject always knows
intuitively that he is in error in each case of belief, why should
he have to be persuaded of the value of knowledge (against belief)
by way of an arduous and rigorous dialectical discipline? After
all, why take intuition to be valid as against the apparent state
of affairs, particularly when its very operation is self-
contradictory? Why not speculate, at least for the sake of
dialectical integrity, that there may be something wrong with the
specific intuition of mathematical truth, certainty, and eternity,
since just the opposite is intuited in all other cases? Further
the known is independent of the form of apprehension. How is it

then caught in the form of apprehension to be presented pos-

sibly to a number of subjects simultaneously? Intuition tells

us only whether the entity is itself presented to the subject.

It does not tell whether anything has gone wrong with the sub-

ject. Plato probably means the sense-organ when he says that

in belief the apprehending agent becomes defective. I do not

wish to elaborate all the traditional objections to Platonism.

My leading question is this: How does one apprehend all this

about apprehension, and does this meta-apprehension, posited in

the form of intuition rather or in effect to avoid the problem,

amount to belief or knowledge? The choice is perhaps painful,

for, to justify the existence of meta-apprehension one has to

go beyond either logic or apprehension itself. Since the result

in any case is no more than an apprehension, one has to swallow

the bitter logic-killing pill of admitting a self-apprehending

apprehension. Again, the whole structure would collapse if the

meta-apprehension is not admitted as knowledge; but then an

eternal Form of knowledge is posited. Such positing, however,

would hardly be justified, because the validity of knowledge is

always intuited in each specific case in a ready-made form and

the positing of an eternal Form of knowledge would then involve

an unnecessary duplication against Ockham's razor. Moreover, it

would imply that the admitted "ordinary" knowledge (of mathematics

and diverse Forms) whose validity is already guaranteed by

intuition is still not sufficiently valid as compared to the
perfect validity of the Form of knowledge as such. Also, the
Form of knowledge must be capable of being known, and even not
considering the inconsistency attaching to this it will come
to pass that in cases where it is known its validity will have to
be guaranteed by intuition. Of course the traditional charge
of the infinite regress -- the Third Man argument -- cannot
also be disregarded.

If the known does not coincide with its corresponding be-
lieved object, what may possibly happen to it in belief? Is
the relation between the known and its corresponding believed,
that is, between the real and its corresponding unreal, itself
real or unreal? It indeed imposes a real strain on one's logical
conscience to be able to see that the question of the reality of
the relation between the unreal and the real behind that real
can be really raised. One should not rather ask the question
of the nature of this relation, for else the conscience may
collapse altogether! How and why our ordinary beliefs get
corrected when in error (say, in the case of taking a rope for a
serpent in the dark), if at all mere beliefs are illusions?
Should these corrections be also illusions without an iota of
corrective value? What may possibly prevent a belief from re-
maining eternally a belief only? Cannot be an incorrect pre-
sentation eternal? If so, and even otherwise, what is so

sacrosanct about mere temporal duration which is only external

to an entity (unless it is the specific case of that duration

itself) and how does its external relation with the latter

affect its reality as well as its value? Since eternity is the

truth-test of all apprehension, its own apprehension and valida-

tion poses a strange logical problem. Is the intuition (self-

validation) known or believed? Is it not accepted at its face

value? Is the eternal Form of change real? If what is known

or knowable is really eternal and immutable, how does it become

degenerate in order to become a believed or believable object?

Does not this locate the defect exclusively in the believer?

But in that case his own apprehending Form would suffer and

this situation would also contradict Plato's assertion that the

soul is in the closest affinity with the Forms.

The favorable and nonvariant connection between morality

and knowledge is hardly shown to be a result of either logical

reasoning or immediate experience. It must then, in Plato's

view, be an insight or commandment of some intuition. It can be

an unquestioned first value but it lacks an empirical support.

It may be noted that I do not ask for empirical "verification"

of morality, but only for some empirical "support," being at

least a relation with an actually felt force. The soul is also

said to be in the closest affinity with the Forms. Is it itself

a Form or is it not? If it is not a Form, it cannot be real and

cannot also be known, and then of course its capacity to know

the real and eternal Forms is jeopardized. Even if it is itself

taken as a Form, strange consequences follow. A Form is im-

mutable and the source of its becoming imperfect or impure is,

in Plato, its getting tainted with what it is not. The Form of

the Beautiful, for example, is never available pure or perfect

in any belief because in all its believed instantiations it is

presented in a sensed object involving a change. If the Form

is separably so tainted by its contradictory, the apprehender

must be able to disconnect the contradictory from it and then

to convert his belief into knowledge-cum-belief to the extent

of seeing its contradictory. In such a case our immediate ex-

perience will not be open to the derisive charge or assignment

of total unreality. Again, the self-contradictory entity with

which the Form is presented has got to be sufficiently specific.

It cannot vaguely and negatively be a mere absence of the beauti-

ful, for that will reduce it unintelligibly to nothing and void.

It also cannot positively exhaust in detail the whole negation of

the Form in question, implying in effect the whole collection of

all believable entities and knowable Forms excepting the specific

Form which is imperfectly presented. To the extent, therefore,

that it is specific the apprehender will again be able to separate

the Forms underlying it. Eventually, all immediate experience

will turn out to be that of the Forms only (or that of the

reflections of the Forms if the Platonic face is still not
desired to be lost).

Now the defender of the Platonic faith may argue that the
non-Form cannot be separated at all from the Form in any case
of belief whatever. This again will be given an intuition.
Since in Plato the intuitions of the intellect have the status
of the cognitive truth-criterion, let us for the moment accept
this one and watch the implications. Because an intuition re-
veals the unseparability of the Form and the non-Form in belief,
the unseparability must be real and not merely apparent. Plato
has already committed himself to the immutability of the Form,
but we tolerated him while he violated the self-evident consis-
tency when he declared that the immutable Form gets contaminated
by some non-Form in the cases of belief which of course is unreal.
We tolerated this in the false hope that after all the contamina-
tion is unreal and so the Form's immutability can be saved. But
now we are disillusioned by this latest Platonist intuition pro-
nouncing that the unseparability is real. The Form joins the
non-Form unseparably and no apprehension can help or penetrate
this odd inconsistent conjunction of contradictories! In fact
it cuts at the very ground of taking any Form to be real because
of or on appeal to the immutability imputed to it. The Platonist
may then say that the non-Form in the belief is simply unappre-
hensible and that this is also given by an intuition. Well, we

are discussing the merits and demerits of the apprehension that

is belief and are simply not concerned with anything which is

not apprehended either because of its inborn unapprehensibility

or of its remoteness or of any other reason. One finds that

this evasive action shatters the Platonist ground instead of

securing it, because in that case no non-Form is ever apprehended,

all belief is eradicated, and we are left with nothing but bliss-

ful knowledge all around us!

It may then be replied that what we apprehend in belief is

not the Form at all but something which imperfectly approximates

to it while being external to it, such as a reflection or image.

It is just an imperfect and hence unreal reflection of the real.

Now the reflection qua reflection must be real, otherwise it be-

comes either fully and unqualifiedly real or simple void. Then

it is difficult to see how the real Form becomes unreal through

a real reflection which is only external to it. (Reflection on

which the crude analogy is based is a part of our knowledge and

so a part of the present problem, hence one can hardly resort

to or expand the analogy to solve the logical problem. One

does not need to deal with such "solutions" which are rhetorical

rather than dialectical.) The reflection must be defective some-

where or by its very definition and separate room must be created

to house the defect, for neither the known Form being the object

of knowledge is prepared to admit it for fear of violating its

immutability of his apprehending Form, or, if the latter is disclaimed by Plato, for the fear of losing its postulated "closest affinity" with the Forms. A separate defective reflector has perhaps to be posited after all. Ockham's razor will not be its only problem, for it will also bring in a full-fledged retinue of the logical problems of its ontic and cognitive status; not to speak of the problem of its exact relation with the Form and the apprehender, which will be uncontrollable, for the reason that both the Form and apprehender have already disowned any connection with it. And the problem of the precise nature of the defect will also be insoluble, because even the intuition has not so far prepared itself to throw any light thereon, having confined its duties only to a mere communication of the result of the mystical operation of the truth-criterion.

This brings us to the intuition itself. Neither Plato nor any Platonist normally gives an intelligible account of the nature of intuition. The question of its relation with apprehension as such has also to be considered. Supposing that the function of intuition is to furnish an insight, from the account given by Platonism we cannot even speculate about it other than that it gives an insight into the result of the operation of the cognitive truth-test, namely eternal immutability. It then has to follow any apprehension (and not to coincide with it), so that there is time enough -- however short -- to apply the criterion and

communicate the result. And is this result of the application of the truth-test itself a Form or not? If not, it is some non-Form beyond all the ultimate Forms (which monopolize reality) and is able to speak upon the very truth of the Forms. It is strange to think of reality which can be guaranteed only by some unreal criterion. To avoid this difficulty it may be said that in intuition one apprehends a Form. Of course this will pose the problem as to how one Form is able to pronounce upon the very truth of others without getting in any way related with them to save its immutability. (The Platonic "hierarchy of Forms" taken from the "divided line" is not relevant because it is categorizing rather than validating in nature.) The more important result, however, is that if the intuition gives nothing but a Form after all, it cannot then differ from knowledge in its ultimate and undisguised form. And in the latter case the entire ground claimed to establish it as a sound (and the only available) truth-criterion slips under the Platonist feet. This one truth-testing knowledge-Form pronouncing upon the truth and reality of other Forms definitely now needs another like itself in order to test its own truth as a Form just as the other Forms, and this ad infinitum. The implication is that no knowledge can at all be acquired, which again contradicts Plato's earlier categorical assertion that it can be acquired on the pattern of the mathematical knowledge.

The above analysis makes it clear that the Forms as con-
ceived by Plato do not seem to have a proper logical ground.
Plato of course is not satisfied with only asserting the
reality and existence of the Forms, for he goes ahead and con-
nects the knowledge of the Forms with the highest moral values
and precepts of human life. Whatever the nature of the Socrates-
inspired morality as directly related to the Forms, it is hard
to see what connection it may have with all the Forms in them-
selves except probably those of morality. Even when one is
overawed by the eternal duration of certain entities feigned to
have it, and then posits a reality for them, it does not stand
to reason why on that very account he should simply go on con-
templating them. It cannot be hoped that such contemplation
will extend itself to eternity or infinite temporal duration, and
it is also doubtful whether it can put the philosopher in direct
acquaintance with the Forms, because if the reality of the Forms
consists only in their being eternal (and immutable), it is not
possible that they can dissociate themselves from this reality
in order to be known to the philosopher who is so expectably
contemplating them in _finite_ time. The philosopher's soul should
then either extend itself to the infinite temporal duration of
the Forms under contemplation (for if the Forms do not reach it,
it should reach them) or just transcend all time and pass into
the realm of the timeless eternal reality of the Forms (perhaps

the only other alternative to reach the Forms). The latter
alternative would require the full-fledged conversion into a
Form because before this it has to remain only in the "closest
affinity" with the Forms.

This closest affinity also has not been explicated by Plato.
Perhaps the only conjecture about it is that the apprehender has
to be presumed in all cases of apprehension. Its unity and con-
tinuity are then secured. Unity and continuity are of course
pre-conditions of being a Form. But these are not sufficient,
for both these now have to stretch themselves into the infinite
duration of time or to transcend all time. So far as our ac-
quaintance with the human soul goes, the souls do not seem
capable of transcending their apparent temporal finitude to
reach infinite duration or eternal time. Of course they are to
be counted as the best examples of unity, continuity, and non-
materiality among all available experiences. They are also
capable of knowing the propositions of the mathematical truth
which is accompanied by an intuition of their certitude, and
this intuition is also exclusively theirs. Even admitting all
this it is clearly impossible to accord the souls with the
status of a Form while we still observe their finite existence.
Perhaps it is meant that they only seem to be finite and tempo-
rary but are really eternal, but that way the Platonists have
posited a Form for many a less durable entity. Here the question

is that of identifying the apparent finitude with some actual

infinity. It is obvious that if eternity or infinite duration

is consistently held to be the only test of reality and truth,

no affinity of souls with the latter can be easily established

even on the ground that among the finite entities apprehended

by them during a finite course of time they themselves are in-

cluded and enjoy the longest finite duration with their unity

and continuity intact. There is no similarity or connection

between the actual finite and the actual infinite which are by

definition poles apart from each other. Disregarding the ap-

parently implausible doctrine of recollection (of the Meno),

the only other way of possibly showing such closest affintiy of

the soul with the Forms is to claim an affinity of essence con-

ceived as different from the infinite temporal persistence which

is the criterion of reality. The Form may be said to be spiritual

or intelligible in nature and similarly the soul. I shall deal

with this shortly in the following part of the discussion of

Plato's views.

The difficulty of Plato's logic is given by the fact that

it does not examine the cause, nature, or sources of either that

which makes knowledge a knowledge or that which makes belief a

belief. Its definite criterion of reality as that which is

eternal, immutable, intelligible, and independent not only

frustrates any logical consideration but is clearly unreal itself

because it fails to establish the impact of the alleged real on the apparently real experience. Even admitting that the ordinary experience delivers only appearances and hides the reality from us, the question remains as to whether the criterion through which the alleged appearance is sought to be smashed is itself capable of yielding the reality. This reality should be such as can actually be felt as an absolute impact (for the very fact that it is the ultimate reality), though it may not drown the one who may feel it. It should be also such that it may be seen to be hiding behind the alleged appearances, though its actual relation with the appearance may not be clarified. A theory of reality which cannot achieve even this much does not obviously deserve serious consideration.

The concept of reality as something which is quite indifferent and dissimilar to the appearances is in itself incompetent, not affording any explanation or understanding of the appearances which is its logical _locus_ _standi_ which it then loses. Plato's criterion of eternal immutability and the resultant reality in the form of the Forms are both incompetent or unilluminating in this respect. They do not stand either to reason or to experience. If this is not felt as an obvious conclusion from the foregoing critique, the following part of the critique may make the conclusion quite evident.

It is clear that it is difficult to make a case for a reality which is neither amenable nor available to reason or esperience and seeks to stand on mere intuition. This would particularly be so in case the existing personal and social values which are inconsistent with a mystical reality are on that account sought not only to be disturbed but also to be inferiorized (or degraded) to those connected with the so-called reality. A concept of reality which goes beyond logic and is unable to explain experience should be dropped before disturbing all the felt values (of understanding) without even considering them. But Plato glorifies reality at the cost of all other felt values. (I am not for a dogmatic philosophical confirmation of the felt values, but that does not mean that the latter can be replaced by those having no superior ground.) Is this not then a veritable sign of "hypocrisy," for the resultant value would be unworkable both in reason and experience? It is doubtful whether the intuition may survive the impact of analysis by reason and experience.

Again, it is difficult to understand exactly why the intellectual contemplation of the intelligible Forms requires a total restraint of the sensuous passions. Instead of asking the feasibilist question "Why the impact of the changeful?," Plato seeks only a disparaging withdrawal from the changing. And of course while the soul remains in the changing world it cannot simply

wish it away by a finite speculation of the alleged eternal.

The whole point of the precept is unfeasible and obviously no

amount of practice can make it workable. How then is it sin-

cere? A theory that cannot be put into practice -- and Plato

also has not shown any way as to how the different Forms can

be actually known and contemplated (how could he?) -- does not

cease to be insincere or non-culpable merely on the ground that

it is prescribed in good faith. No one can think without a

feeling of self-deception and self-contradiction that one is in

direct contact with the unchanging reality through his evanescent

thoughts. If a precept teaches such a thing it cannot be teaching

anything but a "hypocrisy." I cannot of course do injustice to

Plato by outright doubting his sincerity in thinking that what

he taught was practicable. But a thinker of Plato's stature is

expected to examine himself in sufficient logical depth and de-

tail to obviate the possibility of his sincerely preaching an

insincerity. This note on "Plato's" culpable negligence completes

the consideration of his views appearing on pages 65-68 above.

Now I must discuss the implications and possibilities of

whatever I can plausibly make out of Plato's arguments for the

existence of the Forms and his indications about the nature of

the relation between the Forms and their particulars. The argu-

ment from the sciences, meaning mainly that from the mathematical

sciences, is evidently implausible, first for the simple reason

that there is no logical warrant for the two illicit moves

involved therein: first from the existence of the mathematical

known to that of the rest of the known covering all the fields

of belief, and secondly from the felt (though left mystical and

unexamined) stability of the mathematical known to that of the

rest of the known. The second reason for the implausibility of

the argument is the unwarranted assertion that sensible belief

is unstable and stands in a perfect contrast with the intelli-

gible knowledge as instanced by the stable mathematical known.

Forgiving Plato for a moment for his inability or unpreparedness

to further instantiate his stable knowledge and to move away any

further from the mathematical known in support of the rest of the

known, one immediately sees that the only ground on which Plato

could establish the desired stability or endurance as a real

attribute of any content of knowledge is the intuition supposed

to accompany every case of knowledge. If we forgive Plato for

not explicating the nature of this intuition and allow in his

favor that what he meant was only the indubitable certitude ac-

companying the mathematically true propositions, one sees that

he has failed to inquire into how the mathematical concepts arise

and to what extent and in what ultimate elements we can analyze

them. He has also failed to examine what are the actual minimum

commitments involved in realizing mathematical truth. This

charge of course becomes very light for Plato, but very serious

on the whole, when one realizes that it is shared with more or

less culpability by many a subsequent thinker up to the present

time. This does mean that any of the modern forms of logicism,

formalism, intuitionism, or their mixtures are an inadequate

explanation of mathematical truth and certainty. I will elab-

orate my positive view later, but at present it will suffice to

indicate that the problem of the foundations of mathematics can-

not fully be dissociated from the basic problems of reality,

logic, knowledge, and value. This will sound like a discordant

strange note in the context of present thinking about the problem,

but hopefully the point can be driven home.[2] I wish to insist on

charging Plato and others following him of an insufficient or

inadequate analysis of the foundations of mathematics. I will

try to show in the treatment of my positive theory that mathe-

matical certainty is not absolutely independent, underived, and

unconditioned. This certainty can be brought in touch with the

so-called belief to bear a comparison with the latter and in

spite of the nature of the belief whose ontic status may also

be eventually determined accordingly, if certainty be still in-

sisted upon as the criterion of reality or knowledge. In short

I wish to challenge the Platonic assertion that the intuited

stability and certainty of the mathematical known is in perfect

and real contrast with the seeming unstability and uncertainty

of sensible belief. The obvious problem would be to establish

the actual points of liaison in the Platonic gulf between the
known and the believed contents, or the mathematical known and
the sensible belief.

One point more. It seems plain that both the grounds of
sensibility and the grounds of intelligibility have not been
sufficiently examined by Plato. I maintain that Plato's postu-
lated polarity between the two -- his thought-sensation dichotomy
-- is not adequately grounded and that a number of points of
liaison can be shown as operating between the two. I reiterate
that positive argument for this liaison also has to be post-
poned till I come to consider my constructive thesis. But it
provides room for levelling one more point of criticism dealing
with the Platonist argument from the sciences. This is my third
reason in support of the implausibility of the argument. The
intelligibility of the Forms for Plato issues from his view that
the intellect is the only alternative to the senses (and the
latter of course have no ground to support the Forms). Now as
I just proposed, if some points of liaison can be demonstrated
as actually operating between sensibility and intelligibility,
the Platonic ground would disappear for asserting the polarity
between the two and then seducing the intelligibility for the
benefit of the Forms. In brief what I wish to suggest is that
it would be a mistake to try to take advantage of the apparent
intuitive certainty of mathematically true propositions,

particularly when one is not able or prepared to examine the possible grounds of the typical feeling of certainty experienced. Hence, Plato's attempt in this direction is not justified.

The argument from meaning as stated above on page 68 is intended as a more plausible restatement of the argument from sciences. Here the normal successful communication of the common terms is appealed to or taken advantage of. At the first sight the argument seems to be well-designed to carry conviction. On deeper thought it becomes clear that the conviction or persuasion must depend on an affirmative answer to a number of questions such as the following:

1. Is the import (meaning) of all the common terms clear?

2. Is all individual subjective import identical with its general intersubjective counterpart supposed to be communicable?

3. Is direct acquaintance with the model exemplifications of the import absolutely necessary to bring about the import?

4. Are the model instances clear in the minds of all of their users?

5. Is there sufficient ground to support the proposition that no model instance at all can be found in the senses?

6. Is there sufficient ground to think that the senses are absolutely distinct from the intellect?

7. Is there sufficient ground to think that the model instances being intelligible in their essence are independent of the intellect?

8. Is the successful communication of the common terms itself clear enough to warrant in itself the implication of the clarity and the existence of the model instances underlying the terms?

9. Is there sufficient basis to suppose that the particularly notable precision of the mathematical warrants the generalization that such precision exists also in respect of all the non-mathematical known?

Let us consider these questions in order in the following.

To take the first question. If what Plato meant is absolute clarity (and Plato could not have possibly meant otherwise), then his presupposed answer is quite wrong. I have already admitted that mathematical knowledge _is_ one of the clearest among the normally apprehended entities, but that should not blind one to the fact that the non-mathematical concepts are not nearly as clear, and particularly some of them such as goodness, beauty, and happiness, have troubled Plato and Socrates themselves to a great extent without enabling the latter to arrive at any clarity worth the name. The affirmative answer is suppositious and is responsible for much of the Platonic mythology of Forms, for it is then mininterpreted to mean that if the clarity is not clear it can always be somehow made clear through a dialectical exercise. But all such exercises of the powers of reason have failed Plato with respect to the import of the important concepts of goodness,

beauty, and happiness. Mere workability of the concepts does not

ipso facto imply clarity which must be clear on its own. The

Platonic answer is then unjustified particularly when it is

found impossible by Plato and his followers to get at the clear

import of some concepts which are very important according to

themselves. All this is commonplace, but it also does not mean

that one cannot clearly know why and how the vagueness or incon-

sistency arises in certain concepts and what it is that makes it

up. Any one is able to clarify the import of one's own concepts,

though one may not be physically able to get it clarified in all

its possible users and then generalize the individual results by

means of a less imperfect induction. The inductive verification

of the clarity of the import is well-nigh impossible to accomplish.

But the elevated instance of mathematical clarity put forward as

an ideal seduces one's conviction at least in own respect. Undue

advantage seems then to be taken of this special case.

The second question: Is all individual subjective import

identical with its general intersubjective counterpart supposed

to be communicable? No inductive verification of Plato's answer

is possible here as already indicated in the previous section.

But without feeling the need of such verification one gets con-

vinced about the import of the mathematical concepts. This I

propose to discuss later on. One may, however, safely say that

the individual subjective import may in a varying degree be more

or less similar to its general intersubjective counterpart.

(By the latter I mean the set of elements of import of any con-

cept that are absolutely common and logically indiscernible in

all actual import of the concept in all its possible users.)

But it is not at all necessary a priori that some minimum degree

of similarity should always be preserved in the counterpart.

Plato's answer is again presuppositious.

The third question: Is direct acquaintance with the model

exemplifications of the import absolutely necessary to bring about

the import? As far as the mathematical import goes, I would say

here that such acquaintance is necessary but not with the "model"

instantiations but rather with the least presumptive exemplifi-

cations. I have to show that the latter are logically the ones

of the commonest and simplest experiences of any normal human

being. But I think the question is a leading one and an answer

in an absolute affirmative or negative involves commitment on the

vexed problem of the universals. The affirmative commits one to

realism. At present I must refrain from unqualifyingly committing

myself to any side, I should only indicate that my view of the

problem allows me to refrain from committing myself to realism

or nominalism in the issue of the basic concepts. I think that

there cannot be anything more than a teleologically hypothetical

evidence (and this also varying) to support either the "discovery"

(realism) or the "creation" (nominalism) of universals, and that

the best positive evidence on the matter of the basic concepts does not support anything more than the logico-genetic "co-incidence" of the universals with their particulars. This means that Plato's realism is not positively justifiable.

To come to the fourth question: Are the model instances clear in the minds of all of their users? About this also Plato's answer is hasty and presumptuous, for even if one admits that instances of the mathematical model exist and that they are clear for all their users, one does not thereby acquire a logical right to extend the case to other model instances without establishing ontic point of comparison between the mathematical and the non-mathematical model instances. The latter is not done by Plato. In fact there is no such clarity in the apparent state of affairs and this has been admitted even by Plato in the cases of the con-cepts of goodness, beauty, happiness, etc.

The fifth question: Is there sufficient ground to support the proposition that no model instance at all can be found in the senses? Plato's answer would be negated if reflection or intro-spection would be allowed as one of the senses, say, the inner sense. But in all probability Plato means only the external senses. Even then it is difficult to see how Plato's position can be saved in this case from the boomeranging mathematical con-cepts, particularly, the arithmetical ones. Say, I have seven chairs before me at present. Is this not a perfect instantiation

of the number seven? It is at least numerically perfect, for I
see neither more nor less than seven chairs. (If it is possible
to make a mistake here, in what case would such mistake be
logically impossible? If with the "intuition" of the Form of
number seven such a mistake is so impossible, the "intuition"
then would be clearly exposed as an artificial and evasive re-
definition of a supposed, mythical case of logical impossibility.)
Plato may say that the chairs are not eternal, but the number
seven is not an essential property of the seven chairs, and so
the point of the chairs' instability is not relevant. If Plato
means that the model instance of the number seven should have
seven intelligible and eternal elements, say, some seven Forms,
it is hard to see that the instance can thereby, that is, by means
of the thought of the moment, partake of the eternity of intel-
ligibility of the Forms, simply because it has no internal re-
lation with the Forms. Any model instance of "seven" as envisiged
by Plato must have seven elements forming within themselves only
an _external_ relation of sevenness. I do not know what answer I
need to look for in Plato's thesis in defense against this attack.

Furthermore, what is the "sufficient ground" in Plato par-
ticularly when the arithmetical concepts have forsaken him? May
it not be said that the so-called intelligible model instance is
an elaborate and artificial construction of imagination while
that available in the senses is the real, authentic, or

paradigmatic one, for it is only the latter which makes its impact felt upon the human beings? I am not committed to this possibility off-hand, but can it be ignored or skipped over? Plainly not. Even apart from all this, _what_ is there in the external senses that prevents such model instantiation? Want of eternal availability to the intellect? What has then guaranteed such availability of the intellect itself? It is evident that Plato has failed to point out the exact difference between sensibility and intelligibility or between the external sense and the internal sense, whence precisely the position ensues that the eternal model instances are available only through the latter and not through the former.

This also negates Plato's answer to the sixth question: Is there sufficient ground to think that the senses are absolutely distinct from the intellect? Indeed, there are certain apparent differences between sensibility and intelligibility, but Plato has not pointed out the exact ones which are responsible for the singular incapacity of the sensibility to receive the presentations of the eternal. Plato has sometimes pointed to an unlimited matter (_hyle_) as getting mixed with the limited Form or Idea, but such an artificial concept hardly succeeds in handling the real basic issue of pinpointing the exact cause of the inability of the outer senses. Of course one's disgust with the sensible can be sympathetically understood as due to its less easy maniuplation

than that of the intelligible with which one can take many more liberties satisfying one's pious wishes (comtemplation of Forms here). But that does not amount to a logical ground to react upon the sensible in order to disparage it outright through seductive appeals to, say, the subtlety, fineness, spirituality, etc. of the intelligible. In short, since the apprehender is involved in the same way in the cases of belief as in the cases of knowledge, since there is no ground why intuition should be distinguished from belief and knowledge both, and since there remains no proper basis to raise knowledge over belief, it does not appear justifiable for Plato to hold that there is any relevant material distinction between the senses monopolizing belief and the intellect monopolizing knowledge.

The seventh question: Is there sufficient ground to think that the model instances being intelligible in their essence are independent of the intellect? Here Plato opts for epistemological objectivism, but unfortunately it is not substantiated by him. Objectivism involves the commitment to external relation as the form of knowledge. It is hard to imagine how Plato would deal with the now traditional problems (I mean the tradition of the Western philosophy) connected with the acceptance of knowledge as an external relation. The matter is further confused by maintaining that in belief both the apprehender and the apprehended are not themselves but become imperfect or defective. Belief

(it will be noted that the problems of belief or opinion in Plato are with suitable changes very similar to those of illusion or error) has to be taken at its face value and it cannot be transcended except when it is converted into its corresponding knowledge. Since, however, it is not made clear as to what extent the apprehender is responsible in making the apprehended defective in the cases of belief, it is difficult to locate, identify, classify, or specify with any degree of precision Plato's epistemological position. It seems, however, that he means to keep the apprehender free, for when he says that in belief the apprehender becomes defective he rather means the sense-organ becoming defective. This means that he does not want either the cognitive subject or the cognitive relation to be tainted by anything extraneous. Both are to be taken at their face value. All this is well; but then how do we _know_ it? Evidently intuition cannot run out of the cognitive range, for in effect it is clearly within the definition of knowledge. In itself intuition can hardly claim a prior treatment and special privilege to kidnap and monopolize truth and reality. I do not suggest at this stage that knowledge cannot be an external relation. I only want to point out that Plato has not defended it sufficiently. It is not necessary, however, to defend him or offend him now, for I will need to treat the matter sufficiently while discussing other philosophical positions laying greater

stress on epistemological detail. The glaring defect in
Plato seems to be that even though he admits that there is no
access to the known other than the intellect and that the known
is of the same essence as the intellect, that is, of the essence
or nature of spirituality or intelligibility, it is separately
real and independent of the apprehending intellect. Plato also
does not attempt to substantiate this position by a plausible
explanation. Obviously then there is no sufficient ground laid
by him to support the proposition that the model instances are
independent of the apprehending intellect though they are of
the same nature as the latter.

The eighth question: Is the successful communication of
the common terms itself clear enough to warrant in itself the
implication of the clarity and the existence of the model in-
stances underlying the terms? It is clear that the jump from
the successful communication of the common terms to the fixed
clarity and eternal existence of the model instances underlying
these terms lacks sufficient logical and empirical ground. Plato
has, however, argued that if there were no such entities as the
model instances no meaningful communication would have been
possible, and if at all any sense has to be made out of this
actual communication, there is no escape from the postulation of
the Forms. The argument needs some dissection to decompose its
apparent plausibility. Let us take the simple example of "bed"

rather than of the complex ones of "goodness," "happiness,"
or "wisdom" which have worried Plato himself. On the face of
it, it looks as if the concept of bed is quite clear, but a mo-
ment's thought reveals that, if we take a panoramic and compara-
tive view of all possible or conceivable instances to which the
concept of bed can be applied, it becomes clear that, strictly
construed, there does not emerge a sufficient number of the
points of absolute similarity which can represent any thing
even approximating a bed. This is because in practice we have
to accommodate divergences and deviations, and hence we have to
keep our concepts of general use flexible and vague rather than
rigid and clear as Plato has presupposed. Perhaps each and every
attribute of similarity in the common concept of bed is likely to
be sacrificed in actual use, It is not much use to insist upon
the history of the concept by saying that its origin was clear,
for in actual use it can hardly be distinguished from a conven-
tional peg on which any piece from a conglomeration of widely
heterogenous nature can at any time be conveniently hung. Ideal
clarity is foreign to its nature and existence.

This is why Plato failed to get the clear meaning of the
important but complex concepts of goodness, happiness, wisdom, and
beauty. Of course, there is meaningful and successful communica-
tion, but in practice the rigidity and clarity have to give way
to the exigencies of communication. It is then hard to see how

such avowedly fleeting vagueness can be reified and glorified.
Anyway, the real point to stress here is only that the com-
munication of the common concepts does not _necessarily_ imply
generally that the concepts are clear. For if our concepts were
really clear enough, no verbal conflicts could ever arise and no
arduous, rigorous, and persuasive discipline would be necessary
to make anyone a philosopher as Plato required it. It may be
that the communication is motivated by certain purposes and values
and that the latter may be fulfilled even without a rigid logical
clarity in each case. But Plato did not inquire into the matter
along such lines and rather hurriedly jumped into a mystery-
mongering in the name of a necessary implication from the apparent
empirical success of communication to the uncomprehensible, un-
clarifiable, and nonempirical (supersensible) model instances.
It did not occur to him that the communication _may_ succeed without
the need of a rigidly consistent clarity. Evidently, what allured
him to his insistence on the presumed necessary relation between
clarity and communication was the glamorous set of mathematical
concepts which, in spite of the recent logicism, is probably still
a stumbling blick to a full-fledged empiricism.

