Heidegger and the Second Nature of Entities: Sense, Ontology, and Normativity

Graham C. Bounds

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HEIDEGGER AND THE SECOND NATURE OF ENTITIES:
SENSE, ONTOLOGY, AND NORMATIVITY

by

Graham Bounds

B.S., Biology, Louisiana State University, 2010
M.A., Philosophy, Louisiana State University, 2012

DISSERTATION

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
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May, 2021
To my friends and mentors, without whom I would accomplish nothing.

* * *

Everything is inside because in order to think anything whatsoever, it is necessary to ‘be able to be conscious of it,’ it is necessary to say it, and so we are locked up in language or in consciousness without being able to get out.
—Francis Wolff, Dire le Monde, 11 (translated by Ray Brassier)

A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that’s unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than push it.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 42e (translated by Peter Winch)
Acknowledgments

Now I am well aware that none of these ideas can have come from me—I know my own ignorance. The only other possibility, I think, is that I was filled, like an empty jar, by the words of other people streaming in through my ears, though I’m so stupid that I’ve even forgotten where and from whom I heard them.

—Phaedrus (translated by A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff)

This dissertation would never have seen the light of day had it not been for the continuous support of my friends, family, and colleagues, both within academia and without. First, my infinitely encouraging parents, Charlene Cain and Michael Bounds, need special mention. Though not philosophers themselves, they indirectly set me on the path of my philosophical pursuits by way of sharing their intellectual interests with me from a young age. Alongside them, I want to thank my stepparents, as well as my non-academic friends, who have always forced me to keep at least one foot planted firmly on the ground. Margaret Prizzi in particular deserves all the praise and appreciation possible, and I am especially humbled by her reassurance and pride in me.

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To the extent this dissertation represents anything of value, it is owing to the input of those mentioned here. Its shortcomings are attributable solely to me.

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Heidegger and the Second Nature of Entities: Sense, Ontology, and Normativity

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Abstract

This dissertation is concerned with the meaning or content of empirical thought and its relationship to the natural world. More specifically, I seek to develop a response to a problem influentially posed by John McDowell in *Mind and World*, and elaborated in various forms throughout his work, according to which our understanding of such content is positioned between two competing demands about how it is determined: by the way the world is, and by the trappings of a human form of life, in particular, language.

That response is worked out primarily by appeal to the early work of Martin Heidegger, whose conception of *Bedeutsamkeit*, or meaningfulness, I argue, furnishes us with powerful resources for addressing the problem McDowell raises. While McDowell offers his own way of addressing the problem, I contend it suffers from an inability to ultimately resolve itself between the competing demands he outlines. Moreover, it does so because it does not avail itself of some key conceptual tools provided by a philosopher to whom McDowell sees himself as indebted: Hegel. The core of my project revolves around showing that Heidegger’s account of Bedeutsamkeit in fact bears very strong and surprising affinities with just these key elements of Hegel’s thought, specifically the relationship as Hegel draws it between Nature and Spirit. These parallels are anything but coincidental on my reading; instead, they arise out of shared Aristotelian commitments on Hegel’s and Heidegger’s part, ones which prove capable of
offering an alternative response to the problem and accommodating the core intuitions behind both of its halves.
# Table of Contents

Introduction: Sense and the McDowellian Problematic .................................................. 1

Chapter One: Hegel’s Idealism of Second Nature .............................................................. 31
  1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 31
  1.2 Panlogism and the Myth of the Given ................................................................. 32
  1.3 On the Dualism of Receptivity and Spontaneity ............................................. 47
  1.4 The Weakness of Nature and the Principle of *Entwicklung* .................. 59
  1.5 The Creative Activity .............................................................................................. 80
  1.6 Conclusion: Naturalism, Answerability, and the Boundary of the Conceptual ......................................................................................................................... 91

Chapter Two: Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Heidegger’s Problematic .......... 99
  2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 99
  2.2 Phenomenology and Answerability-to-the-World ........................................ 101
  2.3 *Über Sinn und Bedeutsamkeit*: Heidegger’s Fregean Semantics .............. 126
  2.4 Categorial Intuition and the Conceptual Surplus: Heidegger’s Critique of the Given .................................................................................................................. 154
  2.5 The Primordiality of Language and Interpretation: Heidegger’s Psychological Nominalism ......................................................................................................... 169
  2.6 Conclusion: Heidegger’s Problematic .................................................................. 217

Chapter Three: Heidegger’s “Esoteric Doctrines” ...................................................... 224
  3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 224
  3.2 Heidegger on Aristotle’s Definition of κίνησις .................................................... 229
  3.3 The Aristotelian Inheritance, Part I: *Bereitheit* and Inactive δύναμις .... 240
  3.4 The Aristotelian Inheritance, Part II: *Zuhandenheit* and Active δύναμις .... 248
  3.5 Dasein, Disclosure, and Setting-in-Motion .................................................... 265
  3.6 Vorhandenheit, Presence, and Mere Presence ............................................. 284
  3.7 Conclusion: *Destruktion*, Reclamation, and the Aristotelian Inheritance ...... 292


References ......................................................................................................................... 314
Introduction
Sense and the McDowellian Problematic

This dissertation is concerned with the meaning or content of empirical thought, and its relationship to the natural world. More specifically, I seek to develop a response to a problem influentially posed by John McDowell in *Mind and World*, and elaborated in various forms throughout his work, according to which our understanding of such content is positioned between two competing demands about how it is determined: by the way the world is, and by the trappings of a human form of life, in particular, language.

That response is worked out primarily by appeal to the early work of Martin Heidegger, whose conception of *Bedeutsamkeit*, or meaningfulness, I argue, furnishes us with powerful resources for addressing the problem McDowell raises. While McDowell offers his own way of addressing the problem, I contend it suffers from an inability to ultimately resolve itself between the competing demands he outlines. Moreover, it does so because it does not avail itself of some key conceptual tools provided by a philosopher to whom McDowell sees himself as indebted: Hegel. The core of my project revolves around showing that Heidegger’s account of *Bedeutsamkeit* in fact bears very strong and surprising affinities with just these key elements of Hegel’s thought, specifically the relationship as Hegel draws it between Nature and Spirit. These parallels are anything but coincidental on my reading; instead, they arise out of shared Aristotelian commitments on Hegel’s and Heidegger’s part, ones which proves capable of offering an alternative response to the problem and accommodating the core intuitions behind both of its halves.

In what follows, I will lay out the essential features of what I call McDowell’s Problematic in order to highlight its salient points and to make clear my criticisms of his own
response. I will then present the basic outline of the Hegelian-Heideggerian alternative. Finally, I will provide a plan of the dissertation as a whole.

* * *

In his epochal “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” Wilfrid Sellars launches a powerful and influential attack on a central tenet of classical empiricism: the idea that the bases for our knowledge of the world are “Given,” that there are deliverances to our senses that are prior to and independent of the interference of any discursive, conceptual, or otherwise acquired capabilities, and which may at the same time play a justificatory role within the ambit of such capabilities.¹

What Sellars criticizes is the notion that an account of perception which wishes to remain thoroughly naturalistic, in the sense of definitively characterizing perceptual states in terms of scientifically-describable causal impingements upon our sense-apparatuses, can be translated into an account of how such impacts could have any normative force, any epistemic impact—as they must, if they can also be taken up into a process of justifying beliefs.² John McDowell encapsulates the cogency of the point well when he says that appeal to causal interactions in nature, mere physiological impacts, can only accommodate a view of

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¹ Though Sellars levels his attack on many fronts, perhaps the most succinct and powerful expression of his idea that such Givens are a “myth” comes as an analogy with the naturalistic fallacy in ethics:

Now the idea that epistemic facts can be analyzed without remainder—even “in principle”—into non-epistemic facts, whether phenomenological or behavioral, public or private, with no matter how lavish a sprinkling of subjunctives and hypotheticals is, I believe, a radical mistake—a mistake of a piece with the so-called “naturalistic fallacy” in ethics. (Sellars 1997, 19)

² This is, of course, only one way of understanding that most infamous of terms, “naturalism.” McDowell, for instance, insists that his position, which denies the felicitousness of understanding perceptual states in this way, nevertheless is a sort of naturalism, owing to his suggestions about a broadened conceptualization of nature and “the natural.”
how we cannot be blamed for our beliefs, which is of course crucially different from the matter of how they are to be justified.\footnote{As he notably puts it many times in \textit{Mind and World}, the Myth of the Given “offers at best exculpations where we wanted justifications” (McDowell 1994, 13).}

McDowell takes up the Sellarsian point, and the resulting denial of anything like a Given, as a springboard for framing a worry about the relationship between thought and world. If we reject the notion that there is a Given, then, as McDowell explains, it seems like we are left without a conception of empirical thought that is grounded firmly in the way the world is; it ceases to normatively constrain our ways of making it intelligible, thus to act as an epistemic authority over our beliefs about it, even if it remains a causal factor in the origin of those beliefs.\footnote{Such a coherentist epistemology, which maintains room for the causal import of the world in the formation of our empirical beliefs, while denying to it any role in epistemically constraining the resultant beliefs, is perhaps most articulately and succinctly laid out in Laurence BonJour 1976. For his own part, BonJour, once one of the fiercest critics of foundationalism, has since rejected coherentism in favor of his previous \textit{bête noire}.} Instead, it begins to look as if the only sorts of things which may play the role necessary for justifying, that can do the work of providing reasons, are not perceptual deliverances but rather prior beliefs.\footnote{As Donald Davidson summarized it, on such a view “nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief” (Davidson 1983, 310).} And this is where the danger of rejecting any kind of Given begins to make itself apparent: without a Given, a normative foundation for empirical thought, our beliefs about the world appear to be based only in other beliefs, which in turn are based in other beliefs, and so on—and we quickly realize that there is no place in which the world itself intervenes at all in our ways of thinking about it. We are instead stuck in a coherentism about empirical justification, a “frictionless spinning,” as McDowell evocatively calls it, where, paradoxically, thought empirical thought is not kept in check by, or “answerable” to, the world itself.\footnote{The expression “frictionless spinning” is, I take it, meant as an allusion to the first \textit{Critique}, where Kant famously arraigned Plato and the entire rationalist tradition associated with him (at least by Kant himself) for more or less such a thing:}
Though the language in which McDowell often couches this worry lends itself to being interpreted as an epistemic question about belief’s answerability to the world, about justification, it is in fact more fundamentally a question of whether and how our ways of making it intelligible have *objective purport*. In other words, it has to do both with whether and how the world normatively constrains empirical belief *in virtue of* whether and how in the first place it plays a role in determining the cognitive significances that figure in empirical thought. The epistemic issues really bespeak a deeper one within what Carl Sachs refers to as *cognitive semantics*, which concerns the very conditions for an utterance, a judgment, a thought, etc. to have any content in the first place. It is at its core, therefore, a transcendental question, and its concerns are thus “up-stream” from those of epistemology, having to do with “what must be the case for anything to even be the object of deployment of normative notions” (Sachs 2016, 2). Accordingly, the worry about frictionless spinning

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Plato abandoned the world of the senses because it posed so many hindrances for the understanding, and dared to go beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of pure understanding. He did not notice that he made no headway by his efforts, for he had no resistance, no support, as it were, by which he could stiffen himself, and to which he could apply his powers in order to get his understanding off the ground. (Kant 1998, 129; A5/B9)

As McDowell himself says, the question he raises about empirical knowledge is just a “more or less inept expression of a deeper anxiety” (McDowell 1994, xiii) about thought’s relation to the world.

Thus, Sachs draws a crucial a distinction between two conceptually distinct registers of the Given, the epistemic and the semantic. The epistemic dimension consists of the idea, as deVries puts it, that there are cognitive states that are simultaneously epistemically independent and epistemically efficacious (see deVries 2005, 98-9). In a parallel fashion, for Sachs the semantic Given refers to the idea of cognitive significances (i.e. something like Fregean senses) which would hold their content-full (and thus normative) statuses independently of the presence of any other such significances in a cognitive economy, and yet, in their deployment in thoughts, assertions, and the like would positively contribute to the meaning of that thought, assertion, etc. In both its epistemic and semantic registers, then, the Given is whatever performs the function of an unmoved mover—either epistemically as self-justifying or not in need of justification, yet itself capable of justifying, or semantically, as content which is isolable from other such content but which nevertheless bears on or contributes as such to a full, truth-evaluable body of content (whether a proposition or a whole suite of propositional contents).

More deeply than being a matter of whether a system of beliefs can or cannot be intelligibly structured in terms of justification relations between atomic components of that system (foundationalism vs. coherentism), the issues Sellars is dealing with are a matter of semantic or logical atomism vs. holism (see Sellars 1997, 44). It is not just that one must have a whole battery of beliefs for any given epistemic belief to be justified, but that there must be in place a whole battery of content for one to be counted as having *any* content (fulfilling the functions in thought it must to count as such). A thought, if it plays the roles we take it as playing—of being able to stand in normative relations with other thoughts—forms a holistic body with other thoughts the nodes of
emerges from what Sachs calls a “demand for transcendental friction” (the “Demand”), which seeks to find assurances that our ways of rendering the world intelligible allow us to be “in cognitive contact with a world we discover and do not create” (Sachs 2016, 13). The Demand is thus closely related to, but more fundamental than, the narrow epistemic question belief’s answerability to the world.

McDowell is interested in forestalling anything like frictionlessness, and salvaging what he calls a “minimal empiricism,” a picture of how the world acts as an authority both epistemic and semantic for how we think about it. At the same time, however, he wants to do so without lapsing into either the Myth of the Given or, as he calls it, a “bald naturalism” which would, as Sellars warned against, deny outright a space of reasons that stands apart from and is irreducible to empirical description. I will refer to the project of threading this philosophical needle as “McDowell’s Problematic.” His strategy for navigating between the equally undesirable outcomes of the Given and frictionless spinning is to provide a different conception of nature altogether, one which, once adopted and brought to bear on these issues, is meant to dissolve the presumptions that give rise to the problem in the first place.

which cannot be acquired as such or put in relations piecemeal, examined in terms of their semantic content in isolation, or broken up into fragments which are then so examined.  
9 Such a naturalism either reduces any normatively charged categories to purely descriptive-causal ones, or, in an eliminativist move, rejects talk of them altogether. Like McDowell, I do not even entertain this option.  
10 His resolution has many dimensions, but in broad strokes it relies on a handful of crucial conceptual moves. First and most essentially, McDowell invites us to remove a “mental block,” a particularly influential conception of nature as accurately and exhaustively characterized as the space of causal law. For if that is how we conceive nature, then it seems hard to avoid the result that the space of nature and the space of reasons are separated by a wide gulf, and accordingly that a natural event (a sense impression, for instance) simply couldn’t play the role ascribed to it by the Myth of the Given, as a justifier for belief. If instead, though, we cultivate a richer understanding of nature, we may come to recognize that the true dichotomy exists between a space of causal law and a space of reasons, and that nature, more adequately conceived, may encompass both. Once we reorient our thinking in this way about what counts as “natural”—so McDowell contends at least—we will no longer be subject to the anxiety that interactions in nature cannot have any normative or rational weight, and that we commit something like a naturalistic fallacy when we speak of sensory episodes as justificatory.
We may motivate this understanding in particular by recalling Aristotle’s emphasis on second nature, or the ways in which humans’ acquired capacities (which for McDowell means discursive, conceptual, and intellectual capacities) do not merely attach as distinct strata laid atop the empirical, animal, or merely physiological dimensions of our nature, but come to pervade those dimensions and integrate into them. Sense-perception is inherently constituted by the resources of acquired capacities. There is for McDowell no Given at all, in Sellars’ sense, because something exhaustively intelligible in terms of causal description and epistemically independent (i.e. not reliant upon other beliefs) is not then held to be somehow capable of performing an epistemic role; his point is to reject the idea that deliverances of sensibility are exhaustively intelligible in terms of causal description in the first place. Instead, a perception is not merely a causal interaction that is somehow post facto transposed into the space of reasons, in order to serve as a justifier (this would of course be nothing other than the Myth). On the contrary, perceptual episodes are already, constitutively, in the space of reasons.

Thus, what may manifest as an intellectual capacity in many ways apparently disjointed from nature is also called upon within our sensibility. We are not animals with rationality merely affixed or fashioned to us, but rather ones whose rational nature completely saturates and reworks our animal nature. As McDowell says, using Kantian jargon, there is no genuine distinction between sensibility and the understanding, for our passive senses constitutively draw upon the resources of our active conceptual capacities.

11 In Mind and World, McDowell says that “receptivity does not make an even notionally separable contribution to the co-operation [of receptivity and activity in experience]” (McDowell 1994, 9). Later, he denies that this was meant as a declaration of the notional inseparability of the capacities of sensibility and understanding themselves, but rather as one about the inseparability of their contributions to experience (see McDowell 2008, 225-6). It is not clear to me that this caveat actually accomplishes for McDowell what it seems to be intended to accomplish. Surely it remains an overstatement to say that we cannot so much as notionally separate the contributions to experience of the notionally separable capacities; this is exactly what Kant did, and which
This saturation and integration is attained as a matter of a Bildung, an induction into a form of life that is profoundly discursive, consisting in a cultivation of rational sensitivities that eventually become habitual and passive. If we keep second nature in mind, McDowell says, we can open the door to understanding that the space of reasons is not opposed to nature, but instead that rationality is deeply intertwined—to the point, in fact, of inseparability—with the sorts of capabilities traditionally considered “natural.”

However, there is a second component to McDowell’s picture, not made wholly explicit in Mind and World but laid out in no uncertain terms elsewhere. For how are we to think of the world itself, in light of a reemphasis upon second nature? If our Bildung makes us attentive to and responsive to reasons, and this is supposed to solve the problem of how it is that the world exercises normative constraint over our beliefs about it, without any Given, then there must be something more to say about the constitution of the world itself—that in some way or other, it is structured in such a way as to provide reasons, the very ones to which our second nature makes us sensitive. Indeed, McDowell does affirm that the world is “made up of the sort of thing one can think” (McDowell 1994, 27-8), with which he is invoking the early Wittgenstein, who says in Proposition 1.1 of the Tractatus (and, in various

McDowell is at pains to warn us against doing. But understanding the cooperation differently would be a matter of shifting our conception of what is the case, of framing the matter in a different and elucidating way. That does not make the usurped mode of framing matters unintelligible, which it would have to be if there were not even a notional separability of their contributions.

12 The point McDowell is making—and this is really the crux of his picture as elaborated in Mind and World—is that talk of “cooperation” between the two capacities, as though they make separate contributions to a synthesized product, as Kant proposed, takes us down the wrong conceptual path. Indeed, it is one of the primary sources of the very “philosophical anxiety” which McDowell’s picture is meant to assuage. Instead, as he maintains, “When experience makes conceptual content available to one, that is itself one’s sensibility in operation, not understanding putting a construction on some pre-conceptual deliverances of sensibility” (McDowell 1994, 67) and so “we must conceive this co-operation in a quite particular way: we must insist that the understanding is already inextricably implicated in the deliverances of sensibility themselves” (McDowell 1994, 46). In Chapter 1 more will be said as to how sensibility and its contents are to be understood on McDowell’s picture.
forms, in many other propositions) that “the world is the totality of facts, not things” (Wittgenstein, 2014, 5). McDowell defiantly affirms this idea:

[T]here is no conflict with my conception of the world as true thinkables. [...] Frege shows, precisely, a way to see how something that does not break up into objects can be, to continue the echo of the Tractatus, everything that is the case—which seems a fine thing to mean by “the world.” (McDowell 2000, 339)

McDowell thus not only invites us to remember second nature, but also to conceive of the world as “all that is the case,” the totality of true thinkables; together these claims allow us to recognize how nature is pervaded by the space of reasons, rather than opposed to it. The world is already of the right form to exert normative force over belief. What our Bildung does, then, is allow us to see the world not just as a heap of things, but rather in this specific way—as, in a sense, what it always already was even before we became attuned to it as such: a menagerie of reasons.13

I will refer to this as McDowell’s “Tractarian ontology.”14 What this picture accomplishes for him is a view of the world as already coextensive with the space of reasons, for, as Wittgenstein says, “The facts in logical space are the world” (Wittgenstein 2014, 5, emphasis added).15 This commitment thus affords McDowell a response to the problem presented by a recognition of the Given as a myth: there is no outer boundary to the conceptual sphere, the space of reasons and justification, because, as he says, “when we trace

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13 Although not, McDowell cautions, a book of lessons.
14 It ought to be mentioned here that in fact when we take stock of the project and upshot of the Tractatus as a whole, particularly the final propositions, we recognize that statements like “The world is the totality of facts, not things,” is not truly “Tractarian.” After all, that is just the sort of metaphysical claim that is meant to be shown as nonsensical, and cast aside after using it as a ladder. I don’t mean to claim, then, that McDowell’s ontological commitments make him an adherent to the spirit of the Tractatus. The phrase “Tractarian ontology” is merely proposed out of convenience, and out of recognition of its point of origin.
15 Proposition 1.13.
justifications back, the last thing we come to is still a thinkable content; not something more ultimate than that, a bare pointing to a bit of the Given” (McDowell 1994, 28-9).16

In a later essay, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given,” McDowell modifies this picture somewhat, but the principal thrust of his project as I have reconstructed it remains essentially intact. McDowell now makes a concession: there is a real distinction to be drawn, he says, between “intuitional” and “discursive” content: the former designates a field of discursively articulable content, as, for example, given (not Given) in a perception, which, when explicitly articulated, counts as discursive. Discursive articulation involves “putting significances together”—but before this can occur, these significances must be “carved out” (McDowell 2009a, 263-4) of the intuitional content, which intuition itself does not do, instead merely delivering the unarticulated mass of brimming content.17

Note, though, that extracting content which can then be “put together” suggests that the difference between intuitive content and discursive content lies not in their being altogether incongruent, mutually “untranslatable” items, but simply in their being unified in different ways. Judgments, as paradigmatic examples of discursivity, have propositional

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16 It is worth noting that the idea that there is no outer boundary to the conceptual, that there is no supersensible Ding-an-Sich which persists in a realm beyond grasp by the powers of conceptualization, is one of the primary motivators for McDowell’s critique of Kant and preference for Hegel, for this is precisely one of the main issues that drove the post-Kantian German idealists.

17 McDowell cautions that the “putting together” of significances in discursive activity does not mean the totality can be decomposed into parts which still hold cognitive significance:

I mean this to be consistent with rejecting, as we should, the idea that the contents one puts together in discursive activity are self-standing building blocks, separately thinkable elements in the contents of claims or judgments. One can think the significance of, say, a predicative expression only in the context of a thought in which that content occurs predicatively. But we can acknowledge that and still say that in discursive activity one puts contents together, in a way that can be modelled on stringing meaningful expressions together in discourse literally so called” (McDowell 2009a, 263).

Though Charles Travis has levelled the accusation that McDowell’s amended picture runs afoul of Frege’s context principle (Travis 2013, Chp. 8, esp. 242-50), it seems clear that the above proviso was specifically intended to avoid such objections. Nevertheless, McDowell does not expand on how we are to understand “putting significances together,” if not in the most obvious, literal sense. In Chp. 3, I will discuss a strikingly similar view of Heidegger’s, and the elucidation Heidegger gives of the sense in which significances are “synthetic.”
unity. Intuitions have their own sort of unity, and though McDowell does not use this terminology, we might call it a “grammar.” This thought that the difference between the intuitional and the discursive lies in their forms of unity suggests that there is nothing intrinsic about intuitional content as such which precludes it from being unified under a different grammar—that is, expressed differently, in a more articulate form.

This is the reason I say that McDowell’s Tractarianism remains intact. Though intuitions and discursive exercises have different “grammars,” McDowell invokes Kant’s thesis that the transcendental unity of apperception is responsible both for the unity of intuitions and for the unity of cognitions/judgments as the inspiration behind the thought that both intuition and discursivity are conceptual: “the capacity whose exercise in judging accounts for the unity of the content of judgments—propositional unity—also accounts for a corresponding unity in the content of intuitions” (McDowell 2009a, 260). Thus, McDowell maintains his thoroughgoing conceptualism about perceptual contents (a term I will return to shortly) because intuitions no less than judgments or other discursive activities constitutively draw on conceptual capacities; intuitional content stems, as he says, from “actualizations” of conceptual capacities, while discursive content comes on the heels of their “exercise.”

Thus, “every aspect,” he says, “of the content of an intuition is present in a form in which it is already suitable to be the content associated with a discursive capacity, if is not—at least not yet—actually so associated” (McDowell 2009a, 264). Under this modest

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18 McDowell provides scant details with regard to exactly how or in what manner sensibility “draws on” conceptual capacities, or what it even truly means for a passive capacity to make use of the resources of an active capacity, beyond some evocative metaphors, which we are simply left to digest. In McDowell 2009a, as I have said, the metaphors only seem to multiply, without elucidation: there is an “actualization” of conceptual capacities in intuition, and an “exercise” of them in discursivity. The implication seems to be that the former is passive, and the latter more active; in McDowell 2009b, he says that the actualization of conceptual capacities in experience is “involuntary,” as distinct from their exercise in judgment (McDowell, 2009b, 12). Beyond this, McDowell’s phraseology remains somewhat obscure.
corrective, the world remains for McDowell “of the right form,” populated with true thinkables, reasons awaiting reasoners—that is, Tractarian. The only effective difference from the picture presented in *Mind and World* is that here our sensibility, conceptually laden and shaped by *Bildung* though it is, delivers us *patchworks* of thinkable contents from which we must wring out significances before we can *articulate* the true thinkables.

McDowell’s abiding maneuver since *Mind and World* has remained the same, regardless of how the mode of “delivery” of the world’s conceptual content in perceptual experience is understood—whether as already a structured proposition or as unarticulated significances which must be extracted before employment in structure propositions, the ontology, crafted as it is to simultaneously avoid the Given and frictionlessness, is effectively unchanged. Both involve, as he puts it, “deleting” the boundary (McDowell 1994, 34) between conceptuality and the world, in seeing the world as in itself conceptual.¹⁹

There is a deep conceptual problem with McDowell’s picture, though, and in fact it highlights a lingering ambiguity about the sort of role we have thus far ascribed to the

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¹⁹ One of the most succinct expressions I know of Sellars’ overarching vision of the relationship between conceptuality and the world comes from Danielle Macbeth:

On [Sellars’] account, there are word-word relations expressible as semantic rules, which belong to the conceptual order, and world-world relations, semantic uniformities, in the real order; but there are no relations of meaning or aboutness between items in the conceptual order and items in the real order. For that, Sellars thinks, would require the Myth of the Given. (Macbeth 2010, 203-4)

Note that by “semantical uniformities,” Macbeth means, citing Sellars, essentially patterns of linguistic behavior that mirror social rules of use. And “[f]or Sellars, this pair of notions, semantical uniformity and semantical rule, are to replace the (according to him, fundamentally mistaken) notion of a semantic statement as expressing an intentional relation of meaning or aboutness between a linguistic item and a nonlinguistic one” (Macbeth 2010, 203). A similar move in rejecting the idea of reference relations altogether is made by Davidson, although he appeals to somewhat different conceptual resources (Tarski’s Convention T) in order to thereby account for the semantics of ostensibly referential propositions (see Davidson 1977).

It is precisely such maneuvers, of course, which serve as the source of the anxiety about frictionless spinning which McDowell cites. We can think of McDowell’s move, by means of the “deletion,” as undermining the frame by which one might think that there is a distinction in the first place between items in the “conceptual order” and items in the “real order.” This is not tantamount to sliding back into the Myth, for the Myth consists in the idea that where such a boundary occurs it may be crossed; in denying the very existence of such a boundary, there can be no Given.
Tractarian ontology. In a contemporaneous response to *Mind and World*, Julian Dodd accuses McDowell of equivocating between two different identity theses about truth—or rather, of endorsing a version of the identity thesis which attempts to combine elements of these two theses and thereby collapses into incoherence (Dodd 1995). The first of these theses Dodd calls the “robust identity thesis,” which is made up of the following claims:

(RIT) 1. Facts are true propositions.  
   [Identity thesis]  
   2. Facts have as their constituents objects and properties.  
   [Tractarianism about facts]  
   3. Propositions have as their constituents objects and properties.  
   [Singularity about propositions, from 1 and 2]

The second identity thesis is more “modest”:

(MIT) 1. Facts are true propositions.  
   [Identity thesis]  
   4. Propositions have as their constituents senses.  
   [Fregeanism about propositional contents]  
   5. Facts have as their constituents senses.  
   [Fregeanism about facts, from 1 and 4]

Though the robust and modest identity theses share a commitment to 1, they diverge in how they understand facts and propositions, respectively. RIT understands facts as “Tractarian,” corresponding to Wittgenstein’s Proposition 2.01: “A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)” (Wittgenstein 2014, 5). Therefore, owing to facts’ identity with propositions, RIT understands propositions as constituted by objects and properties. MIT, in understanding propositions, following Frege, as constituted not by objects or properties, but their modes of presentation, therefore combines with the basic identity thesis to say that facts should be understood as having as their constituents senses.

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20 These labels in brackets (with the exception of the identity thesis) are mine, not Dodd’s.  
21 Dodd attributes this account of propositions to G.E. Moore, and, at least in the case of the contents of sentence in which occur what he calls “logically proper” names, Russell holds the same view. See fn. 31 for a discussion of Russell on singular propositions.
Now, at the risk of confusion, let us distinguish what I have called a “Tractarian ontology” from what Dodd calls a Tractarian view of facts; the former declares that the world is the totality of facts, while the latter says in turn that facts are constituted by objects and properties. Taken together, a uniformly Tractarian view would hold that the world’s ultimate constituents are objects and properties. Unfortunately, the problem as Dodd identifies it is that McDowell, though accepting a Tractarian ontology, denies a Tractarian view of facts, and instead, by embracing Fregeanism about propositional contents (which, as a Fregean, he had better do), thereby adopts a Fregeanism about facts (as in fact we saw him admit to previously).

This is why, as Tim Thornton notes in his eponymous philosophical biography of McDowell, the puzzle occupying McDowell’s work can be put in slightly different terms from the Problematic as articulated previously, as arising from the interaction of two themes: “first, what we may term McDowell’s commitment to openness to reality, drawn in part from the later Wittgenstein; and, secondly, a neo-Fregean theory of sense” (Thornton 2004, 234). The Wittgensteinian commitment Thornton mentions is the idea that, as it is put in the Philosophical Investigations, “When we say, and mean, that such-and-such is the case, we—and our meaning—do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: this—is—so” (Wittgenstein 1973, 44).

Dodd’s point highlights the tension between these two desiderata: for McDowell the world is the totality of facts, but what a “fact” means here must be clearly distinguished from what it meant for the early Wittgenstein. The claim that his picture affirms the openness of

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22 This does not necessarily mean that the world can be ultimately decomposed without loss into just objects and properties (logical atomism), since presumably the very motivation behind the Tractarian ontology (and Proposition 1.1) lies in the idea that modes of combining objects and properties (as determined in states of affairs) must be taken into account in any adequate description of the world.
thought to the world is thereby put in jeopardy, because the openness he is able to accommodate is essentially qualified. That jeopardy could be avoided, but only by sacrificing Fregeanism about propositional contents. The equivocation Dodd identifies thus enters: when McDowell wants to stress his picture’s compliance with the Wittgensteinian intuition, he emphasizes elements of the robust identity thesis, and when he wants to stress adherence to Fregeanism, he emphasizes elements of the modest identity thesis.\(^{23}\)

McDowell says that it is a perfectly acceptable thing to mean by “the world” something which breaks up not into particulars but into true thinkables. The problem is that it is also perfectly acceptable and intuitive to think of the world as breaking up into particulars. However, this latter conception is foreclosed on McDowell’s picture; because embracing both the Tractarian ontology and a Fregeanism about facts is necessary for his picture to hang together (to satisfy both of the themes Thornton identifies, and so, via them, to balance the competing desiderata of the Problematic), if we take these leaps along with him, we don’t seem to be able to make intelligible at all how a world which breaks up into particulars may exercise normative constraint on our thoughts about it. If this too is a perfectly fine way of

\(^{23}\) To be clear: endorsing a Tractarian ontology is not by itself a threat to openness. The problem is endorsing a Tractarian ontology but rejecting a Tractarian conception of facts.
thinking about the world, then we are left wondering what to say about these intuitions, or what to say in the first place about the role particulars themselves play in thought.24 25

This is not to say that the criticism was unanticipated. In the afterword to *Mind and World* McDowell presents it in summary:

An objector might say something like this: “You can make it look as if your drift is not idealistic, so long as you consider the world only as something whose elements are things that are the case. In that context, you can exploit the claim that it is no more than a truism that when one’s thought is true, what one thinks is what is the case. But as soon as we try to accommodate the sense in which the world is populated by things, by objects (and there had better be such a sense), it will emerge that your image of erasing an outer boundary around the realm of thought must be idealistic in tenor, perhaps in an extended sense. Even if the image allows for a kind of direct contact between minds and facts, it obliterates a certain possibility that we should not be willing to

24 In short, McDowell’s picture can only accommodate one set of intuitions, and does not merely ask us to look at the world differently, but to throw out entirely another set. McDowell’s perfectly permissible picture, insofar as it is impelled by robust intuitions, should not rule out our ability to also find some way of satisfying his desiderata that is impelled by other, equally intuitive ways of considering how the world is constituted. It thus starts to look like McDowell’s strategy rests on a constructive solution to a problem rather than a therapeutic dissolution of it, not so much on removing a “mental block” of conceiving nature a certain way (see fn. 10), as much as substituting in another substantive and theoretical conception entirely, a task made necessary because of the recognition of a genuine problem.

There are some accusations we should be cautious not to make against McDowell, I think, and that we should not conflate with this criticism. Firstly, we should understand neither the Tractarian ontology nor a Fregeanism about facts, nor both together, as implying that there really are no particulars, only senses. This is an accusation Dodd makes in a later article against McDowell, that he is an “eliminativist” about the realm of reference (see Dodd 2008, 83). I think this is overstated, and does not get to the real heart of the problem. The accusation that comes with the attribution, rather, is that the two in conjunction cannot explain—indeed, positively render inexplicable—how it could be that particulars exert normative force in empirical thought.

Secondly, we should not take the conjunction to be stating the world is made up of the sort of thing that *is* thought. In *Mind and World*, McDowell rightly points out that disambiguating between acts of thinking and contents of thinking can help us understand how there being no outer boundary to the conceptual does not entail some nefarious (and rather cartoonish) form of idealism where reality consists merely in what is thought (McDowell 1994, 28). The point he makes is that the world is made up of *thinkable* contents, not contents of occurrent intentional acts or attitudes, for the latter would surely signal something unpalatable.

25 It is worth pointing out how some of McDowell’s own comments do much to throw further fuel on the fire of this objection. As McDowell himself puts it, “On a proper understanding of the Fregean apparatus, my exploitation of Wittgenstein’s truism [...] can indeed be reformulated by saying thought and reality meet in the realm of sense” (McDowell 1994, 180). But commentators such as Thornton have pointed out that this seems to only provide more grist for the critic’s mill. For if we accept McDowell’s own way of caching out the intuition behind sense’s distinction from referent in terms of the latter designating “no more than the independence any genuine reality must have” (McDowell 1994, 42), then the full picture these claims paint [...] makes it look as though the meeting stops thought crucially short of the world. Although talk of Thoughts as facts retains its merely Fregean conception, it seems that there is a kind of mind-world connection that is not accounted for. This is the connection, not between Thoughts and facts, but between thoughts and things. (Thornton 2004, 238)
renounce, a possibility of direct contact between minds and objects, which must surely be external to the realm of thought. (McDowell 1994, 179)²⁶

This ultimately issues in the worry that, as McDowell puts it, “Wittgenstein’s ‘truism’ yields an alignment of minds with the realm of sense, not with the realm of reference” (McDowell 1994, 179).²⁷ Now to understand why McDowell believes this objection ultimately does not work—and why I think it does—one must look to the theory of demonstrative thought pioneered by Gareth Evans, taken up and developed by McDowell himself in the wake of Evans’ untimely death, and brought to bear (if somewhat obliquely) in Mind and World in an attempt to inoculate those meditations against this sort of attack. That theory involves an attempt at a subtle navigation between the Scylla and Charybdis of, on the one hand, a descriptivist understanding of Fregean sense (which would insert mediating specifications between us and the world, sacrificing openness) and, on the other, a “recoil” from that picture of mediation provided by the theory of direct reference (which, in its rejection of a content-constituting role for modes of presentation, embraces the Given).²⁸ McDowell thinks that navigation is possible, though:

²⁶ McDowell also seems to roll the latter of the misconceptions mentioned in fn. 24 into the mix of this accusation he defends himself against. But it seems clear to me that this objection can be detached from an obtuse conflation of thinkables with thoughts, as well as from labeling McDowell an “idealist” (or at least this caricatured form of idealism). It has to do, rather, with the idea that McDowell’s shotgun marriage of Frege and the early Wittgenstein has not genuinely issued in a picture of how we simultaneously account for both the rational texture of thought and our openness to reality. This “stopping short of the world,” at least the world conceived in terms of particulars, runs roughshod over a kind of openness we should be just as anxious to preserve.

²⁷ Put thusly, the objection in its essential features has been articulated not only by Dodd but also in Lyne 2000, esp. 307-9. See also Engel 2001 and Suhm, Wagemann, and Wessells 1999.

²⁸ Although Russellian descriptivism has long been closely identified with the spirit of Fregeanism about reference, Evans wants to disentangle this association. A similar purpose animates Michael Dummett’s reading of Frege; Dummett argues that Frege himself was not a descriptivist, and that Fregean senses are nothing like definite descriptions (Dummett 1973, 97-8). Indeed, Dummett suggests that sense need not be analyzable in linguistic terms at all, but that, if sense determines reference, a sense need only supply some “criterion [of identity] for recognizing” the referent, with senses differing insofar as they provide distinct criteria (Dummett 1973, 110). Therefore, although “in trying to say what the senses of different names may be, Frege is naturally driven to citing such definite descriptions,” it does not follow that senses are in fact equivalent to them (Dummett 1973, 97).
If the relevant senses are rightly understood, the role of sense, in a picture that leaves the relation of thought to the world of facts unproblematic, already ensures that there is no mystery about how it can be that the relevant thoughts bear on the relevant particulars, inhabitants of the realm of reference, in the non-specificatory ways that proponents of the recoil [from the Theory of Descriptions] rightly insist on. (McDowell 1994, 180)

According to McDowell, Evans’ “master thought” points the way by helping us understand how at least some senses are “object-dependent,” in such a way as to disperse the worry.  

One good exegetical line of defense for such a view arises readily from Frege’s documented antipathy toward ordinary language, and the view (in many ways one of the inaugural thoughts of what would later become logical empiricism) that logic’s job is to at long last put ordinary language in order. In “Thoughts,” Frege laments the limitations of language to characterize the nature of thought:

I am not here in the happy position of a mineralogist who shows his audience a rock-crystal: I cannot put a thought in the hands of my readers with the request that they should examine it from all sides. Something in itself not perceptible by sense, the thought, is presented to the reader—and I must be content with that—wrapped up in a perceptible linguistic form. The pictorial aspect of language presents difficulties. The sensible always breaks in and makes expressions pictorial and so improper. So one fights against language, and I am compelled to occupy myself with language although it is not my proper concern here. (Frege 1918, 13n4)

The suggestion is that the tendency of describing such a criterion in the language of a description is simply an artifact of the attempt to express a criterion in language in the first place. Despite this, though, Dummett does not rule out that the criterion can be equivalent to a definite description—it just need not be (Dummett 1973, 110). For his own part, Dummett also says, by way of casting some light on the nature of this criterion for identity, that different sorts of objects require different sorts of criteria (Dummett 1973, 179), and that, intimately connected though they are, the sense is not “constituted wholly” by the criterion (Dummett 1973, 180).

29 The core idea behind Evans’ views can be understood as carving out a place between both a descriptivistic theory of indirect reference and a traditional theory of direct reference, one which understands referential relations as inherently coming in modes of presentation that individuate contents finely, but not by way of intervening or mediating descriptive reconstructions of portions of the world. The latter would involve the idea “that thought relates to objects with an essential indirectness: by way of a blueprint or specification which, if formulated, would be expressed in purely general terms” (McDowell 1977, 173). McDowell, like Evans, sees this as a “suspect conception of how thought relates to reality, and ultimately a suspect conception of mind” (McDowell 1977, 173), wishing to save Fregeanism from such a reading, for it is of course this indirectness, this detachment from the world, which leads to the very frictionlessness that produces the anxiety at the core of McDowell’s project. But the New Theory of Reference, which does not accommodate senses as thoughts contents, goes too far in thinking that “Thought makes contact with objects, from its location within the conceptual realm, by exploiting relations such as perception, which are conceived as penetrating the outer boundary of the conceptual” (McDowell 1994, 105), thus sliding back into the Given.

30 Evans and McDowell championed a reading of Frege according to which his own avowed conception of the senses of proper names is that they are object-dependent. This means that thoughts in which figure Fregean senses without corresponding referents are in fact thoughts only so-called, “mock thoughts” or “sham thoughts” (and issue in truth-value gaps). Whether this is an accurate portrayal of Frege’s own conception of senses has been the subject of controversy. Heimir Geirsson lays out a convincing case for the orthodoxy that Frege was wedded to the idea of object-independent senses. See Geirsson 2002. Though there are some passages that Evans and McDowell point to in favor of their reading (and which Geirsson addresses), passages that run directly against their reading abound. Consider for example this particularly pertinent one from Frege’s diary notes of 1906, posthumously published as part of “Introduction to Logic”:
One arrives, he says, at the concept of object-dependent senses by “[reading] Russell’s notion of acquaintance into a simplified form of Evan’s account of perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation” (McDowell 1986, 232). The idea in outline is as follows. Perceptual experiences present objects to perceivers. Such presentations, however, come in terms of a relation between perceiver and object, and the relationality of this presentation is sufficient for speaking of the perception as providing a mode of presentation of the object. The content of such a mode of presentation can be cached out demonstratively, for the context provides the perceiver a way of thinking about the object which could be captured simply by a perceptual demonstrative—“that,” “this,” “here,” etc. Since this captures a mode of presentation, we can speak of demonstrative senses; nevertheless, such demonstrative senses can, according to McDowell, be understood as acquainting the perceiver—in something like the Russelian way—with the perceived object, because the relation with the object does not need to be understood in terms of some mediating content which specifies by description or predication the object it is about.\(^{31}\) Additionally, such demonstrative senses would be

\[^{31}\text{McDowell in fact means by the expression “singular thought” something entirely different than what Russell did, that objects are constituents of thoughts. For McDowell, “a singular thought is a thought that would not be available to be thought or expressed if the relevant object, or objects, did not exist” (McDowell 1982, 204)—in other words, it is a thought which is object-dependent. This is not how Russell understood singular thought (Russell 1917). As McDowell rightly reconstructs it, “Russell found it natural to describe singular thoughts (or propositions) as propositions in which objects themselves occur” (McDowell 1982, 204). And, McDowell notes, this cleaves naturally to the further analysis Russell provides of a structured proposition as an ordered-pair of the relevant object and the property predicated of it. For his part, Frege adamantly rejected such a possibility of the composition of thought (see Frege 1904, 163). In McDowell’s view, though, all this is “detachable” from the core insight behind Russell’s theory, which is according to him all for the better, since it “allows no room for a distinction between [the] sense and}
dependent upon the *demonstratum* itself, since a demonstration without a *demonstratum* would seemingly have no content. Because demonstrative senses, and therefore the thoughts in which they figure, are *object-dependent* in this way, singular thought is essentially attached at the hip to reality, and so, armed with this idea, McDowell argues we can effectively synthesize Russelian acquaintance with Frege’s distinction between sense and referent.

For McDowell, the resulting understanding of the object-dependence of demonstrative senses “recognizes a relation between objects and thoughts so intimate that it is natural to say that the objects *figure* in the thoughts…” (McDowell 1982, 209, emphasis added)—in other words, that such thought is open to the world, and answerable to it. This reference” (McDowell 1982, 205) of singular terms. McDowell thinks that, accepting the sense-referent distinction, we should dispense with the ordered pair analysis of singular propositions and consider singular thought as merely object-dependent:

Russell’s idea of the constituents of propositions reflects a failure to understand Frege’s distinction between sense and reference; it is not essential to the real insight that his notion of singular propositions embodies. The insight is that there are propositions, or (as we can now put it) thoughts in Frege’s sense, that are object-dependent. Frege’s doctrine that thoughts contain senses as constituents is a way of insisting on the theoretical role of thoughts (or contents) in characterizing a rationally organized psychological structure; and Russell’s insight can be perfectly well formulated within this framework, by claiming that there are Fregean thought-constituents (singular senses) that are object-dependent, generating an object-dependence in the thoughts in which they figure. (McDowell 1986, 233)

It must be clear, then, that McDowell’s picture of singular thought involves a *triangulation* between Frege and Russell, and therefore that he departs from Russell (and, as some would argue, from Frege) in important respects that need to be signaled. McDowell (like Evans) endorses Frege’s comments about the constituents of thoughts being senses and not referents, and opts instead to simply shift the definition of the expression ‘singular thought’; the “real insight” of Russell is not that objects are *constituents* of thoughts, but that thoughts are object-dependent. The singularity of singular thought then gets understood simply as object-dependence.

This is, as he puts it, to understand singular thought in a “Fregean,” rather than a Russelian, way.  

32 Fish and MacDonald, in defending McDowell, argue that it is central to his view of singular thought that we distinguish the idea of an object *figuring* in a thought from its being a *constituent* of that thought (Fish and MacDonald 2007, 40). This is clearly right: fn. 31 shows, straight from the horse’s mouth, the positive declaration that singular thought as McDowell means it precludes the constitution of the thought by the object, because to endorse that would seem to suggest a return to a Russelian understanding of the proposition as an ordered-pair, an understanding which would efface the sense-referent distinction. What’s far from clear is what it means for an object to “figure” in a thought, in a way which would be satisfactory for allowing for openness to the world, if not by being a constituent of it. If all it means is that the thought is *about* the object, then this does not go far enough to meet the Demand. That a thought is about an object—or is directed toward it—does not guarantee the thought makes *contact* with that object, as the Demand specifies must be the case. For according to the Demand thought cannot just be directed toward the world but, in being so directed must not
echoes sentiments voiced by Evans himself, who steadfastly proclaimed that the problems of fitting a semantic appeal to senses with the directness of reference simply dissipate once we have on board the proper understanding the way in which such senses are object-dependent. They result, he says,

Those who have appreciated the conception of Fregean sense which I put forward [...] will wish to object in the strongest possible terms to the idea that the possession by a singular term of a Fregean sense must render thought about the referent somehow indirect. [...] when we realize that the possession by a singular term of a Fregean sense can depend upon nothing more than its being associated with a proprietary way of thinking about an object, the idea that thought about an object which depends upon grasp of a Fregean sense must somehow be indirect will seem absurd. The fact that one is thinking about an object in a particular way can no more warrant the conclusion that one is not thinking of the object in the most direct possible fashion, than the fact that one is giving something in a particular way warrants the view that one’s giving is somehow indirect. (Evans 1982, 62)

Despite this, I contend that the Evansonian picture of demonstrative senses should be problematic for McDowell owing to fact that for Evans the sort of “proprietary way of thinking about an object” which affords a demonstrative identification (not a specificatory or descriptive one) is a matter of spatial relations holding between oneself and the object:

Given that the existence of an information-link between subject and object is not by itself sufficient for identification, what makes it possible to have, in the standard cases of demonstrative identification, a mode of identification that is free of the conceptual element we have been considering? The answer is that in the standard cases, not only is there an information-link, but also the subject can, upon the basis of that link, locate the object in space. (Evans 1982, 150)

Evans understands such a criterion of identity as “nonconceptual” because it is not requisite for the referrer to possess or apply any specificatory or descriptive, i.e. predicative content in

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33 Evans calls this “Egocentric spatial thinking.”
order to fix the referent. Now in the third chapter of *Mind and World*, McDowell accuses Evans of falling into the Myth, because of his appeal to nonconceptual content. Nevertheless, he contends that he can take on board Evans’ fundamental insights, rejecting any suggestion that Evans’ views on nonconceptual content are “central to his thinking about singular reference” (McDowell 1994, 106). However, when McDowell articulates what is at the heart of Evans’ “master thought” such that it avoids the pitfalls of descriptivist theories of reference without relapsing into the Myth, he says that “a perceptual demonstrative thought surely homes in on its object not by containing a general specification, with the object figuring in the thought as what fits the specification, but by virtue of the way this sort of thinking exploits the perceptible presence of the object itself” (McDowell 1994, 105). And in a later essay on Evans’ Fregeanism, he says that demonstrative expressions “single out objects by exploiting their salient availability to perception,” in the sense that the demonstrative thoughts “that can be expressed with the help of such expressions depends on contextual, and partly causal, relations between subjects and objects” (McDowell 2005, 54). Such relations are in fact constitutive of the thoughts’ object-dependence.

McDowell insists that this is no impediment to conceiving such thoughts as conceptual, as conforming to “the requirements of rationality” (McDowell 2005, 54). But

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34 Evans holds, in keeping with Russell’s Principle, that referent-fixing depends upon the referrer possessing some sort of discriminating knowledge, some criterion for identification of her referent. Obviously for Evans this does not mean that such a criterion must be a definite description, but rather this spatial orientation to the object. Now Evans does think there are occasions where some kind of descriptive, specificatory content is necessary to fix the referent: “It is when an information-link does not provide the subject with an ability to locate the object that a conceptual element is needed for identification” (Evans 1982, 149). In other words: when one is not able to exploit a perceptual relation to the object. Additionally, at least in his early hybrid causal-descriptive theory of reference for *proper names*, Evans did think that descriptive contents need to be associated with referring terms, and that they were even necessary to fix the referent; what he did not hold is that they were sufficient to do so, that it is necessary for the referent to satisfy that descriptive content, or that such content is identical to the meaning of the referring term. See Evans 1973.
there seems to be some sleight of hand here. McDowell asks us to think of conceptuality as signaling nothing other than Fregean *Sinne*, that “the right gloss on ‘conceptual’ is not ‘predicative’ but ‘belonging to the realm of Fregean sense’” (McDowell 1994, 107). And, via Evans, he considers *Sinne* as inclusive of any way in which the presentation of an object can be fairly deemed “proprietary” because *perspectival*. Of course it follows, then, that thoughts directed at objects by means of the *perspectival, spatial relationality* between presenter and presentee are “conceptual.” But here we precisely see where McDowell wants to have his cake and eat it too. For this inclusive definition of conceptuality is perfectly fine and good, at least until we realize that nevertheless it must be the case for a Sellarsian a mode of presentation, *if it is to have any role to play in the space of reasons*, must be linguistically or discursively articulate. Otherwise, it remains a perceptual Given, a bare pointing.

Conceptuality, for anyone maintaining the Sellarsian line against the Myth, must be understood as a *matter of language*. This is encapsulated in two related theses. The first is conceptualism about perception, best captured by Sellars’ quip that we can ascribe propositional claims to experience in the sense that the latter “contain” the former (Sellars 1997, 39). Conceptualism is posited as an explanation for the possibility of the efficacious linguistic expressibility of perceptual tokens. We can best express the thesis, and preserve its motivations, as follows: *perceptual tokens have the logical form of linguistic tokens.*

The second thesis at the core of Sellars’ view is what he calls psychological nominalism, according to which all competence in logical space, or the space of reasons, is a function of acquired competencies with language:

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35 Conceptualism is importantly not equivalent to any claim that all perceptual contents can be analyzed without remainder into conceptual contents; what it does imply is that perceptual contents cannot be analyzed, explained, or accurately attributed without reference to conceptual contents.
The primary connotation of ‘psychological nominalism’ is the denial that there is any awareness of logical space prior to, or independent of, the acquisition of a language. (Sellars 1997, 66)

Psychological nominalism is the alternative account with which Sellars replaces the Myth; we do not garner a familiarity with logical space, or an understanding of meaning, by empirical receptivity or acquaintance with objects, but rather by induction into the acquired skills of facility with language. Now, it must be made clear that “logical space” is to be understood in terms of intelligibility and meaning, the domain of the normative relations of rational purchase. It is not strictly the domain wherein acts of explicit reasoning occur, but rather of the cognitive semantics which allow for such acts. Thus why Steven Crowell underscores that the space of reasons is to be understood not simply as the space of reasoning, but as the space of meaning (Crowell 2001). This implies as well that “awareness” of logical space does not just mean capability to carry out inferences, though certainly that capability is a function of such awareness. Rather, such awareness is constituted by understanding, a familiarity and competence with intelligibility such that one can navigate meaning, which would include but is not limited to acts of reasoning (i.e. inferring).

Nevertheless, because this navigability includes the possibility of inferential acts, it is requisite for experience to be located within or have purchase in logical space. Insofar as that is requisite, experience itself must be of a logical form to exert force over the linguistically

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36 As Brandom, puts the thesis, for Sellars “grasp of a concept just is mastery of the use of a word” (Brandom 1997, 137-8). Note that Sellars provides a different definition of psychological nominalism in Sellars 1954, though the two are closely connected.

37 As Brandom summarizes:

It is a certain hierarchical picture of understanding (at this level a necessary condition of believing) that Sellars rejects. […] For to understand a sentence, to grasp a propositional content (a necessary condition of having a belief) is to place it in the space of reasons, to assign it an inferential role in the game of giving and asking for reasons, as entailing some other contents and being incompatible with others. (Brandom 1997, 153)

The epistemic matters are, again, downstream from the semantic ones.
articulate contents of propositional attitudes. And insofar as experience must be of that form, its pertinence within logical space must be a function of language acquisition. Psychological nominalism thus goes hand in hand programmatically with conceptualism about perceptual contents; psychological nominalism provides an *explanation* for conceptualism just as conceptualism provides an explanation for the expressibility of perceptual tokens (and their having rational purchase); perceptual (or other intentional) tokens have the logical form of linguistic tokens *because* acquisition of language is constitutive of them in that respect, thus their capacity—through our recognition of them as such—for rational purchase.

For a Sellarsian, then, not only must one acquire language, but the resultant contents of experience must thereby be *continuous* with language such that the contents are expressible or communicable within it. Only then can anything like a functionalist demand upon cognitive semantics be met, i.e. can those contents play a role or have purchase within the space of reasons.\(^{38}\) To remain within the ambit of the Problematic, its Fregean half of it must be understood as putting a Sellarsian gloss on the notion of sense, which amounts to essentially this: our theory of semantic content is not required simply to account for *perspective* but genuinely *cognitive* perspective.\(^{39}\) A broad appeal to “proprietary ways” of thinking about objects, reconstructed in terms of egocentric spatial relations, as a way to

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\(^{38}\) I use the term “functionalism” here, but “inferentialism” is more often used. For Sellars, all knowledge is inferential—not in the sense that it must *arise* by way of explicit acts of drawing inferences, but rather in the sense that a belief may only count as *knowledge* (because it may only count as justified) if other beliefs bear warrant-transmitting relations to it. The distinction between “inferential” in the sense of originating though inferential acts and in the sense of requiring inferential justification from other beliefs is an important one for Sellarsians. The idea that all knowledge requires explicit inference-drawing is quite critically not part of Sellars’ position, nor is it part of the coherence theories of justification that it inspired (see e.g. BonJour 1976, 290-1).

\(^{39}\) In McDowell’s own words, “Calling something to which spontaneity does not extend a ‘concept,’ and calling the linkage ‘rational,’ is fraudulent labelling” (McDowell 1994, 20). It’s not clear where *spontaneity* enters in Evans’ ways of making out demonstrative identification. McDowell may see it as entering via some kind of *self-consciousness*, for he says that “the detail of Evans’ work […] explains the various ways in which thoughts focus on particular objects, always by placing thinking in its proper context, the thinker’s competent self-conscious presence in the world” (McDowell 1994, 106-7). But that is yet to invoke language, or capacities tied to the spontaneity of rational consciousness in any way.
understand the object-dependence of demonstrative senses will be found wanting with
respect to the governing Sellarsian desideratum, which dictates any such proprietary way of
thinking about an object must be capable of playing a role in the space of reasons. For that,
the cognitive significance must be able to find articulation in linguistic tokens of some
kind. If it cannot, appeal to it is nothing more than an invocation of “an “arché beyond
discourse” (Sellars, 1997, 117).41

Perhaps McDowell could respond that indeed demonstrative senses are linguistically
articulate. After all, they are expressible by linguistic items—demonstrative expressions.
Thus, to use such an expression, at least within a context and as accompanied by a suitable
ostension, is to articulate its content linguistically. Here I think we have to ask if this is really
what is transpiring; Quinean musings on the inscrutability of reference (Quine 1960 and
1968), or Devitt’s on the qua-problem (Devitt and Sterelny 1999, 106-8) show that appeal
simply to the causal or spatial circumstances of perceptual demonstration underdetermine
referent-fixing. Some sort of recourse to implicit specifying descriptive contents are
necessary to home in on the demonstratum (and, especially on the Evansonian model, for the
demonstrative expression to thereby have any content). Indeed, the problem isn’t even just
that the demonstrator herself knows the referent, thus grasps the content of the

40 McDowell says that, “Fregean fineness of grain, held in place by considerations involving rationality, does
not need to be conceived as confined to some inner realm, constitutively independent of those real relations to
objects.” (McDowell 2005, 54). My point about the Sellarsian gloss means this: fineness of grain does need to
be conceived in such a way that the contextual singling out of the object, factoring as it does in Evans’
conception of its mode of presentation—thus in individuating the content of the contextually deployed
demonstrative—be something that can be articulated, subject to explicit expression and so rational scrutiny.
41 Accommodation of perspective, of just any sort whatsoever, is not enough to avoid the Myth, the idea of
content as bare pointing. After all, just pointing is always from a spatial perspective, from a certain position.
What Sellars has in mind in his attack on the Given is not simply any view which parades referents themselves
as semantic contents, and McDowell’s “bare pointing” derogation cannot be attributed only to, e.g. Millian
semantics. The Myth is just as attributable to Evans’ form of Fregeanism (perhaps even Dummett’s, as
presented in ft. 28) as it is to such theories—any which understands contents as simultaneously expressible by
linguistic tokens but not themselves articulate in the form of linguistic tokens.
demonstration, yet fails to be able to communicate it (which would still be an instance of the Myth, entailing something like a private language). The problem is that such a content—as something private and incommunicable—is only a content so-called. As Davidson cautions:

Perhaps someone (not Quine) will be tempted to say, ‘But at least the speaker knows what he is referring to.’ One should stand firm against this thought. The semantic features of language are public features. What no one can, in the nature of the case, figure out from the totality of relevant evidence cannot be part of meaning. And since every speaker must, in some dim sense at least, know this, he cannot even intend to use his words with a unique reference, for he knows that there is no way for his words to convey this reference to another. (Davidson 1979, 13-4)

Of course, McDowell’s professed position is that he maintains a Sellarsian view of cognitive semantics; when he wants to flex his Sellarsian bona fides, McDowell speaks of conceptuality in a manner showing obeisance to language as determinative of cognitive perspective. On the other hand, when he wants to avoid any intimation that reference is fixed by specifications, he understands senses as being “conceptual” in terms broad enough to permit non-discursive means by which thought becomes directed toward objects. Caught between these clashing requirements, McDowell ultimately remains entrenched in the “interminable oscillation” his project is designed to escape.

*   *   *

The question is whether any conception of mind and world is capable of escaping the apparently forced choice between Givens and frictionless spinning, between the Wittgensteinian intuition and the Fregean image of thought. I propose that in fact there is, but it involves making a rather radical leap in how to conceptualize the sense-referent distinction.

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42 In other words, an object-dependent sense cannot be so proprietary that it is something private. See McDowell 1994, 18-23 on the parallels he observates between Wittgenstein’s private language argument and Sellars’ attack on the Given.
Now the conceptualization in question has some historical precedence—ironically, in fact, from philosophical quarters we should expect McDowell to have availed himself more comprehensively. For despite his invocation of second nature and his expressly Hegelian philosophical disposition, what McDowell’s picture is missing, I contend, is a decidedly Hegelian corrective: a parallel notion of how entities themselves have a second nature. This is a motif which springs from Hegel’s understanding of the relationship between Nature and Spirit as one of Entwicklun or development.

At the same time, while such a proposal in its broad features finds its origin in Hegel’s idealism, I do not think it can be best explicated as an emendation to McDowell’s picture solely by reference to him. For, perhaps surprisingly, the essence of the thesis receives its deepest elaboration, in a number of respects, within the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. The reason for this unexpected parallel is quite straightforward: the account is motivated by shared Aristotelian commitments on the part of Hegel and Heidegger, specifically their appropriations of the concepts of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια (potentiality and actuality) into an ontological understanding of how mind relates to world. In short, what both Hegel and Heidegger take from Aristotle are the resources for explaining that not only are we cultivated and inducted into the space of reasons by our Bildung, but so too are the things that populate the empirical world; discursivity, like our own second nature, is written into entities’ first nature as potentialities-for-being, which in an ontological sense lie inchoate, requiring activation or realization by us. As a function of their implication in our practices, in a human form of life, entities take on a new life in their own right, achieve a normatively rich character, and attain to the status of playing a rational role in thought.
Nature, then, is not inhabited by the sort of thing that is *immediately* conceptual, or cognitively significant merely in itself, but by the sort of thing that can be brought to explicit conceptuality by drawing out its capacities to be such.

The resulting picture issues in a conception of Fregean sense which leaves unmistakable how it is that objects, as McDowell put it, “figure” directly in thought, so “intimate” is their relation: as an actualization of an entity’s potentialities-to-be, a sense is simply a *mode of being* of its referent.\(^{43}\) The second nature of entities thereby supplies a way for understanding how thought, although conceived in a Fregean way, as more fine-grained than the world, does not stop anywhere short of it—how, despite the fact that there are no Givens, the world can be conceived of as breaking up into, and normatively bearing upon empirical thought by means of, particulars. So far, then, from threatening frictionless spinning, from being an obstruction to the objectivity of thought, cognitive perspective can be made out as in fact its *enabling condition*.

* * *

My dissertation will illustrate this alternative to McDowell’s way of resolving the Problematic.

In Chapter 1, titled “Hegel’s Idealism of Second Nature,” I explain Hegel’s adherence to the thesis of the second nature of entities by way of his conception of the relation between Nature and Spirit as one of *Entwicklung* or development. It is shown that this concept plays a central role in Hegel’s thought, and can be traced back directly to his way of mobilizing the Aristotelian framework of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια. Through explaining the Hegelian

\(^{43}\) This is not to say that senses cannot be characterized as *modes of presentation* of objects; it is just to say that they can only be counted as modes of presentation insofar as they are modes of *being*. 
formulation of the thesis, details will emerge about how it is that it accommodates the answerability of thought to the world without resorting to the Given.

Chapter 2, titled “Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Heidegger’s Problematic,” shifts to a discussion the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. Its goal is primarily preparatory, aiming to allay terminological or even conceptual concerns about whether and how Heidegger’s thinking can be put into dialogue with McDowell’s. To that end, it effectively serves to translate McDowell’s Problematic, articulated as it is in the language of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and language, into the intimidating terminology of Heidegger’s phenomenology circa his own magnum opus, 1927’s Being and Time. I establish Heidegger’s commitment to the essential insights that motivate both halves of the Problematic, proposing that its defining dilemma not only can be translated into familiar Heidegger language, but can readily be so. Moreover, it implicates key aspects of his thought and some recognizable tensions therein.

In Chapter 3 I finally arrive at an explication of Heidegger’s formulation of the thesis of second nature. The chapter’s title, “Heidegger’s ‘Esoteric Doctrines’” is illustrative of my contention that this thesis is only implicit in Being and Time’s existential analytic of Dasein. Instead, its conceptual bases are exposited in Heidegger’s lecture courses of the 1920s—primarily between 1924 and 1926—leading up to the publication of that text. These courses engage at length with Aristotle, and in ways which shed light on the conceptual genesis of a number of elements central to Heidegger’s early thinking. In particular, his conceptions of Zuhandenheit and Bedeutsamkeit are grounded in a very specific reading of Aristotle on δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, and their relation through κίνησις (motion). An attentive reading of these lecture courses ultimately reveals an ontology of second nature very similar to, but more
detailed in its contours than, that of Hegel. I show that it is not only cohesive with a number of central themes in *Being and Time*, but in fact is capable of providing its own explanatory framework for many of them—from *Vorhandenheit* to the alethic conception of truth—substantiating my claim as to its critical, if subterranean, relevance to Heidegger’s thought of the period.

Finally, the concluding chapter briefly outlines how Heidegger’s version of the second nature of entities not only can be mobilized to address the Problematic as reconstructed in Chapter 2, but in fact was explicitly understood by Heidegger as doing so.
Chapter 1
Hegel’s Idealism of Second Nature

1.1 Introduction

In the Introduction, we saw that McDowell’s method of resolving the Problematic involves invocation of the notion of our second nature to make us sensitive to the world as an expanse of reasons. While I argued that McDowell’s position is ultimately unstable, and in the final analysis falls victim again to the “oscillation” it is designed to avoid, the metaphysical picture it embraces in its attempt to do so consists of seeing nature not as lying outside any boundary to the conceptual, but rather as constitutively made up of thinkables and thus within it. Our second nature simply allows us to recognize the world, as we find it, not just in terms of its dimension as a causal nexus, but, additionally, as a rational one—a space of reasons.

There is an alternative way of looking at nature and our relation to it, one I am suggesting is capable of successfully stabilizing the oscillation and effectively resolving the Problematic. That alternative is, additionally, more truly Hegelian than what McDowell offers us, and although as we shall see in Chapter 3 it receives its greatest elaboration in Heidegger’s work, a more effective introduction to it, both philosophically and for the purpose of distinguishing it from McDowell’s picture, comes with an investigation into its origination with Hegel and his contributions to the intellectual trajectory of post-Kantian idealism. In this chapter, then, I will attempt to motivate the essential Hegelian move, elucidating its key features as constating in a response to Kant by way of a redeployment of basic Aristotelian resources, and rendering unmistakable the contrast between it and McDowell’s strategy.
To this end, 1.2 begins by pushing back against the idea that Hegel subscribes to a form of monism about cognition sometimes called “panlogism,” positing that the basis for his rejection of this monism can be gleaned from his antagonism towards the Myth of the Given. In 1.3 I continue by showing that nevertheless Hegel’s critical position does not result in a dualism about cognition either, as evidenced by his pointed attacks upon Kant’s dualistic model of the relationship between receptivity and spontaneity. Instead, he subscribes to an idea of cognition as simultaneously, and organically, receptive and spontaneous, as “creative,” but in a very specific, Aristotelian-informed sense. I continue in 1.4 by showing the basis of this conception of cognition in Hegel’s logic of Essence and Appearance, and how it relates to his understanding of the relation between Nature and Spirit, including, critically, sensing as a natural capacity vs. thinking as one of Spirit. In 1.5 I argue from an abundance of textual evidence that for Hegel this developmental model of the relation between sensory and rational consciousness cannot be applied solely on the level of capacities for sensing and for cognition, as it does on McDowell’s quasi-Hegelian picture, but in fact between such capacities’ respective contents. Finally, in 1.6, I show that it is because of this developmental model about the contents of cognition themselves that Hegel is able to avoid both panlogism and dualism, and that his specific manner of doing so reveals how his picture navigates the Scylla and Charybdis of McDowell’s Problematic: while decidedly rejecting the Myth, the alternative Hegel formulates in its stead indicates a way of preserving answerability and transcendental friction without Givens.

1.2 Panlogism and the Myth of the Given

I have insinuated that McDowell’s position in Mind and World is only nominally Hegelian, or only partially inclusive of Hegel’s key insights. It would, however, be unfair to cast
aspersions on McDowell’s misattribution of his view to a revived Hegelian sensibility; the
erroneous reading of Hegel on which the misattribution is based has a long history, and it is
worth considering, I think, one major strand of it. For that consideration will provide the
opportunity for a particularly illuminating correction, an analysis of Hegel’s actual views and
how they bear upon McDowell’s Problematic as providing an especially novel response to it.

The strand of Hegel exegesis in question is exemplified by Emil Lask, the brilliant
thinker whose life was cut short with his death in World War I, but who managed to leave an
indelible mark on Heidegger’s early thought in particular. The scope of Lask’s influence on
Heidegger has become increasingly recognized in recent decades, particularly through the
exquisite scholarly work of, among others, Theodore Kisiel and Steven Crowell, and this
renewed attention has brought his body of work to more prominence as deserving of research
in its own right.44 Crowell in particular has demonstrated, via Lask’s singular framework of
transcendental logic, the points of contact between neo-Kantianism and Husserlian
phenomenology that inform Heidegger’s post-habilitation problematization of the categories
and logic, as well as the ways in which Lask’s contributions illuminated the problem space
for Heidegger. Crowell highlights, for instance, the way Heidegger saw Lask’s conception of
logic as providing an entryway for marrying his early Scotian-Scholastic proclivities with the
transcendentalism of Husserl’s phenomenology, citing Heidegger’s proclamation that with
Lask the opportunity arises for “bringing Aristotle and Kant as close together as possible”
(GA1 33).45 As Crowell reconstructs the history, Heidegger saw Lask as the first successful
expositor of an ambition also close to his own, of “combining the ‘transcendental’

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45 The translation is Crowell’s. He cites Heidegger at Crowell 2001, 85.
Invocation of the figures of Aristotle and Kant, and an attempt to triangulate between them, should immediately suggest to us that we are in the vicinity of ambitions also dear to Hegel’s project. The fact was not lost on Lask himself, who, as Crowell notes, was keen to distinguish his own “Panarchie” or “hegemony of the logos” from, specifically, Hegel’s so-called “panlogism.” For Lask, ‘panlogism’ designates, as Crowell puts it, “the effacement of all dualistic elements in Kant’s theory of logic,” in particular by way of the idea that content can be “reduced to logical form” (Crowell 2001, 101). Armed with this distinction, Crowell asserts that McDowell is mistaken to associate his perspective with Hegelianism, instead contending that he lands closer to Lask. While I agree that McDowell

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46 And of course, McDowell likewise articulates his ambitions in these terms (see McDowell 1994, 85), a fact which Crowell notes amidst the confluence of all these figures and their ambitions (Crowell 2001, 14).

47 As noted by Paul Eisenberg (Eisenberg 1990), Walter Kaufmann traces the term ‘panlogism’ and its application to Hegel’s philosophy to Hermann Glockner’s Hegel, which appeared in two volumes in 1929 and 1940. Eisenberg notes that he did not double-check Kaufmann’s claim, and it is clear that, as unearthed by Crowell, Lask in fact beat Glockner to the punch; Lask uses the term ‘Panlogismus’ and describes Hegel’s metaphysics as “panlogistischer” as early as 1902, in his dissertation Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte (see Lask 1923, 18 and 56-67). Eisenberg for his part argues that Hegel is not a panlogist (or panlogicist), but it is worth noting that he uses the term far more broadly than does Lask:

More particularly, panlogism will be construed here to be the view that the world and everything in it exists as the projection and attempted self-comprehension of God, the Absolute, or Geist. Since Geist or, rather, the Hegelian Absolute […] is standardly taken to be itself spiritual or “mind-like” as opposed to physical, panlogism is, as understood here, merely another label for the philosophical position more ordinarily termed “absolute idealism.” (Eisenberg 1990, 159).

48 The claim seems to be, with regard to Hegel, that any differentiation in content is simply the result of the interplay of categorial forms—the basis for this being, from what I gather, his understanding of Hegel’s Logic. As Crowell puts it, in panlogism, “categorial differentiation is supposedly the result of dialectical relations between forms themselves…” (Crowell 2001, 83). But we shall see ultimately for Hegel that the form-content distinction itself cannot be so cleanly drawn.

49 “McDowell associates [his] revision of Kant with Hegel’s philosophy, but it more closely resembles the Fichte-tinged neo-Kantianism of Lask” (Crowell 2001, 15). This Fichtean/Laskian brand of neo-Kantianism, however, is something of an outlier for Crowell; in contrast with the received wisdom, Crowell in fact sees Hegel as allied with neo-Kantianism, and even goes so far as to say that Natorp’s version of panlogism “invites
is not as close to Hegel as he believes, I submit that in fact Crowell, following Lask’s assessment of Hegelianism, has the underlying reasons backwards: McDowell is the panlogist, while Hegel is anything but.

Crowell associates McDowell with Lask on account of the former’s supposed respect (in accordance with “Panarchie”) for the distinction between spontaneity and receptivity, sensibility and conceptuality:

Lask too argued that logical content “reaches right into the object itself,” but like McDowell and unlike Hegel, Lask wished to preserve a genuine distinction between spontaneity and receptivity. Thus, Lask criticizes Hegel’s *Panlogism* (the claim that content just *is* the concept) and defends a more modest “hegemony of the *logos*” that allows him to address the friction problem and to avoid idealism through a theory of the “material determination” of logical form *within* the space of meaning. Against Hegel, this implies that perception and thought have independent, irreducible roles to play in the theory of meaning, a position McDowell also appears to adopt in his account of how perceptual color discriminations can be said to be conceptually informed. (Crowell 2001, 15)

I find it difficult, though, to square this reading of McDowell’s position on the relationship between receptivity and spontaneity with his avowed stance in *Mind and World*: after all, as he is wont to continually emphasize, McDowell asks us to become comfortable with the idea that sensibility is not even *notionally* separable from conceptuality in terms of contributing contents to experience:

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50 I say “conceptuality” here and not “Understanding” (*Verstand*) since the Hegelian view is that Understanding is a transitional moment in conceptuality as it dialectically unfolds. For Hegel Reason is simply the extension of Understanding, the speculative, rather than abstract or negative moment of conceptual apprehension, and so the form conceptuality takes when it is fully consequent. But the niceties of these concerns is immaterial with regard to what is at stake in the question at issue, of whether for these figures there is a distinction to be had between sensibility (or intuition) and conceptuality. I therefore use “conceptuality” as a general term that for present purposes is indifferent to the peculiarly Hegelian matter of the distinction between Understanding and Reason.
The original Kantian thought was that empirical knowledge results from a co-operation between receptivity and spontaneity. (Here “spontaneity” can be simply a label for the involvement of conceptual capacities.) We can dismount from the seesaw if we can achieve a firm grip on this thought: receptivity does not make an even notionally separable contribution to the co-operation. (McDowell 1994, 9)

As he explains, McDowell wants us to forego seeing Kant’s contribution from the transcendental perspective, according to which dual faculties come into contact and make independent contributions to cognition, and instead concern ourselves solely with the basic lesson as it takes shape from the empirical perspective: that *experience* is not the same as *sensing*, but is constitutively fraught with the structures of intelligibility (McDowell 1994, 40-5). In other words, McDowell wants us to leave the conception of a sensibility separable from spontaneity entirely by the wayside, to see experience not compositionally, but in terms of a single capacity of an intrinsically understanding intuition. The analysis of perceptual color discriminations as conceptually informed is meant to clear the way for such an alternative tendency, not to maintain a disposition towards the dualistic approach.

Irrespective of how we classify McDowell, though, the claim that Hegel collapses all distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, between sensibility and intelligibility, between content and concept—and therefore that he is a “panlogist”—is false. Hegel does not seek to straightforwardly “efface” all dualistic elements in Kant’s theory of knowledge and establish a simple monism of logical form in its place, but to establish a position a great

51 McDowell’s advocacy of this strategy in the wake of dissatisfaction with the implications of Kant’s picture closely resembles a similar move by Schelling, at least at certain periods of his thought as he theorizes and re-conceptualizes Kant’s “intellectual intuition.” Intellectual intuition is a concept whose complex role in the development of idealism after Kant, and into Hegel’s own work, I cannot hope to do justice to here, though I shall barely touch upon intellectual intuition later in the chapter. For a reading of Schelling’s intellectual intuition of the *Identitätsphilosophie* period, where it closely resembles McDowell’s conception of experience, see Bounds and Cogburn 2016. On intellectual intuition broadly, and the exceedingly fraught debate over its place in German idealism, see Breazeale 2009, Estes 2010, Förster 2009 and 2012, Gram 1981, Longuenesse 2000, and Westphal 2000.
deal more subtle. Although, like McDowell, Hegel does dispense with Kant’s dualism, and in particular his dualistic picture of two faculties in need of coordination, he does so in a way which defends not only a notional distinction between the sensible and the conceptual, but a real distinction—in fact, as he stresses often, a philosophically indispensable one.52

In order to appreciate that Hegel does indeed uphold a genuine distinction between sensibility and conceptuality, and why, we need to recognize the full extent to which Sellars’ diagnosis of the Myth of the Given embodies far more than just, as he puts it in EPM, an “incipient Meditations Hegeliennes,” but is rather in fact thoroughly and absolutely Hegelian in every facet of its articulation. Of course, expositors of Hegel who find within his work anticipations of Sellars’ critique of the Given have long since—and with good reason—turned to the opening figure of consciousness in the Phänomenologie des Geistes, Sense Certainty, and the attack on the idea of knowledge by demonstrative acquaintance there, to explicate this pedigree.53 A less remarked-upon passage, however, found in the 1817 edition of the Encyclopaedia, provides perhaps Hegel’s single most concise explication of the Myth precisely as Sellars diagnoses it, as well as his most perspicuous rejection of it:

A number of other phrases used for intelligence, namely, that it receives and accepts impressions from outside [Eindrücke von Aussen empfange, sie aufnehme], that representations [Vorstellungen] arise through the causal operations of external things upon it [durch Einwirkungen ausserlicher Dinge als den Ursachen enstehen], and so on, belong to the standpoint of Perception [i.e. as in the Phänomenologie’s figure of Perception], which mixes sensory

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52 With the invocation of “Kant’s dualism” I am glossing over two potential ways of making out the duality of sensibility and understanding, and their mutual interaction. The Kantian transcendental picture considers concepts as empty forms or rules organizing contents. But we could also consider a kind of dualism according to which concepts are not understood as empty but rather as themselves contentful, and come to mingle with their nonconceptual counterparts. Hegel rejects both kinds of dualism, and for our purposes their distinction amounts to little. While, as we shall see, the move from a Kantian view of concepts to a consideration of them as a kind of content is critical to Hegel’s critique of Kant, the ultimate upshot of his assault on the dualism of transcendental idealism applies to any and all forms of faculty dualism, including the second, strictly Kantian sort.

53 See e.g. Brandom 1994, 698 n. 78; Brandom 2002d, 182-3; Brandom 2019, 109-10, 114; deVries 2008; Redding 2007, 101-6). Also: deVries 1988, 90-2, although he does not there relate Hegel’s position to Sellars’.
and rational determinations [Vermischung sinnlicher und verständiger Bestimmungen] […], a standpoint that is unbecoming [nicht zukommt] of spirit and even less appropriate for philosophy [noch weniger aber dem Philosophiren]. (GW13 208/ EPS 226-7; §368 Remark 1, trans. mod.)

The passage above is hardly the only one where Hegel stresses the disparity between the sensory and the rational—Hegel announces such a distinction ad nauseum in his corpus—but it is one where its importance to his larger views about the status of Reason is made especially clear, and along lines similar to Sellars’ explication of the Myth. That the standpoint which Hegel denigrates “mixes” sensory and rational determinations should strike us as reminiscent of the (Myth-generating) tendency Sellars identifies for “crossbreeding” two demands placed upon sensory episodes, as fulfilling the role not only of causal impacts upon sensory apparatuses but simultaneously as foundational for knowledge (Sellars 1997, 21-2). And the fact that Hegel denies intelligence is impressed upon and determined in accordance with causal impacts implies that the conception of experience or receptivity at issue is essentially along the lines of the one posited by what Sellars calls in EPM “classical empiricism”—in other words, receptivity for Given, sensed contents (i.e. contents both epistemically efficacious and epistemically independent).

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54 The corresponding section in the 1830 Encyclopaedia makes the same point, but the parallels with Sellars are slightly less palpable, leaving out the comment about “mixing” sensory and rational determinations:

Eine Menge sonstiger Formen, die von der Intelligenz gebraucht werden, daß sie Eindrücke von außen empfange, die aufnahme, daß die Vorstellungen durch Einwirkungen äußerlicher Dinge als der Ursachen entstehen usf., gehören einem Standpunkte von Kategorien an, der nicht der Standpunkt des Geistes und der philosophischen Betrachtung ist. (WB10 241)

A host of other forms used of the intelligence, that it receives impressions from outside, admits them, that representations arise through influences of external things as the causes, etc., belong to a categorial standpoint which is not the standpoint of the mind or of philosophical inquiry. (PM 173; §445 Remark)

55 I owe this terminology to Willem DeVries. As deVries’ explicates it, the Myth of the Given takes for granted the idea that there are cognitive states both epistemically independent—that is, possessing of positive epistemic status (counting as justified or as knowledge) irrespective of their epistemic relations with other cognitive states (justifying or being justified by them)—and epistemically efficacious—capable of transmitting their positive epistemic status to other cognitive states (see DeVries 2005, 98-9). Of course, the paradigmatic example of a state traditionally proposed as satisfying both conditions would be a perceptual belief, justified not by any other
Thus, sensory and rational determinations are to be kept at least notionally separate, lest we fall into thinking that the sorts of contents and activities characteristically of the domain of Reason can be understood by way of analyzing the accidents and chance realities of operations merely causal. And this implies not just that we cannot absorb the role of conceptuality into that of sensory receptivity (the Myth), but likewise that we cannot simply collapse the role of a receptive sensibility into that of our conceptual capabilities, or, what comes to much the same, disavow in favor of the latter any trace of the former (panlogism).\textsuperscript{56} Hegel, beyond just not inviting us to come to grips with an understanding of sensibility and conceptuality as notionally inseparable—as McDowell does—in fact positively forbids it of us.

Now, the specificity of what is under attack here is important because, in line with the McDowellian aspiration, Hegel’s point as we shall see later is not that receptivity, \textit{broadly conceived}, plays no role in rationally constraining thought; Hegel thinks thought about the world indeed encounters transcendental friction, that the determinations of our receptivity to objective reality serve as a tribunal for it. Hegel therefore is not denying the rational purport of experience outright, under any and all conceptions of the constitution of experience—he is denying only that if it so conceived, it can be an \textit{unacquired} capacity, a capability of the human organism, by which accidents of its environment impress upon it in such a way as to...

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{56}{Preserving a meaningful distinction here is in keeping with Sellars’ own point as well. Sellars is wont to remind us that he does not deny the possibility of sensory episodes, only that \textit{sensing sense contents} is identical with or implies \textit{non-inferentially knowing that}…. It is perfectly possible, on this view, that we enjoy epistemically independent episodes; the point is that such episodes cannot be epistemically efficacious.}
\end{footnotes}
have rational purchase. Thus, Hegel continues by identifying the presuppositions that give rise to the Myth as essentially embodying an individualistic viewpoint: “That the intelligence appears determined in infinitely varied, contingent ways is equally the standpoint of entirely finite individuality, and the extreme untruth of the empirical natural life of the individual soul” (GW13 208/EPS 227; §369 Remark 1, trans. modified).57 The problem is that this individualistic approach, insensitive to other salient factors, can hardly but lend itself to the interpretation of knowledge as ultimately stemming from acquaintance with first-personally available sense data—the kind of “classical empiricism” at which Sellars takes aim.58 As later with Sellars, the entire point of pushing back against the Myth is to emphasize that it stems from a theoretical perspective which is either ignorant of the need for, or discounts the necessity of, accounting for the publicity, communicability, and social embeddedness (if not etiology) of the contents of knowledge—i.e. one not appreciating Spirit in its fully concrete

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57 This passage is removed from the 1830 edition of the Encyclopaedia. Though we cannot know why, it at most indicates that Hegel changed his views on the theoretical origins of the Myth, not on the Given itself being an erroneous postulate; the preceding passage, quoted above, where Hegel excoriates the Myth itself, is retained with minor changes in the 1830 edition (see fn. 54).

Additionally, the Taubeneck translation takes some odd liberties. The original German reads: “Daß die Intelligenz auf unendlich mannichfältige, zufällige Weise bestimmt erscheint, ist gleichfalls Standpunkt der ganz endlichen Einzelheit und der äussersten Unwahrheit des empirischen Naturlebens der einzelnen Seele.” Taubeneck thus squeezes ‘of empirical observation’ out of ‘des empirischen Naturlebens der einzelnen Seele.’ His rationale for doing so is unclear to me. For this reason, I have modified the translation to be more literal, but, if anything, correcting for this highlights the generality of the point; the natural life of the individual, taken as an organism with physiological operations, is not the place to look regarding the source of the determinations of cognition (see also the discussion of the weakness of nature in 1.4). But the “methodological solipsism” (see fn. 58 below) that interrogates even individual psychological determinations to find rational (or spiritual) ones is entirely erroneous or “untrue,” a non-philosophical standpoint born of the illusions of taking the immediate for granted.

