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The Military in Ecuador: Policies and Politics of Authoritarian Rule

by

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Institutional Evolution to 1972
Regimes and Policy-Making
The Traditionalist Military before 1972

Reformists and Traditionalists
Institutional Orthodoxy and Consolidation

The Parties and Military Interests
Institutional and Societal Characteristics

Conclusion

Notes
THE MILITARY IN ECUADOR:
The Policies and Politics of Authoritarian Rule

INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION TO 1972

It is neither novel nor original to observe that an intellectual faddishness has characterized political studies of Latin America.¹ Some of our most fruitful research—and also some of the most foolish—has either deliberately or accidentally responded to contemporary affairs, to the trends of the moment. For example, it is evident that the installation of numerous authoritarian regimes and their continuing presence, especially in the 1970s, influenced writings about the breakdown of democracies and the presumably historical emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism.² The subsequent reversal of these political trends encouraged a reexamination of democratic systems, if somewhat belatedly.³ In 1979 Ecuador became the first South American nation in which a military government declared and carried out a voluntary return to the barracks.

Strongly encouraged by a new administration in Washington,⁴ the Ecuadorean government of the Armed Forces in 1976 reluctantly and painfully negotiated a three-year retreat that led to a newly elected constitutional government in Quito for the first time in nine years. Since that time, the military establishment has sought to consolidate its institutional gains and protect its corporate interests, while somewhat suspiciously watching the carnivalesque
partisanship of civilian rule. In both 1986 and 1987, the elected
government was severely shaken by public military dissidence,
provoked partly, if not entirely, by the uncompromising ferocity of
the chief executive and the unyielding antagonism of his political
opposition. The ability of President León Febres Cordero to serve
out his full term until its constitutional conclusion in August 1988
resulted largely from the electoral campaign and especially the
enduring trauma of the March 1987 natural disaster that struck the
republic.5

It should be borne in mind that this study is part of a
collective undertaking that examines military institutions under
conservative authoritarian rule.6 Its preoccupations have included
the impact of the military on economic policy and regime
performance; military linkages with civilian interest groups; and
the functioning of the military power structure. For organizational
convenience, most of this paper will be devoted to two major
sections. The first will focus primarily on policy, with attention
to decision making and regime performance. The second will examine
more directly issues of politics, embracing the place of the
military in society and the evolution of ties with major interest
groups. Before moving into these discussions, however, further
background is appropriate. Certainly the institutional evolution of
the Ecuadorean military prior to the 1970s is mandatory. Moreover,
at least a few words about the significance and implications of
regimes may be in order.
Regimes and Policy-Making

The concern with regime types and with systemic characteristics has persisted in the literature on Latin American politics for some years. From the ethnocentric and prescriptive analyses of pluralism and liberal democracy beginning in the 1950s through more recent formulations of corporatist models and authoritarianism, scholars have elaborated on ideal types as a means of furthering understanding and refining theoretical perspectives. Subsequent dissatisfaction with earlier heuristic models led to a reexamination of intellectual underpinnings. While this evolving process has had bright and dim spots, the literature has manifested relatively fewer effective efforts to probe the linkages between policy and regime type. This tendency has prevailed, despite the historically large significance of the state in Latin America.

Standing as a powerful and independent entity, the state constitutes "the prime regulator, coordinator, and pace-setter of the entire national system, the apex of the Latin American pyramid from which patronage, wealth, power, and programs flow." The character of the state, the type of regime in question, is therefore crucial with regard to policy-making. One must proceed from the basic assumption that the nature of regime is a significant variable in the character and content of policy. To be sure, ambiguity and dissensus exist over the significance of regime. As Steven Hughes and Kenneth Mijeski have observed:

It is clear . . . from even a cursory review of the relevant literature that no consensus exists as to what are the critical defining characteristics of a regime type. Moreover, there is considerable dissensus over the issue of whether or not
different regimes account for any systematic differences in public policy. If anything, that dissensus is most acute among students of the politics of Latin America.\textsuperscript{9}

As they note, even Aristotle was somewhat uncertain, for he argued that any regime, given its particular social structure, might behave justly or unjustly. Social conditions could be more decisive, then, than actual regime type.