Is there sufficient basis to suppose that the particularly
notable precision of the mathematical warrants the generalization
that such precision exists also in respect of all the non-
mathematical known? This ninth question, in view of the foregoing

discussion of the eight questions, need not detain us long.
I hope it is clear now that the generalization spoken of in the
ninth question cannot be seen to have enough logical warrant.
The fundamental mathematical concepts are closely related to those
of our concepts which are logically basic to understanding. The
latter I have called "basic concepts," which I do not propose
to discover by a priori contemplative reason as in Plato, but
by the microphilosophical investigation into the logic of their
actual operation in our propositions, language, and discourse.
Again, there is no obsession with language here, and hence what
language reflects, our world of experience, is also similarly
proposed to be broken up logically into basic or minimal par-
ticulars. The microphilosophical, feasibilist thesis is that,
logico-genetically, these "basic concepts" and "minimal particu-
lars" "coincide." This "coincidence," to be explicated later,
then emerges as the logical paradigm of our types and reference
in the world of both language use and empirical persistence. In
relation to such a thesis it becomes obvious that the kind of
generalization presupposed in an affirmative answer to the ninth
question, that is, extending, generalizing, existentiating, or
epistemizing the mathematical content into non-mathematical also,
is also a one-sided pious wish unevidenced anywhere except in the
convenient stipulation of a mystical intuition.

Since Plato, this wish to imitate mathematics in philoso-
phy has formatively influenced philosophy in its attempt to
generally understand all our concepts or concept-types, mathe-
matical and non-mathematical. By way of reaction similar one-
sided wishes are generated inspired by physics, biology, or
whatever, which from time to time achieves the status of knowl-
edge in society. The idea in pointing out these different "wishes"
of unequal rigor and universalizability is to drive home the
point that my idea of "coincidence" is not just another, yet
common, pious wish for a political compormise between these con-
flicting wishes. Such a compromising wish, blurring the legiti-
mate distinctions and conflicts, becomes a paradigm of confusion
in philosophy, passing as philosophies os synthesis, integration,
etc., which do not attempt to explicate in logical detail the
various points of compromise proposed. The microphilosophical
"coincidence" of types and reference, on the contrary, is pre-
cisely the result of an attempt to articulate in logical detail
the foundations of the very variety of our structure of types
and reference without letting the foundations to be affected by
social idioms or fashions of "knowledge." Consequently, such
"coincidence," firmly rooted in the basic concepts and minimal
particulars, is also "lax" enough to enable us to rediscover the
basis of the possibility of various wishes, idoms, fashions, and
"knowledge." It does not run into omnibus generalizations (nor

into omniscient reductions) of the type of the ninth question, to be based upon persuasive appeals to preconceived or conveniently conceived dictates of reason. It rather seeks to discover our reason, appealing to the operative basis of our understanding and experience.

Now I come to the relation of the Forms with their particulars. Earlier, I have listed eleven alternatives (pages 68-70 above). I do not suggest that these are exhaustive of the possible and plausible ways in which the relation may be construed, but only that I do not propose to discuss the others in relation to Plato's views. These eleven seem to me to be closely or logically related to my "Plato" (with all the necessary apologies to Plato).

The imitation theory of Plato, as noted, prefers the first alternative with a tinge of the second. These alternatives are (1) the Form is the model or ideal image, and (2) it is the standard criterion or principle. It is implied that the particulars are only imperfect imitations of the Forms which are distinct if not separate from the particulars. Plato would not have liked the work "image"; it can be replaced by the word "instance." Obviously, the two alternative views are intimately related, for the idea of a model or ideal should entail the one of a standard, criterion, norm, or principle or of the application thereof. The word "model" in the concept of the model instance means that the instance in question must be formally and structurally perfect,

and the word "ideal" therein signifies the satisfaction or fulfillment by the instance of the conditions involved in the standard or principle to be applied in the matter.

According to Plato, the Form and hence the model or ideal instance is independent, pure, perfect, objective, eternal, real, stable, and immutable. Now these or the like attributes can scarcely be taken to be anything more than the general principles or tests between all the Forms in general and all the particulars in general. Presently we are seeking for a specific relation between a particular Form and its specific particulars. In that case the imitation theory leads directly to the formal or structural similarity between the Form and its particulars. The Form is then the pure form or structure without containing the defect-generating matter as a constitutional element. The particulars are necessarily material and this is why they can only be more or less similar to their Form and only approximate to it without ever reaching it, for the plain reason that they cannot transcend their materiality.

Plato after such an insistence on the materiality of the particulars would surely find it difficult to indicate the actual materiality involved in the human passions and emotions. (His "fluids in body" hardly indicate more than a rhetorical effect.) On Plato's account of the imitation of the Form by its particulars the only suitable criterion would seem to be similarity.

"Similarity" as the essence of the universal in respect of its

particulars has its own difficulties. Here I would only indicate

that a rigid insistence on a resolutely fixed similarity leads

ultimately to an absurd inconsistent scepticism, not to speak

of its utter impracticality. Any relaxation of such rigidity

leads to a rejection of the logic of the excluded middle and

finally to a willful selection of a willful chaos. The door may

also open for unintelligible reality of universals. I have al-

ready suggested that I would rather replace both the realistic

"discovery" and the nominalistic "creation" by the feasibilist

"coincidence." I would let my position appear through a gradual

dissatisfaction with its important conceivable alternatives to

which I am presently drawing attention.

The third alternative is: (3) the Form is the conceptual

potentiality. A mere potentiality would be too vague and unstable

to deserve the Platonist's assent, even though he himself would

not perhaps end up with anything better. What may be said here

rather cursorily is that the word "conceptual" in the phrase

"conceptual potentiality" roughly (and jointly) implies a mental

act, some similarity, a criterion, and some abstraction. The

word "potentiality" there would mean the pending possible reali-

zation of the unrealized realizable. This looks like airy verbal-

ism at this stage, but it will perhaps suffice here to note that

though in itself it may look indefinite and implausible, through

its incorporation in a concrete synthetic view it may be really

helpful in the feasibilist microphilosophical theory. This

should not, of course, be taken to mean that I stand for a full-

fledged conceptualism.

The fourth alternative is: (4) the imitation theory of the

Forms. This is already considered in the discussion of the first

two alternatives. This brings us to the fifth alternative, that

is, the participation theory, which rejects outright any idea

of either conceptuality or potentiality. I have already re-

marked on participation on pages 69-70 supra where it is also

noted that the idea of participation as conceived by Plato seems

to be of the actual and structural type since the participation

theory itself is intended as an explication or account of the

actual occurrences of the physical events and phenomena. I will

first deal with the general argument for the theory as embodied

in my statement of the fifth alternative, which I reproduce below

in a slightly concise form.

(5) The immediate experience is fragmentary and self-

contradictory, and this cannot be the nature of reality; the

terms of this experience cannot transcend these limitations and

hence cannot give a theoretic account of the experience; truth,

meaning the nature and structure of reality, must be deducible

from certain ultimate elements corresponding to the immediate

experience, and these must be accessible only to the intellect

and not to the senses. I will not dwell at great length upon

the traditionally obvious defects of the argument, such as that

the perfect and consistent reality never comes fully out of its

own veil of mystery, that the human intellect is human and by

that very fact limited to the senses except in the fits of un-

checked imagination, and that a mere intellectual grasp of the

logically consistent and formally perfect final elements cannot

mean any control on the actual impact of the so-called imperfect

and inconsistent appearances. Not that these objections are un-

worthy of consideration, but that they have already been suf-

ficiently considered in the history of philosophy, in what

Whitehead calls the "footnotes" to Plato. Not also that I am

quite satisfied with this consideration, but that my point to

stress is different.

The point to stress against the participation theory is this.

A tacit presupposition in the argument cannot be overlooked by a

feasibilist. It is the anti-feasibilist presumption that the

intellect through the help of the dialectic can transcend and

expose the Cave. The question arises as to how it transcends

itself and allows Plato to state its performance. An easy un-

scrupulous answer is that the intellect has the power to view

and review itself. Such an evasive action, however, would cut

at the roots of genuine consistency, which, on this account, is

shown to be rooted in an avowed self-contradiction of self-chasing

intellect.   In order that "rational" philosophy may be carried

on endlessly, no philosopher usually will admit self-referential

intellect as his built-in inconsistency for it exacts a number of

commitments or presuppositions.   Kant was one of the few who

realized it as one ultimate unsolvable problem of philosophy; he

is to be admired, therefore, in not letting it flow away in the

flood of unconpromising suppositious reasonings characteristic of

much academic philosophy.

   This self-contradiction becomes particularly self-discrepant

to hold, since on the one hand self-consistency is proclaimed and

elevated in the name of self-evidence and on the other it cannot

stand the initial necessary application to itself.   Self-evidence

is not self-applicable!   Not that the view of the self-referring

intellect in itself deserves nothing but disparagement.   The

point of disparagement is that it can be advocated only at the

cost of logic, it has, though, been advocated at the pretension

or profession of logic.   Just by giving up the pretension the

matter can hardly be straightened out, but such abandonment,

with a disposition to understand the presuppositions involved in

the commitment to reflective intellect (without which "rational

discourse" is impossible), can pave the way for a new and perhaps

better view of philosophy itself from a feasibilist footing.

What needs to be emphasized is that not only the pretension itself

but also its logical consequences are responsible for much

nonfeasibilism. The shedding of the "hypocrisy" or self-discrepancy promises to stir and arouse a philosophically beneficial curiosity as to what it is in logic that defies logic itself in its very postulation. Plato's presupposition of the exaggerated ability of the dialectic has then proved rather harmful to the tradition of dialectical philosophy. The glorification (albeit unconscious and innocent) of a flat self-defeat as a self-transcendence through an ostentatious self-evidence means, in the present sense, an effective though unintended "hypocrisy." The removal of the veil of "hypocrisy" means only the first and right (in view of the thesis of this work) step in the direction of feasibilism. Nonfeasibilism tries to duplicate or replace the veil. Plato replaced it through one of mystery, and the result is the vague mysterious Forms. I hope the foregoing dissection of Plato's view is sufficient to expose the nonfeasibilism involved in it.

The sixth alternative. It proposes that (6) the nature of the operation of the Forms on their particulars cannot be known. Plato has not infrequently been insistent on implying such a sort of scepticism. It is rather a confession felt under an artificially created need. But it shows that he was aware of the dialectical difficulties of nonfeasibilism. I need not now point out that a dialectical scepticism veils a "hypocrisy" in that it professes a knowledge of the general unknowability.

Again, there is a widespread tendency to hide the sceptic's

paradoxical behavior under a heap of sophistry and verbiage.

But the paradox is sufficiently clear as understood in plain

language (though it assumes various "subtle" forms to efface its

felt paradoxical effect through an artificial language of philos-

ophy), and this should normally embolden one to cast the veil

off, and to inquire as to what exactly is wrong with the dialectic

that leads to an inconsistent scepticism. The evasive action on

the paradox mostly takes the form of implausible verbal twists.

I do not need here to elaborate or instantiate the dialec-

tical ways to scepticism. In respect of the paradox of the sceptic

I must not disregard one point, however. A fond claim sometimes

prevails asserting that the paradox is not real and is due to the

human limits of linguistic expression. This entails the not so

obvious presupposition that man cannot manage his language or

that language is identical with logic and thought. Evidently,

the former presupposition is less implausible, for the latter

only concedes the point of the limitation of logic. But the

defender of the sceptical faith is hardly prepared to say _what_

is wrong with the language which is his tool, his artifice, his

manageability! Surely the problem is deeper than mere language

and at least penetrates the foundations of logic. The point is

that to use language to make scepticsm look rational is mis-

leading though apparently seductive.

All the five alternatives from the seventh to the eleventh
are variations of the causation theory (of perception or knowl-
edge), so I will take first the causation theory in general so
far as possible and then remark on the specific causes advocated.
The general proposition of the Platonist causation theory would
be that the non-phenomenal, being the spiritual, is the sufficient
condition (let alone invariable concomitance) for the phenomenal,
that is sensual. Apparently this would <u>not</u> be so for the sale
of our simple belief that only the like can cause the like. The
Platonist's case, however, against this belief cannot, <u>ex
hypothesi</u>, be based on an empirical account, hence he harps on a
theoretical or dialectical deducibility of the phenomenal features
from the characteristics of the spiritual. The Form lends its
form to the particular but does not thereby lose itself to any
extent. The account runs into the one-and-many dialectic but
Plato would rather try to save it from the encounter, for the
very admission of the dialectic as relevant (if not as decisive)
would mean a surrender of the eternal immutability of the cause.
Unless there is a Form of causation and it intervenes between the
Form and the particulars as the cause of the latter, Plato's
causationist account cannot easily be made plausible, for <u>some</u>
activization of the Form strongly appears as quite necessary in
order to have any "cause" at all, and this cannot be obtained or
extracted from the Form as it is, without demanding from it a
concession on its independence.

The Form would certainly not involve itself to commit to such extraneous temporal pressure even though the latter may promise not to involve it in its essence, for it would then lose its non-temporality which _is_ essential to it. It may then be said that there is no need for the Form for any acti-vization on its part and that the particular will take care of itself just by imitating or reflecting the Form without involving it, but this account does not establish any _causal_ relation be-tween the Form and its particulars. Even if the meaning of causation is artificially extended to allow such non-committal cause as a legitimate one, one fails to understand how an appearance of the extra-temporal can be kidnapped by the temporal on a crude phenomenal analogy. If it is desired to maintain the non-temporality of the Form, an intermediary Form of causation really needs to be posed (also because the particulars would otherwise come to possess a power of imitating the Forms without deriving the power somehow from the Forms and would thus have an original and independent ontic character). But this will not only be vague and unintelligible, it will have as well to be something like a pseudo-Form with an imposing retinue of the dialectical, ontological, and epistemological problems attached to it.

Of course Plato can fall back on the incredible intuition, but that can only conceal or avoid but not satisfactorily treat

the problems. In the alternative, if the Form is not allowed to transcend time and is made co-extensive with it, not only the time, change, and phenomenality will go "scot-free" as unexplained presuppositions but will also threaten to be independent and real. Also, the relation of imitation or reflection being sensually anthropomorphic in nature will eternally smack of phenomenality and laugh at the non-phenomenal Form. Again an intermediary will be necessary with the intuition to intimate it. In brief, it is difficult to demonstrate causation as proposed, for the demonstration cannot avoid accounting for the phenomenal at least partially in the terms of the latter, and this is what Plato really wants to avoid. Of course, the Platonic lure is to imitate (or even improve upon) mathematics in philosophy. Plato, indeed, did a great deal to inject in the Western tradition of thought the idea of philosophy as an ill-conceived parody of mathematics.

Mathematical deduction does seem a theoretical one from the intelligible or spiritual to the phenomenal or sensual. This, though, is not completely true, even apart from it, the causationist account is _ex_ _hypothesi_ barred even theoretically, and also the dialectic pushed forward as superior to mathematics cannot help the matter. This is because Plato's attempt is aimed at reversing the direction of the method and procedure of the empirical sciences. Instead of proceeding from the available

non-vague to the possible simpler vague behind it and this on empirically evidenced grounds and principles, Plato wants to descend from the inevitably and hopelessly vague (for the Forms are definite only by stipulstion) to the available non-vague (sensual) and this on dialectical grounds. The very word "causation" has strong empirical undertones, and Plato would be eager to exchange it for, say, "deduction." The view that "deduction" has no empirical undercurrents can be shown to be only partly acceptable, but it is more implausible, relatively, than the view that "deduction" has less such undercurrents than "causation." In a credible theory, therefore, one cannot make an easy transition from deduction to causation without taking in his theory an account of the increasing empirical undercurrents. The Platonist account (also compare Kant's attempt to deduce, a _priori_, causation as a category of understanding from the nature of the hypothetical in traditional logic) when based on a reversal of such scientific procedure is then inevitably foredoomed in its very basis.

Supposing that the Forms cause their particulars, the question can be relevantly asked whether the nature of the operation of the Forms on the particulars is (7) mechanical, (8) teleological, (9) material, (10) formal, or (11) of the vague type of a "force." We must consider these alternatives now.

Non of the alternative propositions has a _prima_ _facie_ case specially in view of its Platonist context which tries to descend deductively where it is more proper to ascend inductively. Plato's intellectual leanings of course make him incline towards the teleological and the formalist views. He does have a keen sense of self-criticism (this is not to prejudice the general criticism of self-criticism as a methodological principle as made on pages 36-37 above) and a consequent awareness of the difficulties of his views, and it is for this reason probably that he is led frequently into sceptical or mystical overtures. We have considered the sceptical overtures. Plato's resort to the role of intuition has also been dealt with. What remains to be dealt with is his notion of the "force" of the Forms which causes the particulars in the eleventh alternative.

In brief, I wish to line up the eighth, tenth, and eleventh alternatives together for dissection. Both the teleology and the formal agency of the Forms are speculations based on hasty anthropological (or anthropomorphistic) generalizations. To explain. Teleology is obviously derived from the observation of the human conation also found incompletely in animal life. Its projection into the relation between the Forms and the particulars extending over the entire empirical field on obviously anthropomorphistic value-basis is at least apparently incautious and even insufficiently warranted by a comparison of the proportions of the

empirical facts in and against its favor. It may be objected
that there is not enough reason to be guided by a comparison
based on mere magnitude. It may be that anthropomorphic con-
siderations inevitably and decisively inform all our knowledge
in some sense and in the final analysis. But the alternatives
suggested by Plato come only in the form of didactic "musts."
The ultimate elements of reality and knowledge must be spiritual
and purposive uncaused causes. I should not be taken as giving
a total faith in the materialistic mechanicism on the above
account; I only wish to point out the apparent weakness of its
alternatives to which Plato seems vaguely and variously inclined.
Indeed I would not risk a rash leap from such a surface-level
methodology into a drowning-level cosmology. I would only sug-
gest that Plato does not go deep enough.

Not that the "anthropomorphistic" values cannot have any
say in the basic pholosophical issues, but these need to be
demonstrated and not dictated. For one thing, neither the Forms
nor their relation to the particulars are on the Platonist account
prepared to lend themselves to any sort of meaningful comprehen-
sion of their essential nature. And the critics of Plato have not
spared any exploiting of this inadequacy. The Forms indeed have
been made out to appear as mere figments of imagination. There
is no need then for detailing criticism of Plato on these lines.
The five alternatives presently under consideration, therefore,

in view of their surface-level treatment by Plato, do not

necessitate a detailed criticism. It may be said that, judging

by the empirical standards, evidence is by no means balanced or

easily comparable internally for want of the ascertainment of a

hierarchy of standards which is one of the constructive tasks

of the feasibilist philosophy. In this context, it is obvious

that it is of no special use to repeat the traditional criticisms

of the Platonist causationism. In view of the hierarchy to be

outlined later, the lines of criticism -- so far as they are

novel -- will be automatically clear.

Notes: Chapter II

[1] The main primary sources in my treatment of Plato
are the Theaetetus, the Republic, the Phaedo, and the Meno.
My major concern is with the basic methodological presup-
positions and the immediate metaphysical intimations fol-
lowing from them. I have directed my treatment to what
in Plato has been the most influential for the history
of philosophy. So, I have steered clear from the scho-
larly controversies about Plato's final intentions or
personal philosophical thesis or about how much of philo-
sophy found in his dialogues belongs to Socrates.

I have concentrated mainly on two issues: the exact
relation of the Forms with the intuitive reason which
grasps them and the precise relation they might bear with
the particulars which imitate or participate in them. One
point that might be raised against my treatment of the
former relation is that I blur or ignore the distinction
between reason as having epistemological status and the
Forms as having ontological status. Briefly, my reply is
that a mere declaration that there is such a distinction
between epistemology and metaphysics fails to say anything
about the relation between the two.

If epistemology must claim to reveal a knowledge of
reality, it must clarify the general or special relation
between its knowing apparatus and reality known, for other-
wise the claim would be an unintelligible Delphic declara-
tion merely and would fail to establish or justify itself.

The immediately following account derives largely
from Walsh, Metaphysics, chapter 2, "The Philosophy of
Plato," pp. 20-33. I have also greatly benefitted by
reading A. E. Taylor's Plato: The Man and His Work (London,
1960).

[2] I would hold that I have created sufficient ground,
if not positive demonstration, for this note to sound
plausible, in my treatment of the Russellian logicist thesis
on the foundations of mathematics in my unpublished master's
thesis "A Critique of Logical Atomism." Refer, specifi-
cally, to chapter four called "Untraditional Logicism."
This chapter, incidentally, also gives a critical attack on

the thought-sensation dichotomy perpetuated by Plato in the tradition of Western philosophy. This dichotomy is one of the most important factors in respect to the foundations of philosophy and hence forms one of Plato's most significant, though more implied than explicit or more presupposed than realized, despite the _Theaetetus_ which is explicit, contributions as a formative influence in philosophy. I will not re-treat it here.

CHAPTER III

ORGANON OF FIRST PHILOSOPHY:

ARISTOTLE'S BEQUEST

   . . . and the most certain principle of all is that
regarding which it is impossible to be mistaken; for
such a principle must be both the best known (for all
men may be mistaken about things which they do not know),
and non-hypothetical. For a principle which everyone
must have who understands anything that is, is not a
hypothesis; and that which everyone must know who knows
anything, he must already have when he comes to a
special study. Evidently then such a principle is the
most certain of all; which principle this is, let us
proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot
at the same time belong and not belong to the same
subject and in the same respect; we must presuppose, to
guard against dialectical objections, any further
qualifications which might be added.

Aristotle, Metaphysics.[1]

After a consideration of Plato's basic methodological and

metaphysical views and their presuppositions, let us turn to

those of Aristotle who has probably been no less influential

than Plato in the formation of the tradition of thought in

philosophy. He led a polemic against Plato's Forms and arrived

at different views about reality. Though he concretized the

latter, he retained an ontological realism of universals and

gave a more systematic and lasting form to logic itself.

It is of little use to repeat what has already been said
about him from the viewpoints of settled, mostly nonfeasibilist,
traditions of philosophy. What may be done more profitably is
to show that his basic views on methodology and metaphysics are
largely unsound. Our attempt to show this will be inspired by
the viewpoint of theoretical or microphilosophical feasibilism.
Since, however, the microphilosophy will have to be constructed
independently at a later stage, its actual impact upon the
analysis of Aristotle may not be distinctly felt. This, though
regrettable in a way, is largely inevitable for the sake of a
completer formulation and even understanding of the thesis to be
developed later. Let it be repeated, then, that the main pur-
pose behind the present critical analysis of certain major
philosophies is to bring home the efficacy of the dissective
method indirectly and illustratively through a critical treat-
ment of some influential alternatives to feasibilism. To
serve this purpose, it will be sufficient to state Aristotle's
fundamental views on metaphysics along with the actual instru-
mentality or dialectical methodology through which he would have
arrived at them, and, to examine the tenability thereof. We
shall need to direct our critique more specifically only towards
the salient and crucial features of the method. In doing this,
as with Plato, we shall concentrate on a logical rather than
the historical Aristotle so far as possible, avoiding mere

details of both the historical context and the various, for us

not relevant, implications of Aristotle's basic views and

methodology.

Aristotle's views on the method and the main issues of

philosophy (if not of the now heretic "metaphysics" which

originated with his editor) may, to start with, be condensed as

follows:[2]

Metaphysics or "first philosophy" studies changeless,

separable substance. It is the science of "pure form," God,

or the Unmoved Mover, the cause of the cosmos. It is the

transcendental science of the supersensible. It studies sub-

stance or being (ousia) as such. It is foundational to all

other sciences and treats of the concepts and principles common

to the latter. The two views are not quite reconciled.

Categories classify all reality.[3] An instantiation of one

differs irreducibly from that of another. To neglect this

difference breeds philosophical paradoxes. Substance is the

primary category and the rest are its mere attributes. Indi-

vidual substance is an impredicable subject. Its species and

genera, including essences, are also substances. This

indistinction between particulars and universals remains

logically unhappy.

Contrary to Plato, form immanently instantiates in matter

and it is determined by or even identical with teleological

function. Matter is _for_ form, not _vice versa_. Form (axe)

implies matter (iron), not _vice versa_. There are gradations

from the absolutely unformed prime matter to the absolutely

immaterial pure form, so that each intermediary is relatively

both form and matter. Prime matter cannot exist without some

form while pure form does exist without matter and such form

is God.

Matter has the potentiality of receiving form. Form is

the actualization of potentiality. Not that any matter can

receive any form; a general pattern implying the notions of

growth and change has to be analyzed by philosophy. In con-

nection, value, and time, actuality is prior to potentiality.

So also in change and causation.

There are four causes or principles of change in reality:

material, formal, efficient, and final (Aristotle's famous

fourfold analysis of "why"). The last two tend to unite under

the second, maintaining the form-matter antithesis. This

causation applies to things rather than events.

Logic or "analytic" is the "organon," ancillary to or

prerequisite for any science or genuine knowledge, including

"first philosophy."

Formal or deductive logic is syllogistic and gives necessary

truth so far as the premises go. Any specific science should

start from principles, axioms, and definitions, some common to

all sciences and the rest peculiar to it. It should then proceed

deductively through syllogisms to demonstrate the necessity of

its objects having certain properties. So far as sciences differ

in their premises (and they do so differ), they cannot be united

or synthesized.

The initial principles, axioms, premises, and universal

concepts of all sciences are deductively indemonstrable and

derived from "induction" conceived as intuitive reason leading

to or "inducing" their direct non-inferential apprehension

through one or two instantiations.

Aristotle's view of physical sciences is now outdated in

large parts. His theory of causation is also not quite relevant

for the purposes of our inquiry which relates to the logic of

philosophy, centering, more particularly, on the logic of

philosophizing or philosophical presupposing. Hence, what seems

to be relevant for us as the crucial point is the nature of

induction and deduction. As conceived by Aristotle, the

methodology, called "organon," belongs to logic, called

"analytic." Aristotle plausibly holds that this methodology is

ancillary to or a prerequisite for the knowledge of reality.

This shows that in his view methodology is prior to metaphysics.

This should, _prima_ _facie_, be true. But it also involves a

condition to be fulfilled, which is that the very possibility

of metaphysics on such a view requires a more or less self-

contained set of _clean_ _and_ _clear_ methodological precepts.

If this condition is not fulfilled the resultant metaphysics must remain vague, uncertain, and incoherent. Since metaphysics is the fundamental science, these traits of metaphysics would be inherited by the whole superstructure of specific knowledge that may be built over it. That the methodological principles are clean and clear does not in itself guarantee that they are efficient or competent in their application. It also requires that they be true themselves. They should not only be true _in abstractu_ but be real as well in _concretu_. The last requirement has perhaps not been fully appreciated throughout the history of nonfeasibilist philosophy. We must postpone it for consideration at a later time. To concentrate on the other requirements, we should find out whether Aristotle has clean, clear, and true principles in his methodology or "organon." We turn to examining and analyzing his views of the _laws of logic_, the _nature of induction_, and the _method of deduction_.

Before proceeding to the laws of logic (or of thought) I must consider Aristotle's view of logic proper. He took logic to be a peculiar, non-substantive, and rather transcendental basic science. This is perhaps the reason why it does not fit exactly in his general classification of the sciences as theoretical, practical, and productive. According to him, logic alone enables one to know for what sorts of propositions one should demand proof and what sorts of proof one should

demand for them. It does not study words merely. Rather it studies the thought which is signified by them. It studies thought not _as_ thought, but with respect to its ability to attain truth (which, it seems, has ultimately to be defined circularly as that which Aristotle's kind of thought attains). It studies it not as constituting but as comprehending the nature of things.

It appears that this view of logic has almost become a truism in nearly all the traditions of Western philosophy that swear by some kind of "reason" or "rationality" as essential to philosophy. It is painful, and also difficult, to point out that the view is the result of a fundamental misconception of the philosophical effort. Naturally, it affects the resultant philosophy whatever comes out from among the possible alternatives. The root trouble lies with the presupposition of an obsolute distinction between thought on the one hand and things on the other. While the dissociation strikes as a commonsense truism, it needs at least a clarification at the microphilosophical level, where one concerned with progressing a logical zero- (or rather minimal) situation towards the familiar commonsensical one.

It is said that by following certain laws thought can attain truth, and by following certain principles knowledge of reality can be obtained. A simple question emerges: What is

the *locus standi* of the truth gained through thought, *vis-a-vis*

the nature of reality, ultimate and apparent (remote and

proximate)? Or, is there any conceivable relation between

truth and reality, if there is none between the thought which

attains the truth and the things to which the reality belongs?

The initially posited absolute distinction between thought and

things cannot be carried forward in the same simplicity between

truth and reality. The interaction or relation between the

latter apir seems quite obvious, for it is not very easy to

conceive a truth which can be unreal and a reality that can be

false.

The issue is traditionally sought to be rather ignored or

overlooked through the concept of formality. But by a logical

precondition of its own this formality is difficult to root in

formality itself. It has to be a *function* of thought *as such*

and not just an unconnected by-product of it. Everything points

to the necessity of finding out the exact relation between

thought and things and between truth and reality. Once an

absolute distinction is made between these, in the principles

of logic are not able, as formally true, to make a back-door

ontic entry into the nature of things because in their formality

they have already transcended them in full.

But the tradition still overrates this view of logic,

which I called earlier "philosophical logicism." Its further

resort is the so-called intuitive reason which is supposed to
be a warrant for the formal truth of logical thought. The
real issue as it would seem, however, remains intact. The
simple question persists. What is the locus standi or accept-
able ground of such intuitive reasoning vis-a-vis the ordinary
logical thinking? Could it not be articulated instead of being
just a name for the logical terminus of the logic of philos-
ophy? Even if this is not possible, just how is it arrived at
and recognized as a logically terminal intuition? Since this
question is hardly answered, our conclusion is that it is only
assumed to be such and learnt through self-persuasion or
through imitation of what a group of philosophers persuaded by
it takes it to be. It also appears legitimate to conclude that
it is intellectually vacuous and is used mainly as an excuse
to make various inexplicable intellectual jumps to what a various
times it is supposed to imply or lead to in terms of terminally
revealed "ultimate truth" or "first principles" or even
"ultimate reality." Insofar as a group of thinkers agree to
take it as a name for the inevitable logical terminus of
dialectic, all seems well, but that all is not well is brought
out in the fact that different people mean it differently and
arrive at different results and still claim that it is
"intuitive reason" which imeediately delivers to them their
results. Indeed this is a clever way of persuading others by

implying, if not explicitly stating, that others would be violating an absolute, objective precept of "reason" if they do not follow what in effect is only a set of deeply felt convictions of those who put forward such "reason." This is perhaps enough to unpack the dogma of Western philosophy's "reason" or "rationality."

Of course, this does not provide me with an excuse to advocate just anything as true. My important point is that such a terminal principle(s) is(are) inevitable if philosophy has to be meaningfully pursued, but also, and more importantly, the terminus needs to be discovered rather than prescribed in order to be the logical paradigm of the way we understand ourselves, others, and the world. Perhaps this makes clear the point of my critical dialectic of some major influential deliverances of "reason" that either advocate a revision of our world or understanding or a recommendation of a way to understand our experience or even a description of how experience is understood. In Aristotle's case which tends rather to describe than to revise or recommend (Strawson calls Aristotle and Kant, for example, descriptive metaphysicians), we have a good case-study of how the principles of description are unintelligible and unworkable when pressed to their logical foundations. We not not of course follow through the logical failure through all the quantum jumps necessary in the system to reach back

what they claim to describe. That would be merely of academic interest. It is sufficient to see the general untenability of "rational systems" in order to see what I claim to be at least a better way of rediscovering ourselves or discovering the logic of our understanding.

The question of the _locus standi_ of intuitive reasoning _vis-a-vis_ ordinary logical thinking also can be framed this way: What is the conceivable relation between the two and their products, _inter se_? A presumptive award of a special, peculiar, transcendental status to the nature and process of the intuitive reason (whatever forms it takes in nonfeasibilism) seems to be essentially needed, after all. This cuts against the entire epistemological effort of the traditional philosophy.

To put it simply, the traditional philosopher's self-induced, pre-conceived, and artificial dogma of philosophical logicism as against the so-called psychologism (my thesis is not psycho-logistic) separated wholesale from it without proper ground is this. Truth arises from logical thought where the emphasis is not on thought itself but on its being logical, that is on its ability to follow the laws of logic. So, truth is generally a particular elaboration or extension of such general laws. But the general laws are true only by virtue of the root-level intuitive reason which is to be (vaguely) distinguished from the surface-level ordinary reason (of logical thought). Thus,

fundamentally, truth is to be revealed at the root-level stage
itself without recourse to the surface-level stage. What, then,
is the _locus standi_ of epistemology again exerting itself to
know the nature and conditions of truth in _any_ knowledge _as_
knowledge, specially when the shole effort is now pushed through
only on the surface-level stage? At least I am unable to find
an answer to this question within the possibilities of the
thesis of philosophical logicism. I admit that the point applies
more to rationalist epistemologists and coherence theorists, but
I wish to extend it also to all others who admit "rationality"
as important to their position, implicitly or explicitly, fully
or partly. It applies to any philosophical position which
regards rationality as an independent principle, irrespective
of what other factors are accepted along with it. The catch is
in rationality as _independently relevant_ to philosophy; it is
beside the point to have the independent relevance denied only
verbally but accepted in fact.