Note that I have also rendered ‘mannichfältige’ as ‘varied’ rather than ‘multiple’ since “infinitely multiple” sounds relatively awkward to English ears.

58 Put otherwise, Hegel is presenting here a criticism according to which the Myth arises from a form of what we would now call, following Hilary Putnam, methodological solipsism (Putnam 1975) and its attendant individualism (Burge 1979), according to which the specification and individuation of semantic or mental contents is possible without any reference to the individual speaker or thinker’s physical or social environment. With regard to the present considerations, Hegel’s problem with individualism is essentially none other than that of the social externalist (or, in Burge’s terms, anti-individualism), but, owing to his adherence to transcendental friction, his view of social externalism is closely allied in his larger conception with concerns the physical externalist would also voice.
reality, as communal and therefore determined according to structures and institutions of like-mindedness, which requires induction into those institutions (thus: acquired capacities).

Indeed, the alternative Hegel puts forward in response to dethroning the Myth is, as with Sellars, psychological nominalism, the claim that awareness of logical space is dependent upon language acquisition, paired with a corresponding conceptualism about perceptual contents. In the Lesser Logik Hegel voices his conceptualism quite clearly, proclaiming that, “In all human intuiting there is thinking; similarly, thinking is what is universal in all representations, recollections, and in every spiritual activity whatsoever [überhaupt in jeder geistigen Täigkeit], in all willing, wishing, etc.” (WB8 82/EL 57; §24 Zusatz 1). He further emphasizes that it is none other than the acquired capacities induction into language use or a linguistic practice cultivates which enable the “rational determinations” of cognition. So close, in fact, is the link between language acquisition and entry into logical space that at certain points Hegel uses “language” and “logic” more or less interchangeably as designating the essential modification of the human being that is inaugurated:

The forms of thought [Die Denkformen] are first set out and stored [herausgesetzt und niedergelegt] in human language, and one can hardly be reminded often enough nowadays that thought is what differentiates the human being from the beast. In everything that the human being has interiorized, in everything that in some way or other has become for him a representation, in whatever he has made his own, there has language penetrated [hat...eingedrängt], and whatever he transforms into [zur...macht] language and expresses in it [in ihr äußert], whether concealed, confused, or well-defined [eingehüllter, vermischter oder herausgearbeitet] contains [enthält] a category—so much so is logic natural to the human being, or rather, is his peculiar nature itself. If we however contrast nature as such, as the realm of the physical, with the realm of the spiritual, then we must say that logic is the supernatural element that permeates [eindringt] all his natural

59 I mean here Kant’s sense of ‘cognition,’ Erkenntnis. Hegel distinguishes “thinking” from “cognition,” and reserves the latter for the specific manner of thinking characteristic of philosophy (see, for instance, WB8 41-2/EL 24-5; §2).
behavior, his ways of sensing, intuiting, desiring, his needs and impulses; and it thereby makes them into something truly human, even though only formally human—makes them into representations and purposes. (WB5 20/SL 12, trans. mod.)

Thus, Hegel quite clearly understands the importance of acquired conceptual or discursive capacities, that is, all the accoutrement of Objective Spirit—in particular acquisition of language—as necessary for the forms of cognition we enjoy, holding that all aspects of human activity, whether explicitly “cognitive” or not, are thoroughly permeated by intelligibility and rationality, and are such as a product of language acquisition.

*Prima facie*, it may appear that with invocation the terminology of “permeation” Hegel is indeed leaning towards commitment to a kind of Kantian dualism, according to which two distinct determinations are brought via some transcendental operation into contact

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60 By “only formally human,” Hegel means that language or logic do not yet, in and of themselves, make us philosophically or rationally realized (a topic which I cannot hope to address here); even if they open the door for us into the space of reasons, we must navigate it ourselves. This permeation thus makes us rational animals in Aristotle’s sense, not as an actuality but as a potentiality. Whether we indeed fully realize our capacity for rationality, by in fact living and thinking rationally, is a separate matter.

61 Elsewhere, Hegel gives voice to similar points about language as raising us out of mere anthropological mind:

Language [*Die Sprache*] in general is this airy [luftige] element, this sensory-unsensory [*dies Sinnlich-Ünsinnliche*], by increasing knowledge of which [*durch dessen sich erweiternde Kenntnis*] the child’s mind rises more and more above [*immer mehr über... erhoben wird*] the sensory, the individual [*Einzelne*], to the universal [*zum Allgemeinen*], to thinking. (WB10 82/PM 58; §396 Zusatz)

And:

Man, however, does not stop short at this animal mode of expressing himself [*des Sichäußerns*]; he creates articulate speech [*artikulierte Sprache*] by which internal sensations get a word in [*durch welche die innerlichen Empfindungen zu Worte kommen*], are expressed [*äußern*] in their entire determinacy, become an object to the subject, and at the same time external and alien to him. Articulate speech is thus the highest mode in which man eliminates from himself [*sich... entäußert*] his internal sensations. (WB10 116/PM 83; §401 Zusatz)

62 Karin de Boer examines the thesis that while for Hegel language penetrates our empirical thoughts and thus is constitutive of empirical concepts, pure concepts by contrast hold a certain priority over language and are not penetrated by it (see de Boer 2010, 155). However, she goes on to propose that in fact the suspicion of a priority of pure thought over language is itself a gambit of thought, where it attempts to “efface the traces of this initial interpenetration and to establish itself as the absolute principle of both thought and language.” She speculates in fact that this may be an “essential precondition of thought” (de Boer 2010, 156). The proposal is intriguing and would seem to cohere well a theme we might extract from Sellars’ telling of the Myth of Jones—and the general “myth”-talk—that consciousness is eminently amnesiac about its own origins, and papers over its ignorance with mythologies. Sellars’ attempt to “use a myth to kill a myth” seems to intimate that the best we can hope for is (better) explanatory narratives.
and cooperation. To the contrary, however, Hegel rejects the dualism of such a faculty psychology, though the precise terms of his objections will have to wait. For now it will do to see that the way Hegel understands his psychological nominalism and conceptualism arises from a deconstruction of the simple opposition between thinking and sensing characteristic of such a dualism, and which he sees as based in an ancient misconception:

It is an old prejudice [...] which separates [trennt] feeling [Gefühl] and thinking [Denken] from each other in such a way that they are supposedly opposed to each other [sie sich entgegengesetzt...sein sollen] [...]. When this separation [...] is asserted, one has in mind the thinking that can be called “thinking-over” [Nachdenken]—the reflective thought [das reflektierende Denken] that has thoughts [Gedanken] as such as its content and brings them to consciousness. [...] But it is one thing to have feelings and representations that are determined and permeated by thinking [vom Denken bestimmte und durchdrungene], and another to have thoughts about them [Gedanken darüber zu haben]. The thoughts about [Nachdenken] these modes of consciousness—generated [erzeugten] by thinking them over [Gedanken über]—are what reflection, argumentation, and the like, as well as philosophy, are comprehended under [worunter...begriffen ist]. (WB8 42/EL 25; §2 Remark)63

In other words, drawing a basic act-content distinction, Hegel distinguishes between “thought” as an activity—“thinking over” or reflection—and “thought-determinations” or contents, and thus cautions us to understand this distinction so that we may recognize there is no incompatibility with thought-determinations being constitutive contents of episodes of sensing, freeing us from any impediments to the notion that they may be intertwined with or may permeate those sorts of acts. This is the sense in which Hegel means language “permeates” the sensory: by constituting the contents of sensory (i.e. receptive) episodes.

63 Therefore, Hegel prefers to use the expression “thought determinations [Denkbestimmung]” when referring to the contents of thoughts, and to reserve “thoughts [Gedanken]” to refer to the acts (WB8 81/EL 56; §24 Zusatz 1).

The full passage above bears upon the matter of religion’s relationship to thinking and philosophy, but it is not relevant for our purposes.
This latter point, though, seems to put Hegel as I have been explicating him so far between a rock and a hard place. For if Hegel holds that his way of integrating thought contents to sensory acts, not as the unification of initially separate sensory and conceptual contents but simply the ascription of conceptual contents—and only conceptual contents—to sensory acts, then this appears in tension with the wider lesson I earlier drew from his attack on the Myth (and used to dispute his adherence to panlogism), namely that he maintains a genuine distinction between content as such and conceptual contents, refusing to subsume the former entirely under the latter. Instead, it looks like he indeed makes out all content to be conceptual, in a manner similar to McDowell, and only “distinguishes” them insofar as he denies the genuine possibility of sensory contents entirely, even if he admits of sensory or receptive episodes. The accusation of panlogism reasserts itself.

How are we to square the two positions I have extracted from Hegel—that, on the one hand he strongly distinguishes between sensory and rational determinations or contents, and, on the other, that he seems to deny outright the possibility of sensory contents as separable from conceptual ones within the cognitions we enjoy? Careful attention to Hegel’s claims above displaying his psychological nominalism may at first tempt us to find a way out of the dilemma as follows. It is true, we may say, that for Hegel there are no purely sensory contents, and while there are receptive acts, their determinations are wholly conceptual. But understood within the framework in which Hegel asserts it, we may continue, this does not imply panlogism. For notice that when Hegel speaks above of the permeation of intuition by language and conceptuality he always does so with the proviso that he is referring specifically of the human psychological situation; “in all human intuiting,” he says, “there is thinking”—“logic is natural to the human being.” The qualification matters, we could insist,
for it means that Hegel can deny that there are purely sensory contents for us, while assenting to their existence elsewhere in nature, in other creatures—thus maintaining the distinction, and as more than merely a formal or notional one, but indeed as a real one—all the while avoiding dualism.

Such a retort would not, and should not, impress anyone making the panlogist accusation. The mere existence somewhere in nature of sensory determinations, which is entirely irrelevant to questions about our mode of cognition, hardly avoids the charge. After all, our cognition is the subject about which we are concerned, and with regards to that, this approach still reduces content to concept, only maintaining a distinction by denying the very existence of nonconceptual content within the relevant, anthropic, sphere.

Before proceeding, I want to summarize. We find ourselves at the crossroads of a number of claims I am ascribing to Hegel. First, Hegel rejects the Myth of the Given, the idea of the “mixing” or “crossbreeding” of sensory and rational determinations, that is, that one thing can play both sensory/receptive (epistemically independent) and rational (epistemically efficacious) roles in cognition. This means, as I have argued, that Hegel indeed holds there is a strict distinction between the sensory and the conceptual. And, I have said, this suggests Hegel rejects panlogism. Second, Hegel accepts psychological nominalism and conceptualism, holding that conceptual contents “permeate” all sensory acts. Together these two claims align Hegel with a generally Sellarsian account of cognitive semantics.

From there, however, there are different possibilities as to how one may understand the relationship between the rational and the conceptual and what it means to speak of this “permeation.” One way is that of Kantian faculty dualism, according to which two kinds of content stand as initially separate components of cognition that are then brought into
posterior unity, such that all experience consists of an intuitive and a conceptual element, and in this way the conceptual “permeates” the sensory.\textsuperscript{64} Third, though, I have claimed—and at this point the claim remains a promissory note—that Hegel is opposed to such a dualism.

Fourth and furthermore, the terms of his way of rejecting that dualism appear to suggest he is wedded to an alternative camp of the Sellarsian view (and one which I have argued McDowell can be placed in, a claim all the more tenable given his way of distancing himself from Kant in \textit{Mind and World}) according to which we enjoy sensory or receptive \textit{episodes}, the only \textit{contents} of which, however, are conceptual. It is here that an ambiguity regarding the implications of the first claim becomes perspicuous: to avoid panlogism, it is not enough to hold that there is \textit{some kind} of distinction between “the sensory” and “the conceptual.” Whether an account of meaning is panlogistic or not turns entirely on whether it admits of nonconceptual \textit{contents} within human consciousness such that, as Crowell puts it, they no less than conceptual contents “have independent, irreducible roles to play in the theory of meaning” (Crowell 2001, 15). This means that to reject panlogism requires nothing less than drawing a distinction between the sensory and the conceptual \textit{on the level of contents} (and not between sensory or receptive acts on the one hand and conceptual contents on the other), and, moreover, that this distinction is such that both terms are internal to the sphere of \textit{human} cognitive semantics. The alternative camp, by contrast, \textit{seems} of its very nature to preclude meeting this requirement, and thus appears to indeed fall into panlogism.

I have belabored giving the lay of the land here in order to make all more appreciable how distinctive Hegel’s view in fact is. For I think it is wrong that the alternative camp of Sellarsianism \textit{must} fall into panlogism—although if McDowell is an example of it, it is at

\textsuperscript{64} On the matter of this eliding Kant’s distinction between form and content, and his treatment of concepts as \textit{forms} of the Understanding as contrasted with the \textit{contents} of intuition, see fn. 52 above.
imminent risk of doing so, and avoiding such a fate requires following a narrow path indeed. Fifth, then: there is a small corner of the logical space where we can accept the fourth claim, coherently rejecting the dualistic model, and yet nevertheless also avoid panlogism. This territory is one pioneered by Hegel. His account of cognition carves out a space for a genuine, meaningful *distinction without a dualism*; sensibility and conceptuality are distinguishable on the level of contents, and in an essential relation even in *human* thought, such that we may disentangle them as moments of human mentality, while nevertheless it is the case that cognition is not a matter of independent faculties or capacities mingling their respective determinations. To see how Hegel threads this needle, we must take an extended excurses through his wider system, indeed those insights which constitute his signal contributions to German idealism. For Hegel entirely rethinks the very *dimension* in which we consider drawing the distinction and relating the two determinations, and it is in this, the heart of his essential impact on post-Kantian thought, which lies his way of avoiding the charges both of panlogism and dualism—and thereby also an entirely different kind of response to the Problematic.

### 1.3 On the Dualism of Receptivity and Spontaneity

To make good on my promissory note that Hegel avoids dualism, we should return to his appraisal of the aforementioned “old prejudice,” the duality of thinking and sensing. For at best what the prejudice allows us to say in the relation between the two is that “when we want to experience [um zu erfahren] what is true in objects and occurrences [den Gegenständen und Begebenheiten], as well as in feelings, intuitions, opinions, notions, etc., then we must think them over [Nachdenken erforderlich sei],” and thereby “change [verwandeln] our feelings, and notions, etc. into thoughts” (WB8 46/EL 28; §5). The picture
is characteristic of the classical rationalist metaphysics Kant targets with his critique (more on this momentarily). But Hegel sees more or less the same view as no less operative in Kant’s own Critical idealism, although at a transcendental rather than psychological level. On the Kantian transcendental story, the representations of sensibility are only appearances, and do not contain objectivity validity until elevated to such validity by the transcendental application of the categories. Because, though, the transcendental unity of apperception is the means by which the content is raised to objective validity, this objectivity itself must be a form of subjectivity—not, to be sure, empirical subjectivity, determined by individual psychological idiosyncrasies, but nevertheless of the form of something intrinsically other with respect to the intuited content. While this raising of the sensible content to thought yields cognition, nevertheless because the conceptual contributions of the understanding are determinations of transcendental subjectivity, and conditions for the transcendental constitution of the object as such, this cognition remains conditioned and barred from reality in itself:

65 Speaking of Kant’s picture of the relationship between content and conceptuality in the opening of the Greater Logik’s Doctrine of the Concept, Hegel summarizes: In point of fact, the conceptual comprehension [Das Begreifen] of a subject matter [eines Gegenstandes] consists in nothing else than in the “I” making it its own, in pervading it and bringing it into its own form [als daß Ich denselben sich zu eigen macht, ihn durchdringt, und ihn seine eigene Form bringt], that is, into a universality which is immediately determinateness, or into a determinateness which is immediately universality. As intuited or also as represented, the subject matter is still something external, alien [ein Äußerliches, Fremdes]. When it is conceptualized [Durch das Begreifen], the being-in-and-for-itself [das Anundfürsichsein] that it has in intuition and representation is transformed [wird…verwandelt] into a positedness [ein Gesetztsein]; in thinking it [ihn denkend], the “I” pervades it. But it is only in thought that it is in and for itself [so ist er erst an und für sich]; as it is [wie er…ist] in intuition or representation, it is appearance [Erscheinung]. Thought sublates [hebt…auf] the immediacy with which it first comes before us [mit der er sunächst vor uns kommt] and in this way transforms it into [auf und macht so…aus ihm] a positedness [ein Gesetztsein]; but this, its positedness, is its being-in-and-for-itself or its objectivity. This is an objectivity which the subject matter consequently attains [hat] in the concept, and this concept is the unity of self-consciousness into which that subject matter has been assumed [aufgenommen worden] […]. (WB6 255/SL 515-6)

The same observation about Kant is also made at GW13 227/EPS 216; §337 Remark.
…the concept is given [angegeben worden] as the objective element [das Objektive] of cognition, consequently as the truth. But on the other hand it is taken to be [wird...genommen] something merely subjective, and we are not allowed to extract reality from it [aus dem sich die Realität...nicht heraushauben lasse], for by reality objectivity is to be understood [zu verstehen ist], since reality [sie] is contrasted with [gegenübergestellt wird] subjectivity. (WB6 256/SL 516, trans. mod.)

Since Kant understood the object as distinct from the thing-in-itself standing outside the bounds of all cognition, objectivity and objective reality in the strictest sense—truth itself—becomes substituted for the poor consolation of inter-subjective invariance (and this Kant tries to dignify by calling “empirical reality”). Thus, Hegel says that in the Critical philosophy application of the concept results in the content, though attaining the status of “truth” in terms of objectivity, nevertheless becoming “perverted [verkehren] into untruth” (WB8 148/EL 109; §62). This is, as far as Hegel is concerned, not a critical evaluation of Kant so much as a description of the basic features of his account as Kant himself constructed it. For Hegel, though, the ultimate point is not merely that Kant provides us an inadequate characterization of objective validity as essentially a determination of the form of subjectivity (and so does disservice to the concept of objectivity); more deeply than this, the issue has to do with an equivocation on the very conception of truth—or rather what we might ask of a transcendental account of cognition with regard to our constraints on a theory of truth. Hegel objects to the fact that Kant simultaneously holds that what is true in thought, in this transcendental elevation of the content, only comes about through the contribution of the categories, and that the categories in and of themselves are prone to transcendental illusion:

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66 Di Giovanni does not incorporate the letter of ‘Aber auf der andern Seite’ into his translation (simply rendering it as ‘Yet’), even though it makes a bit more perspicuous Hegel’s judgment of Kant’s position as incoherent.
The objectivity of thought is here, therefore, specifically defined: it is an identity of concept and thing which is the truth. […] it is accepted that the object is in its truth only in its concept [er vielmehr erst in seinem Begriffe in seiner Wahrheit], whereas in the immediacy in which it is given [er gegeben ist] it is only appearance and accidentality [Erscheinung und Zufälligkeit]; that the cognition conceptualizing [welche...begreift] the subject matter [des Gegenstandes] is a cognition of it as it is in and for itself, and the concept is its very objectivity [seine Objektivität selbst sei]. But, on the other hand, it is also equally claimed that we cannot know things as they are in and for themselves and that truth is inaccessible to [sei für…unzugänglich] rational cognition; that the aforesaid truth which consists in [welche in...besteht] the unity of the object and the concept is in fact only appearance, again on the ground now that the content is only the manifold of intuition. (WB6 262-3/SL 521, trans. mod.)

In other words, the fact that the categories “have validity [Gültigkeit haben] only as references connecting [als Beziehungen des durch] the manifold given by intuition” (WB6 256/SL 516), means that likewise the intellectual determination “is not the one which is independent [Unabhängige], is not what is essential and true about that presupposed material [vorausgehenden Stoffes]; rather, this material is the reality in and for itself, a reality that cannot be extracted from [aus...nicht herausklauben läßt] the concept.” (WB6 258/SL 518).

Thus, “the concept and anything logical are declared to be something merely formal which, since it abstracts from [von...abstrahiere] content, does not contain [nicht enthalte] truth” (WB6 256/SL 516).

At bottom the picture equivocates in its very conception of truth on the basis of Kant’s view of what each side to the cooperation lacks; the manifold of content on its own is merely appearance because it lacks the objective validity provided by the ordering of the categories, while the categories on their own put us in peril of transcendental illusion because they cannot provide the friction afforded by the intuitional content.67 The resulting

67 “When Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason […], in connection with logic comes to discuss the old and famous question: What is truth?, he starts by passing off [schenkt] as a triviality the nominal definition that it is the agreement of cognition with its subject matter—a definition which is of great, indeed of supreme value. If
framework does not just fail to give us a unified account of what truth amounts to, but, in the absence of this, leaves unclear whether there can even be a coherent conception of truth on offer. We can easily say that both invalidity and frictionlessness result in untruth, but this leaves obscure by virtue of what shared character they do so.

To put it simply, Hegel identifies the same tension found in McDowell’s Problematic, between representationalist and inferentialist demands upon the semantics of empirical judgments. We see that the incessant oscillation is in fact internal to Kant’s picture, in his inability to decide between whether we understand truth in terms of the referential relations grounding cognition in intuition is meant to provide (giving us friction) or the inferential relations the categories are introduced to account for (giving us validity). What we want, of course, is a unified picture which can integrate them both, but we are given no clue as to how the one does not preclude the other. This is made all the more striking given that, precisely at the point in the first Critique when the expectation for unification between the two components of cognition makes itself most felt, and the two faculties, each on its own answering to one half of the Problematic, are to come into contact on the basis of some shared characteristic—in the infamous Schematism—Kant is ultimately forced to do little more than demure, giving us what amounts to a shrug and an appeal to, essentially, mysticism, to “a hidden art in the depths of the human soul” (Kant 1998, 273; A141/B180-}

we recall this definition together with the fundamental thesis of transcendental idealism, namely that rational cognition is incapable of comprehending [zu erfassen nicht vermögend sei] things in themselves, that reality lies absolutely outside [schlechthin außer...liege] the concept, it is then at once evident that such a reason, one which is incapable of setting itself in agreement [nicht in Übereinstimmung zu setzen vermag] with its subject matter, and the things, in themselves, such as are not in agreement with the rational concept—a concept that does not agree with reality and a reality that does not agree with the concept—that these are untrue representations. If Kant had measured the idea of an intuitive understanding against that first definition of truth, he would have treated that idea which expresses the required agreement, not as a figment of thought [ein Gedankending] but rather as truth” (WB6 265-6/SL 523, trans. mod.).
Caught between the two demands of a theory of cognitive semantics, Kant passes the transcendental buck.

This is simply the inevitable result of a dualism where on one side we have empty form and on the other pure material; because the categories are empty, they require the input of something substantive outside them, and because the appearances are blind, they require the ordering of the categorial forms. The upshot as Hegel sees it is the worst of both worlds: both an inadequate view of conceptuality in its intended function of providing objective validity and of receptivity in its intended function of affording transcendental friction. In this respect at least, Hegel tells us that traditional metaphysics was superior to Kant’s transcendental idealism, in that it at least did not demean the idea of thought in rendering conceptuality as inherently extrinsic and superfluous to reality itself (WB 58/SL 25)—even if its pretension to thereby secure friction inevitably foundered in the face of Critique.

68 “This schematism of our understanding with regard to appearances and their mere form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty” (Kant 1998, 273; A141/B180-1). The inexorable result of the dualism is an incessant regress of faculties, beginning with the imagination, in which the attempt is made to unify sensibility and understanding, content and scheme, particular and rule, but in which the same disparity reemerges and stands in need of explanation for their unification. Because the issue is one of application of rules to contents, the problem is the same as the one Wittgenstein later identifies on rule-following. As Kant summarizes what is required,

The concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general, without being restricted to any single particular shape that experience offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit in concreto. (Kant 1998, 273; A141/B180)

But if the concept is a rule, the Schematism is the attempt to discern a rule for the application of that rule (precisely because the rule cannot be restricted to the particularity of any given content), and in order to avoid the regress of rules of application for rules for application…etc., Kant must turn to the “hidden art.” The problem is simply inevitable given the way the transcendental story is constructed.

69 “The older metaphysics had in this respect a higher concept of thinking than now passes as the accepted opinion [als in der neueren Zeit gang und gäbe geworden ist]. For it presupposed as its principle that only what is known of things and in things by thought [was durchs Denken von und an den Dingen erkannt werde] is really true in them, that is, what is known in them not in their immediacy but as first elevated to [in...erhoben] the form of thinking, as things of thought [als Gedachte]. This metaphysics thus held that thinking and the determination of thinking are not something alien to the subject matters [nicht ein den Gegenständen Fremdes], but are rather their essence, or that the things and the thinking of them agree [übereinstimmen] in and for themselves (also our language expresses a kinship [eine Verwandtschaft...ausdrückt] between them); that thinking in its immanent determinations [immanenter Bestimmungen], and the true nature of things [wahrhafte Natur der Dinge], are one and the same [ein und derselbe] content.”
Nevertheless, such moments should not be read as endorsement, on Hegel’s part, of pre-Critical rationalism. For the latter shares with Kant’s idealism the same erroneous dualism, even if it draws different conclusions from it. The common thread between them, as Hegel identifies, is not just the initial duality and subsequent, extrinsic unity of thinking and being, but the predication of that picture on an even deeper assumption, namely, the static independence of the two factors:

…as assumed in ordinary psychology as well as in Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy, […] the empirical material [Stoff], the manifold of intuition and representation, is at first just there by itself [zuerst für sich da ist], and […] that the understanding then comes into it [dazu hintrete], brings [bringe] unity to it, and raises [erhebe] it through abstraction to the form of universality. (WB6 258/SL 517-8)

Thus, this abstraction (again, whether psychological or transcendental), is concerned only with the universal it extracts from the “sensuous material, which does not suffer in this process any impairment of reality [welcher dadurch in seiner Realität keinen Eintrag leide]” (WB6 259/SL 519, trans. mod.). The thing remains behind as an inaccessible beyond, and does not itself, as itself, enter into the realm of objectively valid cognition. No matter how else it is dressed up or what other consequences are extracted from the account, this duality of sensing and thinking, of receptivity and spontaneity, common to Critique as much as to traditional metaphysics, is premised on the notion of a ready-made world of formless material or content in opposition to an equally ready-made coterie of content-less forms of thought:

The concept of logic has hitherto rested on a separation [Trennung], presupposed [vorausgesetzten] once and for all in ordinary consciousness, of the content of knowledge and its form, or of truth and certainty [Gewißheit]. Presupposed from the start is that the material [der Stoff] of knowledge is extant in and for itself [an und für sich vorhanden] as a ready-made world [als eine fertige Welt] outside [außerhalb] thinking; that thinking is by itself empty
Für sich leer sei, that it comes to this material as a form from outside [als eine Form äußerlich zu jener Materie hinzutrete], fills itself with it [sich damit erfülle], and only then gains [gewinne] a content, thereby becoming [werde] real knowledge. \(\text{(WB5 36-7/SL 24)}\)

Thus understood, “the object is something complete and finished all by itself [das Objekt ein für sich Vollendetes, Fertiges sei] and, for its actuality [zu seiner Wirklichkeit], can fully dispense with [vollkommen entbehren könne] thought…” \(\text{(WB5 37/SL 24, trans. mod.)}\)

Now while on the pre-Critical picture cognition conforms to this statically independent object, this account remains mired in a “nebulous indeterminacy [nebligen Unbestimmtheit]” \(\text{(WB5 37/SL 24)}\) about the precise relationship of these components. For it attends entirely to the one side, the subject matter, in an attempt to find a supreme philosophical “principle” \(\text{(WB5 65/SL 45)}\). So although “earlier abstract thought is at first interested only in the [supreme philosophical] principle as content,” it is, he says, eventually “driven [getrieben] as philosophical culture advances [im Fortgange der Bildung] to the other side to pay attention to [auf…zu achten] the conduct of the cognitive process [das Benehmen des Erkennens]…” \(\text{(WB5 66/SL 46)}\). In other words, the traditional metaphysics

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70 As shall become an important point in the later, Heidegger-centric chapters, I translate ‘vorhanden’ as ‘extant.’ Geraets, Suchting, and Harris translate it as ‘present’ in EL, and Brinkmann and Dahlstrom prefer ‘on hand’ in ELBD.

71 The wider passage reads: Further, these two component parts [Bestandteile] (for they are supposed to be related to each other as component parts [den sie sollen das Verhältnis von Bestandteilen haben], and cognition is compounded from them [wird aus…zusammengesetzt] in a mechanical, or at best chemical, manner) are said to stand to each other [stehen…gegeneinander] in this order [in dieser Rangordnung]: the object is complete and finished all by itself and, for its actuality, can fully dispense with thought; thought, for its part, is something deficient [etwas Mangelhaftes sei] and in need of a material [einem Stoffe] in order to complete itself [sich…zu vervollständigen], and also, as a pliable indeterminate form [als eine weiche unbestimmte Form], must adapt itself to its matter [sich seiner Materie angemessen zu machen habe]. Truth is the agreement [die Übereinstimmung] of thought with the subject matter [mit dem gegenstande], and in order to produce [um…hervorzubringen] this agreement—for it is not extant on its own account [den sie ist nicht an und für sich vorhanden]—thought is expected to be subservient and responsive to the subject matter [soll…nach dem Gegenstande sich fügen und bequemen]. \(\text{(WB5 37/SL 24)}\)

72 “The principle of a philosophy also expresses a beginning, of course, but not so much a subjective as an objective one, the beginning of all things. The principle is a somehow determinate [bestimmter] content—
inevitably gives way to a Critical turn. While Hegel endorses such a Critical turn in its broad features, he argues that, as actually enacted, it merely inverts the same dogmatic relationship, so that content conforms to the form of cognition, leaving the underlying assumption of the static, independent, and mutually indifferent realms untouched. The result of this mere inversion of the traditional metaphysics is that now we arrive at a conception of thinking and being where “each turns out to be a sphere divorced from [von…geschiedene] the other” (WB5 37/SL 24), not only static and independent, but additionally unable to even come into contact with one another.\(^{73}\)

Now, to be sure, Hegel holds that the Critical move is utterly essential, but its true lesson lies in that “the subjective activity [Tun] has also been grasped as an essential moment of objective truth, and with this there comes the need to unite the method with the content, the form with the principle” (WB5 66/SL 46)—that is, the forms of thought with the content of thought. In other words, if the subjective moment, cognition, plays a role in constituting objective truth, a fully consequent Critical turn will recognize that the initial dualism itself of thinking and being as two independent and mutually impassible factors is no longer workable. Kant did not attend to the fact that his own Copernican maneuver means the

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\(^{73}\) As Hegel says, once again returning to a consideration of the strategic gambit of Kantianism, Consequently, as thought receives and informs the material [Empfängen und Formieren des Stoffs], it does not transcend itself [kommt…nicht über sich hinaus] but its reception [sein Empfangen] of this material and its responsiveness to it [sich nach ihm Bequemen] remain modifications of itself [bleibt eine Modifikation seiner selbst]; thus thought does not become its other [es wird dadurch nicht zu seinem Anderen]; the self-conscious determining [selbstbewußte Bestimmen], at any rate, belongs only to it [gehört ohnedies nur ihm an]; even as it refers to [also auch in seiner Beziehung auf] the subject matter, therefore, it does not reach out to it outside itself [kommt…nicht aus sich heraus zu dem Gegenstande]; the subject matter remains a thing in itself, utterly a “beyond” [schlechthin ein Jenseits] of thought. (WB5 37/SL 25)
content of thought cannot be understood as independent of its form, that we can no longer
distinguish between cognition as a medium or instrument and its content; we can no longer
assume a ready-made world or content over against ready-made forms of cognition.

To reiterate, then, the ultimate source of the dualism of sensing and thinking,
receptivity and spontaneity, and the resultant equivocations about truth, stems from a more
fundamental duality of being and thinking. What is at issue in targeting this duality is not
whether thinking and being can be distinguished at all, but whether they can be so according
to the supposition that what is, the object of thought, is something which, in being thought,
undergoes nothing.\(^74\) It is this presupposition which spawns both the naively realist
correspondence conception of truth in traditional metaphysics as well as Critical idealism’s
irreconcilable divide between the empirical reality of phenomena and the transcendent reality
of the ever-retreating, inaccessible Ding-an-Sich. The manifold of content is “just there by
itself,” fully external to the concept, and the concept fully external to it. This is why Hegel
says flatly that the very talk of pure content, outside of and simply awaiting thought, is the
source of the problem (WB6 266-7/SL 524).

It is also why Hegel, in the introduction to the Phänomenologie, famously criticizes
the view of cognition, and its relation to its object, as simply an instrument or medium for the
deliverance of that object.\(^75\) Instead, and contra all dimensions of the attendant dualism,
cognition, Hegel says, is a “creative activity,” wherein the content this activity grasps cannot
be so casually separated from the performance of the activity itself:

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\(^74\) This is the true essence of what is meant by the “dualism” of the two factors.
\(^75\) “To be specific, [the fear of error] takes for granted [setzt...voraus] certain ideas about cognition [Erkennen]
as an instrument and as a medium [einem Werkzeuge und Medium], and assumes that there is a difference
between ourselves and this cognition. Above all, it supposes that the Absolute stands on one side and cognition
on the other, independent [für sich] and separated [getrennt] from it, and yet is something real […]” (WB3
70/PHS 47; §74).
That the content or object [*Inhalt oder Gegenstand*] is for knowledge a given [ein gegebener] content or object, coming to it from outside [ein von außen an dasselbe kommender sei], is therefore only a semblance [ein Schein], by sublation of which the mind proves to be what it is in itself, namely, absolute self-determination [Sichselbstbestimmen], the infinite negativity of what is external to mind and to itself, the ideality that brings forth [hervorbringende] all reality from itself [Realität aus sich]. The advance [Das Fortschreiten] of mind has, therefore, only this meaning: that this semblance be sublated, that knowledge prove itself to be [sich als...bewähre] the form that develops [entwickelnde] all content from itself [Inhalt aus sich]. Thus the activity [Tätigkeit] of mind, far from being restricted to [auf...beschränkt] a mere acceptance of the given [bloßes Aufnehmen des Gegebenen], must, on the contrary, be called a creative one [eine schaffende]... (WB10 235-6/PM 169; §442 Zusatz, trans. mod.)

Instead of being an instrument or medium, cognition is itself constitutive of its object. As might be imagined, everything rests upon understanding properly how Hegel conceives the sense of this constitutive function.

In any case, the radicality of the claim must first be appreciated. We may notice that Hegel speaks here of ‘*Inhalt*’ and ‘*Gegenstand*’ interchangeably. This might suggest to us

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76 Wallace and Miller translate ‘*hervorbringende*’ as ‘produces,’ but a more literal rendering is ‘brings forth.’ The idea of “production” is not wholly inapplicable here, so long as we understand properly what is “produced,” and what is not. And once that is clarified, we see that in fact “bringing forth” serves as a more appropriate way of looking at the matter than “production” *per se*.

As I argue in 1.5, this “creative activity” is not fabrication but actualization, which ‘*hervorbringende*’ in fact fits well (and likewise ‘*schaﬀen*’ can be understood along similar lines, etymologically related as it is to English’s ‘to shape’). What it means, then, to say that Mind “produces all Reality from itself” is not that all which exists (“reality” in the sense of everything that is) is fabricated by Mind but that the concreteness of whatever exists is a function of Mind’s activity (“reality” in the sense of being-real, the fullness of reality of what exists). Mind thus generates anything’s being-realized so that it has genuine reality. This is why Hegel also says that Mind “develops all content from itself,” to signal not that the content’s very existence originates with Mind but only that its advancement to actualization is a function of it. It is important, then, to take seriously when Hegel speaks of this creative activity as a “bringing forth,” and to keep all talk of “production” in its proper sphere.

It is worth noting that the passage above continues with Hegel referring to ‘*die Produktionen des Geistes*,’ but this comes in the midst of a clarification about the creative activity of individual mind: “the productions of the mind, in so far as it is only [insofern er nur] the subjective mind, do not yet acquire [erhalten] the form of immediate actuality but remain [bleiben] more or less ideal” (WB10 236/PM 169; §442 Zusatz). Thus, “*die Produktionen des Geistes*” here is invoked narrowly, in reference to a still-abstract form of this creative activity; Geist in its concrete nature as fully Objective Spirit, thus collective and social, does not produce its contents in this straightforward way, does not engage in figments of its own fashioning, but, if it can be said to “produce” them at all, does so in a wholly different manner, that of a “bringing-forth.” For this reason, it traffics not in the abstract potential, the ideal, but the Actual, the concrete.
that ‘Gegenstand’ in this passage means strictly what it does for Kant: the phenomenon of empirical cognition (or, alternatively, what Kant means by the appearances of empirical intuition)—that is, the manner in which something is presented to us, as Kant puts it, “under the limitations” of our faculties and their forms of representation. Under such an interpretation, the passages above would seem suggest no more than what Kant put forward with his Copernican revolution: that objects conform to cognition in the sense that insofar as they are represented by cognition, they are so in accordance with the conditions of the faculties. But, crucially, this cannot be the case. As I hope is appreciable by this point (and which, emerging in myriad forms, should only become more so in subsequent sections), this ascribes to Hegel views which he resoundingly rejects. For not only would it render entirely inscrutable the fact that all this arises from Hegel’s attack upon Kant’s approach, but it would simply return us to the same presupposition of the two static, ready-made domains, not to mention the thesis of the Ding-an-Sich. No, Hegel’s point about cognition as an activity creative of its objects is much more radical than that: ‘object’ here does not mean just ‘object of cognition,’” but the thing itself. In a way, then, Hegel’s doctrine of the “creative activity” is simply a continuation, and a radicalization, of Kant’s Copernican Revolution, embracing the spirit of that suggestion, the thought that objects conform to cognition, without positing any Ding-an-Sich, the ever-retreating remainder which in the final analysis still lies outside cognition’s access and affectation. This is the first half of Hegel’s signal contribution I alluded to at the end of 1.2.

77 Kant reserves ‘Gegenstand’ primarily for the object of empirical cognition or experience, conditioned by the categories. But outside of his terminology, one may of course refer to “objects of intuition,” and be quite understandably taken to mean what Kant calls the intuitional content itself, the appearances delivered by sensibility, as conditioned only (as yet) by the pure forms of intuition, space and time.
Now, we might think that because for Hegel the object itself is altered by cognition, that he is really admitting of something like a “dogmatic” strain of empirical idealism, as Kant refers to it in the first Critique (Kant 1998, 430; A377/B274-5), in contrast to Kant’s own transcendental idealism meant to salvage empirical realism. It might even appear that Hegel approaches conceiving cognition as akin to the infamous “intellectual intuition,” at least as Kant defined it in the first Critique, as a “divine understanding” which would produce objects through representing them” (Kant 1998, 253; B145), and which is to be contrasted with the sensible or receptive intuition to which, as Kant argues, we are limited.

To see Hegel’s “creative activity” as signaling a move to either empirical idealism or an idealism of intellectual intuition, though, is precisely to miss the second, and arguably defining, half of Hegel’s contribution. For Aristotle’s entrance into Hegel’s thought is perhaps felt most powerfully precisely at the point we may begin to ask just such questions. And that is because Hegel’s appeal to such a creative activity must be understood in terms of his principle of Entwicklungs (development), which derives from incorporating Aristotle’s framework of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια into his conception of the relationship between Nature and Spirit.

1.4 The Weakness of Nature and the Principle of Entwicklungs

The most direct path toward grasping the Aristotelian elements of Hegel’s position involves asking quite naïvely what Hegel means by “idealism,” and its central philosophical conceits,

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78 Kant distinguishes between empirical idealism of the dogmatic and problematic sort, associating the first in the B Edition with Berkeley’s immaterialism and the second with Cartesian skepticism about material objects (though, as has been noted, this latter attribution is odd, given that Descartes was not a skeptic, and in fact attempted to prove the existence of external objects, rather than skeptically deny our ability to do so).

79 Eckhart Förster has argued that the “intuitive understanding” of the third Critique is distinct from the first Critique’s intellectual intuition, but that is a subtlety I cannot address here. See Förster 2012.
in the first place. In the *Naturphilosophie*, Hegel provides a succinct characterization of idealism in its most general form:

Philosophical, true idealism consists in *besteht in* nothing else but the determination that the truth about things is that as such immediately single *unmittelbar einzelne*, i.e. sensuous things, they are only a semblance *Schein*, an appearance *Erscheinung*. (WB9 18-9/PN 9; §246 Zusatz, trans. mod.)

It is for this reason, this basic, critical stance, that he says, “every true philosophy is therefore *Idealism*” (WB8 203/EL 152; §95 Remark, trans. mod.). The status of appearance, then, and the relation of the apparent to the true, is the primary concern of genuine philosophy (or, what is to him effectively the same, idealism).

The crucial difference between appearance and truth is clearly an epistemic concern, since the very valence of “appearance” is as of something that may be mistaken as truth. Nevertheless, the traditional view of the true, or the essential, as standing behind the appearance, as something entirely separate from it and ontologically cordoned off from the appearances, is expressly not the interpretation Hegel assigns to the fully consequent philosophical consciousness. For he tempers his praise for Kant’s reinvigoration of the fundamental idealist sentiment with the accusation that the Kantian mode of articulating it commits a twofold error—first, in locating the true as transcending the apparent as its simple

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80 Another passage at WB5 172-3/SL 124 (Remark 2) explains Hegel’s conception of idealism. However, the passage presents some exegetically intricate elements the clarification of which I do not have space to address here. For an excellent analysis of this critical passage and a consideration of its importance for Hegel’s conception of idealism, see the Ameriks 1991.

81 “Appearance, in any case, is a very important stage in the logical Idea, and it may be said that philosophy distinguishes itself from ordinary consciousness by regarding what counts for the latter as having being and independence *als ein Seiendes und Selbständiges gilt* as mere appearance” (WB8 262/EL 200; §131 Zusatz).

82 I mean this “ontological cordonning” to include not only, for example, the so-called “metaphysical” dual aspect interpretations of Kant (which is the way many of Kant’s immediate successors, including Hegel, read his Critical philosophy), but also even the “epistemic” dual aspect interpretations favored by, most famously, Henry Allison (in Allison 1983). On the latter reading no less than the former, appearance stands before a thing-in-itself which is in some sense transcendent, rather than immanent to, that appearance, and therefore remains, either as an entity or an epistemic aspect, something inaccessible to cognition.
opposite, and secondly in holding that, as a function of this transcendence, it is beyond all access, thus leaving us with a subjectivistic form of idealism (WB8 263/EL 200; §131 Zusatz). In opposition to this, Hegel proceeds to expound upon his formula for *following through*, as he sees it, with the lessons of Kant’s revival:

> It is the very nature of the immediately objective world itself [*der unmittelbar gegenständlichen Welt selbst*] to be only appearance, and since we do know that world as appearance, we thereby at the same time become cognizant of its essence. The essence does not remain behind or beyond appearance, but manifests [*manifestiert*] itself as essence precisely by reducing [*eben dadurch...herabsetzt*] the world [*dieselbe*] to mere appearance. (WB8 263/EL 200; §131 Zusatz, trans. mod.)

In other words, entities in themselves are appearances, though, crucially, not in the (to borrow a McDowellian turn of phrase, “rampantly platonic”) sense that they participate in

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83 “In the history of modern philosophy it is *Kant* who has the merit of having been the first to rehabilitate the distinction between the common and the philosophical consciousness that we have mentioned. Kant stopped halfway, however, inasmuch as he interpreted appearance in a merely subjective sense, and fixated [fixiert hat] the abstract essence outside it as the *thing-in-itself* that remains inaccessible [*unzugängliche*] to our cognition.”

Now in an appendix to the *Prolegomena*, Kant maintains as a response to the Feder-Garve review of the first *Critique* that his Critical idealism turns traditional idealism on its head by in fact holding that truth is found only in the realm of experience:

> The dictum of all genuine idealists, from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: “All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason is there truth.” The principle that throughout dominates and determines my idealism is, on the contrary: “All cognition of things merely from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in experience is there truth.” (Kant 2001, 107)

Despite this, Hegel protests—as we saw in 1.3—that this “truth” for Kant amounts only to objectivity in the sense of intersubjectivity, collective empirical reality, and therefore cannot amount to genuine truth. Truth for Hegel could only be found on the side of whatever is beyond mere means or modes of cognition, and what rightfully pertains to reality itself, as it is in itself. Thus, for Hegel Kant remains a subjective idealist. Of course, whether these sorts of attacks on Kant have merit remains a matter of tremendous controversy in the scholarly literature.

Additionally, note that while subjective idealism is of course to be contrasted with “objective” idealism, according to which this transcendent reality is accessible, one could identify an essential unifying feature of both views: namely, what Paul Redding calls “other-worldism,” whether that be of a Platonic realm of Forms or Kant’s supersensible things-in-themselves. Redding identifies this tendency toward “other-worldism” as a shared antagonist for both McDowell and Hegel, motivating the former’s uptake of key elements of Absolute Idealism, particularly in its Aristotelian valences (Redding 2007, 27-9). Of course, while I think this is true as far as McDowell’s motivations go, I do not find him entirely successful in moving towards Hegel or Hegelianism’s full Aristotelianism. Nevertheless, Redding’s work provides a brilliant exegesis of the issues surrounding this point, whose details I cannot provide here.
forms existing in another, “true” realm of intelligibility transcending them. Rather, the essence or underlying truth is immanent to things by virtue of the fact that they are manifestations or expressions of it, always only presenting a finite facet or perspective—a “one-sided” view. There is therefore no absolute absence of essence, no illusion in the sense straightforwardly oppositional to truth.

Thus, in the Logik’s Doctrine of Essence the simple, traditional opposition between appearance and reality is overcome, and we arrive at the understanding of their conceptual interpenetration: “Essence must appear. […] Essence therefore is not behind or beyond [hinter oder jenseits] appearance, but since the essence is what exists, existence is appearance [sondern dadurch, daß das Wesen es ist, welches existiert, ist die Existenz Erscheinung]” (WB8 261-2/EL 199; §131). This is why Hegel says that in the appearances that make up the world we “thereby at the same time become cognizant of its essence.” Appearances are not the wholesale lack of truth, but at the same time they remain “defective,” we might say, for while essence is immanent to them, the appearances nevertheless have “validity [Gültigkeit] only as moments” (WB8 262/EL 200; §131 Zusatz, trans. mod.).

Nevertheless, the character of appearance as deficient or one-sided necessarily elicits the question of what the contrast to appearance is, what this full manifestation of essence or truth would be. This is what Hegel notoriously deems ‘Actuality.’ From the standpoint of the end of the Doctrine of Essence in the Logik, appearance is not as it was taken to be in the naïveté of the simple opposition between appearance and essence, i.e. the proxy of something inaccessible, but instead something like deficient Actuality. This conception of the relationship between essence and appearance leads us to the ultimate lesson of the Doctrine

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84 Essence, we might say, shows itself, and not something else in its place—it makes an appearance. But that is all it does; it only appears.
of Essence: their relationship is one of actualization. Note that this is emphatically not to say that appearance reveals itself at the end of the Doctrine of Essence to just be Actuality—for simply because something capable of appearance appears does not mean it has felicitously manifested itself. We are in fact cautioned repeatedly by Hegel not to conflate the apparent with the Actual.\textsuperscript{85} Whereas the appearance is whatever happens to occur, regardless of its efficacy in manifesting essence, Actuality, by contrast, is “not the ordinary actuality \textit{[die gemeine Wirklichkeit]} of what is immediately extant \textit{[des unmittelbar Vorhandenen]}” (WB8 281/EL 214; §142 Zusatz, trans, mod.) but the efficacious appearance, “the inwardness that is \textit{totally} to the fore \textit{[das Innere, welches schlechthin heraus ist]}” (WB8 281/EL 215; §142 Zusatz, emphasis added).

The point, then, is that the dynamic between essence and appearance, the one which defines their relationship to one another, is to be understood through the lens of actualization as a process.\textsuperscript{86} The status of the world as appearance is therefore not a denial of its reality and an assertion of its utter falsity as the simple opposite of truth. Indeed, quite the contrary: it is only a denial of its efficacy in instantiating the essence—that is, the Idea. Appearance is, as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{85} In one oft-cited passage, Hegel is at his most unmistakable:
\begin{quote}
A reasonable \textit{[sinnige]} consideration of the world already distinguishes between that which in the vast domains of outer and inner existence \textit{[äußerem und inneren Daseins]} is only appearance, transient and insignificant \textit{[vorübergehend und bedeutungslos]}, and that which in itself truly merits the name of actuality. (WB8 47/EL 29; §6, trans. mod.)
\end{quote}
We see, then, that the perennial invocation of the infamous quip in the preface to the \textit{Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts} that “What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational” (WB7 24/EPR 20), as evidence of an objectionable apologia for the prevailing order, is a charge born either of dilettantism or bad faith. It is in fact anything but an exclamation of Reason as embodied immediately in whatever happens to be the case (indeed, Hegel addresses this directly after the passage cited just above). For a more thorough considerations of these points, see Jackson 1996, Yovel 1996, Johnston 2018 81ff., and Beiser 2005, 221-2.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Moreover, the dialectical point emphasized by the Doctrine of Essence, is that when the understanding of their logical relationship is fully consequent, it is only intelligible on that front. In Hegelian language, we can understand the situation basically as follows: Essence in itself is the abstract moment of the consideration of Essence, Appearance its determinate negation (which is likewise abstract), and Actuality the speculative moment in which comes to the fore their concrete relation, purified of the unstable abstractions of their simple opposition.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Hegel tells us often, a “nullity,” a “falsity,” but this is a qualitative claim about its being deficient in bringing essence to full exhibition, not an admission that it lacks true existence. For this reason, appearance on Hegel’s reckoning must be understood as something objective, transcendentally real, not simply empirically real. The world is one whose furniture are appearances, not because it hides a non-appearing essence, but because it consists of *approximations to manifesting that essence*.87

As Frederick Beiser summarizes the implications of this, “To state that everything is an appearance of the idea now means that it strives to realize the absolute idea, or that everything acts for an end, which is the absolute idea (Beiser 2005, 67). Because, however, the absolute idea is immanent to its appearances or finite determinations, this teleological formulation cannot be construed as invoking what Hegel calls “external purposiveness” [*äußere Zweckinläßigkeit*], which forms the penultimate figure of the *Logik* before the Idea itself, and which signifies a relationship wherein the end is extrinsic to its means.88 Instead, the teleological relation Hegel is after is one wherein something *brings itself about* as its own purpose. With this conception we would not say that there is an end extrinsic to the means but rather that a thing strives for *self*-realization, and so it is its own end.89 We have thus

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87 Thus, we should say: essence, or the Idea, attempts to actualize itself, and indeed it does, in partial ways. These one-sided actualizations are its appearances. They are nothing less than real beings (not images or illusions), and they are accessible to us as “what is tangible and immediately perceptible [dem Handgreiflichen und unmittelbar Wahrnehmbaren]” (WB8 281/EL 214; §142 Zusatz).

88 “When speaking of purpose [Zweck], one usually has only external purposiveness in mind. From this point of view things are held not to bear their determination within themselves [nicht als ihre Bestimmung in sich selbst tragend], but merely as *means*, which are used and used up in the realization of a purpose that lies outside them [welche zur Realisierung eines außerhalb ihrer liegenden Zweckes gebraucht und verbraucht werden]” (WB8 362/EL 282, §205 Zusatz, trans. mod.). Hegel cautions, though, that “External purposiveness stands immediately before the Idea, but what stands on the threshold like that is often precisely what is most inadequate [das Ungenügendste]” (WB8 363/EL 282, §205 Zusatz, trans. mod.)

89 This conforms with Aristotle’s conception of the teleology of nature, which is one of intrinsic, not external purposiveness. Hegel even flags this point at WB9 14/ PN 5-6; §245 Zusatz. Joe Sachs, a more recent translator and expositor of Aristotle, emphasizes along these same lines that, “Aristotle does not say that animals, plants, and the cosmos *have* purposes but that they *are* purposes, ends-in-themselves” (Sachs 1999, liii).
arrived at Hegel’s conception of intrinsic purposiveness, or development (*Entwicklung*),
which is revealed as the successor to Actuality (or the deeper truth of Actuality) at the
beginning of the Doctrine of the Concept, and which is the proper relationship of finite
determinations to the absolute Idea, or to the appearances and the True; the latter, in its
attempt to actualize itself, to bring itself to full realization, thus manifests itself in what is for
all intents and purposes a dialectical sequence of trial and error, and, within this sequence,
these manifestations are properly thought of as developments of it.\(^{90}\)\(^{91}\)

It is worth stressing something perhaps obvious, that implicit in even in the everyday
conception of development is that it does not involve simply any arbitrary transformation.
What develops, Hegel says, “does not lose itself [*verliert sich nicht*] in mere indefinite
change [*bloße ungemessene Veränderung*]” (WVA13 34/LHP1 22). The alteration which
something undergoes when it develops is determinate in a certain direction. Moreover, this
determinacy is nothing more than “draw[ing] out from itself what is inward or implicit [*was innerlich oder an sich ist, aus sich heraus zu ziehen*], and thus to become objective [*sich gegenständlich zu werden*] (WVA13 34/LHP1 22). As such, development is not a process of
changing into something else: “Because what is implicit [*das Ansich*] comes into existence
[in die Existenz tritt], it certainly passes over into change [in *Veränderung über*], yet it also

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\(^{90}\) Karin de Boer masterfully lays out Hegel’s view of teleology in the *Logik* (de Boer 2010, 158-79). In doing
she pioneers some novel explanations of the transition from the *Logik* to elements of the *Realphilosophie* by
virtue of limitations in the applicability of the image of organic development and intrinsic purposiveness to
history and the human condition (de Boer 2010, 171-9). As such, she makes a compelling case for development
as a transitional or only *mostly* accurate conception of the movement of the dialectic, in virtue of its inability to
fully exhibit all the dimensions of negativity. The suggestion as I understand it is that the weakness of Nature
and the foibles of human history are manifestations of a “tragic negativity” intrinsic to the dynamics of
negativity as such, thus motivating the transition from the *Logik* to the *Realphilosophie*, which we might not
otherwise appreciate if we fixate on the image of development. The extraordinary reading suggests limitations
to the analysis I provide, but I cannot consider the full implications of the challenge here.

\(^{91}\) Note that it is not as if each trial is a matter of *starting anew*. Each infelicitous manifestation remains on, and
serves as the means—indeed, the only available means—for further refinement in the direct of Actuality. This is
why this sequence is not one of continuously *fresh* attempts, but a developmental one.
remains one and the same [bleibt...zugleich Eins und Dasselbe], for the whole process is dominated by it [es regiert den ganzen Verlauf]” (WVA13 34/LHP1 22, trans. mod.).

Development, it should be stressed, then, involves something becoming itself, something coming into its own, unfolding in its own being:

Because the emergence [das Hinausgehen] of the philosophical Idea in its development is not a change, a becoming something other [ein Werden zu einem Anderen] but equally an internalization [ein Insichhineingehen], a self-deepening [ein Sichinvertiefen], its progression [das Fortschreiten] makes the previously general, indeterminate [unbestimmtere] Idea more determinate in itself [in sich bestimmter]. The further development of the Idea or its greater determinacy [größere Bestimmtheit] are one and the same. (WVA13 41/Rosen 1982, 85-6, trans. mod.)

We see similar points in the kinds of images Hegel uses for illustrating the concept of Entwicklung. One of his fondest is the maturation of an organism, and at the very outset of the Doctrine of the Concept, Hegel gives us one of the many instances in which he conjures that image:

What corresponds to the stage of the Concept in nature is organic life. For example, a plant develops from its germ: the germ already contains [enthält bereits] the whole plant within itself, but in an ideal way, so that we must not envisage its development as if the various parts of the plant—root, stem, leaves, etc.—were already extant [bereits...vorhanden wären] in the germ realiter, though only in a very minute form. This is the so-called Chinese box hypothesis [Einschachtselungshypothese], the defect of which is that what is extant initially only in an ideal way is regarded as already existent [als bereits existierend]. What is correct in this hypothesis, however, is just that the Concept remains at home with itself in the course of its process [in seinem Prozeß bei sich selbst bleibt], and that the process does not posit [gesetzt] anything new as regards content, but only an alteration of form [eine Formveränderung] is issued forth [hervorgebracht wird]. (WB8 309/EL 237-8; §161 Zusatz, trans. mod.)

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92 Haldane translates ‘an sich’ as ‘implicit,’ and ‘das Ansich’ as ‘that which is implicit.’
93 I have substituted here Michael Rosen’s translation over the Haldane I have otherwise used because I find the former’s wording slightly better and more natural.
94 The analogy has its limits, as made clear in the Naturphilosophie (see, esp. WB9 31-4/PN 20-2; §249 and its Remark and Zusatz), but we cannot consider such subtleties here.
For this reason, the moments of the Whole process should not, strictly speaking, be viewed as distinct successor stages which simply usurp their antecedent stages, but rather as deeper articulations dialectically birthed from those antecedent figures. In other words, something which develops in Hegel’s sense comes into greater clarity and determinateness, with its various registers, dimensions, implications, and significances gradually brought into relief. This is why development is just a more determinate articulation of that dynamic identified as the truth of the appearance-reality distinction at the end of the Doctrine of Essence, actualization. Indeed, the specifically Aristotelian valences intrinsic to understanding Entwicklung and Actuality are very much intended to be at the forefront. In the introduction to the Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Hegel explains that his entire outlook can be grasped with the sufficient comprehension of the principle behind this term of art, ‘Entwicklung,’ and that, “if this were clear, all else would result and follow of its own accord [sich von selbst ergeben und solgen]” (WVA13 32/LHP1 20). He goes on to expressly invoke the Aristotelian concepts of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια as the keys to understanding this all-important principle:

95 As Stephen Houlgate beautifully summarizes the about the dialectical progression of the Logik: We do not advance in the Logic, therefore, by simply replacing an initial incorrect definition of being with a more adequate one […]. We advance in the Logic by specifying more clearly what is entailed by the initial indeterminate thought of being itself. […] In the course of this further determination of being (or, indeed, self-determination of being), new concepts do arise that go beyond the mere thought of being as such. The thought of being is not simply replaced by those new concepts, however, but itself becomes more complex and concrete in them. (Houlgate 2006, 45)

Houlgate is right to identify development as the processional mode governing the broad sweep of the Logik as a whole, despite the fact that, as such, it doesn’t surface until the beginning of the Doctrine of the Concept. There (§161 and its Zusätz), Hegel differentiates development from the dialectical movement in the Doctrine of Being—passing over into another, or transition—and the Doctrine of Essence—shining in another, or reflection. As a matter of fact, though, transition and reflection should not be seen as completely distinct processes which give way to a third, new kind of dialectical movement in the Doctrine of the Concept. As Errol Harris insightfully remarks, “Transition and reflection were premonitions, but not yet exemplifications of development, and only now, from the viewpoint of the Concept, can they be seen as forms or phases of the same process” (Harris 1983, 220). Dialectical movement is itself something which develops over the course of the Logik. Entwicklung is not simply the mode of advancement in either the Logik or the Realphilosophie, but of the dialectic itself, no matter what subject matter it plays out.
In order to comprehend what development is, what may be called two different states [Zustände] must be distinguished. The first is what is known as capacity, power [als Anlage, Vermögen], what I call being-in-itself [das Ansichsein] (potentia, δύναμις); the second principle [Bestimmung] is that of being-for-itself [Fürsichsein], actuality [die Wirklichkeit] (actus, ἐνέργεια) […] (WVA13 33/LHP1 20-1, trans. mod.).

It is only through these conceptual resources appropriated from Aristotle that Hegel’s understanding of “idealism” can be properly grasped, in particular as one way of working out how to avoid anti-realism or subjectivism in favor of a realism about the ideal—a predilection Beiser impresses upon us as shared by the post-Kantians German idealists in general:

The basic error behind […] the subjectivist interpretation [of German idealism] in general, has been its failure to distinguish between two very different versions or forms of idealism. […] The two versions of idealism correspond to two senses of the term ‘ideal’: the ideal can be the mental in contrast to the physical, the spiritual rather than the material; or it can be the archetypical in contrast to the ectypical, the normative rather than the substantive. Idealism in the former sense is the doctrine that all reality depends upon some self-conscious subject; idealism in the latter sense is the doctrine that everything is a manifestation of the ideal, an appearance of reason. […] Once we admit this distinction we get a very different account of the history of German idealism from the subjectivist interpretation. […] German idealism becomes […] the growing recognition that the ideal realm consists not in personality and subjectivity but in the normative, the archetypical, and the intelligible. (Beiser 2002, 6)

To say that what everything strives for is Actuality, the “reaching” of its potential, is to say that it is striving to concretize an ideal, an essence without reality—something that is only as a potentiality and not an actuality. This is why Hegel says of the organic development of the plant from the seed that the plant is present in the germ “in an ideal way”—because “ideality” means potentiality, the abstract ideal. The plant is “implicitly present” in the germ, or the latter, as we saw him say, “contains” the former “in an ideal way,” because it is present as δύναμις rather than as ἐνέργεια. This is Hegel’s sense of “idealism”—an ontology of the
ideal, something only potential, as struggling to bring itself, through its own developmental process, out of mere abstraction and into full concretion as Actual. And each such thing is itself an aspect of the ideal, the ideal of Reason.96

Now, with this understanding of Hegel’s idealism in mind it becomes possible to get a clear view of the fact that his rejection of the Myth of the Given—and more broadly of panlogism—is an integral feature in his thought, being in fact an expression of his doctrine of the “weakness” (Ohnmacht) of Nature, through which the relationship between natural determinations and those of Spirit must be understood:

This is the weakness of nature, that it cannot abide by and exhibit [nicht festhalten und darstellen zu können] the rigor of the concept and loses itself in a blind manifoldness void of concept. […] The manifold genera and species of nature must not be esteemed to be anything more than arbitrary notions of spirit engaged in pictorial representations. Both indeed show traces and intimations [Spuren und Ahnungen] of the concept, but they do not exhibit it in trustworthy image, for they are the sides of its free self-externality… (WB6 282-3/SL 536, trans. mod.)97

As mentioned earlier, Nature is an appearance of the Idea, but vis-à-vis the above discussions, we must recognize both sides of this claim. First, that Nature is an appearance is not meant in the sense of an illusion nor, as for Kant, a phenomenal expanse of merely

96 This reading of Hegel’s Vernunft brings it into some proximity with Davidson’s “constitutive ideal of rationality” (Davidson 1970).
97 Elsewhere: “…it is a consequence of the weakness of nature that it cannot present the logical forms in their purity.” (WB8 84/EL 59; §24 Zusatz 2). Many commentators translate ‘Ohnmacht’ as ‘impotence,’ including Di Giovanni, Garaets et al., and Miller in their translations, respectively, of SL, EL, and PN (and they do so in these passages I have given). This formulation can be misleading, though, for it could be taken as suggesting that for Hegel Nature is without potencies, which as we shall see in 1.5 is quite contrary to the case: natural determinations hold potentiality for spiritual determinations. However, Nature by and large cannot in and of itself realize this potential; for this, it depends upon those narrow domains which have broken out of pure naturality, to then turn back on Nature and drag it out of its inability to felicitously incarnate the Idea. Nature is thus Ohnmacht in being not only a by-and-large feeble exhibition of the Idea, but also in its helplessness to extricate itself from this state. Its “impotence” is an inability for realizing the Idea within itself, of its own resourcefulness, not its lack of holding potentialities for that realization. In this respect, I think ‘weakness’ better exhibits Hegel’s point, without suggesting Nature is literally im-potent, lacking in potentiality.

For more on the weakness of nature and its connection to the role of contingency in Hegel’s System, see Johnston 2012 and chapter 3 of Johnston 2018
empirically objective regularities, but a transcendental reality. Nature is the Notion, but in its self-alienation, i.e. “estranged [entfremdete] from itself” (WB9 25/PN 14; §247 Zusatz); in Nature the Notion “manifests [manifestiert] itself […] but not qua Notion [nicht als sich selbst]” (WB9 31/PN 19; §248 Zusatz). It indeed incarnates the Idea, even if poorly. Nature is thus a faulty attempt—or, more accurately, a vast breadth of faulty attempts, splayed across material space and time—of the abstract Idea to bring itself to concretion, a real residue of such failed attempts at the Idea actualizing itself.

In the second instance, this means that Nature is not the Actuality of the Idea. It remains the case that in it the “unity of the Notion conceals [verbigt] itself” (WB9 25/PN 14; §247 Zusatz, trans. mod.). Actuality, the manifestation of the Notion qua Notion “occurs

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98 As Hegel summarizes, “Since Nature is the Idea in the form of otherness [in der Form des Andersseins], the Idea, according to its Notion, is not present in Nature as it is in and for itself; nevertheless, Nature is one of the ways the Idea manifests itself [sich zu manifestieren], and so must occur therein [darin vorkommen muß]” (WB9 25/PN 15; §247 Zusatz, trans. mod.).

99 The conception of appearance as one-sided moments of the True, valid but deficient, may by itself lead us to conceive the relationship the Absolute Idea and its manifestations or finite determinations as one of part to whole. While this is accurate, it too is a one-sided articulation when understood from the point of view of a synchronic, rather than diachronic metaphor, for when Hegel famously proclaims that “The True is the Whole,” we should consider the immediately following critical clarification to this quip: “But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating [vollendende] itself through its development [Entwicklung]” (WB3 24/PHS 11). With this clarification we can see that the Absolute Idea, rather than describable in the terms of a spatial whole, does not have an immediate reality because it is only that which is capable of manifestation in the finite determinations which constitute its development.

100 Hegel thus excoriates “nature worship” or even crude pantheism: “For this reason, Nature, in the determinate existence [bestimmten Existen] which makes it Nature [wodurch sie eben], is not to be deified” (WB9 27/PN 17; §248 Remark). He clarifies:

In itself, in the Idea, Nature is divine: but as it is, the being of Nature does not accord [entspricht] with its Notion […]. […] Thus Nature has also been spoken of as the self-degradation [der Abfall] of the Idea, in that the Idea, in this form of externality [als diese Gestalt der Äußerlichkeit], is in a disparity [in der Unangemessenheit] with its own self. It is only to the external and immediate stage of consciousness, that is, to sensuous consciousness, that Nature appears [erscheint] as the First, the immediate, as mere being [Seiende]. But because, even in this element of externality, Nature is a display [Darstellung] of the Idea, one may, and indeed ought, to admire in it the wisdom of God. […] In Nature, not only has the play of forms [hat das Spiel der Formen] its own boundless and unchecked contingency [ungebundene, zügellose Zufälligkeit], but each figure [jede Gestalt] lacks [entbehrt] for itself the Notion of itself. The highest toward which Nature strives [zu…treibt] is life; but this, as only a natural mode of the Idea, is at the mercy of [ist…hingegeben] the unreason [der Unvernunft] of externality, and the living creature [die individuelle Lebendigkeit] is at every moment entangled [ist…befangen] with particulars alien to it [mit einer ihr andern Einzelheit], whereas in every expression of Spirit [geistigen Äußerung] there is contained
only in Spirit where the Notion exists as [wie er ist]” (WB9 31/PN 19; §248 Zusatz). The Idea actualizes itself more effectively in Spirit, and in increasingly more felicitous instantiations across its continuing elaboration in that domain.101

It is now that we understand the relationship between Nature and Spirit in terms of potentiality and actuality, that is, as one of a dynamic of actualization or development, that we may finally lay out the claim at which I am driving. In 1.2 I said that Hegel’s view of cognition is neither dualistic nor panlogistic. I showed in 1.3 that Hegel does not subscribe to a dualism between receptivity and spontaneity (and I shall return to the topic of the creative activity shortly). But understanding Hegel’s conception of Nature and Spirit in terms of Actuality or Entwicklung makes clear how he is able to avoid both dualism and panlogism, or, more accurately, what his positive conception is in their place. For I want to suggest that among the natural determinations to be distinguished, as appearance, from the Actual determinations of Spirit, lie mere sensory episodes, understood as causal transactions in nature, as well as their respective, nonconceptual contents. What conceptuality represents, then, in relation to sensibility, is the developed form of the latter into a more determinate, more concrete elaboration of itself. The two are distinct from one another as different stages of a development are distinct, as, roughly, the seed is to the plant.102 This perspective allows

101 Actuality lies on a continuum, as does Spirit. While Spirit with respect to Nature is Actuality in comparison to appearance, nevertheless Spirit continues its own manner of development beyond the determinations of its basic transition from Nature. Spirit is not in and of itself an end state, but an active, at-work process, a feature in fact built into Aristotle’s conception of ἐνέργεια.

102 Note that this is not to say that all exercises of conceptuality intrinsically contain intuitive determinations, or that there is no such thing as unmoored reflection or ratiocination. Thus in the same breath as he tell us that understanding is a developmental successor to its antecedent modes of sensory consciousness, Hegel clarifies that exercises of conceptuality are not conditional on whether acts of sensing, sensation-tokenings, take place: …the stages of feeling, intuition, sense consciousness, and so forth, are prior to the understanding insofar as they are the conditions of its genesis [insofern...als sie in dessen Werden seine Bedingungen...sind], but only in the sense that the concept emerges from
us to acknowledge that sensory and rational contents are indeed distinct, yet not in the manner of a dualism between the determinations of receptive and spontaneous faculties.\(^\text{103}\)

Additionally, the proposal can accommodate the thought that these two kinds of content are distinct within human cognition, where both “have independent, irreducible roles to play in the theory of meaning,” to once again invoke Crowell’s criterion. The independent, irreducible roles of sensory and rational contents have to do with the kind of relation to one another in which they stand; the former have an ineliminable role in any picture of cognition, as precursor determinations on the way to their conceptual successors. A full accounting of our cognitive semantics, of the space of meaning, cannot be given in the absence of a story about the development from one to the other, such that when we consider the conceptual successors, we understand how they become the form intentional contents take within the same kinds of sensory, receptive episodes which once enjoyed merely sensory contents. How the nature of the intentional act, as receptive to reality, remains just that despite the content taking a new form, would be inexplicable without reference to the sensory antecedents as

\[\text{[aus...hervorgeht] their dialectic and their nothingness [Nichtigkeit] and not because it is conditioned by [durch...bedingt wäre] their reality. (WB6 259/SL 518-9, trans. mod.)}\]

What the claim does mean, then, is that, as matured into our second nature, episodes of our sensibility intrinsically “draw upon” conceptual capacities, to borrow McDowell’s turn of phrase. Conceptuality, as an Actuality of Spirit, is a reshaping of our more natural determinations, but this does not limit it from also allowing for all sorts of other, novel acts; the claim about its developmental origin only implies that whenever our intuition takes place it is intrinsically conceptualized, not vice versa.

\(^{103}\) One may ask what nonconceptual contents amount to if we still reject the Given, holding they are more than just qualitative sensations, yet less than epistemically efficacious contents which would allow for belief formation, etc. The answer is that what distinguishes mere content from mere qualia is the former’s representational nature, or their ability to present the world in a way which either gets things right or gets things wrong. But to have representations is not necessarily to have propositionally articulate representations, and so to have intentional attitudes, or attitudes about representations, is not necessarily to have propositional attitudes. Animals are sentient in virtue of their enjoying representational states, but they are not sapient because they do not have language to render their representational states of propositional form. Without that, there is nothing so articulate within a mere representational content to allow for transference of truth or justification between it and another such content, thus nothing which allows for such contents have any rational purchase. It is not simply that animals lack the ability (i.e. reasoning) to do with representational states what we do with them, but that they lack the sorts of complex social determinations which afford them a second nature and transform the character of their representational states in the first place such that there even is anything to be done with them.
such, or without consideration of our endowment with conceptual contents as predicated upon those antecedents.

Note then that on this framework we are doing anything but relegating nonconceptual contents to corners of nature beyond the human. To speak of stages of development, and layers of Spirit emerging out of Nature, does not indicate that these spiritual determinations usurp from the beginning any and all natural determinations and take their place as the immediate reality of our individual being—in other words that we are born inheriting and enjoying all the previous accomplishments of Spirit, that they become folded into us as from the individual’s perspective unacquired capabilities (even if an acquired trait of the species from the vantage point of natural history). What it does mean is that Spirit has developed to such a point that it asserts itself in the form of social, not just individual phenomena, such that our natural, physiological being may be exposed to the fruits of those accomplishments, allowing for our induction into our second nature. The hard-won results of the march of Spirit, the like-mindedness and inculturation of a social milieu, remain ones in need of acquisition—they consist in the assertion of the conditions for the individual’s development, as now something distributable amongst the individuals of the species. And so we can hold a real distinction between sensory and rational contents internal to the sphere of human consciousness, though not one conceived according to the framework of dual faculties in need of cooperation, but rather as one of maturation under the patronage of our social being, particularly the acquisition of language and the discursive capacities that come with it.  

At the end of 1.2 I considered and rejected a proposal in defense of Hegel that the distinction between sensory and conceptual contents is one which we can attribute to being internal to nature—between animal and human life, for example—but not internal to human life. The objection was that although this makes the distinction a real one, it vacates it of any import for a theory of intentionality or for meaning, for with regard to human life is indeed still collapses content into concept. Note here that the proposal I am now putting forward goes not even one but two steps further in regarding the distinction as internal to human life. For we could go further than the previous proposal in attributing sensory content to the intentional states of, say, anatomically
Now, the above story about our second nature assuredly ought to remind us of McDowell’s, for his account of human cognition certainly invokes the notion of development, of our Bildung and induction into a discursive form of life. There is a crucial difference at play between them, however, and one which serves to highlight how Hegel’s picture avoids panlogism while McDowell’s does not. For on the conception I am proffering, we preserve the Hegelian insistence that there is indeed a strong distinction—both notional and real—to be drawn between sensibility and conceptuality, along the axis of contents. In contrast to this, McDowell’s picture does not treat the relationship between nonconceptual and conceptual contents as one of development. For McDowell, development takes place purely between capacities of ours—our purely sensory capacities are reshaped by our second nature into conceptual capacities. The alteration that thus occurs is simply one having to do with our sensitivities, from an ability for mere sensory registration of the world to an ability for encountering it as an expanse of reasons (that is, for experiencing the world). But making that claim is not yet to circumscribe the relation between the differing contents, as for their own part related after the fashion of undeveloped and developed form. Under McDowell’s view, while one figure of consciousness may develop into a more mature form—and certainly in that respect the determinations issuing from exercises of those capacities would differ—this development of the capacities is not accompanied by a development on the content’s own part from an antecedent to a mature shape but simply a substitution, so to speak, of one determination for another.105

but not behaviorally modern humans. This would in a sense make the distinction internal to human consciousness—and one to be understood in terms of development—but I submit in a way still quite unsatisfactory for defending against the charge of panlogism. This view, by contrast, integrates sensory contents into human consciousness much more substantially, drawing the distinction at the same level as that between the infant and the adult. This is just enough to reject dualism while still avoiding panlogism.

105 Even if we, say, add that the substituted determination is a species of the one it replaces, this is the most McDowell’s view ventures to say about their relation, and it is one a great deal less committal.
Indeed, this is the case because the tale as McDowell tells it forces us to dismiss the idea of nonconceptual content altogether; that there is no outer boundary to the conceptual means just that there is no such thing as content beyond conceptual content, and that therefore infants (and animals) enjoy episodes of sensory registration, which, while assuredly possessing qualitative features (sensation), have nothing which can be fairly called contents. Not only, then, do nonconceptual contents play no role in accounting for cognitive semantics—the distinctive failing of panlogism—but there in fact is no such thing in the first place. For this reason, there can be no genuine distinction, much less a developmental distinction, on the level of contents, at all. At best, the distinction which issues according to McDowell from acknowledging the Given being a Myth, and rejecting the “mixing” we saw Hegel speak of, is one which can only be drawn along the lines of act vs. content, between sensory acts as distinct from their conceptual contents; accordingly, the sort of “development” of which McDowell’s picture admits extends no farther than to acts or capacities for acts; our Bildung cultivates the receptive, sensation-laden episodes we enjoy as infants into ones contentful, i.e. conceptual (these being for him equivalent).

This is in fact the ultimate origin of McDowell’s departure from Hegelianism. For Hegel, what McDowell says is certainly true—what is required is an account of a developmental relation between, as Hegel would say in the Phänomenologie, “figures of consciousness” (such as between Sense Certainty and Perception). But it is not just that; in fact, it can only be that in virtue of the fact that it is an account of the developmental dynamic of the contents of those figures of consciousness. Indeed, Hegel explicitly criticizes historical

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106 Recall that Hegel says, “the process does not posit anything new as regards content, but only an alteration of form is brought forth” (WB8 309/EL 238; §161 Zusatz). This assures us that conceptual contents cannot be the first emergence of the content, but only a novel form of something already present. The McDowellian denial of nonconceptual content thus cuts against Hegel’s proclamation.
examples of developmental accounts of the faculties (such as, notably, the faculty psychology of Condillac) as not properly attending to the inner dynamic of the content in its own right, in its negativity and dialectical progression (WB10 234-5/PM 168-9; §442 Remark). 107

Now one of the advantages of the Hegelian as opposed to the McDowellian picture is what it implies about the sort of naturalistic intuitions about ourselves, or about mind’s place in nature, we are to endorse. Crispin Wright explains that McDowell’s admonition that we dismiss the thought of even notional separability undermines our normal intuitions about our commonality with animals and infants, since it stops us thinking—and is precisely intended so to do—of something which a conceptless creature merely feels—its pain—as of a kind with something which goes on within our awareness when we experience pain in McDowell’s fuller sense of “experience.” (Wright 2002, 164)

107 In this passage, Hegel critiques the idea of mental capacities developing in a purely “affirmative” manner (as in Condillac), which does not attend to the sublation of the sensory material itself—that is, the Negative (sublative) aspect of the development of capacities: Here one must not think of the development of the individual associated with anthropological development [anthropologischen zusammenhängende Entwicklung], where the faculties and powers [die Vermogen und Kräfte] are regarded as successively emerging and expressing themselves in existence [als nacheinander hervortretend und in der Existenz sich äußernd betrachtet werden]. For a long time knowledge of this progression [Fortgang] was highly valued (by the philosophy of Condillac), as if such a supposed natural emergence [Hervorgehen] could establish [ausstellen…sollte] the genesis [das Entstehen] of these faculties and explain [erklären] them. In this procedure there is an unmistakable tendency [Er ist hierin die Richtung nicht zu verkennen] to make [zu machen] the various [mannigfaltigen] modes of the mind’s activity [Tätigkeitweisen des Geistes] comprehensible [begreiflich] in its unity, and to point out [aufzuzeigen] an interconnection [Zusammenhang] of necessity. But the categories employed in doing so are in general of an impoverished sort [überhaupt dürftiger Art]. In particular the governing principle [herrsche Bestimmung] is that the sensory is taken, no doubt rightly, as primary, as the initial foundation [als anfangende Grundlage], but that from this starting-point the subsequent determinations appear as emerging [hervorgend] only in an affirmative manner, and the negative aspect of mind’s activity, by which this material is spiritualized and sublated in its sensoriness [wodurch jene Stoff vergeistigt und als Sinnliches aufgehoben wird], is misconceived and overlooked [verkannt und übersehen ist]. (WB10 234-5/PM 168-9; §442 Remark, trans. mod. and emphasis added)

Note that Condillac held that not only are there no innate ideas but in fact no innate capacities; on this Hegel agrees, but he thinks Condillac gives no motivating force to the resultant idea of the development of capacities—only negativity can do this, the negativity we see in the logic of appearance and essence as actualization.
McDowell takes exception to Wright’s characterization, and resolutely affirms that although our normal intuitions of a commonality are correct, this cannot be understood as meaning that sensibility is separable, for human sensibility is something altogether different from that of animals:

Wright seems to miss the point that my distinction between feeling pain and experiencing pain, in my quasi-technical sense, is a distinction between a genus and one of its species. He thinks I am committed to supposing that the painful conditions cats, say, can be in have nothing in common with the painful conditions adult human beings can be in. He is right that this would do violence to common sense about cats and infants. But he is wrong about my commitments. Why can there not be two species of episodes in which a subject feels pain? They have just that in common: that in both sorts of episodes someone or something feels pain. The concept of a genus is not shown to be equivocal by noting that it covers more than one species. We must, and can, resist explaining the commonality by saying we have what cats have but go beyond them in conceptualizing it. […] There is nothing here that threatens our ordinary responses to the sufferings of the conceptless. (McDowell 2002, 288)

The problem with McDowell’s genus-species framework here is that there is no further specification we could give of animal or infant pain that differentiates it from the genus feeling pain, at least if we continue to limit ourselves to not doing violence to our common sense intuitions about such things. The only kind of specifications we could give would involve either simply applying that same category of feeling pain to different kinds, rather than providing substantive differentia (e.g. feeling pain as it belongs to mammals vs. feeling pain as it belongs to amphibians), or carving up the genus in a way orthogonal to how we would differentiate the resulting species from the species experiencing pain (e.g. by intensity of sensation—which would be akin to identifying, say, Greek philosophers as contrasting with idealist philosophers; they indeed form different species, but not mutually exclusive ones). We could, perhaps, say that while we cannot specify or provide the differentia

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108 See also McDowell 1994, 64.
between feeling pain in general and animal or infant pain specifically—because we are not acquainted with what it’s like to be a bat—there nevertheless is such a differentia. But then Wright’s accusation would be correct, and we would be firmly obstructing the idea that the feeling pain of animals or infants is of a kind with experiencing pain, in a way which does violence to our normal intuitions, since we would be conceding we can’t even imagine what animal or infant pain is like. If feeling pain is of a kind with experiencing pain in only an indeterminable, inconceivable way, then this helps nothing as to the stated purpose, giving the intuitions Wright references and McDowell agrees are worth salvaging their due. Barring abandonment of those intuitions, then, the claim that feeling pain and experiencing pain are related as genus to species appears unworkable.

These obstacles could be easily surmounted by McDowell simply doing three things: first, admitting that in the call for denying even a “notional” difference in contribution by sensibility he overshot the mark; second, allowing for the very idea of nonconceptual content; and third, embracing the Hegelian thesis of the relationship between nonconceptual and conceptual content as one of development. This is the way to allow us to deny the claim that “we have what cats have but then go beyond them in conceptualizing it,” for on the developmental account we do not apply concepts to some other, received content over against it. We can then notionally—in fact really—differentiate them (by pointing at the sensory episodes of animals and infants in contrast to those of adult humans) without leading ourselves down the garden path of thinking what distinguishes us from animals is that we apply concepts to deliverances of sensibility which we share with them. Feeling/sensing and experiencing are not related in that way, as input constituent is to output composite, nor as
genus is to species, but as the seed is to the plant.\textsuperscript{109} This preserves the desired commonality, but without forcing us to conceive the contrast in terms of an addition of some differentiating component on top of a shared one.\textsuperscript{110} \textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{109} The “indistinctness” of a sensory impression is not meant to imply that there is anything lacking in its intensity or reality.

\textsuperscript{110} Note, too, that on the Hegelian picture as I have reconstructed it this means it is wrong, strictly speaking, to understand our second nature in terms akin to conceptuality reshaping our animal nature, for that would suggest something much closer to the faculty dualism we are trying to usurp. It is more correct to say: conceptuality is a reshaping of our animal nature—it is our natural determinations in a reshaped form.