Of more recent vintage is Charles Anderson's classic study of politics and economic development, in which he categorized regimes as conventional, democratic-reformist, and revolutionary. The ideologies of each type were examined in terms of policy patterns and outputs. In the end, Anderson was intimidated by the absence of aggregate data and case studies for the period after World War II. In his work published two decades ago, he ultimately contended that few policy styles were as distinctively clear-cut as scholars might argue. Thus,

Military governments tended to engage in large-scale public works projects, and so did other types of regime. In some cases, political stability and "no-nonsense" government contributed to economic growth, and in other cases did not. Large-scale public enterprise was generated by regimes espousing nationalism and social reform but just as frequently by militantly conservative governments.\textsuperscript{10}

Moving toward a consideration of military rule in Ecuador, then, the question over regime type and public policy remains unresolved. Karen Remmer's discussion rightly demonstrated the existence of at least three identifiable schools of thought in contention. One holds that military regimes are more developmentalist in policy than the civilian; another takes the
opposite position; the third asserts that regime type is not significant. Her review of the literature in the late 1970s found little to suggest that regime differences were highly influential on public policy. Furthermore, "underlying socio-economic conditions impose such basic constraints on political actors that it makes little difference whether they are civilian or military." 11

Yet Remmer did not concede the game, stating that it was "premature" to conclude that regime type is unimportant for understanding public policy in Latin America. What is not fruitful is an oversimplistic civilian-military dichotomy, which is often too broadly or crudely drawn. If empirical studies have not conclusively established strong relationships between regime type and public policy in Latin America, the basic linkage has remained unclear. Remmer has continued to pursue these issues, notably in her coauthored work with Gilbert Merkx in dissecting bureaucratic-authoritarian theorizing. 12 Her concerns have been shared by others, including Hughes and Mijeski. A heuristic schema differentiates among democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes have been subdivided into military, traditional civilian, and bureaucratic-authoritarian subtypes. While this discussion could lead too far afield, it is worth repeating Hughes and Mijeski's contention that "one of the more interesting questions to be addressed by students of politics is whether or not there is a connection between different regimes and different patterns of public policy." 13 Certainly this question constitutes a classic issue of political theory and philosophy and requires a few words on the regime-policy relationship.
The evolution of the dichotomy, which has been increasingly challenged, can be viewed in some part as reflecting the political patterns of the day in Latin America—and especially perceptions of these patterns in the U.S. academic community. During the heyday of democratic pluralism, its adherents insisted that the democratic regime, based on popular sovereignty, elections, and respect for citizen participation, presumably permitted the consideration of diverse interests and an institutionalization of peaceful resolution of conflict. Democratic reforms would accelerate state enterprises, expand centralized power and control, encourage professionalism, and effectively respond to national needs. Although a slow and cumbersome approach, it would nonetheless produce in due course the most effective and meaningful policy response to problems of national development. If only impatience over transitory delays and disruptions could be curbed, the more enduring benefits would be duly bestowed upon all deserving members of the polity.

This satisfyingly rosy portrayal of events gradually darkened as events during the second half of the 1960s seemed ever more discouraging. At first stage whispers, then open criticism argued that policy could not be executed through pluralistic systems where conflict and opposition could outstrip popular support and nascent systemic legitimacy. Circumstances lent themselves to such observations as that of Juan Linz, who wrote that in societies suffering injustice and cultural division, "it is difficult to accord intellectual justification to a system in which the will of the electorate, the technicalities of the law-making process, and the decision of the courts can serve to maintain a social order that
arouses moral indignation or, conversely, can allow a reformist majority to question an inherited value system."14