I submit that the implications of the above criticism, if
sound, should seriously undermine not only Aristotle's position
but the entire philosophical tradition nurtured by his view.
"Thought attains truth" means that "When thought has attained
truth, truth belongs to it;" what is not clear here is the
precise relation of "attainment" or "belonging" between thought
and truth. "Attaining" and "belonging" look like intelligible

relations at first sight, but their obvious paradigms in every-
day language are rooted in human endeavor and possessions, and
their analogical extension into abstract concepts, so metaphori-
cally made like human agents, fails exact understanding. A
further important point is that, if logic studies thought not
as such but only in respect of its ability to attain truth,
truth itself--unless again confused somehow with thought--is
divorced from the essential nature of thought. There would be
no meaning in saying that a particular thought is true or that
it attains truth. What exactly does it attain? What is it's
ontic worth, that is, what is the value of such truth in terms
of reality? If it is only externally related to thought, as
it should be on the account furnished, the precise nature of
the relation is in ny way clear to enable the critical inquiry
to be pursued further. Such blockage of inquiry does not appear
like "discursive reason!"

If now it is well-established that there is no plausible
way of demonstrating rationality as an (let alone the)
independent determinant factor in a philosophical theory, it
seems understandable that no general way out has been found of
awarding a unique, suppositious, transcendental status to, say,
formality against thought, truth against formality, intuition
against truth. A line of some such (inexplicable in final
analysis) successive transcendence will logically need to be

evolved, detailed, clarified, and established. Any way we do
not find in Aristotle much attempt to fill this need. Perhaps
the very nature of the problem involves an element of pre-
supposition and commitment in its solution, but then the
problem is reduced to reducing this element. No active effort
in this direction is noticed in Aristotle. Even no awareness
of such reduced problem of reduction is found.

As a result, it is hard to see how Aristotle's view of
logic can be defended as it is. It requires not only demon-
stration but, more importantly, essential clarification.
Aristotle does not seriously undertake to fulfill this require-
ment. On top of this he holds that logic alone enables one to
know for what sorts of proposition one "should" demand proof
and what sorts of proof one "should" demand for them. One
would be at a loss to imagine what sort of force is intended
here by the word "should" and what sort of worth belongs to
such force in terms of truth and reality. Truth and reality
by their very conceptions should not need to be forced by such
recommendation of force, for if they cannot force themselves
nothing else can. If such force is only an axiological recom-
mendation as it seems to be, it obviously is barred from claiming
any logical or ontic worth itself. One also does not know what
kind of value-norms guided Aristotle to recommend logic of his
conception. Is logic _merely_ to dictate its doctrines? After

all, the proposition containing "should" would come down to mean
that logic alone enables one to know what its doctrines are!
This would be a philosophical joke in a strange taste, not felt
though as such by the traditional philosopher because of his
self-hypnosis by it.

The point is that to have a real basis, force, or truth,
logic as a foundational science needs to be evolved through
reality and truth; there seems no other plausible way to prove
its locus standi against the latter. It will have nothing to
recommend itself if it just sits tight over its selfrighteous
presumption of transcending everything. Any claim to reveal
reality has to be grounded in reality itself. This demands that
the concept of reality be brought down to reality, and insists
on stopping the excogitation of what reality should be, in order
to find what it always is in the presuppositions of our under-
standing itself. Wittgenstein did not say in vain: "Don't
think, but look!" He would not have regarded highly my dialec-
tical efforts at undermining the dialectic of philosophy. But
his followers, for the most part, have become ardent champions
of discourse again and they value in philosophy a "high
temperature of argument" more than anything else. So, the
disease of dialectic does not seem to have its permanent cure
in exhortations which cast only temporary spells. I am under
no illusion that my kind of antidote will be effective. The

way philosophy has been practiced, it seems that only those arguments have a place in it which unsettle rather than settle the issues, but one always needs to claim that his arguments have settled the issues; so if I am to claim I am doing philosophy, there is no reason why I should be an exception to this!

Against my preceding procedure against Aristotle, one may object that the basic laws of logic are after all defended by Aristotle (in his Metaphysics) and that the defense is complete so far as it is necessary and possible. Let us turn to the laws and their defense by Aristotle. Mainly two laws underlie demonstration: the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle. The law of non-contradiction is expressed like this: the same attribute cannot belong and not belong to the same thing or subject at the same time and in the same respect. The law has two sides, ontological and psychological; the former makes its contradiction impossible in the nature of things, while the latter does the same in the nature of thought.[4]

To demand a proof of this law is to exhibit an ignorance of or a want of training in logic. This is probably Aristotle's first reaction to such a demand.[5] This reaction is a demand or requirement that one who demands proof of what is held in logic to be a fundamental law must get indoctrinated in logic; Aristotle probably hopes or presupposes, albeit in good faith, that such indoctrination will silence the questioner and allow

the logician to assert thereby an unquestioned validity of his first law. But is a self-righteous, arrogant, muffling of the questioner a logical or rational or otherwise justified answer to the question itself? To turn down the demand for proof or ground by pointing to a set of doctrines calling for unquestioned consumption or adoption hardly amounts to meeting the rational requirements of the demand; namely, a set of proofs to justify oneself. To say that anyone who demands a proof in this case does not know logic properly is scarcely a defense at all, particularly in the mouth of one who calls himself rational and unpresuming.

One does not become psychologically and meaningfully incapable of making the demand for proof here if he has mastered logic as a technique. A further question is whether the demand violates the law of non-contradiction. It is not evident that it does, so it does not seem in itself self-contradictory, illogical, or irrational unless a special concept of contradiction, logic, or reason, not compatible with the demand, is presumed. But such a presumption would not be logical or rational in an open sense.

If the demand for proof of the principle of non-contradiction violates the principle or law, then it is evident that the psychological side of the law cannot be sustained, for here is a thought (embodies in the demand) which violates the law. On the

other hand, if the demand does not violate the principle, then

one must ask Aristotle as to which other logical law is violated

by the demand. If this question is not answered, there does

not remain any ground to justify the charge that the demand

betrays a want of either knowledge or training in logic. A

general, rigid, exclusive self-consistency pre-conceived as

the essence of logic or reason seems logically required to say

that a demand for its proof is illogical or irrational. But

such a preconception can only be a convenient definition or

a prescriptive stipulation of the issue proper, if it is not

intended for an unpacking or intelligible analysis of itself,

not to speak about an intention to justify or even elaborate

implications. Hence to avoid the charge of arbitrariness,

the rule of a pre-conceived self-consistency would have to be

grounded in a universal intuition and such intuition would

further need to be arbitrarily, or as an effect of self-

imposed definition, called a logical intuition, a rational

insight, or intuitive reason.

It may seem as if I have misunderstood the psychological

aspect of the law by implying that the law is a decriptive

principle of thought. But if it is not a factual law, is it a

law at all in the sense intended, that is, foundational and

universal. If non-contradiction is really foundational and

universal to thought, it has to be an essential character of all

the instances of thinking. But that would make all thinking logical ipso facto, making the very idea of contradiction meaningless. For, on this account, contradiction would be impossible; it cannot occur at all. And there would be no point in elevating non-contradiction as a condition of truth, for truth would then need to be characterized in terms other than non-contradiction.

Now, if non-contradiction is not a descriptive, essential character of thought, what exactly is it in relation to thought? If we never thought inconsistently, there would be no need for the discipline of logic. If everyone is always consistent, he would never be inconsistent in thinking that the law of consistency needs a proof. So, again, it would not be possible to brush aside the demand for proof as somehow logically absurd. Indeed, it would look extremely odd to answer negatively the question "Can we think inconsistently?" A "no" would be improper, but a "yes" to this question would leave the "law" as a kind of an obligation of a thinker, a dictatorial ethic for all thinking, or a mere prescription for any thought, rather than as something foundational and universal to the thinker or thinking.

One may object that non-contradiction was not intended as a character of thought but of truth, or, in other words, self-consistency is a primitive condition of truth. Again, besides a

self-evident intuition, there would be no answer to how this is

known. A relevant question also is "What conception of truth is

intended here?" Is truth a mere product of consistent thinking?

Is it generated by or does it charactize any instance of con-

sistent thinking of whatever magnitude or duration or elabora-

tion? At what stage of consistent thought does one recognize or

identify truth? Or, is truth assimilated with the very process

of rational thinking? What, exactly speaking, is involved in

essentially characterizing truth, besides self-consistency? If

nothing can be pointed at beforehand, the pointing of non-

contradiction beforehand does not seem to be different from

running around in a circle, that is, in a set of mutually defined

concepts of "logic," "non-contradiction," and "truth."

It may be said that a demand for the proof of the law of

non-contradiction cannot be made meaningful, that is to say,

its formulation can only be a grammatically faithful linguistic

expression which is devoid of meaning and hence is a mere play of

words. It is not obvious, though, that the demanding person does

not mean, that is, intend the demand or does not think of or take

the matter seriously. Does "meaning" require something more than

seriously intending and expressing a thought, besides grammatical

correctness? Within the thesis of the law of consistency, what

else can be required but self-consistency? In order for a sen-

tence to be meaningful for the logician on this view requires

consistency for itself. This would be evidently question-begging.

Far from being able to affect or influence the demand for proof in the question, logic does not seem capable of affecting the capacity of anyone making the demand. If one is really free to contradict himself, how can a logician, who can only be a spectator to a chosen, willful self-contradiction, bind him to a logical obligation? Or, how can logical responsibility be attributed to a thinker if he is free to contradict himself? In what way is a thinker determined by logic in his thinking, unless he himself freely choses to be logical? Then, logic as dependent on the thinker and looking for his grace is hardly basic and universal. It seems that the mere fact that the demand may be raised and that inconsistent thought is possible speaks against the psychological side of the law. But Aristotle does not take this seriously for I am not able to imagine what he could mean by the psychological legality (or law-ness) of non-contradiction while neglecting to take the psychological occurrence of self-contradiction seriously.

To demand _everything_ to be proved leads to an infinite regress. This is Aristotle's further point.[6] So, some terminus will be present. He seems to want an early terminus and just in favor of logic itself. But, should Aristotle's logic go unexamined and why should it dictate the terms of examining everything except itself?

When somebody asks that _only_ the law of non-contradiction be proved, he is definitely not asking that _everything_ be proved. It is hard to see how his asking can be involved in the actual completion of an infinite series. Should Aristotle just brush him aside saying that he is asking for an infinite regress? No one can _actually_ ask for an infinite regress. Similarly, nobody can provide an infinite number of answers. We expect Aristotle to provide a simple, straight, and clear answer to the demand for a proof of the law. He does not need to point out to the questioner's potentiality to carry the questioning indefinitely. Since no questioner can carry his questioning to infinity, then for the sake of argument a questioner can easily assure Aristotle that he will stop short even with the initial question being answered by Aristotle. But Aristotle does not visualize _this_ potentiality (!) of the questioner.

Let it be conceded, however, that _something_ has to be known without proof, if a thorough scepticism is to be avoided. That is to say, an exercise of selectivity is imperative. But such an imperative by itself does not obviously have a special attach-ment for the law of non-contradiction. Aristotle claims there is nothing "fitter" to be known without proof than the law of non-contradiction, for its very denial assumes its truth. He elaborates this as follows.[7]

To deny the law one must say something meaningful. The moment he says it he is using the law, for he then means something, some one thing, something definite, which he cannot mean by contradicting it. On this account one has to be absolutely speechless in order to be a consistent sceptic with respect to the law.

This argument for the law of non-contradiction involves a naive-looking assumtpion that the opponent has already joined the issue of the law with the proponent of the law. There is no obvious ground to make the wishful presumption that the opponent must make such a tactical mistake. When the law of consistency is being questioned by the opponent, the proponent wants him to be "consistent" in his questioning in order that an answer may be given! Aristotle deals here only with a wishful denial of the law. A genuine denial of the law of consistency implies a real and thorough-going inconsistency rather than a consistent inconsistency. Inconsistency can hardly be equated with mere total lunacy or be reduced to babbling or prattling, for it can surely be employed as a well-planned, well-meant, well-chosen strategy to "tackle" an omniscient claim to self-consistency. The behavior of the opponent of the law may be erratic and unpredictable, and it may be meant to be so, but even this is not necessary, for that again would bring in a necessity or presumption of consistency. In fact the opponent can choose to

be selectively consistent against the proponent of consistency.
The questioner can still contend the point, implying that consis-
tency, far from legalizing his intellectual behavior, is _used_ by
him masterfully to achieve his purpose which is to destroy the
force of a dogmatic stubborness. Thus, if the question of
consistency is to be settled reasonably and fairly, the possi-
bility of freely choosing consistency (which seems obviously to
ride on the idea of consistency itself) or inconsistency needs
at least to be accounted for.

So, the _denial_ of the law, at least in this special case of
the law of non-contradiction, need not be total. It may be
willfully or cleverly partial, without involving an acceptance
of the partial truth of the law thereby. What is legitimately
required of the proponent is the production of a general positive
proof or argument for the law that can effectively counter-
tackle the opponent. The pointing out of a particular observ-
ance of the law by the opponent does not amount to even a
reasonable substitute for such proof.

Aristotle states that he cannot be expected to argue with one
who does not say anything or anything definite for that matter.
He seems to forget that what he is expected to do is to furnish
a general positive proof of his law himself, to discharge the
onus of proof for the claim _he_ makes. He need not involve the
opponent for his sake. What the opponent does or fails to do

may at best be only a particular negative advantage to him.
It does not absolve him of his general positive obligation in
any justifiable way. Also, it is not even his necessary con-
cern. The opponent cannot simply be expected to join the very
issue in question.

There is another misunderstanding of a possible opposing
standpoint. Aristotle seems to confuse the denying or doubting
of the law of non-contradiction with such denying or doubting
of non-contradiction itself. Or else he does not visualize the
possibility of this distinction. Such a distinction would place
the issue in a perspective which may be quite deadly to his
thesis. It is not necessary to challenge non-contradiction in
each case of its occurrence. One may justly doubt that it
should be a law with all the force and necessity which should
go with any alleged fundamental law. Of course, Aristotle
cannot be expected to prove the law by means of a perfect induc-
tion. However, he is surely expected to provide some general
basis for belief in the law and also to provide an explanation
of the general human ability to think contradictorily. Aristotle
makes no effort to provide this. No one can say that all human
thought and behavior is always fully self-consistent; all
deviations (or even their possibility) threaten the law as law,
pointing out the need to demonstrate it. Strangely enough, we
notice a perverse attempt: to consider all such deviations in

men and in things to be logical problems of philosophy and then
to explain them in terms of the law of non-contradiction aiming
at saving the latter as against the actual findings. This
results only in an airy and wishful affectation of the apparent
nature of things without advantage to the cause of knowledge as
such. This has been the fate of much philosophy so far. What
is called for is an unaffected and objective investigation of
the entire issue with the elements of presupposition and pre-
scription reduced to their minimum.

Aristotle makes a further point in his defense. He says
that men's actions in general and his opponent's in particular
do not show that they generally think in terms of contradictions.
For example, when somebody has a clear idea for doing a certain
thing he does not proceed to do something else on the ground that
the distinction or contradiction between the two has no force in
terms of either truth or reality.

This looks like a naive pragmatic argument. Aristotle
conveniently disregards the fact that men often do behave in-
consistently. Or else there would be no necessity of imparting
the science of logic as an intellectual discipline. Does he
mean that the truth of the law is to be decided in proportion to
the statistics of its actual or potential followers! Is such a
truth an inductive function of social psychology abstracted from
the frequency of its adoption? Or, does he mean that the quantum

of practical success in following the law should decide the proportion of its truth? Both these meanings would be untenable as purely logical grounds for the law. Again, perfect induction being impossible, Aristotle must explain the actual occurrence of inconsistent behavior. This alone can prove the force of the law.

We have earlier (pp.41-44) dealt in some detail with the argument that the law is undeniable because its denial involves its acceptance. From the above discussion one can add that the denial of the law need be neither consistent nor total, for else it would involve the denier in the law itself. One who denies the law cannot be committed to it to join its issue from the back door. Against the insistence that the denier cannot avoid affirming it one can also point out that the affirmer cannot avoid begging it in the affirmation itself, let alone in pointing out the affirmation in the denier.

That one cannot state and affirm the law without actually having used it in the affirming statement itself should boomerang on the proponent of the law. The effect will be that one cannot avoid <u>presuming</u> the law. Traditionally, however, this effect of affirming the law has been generally underrated and discounted, with the reflection that in any case the law as such cannot be avoided and the balance must obviously favor its proponent. Probably this has also boosted up the reflection

that the denial cannot be anything else but a verbal jugglery, a play upon words, without actual or sincere intent,[8] and ineffective as such to express reality either metaphysical or psychological. All this deserves a closer look and also a critical examination. But before we consider it, an important point must be made.

Even if Aristotle succeeds in extracting an admission from a naive opponent that the latter has assumed the law of non-contradiction in his attempt to deny it, he does not thereby show ground for the presupposition in which he is involved, namely, that denial excludes all middles, that is, denial is the only way of refuting the affirmation in this case. But, more importantly, what Aristotle has ended up saying is that the denier is inconsistent and so his denial cannot be true. But that he _is_ inconsistent, first of all, shows not only the possibility of being inconsistent but also an admission on the part of Aristotle of his finding an actual case of inconsistency in his very imputation of it in the denier's denial. Still, more importantly, Aristotle's account of the denier's denial reduces to pointing at the inconsistency of explicit denial and implicit affirmation. That both are incompatible may be granted, but it requires an Aristotle to pick up the latter as true and the former as false. That tacit affirmation must be true because it endorses the law and that the denier's position

must be wrong because it is caught in a self-contradiction is,
again, to presuppose rather than to justify the law. No success
at justification is plausibly achieved at all. On the denier's
part it shows that he has successfully _used_ a tacit consistency
to bring an overall inconsistency into effect. Nothing shows
that the law of non-contradiction "holds." What is shown is
that it is only used, and more, that the effect is an overall
inconsistency rather than self-consistency. Moreover, unaided
by intuition, how does Aristotle assure himself that a particular
set of such "tacit admissions" of the law, however repeated, is
enough warrant to universalize the law? How does a finite number
of observations of self-consistency lead to projecting non-self-
contradiction as not only a universal but also a fundamental law?
Even if this step from particular to universal is justified,
does it not presuppose a further, necessary, co-existing "law"
of the universalizability of "logical truths" from such instances?
The presupposition would be unjustifiedly arbitrary for, though
other truths may probably be allowed to be universalized, not
everything would be so allowed, because such an allownace would
then lead to the further universalization of the general warrant
for making any indiscriminate passage from particular to univer-
sal. Unless a check is exercised on such passages and a general
warrant is found for a prescribed check, it would be pointless
for Aristotle to exhort the philosopher to "analyze a general

pattern of growth and change" (page   above). Also, if Aristotle

says that the denier cannot really or sincerely mean to be incon-

sistent in his denial, he is, first, undermining the fact that

the denier means here to be inconsistent, and, secondly, not

giving any criterion of meaning except consistency itself which

makes his position viciously circular. To say that one cannot

really mean to be inconsistent boils down only to an exhortation

that one ought never to be inconsistent.

To say that the law of non-contradiction can be contradicted

only in words but not in intent or in being, implies the accept-

ance of a strange phenomenon that words (as meaningless symbols

or marks) can mutually contradict without any reference to their

meanings or without any relevance to the entities which they

signify. If no meanings or beings can really contradict at all

there would be no _locus_ _standi_ for the host of "logical" (or

dialectical) problems of philosophy like those of universals,

substance, qualities, relations, change, and motion. Why should

any philosopher (holding such a view) including Aristotle, have

addressed himself to them? Stranger still, how is it that the

mere "verbal jugglery" or "word-play" involved in them have

exhausted and still continues to exhaust the intellectual

efforts of serious and doubtlessly competent thinkers for more

than a millenium? (It would be obvious that I am not arguing

for the familiar contemporary thesis that philosophical problems

arise out of linguistic confusion, rather I am arguing for the

thesis that they arise primarily out of philosophical-logical confusion, out of a failure to see the nature of reason, and consequently out of prescribing a preconceived reason. In my limited knowledge of philosophy, I have not so far come across any attempt to formulate, argue, and defend such a thesis.)

If the logical laws are really rooted in thought and reality, one simply _cannot_ contradict at all. If such contradictions are only appearances of the non-self-contradictory re reality which they contradict, an account _has_ to be furnished in non-self-contradictory terms explaining the occurrence of such appearances. That such illusory appearances should occur at all in the face of the very fundamental "law" of all being must itself be sufficient to threaten the law. _Prima facie_ it fights all logic to see how a logical account of them can be given. How logic (or self-consistency) can explain the relation of a logical (or self-consistent) reality behind an illogical (or self-contradictory) appearance must remain beyond logic (or self-consistency) itself. This is because what is at stake here is not the element of logical formality but that of concrete actuality. The latter being quite different in nature from the former cannot be accounted for in terms of the former. By its very nature, again, a formality cannot affect an actuality.

To expalin (an alleged) reality must mean, first, to explain all its appearances. If the reality is to be

authentically self-consistent, none of its appearances can afford
to contradict either another appearance (or manifestation) or
the reality itself. Such appearances would misrepresent the
projected self-consistency. A word, _qua_ word, cannot contradict
another, any more than one vegetable can contradict another.
Meaning _has_ to be brought in. Further, that one can even pre-
tend to contradict the law of non-contradiction _has_ to be a
accounted for in any case in non-self-contradictory terms.
Then, if the law can arise or emerge only as already having been
presumed by one who either affirms or denies it, its retrospec-
tive application to the act of affirming or denying is hardly
tenable. The law simply cannot require such retrospective
effect, not at least in terms of reality, if one concedes the
effect in terms of formality. "Formality" has, however, to be
specially created for the purpose and at a level no higher than
the law itself. Aristotle says that one cannot convince a
vegetable as against a person committed to some definitive
communication. But he hardly realizes that in so stating the
matter he cannot avoid the implication that the entire communi-
cation, perhaps along with its paraphernalia, will have to be
placed above the logical board. That a law of the understanding
has to be a product of the understanding in actual facts does no
credit to the law (of self-consistency). And once the concept of
formality is created to explain the nature of the understanding

as well as the nature of the inconsistent event in order to save

the situation and to pave a clear way for a retrospective effect,

one is trapped even more firmly because one then commits oneself

not to drift away from such formality in order afterwards to

conveniently plunge--and this too retroactively--into actuality.

The position may be clarified like this. The proponent of

the law of non-contradiction cannot avoid the circularity involved

in the very affirmation or statement of the law.[9] He _has_ to find

the law as already having been presupposed or used by him. The

stage at which he has already presumed or used the law _has_ to be

prior to the stage at which he affirms, states, or discovers the

law. But he is at pains to extend the law retrospectively to

the earlier stage. His pain is due to the fact that he has to

fight the law itself in order to save its universality. To say

that the revelation at the second, that is, law-affirming or law-

finding stage has already operated at the first, that is, law-

using or law-presupposing stage is quite self-contradictory.

The act of using or presuming the law along with the one who

uses or presumes it must transcend the law itself, or else one

would not know what would justify the use of the words like

"using" and "presuming" in this context clearly distinguishing

between the user, the use, and the used, or between the presumer,

the presumption, and the presumed. To befog or confound these

obvious distinctions is the painful task of the proponent of the

law. The law can hardly underlie itself, its own use, or its own

presumption. No Delphic declaration of the universal truth of

the second stage as a self-evident intuition of reason can affect

its being second and change the priorities of actual occurrence.

Then "logical priority" has to be invented and nurtured by the

conception of formality by which the proponent hopes to pre-

deliver actuality. This "formality" is no less presuppositious

or uncritical than the self-evident intuition. It says that it

is plain or obvious that the understanding is formal and it has

ntohing to do with actuality, at least so far as what it wants

to call "logical," "formal," "a priori," etc. This fails to

explain the contradiction of the law operating on itself, its

own use, or its own presumption.

Even granting this formal character of the understanding,

which allows certain contradictions to operate as a part of the

nature of the understanding, both the psychological as well as

the metaphysical aspects of the law collapse immediately. First,

the psychological side is ruined by the new position which

defends the possibility of self-contradictory thought in the

context of formality. The proposition of the psychological law

of non-contradiction was that there cannot be any contradiction

at all in thought. The new position is that contradiction may

be or is quite there, but it does not matter, for it is only

formal and has nothing to do with reality (or, alternatively and

much less plausibly, it is in thought as a psychological occur-
rence and not in formality which points beyond thought to con-
sistency). Here it is also forgotten that though the formality
of thought may fight or contrast with, say, the materiality of a
table or a mountain, it cannot do so with respect to temporal-
ity. Its convenient fictitious character cannot convert or
override temporal sequences. The definite temporal priorities
through which the law of non-contradiction has to emerge are a
distinct actuality least vulnerable to the affecting capacity
of the formality of thought. One can scarcely claim that while
thought may be attached to the unaffectable temporal sequences,
its formality is not, for in the new position formality is made
the very nature of thought.

Thought is of course (in ordinary parlance though not
always in "logical" philosophy) clearly distinguishable from
the physical objects and the point here is not to find fault
with such distinction if the concept of formality is just to
tune up this distinction. But presently it is not so. The
concept of formality is being used here to wish away the
actuality of an inevitable and definitive temporal sequence.
This cannot be seen as something obvious. Thought is proposed
to be free of any real contradiction in the ultimate sense.
We have traced a contradiction in the very nature of the thought
which is the vehicle for the expression and discovery of the law

of non-contradiction. We pointed out that the law cannot conceivably transcend or transgress the temporal stage of thought at which it emerges in order to find itself at an earlier stage at which it has been used or presupposed.

Time, in everyday intelligibility, is as real as a table or a mountain and as such it cannot therefore be perverted by creating a convenient, vague, and fictitious conception of formality which may of course be quite useful to distinguish thought from physical objects (but this would be a different story). With the finding that the concept of formality cannot affect the temporal actuality, or that no plausible ground for a desired affectation of this sort has been alid, the pretension of explaining the circularity of stating the law must collapse.

With this the original porposition must break down; namely, that there is no contradiction in thought as such. The psychological side of the law, therefore, falls through. The law is unable to express or find itself without violating itself. With all the persuasive aid of circular concepts of "truth," "direct intuition," "fundamental law," etc. the "universal" law cannot, strangely, sustain even itself, not to speak of anything else. Having emerged at one stage, it restricts its own universality by being unable to relate itself to the earlier stage where it is just presumed to have been already used. The contradiction of the proponent of the law occurs at the level

of thinking only. Though he frowns upon the reality of any
self-contradictory thought, he is unable to explain the
apparently self-contradictory terms. Unfortunately for him, the
very expression, statement, or discovery of the law is wrought
with its contradiction, far away from his initial assertion that
even its denial is wrought with its acceptance. If Aristotle is
sincere in exhorting that a consistent denial of the law must be
speechless, he must accept the boomerang effect that so also
must be its consistent assertion. The argument that both
affirmer and denier must accept the law with the balance in
favor of the affirmer breakds down with our present finding
that the balance is quite reversed because of the fact that both
in fact cannot avoid denying (rather than affirming) the law as
such, that is, the universal application of the law (reinforced
of course also by the fact that the onus of proof was on the
claimant of the universality of the law). All thought of and
about the law, it seems, should be immune from the operation of
the law. This simple requirement formidably implies that the
essential nature of thought, irrespective of its being about the
law or about anything else, is immune from the law. Nothing more
is needed to speak against the psychological aspect of the
operation of the law.

How does the metaphysical aspect of the law collapse?
Once the understanding or thought is characterized as merely

formal so as to allow certain self-overlapping and to make the transcendence of the material objects possible in thought, it is impossible to turn round and descend back into reality. An account of the exact relation of thought with reality will have to be furnished in terms of formality. It is hard to see how a law, formulated in pure isolation from experience, applies fundamentally to all experience, or, how excusing oneself away from all contingency leads to a universal law for all contingency.[10]

One would also have to clarify the exact standing of this general formality of thought as against the actuality of particular thinking. Of course the conception of formality is to serve as an explanation of the self-contradictory appearances of thought. The appearances are said to contrast with the reality behind them. The appearances are said to be merely formal in order that their reality remains purely self-consistent, without even the formal contradictions. Formality is an excuse for the reflective capacity of thought. Thought has to be introspectively or retrospectively capable of self-transcendence. This apparent self-contradiction is to be explained through its formality. Similarly is to be explained the self-contradictory relation of it with its objects when it relates to objects other than itself.

The point is that however strongly one is intuitionally convinced of the utility or necessity of the concept of formality, it is quite clear that the apparent self-contradiction is only verbally patched up by the concept and is left unsolved and affected. No account of the possible relation of this all-transcending and self-transcending formality with its actual occurrences bound at least with time is even conceivable in the thesis which claims to meet the basic needs of all thinkers at all times. The actuality of any particular thought is relegated to a mere formal appearance of the self-consistent reality behind it. What is at hand is nothing but the actuality of the specific thinking and not the abstract theoretical interests of a morali-zer of thought. With no relevant evidence it is easy to see how it can be affected in any name other than its own. To pre-suppose a law of non-contradiction which inevitably contradicts it, to affect it then by the concept of formality, and then to relate it with a still more speculative and unknown reality can hardly be considered an impressive and plausible account of the event as it occurs. The explanation of anything implies its being accounted for in as self-consistent a form as possible. But self-consistency as a desirable discipline cannot be made to overrate itself and affect possible inconsistent realities in ineffective and inarticulate terms, specially, if coupled with a refusal to examine its own limiting presuppositions.

It is hard to see how thought characterized as formal in nature can have a binding connection with the nonformal entities of the world. Yet such connection is a commonplace occurrence. We can think of so many particular physical objects. The formalist must find it hard to relate the formality with actuality and with being, because it is the being with which he contrasts the formality. It is difficult to descend to the world of being from the transcendental pedestal of formality. As an actual occurrence, however, all particular thinking must have a being or at least a right to be explained in terms of being. If formality is awarded to thought just to save the being of thought and of its objects from violating the law of non-contradiction (or getting involved in "contingency"), it will be difficult to reflect upon the being of anything through the means of such thought which has no relation with the being. The metaphysical side of the law of non-contradiction must fail because all being will be out of the purview of all reflection. One will not know what kind of being is formal being. (To hold that formality is somehow out of the purview of being is to seek an uninformative, dogmatic, and unintelligible escape into meaningless and ungrounded supersensibility, however veiled by trying to make it sound acceptable by terms such as analyticity, apriority, basic nature of understanding, paradigm of intelligibility, and so on.) The relation between formality and being being inconceivable

even in speculation, it is hard to see how the law of self-consistency can be imposed upon any being at all.

It all boils down to this. The above consideration is of course mainly negative. The point is that it is no use projecting a law which cannot take care of itself, let alone anything else. It is no negative proof of a law that can easily boomerang as its positive disproof. The law of non-contradiction is projected by Aristotle as the fundamental and ultimate indubitable principle of all demonstration. It must underlie every demonstration. It is the ultimate resort of everyone who means to argue definitively or professes philosophic seriousness. The law is the first principle of the methodology of metaphysics or the basic tool in the organon of first philosophy. Aristotle makes it a law of being and projects it as the first principle of metaphysics itself.

The fundamental law of being should not be one in respect of which one has to exert extra-ordinarily to find out or speculate upon the kind of being to which it can apply. Such being will of course be glorified as the ultimate reality. An account may go beyond appearances after showing their merely apparent nature, but to leave the appearances intact by trying to affect them through idle foreign principles does not deserve the name of an "account" or "explanation" in terms of theoretic or dialectical plausibility.

The point is that the principle of non-contradiction is not exactly what we actually presuppose in all our demonstration. Otherwise, one cannot deny it even "in words." The capacity for a "verbal" denial of the principle is an ontic feature which Aristotle fails to account for in consonance with the law. The law has to be suitably modified or even a different law has to be evolved or formulated as the fundamental law underlying all demonstration. This law must explain our capacity to deny it or to affirm it. Of course it should, in line with our above critique, also be able to explain the possibility of the formulation and propounding of the principle of non-contradiction.

Even the statement of the law of non-contradiction has to leave a lot to interpretative manouvres by proponents of the law. Aristotle's statement or formulation is like this: The same attribute cannot belong and not belong to the same thing or subject at the same time and in the same respect. The terms "thing," "subject," "attribute," "same," and "respect," call for immediate and intelligible clarification, but unfortunately, their unavoidable mention here pre-implies that "identity," a continuing problem in contemporary philosophy, is an extremely clear single concept in respect of particulars, qualities, and relations. This in turn presupposes rather than explains or even elucidates an entire thing-ontology as something precise and given. Also, "thing," "attribute," "respect," etc.

inevitably lead to the well-known "logical" problems of

philosophy and dialectical exercises for making intelligible

our experience and its understanding. The traditional dialec-

tic attending the problems of universals, substances, attributes,

and relations is quite familiar and notorious for its inability

to decide in consistent terms the nature of things, their

attributes and ranges, and their interrelations of diverse kinds.