\textsuperscript{111} There is another virtue of the Hegelian picture, one which has to do not strictly with the sort of naturalistic stance we assume, but with, on a related note, the sort of importance we ascribe to empirical study of the physiological and behavioral similarities between animals and humans, and on this account what similarities we conclude exist in the nature of their respective perceptual states. As Eva Schmidt summarizes, taking the conceptualist to task:

\begin{quote}
We normally use empirical methods to test whether an animal’s perception is similar to that of an adult. The perceptual organs and brain structures underlying adult human perception and the perception of higher animals are very similar; that is normally taken to be evidence for how similar their perceptual states and their contents are. […] By contrast, the conceptualist argues that animals cannot have perceptual experiences with the same kind of content as humans because there is an \textit{a priori} connection between concept possession and the possibility of perceptual states with genuine content. Thereby, he implies that actual similarities or difference between human and animal perception, which can be studied by empirical investigation, are completely irrelevant to the similarity and human and animal perceptual content. This is extremely implausible. The question whether animals, infants and adult humans have the same perceptual states with the same kind of content cannot be decided by \textit{a priori} reasoning alone. If there are empirical studies showing that the brain structures and behavior involved in animal, infant and human perception are very similar, then our theories of perceptual content have to accommodate these results. (Schmidt 2010, 102-3)
\end{quote}

The Hegelian view avoids these epistemological worries. We can hold, along with the conceptualist, that there is an \textit{a priori} connection between concept possession and the possibility of perceptual states with thinkable contents. But unlike Schmidt’s conceptualist, we don’t have to take this to mean empirical data on similarities between human and animal perception are irrelevant. They are indeed relevant, as any well-derived empirical data is; but at most what such data implies is that humans and animals begin from a more-or-less shared biological or physiological base of unacquired sensory capacities. Recognizing this, the Hegelian can say that it is from this shared base that humans, on account of our social milieu and the relevant physiological differences which allow for us to exploit that milieu, develop further, acquiring capacities which instantiate different kinds of behavior, in addition to forms of behavior we continue to share in large part with animals. All that is really to say is that the argument Schmidt invokes, from observed similarities in physiology and behavior, to concluding a similarity in perceptual states and contents \textit{to the extent proposed by the typical nonconceptualist}—as essentially stating that adult human perceptual states have nonconceptual contents, in whole or even in part—was a poor one from the beginning. The existence of the first sort of similarities, in the absence of accounting for the clearly pervasive transformative action of the undeniable \textit{differences}, is indeed evidence for a similarity of a certain sort, but not necessarily of the sort Schmidt and other nonconceptualists hold. We can accommodate the similarities as something we, as infants, share with animals, and yet nevertheless think that from that initial state of similarity they are developed into something enriched. As thus developed and not entirely \textit{sui generis}, our perceptual states play, to a certain extent, a similar role in behavior as they do for animals—namely, they represent the world. But \textit{qua} transformed, they also play many other roles, and allow for a much richer expanse of behaviors, namely by having rational purchase within our capacities for thinking upon the contents of those representations. This is something animals cannot do, not simply because they lack the ability to reason but because their perceptual states are not of the sort available for reasoning, because they are not of a sort shaped
It also allows us to at last understand properly the sense in which cognition is for Hegel an activity “creative” of its contents. For as I want to stress, taking the more thoroughgoing Hegelian perspective on cognition requires much more than a slight emendation to McDowell’s nominally Hegelian account as centered on reviving a sense for our second nature; it requires a fundamental reorientation of that account as situated within the context of something much broader and far-reaching: recognition of second nature, through the prism of Entwicklung, as a central—in fact as we saw he himself affirm, perhaps the central—principle of Hegel’s thought. And this, to reiterate, means that it is not limited in its applicability to just sensory capacities’ developmental relation to rational ones, but so too to the contents or objects of those capacities, as likewise natural determinations. This means that cognition is creative of its object or content in the sense that it develops or actualizes it. If it is not yet entirely clear that Hegel indeed means his principle to extend this far, then I intend to leave no doubt, nor any about its implications.

1.5 The Creative Activity

Hegel at times refers to the creative activity mentioned in 1.3 as “abstractive thought [abstrahierende Denken],” which enters at the stage of Spirit called “Intelligence.” This is not abstraction as typically conceived, though. In contrast to that of classical metaphysics which we discussed in 1.3, according to which we extract the universal from the given (in fact, Given) material and dispense with what is incidental and contingent, leaving behind the

by another body of distinctly human behavior—linguistic practice. Thus, the conceptualist is wrong if he indeed ignores all empirical data and disavows any relevant similarities between animal and human perceptual contents; but the nonconceptualist is wrong if she overestimates the implications of the observed (as well as intuitive) similarities, not attending to clearly relevant dissimilarities, and so into thinking animals and infants have not just similar, but essentially the same—functionally speaking—kinds of perceptual states as do adult humans.
sensuous object to its own devices, abstraction in the Hegelian sense accomplishes a form of affectation upon the given, sensuous object itself, one which epitomizes the lessons of the Doctrine of Essence:

Abstractive thought, therefore, is not to be regarded as the mere discarding [bloßes Auf-die-Seite-Stellen] of a sensuous material [sinnlichen Stoffes] which does not suffer in this process any impairment of reality; it is rather the sublation and reduction [die Reduktion] of that material as mere appearance to the essential, which manifests [manifestiert] itself only in the concept.

(WB6 259/SL 519, trans. mod.)

Thus when Hegel invokes abstraction here he means to be describing it in a way that consciously distances it from the usual sense. Abstraction is not extraction of the universal from the particular, but the sublation of the particular itself, its externalization out of the form of appearance and—what is the same—its internalization into itself, into the promise of its concept.¹¹²

I think it worthwhile to note how pervasive this motif is within Hegel’s repertoire; it arises often, and is characterized by the imagery of Mind bringing objects to a “spiritual reality” or a “universality” beyond their merely contingent, individualized immediacy:

This being-together-with-itself [Beisichselbstsein] of the I in its differentiation is the infinity or ideality of the I. But this ideality authenticates [bewährt] itself only in the relation [der Beziehung] of the I to the infinitely manifold material confronting it [auf den ihm gegenüberstehenden unendlich mannigfaltigen Stoff]. When the I grasps [erfährt] it, this material is at once

¹¹² Moreover, the function of abstraction here is to be clearly opposed to empiricism’s abstractive model of concept formation, which Hegel, like other German idealists, roundly disparages:

In the production [Bei der Erzeugung] of universal representations, the intelligence thus operates spontaneously [verhält sich…selbstständig], it is, therefore, an inept mistake to assume that universal representations arose [entstanden], without any help from the mind [ohne Zutun des Geistes], by the superimposition of [dadurch, daß…aufeinanderfielen] many similar images [Bilder], that, for example, the red colour of the rose picked up [aufsuchte] the red of other images situated in my head [in meinem Kopf befindlicher], and thus conveyed to me [mir…beibrächte], a mere spectator [dem bloß Zusehenden], the universal representation of red. Of course, the particular element belonging to the image is something given [ist das dem Bilde angehörende Besondere ein Gegebenes]; but the analysis [die Zerlegung] of the concrete individuality of the image and the resultant form of universality [die dadurch entstehende Form der Allgemeinheit] come, as remarked, from myself [kommt...von mir her].

(WB10 266/PM 191; §456 Zusatz)
poisoned and transfigured [zugleich vergiftet und verklärt] by the universality of the I, loses its individualized, independent subsistence [verliert sein vereinzeltes, selbständiges Bestehen] and receives a spiritual reality [erhält ein geistiges Dasein]. (WB10 21/PM 12; §381 Zusatz)\(^\text{113}\)

In a word: the sensory material which comes before mind, “is spiritualized [vergeistigt...wird] and sublated in its sensoriness [als Sinnliches]” (WB10 235/PM 169; §442 Remark), and so thereby “what is in itself becomes for Mind and thus arrives at being for itself” (WVA13 35/LHP1 22-3).\(^\text{114}\)

Moreover, this universality or “spiritual reality” is conceptuality; the object is made a rational content. “The implicitly rational content of the object [den an sich vernünftigen Inhalt des Gegenstandes],” Hegel says, is “raised [erhebt] out of the form of externality and individuality [Äußerlichkeit und Einzelheit] into the form of reason” (WB10 239/PM 172 §444 Zusatz). In fact, he tells us that this elevation of the object is accomplished within the discursive ambit of language as a paradigmatic exercise of abstractive Intelligence, which

\(^{113}\) Elsewhere in the Philosophie des Geistes:

…intelligence fills itself [erfüllt sich] with the object immediately given to it [dem ihr unmittelbar gegebenen Objekte], which, precisely on account of its immediacy, is burdened with all the contingency, nullity and untruth of external reality [mit aller Zufälligkeit, Nichtigkeit und Unwahrheit des äußerlichen Daseins behaftet ist]. But intelligence, far from confining itself to merely accepting the immediately presented content of objects [Bei dieser Aufnahme des unmittelbar sich darbietenden Inhaltes der Gegenstände bleibt aber die Intelligenz nicht stehen], purifies [reinigt] the object of that in it which shows itself to be purely external, to be contingent and null. (WB10 244/PM 175; §445 Zusatz 1)

The whole anthropological development of the mind presses on to this goal [Zu diesem Ziele drängt...hin]. As we here look back on [auf...zurückblicken] this development, we recall how the human soul, in contrast to [im Unterschiede von] the animal soul which remains sunk [versekt bleibenden] in the individuality and limitation [Beschränktheit] of sensation [der Empfindung], has raised itself above [sich über...erhoben] the limited content of what is sensed, a content that contradicts its implicitly infinite [an sich unendlichen] nature, has posited this content ideally, and particularly in habit [der Gewohnheit] has made it into [ihn zu...gemacht] something universal, recollected [Erinnertem], total, into a being. (WB10 198/PM 141; §412 Zusatz)

\(^{114}\) “…was an sich ist, wird für den Geist, und so wird er für sich selbst.” Recall from 1.4 Hegel’s declaration that “in-itself” is his name for ὀνόματι, potentiality, and the “for-itself” his name for ἐνέργεια, actuality. When he says this, then, we can translate it thus: “what is potential becomes for Mind and thus arrives at actuality.”
allows for the *rational purchase* the contents thereby assume, i.e. their entry into the space of reasons:

Sound articulating itself further [*sich weiter artikulierende*] for determinate representations, *speech* [*die Rede*], and its system, *language* [*die Sprache*], give to sensations, intuitions, representations a second, higher reality [*Dasein*] than their immediate one, in general [*überhaupt*] an existence [*ein Existenz*] that carries weight [*die...gilt*] in the *realm of representation* [*im Reiche des Vorstellens*]. (WB10 271/PM 195; §459)

Of course, since the transformation to Spirit, like all dialectical transitions, lies on a continuum, the precise manner of this conceptual apprehension, pertaining to different stages throughout the experience of consciousness, will differ. The modes and layers of this actualization into Spirit, by means of various ascending levels of discursivity, are, essentially, the subject matter of (primarily) the *Phänomenologie* and the *Philosophie des Geistes*, and we have no reason to catalogue them here. The point is that these specific figures are variations on a theme, and waypoints on an overriding trajectory; regardless of the context in which the motif arises, regardless of the specific matters at issue, across various figures of conceptual articulation, from the first crude emergence of Intelligence to its more sophisticated manifestations as “study of Nature” and the conduct of the empirical sciences, Hegel speaks of this affection of Mind upon Nature itself. Moreover, he characterizes this affection again and again in terms of “freeing” and “liberation”—as the coming to actualization of essence—rather than imposition or extrinsic ordering after the fashion of the form of subjectivity.

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115 Like Sellars, Hegel thinks of natural science as simply a “sophisticated extension” of empirical knowledge (Sellars 1997, 79).

116 A good basic framework for understanding the transitional nature of development as resulting in *layers* of actuality as regards the Idea is given by Karin de Boer:

Hegel reconstructs this totality [of nature], first, by positing the most general forms of externality as poorest determinations of the concept as such and, second, by comprehending each determination as prevailing over the power of externality to a larger extent than the preceding one. (de Boer 2010, 129-30).
Sensory consciousness therefore apprehends the object immediately as subsisting [als seyende], a something, an existing thing, an individual entity, and its immediacy as determined in and for itself. What the object is otherwise in its concrete form concerns the spirit [...]. [...] In this way it exists for [sensory] consciousness only as an external entity, neither externally for itself nor a being external to itself. The other [i.e. the object of sensory consciousness] can receive [kann...erhalten] this freedom only through the freedom of the spirit. (GW13 226/EPS 216; §335 Remark, trans. mod.)

…it is precisely in the concept that the manifold is sublated inasmuch as it pertains to intuition as opposed to the concept, and that through the concept [durch den Begriff] the subject matter [der Gegenstand] is restored to [in zurückgeführt sei] its non-contingent essentiality [seine nicht zufällige Wesenheit]; the latter does enter into appearance, and this is why appearance is not something merely essenceless [nicht bloß ein Wesenloses], but is the manifestation [Manifestation] of essence. When this manifestation of essence is set free [ganz frei gewordene], then we have the concept. (WB6 263/SL 521, trans. mod.)

…the experiential sciences [Erfahrungswissenschaften] carry with them the stimulus [den Reiz] to vanquish [zu besiegen] the form in which the wealth of their content is offered only as something that is merely immediate and simply found [Gefundenes], as a manifold of juxtaposition [neben einander gestelltes Vielfaches], hence as something altogether contingent [überhaupt Zufälliges]. They are stimulated to elevate [zu erheben] this content to [the level of] necessity [...] On the one hand, this development is just a taking up [nur ein Aufnehmen] of the content and of the determinations that it displays [seiner vorgelegten Bestimmungen]; but, on the other hand, it also gives these determinations the shape [die Gestalt] of coming forth freely [frei...hervorzugehen] (in the sense of original thinking) in accordance with

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This characterization is applicable not just to the developmental movements of Nature but also to Spirit.

117 Di Giovanni translates ‘in zurückgeführt’ as ‘reduced to.’ However, this can be misleading unless we keep in mind that any sense of “reduction” here must be understood in terms of the complexities of ‘Aufhebung,’ and so I think it better to translate it as ‘restored to.’
the necessity of the matter itself alone [nur nach der Notwendigkeit der Sache selbst]. (WB8 56/EL 36; §12, trans. mod.)¹¹⁸

The study of Nature is thus the liberation [die Befreiung] of Spirit in her, for Spirit is present [wird darin] in her in so far as it is in relation [sich bezieht], not with an Other, but with itself. This is also the liberation of Nature; implicitly [an sich] she is Reason, but it is through Spirit that Reason as such first emerges [tritt…heraus] from Nature into existence [in die Existenz].

(WB9 23/PN 13; §246 Zusatz)

Spirit, then, does not just carry along Nature with it and elevate it too to Spirit in just any way it pleases, but specifically in the sense that this is a process of bringing to “being-for-

¹¹⁸ For Hegel, the fact that Nature is the unrestricted externality of the Idea is not to say that freedom is the domain of Nature. On the contrary:

The infinite wealth and variety of forms and what is most irrational, the contingency which enters into the external arrangement of the shapes of nature [in die äußerliche Anordnung der Natugebilde], have been extolled [gerühmt] as the lofty [hohe] freedom of Nature, even as the divinity of Nature, or at least the divinity within it. This confusion of contingency, caprice, and disorder with freedom and rationality is attributable to the sensuous mode of representation. This weakness of Nature sets limits to philosophy and it is quite improper to expect the Notion to comprehend—or as it is said, construe or deduce—these contingent products of Nature. It is even imagined that the more trivial and isolated the shape [das Gebilde], the easier is the task of deducing it. (WB9 34-5/PN 23; §250 Remark, trans. mod.)

¹¹⁹ The expression that qualifies the meaning of this development giving the content “the shape of coming forth freely” is “im Sinne ursprünglichen Denkens”—“in the sense of original thinking.” It is not immediately clear from the passage what this means, but the Zusatz helps us somewhat:

Because philosophy owes its development to the empirical sciences, it gives to their content the fully essential shape [die wesentlichste Gestalt] of the freedom of thinking (of what is a priori), as well as the validation of necessity [die Bewährung der Notwendigkeit]; instead of the verification [der Beglaubigung] which belongs to simply finding and to the fact as something experienced [des Vorfindens und der erfahren Tatsache], the fact becomes [zur…werde] the display and emulation [Darstellung und Nachbildung] of the original and completely independent activity of thinking [der ursprünglichen und vollkommen selbständigen Tätigkeit des Denkens]. (WB8 58/EL 37; §12 Zusatz, trans. mod.)

The “originality” and “independence” of the activity of thinking is characterized here in terms of its freedom and apriority. But for Hegel true freedom is at the same time a form of necessity, just the genuine necessity of Reason and not of, say, natural causal forces. The latter is only necessity in the abstract, and in fact immediately turns into its supposed opposite, the arbitrary indeterminacy of pure chance and contingency. Nor can the arbitrary be considered the essence of freedom—see esp. WB7 65-7, 68/EPR 48-9, 50 (§15 and its Remark, and §16). Neither of these apparently opposed, but in fact mutually equivalent, moments is genuine necessity, concretely thought. “Original thinking” means thinking in the determination of rationality. This determination is freedom from the weakness of Nature in Spirit or the space of reasons. Thus: the development executed by cognition gives the content the shape of coming forth freely, which means releases it into its truth not as contingent Given (and grounded simply in being sensed) but as a spiritual content with a rational valence, thus not conditioned from outside the space of reasons but a original to it. “Thinking that is original” means thinking not grounded in the determination of immediate Nature but of Reason, therefore autonomous. On freedom as a kind of self-determining self-relation, autonomy, see e.g. WB7 67-8/EPR 49 (§15 Zusatz) and 74-5/54 (§22 Remark and §23).
itself,” that is, Actuality, the natural object—its release beyond the limitations and impediments of its own weakness as a purely natural determination, and into its “spiritual reality” as having rational bearing. This “liberation” is the essential ambition and vocation of conceptual thought, and encompasses a broad class of figures of consciousness, or moments of Spirit in its ascension. Indeed, we cannot separate the affectation upon Nature by Mind from Mind’s own ascension. For the development of mind’s conceptual capacities and the elevation of Nature to the dignity of Spirit are, he tells us, two sides of the same coin:

Intelligence, in altering [Indem...macht] the object [den Gegenstand] from external to internal, internalizes [vinnerlicht] itself. These two, the internalizing [die Innerlichmachung] of the object and the recollection [die Erinnerung] of the mind, are one and the same thing. That of which the mind has a rational knowledge becomes a rational content [wird...zu einem vernünftiges Inhalt] just in virtue of its being known in a rational way. Thus intelligence removes [streift...ab] the form of contingency [Zufälligkeit] from the object, grasps [erfaßt] its rational nature and so posits [setzt] it as subjective; and, conversely, in this way it at the same time cultivates [bildet...aus] subjectivity into the form of objective rationality [zur Form der objektiven Vernünftigkeit]. Thus what is at first abstract, formal knowledge becomes concrete knowledge, filled with genuine content [mit dem wahrhaften Inhalt angefüllten], hence objective knowledge. When intelligence attains [zu...gelangt] this goal set for it by its concept [diesem durch ihren

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120 This ascension, of course, hardly concludes with Intelligence, which is not yet what Hegel calls the “absolute actualization [Verwirklichung]” (WB10 29/PM 18; §383 Zusatz) of Spirit; it only represents a finality with respect to the actualization of the object of cognition in its objectivity. Thus, Hegel instead calls it the “first being-for-self of mind” (WB10 30/PM 19 §384 Zusatz). See also fn. 101.

What Intelligence does represent is the highest form of Theoretical Mind, where Subjective and Objective Mind have both been sublated. These structures and dynamics of Intelligence, then, persist for their own part, though still subject to further enrichment and working-out in Practical and Absolute Mind. In the transition to these figures, then, the basic form of the object is retained, and serves as the ultimate statement of the nature of mind viewed through the lens of the theoretical standpoint, essentially correct within that sphere of analysis, encompassing questions of cognition, knowledge, objective validity, etc. Thus why Hegel insists Intelligence manifests the mediated unity of thinking and being (see WB10 283-4/PM 202-3; §465 and its Zusatz)

But in Intelligence this unity of Subjective and Objective Mind remains felt in a certain sense still on the subjective side, and has not yet fully integrated itself into objectivity, i.e. into objectifying itself. It begins to do so only in Will, which forms the transition to Practical Mind, and in which Mind goes on to become aware of its content as being determined by it (WB10 287-8/PM 205-6; §468 and its Zusatz). The distinction between Will and Intelligence is only how Will treats or reacts to its knowledge of things in light of its grasp of the Concept, that is, how it treats itself in relation to this. On this, see WB10 42/PM 28 (§387 Zusatz) and WB10 287/PM 205 (§468).
This freedom of the object, bound to the freedom of Spirit itself in its self-understanding with respect to its relation to Nature, likewise is a condition of that development. Thus there is a co-determination or mutual cultivation of Mind and its object. And so if what is accomplished is the freedom of Nature as released into the dignity of Spirit, so too is Nature, as playing a role in this, a necessary component of the process of the increasing freedom of Spirit in its further development. This mutual evolution of Mind and its content is nothing other than the coming to be of the space of reasons from out of the shell of Nature.

121 ‘Recollection’ (Die Erinnerung) here means something like self-consciousness. In mere sensory consciousness, Mind is outside itself, has not yet returned to itself and recognized itself in the object, in the sense that the object is not yet a rational content (and therefore is not itself yet an objective content). In intelligence, by contrast, Mind returns to itself, recollects itself, through the objectivity of the object: […] intelligence is the dialectic of this immediate asunderness [of intuition], a dialectic that is for itself [die Intelligenz die für sich seelende Dialektik jenes unmittelbaren Außereinander]. Accordingly, mind posits [setzt] the intuition as its own [als die seinige], pervades [durchdringt] it, makes it into [macht sie zu] something internal, recollects itself in it [erinnert sich in ihr], becomes present to itself in it [wird sich in ihr genewàrtig], and hence free. (WB10 256/PM 184; §450 Zusatz)

122 Elsewhere:
…intelligence, […] is posited [gesetzt] as that form of mind in which the mind itself alters [verändert] the object and by the development of it also develops [fortenwickelt] itself to truth. (WB10 244/PM 175; §445 Zusatz 1)

…this stimulus [of the experiential sciences] pulls [reißt] thinking out of its abstract universality—and out of the satisfaction that is only warranted implicitly [der an sich gewàhrten Befriedigung heraus]—and drives [treibt] thinking on to develop itself by its own means [zur Entwicklung von sich aus]. (WB8 56/EL 36; §12, trans. mod.)

123 Hegel outlines this role as follows:
The various stages [Stufen] of this activity, which, with their semblance [dem Scheine], is the destiny [die bestimmung] of the finite mind to linger on and to pass through [zu verweilen und welche zu durchfaulen], are stages in its liberation [Befreiung]. In the absolute truth of this liberation the three stages—finding a world before it as a presupposed world [das Vorfinden einer Welt als einer vorausgesetzten], generating a world as posited by itself [das Erzeugen derselben als eines von ihm Gesetzten], and gaining freedom from it and in it [die Befreiung von ihr und in ihr]—are one and the same. (WB10 34/PM 22; §386)

See also WB10 29-32/PM 18-20 (§384) and WB10 256/PM 184 (§450) for further explications of this point. Nature for Hegel thus comes to play a role not unlike Fichte’s Anstoß, as the obstacle that impels subjectivity forward in its self-recognition, and, ultimately, the recognition of itself as an ethical agent. In fact, the dialectical relation between Spirit and Nature is absolutely essential not just to Hegel’s conception of the development of Spirit in a theoretical orientation, but just as much to his conception of freedom, for it is only as such that Nature can be the stage for a Spirit as practical agent. Indeed, for Hegel (and this is an inheritance both he and Schelling get from Fichte), experience of a world external to it is not simply an epistemic tribunal
The “creative activity” of cognition, then, does not signal anything like an idealism of intellectual intuition, or a dogmatic empirical idealism, which would threaten to collapse the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity back into a kind of recalcitrant monism (of spontaneity). With his Aristotelian and broadly naturalistic disposition, Hegel understands that this activity is not in the business of creating objects, bringing them into existence, nor even transforming them in accordance with determinations extrinsic to the objects themselves, but rather in bringing into being the entity in its actualized form, freeing it into

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124 Crowell notes a Laskian accusation that the panlogist (and Hegelian, on Lask’s reading) position is one of “pure Klarheitmasse,” or, as Crowell puts it, the making “logically ‘transparent’” of the material (Crowell 2001, 83-4), the resolving of “material into pure logicality,” (Crowell 2001, 48). But this accusation too is a false one. The transformation of Nature into Spirit does not achieve the absolute dissolution of all naturality. As we saw, on Hegel’s conception of this creative activity (“abstraction”) the natural determinations of the manifold confronting consciousness are not simply erased or discarded. Content is not evaporated into concept, since the result is the concretion of the concept as something Actual (in Hegel’s sense) rather than abstract (mere ideality). Just as Nature is not the complete absence of the Idea, but the Idea qua its self-alienation, so too is Nature as object of consciousness, thus raised to Spirit, not simply a nullification of its purely natural determinations:

Undoubtedly, traces of determination by the Notion [Begriffsbestimmung] are to be found even in the most particularized object, but it is not exhausted by this [dieses sich nicht durch sie erschopfen lassen]. Traces of this influence of the Notion and of this inner coherence [Zusammenhangs] will often surprise the investigator, but especially will appear particularly surprising, or rather incredible, to those who are accustomed to see only contingency in both natural and human history. One must, however, be careful to avoid taking such trace of the Notion for the totality of the determination of the forms [der Gebilde] […] (WB9 35/PN 23-4; §250 Remark, trans. mod.)

Even in the elevation of the entity to conceptuality, it is not as though it ceases to be an object of Nature in every conceivable respect, and achieves some rarified, ethereal existence, some beatific splendor apart from all materiality. That is decidedly not Hegel’s conception of Spirit. That would be to understand Spirit as something like Idea, the abstract moment, the pure, unadulterated Concept in repose. The point of Spirit in its passage through Nature, in its alienation and subsequent mediated return to itself, is to extricate itself from this mere abstraction and to find concretion—actual, real, tangible presence and effectivity. It is the catharsis of the Idea in Nature raised to its potential, impelled to its conative end. Thus why for Reason the Concept is not simple universality but the individual, the mediated unity of the universal and the particular. It is elevated to Concept, which for Hegel in and of itself signals concrete being. This is intrinsic to the very idea of what Hegel means by Spirit, and so could not be confused with a kind of logical “transparency.” Thus, as Robert Pippin observes, “it is clear that [Hegel] regards natural (including causal) explanation as an irreducible constituent of any adequate explanation of the world, as irreducible and in the proper domain autonomous” (Pippin 1999, 196).

Assuredly, this concretion is not resolution into a material existence conceived in a way that would be palatable to bold naturalism, but to understand concrete Spirit, as aspiration of the dialectic, apart from any sense of materiality or naturality, or as the complete sublimation of the same, is to ascribe to Hegel a position which cuts against positively every sinew of his conception of Spirit and of the dialectic.
itself, i.e. into its concept. The object is thus anything but “fabricated” by cognition. In this way Hegel’s criticism of Kant as we saw in 1.3 does not abandon transcendental idealism for dogmatic idealism precisely because Spirit “shapes” objects in the sense only of fully manifesting them in their objectivity, thereby releasing them into a determinacy appropriate to their concept, that is, their being-in-and-for-themselves, what they were always striving to be from the first.125

This is what Hegel means when he denies that there can be either a ready-made content or a cognitive process, which serves as the instrument or method, simply “found ready-made [vorgefundene] in the subject” (WB6 552/SL 738) for knowledge.126 Instead, content and cognition are in a dialectical relationship—as the manner of cognition hones its conceptual posture, what it considers is brought to a conceptual mode of reality, and as the content arises in new forms along this progression, cognition ascends in its rational comprehension of things. In other words, then, Hegel’s view of cognition and its object, rather than encompassing a relation between two static factors of form and content, independent and indifferent to one another, is one of dialectical co-development, wherein the natural world is not immediately one of normative import, but only becomes one through a process of unfolding and elaboration via its increasing comprehension by Mind in its self-

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125 ‘Creative’ is a translation of the participle ‘schaffende.’ ‘Schaffen’ and its derived forms can be used in myriad ways with a dizzying variety of translations. The verb itself most directly means ‘to produce’ or ‘to create’ (it can also mean ‘to achieve’ ‘to accomplish,’ or even ‘to complete’, all of which give the sense of a successful action). We could understand the sense of creation here to mean either bringing into being in the first place (and ‘schaffen’ can indeed mean this), or in the sense which highlights its obvious etymological connection to the English verb ‘shape.’ ‘To shape’ something is not to bring it into being but to mold it, and it is more in this sense of creation that I argue Hegel uses the participle ‘schaffende.’

126 Di Giovanni translates ‘vorgefunden’ here as ‘found ready-made.’ In earlier examples where we saw his phrasing of ‘ready-made,’ he translates it from ‘fertig.’ But the sense of ‘vorfinden’ is that of simply stumbling upon something already there prior to its detection. As such, it contains a sense of ‘fertig,’ which is a perfect foil to the sense in which Hegel wants to emphasize all these determinations are in fact present prior to thought—as implicit, as undeveloped.
ascension, and wherein its truth as a space of reasons, and not merely of causal laws, is eventually realized. Over the course of the Realphilosophie of the Encyclopaedia System (the Naturphilosophie and the Philosophie des Geistes) the husk of a Nature exhaustively describable merely in terms of mechanical, lawlike regularities (in accordance with the way it is understood in, e.g. the first Critique) is sloughed off, and what surfaces is a Nature increasingly enriched by more fully realizing its Concept, or Reason, its grounding impetus. This involves, in the first instance, the mere emergence of Spirit or Mind as its own crystallization out of Nature, but as Hegel makes clear above, the entire domain of Nature is in the midst of the forms of this ascension “transfigured” by its implication in the increasing fullness of the realization of Spirit’s conceptual activities. As Willem deVries summarizes, “To the extent that nature does not exemplify the ideals of spirit, nature falls short, and spirit must undertake to work its will on nature” (deVries 1988, 199-200).

As I said in the Introduction, the proposal can be readily put in McDowellian language as one of a second nature of entities; not only are we cultivated by our Bildung and inducted into the space of reasons, but so too are the things that populate the world. In Hegelian terms this second nature of entities can be translated into much the same claim as that Spirit—which, as Brandom observes, is for Hegel the realm of the normative (Brandom 2002e, 222), i.e. the space of reasons—does not merely emerge out of and supervene upon Nature, but constitutively turns back upon and reworks Nature itself, transforming it and elevating it to the level of Spirit, and, just as happens to Spirit, to a “shape [Gestalt] worthy of the concept” (WB10 366/PM 257; §553).
1.6 Conclusion: Naturalism, Answerability, and the Boundary of the Conceptual

Let us take stock. In this chapter I have taken aim at the accusation by Lask, and endorsed by Crowell, that Hegel is a panlogist because he collapses all content into conceptual content. I have shown that in fact Hegel, in a move which illustrates his rejection of the Myth of the Given, draws a clear distinction between sensory and rational determinations—more to the point, between nonconceptual and conceptual contents—and this distinction was shown to be a consequence of a wider doctrine, the weakness of Nature. What also emerged in this discussion, though, is that Hegel’s conception of the distinction likewise cannot be understood dualistically but instead developmentally, because, more broadly, Nature and Spirit as such stand in a developmental relationship to one another.

It is Hegel’s principle of Entwicklung which thus allows him to avoid, in one fell swoop, both panlogism and dualism. My larger point, though, is that the conceptual means by which he does so—a developmental view of the relation between Appearance and Essence, Nature and Spirit—informs what we might extract as a distinctive “logic” of sense and referent, and one which, as I briefly sketched at the end of the Introduction, results in a conception of senses as ways of actualizing their referents. By way of conclusion, I intend to explicate how exactly such a model, which, as we have seen, rejects the Myth and takes on board psychological nominalism and conceptualism about perceptual contents, nevertheless does not issue in any threat to Answerability or the Demand for Transcendental Friction, and in fact can stabilize the oscillation McDowell identified but failed to surmount.

Before Mind and World, the possibility of Hegel’s philosophy as providing refuge for epistemological realism even in the midst of a denial of the Myth and its attendant empiricist
foundationalism was recognized by Kenneth Westphal. In *Hegel’s Epistemological Realism*, Westphal contends that

> The important thing that Hegel sees, unlike many recent critics of foundationalism, is that in giving up foundationalism one needn’t give up realism. Realism survives the loss of the myth of the given and the loss of the myth of confronting theories with the brute facts or other unconceptualized reality. How realism survives this is, of course, a complicated story. (Westphal 1989, 159)

In fact, Westphal’s way of reconstructing this complicated story gets tantalizingly close, in my estimation, to documenting Hegel’s idealism of second nature, noting that the grasp of an object through a “self-externalization” of consciousness “makes the object itself into [macht ... zum] a ‘spiritual being’; that is, an antecedently extant being that has become for spirit: It is included in the social comprehension of the world” (Westphal 1989, 186). However, Westphal’s reconstruction of how this is so falls short in communicating the true originality of Hegel’s position and its intricacies, serving instead only to salvage a kind of representational realism—not the sort McDowell aims to safeguard with the themes of openness and transcendental friction, and that in fact Hegel too is after. The analysis culminates in a recognition of Hegel’s proclamations in Absolute Knowing at the end of the *Phänomenologie* that subjectivity has “produced [erzeugt]” its objects by a kind of conceptualization, but Westphal takes the fact that Hegel also refers to this production as a kind of “reproduction [Wiederherstellen]” of the object for consciousness (WB3 584) to substantiate the claim that what is produced is identical only in content, and not numerically identical to, the extant object (Westphal 1989, 187). This reproduction, then, is one which by

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127 While Westphal’s reading may make Hegel out to be an epistemological realist of a sort, it is hardly one which provides succor to anyone hoping to meet the Demand for Transcendental Friction. For, as I discuss, it means precisely that thinking does not reach right out to the world, but instead traffics in epistemic intermediaries.
its nature still results in the kind of semantic and epistemological intermediaries that dog the Wittgensteinian half of the Problematic.

This reading, though, contradicts everything we have come to understand about Hegel’s logic of appearance and essence as issuing in the principle of \(\text{Entwicklung}\) and the relation between Nature and Spirit as embodying this principle.\(^{128}\) Nor can Westphal’s interpretation make sense of Hegel’s repeated insistence that Mind merely “frees” Nature itself into a spiritual reality, a claim that can only live happily with the idea of reproduction as redoubling of the original object, the making of a mental model of the world, with a great deal of exegetical gymnastics. The problems with Westphal’s reading become most apparent when, in response to Hegel’s continuous language of “production,” Westphal comments that such claims are “puzzling,” saying he would “be happier if Hegel had explicitly called this ‘production’ of an object its intellectual reproduction” (Westphal 1989 282 n. 220). But as I have shown, there are good reasons for Hegel’s choice of terminology, and good reasons for us to take these choices seriously, when understood properly and in the full context of his idealism, particularly, of course, the principle of \(\text{Entwicklung}\).\(^{129}\) Recognizing that principle’s place in Hegel’s System, we can acknowledge that there is indeed a \(\text{Wiederherstellen}\) of the object by cognition, in that something extant becomes reshaped, established anew; this is a re-producing, a reforming, but it does not result in some object numerically distinct from the

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\(^{128}\) Themes whose upshot can perhaps be summarized in a single passage:
What we have said already implies that the transition [\(\text{der Übergang}\)] of nature to mind is not a transition to an out-and-out Other [\(\text{zu etwas durchaus anderem}\)], but is only a coming-to-itself [\(\text{ein Zusichselberkommen}\)] of the mind that is outside itself [\(\text{außer sich seienenden}\)] in nature. (WB10 25/PM 15; §381 Zusatz)

\(^{129}\) As we have seen, there are places elsewhere in Hegel’s corpus where motifs indicated in the \(\text{Phänomenologie}\)—such as the critique of cognition as an instrument or medium—are articulated at greater length and more clearly than in that early text. Rather than ascribe to Absolute Knowing what is in my estimation a dubious interpretation that flies in the face of Hegel’s signal contributions to post-Kantian idealism, expressed in more depth within the later System, I have laid out a more exegetically—and I think philosophically—satisfying alternative.
original. And it is on account of this that thought, on Hegel’s reckoning, cannot be seen as stopping anywhere short of the facts.

Critically, though, this admittance of the Wittgensteinian truism is not a result of having conceived Nature as McDowell suggests, as an expanse of reasons awaiting recognition as such. Hegel, in endorsing this idealism of second nature, arrives at his own form of naturalized platonism, one distinct from McDowell’s variety, which in comparison in fact appears somewhat more “rampant,” to borrow his own phraseology. If, as Paul Redding nicely encapsulates it, “what McDowell wants from Hegel […] is a workable conception of what we might call ‘the incarnation of Reason,’” (Redding 2007, 28) then I would contend that insofar as he conceives of himself as a Hegelian, McDowell’s picture nevertheless distorts Hegelianism by thinking of Reason as already, immediately “incarnated”—of Nature as from the outset coextensive with Spirit or the space of meaning.

The distortion comes down to the fact that McDowell’s resolution insists upon simply “deleting” any outer boundary to the conceptual. In doing so he is left with the same old a ready-made world we saw Hegel take to task, only with reasons as its furniture. Even in

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130 I take Sachs’ point to be that, if, as brought up already in 1.4, by McDowell’s own lights the realm of referents designates “no more than the independence any genuine reality must have,” then openness must be to the realm of not just sense but just as much referents, to some mind-independent reality in its mind-independence, something at least in some relevant respect external to or independent of thought or conceptuality (i.e. to sense), and not just to thinking. It follows that the Demand must be understood as placing a constraint on thought from something of a form necessarily unlike that of thought:

Recall that the Demand requires that some experienceable content have both the requisite quasi- or proto-normative structure to constrain the application of conceptual contents and that it be sufficiently distinct from conceptual contents to be a genuinely external constraint, and not just ‘more of the same’ (as arguably was the problem with 19th-century idealism). McDowell’s attempt to dislodge the oscillation between the Myth of the Given and coherentism is his version of the need to satisfy both constraints at once. But it is not clear if he can do so in a satisfactory way, because intuitional conceptual contents have the structure that they have—the structure that is supposed to constrain application of discursive conceptual contents—because they have, in fact, the exact same structure—the structure of conceptual content—that differs only by virtue of the mode in which that content is present (as discursively articulated or as intuitationally articulable). But since experience and judgment have the exact same content, and differ only in mode, McDowell cannot satisfy the Demand,
McDowell’s later, modified picture (discussed in the Introduction), according to which intuitional conceptual content is to be distinguished from discursive conceptual content by lacking the latter’s propositional form—and thus the world is not populated by reasons *per se*—it remains the case that what we are made receptive to by our second nature is an environment which is in itself intrinsically conceptual, and which we merely come to piece together into reasons. Thus, Carl Sachs in fact questions whether even the modified account adequately addresses the Demand, given that at its heart “the Demand requires that conceptual content itself be constrained by something external to it” (Sachs 2014, 19)—that is, something outside of conceptuality entirely, and not just external to reasons, or conceptual articulation which is of propositional form.\(^{131}\)

The truly Hegelian model suggests that there is another way altogether of understanding how something external to conceptuality—after a fashion—holds a grip on thought. And that is with the idea that there is indeed a boundary, though crucially not one between two pre-determined domains, but rather one where what is initially extraconceptual, but *potentially* conceptual, comes into its own in becoming conceptual. The proposal calls into question the very terms by which we would think of what it means for the conceptual to

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because the Demand requires that conceptual content itself be constrained by something external to it.” (Sachs 2014, 18-9)

McDowell cannot really satisfy the Demand, then, because he just makes the world cognitively significant from the get-go; he thus effaces this “externality requirement,” or, as I have otherwise put it, the “naturalness” of nature.

Sachs suggests the only live alternative to McDowell’s picture is the positing of a third space between the space of causality and the space of reasons: a proto-normativity found in the embodied, non-discursive character of somatic intentionality, which in his view affords a “non-Mythical” form of Givenness. I cannot give Sachs the attention his own view deserves. I think Sachs is wrong, and McDowell right, at least on this one score: appeal to a nonconceptual stratum of content will always run afoul of the Myth.

Additionally, McDowell’s modified view, with its idea of conceptual contents which are not discursive contents, seems to run afoul of Frege’s context principle, and seems to suggest there are sub-propositional semantic atoms. But given the fact that this does not even address the externality requirement adequately, I think we should not go this route, and, in keeping with the Fregean-Sellarsian half of the Problematic, should deny the idea of such semantic atoms.
have or not have a boundary at all. For in one sense we cannot rightly speak of one; there is nothing that by its nature stands outside of all discursivity, and to which thought holds any kind of relation, or from which it receives any rational succor. 132 Nothing other than what is, as actualized, conceptual bears upon or has rational purchase within thought. 133 At the same time, though, there is another substantial sense in which we can speak of something like a boundary, for the world is not possessing of cognitive significance from the outset, but must be brought to such a reality. This proposal for a second nature of entities can do justice to the naturalness of nature and meet the “externality requirement,” because what is meant by that which falls “outside” the conceptual is but its antecedent figure, the space of nature, before its coming into its truth as a space of reasons.

Put otherwise, all parties have understood the very notion of a boundary in terms of a spatial metaphor, as a static border, the extent of which is in question. But the Hegelian insight is that if we must use such a metaphor, we should understand it as something dynamic. The horizon is not fixed, and the expanse of conceptuality is not a pre-determined and persisting domain; rather, the boundary itself moves, and indeed this is crucial to understanding conceptuality—and empirical thought—properly. Nothing is of itself inside the space of reasons, but everything is capable of inclusion within it. As such, there is no “arché beyond discourse,” the extent of the conceptual is indeed boundless, and, correspondingly, “the conceptual”—or sense—could be said to properly designate not a

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132 It is certainly the case that there is nothing external to it which the conceptual simply re-doubles, imitates, mirrors, represents, stands in as proxy for in thought, etc.

133 Nowhere in this picture do we exit out of conceptuality. It goes without saying that on this view there is no Ding-an-Sich, for the sense is just the referent-as-actualized. So empirical thought reaches without obstruction to what is the case, to the referents, though not by admitting of a “sideways-on” view of language or allowing a position of “cosmic exile.” That which is actualized and available to thought as conceptual content is nothing other than the thing itself.
region, but an event or activity, not something intentionality or Spirit gloms onto, but something it does or achieves.

Nevertheless, this is not some arbitrarily creative achievement. On the contrary, it gives us a way of understanding how there is rational constraint by something external to thought and all conceptuality. For something external to thinking serves to inferentially constrain empirical thought, similarly to how it does for McDowell: the Actual, that is the Rational, the world as actualized into discursivity, does so, acting as an expanse of reasons. But more to the point, something genuinely external to all conceptual content, that is, something altogether prior to the Actual, prior to the actualization of the Rational, places constraints on the terms and the possibilities of the accomplishment of that actualization, and thus on the thought contents issuing from it that we enjoy.\footnote{In fact, the very formulation of “accomplishment” suggests constraint, since accomplishment implies success, which implies success conditions.} Nature, as δύναμις for Spirit, constrains the possibilities of actualization, that is, the potential senses. In this respect, we continue to distance ourselves from any appeal to something extraconceptual as inferentially constraining thought in the manner of Givens, for the point is not that potentialities in the world impact us and within experience act as non-inferentially acquired contents exerting inferential influence over empirical beliefs. The point, rather, is that built into the world are nonconceptual constraints—although open-ended ones—on what conceptual contents can be actualized, ones imposed by the bandwidth of potentialities belonging to the referents themselves. While not directly inferentially constraining, then, there is no slight to objects’ status as ultimately rationally and epistemically constraining in the manner Sachs articulates with the externality requirement; for it is completely in keeping with the original emphasis McDowell rightly insists upon—the Problematic as being fundamentally a transcendental
one, as upstream from epistemic concerns, about the provenance and conditions of cognitive semantics—to say that the form of constraint at issue is inferential and epistemic *because it is first and foremost cognitive-semantic*, the latter being the sense in which *potentialities* themselves are said to provide friction, such that their *actualities* may thereby serve as reasons, and exert inferential force in thought.
Chapter 2
Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Heidegger’s Problematic

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to argue not only that McDowell’s Problem is amenable to contributions from Heidegger’s philosophy, but, even more, that Heidegger’s work is oriented toward the same themes and, effectively, the same problem. I do this by translating both halves of McDowell’s Problematic, articulated as they are in the language of contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and language, into the intimidating terminology of Heidegger’s phenomenology circa his early magnum opus, 1927’s BT. Through the work of this translation, it will be shown that the two halves of McDowell’s Problematic do not simply emerge, incidental and disjointed, in Heidegger’s philosophy; rather, the apparent tension is a crucial wellspring of the essence of his early thought, and informs the very roots of his project in the 1920s, culminating in BT.

I begin with an analysis in 2.2 of how Heidegger is committed to the idea that Dasein is always intimately open to the world in the respects required by the Demand for Transcendental Friction. Although attributing something generally like the thesis of openness to Heidegger is not controversial, I argue that, contra the conception of his concerns as fundamentally orthogonal to those of epistemology (which Heidegger himself often perpetuated), his insistence upon openness in particular is in point of fact ultimately driven by epistemic concerns, specifically with regard to a methodological demand for

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135 It is worth noting that in broad strokes translation between these idioms has already been either presumed or put to work, quite productively, by others—particularly Robert Brandom, John Haugeland, and Mark Okrent.
136 Though they also extend well beyond it.
phenomenology’s efficacy that lies at the very roots of Heidegger’s philosophical commitments to that tradition.

Having demonstrated that Heidegger is committed to the first of McDowell’s desiderata, I continue by arguing for what is unmistakably a much more contentious claim: Heidegger’s simultaneous adherence to a rejection of anything like a semantic or epistemic Given—and specifically on grounds which a Sellarsian would find familiar. The argument for this constitutes the bulk of the chapter. I start in 2.3 by tracing the steps in Heidegger’s understanding of meaning, showing how his notion of Bedeutsamkeit (significance) satisfies all the key features of Frege’s notion of Sinn (sense), and even plays a similar explanatory role in his thought as the one attributed by McDowell in his conception of the Fregean insight. I continue in 2.4 by showing in detail how Heidegger’s discussions about the relationship between perception and language (or “intuition” and “expression”) surprisingly mirror—extremely closely—Sellars’ attack on the Myth of the Given the primary and most notorious line of argument by which the latter defends the centrality of language and conceptuality for any account of cognitive perspective.

Nevertheless, the claim that Heidegger understands our relationship to the world as fundamentally conditioned by language and conceptuality is quite a heterodox one, running counter to the prevailing reading in the secondary literature. Therefore, in 2.5 I systematically argue that the received understanding of Heidegger, according to which language and interpretation are secondary phenomena to a more primordial form of engagement with the world, is incorrect. I do so by contending head-on with two of the view’s notable, and most emphatic, expositors, Mark Wrathall and Taylor Carman, showing that the general family of readings of which they are representatives are exegetically unsound, and so that Heidegger
indeed conceives the place of language and the discursive dimensions of our being much as McDowell does.

With Heidegger’s commitment to the essential features of both halves of McDowell’s Problematic established, I close the chapter by proposing that the dilemma itself not only can be, but can readily be translated into familiar Heideggerian language, and that the result is something Heideggerians should be quite comfortable with as an undistorted representation of many interwoven aspects of his thought. Indeed, the Problematic in its Heideggerian guise does not arise accidentally, but is fundamentally connected to signal tensions at the forefront of his unique approach to philosophy, stemming from his ambition to integrate hermeneutics into phenomenology.

2.2 Phenomenology and Answerability-to-the-World

In a response to McDowell’s *Mind and World*, Ian Lyne argues that we should distinguish a normative conception of openness from an ontological one, and uses this distinction to compare and contrast Heidegger and McDowell’s versions of the thesis (Lyne 2000). On the normative conception, empirical thought must find its justification in the world, and so is “answerable” to it, while on the ontological conception, the contents of empirical thought are nothing other than slices of the world (to invoke again Wittgenstein’s image, thinking things are thus-and-so does not stop short of the world, at some intermediary item or content). In other words, when we speak as McDowell does of having “a direct hold on the facts” (McDowell 1994, 113), we could understand this both in terms of possessing certain “epistemic rights” (and therefore just as much possessing certain epistemic responsibilities) as well as in terms of direct access to the bits of the world upon which the relevant epistemic facts supervene. While Lyne refers to these as the normative and ontological dimensions of
the “Openness to Reality Conjecture,” I will term them simply “answerability” and “openness,” respectively. We have more or less already met the distinction, in carrying over Sachs’ division between epistemic and semantic registers of the Myth of the Given to understanding parallel dimensions of the “Demand for Transcendental Friction”: that Demand may be understood epistemically or semantically.

As Lyne sees it, McDowell is ultimately driven less by ontological concerns per se as he is by a motivation to defend the normative thesis of the answerability of thought to the world. Nevertheless, according to Lyne, McDowell “slips” from this normative conception to an ontological one. This presents problems for McDowell’s account because, as Lyne contends, the ontological move is at best extraneous and at worst problematic: it leads to “obscurities” (Lyne 2000, 309-10), a charge he also levies at Heidegger, who he sees as “dropping” the normative concern altogether and understanding openness in purely ontological terms, to the detriment of his thought (Lyne 2000, 300).137 The problems and obscurities Lyne argues result from a fixation on openness, whether motivated as a prolegomenon to answerability or otherwise, are more or less akin to the ones identified in the Introduction: it results in butting up against difficulties about how to understand the relationship between referent and cognitive significance, and the fact that the introduction of the distinction threatens to open an ontological gap between mind and world, particularly with regard to their disparity in terms of fineness of grain.138

137 And indeed, Ernst Tugendhat’s famous criticism of Heidegger’s theory of truth (Tugendhat 1967) essentially lies in the claim that Heidegger’s account of truth cannot make sense of the notion of falsity, and therefore essentially suggests that Heidegger, in leaving us unable to distinguish truth from falsity, leaves us unable to approach the matter of the normativity of belief. Tugendhat’s argument warrants a fuller consideration than I can give it here.
138 Oddly, Lyne articulates the disparity between fineness of grain as going in the opposite direction as how it should: “With the notion of a normative linguistic practice firmly in place, one can talk, if one wishes, in terms of the world ‘figuring’ in our practices, but again without there being the pressure to individuate our practices as finely
The idea that empirical thought, though, is answerable to the world presupposes the idea that it is ontologically open to it by way of experience. For how can it be that thinking things are thus-and-so is answerable to things being thus and so unless we have access, presumably afforded us by experience, to things being thus-and-so? It is this access which furnishes us with thinking things are thus-and-so (with the relevant representational contents) in the first place, and therefore places a normative demand on us by placing us at the doorstep of, if not directly within, the space of reasons. Observation reports, and concomitant attitudes upon them, (that is, empirical thought) are and could only be answerable to the world because experience is ontologically open to the world, and because experience is a tribunal for empirical thought. And so, while the answerability of empirical thought and the openness of experience are indeed logically distinct, McDowell means answerability to rise and fall with openness, since answerability in the terms in which he conceives rests upon openness.

Indeed, the basic idea behind the unifying thesis can be stripped of unnecessary baggage by simply understanding it thus: our attitudes about the world are answerable to the world in as the world” (Lyne 2000, 309). But the disparity of fineness of grain is introduced from the fact that sense, the domain of normative linguistic practices, is more fine-grained than reference or the world, not less. The confusion seems to arise from Lyne’s understanding of Frege’s distinction as aimed at accounting for the informativeness of identity statements like “Hesperus is Phosphorus” by the idea that such statements show to the proficient language user that their commitments in using one name outstrip what they took them to be: “One might use the name ‘Hesperus’ in making statements without appreciating that one is thereby committing oneself to parallel claims involving use of the name ‘Phosphorus’” (Lyne 2000, 309). The idea seems to be, then, that the world encompasses more and more finely-individuated content than that for which the content embedded in our practices account. But the entire point of Frege’s investigation is that in linguistic practices where we use ‘Hesperus’ we aren’t thereby committed to parallel claims involving, mutata mutandis, ‘Phosphorus’ precisely because our “commitments” (or any of our propositional attitudes) can’t be understood on an extensional level; thus the need to introduce senses to distinguish between cognitive values and preserve, on this level at least, a consistent configuration of mind where we are not viewed as holding extensionally contradictory beliefs. The way to do this is to understand senses as carving up contents more finely than the world, understood as carved up into referents, is carved.
being answerable to our receptivity to the world (i.e. experience). Put thusly, the thesis can
be dissolved into three claims:

1) Empirical thought is answerable to the world (W-Answerability) because
2) We are receptive to the world (Openness) and
3) Empirical thought is answerable to the deliverances of our receptivity to the world (E-
Answerability).

It is true that McDowell does often use W- and E-Answerability interchangeably, and
switches to the latter particularly when he wants to invoke the Quinean image of the tribunal
of experience. The reason for this vacillation is somewhat more understandable, though,
when we reflect that W-Answerability is meant to already call to mind, as a part of our
understanding of it and E-Answerability (because it is a consequence of them). For this
reason, McDowell says that the motivation that forms one half of his Problematic centers on
understanding empirical thought or belief as “rationally answerable, by way of experiential
openness, to the world itself” (McDowell 1994, 143, emphasis added). That experience is
characteristically open, and that beliefs’ answerability to the world is by way of experience in
its character as open, simply expresses, respectively, (2) and (3) above.

It should be recalled, of course, that McDowell’s task is not to substantiate these
potentially separable theses, but rather to show that they can be made to fit with a rejection of
the Given. Accordingly, my task here is not to defend the theses as such, but instead
consists only of the exegetical task of showing that, contra Lyne’s reading of Heidegger—
which essentially amounts to claiming Heidegger is unconcerned with W-answerability
because he is unconcerned with E-answerability—Heidegger is deeply concerned with these
issues and accepts all three theses.

139 At most, his task in Mind and World involves merely stoking our intuitions in favor of the theses.
Now the idea that Heidegger is wedded to Openness, or, as Lyne calls it, the ontological dimension of the Openness to Reality Conjecture, is, I think, not particularly controversial (Lyne’s reading, for instance, admits of it). It will do, however, to remind ourselves of some of the areas in Heidegger’s thought where it is most on display, not only because it will help us keep in mind the centrality of his motivations for endorsing it, but also because, as will be shown, those motivations in fact in fact converge with those favoring his endorsement of answerability.

One of the most obvious places where openness is on display in Heidegger’s thought comes with his conception of truth as disclosure (Erschlossenheit). As Heidegger says, ‘erschließen’ and ‘Erschlossenheit’ themselves mean “to lay open [‘aufschließen’]” and “the character of having been laid open [‘Aufgeschlossenheit’]” (GA2 101/BT 105). In a line of argument Heidegger repeats across his early oeuvre, if we are to make any sense of correspondence or adequation between a statement and the state of affairs it represents, then we must recognize the underlying phenomenon of, so to speak, presentation itself, the showing of the state of affairs that the statement affords; if the statement does not present the state of affairs, then it can hardly be made intelligible how it represents it, in a way which would admit of any kind of correspondence or homogeneity. Heidegger thus submits that, because this showing or presentation is more primordial than, and is the ground or condition of, truth as correspondence, it should by rights be called truth. One of his clearest summaries of the point comes in the later essay “On the Essence of Truth”:

A statement [Die Aussage] is invested with its correctness [Richtigkeit] by the openness [der Offenständigkeit] of comportment; for only through the latter

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140 Elsewhere in BT he uses different terminology, speaking of “die Weltoffenheit des Dasein” (GA2 183). In the marginalia from his own copy of BT, Heidegger equates Offenheit with both ἀλήθεια and the term which figures more in his later thought, Lichtung (GA2 177 n. A). The marginal comment is likely itself from long after 1927, but the equation of Offenheit with ἀλήθεια is contemporary with Heidegger’s work in the 1920s.
can what is opened up really become the standard for representative correspondence [vor-stellende Angleichung]. […] But if the correctness (truth) of statements becomes possible only through this openness of comportment, then what first makes correctness possible must with more original right be taken as the essence of truth. (GA9 185/OET 142, trans. mod.)

This “openness of comportment” is understood precisely as McDowell understands Wittgenstein’s truism—as indicating the immediate figuring of the things themselves in the comportment. Andrew Bowie has noted that a number of McDowell’s idioms, notably openness itself, bear more than a passing resemblance to some of Heidegger’s, and even suggests an indirect intellectual inheritance via McDowell’s references to Gadamer (Bowie 1996, 536). The suggestion, we shall see, is plausible.

Heidegger’s account of uncovering and his rebuff of the correspondence theory of truth must be viewed within the context of his critique of representationalism, which makes undeniably perspicuous his dedication to Openness. In his 1937-8 lecture course, Basic Questions of Philosophy, Heidegger traces the history of representationalism, highlighting how epistemological concerns inevitably led to “doubt as to whether our representing reaches [erreiche] the entity itself and in itself at all, or does not rather remain enclosed within the circuit of its own activity [in den Umkreis seiner eigenen Tätigkeit] […]” (GA45 16-7/BQP 16, trans. mod.). Since, then, all that we are acquainted with are just representations, “thinking” about what we perceive—judging, believing, cognizing in general—become conceptualized as representational operations performed on other representations: “Consequently knowledge and assertions consist [besteht] in the representation of representations and hence in a combination [Verbindung] of representations. This combining is an activity and a process [Vorgang] taking place [abspielt] merely ‘in our consciousness’”

141 See also Bowie’s n. 21 on the same page.
Heidegger distinguishes idealism and what he generically calls “realism” as philosophical attitudes that are not really at odds, but, on the contrary, are based on the same fundamental presumption:

The doctrine that our representing relates only to the represented, the perceptum, the idea, is called idealism. The counterclaim [Die Gegenmeinung], according to which our representing reaches the thing themselves (res) and what belongs to them (realia), has been called, ever since the advance of idealism, realism. Thus these hostile brothers, each of whom likes to think himself superior to the other, are unwittingly in complete accord [sind…völlig einig] with regard to the essence, i.e., with regard to what provides the presupposition and the very possibility of their controversy: that the relation to entities is a representing of them and that the truth of the representing consists in its correctness. (GA45 17/BQP 17, trans. mod.)

Idealism and representational realism, then, both make the same mistake by starting from a common point. But he goes on to say that not only do the two theories rest on the common soil of representationalism, but that, in fact, this sort of “realism” is actually just idealism:

Realism, for its part, remains captive [bleibt…befangen] to a great error when it claims that even Kant, the most profound “idealist,” is witness for the defense of realism. No—from Kant’s adherence to the traditional determination of truth as correctness follows only, and conversely, that realism, in its determination of truth as correctness of representing, stands on the same ground as idealism, indeed even remains itself idealism, according to a stricter and more original conception of “idealism.” For even according to the doctrine of realism—the critical and the naïve—the res, the entity, is reached by means of the representing, the idea. (GA45 17-8/BQP 17, trans. mod.)

Wittgenstein’s dictum is not “realism” as it is portrayed here. For the point Heidegger is making, as is clear from his tracing of the problem back to an assumption of an act of “combining” representations—is that the shared error between “idealism” (anti-realism) and “realism” (representational realism) consists of a sophomoric act-content confusion: the idea that our intentional acts present things should not be taken to imply that these contents are
“representations,” items distinct from the \textit{rei}, from which the question then arises whether they are in conformity with the \textit{rei} (representational realism) or not (anti-realism).\footnote{Indeed, the positing of such theoretical entities might seem the most straightforward way of reckoning with the fact of representation in the first sense, with the possibility of error, but it is by no means the only one, and should seem in the end a rather blunt, dumb instrument.}

Heidegger wants to completely dismantle this paradigm. For him, an entity is not accessed by means of a representation, if we mean by that term an ‘idea’ or ‘image,’ some \textit{tertium quid} that stands between ourselves and the never-glimpsed world behind the curtain. An entity, rather, is out in the open for direct view. Even in memory, projection, and assertion, that which Dasein comports itself toward is not a picture of an entity, but the entity itself.\footnote{The latter case is particularly important, and I will come back to the matter of assertion in subsequent sections.} As Mark Wrathall says, “By reflecting on our experience in hearing an assertion, we recognize that we are never directed toward or by means of a representational content, but rather directly to the being indicated by the assertion. Assertions and beliefs do not represent beings in the world, they \textit{present} them; they are a way of being oriented within the world so that a state of affairs can show up” (Wrathall 2006, 244). This is precisely the essence of the Wittgensteinian thesis.

The point is, in fact, central to Heidegger’s very understanding of the import of intentionality, stretching back to his explication of phenomenology in the ‘20s:

If we are after the basic constitution \cite{Grundverfassung} of intentionality, the best way to do it is to go after it itself—directing-itself-toward \cite{Sich-richten-auf}. Let us now focus not on the directing-itself but on the \textit{toward-which}. We will not look at the perceiving but at the perceived, and in fact at the \textit{perceived of this perception}. What is this? If I answer without prejudice, I say the chair itself. I see no ‘representations’ \cite{Vortellungen} of the chair, register no image \cite{Bild} of the chair, sense no sensations of the chair. I simply see \textit{it}—it itself. This is the most immediate sense that perceiving offers. (GA20 48/HCT 37)

Likewise:
I can now envisage [vergegenwärtigen] the Weidenhauser bridge; I place myself before [versetze ...vor] it. In this envisaging, the bridge is itself given; I intend the bridge itself and not some image of it, not some fantasy, but it itself […] (GA20 54/HCT 41, trans. mod.)

This conception of intentionality is why, in BT, Heidegger is at pains to distinguish phenomenology’s conception of phenomena from that of transcendental idealism in particular, stressing that “‘Behind’ the phenomena of phenomenology there is essentially nothing else…” (GA2 48/BT 60). And it is why he says that Dasein “uncovers entities in themselves,” that Dasein is brought “face to face with the entities themselves” (GA2 300/BT 270). For the fundamental relation between mind and world is not one of representing in this way, but of presenting, and all understanding of content and of the possibility of error as supervening on this content must be seen in this light.

As might be expected, the full sweep of Heidegger’s point, and its power cannot be grasped without an extended investigation of Heidegger’s view of the relationship between truth (disclosure) and falsity (covering over). Nevertheless, the point serves our present purposes: Heidegger is rejecting the very notion, and indeed the very motivating claim of the necessity of positing a stratum of entities sequestered away in the cloistered domain of a mental theater, and which are to be understood either as redoubling or mimicking, as little recreations or models in the mind, something outside it, for which they stand in as proxy in higher-level acts. Instead, that our acts can be said to “represent” things in the first sense is

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144 Of course, Heidegger goes on to complicate matters, saying that “on the other hand, what is to become a phenomenon can be hidden. And just because the phenomena are proximally and for the most part not given, there is need for phenomenology” (GA2 48/BT 60). How these claims go together is complex. For now, the point is that, as he says, “Covered-up-ness is the counter-concept to ‘phenomenon’” (GA2 48/BT 60)—that is, that the very concept of phenomenon is to be understood in terms of uncovering as predicated on the fundamental openness of intentionality.

145 That “direct realism” or even more generally a rejection of the post-Cartesian “way of ideas” has found itself a growing voice in contemporary, sophisticated views of epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of perception, does not detract from the original or force of Heidegger’s objections; for it is partly on the basis of
only possible because, and is only intelligible in light of, their genuinely directly presenting them.

Having reminded ourselves of the terms of Heidegger’s commitment to openness, we are in a position to ask whether he is likewise committed to E-answerability. For Lyne, Heidegger’s allergy to talk of normativity, and emphasis instead upon ontology, leaves us stranded without anything to say about the normative dimensions of Dasein’s Being-in-the-World, and he traces this allergy back to Heidegger’ critique of neo-Kantianism, particularly Rickert, for whom, as one would expect in the Kantian tradition, normativity holds a kind of priority over description or mere ontology (Lyne 2000, 304-5). Lyne, in fact, claims there is an outright “absence of normativity” in BT (Lyne 2000, 306-7), a claim which I submit is simply preposterous, and the manifest falsity of which will emerge again and again in this chapter.146 Though Lyne begrudgingly acknowledges Heidegger’s pronouncement of entities as “binding [zu binden]” for assertion (GA2 301/BT 270), he is keen to skip over it as little more than an anomaly. On the contrary, as I will show, to suggest that passages like this are anomalous amounts to attributing to Heidegger an incoherent and unworkable conception of experience and even of phenomenology itself. In fact, the claim that entities are “binding” for assertion is perfectly characteristic of how Heidegger consistently speaks about not only essential structures of comportment, but also of the conduct of phenomenological investigation itself.

his objections (amongst, of course, others, though perhaps nowhere more notably), that the explanatory necessity of positing these theoretical entities, these representational interlopers, first came to be understood as extraneous.

146 “The absence of normativity in Being and Time, Heidegger’s first publication for a decade, could perhaps be regarded as an overreaction to the overt Neo-Kantianism of his previously published work” (Lyne 2000, 306-7).
Invoking Husserl, Heidegger explains that each sort of intentional act “has within it a tendency toward fulfillment and its specifically proper way of possible fulfillment” (GA20 59/HCT 44), that is, it motivates (perhaps we could even say, demands) the demonstration of its contents. This demonstration is at the same time not only a matter of the contents of the intentional act being filled in by demonstration (semantic fulfillment), but thereby at the same time a verification of the act by means of the demonstration (epistemic fulfillment). These structures of “fulfillment, demonstration, and verification [Erfüllung, Ausweisung und Bewährung],” occur, Heidegger emphasizes, in “all acts,” including not only perception but “pure theoretical comportment [rein theoretischen Verhaltens], determination [Bestimmens], and speech [Redens]” (GA20 60/HCT 45). However, he says that this taxonomy of act-types can easily obscure the fact that what is of more interest is the complex relations these kinds of intentional comportment can have to one another, specifically with respect to the aforementioned structures:

Empty intending [Leermeinen], envisaging [Vergegenwärtigung], sense perception [sinnliche Wahrenhmung] are not simply coordinated as species in a genus, as when I say that apples, pears, peaches, and plums are fruits. Rather, these modes stand to one another in functional relation [funktionalem Bezug], and the fulfillment itself is of an intentional character. (GA 20 66/HCT 49)

How are we to understand these functional relations? An illustrative case is found in “empty intentions,” a ready example of which is found in the everyday and ordinary case of conversing about something which is not bodily present, and which is not even envisaged in

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147 “These structural continuities and levels of fulfillment, demonstration, and verification are relatively easy to see in the field of intuitive representation. But they are to be found without exception in all acts, for example, in the domain of pure theoretical comportment, determination, and speech. (GA20 60/HCT 45). Also, “These characteristic structures of demonstration [der Ausweisung] and their possibility run through [laufen durch…hindurch] all acts of apprehending [des Erfassens]” (GA20 60/HCT 45).

148 See also GA 20 58-9/HCT 44.
non-bodily givenness—by and large this is how we are intentionally directed towards the subject matters about which we converse (GA20 54/HCT 41). In conversing about something in this way, the intention remains unfulfilled. But, he says, previously empty intentions can subsequently find fulfillment—in the case of perception, “superlative” fulfillment, demonstration or identification of the “state of affairs given in intuition” (GA20 66/HCT 49). And the significance of this demonstrative fulfillment has to do with “what is at first only emptily presumed” becoming “grounded [gegründet] in the matters [Sachen]” (GA20 66/HCT 49, emphasis added). The intuited entity itself, the intentional object, “provides the demonstration [Ausweisung gibt], it gives the identification [Identifikation] its ground and legitimacy [Boden und Recht]” (GA20 71/HCT 53, emphasis added). Identifying fulfillment just is what is meant by ‘Evidenz’ (GA20 67-8/HCT 50-1).

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149 “I can in an empty way now think of my desk at home simply in order to talk about it. I can fulfill this empty intention in a way by envisaging it to myself, and finally by going home and seeing it itself in an authentic and final experience. In such a demonstrative fulfillment the emptily intended and the originarily intuited come into coincidence” (GA20 /HCT 49).

150 While envisaging is capable of fulfilling a prior empty intention, there are varying degrees of “completeness” of fulfillment (GA20 65-6/HCT 49), and envisaging is not the exemplary sort of case: “Envisaging has the possibility of intuitive fulfillment up to a certain level, since envisaging is never capable of giving the matter itself in its bodily givenness” (GA20 59/HCT 44). Heidegger speaks of perception, however, as a “superlative” mode of fulfillment in the sense that it provides the possibility of an “authentic and final experience” (GA20 66/HCT 49). The language of finality suggests no less than McDowell does when he speaks of experience as the final arbiter, the “ultimate grounds” and the ultimate source of friction for empirical thought (McDowell 1994, 19 et al.). Nothing in the Problematic necessitates that “envisaging”—imagining or remembering—an object or state of affairs cannot also play some sort of modest evidentiary role with regard to empirical thought, for of course they can. The point of contention is that experience be the final arbiter, that these other points of evidence ultimately hearken back to experience and indeed are defeasible in light of it further experience.

151 In fact, the normative tenor of these passages is already essentially tied to Heidegger’s conception of disclosure and openness. It emerges as part of his discussion of different conceptions of truth, and he contrasts it with the notion of truth as adequation; rather, he says, on this conception, “The true can also be understood in the sense of the very object itself which is. […] Here, the true amounts to that which makes knowledge true [die Erkenntnis wahr machend]. Truth here comes down to being, being-actual [Wirklich-Sein]” (GA20 71/HCT 53, trans. mod.). Disclosure or self-showing thus underlies the truth of adequatio. The truth-maker is that which most primordially is true, and that which serves as the normative constraint upon the identification. Accordingly, the kind of Answerability of phenomenological identification signaled in this passage cannot be understood just as E-Answerability, as the Answerability of identification to the object considered only in the way it is intuited, but, due to the operativeness of disclosure as Open comportment, W-Answerability, the entity in itself.
Emptily intending something thus stands in a very specific sort of relation to perceptual intending, a relation of fulfillment, which we see now cannot be understood apart from the notions of demonstration and verification. In short, perception holds an evidentiary role with regard to comportments toward the relevant subject matters, including direct perceptual reports but also empty intentions and discourse about it—that is, with regard to what McDowell would call “empirical thought” generally.

Heidegger’s introduction of the structures of fulfillment, demonstration, and verification is not simply exposition of Husserlian phenomenology, but is carried over into BT, where they are employed as positive features of his own account of the sorts of relations that obtain between different kinds of intentional comportments. There, Heidegger invokes again the concepts of demonstration (Ausweisung) and verification (Bewährung) of the contents of assertion by the matters themselves. The full passage is worth citing, to fully underline the respects in which Husserlian insights on the issue of demonstration and evidence, far from being jettisoned by Heidegger, find their way (though, as always, with modification and recontextualization) into BT:

Asserting is a way of Being towards the Thing itself that is. And what does one’s perceiving of it demonstrate [ausgewiesen]? Nothing else than that this Thing is the very entity which one has in mind in one’s assertion. What comes up for confirmation [Bewährung] is that this entity is pointed out by the Being in which the assertion is made—which is Being towards what is put forward in the assertion; thus what is to be confirmed is that such Being uncover [entdeckt] the entity towards which it is. What gets demonstrated [Ausgewiesen] is the Being-uncovering [Entdeckend-sein] of the assertion. In enacting such a demonstration [im Ausweisungsvollzug], the knowing remains related solely to the entity itself. In this entity the confirmation, as it were, gets enacted [spielt…ab]. The entity itself which one has in mind shows itself just as it is in itself; that is to say, it shows that it, in its selfsameness, is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion as being—just as it gets uncovered as being. Representations do not get compared, either among themselves or in relation to the Real Thing. What is to be demonstrated is not an agreement of knowing with its object, still less of the psychical with the physical; but neither is it an
agreement between ‘contents of consciousness’ among themselves. What is to be demonstrated is solely the Being-uncovered ([Entdeckt-sein]) of the entity itself—\textit{that entity} in the “how” of its uncoveredness. This uncoveredness is confirmed when that which is put forward in the assertion (namely the entity itself) shows itself as \textit{that very same thing}. \textit{“Confirmation” signifies the entity’s showing itself in its selfsameness.}\ The confirmation is accomplished on the basis of the entity’s showing itself. This is possible only in such a way that the knowing which asserts and which gets confirmed is, in its ontological meaning, itself a \textit{Being towards} Real entities, and a Being that \textit{uncovers}. (GA2 288-9/BT 260-1, trans. mod.)

There are intricacies here about the ways in which Heidegger’s conception of truth as uncovering impacts his reception of the structure of fulfillment and the relationship of presuming-fulfilling as inherited from Husserl. The notions of confirmation, demonstration, and identification here are not without essential modification, and this undeniably has important implications that ripple across Heidegger’s philosophy. Nevertheless, Heidegger clearly does not simply abandon these broadly epistemic notions; they form, just as they did for Husserl, an essential insight of phenomenology about the nature of intentionality and its

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\textsuperscript{152} When I perceive the thing, what is confirmed is not primarily and primordially that \textit{what} was said matches \textit{what} is there, but that the assertion \textit{showed} the entity in the first place, uncovered it. For we can’t set out to compare what was said and what is there unless it is the case that what was said is a showing of the thing to which it is to be compared (or, put another way, one cannot engage in the comparison in the first place until there is a clear sense of what is said, and there is not a clear, unambiguous sense of what is said until there is demonstration). Therefore, what is demonstrated in perception is not an adequation between two things, two entities, the entity (or the state of affairs) and the sentence, but the being-uncovered of the entity, its shownness. Thus, the structures of demonstration, identification, confirmation which make up fulfillment in perception are no longer functions of comparison between \textit{beings}, but something about the \textit{being} of the perceptual intuition itself, something which the act itself \textit{does}.

On this basis, we can say that the perceptual fulfillment should be understood quite literally as the \textit{accomplishment} of the assertion, not in terms of the achievement of its being-asserted but in the sense of 1) its designation receiving definite clarity about its content—\textit{“this bridge”} definitively identifies and sharply determines the semantics of the relevant designating term—and 2) its being able to properly bear for the first time an evidentiary burden—beforehand it was empty in this respect because it was itself unsubstantiated by any demonstration. Put otherwise: an assertion without an intuition to “ground” it is an incomplete expression, without full definition, and, for this same reason, the assertion can only perform the epistemic work of grounding further discourse if a demonstration via perception is itself performing the epistemic work of grounding it. In other words, by means of a \textit{perceptual demonstrative} does an assertion for the first time come to have these characteristics, to be, \textit{in these respects}, fulfilled. And this is only intelligible on the basis of the showing, the uncovering of the entity itself, its being-uncovered by means of the demonstrating intuition. Perceptual fulfillment is not, then, about adequation of perceptual contents to propositional contents, but about the in-forming, the “filling in” of the assertion in these respects. So we can still speak of fulfillment by the (perceptual) intuition of the assertion, but not as a “matching” of contents between them. The essential Husserlian structure of fulfillment receives essential modification, but is not abandoned.
contents, and about certain kinds of relations between acts, with Heidegger even directing the reader by way of a footnote to Husserl’s discussions of evidence in the *Logical Investigations*.\(^{153}\)

Additionally, in one passage from Division II which rarely receives attention, Heidegger even weighs in, briefly, on the nature of and conditions for warrant:

> In belief [Überzeugung], Dasein lets the testimony [Zeugnis] of the thing itself [Sache selbst] which has been uncovered (the true thing itself) be the sole determinant for its Being towards that thing understandably. Holding something for true [Für-wahr-halten] is adequate as a way of maintaining oneself in the truth [Sich-in-der-Wahreheit-halten], if it is grounded [gründet] in the uncovered entity itself, and if, as Being towards the entity so uncovered, it has become transparent [durchsichtig] to itself as regards its appropriateness [Angemessenheit] to that entity. In any arbitrary fiction or in merely having some ‘view’ [“Ansicht”] about an entity, this sort of thing is lacking.

> The adequacy [Zulänglichkeit] of holding-for-true is measured according to the truth claim [Wahrheitsanspruch] to which it belongs. Such a claim gets its justification [Recht] from the kind of Being [Seinsart] of the entity to be disclosed, and from the direction [Richtung] of the disclosure. The kind of truth, and along with it, the certainty [Gewißheit], varies with the way entities differ, and accords with the guiding tendency and extent of the disclosure. (GA2 340-1/BT 300)\(^{154}\)

The passage is as ignored by the standard, epistemology-phobic readings of Heidegger as its meaning is incontrovertible: Heidegger is essentially providing (very loose) criteria for warranted belief. The “holding-for-true” of the “truth claim” (that is, the propositional attitude) if it is to be “adequate” with regard for “maintaining oneself in the truth” (justified, in its function as aiming at truth), must be “grounded in the uncovered entity itself,” in a way

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\(^{153}\) See GA2 289 n. 15/BT 493-4 xxxiv.

\(^{154}\) Macquarrie and Robinson translate ‘Überzeugung’ as ‘conviction,’ but this comes across as a rather artificial attempt to distance Heidegger from the standard subject matter of epistemology, and in favor of something more exotic, despite the clear context of what Heidegger is up to here. ‘Überzeugung’ simply means ‘belief,’ though with the heavy connotation that the belief is held not flippantly but out of being convinced. This is why Macquarrie and Robinson note the etymological connection between ‘Überzeugung’ and ‘Zeugnis,’ and admit their translation obscures this. Despite the etymological proximity between the English ‘convince’ and ‘conviction,’ the latter misleadingly has the air of something far less ordinary than belief, as well as something essentially defined by the intensity with which it is held rather than there being warrant for its being held.
“appropriate” to that entity, and with “transparency” about that appropriateness. And as if there could be any doubt, Heidegger appends that in arbitrarily believing something, these conditions are not met. The point, though, is that any “Recht” for holding a belief is a function of the entity itself—its “testimony”—and its mode of disclosure; the criteria for warrant Heidegger gives clearly imply answerability. It should further be gleaned from the above passages that the question of what ultimately proves evidentiary is not simply experience but the thing or the state of affairs at issue itself. The answerability on display in these passages is not just E- but W-answerability. Whatever caveats we need to make about Heidegger’s departures from Husserl, what comes across quite unmistakably in these passages is the invocation of the world, entities themselves, as *occasioning some kind of constraint*, both semantic and epistemic, on assertion and belief, and so there must remain in *some sense* the structure of intuitional fulfillment. In fact, we will see in 2.4 that without that structure some of Heidegger’s most central and distinctive appropriations of Husserl’s breakthroughs (particularly categorial intuition) would not gain any traction.

Heidegger’s commitment to meeting the essence of the Demand extends well beyond this, and to the roots of his conception of phenomenology itself. Like Husserl, Heidegger believes that phenomenology, as an enterprise of philosophical research, has the fundamental task of felicitous description of phenomenological contents. Already within this extremely basic methodological requirement lies a conception of the normative bearing of the contents of phenomenological description for their respective description. Across multiple and varied

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155 The characterization sounds awfully similar to Sellars’ internalist reliability condition for knowledge, but exploring this would take us too far afield; for explications of Sellars’ own condition, see McDowell 2018 and Koons 2006, 166. Koons offers a modified version of the condition which, by design, brings it into proximity with Dreyfusian models of skillful coping. For a more general, yet still Sellarsian, discussion of the relationship between reliabilism and broadly internalist conceptions of justification or warrant, see Neta 2009.

156 Thus why Heidegger says the phrase “descriptive phenomenology” is tautological (GA2 47/BT 59).
discussions in HCT, for example, Heidegger provides an overview of the phenomenological approach, and cites a rather standard Husserlian conception of the sense in which phenomenological description must have obeisance to or be drawn from the phenomena themselves; the scientific elaboration of a genuine phenomenology rests on the idea of the evidentiary groundedness of phenomenological description, in intuition, in the phenomena.

It will not do to say that these passages display only Heidegger’s explanations of Husserl’s methodological considerations. Firstly, there is no particularly good reason for thinking Heidegger strays from the bedrock Husserlian conception of the methodology of phenomenology. While it is certainly the case that Heidegger retains these considerations in his own modified form, the fundamental structures behind any intelligible conception of phenomenology—phenomenon, description, and evidentiary fulfillment of the latter in the former—must, if Heidegger can be made sense of as doing anything like phenomenology, nevertheless be present. If one would contend that Heidegger strays so far from these basic structures, I would submit that on such a reading Heidegger cannot be intelligible posed as conducting phenomenological investigation. That is, if the phenomenologist is tasked with attending carefully to the engagement with some phenomenon in order to elucidate its features, and then faithfully articulate those features in an account of the phenomenology, then already baked into the very notion of phenomenological investigation is a deep commitment to the idea that there is at least in theory such a thing as “faithfulness” to the phenomenon, of the phenomenon playing a role that is evidentiary with regard to a description of it. Further, that description is supposed to then be subject to refinement on the basis of further engagement or the input of other phenomenological investigators. The point, in any case, is that intrinsic to all of this at the most fundamental level is an implicit
presupposition of the idea that the phenomenon plays a rational role in thought, in the broadest sense of both “rational” and “thinking”—that there is such thing as the normative or epistemic authority of the phenomenon with regard to the goals of phenomenological investigation itself: description, indication, illumination, etc.

After all, if we reject the idea of any such commitment, to what are we appealing when we take it to be the case that the phenomenon shows itself in such a way that this or that description is appropriate, or that this description ought to be modified in light of such and such further investigation? These are all ineluctably normative notions tied to the very notion of phenomenology as a methodologically sound enterprise, which treat the phenomenon broadly as a reason, as justificatory. If there is any notion of fidelity to the things themselves—and Heidegger certainly cannot be understood apart from his insistence on this notion—there is the idea of answerability, as regards phenomenological description, in its most basic features and implications.157

Phenomenology is, in its very nature, then, committed to the idea that phenomena rationally constrain thought about experience in the particular way in which McDowell means such a thing.158 For Heidegger no less than for Husserl there is a reliance upon the straightforward idea that a phenomenon has something to say, to which the phenomenologist ought to be attentive, and for which there are at least general criteria, however loosely defined, for counting as failing to be attentive. I hope it begins to dawn how intrinsic to the very notion of a phenomenological investigation the epistemic demand of E-answerability is

157 Even if one thinks there can be multiple (or even infinite) appropriate characterizations or descriptions of a phenomenological experience, that is importantly different from saying that “anything goes,” that any and all characterizations one could give would be appropriate. That would be to annihilate in one stroke both any notion of “appropriateness” in characterization, as well as the phenomenological project.
158 In this way phenomenology shares a general methodological commitment with classical empiricism, and a critique of the Given is relevant to phenomenology in its very nature.
that it has become apparent what a farcical suggestion it is to reject not only its centrality but its very applicability to phenomenology as a methodology.

Even a cursory reading of BT reveals a plethora of appeals to normative characterizations of the methodological role of phenomena, such as their fidelity, their appropriateness, etc. Allusions to or implications of methodological constraints on phenomenological practice by experience, and, ultimately, entities themselves, are treated as nakedly self-evident. Consider the following passage, which not only echoes the two cited above from HCT—on the “chair itself” and the Weidenhauser bridge—but goes further, exemplifying the methodological import of why intentionality is to be understood as open comportment:

Let us suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true assertion that ‘the picture on the wall is hanging askew.’ […] If he who makes the assertion judges without perceiving the picture, but merely ‘represents’ it to himself, to what is he related [bezogen]? To ‘representations’ ['Vorstellungen'], shall we say? Certainly not, if “representation” is here supposed to signify representing, as a psychical process [Vorstellen, als psychischer Vorgang]. Nor is he related to “representations” in the sense of what is thus “represented,” if what we have in mind here is a ‘picture’ ['Bild'] of that Real Thing which is on the wall. The asserting which ‘merely represents’ is related rather, in that sense which is most its own, to the Real picture on the wall. What one has in mind is the Real picture, and nothing else [Dieses ist gemeint und nicht anderes]. Any interpretation in which something else is here slipped in as what one supposedly has in mind in an assertion that merely represents, belies the phenomenal facts of the case [verfälscht den phänomenalen Tatbestand dessen] as to that about which the assertion gets made. (GA2 288/BT 260)

It bears asking why Heidegger would insist upon the import of what the phenomenal facts of the case “say,” what they attest to, and therefore what the proper interpretation of the structural features of the case are, if there is no sense in which there is a demand upon the enterprise with regard to justifying and being able to justify what one says about the phenomenon in question. The fact that these methodological notions are not discussed at
greater length in BT is a sign of their presupposition for the purposes of its investigations, not of their dismissal. They underlie the spirit of the text as a phenomenologically-minded existential analytic.

The passage above on the picture hanging askew exemplifies not only Heidegger’s commitment to E-answerability, though, but furthermore to W-Answerability. He talks of the picture itself, and not something else, as what is “sighted” in the intentional act—openness—as well as implying norms of descriptive efficacy along the lines of the answerability of phenomenological description to experience—E-answerability. The passage, in bringing both together in a single overarching depiction of a phenomenological case, makes unmistakable Heidegger’s commitment to W-Answerability.