Authoritarianism therefore became posited increasingly as the regime type most supportive of effective policy-making and management. It was alleged that centralized, coercive military government would assure the level of public order necessary for the promotion of development. The military in conjunction with civilian technocrats and foreign capital would become the new elite that "eliminates electoral competition and severely controls the political participation of the popular sector. Public policy is centrally concerned with promoting advanced industrialization."15 A technocratic policy style would emerge, while policies could be identified and implemented through the "technically rational" pursuit of the twin objectives of stability and growth.16 Among those who were somewhat skeptical, it seemed self-evident that while authoritarianism might deal readily with short-term measures, sustained development could scarcely be assumed. Indeed, promises of future gain "that appear to be contradicted by regressive measures that accelerate the concentration of resources and widen disparities between rural and urban life only perpetuate the kinds of social conflicts the military abhors."17

With either the authoritarian or the pluralist regime, in the Latin American setting there exists inherent faith in the ability of the state to plan and direct policy. There has evolved a broad acceptance of the notion that the state should determine the rules of the economic game, utilizing its authority to manipulate them in the quest for long-range developmental objectives. If distinctions
exist between regimes—even the crude civilian-military dichotomy—then individual case studies and the gathering of empirical data become important. The need exists to refine theoretical constructs and strengthen the available materials that can afford greater insight is possible. Such efforts at refinement can link regimes with significant characteristics of policy-making. Having said as much, one perhaps might set aside the familiar caveats over the limitations of ideal types and simplistic dichotomies while briefly synthesizing those policy characteristics customarily ascribed to authoritarian and to pluralist regimes.

The former has been viewed as tightly centralized, with political power exercised by a small group of persons. This leadership is elitist in values and in approach. The system is closed in the sense that conflict is controlled or contained by whatever methods necessary. Faith in the ability of the state to direct national development is accompanied by the belief of the Armed Forces that no other group is capable of doing so. Domestic forces are thus to be denied access to policy-making, mass participation is proscribed, and political activity beyond the narrow confines of the leadership is illegitimate. Under such conditions, demands are created by the state, and the process of studying and responding to them is organically unified. Little need exists for bargaining with internal organizations and interest groups, thus the regime enjoys solidarity and presents a monolithic front when negotiating and bargaining. This unity is further enhanced by a homogeneous ideology or weltanschauung guiding those who exercise authority.
The opposing abstraction is allegedly typical of the civilian, democratic pluralist regime. The institutions of state governance are de facto decentralized through the interplay of the executive branch, the legislature, autonomous state agencies, plus regional and local governments. The leadership is popular, representing the values and interests of the citizenry. The system is open, with conflict a hallmark of daily activity. Domestic forces and groups are permitted, indeed encouraged to participate. This approach assures that decision makers will be adequately apprised of alternatives. As Anderson wrote, the decision maker is required to consider societal needs as a consequence of the systemic process of representation. The resultant confrontation of diverse sectors in the formulation of public policy then stimulates the necessary linkage between that policy and private-sector performance.\(^\text{18}\)

The assumptions accompanying the democratic rules of the game cede legitimacy to the multitude of groups and to their involvement, with mass participation being invariably desirable. Demands from society reveal systemic attitudes and preferences. Decisions require bargaining with the plethora of representative domestic groups, thereby stimulating disunity and discord. Policymakers under the democratic system must execute policies without alienating either domestic or foreign entrepreneurs, ever conscious that policies may lead to economic hardships, which are believed to fuel sentiment for military intervention. Within the Latin American context, an acceleration of state enterprises will occur as well as an expansion of economic power by the government. The democratic pluralist shares with his or her authoritarian policy-making
counterpart the idea "that the state should determine the rules of the economic game and use its power to manipulate them in pursuit of long-term development objectives." 19

This perhaps overlong prolegomena has been intended to indicate the need to examine policies within the context of regime types and characteristics. Without further repetition of argument, it may nonetheless be useful to restate once the centrality of the statist tradition in Latin America. John Sloan has described it well in declaring that Latin Americans have never been attracted to the liberal state that merely plays "the role of referee among the competing interests of society and . . . provides law and order and a minimum level of public services." 20 Instead, the Latin American state has come to be viewed as the ultimate patrón, the dominant institution in society. With the mounting drive for modernization and development, the functions of Latin American governments have also expanded.