One cannot shelve these logical difficulties in order to exoner-

ate the law of self-consistency. One way of saving the law has

been to state categorically that basic metaphysical categories

do not admit of the ordinary logic operating upon them, and

since, however, these categories are indubitable and presumed

by the human understanding in its very nature, they have to

be taken for granted at par or even prior to the law of non-

contradiction. The law is then left to operate on the entire

world of things at the post-categorial level. To doubt the

categories on the ground of their mutual inconsistencies is

said to be due to a category mistake or to an ignorance of the

special logic of the categories or to a misconceived application

of the law of self-consistency.

In so far as the categories form the very basis of the

understanding along with or even before the law of non-

contradiction, they surely detract from the importance of the

law whose universality of application is obviously restricted

in a crucial way by their behavior. The law is to be relegated to a limited status circumscribed by the categories.

If the categories are unable to integrate the law with themselves, the very nature of the understanding is vitiated by a hostility towards the law. It is hard, then, to see how the understanding comes to reconcile itself with the law at a later and secondary stage. To have a basis which does not incorporate the law and to have the entire superstructure which does incorporate it do not go well together. If the categories obey only a special transcendental logic, the latter must, so far as possible, be clearly laid down and its application to them must be worked out. At least a semblance of fulfilling this simple microphilosophical expectation must be made. If this has to be avoided by saying that it again makes a category mistake and over-expects from the understanding wanting it to explain itself, one must point out that in that case there was neither need nor ground to presume (since now it is known that it was only _presumed_) an unascertainable special logic of the categories. This is particularly so when even the minimum details necessary to identify the nature of the alleged logic are not given, leaving aside the remaining more demanding, logical requirement of a plausible and intelligible account of this mysterious category logic and its relation to normal ordinary logic _via_ the principle of non-contradiction.

It goes without saying that the law of self-consistency, here based on a convenient speculative ground which contradicts it, has a poor basis for itself if any at all. The age-old[11] philosophical attempt at solving the traditional dialectical problems relating to the categories shows that the supposed universality of the law has somehow to be seen through, even in respect of the categories. This, rather than finding a special category logic, must be the traditional business of philosophy. Since our present concern is with Aristotle who was a pioneer of this traditional philosophical position, we must leave the issue here with a considered bias against or doubt about his principle of non-contradiction. We can conclude that the law though taken by him to be the first and foremost principle of the methodology of metaphysics falls far short of the natural expectations made of it in legitimate soundly based philosophizing.

So far my attack on the law of non-contradiction, in line with my earlier criticisms of Plato's basic views, has been directed against the viewpoint of finding a legitimate basis or ground for the supposition of the law through the law itself or through the traditional dialectic. I believe I have made a sufficiently detailed attempt at this and failed to find such a self-supporting basis or ground for traditional "logical" or "rational" philosophy. The analysis shows that what has been

criticized is unable to stand on its own feet and is therefore

nothing but a species of habitual dogmatic obstinacy to which

"philosophy" has been deeply wedded. The happiness of this

wedlock is artificial and not natural, for it is based on a

love of the natural consequence of the wedlock, namely, the

issue of an interminable "rational" discourse and not on a sound

examination of one's own foundations, presuppositions, and

commitments. The dialectical weakness of the law of non-contra-

diction was exposed through an explication of the law's implica-

tions and presuppositions, with which it was found generally

incompatible in respect of both its psychological and meta-

physical sides. Another important point needs to be made from

another perspective, namely, from the angle of the possible

meaning of the law.

What does one precisely and plausibly mean by the terms

like "contradiction," "denial," and "negation"? These terms

and their synonyms and cognates like "non-" and "not" seem

primarily to imply that their purport is to exclude a concept,

object, or entity relevant to the discourse. To be rational,

such exclusion has to be precise, clear, and distinct, if not

terminally definitive. This would be possible only on the

presupposition that the identity of what has to be excluded is

precise, clear, and distinct, otherwise it would not be clear

what is excluded. Hence the point of exclusion and the range

resulting from the exclusion would be unclear too. This of course is to presuppose the clarity and distinctness of identities in discourse, if not in the world, and the pre-positing by Aristotle of the law of identity does not quite serve the purpose of clearly and explicitly recognizing this presupposition. If the law of non-contradiction is to hold for thought and the world, the presupposed clarity of identities needs to be shown, in order that the proponent of the law, finding that these identities do not obtain in actual thought and the world, would not run out of the ordinary thought and the world in order to speculatively locate or fabricate them in a projected artificial discourse of formal, deductive, logic. Aristotle's law of identity merely asserts the identity of any identity and does not inquire into its possibility on the one hand and into the commitments involved in this possibility.

Suppose that there is an identity of something mentionable in discourse. What does it mean to deny it in discourse, in the world, in thought? Is it the same thing to deny such thing in (1) formal discourse, (2) rational thinking, (3) world of experience, (4) ordinary language, and (5) formal language? It is not obvious that it is. Still the law of non-contradiction, in effect, ignores and flattens these important differences. What does Aristotle mean here among these different possibilities? Particularly, the question for him is that of

the meaning of contradiction that has a precise identity in and

is singularly compatible with all our thought and the whole

world of reality. Only an answer to this question can do justice

to the two sides of the law. But it is hard to imagine how such

a general single meaning of contradiction can be worked out to

suit Aristotle's deductive logic as well as our thought and the

world. Outside of some given concrete context, first of all,

it is frustrating to face the very question, however, as to what

it means in general to exclude or deny or contradict something.

What do such acts of excluding, denying, contradicting,

achieve, by which we can recognize them as such acts? It is

evident that in different types of context, such acts would

mean different things, and no single general meaning can be

pointed out to fix their general identities in the way necessary

for the law's meaningful operation. Of course there may be

family resemblances among these acts and we may learn to

recognize the acts through some paradigm cases in actualities of

ordinary language and the world of experience. But the worldly

presuppositions of learning are not the logical presuppositions

of meaning, and my thesis in this work would require me to say

that we need to find out the logical paradigm(s) of contradic-

tion on which our complex of the diverse acts of contradiction

would be logically dependent. By "logic" here I do not mean

some abstract formal system of vacuously self-consistent symbols,

which on the whole is an exercise in sophisticated meaningless-
ness, but a network of concrete dependancies which systematically
as far as possible, elucidates whatever family resemblances and
their related actual paradigms of learning are in question in
philosophy.

The upshot is that, within Aristotle's thesis and perhaps
even within its traditional reinforcements, it is not possible
to get a straight answer to the question as to what is common
and essential to the meaning of contradiction in all thought and
the whole world. Similarly, it would be hard to imagine a
plausible answer to the same question asked in respect of the
essence of thought and reality. Whether it is concept, term,
or proposition that is the essential unit of thought in
Aristotle's intentions, what is it _in_ _thought_ to contradict that
unit? Is it to think about a different unit? Then what is it
to have a _different_ unit to think as distinguished from having
the same one? Unless these questions are plausibly answered, it
is difficult to get at a clear meaning of the very concept of
contradiction. This is more about the psychological side of the
law of non-contradiction. Stressing the metaphysical side, the
relevant questions here would center around the unit of being
and around being _qua_ being. What is it to contradict such a
unit on the one hand and being as such on the other? The answer
is solicited not only in terms of thought, but in terms of

metaphysics. As we saw, deductive or formal logic has to <u>start</u>
with the vacuous dogma of the law of non-contradiction; it lacks
power not only to produce a systematic account of the dogma but
also to elucidate the very meaning of the dogma. In first
philosophy the dogma proves to be vacuous of meaning, for,
firstly, the very idea of denying some particular unit of being
or being as being is semantically suspect, for the reason that
the concept of a unit of being is unintelligible in the absence
of assigning a clear meaning to being itself. But having taken
being to mean the fundamental and universal category of meta-
physics or first philosophy and having thus made being into a
unique kind of unintelligible, unrecognizable, unidentifiable,
and unpresentable concept in the artificial discourse of meta-
physics, Aristotle has to end up with non-being as its denial.
Obviously, "non-" here as attached to a semantically contentless
"being" fails to create a conviction of meaning. All this shows
how even an honest descriptively oriented metaphysician like
Aristotle also is led into meaningless nonfeasibilism through
an exercise of worshipping a preconceived reason. My point is
that, to be valid, reason cannot be a self-persuaded faith in a
meaningless complex of formal structures either of thought or of
reality, rather reason and formal structures have to be seen
through their very possibility in thought and experience thus
involving a commitment to the basis of our recognizable

meaningfulness of empirical understanding which is a prime

condition for actualizing such possibility.

The philosophic despair, common to much contemporary

philosophy, is exercised quite improperly, therefore, in regard

to the concept of reality which is merely an outcome of an

obstinate artificial reason. Its proper exercise is towards

such reason itself which is divorced from actuality. Not that

anything actual needs to be taken as rational, only that the

recognizable conditions of actuality have to be conjoined with

rationality. Such conjunction alone, I would submit, can make

both reason and reality meaningful to our understanding. Hence,

if there is reason to despair about "reality," there is all the

more reason to despair about "reason" or "rationality" which

conditions such "reality." As to Aristotle's law of non-

contradiction, our conclusion must be that in first philosophy

the law, as something giving a basic meaning to thought and the

world, is unintelligible itself, for to be basically meaningful

a principle needs to proceed from an essential unit of readily

recognizable meaning, but Aristotle instead starts with dic-

tating meaning by abstracting something from the surface level.

There _is_ an immediate sense of plausibility in the law

and my purpose is not to affect it by sophistry. My aim is

to pave the way for understanding the reason why even a rigorous

faith in it has failed after many centuries' effort to make our

world intelligible. At least one reason, clear from the above
critique, is that the law is an abstraction from its own essen-
tial context; essential in terms of the very possibility of its
meaningful instantiation in our thought and the world. At
the surface level of ordinary thought and the world the law
looks truistic. On examination at the microphilosophical level,
the law fails. Trying to understand the law at the surface
level, one fails to explain the surface level basically in terms
of the law. The surface level only misleadingly reveals the law
as truistic. The surface level needs to be understood better,
and this can be done perhaps only through microphilosophy.

The law of excluded middle which is next in importance as
a basic law of logic has a parallel fate to the law of non-
contradiction. Recently it has been criticized from diverse
angles, particularly by the intuitionist school of the founda-
tions of mathematics. This law of excluded middle asserts that
any word or concept means something, some one thing, and some-
thing definite. Extremes are sought to show this, for example,
"man" must mean something different from "ship," and so on.
Then abstract negation is introduced to refer to everything
which is not the same as this presumed definite meaning. It is
strangely ignored that if meanings and concepts were clear and
definitive no equivocation would occur. Between any two family
concepts, for example, there usually is a regular range of

middles, which cannot or need not be excluded to cater to the rigid universal needs of the law of excluded middle. That meanings often do overlap has almost acquired the status of a truism in recent linguistic philosophy. There seems to be no immediate reason to believe that in the ultimate nature of thought or things only the rigid abstractions of ancient logic should hole.

With what meaningfulness is the law of excluded middle formulatable? Do we know what "middle" means here? Hardly, but our ignorance is perhaps the reason why we want to exclude middles. On what grounds then is the exclusion justifiable? What is achieved by excluding something whose meaning is neither clear nor conceivable? If nothing significant is achieved by such an exercise, why is it important to make the law a fundamental law of understanding? Even apart from these vulner- abilities, the law of excluded middle shows parallel difficulties to the law of self-consistency. The type of criticism we gave to non-contradiction should be relevant to it also. Particularly so, because its defense by Aristotle follows similar lines to those of the law of non-contradiction.[13]

We also need not subject the law of identity to a special consideration. For, quite similar considerations hold in regard to it. We do not need to dwell much upon the nature of Aristotle's deductive formal logic. Quite a good deal has been said about it,

particularly in relation to the recent discussions of its comparative merits with respect to symbolic logic. With our indication that the most fundamental "law" of non-contradiction needs clarification, modification, or replacement, the relevance or significance of formal logic in direct relation to the law may be discounted.

Elsewhere (A Critique of Logical Atomism, passim., especially Ch. IV) I have discussed certain claims of symbolic logic regarding its ability to systematically relate all the things and events of our daily life or even of the entire universe of discourse, including sciences, and mathematics in particular. The claims of symbolic logic in this respect are supposed to be more competent than those of Aristotelian logic. Hence the latter need not be discussed here in detail. This Critique of Logical Atomism amounts, inter alia, to showing that the claim of formal logic to externally relate material reality has to be discounted as a meaningful and consistent claim. In that study I have a detailed examination with negative results of the possible intelligibility and philosophical soundness of formal denial, and as a result of formal contradiction, a major starting point for a logistic system of formal structures. This aspect relates well with what we found about the concept of contradiction in Aristotle's logic.

That the Aristotelian syllogism involves a _petitio principii_ is a much-discussed topic since J. S. Mill. The path from the universal to the particular is quite obviously and by its very nature repetitive. Evidently it cannot lead to anything new except that it can bring to our attention certain implications which might evade one's notice because of their being a part of an ordinarily unmanageable complexity. This it can do by systematizing the stages in such implications. This advantage is of course only psychological. There is no epistemic advantage, for this is barred by the very nature of deduction. The conclusion of a syllogism is true so far only as the premises go. Contrary to Aristotle's views, therefore, what is more important, especially with reference to the methodology of first philosophy, is the path from the particular to the universal, for this by its very nature implies an intellectual adventure, a surpassing of the data, a search beyond the appearance for the possible reality behind. The first principles for the justification of this process that are applicable to the basic particulars of our experience should _prima facie_ be able to lead us to a proper metaphysics. We turn to Aristotle's view of such a process which he called "induction."

One would expect Aristotle to give a full systematic account of the nature and working of our basic, actual, and necessary induction. However, this he does not give in sufficient measure.

Aristotle tries to explain in syllogistic terms what may be called a perfect induction. His example of such a perfect induction narrates the intellectual advance from species to genus. The prior stage of the advance from individuals to species has to remain an imperfect induction. The perfect induction may perhaps fit in his syllogistic cage, but the imperfect one obviously cannot.

What should be important from the methodological view-point is, however, the imperfect rather than the perfect induction, for, while the latter affords a psychological advance towards apprehending a rational connexion, the former advances beyond psychology into a speculative reality.

Amont the valid imperfect inductions approved by Aristotle the prominent ones are the first principles of the sciences which are known to us by way of the intuition of reason through only one or a few instances. The number of instances is said to be of no significance for the validity of the conclusions of such inductions. This is because the number in such cases is said to depend on the relative intelligibility of the subject-matter. The activity of the intellect is supposed to remain the same in passing from the particular knowledge to the universal uniformly for all kinds of inductions. Relatively fewer instances would be needed in the case where the form is easily separable in thought from the matter. Induction, on this account, is an

immediate intuition or a direct insight rather than a reasoning process. It is only psychologically aided by the mediation of some particular instances taken from actual physical sensation on which, however, it does not depend for its validity. Its validity is self-evident derived from the intellect itself. This is what distinguishes it from the ordinary imperfect inductions which reach only a probable conclusion.

This Aristotelian induction is due to the faculty of intuitive reason which is prior to science. While dealing with Plato's views on the intuitions of reason as revealing the Forms we have already treated this subject in sufficient detail and exposed intuitive reason to various criticisms. What is peculiar to Aristotle is the empirical or rather psychological account of induction which he gives at the end of the Posterior Analytics. The process of the intuitive apprehension of the basic universal concepts for science from the particular instances is traced in progressive stages from perception onwards to memory, "experience," a disciplinary fixation, and then conception proper. Carrying the same process forward one can reach the highest all-encompassing universals. By the latter Aristotle perhaps means, besides the first principles of science, the categories. He is not quite clear about this. He probably makes a two-fold division of his empirical account of the development from sense to reason, namely, the passage from the perception of particulars to the

conception of universals and the passage from particular judg-
ments to universal judgments. The former would then provide us
with the knowledge of the categories and the basic universal
concepts of the sciences while the latter would furnish the
knowledge of the basic laws of logic and the first principles
of the sciences.

The principal casualty of Aristotle's empirical account
of induction is what tradition later crystallized into the
problem of universals and the reason-experience issue. Also,
the whole matter of induction is left at a descriptive level
and no principles of induction are specified. The specifica-
tion of such principles would even be impossible on the descrip-
tive account given, for the basic principles of demonstration
known through intuitive reason cannot possibly be applied back-
wards to such inductive reason in order to extract the principles
behind such reason. The process is not simply convertible.
This means that intuitive reason has a priority over the basic
principles of all reasoning as well as processes of demonstra-
tion which are revealed by it. Aristotle seeks to discount this
empirical or psychological priority by a circuitous emphasis on
the logical priority of the first principles of demonstration.
He points out that their revelation through a psychological
event (which is a mere aid to the revelation) cannot affect or
restrict them. That is how "perception" which constitutes the

first stage in Aristotle's descriptive empirical account of the passage from particular to universal, is said to contain an element of universal. The universal must already be there to be grasped by intuitive reason which can only reveal it. But this amounts to opting for the realism of universals and to discounting the ontic worth of the empirical account of the "development" from sense to reason. In effect the Aristotelian view of induction seriously underrates the importance of the problem of universals and of the reason-experience issue. His realism of universals is not in harmony with his bias for empricism. His terrestrial matter cannot absorb Plato's heavenly Forms without serious dialectical troubles. He has to wage a war with both nominalism and rationalism. But he leaves the matter without essential clarifications of the issues logically involved. Porphyry, in his short commentary on Aristotle's Categories, was right in pointing out the serious difficulties of the deep problems involved here.

The simple but crucial issue is whether the laws of demonstration, the categories, the first principles of the sciences, and the other primary universal concepts or necessary universal judgments are discovered by intuitive reason through its fiction of logical priority or they are created by the human mind or understanding through a regular and disciplined temporal development through particular perceptions. In either case the

significant question will be what exactly would clarify the
nature of and warrant the validity of intuitive reason in
one case and of particular perceptions in the other.

"Intuitive reason," which is at the basis of all universals,
is itself a _universal_ to be known through its _particular_ in-
stances coupled with its own exercise. It constitutes either a
flat self-contradiction through self-restriction or an infinite
regress. Again, it is a _human_ faculty, but this can be known
only through itself, for without it one would not know what the
word "human" would mean in this context. Its qualification or
characterization by the word "human" must naturally imply a
commitment to the actual characteristics meant by the word. This
commitment must then penetrate and restrict the independent
universal nature of the intuitive reason along with its revela-
tions or deliverances. On the whole it seems to be more of an
ingenious mystification than a universal validator as it is made
out to be.

On the other hand, Aristotle's bias for the concrete expe-
rience of particulars leads him into dialectical difficulties of
no less serious magnitude. With the obviously limited number of
particular perceptions available no perfect induction would be
possible, in which case no transition to _universals_ would be
possible from the finite number--however great-- of their
particular instances. What is to validate a particular
perception especially at a stage when the passage to the

universals has just started? Also, what <u>particular perceptions</u>
should determine the nature and even the identity of a particular
perception? Strictly speaking a particular perception must be a
totally isolated feature unconnected with any other in the
world. How could such perceptions evolve <u>together</u> towards the
apprehension of universals? Even if particular perceptions are
to be the sole determinators of universals, the resultant
universals cannot, <u>prima facie</u>, be true in absolute, universal,
and necessary terms. They would remain provisional, probable,
and proportionate truths and not "universals" in the imputed
sense of the term.

Neither the <u>logical</u> priority or paramountcy of intuitive
reason nor the already present <u>element</u> of universal in particulars
is sufficiently demonstrative to wish away the difficulties on
both the sides. It is hard to ascend from pure particulars to
any universals and to descend from genuine universals to bare
particulars. The problem can be tackled only by addressing
oneself to the cause of this hardship. Aristotle, far from
addressing himself to the problem, takes the problem for granted
and attempts to arrive at a justifiable compromise <u>via media</u>.
The only justification possible, in relation to the organon of
first philosophy, seems to be through the consequences. Whether
he is eventually able to explain both the apparent and ulterior
realities through his first principles of demonstration should

decide the issue of the tenability of his (here Aristotle's, generally a philosopher's) methodology.

Our foregoing critique makes clear that Aristotle's organon and first principles are not suited to bring about their own justification by consequences, that is, by reaching an understanding of our world of experience and language through themselves alone. Genuine reason needs to be discovered through this world so that it can efficiently reach the world and create authentic conviction in our minds about itself. That which is only preconceived or hastily abstracted cannot reach back except by accident. Though it may succeed in appealing to our surface convictions which inspire or instigate it, on examination it fails to convince authentically. Being hypnotized by it leads to an attempt to "understand" the world in terms of such abstract reason. In more extreme cases, like Plato's for example, the inevitable failure to understand the world ends up in a rejection of the world in favor of a realm of Forms. The genuine, though ununderstood, lure of the world, such as later Wittgenstein's, tries to undermine such rejection but, in the grips of such so-called reason, can produce only rationalizations in its favor. This obviously keeps the die-hard devotees of this reason unsatisfied. So, the endless but variously entertaining drama goes on. It is called discursive inquiry and is philosophy in its most respectable sense.

Notes: Chapter III

[1] Book IV, Chapter 3, trans. W. D. Ross, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York, 1941), p. 736.

[2] This condensation is mainly derived from "Aristotle," The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers, ed. J. O. Urmson (London, 1960), pp. 28-32, 49-50. It is an overall summary of Aristotle's basic philosophy. I will, however, concentrate on the law of contradiction (or, better, law of noncontradiction). My major primary source in this respect is Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book IV, Chapters 3-6. This part of Metaphysics is well-summarized in W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1949), pp. 159-163.

[3] The problem, however, as to how they differ from classes, if they do, persists till today. Cf. Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning, chapter 7, "Allocation to Categories."

[4] Cf. Ross, Aristotle, p. 159: " . . the law of contradiction . . is first expressed in the form 'the same attribute cannot belong and not belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same respect.' This is, it will be observed, stated quite objectively as a law of being. But from it follows a psychological law; to think that the same attribute does and does not belong to the same thing at the same time in the same respect would be to be oneself oppositely qualified at the same time in the same respect, and is therefore impossible."

[5] Ibid.: "Aristotle rightly makes no attempt to prove the law. To demand a proof of it is, he says, to betray one's want of training in logic."

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ross, Aristotle, pp. 159ff.

[8] Ross, Aristotle, p. 160.

[9] Even Ross concedes that "the argument for the law of contradiction is not at all points free from the charge of circularity," but, strangely, he continues the traditional faith, "but in the main Aristotle confines himself to the proper method, that of showing that the very denial of the law of contradiction implies its assertion." Aristotle, p. 163. We have exploded this "proper method" and shown the inadequacy of what it tries to "show."

[10] It will be said that thinking is only externally, if at all, related to its objects. This brings in the "logical" problem of relations with its well-known dialectical difficulties. (The problem of relations has, though, been traditionally raised largely in terms of things and their attributes and relations; the relation of thought or formality to experience or reality is not much meditated upon, otherwise the "law" would have become suspect long before.) The problem is due in the main to the difficulty of finding a consistent account of the concept of relation in ontic and intelligible terms.

[11] The recent work on the problem is of course done through the linguistic idiom. Notable attempts are by Gilbert Ryle, Passmore, and Fred Sommers, among others. Strawson's "knowledge" by "reidentification" and Bergmann's that by "presentation" still show old schisms in new, interesting though awkward, forms.

[12] The law of identity, to which we already alluded, is obviously fraught with problems. The recent discussion on identity shows the difficulties of making identity intelligible in relation to either natural or artificial languages.

[13] _Metaphysics_, Book IV, Chapter 7.

CHAPTER IV

SCEPTICISM, SELF-TEST, DESCRIPTION, AND KNOWING:

HERITAGE OF TRADITION AND

A PARADIGM OF CONSTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS

The theater of philosophy and the type of drama set there

largely by Plato and Aristotle was greatly enriched in sophis-

tication and enhanced in intellectual quality by a long-drawn,

rigorous tradition. Though reason was often subordinated to

faith in the medieval ages, the intellectual experience that

these philosopher-"dramatists" provided, particularly after

Descartes, has been aesthetically deeply gratifying. The cul-

tural importance of this rich philosophic experience remained

unique in the West. It was of course inflated and exaggerated

with the claim of philosophical logicism that ultimately sought

a reduction to some sort of reason or intellectual rigor as our

best guide to objective truth, logical validity, and ultimate

reality. This faith was made less rigorous and objective by a

coordinate acceptance of whatever came to be culturally respect-

able as knowledge at different times.

In the medieval period "reason" was married with faith,
and later mostly with science. We saw that Plato married
"reason" with mathematics and Aristotle with biology. These
two traditions were continued in diverse ways and became pre-
dominant whenever mathematics and biology attained a high cul-
tural position as a form of knowledge. On the continent,
mathematics remained predominant for a long time during the
modern age, and gave us a rigorous tradition of rationalism
running through Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and culminating in
Hegel. In Britain, experimental physics remained dominant for
the most part, and gave us a lively rival tradition of empiri-
cism beginning with Bacon and running through Locke, Berkeley,
Hume, and culminating in Mill. Rationalism drew mainly from
intuitive reason while empiricism was based on sensory experience.
Kant's critical philosophy was indeed a great confluence of the
two traditions, though it finally emphasized rationalism a little
more than empiricism. Biology came to predominate especially
after Darwin and culminated in the philosophy of Spencer and also
in Dewey. Newton of course remained the greatest indirect in-
fluence on modern philosophy as a whole. Language and symbolic
logic came to dominate the scene recently, running through Moore,
Tussel, Wittgenstein, and culminated in Strawson and Quine. It
can easily be seen that ordinary language philosophy is a peculiar
continuation of the tradition of common-sense empiricism with a

certain stress on language. Formal language philosophy, on
the other hand, inspired by Fregean-Russellian logicism, con-
tinues the marriage with mathematics, which, if not explicitly
rationalistic, is "revisionary" as against its main rival which
claims to be "descriptive."

So far as the tradition goes after Plato and Aristotle,
epistemology gradually came to subordinate metaphysics and this
is a healthy and desirable feature from the viewpoint of feasi-
bilism. Wittgenstein came to reject even epistemology, but in
spite of a great deal of apparent sophistication brought to his
philosophy by his followers, the rejection remains largely un-
convincing, arbitrary, and fashionably dogmatic. The old problems
of philosophical dialectic, are declared to be fruitless and
spurious. Their loss of respect in the philosophic academy
seems due more to despair, indecision, and confusion than to
really good arguments, and fortunately the old problems are again
coming up in a new idiom in the recent discussions by Strawson,
Quine, and Bergmann. From the point of view being developed in
the present work, Strawson deserves the greatest relative credit
because of his attempt to systematically elucidate the rich logic
of our ordinary language. What mars his attempt and success is
his persistent ordinary language orientation. I do not object
to this orientation as such, but rather to the distortion which
it brings; for, ordinary language is evidently subject to the

mere exigencies of everyday communication, and as important as
it is, it does not necessarily give us the best insights into
the fundamental nature of our understanding. At best it can
give important glimpses into this nature as an expression of it.

In this chapter, I wish to deal with four topics. Three of
these relate to important features contributed during the history
and tradition of Western philosophy. The fourth relates to pre-
paring a basis for understanding the positive thesis being devel-
oped in this work. First, I will deal with some pros and cons
concerning doubt as a mathodological starting-point in philosophy.
Descartes is supposed to be the paragon of doubt as philosophic
method. In the tradition, scepticism has acquired a notorious
position as a turning point in the dialectic. Much in episte-
mology has been a struggle against idle, though intellectually
glorified, doubt. Before Descartes, however, Augustine explored
the issue of philosophic doubt and envisaged an argument against
the vacuous pretensions of mere doubt. This argument can be
seen, logically speaking, to be pivotal in Augustine and I will
treat it and its implications first.

Secondly, I will consider an important point in empiricism.
In dealing with Plato and Aristotle I have already considered
the main foundational points of rationalism. To balance this I
need to consider the vulnerabilities of the empiricist tradition
in its foundational philosophy. I will take up Hume's distinction

between ideas and impressions for a feasibilist test; more particularly, I will examine it from its own point of view and try to see if the distinction can sustain itself in terms of what it distinguishes. I call this sort of a self-test. It implies that a philosophy, to be feasible, needs to be able to sustain itself, that is, we must be able to state and formulate it or at least to explain or elucidate it in its own terms.

Thirdly, I will be concerned with what I consider to be one of the most important schisms of philosophy. This schism is variously expressed by dividing philosophies into naturalistic and transcendental, this-worldly and other-worldly, and, recently, into descriptive and revisionary. I will consider this recent way of dividing philosophies, due to Strawson, whose important book, Individuals, is subtitled An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. It is clear from what I have been saying so far that feasibilism or microphilosophy would favor descriptive rather than revisionary philosophy, in so far as it is theoretically and dialectically "feasible." I will try to show that the ideal possibility of mere description is ruined in philosophy and consequently, we are let to reduce the element of revision as much as we can to get at bare feasibility. This element of revision could be called the element of irreducible excess over evidence to ensure minimum feasibility. In short, I will ask Strawson the question "Is a purely descriptive metaphysics or philosophy

possible or, better, feasible?" The answer to be elicited is of course suitably negative. My point ultimately in this respect is that the impossibility of the descriptive enterprise should not lead us to despair in which we project another, revised world as somehow "real" over against the mere "appearances" of the describable world. Rather it should motivate us to the positive task of augmenting the enterprise in a way which makes description possible or feasible. Such augmenting has to be reduced to the minimum in order to avoid groundless speculation. Finally, the suitable augmentation will need to be meaningfully incorporated in the descriptive account aimed at to ensure the demands of coherence and intelligibility. This does not exhaust in any way what a descriptive philosophy of feasibility accomplishes.

Fourth, I will produce a paradigm case of constructive analysis according to feasibilist microphilosophy. Since I regard epistemology more highly than metaphysics and descriptive reason more highly than preconceived reason, I will try to produce a descriptive account of the commitments and presuppositions involved in the very act of knowing as the best access to truth, validity, reality, or feasibility, whatever our term is for the result at which philosophy aims as a meaningful activity. I will attempt to show that if knowing is to be a recognizable act leading to show up feasibility by itself being feasible in an important

way, it involves a commitment to a complex of presuppositions which are the very conditions of philosophy in its foundational sense. I will try to unpack this complex to some extent as well as leaving part of it for a fuller unpacking in the next chapter. I hope that my constructive analysis of knowing will make for a clearer understanding of the positive thesis to be developed. I turn first to Augustine on scepticism.

Some think it unprofitable to attempt a philosophically objective analysis of a thinker who is primarily given to religious dogmas. However, without prejudice to the point that religious thinkers in general and particularly in the West are too indoctrinated or pre-oriented to be completely open to reason, the possibility remains that in the process of rationalizing the dogmas of their religions, such thinkers sometimes reveal certain rational insights or make purely logical points, that are of general philosophical interest or are even worthy of free philosophy which is relatively independent of pre-judgments. I will attempt to show this possibility in some aspects of Augustine's philosophical thought. The main point will be to discover the basic argument in Augustine's philosophical method, on which it logically turns. I deem it worthwhile to find such an argument for, Augustine was "in his own day the dominant personality of the Western Church, [and] is generally recognized as the greatest thinker of Christian Antiquity."[1]

Frederick Copleston remarks that "Augustine's attitude to sense-knowledge is much more Platonic than Cartesian."[2] But he also says that "Augustine anticipates Descartes: Si fallor, sum."[3] There is no essential contradiction, for Copleston also clarifies that "Augustine may have anticipated Descartes by his 'Si fallor, sum,' but he was not occupied with the question whether the external world really exists or not. That it exists, he felt no doubt, though he saw clearly enough that we sometimes make erroneous judgments about it and that testimony is not always reliable, whether it be testimony of our senses or of other people."[4] My point is to bring together these two divergent strands of Platonism and Cartesianism[5] in Augustine. In a way, Augustine's tirade against scepticism appears more fruitful than Descartes' in the sense that, while Descartes started with doubt and ended up with knowledge of the soul's existence through the soul's own thinking, Augustine assumed[6] as a certainty that it is clear to a man that he exists, he lives, and he understands.[7] Augustine's justification of this triple certainty would consist in pointing out that no sceptic can doubt that he doubts and in his doubting he assumes the triple certainty. This multiple certainty is necessary to Augustine for he is quite concerned to show that knowledge of truth pertains to wisdom and that wisdom pertains to happiness; in other words he wants to start with the epistemologically certain factors of living, free will, and

understanding besides that of mere existing. His intermingling
of wisdom and happiness with truth and knowledge may have his
religious orientation as its backbone,[8] but what I want to
emphasize is that for him the whole triple certainty has an
important philosophical support. This is contained in Augustine's
insistence that the sceptic should look at himself before ad-
vancing his sceptical charges. This insistence expects to make
a valid logical point (though some logicians, to save their
formal logic, would call it ad hominem or a psychological point)
by projecting the validity of abstract logic into the logic of
action, into the logic of thought and behavior as actual occur-
rences.