In fact, though, the very definition of ‘phenomenology’ itself, understood as Heidegger does, implicitly contains a statement of the normative constraint upon description by the world. For phenomenology means logos of phenomena. Λόγος as meant here is the direct displaying or exhibiting [Aufweisung] and demonstrating [Ausweisung] (GA2 46/BT 59) of phenomena, by means of description. This characterization explicitly has prescriptive force: the exhibition must be conducted in the right manner—“einer rechten Beibringung des Seienden selbst” (GA2 49/BT 61, emphasis added), for description has “the sense of a prohibition [einen prohibitiven Sinn]—the avoidance of characterizing anything without such demonstration [Fernhaltung alles nichtausweisenden Bestimmens]” (GA2 47/BT 59, emphasis added). So λόγος itself is understood in such a way that requires E-answerability.

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159 The prescriptive force is even more strongly felt given the fact that, despite the Openness of comportment, there is a sense in which phenomenology nevertheless is a laborious process requiring the proper mode of accessing the very phenomena which lie open to view. As was mentioned before, Heidegger says that, “‘Behind’ the phenomena of phenomenology is essentially nothing else…” But he continues: “On the other hand, what is to become phenomenon can be hidden. And just because the phenomena are proximally and for the most part not given, there is need for phenomenology” (GA2 48/BT 60). For since it is not only possible
Additionally, recall, though, that ‘phenomenon’ is understood in such a way that implies the openness of comportment. Since, then, phenomena are that which show themselves from themselves, and λόγος is the exhibiting of phenomena, phenomenology is “let[ting] that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (GA2 46/BT 58). The prescriptive force of letting behind λόγος as description, exhibition, demonstration of phenomena, transmits to a prescription about letting entities speak for themselves: “assuring ourselves ‘phenomenologically’”—that is, by demonstration—of the entity to be investigated “has already been prescribed [vorgezeichnet] as our point of departure” (GA2 50/BT 61).160

but, apparently, imminently predisposed to erroneous description, the imperative of avoidance is all the more salient and at the forefront of the methodological concern:

Thus the very point of departure for our analysis requires that it be secured by the proper method, just as much as does our access to the phenomenon, or our passage through whatever is prevalently covering it up. The idea of grasping and explicating phenomenon in a way which is ‘original’ and ‘intuitive’ is directly opposed to the naïveté of a haphazard, ‘immediate,’ and unreflective ‘beholding.’ (GA2 49/BT 61)

A similar passage in HCT:

We must free ourselves from the prejudice that, because phenomenology calls upon us to apprehend the matters themselves, these matters must be apprehended all at once, without any preparation. Rather, the movement toward the matters themselves is a long and involved process which, before anything else, has to remove the prejudices which obscure them (GA20 36-7/HCT 29)

Thus the need for Destruktion. And so “The way in which Being and its structures are encountered in the mode of phenomenon is one which must first of all be wrested from the objects of phenomenology” (GA2 49/BT 61). As reiterated later in the text:

It is therefore essential that Dasein should explicitly appropriate what has already been uncovered, defend it against semblance and disguise, and assure itself of its uncoveredness again and again. [...] Truth (uncoveredness) is something that must always first be wrested from entities. Entities get snatched out of their hiddenness. The factual uncoveredness of anything is always, as it were, a kind of robbery. (GA2 294/BT 265)

This characterization of the intransigent obstacles to felicitous description serves to color the task of λόγος itself, giving it this sense of a labor of wrestling or robbery. Given this emphasis, the attribution of a methodological imperative seems to positively haunt the conduct of phenomenology, on Heidegger’s conception.

160 Only in this way may the analysis, he says, be “authentic [eigentliche]” (GA2 50/BT 61). While ‘vorgezeichnet’ may be better translated as, e.g. ‘has been delineated,’ which has less of a prescriptive valence, both Macquarrie and Robinson as well as Stambaugh (BTS 35) translate it as ‘has been prescribed.’ The reason becomes clearer with the full context of the sentence: “Die Voraufgabe einer »phänomenologischen« Sicherung des exemplarischen Seienden als Ausgang für die eigentliche Analytik ist immer schon aus dem Ziel dieser vorgezeichnet.” This assurance is the goal (Ziel) of the phenomenological analysis, and with this the pronouncement takes on a decidedly more prescriptive flair, not simply as “delineation” but as a methodological imperative in keeping with this goal.
Heidegger’s discussion of the task of his inquiry in BT, particularly the discussion of phenomenology and its antecedent concepts of *phenomena* and *logos* in the second half of the introduction, is positively littered with either explicitly normative language, or language which heavily intimates normative considerations—not just in generalities but specifically in the sense of the answerability of descriptions of phenomena to the phenomena themselves. And this is hardly surprising, considering they are considerations bearing upon the conduct of a *methodology* or at least a form of inquiry with defined aims.\(^{161}\) The idea, then, that phenomenological description comes without the normativity of prescriptive force is absurd. The very notion of phenomenological description must be understood as necessarily saddled with prescriptive force—just as the any enterprise concerned with efficacious description must. Phenomenological descriptions are subject to rational constraint by the contents of their respective experiences, the phenomena at issue. And, since there is nothing behind the phenomena, that is, since intentionality is open comportment to entities, phenomenological description is subject to rational constraint by entities themselves.

In short, then, to say that Heidegger is unconcerned with the normative dimension of openness—that is, answerability—is, I submit, to completely vitiate his conceptions of both experience and phenomenology. The normative constraint of entities upon the conduct of phenomenology, understood in terms of methodological prescriptions and proscriptions, is hardly absent from BT, but positively pervades it. Now, there is a wrinkle to this claim. For it should be made clear that I am not making the obviously false claim that phenomenological description just is, or is a species of, empirical thought, such as, most pertinently, observation reports. Phenomenological description would concern itself primarily with the *(apriori)*

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\(^{161}\) Heidegger does not hesitate to call phenomenology a “method”—“The Phenomenological Method of Investigation,” as Sec. 7 is titled.
structures and lived, experiential valences of intentional acts, not just their contents; it would concern itself with dissecting the manner of structuration and layering of acts in, e.g., a perception, and not simply in presenting the straightforwardly empirical content of that act (as a report of it would). Are the methodological implications of Heidegger’s decrees really evidence, then, of another manifestation of his commitment to E-answerability (and ultimately W-answerability)?

I think that the wrinkle no sooner makes itself apparent than it disappears.

Heidegger’s most extended discussion of the features of fulfillment for what he calls a “perceptual assertion” (i.e. observation report) comes with regard to raising the matter of the categorial structuration of even simple perceptions. The example he gives is of a simple perception of a yellow chair and a corresponding perceptual assertion “The chair is yellow” (GA20 76-81/HCT 57-60). With reference to these acts, Heidegger asks after the matter both of the fulfillment of the contents, as well as of the evidentiary fulfillment for the report in the perception. He uses this investigation to illuminate how structural, categorial elements of the report are already on display as moments in the “multi-layered” perceptual act itself, such that the report finds fulfillment in this act. Although Heidegger provides phenomenological descriptions which illuminate the structuration of the perceptual act, he does not bring up the matter of the requisite fulfillment for those (second-order) descriptions. That is, the discussion centers specifically on the matter of fulfillment of the observation report of that perception—“The chair is yellow”—not fulfillment of any subsequent phenomenological descriptions about the structuration of the perception.

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162 Also, though this point is not so relevant for our purposes, it is not directed specifically at empirical thought so much as all thought, though this of course would not exclude empirical thought, and so doesn’t constitute an objection.

163 I shall dissect these passages in greater depth in 2.4.
The entire exercise can be understood, in fact, as a defense, via second-order phenomenological description, of the viability and felicitousness (as regards fulfillment) of first-order expressions of experiences (reports like “The chair is yellow”) relative to the experiences themselves. What we are given is a series of phenomenological descriptions which show that and how basic expression is or can be answerable to intuition, by way of second-order demarcation of the categorial structures of intuition, and so their concordance with the logical form of their corresponding reports. The overarching section under which the discussion of categorial intuition is subsumed is titled “Intuition and Expression,” for the very issue of phenomenologically illustrating categorial intuition, the categorial structuration of the full, multi-layered perceptual intuition, arises only as a response to the issue of continuity, construed both semantically and epistemically, of intuitions and their expressions in language (in the form of reports, descriptions, etc.).

Phenomenology’s signal contribution, in the form of the three insights Heidegger goes on to exalt later in HCT (intentionality, categorial intuition, and the original sense of the apriori), lies in providing an account of how this continuity is possible—how experience constitutes a tribunal by exerting rational friction at empirically-oriented thought’s Archimedean crux, basic perceptual reports like “The chair is yellow.”

Of course, in order to do this, the second-order phenomenological description must itself be answerable to the intuition, and in fact the overarching concern of, for example, the early lecture course PIE in particular is centered around the idea of the continuity between

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164 The concern about the continuity of intuition and expression has its origin well before 1925, at least as far back as 1920’s Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks (PIE). It is no accident that the relevant section of HCT, on categorial structuration and fulfillment, is titled “Anschauung und Ausdruck” (GA20 74/HCT 55). I will discuss some elements of PIE related to these considerations at the end of 2.3.

165 In addition to the philosophical importance Heidegger ascribes to categorial intuition in HCT, his reflections in the much later Seminar in Zähringen emphasize with the benefit of hindsight just how critical it was to his early ontological investigations. See GA15 372-400/FS 64-81).
intuition and expression specifically vis-à-vis second-order phenomenological descriptions
(and the possibility of philosophical “concept formation”)—thus addressing the very
possibility of anything like phenomenology as a methodology.\(^\text{166}\) By orienting the question of
fulfillment around that of the report itself, though, Heidegger makes clear that all items
which would fairly qualify as descriptive of experience—from sophisticated
phenomenological identifications of structural moments, born of analytical precision and
even application of \textit{epoché}, down to the most basic discursive practices of circumspective
reports and assertions—raise the question of their fulfillment in the acts of intuition of which
they are descriptions.\(^\text{167}\) Phenomenological descriptions about intentional structures find their
fulfillment in the act of which they are reports, just as reports of perceptions or even empty
intentions do.\(^\text{168}\) Both are semantically and rationally constrained by the experience itself,
and ultimately therefore by the world itself.

All these are the reasons why entities are “binding” for assertion, a claim which
should be recognized now not as anomalous but as fundamentally inextricable from not only
what Heidegger sees as the fruits of phenomenological analysis (securing and accounting for

\(^{166}\) The same motivation seems present, but unstated in HCT. Heidegger is indeed concerned with
demonstrating, by means of a simpler case, i.e. the case of a first-order observation report, the methodological
requirements for fulfillment of \textit{any} given reportive content, whether of a first or second order; application of the
basic principles shown in this example to the matter of fulfillment for phenomenological description in the
structuration of the perception in relation to its corresponding observation report.

\(^{167}\) In addition to this, I think there is also the simple point that commitment to the E-answerability of
phenomenological descriptions betrays a general kind of epistemic disposition of phenomenologists, an attitude
about justification that suggests an orientation toward a “minimal empiricism” about claims—any claims—
regarding the character of experiences.

\(^{168}\) There is, I think, another rather straightforward reason for this. It would, I think, be too quick to say that a
basic observation report like “The chair is yellow” is \textit{not} akin to a phenomenological description, for it itself
displays relevant structures of the perceptual act; the report already provides a certain articulation of structural
moments of the experience, even if it doesn’t do so fully transparently, or doesn’t reflect further upon these
structural moments, their interrelations, roles, or significances, as a full-fledged phenomenological reflection
would. So while phenomenological descriptions are not just observation reports, nor a species of them,
observation reports themselves, of even the most basic sort, are something like crude, first-pass
phenomenological descriptions, or, put better, are indispensable, if elementary and ultimately facile,
components of a full-throated phenomenological investigation of the act of which the report is a report.
the continuity of intuition and expression), but from his own conception of phenomenology as a *logos* of *phenomena*.

What we have seen bespeaks a commitment on Heidegger’s part to not only openness and E-answerability, but W-answerability—one which those moved by the Problematic should find acutely familiar. In what follows I will bring into relief further dimensions of normativity in Heidegger’s thought—ones which put him into proximity not with Wittgenstein and his truism but with Frege, Sellars, and the other half of the McDowellian Problematic.

### 2.3 Über Sinn und Bedeutsamkeit: Heidegger’s Fregean Semantics

In this and the following sections I will show how Heidegger’s acceptance of Answerability, via Openness, demonstrated in 2.2, is nevertheless dogged by an understanding of the contents of intentional acts that is in tension with the notion of transcendental friction. Specifically, Heidegger has, as we shall see, a conceptual commitment to the notion of sense or cognitive significance—understood in terms capable of satisfying Frege’s general considerations about and constraints on a theory of meaning—as necessarily distinct from intentional objects. This Fregean outlook of meaning extends to encompass precisely the implications of the Fregean/Sellarisan half of McDowell’s Problematic in tension with the Demand for Transcendental Friction.

In fact, I will show that Frege’s ‘Sinn’ can be translated felicitously into Heidegger’s ‘Bedeutung.’ Though Heidegger does not often speak of individual *Bedeutungen per se*—more often invoking ‘Bedeutsamkeit,’ we shall see that this more or less simply signals Heidegger’s gloss on the holistic nature of what Frege calls ‘Sinn.’ *Bedeutsamkeit,* understood as designating the expanse of meaningfulness constituting what Heidegger calls...
the *Weltlichkeit der Welt*, the “Worldhood of the World,” plays a similar role as does *Sinn* as such in Frege’s philosophy, in that it allows us to distinguish meaning from referents and carve up the contents of intentional states more thinly than we could cut up the world as a totality of entities (Frege’s *Bedeutungen*), that it therefore affords us an account of meaning in terms of cognitive perspective, accordingly constitutes the framework for a theory of cognitive semantics, and so, ultimately, allows us to understand minds as, in the terms McDowell puts it, “configured” in certain important respects.

Indeed, my point is not solely that Heidegger’s *Bedeutsamkeit* happens to address these concerns or can be understood as playing a broadly Fregean role in understanding mind and its relation to world, but far more than this: it was *expressly* understood by Heidegger as answering to concerns along the lines McDowell, in his specifically Sellarsian way, sees Frege’s *Sinn* as addressing. Heidegger himself understood his invocation of *Bedeutsamkeit* as providing something of a transcendental semantics, and through this a kind of transcendental logic, a phenomenology of λόγος and its conditions.169 The commitment must be understood as playing an indispensable role in Heidegger’s philosophy—indeed a role in many ways similar in scope, significance, application, and even motivation as those found in McDowell’s inquiry, and which makes the tension between both halves of the Problematic compelling and perspicuous. Not all of these claims will be fully demonstrated presently, but I will lay the groundwork for them, and over the course of the sections to follow the motifs of the Fregean/Sellarsian half of the Problematic, as they are articulated in Heidegger’s work, will be developed.

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169 I share with Steven Crowell a rejection of the received view that it “seem[s] perverse to identify as ‘transcendental phenomenology’ Heidegger’s contribution to an elucidation of the space of meaning” (Crowell 2001, 4). After all, Heidegger does quip that “Every disclosure of Being as the *transcendens* is *transcendental* knowledge. *Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis*” (GA2 51/BT 62).
Any consideration of translation between Frege and phenomenology on the question of meaning would be remiss to start anywhere but with Dagfinn Føllesdal’s rightfully celebrated 1969 essay “Husserl’s Notion of Noema,” the founding document of California phenomenology. Føllesdal lays out a rather compelling—though not altogether uncontroversial—case for the idea that the Husserlian noema is more or less a “generalization” of the notion of Fregean Sinn, meant to encompass significances as fundamental to all intentional acts. While I won’t address all twelve of Føllesdal’s theses, I do want to briefly recall five of them, for they will collectively provide the core of a traditionally Fregean model of how to understand Sinn—and more particularly the sense-referent distinction itself—from which we may both compare and contrast my own model, gleaned from Heidegger’s account of meaning. The five theses of Føllesdal’s on which I want to focus are as follows (from Føllesdal 1969):

(3) The noematic Sinn is that in virtue of which consciousness relates to the object.

(4) The noema of an act is not the object of the act (i.e., the object toward which the act is directed).

(5) To one and the same noema, there corresponds only one object.

(6) To one and the same object there may correspond several different noemata.

(7) Each act has one and only one noema.

Each of these captures an essential element of Husserl’s view that corresponds quite unmistakably to a counterpart of Frege’s own understanding of sense, and its distinction from referent, as originally presented in “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”: (3) more or less states Frege’s claim that Sinn is a “mode of presentation” of a Bedeutung; (4), that Sinn and Bedeutung are numerically distinct; (5) and (6) together, that Sinn determines Bedeutung but not the converse; and (7) that a proposition, composed of Sinne, has a determinate,
unambiguous content that can be identified and individuated (this is after all, the entire
overriding desideratum for positing the distinction in the first place—that propositional
contents are fine-grain enough that ascriptions of attitudes upon those contents can be
accordingly finely differentiated).

Now, there are other of Føllesdal’s theses that correspond well to Frege’s own
account of Sinn. What stands out about Theses (3)-(7), however, is that they represent, not
simply traditional Fregean features of a theory of sense, or features in accordance with those
laid out by Frege himself in his own work, but rather elements utterly indispensable for his
purposes, for they are the primary features that are necessary to guarantee the results for
which a distinction between sense and referent is in the first place motivated. That is, it is
possible to distinguish indispensable elements of Frege’s own account of meaning from
dispensable ones, based on their centrality to the thrust of Frege’s point in “Über Sinn und
Bedeutung,” which is nothing more than the following: a distinction between Sinn and
Bedeutung, with Sinn understood as more fine-grained than its counterpart, is explanatorily
necessary with respect to meaning ascriptions (and consequently, to propositional attitude
ascriptions). This is the ineliminable core of a Fregean view of meaning.

Of course, Føllesdal only substantiates a parallel between Frege and Husserl. The
degree to which this translation between Fregean Sinn and Husserlian noema can be mapped

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170 Theses (8), (9), and (10), for example: respectively, noemata are abstract entities, are not perceived through
the senses, and are known through a special kind of reflection (phenomenological reflection).
171 Of course, Frege made additional claims about the distinction, annotations upon this core. Beyond these
central ones, however, all else is somewhat extraneous to the essential point—for example, Frege’s claim that
Sinne are abstract entities, denizens of a “third realm” (captured in Føllesdal’s thesis (8)), or that the Bedeutung
of a proposition is its truth-value. Likewise, corresponding addenda may have been held by Husserl about
noema. My point is that these are exegetical curiosities compared to the central thrust of Føllesdal’s point, that
Frege and Husserl are both driving at one and the same basic phenomenon. Føllesdal’s detractors miss the forest
for the trees. The fundamental, convincing affinities should not be missed in light of extraneous further
considerations.
(via a further translation) onto Heidegger’s philosophy is another exegetical matter entirely. Heidegger rarely speaks in terms of noematic content, unless he is discussing Husserlian phenomenology explicitly. He does, though, sometimes speaks of Husserlian phenomenology and its terms of art, such as ‘intentionality’ itself, as representing “an initial approach” (GA20 63/HCT 47), indicating, no less about noema than about other Husserlian notions, modification rather than rejection.¹⁷² This is an anodyne observation; many of Heidegger’s modified forms of Husserlian structures and concepts are already recognized as such in the secondary literature. Given this, it would do to ask where his own counterpart to the Husserlian noema may be found, though particularly with an eye to an investigation of its crucial transformation in his own thought.

Now, to draw the connection between Fregean Sinn and a corresponding Heideggerian term of art, it is not necessary for me to endorse, nor treat Heidegger as endorsing, all the elements of Frege’s own account of Sinn, and certainly not of Føllesdal’s, or anyone else’s. For elaborations or theories of the nature of Sinn, and even many intricacies about its distinction from Bedeutung are not relevant; what is relevant, and indispensable, is first and foremost the Sinn-Bedeutung distinction (as at least a conceptual distinction) as such, and that Sinn sufficiently fulfills the theoretical role for which its distinction from Bedeutung was drawn in the first place (to account for cognitive perspective and its semantic role in intentional attitudes and utterances). As I have already hinted at the end of the Introduction, Heidegger’s theory of what Frege calls ‘Sinn’ is not Frege’s, nor Husserl’s.¹⁷³

¹⁷² “Intentionality is not an ultimate explanation of the psychic but an initial approach toward overcoming the uncritical application of traditionally defined realities such as the psychic, consciousness, continuity of lived experience, reason” (GA20 63/HCT 47).
¹⁷³ Indeed, the entire point of my analysis is to highlight some ways in which Heidegger’s account very decisively departs from some of the key theses Føllesdal extracts from his relating Frege and Husserl.
What it is is a theory of the same phenomenon as what Frege termed ‘Sinn.’ And as I have already stressed, the features of this phenomenon, and its distinction with respect to its role in a theory of meaning are captured in Føllesdal’s theses (3)-(7). I intend, then, to proceed in two respects: first, by showing that Heidegger understood the Husserlian noema in a way which accords with Føllesdal’s reading of the latter, as meeting the criteria for Fregean Sinn given by theses (3)-(7); secondly, to show not only that there is a clear candidate for Heidegger’s analogue of Husserlian noema, but that this analogue plays such a role in Heidegger’s conception of Dasein that it is most naturally understood as likewise conforming to theses (3)-(7).

(3) The noematic Sinn is that in virtue of which consciousness relates to the object.\textsuperscript{174}

(4) The noema of an act is not the object of the act (i.e., the object toward which the act is directed).

In his discussion of Husserl’s phenomenology in HCT, Heidegger elaborates upon the critical nature of the distinction between the intentional object and the noema (or intentum). While Brentano had identified and defined the noesis, he had an undeveloped conception of the noema, which resulted in equivocation on what is meant by the ‘intentional object’ of noesis:

How is [Husserl’s] analysis of intentionality different from Brentano’s? In intentionality Brentano saw the intentio, noesis, and the diversity of its modes, but not the noema, the intentum. He remained uncertain in his analysis [unsicher in der Bestimmung] of what he called “intentional object.” The four meanings of the object of perception—the perceived—already indicate that the sense of ‘something’ in the representation of something is not transparently obvious. Brentano wavers in two directions. On the one hand, he takes the “intentional object” to be the entity itself in its being. Then again it is taken as the how of its being-apprehended unseparated from the entity [dann wieder das Wie seines Erfaßtseins ungeschieden vom Seienden]. Brentano never clearly brings out and highlights the how of being-intended [zur reinen Abhebung des Wie des Intendiertseins kommt es bei Brentano überhaupt]

\textsuperscript{174} Each of the theses is directly from Føllesdal 1969.
In short, he never brings into relief [ist bei ihm nicht abgehoben] intentionality as such, as a structural totality. (GA20 61-2/HCT 46)\textsuperscript{175}

Thus, for Heidegger, one of the key developments which set Husserl apart from Brentano lay precisely in drawing the distinction between intentional object (referent) and intentional object in its mode of presentation, in \textit{intentio}, i.e. the \textit{intentum} or \textit{noema} (sense). It is in the further analysis of \textit{intentio}, particularly in understanding how the modes of the act-character color the way the object is phenomenally given (as Føllesdal lays out in his thesis (2), this is the thetic character of the \textit{noema}), that the \textit{intentum} or \textit{noema} first becomes properly understood.\textsuperscript{176} Thus:

The perceived in the strict sense [im strengen Sinne] for phenomenology is not the perceived \textit{entity} in itself but the perceived \textit{entity} insofar as it is perceived [sofern es wahrgenommen], as it shows [zeigt] itself in concrete perception. The perceived in the strict sense is the perceived as such or, more precisely expressed, the \textit{perceivedness} [Wahrgenommenheit], of this chair for example, the way and manner, the structure in which [die Art und Weise, die Struktur in der], the chair is perceived. [...] Accordingly, we can distinguish along the following lines: \textit{the entity itself}: the environmental thing, the natural thing, or the thingness; and \textit{the entity in the manner of its being intended} [das Seiende in der Weise seines Intendierseins]: its being-perceived [Wahgenommenseins], being-represented [Vorgestelltseins], being-judged [Geurteilt-], being-loved, being-hated, being-thought in the broadest sense [Gedachtseins im weitesten Sinne]. In the first three cases we have to do with the entity in itself, in the latter with its being-intended, the perceivedness of the entity. (GA20 52-3/HCT 40)\textsuperscript{177}

This being-intended of the entity, “the subject matter insofar as it is intended in the Intention,” he equates with the Husserlian \textit{noema} (GA20 129/HCT 94), and this as-structure

\textsuperscript{175} In fact, Heidegger even asserts that Husserl’s 1910 essay “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” displays a “lack of clarity” on the distinction between \textit{noesis} and \textit{noema} (GA20 164/HCT 119). Nevertheless, Husserl’s analysis managed to increasingly shed further light on the distinction, and thereby on the difference between the intentional object and the noema. The fact that Heidegger even chastises Husserl shows the extent to which he thinks maintaining and foregrounding a clear understanding of these distinctions is essential.

\textsuperscript{176} Heidegger would agree with Føllesdal’s thesis (2), given his explication of the thetic character of intentional acts (see GA20 135-6/HCT 98-9). I propose Heidegger would also agree with Føllesdal’s (9) and (10). However, for reasons of space this will have to remain unelaborated.

\textsuperscript{177} See also GA20 60/HCT 45 for similar articulations.
which defines the manner of the entity’s being-intended is clearly alike to a mode of presentation of the entity. So, both theses (3) and (4) flow out of the above passages. The way in which an entity shows up, that which it shows up as, i.e. the as-determination is not to be understood as the entity but is instead a mode of presentation of the entity, that in virtue of which we are comported towards it.

(5) To one and the same noema, there corresponds only one object. The manner in which Heidegger speaks of intentum, as the entity in the how of its being-intended, entails this, that the manner of presentation yokes the entity to it, so that, as McDowell would put it, the entity itself “figures in” the showing. Accordingly, the relevant content which constitutes intentum, noema, the as-determination, is be understood as determining its object. An as-determination is never free-floating, a presentation detached or detachable from that of which it is a presentation. It is always the as-determination of the presented entity. Just as with Fregean sense-reference, fixing intentum or as-determination fixes the intentional object. The intentum is the thing in its specific manner of presentation or encounter, a mode specific to the entity.

(6) To one and the same object there may correspond several different noemata. Defining the noema or intentum as the entity in the manner or how of its being intended, as we have seen above, already implies variance in individuation of noema, specifically in virtue of the manner of comportment. And though not with respect to Husserlian noema directly, Heidegger is wont to repeat that, “an entity can show itself from itself in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of access [Zugangsart] we have to it” (GA2 38/BT 51).\footnote{A parallel passage occurs at GA20 111/HCT 81. The point is critical for Heidegger’s understanding of the notion of semblance, and so his notion of covering-over or falsity as a privative mode of phenomenon.}
(7) Each act has one and only one noema.

With respect to the Husserlian noema, Heidegger observes that “every act has its intentional correlate” (GA20 69/HCT 51)—every intentio has its correlated intentum. He also refers to the “single correlate” (GA20 72/HCT 54) of an act.¹⁷⁹

I think it clear that Heidegger’s gloss on noematic content or intentum aligns with Føllesdal’s understanding. The task remains to show by what term of art Husserlian noema is captured (even if in modified form) in Heidegger’s own terminology. Given Føllesdal’s work, the natural first place to look for a translation of Husserlian noema is indeed ‘Sinn,’ which does, of course, figure in Heidegger’s thought. However, as Sheehan points out, Heidegger’s use of both ‘Sinn’ and ‘Bedeutung’ should not be understood as mapping onto the Fregean usages:

Sinn does not refer to an ideal unity of sense, a pure, unchanged ideality that is unaffected by the psychological acts that grasp it, nor is it the noema of a Husserlian noesis. Likewise Bedeutung does not mean “reference” (or “referent”), as in Frege, and it does not refer merely to a linguistic expression, as in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. (Sheehan 2014, xviii).

Instead, as Sheehan goes on to observe, ‘Sinn’ must be understood in different ways depending on context: most often, as when used in the expression ‘der Sinn vom Sein,’” it designates a structure of clearing or transcendental horizon that allows for intelligibility, the condition for the possibility of anything showing up in an intelligible respect.¹⁸⁰ It is thus “an

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¹⁷⁹ Context shows Heidegger stresses the point. The state of affairs “has in itself the correlate, the single correlate, in the state of affairs itself: “in sich hat, das Korrelat, das eine Korrelate im Sachverhalt selbst ist.”

¹⁸⁰ “Meaning [Sinn] is the ‘upon-which’ of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible [her…verständlich wird] as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having [Vorhaben], a fore-sight [Vorsicht], and a fore-conception [Vorgriff]” (GA2 201/BT 193).
existentiale of Dasein, not a property attaching to [am...hafter] entities…” (GA2 201/BT 193).\footnote{181}

Now, on rare occasion, Sheehan says, ‘\textit{Sinn}’ is used to refer to the “sense, meaningfulness, or intelligibility” of entities, but predominantly this is the office of ‘\textit{Bedeutung},’ which “always refers to the sense or meaning of a particular thing” (Sheehan 2014, xviii). Heidegger also typically uses ‘\textit{Bedeutung}’ in connection with words, particularly, and continuously, in the introduction to BT, where he lays out much of his terminology. Even a cursory reading of BT bears out Sheehan’s observation: ‘\textit{Bedeutung}’ is never used by Heidegger in the sense in which Frege means it, to designate the referent or denotation of a word. It is always used, rather, in the sense either of the meaning-content of a word, the mode of signification under which it is to be understood.

These first indication in favor of ‘\textit{Bedeutung}’ as translating Husserl’s ‘noema’ readily find further textual support not only in Heidegger’s predominant usage but in his commentary about his usage. In support of the first of his theses, that Husserlian noema represents a generalization of the notion of linguistic meaning (Føllesdal 1969, 681), Føllesdal cites the following passages from Husserl’s \textit{Ideen}:

Originally, these words [‘\textit{Bedeuten}’ and ‘\textit{Bedeutung}’] related only to the linguistic sphere, that of ‘expressing.’ It is, however, almost unavoidable and
at the same time an important advance, to widen the meaning of these words and modify them appropriately [zu erweitern und passend zu modifizieren], so that they in a certain way are applicable to the whole noetic-noematic sphere: that is to all acts, whether these are intertwined with expressing acts [ausdrücken Akten] or not. (Hua III/1, 256)

The noema is nothing but a generalization of the idea of meaning [aber nichts weiter als die Verallgemeinerung der Idee der Bedeutung] to the field of all acts. (Hua V, 89)

Heidegger speaks in much the same way about Bedeutung (meaning or signification—as in a meaning-determination) and Bedeutsamkeit (meaningfulness or significance as such)—that is, as more broadly applicable than simply to acts of verbal expression, in virtue of being present in all kinds of intentional acts. Significance is, as Heidegger says, a fundamental “structure of encounter” of the environing world (GA20 272/HCT 200). At the same time, Bedeutsamkeit is nevertheless also intimately connected with meaning in the sense of acts of verbal expression. In BT, he ties Bedeutungen to linguistic meaning, as that on which “is founded the Being of speech and of language [Wort und Sprache]” (GA2 117/BT 121).

This connection is elaborated upon more in HCT:

Meaningfulness [Bedeutsamkeit], as we use the term, understood negatively to begin with says nothing about meaning [Bedeutung] in the sense [Sinne] of value and rank. In another sense, meaning also signifies the meaning of a word [Bedeutung eines Wortes], meaning as something which word-combinations can have. Even this sense of meaning is in a certain way connected with what we call meaningfulness, in fact much more properly than the first sense of meaning and meaningfulness in terms of value [im Sinne von Wert]. That such delimitations, which we are making here quite formally in regard to the bare words, already become necessary itself points to a certain embarrassment in the choice of the right expression [Ausdrucks] for the complex phenomenon which we want to call meaningfulness. And I frankly admit that this expression is not the best, but for years I have found nothing better, in particular nothing which gives voice to an essential connection of

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182 I have used Føllesdal’s translations of Husserl.
183 Macquarrie and Robinson often translate ‘Wort’ loosely as ‘words,’ (as they do in this passage), but this can be misleading if we understand the English ‘words’ as meaning discrete word-units and not words in the sense of a meaningful collective: speech, expression, utterance. I think quite a bit rests, exegetically, on this point, and it will become a centerpiece of my arguments in 2.5.
Just as noema represents for Husserl a generalization of the notion of linguistic meaning, so does Bedeutsamkeit for Heidegger.

Moreover, though, Heidegger distinguishes *Bedeutungen* from entities themselves, and even does so by expressly contrasting his from a Millian view of meaning. In fact, ‘Bedeutung’ occurs in that context in a manner *exactly equivalent* to Frege’s use of ‘Sinn.’ In the late 1927 lecture course BPP, Heidegger lays out a direct attack on Mill’s semantics of proper names, and specifically, by critiquing Mill’s account of identifying statements arising from consideration of the copula (and Mill’s attempt to disambiguate between its functions of combination and of existential designation). According to Mill, a division between real or accidental (i.e. synthetic) and verbal or essential (i.e. analytic) expressions is required; in the latter, the copula is in fact a disguised ‘means,’ and a statement of the form “a = b” should be understood not as positing an identity between the objects designated by the names ‘a’ and ‘b; but rather the usage of the names themselves. When we learn the truth of “Hesperus is Phosphorus,” we do not discover anything about the world, only something about our linguistic conventions: that the proper name ‘Hesperus’ is used as is ‘Phosphorus.’ Provided one is privy to these conventions, one can determine *apriori*, then, that such an identifying statement is true, and need not consult the world.\(^\text{184}\)\(^\text{185}\)

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\(^{184}\) As latter-day theories of direct reference would put it, the relevant conventions have to do with “tagging,” or of an “initial baptism” alongside the conventionality of the baptism being maintained in a causal chain of usage.\(^\text{185}\) Mill’s own semantics are only extensional about proper names; his distinction between denotation and connotation, which complicates the overarched account of semantics, extends to all other kinds of names. However, this is misleading, for on Mill’s own view, names are just tags. They have no meaning; they simply function to point to that which they name. “Millianism” often today means an extensional theory of semantics, which says that the meaning of a proper name is its referent. This is not what Mill claimed. Nevertheless, I am
As Frege made clear, however, this leads to the puzzle of how to understand identifying statements using co-referring names, such as “Hesperus is Phosphorus” as distinct from trivial identifying statements, like “Hesperus is Hesperus”; whereas the latter seems uninformative, the former does not. In such cases we must understand the copula not simply as proxy for ‘means’, and the statement as about names—i.e. for such statements to be verbal expressions—but rather as expressing an identification found through the (empirical) discovery that in fact the two names co-refer. In other words, these identifying statements should be understood not on the level of the metalanguage, according to which they should, apparently, simply be analytic and therefore apriori, but on the level of the object language. Echoing Frege on this point, Heidegger maintains that these supposedly analytic

Going to elide this difference and speak of Millianism and Mill’s own views as if they were one and the same; in general, I think the distinction isn’t much relevant for my purposes.

And that Mill’s theory rules something like this out is why Heidegger insists that Mill’s view of names is inconsistent with his overall nominalistic and empiricist outlook. See GA24 273, 278/BPP 192-3, 196.

Heidegger’s affinity with Frege must be understood as deeply in keeping with his ontological views, owing to the issue’s implications about the meaning of being. The Millian move allows for a purely extensional semantics, effectively shunting aside the explanatory need for cognitive significance, by distinguishing analytic from synthetic statements and thereby eliding ambiguity in the copula as ultimately illusory; the occurrence of the copula would better be understood as pragmatically functioning as a disguised ‘means’: “By means of this alteration of the expression ‘is’ in the case of analytic, that is, essential or verbal propositions, Mill tries to avoid the ambiguity of the copula and thus to settle the question of the different meanings of being in the ‘is’” (GA24 280/BPP 197).

The Fregean move, by contrast, in retaining these sorts of identifying statements as within the object language, and affirming cognitive significance in order to differentiate meanings within the object language so understood, embraces the polyvalence of the copula in both its combinatorial and existential functions (on Frege’s embrace of the polyvalence of the copula, from a critical perspective, see Hintikka 1986; Hintikka calls this embrace the “Frege-Russell thesis,” and identifies an ambiguity between not two but four uses). The ambiguity of the copula, Heidegger says, must not be avoided but contended with head-on: “the problem of inquiring into the unitary ground of this ambiguity necessarily emerges. For an ambiguity of the same word is never accidental” (GA24 276/BPP 194). Heidegger’s point here is not that the ambiguity cuts against ‘being’ as univocal, but on the contrary that it is the Millian move of disambiguating uses of the copula that cannot be understood as preserving univocity—in fact, it dismembers being, at bottom side-stepping the deep issues about its polyvalence. To genuinely think the univocity of being, we must contend with the ambiguities (and, so it would seem, find a way to resolve them under a unitary understanding), rather than attempt to explain or hand-wave them away as arising from deceptive usage (the difference is of that between finding a dialectical unity of opposites vs. eliminativism of the opposition).

We cannot, therefore, understand Heidegger as departing from a Fregean type of analysis without obscuring how conceiving of meaning in purely extensional terms leads to a conception of the copula that is at odds with what Heidegger wants to assert about the meaning of being. So, there are not only phenomenological but ontological motivations which lead Heidegger to converge with the traditionally Fregean account of
identifying statements must be understood as properly referential (i.e. within the object language):

…in every meaning [Bedeutung] of a name lies some reference to the real matters [Sachbezug], so that Mill’s allegedly verbal propositions cannot be completely severed from the beings they intend. (GA24 280/BPP 197)\(^{188}\)

Again like Frege, Heidegger takes this to imply that “Names, words in the broadest sense, have no \textit{a priori} fixed measure of their significative content [Bedeutungsgehaltes]” (GA24 280/BPP 197)—that is, their contents are not determined \textit{apriori} in the way Millianism would have it, as \textit{nothing but} a matter of conventional designation.\(^{189}\) Instead, they are subject to discovery and revision:

With regard to Mill’s division between verbal propositions [\textit{wörtlichen Sätzen}] and real propositions [\textit{wirklichen Sätzen}], the following therefore has to be said. Real assertions, assertions about beings, are constantly enriching [\textit{bereichern}] and modifying [\textit{modifizieren}] the verbal propositions. (GA24 280/BPP 197)\(^{190}\)

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\(^{188}\) Hofstadter translates ‘Sachbezug’ as ‘reference to things,’ which is fine, but the word has the connotation of not simply reference to something whatsoever, but \textit{objective or factual} reference, reference to something specific which really is the case. I have also changed his translation of ‘liegt’ to ‘lies’ rather than ‘is implied.’

\(^{189}\) Elsewhere, Heidegger says that “The sound of a word [\textit{De r Wortlaut}] does not have a meaning for all time and does not actually have the fixed meaning [\textit{die feste Bedeutung}] that refers to [\textit{meint}] a subject matter…” (GA17 16/IPR 12).

\(^{190}\) It is on this basis that “The separation between verbal and real propositions is not feasible in [Mill’s] sense. All verbal propositions are only abbreviations [\textit{Verkümmerungen}] of real propositions (GA24 281/BPP 197). Though Heidegger may be rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction here, akin to Quine, it has to be clear that the implications for him would in no way be naturalistic or affirming anything like a strong continuity between philosophy and science, as they are for Quine. The reason is simple: because of the permissiveness with which phenomenology treats intentionality (as intrinsically referential, no matter the ontological status of the intentional object), what Mill called \textit{real} propositions can in no way be understood as synonymous for Heidegger with \textit{empirical} propositions. For Heidegger any kind of reference at all makes the proposition real or synthetic, which for him is just to say a proposition in the object language. Therefore, collapsing the analytic-synthetic distinction cannot be understood as speaking against apriority. Unlike the logical empiricist tradition Quine was responding to, Heidegger does not \textit{equate} the \textit{apriori} with the analytic (even if, in keeping with Kant and much of the tradition, analyticity implies apriority, he does not think the converse is true) nor the \textit{aposteriori} with the synthetic. Additionally, Heidegger, unlike Quine, has no nominalistic compunctions; indeed, he frames his entire attack on Mill in 1927 as an attack on nominalism, just as in 1925’s HCT he frames the upshot of categorial intuition as anti-nominalistic. Heidegger’s point in rejecting the analytic-synthetic (or verbal-real) distinction is simply that we cannot analyze identifying statements as metalinguistic, and instead they must be understood in terms of the object language; it is therefore ultimately not a critique of the \textit{aposteriori-apriori} distinction, but, in order to preserve the univocity of being (as discussed in ftn. 187), of the object language-metalanguage distinction.
And, sounding more and more like Frege, Heidegger continues that the reason this is so is because co-referring names differ in the mode by which they present or provide a perspective on the thing named:

Names, or again their meanings [Bedeutungen], change with transformations in our knowledge of things. And the meanings of names and words always change according to the predominance of a specific factor of meaning [bestimmten Bedeutungsmomentes], that is, in each case, according to the predominance of a specific line of vision [bestimmten Blickrichtung] toward the thing somehow named by the name. (GA24 280/BPP 197)

In other words, meaning must be understood as capturing cognitive perspective, and being therefore a matter of the limitations of what is known about the referent, is subject to informative discoveries of identity. Heidegger, though he never invokes Frege by name in these discussions, unmistakably gives a full-throated embrace of the basic features of the Fregean response to Millian semantics.  

Though Heidegger does not elaborate further in BPP upon what this “line of vision” on an entity consists in, the point clearly stems from fundamental aspects of the phenomenological account of intentionality: entities are not encountered as simply present

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It is worth noting, however, that part of what rejecting the distinction does show according to Heidegger is the continuity between everyday language and experience on the one hand with philosophy and science on the other: “The distinction that is really operative in Mill’s mind [and which is unfeasible] is that between the view of beings that makes itself manifest in common meaning and understanding, as it is already laid down in every language, and the explicit apprehension and investigation of beings, whether in practice or in scientific inquiry” (GA24 280/BPP 197). This is another reason why, as I argued in 2.2, observation reports and phenomenological descriptions lie on a continuum.

191 Heidegger only mentions Frege by name once in passing (if esteem) in his entire oeuvre. Nevertheless, it is clear the young Heidegger was quite familiar with, and complimentary of, Frege’s work. In the sole reference to Frege in his corpus, in the 1912 essay “Neuere Forschungen über Logik,” Heidegger speaks very highly, if briefly, about Frege, saying that the latter’s “logico-mathematical researches are in my opinion not yet appreciated in their true significance, let alone exhausted” (GA1 20/RRL 33). Although he mentions that, in comparison to Husserl’s attack on psychologism and its “relativistic consequences,” Frege’s only “overcame [it] in principle,” he singles out for mention “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” itself, alongside “Über Begriff und Gegenstand,” extolling their value “for a universal theory of the concept.” These comments make apparent that Heidegger’s understanding and interest in Frege extended beyond merely general affinities with Husserl as regards, e.g. their shared anti-psychologism, but included his work on semantics.
before us, but in a certain light, in terms of a certain significance they hold. The as-
determination is that “line of vision” or “factor of meaning” under which and by means of
which the entity is encountered. Thus, just as Frege says that Sinn is mode of presentation of
a referent, Heidegger says that “Meaningfulness is first of all a mode of presence in virtue of
which every entity of the world is discovered” (GA20 287/HCT 210).

So Bedeutsamkeit is a key feature of all intentional acts, and in particular it is what for
Heidegger constitutes the “Worldhood of the World,” for all encounter with entities will
come in terms not of their bare, valence-less extantness (Vorhandenheit) to consciousness,
but in virtue of their vividly being-meaningful and showing up as meaningful in their
presentation, in the respect of being serviceable for this or that task in which Dasein is
engaged (Zuhandenheit). The Cartesian tradition elided the Worldhood of the World, and
thereby conceived both the presentation of entities and the World in terms of the bare
presence of something to a consciousness. It passed over the proximate mode of encounter
with things as meaningful in their presentation.

In other words, when the chair is encountered as a chair, as something suitable-for-
sitting, this significance is only possible, and only intelligible, when understood within a
larger context of significations: its place and orientation in the room (were it on the stage
where the speaker stands, or turned against the wall, it would not show up as suitable for
sitting, unless, perhaps, taking into account also the circumstances of the room, there were no
other chairs available), the etiquettes of attending a lecture, my bodily state as telling me now
I would prefer to sit, etc. The significance chair only shows up to me in my encounter with
the entity because of my practical (i.e. not necessarily explicitly thematized) grasp of these
other significances and respective entities, and, even more, is constituted by this practical
network. Thus, a creature for whom these reference relations have no salience, because they have not been inducted into a suitably familiar form of life, would not—could not—encounter the entity in this way.

One might suggest that since Heidegger characterizes Bedeutsamkeit in terms of reference relations, this signifies, despite all the other matters brought into consideration, something closer to Fregean Bedeutung than Fregean Sinn. But this is, first, to confuse referent (extension) with reference (the species of relation), and second, to miss precisely Heidegger’s own particular gloss on the way in which sense is holistic: it is so because every meaning is constituted by a reference-relation to other significances via an implication of other entities as they show up in a practical totality.\(^\text{192}\) Thus, we might say that for Heidegger what Frege termed Sinn is only properly understandable in terms of a holistic network of reference-relations. This is not to collapse sense into referent, to deny their distinction; on the contrary, it is to argue that the phenomenon of sense is only possible, and cannot be understood apart from, the phenomenon of reference as such. It is not a rejection of the Fregean paradigm but an elaboration upon it—and an illuminating one at that.\(^\text{193}\)

Now the reference-relation shows up in terms of our projectedness into possibilities—the thing shows up in-order-to, with-which, and for-the-sake-of-which (notice how these are necessarily referential or coordinating phrases), and these phenomena themselves point back to concern as the horizon for signification. Dasein’s concernful Existenz results in things showing up as serviceable-for with respect to these sorts of coordinations, and thus as

\(^{192}\) “As the Being of something ready-to-hand, an involvement is itself discovered only on the basis of the prior discovery [Vorentdecktheit] of a totality of involvements” (GA2 114/BT 118).

\(^{193}\) For not only now do we understand (owing to Frege’s context principle) Sinn as never a matter of isolated significances, but now we understand better why this is so: the reason significances only ever show up artificially and post hoc as atoms is because they are themselves constituted by a totality of reference-relations.
signifying in such or such a way, pointing beyond themselves to other entities and what they signify under the concernful orientation. Taken on the whole, we could therefore understand the utterances, behaviors, and dispositions of a person in terms of the web of existentially significant meanings, ordered by Verstehen (one’s understanding of themselves and their place in this web), Befindlichkeit (their disposition, or how they find themselves in and responding affectively to that web), and Rede (discursive practice and its vagaries, which pre-configures much of these referential connections for them), by means of which are constituted their projects (simply, what they are up to, their goals, aspirations, ends, in total, their impulsions of themselves into a future). These phenomena are all ultimately traceable back to the fact that Dasein is not merely intended towards things, but comports itself towards them, because it is at bottom not simply a subject-pole of an intentional arc, a possessor and processor of symbols, but Sorge. As John Haugeland perfectly put it, what distinguishes us from computers is that we “give a damn” (Haugeland 1998, 47), an expression which perfectly captures the conditions of Heideggerian significance:

Thus the south wind can be a sign of rain. It is more accurately an omen, and first and strictly an omen which is addressed to everyday concern, where it is encountered and as such discovered by everyday concern in the course of directing itself toward the weather (cultivation, harvest, or a military venture). […] This sign-taking institution [zeichennenmende Stiftung] comes about by taking the weather into account, which in turn is grounded in a particular concernedness, in everyday affairs, the everyday work of the farmer himself; more accurately, this is the primary discovery as an entity before any explicit elaboration. The sign-taking is grounded in this concernedness. (GA20 281-2/HCT 206)

Of note in this passage is that the intended entity is always presented in the context of one’s projects; the south wind shows up as a sign of rain to the farmer in light of and in the midst of

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194 A corresponding passage occurs at GA2 107-8/BT 111-2, but the question of what we might call the “transcendental” issues of sign-institution are largely elided in favor of the points about circumspective concern.
of the farmer’s daily business. In showing up in this way, and being instituted as a sign, it is allowed to function as a sign, to have a sense, and thereby to play a meaningful role for the farmer. But the fact that the entity shows up in the context of the farmer’s projects is explicable because Dasein is Sorge, and it is in terms of this that the disclosure of entities always takes place, whether the farmer explicitly thematizes his concerns and projects or not. And all this is why we are not bare intentionality: the sundries of factical life, of our lived experience, the rich expanse of significances and their intricate interpenetrations, cannot be made intelligible apart from our character of giving a damn.

Now with an eye to the features of Bedeutsamkeit that have been excavated, specifically in light of its connection to the as-structure, I think we can now see the ways in which the core theses of a Fregean semantics, extracted from Føllesdal’s discussion, hold—and must hold—with respect to it. The theses cohere with what we have already understood about Bedeutsamkeit and Bedeutungen. The farmer is comported to the south wind in a specific, determinate way, in virtue of which it shows up as a sign of rain, with that particular significance. This specification of the entity, the Bedeutung or as-determination is that in virtue of which entities are presented or in which Dasein comports to them (3), and, insofar as the Bedeutung or as-determination is a mode in which something shows up, it is distinguishable from the encountered entity as such (4).

Further, just as we said before about the way Heidegger always speaks of the intentum and the intentional object, the manner in which he speaks about the as-structure (something as something), necessitates that each specification characteristic of the signification is necessarily indexed to the entity at issue. When Heidegger speaks of the as-structure he consistently refers to it by invoking the entity with respect to that which it is
considered as.\(^{195}\) While other things may show up similarly as a sign of rain for the farmer (e.g. a thunderhead on the horizon), the presented entity is that in virtue of which and with respect to which the specific sign of rain is presented; the signification is not *sign of rain* but *the south wind as sign of rain*.\(^{196}\) Additionally, we have seen that when speaking of *Bedeutung*, Heidegger says in every signification lies *Sachbezug*—reference to the real matters (GA24 280/BPP 197).\(^{197}\) Accordingly, signification determines referent, because every signification implicates a certain referent; to one and the same Bedeutung or as-determination, there corresponds only one entity (5).

Additionally, to one and the same entity there may correspond several different *Bedeutungen* or as-determinations (6). The nature of the practice and the interests of Dasein so involved will determine the manner of the presentation of the entity. Owing to this, different projects and concerns will present the entity differently, under different significations. The south wind would show up differently, for instance, and play a different role, for the meteorologist, ensconced in a project of determining long-term trends and making predictions, and not its effects on the harvest.

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\(^{195}\) To give just one example:

We say, “I am giving roses,” I can also say, “I am giving flowers,” but not “I am giving plants.” Botany, on the other hand, does not analyze flowers but rather plants. The distinction between plant and flower, both of which can be said of the same rose, is the distinction between natural and environmental thing. The *rose as flower* is an environmental thing, the *rose as plant* is a natural thing. (GA20 50/HCT 38, emphasis added)

\(^{196}\) This says a great deal more than just that senses are object-dependent. One might be tempted, in light of the issues I raised in the Introduction, to think that we have already, then, dispensed with the problems of McDowell’s approach, and solved matters; the referent is always involved in the sense and in fact forms a part of it. But in fact this by itself no more allows for openness or answerability than McDowell thought he had, for the as-what or ideational content, in being a matter of language and interpretation (a case I make in 2.4 and 2.5), and remaining a condition for the presentation of the entity in the first place (on pain of the Myth), yet threatens the directness of reference for the same reasons I presented previously in the Introduction. We have not yet extricated ourselves from the Maze of Words simply by invoking this view of senses in terms of the as-structure.

\(^{197}\) As mentioned in ftn. 188, ‘*Sachbezug*’ has a connotation not simply of reference (*Bezug*) but objective or factual reference, reference to the matters actually at issue. Therefore, for Heidegger not just a reference-relation, but the referent or referents themselves are involved in the signification.
Finally, each comportment has one and only one Bedeutung or as-determination (7). For a comportment in which the south wind showed up otherwise would be a different comportment altogether, drawing upon a different set of projects and concerns. Moreover, just as for Frege the requirement that we be able to felicitously discriminate between propositional attitudes (in order to ascribe them properly) constrains a theory of meaning in such a way that propositions must be conceived as having a determinate, unambiguous sense, so too for Heidegger is it that the requirement we be able to felicitously discriminate between contents of an experience (in order to ascribe content to an experience properly, and so in order to engage in the practice of phenomenological description at all) constrains a theory of meaning such that the content of experience must be conceived as having a determinate, unambiguous sense.198

With all these varied considerations in mind, I propose ‘Bedeutung’ thus emerges as the best candidate within Heidegger’s terminology for a translation of Fregean ‘Sinn.’199 The

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198 None of this is to say that there can be no pluralism about phenomenological description: for no one, and certainly not Heidegger, would claim that a given phenomenological description exhausts the respective phenomenological content of which it is a description. The thesis does not state that there is one and only one correct exhibition of the noema. What it does state is that there is a standard by which any exhibition of the noema must conform, and that is the noema itself, which is not ambiguous and which is therefore subject to correct or incorrect exhibition through description. In other words, the thesis simply states that there is such a thing as getting it right and there is such a thing as getting it wrong with respect to describing the noema. And that there is a distinction does not imply there is one and only one way of doing either, or that any single given description may say all that is to be said in either direction.

199 There are good exegetical reasons for suggesting that ‘Phänomen’ is also a candidate for translating Husserl’s ‘noema,’ especially given that Heidegger’s discussion of the fact that entity’s show themselves in many ways, as brought up above in reference to Føllesdal’s thesis (6), comes as part of the discussion of ‘phenomenon’ as meaning the entity as it shows itself from itself. My view is that the candidacies of ‘Bedeutsamkeit’ and ‘Phänomen’ are not mutually exclusive. ‘Phänomen’ is Heidegger’s generic term for Husserlian noema, as the way an intentional object shows up, viewed strictly with the features of cognitive perspective at issue, or with regard to the task of properly individuating phenomenological contents more finely than just in terms of specifying the intentional object. ‘Bedeutsamkeit’ is Heidegger’s translation of ‘noema’ with the features of cognitive significance in mind, that is, with regard to the task of specifying the roles and interrelations of phenomenological contents within a cognitive economy, or within the architecture of an overall configuration of mind (the case for which will be laid out later in this section). Of course, there is no real divide between these two aspects of sense; individuating contents and understanding their roles are two sides of the same coin—that is the Sellarsian insight, after all. I propose that we can understand ‘Bedeutsamkeit’ as a clarification of ‘Phänomen’ on Heidegger’s part, roughly analogous to how Sellars’ insight about semantic
difference between *Bedeutung* and *Bedeutsamkeit* for Heidegger is the difference between a meaning-determination and the being-meaningful as such of the determination. With this distinction, and in virtue of the textual evidence marshalled, I think we can now, with some justification, make the following claim: Fregean ‘*Sinn*’ as such (i.e. the concept of *Sinn*), can be felicitously and accurately translated into Heidegger’s ‘*Bedeutsamkeit*.’ Fregean ‘*Sinn*,’ as used to refer to a particular meaning-determination can likewise be translated by Heidegger’s ‘*Bedeutung*.’

Now, I said earlier that Heidegger’s theory of what Frege called ‘*Sinn*’ need not emulate Frege’s own account beyond Føllesdal’s theses (3)-(7). When I said that, I meant it to be true only in the respect that meeting those criteria was all that was necessary for the identification of Heideggerian *Bedeutsamkeit* with Fregean *Sinn*. But now that that identity has been established, there are further considerations I must meet: for I wish to not simply say there is affinity between Heidegger and Frege on the features and role of the notion of *Sinn*, but that there is affinity between Heidegger and McDowell in those respects. On that front, I believe it quite clear by now that many elements of Heidegger’s account of *Bedeutsamkeit* are additionally quite close in character to an understanding of semantics at the basis of, and instigating of, McDowell’s Problematic. To that end, let us summarize some of the features of *Bedeutsamkeit* that fall out of the above discussion. The conception of *Bedeutsamkeit* on offer by Heidegger is:

1) *Holistic*. Meaning may be broken up into distinct Bedeutungen-determinations, but is more properly understood in terms of *Bedeutungsganze*, a totality-of-significations (at least, if we engage in trying to explicate a given *Bedeutung*, we could only do so in reference to other entities and other *Bedeutungen*) that collectively makes up the *Weltlichkeit* of *In-der-Welt-Sein*. Like Sellars, Heidegger embraces semantic or logical holism.

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content as analyzable in terms of semantic or rational roles affords us a clarification of the nature of Fregean *Sinn* (vis-à-vis the case I made to that effect in the Introduction).
2) **Pragmatist**, in the broadest sense. Entities are presented as-this-or-that, or under Bedeutungen, in virtue of Dasein’s involvements, projects, and practices. Meaning must be construed in relation to *praxis*. Further, meaning is *public and social*. Because it is scrutable and discernible by way of the discernibility of the involvements, projects, and practices of Dasein, meaning is not private. Nor is it a matter of subjective, individual construal, being based in norms of serviceability of entities for practices occurring within a tapestry of social behaviors and expectations.

3) **Explanatorily powerful.** Because meaning is itself scrutable in terms of Dasein’s involvements, apprehension of the relevant significations (and projects) involved in given circumstances is in turn capable of shedding light on individuation of the attitudes, judgments, evaluations, comportments, utterances, and, to some degree, even the mental behaviors and hygiene of others (in short, it gives us a degree of defeasible access to the contents of their various intentional states). Moreover, owing to 1 above in particular, meaning on this account is capable of rendering minds scrutable and intelligible in the sense of being ordered or, in McDowell’s terms, “configured” in terms of *normative relations* between these individuated contents.200

By “configuration of mind,” McDowell does not just mean specification of a collection of intentional states, for that would not yet address the Fregean program, which asks us not merely to be able to account for the semantics of each intentional state in its turn, but additionally to understand that and how these stand in relations to one another characteristic of their roles in our mental lives—i.e. the relevant relations construed in a way suitable to understanding norm-governed behaviors both mental and linguistic.

There is something similar in Heidegger’s existential analytic. In 2.2 I discussed how Heidegger, like Husserl, understands phenomenology as tasked with the accurate description of phenomenological contents (and as, arguably, anyone engaged in something recognizable as phenomenology must). We see now, however, that for Heidegger’s phenomenological project there is an additional emphasis on accounting for the interconnectedness of these contents, in virtue of a certain sort of associative linkages between them. The Heideggerian

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200 “We might say that Frege’s introduction of *Sinn* reflects an idea along these lines: the very idea of a configuration in a mind needs to be seen in the context of the concept of rationality” (McDowell 2005, 49)—in the sense that it is “determine by the requirements of rationality” (McDowell 2005, 54).
The task is not simply to understand that and how a given comportment is meaningful or has existential import, considered atomistically, but to understand how those existential imports are coordinated, part of an overarching network of the existential horizons of the with-which, the in-order-to, and the for-the-sake-of-which. Together these horizons order *Verstehen* as an understanding of both ourselves and the world, our concrete being-in and navigating-of-the-world. Each meaning-determination is part of a (more or less) coherent existential narrative that defines our projects and orients how we find ourselves in the world—and thus too, how the world shows up for us.

The question as to what these associations more precisely consist in is answered by the fact that the horizons of the with-which, the in-order-to, and the for-the-sake-of-which are understood by Heidegger as species of reference-relations. The fact that these reference-relations are conditioned on the import or serviceability of entities for this or that task means they have a specifically normative character, embodying, not simply contingent psychological associations or law-like causal regularities but, on an implicit or explicit order, rule or rule-like linkages, properly normative and a matter of evaluation.

At the same time, Heidegger is not particularly concerned with accounting for a *rational* configuration of mind, understood as a coherent ordering of *inferential* linkages and

\[201\] These horizons are themselves reference-relations which structure and determine the specific ways the *relata* are related. For example, the entity before me shows up as a chair, with-which I may sit, in-order-to listen to the colloquium, for-the-sake-of my education about its subject matter (this is only one layer of these horizons; we may iterate the procedure). By means of these structures, the chair, myself, the colloquium, the lecture itself, the lecturer, other attendants, and my educational goals all become co-invoked and find themselves situated in relations, such that to understand the significance of anyone will implicate, or reference, the others.

\[202\] I do not mean, as yet, to signal anything about the origin of these norms—whether they are meant to indicate a realism or a conventionalism. We shall see that the thesis of the second nature of entities has much to say on this question, though. For now I can say that though I strongly agree with Haugeland’s contention (Haugeland 2005) that for Heidegger norms and intelligibility are not simply a matter of convention (and on this account he disputes its relation to pragmatism), this does not in my view cut against the attribution to Heidegger of a certain sort of pragmatism, broadly construed. Nor even does it cut against the idea that socially-structured and determined conventions play some kind of role in making possible a normativity which does not ultimately rely on those conventions for its “legitimacy.”
which thereby sheds light on inferential practices; the linkages at issue are arguably not inferential, despite their normative character. However, Heidegger is deeply intrigued and motivated by the task of accounting for what we might deem an “existential-concernful” configuration of mind, with meaning’s place in Dasein’s practices broadly construed. The “configuration of mind” at issue is not cashed out in terms of an ordering of rational or inferential linkages between propositional contents or attitudes but rather in existentially relevant associations between ways of considering entities. When I invoke the image of an “existential-concernful configuration of mind,” then, I mean something like the following: an accounting of the normative associations between contents of mind in terms of the sorts of relations (captured well by Heidegger’s expressions “with-which,” “in-order to,” and “for-the-sake-of-which”) which, in analogy to their inferential counterparts, we may term “existential relations,” capturing as they do endorsements or evaluations about the import of their corresponding arguments in view of projected ends or concerns of an existentially-oriented agent—Dasein is that being for which, as Heidegger says, *its being is an issue.*

On the other hand, there is a case to be made that these associations could be construed, with some caution, as inferential, i.e. as constituted not just by generically

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203 What it means to say that a theory of mind interested in belief ascription and explanation should be one with an eye to understand mind as having a rational configuration, is that two criteria must be met. First, the network of propositional attitudes held by a generic agent are consistent (or at least, we should proceed with a theory of mind and belief predicated on the defeasible presumption that, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, an agent’s network of beliefs is consistent). Second, the network of propositional attitudes is largely connected via legitimate rational-inferential linkages (or, again, we should proceed under the presumption that this is on the whole the case). One may notice that together these criteria seem rather akin to at least part of Davidson’s prescriptive criteria for radical interpretation, to be found in the principle of charity: one assumes, insofar as one is able in the absence of defeating evidence, that the speaker in question is rational and not in the grips of either major error or inconsistency. In this way, we may “solve the problem of the interdependence of belief and meaning by holding belief constant as far as possible while solving for meaning” (Davidson 1973b, 324). Davidson emphasized that a key component of the principle of charity is attribution of pervasive true belief, and this seems like it would be separable from the attribution of rationality amongst the belief network. If so, Davidson’s prescription of charity seems to include, but go beyond, the basic idea McDowell appears to have in mind.
normative but by specifically *rational* linkages. It is not entirely clear that anything in the projects of Frege, Sellars, or McDowell hinges on the linkages being construed as inferential in the sense of inference-*drawing*, i.e. *inferring*. For inferring is a certain kind of psychological act, and in characterizing an association between contents as inferential, we need not imply anything whatsoever about acts involving those contents, or that the associations at issue, in order to possess an inferential character, are conditioned on acts of such a sort. The attribution of such a character is solely about the kind of normative bearing some content has upon another such that, were an actual psychological act in fact associating them to occur, such an association would be logically felicitous or normatively sound. With regard, then, to whether the normative linkages at issue between contents qualify as
“inferential” linkages, the question of whether such an act as we would term an “inference” occurs or not is therefore entirely beside the point.

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204 That the Sellarsian point considers a content or attitude to be inferential only in the sense of possessing a kind of substantive relational property of norms to other contents, and not in the sense of being the product (or motivator) of any act of explicit inference-drawing is an important refrain of a number of his expositors. Laurence BonJour, in advocating for a coherentist epistemology broadly inspired by Sellarsian reflections, cautions us not to confuse the matter of a belief’s origin with the matter of its epistemic status; a belief may originate from something other than an actual inferential act, but the sticking point is that no belief is non-inferential in terms of its status as warranted or not (see BonJour 1976, 290). Now, the characteristic Sellarsian internalism about the epistemic status of a belief holds; in order for a belief to be justified, it is not enough simply that it possesses the appropriate inferential connections, but that in some sense this is grasped. Nevertheless, the way BonJour talks about such “grasping” means explicit acts of inference-drawing are not required, and leaves open that some sort of implicit, practical engagement, in which inferential connections “are in some way tacitly or implicitly involved […] even if [the epistemic agent] does not rehearse them explicitly and indeed might well be unable to do so even if challenged” (BonJour 1976, 296). For an elaboration upon a Sellarsian background which conforms to the notion of these inferential connections as understood within (along Dreyfusian lines) an embodied familiarity or skillful coping, see Koons 2006, 166-7.

In his “study guide” for EPM, Robert Brandom makes a similar point in distinguishing senses of “inferential”:

For Sellars, there is no such thing as a noninferential belief, if by that one means a belief one could have without grasping its inferential connection to at least some other beliefs. For to understand a sentence, to grasp a propositional content (a necessary condition of having a belief) is to place it in the space of reasons, to assign it an inferential role in the game of giving and asking for reasons, as entailing some other contents and being incompatible with others. A noninferential report or belief can properly be called ‘noninferential’ only in the sense that the reporter’s commitment to an essentially inferentially articulated content is elicited noninferentially on this occasion—that is, that is elicited as a response to some nonlinguistic, nonepistemic environing circumstance, rather than as a response to another belief or assertion. (Brandom 1997, 153)

Brandom rightly stresses that Sellars accepts the idea there are noninferential beliefs in this latter sense of noninferential, and that these beliefs (the exemplary case being attitudes upon observation reports) “constitute the ultimate court of appeal for all factual claims.” But they are inferential in the sense that they nevertheless presuppose other beliefs, for understanding their contents is dependent upon grasping, at some level and to some degree (not necessarily explicitly or fully), their normative, inferential purport (Brandom 1997, 152-3).

The distinction is critical for understanding Sellars properly, but even more so in the case of Frege, the idea that the rational linkages constituting a configuration of mind should be understood in terms of any kind of psychological act would seem to be anathema to the entire project, constructed as it is to push back against a psychologism that would collapse prescriptive “laws of thought” or logic into descriptions of psychological behaviors.

205 There is an additional reason why an “existential-concernful” configuration of mind could perhaps be fairly understood as a rational configuration. I have said that the bearers of these existential-concernful linkages are ways of considering entities and not propositional contents or attitudes—which might make it sound as if the associations hold between propositional constituents and not full propositions themselves—this is in fact incorrect, given the way Heidegger understands his analog to Fregean Sinne, Bedeutungen. For Heidegger the as-structure itself, taken properly as a whole, can be unpacked as a propositionally articulate content consisting of a demonstrative and a predicative content, the latter of which includes a synthetic categorial form (such as the copula) and an ideational content (such as chair)—e.g. “This is a chair,” which, in actual comportments, shows up as collapsed into what is expressible as a complex demonstrative: “This chair” or simply “The chair” (with an implicit deixis). This is because, strictly speaking, the as-structure does not designate an ideational content in isolation but an ideational identification—it is always concretely a consideration of something as something—not simply an abstract as-content (e.g. chair). For this reason, again, full caution would dictate we distinguish the as-structure itself from an ideational content. When I say, then, as I did above, that for Heidegger
Whatever we may think about the efficacy of understanding Heidegger’s ordering of mind in terms of the inferential linkages, an existential configuration of mind, ultimately ordered by Sorge and temporality, plays much the same larger transcendental role for Heidegger as a rational configuration of mind does for McDowell. The transcendental point of the semantic holism McDowell takes from Sellars is that no isolated state can be seen as in continuity with the rest of the mental life of the subject, unless it is of a form conducive to all aspects of that mental life. And since some aspects of our mental life involve, consciously or unconsciously, in explicit acts or implicit acts, grasping inferential connections, that is rationally relating thought contents, then if the deliverances of perception are to be integrated into an overall picture of that mental life and the roles the contents figuring in it are to play, they must be of a form conducive to bearing such rational relations. For only then can we speak of the semantic and therefore epistemic relevance of perceptual contents.

Likewise, we can say of Heidegger that perceptual states must be of a form to be integrated into or play a role in mental life, though now not with an eye to thought contents bearing rational relations but rather with an eye to thought contents bearing existentially relevant relations to others—as bearing existential import, and so normatively bearing upon other contents; only then can we make sense of Dasein as having lived experiences in which things show up as significant (as, we might say, with its more existential valences—meaningful) to it in the first place.

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normative linkages hold between “ways of considering entities,” this is in fact really only true with regard to the full as-structure, a consideration of something as something, and not merely an ideational content. For it is not a free-floating ideational content but only an ideational identification of something as something that impresses itself upon Dasein and provokes it to implicating the so-identified entity in its practices. Therefore, the normative associations at issue for Heidegger are not associations between abstractions or universals, but indeed hold between what are, in effect, propositional contents, even if those contents do not necessarily show up in the comportment as fully “unpacked” (indeed, they usually do not).
Heidegger’s investigation, then, is akin to, but ultimately even more primordial than Sellars’. We see how his account of Dasein as Sorge determines his view of how and why Dasein is always already ensconced in a network of holistic significance relations, and that this transcendentally structures the character and contents of intentional comportments. So Heidegger has traced back to its ultimate source the nature of the semantic background that Sellars argues is a precondition of any encounter with things as having semantic import and normative bearing. If Sellars leads us back to this precondition (the background), Heidegger leads us back even further to that precondition’s own precondition or horizon (Dasein’s existential being as Sorge), and in doing so helps us get an even firmer grip on the character of the background and what it affords us: not just making intelligible Dasein as a inhabitant of the space of reasons, but even more fundamentally making intelligible—as well as salient and ineliminable—Dasein essence as Existen, an existential being, to whom things matter, and about which it gives a damn in the first place (in other words, an inhabitant of the world in its full worldhood, Being-in-the-World), so that there may be anything like a space of reasons at all. Heidegger, we could say, is investigating the ultimate sources of the space of reasons.

2.4 Categorial Intuition and the Conceptual Surplus: Heidegger’s Critique of the Given

In 2.3, I established that Heidegger’s notion of Bedeutsamkeit has close affinities in several key respects to a Fregean notion of Sinn and its role within an account of mind, at least in its broadly Sellarsian or McDowellian elaboration. Following that line of thought, I closed with a brief consideration of Heidegger’s elaborations of 1920, that in fact the key problems confronting this era have to do with understanding the place of the norms of rationality in
factual life. As we shall see, the fundamental form of this question carries over into the
discussions that foment BT later in the decade. The 1920 course is hardly the last time that
Heidegger’s discussions leading up to BT deal with the *apriori* understood in the sense
explicated above; though he typically refrains from invoking such things as “the principles of
reason” or the like in the same terms, the overall flavor of much his inquiry into the *apriori*
carry over, for instance, into his discussions of the same in 1925’s HCT.\(^{206}\)

In fact, the affinities between Heidegger and the Fregean/Sellarsian half of
McDowell’s Problematic go much deeper than I what I have so far discussed. As we have
already seen to some degree, for Heidegger, in parity with Sellars and McDowell, philosophy
must provide some account of the continuity between intuition and expression, that is,
between the contents of experience and the contents upon which the norms of rational
relations have purchase. As we saw in 2.2, for Heidegger this continuity is understood as the
one holding between *phenomenon* and *logos*, such that the latter is answerable to the former.
The problem is, a careful phenomenological investigation of intentionality *at the same time*
also reveals—and in this Heidegger simply follows Husserl’s observations to this effect—a

\(^{206}\) As Heidegger puts it in HCT’s commentary on categorial intuition—a matter to which I will turn in Sec. 2.3,
and to which we shall return again in Chapter 3:

…this discovery has pointed the way to a real understanding of abstraction (ideation), of the
apprehension of the idea. A provisional answer is thus provided to an old dispute, the problem
of the universals, of the being of universal concepts…The justified denial of the reality of
universals in the same sense as the reality of the chair also led to the denial of the objectivity
of universal objects and of the being of the ideal. This spell was broken with by the discovery
of categorial intuition… (GA20 98/HCT 72).
Later, he goes on to say of the closely related issues that phenomenology raises about the *apriori*, that “…there
is some warrant for speaking of Platonism within phenomenology itself” (GA20 102/HCT 75). Now, that
Heidegger says these results are “provisional” cannot be ignored, and so this passage should not be read as an
unhesitant endorsement of an unalloyed Platonic position. My point, however—at least here—is not so much a
matter of where Heidegger plants his flag, but rather that it is clear from this passage he sees the topic of
categorial intuition and the *apriori* as raised in 1925 as lying within the same general problematic—the “old
Platonic” one, in new, more complex form—as he laid out in the 1920 course. To be sure, his views are
different, more sophisticated, and more worked out by 1925; but they have been worked out through
consideration of one and the same issue set.
fundamental disparity or disconnect, rather than continuity, between expressions and the contents of perceptual intuitions, narrowly defined in terms of purely sensed contents, to which they are supposed to give voice. This disparity is to be understood as a shortfall of categorial content (required for expressible description) within the contents of sensory intuition. As I will show, Heidegger’s elaboration upon the nature of this shortfall surprisingly mirrors, almost exactly, Sellars’ arguments in EPM about the inadequacy of sense contents in justifying, in and of themselves, corresponding observation reports, requiring instead the input of compensatory conceptual contents to do so. Moreover, the philosophical lessons Sellars and Heidegger draw from their respective investigations are ultimately the same, that the demanded continuity can only be maintained by denying the narrow interpretation of experience as limited to sensed contents, and deciding in favor of its prior structuration, via language acquisition, in a manner conducive to the logical form of the proposition.

As Sellars makes salient in his discussion of the “logic of looks,” sees- or is-talk (encompassing reports which endorse the propositional contents they ascribe) is more fundamental than looks-talk (or sense-data reports, in which a sense of endorsement does not figure); it is not the case that the former is built up from the latter, but instead the latter arises from a derivative withdrawal of endorsement from the former.\(^207\) The lesson to be drawn

\(^{207}\) Sellars distinguishes between two different species of observation reports. In the first kind of case, one employs sees-talk to characterize the observation, as when one says, “I see that the necktie is green,” or “Jones sees that the chair is yellow.” Because, though, “sees” is an achievement word—or as Sellars prefers, a “so it is” or “just so” word (Sellars 1997, 40)—a report of this kind constitutes not merely a report of the perceptual contents but an endorsement of them as veridical.\(^207\) The other species of observation report, by contrast, paradigmatically employs not sees-talk but appears- or looks-talk. In this second kind of case, as exemplified by the likes of “The necktie looks green,” the report characteristically withholds endorsement and merely describes the contents of the perception as such.

The point is not just that there is a distinction here, but that reports in which looks-talk figure are in fact parasitic upon ones in which sees-talk figures, and not, as classical empiricism would have it, the other way around. For endorsement is not an added feature of some reports— withholding endorsement is the added
from this is that the concepts with which determinate predicative ascriptions are made are not
built up from nonconceptual dator inputs, immediate appearances, or pure sensations, as the
classical empiricist image of concept-acquisition by abstraction proposes. And if that is so,
then whatever a perceptual episode may furnish us with, it all by its lonesome could never
furnish us with contents sufficient (or perhaps even of the right form) either to formulate or
to justify even the most rudimentary observation report to the effect that x is φ. Instead, the
very notion of even formulating an observation report—any observation report—much less
justifying it, absent a prior acquisition of the concepts through which it is expressed or
articulated, is the Myth; to the contrary, there are no “self-authenticating nonverbal episodes,
the authority of which is transmitted to verbal and quasi-verbal performances…” (Sellars
1997, 77). Any such verbal episode will require the acquisition of a great deal of conceptual
(that is, verbal) content as accoutrement, at least some of which will be directly called upon
to formulate the report, if it is to be a report of what it purports to be of in the first place.

There is, then, a conceptual “shortfall” in any given perceptual episode, were we to
artificially isolate its “sensible contents” from the contributions of the acquired linguistic,
conceptual capacities of the perceiver. The lesson can be broken down into three claims: 1)
there is a conceptual shortfall with regard to the purely sensory contents of perception, 2)
that shortfall is—can only be—rectified, such that the perception is subject to felicitous
expression in observation reports, provided a compensatory or surplus background of

feature; one would only do so if circumstances conspired to raise questions on the part of the reporting party
about whether the perception is in fact veridical (Sellars 1997, 40-1). 207 This is the keystone to Sellars’ entire
argument against perceptual Givens in EPM, for if looks-talk is parasitic upon sees-talk, then this suggests that
“the concept of looking green, the ability to recognize that something looks green, presupposes the concept of
being green” (Sellars 1997, 43). And this substantiates the critique of logical atomism that puts in jeopardy the
notion of perceptual Givens.
"conceptual contents" is operative in the perception itself, and 3) these conceptual contents (or capacities) have been acquired, namely through a process of language-acquisition.

As it turns out, Heidegger agrees with all three of these Sellarsian claims. The third, programmatic claim represents what Sellars terms “psychological nominalism,” the applicability to Heidegger’s thought I will address, alongside the related thesis of conceptualism, in 2.5. The first two claims, though, happen to be found in Heidegger’s review of the Husserlian insight into categorial intuition in 1925’s HCT lectures. The entire discussion is orientated around the question of meeting the demand (one which, as we have seen in 2.2, lies at the heart of the enterprise of phenomenology, as the logos of phenomena) that experience be expressible, subject to report. In other words, the governing concern of the section is the requirement that intuitions be capturable in expression, which is no different from the concern, operative in EPM, that experience be articulable in observation reports. Further this demand is met by attributing to perceptions not simply sensory contents but, over and against the former, categorial contents.

Before substantiating these claims, I want to dispense with what is likely to be a lingering concern about the extent of translatability between Sellars and Heidegger on the issue of “expression.” In 2.2 I addressed an objection to the proposal that observation reports

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208 As will emerge at the end of this section and the beginning of the next, the second of the claims presented does not yet constitute conceptualism per se, at least Sellars’ version of it. In short, Sellars’ conceptualism does not merely attribute to experience a conceptual surplus but, owing to a close connection between conceptuality and language, this surplus must be understood as rendering experience as of the logical form of a linguistic token. Accordingly, while in this section I will show that Heidegger is committed to the second claim (in addition to the first), doing so will not yet establish that Heidegger is committed to conceptualism along Sellarsian lines. Doing that will have to wait for 2.5, where I will also establish his adherence to psychological nominalism.

209 The point is of course generalizable, being applicable to all intentional acts, not just perceptions, though Heidegger does focus on the latter.

210 The overarching section in the lectures is even titled “Intuition and Expression,” harkening back to the overriding concern of the 1920 lecture course PIE.
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glance. There is another track this sort of objection might take: one may argue that what epistemologists like Sellars mean by “observation report” could not be congruous with what Heidegger is after with “phenomenological description,” since observation reports would be of the sort of theoretical tenor that departs from the character of circumspective concern, the significance of which is meant to be preserved in phenomenological description (at least at its best). On the contrary, though, Heidegger says that “intermediate” between circumspective concern and disinterested, de-worlded inspection of what is merely extant (or present-at-hand) lie a whole host of modes of assertion, among which we could quite clearly locate observation reports:

Between the kind of interpretation which is still wholly wrapped up in concernful understanding and the extreme opposite case of a theoretical assertion about something extant [Vorhandenes], there are many intermediate gradations: assertions about the happenings in the environment [Aussagen über Geschehnisse in der Umwelt], accounts of the ready-to-hand [Schilderungen des Zuhandenen], ‘reports on the Situation’ [“Situationsberichte”], the recording and fixing of the ‘facts of the case’ [Aufnahme und Fixierung eines “Tatbestandes”], the description of a state of affairs [Beschreibung einer Sachlage], the narration of something that has befallen [Erzählung des Vorgefallenen]. We cannot trace back these ‘sentences’ to theoretical statements without essentially perverting their meaning. Like the theoretical statements themselves, they have their ‘source’ in circumspective interpretation. (GA2 210/BT 201)

In this list of intermediate cases are a number of categories in which observation reports might fairly be grouped, depending on their purpose and subject matters. Of course, any act of assertion, in bringing into relief some features of the phenomenology at the expense and obfuscation of others, and in interrupting the normal immersion of circumspection, is going to depart to some extent from that immersion and be “intermediate” between pure circumspection and theoretical comportment. On the other hand, to report what shows up before us—and by and large we at least intend to do nothing else in observation reports—is
not to take a theoretical distance, to artificially assume a fully detached contemplative stance which consists simply in demarcating properties of present objects (the “extreme opposite” of circumspective concern, as Heidegger says), but instead takes as its point of departure the significances which show up in the concernful comportment towards things.

Additionally, on the other side of the comparison, I think to ascribe to Sellars’ view of observation reports a necessarily theoretical bent is precisely to misunderstand his point about the derivativeness of looks-talk with respect to sees-talk (or is-talk). For the point is that proximally and the most part we do not, in describing or reporting experiences, take a theoretical distance from what is reported, but rather come to it with a default stance of endorsement, which we only subsequently may find warranting of withdrawal. Seen from this dimension, Sellars’ attack on sense-data accounts of perception and knowledge, with their insistence on the construction of endorsing sees-talk from bare looks-talk, is not so incongruous with Heidegger’s familiar criticism of the traditional view of the subject, and the skepticism which underpins it, as primordially finding itself behind a veil of appearances, from which paltry materials must be constructed an account of how that subject “breaks out” to the world beyond and is able to secure genuine knowledge. On the contrary, by and large we find ourselves already in the midst of the matters and “taking them for granted”—giving tacit endorsement—only taking a skeptical stance toward them in a mode of comportment that is founded upon and privative of our primordial Being-in-the-World.²¹¹ Sellars’ understanding of observation reports, drawn from an analytic of our modes of actually making them in practice—almost a kind of phenomenological interrogation of these sorts of

²¹¹ The skeptical presumptions of such a view of experience and its contents are not to be met with solution—that is, the task is not to find a way to properly ground being in appearances, but to upend the very way in which we are inclined to speak about our phenomenology such that the puzzle rears its head in the first place. See the familiar discussions of BT §43.
acts of assertion—is meant to impress upon us that these reports have the basic character of straightforward descriptions not predicated on the diffident qualifications of a “de-worlded,”
theoretical disinterestedness.\footnote{Of course, it is possible to overstate the similarities here. Sellars’ point about the primordiality of is-talk is meant as an argumentative preliminary to his attack on the Given, not to an account of Being-in-the-World as a substantive critique of tradition views of subjectivity. He does not take the lessons here as far as does Heidegger. Nevertheless, I think the similarities are illuminating of some fundamental affinities between their views.}

I think, then, that with these sorts of objections swept aside, we can fruitfully engage in a project of mapping what Sellars says about the conceptual shortfall of sense contents relative to observation reports onto Heidegger’s consideration of the categorial surplus in

\footnote{\footnotesize Of course, it is possible to overstate the similarities here. Sellars’ point about the primordiality of is-talk is meant as an argumentative preliminary to his attack on the Given, not to an account of Being-in-the-World as a substantive critique of tradition views of subjectivity. He does not take the lessons here as far as does Heidegger. Nevertheless, I think the similarities are illuminating of some fundamental affinities between their views.}

One way to understand the difference Sellars highlights between sees-talk and looks-talk is in terms of an act-content distinction; on one meaning of observation report, to report an observation could mean to report its contents, while on another, to report an observation could mean to report the act of observation, the observing (not simply that it occurred but the features of the act). This disambiguation maps onto Sellars’ distinction. In cases of reports involving sees-talk, there is an intrinsic evaluation of achievement on the part of the observer, in the contents as provided as veridical, and therefore nothing is required beyond reporting those contents. In the second kind of case, though, the report is about the observing, the act as such, implicitly highlighting the act as something potentially subject to failure, and accordingly the report withholds endorsement of the contents. While the second form of reporting still certainly involves describing perceptual contents, the withholding of endorsement draws attention, as it were, to the act as such, as opposed to solely the content. This feature figures in Sellars’ characterization of looks-talk, as when he says that, “when I say ‘X looks green to me now’ I am reporting the fact that my experience is, so to speak, intrinsically, as an experience, indistinguishable from a veridical one of seeing that x is green” (Sellars 1997, 41).

Understood in terms of an act-content distinction, an intriguingly similar line of thinking—leading to a rejection of perceptual Givens—occurs in the leadup to Heidegger’s discussion of categorial intuition in HCT. For Heidegger opens the section with a discussion of two possibilities of what it might mean “to give expression to a perception” (GA20 75-6/HCT 56)—i.e. to make an observation report. One is to provide an “announcement of the act of perceiving […]. To give expression then means something like the following: I now communicate that I hear the sound of a car below” (GA20 76/HCT 56). This is contrasted with the other possibility, which would involve not “giving notice of the act but the communication of what is perceived in the act” (GA20 76/HCT 57). “In this second kind of expressing,” as he says, “I make no assertion about the act and its extantness [Vorhandensein] and I do not confirm the occurrence [Vorkommen] within me of a perception of a chair.” (GA20 76/HCT 57). Now, given that Sellars distinction highlighted cases of observation reports involving sees-talk, and sees-talk seems to “confirm the occurrence” of a perception, Heidegger’s point does not correspond perfectly to Sellars’. This is a subtlety, though, that would lead us to miss the forest for the trees. At the end of the day, Heidegger’s distinction between different ways of “giving expression to perception” is, like Sellars’, a matter of drawing an act-content distinction that broadly allows us to disambiguate between what we mean by “observation” in “observation report”—or “expression” in “expression of perception.”

What’s more, Heidegger heavily implies that giving expression to perceptual contents is more fundamental than expressions of perceptual acts, because by and large “perceptual assertion,” he says, designates the former rather than the latter. The implication is that it only designates the latter derivatively: “A perceptual assertion is a communication about the entity perceived in perception and not about the act of perception as such” (GA20 76/HCT 57). So looks-talk is parasitic upon sees-talk (or, as Heidegger would perhaps prefer, is-talk, e.g. in “The necktie is green”).
intentionality, as it relates to the matter of “fulfillment” of assertions in intuition. Similar to Sellars’ arguments based on the “logic of looks,” Heidegger submits that careful phenomenological scrutiny of the structures of intentionality in perceptual acts shows that the immediate sensed (or “perceived”) contents are not up to the task of fulfilling their respective reports or expressions. The considered case is a simple perception of a yellow chair, as compared with the basic corresponding observation report that “The chair is yellow.” Heidegger asks us simply to attend to the respective contents of these acts, one perceptual, one verbal. In comparing the verbal act to the perceptual act, I find that

I can see the color yellow but not the being-yellow, being-colored; and the expressive element ‘yellow,’ that is, the attribute, in its full expression in fact means ‘the chair being yellow.’ And this ‘being’ in this expression and in the one above in the form ‘is’ cannot be perceived. (GA20 77-8/HCT 58)

The conclusion to be drawn is that “There is in the full perceptual assertion [i.e. the observation report] a surplus of intentions whose demonstration cannot be borne by the simple perception of the subject matter” (GA20 77/HCT 57-8). Rather: “In content, what is perceived falls short of [bleibt an Sachgehalt hinter dem zurück] what the assertion asserts of it. The assertion expresses something which is simply not found [nicht vornindlich] perceptually” (GA20 78/HCT 58). This presents a prima facie problem for the notion of both openness and the answerability. Since “There is obviously no adequation between what is expressed and what is perceived” (GA20 78/HCT 58), the matter of both the semantic and epistemic fulfillment of an expression by its intuition, a question whose force Heidegger feels not the least of which being the very possibility of phenomenology as a philosophical enterprise, rears its head as in need of answer. Though here explicitly formulated in the semantic register, the point, again following the lessons of 2.2, is clearly meant to also apply in the epistemic register: in asking after the evidentiary “fulfillment” of the expression, we
find an epistemic shortfall in the corresponding perceptual content. It is thus not able to
“bear” the requisite “demonstration,” and we can understand the demonstration both in terms of tracing back contents as well as in terms of tracing back justification.

Of course, though, Heidegger, again following Husserl, does not treat this apparent problem as the end of the story. Rather, the investigation of categorial intuition and the fulfilling relation between intuition and expression bespeaks a distinction between “simple” and “founded” acts of intuition—between “sense intuition” and “categorial intuition,” with their respective “real” and “ideal” contents. The “sensuous” yellow, the sensation of color of the chair is a “real moment” of the perception, but being-yellow is a part of the surplus of ideal contents—a surplus which can be found not merely in the intentional act of the perceptual assertion but so too in the perception itself. Though categorial intuitions, as Heidegger says, are “founded” upon sensuous intuitions, he stresses that this does not mean the former are therefore given in higher-order acts above and beyond—that is, separable from—the initial comportment (like, say, the act of providing an observation report would be). For, as he says, “even simple perception, which is usually called sense perception, is already intrinsically pervaded by categorial intuition” (GA20 81/HCT 60).

To see why this is so, we need to understand more details of the phenomenological analysis. Under the umbrella of categorial intuitions, there are two types. The first are acts of synthesis, whose contents are formal propositional features, such as the copula, logical operators of conjunction and disjunction, quantifiers, and demonstrative phrases.213 These

213 This enumeration comes from Heidegger’s own (obviously non-exhaustive) list of paradigmatic categorial form: “…‘being,’ ‘and,’ ‘or,’ ‘this,’ ‘one,’ ‘several,’ then’…” (GA20 79/HCT 59). This list is culled from Husserl. Perhaps with the intention of including deictic phrases in general, I take the inclusion of simple demonstratives here alongside merely formal elements as based in the fact that, outside contexts of use, these expressions embody little more than rules for their use—what Kaplan later calls their character, as distinguished from the content they have when they actually refer by means of a supporting context (Kaplan 1978).
formal features serve to order the underlying contents into propositional form: “The new objectivity, the state of affairs, is characterized as a specific relation whose members give what is articulated in them in the form of subject and predicate” (GA20 87/HCT 64).

The second type of categorial intuition has to do with acts of ideation, wherein figure eidetic contents, or universals:

When I perceive simply, moving about in my environmental world, when I see houses, for example, I do not first see houses primarily and expressly in their individuation, in their distinctiveness. Rather, I first see universally: this is a house. This “as-what,” the universal feature of house, is itself not expressly apprehended in what it is, but is already coapprehended in simple intuition as that which to some extent here illuminates what is given. Ideation is that act of dator intuition which actually gives the species, that is, the universal of individuations.

In ideating abstraction, the species house is brought into relief within the multiplicity of individual houses. From a multitude of individuations of red I see the red. This “seeing from” of the idea is a founded act, since it is based upon an already given apprehension of individuation. But the objective here, which ideation allows us to see anew, the idea itself, the identical unity red: this objective is not the individuation, this particular red. (GA20 91/HCT 67)

We may say, then, that with respect to the perception of the yellow chair, the being-yellow or being-a-chair are synthetic contents, while being-yellow or being-a-chair, are the ideational contents. Only on the basis of the full complement of intuited contents is it possible for a

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214 The two kinds of categorial intuition, and their respective kinds of ideal contents, are distinguished as follows. In ideation, the founded intuition of the generality does not contain itself the founding object—while that object is given, as individual, in the founding sensory intuition, it does not form a moment of the founded (eidetic) categorial intuition. The real object is not intended again. This is contrasted with acts of synthesis, wherein the founding content is also given in the founded, new objectivity of the (synthetic) categorial intuition: the real, sensuous moment of yellow is given again the level of the categorial intuition of being-yellow. The real object is intended again.

We have been discussing the founded acts of synthesis, which necessarily cointent [mitmeinen] their founding objectivity. These differ from the act of ideation, which is also based upon a founding objectivity but does not actually intend this founding objectivity. These acts of ideation, of the intuition of the universal, are categorial acts which give their object. They give what is called an idea, ἵδεα, species. The Latin term species is the translation of ἵδεος, the outward appearance of something. The acts of universal intuition give what is seen in the matters first and simply. (GA20 90-1/HCT 66)
report in the form of “x is ø” to find intuitive fulfillment, both in a semantic and an epistemic sense:

The full composition [Bestand] of the intentions of the assertion “This S is p
and q” certainly does not get fulfilled in the domain of sense intuition, but
even the categorial acts of ‘is’ and ‘and’ as such cannot in isolation provide
the possible fulfillment of this assertion. The full composition of the intentions
of this assertion instead takes place [vollzieht] intuitively only in a founded
act, in a sense perception pervaded by [mit...durchsetzen] categorial acts. This
means that concrete intuition expressly giving its object is never an isolated,
single-layered sense perception, but is always a multi-layered intuition, that is,
a categorially specified [bestimmte] intuition. It is just this full, multi-layered,
categorically specified intuition which is the possible fulfillment of the
assertion giving expression to it. (GA20 92-3/HCT 68)

The parallels with Sellars’ discussion in EPM are striking. Heidegger’s observation is
essentially the same as Sellars’ when he asserts that, while perceptual contents to the effect of
the sensible greenness of the necktie may be part of the perception, there must also be a
surplus conceptual content over and against this, being-green. The full content of the
experience contains not just the sensory but the conceptual content necktie and green (the
ideational content, the being-x and being-ø) as well as being-green of the necktie (the
synthetic content, the being-x and being-ø) which together give the necktie as being-green
such that the assertion “The necktie is green” is fulfilled in the experience. Both of these are
elements of the conceptual content which, on Sellars’ account, must be operative for the
experience to be describable in this way. Indeed, the affinities between Heidegger’s and
Sellars’ analyses are such that they even use essentially identical example cases: “The chair
is yellow,” with its corresponding intuition, and “The necktie is green,” alongside its own.

We have accordingly set forth two groups of categorial acts. In the latter group, we have seen that there
are categorial acts which in their sense naturally need founding objects, and yet do not themselves
intend them.
(GA20 92/HCT 68)

Note that this lack of co-apprehension in ideational acts does not mean the individual is not apprehended: it
means simply that in the founded layer of ideational act, the individual is not intended a second time. It remains
an object given in the founding, sensory layer.
Whether the case at issue deals with a yellow chair or a green necktie, whether it is presented as a phenomenological observation drawn from an investigation of intentional structures or an examination of the underlying conditions for the linguistic practices of different kinds of observational talk, the lesson is one and the same: the semantic and epistemic inadequacy of immediate sensory contents, or “perception” conceived as exhausted by such contents, relative to their corresponding observation reports, which bespeaks the need for a compensatory surplus of contents in order to account for the very possibility of the basic phenomenological or linguistic fact of such reports (as semantically efficacious or genuinely “fulfilling”).

Perception, then, considered now not narrowly but in the fullest sense, is “multi-layered,” with categorial intuition coming on the back of an underlying sensible intuition. Likewise, the converse holds: all sensible intuition is accompanied by categorial intuition, and forms an indelible part of all perception. And, as hopefully is appreciable by this point, this conclusion is borne from a demand intrinsic to the aims of phenomenology: this must be so, if observation reports are to even be possible as such.

Of course, though, the ultimate point of Sellars’ analysis is not simply to recognize this surplus but to assert its distinguishability from sensory contents evinces that its occurrence is a function of something other than acquisition by way of the empirical episodes.

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215 This is what it means that an act is “founded.” That all categorial acts are founded does not mean that they are incidental or that sensible intuition is possible without their occurrence, but only that all categorial acts are of or are tied to a sensuously given content and must accompany sensuous intuition as intuited surplus. There is no “free-floating” categorial intuition, or intuition of categorical forms without a sensibly given object: “The discovery of categorial intuition is the demonstration, first, that there is a simple apprehension of the categorial, such constituents in entities which in traditional fashion are designated as categories and were seen in crude form quite early. Second, it is above all the demonstration that this apprehension is invested [investiert] in the most everyday of perceptions and in every experience [Erfahrung]” (GA20 64/HCT 48). And “categorial intuition is found in every concrete perception (perception of a thing), as it were, as an inclusion” (GA20 64/HCT 48).
themselves, that it is not a product of any kind of receptivity. So the mere fact that Heidegger sees categorial intuition as pervading all perception does not yet establish that he is akin to Sellars in the programmatic conclusions the latter draws about the conceptual surplus (either psychological nominalism or conceptualism), since the upshot of Sellars’ investigation is that experience is conditioned on language. As Brandom reminds us, “For Sellars, [conceptuality] is a linguistic affair: grasping a concept is mastering the use of a word” (Brandom 2002a, 350).

It is at this point that Heidegger and Sellars’ analyses ostensibly part ways; as Heidegger delves deeper into the intentional structure of the surplus and its relationship to the perceptual content, he at first seems to present a very different story about the compensatory contents and their origins. For Heidegger, again following Husserl, speaks of categorial contents as intuited. It may be suggested, then, that categorical intuition constitutes an exotic form of Givenness, which would certainly and decisively undermine any claim to affinity here with the (ultimate) philosophical lessons of EPM; if the categorial is intuited, surely this means its apprehension would be a paradigmatic form of unacquired, if non-sensory, capacity. Accordingly, any contents delivered via such a capacity would, it seems, fairly be called Givens.

There are indeed some prima facie textual reasons for entertaining this point. Heidegger asserts that phenomenology’s recognition of categorial intuition affords us greater clarity on the nature of the apriori, as that which is prior in all instances to any comportment (GA20 97-103/HCT 71-5), yet he also strongly avers that categorial forms are not organizing schemes or structures which order the sensory, hyletic data, in the vein of transcendental idealism, and continually denies that they have to do with a constituting subjectivity or are
contents in any way provided by the subject—in fact, this is, according to his view, one of phenomenology’s most important insights.\(^{216}\) Instead, ideal contents are accessed by “simple apprehension” or “originary intuition” (GA20 102/HCT 75) which is “self-giving” (GA20 80/HCT 60).\(^{217}\)

Nevertheless, the conclusion that those contents must be Given, based on Heidegger’s claim that categorial contents are intuited, is simply false. Firstly, to say that categorial intuition is a form of intuition is, in phenomenological terms, just to say that the content is present in the experience, forms a part of the intentional expanse, and so must be reckoned with and taken seriously. It is not, in and of itself, about assigning an etiological theory to the content. So ‘intuition’ as Heidegger understands its valence in phenomenology must not be understood in a Kantian sense as the receptive contribution to experience. This would be to prejudice everything from the beginning in precisely the manner the *epochés* prohibit.

Additionally, though—and more directly to the point—Heidegger does think that apprehension of categorial forms is a matter of language acquisition. We will see that ultimately, and despite appearances, Heidegger’s and Sellars’ investigations indeed reconcile on this topic; the former espouses psychological nominalism, that is, the third of the three claims which I dissolved Sellars’ lessons into at the beginning of this section. For Heidegger,

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\(^{216}\) He denies that simply because these ideal contents are ideal that they are therefore not objective (GA20 89/HCT 66); he asserts that the *apriori* categorial forms have “nothing at all to do with subjectivity” (GA20 101/HCT 74) and are not “thought into” the object by the subject or consciousness (GA20 78-9/HCT 58-9); he specifically rejects the transcendental idealist picture (GA20 96-7/HCT 70-1).

\(^{217}\) Additionally, one might point to the fact that Sellars’ analysis seems to go one step further than Heidegger’s in a very specific respect: it identifies as a condition of the full experience *the ability to recognize standard conditions*. Presumably, it is this observation which puts the final nail in the coffin of the Givenness of conceptual content, since this element of the compensatory background seemingly *must* “involve a long history of acquiring *piecemeal* habits of response to various objects in various circumstances,” (Sellars 1997, 44-5) such responses being (or at least including) verbal or quasi-verbal performances, and therefore *can only be* acquired through induction into language use. Heidegger does not seem to indicate recognition of standard conditions as part of what must be brought to bear for fulfillment of the assertion in the experience (nor to my knowledge does Husserl). Heidegger may in fact endorse some kind of internalist reliability condition on knowledge, though not specifically the one Sellars gives, as recognition of standard conditions. See fn. 155.
categorial intuition is no exotic species of Givenness—indeed, there can be no Givens at all—because, to use deVries’ articulation of the elements of the Myth, no content is epistemically or semantically independent; everything is under the auspices of interpretation, where interpretation is always something articulate and expressible in the form of linguistic tokens. In fact, Heidegger’s view of the relationship between perceptual contents and language is altogether Sellarsian in spirit.

2.5 The Primordiality of Language and Interpretation: Heidegger’s Psychological Nominalism

As I mentioned in 2.4, there are two related theses which make up the core of Sellars’ programmatic response to recognition of the conceptual surplus. The first is conceptualism about perception, which, as I explained in the Introduction, can be expressed by the claim that perceptual tokens have the logical form of linguistic tokens. Conceptualism goes beyond mere acknowledgment of some kind of conceptual surplus within perceptual tokens: in connecting that surplus to linguistic articulateness, it is posited as an explanation for the possibility of the efficacious linguistic expressibility of perceptual tokens, particularly with an eye to confronting the difficulties in that prospect outlined in the previous section.218

The second thesis at the core of Sellars’ view is what he calls psychological nominalism, according to which all competence in logical space, or the space of reasons, is a function of acquired competencies with language. Recall as well from the Introduction that the space of reasons is to be understood as the space of meaning.219

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218 Put otherwise: while positing a conceptual surplus may be a necessary condition for addressing the expressibility of perceptual tokens, conceptualism is intended as a sufficient condition. Or at least, Sellars would consider conceptualism so characterized as sufficient, and would not count anything less as such.

219 As discussed in the Introduction, psychological nominalism provides an explanation for conceptualism just as conceptualism provides an explanation for the expressibility of perceptual tokens (and their having rational
My overriding concern in this section will be to substantiate the claim that, while undoubtedly on principle Heidegger would not be caught dead subscribing to any theses so named, he does indeed subscribe, *avant la lettre*, to both conceptualism and psychological nominalism—and furthermore that his cleavage to them is motivated similarly to Sellars’ and McDowell’s, as intrinsically tied to his account of significances and the categorial structuration of experience. Effectively, it is due to the hermeneutic dimensions of his work that Heidegger repudiates the Given, categorically and in the strongest terms distancing himself from the idea that there are intentional comportments free from interpretation, and even more pointedly, endorsing the idea that the concernful comportments of Dasein’s Being-in-the-World are thoroughly hermeneutic in the sense of being intrinsically mediated by discursive capacities understood in terms of language and conceptuality. For Heidegger as much as for Sellars, and in keeping with the second half of McDowell’s Problematic, the continuity between experience and language is a function of the linguistic articulateness of the former.

However, due to the complex nature of Heidegger’s conceptions of interpretation and language, and their roles in Dasein’s Being-in-the-World, their intimate connection with one another as primordial dimensions of Dasein requires illumination. Moreover, while the exegetical claims that interpretation and language are primordial for Heidegger, in the sense of being determinative of the content of all intentional states, is not a new one, it has nevertheless arguably been put on the defensive in English-language scholarship by elements of the momentous work of Hubert Dreyfus, and carried on—with some varying details—in

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purchase); perceptual (or other intentional) tokens have the logical form of linguistic tokens *because* acquisition of language is constitutive of them in that respect, thus their capacity—through our recognition of them as such—for rational purchase.
the works of many of his students. I can hardly scratch the surface of such a large body of work deserving of attention. Nevertheless, I will address two primary expositors of the “Dreyfusian” family of views, Mark Wrathall and Taylor Carman, as well as certain “problem passages” they invoke.

First, I will address Wrathall’s “pragmatist” reading of Heidegger, according to which interpretation (Auslegung) is derivative of a primordial mode of understanding (Verstehen). I will show, contra this, that interpretation is utterly fundamental according to Heidegger. Then, I will demonstrate that Heidegger’s conception of interpretation, and most importantly the hermeneutic-as of circumspective concern, is such that it is intimately connected with language and equiprimordial with it, specifically in the sense that interpretation is linguistically articulate. Finally, I will argue against Carman’s “instrumentalist” account of Heidegger on language, which, in analogy to Wrathall, poses language (Sprache) as a subordinate form of discourse (Rede). In contrast to Carman, I will illustrate the ways in which Heidegger indeed conceives language as an ineluctably elemental facet of Dasein’s Being-in-the-World, saturating and determining its every comportment. In the midst of these criticisms, the ways in which Heidegger anticipates Sellars’ psychological nominalism and conceptualism will come into relief, and the basic framework of an overarching, comprehensive, and novel positive account of Heidegger’s existential analytic with respect to the nature of circumspective concern and the hermeneutic-as, centering the role of language, shall emerge.

What are the general contours of the Dreyfusian position against which I am aligning myself? On most variants of the view, Heidegger’s account of Zuhandenheit and circumspective concern are meant to call attention to a ubiquitous and proximate form of
“everyday” understanding engagement with the world which is nonlinguistic or prelinguistic, assuredly normative in texture and not simply physiological or causal, but nevertheless embodied in structures other than those shared with linguistic utterances and the like (instead: “skillful coping” or know-how). The locus classicus for this sort of reading of Heidegger is the seminal work of Hubert Dreyfus, but Mark Wrathall, Taylor Carman, William Blattner, and others offer variants.\textsuperscript{220} 221

This “Dreyfusian” reading of Heidegger has application across many dimensions of his thought, particularly in BT; with regard to the status of Auslegang specifically, the view holds it to be a secondary phenomenon subordinate to Verstehen. Wrathall refers to this specific application under the heading of the “pragmatist” account. Over and against this “pragmatist” view stands what Wrathall calls the “hermeneuticist” reading, attributed

\textsuperscript{220} See Blattner 1999 and Carman 2002 and 2003. These views are far from homogenous, however, and Wrathall’s exquisitely clarifying “Heidegger on Human Understanding,” which serves as an excellent cipher for this rich, fraught, and complex area of Heidegger scholarship, carefully distinguishes them. Additionally, to this list we should also probably add Mark Okrent, who criticizes Brandom’s reading of Heidegger and suggests, like these other interpreters, the primordiality of a nonconceptual, nonlinguistic stratum of normativity (see Okrent 1988 and 2017).

Some of the expositors of Heidegger with which the Dreyfusians sometimes find themselves in disagreement (and with which I am quite naturally am more sympathetic) are Cristina Lafont (see Lafont 2000) and Charles Guignon (see Guignon 1982), especially on the topic of the status of language. Carman in particular has sparred with both of them, and ascribes what he calls the “linguistic model,” to Guignon (see Carman 2003, 220-7). Robert Brandom probably also deserves to be added to this list (see his Brandom 2002b and 2002c). Additionally, Sacha Golob has recently argued for a reading of the early Heidegger’s views of intentionality as giving pride of place to conceptuality (see Golob 2014). My view is ultimately similar to Golob’s in certain respects. I hope to add something of substance to the debate.

\textsuperscript{221} I think it important to note that I believe the Dreyfusian the model of skillful coping remains an insightful lens through which to read Heidegger. My issue with the Dreyfusian picture does not have to do with skillful coping per se, but rather the narrative that is told about its origination, or about its relationship to other strata of Dasein’s existential constitution, namely Rede and Sprache. I do not think skillful coping, as a form of Understanding, is more primordial than language, or something we have, as embodied beings, in the absence of language acquisition. Our conversance with our bodies as sites of possibilities—in a way which is distinctively human—is a function of language acquisition, and skillful coping is a product of the way in which language, once acquired, becomes folded into the body as no longer a matter of explicit rules or procedures but habitual familiarity. It thus pervades our receptivity itself. What is skillful about skillful coping is not the absence of language but the absence of its explicit expressions; this is the sense in which it is know-how or, as Merleau-Ponty says, “knowledge in the hands” (PP 144). In fact, this view would seem to conform to Dreyfus’ own stated model of skill acquisition, as, e.g., laid out in Dreyfus 2002: first we learn the rules explicitly, then we gain such a mastery of them that they become habitual, second nature.
primarily to Gadamer, and according to which, interpretation, bound up with language and conceptuality, pervades all understanding and intelligibility.

For his own part, Wrathall subscribes to what he calls the “structural-functional” account, a somewhat heterodox variant on the Dreyfusian, pragmatist reading. It is distinguished from both the hermeneutic interpretation and more orthodox pragmatist accounts by viewing interpretation as pervasive and always operative (unlike the pragmatist view), but nevertheless derivative of understanding (unlike the hermeneutic view). As Wrathall summarizes: “Although pervasive, however, interpretation does not completely permeate the world, as there are possibilities projected in the understanding that are left standing while we divert ourselves into a particular interpretation” (Wrathall 2013, 197).

Although I do think that this is a plausible and nuanced view, and one defended resourcefully from the texts, I ultimately side with a view more akin to the hermeneuticist reading, in which interpretation is thoroughly primordial for Heidegger.

One of the key passages Wrathall cites runs as follows:

…interpretation as such does not actually disclose [erschließt], for that is what understanding or Dasein itself takes care of. Interpretation always only takes care of bringing out what is disclosed [Hebung des Erschlossenen] as a cultivation [Ausbildung] of the possibilities inherent in an understanding. The most proximate everyday mode of interpretation has the functional form of appresentation, specifically the appresentation of meaningfulness in the sense of bringing out the referential correlations accessible at any given time. (GA20 359/HCT 260)

222 We have already seen that for Heidegger language is hermeneutical in its very nature. It should be no surprise then that, given the above passage, Heidegger says something almost identical about language: “Language makes manifest [Sprache macht offenbar]. First of all, it does not produce anything like discoveredness [Entdecktheit]. Rather, discoveredness and its enactment of being [Seinsvollzug], understanding as well as its continuation in interpretation, being grounded in the basic constitution of in-being, are conditions of possibility for something becoming manifest” (GA20 361/HCT 262). None of this means that language, or interpretation, are uninvolved in world-disclosure. For, as we saw, language is in a certain sense Rede itself, and as we shall see, interpretation is Verstehen itself in its own way. Once these claims are understood in their proper sense, it will become clear in light of them what Heidegger means when he says that Rede or Verstehen disclose, and language and interpretation do not.
This passage is an assuredly important one, for it sheds light on some of Heidegger’s important conceptual relations regarding understanding and interpretation. What Wrathall primarily gets from this passage, crucial for expounding his own view, is that interpretation is a cultivation or development of the possibilities given in understanding. In other words, then, understanding always already discloses a world, and then interpretation takes over in specific territories to further the determinateness of this disclosure, making more concrete a precise allotment of the disclosed, understood world. Interpretation makes explicit or salient that which is implicitly available through disclosure in understanding, though for Wrathall this explicitness is not necessarily linguistic or conceptual (Wrathall 2013, 196). Though always interpretive, Dasein is thus never interpretive of everything within the pre-disclosed field of its implicitly understood world. Therefore, for Wrathall, interpretation is ubiquitous but still less primordial than understanding.

However, I think the above passage, alongside similar ones in HCT and BT, where Heidegger distinguishes understanding from interpretation, can lead us down the wrong path if we are not careful. For a quite natural reading of that passage—and this is what forms the crux of Wrathall’s argument—is to take understanding-disclosure and interpretation as something like separate “performances” or “operations.” This distinguishes understanding-disclosure and interpretation in a problematic way, however, because, while Wrathall’s account is based on recognizing understanding as 1) an existentiale of Dasein, 2) disclosive “in advance” of “concrete activities,” (or of, I would add, I think fairly and in the same spirit,

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223 I will discuss appresentation and its relation to sign-institution and signification more in Chapter 3. As I signal later, note its close association with interpretation here.
224 This notion of interpretation as cultivation of the understanding is one which requires more attention than I can give it here. See Bounds 2018 for some gestures at proper consideration of it in connection with these issues.
specific comportments) and 3) not necessarily cognitive or a matter of explicit
thematization—all of which he quite rightly emphasizes—it nevertheless does not coordinate
these first two features in the way in which, I think, they must be coordinated.

In HCT, Heidegger gives us one of his clearest presentations of his own idiosyncratic
view of the apriori. Alongside intentionality and categorial intuition, he highlights “the
original sense of the apriori” as one of the greatest insights of Husserl’s phenomenology.
Etymologically, he says, the apriori simply means “that which already always is the earlier”
(GA20 99/HCT 73).225 Heidegger thus goes on in HCT to speak of the apriori structures of
Dasein—of care, of discourse, etc. That is, the existentialia, such as understanding, are
apriori. It is true, then, as Wrathall correctly stresses, that understanding is “in advance” or
always earlier than “concrete activities,” for it names the disclosive givenness of a world to
Dasein in its worldhood, as structured in terms of a totality of significance, of possibilities-
for-being for this being-in-the-world (thus neither possibilities of just Dasein nor of just
entities it may encounter, but both), “earlier” than any comportment that interprets this fore-
having of the world. Thus, Heidegger often says of the world that it is “always already”
there, discovered, present, etc., and in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, a lecture
course given in the summer of 1927, very shortly after the publication of BT, Heidegger
speaks of the projection of the understanding as “always already” having uncovered entities,
as having “projected outward [‘hinausprojiziert’]” a world (GA24 239/BPP 168).226

225 In Modern philosophy in particular, this “earlier” becomes construed with ever-increasing focus on apriori
knowledge, bottoming out in Kant as “a feature of the subjective sphere” (GA20 99/HCT 73). What
phenomenology makes available for us, however, is the true, more primordial sense of the apriori as (what the
later Heidegger might call) a name for being.
226 “To exist means, among other things, to cast-forth a world, and in fact in such a way that with the
thrownness of this projection, with the factual existence of Dasein, extant entities are always already
uncovered.” The translator, Alfred Hofstadter, notes that “The phrase Heidegger uses, ‘sich Welt vorher-
werfen’, also suggests that the world is thrown beforehand, in advance, and not merely ‘forth’; it is pre-thrown,
pre-cast; it is an a priori of the Dasein’” (Wrathall 2013, 168 fn.).
The problem is that this “always already” or “earlier” cannot be understood literally diachronically. That which is *apriori* cannot be understood, Heidegger says, as something prior in ontic, sequential time. Rather, it has to do with the structure of the being of entities itself:

The ‘earlier’ is not a feature [Charakter] in the ordered sequence of knowing, but it is also not a feature in the sequential order of entities, more precisely in the sequential order of the emergence [Entstehung] of an entity from an entity. Instead, the apriori is a *feature of the structural sequence in the being of entities, in the ontological structure [Seinsstruktur] of being.* (GA20 102/HCT 74)

When Heidegger speaks of understanding as disclosing “in advance” of specific comportments, and in particular in advance of interpretation, this must be understood ontologically, not as temporal antecedence between two entities. That the *existentialia* are *apriori* does not mean that they are features of Dasein’s being before its having any *existentiell* features. This should be recognized as a rather straightforward and uncontroversial gloss on Heidegger when we think of other *existentialia*. For instance, interpretation is spoken of by Heidegger in relation to understanding in similar terms as mood or attunement (*Stimmung*) is spoken of in relation to disposition (*Befindlichkeit*). Just as mood or attunement is the ontic or *existentiell* manifestation of the *existential* of disposition, so too does interpretation refer to the *existentiell* manifestation of the *existential* of understanding in specific comportments, the understanding as concretely enacted. Understanding-disclosure is not an occurrence “before” interpretation, any more than having a disposition is something that happens “before” having a mood; it is, rather, the *existential-ontological ground* of mood. For Heidegger the apriority of the *existentialia* means that—to paraphrase Kant—although all *existentialia* manifest with the *existentiells*, it does not follow that they arise from the *existentiells*. 
“Interpretation as such,” then, does not itself disclose, only because disclosure does not happen piecemeal in specific comportmental “events,” but is rather part and parcel to Dasein’s existence itself, bound up in its very ontological structure. This is the sense in which, as Heidegger says, interpretation is the enactment (Vollzug) of this apriori disclosed field. Interpretation is just the ontic way Understanding receives expression, just as mood is the ontic way disposition gets expressed.227 Thus Heidegger says in HCT that understanding is the “enactment of the being of discoveredness” and interpretation is “the mode of enactment” that this enactment has (GA20 359/HCT 260)—not a mode or a derivative mode, but the singular mode. Thus, a common refrain of HCT is that interpretation constitutes “cultivation [Ausbildung] of understanding” or discoveredness itself (GA20 359, 360, 366/HCT 260, 261, 265, et al.)—it is given not as another mode alongside others but the way, he says, that this cultivation is “accomplished.” Which is why in BT he remarks that “In interpretation, understanding does not become something different,” but rather, he continues, “It becomes itself” (GA2 197/BT 188). We do not have here two distinct entities, one emerging from another, or following the other as two events might, but the becoming-itself of one and the same thing, through its realization in concrete comportments.

Thus, interpretation is just the realization of Dasein’s “tendency” for disclosing; it is understanding “in action.” It is not an act of making explicit that which was implicitly disclosed in a previous act. It is disclosure itself, as it actually occurs in the course of facticity, akin to an “empirical” instance of the “transcendental” condition in operation. Thus, to separate the two, to treat understanding-disclosure and interpretation as two different “operations” is misleading. Interpretation is just understanding-disclosure as it is concretely

227 And, as we shall see, as language is “the way in which discourse gets expressed” (GA2 214/BT 204).
lived in expression, not a further, separate treatment of an implicit material provided by understanding-disclosure. There is no “pure” understanding, un tarnished by interpretation; interpretation, on the contrary, just is understanding in its ontic posture.

Worse than just misleading, though, the view threatens to obviate the ontological difference itself. For the ontological difference, and its relevance to the existentielle—existentiell distinction, if we are to keep it, would suggest to us that it is wrongheaded to speak of the existentialia in the same terms as the existentiells, as secondary phenomena of the same order, rather than secondary in the sense of being existentially and explanatorily grounded in the underlying ontological order. Rather, the fact that the existentielle-existentiell distinction is to be understood as an ontological-ontic distinction should impress upon us that the existentiells are the modes in which the existentialia are ontically expressed—they are the existentialia themselves as they are “at work” in factical, lived experience. They cannot be treated on the same logical level as we would treat the existentiells—this is why, as apriori, the existentialia are not “a feature of the sequential order of entities” but rather of “the structure of the being of entities”. The very apriority or

228 The point is not altogether dissimilar to the one Ryle makes about category mistakes in The Concept of Mind:

Team-spirit is not another cricketing-operation supplementary to all of the other special tasks. It is, roughly, the keenness with which each of the special tasks is performed, and performing a task keenly is not performing two tasks. Certainly exhibiting team-spirit is not the same thing as bowling or catching, but nor is it a third thing such that we can say that the bowler first bowls and then exhibits team-spirit or that a fielder is at a given moment either catching or displaying esprit de corps. (Ryle 1949, 7)

Similarly, to “merely” understand is not a mode of being of Dasein, or a comportment, or a conduct of Dasein separate or separable from another, called interpreting. To “merely” understand as such is not to do something other than to interpret; “bare” Verstehen is not a state to be contrasted with another, Auslegung.

The invocation of Ryle’s parable is not meant to be flippant. Without taking the point too far, something not entirely alien to the lesson he draws about interesting category mistakes can be drawn about the treatment of existentials as modes of the same logical type as their corresponding existentiells: “It is pertinent to our main subject to notice that, so long as the student of politics continues to think of the British Constitution as a counterpart to the other institutions, he will tend to describe it as a mysteriously occult institution…” (Ryle 1949, 8). By much the same token, I think that so long as the student of Heidegger continues to think of the existentials “as such” as counterparts to their corresponding existentiells, they will tend to be described as occult modes of Being-in-the-World and of disclosure.
transcendental or ontological nature of Understanding as an existentiale, above the empirical
or ontic nature of Interpretation as an existentiell, is not one which admits of the possibility
of Understanding “before,” “prior to,” or “without” Interpretation. Interpretation must,
therefore, be recognized as primordial. There is no form of comportment more fundamental
than the hermeneutic-as, or on which the hermeneutic is founded. All understanding is
hermeneutical-interpretational.

There are readings of Heidegger, however, which acknowledge the primordiality of
interpretation, but nevertheless hold that it constitutes a prelinguistic or nonlinguistic stratum
of Dasein’s existential constitution, with only a subordinate mode of it emerging in linguistic
articulation. A canonical point in favor of this view is Heidegger’s famous distinction
between the hermeneutic-as and the apophantic-as, with the former understood as interpretive
determination as such, and the latter taken as its specifically linguistic form. Against such
views, I will argue that interpretation is always linguistic in form—there is no interpretation
beyond, before, or in the absence of language and its determinative articulateness. I will
provide two arguments for this. First, I will show that the distinction between the
hermeneutic-as and the apophantic-as has to do with, one the one hand, the as-structure in its
broadest form as linguistically articulate, and on the other its specific manifestation in
assertion—and not between prelinguistic and linguistic modes of intelligibility. Second, I
will show that linguistic articulateness underlies the hermeneutic-as of circumspective
concern—thus, that Heidegger cleaves to conceptualism.

Now the claim that interpretation is fundamentally tied to language runs counter to a
sacred cow of Heidegger scholarship, the prevailing reading of Heidegger’s distinction
between two different forms of disclosure, that of the hermeneutic-as and the apophantic-as.
Using this distinction as a guide, the received wisdom is that in his conceptions of circumspective concern and the ready-to-hand Heidegger delimits a form of ineluctably interpretational engagement with the world which is nonlinguistic or prelinguistic. *Apophansis,* unlike *hermeneia,* then, designates a less fundamental mode in which beings show themselves in language.

This construction of the difference between the hermeneutic-as and apophantic-as is, I submit, incorrect, and close attention to the way Heidegger characterizes the latter reveals that it designates not interpretation under the auspices of language generally, but only specifically under the auspices of *declarative statements.* Accordingly, the hermeneutic-as does not designate a prelinguistic layer of primordial intelligibility, but a wider realm of meaning and expression from that found solely in assertions—the sort which in Heidegger’s view has, in comparison, received too little attention in the history of Modern philosophy, so thoroughly fixated on *judgments.* Such a fixation, Heidegger is exhorting us to recognize, is to the detriment of philosophical analyses of other modes of expression and discourse.

There are very good reasons for thinking this. To begin with, it conforms with Aristotle’s original use of ‘λόγος ἀποφαντικός,’ which is decidedly narrower than just language at large. In *De Interpretatione,* Aristotle characterizes a λόγος generally as a sound carrying significance (σημαντικός) but which can also be broken up into sounds which themselves carry significances (16b26-16b28).229 In other words, a λόγος is a composite of significances, a *sentence.*230 He goes on to draw a differentia within the genus of λόγος, saying that while “every λόγος is significant […] not every λόγος is a statement-making λόγος, but only those in which there is truth or falsity [ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι]” (16b33-

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229 Aristotle 2002, 45.
230 Ackrill translates ‘λόγος’ as ‘sentence.’ I leave it untranslated, but his is clearly an accurate rendering.
He thus quite clearly distinguishes between meaningful language generally, \( \lambda \varrho \varphi \sigma \varsigma \), and one of its species, the \( \lambda \varrho \sigma \varsigma \varepsilon \pi \varphi \alpha \varphi \alpha \gamma \iota \kappa \varsigma \) — the assertion or proposition.

As Sheehan has observed (Sheehan 1988), Heidegger’s discussion of \( \lambda \varrho \sigma \varsigma \) in the introduction to BT maps nearly perfectly onto Aristotle’s in Chapter 4 of *De Interpretatione*. Heidegger’s discussion begins by criticizing the understanding of \( \lambda \varrho \sigma \varsigma \) as narrowly designating assertions or judgments, instead making the case that the apophantic-as is a special case of \( \lambda \varrho \sigma \varsigma \). Whereas in \( \lambda \varrho \sigma \varsigma \) something is made manifest, *apophansis* constitutes a special case in which something is made manifest specifically by “pointing it out”:

This mode [i.e. *apophansis*] of making manifest in the sense of exhibitive letting-be-seen [*Offenbarmachen im Sinne des aufweisenden Sehenlassens*], does not go with all kinds of ‘discourse’. Requesting [*Das Bitten*] (εὐχή), for instance, also makes manifest, but in a different way. (GA2 44/BT 56, trans. mod.)

The parallels here with the relevant sections of *De Interpretatione* Chapter 4 are difficult to miss. They are so extensive, in fact, that Heidegger’s example of \( \lambda \varrho \sigma \varsigma \) which is not \( \lambda \varrho \sigma \varsigma \varepsilon \pi \varphi \alpha \varphi \alpha \gamma \iota \kappa \varsigma \) — requesting — is taken directly from Aristotle’s own example of a contrast class, when he says that “There is not truth or falsity in all sentences: a prayer [εὐχή] is a \( \lambda \varrho \sigma \varsigma \) but is neither true nor false” (17a3-17a4). Given these close parallels, Heidegger looks to be following Aristotle in his view of ‘\( \lambda \varrho \sigma \varsigma \)’ as designating sentences generally, and ‘\( \lambda \varrho \sigma \varsigma \varepsilon \pi \varphi \alpha \varphi \alpha \gamma \iota \kappa \varsigma \)’ as designating assertions specifically.

Despite this, there is a conspicuous departure between Aristotle’s and Heidegger’s identification of the differentia between \( \lambda \varrho \sigma \varsigma \) and \( \lambda \varrho \sigma \varsigma \varepsilon \pi \varphi \alpha \varphi \alpha \gamma \iota \kappa \varsigma \): Heidegger seems to think the differentia characteristic of \( \lambda \varrho \sigma \varsigma \varepsilon \pi \varphi \alpha \varphi \alpha \gamma \iota \kappa \varsigma \) is not that in the latter “there is”

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231 Aristotle 2002, 45.
232 The point is that in exhibition what is being talked about is *featured* in a certain way. The showing thus has the specific character of *exhibition*.
ἀλήθεια—that it is truth-apt, or otherwise rendered, discloses or makes manifest—but rather that it is ἀλήθεια in the specific mode of “displaying” (Aufweisung). If we keep pace with Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, though, we find that this apparent discrepancy between their views disappears. The 1926 lecture course LQT in particular sheds light on the parallels between De Interpretatione and the BT passage. Observing that the received view of Aristotle’s division between λόγος and λόγος ἀποφαντικός as a matter of truth-aptness has been challenged by Bolzano and Husserl (who he observes held that all λόγοι are in some sense truth or false), he proceeds to give a few telling pronouncements:

If I say, “Please give me the scissors that are on the table,” when in fact there are no scissors on the table, what I say does not correspond with what is the case [stimmt doch, was ich sage, gar nicht überein mit dem Seienden]. My speech is objectively false [die Rede ist objektiv falsch]. I am deceived [täusche], and my utterance expresses that deception. That act of speech [Die Rede] says something false—but is my request [die Bitte] false? Obviously not. Is it true? No, not that either. (GA21 131/LQT 110, emphasis added)

Note that while Heidegger holds the request is neither true nor false, he does claim the speech act of requesting non-existent scissors is in some sense deceptive, and “says something false.” There is something about this speech act that is subject to truth and falsity, in the sense of covering and uncovering, even though, as he says, the request as such cannot be true or false. What are we to make of this?

The answer lies in Heidegger’s own translation of Aristotle’s key proclamation that “not every λόγος is a statement-making λόγος, but only those in which there is truth or falsity”—“ἄλλ’ ἐν ὃ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει.” Everything hinges on Heidegger’s exposition that ὑπάρχει does not mean merely occurring or extant (vorhanden) but underlying as the essence:

234 Heidegger suggests his investigation will not resolve the matter decisively. Nevertheless, crucial elements of his own view can be extracted from the text.
In the place of our expression “to happen” [vorkommen] stands the Greek ὑπάρχειν—to be extant [vorhanden sein]. But here it does not signify [bedeutet] what it often can, “to happen” in the quite broad sense of “there is something” [“es gibt etwas”], as if Aristotle meant to say: speech is displaying only [Aufweisend ist nur das Reden] where there is [es…gibt] such a thing as discovering and covering-over [Entdecken und Verdecken],” as if covering-over and discovering could sometimes happen in the statement, sometimes not [zuweilen vorkommen, zuweilen nicht]. Instead, ὑπάρχειν has the weighty sense [den prägnanten Sinn] of the philosophical concept that is used by Aristotle: ὑπάρχειν means “extantness a priori” [das im vorhinein Vorhandensein], “underlying something in such a way that everything else is sustained by this thing that is extant a priori” [das zum Grunde liegen für etwas, so daß durch dieses im vorhinein Vorhandene alles andere getragen wird]. For that reason, Boethius translates the Greek ὑπάρχειν in an entirely correct way as “in-esse,” “being-within [darin-sein],” in this case: “belonging to the very essence of speaking” [zum Wesen der Rede selbst gehörig]. (GA21 132/LQT 111, trans. mod.)

From this, Heidegger extracts the reading that those λόγοι in which “there is” truth or falsity properly means those λόγοι in which discovering or covering-over do not simply happen but rather in which such possibility forms their underlying essence—that is, forms the essential or characteristic intention (absicht) behind their utterance. “Not all ways of speaking,” he says, “are primarily oriented to [halten sich primär in der Tendenz des] uncovering and covering-over” (GA21 133/LQT 111, emphasis added). This orientation, rather, is what is distinctive about assertions.

For this reason, Heidegger proposes Aristotle’s characterization of the differentia should be read as follows:

Speech is exhibitive letting be seen (assertion) [aufweisend sehen lassend (Aussage)] only wherein [darin] the discovering or covering-over sustains [trägt] and determines [bestimmt] the authentic intention of the speaking

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235 I draw no conclusions about the accuracy of Heidegger’s translation of Aristotle; that question is, after all, not relevant to my present purposes. It is worth noting in passing, however, that on purely etymological grounds Heidegger’s reading seems plausible.

236 I have followed Sheehan in translating ‘im vorhinein’ as ‘a priori.’

237 “…halten sich primär in der Tendenz des…” is more literally “…hold themselves primarily in the tendency…”
[eigentliche Redeabsicht]. (GA21 133/LQT 111, trans. mod. and emphasis added)

Put otherwise, only those are “statement-making λόγοι” in which the intention, as a speech act, is to uncover or cover-over, and in which the resulting λόγοι succeed in meeting this intention. In effect, Heidegger is claiming the proper translation makes clear that Aristotle does not draw the distinction between statements and other forms of speech on the level of the locutionary or perlocutionary acts, but instead on the level of the respective illocutionary acts, the intentions behind the locutions.

It is important, then, to read Heidegger’s attributions of truth-aptness (in terms of discovery and covering-over) in the various texts of this period with an eye to the above.

When Heidegger says, merely repeating Aristotle, that, “a request is speech, but as a request, it neither discovers nor covers-over [aber bittend entdeckt die Rede weder noch verdeckt sie].” (GA21 133/LQT 111, emphasis added), he does not mean that requests in all respects fail to be truth-apt. Rather—and like Bolzano and Husserl, who he invoked earlier—all λόγοι, including requests, have the effect (perlocution) of uncovering or covering-over; thus why he says in BT, as we saw earlier, that a request makes manifest, but in a different way than apophansis. 238 Nevertheless, qua request it does not uncover or cover-over because, with respect to what makes it a request, that is not its intended function. 239 240 For the λόγος ἀποφαντικός, by contrast, the intention (illocation) is to uncover or cover-over, and so what sets a statement apart is that both in respect to its effect and its intended function, it uncovers

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238 Heidegger does occasionally make proclamations that might lead us to believe otherwise. For instance, in 1925’s PS, he appears to straightforwardly deny that all λόγοι contains ἀληθεύειν (GA19 180/PS 124). But the above passages from LQT strongly suggest that, at least by 1926, he had either modified this view or all along meant this denial to apply only on the level of illocation, not perlocution.

239 This is not to say that the only perlocution of non-assertoric speech acts is to uncover or cover-over.

240 Thus, Heidegger summarizes, “A request does not have the sense [Sinn] of uncovering or covering-over” (GA21 133/LTQ 112).
or covers-over; its illocutionary force *echoes* the perlocutionary act common to all articulate speech.

This sheds light on the apparent disparity I signaled before between the differentiae Aristotle and Heidegger provide which define the λόγος ἀποφαντικός—for Aristotle, the ostensible differentia is truth-aptness, whereas for Heidegger it is making manifest in the specific form of “displaying” (*Aufweisung*). We see now that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is such that truth-aptness *per se* is not Aristotle’s differentia in the first place; rather, the differentia is the illocutionary force of an intention to uncover or cover-over, and this sort of force is called by him “*Aufweisung*.”

As Heidegger sees it, then, his account of λόγος and λόγος ἀποφαντικός, and the nature of their distinction, is simply Aristotle’s, which consists in the following. ‘Λόγοι’ designates the class of linguistic expressions in general, and each λόγος is truth-apt in the sense of effectively uncovering or covering-over. ‘Λόγος ἀποφαντικός’ designates the class of assertions, which uncover or cover-over specifically in the manner of *Aufweisung*, constituted by a certain discursive intention. Thus, what is distinctive about *apophansis* is not that it encompasses a linguistic sphere to be contrasted with a nonlinguistic one, but rather that it has to do with the narrow band of assertoric locutions. Accordingly, Heidegger reserves the name ‘*apophansis*’ for that mode of interpretation which figures in the restricted mode of assertoric form, and ‘*hermeneia*’ to interpretation in general, not as confined to the locutionary form of assertion, but as it unfolds in λόγος or Rede at large, in its broadest expanse as encompassing all forms of discursive articulation.²⁴¹ Heidegger’s driving

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²⁴¹ Nevertheless, locating interpretation within a more generic or primordial sphere than language or λόγος constitutes the received view in the secondary literature. According to Sheehan, for Aristotle λόγος or λέγειν (which he calls “*hermeneia*-2”) is already a species of communication in general—*semainein* (“*hermeneia*-1”)—its differentia being that it is verbal or discursive (Sheehan 1988, 71), and which has as one of its
motivation behind the distinction, behind his screeds about the later corruption of \( \lambda \omicron \gamma \acute{o}z \) into \textit{ratio}, and about truth as a feature only of judgments, is not in service of demarcating a sphere of nonlinguistic disclosure at all, but rather is meant to forcefully push back against what he sees as the myopic conception of both the potential determinativeness and alethic character of discourse as residing in just one small region of the full domain of linguistic expression; that conception loses sight of the fully articulable, expressible, and disclosive nature of any form of discourse whatsoever—yes, indicatives, but no less interrogatives, imperatives, subjunctives, etc.\textsuperscript{242}

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\begin{align*}
\text{respective species } & \text{\textit{apophainesthai ("hermeneia-3")}. There are complex exegetical issues that deserve unpacking here, but in general, while Aristotle (at least on Sheehan’s reading) treats } \textit{semainein}, \text{as a form of } \textit{hermeneia}, \text{as broader than } \textit{\lambda \acute{e}g\acute{e}n} (\text{and as something even animals possess}), \text{Heidegger rejects the idea that, at least for Dasein, there is } \textit{semainein} \text{without } \textit{\lambda \acute{e}g\acute{e}n}.\textsuperscript{241} \text{This is clear from a number of factors, notably the fact that Rede or } \lambda \gamma \omicron \acs{\omicron} \text{is not a species of any broader or more fundamental genus but is absolutely radical as an existentiale. Additionally, in passages we are soon to see, Heidegger asserts that the } \alpha \iota \sigma \theta \eta \omicron \acute{s}i\omicron{s}\text{ belonging to Dasein is unlike that of animals, making clear that their differentiation lies in Dasein’s } \alpha \iota \sigma \theta \eta \omicron{s}i\omicron{s}\text{ being pervaded by } \lambda \gamma \omicron \acs{\omicron} \text{to its root. Sheehan tacitly recognizes this when he notes that for Heidegger ”any } \textit{pathos”, that is any creature with a } \textit{psi\chi\epsilon}, \text{”possesses” (in the sense of } \omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota) \text{a world—Sheehan’s neologism is ‘} \textit{to on echomenon}’—but that the form of this having characteristic of Dasein is } \textit{to on legomenon} \text{(Sheehan 1988, 73). Thus, “The nature of } \textit{pathos} \text{ is such openness, such having-of-world, and if there is a difference between the ways animals and human beings have world, that difference is interior to } \textit{pathos} \text{ itself” (Sheehan 1988, 73), rather than a factor exogenous to } \textit{pathos}, \text{an additional stratum atop it. Nevertheless, Sheehan, insofar as he continues to treat } \textit{hermeneia-1} \text{ as broader than } \textit{hermeneia-2 for Dasein}, \text{as a real distinction within Dasein’s } \psi\chi\epsilon\omicron{s} (\text{rather than a conceptual distinction)}, \text{does not acknowledge the implications of holding Dasein as } \textit{to on legomenon}. \text{He does not call attention to this critical caveat with respect to its bearing on his division of } \textit{hermeneia}, \text{and continues to speak of } \lambda \acute{e}g\acute{e}n \text{ as a simple addition to Dasein’s other features:}

\begin{itemize}
\item That is to say, whereas } \textit{hermeneia-1} \text{ was a possibility of any entity that had an animal } \psi\chi\epsilon\omicron{s} \text{ with } \textit{pathos} \text{ and } \psi\chi\eta\omicron{s}i\alpha\omicron{s}, \textit{hermeneia-2} \text{ belongs only to } \zeta\omicron\upsilon\omicron{n} \text{ to } \tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon\omicron{o} \text{ } \tau\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \text{. Or to reverse the proposition, human nature may be defined as a specific form of } \textit{hermeneia}: \text{The genus of human beings is } \textit{pathos} \text{ and his specific difference is the power of logos. (Sheehan 1988, 74).}
\end{itemize}

\text{On the contrary, } \lambda \gamma \omicron \acs{\omicron} \text{ for Dasein permeates the more general features of Dasein that Sheehan highlights as shared with animals, } \textit{pathos} \text{ and } \psi\chi\eta\omicron{s}i\alpha\omicron{s} \text{ (in addition to } \alpha \iota \sigma \theta \eta \omicron{s}i\omicron{s}\omicron{s}, \text{meaning that, for Dasein at least, the claim that } \lambda \acute{e}g\acute{e}n \text{ is a species of a broader form of communication and expression has to be severely qualified and must be understood with respect to this critical point. Thus, for Dasein, } \textit{hermeneia-2} \text{ is coextensive with } \textit{hermeneia-1}; \text{there is no } \textit{hermeneia} \text{ apart from } \lambda \gamma \omicron \acs{\omicron}.\textsuperscript{242} \text{And this is why Heidegger also says that “…the kind of interpretation which is circumspectively expressed [} \textit{umsichtig ausgesprochene} \text{] is not necessarily already an assertion [} \textit{Aussage} \text{] in the sense we have defined” (GA2 209/BT 200). The interpretive structure is not apophantic, but, in virtue of having this expressiveness or determinativeness, is conducive to speech acts, whether assertoric or otherwise, which communicate its contents.}
This reading of the apophantic-as is the only way I can see to make sense of claims Heidegger persistently advances about the connection between language and perception. Of course, Heidegger highlights the hermeneutic character of circumspective concern or 
*Umsicht*, the absorbed engagement with the world characteristic of *Zuhandenheit*; interpretation is embedded in and underlies our everyday, pre-theoretical comportments. But he also affirms, in lecture courses spanning the 1920s that that the hermeneutic-as of circumspection, as an articulate structure, is essentially a function of λόγος or *Sprache*. In 1924’s BCR, he claims “this looking-around [*Umsicht*], and what is there in it, are revealed [wird...aufgezeigt] precisely by means of [*gerade durch*] the λόγος that is in fact ἀποφαίνεσθαι” (GA18 63/BCR 44).243 Λόγος, he says in 1924-5’s PS, is “the mode of enacting [*Vollzugsart*]” αἰσθησις (GA19 202/PS 139, trans. mod.). And he says exactly the same about *Sprache* a year earlier in IPR:

Αἰσθησις is present in the sort of being [*ist in einem solchen Wesen*] that has *language*. Whether or not it is vocalized [*Mit oder ohne Verlautbarung*], it is always in some way speaking. Language speaks not only in the course of the perceiving [*Die Sprache spricht nicht nur mit beim Vernehmen*], but even

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243 The full passage reads:

It is precisely λόγος that points out [aufzeigt], makes explicit [ausdrücklich macht], conduciveness [Beitraglichkeit] as such and, on the other hand, the οὖ ἐνεκα. Λέγειν τι κατὰ τινος, something is meant “as something”; the world is possessed there in the character of the as, posited [gestellt] in a definite respect. On this basis, Aristotle can also say in the same passage: αἰσθησιν ἔχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. We designate this sight of concern [Sicht des Besorgens] as looking-around [*Umsicht*]. In deliberating [Überlegen], I take a look around myself. However, this looking-around, and what is there in it, are pointed out [aufgezeigt] precisely by means of [durch] the λόγος that is in fact ἀποφαίνεσθαι. […] Thus we see here that λόγος carries out [vollzieht] its basic function: ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνειδικόν; it is ‘to thereby make manifest [offenbar zu machen]’ the world. (GA18 63/BCR 44, trans. mod.) I have chosen to translate ‘aufzeigen’ as ‘to point out,’ not ‘to exhibit’ and ‘durch’ as ‘by means of’ rather than ‘through.’ Macquarrie and Robinson translate ‘aufzeigen’ as ‘to point out’ in BT, and Kistel follows suit in HCT. I have stuck with this translation. Note also that one should exercise caution so as not to conflate ‘aufzeigen’ with ‘aufweisen,’ a specific form of aufzeigen that, as we shall see, is specific to assertion.

Additionally, note that ‘deliberating’ (‘Überlegung’), which appears in the full passage, is not opposed to circumspection, and is not anything like disinterested or detached theoretical rumination. As is said in BT, it is a specific mode of circumspection: “This specific way of bringing the object of concern close by interpreting it circumspectively, we call “deliberating” [Die spezifische, umsichtig-auslegende Näherung des Besorgten nennen wir die Überlegung]” (GA2 475/BT 410).
Whether or not it makes any linguistic performances, Dasein is primordially linguistic. And it is precisely because of the fact that language pervades the entire being of man that thinking is possible:

[...] λόγος is the phenomenon which is taken to be the basic determination [Grundbestimmung] of the constitution of the Being of man [was das Sein des Menschen ausmacht]: man is the living being that speaks [das spricht]. Insofar as this speaking, however, is the mode of enacting seeing and perceiving [die Vollzugsart ist des Sehens, des Vernehmens], i.e. the mode of carrying out αἴσθησις as well as νοεῖν, λόγος as the basic character [Grundcharakter] of the Being of man becomes at the same time representative [stellvertretend] for the other determination of the ζωή of man, νοῦς. (GA19 202/PS 139, trans. mod.)

The point is fundamentally Sellarsian in its implications. Λόγος is, and can only be, determinative of nous, of thinking, because it is determinative of perception. The continuity of αἴσθησις and nous is established in virtue of the “logical” (here meaning λόγος-structured) character of αἴσθησις.

This capacity for language is therefore not separable from man’s others, and man does not incidentally possess language atop its other determinations, but rather its capacities are saturated and determined by language, such that man’s mode of perception is sui generis. Heidegger will later re-emphasize this lesson in his 1931 lecture course on Aristotle’s Metaphysics:

Perception is also a capability of the human. It would be erroneous to hold that the human then possesses in addition to this the property of thinking and of reason, such that we have only to take this away [so daß wir diese nur abzuziehen brauchen] in order to have what the animal has. The perceiving of the animal is rather from the ground up other than that of the human [vielmehr von Grund aus anders als das des Menschen]. Humans comport themselves perceptually toward beings, something of which the animal is never capable [...]) (GA33 196-7/AM 169)

Again, I translate ‘durch’ as ‘by means of’ instead of ‘through.’
Aἴσθησις is permeated by the categorial determinations by means of which things show up always as this or that, and in this way, beings show up qua beings for Dasein. Even in its basic perceptions, Dasein is comported not simply toward beings, but their being, and so beings as beings and in their being.

Though the passages above arise predominantly in the midst of ostensibly explicating Aristotle, Heidegger is unmistakably highlighting an insight meant to be folded into his own conception of Dasein. Notice, in fact, the similarities of the above passages to the following (the one in fact, which introduces the topic of categorial intuition in 1925’s HCT):

Assertions are acts of meaning [Bedeutungsakte], and assertions in the sense of a formulated proposition [formulierten Satzes] are only specific forms of expressness [bestimmte Formen der Ausdrücklichkeit], where expressness has the sense of expressing lived experiences [Erlebnissen] or comportments [Verhaltungen] through meaning. It is essentially owing to phenomenological investigations that this authentic sense of the expressing and expressness [des Ausdrückens und der Ausgedrücklichkeit] of all comportments was made fundamental and placed in the foreground of the question of the structure of the logical. This is not surprising when we consider that our comportments are in actual fact pervaded through and through [durchgängig...durchsetzt sind] by assertions, that they are always performed [vollzogen werden] in some form of expressness. It is also a matter of fact that our simplest perceptions [Wahrnehmungen] and constitutive states [Verfassungen] are already expressed, even more, are interpreted in a certain way. What is primary and original here? It is not so much that we see the objects and things but rather that we first talk about them [zunächst sprechen wir darüber]. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter [wir sehen, was man über die Sache spricht]. This inherently determinate character of the world [eigentümliche Bestimmtheit der Welt] and its potential apprehension and comprehension [Auffassung und Erfassung], through expressness, through already having been spoken and talked over [durch das Schon-gesprochen-und-durchgesprochen-sein], is
basically what must now be brought out in the question of the structure of categorial intuition. (GA20 74-5/HCT 56)\textsuperscript{245} \textsuperscript{246}

That is, things show up in respect to the ways they are always already talked over, understood, and invoked in discourse, which occurs not in some vague way, but specifically

\textsuperscript{245} On the one hand, Heidegger says that assertions are only one form of expression, with the implication being that assertion is therefore only one form of the expressiveness of comportments. On the other hand, he says that all comportments are pervaded by assertions, specifically. I think what Heidegger means is this: the discussion of categorial intuition that follows this passage shows how categorical contents are intrinsic to all comportments, including simple perceptions, and that these categorical contents are immanently ripe for expression in the form of assertions, though potentially they could find expression in other forms (and I will deal with this issue in the discussion of hemeneia and apophansis below). Assertion would capture the being-X of the intended object, its as-structure in the formulation of predication. It would simply be to thematize the intrinsic categorial content of the comportment which renders it determinate and expressible. The being-yellow of the chair, this categorial content inhering in the simple perception of the chair, can be expressed in the assertion “The chair is yellow.” This isn’t to say perception is of propositional form per se, but it is to endorse conceptualism about perception—and even moreso to say something akin to the idea, as Sellars expresses it, that “experiences contain propositional claims”—with “containment” here understood as implicit or easily transcribable into. Heidegger would endorse this, though not in the sense that intuitions are of propositional form as such, but rather that intuitions are expressible in propositional form precisely because they are through and through pervaded by categorial content—and this categorial content is immanently ripe for expression.

\textsuperscript{246} It may be suggested, owing to the invocation of “what one [man] says,” in its proximity to BT’s das Man, that this passage is highlighting not the expressionical character of all comportments, but rather the expressional character of, for instance idle talk, or “fallen” modes of discourse. I think, though, that the wider context of the passage, and of the surrounding discussion in HCT, simply invalidates this objection on its face. Additionally, Heidegger gives strikingly similar examples of this intrinsic “expressness” of comportment in both BT and the later OWA, the contexts of which clearly suggest he means the point to apply to intentionality generally. Compare:

What we hear “first” (“Zunächst”) is never noises or complexes of sounds [Geräusche und Lautkomplexe], but the creaking wagon, the motorcycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling. It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind [künststlichen und komplizierten Einstellung] to “hear” a “pure noise” [reines Geräusch]. That we first hear motorcycles and wagons, though, is the phenomenal evidence [Beleg] that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongside [beim...sich aufhält] what is ready-to-hand within the world; it certainly does not first dwell alongside “sensations” [“Empfindungen”], the turmoil of which [deren Gewühl] would have to be given shape [geformt werden müßte] in the first place, to provide the springboard from which the subject leaps off [abspringt] and finally arrives at a “world” [zu einer “Welt” zu gelangen]. (GA2 217/BT 207, trans. mod.)

In the appearance of things we never perceive [vernehmen] first and foremost [zunächst und eigentlich] a throng of sensations [Anandrang von Empfindungen], e.g. tones and noises [Töne und Geräusche]. Rather, we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, the three-motored plane, the Mercedes which is immediately different from the Adler. Much closer to us than any sensation are the things themselves. We hear the door slam in the house and never acoustic sensations or even mere noises. To hear a bare sound [reines Geräusch] we must listen away from [von...weghören] the things, direct our ears from them [unser Ohn davon abziehen], i.e. listen abstractly. (GA5 10-11/OWA 8, trans. mod.)

See also a similar passage at GA19 599/PS 415.
in the determinate, articulate expressness of linguistic utterances.\textsuperscript{247} The determinativeness of language already underlies the hermeneutic-as of perception. Experience—indeed all comportments, thus disclosure itself—has the logical form of language. Thus, in BT itself Heidegger says that

\begin{quote}
Perception [Das Vernehmen] is the mode of enactment [\textit{hat die Vollzugsart}] of the addressing and discussing [\textit{des Ansprechens und Besprechens}] of something as something [von etwas als etwas]. This amounts to \textit{interpretation} in the broadest sense; and on the basis of such interpretation, perception becomes an act of \textit{making determinate} [\textit{wird das Vernehmen zum Bestimmen}]. What is thus perceived and made determinate [\textit{Das Vernommene und Bestimmte}] can be expressed [\textit{ausgesprochen}] in propositions [\textit{Sätzen}], and can be retained and preserved as what has thus been asserted [\textit{Ausgesagtes}].
\end{quote}

\textit{(GA2 83/BT 89, trans. mod.)}\textsuperscript{248}

Heidegger does not say here that perception precedes articulate, expressible contents—what gets put into verbal expression—but that perception is in fact determinate in the very sense of its constitutive interpretedness already being articulate in this way, such that it can subsequently be given voice by speech acts. Moreover, though, the main point he is making here is not the anodyne claim that speech acts “enact” or “put into practice,” by way of vocal expression, the interpretational content of the perception. Nor is it the unintelligible claim

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{247} The point is not that things show up only due to some \textit{specific} discursive act, and certainly not the one which immediately directs itself to expressing the showing at issue, but rather owing to a background discursive practice as a whole.
\textsuperscript{248} Macquarrie and Robinson translate the first sentence of this passage as “Perception is consummated when one addresses oneself to something as something and discusses it as such.” But their editorial insertion of ‘when,’ alongside the translation of ‘\textit{hat die Vollzugsart}’ as ‘is consummated’ gives the sense that perception may occur \textit{without} “addressing and discussing,” which serve only as finishing touches, incidental formalities, upon a distinct, already existing act of perception. Instead, the point here is that “addressing and discussing,” as practices, are constitutive of perceptual interpretations. Stambaugh corrects this, and her translation gives a better impression of perception as intrinsically tied to these modes of \textit{Rede}: “Perception takes place as addressing and discussing something as something” (BTS 61). Nevertheless, I prefer ‘enactment’ or ‘enacting,’ for ‘\textit{Vollzug}’; it has connotations of the present \textit{perfect} that ‘takes place’ does not, though without the sense of being a mere flourish of an already existing process that ‘is consummated’ arguably has. Moreover, there is a difference to be noted between the act of fulfilling and the fulfillment or consummation itself. Perhaps the most literal translation would be: “Perception is the mode of enactment of the addressing and discussing of something as something.” This, however, remains ambiguous between whether the genitive taken by ‘\textit{Ansprechen}’ and ‘\textit{Besprechen}’ is the subjective or objective genitive, where recognition of the \textit{subjective} genitive is crucial to understanding the passage.
\end{quote}
that the speech acts which give expression to the antecedent perception somehow constitute that perception’s determinate content or its interpretation. ‘Ansprechen’ and ‘Besprechen’ do not indicate those very subsequent acute acts but rather (in keeping with Heidegger’s general usage of the terms) the very enterprises of discourse; “addressing” and “discussing” designate not ontic cases of word-manipulation but modes of conversance. The point, then, is that the content of the perception’s interpretation is itself determined by the discursive practices in which those speech acts are embedded—as I put it earlier, things are already talked-over and (pre-)understood—such that the interpretation is the “putting into practice,” the ontic manifestation of, these aspects of Rede—thus the determination of the perceptual content by discourse. In other words, the perceptual interpretation is not somehow transmuted from a non-linguistic into a linguistic form, but that it is already, constitutively of the form of a linguistic token, ripe for expression in speech acts. “We see what one says about a matter,” as we saw Heidegger explain—“we first talk about them.”

When Heidegger says that interpretation is carried out “without wasting words,” that “From the fact that words are absent, it may not be concluded that interpretation is absent” (GA2 209/BT 200), he by no means is saying that interpretation is possible in the absence of language itself. These passages imply only this: we do not in the first instance uncover things in explicit acts of speaking, conversing about them. Interpretation occurs without the necessary accompaniment of speech acts; I need not speak about the entity to uncover it as a chair—I need only see it. But from the fact that what I see is expressible in language at all, we must recognize the linguistically determinate character of the seeing. Indeed, several passages attest to the fact that Heidegger is using the idea of the inherent articulate
expressibility of basic comportments to attack any suggestion that expression tokens constitute the first emergence of this articulateness:

That which is understood gets Articulated when the entity to be understood is brought close interpretatively by taking as our clue the ‘something as something’; and this Articulation lies before [liegt vor] our making any thematic assertion about it. In such an assertion the ‘as’ does not turn up for the first time; it just gets expressed for the first time, and this is possible only in that it lies before us as something expressive. [...] The fact that when we look at something, the explicitness [Ausdrücklichkeit] of assertion can be absent, does not justify our denying that there is any Articulative interpretation in such mere seeing, and hence that there is any as-structure in it. (GA2 198-9/BT 190, emphasis added)

Instead, language is operative, as we saw above, “whether or not it is vocalized”—for “verbal utterance [stimmliche Verlautbarung],” he tells us, “is not essential for discourse” (GA2 360/BT 217). The extraneous element he identifies here is explicit vocalization, not language as such.

Heidegger says nothing different in these passages, on the expressness of comportments, than what Sellars declares in EPM about experience as “containing propositional claims” (Sellars 1997, 39). And just as with Sellars, assertional fulfillment is possible because perceptual episodes already contain articulate, structured contents—in the sense of the categorial structuration which actual acts of assertion express. They both come not only to the same diagnosis of the inadequacy of sensory contents taken in isolation, but also the same response to it: conceptualism as a way of accounting for the possibility of the continuity of intuition and expression.

249 I want to make it clear that the following point must not be skipped over, indeed is worthy of emphasis and reemphasis, at the risk of beating a dead horse: The similarity is not incidental. The reason Sellars says that experiences must “contain propositional claims” is that, as he argues, it is the only way to make sense of their purported normative authority over, specifically, propositional attitudes, but also more generally any empirical thought. We are in a position to fully appreciate that this is exactly Heidegger’s motivation for saying what he says in the above passage.
I think it well substantiated, therefore, that Heidegger endorses conceptualism about perception—in fact conceptualism about all intentionality, since it seems clear that for him all intelligibility has the logical form and articulateness of linguistic tokens. Nevertheless, it is at this point appropriate to note that conceptualism does not—or at least need not—say that perceptual tokens have the *surface grammatical* form of *assertions*. For Heidegger 1) as we have seen, the relevant domain of linguistic tokens is broader than the category of assertion, and 2) what matters is not the surface grammar of linguistic tokens, but rather the logical form of what he calls the “primary and authentic proposition [*primären und eigentlichen Satzes*]” (GA20 360/HCT 261)—i.e. the as-structure—which underlies them, be they assertions or otherwise.

Now, on the basis of the claim that Heidegger is a conceptualist, it becomes easier to establish that he is also a psychological nominalist. Doing so involves, as I mentioned at the beginning of this section, that language-acquisition provides an *explanation* for the logical form of perceptual tokens, and in particular does so by “constituting” them. Sellars’ psychological nominalism is in fact very similar to what Guignon calls the “constitutive” view of language, and which he attributes to Heidegger:

[The constitutive view] pictures language not so much as a tool on hand for our use as a *medium* in which man dwells. On the constitutive view, language generates and first makes possible our full-blown sense of the world. The constitutivist maintains that the mastery of the field of significance of a *world* (as opposed to, say, an animal’s dexterity in its natural environment) presupposes some prior mastery of the articulate structure of a language. (Guignon 1982, 118)

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250 Note the close parallels in Guignon’s and Sellars’ wording. Compare “mastery of the field of significance of a world” with “awareness of logical space,” as well as “presupposes prior mastery of the articulate structure of a language” with “depends on acquisition of a language.”
Against this, Taylor Carman has argued for a Dreyfusian take on Heidegger’s account of language, what he calls the “instrumentalist” view, according to which “language is just one manifestation of discourse among others” (Carman 2003, 223), and therefore functions as one “tool” among others in Dasein’s arsenal for enacting discourse. Of course, we have already seen that distinguishing language from discourse this sharply is problematic. Nevertheless, Carman cites a few passages which might be seen to lend weight to the instrumental view. Through examining those passages more closely, however, we actually uncover a commitment on Heidegger’s part to the explanatory role of language, in the manner psychological nominalism posits.

The second of the two passages Carman cites (Carman 2003, 222)—I will come to the first later—declares that language is a founded mode upon significations and their disclosure:

But in significance itself, with which Dasein is always familiar, there lurks the ontological condition [Bedingung] which makes it possible for Dasein, as something which understands and interprets, to disclose such things as ‘significations’; upon these, in turn, is founded [fundieren] the Being of speech and of language [Wort und Sprache]. (GA2 117/BT 121)

Carman cites as additional evidence this passage undercuts the constitutive view the fact that Heidegger’s later marginalia in his own personal copy of BT take issue with this claim: “Not true. Language is not built up [aufgestockt], rather it is the primordial essence of truth as there” (GA2 117 n. c). The marginalia thus signals to us that, while Heidegger may have later held a constitutive view of language (it is not clear when the marginalia was written), he

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251 Macquarrie and Robinson translate the end of this passage as “the Being of words and language.” But this is potentially misleading, for “words” here only works as a translation provided we understand it not as plural of verbal signs, linguistic units, but as equivalent to “speech.” ‘Speech’ is a perfectly acceptable rendering of ‘Wort’ in certain contexts, and this seems an exemplary candidate.

252 “Unwahr. Sprache ist nicht aufgestockt, sondern ist das ursprüngliche Wesen der Wahrheit als Da.”
himself took this as a contrast to the view expounded in BT, where language is “built up” atop more fundamental strata of Dasein’s existential constitution.253

The BT passage presents in shortened version a somewhat more detailed exposition given elsewhere of this apparently hierarchical “layering” of founding and founded features of Dasein’s existential structure:

There is verbal expression—Language—only insofar as there is considering, and such a consideration of something as something is possible only insofar as there is interpreting; interpretation in turn is only insofar as there is understanding, and understanding is only insofar as Dasein has the structure-of-being of discoveredness, which means that Dasein itself is defined as being-in-the-world. This continuity which founds the several phenomena—considering, interpreting, understanding, being discovered, in-being, Dasein—at the same time serves to define language, or gives the horizon from which the essence of language can first and foremost be seen and defined. (GA20 360/HCT 261)254

If language is founded upon prior disclosure, then how could it be constitutive of experience in the way psychological nominalism or constitutivism proposes? Everything turns on how we understand the proper sense in which anything is “founded” upon anything else. For the term is a reference to Husserl’s Fundierung relation, and thus means something very specific.

As Crowell points out, the Fundierung relation as Husserl conceived it is neither logical nor causal, nor genetic in a more general sense (Crowell 2013, 37).255 Despite the fact that Heidegger employs the relation with abandon across his oeuvre, he almost never pauses to explain it. However, when he does, what he says conforms to Crowell’s cautions. In PRL, he exclaims support for Husserl’s concept of foundation [Fundierung],” as representing “an

253 The positive features of the later Heidegger’s view of language may be captured in 1935’s OWA: “Language, by naming entities for the first time, first brings entities to word and to appearance” (GA5 61/OWA 46, trans. mod.).
254 Recall that we have already established “verbal expression” here does not mean performance of verbal tokens but the very enterprise of expression itself, the practice.
255 Crowell points out (Crowell 2013, 37) that Husserl later comes to understand Fundierung as genetic in a certain qualified, non-causal, way, citing Hua 1, 108.
extraordinary step forward” in understanding the kinds of connections or relations that hold between moments of lived experience, the “changing determinations of our self” which make up the “constant following [Sichfolgen] and interweaving of situations” (GA60 331/PRL 250). He denies that the connections between these determinations are best understood in analogy with natural relations or “according to the theory of nature,” and instead proposes that Fundierung elucidates how they “are built up [aufbauen] out of the basic structure of consciousness,” where “Situations can supersede [ablösen] one another purely on the basis of the contents of consciousness and their immanent connections, or motivated [motiviert] by certain gradations and vivacities of the specific act-characters” (GA60 331/PRL 250). Of course, the positive characterization of Fundierung remains somewhat arcane here. Nevertheless, what it is not comes across quite clearly.

The other place where Heidegger sheds some light on the Fundierung relation is amid HCT’s discussion of categorial intuition as founded on sensuous intuition, which we have already seen. The founded categorial acts, while “indeed directed toward the objectivities co-posed in them from the simple acts,” nevertheless “disclose the simply given objects anew [die schlicht vorgegebenen Gegenstände neu erschließen]” (GA20 84/HCT 62). That the founded acts are and must be directed toward the same objects as the sensuous intuition is the respect in which they are derivative; they cannot be given in and of themselves but rely on the sensuous intuition. Thus, Heidegger clarifies: “the thesis that everything categorial ultimately rests upon sense intuition is but a restatement of the Aristotelian proposition: […]

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256 The translators render ‘ablösen’ as ‘follow.’ But this translation wrongly gives the impression of the founded term in the Fundierung relation as temporal successor. The inappropriateness of preserving this connotation is even more pronounced given the fact that Heidegger has already indicated that ‘Sichfolgen,’ which is translated as ‘following,’ gives too much of an impression of a relation within nature (a temporal or causal one). ‘Supercede’ doesn’t connote a temporal or causal relation as strongly (at least it need not). Additionally, I have chosen to translate ‘aufbauen’ as the more literal ‘are built up,’ as opposed to Fritsch and Gosetti-Ferencei’s ‘develop.’
'The soul can presume nothing, apprehend nothing objective in its objectivity, if nothing at all has been shown to it beforehand’” (GA20 94/HCT 69). But this “beforehand” is the priority of a transcendental condition, for Heidegger repeats that the acts are not “coup[ed] in the manner of temporal succession” (GA20 84/HCT 62). In fact, not only does the founded act not follow the founding in time, but indeed the two “cannot be separated” at all, and this is part of the “basic constitution of intentionality” (GA20 83-4/HCT 62).

Heidegger’s explication of the Fundierung relation is in fact effectively no different from the one Merleau-Ponty famously gives in Phenomenology of Perception:

The founding term […] is primary in the sense that the founded term is presented as a determination or a making explicit of the founding term, which prevents the founded term from ever fully absorbing the founding term; and yet the founding term is not primary in the empirical sense and the founded is not merely derived from it, since it is only through the founded that the founding appears (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 414).

The core lesson is this, then: the founding cannot be understood as holding apriority over the founded in any sense which could be cached out in empirical or naturalistic terms—it is prior in the sense of being a condition of the possibility of the founded act—so that the two always come coupled together, as part of one and the same phenomenon. If there is a respect in which the founded is dependent upon the founding, then, there is another respect in which the converse is true: the sensuous content is essentially structured, and the articulate character of the objectivity of the perceptual contents, as the manner in which intentionality factually occurs, is owing to the synthetic and ideational moments of intuition. Thus, Heidegger

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257 Or: “We can formulate the import of the sentence in this way: Everything categorial ultimately rests upon sense intuition, no objective explication floats freely but is always an explication of something already given” (GA20 94/HCT 69). Thus we see that the foundedness of categorial acts is just another form of expression of the commitment to Answerability that we saw in 2.2, a kind of “minimal empiricism.”

258 For more on the reciprocal and dialectical valences that Merleau-Ponty observantly extracts from the Fundierung relation, and which bear greatly upon the matters at hand, but in which I cannot become sidetracked, see Dillon 1988, esp. 194-5ff.
affirms that the full sweep of perceptual contents “can never become accessible in the simple [sensuous] acts at the ground level” (GA20 84/HCT 62). The (asymmetrical) codependence lies in one and the same thing: that the founded is simply a determination of the founding.

With the instances of the *Fundierung* relation as Heidegger discusses it as our guide, we can say three things about the relation generally:

1) The relation does not reflect a temporal, causal, or genetic priority of the founding term.
2) In fact, the founded term is temporally simultaneous, and inseparably so, from the founding term.
3) If there is a sense in which the founded term is dependent upon the founding, there is another, different sense in which the reverse is also the case.

Invocation, then, of Heidegger’s assertion that language is founded upon multiple strata of existential conditions, does not show what Carman claims, that language is not a constitutive existential condition in its own right. It is not a subsequent phenomenon in which Dasein may or may not engage—it is always in play. And when Heidegger later comments in the marginalia of BT that language is not built up, the best we can fairly extrapolate is only that he indeed seems to deny it is founded, and instead is asserting language lies at a more founding layer of the existential strata. Regardless, though, whether understood as founded or founding, whether on the later or the earlier view, language is constitutive of Being-in-the-World, rather than a phenomenon ensuing from or generated consequent to it.

What I have yet to clarify is the character of either dependency involved in the *Fundierung* relation between significations and language. This will become illuminated via

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259 Heidegger’s explication of the relation between founded and founding in HCT even refers to the former as “built upon [aufbauen]” the latter (GA20 83-4/HCT 62), using very similar language as would later appear in his marginalia (‘aufgestocken’), and lending credibility to the idea that Heidegger’s later view is specifically a denial of the foundedness of language in this specific sense of *Fundierung*. Much turns on this denial for the later Heidegger, but my point is solely that it does not make much difference for our purposes, i.e. with regard to the thesis of psychological nominalism.
consideration of the first of the passages Carman cites in defense of his reading, and against
Guignon’s “constitutive” view”—the infamous quip that “To significances, words accrue”
(GA2 214/BT 204). On the surface, the claim seems to directly contradict the idea that
language is primordial, suggesting, instead, that we can understand a stratum of meaning to
temporally prefigure language. The original German in its wider context, however, is
revealing:

Das Bedeutungsganze der Verständlichkeit kommt zu Wort. Den Bedeutungen
wachsen Worte zu. Nicht aber werden Wörterdinge mit Bedeutungen
versehen.

The totality-of-significations of intelligibility is *put into words*. To
significations, words accrue. But word-Things do not get supplied with
significations.

Parsing the passage turns largely on how we understand what ‘Worte’ designates here.
Macquarrie and Robinson translate ‘Worte’ as ‘words,’ but whereas ‘Wörter’ means a
plurality of words as discrete signs (a dictionary—*Wörterbuch*—is a collection of ‘Wörter’),
‘Worte’ means a plurality of words as conveying something (either in one sentence or
many)—as when one says, “He gave me some words of advice” or, rather appropriately,
Wittgenstein’s proclamation “Words are also deeds [Worte sind auch Taten]” (Wittgenstein
1953, 146). In this sense ‘Worte’ is used in a way more or less interchangeable with the
singular ‘Wort,’ which can often mean ‘speech,’ or an instance of speaking, an utterance,
rather than ‘word’ in the sense of linguistic unit—as in “Her word is law.” Attention to the
original German therefore suggests Heidegger is not making a claim about the genesis of
linguistic signs *per se*, or the origination of these signs by attaching to pre-existing
significations some symbols, but rather about the underlying conditions for the *performance*
of utterances, of speech act tokens. Thus, to significances, *utterances* or *expressings* accrue.

This reading is bolstered when we consider the equivalent passage from HCT:

> It is not as if there were first verbal sounds [*Wortlaute*] which in time were furnished [*versehen würden*] with meanings. On the contrary, what is primary is being in the world, that is, concerned understanding and being in the context of meanings [*Bedeutungszusammenhang*]. Only then do sounds [*Verlautbarung*], pronunciation [*Laute*], and phonetic communication [*lautliche Mitteilung*] accrue [zuwächst] to such meanings from Dasein itself. Sounds [*Laute*] do not acquire [bekommen] meaning; rather, it is the other way around: meanings are expressed [warden... *ausgedrückt*] in sounds [*Lauten*]. (GA20, 287/HCT 210)

The fact that the BT version of this passage, where Heidegger uses ‘*Worte*,’ is derived from a draft where the discussion centers around the issue of verbal sounds (verbalizations, *Wortlaute*) being secondary seems to indicate further that Heidegger is making the point that performative *tokens*, the *expressings*, accrue to significations, not that the linguistic *expressions*, strings which articulate the significations in language, arise in the first instance subsequent to pre-articulate contents. Heidegger is not saying that first exist the meanings in the absence of language, and then we make our initial baptisms to capture them in words, assigning terms; rather, he is making a claim about the role of overt speaking, of Dasein’s expressing itself.\(^\text{261}\)

\(^{260}\) ‘*Wortlaut*’ more often means ‘wording’ or ‘word choice,’ as in “his wording was awkward.” However, Kisiel’s decision to translate it more literally as ‘verbal sound’ seems appropriate here, given the context, as does Dahlstrom’s rendering as ‘sound of a word’ in IPR (see fn. 189). One possible rendering which may capture both dimensions is ‘verbalization.’