Augustine is probably not the first one to extend the validi-
ty of abstract logic to concrete thinking or communicating. At
least in Indian philosophical debates, a type of argument is fre-
quently observable where an inadequacy is shown in the opponent's
position by pointing out the fact that he has not been consistent
in his accusations since in the very act of making them he has
contradicted them. One may call it an argument from implicit
contradictory assumption. The question of the general philosoph-
ical adequacy of this argument would be a digression. Here I will
concentrate on its specific relevance to Augustine as the method
of his metaphysics and then on certain of its important impli-
cations of philosophy.

However, one important point should be observed before we explore Augustine in further detail. It shows up a curious but rather typical double-dealing in modern philosophizing. To challenge scepticism is usually regarded as more respectable than challenging the law of noncontradiction. This respectability ends up a curiously self-discrepant attitude to the "ad hominem" arguments in respect of the two challenges. The ad hominem argument against the sceptic is generally scoffed at, in comparison with the ad hominem argument used to tackle one who challenges the law of non-contradiction. To say that a sceptic in his thought and conduct implies an assumption of knowledge which is at variance with or even flatly contradicts his profession of doubt is not regarded as decisive against the sceptic. The ways found to tackle such a move against the sceptic (who is respected as a cautious and scientific thinker) have been diverse and ingenious, but the fundamental point guiding them appears to be that an appeal to thought and conduct, in terms of consistency, is not logical but psychological, empirical, or ethical. A thorough sceptic is supposed to be making a logical point which cannot be tackled, presumably, by such empirical imputations. I will not elaborate on the comparative value between this supposedly psychologistic point, on the one hand, and this so-called logical point on the other. To bring out the point I wish to make, I need to show the empirical or psychologistic imputations which a

logician makes in order to "prove" the law of noncontradiction.
As we saw in our treatment of Aristotle, the proponent of the
law first wants the opponent to make a meaningful statement.
When this obviously empirical demand is satisfied, he thinks he
is logically enabled thereby to point out the "consistency"
assumed by the opponent, which, in his terms, is that the op-
ponent must mean the same thing that he says and cannot assert
that he means something else. If the opponent denies the law,
the proponent is satisfied "logically" by pointing out that the
very act of the opponent's denial assumes, in the proponent's
view, the law of noncontradiction. The act pointed out here is
of course empirical and the implicit assumption indicated is
psychological. But the proponent, because he happens to be de-
fending a preconceived dogma shared by "logicians," attains re-
spectability in philosophical dialectic or in objective and
scientific discourse. One who challenges the sceptic on similar
grounds attains, in contrast, a disrespectability unworthy of
such discursive inquiry. This is nothing else but a convenient
double-dealing, intentionally or unintentionally, meant to facili-
tate the perpetuation of a set of dogmas to which a group is
committed. I do not know any other way to construe this general
respectability of an ad hominem argument defending a preconceived
law of logic in relation to the usual disrespectability of an
ad hominem argument to defend philosophic cognitivism against

scepticism. A thorough sceptic, professing to be logically honest, is enabled to contradict what is involved in his behavior, but when his scepticism is extended to cover the law of non-contradiction, he is charged with logical dishonesty and the charge is proved by pointing out how one contradicts somewhere what is involved in one's behavior. I am unable to digest this profession of "rationality."

Augustine's triple certainty may be clarified further by the following excerpt: "We exist and we know that we exist and we love that fact and our knowledge of it; in these three things which I have enumerated no fear of deception disturbs us; for we do not attain them by any bodily sense, as we do external objects."[9] But here his Platonist strand takes greater importance, and he tries to elevate reflective thought by playing down sense-objects. Augustine seems to claim that we have absolutely certain knowledge through our inner experience or self-consciousness. But what about the objects of our sense-experience? Are they un-real, as in the Platonic vein, because they are fleeting and deceptive? Augustine did not think that the external objects apprehended by the senses constitute the proper object of the human intellect; and this was mainly due to his chief interest in the soul's orientation to God, requiring the soul's withdrawal from the senses and return to itself as a stepping-stone to God. Augustine did recognize our dependence on the senses for a great

deal of our knowledge and he did not want to maintain an

extreme sceptical attitude towards the reality of the sense-

objects. Copleston says:

> It is one thing to admit the possibility of error in
> sense-knowledge and quite another to refuse any credence
> at all to the senses. Thus, after saying that philosophers
> may speak against the senses but cannot refute the con-
> sciousness of self-existence, Augustine goes on at once
> to say, 'far be it from us to doubt the truth of what we
> have learned by the bodily senses; since by them we have
> learned to know the heaven and the earth.'... the fact that
> we are sometimes deceived in regard to the objects of our
> senses is no warrant for complete scepticism. ...For prac-
> tical life it is necessary to give credence to the senses.
> ... he was not occupied with the question whether the external
> world really exists or not. That it exists, he felt no doubt,
> though he saw clearly enough that we sometimes make erroneous
> judgments about it and that testimony is not always reliable,
> whether it be testimony of our senses or of other people.
> ... If we have not got 'true knowledge' of sense-objects,
> that is due, not merely to any deficiency in the subject
> but also to a radical deficiency in the object.[10]

This is obviously not a very rigorously coherent account of

the external world. Copleston is hardly plausible in defending

Augustine when he says "he felt no doubt, though he saw clearly"

etc., for the more important question than starting with a proper

understanding of difficulties is the ending up with a plausible

solution. Seeing the philosophical difficulties does not amount

to solving or adequately treating them, and if the two are con-

fused, it becomes doubtful whether such insight occurred. Apart

from this, the main point Augustine missed in his account of the

external world seems to be that the occasional unreliability of

sense-experience as such. If one instance of sense-experience is

found to be misleading, there is no warrant to hold that other
cases are not, at least may not, be misleading too. The point is
logical and does not rest with or is not exhausted in the particu-
lar instances found as illusory experiences. Unless pointed out
and proved, there is no support for such arbitrary restriction.
The special cases are held to be illustrative by our reason, and
the rational faculty demands that we really doubt all sense-
experience through the example of such cases (compare the role of
Aristotle's intuitive induction of first postulates of each
special science through a few appropriate examples). All this,
that is, the argument from illusion (the standard example is the
straight stick appearing bent whild dipped in water), is perhaps
commonplace in modern philosophy.

But Augustine has something more to say on the point and
this should be taken into account. In his attack on the sceptic
he takes a near-phenomenalist view in respect of the external
sense-objects; thus:

> I do not see how the sceptic can refute the man who
> says, 'I know that this object seems white to me, I know
> that this sound gives me pleasure, I know this smell is
> pleasant to me, I know that this feels cold to my touch.'
> ... the senses as such never lie or deceive us, even if we
> may deceive ourselves in judging that things exist objectively
> in the same way that they appear.[11]

Augustine, however, presumes here that the sceptic doubts
appearances as appearances rather than as true communications of
reality. If I interpret him rightly, the presumption appears to

be a misconstruction of the sceptic's view. And, by saying

that "we may deceive ourselves" Augustine has strengthened the

unfavorable point that the internal, mental world is in fact not

free from deception. If my thoughts (qua thoughts) on sense-

objects can go wrong, my thoughts on myself and on my existence

can go wrong too. In other words, the doubt which was sought to

be confined to the sense-objects only has now contaminated the

internal perception also. At least the logical possibility

would be left open that there is deception in my thinking that

I exist, irrespective of my reasons to think so. Since now the

locus of deception is found in mind, there is no way to restrict

it to external objects only.

In fact there was no ground for the restriction of illusions

or misrepresentative experiences merely to the physical sphere,

for besides physical illusions we have mental hallucinations also.

The whole range of dreams is a case in point. How would Agustine

reply? He might have two kinds of reply: (1) "Sceptical philos-

ophers may babble about the bodily senses and the way in which

they deceive us, but they cannot invalidate that certain knowl-

edge which the mind has by itself, without the intervention of

the senses."[12] This amounts to throwing the active locus of error

into the bodily senses. But how do we know that only the senses

deceive us? Do we know this without any direct intervention of

the sense? (2) "Everyone who doubts knows that he is doubting,

so that he is certain of this truth at least, namely the fact

that he doubts."[13] We have come a full circle to find that his

original point is, in logical importance, his pivotal and crucial

point. Leaving aside how he would base this point or his whole

philosophy in general on his religious standpoint, it is important

to note that from an objective viewpoint this point should seem

basic in Augustine. Its specific relevance in his metaphysics

cannot be exaggerated. In this argument from implicit contra-

dictory assumption, as we have named it, we find the pivotal

point on which his philosophical thought turns, viewed from the

perspective of logical, relatively non-dogmatic philosophy.[14]

The argument is more important for philosophy in general than

simply for Augustine, and to this greater importance we turn.

From the way I have been developing Augustine's philosophy,

I will focus attention on the general form of the argument from

implicit contradictory assumption (henceforth called AICA).

Augustine's argument against the epistemological sceptic is an

example of AICA in that the sceptic should notice his own assumed

certainty, which he cannot avoid in the very act of voicing or

communicating his scepticism. The force of the argument rests

on the view that it is not enough for one to be consistent within

the thesis he puts forward, but his thesis should be consistent

with his actual mental and verbal behavior, at least to the ex-

tent that the latter two are invariably and unavoidably associated

with the production and expression of his thesis. The importance and applicability as well as the relevance and admissibility of the argument is easily recognized for philosophy which is a general argumentative discursive inquiry.

Logic insists on internal consistency. In the AICA, this insistence is carried a step further. Consistency is not only internal but extends to the invariable concomitant circumstances accompanying a thesis. In a sense, logic becomes ethical; it is applied not only to thought but also to the thinker. We can see that if we accept the validity of this type of argument it can affect any metaphysics or philosophical effort. I have hopes that this will be clear from what follows; but if it is true, it seems alarming.

In my limited knowledge, besides Augustine, Indian philosophers have made an extensive use of this kind of argument, assuming, perhaps, that its logic is self-evident. Probably, such an argument is taken to be just an obvious advance of the law of non-contradiction. While conceding that there may be a good case for the validity of the argument (AICA), I want to discuss the case for and against it.

I will try to suggest the wide scope of the AICA by some examples. Illustratively, the AICA can be used against the following propositions: (a) "no knowledge is certain" (this assumes a _certainty_ for itself), (b) "I am lying" (the lier's paradox),

(d) "no linguistic communication is possible" (the speaker wants to _communicate_ this), (e) "the world is nothing but my idea" (the solipsist or subjective idealist, probably surrendering to the egocentric predicament, wants his statement to be accepted by _others_ and does not want them to treat it simply as his idea; he tries to sell his theory not to himself but to others), (f) "there is no self or consciousness" (the speaker is well aware of his own _self_ as _consciously_ making this statement, and (g) "observation of behavior is the only access to mind" (the AICA would here draw upon the famous argument against behaviorism, that the behaviorist cannot simply be observing his own external behavior when he observes, analyzes, and judges others' behavior).

Case _for_ the AICA:

(1) The AICA is a legitimate extension of self-consistency. It requires a man to be consistent with what he says. It is an application of the law of non-contradiction. In an implicit contradictory assumption one violates the fundamental law of thought, namely, self-consistency, in his behavior, if not in his thesis proper.

(2) If the AICA is invalid, one can get away with almost any kind of inconsistent behavior and this leaves us with con-flicting positions which we cannot resolve.

(3) If the self-contradicting behavior is not meant to be a contradiction, the proponent may avoid confusing himself and others by refraining from stating it in inconsistent terms.

(4) Responsibility in discourse demands that proper limitations be imposed on the propensity to proliferate self-consistent but still mutually diverse systems. The AICA aids this responsibility. Besides this, it even grounds the discourse and makes it possible within the thesis of the AICA itself. This is an unusual advantage for the life and efficacy of discourse itself. Otherwise, the abstract law of non-contradiction faces trouble in finding its own ground and has to hang on an abstract appeal to formality.

Case against the AICA:

(1) The alleged contradiction is innocent and unintentional. Why should it be attributed to or imposed upon the thesis-holder against his own wish?

(2) Criticism is directed against the letter rather than the intent of the proponent. What he means to say may not fit the canons and conventions of normal linguistic expression but one can surely infer the exact import, as in literature where one always tries to get at the real intention behind absurd-looking poetry. Certainly there are limits to linguistic communication. Does anyone doubt the validity of this last statement, only because it seeks to communicate an assertion of the limits of communication? It apparently contradicts itself inasmuch as it points beyond communication, transcending its own communicational nature in order to make an affirmative statement on all

communication (hopefully excluding itself from its field of operation). But if what it purports to convey is not meaningless and there is no way of expressing it in apparently non-inconsistent terms, applying the AICA to it is mere sophistry.

This argument emphasizes the paradox of self-reference in certain concepts, the sort which Russell and his followers tried to get out of with their ramified and simple theories of types. To help with an implicit meta-language leads to infinite regress. Nor one can throw away the wittgensteinian "ladder" without hurting his intellectual conscience.

(3) The AICA ties us or condemns us to a specific phenomenalism of intellect and communication which will have to be accepted as final and ultimate in any inquiry. This is suicidal to the philosophical spirit of free and open (and endless) inquiry where self-criticism is not only allowed but encouraged.

(4) Acceptance of the AICA, somewhat like that of the contemporary argument against private language, easily leads to a position where no philosophical view other than common sense realism is considered legitimate. For, even a sincere solipsist or subjective idealist always behaves in the world of his life as if he is a convinced naive realist. Does the contradiction between his philosophical belief and actual conduct logically force him to abandon his belief? Why does it not deprive him of his conduct rather than save the validity of his thought?

A defendant of the AICA might reply that one has to go wherever reason (non-contradiction here) leads. If it leads to a definite position in philosophy, so much the better for those who want to see philosophy stabilize itself rather than rambling endlessly. One important result seems to be that the AICA tends to nip the very bud of philosophy, threatening to solve the philosophical problems without entering into them. A bit difficult for a chronic philosopher to digest! This assumes the full logic of the AICA. These arguments form an important coherent group with significant implications for the dialectical inquiry that is philosophy.

Like many dialectical tangles of philosophy, the above arguments end in an apparently unresolvable deadlock for and against the AICA. At this stage I would say first, that the deadlock is there and no Delphic declaration that it is a pseudo-problem would do as an intellectually honest gesture. Second, since the deadlock is about the philosophical efficacy of logical argument in general, it is important to see that it is one of the basic issues of dialectical philosophy and must be resolved. Third, though it does show basic difficulties in construing the proper nature of logical validity, leading up to taking decisive sides in interpreting logic for validity itself, it is clear that our ability to understand remains in tact intuitively despite the fact that the deadlock obscures this understanding. To surmount

the deadlock we need to elucidate the intuitive validity

principles which it has failed to elucidate. Fourth, two

steps need to be taken in order to preserve what is valid on

both sides of the dilema. On one side is the need to ground

the dialectic or philosophical logic so that self-referential

problems are rendered ineffective and logic is liberated from

vacuous claims to abstract truth. On the other side, a suitable

restriction should be imposed that we do not end up grounding

more than just what is barely needed to have for a viable

(feasible) logic; that is to say, the AICA should not be al-

lowed to block the dialectic completely and to make dialectical

alternatives impossible which are intuitively meaningful to us.

Our objective is to elucidate the intelligibility of the dialectic

in order to ground the dialectic and ensure common recognition in

our intuitive experience. The objective cannot be to block the

dialectic and render it impossible, or to prohibit it through

appeals to extra-discursive "principles" like the verifiability

principle of meaning or the paradigm case test in ordinary lan-

guage. Quick reductions of philosophical problems to some kind

of meaninglessness need to be avoided, if intellectual integrity

is to be preserved in philosophy. Now I turn to Hume.

> Philosophers may use terms which are vacuous, in the
> sense that they signify no determinate ideas and possess ·
> no definite meaning. 'When we entertain, therefore, any
> suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without
> any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but

to inquire, <u>from</u> <u>what</u> <u>impression</u> <u>is</u> <u>that</u> <u>supposed</u> <u>idea</u>
<u>derived</u>? And if it be impossible to assign any, this
will serve to confirm our suspicion![14]

Can Hume meet this Humean test?

The most fundamental of Hume's doctrines is the distinction
between impressions and ideas. Whatever Hume has done in order
to arrive at the distinction, he has involved himself in a mental
act or acts (we shall use the singular for the sake of facility
and uniformity). If anyone is to understand him, he would be
expected, by Hume, to undergo the same or a similar mental act.
Is this mental act an impression or an idea? In which sub-division
of impressions or ideas would it fall? Can we explicate the
impression which it is or to which it can be ultimately traced?
And if it be impossible to assign any impression after all, will
this serve to confirm the Humean suspicion itself, to confirm,
that is, that Hume's distinction is meaningless?

First of all, the mental act which makes the distinction
between impressions and ideas does not appear to be an impression.
One would like to leave no doubt about it. If it is an impression,
how forceful and vivid is it? In view of the circumstance that
this mental act undertakes to validate an authoritative generali-
zation about all the impressions (and ideas), one would expect
it to be the most vivid of all impressions. This does not,
however, appear to be the case, else no doubt about its truth
could ever arise, and it would not have been necessary for mankind

to wait for Hume to expound it. This is not to undermine the
possible validity of Hume's doctrine that the justification of
his distinction between impressions and ideas, and of the pri-
macy of the impressions, consists in a universal inductive in-
tuition. The question of this validity is a separately debatable
issue. The relevant question for us is whether the mental act
we are examining is the same as this intuition. Anyway, the
act will at least comprise the intuition. The problem persists
in a new form: Is this intuition, together with the conjuncts
which may go with it to make up the mental act, an impression,
and if so, to what sub-division would it belong?

As we already observed, it lacks the potent vivacity expected
of it. Is it a simple or a complex impression? It looks like
quite a complex one. It may be simple, if we assume that it
consists of only the intuition without any conjuncts or adjuncts.
Since Hume does not explicate it, we cannot pin it down. Is it
an impression of sensation or of reflection? It is difficult to
think of an abstract intuition in terms of a sensation. But if
we take it to be an impression of reflection, we are obliged to
trace it back to some sensation because Hume states that all im-
pressions of reflection are ultimately derived from or grounded
in those of sensation.[15] So this does not seem to lead us to a
clear position. The particular instances which might be given
to support the inductive intuition are not useful in suggesting

this basic impression for they are not essential to it; a generalization pertaining to an infinite number of members cannot have its _validity_ in or derive its essence from finite exemplifications.

Let us consider whether it would help to see the mental act as an idea. But Hume again insists on some definite impressions from which any idea must be derived and his only exception seems to be a missing shade of blue in a sequence of shades and nothing of this sort fits our situation. The intuition has no appearance of pointing to any impression to which it can correspond as an image. Is the idea simple or complex? Again, it seems to have the make-up of a complex one, but no clear position can be developed. Is it an idea of memory or of imagination? If it is from memory, it lacks sufficient vivacity though it seems unvarying. On the other hand, if it is from imagination, its insufficient vividness is not matched by the requirement that it should be variable. Indeed, the fundamental principle cannot be surrendered to the vagaries of imagination. Hume sometimes uses the work "idea" in two different senses: that of an image-idea and that of a concept-idea. Our intuition is not an image for we have not been able to trace it to the impression of which it can be the image. If it is a concept, what instances have gone into forming it? If there are similar, other intuitions with different contents, from whose analysis the concept is

possibly derived, how would it cover them within its validity of generalization? It is also difficult to conceive of it as a secondary idea, as an idea of idea, for its stupefying and mystifying uniqueness makes it difficult to discover the idea behind the idea which it may be.

Beyond all this, no matter how we try to see the issue, it seems to involve an inescapable circularity. It is hard to see how a mental act can have the validity of a generalization that includes the act itself. And if the act is isolated so as not to be so included, it will require its separate justification.

Has Hume survived this self-test? It looks as if he has defeated himself. It should be obvious that I have been trying a similar test in respect of Plato and Aristotle when I dealt with them earlier. I have not met with any conspicuous success in finding Plato, Aristotle, or Hume able to stand the self-test. In particular, I tried out different logical possibilities within the presuppositions, main theses, and implications of Plato and Aristotle, but nothing there seems to lead to a capacity to survive a self-test. Self-test is plainly a prime logical requirement for a philosophical system. It requires that a philosopher should be able to state or formulate his own thesis and its presuppositions intelligibly within the thesis and presuppositions themselves without recourse to anything extraneous. Only this would make his fundamental starting-point self-grounded and

self-subsistent. This self-stability criterion or self-stability
test is intended as one of the prime criteria of feasibility.
It is meant to ensure that a philosophy is feasible in itself
and does not need anything extraneous for its foundation. One
reason why Plato, Aristotle, and Hume fail to meet the criterion
is that they do not try to live with the logic of their own
philosophy. If one hopes to achieve the satisfaction of self-
referential test at some later point in his system, he will not
succeed unless he achieves that satisfaction in his starting-
point.

The "moral" is that one must ground himself in some self-
reference in the beginning of his philosophizing in order that
he does not have to face a failure through self-reference at a
later stage. Augustine, as we saw, implicitly tried it out, but
went to extremes in the sense that he ended up in a self-
sacrosanct whole system of philosophy as presupposed in the very
act of doubt-overcoming "knowledge" that one exists, lives, and
understands. The attempt of philosophy is not merely to state a
whole presupposed system of what we actually do, but to elucidate
or intelligibly rediscover our understanding and what we do when
we understand this understanding of ourselves. No doubt, Plato,
Aristotle, and Hume are great philosophers. What they tell us
is intelligible and discussable and not reducible to meaningless-
ness unless viewed from a rival philosophical theory of meaning.

In fact, they abstract artificially from our normal understanding, and hence a feasible theory of understanding should enable us to understand how other systems are intelligible. In sum, the step we need to take is that we must ground self-reference as one essential element in our normal understanding. Next, we should elucidate our understanding in its own terms without recourse to extraneous, revisionary elements. Finally, we must procure the possibility and (at least partial) intelligibility of the artificially abstracted systems proposed by great philosophers. In other words, we need to engage in a microphilosophical exercise of finding a self-stable and self-statable logic of philosophizing. I turn now to Strawson.

I shall start with the very last sentence in Strawson's Individuals: "So if metaphysics is the finding of reasons, good, bad, or indifferent, for what we believe on instinct, then this has been metaphysics."[16] It seems to follow that such metaphysics would be good, bad, or indifferent depending upon whether the reasoning was good, bad, or indifferent. Turning to the first two sentences of Strawson's book, namely, "Metaphysics has often been revisionary, and less often descriptive. Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, ..."[17] one notices a discripancy between the two enterprises. The two enterprises of "finding of reasons ... for what we believe on instinct" and being "content

to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world" are not identical. While Strawson's case for the identity of "what we believe on instinct" and actual structure of our thought about the world" may be sound, such identity between "finding of reasons for" and "being content to describe" is not very clear. Both, "finding of reasons" and "describing the structure of thought," are no doubt intellectual activities, but the former is justificatory, while the latter is investigatory. The former involves going beyond mere description, while the latter does not. Despite its opposition to "revisionary," it is not merely "descriptive," for it seeks to justify or rationalize the account offered by the description. Such justification would not be necessary without the context of countering the revisionary metaphysics, except, though, as a purgative to internal proliferation of various descriptions.

In his _Individuals_, Strawson is involved in both these activities, investigation and justification. Both are important to him, because there seems to be no passage in the book where he clearly prefers one to the other or even distinguishes the two as different. He may even argue that justification finally converges into description; if we take a hint from the penultimate sentence in his book, "It is difficult to see how such beliefs could be argued for except by showing their consonance with the conceptual scheme which we operate, by showing how they reflect

the structure of that scheme."[18] It seems as if descriptive

metaphysics is the best argument for itself. If it is correct

that metaphysics is a _sui generis_ activity (also a logically

terminal activity making all metaphilosophy philosophy), then

such descriptive justification would not appear _prima facie_

implausible.

Granting that all metaphysics, revisionary or descriptive,

has to start with a position which is self-justifying, there is

no escape from the fact that any such starting point suggests a

value proposition. Since one can have a multiplicity of positions

in descriptive metaphysics, the impasse persists of having no

criterion for choosing among the many value propositions. In

reference to such basic value propositions the position of a

descriptive metaphysician may be described as follows: "What

we believe on instinct is what we are always going to believe in

and act upon. The actual structure of our thought about the world

will remain the basis for our actions and lives, even in the face

of an intellectually favored revisionary structure which is dif-

ferent from the built-in structure we already have. The best we

can do, therefore, is to describe the actual structure, or to be

fully clear about it, or to rationalize or justify it." I do not

know how such a position can be essentially distinguished from a

sophisticated naive realism.

However, since Strawson is highly sophisticated and knowl-
edgeable, he is not as simple-minded as the above reflection
might suggest. He is not content to describe our built-in con-
cept structure in just any way. He is concerned to produce an
adequate description. The question of adequacy leads him into
the deeper realms of logical priorities and rational propriety.
He says, "... I have tried to give a rational account ..."[19]
Coherence is one thing he looks for in explaining things even
in an avowedly descriptive sense. For example, he rejects the
"no-ownership" view of the states of consciousness or the "no-
subject" doctrine of the self[20] because he finds such a view to
be incoherent.[21] From where does he get the criterial idea of
coherence? He uses it as one general test of adequacy in descrip-
tive metaphysics, but does not derive it from and as a feature of
our concept structure which he aims at merely describing. So,
indirectly, if not directly, he appears to be imposing such ra-
tional coherence upon the concept scheme which should be left
avowedly unaffected. In such results he falls to the line of
the older rationalist metaphysicians. The sheer possibility that
the actual structure of our thought about the world might be in-
coherent cannot be prima facie ruled out, but the attempt, such as
Strawson's to eliminate incoherence starts by ruling it out.
Hence, one is not surprised if the resultant "descriptive" account
is a bit prescriptive (value-oriented). I will try to show this
in my treatment of Strawson.

With respect to his concern to render "a rational account

of the central position of material bodies and persons among

individuals, i.e., among things in general,"[22] Strawson attempts

to show that the complex concept of a "person" is logically

primitive.[23] "The concept of a person is logically prior to

that of an individual consciousness," and "the concept of a pure

individual consciousness might" only "have a logically secondary

existence."[24] After asking the apparently non-descriptive ques-

tions, namely, "why are states of consciousness ascribed to any-

thing? and why to the same thing as corporeal characteristics?,"[25]

he refers to the Cartesian view and discusses and questions the

"no-ownership" view.[26] He then argues for the view that "a con-

dition of the ascription of states of consciousness to oneself

is ability to ascribe them to others."[27]

The above view seems to reverse the commonsense view that

at the reflective stage one does not and cannot ascribe per-

sonality to others which one does not understand in application

to himself.) Strawson achieves this reversal by a "logical exer-

cise. Is this not apparently, or at least possibly, a revisionary

exercise?

Strawson says,

> There would be no question of ascribing one's own
> states of consciousness, or experiences, to anything,
> unless one also ascribed, or were ready and able to ascribe,
> states of consciousness, or experiences, to other individual
> entities of the same logical type as that thing to which one
> ascribes one's own states of consciousness.[28]

One may object that what Strawson says here is adequately descriptive of what actually happens and that what I just mentioned as its converse but as the commonsense view is prescriptive. What is important is that Strawson concludes his view as if logic forces him to do so. He does not state or derive the view as a result of a descriptive inquiry merely.

His logic here is not altogether free from controversy, for he does not adequately discuss who has and how does he (a person) come to acquire "the ability to ascribe them (states of consciousness) to others?" That a person must logically know other persons first, in order to discover himself as a person, hardly appears to be a mere description. One can equally take the view that, since a person has no access whatever to other persons' experiences and states of consciousness, the way he knows the latter (other persons) is by knowing himself as a person first and the hypothetically extending this knowledge to other persons by way of analogy. The analogy is grounded in the great similarity which his personal situations have with many situations (of other persons) which are not his own. This description is just the reverse of Strawson's, namely, that, in terms of logical priorities if not in view of psychological learning-sequences, a person first distinguishes himself as different from material bodies and as a mind distinct from his personal body, ascribing states of consciousness to himself as distinct from the bodies

<u>he</u> can handle. On observing similar bodies of others in similar

behavioral situations he then ascribes personality to others by

way of analogical extension. If this is an alternative descrip-

tion, Strawson's "logical" preference for his "descriptive" view

appears to go beyond mere description, requiring justification

for his description against this possible description. This is

a prescriptive description, a kind of a medical diagnosis.

Another point may be urged against Strawson's quasi-

behaviorist view that a person's readiness to ascribe states of

consciousness to other persons is logically prior to and is a

condition of ascribing them to himself. It is that Strawson fails

to distinguish the logical conditions of explicit, estensive,

observable ascription from those of implicit intelligible under-

standing. There is a difference between ascribing a character-

istic to oneself in communicative language and understanding

that such a characteristic belongs to oneself in an effort to

render one's intuitive and instinctive understanding of oneself

intelligible and self-conscious. If an ascription is to be identi -

fiable and intelligible as such, it has to be backed by its own

meaning which may, in a given case, be implicit rather than ex-

plicitly verbalized and communicated. For example, if a mechanical

contrivance which is a kind of language machine, accidentally

"utters" an ascription-sentence, it cannot thereby be said to be

"meaning" that sentence and intelligibly ascribing something.

In commonsense parlance, it would be said to be ascribing only in an analogical and metaphorical sense drawn from conscious human persons. So, it would seem that implicit understanding is logically prior to and is a pre-condition of explicit ascription. That an encounter with and understanding of other persons provides a person with a whole new dimension of action or form of life need not be denied at all, for the point is that a person's self-subsistent minimal identity is already implicitly understood when he identifies other persons. What other persons add is only an enrichment of this already understood identity which makes the identification of other persons as persons possible at all. What we can learn from Strawson, however, is that while we may plausibly regard this minimal self-identity as the logical paradigm of other identities, we should not blind ourselves to knowledge gained from other identities and in an idealist vein declare them only to be derivative from our own sense of identity.

My criticism of Strawson is not meant to suggest that a metaphysics which revises and prescribes for the possible multiple descriptions is wrong in all respects. If Strawson does this, as I have tried to show only illustratively, he may be right. Only he is not aware that he is right. What I want to propose is that depending upon one's basic value propositions, which give him a start, he may arrive at different or even conflicting descriptive views of what our concept structure actually is. This structure

may be seen from many angles, thus producing diverse metaphysical views, albeit descriptive. Metaphysics as an intellectual activity cannot be content with a set of conflicting views, so reason steps in to help us choose from the diversity gathered. But if one sees that reason is added as one of the basic values, the dilemma of not being able to arrive at a single, general, uniform, objective, ultimate, definitive, philosophical criterion free from individual subjective values persists for the metaphysician. This is a dilemma to which Strawson or other ordinary language philosophers have not seriously attended. To take reason as an absolute criterion is the age-old bane of philosophy and to recognize it as one basic value possibly coordinate with some others seems more plausible and feasible. We shall be dealing with this in greater detail later.

About the dilemma I just mentioned, perhaps it is not even felt among linguistic philosophers, for these thinkers are not as much concerned about producing such a criterion (as mentioned above) as with elucidating the different ways in which we use ordinary language and the "rich logic" of this language. A question has recently arisen among them about the distinction between what we don't say in our language and what we just can't say. But unaided by a self-justifying intuition, how can they find out what we can't say and why we can't say it? Even without the assistance of Wittgensteinian "showing," we do seem to

recognize cases of apparently absolute prohibitions of language,
like, say "the theory of relativity is blue." We can go on pro-
ducing such type-crossing "absurd" statements almost indefinitely.
On the face of it, it does not seem useful to study these pro-
hibited category mistakes by first producing them in abundance
and then looking closely at them to gather insights concerning
the points of similarity in them which have caused their pro-
hibitiveness. Such a post-mortem discussion looks like a perverse
hang-up on language which is logically secondary to our sense of
how to use language. Why can't we go to the logical source of
language, namely, to the symbolic features of out thought which
are used in our language and adjusted to the exigencies of com-
munication?

My criticism of Plato and Aristotle shows that I am not re-
verting to old, reason-intoxicated metaphysics. Rather I am
asking for something quite radical in philosophy though quite
non-revolutionary in common sense, that is, for a descriptive
revision of philosophy's fundamental traditional revisions. If,
as should be clear from my criticism of Strawson, mere descrip-
tion is not possible or feasible, what we need to do is to add
a minimal set of values to make it feasible. I think this would
be a sufficient deterrent to an endless conflict of hair-splitting
revisions. But our minimal descriptive revision should be care-
ful not to destroy the imperfect intelligibility of these older

diverse revisions but to find a place for them in the intelligible framework of our understanding. My point in criticizing great thinkers is not to show that they are totally unintelligible but to show that they are unintelligible from their own point of view while their intelligibility is due to what they claim to explain or revise. Their actual implicit presuppositions, which enable them to carry on their discourse, are largely the same as what we normally and always implicitly presuppose in our understanding of the world. But they are hardly the same as what these philosophers would call their own "rational" starting-points. This is why these thinkers constantly fail a self-test.