\(^{261}\) Now the question of the origins of language is one which Heidegger broaches (though not at much length). In doing so, though, he does not come to the conclusion that words, as sounds, come to be attached to pre-existing meanings. Rather, he says that the very problem, which various theories of language start from, of unifying significances and sounds, such that word-units manage to “have meaning,” is “contrived” and “totally uprooted from the phenomenal composition of speaking and language” (GA20 288/HCT 211). For words, as isolated units, are *Vorhanden*, and so derivative, of the *Zuhanden* whole of the practice: “…as an entity within-the-world, this totality [of language] thus becomes something which we may come across as ready-to-hand [wie ein Zuhandenes vorfindlich]. Language can be broken up into word-Things which are extant [zerschlagen werden in vorhandene Wörtdinge]” (GA2 214/BT 204). This is why Heidegger rebuffs the notion that word-things “get supplied with significations,” a claim which reads no less naturally as denying that pre-existing significations enrich empty symbols as it does that empty symbols predate significations and require subsequent enrichment by them. Both are artificial abstractions from the concrete phenomenology of the practice of
This fits well with the rest of the context of the BT passage. Heidegger says that significance ‘kommt zu Wort,’ but ‘zu Wort kommen’ idiomatically means something like “to have a say,” “to get a word in.” Significances are expressed, we put significations into words, not in the sense that this is how linguistic units in the first place become attached to meanings and originate as signs, but in the sense that speech’s motive lies in the desire of Dasein to “speak its mind,” to bring intelligibility into expression. In fact, the underlying current of the passage as it immediately precedes this has to do with highlighting an existential feature of Dasein, that it seeks to express itself. Discourse, he says, “has a kind of Being which is specifically worldly,” in the sense that that “the intelligibility of Being-in-the-World […] expresses itself [spricht sich…aus] as discourse” (GA2 214/BT 204).  

Heidegger’s wording (‘aussprechen’) has the unmistakable flair of acute verbal performance, of speech act tokens. The passage, in fact, reflects an underlying existential motif to which Heidegger often returns, that Dasein is outspoken:

Insofar as a human being is in the world and wants something [etwas will] in that world and wants it with himself, he speaks. He speaks insofar as something like a world is uncovered [entdeckt] for him as a matter of concern [als Besorgbares] and he is uncovered to himself in this “for him.” (GA17 16/IPR 12)

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262 “Die befindliche Verständlichkeit des In-der-Welt-seins spricht sich als Rede aus.” This is of course set-up for the claim we saw above—and that follows not long after this one, that language has a Being which is worldly.

263 We have seen Heidegger’s claim “Die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede ist die Sprache.” Macquarrie and Robinson translate this as “The way in which discourse gets expressed is language,” but a more literal translation is “The outspokenness of discourse is language.”

264 Elsewhere he says that “existence [menschlichen Dasein] has and understands and strives for this basic form of revealing [in speaking]” (GA21 7/LQT 6); that “Primarily seen (in an interpretative way) as speaking in the eeriness [Unheimlichkeit], language means: announcing oneself [sich aussprechen], making oneself heard [lautwerden] in the eeriness” (GA17 317/IPR 240). Also: “In speaking about something, the Dasein speaks itself out, expresses itself, as existent being-in-the-world, dwelling with and occupying itself with beings” (GA24 297/BPP 208).
Dasein is driven to *speak out* or express itself as a part of its existential character and constitution.\(^{265}\) When Heidegger touches on the “origination” of words and of language, the distinct sense that one gets, then, is that he is referring to the genesis of *acts of utterance* as arising from out of Dasein’s existential vocation for expressing itself. He does not mean that word-meanings or that the *contents* of those acts arise from what is in the first instance a foundational *arché* of experience that subsequently gets hitched to symbols. In fact, he explicitly rejects that:

> …a word as a whole is drawn [*das Wort ist als Ganzes...geschöpft*], not from a primary, primordial experience of the subject matter [*primärer ursprünglicher Sacherfahrung*], but from preconceptions [*Vormeinungen*] and the nearest at hand perspectives [*nächsten Ansichten*] of things. The word’s genesis [*Die Genesis des Wortes*] is not born [*wird...getragen*] by a human’s physiological being, but by his actual existence [*eigentlichen Existenz*].

(GA17 16/IPR 12)\(^{266,267}\)

Word-meaning is not a function of Given contents, but rather of *an already operative* “line of vision,” a background of prior conception and cognitive perspective—that is, immersion in a

\(^{265}\) Allen Scult refers to this as Dasein’s “urge to articulate one’s particular seeing,” which “locates one’s being in the world as a being-with-others” (Scult 1999, 154), and which he sees as a “phenomenology of speaking” that incorporates Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* into BT’s fundamental ontology.

\(^{266}\) Dahlstrom renders ‘Ansichten’ as ‘views,’ but I translate it here as ‘perspectives,’ for it seems to conform better with what Heidegger is getting at, and without connotations that he is referring to something like literal vision, for that is precisely what he means to contrast it with. Nevertheless, the visual metaphors are to some degree unavoidable (“line of vision,” “perspective” and the like), and perhaps “points of view” would also render ‘Ansichten’ well. ‘Opinions,’ though, has a great number of undesirable connotations in English, not the least of which being in this case that opinions seem far more sedimented than *Ansichten*.

\(^{267}\) Those attuned to Heidegger’s impact on hermeneutics will recognize the use of ‘*Vormeinung*’ as the term Gadamer takes up readily in order to describe the sort of ‘prejudice’ of a forerunning interpretation that colors matters. So just as with Sellars, Heidegger holds that the conceptual and linguistic acuity of our comportments is owing to an always already operative *compensatory background* of conceptual resources; Heidegger calls this the fore-conception (*Vorgriff*). In addition to ‘*Vorgriff*,’ Gadamer invokes the latter as a close synonym in his discussions of prejudice in *Truth and Method* (see Gadamer 2004, 278ff). And Crowell, for instance, identifies the articulateness of *Rede* in *Vorgriff*, the fore-conception which structures understanding, and means that not matters are conceptualized in the sense of a kind of *explicit*, thematized comportment toward them, but that they are *conceptualizable* in that sense (Crowell 2013, 231). This conceptualizability has a determinateness and is always already understood, always lies in the background. Crowell goes on to say that conceptuality, in this sense of *Vorgriff*, has been neglected in Heidegger scholarship owing to the fact that Heidegger never really elaborated upon it (Crowell 2013, 232). And while Crowell is not entirely wrong on this count, I do think that ‘*Vormeinung*’ in cases such as this passage plays a similar role.
practice into which it is thrown (as mitsein), and which is constitutive of its actual, concrete Existenz, as opposed to its abstraction as simply a sensing organism.\(^{268}\) Heidegger therefore denies that a word should be understood as “like a tool [Werkzeug]” (GA17 16/IPR 12), a view which would seem to be implied by the idea that language originates from out of a field of prelinguistic intelligibility, and serves merely as an instrument for enunciating it—the instrumental view Carman defends and Guignon rejects.\(^{269}\) Rather, language is, in an idiom that we shall emphasize more below, “the being and becoming of the human being” (GA17 16/IPR 12), and this is why: Dasein, in speaking, takes on a way of being, seeking to project itself into its world in a certain way, to express its being and the way it finds itself in the world. Language does not enunciate pre-existing significations, but—and this is the pivotal point—it enunciates and enacts Dasein itself. It cannot then be so downstream of and incidental to Dasein’s existential constitution as a mere appliance for conveying meanings which are allegedly exogenous to it.

We see again from close analysis of these passages that Bedeutsamkeit, as the founding term, does not hold a temporal, genetic, or causal priority over language, but it has further afforded us a way to appreciate a different sense in which it can nevertheless be the aition of, and account for, language. The existential motif of Dasein’s outspokenness helps us clarify the relevant respect in which language can be said to be less primordial than significations; for there is language, as a matter of linguistic acts, only because—and it is

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\(^{268}\) In this one passage we see more pointedly than perhaps anywhere else Heidegger’s denial of the Myth. One might think at first glance that Heidegger’s point in the above passage is to drive a wedge between language and “primary, primordial experience”—which would suggest a Dreyfusian lesson—but in fact the next sentence makes clear that for Heidegger the disparate parties are language and Dasein’s physiological being. More akin to Sellars than to Dreyfus, the emphasis here is upon distinguishing Dasein’s full, “actual Existenz” from its merely physiological dimensions—and the former, inclusive as it must be of Dasein’s social and discursive being, is that from which language arises.

\(^{269}\) Heidegger cites Aristotle on this, mentioning the claim in DI that each λόγος is significant “οὐχ ὡς ὀργανόν” (DI 16b33)—”not like an instrument.”
only *intelligible* in terms of the fact that—Dasein seeks to put into expression itself and its world. Language as an enterprise hardly makes sense except as grounded in Dasein’s lived impetus to express the way it finds itself in its Being-in-the-World. On one level of explanation, then—we might call it an *existential* order of explanation—significance is more primordial than language. After all, BT is an *existential analytic* of Dasein, so it should be no surprise that in the sense relevant to Heidegger’s investigation—the existential motif—language is founded upon intelligibility or significations.

In what way, then, do I suggest language in its turn holds a certain priority to significations or intentional contents for Heidegger? In very much the same way as it does for Sellars in his explication of the so-called Myth of Jones, the point of which is that any account of intentionality is modelled after and explicable primarily in terms of the aboutness of that phenomenon with which our Rylean ancestors are initially more familiar: language. As Sellars puts it, whereas “the classical scheme includes the idea that semantical discourse about overt verbal performances is to be analyzed in terms of talk about the intentionality of the mental episodes which are ‘expressed’ by these overt performances,” instead, Sellars continues, “the categories of intentionality are, at bottom, semantical categories pertaining to overt verbal performances” (Sellars 1997, 94). The basic point Sellars drives at with the

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270 The account I am providing has the added advantage of being able to readily explain why Heidegger comments in the margins of BT that language is not founded: Heidegger’s later rejection of the *Fundierung* claim coincides with his increasing skepticism about the efficacy of an existential analytic of Dasein for an investigation into the meaning of being. So of course, he would become less interested in a view of language as grounded in Dasein’s existential constitution, as I have said the early Heidegger sees the issue.

271 As Brandom summarizes the Myth of Jones, “thought must be understood by analogy to talk,” rather than the other way around, “in the sense that the concepts we put into play to talk about the meanings or contents of our thoughts are understood in terms of their role in their original or ‘home’ language game of talking about what we say, rather than about what we think” (Brandom 1997, 173). That is, because “semantic discourse falls on the side of the epistemic,” we can understand the contours of the space of reasons, and what it means to play the game of giving and asking for reasons, by understanding the functions of semantic concepts in language games that are reflexive, about language itself. Our understanding of language games about thought (including our understanding of reasoning), in fact, can and should be modeled on our understanding of language games about language, and not vice versa.
Myth of Jones is that mentalistic discourse, discourse about intentionality, is a “mongrelized” corruption or derivation of semantic discourse, discourse about language, and not the other way around. Thus, language has its own explanatory priority of a very specific sort, and the mythological narrative is meant to metaphorically illustrate this.

Now we have seen that the point Heidegger makes in passages like we have scrutinized above is that overt verbal performances, as acts, are derivative with regard to meanings, contents. He never suggests that those intentional contents cannot be, or even wouldn’t best be, analyzed or constitutively explained in terms primarily of verbally expressible contents, the point Sellars is ultimately making in invoking the Myth of Jones. In fact, not only does Heidegger nowhere suggest intentional content can’t or shouldn’t be analyzed first and foremost in terms of verbally expressible contents, but to the contrary his entire discussion of the relation between intuition and expression, which proceeds by tracing back the same categorial structures as found in propositional contents like “The chair is yellow” to the intuition its assertion would report, amounts to an example, in the milieu of phenomenological investigation, of the Sellarsian claim about the directionality of explanation as running from language to intentionality and not vice versa. That very directionality of explanation implied by the phenomenological notions of intentional presumption (in empty intending, including assertion) and fulfillment (in perception)

272 “With the resources of semantical discourse, the language of our fictional ancestors has acquired a dimension which gives considerably more plausibility to the claim that they are in a position to talk about thoughts just as we are. For characteristic of thoughts is their intentionality, reference, or aboutness, and it is clear that semantical talk about the meaning or reference of verbal expressions has the same structure as mentalistic discourse concerning what thoughts are about. It is therefore all the more tempting to suppose that the intentionality of thoughts can be traced to the application of semantical categories to overt verbal performances, and to suggest a modified Rylean account according to which talk about so-called "thoughts" is shorthand for hypothetical and mongrel categorical-hypothetical statements about overt verbal and nonverbal behavior, and that talk about the intentionality of these ‘episodes’ is correspondingly reducible to semantical talk about the verbal components” (Sellars 1997, 93).
suggests an analysis proceeding from expressible contents as *explanans* to fulfilling intuition as *explanandum*, rather than the other way around.\(^{273}\) The picture is meant to account for how it is possible that expression can be felicitous with regard to intuition, and so the order of explanation is established in accordance with that demand.

So, for both Sellars and Heidegger semantic contents are to be understood by analogy to or as modeled upon linguistic meaning. In phenomenological language, we might put Sellars’ thesis this way: the noematic contents of acts are to be understood by reference to linguistic contents or Fregean *Sinne*. And after all, isn’t this precisely what we saw from both Husserl and Heidegger in their respective explications of *noema* and *Bedeutsamkeit* in 2.3? When Husserl and Heidegger ask us to understand *noema* or *Bedeutsamkeit* in analogy with linguistic meaning, what is on offer is nothing other than a sophisticated form of the “Jonesean” picture of their relative explanatory relation, in terms of content analysis.\(^{274}\) The phenomenological account of intuition and expression is akin to Jones’ theory of mind, with postulates about intentionality (specifically, about noematic content) put forward analogically from observations about linguistic meaning, as, in the way Føllesdal put it, a “generalization of the notion of linguistic meaning.”\(^{275}\)

\(^{273}\) This is why fulfillment is contrasted with *Vermeinen* (which Kisiel translates as ‘presuming’) which emphasizes the emptiness of “empty intending.” By and large we engage in *Vermeinen*, already take a stance on things in coordination with our prejudices, preconceptions, and projects, and only subsequently ask after its evidentiary status.

\(^{274}\) By “analysis” of contents, I mean what Sellars means: among other things, individuating and distinguishing them from one another. To claim Heidegger is uninterested in such an analytical task is absurd; I refer the reader back to the previous discussions of 2.3, where I argued Heidegger’s account of *Bedeutsamkeit*—in its connection with the *existentialia*—affords us the ability to render the mental states and utterances of others scrutable in accordance with an existential-concernful ordering of mind. The very fact that this “ordering” presents us with a way to distinguish between modes of comportment by reference to thrown projection and, ultimately, *Sorge*, means Heidegger gives us the analytical tools for both linguistic and cognitive semantical individuation. But not only is this an outgrowth of Heidegger’s account, I hope by now there is some salience to the claim that it is a central motivating factor behind it in the first place, that Heidegger himself was interested in pursuing.

\(^{275}\) Further, we have seen there is a compelling reason for this theoretical postulate, and an understanding of noema in terms of language and not the other way around. In fact, the compulsion is much the same for
Thus, significations are to be understood by reference to linguistic contents, not the other way around, and this owing to the fact that language (here meaning verbally expressible contents, not acts), as the founded term, is the manner in which significations receive concrete expression—and there is no other. That is, the intentional contents must be analyzed with respect to linguistic use and practice, for otherwise we are left with an inscrutable and ill-defined cognitive semantics—with an inscrutable intentionality itself—whose connection to its own expression remains by its very nature cryptic. Thus, in a quite distinct explanatory respect, that of content analysis, of understanding and individuating intelligible contents and how they are constituted, we must posit the explanatory priority of language over significations. Without an analysis grounded in the latter’s determinate and felicitous expressibility, trying to understand such contents necessarily bottoms out in an ultimate admission of a certain unavoidable degree of inscrutability and ineffability, an inherent disconnect between intuition and expression (which, as should by now be appreciable, would disrupt the very methodological pretenses of phenomenology). This is nothing other than the lesson of the Myth of Jones, indeed one of the central morals of EPM as a whole.

To summarize then: while we cannot make sense of linguistic acts except by appeal to Bedeutsamkeit, we cannot understand Bedeutungen other than as constituted by the contents of those very linguistic acts which give them expression. All of this is fully in keeping with the foundedness of language upon significations, for we have seen that phenomenologists as it would presumably be for Jones: it allows us to make sense of the expressibility or communicability of at least certain inner states, since those inner states are modeled on language. The direction of fit Sellars suggests is not only more plausible but more explanatorily useful. For the other way leaves us wondering whether language modeled on inner states is really up to the task it sets itself. To reiterate what we saw from Merleau-Ponty before, “it is only through the founded that the founding appears” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 414).
Fundierung is a relation of *reciprocal* dependence, though not of the same sort in both directions.

Now beyond this, there is a sense in which the thesis of psychological nominalism, particularly as illustrated by the Myth of Jones, is indeed meant to suggest not only an *explanatory* but also a *generative* role for language—the sense in which, before one can occupy logical space—i.e. understand meaning—one must have “a long history of acquiring and manifesting verbal habits” (Sellars 1997, 77). That is, as psychological nominalism claims, awareness of logical space depends upon *acquisition* of language, or, as Guignon explicates the constitutive view, our sense of the world is *generated* through *mastery* of language. This, surely, would seem to contradict what we have seen about Heidegger on the Fundierung relation between Worldhood and language, for talk of acquisition and mastery would require a temporal priority on the part of language.

There is indeed a parting of the ways between Sellars and Heidegger here, but not the one just suggested. For whereas Sellars speaks of language, understood in terms of *verbal habits*, as holding a kind of priority, Heidegger would never call this *Sprache*; Heidegger never says, and never would say, that language-acquisition generates Worldhood, because by ‘Sprache’ he does not intend anything like a history of acquiring and manifesting verbal habits. But this is exactly why his view does not preclude Sellars’ point about the generative status of learning *verbal behaviors*. In this respect, Sellarsians and Heideggerians who might disagree on this point would simply be talking past one another. Guignon is in this sense wrong in the letter of what he says: language for Heidegger is not *generative* of significations. Language does not temporally predate the Worldhood of the world; the

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277 See fn. 261 above as well as my discussion below of what Heidegger says language in fact *is*. 
founded term is temporally inseparable from the founding. Nevertheless, *Sprache* is constitutive of significations in the sense outlined above:

Language, speaking, thinking [*Sprechen – Reden – Denken*]: they coincide [*fallen in eins zusammen*] as the human way of being [*als die Seinsart des Menschen*]. They are the way we make manifest and illumine [*offenbar macht, aufhellt*] (both for ourselves and for others) the world and our own human existence, so that in this luminosity we gain sight [*Sicht zu haben*]: human insight [*Einsicht*] into ourselves and an outlook on, and a practical insight into [*Aussicht auf und Umsicht über*], the world. (GA21 7/LQT 6, trans. mod.)

Given this, as well as everything else we have seen in this chapter, it seems hard to fathom how Heidegger—who recall, contends that “we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter”—could not agree that the “long history” Sellars speaks of, which is undeniably a facet of being thrown into Being-with-others, indeed generates “mastery of the field of significance of a world,” and, along with it, language in the proper sense.

There is, then, no conflict between psychological nominalism and the sort of pronouncements Heidegger makes that are classically brought to bear against ascribing such a view to him. While certain passages may, at first glance, make it appear as if Heidegger is expressly arguing against such a thesis about the role of language, the fact is that upon a little inspection we find this is anything but the case.

Having motivated the idea that Heidegger subscribes to the thesis of psychological nominalism, I think it helpful to illustrate what the thesis would look like through a Heideggerian lens and stated in Heideggerian terminology. To that end, I will, at long last, and keeping in mind the observations made up to this point, propose a basic framework for

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278 “...*fallen in eins zusammen*...”—literally, “fall together into one.”
understanding Heidegger’s account of Sprache. Psychological nominalism articulated in a Heideggerian milieu will fall quite naturally out of the picture.

Heidegger’s work in the 1920s presents many characterizations of the nature of language, but there are several reoccurring motifs. Occasionally, Heidegger refers to language in rather straightforward terms: it is a “totality of words [Wortganzheit]” (GA2 214/BT 204), or “verbal expression [Wortausdruck]” (GA20 360/HCT 261)—seemingly suggesting that by ‘Sprache’ he means to signal rather familiar notions of a lexicon or of overt speech. However, far more often, Heidegger presents much more sophisticated and provocative explications of the essence of language, in the midst of which he often explicitly denies what the most obvious readings of the characterizations above would suggest. For instance, he also tells us that “Language is not identical with the sum total [der Gesamtheit] of all the words printed in a dictionary” (GA24 296/BPP 208), and, as we have seen, he says in several places that making vocal sounds per se is a secondary consideration.279 A “totality of words,” then, cannot mean a heap of Wörter, and “verbal expression” is unlikely to mean simply a collection of acute expressings, a body of speech acts.280

The much more common, oft-repeated, and positive characterizations Heidegger gives of language at various points in the 1920s frequently overlap or elaborate upon one another. We have already brushed up against some of them:

1) Language is intimately connected to discourse or conversance—specifically in the sense that conversance is a condition of language:

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279 GA17 30/IPR 22 and GA21 7/LQT 5-6, as discussed previously.
280 Wrathall focuses on the characterization of language as Wortganzheit, glossing Heidegger’s view of language as “a vocabulary with rules for combining words into sentences” (Wrathall 2011, 130). But this contradicts Heidegger’s explicit rejection of reducing language to this, as well as ignoring his other ways of talking about it, to follow below.
“There is language only because there is discourse, and not conversely.” (GA20 365/HCT 265)

“The existential-ontological foundation [Fundament] of language is discourse.” 281 (GA2 213/BT 203)

Indeed, in some sense language is discourse or conversance, in expressed form—a form which it always already is:

“The way in which discourse gets expressed [Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede] is language. Language is a totality of words, a totality in which discourse has a ‘worldly’ Being of its own […]. Discourse is existentially language [Die Rede ist existenzial Sprache]…” (GA2 214/BT 204)

“For the most part, discourse is expressed by being spoken out, and has always been so expressed; it is language.” (GA2 222/BT 211) 282

2) Language is intrinsically hermeneutical or contains interpretation:

“All the primal conditions [Urbedeutungen] of language are, for this reason, hermeneutical in their basic character [Grundcharakter]…” (GA17 318/IPR 240)

“…communicated discourse is always spoken, and the spoken character of the interpretation (language is nothing else) has its rise and its fall.” (GA20 373/HCT 270)

“For the most part, discourse is expressed by being spoken out, and has always been so expressed; it is language. But in that case understanding and interpretation already lie in what has thus been expressed.” (GA2 222/BT 211)

We have already seen elements of the essential connection between language and interpretation, such that, not only can we not intelligibly invoke language without speaking of interpretation, as the above passages make clear, but conversely we cannot intelligibly invoke interpretation without speaking of language.

3) Language is a mode of the being of Dasein, or has Dasein’s kind of being:

281 Note the terminology here: Rede is the Fundament of Sprache, not its Fundierung. It is unclear if language is founded on conversance in precisely the way, e.g. categorial acts are founded on sensuous acts, or, as I have argued, language is founded on Bedeutungen. There are, however, some clear parallels.

282 “Die Rede spricht sich zumeist aus und hat sich schon immer ausgesprochen. Sie ist Sprache.”
“Language is the being and becoming [Sein und Werden] of the human being himself.” (GA17 16/IPR 12)

“Language: a specific manner of being [Weise des Seins] on the part of the human being, the being in the world.” (GA17 317/IPR 240)

“Language itself has Dasein’s kind of being [hat die Seinsart des Dasein].” (GA20 373/HCT 270)

As if to further drive home the intimate connection between Sprache and Rede,

Heidegger says the exact same about the latter:

“All discourse, in saying something about something, which it does first of all wholly in the course of concerned preoccupation and being with one another, is, as a mode of the being of Dasein, essentially being-with.” (GA20 362/HCT 263)

Sometimes, Heidegger elaborates that language is a possibility of the being of Dasein in the sense that it makes Dasein manifest by way of meaning:

Language is nothing but a distinctive possibility [ausgezeichnete Seinsmöglichkeit] of the very being of Dasein…” (GA20 360/HCT 261)

“Language is the possibility of the being of Dasein such that language makes Dasein manifest in its discoveredness by way of interpretation and thus by way of meaning.” (GA20 361/HCT 261-2)

Heidegger also sometimes says that the sense in which language has Dasein’s kind of being is with respective to the fact that it is historical in its being:

“Language itself has Dasein’s kind of being. There is no language in general, understood as some sort of free-floating essence in which the various ‘individual existences’ would partake. Every language, like Dasein itself, is historical in its very being. The seemingly uniform and free-floating being of a language, the being in which Dasein always first operates, is only its lack of pertinence to a definite, temporally particular Dasein, which is language in its most proximate mode of being in the Anyone.” (GA20 373/HCT 270-1)

“…language, so far as it is, is as the Dasein is, because it exists, it is historical.” (GA24 296/BPP 208)
The question arises as to what, if any, unified sense these three Heideggerian themes about the nature of language suggest to us.

Each of the claims—that language is closely connected with Rede, that it is hermeneutical, and that it has the being of Dasein—suggests that, although language is not listed among the existentialia (because as an existentiell, it is an ontic, not ontological, dimension of Dasein), it is intimately tied to Dasein’s existential constitution. It cannot then, be akin to Saussurian *langue*, a body of linguistic units and the rules for their use; it cannot be an entity or a structural totality lying outside and in some sense independent of Dasein. At the same time, though, language cannot be like *parole*, a body of utterances or verbal tokens. For though language as *parole* would yoke it to Dasein and make it dependent upon Dasein, as has been impressed upon us, it is more deeply penetrating of Dasein’s existential constitution than mere events of verbalization.

There is a way of understanding language that coheres well with the above three claims: language is a *practice*. Like *langue*, a practice consists of norms and rules, but unlike *langue*, a practice has the sense of requiring being incarnated in the concrete activities of *practitioners*, rather than being a free-floating, independent structure. Like *parole*, a practice is a matter of performance, but not necessarily in the sense of *expressing* verbal or written tokens; one can be engaged in the practice of language use and the exercise of one’s linguistic competencies without issuing any such tokens—listening to the words of others, or reading, for example.\(^{83}\) Indeed, one can be ensconced in the practice without executing any sort of acute *performance* whatsoever, and this is the sense in which understanding language as a practice makes it immediately intuitive how it can be a mode of the being of Dasein. To

\(^{83}\) Or even contemplating a word puzzle or musing over the obscure meaning of a remembered passage—an attempt to navigate oneself in an enigmatic language game.
participate in a practice, at least one as encompassing and immersive as language, is to be in a certain way, to be shaped by that practice and inextricable from it, unlike undertaking the acute task of performing a speech act, which doesn’t give off the same inflections of pervading one’s being, and certainly unlike any relation one might have to a disembodied structure of rules.

By way of this reading, we can also glean what Heidegger means by puzzlingly characterizing language as Wortganzheit, a “totality of words,” and as Wortausdruck, “verbal expression.” Recall that ‘Wort’ can mean ‘speech’ as much as it does ‘word’ in the sense of linguistic unit. I suggest ‘Wortganzheit’ should not be understood as a word-totality in the sense of a lexicon, nor even in the sense of a totality of speech-acts, but a totality of usage—speech as a practice. Likewise with ‘Wortausdruck,’ with the ambiguity of the English ‘expression,’ as potentially designating either an expression token or the enterprise of expressing itself, should be resolved on the side of the latter. The clarifications not only naturally converge with the notion of a practice, but additionally make these claims consistent with both Heidegger’s denials of their surface readings as well as his other characterizations of language.

What, then, of articulating the thesis of psychological nominalism—the claim that awareness of logical space is dependent upon language acquisition—in a Heideggerian fashion? We saw at the beginning of this section that “logical space” designates the space of meaning or intelligibility. There is a name, in Heideggerian jargon, for something like awareness of logical space, so understood: conversance, Rede (and it is no accident that Heidegger equates Rede with λόγος). In Heideggerian terminology, then, psychological

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284 He does so primarily at GA2 43/BT 56, but in many, many other instances besides.
nominalism is the claim that conversance with intelligibility necessarily depends upon language acquisition—which, when understood as I argued above, as a practice, means nothing other than dependence upon the attainment of competency or facility with language.

Indeed, Rede just is *conversance with language*; we’ve seen just above that Heidegger claims outright *Sprache* and *Rede* are in a certain sense one and the same. Nevertheless, citing such passages in a vacuum is hardly explanatory, much less convincing, in and of itself. What I hoped to accomplish is to show why Heidegger says this, what exactly he means by it, and why we should take him at his word when he says it. We saw part of the story earlier: a close reading of Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle on λόγος and λόγος ἀποφαντικός shows that the domain of *Sprache* is not confined to the apophantic-as but rather extends to encompass all λόγος. This too suggested there is no *Rede* that is not *Sprache*, that the two are coextensive. We are now able to see even more clearly, though, what exactly this means and why it should be the case. *Sprache* is related to *Rede* just as I argued before *Auslegung* is related to *Verstehen*: *Sprache* is the concrete manifestation of the existential of *Rede*. This is ultimately what it means to say that *Sprache* is a practice—the putting into action of conversance. So language understood as practice also makes clear how it is a manifestation, embodiment, or “way of expressing” *Rede*, as well as how *Rede* is a condition of *Sprache* (and in a way which displays how ‘conversance’ is a beautiful translation of ‘Rede’): to be conversant is to understand the contours of a practice, to have an underlying competence, *by virtue of which* one can be a practitioner, and which is manifest in the being of the practitioner as concretely involved in the practice.\(^{285}\) Conversance is the

\[^{285}\text{At the same time, this is not to say that conversance is a state “preceding” immersion in or engagement with the practice, as though we do, or may, dip in and out of being practitioners. The distinction rests on a transcendental, not temporal point: it signifies not a sense in which we are conversant and then transition to being practitioners, but rather the sense in which being a practitioner requires an underlying conversance. As I}\]
underlying condition or horizon for engagement in language, for that possibility of the being of Dasein, but likewise it is not extricable from it, and cannot be understood in its absence, just as it would not make much sense to speak of someone as proficient in archery had she never in fact held a bow. *To be conversant* in a practice means *to be a practitioner* of it no less than to be a practitioner means to be conversant. Therefore, to invoke *Rede* is to invoke *Sprache*, and there is no form of *Rede* that is not linguistic.

### 2.6 Conclusion: Heidegger’s Problematic

In this chapter I have sought to map what I have been calling “McDowell’s Problematic” onto Heidegger’s philosophy, by showing his cleavage to both halves of the characteristic tension. I want to conclude by showing that this is true, though, not incidentally, or that Heidegger was unaware of the conflict; on the contrary, the Problematic is central to his thought and *his own conception of his project* in the 1920s leading up to BT.

While there is a familiar and anodyne truth in the claim that, unlike the philosophies of Frege, Sellars, and McDowell, Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein hardly centers the notion of accounting for rationality, I have already hinted at ways this can be called into question. And the fact is that his project in the 1920s, culminating in BT, had as one of its original impetuses concerns precisely about the place and status of rationality.

Theodore Kisiel, in his magisterial study of the philosophical roots of Heidegger’s *magnum opus*, identifies the 1919 emergency war semester course *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* (GA 56/7), with its emphasis upon the “pretheoretical” or

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286 This one respect in which ‘discourse’ might be an even more appropriate translation of ‘Rede,’ since ‘discourse’ has the tenor of designating something always already in practice (we speak of “discourse” as if of something already at work and into which me may jump).
“primal something” [Ur-etwas], as the exegetical cipher to Heidegger’s resulting investigations leading up to BT (Kisiel 1993). This “primal something” is indicated in many ways: we can call it “life,” “factic life,” or simply “facticity.” In the 1920 summer semester course, though, notably titled Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression, Heidegger decomposes this “question of life,” the agenda for which he set so profoundly in the 1919 course, as a “problem situation” with two closely related “question groups.” One consists, as he summarizes it, in the question of how “life as living experience becomes rationally accessible [zugänglich] for philosophy” (GA59 88/PIE 70). The question arises in virtue of the character of lived experience as not simply a concatenation of determinate contents but rather in and of the human being as “something achieving, creating, experiencing life” (GA59 88/PIE 70)—as, at least ostensibly outstripping rational explication and thus “irrational.”

The question group is thus interchangeably termed by Heidegger “the problem of lived experience” and the “problem of the irrational.” Central to this question is how to secure and understand the continuity of intuition and expression, how expression can capture intuition, such that philosophy may rationally grasp that which, on Heidegger’s conception, in the first instance gives it its remit: factical life.

The other “question group” concerns the “problem of a priori validity.” It consists, essentially, in “the old Platonic problem” (GA59 23/PIE 16) of how the *apriori*, necessary, or absolute (and thus atemporal) can be grasped by contingent beings, or how, in Platonic terms, the “intellectual” is accessible to inhabitants of the “sensible.”

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287 What in 1925 he will refer to—with almost imperceptible degree of subtle derision—as the “famed irrationality of lived experience [Erlebnisse] and its structures” (GA20 426/HCT 309).

288 The “problem group” actually contains a number of issues, as Heidegger enumerates them: “questions such as the one about the relation between the relative and the absolute, the problem of history (temporality and supra-temporality), the problem of culture (absolute validity of value and relative forming of goods) and the problem of possible knowledge of the absolute (appréhension of the valid from the relative forms [Gestalten])” (GA59 21/PIE 14-5). We see, then, a number of familiar contemporary metaphysical, epistemological, and
says, is only exacerbated, or “essentially amplified and complicated through the phenomenon of historical life” (GA59 23/PIE 16), a topic at the time increasingly finding its way into neo-Kantian and Husserlian thought (and perhaps best given its due by Emil Lask). Heidegger characterizes the “opposition” that circumscribes the problem:

Does not the truly vital aspect of life—life as historically forming, reshaping, shaping anew, demolition, blooming and decay [geschichtliche Gestaltung, Umbildung, Neubildung, Zerstörung, Blüte, und Verfall]—prove that the assumption of something absolute and something valid is amiss and entirely superfluous? Is absolute validity, ‘general validity’ not simply an unwarranted naïve exaggeration of one’s own contingent historical position […]? (GA59 20/PIE 14)

In this respect the spirit of the question is more or less the one Husserl himself also recaptured in the Logical Investigations’ guiding antinomy between Platonism and psychologism, in whose hands it persists as the question of how is it that the objective idealities of essences, which are independent of contingent intentional acts, come to be accessible in those acts. In Heidegger’s hands, though, it is not only rendered far more complex, through recognition of the factical, pre-theoretical character of “historical life” but emerges afresh as, essentially, the question of the meaning of being.

Putting both “question groups” together, what is ultimately at stake in the “problem situation” for Heidegger is nothing other than matter of the relation of thought and being—

_metaethical questions arise here, not the least of which being what J.L. Mackie calls the “Problem of Queerness” about moral claims. But of course, the issue can be generalized far beyond this, to classical Platonic questions about forms, Medieval concerns about universals, or metalogical questions, both metaphysical and epistemological, about the nature of inferential rules and logical relations.

Plato’s clearest expression of the problem comes at Parmenides 133a11-134c2. Livingston, pulling from related issues emerging in the Sophist, describes the problem thusly: “the friend of forms is forced to admit that there must be some real relationship between the temporal realm of becoming and the static realm of thinkable beings in themselves. […] The consideration that most directly demands this admission is that the living, dynamic soul nevertheless has the capacity to know or understand being or what is. The problem of this capacity is thus the problem of the temporal structure of the thought of being as such, or of the means by which a being irreducibly situated in time nevertheless grasps the categories and underlying structures of whatever truly is” (Livingston 2017, 3).

Ironically, this additional complexity will prove integral to resolving the problem. It is precisely element that is simultaneously integral and perennially overlooked.
the possibility of *being* as accessible for philosophical explication, and more specifically in the form of phenomenology. For if being is caught up in the “primal something” of factical life, in a kind of pre-philosophical access, and if factical life is explicable by, most fruitfully, phenomenology, then what we have is the challenge of the “validity” of phenomenology itself, as, most saliently for Heidegger, being able to provide insight into the meaning of being, making possible being as rationally accessible. For “*only as phenomenology, is ontology possible*” (GA2 48/BT 60)—and the second of the problem groups makes clear the status of the ancient problem of ontology as an inquiry into the *transcendens*. Thus, Heidegger waxes poetic, “*Being is the transcendens pure and simple.* […] Every disclosure of Being as the *transcendens* is *transcendental* knowledge. *Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis*” (GA2 51/BT 62). The conception of the efficacy of phenomenological description, of the expressibility of the “primal something” as a way of glossing its rational accessibility, lies behind Heidegger’s version of the Fregean/Sellarsian desideratum. For expressibility in its connection to reason is precisely the issue.

In *Mind and World*, McDowell likens Sellars’ attack on the Given to Wittgenstein’s private language argument: since “Only one person could be the subject to whom a particular bit of the Given is given” (McDowell 1994, 19), any language derived from or intending to capture those “bare presences” would be private by its very nature. Sellars’ bugbear, the Cartesian image of the transparency of one’s mind to oneself, goes hand-in-hand with Wittgenstein’s, the Augustinian view of language as transmission of private contents by means of exogenous symbols. What comes with rejecting the Given is contesting the privacy of experience, and insisting, instead, upon its expressibility, communicability, and, thus,
This is just another way of insisting upon experience’s residing in the space of reasons, for the game of giving and asking for reasons cannot be played where communication is impossible (and thus another illustration of the fact that residing in the space of reasons is first and foremost residing in the space of meaning, of mutual intelligibility and the shared Worldhood of the world, and only derivatively of reasoning).

We have seen, though, that accounting for the semantics of experience in terms of their roles in this mutual intelligibility seemingly comes at the cost of their objective purport. Understood in this valence, Stephen Watson captures the essence of this “problem situation,” as essentially an expression of McDowell’s Problematic, almost perfectly:

...it is this new criteria of rationality, this new gloss on the objective and the “communicable,” that Heidegger invokes as peculiar to Kant’s finding. But truth is communicable in this instance precisely in driving a wedge between the communicable and the objective, that is, by opening up a domain of communication within the sensus communis as ‘hermeneutic’” (Watson 1988, 484).

The objectivity of thought runs aground on its communicability, and the communicability of thought likewise runs aground on its objective purport. Of course, both are demands of the constitutive ideal of rationality. Perhaps our deepest inheritance from Kant, then, indeed lies in just this problem. In drawing it out, though, McDowell is simply following Heidegger in marking a tension the latter had already noted, and lay as a challenge at the heart of his thought.

I submit that the “problem situation” laid out in 1920 pervades much of Heidegger’s philosophical concerns of the following decade, specifically in the form of a tension which

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291 By “publicity” here I mean not the accessibility by anyone of the episodes or phenomenological events as events, but rather the idea that their contents can be efficaciously transmitted in language. Sellars does not deny the privacy of the mind in every respect; he affirms there are inner episodes. The point is that the contents of those episodes are not private in the sense of incommunicable.
lingers in the background of his works in that time period. And with the previous discussions in mind I believe I can now say with some plausibility that that tension with which Heidegger is grappling essentially captures the one McDowell’s project elucidates and for which it seeks to formulate a response—the search for a conception of thought’s answerability to the world which avoids the Myth of the Given—and can be translated into Heideggerian language roughly as follows: what is at issue is an account of how it is that intentionality—and so all our comportments to entities—while ineluctably hermeneutical, nevertheless “let[s] that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (GA2 46/BT 58)\(^{292}\) The basic problem can be encapsulated even more simply: it is the challenge of integrating hermeneutics into phenomenology. The enterprise of phenomenology, on Heidegger’s conception, demands not only the continuity of intuition and expression, such that expression may felicitously capture the content of intuition, but, as *logos of phenomenon*, the continuity of *being* and expression. But a hermeneutics of factual life requires that not only expression but intuition itself is always interpreted, clothed as it necessarily is in *modes of presentation* of entities, significances tied to Dasein’s projects and self-understanding, and themselves determinations of the acquisition of a historically situated language and form of life, a social practice.

John Haugeland once quipped that he “make[s] Heidegger out to be less like Husserl and/or Sartre than is usual, and more like Dewey and (to a lesser extent) Sellars and the later Wittgenstein” (Haugeland 1982, 15). With respect to my own aims here, I share the sentiment (while remaining silent on Dewey), but I also hope that the foregoing discussions have shown that the task lies not in mapping Heidegger’s thought onto Sellars’ and

\(^{292}\) This is nothing other than what Heidegger calls phenomenology. He continues that “here we are expressing nothing else than the maxim formulated above: ‘To the things themselves!’” (GA2 46/BT 58).
Wittgenstein’s, so much as unearthing some of the most fundamental concerns that lie subterranean to the investigations of BT, and which in fact anticipate, at least in their most stripped-down forms, the lines of thinking that occupied the tradition of which those two are exemplary representatives. Both sides of what I have been calling “McDowell’s Problematic”—the answerability of thought to experience (in the form of the answerability of phenomenological description to intuition, allowing for objectivity) and the continuity between intuition and expression, decided on the side of the propositional articulateness of experience (and so implicating the historicality of language and interpretation, thus threatening objectivity)—are so indelibly intertwined with Heidegger’s methodological concerns surrounding phenomenology’s suitability for interrogating the meaning of being itself that we could, with some justification, say that at the end of the day we are not so much drawing a Heideggerian parallel with McDowell’s Problematic as McDowell has all along been touching upon Heidegger’s Problematic.
Chapter 3
Heidegger’s “Esoteric Doctrines”

3.1 Introduction

In Chapter 1 I argued that Hegel’s basic ontological framework consists in understanding the relationship between Nature and Spirit—that is, between sense and referent—as one of a development or actualization of essence in its modes of appearance. In doing so, I proposed that the novel logic of sense and referent presented in the midst of Hegel’s idealism addresses McDowell’s Problematic effectively and in an unexpected way. Chapter 2 shifted gears to Heidegger, and we saw how the terms of the Problematic can be put in the idioms of Heidegger’s phenomenology. In this chapter I will show how in fact the essential features of the Hegelian solution proffered in Chapter 1—what I have been calling the thesis of the “second nature of entities”—likewise find expression in Heidegger’s thought.

As may be expected, Hegel’s ontological framework can be detached with relative ease from the wider metaphysics I have ascribed to him; we do not need to endorse the more metaphysically extravagant idealist picture wherein the ideal, as final cause, moves from abstraction to concretization, mediated by its externalization in Nature, in order to affirm the comparatively more modest transcendental or ontological commitment to the second nature of entities the framework implies. This is a critical point, for my argument now is that we find in Heidegger essentially nothing other than a so-detached logic of sense and referent via an ontology of actualization.

293 Though I think it is worth recognizing that that framework is indeed a robustly ontological one, and so our detachment from metaphysics as such cannot be a complete one. This shall become a point of contention later.
Now, I do not claim that Heidegger intentionally understood his views as echoing or building upon those of Hegel, nor even that they arise from philosophical encounter with him. Rather, I contend the unexpected parallel is a consequence of Heidegger’s prolonged scholarly focus on Aristotle in the 1920s. As Thomas Sheehan once declared, “Aristotle appears directly or indirectly on virtually every page” of BT (Sheehan 1975, 87). This is a claim that has become practically rote among Heideggerians; Franco Volpi even goes so far as to proclaim Heidegger as having “the most significant philosophical confrontation of Aristotle in [the twentieth] century” (Volpi 1994, 195). And indeed, in the 1920s Heidegger was positively steeped in the study of Aristotle, being engaged in that period with no other figure, besides perhaps his mentor Husserl, more consistently and intensely.294 While this engagement, and the resultant centrality of Aristotle to Heidegger’s existential analytic, has been the subject of much inquiry, I believe Sheehan’s declaration is even more apt than is known, that the true import of Heidegger’s appropriations in the years leading up to the publication of BT has even now yet to be fully appreciated.

I hope to corroborate this sentiment, however, from a direction which has so far received insufficient scholarly attention. For as it turns out, the second nature of entities is hidden in plain sight in BT, and can be demonstrated as such across multiple axes of his thought and in respect to an array of his familiar terms of art in the 1920s. The overriding point is as follows: Heidegger’s very understanding of Zuhandenheit, Bedeutsamkeit, and Weltlichkeit is derived from Aristotle’s definition of motion, and in particular a reading of it dependent upon the distinction between inactive and active δύναμις (as well as first and second ἐντελέχεια). This reading, as I will show, is demonstrably ascribable to Heidegger,

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294 As is well-known, Heidegger was even developing a book on Aristotle early in the decade which never materialized. Nevertheless, it is clear BT was formed from the ashes of that project.
and from it he constructs the ontology of BT as at once an existential analytic of Dasein and a
transcendental account of the being of entities.

Ultimately, Heidegger’s is far more than merely a recapitulation of Hegelian points, but is, as we shall see, a much deeper elaboration of the basic ontological position about the
second nature of entities; what results is a far more specific and attentive appropriation of
Aristotle on the relationship between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια/ἐντελέχεια, or what is the same,
the conception and explanatory role of κίνησις. Indeed, Heidegger’s account of
Zuhandenheit, Bedeutsamkeit, and Weltlichkeit cannot, I contend, be fully understood apart
from these notions of δύναμις, ἐντελέχεια, and κίνησις (and their proper conceptualization).
In them lies what Sheehan has called “the ‘secret’ of the Aristotelian bases to Heidegger’s
thought” (Sheehan 1975, 87), which can only be sussed out by attending to the integration of
Aristotelian concepts into the core of BT’s phenomenology.295

With some trepidation, I refer to these bases as Heidegger’s “esoteric doctrines,” in
obvious reference to those of Plato.296 Just as Plato’s esoteric doctrines were, according to the

295 Heidegger’s engagement with Aristotle, specifically regarding δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, has been noted as informing his conception of life in the pre-BT era (see Rubio 2010). And while the impact of Aristotle on his broader ontology has been recognized for decades, to my knowledge, however, its importance to his conception of the being of entities more broadly has not ever been fully reconstructed, nor in the manner I propose. The only work I know close to that effect is Sheehan’s own groundbreaking essay “Heidegger’s Interpretation of Aristotle: Δύναμις and Ereignis” (Sheehan 1978), in which he traces back certain of Heidegger’s terms of art to the Aristotelian concepts of δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, and physis (the latter has not entered into my work here, although it an important related concept). However, Sheehan ultimately draws different conclusions regarding how Aristotle “translates” into Heidegger than I do. For example, he does not draw a distinction between inactive and active δύναμις and the distinct significance they come to have for Heidegger’s ontology; he understands δύναμις as equivalent to Eignung (appropriation), and on his view for Heidegger “Natural beings have their Being as Being-underway-to-telos” (Sheehan 1978, 302)—i.e. as ἐνέργεια. Moreover, κίνησις is for Sheehan “ἐνέργεια ἀτελής atelēς” (translated as “incomplete being”), whereas I understand Heidegger as locating in the ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια constitutive of κίνησις the fullest kind of being. Ultimately, Sheehan does not connect Aristotle’s concept of κίνησις to Zuhandenheit. In short: I am walking on ground already mapped by Sheehan. We disagree, however, on not only the map, but the territory, and—I suspect—to some degree cartography itself. Cataloguing all the elements of Sheehan’s work in the aforementioned essay, how they differ from my reading of Heidegger on Aristotle, and what to make of this disparity, would take an entire chapter in its own right. I have opted instead to simply explicate my reading.

296 Indeed, I think Heidegger’s “esoteric doctrines” are very closely linked conceptually with Plato’s own, and stem from deeper philosophical problems associated with them. Thus, the designation as regards Heidegger’s
attestations, presented by him in the form of lectures, but remained unstated in his written dialogues—even if they did underlie much of the stated, exoteric teachings of the dialogues—so too Heidegger’s are presented in the 1920s lecture courses without, for the most part, finding explicit statement in BT. Of course, in and of itself, the claim of the importance of those lecture courses and their content for BT, and their implicit inclusion within that text, is nothing new, and was in fact admitted by Heidegger himself. But the substance and import of those contents which underlie BT have yet to be been fully mined.

I begin in 3.2 by carefully unpacking Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s definition of motion, showing that it in fact anticipates an influential 20th century interpretation according

thought is more than just cute reference: the content of Heidegger’s doctrines in fact reaches back and comment upon the content of Plato’s. I hardly have the space here to explicate this line of thought, however.

Due to the fact that, of course, many of these lecture course materials are based on Heidegger’s own manuscripts (although many also come from testimonia by his students—lecture notes, etc.), it would hardly be fitting to refer to them as “unwritten doctrines,” as Plato’s often are, much more appropriately. Far from being literally unwritten, his esoteric doctrines positively pervade Heidegger’s lecture courses. Nevertheless, they remain essentially subterranean with regard to the exoteric doctrines of BT, underlying them (as we shall see), but by and large not explicitly voiced. The phenomenological analysis of BT, insofar as it represents unsubmerged portions of these doctrines, can perhaps best be put in analogy with the Philebus and the Timaeus. There might remain for some readers an exegetical question regarding to what extent in these lecture courses Heidegger is merely explicating Aristotle or appropriating him (at least to those who, for whatever reason, do not ascribe to Sheehan’s view of BT, or that of other studious scholars such as Theodore Kisiel, John van Buren, Walter Brogan, etc.). To this at the outset I have only this to say: I issue as a promissory note that as the chapter unfolds good reason shall be supplied for viewing Heidegger largely as appropriating Aristotle on the relevant subject matter, for deploying these Aristotelian concepts as instruments for his own purposes, and for incorporating them into his own views and terminology. Assuredly, my treatment of the content of these lecture courses is far from exhaustive, yet the span of the textual evidence I think settles the matter to any attentive student of Heidegger.

As Richard Rojcewicz, the English translator of GA22 (BCN, a text which will figure heavily), acknowledges, “The content of the course, besides illuminating the ancient thinkers, also sheds light on many of the central concepts of Being and Time and shows how these have roots in the basic concepts of ancient philosophy itself” (Rojcewicz 2008, xiii). There are places where the exegetical fact comes across more clearly than others, but I will not have occasion to start by invoking such passages; when it does come across, it shall be utterly apparent how deeply Aristotle’s influence lies, and the extent to which the Aristotelian resources are continuous with Heidegger’s thinking. Thus, if I launch freely into citing passages in which Heidegger explicates Aristotelian notions, the approbation of which on the part of Heidegger himself is not immediately clear, I beg for some patience. Beyond that, I can only say that no one who has seriously engaged with these lecture courses could possibly walk away from them appreciating Heidegger’s discussions of Aristotle on these topics as essentially just pedagogical remarks on another philosopher. Anyone who reads them becomes immediately aware that the entire enterprise animating the courses is organized around elucidating nothing other than these concepts and their centrality. To do that justice is impossible in this space; I ask only that the reader see for themselves.
to which the definition is to be understood in terms of Aristotle’s distinction between inactive and active δύναμις, the latter being identifiable with first ἐντελέχεια as distinguished from second ἐντελέχεια. This reading of κίνησις proves essential to appreciating Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle for his own ontological purposes, and in 3.3 and 3.4 I show how active and inactive δύναμις, and their relation in terms of κίνησις, become integrated into Heidegger’s terminology in BT. I do so first by tracing Heidegger’s consistent identification of inactive δύναμις with Bereitheit—readiness—followed by an explication of a likewise consistent identification of active δύναμις with Zuhandenheit. The rest of the chapter continues by showing how this understanding of Zuhandenheit as active δύναμις (or first ἐντελέχεια) has a great deal of explanatory power within the existential analytic of BT and Heidegger explication of the being of entities there. 3.5 documents a number of the myriad instances in the period surrounding BT’s publication in which Heidegger invokes the motif of actualization (or the transition from Bereitheit to Zuhandenheit) as conditioned on or precipitated by the activities of Dasein, showing how and why this theme emerges in different terminologies and contexts across the texts of the period. Through explication of these instances a clear pattern emerges according to which Heidegger ascribes to what I have been calling the thesis of the second nature of entities—that sense or significance is a mode of being, an actualization of potentialities-for-significance which Dasein catalyzes. With that model in mind, 3.6 addresses the Zuhandenheit-Vorhandenheit relationship, demonstrating how its essential, classically recognized features naturally fall out of the second nature account. Finally, 3.7 concludes with a brief consideration of the early Heidegger’s Destruktion and retrieval of the history of philosophy, and how that bears upon the sort of explanatory weight to be afforded Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle.
3.2 Heidegger on Aristotle’s Definition of κίνησις

In Physics III, Aristotle famously defines κίνησις in terms of ἐντελέχεια and δύναμις. The definition as Aristotle presents it as follows:

...ἡ τοῦ δύναμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ἡ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς ἐστιν. (201a10-11)

The passage has been the subject of contention from the beginning, which continues apace in the scholarly literature. Weighing in satisfactorily on this ancient, extensive debate is well beyond the scope of this chapter, but if we are to understand Heidegger’s appropriation of these interrelated Aristotelian concepts, it will help to briefly touch upon critical aspects of debate, and how some traditional renderings of the definition obscure what Aristotle is up to here.

As has been pointed out in various instances since antiquity, but in contemporaneous form most notably by Aryeh L. Kosman, the interpretation of ‘ἐντελέχεια’ by way of the English ‘actualization’ (or a verbal noun such as ‘actualizing’) renders the definition itself “astonishingly vacuous” (Kosman 1969, 41), for it defines motion in such a way that is itself necessarily implicating of motion and change. In response to this, Kosman has influentially argued that we should understand the passage as strictly as possible: motion is the actuality of a potentiality as such.²⁹⁹ Some translators of Aristotle, such as R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, had already presented renderings arguably tacitly endorsing a similar understanding:

...the fulfilment of what is potentially, as such, is motion. (Aristotle 1991a, 474)³⁰⁰

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²⁹⁹ For another reading of Aristotle broadly along these lines (though also interestingly different), see Hintikka et al. 1977. While influential, the view has its detractors. Kostman 1987 (not to be confused with Kosman), for instance, takes up the argument once more for the “process-view,” as opposed to the “actuality-view.”

³⁰⁰ W.D. Ross does the same in his translation of a nearly identical passage in Metaphysics: “…it is the fulfillment of the potential as such, that is movement” (Aristotle 1991b, 605). Despite this, Ross is one of the proponents of the view Kosman critiques; see Ross 1949, as just one example within his output.
Motion is not the *fulfilling* of what is potentially, as such—which in the relevant respects would function similarly to ‘actualization’—but the *fulfillment*, the *actuality*. This sort of reading, though, presents its own problems. For while defining motion as the *actualization* of a potentiality appears circular, the notion of actualization at least seems comprehensible as related to the concept of motion; on the other hand, defining motion as the *actuality* of a potentiality seems genuinely informative, but obscure, and even paradoxical: isn’t motion precisely *not* some finished *state*, but rather that by means of which the finished state comes about? What the actuality of a potentiality means, in a way which, functioning as a definition, clarifies the nature of motion, remains in serious need of explication.

While, again, avoiding the minutiæ of the scholarly literature, there is a fruitful line of response to these concerns, one which has been championed by Kosman in his interpretation. Aristotle tells us not only in *De Anima* (412a10-b5, 417a22-b1) but also in the *Physics* (255a24-b31) that there are different “levels” of δύναμις and of ἐντελέχεια. In the contemporary literature these are most often called *first* and *second* potentialities and actualities (the distinction as regards potentialities specifically is sometimes put in what I think is the preferable terminology of *inactive* and *active* potentialities, and I will primarily adhere to this precedent). To use a shopworn illustration: someone lying in bed has the potentiality for walking, a potentiality which is an actuality when he in fact gets out of bed and walks. Once he is walking, though, this actuality is at the same time a *further*, second, potentiality for a likewise *further* actuality—e.g. reaching the door on the other side of the room. But notice that this second potentiality is really just an extension of the first—it *is* the first potentiality, just in the mode of being *active or at work*, as opposed to in the mode of being *inactive or dormant*, as it is when the man is simply lying in bed. Walking as such
extends itself by its very nature into *walking to some place or other*, or to accomplishing something further by means of the accomplishment of walking as such. The first actuality and the active potentiality are just two sides of the same coin; when the potentiality is active, it is fully realized as what it is, with respect to the potentiality for walking as such, so that we can say when the potentiality for walking is an actuality, this actuality is at one and the same time, and in virtue of this, the potentiality for something further.

The appeal to Aristotle’s distinction between levels of potentiality and actuality serves as the basic lever of Kosman’s exegetical rationale for interpreting the definition of κίνησις as both substantive and coherent. Utterly crucial is recognition of the unity of first actuality and active potentiality, and it is in this unity that the concern about motion identified in terms of actuality can be resolved. As Kosman puts it, “Motion, in other words, is not the actuality of a potentiality in the sense of the actuality which results from a potentiality, but rather in the sense of an actuality which is a potentiality in its full manifestation” (Kosman 1969, 50).

Beyond these implications for the definition of κίνησις, though, we must notice what this unity implies about ἐντελέχεια itself. For it suggests (as do other reasons) that ‘ἐντελέχεια’ is from the outset poorly translated by the English ‘actuality,’ or even, as with Hardie and Gaye, ‘fulfillment.’ Lost in these renderings are valences at the heart of this word invented by Aristotle for the specific purposes of communicating a quite densely packed concept. Joe Sachs, one of Aristotle’s more conscientious contemporary translators, insists how imperative it is we understand ‘ἐντελέχεια’ as the triangulation point of a number of irreducible conceptual elements. As Sachs explains:

[ἐντελέχεια is a] fusion of the idea of completeness with that of continuity or persistence. Aristotle invents the word by combining ἐντελέξεια with ἐντελέξεια entelesthai.
(complete, full-grown) with ἔχειν echein (=ἔξις hexis, to be a certain way by the continuing effort of holding on in that condition), while at the same time punning on ἐνδέλεχεια endelecheia (persistence) by inserting τέλος telos (completion). (Sachs 1999, li)\textsuperscript{301}

Given these considerations, the error not only of understanding ‘κίνησις’ circularly as the actualization of a potentiality but also, and more deeply, the danger of rendering it using the English ‘actuality’ becomes clear. Any translation of ‘ἐντελέχεια,’ such as ‘actuality’ or ‘fulfillment,’ which brings the valences of ‘ἐντελές’ into relief, but occludes those of ‘ἔχειν,’ misses a critically important element of Aristotle’s concept, the sense of that which is ἐντελές not being simply in repose as complete, but actively at work maintaining that completeness. This is why, as Aristotle tells us, and as Sachs stresses, the sense of ‘ἐνέργεια,’ ‘being-at-work,’ “converges” with that of ‘ἐντελέχεια,’ and why Sachs favors rendering ‘ἐντελέχεια’ as ‘being-at-work-staying-itself.’\textsuperscript{302} ‘Actuality,’ as Sachs therefore rightly admonishes, is an extremely impoverished term that barely approaches the sense of ‘ἐντελέχεια,’ and so in misunderstanding the meaning of the latter the meaning of ‘κίνησις’ is thereby entirely distorted. Given the complexities at hand, Sachs rightly cautions us:

This is a three-ring circus of a word, at the heart of everything in Aristotle’s thinking, including the definition of motion. Its power to carry meaning depends on the working together of all the things Aristotle has packed into it. Some commentators explain it as meaning being-at-an-end, which misses the point entirely, and it is usually translated as “actuality,” a word that refers to anything, however trivial, incidental, transient, or static, that happens to be the case, so that everything is lost in translation, just at the spot where understanding could begin. (Sachs 1999, lli)

\textsuperscript{301} Sachs’ etymological reconstruction of Aristotle’s neologism in terms of the interaction of ‘ἔχειν’ and ‘τέλος’ is also similar to that of Blair 1967.

\textsuperscript{302} “τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τέλος, ἢ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὸ ἔργον, διό χαὶ τοῦνομα ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὸ ἔργον χαὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχεια” (1050a21-3).—“For the completion is the activity, and the activity is being-at-work, which is why even the term ‘ἐνέργεια’ is said with respect to activity and extends to ἐντελέχεια.” A similar claim is made at 1047a30.
It is only with the full sense of the concept in mind that we get a good grip on how an ἐντελέχεια can at the same time be a δύναμις—as one active or at work—and it is this full sense that appeal to levels of potentiality and actuality brings into relief. The following rendering of Aristotle’s definition may serve the purpose of keeping visible the complexities at issue:

...η τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ἡ τοιοῦτον, κίνησις ἐστιν.

...motion is the being-at-work-maintaining-itself-in-its-completion, as something potential, of what is potential.304 305

303 It may be remarked that with the incorporation of ἐνέργεια as being-at-work into the concept of ἐντελέχεια we arrive again at something similar to the process view of motion. However, unlike the process view, according to which motion is defined in terms of actualization—which, in signaling a process of transition or alteration from one state to another, cannot then serve as a definiens for motion—the specification being-at-work does not necessarily imply motion or alteration of any kind. Something may be operative without any transition taking place (indeed, that can be seen by reflecting on the role of ἔχειν in ἐντελέχεια). Being-at-work is not itself a process but a state something may be in. It is closely linked with process, but as an explanans; for Aristotle, and very intuitively, a process of alteration or change—motion—cannot take place unless something is operative.

304 When we preserve all the registers of ‘ἐντελέχεια’ (instead of collapsing it into ‘activity’), we make clear that it should be treated as the verbal noun it is. Combined with the fact that it acts here as a subject complement, this suggests that it makes sense to take the qualifier ‘ἡ τοιοῦτον,’ which is, grammatically, an adverbal phrase ostensibly qualifying the verb ‘ἐστιν,’ as in fact functioning to qualify ‘ἐντελέχεια’ itself, or the verbal aspects packed into it, and not simply the linking verb. What the qualifier should be understood as doing, then, is highlighting that what is ἔχειν in its τέλος is nothing other than the being-potential of δυνάμει ὄντος; what is potential is not dissipated in its being-potential, but is completed or consummated as something potential, and maintained as such—and this is the specific respect in which it is ἐνέργεια (accordingly, when we place the qualifying phrase directly after ‘ἐντελέχεια’—as with the ἐντελέχεια, as something potential, of what is potential”—instead of after it and the possessive prepositional phrase—as with “the ἐντελέχεια of what is potential as something potential”—we simply emphasize this point to the English ear). Rendered this way, the triple distinction between inactive potentiality, active potentiality/first actuality, and second actuality, and the unity of actual potentiality and first actuality, emerges right out of the definition of ‘κίνησις’ itself.

Notably, this interpretation also works readily with Aristotle’s equally difficult second definition of κίνησις:

...η δὲ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, ὅταν ἐντελεχεία δὸν ἐνεργῇ οὐχ ἧ αὐτῷ ἄλλ’ ἡ κινητὸν, κίνησις ἐστιν (201a27-29)

It is the fulfillment of what is potential when it is already fulfilled and operates not as itself but as movable, that is motion. (Aristotle 1991a, 474)

Hardie and Gaye’s translation, though falling prey to the usual distortions in translating ἐντελέχεια, nevertheless does emphasize something important first stated in this second definition: ὅταν ἐντελεχεία δὸν ἐνεργῇ οὐχ ἧ αὐτῷ—“when it is already being-at-work-maintaining-itself-in-its-completion and operates not as itself…” The walking is complete with respect to the potentiality for walking per se, but nevertheless still, in that very being-at-work of the completeness, maintains itself as at work with respect now to something else potential, and potential precisely in virtue of the completeness of walking per se.

305 Note that I translate ἐντελέχεια as ‘being-at-work-maintaining-itself-in-its-completion’ as a nod to Heidegger’s characterization below. The translation is unwieldy, but preserves well the ineliminable surplus of meaning in Aristotle’s term of art. It is of course also similar to Sachs’ preferred rendition of ‘being-at-work-
Now I have so far mobilized the interpretations of Kosman and Sachs to lead the discussion of Aristotle’s definition. It should be recognized, though, how closely their points of emphasis echo Heidegger’s earlier reading. Of course, Heidegger infamously criticizes, at every opportunity, the distortion of the Greek ‘ἐνέργεια’ and ‘ἐντελέχεια’ into the Latin ‘actualitas’. The parallels between the preceding commentaries and his, though, go well beyond any mere etymological cantankerousness. In 1931’s lecture course on the *Metaphysics*, AM (with which Sachs shows some familiarity—see Sachs 1999, xl n. 45), Heidegger translates ‘ἐνέργεια’ as ‘Am-Werke-Sein’; this itself follows an effectively equivalent earlier translation of ‘In-Arbeit-Sein’ in 1924’s BCR, and, additionally both ‘In Arbeit sein’ and ‘Im-Werke-Sein’ in 1926’s BCN. Additionally, Aristotle’s remark that the sense of ‘ἐνέργεια’ converges with that of ‘ἐντελέχεια’ is emphasized by Heidegger across these courses. And although Heidegger translates ‘ἐντελέχεια’ in a way which superficially appears unrelated to its counterpart for ‘ἐνέργεια’—in BCR and BCN he renders

staying–itself,’ but I favor what we shall see as the even more strictly Heideggerian translation, since it makes clearer what is ἔχει or maintained—the τέλος or being-complete of the thing.

306 Heidegger is also critical of the German ‘Wirklichkeit’ as a translation, but some caution is deserved when we observe that fact. While Heidegger contends the German term has fallen into an impoverished state (the same one Sachs notes ‘actuality’ has in English), as signifying the mere occurrence or extantness of whatever happens to incidentally exist, nevertheless its etymological connection to ‘Werk’ marks some worthwhile considerations about its relation to the convergent senses ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια have. Thus, lamenting, Heidegger declares, “If our expression ‘Wirklichkeit’ were not so worn out [abgegriffen wäre], it would be an excellent [ausgezeichnete] translation [of ‘ἐνέργεια’]” (GA18 70/BCR 50; see also Brocker’s notes at GA22 322/BCN 236). Heidegger thus has few philosophical qualms about rendering ‘ἐντελέχεια’ as ‘Wirklichkeit,’ and in keeping with this cautious endorsement, he uses ‘Wirklichkeit’ repeatedly and freely in certain lecture courses, with its meaning being the primary point of investigation in 1931’s AM, for example.

307 Sachs has acknowledged his indebtedness to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, though primarily by way of Heidegger’s own student, Jacob Klein (see Sachs 1999, xxxvi), and his essay “Aristotle, an Introduction” (in Klein 1985). Klein indeed adopts Heidegger’s translation of ‘ἐνέργεια,’ putting it into English quite directly as ‘being-at-work’ (see Klein 1985, 180-1).

308 In BCR Heidegger cites Aristotle at the passage noted in n. 2, 1050a21-3: “‘Ἐνέργεια, on the other hand, συνείται πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν, ‘stretches itself out to the end [‘spannt sich aus zum Ende’]’” (GA18 296/BCR 200). In the final stretch of AM, he translates the similar passage at 1047a30-32, telling us that “the name and meaning of ἐνέργεια—being-at-work, […] is directed toward [in isch ausgerichtet ist auf] ἐντελέχεια—holding-itself-in-completion [Sich-in-Fertigkeit-halten] […]” (GA33 224/AM 192-3).
‘ἐντελέχεια’ primarily as ‘Gegenwart’ (sometimes as ‘Anwesenheit’), and in AM as ‘Anwesenheit’—it must be noted that from the first these terms are intended very expressly as packing into them all the meaning Sachs’ English translation highlights, and which make undeniable the close connection to ‘ἐνέργεια’:

...ἐντελέχεια: that which maintains itself in its being-completed [das, was sich in seinem Fertigsein hält], what is there in the genuine sense [was im eigentlichen Sinne da ist]. (GA18 296/BCR 200, emphasis added)

Note not only Heidegger’s gloss of “that which maintains itself in its being-completed,” which is essentially identical to Sachs’ emphasis upon both ἐντελές and ἔχειν, but also his claim that what is ἐντελέχεια is there (da) in the genuine (eigentlich) sense; again in line with Sachs’ insistences, then, Heidegger’s use of ‘Gegenwart’ or ‘Anwesenheit’ as a translation of ‘ἐντελέχεια’ does not designate what merely happens to be the case, but what is genuinely present, what is there in the fullest sense (because completed in a certain respect and maintained in that completion). Presence in this register, as a translation of ‘ἐντελέχεια,’ is a

Note Heidegger’s use here of ‘Fertigsein, which is perhaps the perfect term for what is at issue; with connotations of both being prepared and being finished, it captures all the valences that, as we shall see, Heidegger could want to invoke in τέλος as related to the ἔχειν of ἐντελέχεια—it captures the idea of something being available because it is completed with respect to that availability.

Now in Chapter 1, we saw that Hegel contests the assumption of a “ready-made world” (“eine fertige Welt”)—that is, a world already at the immediate disposal of thought. Heidegger’s usage of ‘fertig’ here accords with Hegel’s usage, and with his point; over the course of this chapter and the concluding one we shall see that Heidegger does not ascribe to nature this Fertigsein or ἐντελέχεια, the completeness of an active potentiality/first actuality. Rather, this ἐντελέχεια is a function of Dasein’s implication of entities in its activities, just as it is for Hegel a function of Spirit’s activity. Entities are not “ready-made” as Givens—they are not active potentialities, fertig or already completed and in that respect ready for a second actuality. What entities are, instead, is bereit—“ready” for that completion of Fertigsein, and so inactive potentialities. While ‘Fertigsein’ in both usages coincides with the ἐντελέχεια constitutive of κίνησις, Heidegger’s ‘Bereitheit’ designates instead the δύναμις “prior” to κίνησις.

309 See also GA18 296, 368/BCR 200-1, 248-9, where Heidegger, like Sachs, emphasizes the meaning of ‘ἐντελέχεια’ as elucidated by attention to its etymological components, ‘ἐντελές’ and ‘ἔχειν.’ The connection between ἔχειν (or ἔχειν) and ἐντελέχεια in particular is a major point of emphasis in BCR (see esp. GA18 171ff., 296, 368/BCR 116ff., 201, 248-9). It is also integral to the later discussions of AM, as shall become clear in 3.3. Of course, Heidegger was hardly the first to dissect Aristotle’s term of art, or to note these as its constituent parts. My point is just to emphasize that Heidegger’s translation of ‘ἐντελέχεια’ into ‘Gegenwart’ and ‘Anwesenheit’ must be understood in light of his acknowledgment of, and insistence upon our keeping in mind, the etymological components.

310 Note Heidegger’s use here of ‘Fertigsein, which is perhaps the perfect term for what is at issue; with connotations of both being prepared and being finished, it captures all the valences that, as we shall see, Heidegger could want to invoke in τέλος as related to the ἔχειν of ἐντελέχεια—it captures the idea of something being available because it is completed with respect to that availability.
superlative mode of being; as Heidegger elaborates, “ἐντελέχεια: […] Not only present in general [überhaupt anwesend] […] but out of itself, according to its essence, only in act [von ihm selbst her seinem Wesen nach nur im Wirken seiend],” and continues, “Being resides precisely therein [gerade in ihr ist Sein],” as “finished [fertig] and yet not stopping [nicht Aufhören] in its insistent presence [der vordränglichen Anwesenheit]” (GA22 175/BCN 146)—i.e. in the ἔχειν of what is ἐντελές. He tells us that it is in the ἐντελέχεια of a δύναμις that “the most fundamental character of the there comes to expression [zum Ausdruck]” (GA18 90/BCR 62).311 312

Further, Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle quite clearly anticipates that of scholars who use the distinction between inactive and active potentialities to understand the relationship between δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια, and he does so in a way which elaborates even more upon the themes above. Heidegger even articulates the relationship in terms akin to Kosman’s, saying that “Movement [Bewegung], ἐνέργεια, does not extinguish [vernichtet nicht] the potentiality [Möglichkeit], but simply preserves it [erhält sie gerade], constitutes [macht…aus] its there [ihr Da]—the active [tätige] potentiality” (GA18 378/BCR 256, trans.

311 The idea of ἐντελέχεια as a superlative form of being can be made more intuitive when we understand it in terms of the example used earlier. The potentiality of the walking man to be on the other side of the room is more concrete, more vividly present and real than the potentiality of the man when he is in bed, before he begins walking. Using rather Hegelian language, we might say that in the first actuality the potentiality is concretely potential, an “imminent possibility,” rather than merely something potential in the abstract.

312 Olafson understands presence (particularly as Anwesenheit) to be “the fundamental character of being as such” (Olafson 1987, xvii) not only in the later writings but for the earlier Heidegger as well. I take my examination of these lecture courses to largely act as an extension of and further substantiation of Olafson’s thesis.

It might be asked how this reading of Heidegger according to which ἐντελέχεια is a superlative form of being squares with his famous statements that seem to denigrate Wirklichkeit in favor of Möglichkeit, such as in BPP: “the possible [das Mögliche] is higher than everything actual [höher al salles Wirkliche…ist]” (GA24 438/BPP 308). He makes a similar claim at GA2 51-2/BT 63—“Higher than actuality stands possibility”—though there he is driving at a different point, and leaves the claim unclarified. We are not yet in a position to appreciate what Heidegger means by these claims, but will be by 3.6. See ftn. 396 and the main body text to which it is attached.
mod.). He characterizes ἐντελέχεια much the same, clarifying that what is maintained, in the form of its completion, such that it is genuinely present, is the δύναμις ὁντος itself: “An entity determined by ἐντελέχεια means fundamentally such an entity as maintains itself in [ein solches Seiendes, das sich selbst hält in] its genuine being-potential [eigentlichen Seinsmöglichkeit] so that the potentiality is consummated [vollendet ist]” (GA18 90/BCR 62, trans. mod.). This is why he also speaks of the co-incidence or simultaneity of potentiality and actuality, such that the being of a thing in motion is characterized by διχός, duality.314

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313 I have changed many of Metcalf and Tanzer’s word choices here. I have opted for ‘extinguish’ rather than ‘negate’ for ‘vernichtet,’ and ‘preserves’ over ‘contains’ for ‘erhält.’ Also, they translate ‘tätige Möglichkeit’ here as ‘effective possibility,’ but ‘active possibility’ is both more straightforward and more appropriate.

One thing of note about this passage is the fact that Heidegger, immediately after telling us Bewegung “does not extinguish [vernichtet nicht]” the potentiality, says that it nevertheless ‘constitutes’ [macht….aus] its ‘Da.’ Heidegger seems to be making a play on words here, for ‘ausmachen,’ like, for example, its much more infamous counterpart ‘aufheben,’ has curiously contradictory meanings, and can signify “to negate/extinguish/turn off” in addition to its more positive valences like “to make/constitute.” I find it hard to imagine this tension was lost on Heidegger, and it suggests he appreciates the intricacies of the fact that the active potentiality is simultaneously a negation of the potentiality qua its inactivity, while also the more emphatic presence of the potentiality qua its “potentiality-ness.” See also fnns. 332 and 378.

Most important here is the issue of ‘Möglichkeit,’ Heidegger’s preferred translation for ‘δύναμις.’ Despite its most literal rendering in English as ‘possibility,’ though, Heidegger repeatedly distances the concept of δύναμις, and ‘Möglichkeit,’ insofar as it translates Aristotle’s term, from any notion of “possibility” we might want to distinguish from “potentiality” in the Aristotelian sense (like e.g. logical possibility):

Potentiality [Möglichkeit] understood negatively: non-contradiction, potentiality-for-Being [Seinkönnen] in general. Understood positively: definite ability to be something [es können], suitability as such [Eignung überhaupt]. (GA22 174/BCN 145)

It is this “positive” sense that is at issue with Möglichkeit and δύναμις. In 1925’s PS he elaborates that δύναμις “is not intended as empty conceptual [als leere begriffliche]—logical—possibility, as arbitrariness [als Beliebigkeit] […] but instead the δύναμις is a possibility which is determinately prescribed [bestimmt vorgezeichnete ist] and which always harbors in itself a direction [die immer eine Direktion in sich trägt]” (GA19 109/PS 75). And in BCN he explains,

δύναμις for something: not simply to act in some way or other [nicht überhaupt zu tun], but καλος….η κατα προσβέσειν [Rojcewicz notes: “well and as anticipated”]) (1019a23f). To be able in an emphatic sense [Können in betonten Sinne], to be an adept [Können]. ‘He can run,’ said of a sprinter. ‘He can play’ = he plays well” (GA22 169/BCN 140).

This accords with Aristotle’s usage of δύναμις, as Sachs explains:

The word has a secondary sense of mere logical possibility, applying to whatever admits of being (1019b 31-33), but this is never the way Aristotle uses it. A potency in its proper sense will always emerge into activity, when the proper conditions are present and nothing prevents it (1047b 35-1048a 21). (Sachs 1999, lii)

For this reason, I have by and large elected to translated ‘Möglichkeit’ as potentiality, at least in the contexts of Heidegger’s explicit discussions of δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια.

314 Other, related characterizations are given through στερήσες, “absence” or “lack” (GA18 311-2/BCR 210-1), and ἐπιρρόσης, “otherness” or “difference” (GA18 317-8/BCR 214-5). But Heidegger also stresses that, at least in the case of the latter characterization, although it helps for understanding the relationship between δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια, it is insufficient for understanding κίνησις; for that, presence is necessary (GA18 318/BCR
The point emerges again in the later AM, where Heidegger, near the end of the course, stresses that the “execution [Ausführung]” of a capability [Vermögen] “is not the brushing aside [ist nicht das Beseitigen] of the capability, not its disappearance [das Verschwindenlassen], but rather the carrying out [das Hinausführen] of that toward which [in das, wozu] the capability itself as a capability drives [drängt]” (GA33 218/AM 187).

Accordingly, the distinctive sense of Heidegger’s reading across these courses engaging with Aristotle is that what is brought to completion and maintained in the ἐντελέχεια constitutive of κίνησις is not that which δυνάμει ὄντος ultimately has the potential for (what would in fact be the second actuality), but rather δυνάμει ὄντος itself, so that ἐντελέχεια is another way of naming what is potential as specifically in the mode of its being.

215. Thus in BCR it is stressed again and again that we must recognize κίνησις is not the actuality of non-actuality (that is, of something straightforwardly contrary to it), because actuality does not eliminate potentiality:

Insofar as κίνησις is the presence [Gegenwart] of this being-from-to [Von-zu-Seins], it is important to establish [festzulegen] the categorial comprehension [die kategoriale Erfassung] of entities with respect to [hintschlich] its δῆμος. Presence, which movement is determined as, is not the actuality of non-actuality [Unwirklichen] in a determinate sense. (GA18 315/BCR 213, trans. mod.)

Instead: “One can say in Aristotle’s sense, an entity is at once determined as ἐντελέχεια— the wood is present [gegenwärtig] as wood—and yet it is something else insofar as it is δυνάμει [und es ist noch etwas anderes, sofern es δούναμει ist]—namely, that it can be a chest” (GA18 317/8/BCR 215, trans. mod.). The thing as ἐντελέχεια, Heidegger says, is “together with it as [in eins damit als] δυνάμει” (GA18 300/BCR 203); “An entity thus in the world and can, as δύναμις, at the same time [zugleich] be something usable. […] This being that is there thus, as there completed [als fertig da] and usable for… [verwendbar für…] is characterized by [charakterisiert durch] the δῆμος as an entity” (GA18 313/BCR 212, trans. mod.). He makes the same point in BCN: “In its actuality (readiness-to-hand), the preparedness has been consummated [aufgehobene], and at the same time, this actuality has its own character of preparedness [ein Bereitungscharakter].” (GA22 201-2/BCN 166, trans. mod.). The duality of entities as simultaneously ἐντελέχεια and δύναμις is why Heidegger expressly singles out for distinction from the usual sort of case that of ἐντελέχεια μόνον, or that actuality which “excludes [ausschließt] every δύναμις” (GA18 296/BCR 201).

In fact, Heidegger even mocks the compression of ἐντελέχεια into actuality precisely as losing tracking of the triple distinction, such that first actuality is no longer seen as in unity with active potentiality, and actuality and potentiality are considered in terms of a simple dichotomy:

On the other hand, there is not time to even understand Aristotelian research, let alone to take it seriously. And that for the same reason: an indeterminate concept of actuality […].

Actual—possible; the possible is the non-actual [Nichtwirkliches]. Equipped with this, one can deal with Aristotle’s definition of movement. Therefore: Aristotle says, movement is actuality, but the actuality of δύναμις, of possibility, i.e., of non-actuality—actuality of inactuality: a contradiction—and he even lets it stand—antinomy, dialectic! That sounds very ingenious, but there is nothing to it except thoughtlessness, or perhaps something else: irresponsibility to history. (GA18 379/BCR 256-7)
active (and thus in a superlative mode of its being). This is borne out in Heidegger’s actual renderings of Aristotle’s definition of κίνησις:

Movement is the presence [die Gegenwart] of the ability-to-be-there as such [des Daseinkönnens als soche]. (GA18 313/BCR 212)

Κίνησις is the presence [Gegenwart] of an ability-to-be [eines Seinkönnenden]. (GA18 328/BCR 221)

Motion is not the presence of something potential or able (the δυνάμει ὄντος) that, in that presence, has sloughed off its being-able, but is instead presence, in that ability, of something able; it is what is able as more genuinely and emphatically able—because at work and operative with respect to that ability. The ἐντελέχεια characteristic of κίνησις is, as Kosman puts it, the “full manifestation,” or—in a way which makes Heidegger’s choice of terminology now very intuitive—the genuine presence, of what is potential in its being-potential. Heidegger’s own glosses on the definition above, though perhaps through a glass darkly, and with characteristically Heideggerian flourishes, nevertheless just exhibit succinctly and elegantly an appropriate emphasis upon the fact that what is ἐνέργεια as ἔχειν in its τέλος—what is ἐντελέχεια—is the δυνάμει ὄντος itself.

315 Heidegger provides the second of these after a direct translation of 201a10-11, which he gives as “Motion is ἐντελέχεια, presence [Gegenwart] of entities that are there [des Daseiend] as entities able to be there [als des Daseinkönnenden], indeed presence insofar as they can be there [es da sein kann]” (GA18 313/BCR 212, trans. mod.).

Curiously, Heidegger elides Aristotle’s qualifying phrase, presenting the passage as: “ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια […] κίνησις ἐστιν.” This is especially odd given that the qualifying phrase has long been a flashpoint of scholarly contention surrounding the proper understanding of the passage, and its presence is often cited as one reason against the translation of ἐντελέχεια in this passage as actualization rather than actuality (because the former renders the inclusion of the qualification inscrutable). Nevertheless, despite the oddness of the elision in the original Greek, Heidegger’s translation into German renders it superfluous. For the fact that he defines κίνησις as “the presence of an ability-to-be” already communicates that ἐντελέχεια does not represent the evanescence of the potentiality, but its consummation, its coming to an emphatic state, its being even more fully what it is (that is, its being even more fully a potentiality). Thus, it shouldn’t strike us as odd that his German translation of the definition leaves out the qualifying phrase, even if his presentation of the Greek might.
Now as it happens, the above examples are not the only occasions on which Heidegger provides an explication of κίνησις; in fact, as we shall soon see, in the same pre-BT texts that have so far become points of emphasis, 1924’s BCR and 1926’s BCN, κίνησις also finds expression in a form incorporating decidedly familiar notions of Heidegger’s own thought, including those of BT, and in a way which gives us a clue as to the key, if unspoken, role the entire Aristotelian framework plays in the existential analytic itself. That role, however, cannot become apparent until we have also clarified how Heidegger understands the being of inactive δύναμις.

3.3 The Aristotelian Inheritance, Part I: Bereitheit and Inactive δύναμις

In the previous section I discussed how, according to Heidegger, the definition of κίνησις has to do with a certain mode of being of δύναμις, when it is fully manifest or at work, active. Motion is illuminated by appeal to this mode of being of δύναμις. But the definition of motion does not tell us what the being of δύναμις itself consists in, or what the essence of Aristotle’s concept is. For this we must turn not to the definition of motion but to an examination of the very concept of δύναμις itself.