My task is to elucidate these already implicit presuppositions of our understanding which, while retaining the intelligibility of other rival sets of presuppositions, render the latter superfluous, arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary. In this, I will try to explicate the logic of philosophizing or the commitments and pre-conditions of presupposing in philosophy. Since by philosophy I mena an attempt to elucidate our understanding of the world as it is, this explication would only make this understanding philosophically explicit in a theoretical framework and would not invent or manufacture it for a philosopher's consumption.

I will begin by taking up two ingredients in philosophy which may be called "the method employed" and "the intended

result" in philosophy. The first generally goes by the title
"epistemology" or "philosophical logic" while the latter goes
by the name "metaphysics" or "ontology." These traditional
designations are partly misleading. The reason is that they
lead to artificial fragmentation of philosophic validity. We
fracture our thinking into concepts like logical truth, validity
of inference, suitability of evidence, correctness of belief,
metaphysical reality, types of being and so on. These fruitless
distinctions are like injecting artificial blood into the body
of endless dialectic or interminable discourse. Philosophy usu-
ally attempts to find a more firm and intellectually more ac-
ceptable framework for our understanding of ourselves and our
world of experience. Such a framework is what I mean by the
"intended result" of philosophizing. Philosophizing itself is
a method by which the result is supposed to be achieved, but it
gets divided into diverse traditional concepts by employing dif-
ferent stages that create the fracture of the framework. So,
this complex of methods generally characterized by philosophizing
is what I mean by the "method employed." My critical drive so
far should have made it clear that there is no genuine or apriori
obvious distinction between the method employed and the intended
result, not at least in microphilosophy which discovers method
as an element in result and result as implied im method. The
distinction, though, may help our understanding, and so I will

make it initially to aid intelligibility. In sum, method

distinguishes itself from result in ways similar to how logic,

knowledge, and reason distinguish themselves from validity, truth,

and reality respectively. Logically speaking, method is prior

to result. Philosophizing may be characterized as employing

the method towards the intended result. We can concentrate

first on the method and let the result largely develop itself.

The logical paradigm of method may be designated as "knowing."

In the rest of this chapter I will explore and elucidate what is

involved as prime commitments in the very conception of engaging

into "knowing." This attempt could give an intimation of the

nature of the logic to be employed and discovered in microphilo-

sophical feasibilism.

It is important to note that "knowing," "knowledge,"

"knowledge situation," and the cognate terms in the following

should be understood in the sense just described and not in the

narrower sense in which they are used generally in philosophy.

My aim in what follows is to show the crucial philosophical

significance of certain logical, ontic, and valuative commitments

involved in the very conception of the knowledge situation and to

make clear the implication that the circular interdependence and

intercommitment of logic, reality, knowledge, and value can be

overcome only by positing a synthesis of their minimum require-

ments ("Ontic," "metaphysical," "real," etc., again, should be

understood as related to the "intended result" aforesaid.)

Since the present concern is about the fundamental postu-

lation in human understanding, it would be out of place to expect

the traditional type of dialectic in arguing a case or demonstrat-

ing a standpoint. The priority of logical argument over the

basic postulates of human understanding is not taken here as a

settled issue to start with. This rejection of the priority of

the role of intellect in philosophy does not, however, bar the

admission of a coordinate or subsidiary role for it. The issue

need not be pursued by itself because it forms just one part of

the larger basic issue whose consideration follows.

To begin with the knowledge situation. No independent

epistemology seems possible and no epistemological inquiry can

be started without accepting the apradox that any would-be solu-

tion[29] or even formulation or explication of the problem of knowl-

edge cannot itself be knowledge open to the epistemological analy-

sis. This holds because, if it is admitted as knowledge it would

lead, accordingly as it is so admitted (a) in distinction from

the earlier class of all particular items of knowledge or (b)

in inclusion in the latter, to (a) positing an infinite series

of knowledge situations each claiming to know the preceding and

to be known by the succeeding one, or to (b) accepting a part's

pretension to explain the whole of which it is a part. The

former alternative, (a), where an epistemological statement is

admitted in distinction from particular knowledge statements, is

totally disastrous and would hardly be entertained. But the latter, (b), where an epistemological statement is admitted inside the set of particular knowledge statements, although it looks comparatively innocent and manageable, can prove to be quite mischievous. For, the only way to explain it away (meta-linguistic formalization is no such way, this will be treated and cleared eventually) is to say that the solution, formulation, or explication of the problem of knowledge, which is here posited as already forming a part of or being a member of the whole class of knowledge as such, has essentially the same structure which every other part or member of the class invariably possess. As such it can at least symbolically stand for the identical struc-ture of whatever knowledge as such there can be. Now this stand-point can be shown to have not only posited and increased at least seemingly uncalled-for presuppositions but also inherited the original (sin of) inconsistency which it was the intention to explain away.

To explain. First, it seeks to posit and presume an advance intimation of the universal, being here the very structure of knowledge which it is the very purpose of epistemology to inquire and ascertain. Second, it posits intuition in the place of com-plete or perfect induction involved in ascertaining that all particulars partake of the universal. Third, it assumes the uniform identity of the universal structure throughout the class

of the particular instances of knowledge. Fourth, it presumes

that at least this very item of knowledge, though it is only a

particular solution, formulation, or explication of the problem

of knowledge, does exhibit such structure which we are asked

to admit forthwith. Last, on top of all this, it posits itself

in intolerable arrogance, for if it was at all necessary to know

such identical structure in this way and at this stage, it could

have been easily obtained from any of the simpler and readily

available items of knowledge without having created and resorted

to such a complex and artificial sample which is more likely to

mislead than to give a true account.

Moreover, the original problem that was at the root of the

particular inconsistency we hoped to explain still persists:

whether such advance intuition threatening to solve the problem

even before it can be inquired into (incidentally, it cannot do

so because it is clearly different from the identical structure

which it is supposed to have revealed), as well as the kind of

intimation afforded of the universal structure, of the uniform

identity of the latter in all its particulars, and of its being

correctly instantiated in all the particulars, and then the im-

plication of its particularly correct instantiation in the

present particular item of knowledge, together with the revelation

of the self-imposed truth of all this, do also themselves amount

to knowledge.

It is indeed unfortunate that an intellectual inquiry has to start with a logical paradox. The logical birth-pangs of epistemology have, however, been persistently ignored by the epistemologists, perhaps in the hope that the inconsistency would somehow be dissolved during the course of the inquiry. But this hope has not so far met with any fulfilment which, if reached, would in any case be considered to be a spectacular achievement, because it would suggest that an infant killed be- fore it can even know itself would somehow mature in a ghostly way and then undo not only its previous killing but also all the consequences that followed its death.

I should not, however, bring the charge of this paradox of epistemology against the epistemologists who thus illogically pursue knowledge about knowledge. I would also not mind their starting the inquiry and following it up. But this gesture should not be mistaken for a mere courtesy on my part, for it is really a result of coercion. I know that the missile which I may hurl at the epistemologist may after doing him away prove a boomerang and do me away also. (Actually, it has been the poor sceptic who is prone to receive the charge of inconsistency, while the intellectualists who bring the charge have been forgetting not only that they themselves are liable to the same charge but also that their loss of positive face would be much worse than the sceptic's loss of a mere negative pretension.) The fact that his

loss of positive face would be much worse than my loss of a negative pretension would not be a consolation to me, for the boomerang effect being potentially endless, its adoption would appear quite senseless. As a result we would keep quiet. Our agreement on mutual reticence would at best be described as a piece of wisdom in respect of the circumstances, and not as an intellectually satisfactory solution of the problem.

It would be a digression to deal with the nature of this logical paradox, but it requires some attention. In case it cannot be solved or adequately treated, we cannot talk sensibly about knowledge at all. But though it has not yet been satisfactorily solved we do appear able to talk about knowledge without any loss of intelligibility. So far as the inconsistency persists this intelligibility is reduced to a dogmatic and intuitive conviction for want of a logical basis. Perhaps we have misunderstood the nature and scope of logic or possibly logic itself needs a modification in its form or rigor in order to explain the almost universal conviction of this intelligibility. Within the limits of this chapter, it can only be indicated, and not "demonstrated," that, though both these alternatives have some truth, they cannot provide a solution. The solution can ultimately be given only by positing a synthesis of the minimum demands of logic, reality, knowledge, and value ascertained after an adequate analysis of their foundations.

Possibly the initial problem of epistemology reduces or transforms itself into an axiological one, that of making a choice between the devastating results which follow from the demands of logical necessity and the intuited conviction that the present instance of the logical inconsistency need not be taken seriously, for no other reason than that somehow in actual life we do not encounter such a disaster as would be imminent in any such logical demand and we actually carry on all sorts of talk involving knowledge. The "law" of the excluded middle is merciless and does not leave any alternative even for itself. Why give up consistency only here and not everywhere else? Even in the present instance the scope and intensity of such a disaster cannot be exaggerated, for the prohibition of all intelligible reference to knowledge means a wholesale ban also on the knowledge of any truth whatever, because anything to be known as true requires that it should first be known at all. To know that falsehood also would be equally unknowable obviously would be no consolation.

Logic thus seems to deny us our apparent freedom of knowledge. To put it rather strongly, it denies our obvious freedom and capacity to know and believe, and in the same vein of its denial cannot explain the denial. We cannot have any knowledge about knowledge. We are not free to contradict ourselves, for we cannot have a contradictory knowledge. Our knowledge seems

condemned to a perpetual bondage and defies any review of it.

It cannot be revised or even looked at without setting logic

aside. We should remain ignorant of the nature and structure

of knowledge, and logic does not even let us know what it is

that it prohibits. This is sheer disaster.

How do we arrive at the knowledge that a knowledge about

knowledge is logically inconsistent? Obviously, by the help

of logic. How is it consistent that logic can allow such knowl-

edge, albeit negative, about a knowledge of knowledge? Is

logic illogical? Furthermore, before the self-evident truth of

the basic laws of logic is known, the laws should be known them-

selves separately from their having the property of truth. But

this would amount to a knowledge of knowledge, because logic pos-

its its basic laws to be the universal features of all knowledge

and the knowledge of their truth then does amount to a knowledge

about all knowledge and not only of some particular items of

knowledge. This illogical pretension of omnipresence on the part

of logic is at times defended by another equally arrogant pre-

tension of "self-evidence." It is claimed that the truth of the

basic laws of logic has not to be known at all because it is

self-evident. But is its self-evidence to be known or not? This

"self-evidence" seems to confirm our earlier observation that a

logical consideration of the epistemologist's situation leads to

a dogmatic and intuitive conviction. Why not invest "self-evidence"

in a worthier cause than the rigid, formal, and unsubstantial logic? Logic that cannot grant us freedom of knowledge should not itself be granted full freedom in the name of "self-evidence," at least not in its rigid, aggressive, and destructive form. The above discussion should give a fair indication of the nature of the axiological commitments involved in the conception of the epistemic situation. In brief, it requires a value choice in favor of a minimum possible epistemology. This amounts to swallowing the initial logical paradox. Incidentally and strangely, only this illogical choice makes logic possible at all, otherwise logic would be impossible along with knowledge itself.

The general question whether there is a good alternative to logic is not easy to wnswer. Pure experience, in that it comes with a belief-coercing force, often branded as reality, and the total freedom of the subject in that it gives us free will and values seem to reduce themselves to different types of chaos, if not controlled in some way by logical form. Our everyday would seems at once real, intelligible, knowable, and free for us, and yet it is somehow controlled by itself and by us. No knowledge situation then conceivable without incorporating these minimum aspects of these are exactly the commitments involved in this conception. Both freedom and pure experience seem in themselves inefficient and insufficient to give our minimum workable world back to us. At least, experience must be guided by some

form and freedom by some specific values so that a workable

or feasible work results in place of a chaos. These requirements

apart, it should be obvious by now that any of the two, freedom

or pure experience should be preferred to the rigid, destructive

and nihilistic logic, or at least that the latter should be ini-

tially restrained in its overenthusiastic rigor.

The initial logical paradox involved in the conception of

the knowledge situation has been held to be resolvable in some

contemporary circles. It has been claimed that it can be dis-

solved either by positing a metalanguage to refer to and know

the knowledge expressed in a prior language (Tarski, Carnap),

or by formalizing or impredicating the latter in such a way that

cross inter-reference is made possible and the paradox avoided

(Russell, Quine). This presupposes that logic is a matter which

can be freely handled and manhandled by playing tricks on words.

A metalinguistic calculus or an ad hoc avoidance is not in any

sense likely to excape -- though it may seem to evade -- an al-

ready detected and located contradiction. Logic and its laws

go deeper into reality (or, better, "the intended result") and

are not confined to words. At least logic goes into the meanings

of the words if not into the actual facts represented by the

words. Hence, logical consistency is not a grace of words and

the words in themselves can hardly oblige us to maneuver it. It

is a separate problem to discuss how consistency arises at all,

though it is very relevant in determining the origin and nature

of the paradox of the epistemologist's situation. The conception

of consistency involves its own commitments which I will not

expound here in great detail. These cannot be avoided by any

formalized system or calculus if it is to be consistent. In the

above context, the formalist's search for a consistency proof

for each separate formal system looks unworkable. He ignores a

basic inconsistency which is the paradox of the relation of an

epistemological statement with the particular knowledge state-

ments. Second, he erects a complex system on the basis of this

willful -- albeit sincere -- neglect (together with some arbi-

trary postulates and principles of inference), and gets into an

artificial system. Third, he wants to ascertain and ensure that

no inconsistency will ever arise throughout the system so created.

(This ambition is checked by Godel's theorem.) Last he starts the

search for a consistency proof either without leaving the system

or by making use of another system he hopes would draw him out

of the maze. In this way he creates another maze within or be-

sides the original one hoping thereby to escape both of them.

He forgets that his fundamental misunderstanding of both has

ex hypothesi and ab initio barred the possibility of his escape.

Further, such a consistency proof, however skillfully created,

cannot be a proof for its own consistency and will involve him

in finding a consistency proof for the consistency proof, and so

on <u>ad</u> <u>infinitum</u>, if and until he has resort to some "ultimate"
intuitive conviction. This also illustrates how the neglect of
a basic inconsistency finally leads to an infinite regress.

After this brief discussion of some logical and the value
commitments, amounting to little more than an indication of a
perspective, we turn to the ontic commitments involved in the
formulation of the epistemic situation. This ontic involvement
is too clear and obvious to be missed. The knowledge situation
can hardly be supposed to be anything other than a relation.
No ontology is possible unless some knowledge is admitted as
real, for it is only the truth or validity of <u>knowledge</u> that can
give us reality. Even in the case of knowledge supposed to be
unreal we assume the reality of the unreal as known. So, all
knowledge is committed to ontology at least negatively or in-
directly if not always positively or directly. This, together
with its being a relation, brings in all the relevant ontology
involved.

My suggestion is that knowledge as a relation devoid of any
reference to the reality of what it relates, that is, mainly,
what is known, cannot consistently be branded as unreal by any
ontological speculation. The point here is that, if any knowledge
at all has to be real (no epistemologist would start with a
contrary presumption, for even the sceptic has the negative knowl-
edge of the uncertainty of knowledge), then the essential

ingredients of the knowledge situation will have to be pre-
sumed as real. This immediately commits the epistemologist to
a consideration of the basic ontic status of each of the essential
elements of the epistemic situation. Since the knowledge situ-
ation is taken as a relation, he will be committed to relational
ontology at the outset.

It is now clear that a consideration of the ontic commitment
involved in the epistemologist's situation leads us deep into
the discussion of the latter. But since it is not my intention
to go into all the details of the analysis of knowledge, I will
limit the analysis to the minimum necessary to show the impact
of ontology on epistemology.

The knowledge relation can be taken either as an internal
relation or as an external relation. In the former case it will
alter the very nature of all that it is supposed to relate, and
it will thereby prevent all genuine and valid knowledge of any
relata because of its effect on the nature of the relata. More-
over, it will be of marvel as to how such a thesis could ever
come to be asserted, for by its very nature it has undermined
its own basis. How could such internality be transcended all
of a sudden in this very assertion of the thesis? With the in-
ternally intact we cannot have knowledge as such, that is, knowl-
edge in which its essential nature is not in any way disturbed.
The internalist can hardly view the knowledge relation externally

and then pronounce his judgment of internality. No way out
of this difficulty seems available to him.

While genuine knowledge is made possible in the case of the
externality of the knowledge relation, the logical difficulty as
to how a particular knowledge can assert the externality of all
knowledge still persists. Since I have already dealt with this
basic logical commitment of the epistemic situation so far as it
is relevant to the present concern, it need not be treated again.
There still remains another difficulty in the externalist's posi-
tion which is relevant here. If the knower is wholly external and
independent of the known, how can the genuine intimation of the
real and essential nature of the known be afforded to the knower?
This criticism by the internalist cannot be answered satisfactor-
ily without some compromise with his position. Without trying to
justify it beyond the present context I suggest the following
outlines for such a compromise (or synthesis).

This compromise should be weighed in the light of my view
that while in essence it may not be possible for the human
understanding to transcend itself, an objective self-reference
in its case is not only possible but is also distinctly actual,
due, at least, to its very indispensibility (also see pages 214-216
above where a case for such self-reference is discussed). I
suggest that an intermediary element has to be posited to corres-
pond (or "communicate," metaphorically speaking) between the

knower and the known. To be precise I assert that by the word

"knower" I mean the cognitive self or subject and by the word

"known" the presentationally immediate entities. To avoid the

internalist's full-fledged criticism, this intermediary must

be ultimately unreal. It also has to be unreal in order to avoid

being directly known and thus positing an infinite series of

such intermediaries. We should not run out of the knower and the

known and throw in some third entity. Again, it has to be an

essential element in the knowledge relation in order to perform

the important task of permanent intermediary, hence it cannot be

a series of mere ad hoc evasions. These conditions can be ful-

filled, I suggest, only by a symbolic feature of one of the two

elements of the knowledge relation, that is, the knower or the

known. This is the only way within the externalist framework,

in which we can ascertain the genuineness of the reality known

in it.

We are in a suitable position to assess the ontic commitment

in the knowledge relation. We have already seen (pp. 239f)

that the ontic commitment affects the very nature of the knowl-

edge relation and the epistemologist in his initial act of

formulating the concept of the knowledge situation has to decide

on this commitment. The above compromise has been framed not

merely to avoid the deadlock between the internalist and the ex-

ternalist positions, but as a concrete necessary synthesis flexible

enough to allow for a decision on the ontic commitments. It
has also been kept in mind that the overall ontic commitment
must be kept at the minimum in harmony with Ockham's razor.

Which of the three elements envisaged in our conception
of the knowledge situation as a triple relation should be re-
garded as real and which as unreal? Obviously, the intermediary
symbol which we have posited to get the correspondence between
the two fundamental elements cannot claim this reality insofar
as it works merely as a symbol. This should be so even though
the task of the intermediary is permanent and centrally important,
because ex hypothesi it has been posited merely as a symbol to
achieve the understanding of the known by the knower. Since it
has no other identity than merely symbolizing some other entity
it loses all claim to a possible ontic character.

It is generally admitted concerning the known that the enti-
ties immediately presented to us are infinitely diverse and can
have, if at all, nothing but being as their most common character-
istic. Since we are not here discussing ontology but only episte-
mology we do not treat this characteristic any further. (See
the next chapter, passim., where the relationship between episte-
mology or method employed and metaphysics or intended result is
discussed and brought out.) Any attempt to load it with full-
fledged reality would amount to a replacement of epistemology by
ontology and of what is epistemologically proper by what is onto-
logically presumptuous.

Fortunately, we are still left with the knower who can be our only "savior" if there is one at all. To suggest, at this stage, that the knower cannot be such a savior amounts to giving up all hopes of having any epistemology at all. (See the next chapter, again, for the general implication that such a suggestion and its sceptical alternatives involve an acceptance of the "savior.") Even if the knower as the self or the cognitive subject does not seem, through the current behaviorist prejudice against it, like inspiring confidence in us as to its ability to save us, then we shall have to make him save us. (See the following chapter for a more precise characterization of this "savior" which can save behaviorism too to some extent.) Our comprehension of the world is so natural that it does not seem to have come out of such an illegitimate make-believe or artificial strain on our credulity. No philosophy worth the name can be based on such a strain. I suggest that the knower is the fundamental element being at once a single, steady, natural, and irreducible -- albeit almost nihilistic (because largely functional in our conception, for which see the following chapter) -- unifying force of all possible knowledge. It can save our position without effort and with brilliance. I have to repeat that the elaboration and justification of the exact ontic status and nature of the self lies beyond the scope of this chapter.

Any conception of the knowledge situation not commited to the reality of the knower is an unworkable and absurd contradiction sufficient to refute itself. How indeed can such a conception be formed without the conceiver and to whom is it addressed? No psychological maneuver, however strongly asserted and sophisticated, can deny the initially presumed cognitive subject which is the foundation of all knowledge. This is not to suggest that the empirical and the logical difficulties should be ignored. Though an examination of the difficulties is beyond our scope here, we can learn something from the fact that, logically and dialectically pressed, both empiricism and rationalism run into some kind of solipsism or subjectivism, the former thr through the egocentric predicament and the latter through idealism. No logic or experience has been objective enough to be addressed to no knowledgeable self whatever. The ordinary human understanding cannot be transcended within its own framework to yield something absolutely objective. Any attempt to do this -- philosophers have unfortunately been doing it all along -- finally reduces itself to an absurd and fruitless self-discripancy.

The self needs, therefore, to be accepted as the minimum ontic commitment of any epistemology. (We have already seen how Plato's and Aristotle's objective, universal "reason," when pressed, finally has to resort to intuition as its source which evidently belongs to the cognitive subject or self as we are

conceiving it here.) Neither ontology nor epistemology has to
suffer any strain on this account, for the knowledge situation
gains a firm foothold into actuality and remains able to allow
for all the characteristics that the epistemological inquiry
may determine for it later on. The loss of ontology is restricted
only to its right to determine the ontic features of the almost
nihilistic self and the whole playground of the known is left
open for its free and elaborate play.

One more point remains to be made. We saw that the avowedly
unreal element of our conception of the knowledge situation is a
symbolic feature of one of the two fundamental elements of the
situation. I must indicate to which of these the symbolic element
belongs. It should be clear that only the real knowing self which
is a single and steady univying force can provide for the symbolic
intermediary, and not the endlessly various known entities. The
symbolic go-between should be at once free so to go and still
remain unaffected in its essence. It should also be competent at
least empirically, if not logically, to receive intimations of
the infinite diversity of the known. The self, by the very nature
of its logical conception, is qualified to fulfil these conditions.
Concerning the logical difficulty as to how such a self can be
both the knower and the symbol for the known, only one point can
be stressed here; that the cognitive self as a symbol is ex
hypothesi unreal and hence does not involve any ontic inconsistency
at all.

To conclude and summarize our epistemological excursion.
The impact of formal logic appeared disastrous to the very con-
ception of the knowledge situation, but on analysis it proved
totally impotent and even suicidal in its effect, losing not
only force but also respect. Rather than directing a change in
any epistemological effort, it was in need of a change or re-
formulation. The details of such a change, being beyond the
scope of the present topic, were not pursued. The epistemologist
was not bound to start with a commitment to logic in its rigid
form as ordinarily conceived. The impact of axiology provided
a helpful antidote against any pretensions of logic to fully
commit the epistemologist. It was observed that the freedom of
knowledge has to be posited as a postulate, for otherwise the
ease, flexibility, and diversity of the known objects cannot be
satisfactorily explained. Further, in the case where logic has
to be abandoned in its ordinary rigid form, values remain to
direct our knowledge. The values involved the freedom of the self
or the conative subject. But we saw that absolute freedom led to
chaos. We did not discuss what specific values can effectively
guide such freedom. The epistemological commitment to axiology
was found to be limited to the acceptance of an essential freedom
of the self. It was not considered necessary to be rigid and
meticulous about the extent of such freedom, except that the
freedom must be sufficient to effect a choice for the possibility

of epistemology against an initial logical blockade. The consideration of the ontic commitment led us deeper into the conception and interpretation of the knowledge situation. The impact of ontology on epistemology is vital, but we succeeded in limiting the commitment only to the self, though this was achieved only through a uniquely conceived view of the knowledge situation. This view was shown to have the advantage of allowing any ontology its full play.

I would suggest that a similar consideration can be given to the logical, ontic, and valuative situations and as a result all these situations, together with the knowledge situation, can be shown to be circularly inter-referent and interdependent. (I will not show this in detail about these different situations, but the way I have presented my treatment of "knowing" as a paradigm of contructive analysis can be followed in each of these other situations *mutatis mutandis* and the "intended result" be found.) I further suggest that the only way out of this inter-commitment of logic, reality, knowledge, and value is to synthesize their minimum demands. Though *prima facie* such synthesis may seem theoretically impossible, it can be shown that this synthesis is not only the ground of all theoretic possibility, but is also a concrete and real postulate underlying all normal human life including philosophical life. It is flexible enough to incorporate the basic attitudes and understanding of the layman, the

scientist, and the high-minded idealist and to allow fir their

differences (if these differences would not have been allowed,

out world would have been a different one). Last, but not

least, this synthetic postulate, quite unlike practically all

philosophical theories, can be stated easily without an actual

self-contradiction. It meets what we described earlier as the

self-statability criterion. In the next chapter I will attempt

a statement of this synthetic postulate.

Notes: Chapter IV

[1] _Encyclopaedia Britannica_ (Chicago, 1968), vol. II, 754.

[2] _A History of Philosophy_ (Westminster, Maryland, 1950), vol. II, 56.

[3] Page 54.

[4] Page 56.

[5] I am aware that the word "Cartesianism" as applied to Augustine's concepts involves an inversion in history, but I am using it in terms of Augustine's anticipation of Descartes' famous _cogito_ argument which is more well-known through Descartes than through Augustine.

[6] Cf. "That we do attain certainty being _assumed_ as a datum . . ." Copleston, p. 52. Underlining mine.

[8] _The Essential Augustine_, ed. Vernon J. Bourke (New York, 1964), pp. 37-40. Also, p. 122: "Augustine worked out a list of many important divine attributes and concluded that 'Wisdom' is one of the best names for God."

[7] Copleston, page 54.

[9] St. Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, II, 26, quoted by Copleston, p. 54.

[10] Pages 55-56.

[11] Copleston, p. 53.

[12] Copleston, p. 54.

[13] Copleston, p. 53.

[13a] In my attempt to discover in this way Augustine's point of pivotal significance I have given great importance to what enables, justifies, and strengthens his starting-point. Thus it is that I have seized upon the argument from implicit contradictory assumption. This was fortified by seeing that he has to return to this argument logically. However, if one gives greater importance to Augustine's philosophical thought as a whole (rather than to its starting-point), he cannot perhaps ignore the significance of the Augustinian theory of illumination. I have avoided reference to illumination because, first, it occurs in Augustine at a developmental rather than the foundational

stage, secondly, its necessity in his thought is due to his
Christian orientation rather than to his philosophical logic,
and thirdly, because of its metaphorical expression by Augus-
tine its interpretation is both difficult and controversial.
These reasons are perhaps explained and supported by Cople-
ston when he says (p. 66): "We are enabled to perceive
such [necessary, immutable, and eternal] truths under the
action of the Being who alone is necessary, changeless and
eternal, God. God is like a sun which illumines our minds
or a master who teaches us. At this point the difficulty
in interpretation begins. The present writer inclines to
the interpretation that . . ." Underlining mind.

[14] F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Westminster,
Maryland, 1959), vol. V, 266.

[15] A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford, 1888), pp. 7-8.
Hume's general views referred to in the present treatment
belong to the Treatise, Book I, Part I.

[16] Page 257. All of the following references to Straw-
son are to his Individuals.

[17] xiii.

[18] Page 257.

[19] Page 256.

[20] Page 89.

[21] Page 92.

[22] Page 256.

[23] Page 100.

[24] Page 99.

[25] Page 84.

[26] Pages 89ff.

[27] viii.

[28] Page 100.

[29] I am pointing to the efficacy of the method employed
towards achieving the intended result.

CHAPTER V

PHILOSOPHIZING AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING:

MICROPHILOSOPHY AS SELF-REDISCOVERY OF AND PHILOSOPHY

AS PROGRESSION OF THE LIVING PRESUPPOSITIONS

OF OUR TYPES AND REFERENCE

In my critique of Plato, Aristotle, and the tradition of
philosophy I have been making intricately related demands and
what I arrive at in this chapter as satisfying these and several
other demands is quite complex. Our experience, understanding,
and world are not obviously simple and if I claim to propose
their grounds, presuppositions, and foundations I cannot propose
a series of simple elements. What I particularly need to empha-
size in this introductory paragraph is that my positive thesis
as expounded in this chapter draws from the earlier chapters
not only in terms of intellectual coherence but also for
philosophical justification. However, in this narrow compass
I will try to state my thesis as fully as possible in terms of
coherence and justification.

The exposition of my thesis begins with general reflections
on philosophy's present state and gains orientation from the

particular standpoints of the synthesis of knowledge and the act

of philosophizing. The rest of the chapter will be devoted to

viewing the thesis from different standpoints and to elaborating

ways in which the thesis satisfies various criteria. These

criteria will include those I have implicitly proposed so far.

Hence they will involve me in some relevant recapitulation from

the preceding chapters. In general, my thesis is likely to sound

extremely ambitious from the viewpoint of philosophers and their

philosophizing, traditional and contemporary, but this high-

handedness will be counteracted by the foundations and results

of my thesis which are not likely to appear particularly revolu-

tionary from the viewpoint of our everyday understanding of the

world of experience. I need to stress, that my thesis is not

confined to elucidating commonsense truisms, rather it has

repercussions for practically everything in our knowledge.

Like the universe of astronomy the world of knowledge is

expanding. Unlike the former, which is a subject of healthy

controversy, the latter seems to have been accepted as a truism,

though the acceptance lacks strength, stability, and perhaps

even sanity. Sporadic attempts at examining and exposing it have

scarcely attracted serious sympathy. Amassing technical informa-

tion on a rapidly widening scale of topics without an equally

deepening perspective is confounded with a progressive expansion

of knowledge itself. This is a consequence of a fearful regard

for a triumphant technology that passes as "science" which has semantic associations with "knowledge."

Philosophy, which could have checked this degradation of the concepts of knowledge and science, has surrendered and contributed to it by playing down its own significance. Technology has assured worldly success and has elicited mortal fear at the same time. The popular psychological response has naturally rewarded technology by elevating its status to science, knowledge, and even truth or reality. The subsequent "philosophy" has, in the net result, either cooked nourishments for the response or retreated in a reactionary way.

Has philosophy become too old a "mother" of science? Or, has it been the wrong kind of mother? Whatever it is, it needs a substitute or at least a reform, which must replace what passes as knowledge by the real shape of knowledge. This will have to be integrated internally without affectation or oversimplification. What is needed is an intelligible synthesis or a meaningful integration of knowledge. That it is not in consonance with the prevailing mood of philosophy has no merit. Let it be judged on its own merits rather than cater to the current idiom of philosophy.

Philosophy should be put in a proper perspective, not bypassed, and assigned a due place in our knowledge, learning what we can from the current idiom. The presumptions of the

present philosophical mood should not be taken for granted nor viewed in urgent seriousness. The practical importance which currently clings to them may be left to dwindle away in view of the perspective that must emerge.

The synthesis of knowledge has to force itself rather than be forced. The right start is crucial. A synthetic perspective of knowledge may be constructed and then tested as an hypothetical philosophical necessity. It should synthesize knowledge on a competent, flexible, intellectual, and valuational basis. The emerging synthesis must be empirically solid, intellectually sound, and valuatively balanced. Only then may it be said to be philosophically necessary or ideal. All this sounds overambitious in the extreme. The main purpose here, then, will be to show that it is possible and plausible. Let the following be a basic outline of the hypothetical foundations of such synthesis:

The consideration of the root problems must be given the top priority. This requires a frank and unabashed confrontation with the basic issues of methodology, metaphysics, and axiology. These are found to be mutually interdependent and also interrefuting. This ugly war of theirs must be prevented in order that any methodology for the proposed synthesis can be devised. This can be done only by positing an unhurried synthesis of their minimum demands ascertained through a thorough dissection of the issues involved. Luckily the latter synthesis is not only

possible but also happily <u>coincides</u> <u>with</u> <u>the</u> <u>most</u> <u>fundamental</u>
<u>and</u> <u>necessary</u> <u>postulate</u> of all normal human life. The latter
fact, which avoids the need for transcendental revisionary
systems, adds to it a dimension of the greatest importance and
makes it a worthy cause for elaboration and application. Only
a dissective synthesis of the basic issues can, by way of its
elaboration and extension, eventually yield a suitable synthesis
of human knowledge.

The metaphysical view underlying the above may be de-
scribed as "feasibilism" and the methodological view apparent
from it as "microphilosophy." Naturally, the latter takes
precedence over the former which has to be a result of its
application.

The expressions underlined in the above outline are
important. They are considered in the following. The consider-
ation is not exhaustive, but it is sufficiently indicative in
view of the space available.

The "root problems," in relation to a discussion of the
synthesis of <u>knowledge</u> include the problem of truth and
validity of knowledge. Truth-tests and validity-criteria have
to be laid down, which means an epistemic criteriology is called
for. The application of the criteriological principles to a
given mass of information is supposed to yield truth or reality
and to explain the information. Tradition has already found

the "root problems" to coincide with the problems of truth, reality, and freedom. The mutual conflict of basic truth-criteria has been the main reason for the historical failure of philosophy which still persists. My view is that though they conflict they also eliminate each other if pursued in isolation. This mutual elimination has to be avoided at the beginning. This will not solve the at-least-seemingly-basic conflict, but it will eradicate the presuppositious confusion in traditional philosophizing about the independent (or even inarticulate, half-hearted dependent) roles of the truth-criteria.

The history of philosophic efforts makes clear that the basic conflict probably cannot be avoided. The problem is to find a pattern for its utmost possible clarification so that confusion which would proliferate and permeate the entire structure by vitiating the basis is blocked at its minimum. "Microphilosophy" provides this pattern. The utility of this pattern is formal or theoretical in the sense that it is to be so designed as to avoid theoretic confusion on the issues of basic truth-criteria. It will be substantive or practical in the sense that it will rediscover the nature of the human understanding of our world. Rediscover, because the effort at the pattern cannot itself pass out of the pattern.

Logic, epistemology, and axiology may be taken as basic methodological sciences whose prime issues necessarily depend

upon each other. Being basic implies that one cannot pose a more
basic discipline because the latter would become basic and not
the former. A basic postulate can be judged only by its conse-
quences, for asking for a more basic discipline merely contra-
dicts its being basic and is endless if pursued. Also, no basic
discipline would be unquestionable on this account and the
questioner refutes his recognition of it as basic.

This need not coincide with the Aristotelian argument for
the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. In
fact it is not sufficient ground for the "laws" to stand on.
So, the tradition added "self-evidence" to it and more or less
presumed that the laws are thereby settled in peace. Neither
the negative requirement that there has to be a basic postulate
in order to avoid an infinite regress nor the positive pre-
sumptuous award of self-evidence implies, ipso facto, the
perpetual tenability of the "laws." That this simple but crucial
point was never seriously examined makes a sad reading of the
entire history of philosophy from Aristotle till today. This
need not be construed as an outright denial of the "laws" or
as a summary rejection of the other arguments for them such as
their self-undeniability or transcendental formality. I have
considered these arguments earlier in sufficient detail. Here,
I mean only to warn against a mistaken identification of my
point with the entire tradition after Aristotle while in fact
my intention runs about the reverse.

The point is that the basic postulate must submit to the judgment by consequences. This requirement cannot be eschewed in the name of "self-evidence," however strongly one may feel about the latter. Since basic philosophical problems still persist, they have not stood the judgment by consequences. The philosophic effort to explain our ordinary experiences by the "laws" has succeeded only in formally confusing our experiences. Even formal clarity cannot make up for the stringent philosophic requirement of judgment by consequences. Philosophy also requires an explanation of ordinary experiences which is no less real than them.

A synthesis of knowledge and its basic postulate and methodology must be real and necessary. The synthesis cannot be a forced patchwork. It must force itself. Accordingly, its basis has to be rediscovered through our common, basic, experienced phenomena rather than invented by speculation. It must be given up if an honest investigation finds it impossible. What I mean is that it is neither impossible nor implausible in itself. Not that this secures it fully; the details and extent of security must remain open for ascertainment.

The basic synthesis which I propose must be already there, fully presumed, even in the act of asking for the method through which the basic issues are to be synthesized. This is implied in its being basic and necessary. It is not just a philosophizing

of the traditional speculative type or an anti-philosophizing of
the modern reactionary type, but is a concrete actuality, being
an inevitable, commonly experienced phenomenon.

Apart from the question of specifying the method it may
still be pertinent to ask what exactly will determine the pattern
of the synthesis. The following may be sufficiently indicative:
We have to work under the concrete and real contradiction that
the very formulation of the basic synthesis presupposes it. So,
its essential ingredients are put together and postulated at
one and the same time. They should be patterned to be justified
through their consequences. The most basic and necessary ele-
ments must be rediscovered first, and the movement must gradually
proceed to rediscover the less and less basic and necessary
elements. These elements constitute our evidence which should
not be exceeded either in the process of their rediscovery or
in the resultant rediscovery itself. This is a very stringent
test which (as we found in our treatment of Strawson) has to be
given up by the human understanding and that such a giving up
is a part of human understanding. But the stringency has to
be and can be pursued and applied to the maximum extent possible
and this can easily be salvaged (such a salvaging being, again,
a part of the human understanding). The actual presuppositions
of our understanding are to be rediscovered and left clear and
unaffected by any pretentious speculation trying to "explain"

them. Presumptions are never a happy matter in theory and they must be reduced to the minimum possible in harmony with the Ockham's razor. These are broad illustrative guidelines. The entire attempt will follow them as a part of the methodological strategy of microphilosophy.

I may now describe the perspective of microphilosophy as rational, objective, and scientific even within its peculiar self-imposed limits. To work it out we must eschew the usual dwelling upon the traditional dialectic (of which we have had enough in our counter-dialectic against Plato and Aristotle) which goes under the name of the theoretic demonstration of a philosophic standpoint.

Microphilosophy claims to treat in the best possible way the basic problem of philosophic methodology. The root problems of first philosophy do not admit of a better answer than micro-philosophy which, as a methodology of philosophy, means, in a nutshell, that the starting-point of philosophy has to be an ontologizing synthesis of the minimum demands of the inter-dependent though interrefuting basic issues of logic, episte-mology, and axiology. The elements and the nature of such root synthesis are to be ascertained by a thorough analysis of the main issues of these three sciences belonging to the philosophic methodology. In the preceding chapter I attempted an outline of such analysis with respect to epistemology. My treatment of

Aristotle and partly of Plato provides abundant intimations of what an analysis of logic or reason would yield. My brief treatment of Strawson suggests some elements which an analysis of metaphysics and axiology would reveal. Microphilosophy shows that such a synthesis is incorporated as a foundation postulate in the basis of human normalcy, and is unavoidable by the normal human consciousness without which, incidentally, no philosophical problems can conceivably arise at all. The philosophical result of the application of this methodology is theoretical feasibilism ("the intended result"). The latter recommends a hierarchic ontic status for the ingredients of minimum human workability.

The main theme is that the basic criteria of truth are divisible among the three, reason, experience, and value, which are to be taken in a very broad and general sense. They are the validators of knowledge which is supposed to reveal the basic reality along through a further criterion of minimum feasibility. These four, then, being reason, experience, value, and reality are seen to be interdependent and inter-refuting. This ugly war can be ended only through the postulation of their minimum requirements. This eventually rediscovers our actual minimum feasibility through the latter itself. The complete theoretical method to arrive at this kind of feasibilism would be to dissect the four, see their conflict, determine their minimum demands, and to synthesize--or, rather, to rediscover the synthesis of--

the demands. <u>This method, microphilosophy, reveals the structure</u> <u>of the basic reality and our minimum feasibility as dissective</u> <u>(analytical) and yet synthetic (elucidatory).</u> The method along <u>with its outcome, that is, microphilosophical feasibilism,</u> <u>should provide guidelines for the eventual synthesis of the less</u> <u>basic issues and the applied aspects of human knowledge.</u>

My selected short-cut to the thesis is through "the act of philosophizing" to which the entire theme will henceforward be oriented.

Microphilosophy as a philosophic criteriology achieves a synthetic methodology through a dissection of the basic action involved in any philosophizing. The basic action is roughly described at the outset as someone's thought of a sensation internal perception. The action as so conceived can be seen to be basic to all human knowledge too. The logic of this action requires that one pretend not to transcend it while analyzing or contemplating it intellectually. (Such spurious transcendence is what engaging in abstract logic or formal reason amounts to. How it fails in various ways is what we saw while examining Plato and Aristotle. See also chapter IV of my <u>A Critique</u> <u>of Logical Atomism</u> for detailed criticism of contemporary formal logicism.) This is the novel point of microphilosophy in contrast to all philosophies proposed so far (in spite of what we thought was suggested in Augustine's treatment of scepticism).

It follows from the observance of the logic of the basic action that one cannot avoid a dialectical circularity which has got to be eschewed rather than pondered over as the philosophic tradition has partly done till date. With the eschewal the fundamental postulate of the human understanding emerges as a synthesis of its basically inevitable elements. This postulate or first premise is incorporated in the basic action also. It is formulated thus: Self refers freely and symbolically to itself, own person, own body, material bodies, other persons' bodies, other persons, other selves. The ontic criterion in dissecting this root synthesis is the basic helplessness of human sanity in opting for certain values against the conceivable alternatives. The starting-point in the ontic hierarchy that emerges is self-consciousness in the intellectual sense. Microphilosophy is rooted neither in a so-called basic intuition nor in empty dialectical pretensions. It emerges from the very conditions of human normalcy and bases itself on the inevitable intersubjective values rather than on appeals to mystic intuitions or empty reasonings.

Taking philosophy broadly as a pursuit of a true explanation of our world, and understanding that the issue is one of the most basic ones, the peculiar methodological problem arises as to how can we get at an explanation which not only explains "our world" but also the pursuit, the pursuer, and the

explanation itself as parts in such a world. To avoid a real-
life contradiction (as distinguished from an empty dialectical
one on which we saw Aristotle founder) the philosopher has to
rediscover not only the world but also himself in his philosophy
as one who philosophizes. This dictum contrasts with the normal
pretension of self-forgetfulness of the philosopher in the name
of rational objectivity which evidently is meaningless when not
grounded in the actual intelligible world, vainly attempting to
make it intelligible. The issue is so basic that any assertion
proposed by way of solution ought to be judged not as an infer-
ence or in any way as a derivative but as a first premise or
basic postulate, to be valued only in the light of its conse-
quences. It cannot be regarded as true unless its consequences
do not rediscover the identity of the one who philosophizes and
the world over which he philosophizes.

Let us take for instance a truism of the traditional, dis-
cursive, first philosophy that the philosopher's hunt is not for
the data (which are already supplied by common sense and
sciences) but only for their coherence. This has the merit of
attracting credulity at first sight, but a moment's dissection
will reveal its methodological defect. Our acceptance is the
result of having frequently observed it operation on derivative
and non-basic issues from which the basic philosophical issues
have to be clearly distinguished. The philosophizer cannot

transcend the basic data of which his philosophizing is a part

or illustration, for this is the logical precondition from

which he starts. The traditional claim, then, of transcending

the data in the name of coherence (which is in turn supposed

to have a prerogative on "objective reality") appears to be a

mere glorification.

To insist on the argument that the basic data are self-

contradictory and therefore unreal is to overlook the implica-

tion that the arguing is either a part of the data, in which

case it will efface itself, or not such part, in which case the

reason for holding the view will remain mysterious and the

inclination of the philosophizing agent for it presumptuous.

In the part-of-the-data case the whole argument falls flat by a

self-kick and has to blame itself for its performance. In the

not-such-part case the argument discovers its circular nature

as one hiding an array of presumptions on the basic issues on

which judgment is being offered. An array, because the

coherence-theorist will be quick to exhort that we have missed

his point, namely, that when we think of a thing we think of the

"thing" and not our thinking itself (cp. what I called the

thought-sensation dichotomy perpetuated by Plato, especially, in

his Theaetetus).

I must make it clear that I am not arguing that thought

cannot refer to objects including itself. What I am trying to

do is to discover the conditions of such reference and view such reference through living inevitable conditions rather than become imprisoned by the surface nature of reference which can give only a preconceived, distorted though not entirely wrong, version of reason. The coherence-theorist forgets that "his point" is about thinking itself and that he then makes it unthinkable while he exhorts it as a result of his thought. He means to say that logic transcends chronology or that what thought points to is independent of the empirical environment in which the thought is set and from which it seems to emerge. In other words he wants to raise the age-old bogey that thought transcends sensation. If so, how is sensation thought of, and what does the thought of sensation mean? What about the thought of thought, the inward sensation of thought, and the thinker, too? All these are well-known traditional trouble-spots whose primacy the traditionalist tends to overlook in the beginning and starts realizing it only at a stage when it is no longer possible for his logic to solve the issues involved which are then declared to be "logical" problems. This is because he insists on abstract logic at the cost of the logic of his action involved in the very act of his insisting. It results not only in a fruitless and justified glorification of the freedom and omni-applicability of logic but also in an array of presupposi-tions which are implicit in the theory of thought's transcending

all sensation. The array hides a whole theory of dualistic epistemology which has its well-known dialectical difficulties.

The resulting diagnosis of the whole affair is that the difficulty seems due neither to a defect in the principles of logic nor to one in the report of experience but to a prejudice against experience and in favor of reason as a result of a gross neglect of the logic of the inevitable action from which any concept of the role of reason has to emerge and in which any philosophizing has to be embedded.

In the light of the above the basic problem of philosophic methodology does not appear insoluble. The solution lies in a dissection of the very act of philosophizing. This reveals that it is impossible for thought to transcend itself without transcending the freedom of logic which is so apparent on non-basic issues. It results in the predicament that a theory of knowledge cannot avoid being a part of knowledge without avoiding a circularity at the same time. Traditional philosophy overlooks this dictate of the logic of its own philosophizing by postulating a freedom of the abstract logic from all action. But the postulate defeats itself by being a result and expression of the action. The proper course is to postulate the essential nature of the basic action itself. The difficulty is that this cannot be done without indulging in action. The difficulty also cannot arise without recourse to the action, and it is due to abstract

logic which requires the action to reveal itself. It is better on the whole, therefore, to forget it than to entertain the pretentious rationalizing bogey of the logical priority, also because the inevitably retrospective and retrograde attribution of priority to anything against the very idea of sequence is only a piece of mystification, particularly if pressed into an ontology. The casualty of this forgetting will be our credence in the freedom, objectivity, and omni-applicability of logic or reason. We shall do well to remember that the ease of the credence will have to be rediscovered in its proper place and set in a suitable perspective. The course may seem to be self-contradictory, but this will not seem to be a defect the moment it is remembered that the human understanding cannot avoid or transcend it while remaining what it is.

The next step in the method is to dissect the essential nature of the basic action within that action in order to reconstruct or grasp the synthesis which it is. The action can be described as someone's thought of a sensation (or someone's intentional thinking). So far as a thought is itself a sensation we can take someone's sensation of a thought (or awareness of thinking) as a co-ordinate description.[1] This reveals three obvious elements in the basic action: the thinking or sensing agent, the thinking or sensing relation, and the thought or sensed object. This is not a reitification but only a

descriptive distinction, an immediately intelligible reportage,
and does not contain either a thing-ontology or a fact-ontology
at this stage. Let the trinity of descriptive elements be
termed the agent, the relation, and the object. The next stage
in our process of philosophic self-rediscovery is an explication
of the relation. This will be followed by a reification, for the
ultimate philosophic intention is always to report reality.
(Care may be taken here to understand "reality" and "reification"
in terms of philosophic acceptability in general or of "the
intended result" as conceived in the preceding chapter. In
brief, "reality" here would include truth and validity as de-
manded by philosophic rigor. Nothing like "ultimate reality"
or "Absolute" is intended. The reason why I choose to speak of
"reality" and "reification" is that we all distinguish real things
in everyday life, and so the current prejudice against "meta-
physics" and "reality," by justifiable reaction against grandiose
metaphysicians, need not be extended to human beings and their
natural understanding shared by all philosophers too.) Let us
formulate two stages.

Our explication of the relation should not exceed the
evidence in the action. The relation as an element in the
action is constituted of something which at once connects and
distinguishes between the agent and the object, the other two
elements. The nature of our self-rediscovery does not require

us to be alarmed by the dialectical problem of the externality

or internality of relations, which we have treated in relation

to "knowing." Even so, we have to explicate this basic relation

because the consequences will illuminate the apparent nature of

the other relations.

Since both thought and sensation have the form of experience

common to them, our account will also explicate the relation of

experience. The relational element in the basic action will

contain the agent as experiencing the object. In meaningfully

experiencing the object the agent is at least conscious or aware

of it. Consciousness of any thing is not mere receptivity, for

it also involves an active role on the part of the agent. This

requires a certain freedom for the agent. I will describe such

active consciousness of the agent as "reference." The agent,

of course, has no direct access to any such activity external

to itself. So, all externality has only a receptive role for it

in relation to its active role. Then let us speak of the

"agent's free reference to object." In the basic action there

is neither evidence nor indication that the agent's free

reference meddles with or determines the nature of the object.

(This answers idealism decisively, at least so far as extreme

idealism is concerned; for the agent as here conceived as

receptivity, being-presented-with-something, and disposition

to mere reference-activity, would be quite unintelligible as

having in itself whatever it refers to.)[2] The agent is free only so far as its activity of reference is concerned. In all other respects it is bound by its receptivity of the object. The reference cannot be anything more than nominal. The situation can be described as "agent's free and symbolic reference to object." This is the bare form of experience and it also applies to the relational element in the action. It is a fair report of the form of the basic action as well.

In the second stage, we have to place suitable contents in the form. This means a reification of the form of the synthesis. The process of philosophic self-rediscovery is also a search for the basic postulate of human understanding. The process or the postulate, then, will reveal an ontic element. There is no need to multiply such assumed elements. Ockham's razor is the right instrument for this purpose. In the "agent's free and symbolic reference to object," the "object" is the most likely to multiply both in variety and in number. As a minimal beginning I suggest: agent refers freely and symbolically to itself. For the sake of greater clarity I will call the agent the "self." (This should not create any misgivings. The idea is to report the basic appearance[3] or presentation and to ground it in intelligible reality, and neither to invoke a baseless mystical nor to escape such basic presentation in search of "objectivity.") Obviously, this formulation of the basic

postulate or presentation does not go far enough. But it has

potency. Let us first see how far it goes by itself and then

make the required additions.

With the knowledge of what traditional philosophy says about

self-consciousness, self-experience, and self-knowledge, the only

ontic element needed by our proposed basic postulate to expli-

cate them as actual occurrences is the self. "Self refers freely

and symbolically to itself," amounts to knowing the self in the

intellectual sense and to reporting the empirical occurrences

covered by it. The reification of the self does exceed the

basic data to some extent but this is only symbolical and a

mere fiction of human understanding. It also reveals at the

same time the type of the ontic fictions which the human under-

standing cannot avoid.[4]

It is almost truistic to assert that thought is self-

conscious or that it involves consciousness. Asserting anything

more about it would be controversial, because the basic synthesis

has not been properly dissected. Since belief is easiest in

self-consciousness and not in external objects (this is normal,

but a philosopher can seduce himself to the reverse), the proper

course is to start from self-consciousness in order to reach out[5]

To cover the form and the content of thought it is suffi-

cient to add "such reference" to my proposed postulate. This

will also rediscover the nature of thought. Thought is a free

use of self-consciousness in the intellectual sense. There is
no ontic addition. We have so far uncovered the nature of
cognition and the amount of "will" that goes with it. (So far,
"subjectivity" and "objectivity" are irrelevant to what is
understood by and can be deduced from "self refers freely and
symbolically to itself and to such reference," for the reason
that self as a function of reference here has no non-self to
contrast with and that it is not the normal or psychological
ego, subject, or person at all.) To cover all internal per-
ception we bring in only time and emotion. This requires a
personification of the self. It will do, therefore, to sub-
stitute "own person" for "such reference." This starts the
movement outside in the human understanding. This whole move-
ment leads to "own body, material bodies, other persons' bodies,
other persons, and other selves." In all this the word "freely"
will help us grasp the overlappings and to overcome all
dialectical rigidity on basic issues.[6] In the end we rediscover
our philosophizing and also the object-world through the basic
proposition formulated thus: "Self refers freely and symboli-
cally to itself, its own person, own body, material bodies,
other persons' bodies, other persons, and other selves." For a
human being not to be insane it is necessary first of all to
swallow this proposition along with its "self-contradictions."
No philosophizing can disavow it sincerely, because none is

wedded to insanity and none therefore tries to project its precepts beyond pretensions. The proper guiding factor of an ontology should be the helplessness felt by human sanity in its opting for certain values out of the available lot conceivable, and not a feigned objectivity in the name of self-consistency or self-evidence.

From an explication and brief elaboration of philosophy as synthesis of knowledge, I was led to elucidate the presuppositions involved in the act of philosophizing. Philosophy or microphilosophy may be conceived as the elucidation of the logic involved in philosophizing. I will now summarily state a series of propositions elucidating logic. In the light of the foregoing, they should appear intelligible and plausible.

1. Philosophy attempts an adequate explanation of our world of understanding and experiences.

2. Philosophy should search for a position to which one can ascend from and from which one can descend to anything whatsoever.

3. All metaphilosophy is philosophy.

4. Philosophizing has philosophical value.

5. Any statement of, in, or about philosophy involves philosophizing.

6. No philosophy is plausible unless it accounts for the philosophizing involved.

7. A plausible philosophy is at least consistent with its philosophizing.

8. Philosophizing involves thought.

9. Methodologically philosophy is inevitably committed to thought.

10. Thought is an act.

11. Thought about thought may be called pure thought.

12. Pure thought is a pure act.

13. Self-awareness is minimal pure thought.

14. An act is not conceivable or meaningful without an agent and an object.

15. Act, agent, and object, as inevitable to philosophizing, need to be minimally grounded philosophically.

16. Minimal grounding requires that we resist exceeding of evidence.

17. Philosophic reification is basically and initially confined to the act.

18. Agent and object, as necessary concomitants for act's intelligibility, are peripheral to the needs of grounding, and may be reified as relational functions of act.

19. In minimal pure thought, agent and object, though contradictory as such, are intuitively identical.

20. The intuition involved adds nothing and can be subsumed under the minimal grounding.

21.   The minimal grounding is the representation of the minimal pure act as "self refers to itself" where "self" and "itself" are relational functions or, rather, function of the act of reference.

22. The act of reference represented by "self refers to itself" is indefinitely repeatable _ad_ _libitum_ and, being self-referential, has a built-in freedom against the "law" of non-contradiction; which produces an expanded presentation: "self refers freely to itself."

23.   Since "self" and "itself", the agent and the object, are identical, the apparent split, though giving meaning or intelligibility to the act, is only symbolid; building this also into the representation gives "self refers freely and symbolically to itself."

24.   If "self refers freely and symbolically to itself" is a representation of the minimal pure act, the pure act would be minimally representable by "self refers freely and symbolically to such self-reference."

25.   This minimal representation needs to be suitably augmented for theoretically developing it to full representation.

26.   The full representation needs to be further developed theoretically to arrive at a representation of the act of philosophizing.

27.   Philosophizing from philosophizing is pure philoso-
phizing or microphilosophy, exemplified above.

The above series of propositions is arranged in order so far
as the method espoused permits. Please remember that it repre-
sents only a theoretical self-rediscovery and a self-statable
rediscovery for that matter. One who reads through it is not
likely to take it to be something else than what he always does.

I may now plausibly go ahead to make a statement of my
theses as follows:

Thesis I.   Basic knowledge criteria of maximally objective
truth or reality reduce to "reason," "experience," "value."

Thesis II.   They interdepend and inter-refute each other.

Thesis III.   The best treatment, if not definitive abso-
lute "solution," is to synthesize or synchronize their minimum
demands.

Thesis IV.   The knowledge situation as such a minimal
synthesis co-depends on maximally objective truth or reality
which manifests and grounds it.

Thesis V.   The situation is to be synthesized or
synchronized with the minimum demands of truth or reality.

Thesis VI.   The situation resulting from the further
synthesis is microphilosophy situation; it can be reached from
philosophical scepticism; it can also be attained from any
everyday situation; this seals it as the best working hypothesis

we can reach from these two different directions which may be called the logically zero-situation and the credulously open situation respectively.

Thesis VII. The microphilosophy situation has a synthetic mechanism to progress basic categories of truth or reality.

Thesis VIII. With different types of approaches the situation can be geared to elucidate theoretically the different worlds of our understanding and experiences, such as, common sense, science, and value fulfillment.

The terms "reason," "experience," and "value" are understood here in a very broad sense. For example, "reason" relates to consistency, coherence, understanding, intelligibility, recognition, and interpretation of the data of experience. "Experience" is the name for our general act of awareness or reception of objects or being presented with something. As such, it subsumes the logical structure or form of rational insight or abstract reasoning or logical intuition within itself. "Value" involves freedom of choice and exercise of preference in general.

One can see that I ground the structure of our receptivity of anything rather than adopt a privileged status for the particular deliverances of specific experiences or intuitions. Without such grounding, method can hardly be related with result.

Plato's favored intuition is made logically and empirically possible. Free self-reference, which I have grounded, also makes other intuitions possible, like Aristotle's laws of logic. Augustine's implicit demand in the AICA is satisfied, for no self-discrepancy results for one who asserts that self refers to itself. This is because this always and inevitably occurs. One is referring to himself when he either asserts or denies that he refers to himself. The problem of self-reference as in Hume does not arise. Since we have incorporated a value element also, the problem, which Strawson ran into in our treatment of his "descriptive metaphysics," is also straightened out.

About the thought-sensation dichotomy, it may be said that thought as thought falls under what I call "experience" and that thought as referring to or pointing at or standing for something falls under "reason." In our postulate, the "reason" element is signified by the word "sumbolically," the element of "experience" by "refers," and the "value" factor by "freely."

One result worth mentioning is that because we have grounded free symbolic self-reference, not only our own philosophical thesis but also any other thesis becomes statable within our thesis. But within any other thesis not only our thesis but also that thesis itself would not be statable. This failure of self-statability criterion was observed in regard to Plato, Aristotle, and Hume. The reason for the failure would now be

evident. It is that one cannot succeed here if he grounds some-
thing other than what he basically does.

Some salient points emerge from the above thesis as a whole
and they relate with the concept and function of philosophy I
have been developing in the present work. Certain criteria can
be stated which microphilosophy satisfies through the way it
reaches minimum feasibility theoretically and the way it leads
to maximal feasibility by theoretically developing such minimum
feasibility towards maximal or optimal feasibility or worka-
bility in different directions or phases of our complex world
which we always understand intuitively and immediately in its
essential drive though not in all its ramifications.

The basic idea is an elucidation of the fundamental minimal
conditions, commitments, and presuppositions of our thought,
reason, intuition, meaning, and values about world and experiences.
First, we distinguish "method employed" and "intended result."
This is roughly the distinction which is usually made in philos-
ophy between reason and reality, inference and validity,
judgment and truth, evidence-assessment and knowledge, valuation
and objective values, or, broadly, methodology and metaphysics.

Second, we can visualize two broad situations in order to
ensure a right or adequate "method employed" to achieve the
"intended result." One such situation is obtained from rational
philosophy as conceived and pursued in the Western tradition.

It may be called the logical zero-situation. In it one doubts

everything in order not to accept in philosophic discourse

something which is not properly accounted for, or not adequately

grounded, or not simply subjective. We visualize a universal

doubt in the Cartesian vein and imagine a logical possibility

that nothing at all is philosophically acceptable. Is such a

possibility, or logical zero-situation, feasible, especially

in its logically extreme form? In what sense, if at all, can

one entertain such theoretical nihilism? And of what use could

it be in a philosophy conceived as achieving the intended result

which is an explication of our already existing intelligibility

about our world and not an unintelligible denial of this

intelligibility which at best can only be vacuous and is in all

likelihood unnerving and undirecting? The paradigm of intel-

ligibility presumably can be rediscovered from its long-practiced

form in our everyday life. Would it be sensible to reject it in

view of some ideal intelligibility which can be of no use to us

either in understanding or in operating in our world?

Such ideal intelligibility can only be revisionary and we

saw that it founders in various ways. We found it clearly in

Plato's attempt to vacuously imitate mathematical intelligi-

bility. We also found it in Aristotle's formalizing of an

abstraction from a surface observation of the everyday intel-

ligibility. In Augustine, we saw a concern for our paradigm

meaning of our identity, but it was implicit and inarticulate.
Hume fared no better. Strawson, albeit sophisticated, was found
trying to continue and reconcile the old philosophic reason in
terms of the paradigm meaning. Our real identity, I argued,
went beyond an ideal revisionary criterion of meaning and could
not be understood through such criterion. It is in terms of this
real identity that we find any criterion intelligible at all.
But if an understanding of this real identity has commitments whi
which are contrary to a revisionary criterion in any way, we
must discount the criterion rather than our identity. However,
the validity in the criterion can be preserved after the cri-
terion has been duly modified in terms of the identity.

So, we would not end up in a mere declaration of the
identity nor in a mere denial of an abstracted revision, rather
we would find identity directing and pointing to a proper
revision so far as is necessary. We would by satisfying the
Wittgensteinian demand of leaving things as they are, only we
end up understanding them in the way they are. We want to
escape theoretical nihilism so as to reconstruct our own
practice in terms of a theory, because theory is what philosophy
aims at. Like science, we find the best working hypothesis to be
a descriptive theory of ourselves and our world.

The steps involved in seeing that the logical zero-situation
does not work in terms of intelligibility enlighten us as to what

is needed to make it intelligible. This ensures that we do not

presuppose more than is warranted or grounded or true and real.

The zero-situation, long held mythically ideal for scientific

cautiousness, is, something that can be immensely useful to us.

This is the virtue of traditional philosophy. In brief, we try

to see how someone, who holds that nothing may be true or real,

makes sense. Basically it requires the presumption of identity

of the speaker, the sceptic or the agnostic. If this identity

is taken away as possibly untrue or unreal, the position collapses.

We need not take this identity to be more than just what is

necessary for comprehending the situation. We saw that Augustine

exceeded the evidence of this minimal identity and landed

promptly in our full-fledged world, asserting that what was

involved was that we all exist, live, and understand. This not

only exceeded the evidence but also failed to articulate what

"we," "exist," "live," and "understand" mean. In fact, the

minimal identity of the subject, agent, or self, in so far as it

is the foreground of all intelligibility and experience, is not

committed to any criterion for such intelligibility or experience

that may be developed later. In this sense it is basically free,

intellectually, cognitively, and empirically. Yet, it is not

psychological or empirical on the one hand and is not rational

or abstractly intuitive on the other. Rather it is the minimal

ground of both these traditions in philosophy, namely, empiricism

and realism on the one hand and rationalism and idealism on the
other. Nevertheless, we also found that the minimal identity
was not meaninglessly mystical, some Self or Absolute, rather it
is a complex function ensuring a place for the anticipated
intimations or deliverances of any possible reason or experience
that is intelligible. Because it is free in its basic form, the
possibility exists of its freely becoming attached to revisionary
attitudes. Hence, not only a nihilistic statement of omniscient
doubt but also the statements of revisionary philosophers become
intelligible to us as possible directions that such freedom can
take though the outcome of the direction may remain unintelligi-
ble. So, our enterprise of re-discovering and philosophically
grounding the minimal identity of ourselves as a part of the
intended result has the unusual virtue of not only elucidating
our intelligibility about ourselves but also of preserving the
way other alternatives professing such elucidation are under-
standable. We do not have to declare, seduced by an inarticulate
attachment to our explicit world of common sense or science,
that all revisionary philosophy is meaningless through some
ideal criterion like the verifiability principle. Nor do we
see the need for a therapeutic treatment of the systems of the
great thinkers through the use of ordinary language.

Turning to the other situation, which may be called the
credulous open situation, we can learn a great deal from this

supposedly naive and generally discredited view. In its logically

extreme form, this universal belief affirms everything that one

may experience or think. Once we reject the logical zero-

situation as failing to lead anywhere, we seem driven to this

credulous open situation, because we have not developed any

criterion which may help us select some kind of reason or ex-

perience as more acceptable than another. If we have to develop

a mean between the two positions, we have to select something

over something else. This, again, requires a basic freedom,

coupled with some restriction of this freedom, to ensure the

stability of the basic selection, or "value" as I have called it.

Identity, in its minimal sense, would be required to understand

a statement that anything that may be experienced or can be

thought of is true or real in some sense. It would be similarly

required for a statement of the mean between the two extreme

situation statements. The logical zero-situation imposes a total

vacuous restraint on our freedom to experience, reason, and be-

lieve anything whatever. Self-referentially, such an imposition

is caught in the criterion and self-defeated which would land

us in the other situation which bestows a total meaningless free-

dom on us to experience, reason, and believe anything whatsoever.

Self-referentially, in this free and open situation, we can be-

lieve in something and also at the same time believe in its

contrary or contradictory. The completely open situation becomes

meaningless because it has no way to provide any decision among alternatives. We cannot digest the overdose of freedom it gives us. It equates belief and disbelief and thus makes freedom meaningless by failing to contrast it with some restriction.