Such an examination is the central aim of the aforementioned 1931 course on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Θ 1-5, the subtitle of which is “Das Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft.” There, Heidegger stresses that what he is after is not δύναμις in its “usual [gebrauchlichen]” sense, or “the common [gelaufige] meaning understood with a view toward movement” (GA33 53/AM 43, trans. mod.)—δύναμις κατὰ κίνησιν. Instead, what Heidegger seeks is “a higher and more essential meaning” (GA33 53/AM 43), that is, the very sense of δύναμις as such. For “δύναμις as such,” Heidegger says, “has its own actuality [als solche ihre eigene Wirklichkeit hat],” (GA33 216/AM 185, trans. mod.), “is already
actually extant before the actualization [vor der Verwirklichung], if by that we understand ‘enactment’ ['Vollzug']” (GA33 183/AM 157, trans. mod.).

From this it is clear that by the “actuality” of δύναμις, Heidegger cannot intend to refer to the (first) ἐντελέχεια constitutive of κίνησις. And while it may seem odd to refer to δύναμις this way, as having actuality, since it is precisely δύναμις in itself, in ostensible contradistinction from ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια, Heidegger is clear that what he means by this is nothing other than the being of δύναμις in its own right, clarifying that, “the task is to determine that in which [worin] the being of something capable [des Vormögenden], its actuality […] consists [besteht]” (GA33 220/AM 189). Put otherwise, what is at issue in AM is not, as in the definition of κίνησις, the kind of actuality a potentiality itself is when active, or enacting that of which it is potential, but instead the kind of actuality it has when inactive, “prior to” or in the absence of κίνησις, when it itself is not yet an ἐντελέχεια. This is the nature or essence of δύναμις οὐ κατὰ κίνησιν. That the being of δύναμις οὐ κατὰ κίνησιν can be characterized in terms of ἐντελέχεια means that to it, in some way or other, can be ascribed the same characteristics unpacked in 3.2 in the meaning of that term of art—namely, ἔχειν, ἐντελές, and ἐνέργεια—and moreover that these characteristics ought to in fact be illuminating about its being. At the same time, the manner in which these characteristics belong to inactive δύναμις, in which ἐντελέχεια belongs to δύναμις οὐ κατὰ κίνησιν in its own distinctive way, cannot be the same as the manner in which δύναμις κατὰ κίνησιν is an ἐντελέχεια. Accordingly, we shall see that the inactive δύναμις too has a form of presence, but this will not be the same form of presence of the active δύναμις.

The investigations of AM are motivated by Aristotle’s critique of the Megarians in Book Θ of the Metaphysics, which Heidegger engages with at extreme length in the course.
In short, the Megarians formulate the clearly fallacious argument that, eliding the distinctions just made, since that which is potential can be said to be something actual or present solely in the actualization (or enactment, Vollzug), then there can be no sense in which the potentiality itself can be said to have actuality outside of enactment. This means that there can be no real sense in which a δύναμις, insofar as it is inactive, can be said to have being.\footnote{As Heidegger summarizes the problem-space:
According to the Megarian thesis, builders exist, insofar as they are builders, only if they are engaged in the act of building \[\text{wenn sie im Bauen begriffen sind}.\] To make the consequences of this clear, it would thus be completely impossible to commission a builder to build a house, since he is in fact no builder at all if he is not yet building \[\text{den er ist ja gar nicht ein Baumeister, wenn er noch nicht baut}.\] To this Aristotle rejoins that being a builder means first of all being capable of building \[\text{Baumeister sein heißt gerade und zuerst: vermögend sein zum Bauen}.\] (GA33 174/AM 149)}

Of course, Aristotle contests this line of thinking, assigning to potentiality itself, as something not yet enacted, not yet actual, its own form of presence or ἐντελέχεια. It is hardly enough to simply draw the distinction as we have before, between a δύναμις being an ἐντελέχεια and having an ἐντελέχεια; what Heidegger wants to extract from Aristotle is rather an explication of what this having consists in, in what manner precisely ἐντελέχεια is applicable to δύναμις as something not yet enacted.

Without dwelling on the extended details which emerge over the course of the text, what the investigation ultimately lays bare is that the nature of δύναμις generally is to be understood through the image or analogy of proficiency—something like conversance with a practice.\footnote{It is worth noting that in AM, Heidegger translates ‘λόγος’ as ‘Kundschaft,’ which Brogan and Warnek in turn translate as ‘conversance’; the translators also note the curious fact that this is the only time Heidegger translates ‘λόγος’ this way (Brogan and Warnek 1995, xii), although of course ‘conversance’ as a translation of ‘Rede’ (which as mentioned in Chapter 2 Heidegger equates with ‘λόγος’) has been championed by several commentators.} In being proficient, the builder of the house possesses the capability for building, even if he is not in the midst of the act of building itself. This is the sense in which he can be said to be a builder (to be actual in that respect), one capable of building, even when not so...
engaged. In this way, the actuality of the capability constitutes a “between”—between on the one hand simple nothingness, non-actuality or non-existence, and on the other the actuality of the capability which lies in the enactment itself:

Enactment is never only the emergence of [das Auftauchen von] something which before was completely gone [was zuvor schlechtin weg war] […] . Although enactment is presence, it is by no means the presence of what was previously simply absent [einfach Abwesenden] but just the reverse, the presence [Anwesenheit] of something which was indeed already present [Anwesenden] as well; this means, however, that this is no arbitrary, indefinite presence in general [keine beliebige unbestimmte Anwesenheit überhaupt] but rather one peculiar and distinctive [eine eigentümliche und ausgezeichnete]. […] non-practicing as non-enactment is not what is completely ‘gone’ [das schlechthinige ‘weg’], simple absence: if this were so, then non-practicing would be identical with being-out-of-practice [Aus-der-Übung-sein], which is not at all the case [was ganz und gar nicht zutrifft]. (GA33 185/AM 158-9, trans. mod.) 318

But in what does the being of a proficiency, being-in-practice without practicing, consist?

The answer—which makes clear the sense in which an inactive δύναμις can be said to possess a form of ἐντελέχεια (even if, again, it itself can’t be said to be an ἐντελέχεια)—is that proficiency is constituted by a kind of ἔχειν, maintaining or holding. More specifically, it is something like: holding-at-the-ready. Thus Heidegger tells us that the key to understanding the being or distinctive ἐντελέχεια applicable to δύναμις οὐ κατὰ κίνησιν was already embedded within the component senses of ἐντελέχεια itself:

[The thesis of the Megarians states that] the actuality of a capability lies in its enactment [liegt im Vollzug], in which it presents and produces itself [darin stellt es sich dar und her]. To which Aristotle replies: The actuality of a capability as capability lies in its ἔχειν, in having [im Haben]. […] Ceasing [Aufhören] is thus not a giving up [Weggeben], but rather a taking into oneself

318 Also: “Non-enactment [Nichtvollzug] as a suspension [Einstellung] of practice is just as little the disappearance [Verschwinden] of a capability. Such a disappearance can come about [kann eintreten] if, for example, the potter, through some misfortune, πάθος, loses both hands. Then we say: for him pottery is finished. But this being finished is a totally different occurrence [Geschehnis] from, say, the potter getting up from the wheel and walking away from the workplace. Indeed, even with such a loss of hands [Verlust], the capability has not utterly [schlechthin] disappeared, in the sense that the Megarians wanted to be able to assert, namely that it is simply gone [einfach weg]. It is merely in a certain way no longer extant” (GA33 186-7/AM 160 trans. mod.).
The actuality belonging to δύναμις οὐ κατὰ κίνησιν, then, is to be understood on this basis, so that what it means to say that a potentiality has actuality is that it is something held at the ready for activation, for reaching its active form, for being-at-work enacting (as it does in κίνησις) that for which it is a potentiality.

The lecture course therefore culminates in an extended illustration of the image of a sprinter, poised and at-the-ready. I would like to quote this remarkable passage at length:

Let us consider a sprinter who, for example, has (as we say) taken his or her mark in a hundred-meter race just before the start. What do we see? A human who is not in movement: a crouched stance: yet this could be said just as well or even more appropriately about an old peasant woman who is kneeling before a crucifix on a pathway; more appropriately, because with the sprinter we do not simply see a kneeling human not in movement [nichtbewegten]; what we call “kneeling” here is not kneeling in the sense of having set oneself down [des Sichnungsgelassenhabens]; on the contrary, this pose [Haltung] is much more that of being already “off and running” [ist weit eher die des “weg von der Stelle”]. The particularly relaxed positioning of the hands, with fingertips touching the ground, is almost already the thrust [ist schon fast der Abstoß] and the leaving behind of the place still held [das Hintersichbringen des gerade noch eingehaltenen Platzes]. Face and glance do not fall dreamily to the ground, nor do they wander from one thing to another; rather, they are tensely focused on the track ahead, so that it looks as though the entire stance is stretched taut toward what lies before it [als se diese ganze Haltung von dem her, was da vorn liegt, gestrafft]. No, it not only looks this way, it is so, and—what is just as crucial to consider—we immediately see it that way; what limps along afterwards and is attempted inadequately, or perhaps without seriousness, is the suitable clarification of the essence of the actuality of this entity which is actual in this way [dieses so Wirklichen]. (GA33 217-8/AM 187, trans. mod.)

Heidegger indulges here in a powerful and evocative phenomenological description of the significance present in the image of the sprinter’s comportment, the immediate sense of the sprinter at the ready—a description which illuminates the sense of the being of inactive δύναμις as lying in a certain kind of ἐνεπελέξαμα, specifically with respect to a certain kind of
However, the sense of ἔχειν here also highlights that, in entirely different respects to the manner in which all these aspects of ἐνταλέχεια are operative in δύναμις κατὰ κίνησιν, we can say that they are also applicable in their own distinctive way to δύναμις ὡς κατὰ κίνησιν.

Thus the passage continues:

What presents itself [sich uns darbietet] to us is not a human standing still [stillstehen], but rather one such as is poised to start running; he is poised for it, and he is this utterly and totally, so that we say—and we say it because we see it, without looking any further—that he is poised to start running. The only thing needed is the call “go.” Just this call and he is already off running [er auch schon losgelaufen], hitting his stride [im Lauf], that is, in enactment [im Vollzug]. But what does this say? Now everything of which he is capable is present [Dann ist all das anwesend, was er da vermag]; he runs and holds nothing back of which he would be capable [es bliebt nicht zurück, was er nicht vermöchte]; running, he executes [führt...aus] his capability. This execution is not the brushing aside [nicht das Beseitigen] of the capability, not its disappearance [das Verschwindenlassen], but rather the carrying out [das Hinausführen] of that toward which [in das, wozu] the capability itself as a capability drives [drängt]. The one who carries out [Der Vollziehende] is just that one who leaves nothing unfulfilled [nichts unausgeführt läßt] in relation to [in Rückbezug auf] his capability, for whom there is now in the running actually nothing more of which he is capable [wirklich nichts mehr gibt, was er nicht vermag]. This, of course, is then the case only if the one who is capable [Vermögender] comes to the running [zum Laufen antritt] in full readiness, if in this readiness he extends himself fully [sich...voll ausbreitet]. But this implies that he is then only genuinely in a position to run [dann eigentlich im Stand zum Laufen] if he is in good condition [wenn er gut im

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319 By elaborating the character of δύναμις ὡς κατὰ κίνησιν as ἔχειν, Heidegger again reiterates the point emphasized before, that this character has to do with the inactive δύναμις, rather than the active δύναμις—that is ἐνέργεια, or the sense of presence attached to it and as discussed in 3.2:

It is therefore manifest that the extantness [das Vorhandensein] of δύναμις may not then be immediately taken as the presence [Anwesenheit] of ἔγγον, or of producing [des Herstellens]. Aristotle sees the presence of δύναμις as such in ἔχειν; what one has is, in the possession and as possessed [im Besitz und als Besessenes], available [verfügbar], extant. But now this presence of δύναμις as such in the sense of being possessed [des Gebahstseins] is simply not the δύναμις in enactment [im Vollzug]. [...] Δύναμις ἔχειν means that something which is capable is capable in that it “has” a capability; it holds itself in [sich in...hält] this capability and holds itself back with [mit an sich hält] this capability—and thereby precisely does not carry out [gerade nicht vollzieht]. This holding itself back [Ansichhalten] now shows itself [zeigt sich] to us already more clearly as a way [eine Art] of being. This holding itself back is at the same time a holding onto for... [Aufbehalten für... ] (the carrying out [das Vollziehen] itself). (GA33 183/AM 157, trans. mod.)

Note that Brogan and Warneck here translate ‘Vorhandensein’ as ‘being present,’ but this loses precisely the key difference between mere extantness and presence (Anwesenheit).
Heidegger is signaling the ontological difference here: an interrogation of κίνησις [movement] as such is determined δύναμις [potentiality] of being. Heidegger says the sprinter “holds not only to what it is, but in that manner completely, ‘has imposed itself.’” More importantly, they also translate ‘Sich-ins-Zeug-legen’ as ‘setting oneself to work.’ It might be noted that ‘Zeug’ is oddly used here, as we consider that, of course, it is a Heideggerian term of art signifying equipment. But ‘sich ins Zeug legen’ is idiomatic, meaning something like ‘to go all out.’ But Brogan and Warnek’s translation certainly captures the essential point quite well, and rendering ‘Zeug’ here roughly as ‘work’ is validated by the note Heidegger makes at the end of the paragraph: “(εργον: das Werk oder das Zeug),” which demonstrates his idiom in the passage. (Keeping the idiom in mind also works well considering the above image of the sprinter, according to which, once the starting gun sounds, Heidegger says the sprinter “holds nothing back,” “extends himself fully, ‘leaves nothing undone.’”)

Heidegger emphasizes the sense of completion or 티로스 in the ἐντελέχεια of the being-poised of the sprinter: being-poised is utter readiness, unmitigated preparedness for full extension into the act: “only that extant thing [jenes vorhanden] which in enactment must leave nothing unattained [nichts unausgeführt zu lassen braucht] is something fully and actually in-a-position-to [Als völlig und wirklich im Stand ist]” (GA33 220/AM 189, trans. mod.).

Note then that its being is to be understood not in terms of κίνησις, not as something in κίνησις, but indeed still by reference to κίνησις. This is why Heidegger emphasizes that the essential meaning of δύναμις of κατά κίνησιν nevertheless remains one which can only be intelligible with an eye to κίνησις. Then is the singular meaning [Bedeutung] of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια nevertheless not to be taken [nicht...genommen werden] κατά κίνησιν? Certainly not. For to question [fragen] κατά κίνησιν and to take [nehmen] δύναμις as κατά κίνησιν is fundamentally different from questioning κατά κίνησις (genitive), from asking whether δύναμις has anything at all to do with [mit...etwas zu tun hat] movement as such—not only to ask to what extent does any δύναμις whatsoever move what moves and bring about [hervorruf] movement, but whether movement as such is determined by [durch...bestimmt ist] δύναμις. (GA33 53/AM 44)
Now it becomes clearer how the actuality of όλο κατά κίνησιν is to be comprehended [aus zu fassen ist] through [vom] έχειν, having and holding [vom Haben, Halten], namely as holding oneself in readiness [sich in Bereitschaft...halten], holding the capability itself in readiness. This being held is [Diese Gehaltenheit ist] its actual presence [seine wirkliche Anwesenheit]. (GA33 219/AM 188)

Now as becomes clear near the end of the lecture course, Heidegger’s ultimate target in AM is not in fact an understanding of the δυνάμεις οὐ κατὰ κίνησιν belonging to, say, the builder or the sprinter. While Heidegger invokes the image of proficiency in a practice—that is, by way of an analysis of the kind of δύναμες such entities as Dasein have, i.e. capabilities—he means to apply this as a clue on the way to an understanding specifically of the being of the ἁπνη—soulless entities—and particularly with respect to their being αἰσθητά (see GA33 193ff./AM 165ff).323 The analyses of AM, then, are intended to elucidate a wider ontological point about the being of entities at large.

such itself, which, while still relevant to the concept of κίνησις as such, is nevertheless not a matter of any particular case of motion:

When a house is built, all sorts of things are in movement. Stones and beams are laid upon one another, coming together to form the work [zum Werk zusammen]. Forces [Krafte] and activities [Tätigkeiten] are also at work here. If we look upon this movement as a whole and discern [feststellen] the activities and forces which are here extant, we are then viewing κατὰ κίνησιν and so also perceiving δυνάμες, those things which are also extant along with what moves, namely, along with those extant entities [Vorhandenen] in movement. But we are not viewing here movement as movement, not viewing κινοῦμενον ἢ κινούμενον; we are not asking what moved-being [Bewegteiseinde] as such would be. We are not taking the κινοῦμενον as ἢ ὄν, and we are not taking the κινήσις as ἢ εἶναι. We are not dealing with [handeln] κατὰ κινήσεως, with movement, so that it as such is the theme. To question in this fashion would be to ask about εἶναι, about being, and thereby about δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, but in a completely different sense… (GA33 53-4/AM 44, trans. mod.).

This is “δύναμις κατὰ κινήσεως,” and thus we are after a sense of the ἐντολέχωμα of δύναμις per se, not what appears in the definition of κίνησις, which—as we would do well to remind ourselves—is δυνάμει ὄντος, something potential—i.e. a particular potentiality.

323 Heidegger thus also differentiates between capability [Vermögen] and potentiality (translated in different ways in AM, usually as ‘Kraft’ or the more familiar ‘Möglichkeit’). The essence of the distinction is related to the one drawn in BT between existentials and categories: it is the difference between, respectively, those δύναμες belonging to entities with λόγος (δύναμις μετὰ λόγον) and to those without (GA33 130/AM 111). Some commentators, though, such as Brogan, treat the two as interchangeable (Brogan 2005, 130). Since the distinction carries no relevance for my immediate purposes, I too will use them interchangeably. However, the distinction is indeed important, for the relationship between conversant and non-conversant δύναμις is relevant to my ultimate aim.
Indeed, this wider ontological lesson is one also determinative of the “fundamental ontology” of BT—for the language of ‘Bereitschaft,’ it turns out, does not first come into Heidegger’s vocabulary in 1931. While Heidegger’s most lucid and articulate exploration into the matter of the being of inactive δύναμις is found in the lecture course AM, as we shall see, he already has such a conception worked out in the 1920s, in particular in those courses which most closely engage with Aristotle (primarily, BCR and BCN); he even uses the very same terminology to characterize the being of inactive δύναμις. The foregoing discussion around AM serves simply, then, to lay the groundwork for understanding more clearly how Heidegger mobilizes the very same concept in the 1920s courses, and how he incorporates it there into motifs which will come to inhabit the existential analytic of Dasein.

### 3.4 The Aristotelian Inheritance, Part II: Zuhandenheit and Active δύναμις

We have seen Heidegger’s use of the term ‘Bereitheit’ to designate a conception of the being of inactive δύναμις that he extracts from Aristotle. That which is inactively potential is ready or prepared, poised on the cusp, for activation (though what exactly this activation consists in we are still only on our way to appreciating). Now the use of the term might suggest, prima facie at least, that it is in fact simply another name for ‘Zuhandenheit,’ or an evolving conception of it, adopted in the span of what was for him the philosophically tumultuous period between 1927 and 1931. This is, though, not only backwards exegetically—Macquarrie and Robinson invented the English neologism “ready-to-hand,”

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324 The English translators of AM, Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek share the conclusion that AM simply provides a more detailed, careful explication of a conception of δύναμις already worked through in the previous lecture courses, declaring that, “Although delivered in Freiburg at a later period, the lectures that constitute this volume […] are clearly the fruit of his earlier Marburg lectures on Aristotle” (Brogan and Warnek 1995, x-xi). What we shall see is anything but a post-BT development; instead, it only more elaborates upon the doctrines undergirding BT.
and did so well before the publication in the original German of either AM or any of the other texts in Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe under discussion—but additionally can be shown as incorrect upon close inspection of the 1920s lecture course texts.

I ended 3.2 with the translations of Aristotle’s definition of κίνησις Heidegger provides in 1924’s BCR: it is “the presence of an ability-to-be.” In 1926’s BCN, though, he submits a different formulation, one which makes entirely clear the relationship between Bereitschaft (or Bereitheit) and Zuhandenheit:


\[\text{άτελές - έντελέχεια}. \text{ (GA22 173/BCN 145)}\]

The definition is striking and, when fully unpacked, makes evident the shadow of Aristotle’s framework on BT. If motion is, by Aristotle’s definition, the έντελέχεια qua potentiality of what is potential, is additionally, by Heidegger’s translation in BCR, the presence of an ability-to-be as such, and is, finally, by this characterization above, the Zuhandenheit of what is prepared in its preparedness, then this tells us a great deal about Zuhandenheit and its relation to Bereitheit. There is much to parse here.

First and most pressingly, we can glean from this definition that ‘Bereitheit’ and ‘Zuhandenheit’ are not equivalent or interchangeable terms. Nearby passages bear out what we might already suspect—that, just as he later will in 1931, in 1926 Heidegger understands ‘Bereitheit’ as a designation for the ontological character of δύναμις (Möglichkeit), specifically of the inactive δύναμις preceding the “enactment” (Vollzug) of motion:

Potentiality [Möglichkeit] understood negatively: non-contradiction, potentiality-for-Being [Seinkönnen] in general. Understood positively: definite ability to be something [es können], suitability as such [Eignung überhaupt]. Potentiality: suitability, but suitability-for, readiness, preparedness [Möglichkeit: Eignung aber als, bereitet, Bereitshaft]; it lacks only the carrying out of the enactment [es bedarf nur nochs des Vollzugs der
It is clear, then, that, ‘Bereitheit’ signals, just as it does in the later AM, being poised for activation or extension into activity—thus, inactive δύναμις or δύναμις οὐ κατὰ κίνησιν. Accordingly, the definition above suggests that Zuhandenheit is this same δύναμις in the modality of being-active or at-work, δύναμις κατὰ κίνησιν or the first ἐντελέχεια constitutive of κίνησις. For the passage says that motion is the readiness-to-hand (ἐντελέχεια) of what is prepared (δυνάμει ὄντος) in its preparedness (ἡ τοιοῦτον). While ‘Bereitheit’ designates inactive δύναμις, ‘Zuhandenheit’ designates active δύναμις or first actuality.

And indeed, Heidegger continually uses these two terms in this relationship, specifically as playing these roles relative to one another with regard to motion. He continues the above passage by declaring that “When something extant [Vorhandenes] in such a

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325 Note the similarities between the use of ‘Vollzug’ here and in AM (particularly in the image of the sprinter), which cements that Heidegger understands ‘Bereitschaft’ to designate precisely what it designates in the later course: the inactive potentiality that precedes Vollzug. Rojcewicz translates ‘Vollzug’ here as ‘transformation,’ while, as seen in the discussion of AM, Brogan and Warnek prefer ‘enactment’ (as does Kisiel in HCT). I also prefer ‘enactment’ and have substituted it for other translations wherever it appears in this chapter. Note that in chapter 2 ‘Vollzugsart’ was, following other translators, given as ‘mode of carrying out’ (and that Rojcewicz translates ‘Überführung’ as ‘carrying out’).

326 Rojcewicz translates ‘Bereitschaftlichkeit’ as ‘fully prepared.’

327 Moreover, Bereitheit—as was the entire point of the investigation in AM—is not non-being, but is a form of being different and distinctive from that of the active potentiality; it constitutes the “between” of δύναμις οὐ κατὰ κίνησιν. He tells us:

This “potentiality” as a mode of presence [Anwesenheit], suitability [Eignung], preparedness for [Bereitheit zu], availability for [verfügbar für], but in view of a toward-which [im Hinblick auf Wozu] a not-yet [ein Nochmehr], στέρησις [privation, lack], but not nothing, not nonbeing; instead, extantness [Vorhandensein]. […] The “potential” is not un-actual [ist nicht Unwirklich] in the sense of something not at all extant [des überhaupt nicht Vorhandenen], but is un-actual as not at work [nicht im Wirken]. (GA22 173/BCN 145, trans. mod.)

Note that in the midst of this Heidegger tells us, by contrast to the inactive potentiality of Bereitheit, “Actuality, extantness as being-in-work [als im-Werke-Sein].” Rojcewicz translates this sentence as: "Actuality, presence-at-hand, as being-in-act.” The inclusion of the second comma suggests these are three formulations of one and the same thing, that actuality = presence-at-hand = being-at-work. But in fact the original German reads “Wirklichkeit, Vorhandensein als im-Werke-Sein”—without a second comma. The sense of the German thus is that actuality = extantness (or presence-at-hand) specifically as it is under the condition of being at work. The difference is certainly subtle, but whether intentional or not, Rojcewicz’s English is misleading here.

328 Another passage, though presented more skeletally, nevertheless also makes unmistakable their relation to one another: “Ontologically and fundamentally δυνάμει ὄν—ἐνεργεία ὄν: Bereitheit—Zuhandenheit” (GA22 173/BCN 145).
way”—that is, as prepared—“is ready-to-hand [zuhanden ist] with respect to this mode of being [hinsichtlich dieser Seinsart]”—i.e. its preparedness—“then it is in motion” (GA22 174/BCN 145, trans. mod.). Additionally, as we might expect, Heidegger explicitly says that readiness-to-hand is the presence, thus the active form, of what is simply ready, just as the first ἐντελέχεια is the presence or active form of a potentiality:

When it, as this prepared thing [als dieses bereite], is ready-to-hand as present [anwesend] in its preparedness [in seiner Bereitschaft], then it is in motion. The preparedness [Die Bereitheit] of what is extant: this extant thing present with respect to its preparedness, as prepared. When does it, in and of itself, become ready-to-hand in its preparedness? When and how does it show itself in itself in its preparedness? Not when I simply observe [lediglich feststellte] it. For then all I can say is that it is something which can become a table. The preparedness is manifest in itself [offenbar an ihr selbst] when the wood is being worked on and as long as it is in hand [unter der Hand], during the whole span of becoming worked up into something [in der ganzen Erstreckung des Verarbeitetwerdens zu]. Then and so long as it becomes, this becoming, changing [dieses Werden, Umschlagen], is then the presence of the extant in its preparedness [Anwesenheit des Vorhandenen in seiner Bereitheit] and with respect to its preparedness: κίνησις. Being at work [In Arbeit sein], i.e. the Being of the being, that which is discovered through being manipulated [unter der Handhabe entdeckt], being taken in hand [das unter der Hand sein], readiness-to-hand. (GA22 174/BCN 145-6, trans. mod.)

Bereitheit is a mode of being of entities, but motion only occurs when, with respect to this mode of being, it is “in hand” and thereby set into motion as enacting that for which it is prepared. That which is Zuhanden is therefore what is ready, as it is specifically when it is “in hand,” i.e. what is prepared when it is set in motion by being taken up in practical engagement and deployed with respect to this ready suitability, as equipment. It is the suitable in action, “present [anwesend] in its preparedness [in seiner Bereitheit]” (GA22 171/BCN 143)—not readiness as such, but consummated readiness, or, to again invoke

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329 Rojcewicz translates ‘in der ganzen Erstreckung des Verarbeitetwerdens zu’ as ‘during the whole time in which it is being worked up into something.’ He also renders ‘in Arbeit sein’ here as ‘to be take up and worked on.’
Kosman’s phrasing, “potentiality in its full manifestation.”

Indeed, the distinction between Bereitheit and Zuhandenheit as Heidegger draws it is positively paradigmatic of the triple distinction between inactive potentiality, active potentiality/first actuality, and second actuality: “In its actuality (readiness-to-hand), the preparedness has been consummated [aufgehobene], and at the same time, this actuality has its own character of preparedness [ein Bereitheitscharakter]” (GA22 201-2/BCN 166, trans. mod.). In other words, this (first) actuality is the consummation of the first or inactive potentiality, and simultaneously is also a second or active potentiality for the second actuality.

Additionally, we see yet again the idea of this active δύναμις or presence of what is ready—Zuhandenheit—as a superlative form of being. In the midst of the same discussions above which translate the definition of motion into the milieu of BT, Heidegger reiterates to us that, as regards motion, “a higher presence resides therein [liegt darin eine höhere Anwesenheit], insistence on [Aufdringlichkeit in] that which it can be and is [was es sein kann und ist]” (GA22 171/BCN 143). And ἐντελέχεια, he explains, is “presence [Anwesenheit] of the potentiality-for-Being [des Seinkönnens] in its potentiality [in seinem Seinkönnen], such that it is precisely itself in this Being [so zwar, es in diesem Sein gerade es selbst ist], not to be at its end [nicht zu Ende sein], to stop [aufhören], but precisely to be in the proper

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330 To drive home just how comparable Heidegger’s reading is to that of Kosman, presented 40 years later, consider their ways of articulating the point about the connection between presence and motion. Heidegger says above that the prepared thing, e.g. wood, is “manifest in itself when the wood is being worked on, and as long as it is in hand, i.e. during the whole time in which it is being worked up into something.” Meanwhile, Kosman says that,

The expression “the actuality of the buildable” can mean building or the product of building, i.e., the house. But by the time the house is there, the buildable has been actualized in such a way that it is no longer buildable. It is, on the contrary, when the buildable is being built that it is most fully manifesting itself as actually buildable. (Kosman 1969, 54; emphasis added)

331 Rojcewicz translates the sentence as, “In its actuality (readiness-to-hand), the preparedness has been consummated, and, at the same time, this actuality has its own preparedness to become something else.” Note also his translation of ‘aufheben’ as ‘to consummate,’ which I have kept, although of course the term is difficult to translate. On this latter point, see also fnns. 313 and 378.
[eigentlich] sense” (GA22 202/BCN 166). It is in light of this understanding of Zuhandenheit as presence of an ability-to-be or active δύναμις, that Heidegger makes his puzzling proclamation in BT, that “Readiness-to-hand is the ontological-categorial determination of entities as they are ‘in themselves’ [Zuhandenheit ist die ontologisch-kategoriale Bestimmung von Seiendem, wie es ‘an sich’ ist]” (GA2 96, BT 101, trans. mod.).

Now one way Heidegger speaks about Zuhandenheit in BT is as the “involvement” (Bewenden or Bewandtnis) of entities: “The character of being [Der Seinscharakter] which belongs to the ready-to-hand is that of involvement [Bewandtnis]” (GA2 112/BT 115, trans. mod.). 332 This being-involved of a given entities is understood in terms of a coherent complex of its signification relations, a referential totality of equipment and equipmentality, of tasks and projects, of serviceabilities and serviceable items, of contexts and their paraphernalia—in short, contextualized implication in Dasein’s antics. 333 It is only in such contextualizations that it makes sense to speak of something as something; the wood shows up as suitable material for making a chest, or the hammer shows up as a hammer as such, and

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332 “Der Seinscharakter des Zuhandenen ist die Bewandtnis.”
333 “Involvement” does not just mean, then, being with other entities in a collection, but being alongside them in definite meaningful relations, and also alongside the projects, aims, and practices which define the contours of such relations; it has a decidedly existential signification:

That in which [an entity] is involved is the “towards-which” of serviceability [Dienlichkeit], and the “for-which” of usability [Verwendbarkeit]. With the “towards-which” of serviceability there can again be an involvement: with this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a “hammer”, there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection ‘is’ for the sake of providing shelter for Dasein—that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein’s Being. Whenever something ready-to-hand has an involvement with it, what involvement this is, has in each case been outlined in advance in terms of the totality of such involvements [ist je aus der Bewandtnisganzheit vorgezeichnet]. In a workshop, for example, the totality of involvements which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand in its readiness-to-hand, is ‘earlier’ than any single item of equipment; so too for the farmstead with all its utensils and outlying lands. (GA2 112/BT 116)
as “up to the task,” exactly because and to the degree that I integrate it into such a context and treat it as such.

Now if Zuhandenheit is, as the pre-BT texts suggest, active potentiality/first actuality, and if it is characterizable by involvement as BT states, then we should expect Heidegger to characterize inactive potentiality as something like potentiality for involvement. And this is indeed what we find in 1925’s PS lecture; there, Heidegger comes across as not only sympathetic with but positively enthusiastic about the mysterious suggestion (infamous and controversial among scholars) of the Sophist’s Eleatic Stranger, that of the fundamental determination of being as δύναμις, more specifically, as δύναμις κοινωνίας—potential to be-with or “the being-potential of being-together [das Mögliche-sein als Zusammen-sein]” (GA19 533/PS 369, trans. mod.). Though Heidegger does not speak of δύναμις κοινωνίας in precisely the language of ‘Bewandtnis’ in PS, it is clear that it could be fairly described as something like potentiality for involvement:

Being itself, then, will mean for Plato, if he is to make both these positions intelligible, δύναμις, as the potentiality of co-presence with something [als Möglichkeit zur Mit-Anwesenheit bei etwas], in short δύναμις κοινωνίας, or in a fuller determination, παρουσία δυνάμεως κοινωνίας, extantness of the potentiality of being with one another [Vorhandensein in der Möglichkeit zum Miteinandersein]. (GA19 486/PS 336, trans. mod.)

Being means nothing else than to be able to be with each other [Miteinandersein-Können], or formulated differently, in relation to [mit Bezug auf] Being as δύναμις, to be capable of presence with something [Imstande-sein zur Anwesenheit bei etwas]. (GA19 480/PS 332)

Now it is worth mentioning that the proposed characterization of being in terms of δύναμις is not traditionally taken as a serious one on Plato’s part; instead, it is typically proclaimed to be, variously, a provisional determination, a diplomatic overture to both sides of the debate (namely, the materialists and the friends of the Forms), and/or a mere suggestion in the midst
of the discussion intended to be replaced later. Heidegger, though, does not subscribe to this school of interpretation; in fact, he positively and categorically rejects it, pausing the exegetical flow of the course in order to chastise the typical reading of the thesis. In fact, Heidegger is adamant that the dialogue’s route into further clarifications “cannot mean that [the determination of ὄν as δύναμις] is to be abandoned [aufgegeben werden soll] but only that it should be grasped more originally [ursprünglicher gefaßt], in order to acquire a more perfect determination [so eine vollständigere Bestimmung gewonnen werden soll]” (GA19 476/PS 329).

Heidegger takes the Stranger’s thesis as a proposal put forward in all seriousness by Plato—even moreso as an ontological thesis worthy of legitimate consideration. His ‘Bereitheit’ is essentially another name for the Eleatic Stranger’s conception of being as

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334 “Yet it is in no sense an artifice [ein Kunstgriff] Plato employs [anwendet] simply to give the two opponents [i.e. the materialists and the friends of the Forms] a common denominator, as if he were not serious about this definition [als wäre es ihm mit dieser Definition nicht Ernst]. If the tradition interpretation says Plato could not be serious about this definition, that is because δύναμις is translated as ‘power’ [‘Kraft’] […]. The difficulty people have found in the proffering of this quite new definition derives from their conceiving δύναμις too massively from the very outset [von vorneherein zu massiv faßt] […]. Above all, it derives from the fact that people have not investigated [verfolgt] how precisely [wie gerade] this determination of ὄν as δύναμις bears the entire ensuing meditation [die ganze folgende Betrachtung trägt] […].” (GA19 474-5/PS 328-9).

335 Being as δύναμις is proffered as a thesis, but, he insists, “That does not mean it is merely suggested tentatively, simply as a way out, on the contrary, it is ‘pre-offered’ […]” in order that it “will be dealt with more thoroughly later [die später eindringender behandelt wird]” (GA19 474/PS 328). It is “not provisional [nicht etwas Vorläufiges] in the sense of something that is later to be renounced [das später aufgegeben wird]. It is provisional in the sense of preparatory [des Vorbereitenden]; later it will indeed be understood quite differently, but that only means more originally [das später wohl anders, aber lediglich ursprünglicher gefaßt wird]” (GA19 473/PS 328).

336 It is also worth mentioning that the Stranger’s thesis is brought under scrutiny by Plato, acting as proxy for the friends of the Forms, and that Heidegger notes (GA19 479/PS 331-2) these friends of the Forms are in fact none other than the Megarians, so critical to the development of Aristotle’s views, as we saw Heidegger lay out in AM. Heidegger goes on to explain that, on his reading of the Sophist, Aristotle’s position in opposition to these friends of the Forms had already been somewhat developed, and that the dialogue represents in many ways Plato’s way of not only coming to terms with, but in fact incorporating the views of his student. As Heidegger concludes, “…it is difficult to get around the fact that the young Aristotle stands in the background of these discussions, and that a confrontation [Auseinandersetzung] with him is already in play [schon…lebendig ist] here” (GA19 483/PS 334, trans. mod.). Whether Heidegger is right or not about this is irrelevant to my purposes; what matters is that it substantiates the view that in this period Heidegger enthusiastically appropriated Aristotle’s framework, even to the point of attempting to excavate the Stranger’s thesis in terms of that framework, and as representative of (the late) Plato’s considered philosophical position.
δύναμις κοινωνίας—potentiality for involvement. And if readiness is readiness for being-together, suitability for implication within the network of involvements, then Zuhandenheit is nothing other than the actuality of δύναμις κοινωνίας, that potentiality as active.

Of course, this referential totality, this network of involvements, is nothing other than what Heidegger means by the ontic signification of ‘Welt’ as “that ‘wherein’ a factual Dasein as such can be said to ‘live’” (GA2 87/BT 93). And, given that we have seen that Heidegger speaks of ἔντελεχεια as a superlative form of being, or being in its fullest register, it is notable that in BCN he says the same of world: “ἐνέργεια itself, fundamental presence [Grundanwesenheit], reference [Verweisung], ‘world’ (GA22 173/BCN 145).338

The key point at which I am driving with all this hopefully begins to come into focus: since Zuhandenheit is the sphere of Bedeutsamkeit, Weltlichkeit as constituted by meaning-relations—what it means to say that Zuhandenheit is an active δύναμις or first ἔντελεχεια is that Bereitheit, as that δύναμις in its inactive form (δύναμις κοινωνίας) is nothing other than preparedness for being-significant, for intelligibility. Because Bereitheit makes up the “between” of inactive potentiality, entities themselves are not significations, but neither are

337 Macquarrie and Robinson note the curiousness and difficulty of the German terms ‘Bewenden’ and ‘Bewandntis,’ in particular drawing attention to the fact that “Their root meaning has to do with the way something is already ‘turning’ when one lets it ‘go its own way’, ‘run its course’, follow its ‘bent’ or ‘tendency’, or finish ‘what it is about’, ‘what it is up to’ or ‘what it is involved in’” (see their n. 2 on BT 115). This is an astute etymological observation, and one which strongly substantiates the point I want to make: Zuhandenheit is a matter simply of releasing a thing into its potentiality for being, for which it is already prepared or poised (Bereitheit), and therefore is simply a matter of “letting be,” of “letting something be involved” (see §18, GA2 111-9/BT 114-22; see also GA2 467-8/BT 404-5), merely releasing it into that for which it was poised. In BTS, Stambaugh prefers ‘relevance’ over ‘involvement,’ but while I think this is a good expression of the ultimate ontological character Heidegger is getting at with ‘Bewandntis,’ ‘involvement’ makes explicit what it is about the referential contexture that makes the entity “relevant” in the first place.

338 Heidegger also proclaims: “World: what is closest [die engste], Being in the proper sense [das eigene Sein]” (GA22 24/BCN 20). One reading of this passage suggests that it is highlighting that world is what most one’s own, what is ownmost for Dasein, since things show up in terms of one’s projects. And while Heidegger certainly means this to be so, that point is fundamentally entangled with the sense of world as the full presence, the actuality of entities. For, to reiterate the connection between disclosure and actualization explored in 3.5, things showing up in terms of one’s projects is a simply the same as bringing them to presence.

The close connection between presence and world will be examined in a bit more detail in 3.5. However, I cannot do justice to it in the way, for example, Olafson does in chapter 2 of Olafson 1987.
they a nullity in this regard, wholly indeterminate or indifferent with respect to signification; rather, they are poised for playing the role of Fregean Sinne, or Heideggerian Bedeutungen. 339 And in fact Heidegger tells us as much:

A tree that stands in the forest is ἐντελεχεία, present [gegenwärtig] there for me as a tree. Or it can also be there as fallen tree, tree trunk. This tree trunk can be encountered [kann...begegnet] by me in the character of serviceability for... [Dienbarkeit zu...], of availability for [Verfügbarkeit für] shipbuilding. The tree trunk has the character of being-serviceable for..., of usability for... [Verwendbarkeit zu...], not in such a way that I first construe it as such [ihn erst so auffasse], but rather it is the mode of its being [die Weise seines Seins]. It is encountered such that it is not mere wood, as a thing called wood. The being that is there in the surrounding world has the character of συμφέρον; it refers [verweist] to something. This character of being-referring [des Verweisendseins] in the sense of being-serviceable for...determines this being that is there, this trunk, that is there ἐντελεχεία and together with it as δυνάμει. Δυνάμει-being is a positive determination of the mode of its there [der Weise seines Da]. For a long time, I have been designating this being-character of being-there as meaningfulness [Bedeutsamkeit]. This being-character is the primary one in which the world is encountered. (GA18 300/BCR 203, trans. mod.) 340 341

Now, some precision is called for here. A key point to keep in mind about Bedeutsamkeit is that significance does not reside in the coming about of that for which something is suitable—sitting in the chair, for example. Rather, significance resides in things showing up as suitable or not; the significance of the chair as chair lies in its showing itself as something suitable for sitting, whether or not the chair is, in point of fact, sat in. Brandom summarizes

339 The fact that entities are not simply “blank slates” in terms of signification—while still also not in themselves meaningful—may be used to counteract the Modernist conception of entities as, to put it in Iain Thomson’s words “intrinsically meaningless resources awaiting optimization” (Thomson 2001, 164). That they are “intrinsically meaningless” on this account must be heard in an entirely different way. This suggestion does not, however, entirely assuage concerns about the relation between the view I am attributing to the early Heidegger and the technological enframing he later will diagnose in Modernist metaphysics (and, to some extent, his own work). See ftn. 369.

340 Note in this passage too that Heidegger speaks of the trunk as simultaneously ἐντελεχεία and δυνάμει. Thus we see at work in his elaboration of the simultaneity of active potentiality and first actuality.

341 Metcalf and Tazner translate ‘auffassen’ as ‘to apprehend,’ which, in many contexts, is a fair one. However, Heidegger’s use comes with a clear disapproval of its association with the presence of something in its serviceability. ‘Construe’ communicates to the English ear this negative connotation in a way neutral terms like ‘apprehend’ do not. We shall see the term again in 3.5, where its pejorative significance for Heidegger is unmistakable. See ftn. 355.
the key point to observe here perfectly when he explains that “The readiness-to-hand of a piece of equipment consists in its having a certain significance. This significance in turn consists in its appropriateness for various practical roles and its inappropriateness for others” (Brandom 2002c, 390). In other words, significance does not consist in the piece of equipment’s actual use in the given role, but its appropriateness or serviceability or conduciveness for that role.342

This is why motion is, as Heidegger renders it, the presence of the ability-to-be, i.e. of the suitability itself—not the presence of that use for which the equipment is suited. Put otherwise, Zuhandenheit or Bedeutsamkeit consists in the potentiality’s presence as a suitability for a second actuality, rather than in the fulfillment or coming about of that second actuality. It is for this reason that Heidegger is at pains to insist that, in keeping with the observations we made in 3.2, the ἐντελέχεια of a δύναμις, κατὰ κίνησιν, does not reside in the fulfillment, the τέλος of the second actuality, but rather in that of the δυνάμει ὃν itself as such, in the becoming-active or being-put-to-work of the potentiality, thus its completion as what it is. In fact, In BCR he singles out this issue as a point for clarification, thinking it important enough to dedicate to it an entire, albeit short section, the title of which is, tellingly, “Movement as ἀτελής in Relation to the ἔργον.” In it he says:

Κίνησις is defined as a being-present [Gegenwärtigsein] that has the character of the ἀτελής, of the “not at the end” [“nicht zu Ende”]. What is able-to-be [Das Seinkönnende] (the wood lying before in the workshop), that is in work [in Arbeit ist], is there as able-to-be precisely when it is taken up [genommen ist] into work. In this sense, one can say that maintaining-in-work [In-Arbeit-Halten] is the τέλος of the δυνάμει ὃν τοῖς τοιοῦτον. The being-in-the-potentiality [In-der-Möglichkeit-Sein] comes into its end in [kommt in...zu

342 There is a sense in which we can fairly say that conduciveness is already something like occupation of a role; the chair as chair, whether sat in or not, already occupies a role as something suitable for sitting in, within the network of significance. In fact, I think this is the right way to speak of matters. Nevertheless, this way of specifying what it means for an entity to occupy a role is distinguishable from the other way, and that they can be so distinguished is what really matters here.
The presence of the potentiality does not signal the result of the activity, but the activity itself. Accordingly, the readiness-to-hand of what is prepared in its preparedness does not imply the potentiality is ἑντελές with respect to the ἔργον, the characteristic activity belonging to the piece of equipment as equipment (e.g. sitting in the chair). Significance does not reside in the completion of the ἔργον, but in that of the δύναμει ὑτ οἰοντον. Inactive potentiality reaches its completion in first actuality, in its own being-active, and so can just as fairly be characterized as potentiality for its own activity. Readiness, then, is readiness for being-in-hand, Bereitheit is readiness for Zuhandenheit itself, and it is in Zuhandenheit that this readiness is consummated or reaches its τέλος, even if the ἔργον of the entity remains ἀτελής.\footnote{343 The same point is made at GA22 172/BCN 144: “κίνησις is ἀτελής.”}

\footnote{344 In parsing all this so closely, there arises the opportunity for the claim that Heidegger equivocates on what precisely readiness (Bereitheit) is readiness for. Sometimes Heidegger speaks of the preparedness of things in such a way that suggests it is indeed readiness for the fulfillment of the ἔργον of the entity—i.e. the second actuality—and that Zuhandenheit is the presence of this preparedness. An example of this is the above, where he says the tree trunk can be encountered as available for shipbuilding. On the other hand, sometimes preparedness seems to designate preparedness for being-significant as such, that is, for being “in hand” or for activation—for Zuhandenheit, as in the discussion of δύναμις κοινωνίας above. In other words, he seems to equivocate on whether inactive potentiality is a potentiality for an ultimate, second actuality (sitting), or rather for the first actuality itself, i.e. for being activated or being an active potentiality (being something suitable for sitting).

In fact, though, this seeming equivocation on Heidegger’s part plays directly into the understanding of κίνησις in terms of active and inactive δυνάμεις with which we have been working from the outset. For recall that the active potentiality/first actuality, as complete in itself—e.g. walking per se—thereby extends itself into something else not yet complete—e.g. walking to the other side of the room. The same is applicable to Heidegger’s analysis. Bereitheit is suitability for Zuhandenheit, for being-significant as such. But in the very being-at-work in maintaining itself in the accomplishment of this, Bereitheit extends itself into the specificity of a particular signification—suitability not just per se but suitability for thus and so in particular. And this is very understandable once we make the observation that an inactive potentiality like the latent ability for walking in someone lying down is quite clearly and simply at once both a potentiality for being the actively being-at-work, the first actuality (walking), and for the second actuality, or the τέλος of that activity, whatever it may be (e.g. reaching the other end of the room).

Accordingly, the inactive potentiality of entities as Bereitheit is quite intelligibly at once both a readiness for activation or being set in motion, and for the second actuality (or τέλος of the ἔργον). Another way to say this is that the inactive potentiality is readiness for meaningfulness per se as well as meaningfulness in a
Before moving on, a final point of clarification about Zuhandenheit as connected to κίνησις is in order. One may get the impression that by “in hand” Heidegger means literal manual labor with the entity in question. And indeed, his manner of speaking at times can play into this, as when he makes comments like the following: “When is something, from itself, ready-to-hand in its preparedness [Wann ist etwas von ihm selbst her in seiner Bereitheit zuhanden]? When it is in hand [unter der Hand], i.e., in the motion of handwork [in handwerklicher Bewegung]” (GA22 174/BCN 146). Likewise, in BCR he tells us that, “Whenever the cabinet-maker is at work on it, it is there in its ability-to-be [Seinkönnen]. The ability-to-be is present [gegenwärtig] in the being-at-work insofar as the cabinet-maker has it in hand [es unter der Hand hat]” (GA18 313/BCR 212). Heidegger does himself no favors with putting matters this way, though, for in the midst of the exact same passage as the last, he unmistakably tells us that motion, as constituted by the presence of an ability-to-be, is not identifiable with literal manual manipulation. He considers the case of Zuhanden equipment which is involved in the network of significance, yet not currently being directly employed or “in hand” in a straightforward sense:

One must consider such an entity: a piece of wood that lies extant [vorhanden liegt] is there in a workshop with the cabinet-maker; as wood, it lies there [liegt...da] with the determination [in der Bestimmung] of usability for… [der Verwenderbarkeit für…]. “Movement is ἐντελέχεια, presence [Gegenwart] of entities that are there as entities able to be there [als des Daseinkönnenden], indeed presence insofar as they can be there.” Movement is the presence of the ability-to-be-there as such. The wood can be a chest; it is now thought immediately and simply [jetzt zunächst einfach vermeint]. This ability-to-be a chest is thought [vermeint] in this ability-to-be of the wood. Insofar as it is there [Sofern es da ist], the wood is in movement. Insofar as the wood is there as being-able-to-be-a-chest [als Kastenseinkönendes da ist] in the genuine sense, there is movement. […] Accordingly, Aristotle can also define specific register, under some particular signification or as-determination. They are, in fact, just two sides of the same coin: the former captures the fact that the entity in motion is (first) ἐντελέχεια with respect to its (inactive) δύναμις for meaningfulness as such, and the latter captures the fact that the entity in motion is (active) δύναμις, which consisting in a specific Bedeutung (suitability-for-sitting), that is, a suitability for a second ἐντελέχεια.
movement in what follows as ἐνέργεια. Ἐνέργεια as a mode [ein Weise] of being-there [des Daseins] means nothing other than the being-at-work of something. The wood as a thing lying there [als vorliegendes seien des Ding] is there, and is at the same time [zugleich] usable for a chest. (GA18 313-4/BCR 212)345

In this passage, Heidegger seems to be implying that in simply lying there, the wood is present in its ability-to-be, for it is there as having been incorporated into the network of significance, and, within that network, whether being immediately in use or not, has its place in terms of its ability-to-be. And since movement just is this manner of presence, he seems to affirm that simply in “lying there,” the wood is in some sense in movement.

We may ask if Heidegger indeed really means this, and he himself goes on to suggest that a more careful way of speaking about these matters is in order. Playing devils’ advocate, he asks whether the wood lying in the workshop is in fact characterizable in terms of meaningfulness at all, given that the usability of the wood is only truly present while the cabinet maker is working on it:

From this, one could infer that meaningfulness [Bedeutsamkeit], as the determination of the entities that are there in the being of the world [von dem Daseienden des Seins der Welt], is not genuinely apt here [i.e. in the case of the wood lying in the workshop] since usability is genuinely there only insofar as wood is at work [in Arbeit ist]. (GA18 314/BCR 212, trans. mod.)

In other words, we might be liable to think, in noting that by and large many of the entities we encounter in the environing world do not show up as straightforwardly in motion, that

345 Heidegger continues with what is on the surface a rather enigmatic claim: “As wood, to be there and to be usable for…are not the same [Als Holtz da sein und verwendbar sein für…ist nicht dasselbe].” I think this is easy to misconstrue as separating usability and presence, contra my reading. Given the context, though, I think this is a mistake, and we ought not take this as saying that usability is not found in the being-there (presence) of the wood. The immediately previous statement (the final sentence of the cited passage) differentiates between the wood’s being there, and being usable—these are different, but simultaneous (“zugleich”), determinations. Thus, in saying that they are distinct, he is not claiming they do anything other than rise and fall together. Rather, he seems to be positively affirming their connectedness, along the lines we have emphasized since 3.2: namely, that first actuality (“to be there”) and active potentiality (“to be usable for…”) are one moment seen from two sides.
such entities are not characterizable by meaningfulness, and do not show up in terms of usability. We might, instead, think that it is only when things are overtly moving, as in literal manual work, that meaningfulness is at play, and their abilities-to-be are manifest.

Heidegger, though, immediately tells us in no uncertain terms, that “this is a deception” (GA18 314/BCR 212). He goes on to explain that this error is predicated on the wrong understanding of what it means for something to be at work, and so to be in motion—that is, to be characterizable in terms of motion as a determination of its being. In fact, for the most part the entities of the environing world are encountered as at rest. This does not mean, though, that they are not in motion in the sense we have been meaning:

If the cabinet-maker is gone from the workshop, the chest that was begun [angefangene] lies there [dalieglt], and the wood is not extant [vorhanden] in movement, but it is also not how it was before the work [auch nicht so wie vor der Arbeit]—which is to say, merely ὑπάρχειν in the first sense [also bloß im ersten Sinne]—rather it is extant in rest [ist vorhanden in Ruhe]. Rest is only an extreme case [nur ein Grenzfall] of movement. Resting is only possible for something [Ruhen kann nur etwas] that in itself has the being-determination of being in movement or being able to be in movement [in Bewegung zu sein oder sein zu können]. We encounter many things of the world—most of those with which we have to do [mit dene wir es zu tun haben]—for the most part as resting [zumeist als ruhend]. (GA18 314/BCR 212)

The wood, as it lies in the empty workshop, is not “extant in movement.” But is also not pure potentiality, first or inactive potentiality, as it was before the cabinet maker began the work.

Having been already put to work and set in motion toward becoming a chest, it remains, even lying in the shop, at work and present in its ability-to-be, and so characterizable in terms of a determination of motion. This determination, though, has the specific character of rest, which is only “extreme case,” or, as he often puts it otherwise, a “limit-case [Grenzfall]” (GA18 377/BCR 255; GA22 203/BCN 167) of motion.346

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346 Likewise, in BCN: “The actuality of what is at rest [des Ruhenden] is to be understood on the basis of motion [ist von Bewegung her verstanden]. The other way makes everything unclear [Wird umgekehrt bzw.
As such, what it means for something to be “in-hand,” thus Zuhanden, is applicable just as much to things at rest, entities as already incorporated into the network of significance, whether in the here and now directly taken up in labor or not:

In work [Arbeit], one has the surrounding world (also that which is of interest, and the like). We are concerned with the surrounding world in hand [unter der Hand]. Even what is at rest is there in this mode [Auch was ruht, ist in dieser Weise da]. What I have [habe] in hand can rest, and only what is being-in-hand can rest. […] it rests in the workshop during the mid-day break. But the world is very often and for the most part there, and that means κινούμενον [i.e. in motion] too. The there-character of rest belongs to the being-there of the surrounding world [um Da-sein der Umwelt der Da-Charakter der Ruhe].

[…] resting [das Ruhende] is a how of the there of [ist ein Wie des Da von] an entity in work [in Arbeit Seienden], taken into work [in Arbeit Genommen]. […] Rest is constitutive of [konstitutiv für] this there [dieses da], i.e., meaningfulness. (GA18 380/BCR 257, trans. mod.)

This discussion shows that Heidegger intends attribution of motion to be appropriate beyond just what is being literally and currently manually manipulated; it is the mode of being of entities which have the character of worldliness, of being-significant. This, of course, conforms with the standard understanding of equipmentality; a hammer is Zuhanden, and equipmental, even if I am not currently hammering with it. Indeed, I do not need to be currently engaged with it at all, even in the midst of immediate circumspection. The hammer is equipment even when it lies in the workshop and I am gone; here it remains a matter of Überhaupt nicht klar]” (GA22 173/BCN 145)—“the other way” meaning understanding rest as the opposite of motion (which conflates what is at rest with what is unmoving). Instead, Heidegger offers the analogy: “Death is not lifeless [das Leblose]; on the contrary, it is what is deprived of life [das Unlebendige] and so is a determination of a living being [Lebendigen], just as rest is a determination of motion” (GA22 184/BCN 155). Thus, “movedness [Bewegtheit] holds for [gilt für] everything moving or at rest” (GA22 171/BCN 143). A similar point is expressed in 1931 (see GA33 186-7/AM 159-60).

347 The editor of GA18 inserts a ‘gehört’ into the final sentence here, so that it reads: “Zum-sein der Umwelt [gehört] der Da-Charakter der Ruhe.” In context this seems an acceptable editorial decision, and yields the most natural correct reading of the sentence.
circumspective concern, construed broadly, even if I am not engaged with it at the moment, even if I am not “preoccupied” with it from a distance, but going about other business.\(^{348}\)

Ultimately, the “deception” Heidegger is trying to avoid finds its origin in a misunderstanding of what phenomenon Aristotle intends to illuminate with the concept of \(\kappa\iota\nu\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma\) itself. For the sort of motion at the forefront here, with respect to the \(\epsilon\nu\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\chi\epsilon\alpha\iota\alpha\) of intelligibility, is fundamentally \textit{ontological}, not ontic. “Movement is a \textit{how} of being” or a “how of presence [\textit{Gegenwart}]”—“\(\kappa\iota\nu\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma\) is an \textit{ontological} determination. Being-moved [\textit{Bewegtsein}] is a mode of the being-present [\textit{Gegenw\"{a}rtigseins}] of determinate entities [\textit{von bestimmtten Seienden}]” (GA18 372-3/BCR 252, trans. mod.).\(^{349}\) This is why earlier we saw him say that motion, \textit{understood ontologically}, is the readiness-to-hand of what is prepared in its preparedness. This coheres with Aristotle’s sense: while \(\kappa\iota\nu\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma\) may \textit{involve} an ontic determination, such as the physical change in location of an entity, \textit{to be} in motion, or \textit{to be} “in hand” is itself an ontological determination, and in fact encompasses more than just locomotion but any sort of alteration with respect to the being.\(^{350}\)

\(^{348}\) This is why Heidegger says that circumspection “discovers the ready-to-hand and \textit{preserves it in its discoveredness} [\textit{in seiner Entdecktheit verwahrt}]” (GA2 228/BT 216, trans. mod. and emphasis added). An entity, once set in motion, remains in motion in the relevant sense even when ostensibly at rest. The wood is in motion, being-at-work-maintaining-its-completion, even when it is at rest in the shop, and this is because it is present or maintaining itself in this way, in motion in this way, so long as it is incorporated into a world, involved in a network of significance. The image of the literal, manual working is just vividly illustrative of the dynamic, for in such examples we see most forcefully the sense in which something is incorporated into a sphere of concernful implication, in \textit{lived} experience rather than detached observation or the mere data-gathering of a theoretical stance. Nevertheless, from this illustrative case we can nevertheless get a grip on the way in which even concernful thinking about something absent is not the same as taking a theoretical stance on it.

\(^{349}\) Also: “Thus what is moved amounts to \textit{[ist]} a change \textit{[ein Wandlung]} in Being. Motion as such is \textit{ontological}, a mode of Being \textit{[ein Seinsmodus]}” (GA22 203/BCN 167).

\(^{350}\) \(\kappa\iota\nu\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma\), as Heidegger points out, is not simply spatial movement, “motion from a place \textit{[vom Platze]}, locomotion \textit{[Ortsbewegung]},” but \(\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\zeta\beta\omicron\omega\lambda\varsigma\), “the coming to presence of some alteration \textit{[Anwesendsein des Umschlagens]}” (GA19 18/PS 12-3, trans. mod.).

Heidegger’s discussion of the spatiality of \textit{Zuhandenheit} in BT §22 also clues us into the fact that being “in-hand” cannot be understood in terms of ontic location:

Every entity that is ‘to hand’ has a different closeness \textit{[N"{a}he]}, which is not to be ascertained by measuring distances \textit{[nicht durch Ausmussen von Abst"{a}nden festgelegt ist]}. This closeness regulates itself \textit{[regelt sich]} in terms of circumspectively ‘calculative’ manipulating and using
The foregoing ultimately amounts to one central observation: *Zuhandenheit* is to be understood in terms of Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s definition of κίνησις. Indeed, we can say that *Zuhandenheit* just is Heidegger’s term for the active δύναμις, for the ἐντελέχεια constitutive of κίνησις, i.e. the presence of an ability-to-be, as such. Having enumerated various aspects of how Heidegger incorporates the Aristotelian conceptual framework into the terminology of the existential analytic, it becomes possible to see how organic is the connection, how well the language of potentiality and actuality—understood in accordance with the observations about Aristotle’s distinctions in 3.2—coheres with the recognized features of the concepts of *Zuhandenheit*, *Bedeutsamkeit*, and *Weltlichkeit*.

### 3.5 Dasein, Disclosure, and Setting-in-Motion

In the previous sections, I have argued that Heidegger extracts from Aristotle the resources for understanding, in one fell swoop, the being of entities both in themselves and in relation to Dasein via the conceptual framework of δύναμις, ἐντελέχεια, and κίνησις. I further argued that this framework in fact essentially underlies his conception of *Zuhandenheit* and of *Bedeutsamkeit* in BT. In doing so, ‘*Zuhandenheit*’ was revealed to be nothing other than Heidegger’s rendering of the ἐντελέχεια or active δύναμις constitutive of κίνησις, with the sense of κίνησις at issue being not of ontic locomotion, but ontological motion. Accordingly, “setting-in-motion” or “making present” in the relevant sense—bringing entities to

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[aus dem umsichtig ‘berechnenden’ Hantieren und Gebrauchen]. At the same time what is close in this way gets established [fixiert] by the circumspection of concern, with regard to the direction in which the equipment is accessible at any time. (GA2 137/BT 135) He goes on to say that closeness is only a mode of “remoteness [Entfernheit]” (GA2 137-8/BT 136). That is, something being physically close is irrelevant for its Zuhandensein; indeed, closeness is not a matter of objective spatiality, and physical proximity is a specific modification of place, rather than the predominant condition. The point also follows from his discussions of “de-severance [Entfernung],” which “means a vanishing of the farness, that is, of the remoteness of something, [its coming into] proximity [Näherung] (GA2 140/BT 139, trans. mod.).
Zuhandenheit—does not require literal, bodily manipulation, but rather “implication” or “involvement” by Dasein in its world. Such vaguely indicative expressions have mostly served so far as placeholders for a phenomenon not yet fully brought to light. In this section I intend to investigate the nature of this “setting-in-motion” and where Heidegger’s conception of it emerges in his existential analytic.

In HCT Heidegger takes up the topic of “sign institution [Zeichenstiftung],” which, he says, is a matter not of the ontic production of the entity but rather of taking it, through concern, in its situatedness or contexture with other entities:

Thus the south wind can be a sign of rain. It is more accurately an omen, and first and strictly an omen which is addressed to everyday concern, where it is encountered and as such discovered by everyday concern in the course of directing itself toward the weather (cultivation, harvest, or a military venture). Neither the south wind nor the rain, nor their conjunction and extantness [Vorhandensein] in the world as natural processes, none of these entities is instituted in the sense of being produced [im Sinne der Herstellung gestiftet]; in each instance, it is a matter of something always already extant of itself [das immer schon von ihm selbst her Vorhandene]. The south wind’s being a sign [Zeichensein] is instituted by taking it as a sign [als Zeichennehmen]. This sign-taking institution [zeichennehmende Stiftung] comes about by taking the weather into account [vollzieht sich in einem Rechnungtragen dem Wetter gegenüber], which in turn is grounded [gründet] in a particular concernedness [Besorgtheit], in everyday affairs, the everyday work of the farmer himself; more accurately, this is the primary discovery [Entdeckung] as an entity before any explicit elaboration [expliziten Ausarbeitung]. The sign-taking is grounded in this concernedness. (GA20 281-2/HCT 206, trans. mod.)

Before any explicit thematization, the entity is always given under an interpretation, always presented in the context of one’s projects and a totality of involvements; the south wind shows up as a sign of rain to the farmer in light of and in the midst of the farmer’s daily business. In showing up in this way, and being instituted as a sign, it is allowed to function as a sign, to have a sense, and thereby to play a meaningful role for the farmer. Heidegger refers

351 Kisiel translates ‘Vorhandensein’ as ‘being on hand,’ and ‘Vorhandenen’ as ‘something on hand.’
to this “showing up” as the “appresentation” (*Appräsentation*) of the south wind, a term he borrows from Husserl. An appresentation is not a bald deliverance, something like the bare Givenness of the thing, but is reliant upon a dispositional background of circumspective concern, together with a general domain of interconnected meaning-relations (farming practices, the weather and its relevance for the farmer’s projects, etc.) through which the concernful disposition itself is refracted, but which does not in any way come to the fore as explicit vocalization, explicit thematization, or the like. Indeed, as we saw in the previous chapter, Heidegger closely associates *Appräsentation* with *Auslegung* (interpretation). In BPP, this appresentation figures as “expectant-retentive enpresenting [*Gewärtigend-behaltenden Gegenwärtigen*]” (GA24 416/BPP 293), through which a “determinate totality of involvement [*bestimmte Bewandtnisganzheit*],” he says, “is pre-understood [*vorverstanden*]” (GA24 233/BPP 164, trans. mod.).

Nevertheless, this discursive background of interpretation cannot be taken as something subjective, or as issuing in a subjective understanding of the entity so instituted.

The HCT passage continues:

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352 “The most proximate everyday mode of interpretation has the functional form of appresentation [*die Funktionsform der Appräsentation*], specifically the appresentation of meaningfulness in the sense of accentuating [*der Hebung*] the referential correlations accessible at any given time [*der jeweils zugänglichen Verweisungszusammenhänge*]” (GA20 359/HCT 260, trans. mod.).

353 Hofstadter translates ‘Einer bestimmte Bewandtnisganzheit’ as ‘A specific functionality-whole,’ a translation which is appropriate and rightly highlights the *functional* character of equipmentality. However, it also covers over the reference here to *Bewandnis*, *involvement*, which I have been emphasizing.

354 Heidegger’s conception develops from a radicalized appropriation of the Greek [*eidos*], what he terms the “anticipated look [*vorweggenommene Aussehen*]” (GA24 149-51/BPP 106-7). He takes the Greek conception to serve as a “guiding clue [*der Leitfaden*]” for the “productive comportment [*herstellende Verhalten*]” (or “productive-intuitive comportment [*herstellend-anschauenden Verhalten*]) of Dasein (GA24 165/BPP 117). I will address this topic, and the issue of Heidegger’s inheritance of the Greek conceptions, in 3.7.
The sense of this sign-taking would be mistaken if one were to say that the south wind ‘in itself,’ ‘objectively,’ is not a sign, it is so construed [aufgefaßt] merely ‘subjectively.’ It is thus overlooked that this sign-taking, taking the south wind as a sign, is not a subjective construal [Auffassung], any more than this apparent mere construal has the sole sense of divulging [freizugeben] the objective, which means the environing world, equipment in its character of handiness [Zuhandenheitscharakter] and in its nature, of letting us encounter [begegnen zu lassen] this world and making it accessible [zugänglich zu machen]. With the interpretation of the sign as a subjective construal [Auffassung] one abandons [gibt...aus der Hand] the authentic sense of sign-taking, which consists precisely in appresenting [zu appräsentieren] the world more authentically in a certain direction [in einer gewissen Richtung in Welt eigentlicher], in bringing it out more emphatically [eindringlicher freizulegen] and not in subjectively construing [aufzufassen] it in some way. (GA 20 282/HCT 206-7, trans. mod.)

Heidegger insists on the same point in BT itself:

The kind of being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand [Die Seinsart dieses Seienden ist die Zuhandenheit]. But this is not to be understood as mere character-construal [bloßer Auffassungcharakter], as if such “aspects” were talked into [aufgeredet] the “entities” which we initially encounter [zunächst begegnenden], or as if some world-stuff [Weltstoff] which is initially extant in itself were “subjectively colored” [“subjektiv gefärbt”] in this way. (GA2 96/BT 101, trans. mod.)

Macquarrie and Robinson translate ‘Sie darf jedoch nicht als bloßer Auffassungscharakter verstanden werden’ as ‘But this characteristic is not to be understood as merely a way of taking them.’ I have opted to hold together ‘Auffassungscharakter.’ Stambaugh does so as well, translating it as ‘character of interpretation’ (BTS 67), but this risks confusing ‘Auffassung’ with ‘Auslegung,’ which she (like MacQuarrie and Robinson) also translates as ‘interpretation,’ and which (as is the entire point) carries for Heidegger none of the negative connotations he clearly wants to attach to ‘Auffassung.’

Additionally, Stambaugh opts for ‘discursively force upon’ as a translation of the rather oddball ‘aufgeredet.’ I much prefer Macquarrie and Robinson’s ‘talk into.’ A more playful translation of ‘aufrede’ might be ‘to confer upon,’ which capitalizes on the polysemy of the English ‘confer’ to imply both discussing and bestowing.

Additionally, in a passage which directly corresponds to the “south wind” discussion in HCT, he says:

If, for instance, the south wind ‘is accepted’ [‘gilt’] by the farmer as a sign of rain, then this ‘acceptance’ [‘Geltung’]—or the ‘value’ with which the entity is ‘invested’ [der an diesem Seienden “haftende Wert”]—is not a sort of bonus over and above what is already extant in itself, the flow of air in a definite geographical direction. The south wind may be meteorologically accessible [zugänglich sein mag] as something which just occurs [Als dieses nur noch Vorkommende]; but it is never proximally extant in such a way as this, only occasionally taking over the function of a warning signal. On the contrary, only by the circumspection with which one takes account of things in farming, is the south wind discovered in its being. (GA2 108/BT 111-2, trans. mod.)
Interpretation does not yield anything like a semantic or epistemic intermediary. To appresent is not to put something in place of the thing itself, nor to wrap it in subjective clothing; on the contrary, it is precisely the south wind itself, and nothing else, that is shown, when it shows itself as a sign of rain.

In lieu of talk of intermediaries, Heidegger tells us that “appresentation” is the “making present” of the entity; in fact, Heidegger uses the expressions interchangeably: “The environmental sign-thing [umweltliche Zeichending] […] stands in [steht in] an environmental correlation of references [Verweisungszusammenhang], and it appresents, makes present [macht gegenwärtig], the environing world […]” (GA20 280-1/HCT 206).\footnote{It is worth noting that Heidegger distinguishes between signs [Zeichen] and equipment [Zeug], and between their respective modes of signification (see §17 at GA2 102-11/BT 107-14). Heidegger treats signs as holding a special kind of signification, in which they do not merely “refer [verweisen]” to other equipment within an equipmental totality but “show [zeigen]” them in a certain way. Heidegger also draws this distinction at GA20 278-80/HCT 204-5. It may be suggested, then, that the functionality he attributes to signs here (appresentation, making present, etc.) is specific to them as a special kind of equipment, and not of what is Zuhanden generally. But this not only fails to make sense of why, as we have seen, Heidegger speaks of Zuhandenheit as presence (something he even does in the middle of his discussion here, at GA20 280/HCT 205)—nor why, as we shall see, the term which replaces ‘Appräsentation’ in BT is used more generally than in narrow reference to the functionality of signs—it also ignores the specifications Heidegger goes on to make in HCT about this very characterization of signs. Although he first brings up the identification of appresentation as making present in his discussion of the sign, it becomes clear that what distinguishes the sign from ordinary equipment is not that it appresents per se, but that it does so in a peculiar way of “pointing out” and thereby setting an explicit expectation about what is to be encountered equipmentally in the environment:

The environmental sign-thing, the arrow, stands in an environmental correlation of references, and it appresents, makes present, the environing world, in this case the local constellation of the next moment. This sign at the same time points out toward [zeigt…vor auf] something which will be environmentally extant [umweltlich vorhanden], the way and the places which the way will traverse, a particular constellation which determines and modifies my own and every other being in the world insofar as it is oriented locally (GA20 281/HCT 206, trans. mod.).}

This “pointing out” (aufzeigend) constitutes the manner of the sign’s showing (Zeigen). In BT he also addresses the distinction, noting that sign-establishment is conceptually dependent upon Zuhandenheit:

The sign-establishment [Die Zeichenstiftung] need not necessarily be carried out [zu vollziehen] in such a way that equipment which is not yet ready-to-hand at all is produced [hergestellt wird]. Signs also arise [entstehen] when one takes as a sign [Zum-Zeichennehmen] something that is ready-to-hand already. In this mode the sign-establishment is manifest [offenbart] in an even more primordial sense. The showing [Das Zeigen] not only procures the circumspectively oriented availability of a ready-to-hand equipmental totality [Zeugganzen], and of the environment in general, but sign-establishment can as a matter of fact discover [entdecken] from the first [allererst]. What is taken [genommen ist] to be a sign becomes accessible only through its readiness-to-hand. (GA2 107-8/BT 111, trans. mod.)
Likewise, Heidegger says the same of enpresenting: “In expectant-retentive enpresenting, the equipment comes into play [begegnet], becomes present [wird anwesend], enters into a present [kommt in eine Gegen-wart herein]” (GA24 416/BPP 293). Note that as Heidegger explicates it this “making present” invokes features familiar to the discussions of previous sections about what the presence or active δύναμις constitutive of motion consists in: when appresented or made present, the south wind, he says, *is brought out more emphatically in its being*. Since, by this presence, Heidegger means being-significant, being-meaningful, when Heidegger speaks of an event of “making present,” he means the cultivation of a thing into its capacity for sense, for showing up as meaningful and playing a functional role in the life of, for example, the farmer. But if this “making present” does nothing more than set the thing in motion with respect to its *Bereitheit*, sets it to work (to ἐνέργεια) or enacts its ownmost preparedness, then it is not a matter of lending the entity “subjective coloring” but rather simply delivering it into a mode of being for it, a mode wherein it is meaningful within the pervasive network of existential-concernful reference relations. Understanding the “making present” of appresentation—of interpretation—through the lens of the previous discussions explains why Heidegger is adamant that interpretation is not a matter of subjective construal.

Indeed, what is at issue is not even so much a matter of “making present” as “*bringing to presence*”—“*letting be present,*” even. Or, even more specifically, what

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Thus, he explains that the sign “explicitly place[s] under care [ausdrücklich…in die Sorge gestellt]” a particular appresentation (GA20 281/HCT 206), and this is what distinguishes the sign from other, more ordinary kinds of equipment, rather than that it appresent at all. Signs, as Kisiel puts it, consist simply in “attend[ing] to the appresentation of the world explicitly” (Kisiel 2002, 51). This is further evidenced by the fact that Heidegger signals at the beginning of the discussion he will use the characterizations of signs and showing as a way of clarifying the sense of meaningfulness itself (GA20 279/HCT 205). Thus, we cannot take everything he goes on to attribute to signs as attributable only to signs as such; because of how overt they are in their meaningfulness-character, Heidegger uses them as a particularly perspicuous way of introducing the topic meaningfulness and the referential character of meaningfulness. But the structure of making present, of appresentation, and the points about appresentation not being subjective construal, apply to the signification of equipmentality in general.
Heidegger calls in BT and BPP Bewendenlassen—letting-be-involved, which he speaks of as a freeing of the entity: “Letting-be-involved, ontologically understood, is the prior freeing of the entity for [vorgängige Freigabe...auf] its environmental readiness-to-hand” (GA2 114/BT 117, trans. mod.). Because, as discussed in 3.4, involvement is something like being-with, being-together, Bewendenlassen, Heidegger says, is letting something “be involved with something [lassen....mit etwas bewenden],” predicated on an involvement relation [Bewandtnisbezug] (GA24 415-6/BPP 293). It is simply, then, the actualization of Bereitheit, of δύναμις κοινωνίας, the release of entities into their possibilities of being-together, of composing a world.

In the 1930s, a notable appeal to a verbal use of ‘Welt’ will come to prominence for Heidegger, particularly in OWA and the Beiträge. That motif, however, originates in a number of courses and texts immediately following BT’s publication. In, for example, 1928’s MFL and the same year’s OEG, he speaks of the “world-entry [Welteingang]” or the “advent of world [Aufbruch von Welt],” and in 1929/30’s FCM, waxes on the topic of “world-formation [Weltbildung].” The structure of second nature, of actualization through the taking up and involvement of the entity by Dasein figures very clearly in Heidegger’s characterization of this “world-entry”; as he tells us, the entity’s “intraworldliness [Innerweltlichkeit]” can be understood as “the transcendental condition [Bedingung], in the

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358 Hofstadter translates this as “letting-function,” which highlights the sense in which it is simply a matter of releasing the thing into the motion towards which it already trends, that for which it is poised, letting-be-at-work in the sense of releasement in ἔνεργεια or enactment.

359 John Haugeland rightly emphasizes the importance of being as “letting be”—specifically as a “bringing together”—in his excellent essay of the same name (Haugeland 2007). I admit that Haugeland’s reading is near and dear to me, and influential to my reading of Heidegger beyond the credit I can really give it here. However, Haugeland’s meditations on “letting be” are short. I have sought to extend his reading’s exegetical basis, and, in doing so, have tried to further corroborate his point.

360 While in HCT and BT Heidegger does not speak of “worlding” directly, he does talk about Unzuhandenhheit, and Vorhandenheit in terms of “unworlding” [Entweltlichung].

361 ‘Aufbruch’ is translated by McNeill in OEG as ‘irruption.’
primordial sense, for the possibility [Möglichkeit] of extant things [Vorhandenes] being able to emerge as they are [in seinem Ansich sich bekunden kann]” (GA26 251/MFL 194).362 Thus, entities are not, as we might say, worldly in their immediate being: “Intraworldliness is accordingly not an extant property [vorhandene Eigenschaft] of extant things in themselves” (GA26 251/MFL 194); instead, “the entry into world is ‘something’ [‘etwas’] that happens [was mit ihm geschieht]” to the extant entity and specifically only occurring “when transcendence happens [geschieht], i.e., when historical Dasein exists [existiert]” (GA26 250-1/MFL 194).363 Dasein is the indispensable “opportunity [Gelegenheit]” for the world-entry of entities, a formulation he uses in both MFL and OEG.364

At the same time, though, Heidegger is just as adamant that in this world-entry precipitated by Dasein, entities undergo no change [Veränderung] (GA26 250/MFL 194) and instead “remain [bliebt] […] completely untouched [schlechthin unberührt]” (GA26 252/MFL 195). In OEG he clarifies that Dasein being “weltbildend,” means “it lets world occur [es Welt geschehen läßt]” (GA9 158/OEG 123, emphasis added), and in FCM he says that interpreting ‘Weltbildung’ as meaning “world is nothing in itself but rather a construction by man, something subjective” is an interpretation of the “problem of world and the concept of world” which “precisely fails to grasp the crucial problem” (GA29/30 413/FCM 285, trans. mod.). These features of world-entry all fit with the discussions of 3.3, together indicating it is a matter ontological realization, an actualization of a mode of being

362 MFL’s translator, Michael Heim, renders ‘Vorhandenen’ as ‘extant things.’
363 In OEG: “World-entry is not some process that transpires in those entities that enter into it [ist kein Vorgang am eingehenden Seienden], but is something that “happens” [“geschieht”] “with” entities. And such occurrence is the existing of Dasein […] (GA9 159/OEG 123, trans. mod.)
364 One example: “At any rate, entities (extant things) could never get encountered [nie angetroffen werden] had they not the opportunity to enter a world. We are speaking therefore of the possible and occasional [geleglichen] entrance of entities into world” (GA26 250/MFL 194).
of the thing, not some ontic alteration or subjectivization. And that is because it is nothing other than releasing into motion, letting-be-involved.

Now as I mentioned above, Heidegger borrows ‘Appräsentation’ from Husserl, and it has been noted that HCT is the only lecture course where he uses the term (Denker 2013, 72). There is, though, an expression deployed in BT—indeed utterly central to that text and within Heidegger’s existential analytic—which plays the same role of meaning for Heidegger “making present,” and which has connotations in ordinary usage of actualization. It is in fact a term which Kisiel (Kisiel 2002, 98) surmises to have replaced ‘Appräsentation’ within Heidegger’s terminology: ‘Erschlossenheit,’ often translated as ‘disclosure’ or (quite aptly) ‘world-disclosure.’ And this conclusion on Kisiel’s part makes a great deal of sense, for the structures of appresentation as actualization, setting in motion, can be wrung from the very etymology of ‘Erschlossenheit.’

First, ‘Erschlossenheit’ is not to be confused with ‘Entschlossenheit,’ resoluteness, though Kisiel notes that the etymological connection is one on which Heidegger deliberately capitalizes. Their common root is ‘schließen,’ which means something like: to close, to

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365 Husserl most notably uses the term in connection with the mode in which other subjectivities are presented. The other is appresented to me in the sense that it is not presented exhaustively but rather in such a way that there is an indication something is outstanding and not presented. For Husserl, just as the other as such comes into view so too does their subjectivity as such recede. See also Denker 2013, 73-4.

366 As Kisiel notes, throughout the 1920s Heidegger by and large used ‘Erschlosseheit’ (disclosedness or disclosure) with regard to Dasein and ‘Entdecktheit/Entdeckung’ (discoveredness) with regard to entities, only “reversing” this practice in BT (Kisiel 1993, 275), in order to “bring [the term ‘Erschlossenheit’] into terminological proximity” with Entschlossenheit (resoluteness) (Kisiel 1993, 422). Additionally, it seems clear, especially given the nature of Understanding as Heidegger describes it in HCT, BT, BPP and elsewhere, that Dasein and its world are always co-disclosed. As Dahlstrom puts it beautifully, “In understanding being-here [Dasein] discloses the manner of being of entities within-the-world. In the process, it also discloses itself and, indeed, precisely by finding itself disposed in the world; being so disposed, being-here understands what is at stake in being-in-the-world” (Dahlstrom 2001, 306).

For these reasons, I speak here of the disclosure of entities, or their being, and by and large treat ‘Erschlossenheit’ and ‘Entdecktheit/Entdeckung’ interchangeably. Likewise, I will not delve into the intricacies of the distinctions between these concepts and Unverborgenheit (unconcealment). These intricacies have, in my view, been decisively elucidated in Wrathall 2011.
bring to a close, to conclude, to resolve, or to decisively determine. ‘Entschliessen’ thus means to decide, to commit, to resolve oneself, and thus to determine oneself in the sense of determination or steadfastness, (the latter two being precisely what ‘Entschlossenheit’ means). ‘Erschließen,’ like ‘schließen,’ means in one sense to conclude, but in the more specific register of a natural or even favorable conclusion (here I mean ‘natural’ in the sense of characteristic or essential, not having to do with nature). It thus has a subtle teleological or even evaluative connotation; ‘erschließen’ means specifically to bring to completion—not some arbitrary completion, in the bare temporal sense (as would perhaps be an appropriate use of ‘schließen’), but, with regard to what is completed, its completion, a consummation characteristic of it, a resolution natural and proper to it.367 For this reason, despite its sense of “concluding,” it also has shades of accessing, unlocking, opening (thus the understandable translation of dis-closure).368 Taking these valences together, we get a verb which means to access something, and at once to open it up, to bring it to full flower, and thus to its completion—in other words, ἐντελέχεια as active δύναμις. The sense of “accessing” which ‘erschließen’ expresses, then, is not just coming across something, but rather tapping into it, harnessing it, releasing its potential.

For these reasons, a felicitous translation of ‘Erschlossenheit’ is as a broad synonym of Hegel’s ‘Entwicklung’: ‘development’ or ‘cultivation,’ as we might speak of a farm as a “development,” or a primeval forest as “undeveloped” (or as holding “untapped

367 Note as well, then, the sense of kairological temporality that Heidegger was developing in the 1920s (and which Theodore Kisiel has so lucidly excavated) present in the meaning of Erschlossenheit. Echoing the valences of Erschlossenheit, kairos means time not in the straightforward, quantitative sense of a sequence of linear moments, but in a qualitatively loaded sense, the auspicious or decisive moment, as when we say, “the time is right,” “this is our time,” or “her arrival was timely.” As Kisiel says, “Kairolgy and formal indication will together constitute the most essential, but largely unspoken, core of BT itself” (Kisiel 1993, 152).

368 As observed in 2.2, the sense of ‘erschließen’ is equated by Heidegger with that of ‘aufschließen’—to lay open (GA2 101/BT 105). Thus ‘Erschlossenheit’ can mean openness.
potential”). These shared shades of meaning between Hegel’s ‘Entwicklung’ and Heidegger’s ‘Erschlossenheit’ are anything but accidental, both issuing from a similar manner of appropriating Aristotle’s conceptual framework of δύναμις, ἐντέλεχεια, and κίνησις. Nevertheless, the complexities of ‘Erschlossenheit,’ and its use by Heidegger, mean that, more specifically, the ἐντέλεχεια of such development or actualization is understood as nothing other than the potential in its active form, as being-at-work (not, therefore, as second actuality).