The zero-situation is not only vacuous and unintelligible but also impotent and self-destructive through an inevitable self-reference. In contrast, the open situation is meaningless by being too full and is without philosophic strength from its inability to lead or direct us towards the intended result. Any result can be an intended result for it. Self-reference can destroy it from within in this way: if everything is real and every statement is true, then the statement that no statement is true and that nothing is real must also be true. Hence we find that we cannot avoid self-reference on the one hand and some kind of mean between the two situations on the other. The mean cannot be achieved by an objective rational criterion because no such criterion is implicit in the two extreme situations. We require some basic value to guide us. The lesson of visualizing the meaning of the open situation is that the intelligibility of all possible alternatives would have to be allowed in formulating our intended result. On the other hand, from the contrast of the two situations we see that we need to find a ground in an essential freedom in order to have a basic value. The basic value must suitably constrain the freedom so that the truth or reality of

the intended result is liberated from a mere subjective whimsical freedom. We find that although we have to postulate freedom, some restriction on freedom must be our second step in the procedure. We need to reconstruct or rediscover the presuppositions of a mean situation irrespective, for the time being, of what kind of mean it would give us. To this end, we must postulate minimal identity, self-reference, freedom, and a restriction of freedom. All this sounds self-contradictory, but we now see that it is the only intelligible way to ground non-contradiction itself at the beginning and to have a non-self-contradictory view later on. We are trying to find the minimal intelligible preconditions of self-consistency.

It is understood that we would try to preserve the intuitive intelligibility of self-consistency as far as we can. To this end we must find a minimal unit of meaning, understanding, or intelligibility, and then find a place for it in our basic intended result. Also, we need to see that we do not create a mythical reason thereby. To this end, we must adhere to some kind of experience which can readily ground our projected unit of intelligibility. Facing the need for an empirical unit of intelligibility, we should be on our guard not to be seduced by a strong tradition of Western philosophy where the paradigm of determinate intelligibility has long been perception, sense-experience, or spatiotemporal location. Besides this empiricist tradition, which has

to presume an entire physics if nothing else, we also
have the rationalist tradition of intuitive reason. To
the extent that we find reason ultimately grounded in some
kind of abstract intuition (we found it amply in Plato
and Aristotle), we can take intuitive experience as the
least committed paradigm of intelligibility. In Hume, too,
we saw that finally one has to turn to some intuition
in order to make his basic distinction in philosophy, be-
tween impressions and ideas. What we need to guard against
in respect to intuition is declaring it to be rational,
objective, scientific, absolute, etc. In addition we must
exclude any of the high-flown delieverances of it. Rather
we should ground only its logical structure or form. When-
ever we reach an ideal mean situation in terms of the
intended result. This will unavoidably constitute our
starting-point, even though it is a giveness of some ab-
stract sort. We need to reconcile such a givenness with
minimal identity, self-reference, freedom's possibility
as well as partial restriction, and value. We have turned
to or terminated upon such intuition or its form because
it is minimal and least committal as compared to physical
experience which will bring in space, time, location,
and a host of extraneous commitments. So, a self-subsis-
tent unit of intelligibility requires a minimal (intuitive
or immediately presented) givenness of something. While
this gives the bare form of experience it does not seem
like a unit of intelligibility. What would it mean to

to understand something apart from or in addition to its
being given or presented to us? If it has to be a minimal
unit which is our starting-point, could it be anything
else than an approving kind of awareness of it? Because
if it has to be understood as being something of an al-
ready known type or as being an instance of a universal,
then it would not be the starting-point at all. The start-
ing-point would then rest with an awareness of such a type
or universal. But such awareness cannot be the type of
recognition for that would presuppose a prior acquain-
tance which would threaten to be the starting-point. It
can only be of the type of immediate cognition (not recog-
nition) and approval, and experience and understanding
at the same time, intuition and reason at once, cognition
and recognition in one instance. There is no other way
to start. This is a basic, logico-genetic, coincidence
or co-occurrence or concurrence or synchronicity. To have
a self-subsistent starting-point as a unit of intelligi-
bility one needs to have a complex structure whose units
can only occur immediately and together. The immediate
approving awareness of the presented something is what I
have mean't by the self referring symbolically to some-
thing. To take intelligibility to be something else than
a symbolic reference is to run into the mystifications
of rationalism and idealism, to Plato's argument for the
soul's pre-existence as in the Meno, for example, or to

eternal kind of existence called subsistence. We are not going to be fully satisfied with mere symbols, for, in spite of nominalism, that is not the way we look at the world normally. We do classify it in different types. We shall add something to our starting-point of symbolic reference so that the minimal self-contained unit of intelligibility is developed towards realizing an understanding of our full-blown types of everyday experience. We start with a logico-genetic coincidence of the method employed and the intended result, of basic types and basic reference, of foundational universals and foundational particulars, and this co-ordination of reason and experience will be theoretically developed in such a way that their relative separation in the ordinary would will be rediscovered in terms of feasibility. From the very beginning we insist on having a minimal self-contained unit and this unit has to be such that it is feasible and not a mere expression of a pious rational wish. In the light of this consideration and of the theses, one can understand the philosophic kind of necessity that is contained in one small sentence which compresses a feasibile solution of a host of dialectical problems, namely, "self refers freely and symbolically to itself." I proceed to state the broad criteria satisfied by this sentence.

Since we have understood that a really primary postulate can only be judged by its consequences, it will

strengthen our postulate to mention some of its conse-
quences in the form of criteria which would be recognized
as generally respectable in philosophy. It is possible
to move in the opposite direction by finding a postulate
which satisfies these criteria, but it would be cumbresome,
involved, and intricate to work in this direction, because
the number of closely related criteria that are satis-
fied by our postulate in an integrated and natural fashion
would frustarte someone who wants to starts with them
rather than sees them as consequences. That is why I have
centered on some crucial and basic issues, like the foun-
dations of rationality, in order to bring out the pos-
tulate itself, leaving criteria to emerge as consequences
of the postulate.

(1) Intimations from philosophical scepticism: We
have seen that the postulate is partly suggested by uni-
versal doubt as a method in philosophy. One who entertains
the thesis of total philosophical scepticism is in a sit-
uation which lends intellegibility about that position.
He has a minimal identity which allows him to entertain
the statement (of his thesis) and he has a presumed im-
munity from this doubt attacking and destroying his identity.
What would be unintelligible in his statement is that
even if the identity of the maker of the statement is held
corrigible by the doubt in some objective sense, the
statement itself would not then be so allowed to be cor-

rigible. But what is the identity of such a statement?
Does it exist? In what sense? That the speaker as a
full-fledged psychological person may be corroded by
his professed doubt may not be doubted, for the good of
the speaker himself, but then what the statement itself
means has to be preserved, if at all it has to be a state-
ment of doubt that it claims to be. But how can it be
preserved except bassically in the speaker's disposition
to make it? In the speaker's view; the statement has no
doubt-free existence as a congeries of sounds or marks
on paper. So, he as one who means and is disposed to
making the statement is the sole possible ground or origin
of whatever identity his statement may have.

What he means is not intelligible completely. If
everything is possibly untrue, unreal, or doubtful, what
can one mean by something having doubtful reality or truth?
Something having reality can be understood to be existing;
something not having reality can be understood to be not
existing; but something having "doubtful existence" cannot
be understood as a meaningful statement at all. In fact,
it is worse than the philosophically corrigible and question-
able "subsistence." The doubtful existence would have
to be transferred to the one who doubts. It cannot be
called a mode in which a thing may be, so it would have
to be called a mode of speaker's belief. But what it to
have a doubtful belief? The very belief is not having

its existence doubted but only its reference or it is the
truth of what the belief refers to that is doubted.
What is the ground of such reference or how is such re-
ference, which is the ultimate ground for the sceptic's
validity, possible? The commitments of reference are
to be incorrigible if the statement is to be preserved
intact. This leads us back to our postulate in which
we see that the very possibility of having a language ad-
justing with our thought is built in. Our symbolic re-
ferring is our prime nature which allows us to recognize
a reference of something to something other than itself.
Without this built in disposition of symbolic reference,
a word would never be recognized as a word, as a symbol
standing for something, or usable in some situation.
Our postulate allows the sceptic to make his statement
though it does not allow his thesis. The sceptic, in our
view, is free to hold his thesis even in the face of its
contradiction with what he is committed to in the act
of holding the thesis, that is, freely referring to what
he means by his thesis. But his own thesis not only does
not allow him to preserve the possibility and intelligi-
bility of any other thesis; it does not allow him even
to state his own thesis. This is what we have repeatedly
found in most of the nonfeasibilist views which seem to
have a built-in refutation of themselves. Our microphilo-
sophical feasibilism isolates what is sound in philosophical
scepticism, adopting caution but not refuting itself.

(2) Degrees of assurance: We make no claim to
absolute truth and reality in any sense. The efficacy,
feasibility, or philosophic acceptability of our intended
result is the outcome of gaining as much assurance as we
can at the start and then narrowing to include what is
relatively less necessary in the intended result. So,
"self refers freely and symbolically to itself" has re-
latively the highest assurance that a best feasible account
of the world requires. That it is _free_ ensures that there
is no rigidity in it at all. At the same time it is the
condition of any knowledge. It can only be said to be
the best hypothesis of minimum feasibility (of reason,
experience, value, and truth). I propose it only as an
hypothesis and I must at all times be ready to replace
or modify it if a better hypothesis is produced having
a greater power to elucidate feasibility.

Our position concerning degrees of acceptability
does not flatten our ideas of truth or reality but helps
to discover the pattern which we work with when we find
and distinguish more and less acceptable beliefs. This
is built into the basic commitment to essential freedom.
What restrains freedom the most is the real. This is also
the common sense view of reality, namely, reality is that
which cannot be simply wished away. In the minimal feasible
situation, namely, "self refers freely and symbolically
to itself," there is the greatest freedom, for in any sit-
uation any agent is potentially capable of referring to

himself.

But he is prone to surrender his freedom and is unable to wish away a number of things other than his own identity. When he forgets his identity, abandons the minimal ground and forthwith lands in lunacy. But when he does not, he retains his identity and begins to compromise his freedom by finding that his freedom to refer has limits. When I, for instance, look at the typewriter in front of me, I am not free to refer to it as a horse or a galaxy or as a mere idea of myself. While I do not surrender the essential freedom of my own identity, I still lend myself to a constraint of freedom. Such a compromise of freedom can occur in different ways in different persons.not in different selves, for I have conceived self as that which is logically common in different persons and I have tried to conceive the minimal that is so common. All that is deducible from "self refers freely and symbolically to itself and such self-reference" is the paradigm of greatest possible objectivity in terms of which any other objectivity would be feasible at all. This I have made so by definition, though I have not rested with a mere definition. The point is that what we encounter in the world has different degrees of impact and we compromise our freedom of reference in different degrees. What we can do to bring out the degrees of reality is to find out what constrains freedom the most and then narrow towards less and less constraint of freedom.

After the bare self, we move to "own person," which
one could not give up if he wants to preserve his identity
as construed in psychological terms, not in the abstract
terms of the feasibility of free reference. We proceed
to less and less real - in terms of impact on freedom -
elements in our feasible world. Besides constraints of
freedom, there are also other factors like minimal excess
over evidence and minimum presuppositions that guide the
degrees of assurance of "reality". In this way our bare
self presupposes the minimum, "person" exceeds the evi-
dence of the self and presupposes relatively more than
the self, "own body" goes even farther in presupposing and
in exceeding the evidence of experience, and so on.

(3) Hypotheticalness: In (2) above I have made it
clear that I have no intention to claim any final truth
and reality. I propose thesis of microphilosophical
feasibilism as the best working hypothesis. The feasi-
bility is minimal when self refers only to itself. It
is also, of course, optimal. It becomes less minimal
and more maximal in further progression towards persons,
bodies, etc. When we arrive at the full-fledged common
sense world, we find that we do not depend upon many things
but habitually surrender our freedom to find ourselves
in types of reality like social reality, economic reality,
political reality, the reality of physical sciences, etc.
The tendency to undermine one's foundations and minimum

feasibility, though, needs to be checked. Because philo-
sophy has traditionally played up socially fashionable
knowledge and, as a result, undermined its own and the
plain man's foundations, a reminder about these foundations
becomes necessary. The hypothetical foundations of feasi-
bility suggest nothing in terms of absolutely certain
knowledge or ultimate reality or final truth. When a
genuine restriction on freedom is encountered it is en-
dowed with some degree of reality. Our procedure has no
connection with absolute conditions. It is genuinely free
and never rigid. We find that what the greatest thinkers
have to say about "ultimate reality" leaves plain men cold.
He can maintain his cold attitude, for he cannot see how
such "ultimate reality" is even minimally real in terms
of actual impact on freedom. His scheme has no approval
mechanism for that which only a particular philosopher can-
not wish away. But a philosopher does wish away his
ultimate reality when he encounters "less" real everyday
situations.

(4) Basic presuppositions as the primary start:
Microphilosophy starts with basic presuppostions of mini-
mal feasibility. This is quite clear by now and need not
be elaborated further.

(5) Minimum presuppositions: Ockham's razor has been
our sharp instrument to limit presumptions in our primary
start. The method employed does not announce the ration-

alist's mythical presuppositionlessness. From nothing
nothing can be deduced. We have also seen how a feigned
experience-transcending pedestal of formality has no phil-
osophic power. One important point must be made here:
the deal of being content with numerically or quantita-
tively minimum presuppositions is necessary because I have
implicitly disallowed all considerations of qualitative
ideals. As a result, I have refused to give credence to
intuitions when they come in the supposedly superior dress.
Mystic intuitions are of a different category and I have
not touched them. I deny that some abstract intuitions
are qualitatively superior insights into our world.
I challenged Plato's rational intuition of the Forms and
Aristotle's intuitions of the laws of logic and of in-
duction for the basic postulates of the sciences.

In creative science we encounter sudden insights which
lead to important discoveries. But first philosophy
is largely a self-rediscovery to suit the demands of the-
ory, in it there is no obvious place for such insights,
for there is presumably nothing new here to discover.
The claim to a qualitative superiority for certain types
of deliverances obtained from rational intuitions is
doubtful to start with, because when it encounters rivals
there is no way out of the conflict that ensues. This
is one source for the "rational" intuitions leading to
diverse deliverances all claiming to "clear and distinct"

or logically valid, and so on. Rational intuitions also
collided with empirical deliverances and gave rise to
rivalry between rationalism and empiricism. The East
did not allow such value choices on sense-experience and
abstract reason, and exercised its value judgment in favor
of deep life experiences which till the advent of existen-
tialism was hardly understood in the West and was con-
fused with emotionality. If qualitative rivalries of
certain preferred kinds of experiences are to be cut
through, the only alternative would be a quantitatively
minimal commitment. The result intended is to be con-
ceived not in terms of an ideal value of a supposedly high
quality but in terms of what would be presupposed in
entertaining and finding any such value at all. Trying
to avoid commitment to value presuppositions, I was led
to the view that the best way to deal with is to reduce
them to a minimum. The minimum of presuppositions was
to be determined by whatever initial value is given to any
human being's minimal identity with a feasible and intel-
ligible understanding of this identity. Only in this
way do minimum presuppositions make sense. Since I have
secured just the minimum feasibility to start with, any
further feasibility for other quality values is rendered
possible and one can move in such direction, constructing
them from the basis. The essential freedom of the plain
man and the philosopher to be seduced by the different

values is preserved.

(6) Inevitable presuppositions: To find the most forceful reality that cannot be wished away and is a force by itself through which one always works, one needs to do away with the philosopher's usual presuppositions couched in terms of rationality. The fact that even an ordinary man can get away with irrational or inconsistent behavior creates a doubt about the inevitability of rationality and consistency. Inspite of the rationalist's exhortations that reason in his sense is absolutely inevitable for attaining truth or reality (again of his conception only), we find as an everyday matter of fact that we only use such reason and are capable or free to contradict ourselves. A philosopher can argue with a plain man endlessly but he can never genuinely convince him . The reason why the ordinary man can get away with simply contradicting the verbally self-consistent philosopher is not that he does not want to attain the glorious truth which the philosopher possesses but simply because self-consistency is not an absolute proposition of feasibility. In terms of actuality, though not in the philosopher's ideal "reality," self-consistency has no obvious value or power to force someone to become absolutely committed to it. Isolated rationality does not amount to inevitable presupposition. This is why I was led in search of what is really inevitable presupposition in our feasible understanding, rather

than being content to declare self-consistency as an ideal
presupposition and vainly trying endlessly to follow it up.

(7) Minimum feasibility: The basic intended result
is called minimum feasibility. This is the minimum necessary
ground conditions for several factors taken together: reason,
experience, freedom, value, and identity. Minimum feasibility
is the logical paradigm of our understanding and experience
of the world in concrete descriptive terms. Enough has
already been said about it.

(8) Logic of basic action: Instead of catering to
the dictates of preconceived reason, our approach has been
to find the logic already contained in our basic action and
taking it to be the paradigm of logic in non-basic actions as
well as extending it to all non-basic issues. The basic
action is the logical structure of concrete experience by
which we mean the mechanism with which we understand any pre-
sented object. Say, I am perceiving a table. It means that
I am understanding my datum of experience in terms of a
table. If I look at the table absent-mindedly, I am not
likely to have a perception in terms of intelligibility.
Besides being presented with something I also need to inter-
pret that something. There is no evidence that I thereby
create that thing as interpreted. At most I have the power
to be aware of my being presented with something. This power
of being aware of being presented with something can be active-
ly employed to stand for that thing symbolically if I fail to
interpret that thing in already known terms. This symbolic

use of awareness is all that can be done in respect of terminally basic units. It is of course active and basic itself.

There is no evidence for imagining that my mere awareness (self being an identity-procuring function by the use of awareness) can create things and understandings about them. Idealism has no evidence to support itself. It is not intelligible how things or even relations can be fabricated by mere awareness. Awareness is a mere use of the form of experience. When awareness is presented with something unintelligible, the active use of it takes the form of becoming a symbol which then stands for that thing. When the thing is presented again, the symbol is revived and re-applied and understanding in terms of universals is born. A concept can be characterized as potential symbolic reference or as a field of referability. It is nothing more than that. Since such reference is free to the extent that it can even refer to itself, overlappings of concepts create no problem of self-contradiction. Self refers to objects of presentation in symbolic terms to start with and in terms of potential reference following the starting points. Anything presented is not _in_ it or somehow created by it simply because there is no evidence for it in the basic action or in the logic of the basic action. Whatever is presented to such a referring self, is understood in terms of symbolic reference or of potential reference.

The point of stating this in such detail is to cut

through the problems of perception. For example, there is
the problem about the persistence of identity of things.
We see or seem to see different presentations of the same
object, and still hold on to the identity of that thing.
We tend to think in philosophy that there is a problem here,
namely the identity of something behind its various appear-
ances. A tree looks larger close at hand than from a dis-
tance. The problem is how we come to receive it as identical
through it various manifestations, and if it is really iden-
tical, the problem then comes to finding the nature of that
which is identical. Our account simply says that we call
that the same tree which gets into us and secures a compromise
with our freedom of references and forces us to assume the
same identity throughout. Besides the seduction of symbolic
reference in terms of what it stands for when presented with
different appearances of the same thing, there is no real
something to be discovered in between the appearances that
would make them identical. Identity is a forced fiction.
We have only more or less forced units of reference.

Awareness can freely stand symbolically for a number
of different appearances and reality is merely some kind of
external and objective force which moulds this self's capa-
city to symbolize in particular patterns. Similarly, we
can explain change, process, causality, relation, etc. We
merely name these presentations through awareness to start
with (language when acquired adds an element of facility to
this), and that is the power of understanding. Understanding

cannot go beyond this to discover an explanation of pheno-
mena in so-called rational terms. Whatever we can do here
would be done by sciences which break up the experiences and
pattern them in a more coherent way. The coherence of the
form of experience cannot be secured by any means. To try
to do that is only to confuse oneself through a self-imposed
logic. Once we understand the logic of the basic action,
we understand the logical paradigm for all logical thinking.
There is no other alternative logic in terms of which we
can under tand the basic action, because it requires a basic
action to understand any other logic. Basic action is con-
strued as someone's thought of a sensation or sensation of
a thought. It is a self-contained unit occurring by itself
and understood in itself. Basically, it is self as referring
freely and symbolically to objects which include not only
thoughts and sensations but also the self and references.
In the light of the above, one must be careful to take "self"
only as the most forced result of symbolic reference. There
is nothing to be discovered behind reference which might be
understood as the identity of the self. The logic of the
basic action elucidates merely, it does not generate
"rational," "objective," or "scientific" "explanations."
It is not speculative except for the fact that it creates
or rather shows up basic fictions through which alone we can
work. But if we realize these basic fictions as symbolic
necessities of feasibility and of understanding, we would
not be seduced into the futile philosophic effort of replacing

them in the interest of a speculative ideal reason. They
are moulded to their own reason, which is our own reason; a
borrowed artificial reason would not do.

(9) Thought-sensation integration: The thought-sensation
dichotomy is one of the stumbling blocks of the rigid logic
of traditional philosophy. It prevents the philosopher from
understanding the essential nature of thought on the one hand
and sensation on the other. Separated from sensation, thought
is regarded as objective, rational, universal, necessary,
formal, etc. In the end, no intelligible way is left to see
how thought is related to sensation. I have taken a different
course by postulating the structure which is common to both
sensation and thought. Both have an element of receptivity
and also an awareness of this receptivity. When thought is
understood as thought, and sensation as sensation, what we
have understood is just this structural form of being pre-
sented to, presentedness of an object, an awareness of being
presented to, an awareness of the presentation of an object.
The latter awareness can be more or less active; when it is
in itself and more active relatively, it is thought; when
it is without itself and less active comparatively, it is
sensation.

Both sensation and thought involve (self) referring
symbolically and freely to something. In thought, symboli-
city of reference is more emphasized, while in sensation
the object of reference is more pronounced. No actual and
absolute divorce is necessary or even desirable from the
viewpoint of feasibility. As we have seen, both the symbolic

and the intentional aspects of reference are co-determinants
of feasibility among other co-determinants. Their divorce
results from an artificial injunction of the verbal court
of "reason." In our scheme, both thought and sensation, in
spite of their sharing the same basic form (of the basic
action), are still distinguishable and cannot run into each
other. Both are understood as they are and one is not pitted
against another as an arbitrary judge over the other. In
rationalism thought gets the status of judge and in empiri-
cism sensation. Half-way houses between the two are houses
of greater confusion, because they are symptoms of indecisio
rather than understanding.

(10) No mystification: Vagueness or mystification
in philosophy is a symptom of running through a blind alley
and declaring the failure to achieve anything as an attain-
ment. In Plato, the Forms are a mere name by which the
philosopher ends up referring to what he aims at or desires.
I have directed my attacks against the professions of "reason"
because "reason" claims to be without any element of vague-
ness or mystification unlike avowedly mystical philosophies.
Concealing a sphisticated mysticism is more culpable than
professing one. In arriving at my postulate I have tried
to reduce mystification to the minimum feasible. The only
place that it enters into the postulate is where "onticiza-
tion" occurs. But if we have understood "self" etc. as
convenient but necessary fictions of feasible understanding,
as units of essentially free though partly bound reference,
we would not have difficulty seeing through them for what

they are. I have tried not to import any extraneous
elements or factors to "explain" things, for such expla-
nations tend to generate mystifications. Hence, I have
tried only to eluciadate feasibility through feasibility
itself. I have attempted to explain our reason, experience,
and value through postulating their minimal feasible sit-
uation and developing this situation towards broader sit-
uations. I believe this is the only way to destroy mys-
tifications.

(11) Minimum speculation: This is what I have
meant by a stubborn refusal to exceed the evidence of
a situation. But such a zero-situation does not work
out well for generating an intelligible conviction. One
needs to go somewhat beyond the evidence in order to have
a feasible situation. Like the myth of "presupposition-
lessness," "speculationlessness" is also to be regarded
as a myth and treated similarly, that is, one has to find
and opt for a situation which has the maximum feasible
speculationlessness. For example, the very unit-making
activity of free reference seems to go beyond the evi-
dence. To regard an immediate datum or presentation or
content of awareness as a unit goes beyond taking it merely
as a temporary datum. No feasible understanding can be
generated by a tight confinement to momentary data. So
we break up the data in units. There is no such thing
as final and ultimate units or the Unit. To search for
them is to ground oneself in mere speculation. Certain
units are simply forced upon us and because all of us

are victims of them, they may be regarded as intersubjec-
tively real. But we can have some units not shared among
us, entertained by some only. They can be regarded as
relatively less real. But no ultimate reality is discover-
able through a speculative, though professedly rational exer-
cise. To find that some of the basic units were forced upon
us or that we subconsciously forced them upon ourselves,
because that is how we want a workable world, is not an
independent discovery. I am referring to pragmatism here.
We may find that our way of looking at the world is deter-
mined by whether the way would work. But what it would
mean to "work" is forced on us, never created or excogitated
by us, so nothing follows from the post-mortem observation
that a specific way of understanding the world works and
some other way does not so work. What we are concerned
with is the set of conditions which make possible the work-
ability itself. Like Kant, who attempted to find the condi-
tions of experience, I have been trying to do the same also
for reason, value, and workability.

(12) Logical self: I have already said that by "self"
I do not mean anything mystifying or ancient. I mean a
function of reference or a necessary fiction of reference.
So conceived, it makes logic possible, and may be called
the logical self. It should be regarded as a logico-genetic
self or logico-genetic-valuative self as minimally understood
by us.

(13) Eschewal of the methodological paradox: This
paradox results from trying to find out the possible relation
between the method employed and the result intended. For
example, if one takes reason as his method and reality as
the intended result, the question is what is the exact rela-
tion between the reason as method and reality as result. How
does the resultant knowledge of reality achieve the status
of method leading to reality? Or, is the resultant knowledge
real? More importantly, is the method itself real? How
much, in relation to the result which is reality itself? If
we are really concerned with basics, the paradox is inevit-
able, because we cannot have a method which does not really
go into the basic aspects and still yield the intended result.
Also, in philosophic re-discovery we cannot have a result
which was not already there before the method was employed.
The logical primacy of method is pitted against the genetic
primacy of result, for what has to be understood or achieved
should already be there, while one still needs a method to
find it. But if method is really basic, one is in no way
committed to entertain without ground a belief beyond the
evidence of the method itself that what was indicated by
the method was there prior to the application of the method.
The only access we have is through the method and to assert
that what method discovers was already there certainly goes
beyond the evidence.

We found a unique way out. It is that in first philo-
sophy, both method and result should coincide, concur, or

co-determine each other. Self as referring to itself is knowable through reference only, but it is already implied in such reference because it is nothing but a function of such reference. This good luck really belongs to human understanding. That is why it always works; otherwise rigid rationalists have already damned it long since. We found our way out by compromising the rigidity of reason which generated the paradox. Pondering over the paradox is a blind alley and does not lead anywhere except in the church where reason is the self-appointed Pope. We can move to a feasible solution if we are ready to give up an abstract hang-up. We eschewed the basic methodological paradox in order to render it ineffective.

(14) Basic co-determination: We found that method and result co-determine each other in terms of basic feasibility. We also saw that the different possible elements of the complex unit of method have a co-ordinate status with respect to each other. Between reason, experience, and value, there is no basic way to decide over the relative primacy. The usual way out is to exercise one's prejudice and opt for one of the three or a haphazard congeries of two or all three left unbalanced and ungrounded. A notable example is the so-called "federation" of different methods of philosophy, achieved by William P. Montague in his otherwise extremely lucid and important work The Ways of Knowledge. In spite of my polemic against reason, I found reason to be one of the important co-determinants of the intended result. The polemical drive was against artificial, preconceived,

dictatorial, sermonizing kinds of reason and not against the reason which is our ever-present friend as we know it.

(15) Progression of types: The idea is to get induction and deduction basically together and operating on both at the same time to get ahead with different aspects or types in our feasible world. Broadly, I divided feasibility into different types like self, own person, own body, mat rial bodies, etc. Between these types there is a bridgeable gap. Progression would not only bridge the gap, but also place the types and sub-types in a proper order in terms of acceptability. For example, we must theoretically develop everything that can importantly be developed from, first, "self refers freely and symbolically to itself," and then from "self refers freely and symbolically to such reference," and then from "self refers freely and symbolically to one's own person," and so on. Another sense of the progression of types is to proceed from the minimal feasibility towards less and less constraining kind of feasibility. In this way we found free symbolic self-reference to be the most important minimal unit of feasibility, but a reference to, say, material bodies, is not a minimal commitment, so we put it after the minimal unit. We included material bodies, however, because they form an important part of our feasible world. Since our primary start is both logical and empirical at once, our theory development cannot be described as deduction or induction; hence I have called it progression. One remembers the difficulties which Kant faced in his

deduction of categories.

(16) Feasibilist foundations of mathematics: What the Fregean-Russellian logicism has achieved is to make clear what the basic minimal postulates or axioms of logic (or mathematics) are on which mathematics depends. In micro-philosophical feasibilism, most of these axioms are already there at the very start. "Self refers freely and symbolic-ally to itself" gives us a minimal abstract unit of reference. The freedom of symbolic self-reference is exercisable ad libitum. Self can go on referring to itself indefinitely. In the situation of minimal feasibility, we have only the self referring to itself, for there is nothing that is needed to complete this minimal unit of intelligible feasi-bility. Freedom consists in repeating the self-reference of the self, for the self is nothing apart from its disposition to refer. Without involving reference or precommitment to time, the self can go on referring to any of the previous self-references as distinct at will. This gives unity, duality, triplicity, etc. up to plurality leading to the idea of infinity. We also have here the idea of succession which can be referred to in terms of units or doublets or in any wise. Since it is reference which is basic to thought and sensation, we would not have any problem in transferring this abstract mathematics to thought or sensation later. So, the problem of pure and applied mathematics is smoothed out too. Since the whole of mathematics (except perhaps

geometry and its cognates) can be theoretically developed
at the very first stage of feasibility, one can see the power
of mathematics to seduce intuitively our credence. Plato
was not wrong in being seduced, but he had no apparatus to
decipher the nature of the force that the seduction apparently
has. Our position has a built-in freedom to work with dif-
ferent kinds of space, time, geometries, at early stages
of feasibility. We are in no way confined to particular formal
or mathematical systems. Our progression of categories has
this distinct advantage against the Kantian kind of deduction
of categories. For instance, when self has referred to itself
a certain number of times, time can be referred to as a func-
tion of such a number of references, and since this number
is changeable, the concept and function are changeable also
Basically and minimally we are not precommitted to particular
ideas of time, or of space or geometry. All this can be
worked out in great detail. One point remains to be made.
It is that the closer one gets to a result from an earlier
stage of feasibility, the truer would be his result. Quanti-
tative considerations are "progressable" in our postulate
at an early stage. Material bodies come at a later stage.
To create true convictions and to work more feasibly with
material bodies would be to reduce them as much as possible
to quantitative considerations.

(17) Existential rationality: One may say that we
have adumbrated an existential rationality as against an
externally imposed reason. We have worked through the

concrete nature of our understanding and grounded its own reason. But we have also taken into account factors other than reason.

(18) Self-statability: We made this a stringent test while dealing with a number of thinkers whose theses could not be stated in their own terms. Since we have grounded self-reference in its concrete sense in the primary start itself, there is no problem with this test at all.

Notes: Chapter V

[1] It is necessary at this stage to clarify the meaning of "sensation" as I use it. I have used it here in the widest sense possible so as to include all perception, sensory and nonsensory, external and internal. The idea is to visualize the element of receptivity in human understanding and experience. The epistemological issue as to how far the understanding itself contributes towards the constitution of its receipts is left without a detailed consideration here, for it would serve at this stage as a digression. That there is at least an appearance of the basic duality in human understanding--a receiver and a received, in terms of ready intelligibility--cannot be denied and is taken for granted. So, "sensation" in my sense would mean the felt reception in human understanding without any presumptuous commitments on the ultimate nature of either the received or the receiver. For a reference to the issue of the contribution by the understanding please see the passage referred to by footnote 2 below.

[2] See footnote 1 above.

[3] It goes without saying that the basic appearance belonging to the basic action must be taken at its face value and be onticized as such. For, if the basic appearance or presentation cannot report reality, no other can; and even to deny such report is to violate the logic of the action, which then leaves no alternative but an endorsement of the basic form of our experience.

[4] I endorse the implication that the substances, qualities, and universals are basically only the instruments for symbolic report by the self, and that all relations are basically external though some are taken as symbolically internal in order to preserve a high value for sanity.

[5] In this sense, Vedantism perhaps starts well but it manages to suffocate itself by failing to reach out. On the other hand, the Western attempt to use a ladder to the self from the presumed external object is also equally absurd.

[6] There is no ghost in the machine, says Ryle. Does it follow, however, that there is a machine in the ghost making such statement? In the ontic hierarchy of microphilosophical feasibilism, self, person, personal body, and material bodies will form separate categories. Separateness of the categories here, it would be understood, is not conceived in terms of an abstract distinction but in relation to necessary discrimination with regard to feasibility.

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