I submit, then, that ‘Erschlossenheit’ as a Heideggerian term of art must be understood precisely so as not to lose its characteristic signification in terms of making present as setting in motion. It must, in other words, be understood in terms of a second

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369 It should be noted, further, that the sense of ‘erschließen’ also converges with that of ‘to utilize’ (or even ‘to exploit’) in the sense of using as a means, that is, of instrumentality. This obviously coordinates well with the sense of ‘Zuhandenheit,’ and so ‘erschließen. Of course, these instrumental connotations (and ‘to exploit’ makes them most forcefully felt) are ones which, from an ecological perspective, may be troubling. As Iain Thomson vibrantly illustrates:

> Just think, on the one hand, of a poetic shepherding into being that respects the natural potentialities of the matters with which it works, just as Michelangelo (who, let us recall, worked in a marble quarry) legendarily claimed he simply set his “David” free from a particularly rich piece of marble (after studying it for a month); or, less hyperbolically, as a skillful woodworker notices the inherent qualities of particular pieces of wood—attending to subtleties of shape and grain, different shades of color, weight, and hardness—while deciding what might be built from that wood (or whether to build from it at all). Then contrast, on the other hand, a technological making that imposes a predetermined form on matter without paying heed to any intrinsic potentialities, the way an industrial factory indiscriminately grinds wood into woodchips in order to paste them back together into straight particle board, which can then be used flexibly and efficiently to construct a maximal variety of useful objects. (Thomson 2011, 21)

Concerns about Heidegger’s picture here—that it does not adequately distinguish between the two models Thomson gives, are legitimate; in fact, for reasons broadly along these lines, Heidegger will eventually come to see in Erschlossenheit remnants of an impositional or subjectivistic model of significance and signification which he intended to move beyond, one stuck within a (Late) Modernist propensity for technological enframing. This sort of self-criticism, and the move away from Erschlossenheit and its valences is one of the crucial dimensions, I think, of Heidegger’s Kehre (though certainly not the only one). Here, however, I am concerned solely with providing what we might call the transcendental features of the early Heidegger’s account, and the transcendental sense in which disclosure is not a matter of subjective imposition. This leaves open ethical and ecologically-minded senses, and the concerns that go with them. The distinction between poetic and technological modes of actualizing entities is, I suspect, connected in some way with the fact that truth encompasses both phenomenon and semblance, which I shall touch upon in the Conclusion. Additionally, see fn. 339 for an indication of why the picture itself may harbor an indication of how to avoid technological enframing.
nature of entities. Erschlossenheit is not, then, the mere presentation or rendering visible of something which in that suffers no alteration of its being, but must be attributed an ontological significance as the entity’s literal dis-closure or opening-up in its being, its ontological elevation into meaningfulness.\(^\text{370}\) This significance can be kept alive if we center the Aristotelian pedigree: disclosure is not simply a matter of beholding something but setting it in motion.\(^\text{371}\)

Now ‘Erschlossenheit’ is of course one of Heidegger’s translations of the Greek ‘ἀλήθεια.’ But understanding it in this way, as containing a “double sense,” of both exhibition and elevation, also brings it close to being an expression for ‘ποίησις’ (or at least Heidegger’s conception of it). For Heidegger explains in 1925’s PS that ‘ποίησις,’ as the Greeks originally understood it, is loaded with two key dimensions of meaning, noting that “the sense oscillates [schwingt] between bringing into presence [In-die-Gegenwart-Bringens] and letting be seen [Sehen-lassens] […]” (GA19 392/PS 271, emphasis added). Put more carefully, this bringing to presence is a kind of production, though one in which what is thereby created is not the shown entity itself but rather the showing itself; what is produced is not the entity but “only a determinate mode of the thing’s self-giving [eine bestimmte Weise des Sich-Gebens der Sachen]” (GA19 394/PS 273).\(^\text{372}\) This mode of self-giving may be genuine or it may be ingenuine (it may be phenomenon or semblance), but in either case it

\(^{370}\) I do not mean to suggest that ‘disclosure’ is a poor translation of ‘Erschlossenheit’ so much as to insist we understand and keep in mind its connotations.

\(^{371}\) Notably, in PS Heidegger explicates the nature of γιγνώσκειν (knowledge)—a manner of understanding disclosure, and an “exemplary phenomenon of κοινωνία”—interchangeably in terms of both Erschließen and Vollziehen (carrying out, putting into practice, accomplishing), and by means of these associates it with κίνησις: “[Γιγνώσκειν] is determined in its being according to [wird bestimmt in seinem Sein nach] its two aspects,” the first of which, he tells us, is “accomplishing [Vollziehen], disclosing [Erschließen]: κίνησις…” (GA19 489/PS 338, trans. mod.)

\(^{372}\) ‘Weise des Sich-Gebens’ is translated by Rojcewicz and Schuwer as ‘mode of presentation.’ And while this is apt, not only as a translation but also given the connections here to Fregean semantics, I have decided to remain more literal.
occurs “in such a way, to be sure, that the thing is present in itself [so allerdings, daß die Sache in sich selbst präsent ist]” (GA19 392/PS 271).\textsuperscript{373} Both ‘Erschlossenheit’ and ‘ποίησις’ carry the double significance of showing and setting-in-motion, such that we might say in the showing something is \textit{manifest} not only in the sense of rendered visible but in an ontologically thicker sense of \textit{taking shape}, bringing to \textit{ἐντελέχεια} a δύναμις.\textsuperscript{374}

It seems clear at this point that these assorted terms of art appearing either before, within, or directly in the wake of BT—\textit{Appräsentation, Bewendenlassen, Welteingang, Weltbildung, Erschlossenheit}—are not simply linked together as variations on the recurring theme of “making present,” but more precisely illustrative of the motif of actualization I have been explicating all along, and which in fact underlies Heidegger’s concept of presence itself. That structure of actualization or setting-in-motion exhibited in all these moments of Heidegger’s corpus, though, has its foundations at the very roots of Heidegger’s phenomenological inheritance from Husserl. In HCT’s resume of basic phenomenological concepts, Heidegger understands the import of Husserl’s categorial intuition as constituting something very similar to actualization, describing categorial intuition in terms of “acts of synthesis” which generate a “new objectivity,” in the bringing into relief of the object’s “moments” or specific determinations. Heidegger tells us that the subject matter which constitutes the categorial moments of the full intention render visible the entity in a new light, not just in its ontic character but in the manner of its being: “In other words, the being-yellow of the chair, the previously unarticulated [vordem ungegliederte] subject matter, now

\textsuperscript{373} How something can be present in itself and yet only shows itself as a semblance is something which I shall come to in the Conclusion.

\textsuperscript{374} It is notable that therefore ‘ἀλήθεια’ must have this sense for Heidegger too, and this is why Heidegger not only associates ποίησις and ἀλήθεια rather closely but moreover why a verbal sense of truth—“truthing”—becomes a topic for Heidegger.
becomes visible [wird...sichtbar] through the articulation [die Gliederung hindurch], through the arrangement [Gliederung] which we call the state of affairs [Sachverhalt]” (GA20 85/HCT 63). More...
means the “accentuation” [Hebung] which draws out the state of affairs “transforms [formt] nothing in the given matter; nothing happens [geschieht] to the chair in its simply given reality [schlicht gegebenen Realität]” (GA20 86/HCT 63). That is, no ontic transformation occurs, just as we have seen Heidegger say that Appräsentation, Weltbildung and ποίησις do not amount to a production of the entity itself. Secondly, though, a transformation does occur on the level of the “ideality” that is the state of affairs; a “new objectivity” arises which actually presents the entity “more authentically”:

Yet through this new objectivity of the accentuated [gehobenen] state of affairs, the chair becomes [wird er] expressly visible [ausdrücklich sichtbar] precisely in what it is [gerade in dem, was er ist]. Its presence, its being present [Anwesenheit, Gegenwart] becomes [wird] more authentic through this assertion [“This S is p and q”], through the accentuation of q as situated in [in...befindlich] S, the accentuation therefore of the relation [der Beziehung] of the state of affairs. In this accentuation of the relational state of affairs [der Sachverhaltsbeziehung], we have a form of more authentic objectification of the given matter [der vorgegebenen Sache]. (GA20 86/HCT 63, trans. mod.)

The being of the chair is what is elevated or accentuated through the comportment—i.e. raised to a superlative mode. Its potential for fulfilling this objectivity, its presence in the relationality of a state of affairs, is realized through the categorial act.

376 “However, even though this accentuation of the state of affairs is grounded in the perceived subject matter, it cannot be said that the state of affairs itself, the composition [Bestand] brought out [herausgehobene] in the subject matter, is a real part or portion of this matter [realer Teil der Sache, ein reales Stück]. The being-yellow of this chair, the state of affairs as such, is not a real moment in the chair like the arm or the upholstery. The state of affairs is rather of an ideal nature [ist idealer Natur]. The chair does not contain [hat] its being-yellow as a real property [Eigenschaft]. What is real is the yellow, and in the state of affairs only the quality [die Beschaffenheit] is accentuated as something real, objective” (GA20 85-6/HCT 63).

377 ‘Hebung’ literally translates as ‘elevation’ or ‘raising.’ The etymological similarities between ‘Aufhebung’ on the one hand and on the other the sorts of words Heidegger uses here and which Kisiel chooses to translate as “accentuate” and “accentuation” (gehobenen, Hebung)—words that connote elevation or the raising of something to a higher status—require little remark beyond the obvious; the reader may draw from this what they will, but the mounting parallels I have exhibited between Hegel and Heidegger’s ontological commitments ought to assuage any dismissal of the similarity in word choice as being either merely incidental or insignificant. See also fnss. 313 and 332.
Thirdly, Heidegger therefore does not understand synthesis as alike to that of transcendental idealism, and expressly rejects this “old mythology” of faculty dualism:

One sees in the antithesis of the two kinds of intuition [sensuous and categorial] a recurrence of the old contrast of sense and understanding. If one adds to this the conceptual pair of form and matter, the issue may be laid out in the following fashion: Sensuousness is characterized as receptivity and understanding as spontaneity (Kant), the sensory as matter and the categorial as form. Accordingly, the spontaneity of understanding becomes the formative principle [formenden Prinzip] of a receptive matter [empfangenden Stoffes], and in one stroke we have the old mythology of an intellect which glues and rigs together [zusammenbastelt und verleimt] the world’s matter with its own forms. Whether it is metaphysical or epistemological as in Rickert, the mythology is the same. Categorial intuition is subject to this misunderstanding only as long as the basic structure [die Grundstruktur] of intuiting and of all comportments—intentionality—is not seen or is suppressed. The categorial ‘forms’ are not constructs [Gemächte] of acts but objects [Gegenstände] which manifest themselves [sich selbst sichtbar werden] in these acts. (GA20 96/HCT 70)\(^{378}\)

Intentional contents are not to be understood as the cobbled-together unity of discrete material and formal determinations, each brought to the exchange, respectively, by the world and the subjective intellect, but rather as the result of a categorial structuration inchoate in the sensuous and merely rendered explicit or disclosed via its being intended. The act itself is indeed necessary for the emergence of this “new objectivity,” but not because it (or the enacting subjectivity) carries along with it structural form which it imposes upon a mere sensuous content, or deigns to endow such content with a schematic form extrinsic to the thing itself. Synthesis, Heidegger insists, “is not so much a matter of connecting [so sehr em das Verknüpfen] two parts which are at first separated [zunächst getrennt] as we glue two things together and fuse them [wie wir zwei Dinge zusammenlemein und verschmelzen].

\(^{378}\) He reiterates this main thrust of this point in BT: “Thus the significance-relationships [Die Bedeutsamkeitsbezüge] which determine the structure of the world are not a network of forms which a wordless subject has laid over [übergestülpt würd] some kind of material” (GA2 484/BT 417).
Instead [...] σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις give [geben] objects” (GA20 87/HCT 64). This giving is the *displaying or exhibiting* in the sense of *Aufweisung* discussed in Chapter 2, as is made clear in BPP:

What Aristotle is familiar with [kennt] as σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις must not be [darf man nicht] interpreted externally [äußerlich] as it was in antiquity and continued to be later on, as though representations [Vorstellungen] are first taken apart from one another and then once more combined [auseinander genommen und dann wieder verbunden werden]. Instead, this synthetic and diairetic comportment [Verhalten] of assertion [der Aussage], of Logos, is intrinsically exhibiting [ist in sich selbst aufweisend]. (GA24 298/BPP 209, trans. mod.)

This is in fact precisely why this “synthesis” is only “Hebung,” accentuation or elevation; it cannot be seen as a modification of the real object by some externality, or as a stitching together or representations, but instead, just as we have seen in the manifold figures for *making present*, a development of its *being* in a more authentic register:

[The categorial ‘forms’] are not something made [Gemachtes] by the subject and even less something added [Herangebrachtes] to the real objects, such that the real entity is itself modified [modifiziert] by the forming [Formung]. Rather, they actually present [präsentieren] the entity more truly in its ‘being-in-itself’ [‘An-sich-sein’]. (GA20 96/HCT 70)

Thus “synthesis” means the elevation of the entity to a more authentic or superlative mode of its being, one discursively rich and accessible—namely, *Bedeutsamkeit*, status as a sense or

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379 Therefore, again, this *bringing to presence* is of an *ontological*, rather than ontic, sort:

Categorial acts constitute [konstituieren] a new objectivity. This is always to be understood intentionally and does not mean that they let the things spring up [entstehen] just anywhere. ‘*Constituting*’ does not mean producing [Herstellen] in the sense of making [Machen] and fabricating [Verfertigen]; it means *letting the entity be seen in its objectivity* [Sehenlassen des Seienden in seiner Gegenständlichkeit]. This objectivity, which presents itself in the categorial acts or in perceptions pervaded by categorial acts, is not a result of the activity of intellectual understanding [nicht Resultant der Betätigung des Verstandes] upon the external world [an der Außenwelt]. It is not a result of an activity upon an already given mix of sensations or throng of affections [an einem zuvor gegebenen Empfindungsgemenge oder Gewühl von Affektionen], which are ordered [die geordnet werden] to form [entsteht] a picture of the world (GA20 96-7/HCT 71).
In what respect does this bear any semblance to an intuitive conception of anything fairly termed “synthesis”—putting together, composition? In just this way: it is the integration of the entity into a larger whole, *its incorporation into a world* or a network of significance and involvements. It has one and the same meaning for Heidegger as *Bewendenlassen* or *Weltbildung*, as the bringing to actualization of δύναμις κοινωνίας, *Bereitheit*.

An essentially identical account of synthesis is given in BT itself. Heidegger explains that, “Here ‘synthesis’ does not mean a binding and linking together [*Verbinden und Verknüpfen*] of representations, a manipulation [*Hantieren*] of psychical incidents [*Vorkomnissen*] where the ‘problem’ arises of how these bindings, as something inside, agree with [*mit...übereinstimmen*] something physical outside” (*GA2 44/BT 56*, trans. mod.). Instead, it “means letting something be seen in its togetherness [*Beisammen*] with something—letting it be seen *as something*” (*GA2 44/BT 56*)—i.e. within, as he says in

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380 It thus provides the resources for understanding an objectivity that goes beyond the merely “real,” yet not by importing a constructive subjectivity:

When we say that the relational state of affairs [*Sachverhaltsbeziehung*] is ideal and not real, this certainly does not mean—and this is the decisive point—that it is not objective or even the least bit less objective than what is given as real [*als das real Vorgegebene*]. Rather, by way of understanding what is present in categorial intuition we can come to see that the objectivity of an entity is really not exhausted by [*nicht in dem erschöpft*] this narrow definition of reality, that objectivity in its broadest sense is much richer than the reality of a thing, and what is more, that the reality of a thing is comprehensible in its structure [*in ihrer Struktur...verständlich ist*] only on the basis of the full objectivity of the simply experienced [*erfahrenen*] entity. (*GA20 89/HCT 66*, trans. mod.)

The thing’s objectivity is also constituted by its ideality, that within it which is implicit and made explicit in the new objectivity afforded by the categorial act. There are broad similarities here with Hegel’s language of “ideality” as potentiality, which we saw in 1.4: “the germ already contains the whole plant within itself, but in an ideal way” (*WB8 309/EL 237; §161 Zusatz*). So too is something like this true of the state of affairs, which need only be drawn out and made actual.

It is on the basis of this broadened conception of the objectivity of the real that Heidegger says that phenomenology is able to counter idealism, by which he means *subjectivism*:

Today we are in a position to move against idealism precisely on this front only because phenomenology has demonstrated that the non-sensory [*Unsinnliches*] and ideal cannot without further ado be identified with the immanent, conscious, subjective. This is not only negatively stated but positively shown; and this constitutes the true sense of the discovery of the categorial intuition […]. (*GA20 78-9/HCT 58*)
HCT, the relationality of the state of affairs. By showing the entity \textit{in terms of something else}, it is given in a certain relationality, and it thereby presented \textit{as} such and such.

In Chapter 2 I discussed the connection between \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\zeta\) and the propositional articulateness of the as-structure, whether apophantic or hermeneutic. This as-structure is nothing other than the “product” of what is “produced” in synthesis, that is, in the functioning of \(\lddot\gamma\dot\varepsilon\iota\nu\). It is not surprising, therefore, that, finally, Heidegger speaks as well of \(\lddot\gamma\dot\varepsilon\iota\nu\) in terms of “making present”:

In this deliberating, the world explicitly keeps to its primary character of as such and such, as conducive to...and precisely because \(\lddot\gamma\dot\varepsilon\iota\nu\) in its primary manner and mode addresses the world as something [...]. In speaking about something, I make it present, I bring it into the there, as this or that, in the character of as. (GA18 60/BCR 42-3).

And \(\lddot\gamma\dot\varepsilon\iota\nu\), the unlocking of entities in speech [\textit{das ansprechende Aufschließen des Seienden}], is nothing else than the making present [\textit{das Gegenwärtig-machen}] of what is most properly visible in entities [\textit{der Sichtbarkeit des Seienden selbst}] and thereby the making present of entities in their essence [\textit{damit dieses in dem, was es ist}]; as presenting disclosure [\textit{als gegenwärtigendes Erschließen}], \(\lddot\gamma\dot\varepsilon\iota\nu\) appropriates [\textit{bringt...zur Aneignung}] what is present [\textit{die Gegenwart}]. (GA19 579-80/PS 401, trans. mod.)

The condition of involvement, of synthesis or the actualization of \(\delta\omicron\nu\acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{\iota}\varsigma\) \(\kappa\omicron\iota\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\nu\acute{\iota}\varsigma\), of things becoming fully present in their abilities-to-be, is none other than \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\zeta\): the determinancy of \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\zeta\) brings into synthesis entities themselves, allows them to come into their own in relation to one another and involvement with one another, as such and such.\textsuperscript{381}

And this is why, as we saw in 3.5, motion as precipitated by in-handedness is not a matter of ontic manipulation but rather of being taken up in Dasein’s \textit{practices} in whatever respect, wherein a determinate and propositionally articulate conversance with the matters always

\textsuperscript{381} In fact, Heidegger says, rather cryptically, that Plato determines \(\kappa\omicron\iota\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\nu\acute{\iota}\varsigma\) is “the apriori title for \(\psi\omicron\chi\omicron\varsigma\) and \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\zeta\)” (GA19 579/PS 401). But we now understand that this means the essence of \(\lddot\gamma\dot\varepsilon\iota\nu\), as the essential determination of the human, as \(\zeta\omicron\omicron\omicron\nu\) \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\zeta\) \(\acute{\iota}\nu\), is tied to \(\kappa\omicron\iota\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\nu\acute{\iota}\varsigma\); \(\lddot\gamma\dot\varepsilon\iota\nu\) is setting-in-motion. See also ftn. 323.
already lies. One of the primary ways we “involve” things is simply by talking about them, i.e. Rede; we refer to them, and thereby implicate them in the expanse of reference-relations. But this means that Rede is the fundamental means, underlying praxis as such, for setting entities in motion, of bringing to presence.

### 3.6 Vorhandenheit, Presence, and Mere Presence

Despite all of the textual evidence amassed, the association of Zuhandenheit with presence may appear problematic, especially in light of Macquarrie and Robinson’s canonical English rendering of ‘Vorhandenheit’ as ‘presence-at-hand.’ Some commentators, such as Taylor Carman, have even understood presence as playing an either unimportant or antagonistic role within Heidegger’s early thought. As the previous sections should highlight, however,

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382 We might then suspect that simply being intended at all, in any fashion, is the essential means by which implication occurs. We don’t need to investigate this further here, however.

383 There are a host of complex issues surrounding the translation of ‘Vorhandenheit’ and its derivatives. Macquarrie and Robinson’s ‘presence-at-hand,’ while technically appropriate in some respects, invites catastrophically misreading Heidegger when paired with translating ‘Zuhandenheit’ as ‘readiness-to-hand’ (a fine translation of that term) by thereby associating, intentionally or not, presence strictly with Vorhandenheit. And, as Dreyfus notes (Dreyfus 1991, 40), there is no trace of ‘presence’ in ‘Vorhandenheit’ (at least, beyond idiomatic translations). Stambaugh’s preferred ‘objective presence’ is perhaps even worse in this regard, for it has the further problem of suggesting Zuhandenheit by contrast is not a matter of objectivity—an intimation that, as is my overarching point, runs counter to Heidegger’s entire conception (more on this in 3.4). In any case, Macquarrie and Robinson did not have the benefit of the relevant lecture courses which clarify the relationship between presence and Zuhandenheit.

A slew of translational preferences have cropped up, only a fraction of which I can document here. Rojcewicz keeps to Macquarrie and Robinson’s familiar translation in BCN, as do Rojcewicz and Schuwer in PS (for ‘Vorhandensein’; for ‘vorhanden’ they use ‘there at hand’ or ‘there on hand’). In BCR, Metcalf and Tanzer opt for ‘being-at-hand’ or ‘at-handedness’ while Brogan and Warnek in AM choose ‘being present’ (but shift between ‘at hand’ and, confusingly, ‘present’ for ‘vorhanden’). Sheehan unsurprisingly stands out from the crowd with the unique ‘out-there-ness’ in LQT. Kiesiel shifts between ‘extantness’ and ‘being on hand’ in HCT, and Thomson cleverly adopts ‘on hand’ in order to contrast it with the ‘hands-on’ of Zuhanden. Both Hofstadter in BPP and Heim in MFL follow Kiesiel with ‘extantness.’ A somewhat similar rendering is favored by Dreyfus, Blattner, and Haugeland, with ‘occurrentness’ or ‘occurrence.’

I for my part have selected ‘extantness.’ ‘The extant’ has the sense of the immediate, temporal present that is critical to understanding what Heidegger means by the term in its distinctness from Zuhandenheit.

384 Carman’s view stems from a response to Olafson’s critique of Dreyfus’ Heidegger, where, among other things, he criticizes Olafson’s contention that presence plays a positive role in Heidegger’s early period. Carman argues that Olafson’s reading of Heidegger, resting on his conception of presence and intuition, conceives of Dasein in an “over-individuated” sense, downplaying the social elements of its existential constitution (Carman 1994). See also Olafson 1994 for his response.
disentangling the proper way of understanding how Zuhandenheit, Bereitheit, and now Vorhandenheit relate to one another, and how presence figures into these relations, requires a great deal of caution.

Heidegger tells us that to Zuhandenheit belongs presence of a specific kind: “readiness-to-hand formally implies [besagt formal] praesens [Praesenz], presence [Anwesenheit], but a praesens of its own kind [eigener Art]” (GA24 439/BPP 309, trans. mod.). In BT itself he tells us that circumspection is characterizable by presence, or a certain kind of making-present, one which is to be distinguished from that of objectification characteristic of extantness: “Being which Objectifies and which is alongside the intraworldly extant, is characterized by a distinctive kind of making-present [ausgezeichneten Gegenwärtigung]. This making-present is distinguished from the Present of circumspection […]” (GA2 480/BT 414, trans. mod.). In 3.4 I concluded that this specific form of presence is a matter of the being-at-work of the potentiality: “ἐντέλεσις: […] Not only present [anwesend] in general, […] but out of itself [von ihm selbst], according to its essence, only in act [her seinem Wesen nach nur im Wirken seined]” (GA22 175/BCN 146). We also saw in 3.2 that there is another form of presence a potentiality may have, that belonging to the inactive δύναμις. In contrast with the previous, this is the presence of a potentiality not as its full manifestation in being-at-work, but rather with respect to its possible activation per

As regards the issue of presence in particular, I adamantly side with Olafson. Generally speaking, I fall more into Olafson’s camp than into Carman’s, and while some elements of the latter’s critique of the former have merit, I think (particularly with regard to Olafson’s blindspots about das Man), Chapter 2 shows that my own reading, insofar as it stresses pragmatist themes, cannot be subject to claims of “individualizing” Dasein. Hofstader translates ‘eigener Art’ as ‘of a peculiar sort.’

Note the equivalence here between Praesenz and Anwesenheit, a fact which Olafson also observes (Olafson 1987, 264-5 n. 13).

As I mentioned in ftn. 312, Olafson understands presence as a clarification of the meaning of being in both the early and later work (Olafson 1987). He therefore cautions that, “Vorhandenheit is not to be confused with presence—either Praesenz or Anwesenheit […]” (Olafson 265 n. 22).
se, its holding-itself-in-readiness for being set in motion. Heidegger acknowledges, then, two distinct manners in which presence may belong to a potentiality, corresponding respectively to that of the inactive and active δύναμις. And he characterizes these, again respectively, as *Bereitheit* and *Zuhandenheit*.

What then of *Vorhandenheit* and presence? Earlier, we saw Heidegger’s explication that readiness-to-hand is the presence of what is extant—*das/die Vorhandene(n)*—with respect to its readiness. Such passages make clear that Bereitheit is not another name for Zuhandenheit. It is important to recognize, though, that neither should they be read as suggesting *what is ready* is simply another name for *what is extant*. In contrast to both *die Bereiten* and *die Zuhandenen, die Vorhandenen* would refer to what exists, simply in terms of its existing and nothing else. In other words, it designates entities with respect to their presence in the narrowest, most stripped-down sense, as what is immediately present in the here and now.\(^{388}\) This means that what is distinctive about Vorhandenheit is not presence *per se* but a specific form of it, and here in particular a derivative one: presence in a purely privative sense, *mere presence and naught else*: extantness. In and of itself there is nothing objectionable for Heidegger in referring to an entity—any entity—as *das Vorhandene*, or of describing it as *vorhanden*.\(^{389}\) The problem arises when extantness itself, Vorhandenheit, is taken as designating the basic ontological character of an entity, i.e. of providing an account of what it fundamentally means for something to be—an error which Heidegger calls the *ontology of Vorhandenheit* (GA2 220/BT 209).

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\(^{388}\) At one point Heidegger gives ‘*Vorhandenheit*’ as a translation of ‘Ἀποκείμενον’ (see GA18 34/BCR 25).

\(^{389}\) While Bereitheit and Zuhandenheit are mutually exclusive ontological categories (insofar as the inactivity and the activity of a potentiality are mutually exclusive), Vorhandenheit is equally applicable to entities which are either. As an ontological descriptor, ‘vorhanden’ is categorically orthogonal to the Bereitheit-Zuhandenheit distinction.
In point of fact, the Aristotelian framework sheds light on what is problematic to Heidegger in such an ontological picture. Because Zuhandenheit involves the manifestness of something with respect to its readiness for such and such, with respect to its ability-to-be, matters of temporality—that is, diachronicity—necessarily come into play. When entities are present as standing in pragmatic relations and uses, entities in their functionality or functional roles, they show themselves relationally, for they have the referential structure constitutive for Heidegger of Bedeutsamkeit, referring beyond themselves, to a whole of other entities, scenarios, utilities, actions, and significations in which they are embedded as a component of a network of intelligibility with which one is at home. Thus, Zuhandenheit is always a grasping of the thing as extending beyond itself, as in the midst of other entities and of purposes, of uses and deployments, of involvements and implications. When entities are present in their abilities-to-be, thus determinative with respect to their characteristic suitabilities, as this or that, the world therefore does not show up as a heap of what is just actual or present in the narrowest sense, or of the facts—“alles was der Fall ist,” in Wittgenstein’s famous proposition—but is rather the site of what can be: what could have been, and what may yet be—“Entities are thus [Seiendes, das ist] and therefore something is not yet, but it can be [dabei etwas noch nicht ist, aber es sein kann]” (GA18 377/BCR 255, trans. mod.). Zuhandenheit is the presence—that is, the full manifestation—in the immediate here and now, of something which is not entirely of the immediate here and now.

390 This means not just the relations they do stand in, but the relations they may stand in—the web of significance is a web of relations, but this means both actual and potential relations).

391 The invocation of the Tractarian Wittgenstein here glosses over many intricacies of the Tractatus’s stated ontology. For Proposition 2.0123 also says that to know an object is to know all the possibilities of its occurrences in states of affairs—and that these possibilities lie in the nature of the object itself (Wittgenstein 2014, 6). Under at least one manner of appropriating such claims, there is a Heideggerian theme to be gleaned from this, and it would imply that “knowing” the world, as all that is the case, also implies understanding it as a site of possibility via the possibilities that lie in objects.
a potentiality as just such a thing. Its form of presence then bespeaks not just “the present,” but exhibits a sensitivity with respect to temporality, a diachronicity.\textsuperscript{392} As such, the dimensions of the world in its Worldhood and the significance therein extend beyond just the temporal ecstasy of the present, and it instead resonates with the enriched temporality of extension into a past and a future—historicity and projection. And because of this, the world, in its Weltlichkeit, is a site not just of cognition, of theoretical knowledge, but of existential significance and practical agency.

By contrast, if we artificially strip such a way of making things manifest from them, such that they are no longer shown with respect to any capability, the diachronic structure of Zuhandenheit is levelled off to mere presence. When this happens, entities do not show themselves in terms of any projection into a possibility of which they are capable, and instead are just there, merely extant—the thing as limited to its immediate here and now, to its “intrinsic” characteristics. Vorhandenheit is thus “atomistic” with regard to not only other entities in a synchronic sense, but, more to the point, in time, even with regard to itself. Thus, while fairly applicable to any entity, what is so perilous about Vorhandenheit is that it obfuscates temporality in such a way that, if taken as ontologically determinative, we lose

\textsuperscript{392} Paradoxically, what is beyond the present is accessible precisely in a form of presence. As Malpas puts it, “Heidegger does indeed tend to think of being always in terms of presence, but that presence does not always mean presence in the sense of standing fast in the present…” (Malpas 2008, 11). In the case of Zuhandenheit what is perceived right here, right now, presently, is not some present fact about it, not some immediately visible features, but its modalities-for-being. There is a sense in which the thing is present but not in terms of its present characteristics—in terms of its potential characteristics, characteristics it could have. Instead, we have a kind of presence which is simultaneously subtler and richer than mere immediate presence—a kind of invisible presence, the presence of something not actual in terms of the actuality of what it is a potentiality for, but nevertheless present and actual precisely as a capability for that. Thus the temporality of this presence has a complex structure, more so than if we merely attended to its presence in its immediately present features. This is why presence as Heidegger means it is not a matter of “the present,” i.e. the here and now; “Praesens is a more original [ursprünglicheres] phenomenon than the now,” for it names “the condition of possibility of understanding readiness-to-hand as such” (GA24 433-5/BPP 305-6, trans. mod.). Olafson rightly draws attention to the fact that Heidegger distinguishes between presence and “the present” (Olafson 1987, 264-5 n. 13).
sight of the diachronic dimension of an entity’s being, privileging its *mere presence*, and thus “the present.” “The present” now becomes the privileged ecstatic of temporality, determinative of all ontological understanding, and the entity can no longer show up as extended from itself, with respect to its capabilities—only its sheer there-ness in the here and now. Extricated from the network of significance, it is now only intelligible, if at all, in terms of specifiable *intrinsic properties*. Accordingly, an entity becomes an *object for theoretical cognition*, for detached observation and analysis, but not a *signification for action or practical, concernful engagement*. When this artificial levelling off becomes determinative of a philosophical comprehension of entities, we are left with the aforementioned ontology of *Vorhandenheit*.

A competing “ontology of *Zuhandenheit,*” by contrast, makes us sensitive by its very nature to the being of entities as lying in their potentialities-for-being, that is, to their significances as suitabilities for…, foregrounding an understanding of presence or actuality in a temporally complex sense, and holding open the other ecstasies of temporality as determinative of the intelligibility of entities. Heidegger’s Aristotelian analysis points us in the direction of acknowledging that the ontological character of the extant is in fact more than mere extantness, that Vorhandenheit, even if applicable to entities, does not adequately

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393 Thus, like the Megarian understanding of being, κίνησις is obscured, and with it the relationality between these modes of being, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια/ἐντελέχεια. As David Krell observes, what is distinctive about *Vorhandenheit*, as privative of *Zuhandenheit*, is in fact a kind of *absence*, or a presence of absence (Krell 1980, 216).

394 It is also for this reason that the merely extant obscures not only the entity in its temporality but the character of Dasein itself. For since the temporality of the thing becomes lost, its capacities, its ability to *be deployed, to be set to work*, in this or that way, in the midst of concernful dealings, or to be implicated in this or that way, become lost, and so it becomes fundamentally disconnected from its relation to one’s projects, from the projecting Dasein does of itself, in its being-in-the-world, and so implicating of the world, into a future for itself. The thing before me no longer shows up as a desk, as serviceable for sitting at and writing. And so when this stripping down of entities in the world becomes the cornerstone of philosophical understanding of the world, Dasein too becomes stripped down (seen only, for example, in its biological or chemical or physical determinations).
clarify *their being*—even, in fact, with respect to fairly designating them as “*vorhanden.*”

Rather, Heidegger determines that the basic ontological character of the presence what is extant cannot be abstracted without loss to the point simply of extantness, but to the mode of presence of *Bereitheit*.

This, moreover, is why *Zuhandenheit* as an ontological characterization of entities has, for Heidegger, not simply a *phenomenological* priority over any other (i.e. a priority in the manner in which things show themselves to or can be encountered by Dasein), but a *conceptual* priority—that is, as determinative of a fundamental ontology.\(^{395}\) For if we understand the being of entities within the framework of *Zuhandenheit*, then their being as they are “prior to” or “outside” of any involvement is not so much as *intelligible* except in relation to their being as they are in the midst of Dasein’s antics—just as the very concept of potentiality is not intelligible except in relation to actuality, as that *for which* the potentiality is a potentiality.\(^{396}\) *Zuhandenheit* serves as the ineliminable *ontological clue* for the being of entities, and the cipher for a fundamental ontology.

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\(^{395}\) The phenomenological sense of *Zuhandenheit*’s priority is captured well when Heidegger tells us that, “To lay bare [zu *Freilegung*] what is just extant and no more, cognition must first penetrate [dringt] beyond what is ready-to-hand in our concern” (GA2 96/BT 101, trans. mod.). But ultimately the priority of Zuhandenheit for him extends to much a deeper philosophical level than just this.

Nevertheless, the question of what is *fundamental* about a “fundamental ontology” is a complex one that I cannot do justice to here. A good exploration of Heidegger’s changing conception of it is provided in Krell 1980.

\(^{396}\) Previously I raised the issue of Heidegger’s proclamations that “the possible [das Mögliche] is higher than everything actual [höher al salles Wirkliche...ist]” (GA24 438/BPP 308), but demurred on addressing them. Having at this point clarified the nature of *Zuhandenheit* (and *Bedeutsamkeit*) as the active potentiality which constitutes κίνησις, we are in a position to understand exactly what Heidegger is getting at, and why it does not conflict with the idea that Zuhandenheit, which I am reading as a form of actuality, holds a conceptual or ontological priority. In BPP he expands somewhat upon what he means and his rationale for stating these claims. Thus the above passage in full reads:

> Fundamentally it must be noted that if we define *bestimmen* temporality as the original constitution *[die ursprüngliche Verfassung]* of Dasein and thus as the origin of the possibility of the understanding of being *[den Ursprung der Möglichkeit von Seinsverständnis]*, then Temporality as origin is necessarily richer and more pregnant *[reicher und trächtiger]* than anything that may arise *[entspringen]* from it. This makes manifest a peculiar circumstance, which is relevant throughout the whole dimension of philosophy, namely, that within the ontological sphere the possible is higher than everything actual. All origination *[Entspringen]*
The Aristotelian reading of Heidegger’s distinctions can make sense of the *Vorhandenheit-Zuhandenheit* distinction, and in a particularly illuminating way. If we are sensitive to Heidegger’s painstaking deployment of Aristotle’s framework of potentiality and actuality, it becomes clear that presence is applicable, in appreciably different respects, to all three ontological categories—*Zuhandenheit, Vorhandenheit*, and *Bereitheit*. What’s more, recognizing this means that associating presence strictly with *Vorhandenheit* is exegetically problematic, and in particular the canonical rendering of ‘*Vorhandenheit*’ as ‘presence-at-

and all genesis [*Genesis*] in the field of the ontological is not growth and unfolding [*ist nicht Wachstum und Entfaltung*] but degeneration [*Degeneration*], since everything arising rises from [*entspringt*], that is, in a certain way runs away [*gewissermaßen entläuft*], removes itself from the superior force of the source [*sich von der Übermacht der Quelle entfernt*]. An entity can be uncovered as an entity of the ontological manner [*der Seinsart*] of the ready-to-hand, it can be encountered in our commerce with it [*Umgang*] as the being which it is and how it is in itself [*das es ist und wie es an sic hist*], only if and when this uncovering and commerce with it are illuminated by [dur...ehellt sind] a prae...s somehow understood [irgendwie verstandene Præsenz]. This præsens is the horizontal schema of the ecstasis which determines [bestimmt] primarily the temporalizing of the temporality [*die Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit*] of all dealings with the ready-to-hand. (GA24 438/BPP 308, trans. mod.)

If we attend closely to Heidegger’s elaboration, we find that what he is putting forth as cases of “actuality” that represent “degeneration” are very specifically those of *second actuality* or the τέλος of the ἔργον—and which therefore hold no trace of potentiality. The temporal understanding which makes things intelligible in terms of their possibilities, which lets things be present in their abilities-to-be, lets them manifest as available for our commerce with them, is thus “higher” than this commerce itself. In other words, the signification, as a second, active potentiality for a second actuality, is higher than its second actuality—the signification of the chair as chair, as something suitable for sitting, is a richer and deeper phenomenon than the sitting itself, or the chair as something actually sat in. It On this point it is worth noting how little Heidegger ever speaks of *the sitting itself* in his analysis, of the bringing to actuality of those availabilities *Zuhanden* entities present. Such phenomena are apparently for him, ontologically and phenomenologically speaking, comparatively uninteresting.

Furthermore, there is a good reason why Heidegger would intend any pejorative use of “actuality” here to designate only second actuality and not at all the first actuality that constitutes signification. Indeed, we have already noted that reason: Heidegger’s insistence, anticipating Kosman, that in the ἐντόλεξειa constituting κίνησις the potentiality is not negated but is “contained” or “consummated” by it. The first actuality/active potentiality which constitutes the signification of the *Zuhanden* is thus hardly the actual in the “degenerative” sense Heidegger signals in the BPP passage; on the contrary, as consummation of the potentiality, it is to be expressly contrasted with the merely, flatly actual, i.e. the actual which represents the full translation of the potential into it, the full exhaustion of the potential qua potential, the second actuality.

So from the passage itself, we can glean that when Heidegger says that possibility (or potentiality) is higher than actuality, he means in particular that those activities for which things are suitable are degenerations of the possibility-laden suitability themselves, i.e. from *Bedeutsamkeit*. In other words, potentiality, and specifically active potentiality (which is first actuality), is higher than second actuality. Thus, when Heidegger proclaims that potentiality is higher than actuality, it is not because first ἐντόλεξειa is anything other than a superlative or emphatic form of being, or because *Zuhandenheit* is anything other than conceptually primordial, but because first ἐντόλεξειa cannot be understood except as active δύναμις, and therefore in contrast to second ἐντόλεξειa. Heidegger uses “actuality” in his pejorative sense to mean specifically second actuality, a vituperation which subjects my reading to no stress whatsoever.
hand,’ in distinction from ‘Zuhandenheit’ as ‘ready-to-hand,’ which suggests just such a
strict association, is likewise flawed.\footnote{If we come to understand the ontological character of the extant in terms of \textit{Bereitheit}, then the common English rendering indeed finds some justification, but in an unexpected way. For under such an understanding, it is no longer something “at-hand” in the sense of “just there,” but rather in the sense of being immanent, as when we say, for example “the time is at hand.” It is only in this sense that ‘\textit{Vorhandenheit}’ is arguably well rendered as ‘at hand’ or ‘presence-at-hand.’ Outside of this context, however, Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation simply invites a misreading.}

\textbf{3.7 Conclusion: Destruktion, Reclamation, and the Aristotelian Inheritance}

In the 1927 lecture course BPP, Heidegger explores in various guises a recurring motif of
Western philosophy, what he calls the “productive comportment” [\textit{herstellende Verhalten}]’
of Dasein. As a producing being, Dasein’s pre-ontological disposition toward itself in its
Being-in-the-World is as one of laborer and producer. But this disposition became engrained
in the very foundations of ancient ontology, when Dasein naturally comes to reflectively
understand itself in the very terms in which its pre-reflective form of life is predicated, with
\textit{production} “serv[ing] as horizon for the ontological interpretation of entities (GA24 165/BPP
116, trans. mod).\footnote{Production thus emerges as the underlying framework through which to understand the retinue of traditional metaphysical concepts: \textit{οὐσία}, \textit{ὑλή} and \textit{μορφή}, \textit{existentia} and \textit{essentia}, etc.} Heidegger traces how this is further determinative in implicating the
\textit{subject}, as \textit{agent} of production, as even more fundamentally the horizon for ontological
understanding, in a multitude of forms from Parmenides to Kant and thereafter. Albert
Hofstadter, BPP’s English translator, gives a brief inventory of the sense in which the
productive subject holds pride of place in the history of ontology:

The subject which dominates all these categories of the tradition, ancient,
medieval, and modern, is the subject conceived of as producer, doer, maker,
realizer. The beings which are, are products, and their being is that of a
product or of an entity involved in production; it is the being of the product as
equipment, handiness, or of the product as simply released from the
productive process or as merely ready and available (or not-available) for
production, extantness, being-present-at-hand. Both types of being are
understood as presence, Anwesenheit, in their own special ways, whether the presence characteristic of equipment (functional presence) or the presence of merely natural things. Energeia, entelecheia, actualitas, Wirklichkeit, actuality, all these expressions for being (on the side of way-of-being) are derivative from the subjectivity of the producer, his products, and the consumer of them. (Hofstadter 1982, xxx)

The text BPP, which has been recognized among Heidegger scholars as forming the closest thing to the unrealized Third Division of BT to see publication—serves largely as an extended excavation—a Destruktion—of this historical lineage. We might think, therefore, that the purpose of BPP’s investigations is to unseat this conception of a creative, productive Dasein. And indeed, a critical assessment of various forms of that conception, from ancient to modern, is the focus of its investigations.399 But this hardly means Heidegger’s project is a straightforwardly polemical one, or that Destruktion of this lineage oriented towards the notion of productive comportment is a matter of making way for its replacement with

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399 One place where Heidegger is particularly lucid about the nature of BPP’s topic:

The verbal definition [Worterklärung] of existentia already made clear that actualitas points back to [auf...zurückweist] an acting [Handeln] on the part of some indefinite subject or, if we start from our own terminology, that the extant [das Vorhandene] is somehow related [bezogen ist] by its sense to something for which, as it were, it comes to hand [vor die Hand kommt], for which it is something handy [ein Handliches]. The apparently objective interpretation of being as actualitas also at bottom points back to [weist...auf...zurück] the subject, not, however, as with Kant, to the apprehending subject in the sense of the relation [der Beziehung] of the res to the cognitive faculties [zu den Erkenntniskräften], but in the sense of a relation to our Dasein as one acting [als einem handelnden], or, to speak more precisely, as one creative, productive [als einem schaffenden, herstellenden]. The question is whether this horizon for the interpretation of existence as actualitas is derived [hergeleitet ist] merely from the literal meaning of the word itself—so that we simply infer from [aus...schließen] the designation for existence, ‘actualitas,’ an agere—or whether it can be made clear from the sense of actuality as it was conceived in ancient thought and Scholasticism that actuality is understood by going back to the productive behavior of Dasein [im Rückgang auf das herstellende Verhalten des Daseins]. If this latter is the case, then it should also be possible to show that the concept of reality and of essentia, and consequently all concepts we have enumerated for essential (quidditas, natura, definition, forma), must be made intelligible from this horizon of productive behavior. The next question then is: How do the two traditional interpretations of existence and actuality—the Kantian, which has recourse to apprehending, perceptual behavior [die auf erfassende, wahrnehmende Verhalten rekurriert], and the ancient-medieval, which goes back to [zurückgeht] productive behavior—go together [zusammen]? Why are both really necessary, and how is it that until now both of them, in this onesidedness [Einseitigkeit] and uniqueness, could so decisively dominate [maßgebend beherrschen konnten] the ontological problems of the question about being in general? (GA24 143/BPP 101-2, trans. mod.)
something else. Hofstadter, rightly points out that Heidegger’s intention is not to sweep away the tradition’s focus upon the subject as a clue to understanding the meaning of being, but instead to return to its primordial grounds: “Although Heidegger wishes to destroy this entire tradition, the destruction is to be done not by removing the orientation to the subject but by correcting it” (Hofstadter 1982, xxx). Bernasconi similarly argues (Bernasconi 1986) that Heidegger’s project in BT of giving a fundamental ontology is not one of providing a wholesale alternative to that of the Greeks but rather one of retrieving and redeploying its most basic insights. In BPP Heidegger indeed tells us that philosophy’s “trend [Zug] toward ‘the subject’—not always uniformly unequivocal and clear—is based on the fact that philosophical inquiry somehow understood that the basis for every substantial philosophical problem could and had to be established [geschaffen werden konnte und mußt] from an adequate elucidation [aus der zureichenden Aufhellung] of the ‘subject’” (GA24 444/BPP 312). He stresses that this focus upon the subject “is not an accident [Zufall] and has so little to do with world-view [hat mit Weltanschauung sowenig zu tun] that, instead, the admittedly still hidden basic content [der freilich noch verborgene Grundgehalt] of the problems of ontology as such pressed and directed [drängte und lenkte] scientific inquiry [das wissenschaftliche Fragen]” (GA24 444/BPP 312).

The existential analytic of BT does not constitute a “correction,” in the manner to which Hofstadter alludes, by providing an alternative to the horizon of the productive subject

\[400\] In BT, Heidegger talks of Destruktion as a “loosening up” of the tradition, in which “the concealment it has brought about are to be dissolved.” What is to replace these concealments are “the primordial experiences in which the first and henceforth guiding [die ersten und fortan leitenden] determinations of being were obtained.” Thus, “this deconstruction is just as far from having the negative sense of shaking off [Abschüttelung] the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out [soll...abstecken] the positive possibilities of that tradition […]” Its target, then, is the present understanding of the tradition, the “received wisdom” of the way it becomes conceptualized: “On its negative side, this destruction does not relate itself towards the past; its critique is aimed at [triffit] “today” and at the prevalent way of treating [herrschende Behandlungsart] the history of ontology […] (GA2 30-1/BT 44, trans. mod.)
as the guiding clue. It is neither a rejection of the subject generally or the productive subject specifically as the horizon. Rather, this very horizon is re-grounded by reorienting not only the conception of the subject back towards its primordial significance, but also the conception of production. Such passages as the following make unmistakable Heidegger’s stance on the Greek horizon of production as one in need of a programmatic reclamation:

But this still does not explain [ungeklärt] why ancient ontology interprets being from exactly this direction. This is not self-evident [selbst-verständlich] and it cannot be an accident [kann kein Zufall sein]. From this question, why it was precisely production [Herstellen] that served as the horizon for the ontological interpretation of entities, arises [erwächst] the need to work out [auszuarbeiten] this horizon and give explicit reasons [ausdrücklich zu begründen] for its ontological necessity. For the mere fact that ancient ontology moves [bewegt] in this horizon is not yet the ontological foundation of its legitimacy [Rechts] and necessity. Only when the founding argument is given [gegeben wird] is a legitimate birth certificate issued [erhalten] for the ontological concepts of essentia and existentia arising from [aus...erwaschenden] this way of posing [die Ausstellung] ontological problems. The argument for the legitimacy of the horizon described above for the interpretation of entities with regard to their essentia and existentia can be carried out [läßt...durchführen] only by making intelligible from the most distinctive constitution of Dasein’s being [Seinsverfassung des Dasein] why Dasein primarily and for the most part [zunächst und zumeist] has to understand the being of entities within the horizon of productive-intuitive comportment. We must ask: What function does the producing-using comportment [herstellend-gebracuchende Verhalten] in the broadest sense have within Dasein itself? The answer to this is possible only if the constitution of Dasein’s being is first brought to light [ans Licht gestellt] in its general basic features [in den Grundzügen], that is, if the ontology of Dasein is made secure [gesichert ist]. Then it can be asked whether from Dasein’s mode of being, from its way of existing [Existenzweise], it can be made intelligible why ontology is oriented [orientiert] at first naively in conformity with this productive or perceptual-intuitive comportment. (GA24 164-5/BPP 116-7, trans, mod.)

In other words, what is needed is an existential analytic of Dasein in order to properly understand in what respects “productive comportment” is productive, and in what respects it is not—in what analogies or images it finds adequate expression, and in which ones it does not.
In a similar way, Heidegger says in PS that the Greek identification of being with presence had similarly “ontologically necessary” grounds, and ones which also naturally and predictably led to a degradation in the meaning of being away from its primordial clarity:

The meaning of being implicitly [unausdrücklich] guiding [leitet] this ontology [of the Greeks] is Being = presence [Anwesenheit]. The Greeks did not get [nicht...geholt] this meaning of being from just anywhere [irgendwoher], they did not just invent [ausgedacht] it; rather it is the one borne by life itself [es ist der, den das Leben selbst...in sich trägt], by factual Dasein, insofar as all human Dasein is interpretative [Auslegendes ist], interpreting both itself as well as everything that is a being in any sense. In this interpretation there is operative [lebendig ist] an implicit sense of being. And indeed the Greeks drew [geschöpft] their implicit sense of being out of the natural immediate interpretation of being [natürlichen nächsten Seinsauslegung] by factual Dasein, where Being means to be there already at the very outset as possession [im vorkhinein schon da sein, als Besitz], household [Hausstand], property [Anwesen]—put more sharply: as presence [überschärft: Anwesenheit]. (GA19 466-7/PS 323, trans. mod.)

It is clear that Heidegger does not dispute the grounds of these interpretations about the productive comportment, or about being as presence per se, but thinks the actual formulations of their interpretation were at first naively adduced, as a result were handed down and twisted, losing their initial guiding insights and impetuses in a calcified tradition. What Heidegger does reject are the predominating conceptions—even the ancients’ own conceptions—of the productive subject, i.e. the sense of production in which that subject traffics, and, correspondingly, its relation to what it thus produced. If, by contrast, we are to understand the guiding clue properly and reach a more substantive reckoning with the interpretation, we must return to the original guiding sense of the productive comportment, and of presence.

The turn—seemingly, but not really, a turn back—to conceptual resources from Aristotle is meant to do just this. I said in 3.6 that Zuhandenheit is the presence in the immediate here and now, of something which is not entirely of the immediate here and
now—that is, of a potentiality as a potentiality. It is in such a respect that Heidegger
reclaims, by way of Destruktion, the guiding spirit of the Greek understanding of being as
presence by undermining the letter of its articulation, the attenuated conception of that spirit,
namely presence simply meaning the presence of the present, what is immediately here and
now. As Jeff Malpas puts it, “In Being and Time, the focus is on a rethinking of being against
the prevailing, and especially Greek, understanding of being as presence in the present”
(Malpas 2008, 13, emphasis added). This is not to deny the fundamental insight of the Greeks
that being = presence, but to reestablish its basis.401

That basis is only comprehensible through a similar rethinking of the productive
comportment, and of the productive comportment through the rethinking of presence. What
is produced in such comportment is not the entity itself but its letting-be-involved, its
presence, a mode of being not determined not by the mere extantness “in the present” of
something, but it fullest being, in which its possibilities shine forth and show themselves.
Thus, production is in no way fabrication or creation in a simplistic, ontic sense:

Productive comportment’s understanding of the of the entity
[Seinsverständnis] toward which it is behaving takes this entity beforehand as
one that is to be released for its own self so as to stand independently on its
own account [als ein für sich selbst Freizugebendes und Eigenständiges].
The being [Sein] that is understood in productive comportment is exactly the
being-in-itself of the product [das Ansichsein des Fertigen]. (GA24 160/BPP
113, trans. mod.)402

401 Mistakenly taking Heidegger as equating presence with “the present” has warped certain interpretations of
Heidegger, including readings which seek to understand his reading of Aristotle. Ted Sadler, for instance, takes
Heidegger’s orientation toward Aristotle as one of identifying, from a critical standpoint, a “presuppositional
structure” namely “the structure which takes the ‘Being of beings’ (das Sein des Seienden) as equivalent to
‘presence’ (Anwesenheit).” (Sadler 1996, 30). Sadler premises this on the idea that for Heidegger presence
corresponds to the temporal ecstasis of “the present” (Sadler 1996, 44). Heidegger therefore views Aristotle’s
governing conception of being as presence, according to Sadler, “from a standpoint which sees even presence as
a particular, ontologically derivative, way of being” (Sadler 1996, 44). But this understanding of Heidegger’s
reading of Aristotle is wrong because the underlying premise about Heidegger’s conception of presence is
wrong, mistakenly understanding presence as signaling the ecstasis of “the present.”

402 See also the discussions at GA24 219ff./BPP 154ff. and even moreso the discussions of handiness and
presence at GA24 429-45/BPP 302-312.
Production is *letting-be-involved*, the actualization of δύναμις κοινωνίας, and Heidegger’s retrieval of it from the tradition is meant to re-ground its sense as such. This is why he suggests in PS that the Stranger’s proposal remains still effectively un-thought:

What [Plato] exposed [herausstellte] with the δύναμις κοινωνίας, as ὑπόθεσις is, in a certain sense [ist in gewissen Grenzen], the last matter at which Greek ontology can arrive [gelangen kann] while maintaining [wozu...auf] the ground of its research. That does not mean this δύναμις κοινωνίας would not itself demand and make possible [forderte und ermöglichte] a further clarification [weitere Aufklärung] of its sense. (GA19 533-4/PS 369, trans. mod.)

Ultimately, Heidegger says, “We wish to revive [wollen...erneuern] neither Aristotle not the ontology of the Middle Ages, neither Kant nor Hegel, but only ourselves; that is to say, we wish to emancipate [freimachen] ourselves from the phraseologies and conveniences of the present, which reels [taumelt] from one fickle fashion to the next” (GA24 142/BPP 101). In this chapter I have argued that many of Heidegger’s most fundamental philosophical insights are grounded in his reading of Aristotle. The point isn’t that Heidegger is simply an Aristotelian with an Aristotelian ontology, but rather that he excavates the original sense of Aristotle’s concepts and puts them to work within a phenomenological milieu. And, as we shall see in the Conclusion, he tells us that even Aristotle did not acknowledge the radicality of his central framework, could not appreciate the full breadth of its application to ontology.
Conclusion

We saw in Chapter 3 Heidegger deny, in many different texts and circumstances, that interpretation, as “making present,” is something subjective. Yet he also expressed, again in a variety of places and manners, that Dasein, “the subject,” plays an ineliminable role in rendering entities intelligible. I argued that his approach to marrying these two criteria is found in his appropriation of Aristotle’s conceptual resources surrounding κίνησις, in the ontological picture of the second nature of entities. What may not have been entirely clear in Chapter 3, however, is that Heidegger expressly understands this ontological proposal as responding to the Problematic (as I reconstructed in the terms of “Heidegger’s problematic” in Chapter 2).

In AM Heidegger explicitly frames the dilemma of the Problematic by invoking Protagoras’s notorious dictum that “man is the measure of all things.” Though Heidegger notes Aristotle explicitly aligns the Protagorean principle with the Megareans (1047a4-7), he does not agree with the attribution, saying that that Plato and Aristotle understood Protagoras in a “very specific” way (GA33 198/AM 170), i.e. as a skeptic or pernicious relativist, according to whom “we never know [erkennen] entities as they are in themselves [wie es für sich...ist], i.e. as unperceived [unwahrgenommen], as not taken up into perception [als nicht in eine Wahrgenommenheit eingegangen]” (GA33 199/AM 171, trans. mod.). Heidegger himself, however, assumes a cautious, and ultimately defensive, posture regarding the principle:

It is thus not immediately clear what Protagoras meant with his ἀλήθεια; as a precaution one must be on guard against interpreting [auszudeuten] this Protagorean teaching in a crude so-called sensualistic sense and labeling [zu stempeln] it an epistemological school of thought [erkenntnistheoretischen],
about which it could be convincingly demonstrated [überzeugung gezeigt werden kann] with a turn of the hand [im Handumdrehen] to any halfwit that such a doctrine leads [führt] to so-called skepticism. For if the true is at any time precisely that which appears to someone in the manner that it appears, and is true only on that account [so wahr ist], then of course a generally valid, objective truth would not be possible. (GA33 198/AM 170, trans. mod.)

Heidegger’s dismissiveness of the skeptical or relativistic reading of Protagoras makes clear that he rejects any interpretation which understands the dictum as cutting against the possibility of objectivity. At the same time, his defensive stance on the dictum signals that somehow safeguarding objectivity is to be made coherent with the dictum itself— that we are to stake out a sense in which the human being is determinative of the manifestness of entities, without this encroaching upon the idea that they show themselves from themselves in such manifestness. Thus he lays out the dilemma very clearly:

What is in question is not how soulless [seelenlosen], extant material things exist among themselves in relation to each other [unter sich zu einander sind], but rather how they can be manifest in themselves [sie an sich...offenbar sein können] as entities in themselves [als an sich Seiendes] without being infringed upon by the fact [unbeschadet dessen] that the occurrence of this being manifest [das Geschehen des Offenbarseins] is bound [gebunden ist] in itself to the actuality of the ensouled [des Beseelten], to the actuality of human beings. (GA33 202/AM 173, trans. mod.)

The dilemma is recognizable in precisely the terms of the McDowellian Problematic as I reconstructed it in Heideggerian language at the end of Chapter 2: how is it that the showing of entities in themselves and from themselves, as such self-showing, is not slighted, given that the terms of being manifest, of being shown at all, are dependent upon Dasein? Invocation of the Protagorean dictum is staged for Heidegger for no other purpose than raising the question of—and indicating the guiding Aristotelian insight for resolving—the Problematic.

On consideration of this same tension from a somewhat different angle see also Heidegger’s later discussion of the Protagorean principle in the appendices to “The Age of the World Picture” (GA9 102-6/AWP 77-80).
Already in the period of BT, Heidegger was formulating these questions. In BPP he raises the issue of the relationship between the entity itself and its perception (Wahrgenommenheit). Since “The perception of something extant is not itself extant in this thing but belongs to Dasein […] to perceptual intentional comportment [zum wahrnehmenden intentionalem Verhalten],” the question naturally arises: “How can perception belong in a certain way to the extant [gehören…zum Vorhandenen] without itself being something extant [ohne ein Vorhandenes zu sein], and how, being this [als dieses], can it belong also to Dasein without signifying something subjective [ohne etwas Subjektives zu bedeuten]?” (GA24 97-8/BPP 69, trans. mod.).

Note that the question is posed as a transcendental one: the issue is not whether it is the case that subjectivism is avoided given the other commitments, but how it could possibly be the case. For Heidegger nowhere so much as entertains the suggestion that we ought to draw relativistic or subjectivistic conclusions from these questions about perception and truth. That the perception of something extant belongs to Dasein “does not,” he maintains, “mean that it belongs to the subject and the subject’s immanent sphere [zum Subjekt und seiner immanenten Sphäre gehörig]” (GA24 98/BPP 69, trans. mod.). Similarly in BT he affirms that truth as disclosure—something which occurs only with the existence of Dasein, and which always results in the interpretive presentation of the entity—cannot signal a subjectivization of truth:

Because the kind of Being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is relative to Dasein’s Being. Does this relativity so much as signify that all truth is “subjective”? If one interprets “subjective” as “left to the subject’s discretion [in das Belieben des Subjekts gestellt]”, then it certainly does not. For uncovering, in the sense which is most its own, takes asserting out of [entzieht] the province of “subjective” discretion, and brings the uncovering Dasein before the entities themselves. And only because

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⁴⁰⁴ Hoftsadter translates ‘Wahrgenommenheit’ as ‘perceivedness.’
“truth”, as uncovering, is a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein, can it be taken out of [kann...entzogen werden] the province of Dasein’s discretion. […] If truth has been correctly understood, is it in the least impaired by [dadurch im mindesten angetaster] the fact that it is ontically possible only in the ‘subject’ and that it stands and falls with the Being of that ‘subject’? (GA2 300-1/BT 270, trans. mod.)

As I hopefully showed in Chapter 2, Heidegger did not simply stumble onto the Problematic; rather it emerged organically from within his commitments. Here my point is that Heidegger in fact formulated more or less precise statements of it in the form of a transcendental inquiry.

Moreover, his method of addressing this transcendental question is precisely calibrated, again specifically with the terms of the dilemma in view. When Heidegger makes his proclamations with regard to a proposed resolution, he does so by mobilizing the conceptual resources highlighted in Chapter 3—namely, by applying the same lessons about the betweenness of capacity, illustrated so vividly by the image of the being-poised of the sprinter, now to the perceived object, the αἰσθητόν and its very capacity to be perceived. In other words, the determinations of the ἐντελέχεια of δύναμις ὑπὸ κατὰ κίνησιν, as lying in a form of ἔχειν, affords us a conception of extant, natural entities as Bereitheit, as poised for αἰσθῆσις, for the disclosure—that is, the actualization—which occurs in the enactment of perception. Thus Heidegger offers up his response to the transcendental problem of the Protagorean dictum:

What does this call for? Nothing less than such an entity which itself and from out of itself [das für sich und von sich aus], prior to all being perceived [vor

405 Likewise, he scolds that, “it remains a naïve misunderstanding to believe that truth, if it exists only and as long as Dasein exists, is delivered over [ausgeliefert werde] to relativism and skepticism” (GA24 316/BPP 221).

406 Ἀίσθησις is a capability for ἀληθεύειν, for making manifest and holding open [des Offenbarmachens und Offenbarhalts], a capability for knowledge in the broadest sense” (GA33 195/AM 167). In other words, it should be clear that αἰσθῆσις is meant as a stand-in for any form of encounter, implication in human activity. If it is perception, it is circumspective concern, not detached observation, which is, of course, derivative and privative.
aller Wahrgenommenheit], is empowered (δύναμις) to be perceived [kräftig ist...wahrgenommen zu werden]. This perceptible entity [Wahrenehmbare]—that is, an entity with the ability to be perceived [Wahrgenommenwerdenkönnende]—must ‘be’ as such a capable thing [Könnendes], must ‘be’ actual, if a perceiving and becoming manifest [Offenbarmachen] is to happen at all [überhaupt...soll geschehen können]. (GA33 200/AM 171, trans. mod.)

The being of the αἰσθητόν, that which is actually perceived, lies less in being an object of actually occurring αἰσθησίς than in being capable of becoming an object of αἰσθησίς (and thus, of ἀλήθεια or disclosure); and in this capability, a holding-in-readiness for perception, lies its actuality or its being as something independent of perception. What Heidegger calls the “self-sufficient actuality of what is perceptible [Die eigenständige Wirklichkeit des Wahnehmbaren]” (GA33 206/AM 177) is nothing other than what is perceptible having a capability for being αἰσθητόν—a determination lying “between” both non-being and the actuality of αἰσθητόν, and which, thanks to Aristotle, was for the first time explicitly demarcated within ontology with the conception of δύναμις.

Through this framework Heidegger argues we can preserve both the independent being of entities as well as a manner of their dependence upon Dasein, the ensouled:

Only in terms of [this] phenomenon [...]—namely, the ability to perceive [Wahrnehmenkönnen] as something unactualized but nevertheless actual [als einem unverwirklichten und doch wirklichen]—is it made possible for the αἰσθητόν to be released as something which from out of itself can offer itself to being perceived [das von sich aus dem Wahrgenommenwerden sich darbeiten kann]; within this suitability for being affected through being manifestable [Eignung zur Betroffenheit durch Offenbarkeit] lies the mark [Anzeichnen] of its genuine independence. (GA33 206/AM 177)

407 Here Heidegger signals “Kant’s solution,” but his invocation here simply has to do with the fact that Kant made headway in understanding truth as an “event of objectivity [das Geschehen von Gegenständlichkeit]” (GA33 200/AM 171)—not in endorsing the precise manner Kant understood this event. Kant “was once again starting to broach the real question about being” (GA33 33/AM 27, emphasis added)—namely, by centering the sort of questions about the role of the subject that we saw Hegel follow through on in Chapter 1.

408 Heidegger in fact says that this way of understanding the independence of entities, in terms of their potentiality-for-being as they are in intentional comportment, “points to an inner connection between truth and time” (GA33 206/AM 177). Thus, we already see a glimpse in how deeply this strikes to some of the themes of BT.
Heidegger acknowledges that Aristotle himself was not in a position to appreciate either the problem or the suitability of his conceptual apparatus for addressing it. In this, though, Aristotle was not alone; Heidegger in fact calls this matter of the clash between Protagoras’ dictum and the independence of entities, the two halves of the Problematic, not only the question which has “confronted [ständig entgegengetreten]” the course for its entirety (GA33 201/AM 173), but one which “the entire subsequent history of philosophy” has failed to answer because it has been “taken too lightly [zu leicht genommen wird]” (GA33 201/AM 172). As Heidegger reflects:

Aristotle was not capable of comprehending, no less than anyone before or after him, the proper essence and being of that which makes up [ausmacht] this between—between αἰσθητόν as such and αἴσθησις as such—and which in itself brings about [vollbringt] the very wonder that, although it is related to entities that are in themselves self-reliant [eigenstandig für sich], it does not through this relation [durch diesen Bezug] take their self-reliance away, but instead thereby in fact enables [ermöglicht] the related entity [Beziehenden] to secure [zu versichern] for itself this self-reliance in the truth. (GA33 202/AM 173, trans. mod.)

409 Of course, it is a somewhat ironic turn that, given Aristotle’s outright rejection of the Protagorean thesis, Heidegger sees Aristotle’s own philosophy as unwittingly supplying the resources for a response. Heidegger is not blind to this irony; see GA33 205-6/AM 176.

410 “With this a task is posed [gestellt] which Aristotle does not positively resolve [lößt] but rather exhibits in its inexorability [nur in ihrer Unumgänglichkeit zeigt]. The entire subsequent history of philosophy, however, testifies to how little the solving of this task has met with success [gelungen ist]. The reason for this failure has little to do with not finding a way to an answer, but much more with the fact that continually and up until the present day the question as such has been taken too lightly. Here we will have to dispense both with unfolding this question in its many-sidedness and with showing thereby how something essential is lacking [fehlt] in Aristotle and in antiquity in general. But we shall forgo this in order to bring the question as a question into its own [ins reine zu bringen].” (GA33 201/AM 172-3)

411 Heidegger makes the same point in a much more obtuse—in fact, seemingly paradoxical—formulation:

The independence [Die Unabhängigkeit] of extant things from humans is not altered through the fact [wird dadurch nich angeraster] that this very independence as such is possible only if humans exist. The being in themselves [Das Ansichsein] of things not only becomes unexplainable [wird nicht nur etwa unerklärbar] without the existence of humans, it becomes utterly meaningless [völlig sinnlos]; but this does not mean that the things themselves are dependent upon humans [die Dinge selbst vom Menschen abhängig seien]. (GA33 202/AM 173-4, trans. mod.)
This *between* which secures the self-reliance of entities despite Protagoras’ teaching, Heidegger calls “the possible belonging to the world [*die mögliche Weltzugehörigkeit*] of entities, in which they first “become” [*’wird’*] entities and thus emerge [*sich herausstellt*] as something which before this emergence also was not nothing [*als jenes, das auch vordem nicht nichts war*]” (GA33 202/AM 173, trans. mod.). In other words, the “between” is exactly the δύναμις κοινωνίας, that potentiality the activation of which is simply the “letting be involved” which constitutes MFL’s “world-entry,” as we saw in Chapter 3.

A year before MFL, in BPP, Heidegger uses this framework to contrast *world* with *nature*, just in the manner in which the κοινωνία is differentiated from its δύναμις. Intraworldliness, he tells us, is something that “*befalls* [fällt…zu] this entity, nature, solely when it is *uncovered* as an entity,” solely when the entity that we ourselves are exists, i.e. if there is a being-in-the-world, then *eo ipso* entities as intraworldly are also factually uncovered in greater or lesser measure” (GA24 240/BPP 169, trans. mod.). Nature, he repeats, does not depend upon Dasein in order to exist (GA24 241, 313, 315/BPP 170, 219, 220). Its manner of dependence is otherwise; its being hinges on Dasein’s activity solely in terms of this possible determination of its disclosure as releasement into truth. This means that while truth is not a *characteristic* or *determination* of nature, neither is nature merely *indifferent* with respect to such a determination. Instead, truth is a *possible determination* of nature:

Intraworldliness belongs to [*Zum*... *gehört*] the being of the extant, nature, *not* as a determination of its being, but as a *possible* determination, and one that is necessary for the possibility of the uncoverability [*der Entdeckbarkeit*] of nature. (GA24 240/BPP 169, trans. mod.)

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412 Brogan and Warnek translate ‘*sich herausstellt*’ as ‘make themselves apparent.’

413 Hofstadter translates ‘*zufallen*’ as ‘to devolve upon.’
Thus, we cannot take the claim that because “being-true is not something in things [nicht etwas unter den Dingen]” (GA24 310/BPP 217) that therefore truth as a concept loses its patina of signaling objectivity, that therefore it is something merely having to do with subjectivity, a determination wholly divorced from nature or the world. We should not be so quick to dislodge it in such a way:

For just because truth is only so far as it exists, i.e. has the mode of being [die Seinsart] of Dasein, and because there belongs to it [zu ihr...gehört] at the same time the unveiledness of that to which it relates [dessen...worauf sie sich bezieht], it is admittedly not anything extant; but as the unveiledness of that to which assertion refers, it is a possible determination of the being of the extant. It is a determination of the being of the extant so far as the extant is, for example, unveiled in an unveiling assertion. (GA24 310/BPP 217, trans. mod.)

In Chapter 3, I discussed disclosure as “making present” or “setting in motion,” as an event which is a function of Dasein’s antics, the actualization (not the actuality) of an entity’s potentialities-for-being. Here, Heidegger seems to mean something slightly different. Truth now, as a possible determination of the being of the extant, of nature, does not have the same verbal sense of truth or disclosure; it is something not which occurs to beings but which we can say about them. It certainly seems like Heidegger has shifted to a conception of truth as a mode of being of entities—from actualization to actuality. This would put Heidegger in even closer proximity to Hegel’s conception of the True as the Actual.

This is in fact a formulation we see Heidegger give in certain texts. In HCT, Heidegger examines three different theories of truth. The first is found in the identity relation between intentio and intentum, between content of the intentional act and its correlate (GA20 69-70/HCT 51-3). The second conception of truth, by contrast, is a matter of the evidential relation between acts (paradigmatically, between presuming and intuition) (GA20 70/HCT 53). In other words, each of these two conceptions of truth accounts for a different cognitive-
semantic constraint upon the comportment to be labeled as true: respectively, a
*representational* constraint and an *inferential* constraint. To say an intentional act is true in
the first sense is to say that it *represents* its intentum; to do so in the second sense is to say
that it affords a certain functional relationality between acts. “The controversy [*Der Streit]*
over the concept of truth,” he says, “goes back and forth between [*geht hin und her
zwischen*]” these two theses (GA20 70-1/HCT 53)—truth as correspondence vs. truth as
coherence. Both, he says, are “incomplete” and fail to capture the “original sense of truth”
(GA20 70-1/HCT 53).

At the end of this inventory, Heidegger briefly presents—no more than gestures at,
really—a third conception of truth, one which, he cautions, should not be conflated with the
previous two (as has often happened, he says), and which he claims can be traced back to
Greek philosophy. It is a theory of truth according to which truth is a determination of
entities themselves, namely, their *being-actual*: “The true can also be understood in the sense
of the very object itself which is. […] Here, the true amounts to that which *makes* knowledge
true [die Erkenntnis *wahr machend*]. Truth here comes down to *being, being-actual
[Wirklich-Sein]*” (GA20 71/HCT 53, trans. mod.).

By this point any suggestion that Heidegger means “the true” designates something
like the truth-makers of propositions should sound absurd. We understand now that when
Heidegger involves ‘*Wirklichkeit*’ here we must take this invocation seriously, as signaling,
in particular, the Aristotelian framework of κίνησις, δύναμις-ἐνέργεια. At the same time, note
that truth figures here otherwise than it did previously in Chapter 3, as the actualization of
nature to *Bedeutsamkeit*, to involvement and world—that is, disclosure—but as the being-
actual of the entity. Truth is a mode of being, its actuality, and the being-actual of a natural entity is accordingly its second nature.

I make no pronouncements as to how we are to understand this formulation alongside the one presented in Chapter 3; perhaps both are facets of Heidegger’s overarching alethic conception of truth. Perhaps Heidegger is simply being imprecise here. In any case, fully appreciating why and in what ways, exactly, this third conception of truth offers an alternative to the other two, more historically represented options catalogued in HCT, is, I submit, not possible without understanding Heidegger’s ontology of second nature. The questions is: how does this alternative view of truth stack up against the demands to which the other conceptions are devised to respond?

Because Bedeutsamkeit, as what results from the alethic event, is a matter of simply this being-at-work, this releasement into a thing’s potentialities-for-significance, it is not a matter of entities being represented by the mind, but a way for them to be, in an ontologically thick sense. If significations can be said to be “modes of presentation” of entities, that is because more fundamentally they are modes of being of the entities. What interpretation results in is not, then, a matter of “subjective coloring,” indeed, not something “in the mind” at all, but instead something objective, in the world—not to be sure, an entity itself, but as something about an entity itself.414 And so a singular thought in which figures a Bedeutung-determination could hardly be alleged as stopping anywhere short of the world.

414 “Unveiledness is indeed not an extant determination of something extant, not a property [keine Eigenschaft] of it, but belongs [gehört…zu] to existence qua unveiling [der Existenz als enthüllender]. Nevertheless, as a determination of that about which assertion is made [worüber ausgesagt wird], unveiledness is a determination of the being of the extant” (GA24 310/BPP 217-8, trans. mod.). It is worth noting how the Fregean solution of positing a third realm indifferent to the subject-object distinction arises in the midst of discussing this between, and is swiftly rejected by Heidegger:

On the contrary. the theories of relativism and skepticism spring from a partially justified [einer z.T. berechtigten] opposition to an absurd absolutism and dogmatism of the concept of truth, a dogmatism that has its ground in the circumstance that the phenomenon of truth, taken
Furthermore, the content of a Bedeutung-determination is delimited by something likewise objective and in the world: how the respective entity may be made present, the possibilities for signification it holds. Heidegger observes that κοινωνία is not unrestricted—things cannot be involved with one another without condition (GA19 515-7/PS 356-7).

Instead:

[...] the κοινωνία within entities [innerhalb des Seienden] is in general a conditioned one [eine bedingte ist] and is conditioned by [bedingt ist durch] the present ontological and substantive constitution of the entities that are to be combined [die jeweilige Seins- und Sachhaltigkeit der möglichen verbindbaren Seieinden]. This κοινωνία is conditioned in a quite peculiar sense: it is grounded in the things [sie ist in den Dingen…gegründet], in the matters themselves [in den Sachen selbst], and is predelineated by them [durch sie vorgezeichnet]. (GA19 516-7/PS 357, trans. mod.)

Κοινωνία is a conditioned by the parameters of δύναμις κοινωνίας, and so the specific significance-determinations of entities, their modes of being in involvement, are conditioned upon the potentialities-for-significance they themselves hold. This means there is constraint, by something “extraconceptual,” on the conceptual, on what possible ways an entity may or may not be actualized into conceptuality. Thus Heidegger says in BPP that uncovering is to

externally as a determination of the subject or of the object, or, if neither works, as some third realm of meaning. (GA24 316/BPP 221-2, trans. mod.)

Given Heidegger’s insistence in HCT that apriori categorial contents neither “[belong] primarily to the sphere of the subject” nor are they “specifically bound up with [verhaftetes] reality” (GA20 101/HCT 74), it might be tempting to hear in his attack on relativism something of Frege’s distinction between Sinn and Idee (captured in his famous analogy of the telescope in “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”), where Sinn resides “between” the Bedeutung and the Idee (Frege 1892b, 154-5). But passages like the above, alongside the lesson engrained in the very conception of senses as actualizations of entities, should tell us that in fact Heidegger does not endorse this form of “rampant Platonism,” that is, categorial contents as themselves abstract entities, and accessible via an apriori form of Givenness. This rejection of the Fregean conception of the Sinn-Bedeutung relation (or more properly, his three-way Idee-Sinn-Bedeutung distinction) is in keeping with the Hegelian view of their relation outlined in Chapter 1: the relation between Nature and Spirit, between the space of nature and the space of reasons, is not one of two ontologically distinct realms, but comes down to the ontological difference. Sense is a mode of being of referent, not a distinct entity which stands as merely a mode of presentation of the referent. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s shared investment with Frege in the idea of a “between,” in the notion of meaning as residing neither in the subjective Ideen nor in the empirical or sensible Bedeutung, and which in some distinctive fashion constitutes a kind of objectivity (thus, like McDowell, skirting both the conventionalist frictionless spinning of psychologism and “bald naturalism”) should be recognized in its positive significance, as greatly informing his views on the nature of logos as constituting a kind of objectivity, as an advancement in understanding the apriori in the sense he used the term in 1921’s PIE, as tied to rationality and normativity.
be understood in such a way that it is “regulated and prescribed [normiert und vorgezeichnet werden] by the entity to be discovered and its mode of being [wie...der Modus des Entdeckens durch das zu entdeckende Seiende und seine Seinsart],” and in such a way that “the mode of comprehension can conform to it [sich der Modus des Erfassens nach ihm richten kann]” (GA24 99/BPP 70, trans. mod.). And in AM he says that “In the end, presence [Anwesenheit] does differ according to the character of the entity which supposedly is there present [das da anwesend sein soll]” (GA33 182/AM 156, trans. mod.).

More specifically, it is in this way that entities are, as Heidegger says, “binding” for assertion—in this respect is assertion answerable to particulars:

Even the “universal validity” of truth is rooted solely in the fact that Dasein can uncover entities in themselves and free them [freigeben kann]. Only so can these entities in themselves be binding [vermag dieses Seiende an ihm selbst...zu binden] for every possible assertion—that is, for every way of pointing them out [Aufzeigung seiner]. (GA2 300-1/BT 270)

From this vantage it becomes eminently clear why Heidegger is so adamant across the lecture courses traced in Chapter 3 that δύναμις be distinguished from empty logical possibility, and that it be understood as determinate possibility. That “the δύναμις is a possibility which is determinately prescribed [bestimmt vorgezeichnete ist] and which always harbors in itself a direction [die immer eine Direktion in sich trägt]” (GA19 109/PS 75), is what makes possible the grounding of thought in the matters themselves.

The lesson here is that Heidegger’s second nature of entities can effectively respond to the Demand for Transcendental Friction—as I showed in 1.6 that Hegel’s does—but without sacrificing the idea that cognitive semantics must accord with a rational (or

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415 Also: “The mode of uncovering [des Entdeckens] and the mode of uncoveredness [der Entdecktheit] of the extant [Vorhandenem] obviously must be determined by [müssen offenbar bestimmt sein durch] the entity to be uncovered by them and by its way of being [das von ihnen zu entdeckende Seiende und desse Weise zu sein]” (GA24 99/BPP 70).
existential-meaningful) conception of mind’s configuration which ascribes explanatory pride of place to language and the fundamentally hermeneutic nature of all intentionality in accounting for the linkages between nodes of that configuration.

There is one last consideration to elaborate. In speaking of senses as actualizations of entities, and as their modes of being, it might be asked where, in this account of truth, is there room for falsity. For after all, if cognitive perspectives are features of the objective world, then whence error? Surely accommodating the possibility of getting matters wrong is an ineliminable constraint on any theory of cognitive semantics.

The answer is that assuredly the account allows for erroneous perspective, and it requires making a rather simple clarification which, up until this point, has remained unstated. For the formulation of the thesis of the second nature of entities requires some care; what the thesis states is that entities are actualized by us into certain modes of being, into being-significant. These signification-determinations are able to be cached out according to some linguistically articulate, specificatory content. What is not being proposed is that an entity is actualized into what that specificatory content specifies. For that claim would not only amount to an absurdly extravagant metaphysical doctrine, but an account entirely unable to accommodate the possibility of cognitive perspective as issuing in erroneous takings-as.

Thus, to say that a sense is something objective and of the world is not to say that the content of that sense is incapable of misrepresenting matters, or of cover over entities. But this is because, as Heidegger asserts, the potential for falsity, for entities actualized in such a way that they show themselves as being otherwise than they are is just as much something that lies in the entities in themselves as potentialities-for-being.
This strange observation is (given the text at issue, somewhat unsurprisingly) one of the central themes under investigation in PS. There, Heidegger notes that “It is mysterious that something should be what it at the same time is not [daß etwas ist als das, was es zugleich nicht ist]” (GA19 580/PS 402). But that mystery is assuaged somewhat by recognizing we need to disambiguate between something being what it is not, and something being in such a way that it shows itself as what it is not (which Heidegger takes to be the lesson of the Sophist). Just as we saw earlier Heidegger speak of truth as a possible determination of entities, in PS he draws the same conclusion about falsity:

...ἀπάτη does not here refer to a person’s deceptive comportment [das täuschende Verhalten] but to a possibility pertaining to entities themselves, namely that they can be false [trügen kann], just as we say: “appearances deceive” [“der Schein trügt”]; ἀπάτη is thus a determination of entities themselves. (GA19 580/PS 401-2, trans. mod.)

As Mark Ralkowski notes, Heidegger finds in Aristotle “the view that truth is ‘a character of beings’ and ‘a determination of the Being of human Dasein itself’”—an observation we have seen validated. Ralkowski takes from this that “Heidegger thinks Aristotle discovered that we can be in the truth well or badly” (Ralkowski 2009, 124). That is certainly so. But we can also take from it the further lesson that, having been brought to truth, entities themselves can be in the truth well or badly, either as phenomena or as semblances. In either case, they have been brought to presence, let be as what they are capable of being, released into their potentialities. Even the semblance, the false appearance, is a “truthing” of the entity, though certainly of a peculiar short.

This consequence of the thesis brings to light something about the Problematic which all along was left unattended. The question of whether the world constrains empirical thought was never, in fact a question about truth per se. It was a question about objectivity, and that is
something altogether different. “Empirical thought is answerable to the world” does not mean: “empirical thought, when it is true, is determined by the way the world is(—and about cases of error let us say something else).” It means rather: “empirical thought, even in cases of error, is constrained by the way the world is; even getting things wrong is a function of, in a broader and more basic sense, getting them right.”

To think that is to leave aside a crude binary about mind and world. The Myth is a narrative about the world’s dictation to thought; its simple opposite, about thought’s untrammeled freedom. The clear alternative to both, if we want it, is precisely the one Hegel and Heidegger put on offer: the ways we think about the world are culled by our understanding and projection, our mindedness and like-mindedness, from a band of possibilities which the world offers up for us. On the account I see Hegel and Heidegger as proposing, the world neither dictates nor is it silent. Instead, to cite Thomson’s preferred imagery, it offers suggestions, solicitations. A solicitation calls for a response—it is something “to discern and creatively develop,” to “bring forth […] responsibly” (Thomson 2011, 25, emphasis added). Little wonder, then, that Heidegger says of the Protagorean dictum, which we now recognize as anything but a relativist’s slogan:

Understood in this way, the statement by Protagoras takes on an entirely new meaning, namely, one which raises it to the most lofty principle of all philosophizing [die ihn zum obersten Grundsatz alles Philosophierens erhebt]. […] A fundamental principle [Ein Grundsatz]—not a cheap and easily accessible [nicht als billige und beliebig gangbare] assertion, but an initiation and a staking out [als An- und Einsatz] of the question in which the human goes to the very basis [auf den Grund…geht] of its own essence. (GA33 203/AM 174)
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Abbreviations for Works by Hegel


Abbreviations for Works by Heidegger


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<th>Title</th>
<th>Translators/Editors</th>
<th>Publisher, Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
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<td>Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN</td>
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