At this point, it bears repeating that any dichotomous formulation of roughly traditional or innovative policy as hypothetically embodied in either authoritarian or liberal pluralist regimes is unquestionably oversimplistic. The Latin American experience has been richly diverse. For instance, Hughes and Mijeski cite a study demonstrating that educational and defense spending reflected an incrementalist approach under both pluralist and authoritarian regimes. 21 Enrique Baloyra's examination of Venezuelan oil policies and budgets over a thirty-year span found that national petroleum policy was approached by civilian leadership with boldness, treating such policies as a high-stakes game. The
previous dictatorial regime, in contrast, had been cautious and narrowly incremental in the best traditional sense. Such findings remind analysts of the need to avoid a priori assumptions about policy strategies vis-à-vis regime types. Regarding Ecuador in recent and contemporary times, let us now examine its authoritarian experience and, more broadly, the role of the Ecuadorean Armed Forces both in power and behind the scenes of civilian pluralist government.

The Traditionalist Military before 1972

Anticipation of the chronological focus seems useful at this point. Consequently, my empirical inquiry will stress the seven years of military government from 1972 to 1979. This period includes the first four years under General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara and the subsequent three under the Triumvirate. This examination will also look at the military under the conservative government of President León Febres Cordero, although largely within the context of military disidence, corporate factionalism, and a challenge to systemic legitimacy. Before entering into a closer examination of events and forces during this period, some general background may be helpful. A few admittedly rough and ready sketches will depict a military establishment that until the 1970s was no more modernized than other elements of the political system.

The years from Ecuadorean independence until the early twentieth century constituted an era of military caudillos. In fact, the first half-century of the independence period was "largely a tale of a series of generals--Flores, Urbina, Veintimilla--who
dominated politics for relatively long periods of time, interspersed with civil wars in which various military leaders contested to establish their personal hegemony." When the cacao-based coastal plutocracy developed late in the 1800s, it contributed to a thirty-year period of Liberal political hegemony. But when the economic boom collapsed with little advance notice in 1922, the stage was set for the military coup of 9 July 1925, which marked the appearance of the Armed Forces as an institutional political actor. This so-called Revolución de Julio, a movement made up predominantly of young officers seeking to overthrow the Guayaquil business oligarchy and Liberal domination, soon yielded the stage to civilian politicians.

Between 1925 and 1948, twenty-one different governments came and went in Ecuador, and yet such pronounced instability was not marked by a dominant military role. Only three governments after 1931 were headed by officers, two of which survived less than a year. Only early in the century had the first steps been taken to professionalize the military, which was slow to move toward a corporate entity with true political power of its own. The nineteenth-century pattern of military-political caudillos, acting as individuals, gave way only slowly and grudgingly to a minimally professionalized military subordinated to civilian control. The first foreign military mission was provided by Chile in 1903, while in 1922, Italian advisors organized several specialized training schools for the Ecuadorean Army. Meanwhile, recruitment for the officer corps through creation of the Escuela Militar began only in 1925. In time, recruitment turned increasingly toward the urban
middle strata, and few officers came from the national elite or from working-class families. 25

Contrary to accepted folk wisdom about Latin America in general, the military in Ecuador remained a weak force institutionally despite the low level of party development and the weakness of constitutional traditions. As John Samuel Fitch has written authoritatively, "Minimal professionalization thus contributed to the political subordination of the armed forces, with individual officers being generally reduced to secondary roles in the clienteles of civilian leaders, whether of the government or of its opposition." 26 This status was powerfully affected, however, by the military defeat of 1941. Peruvian troops crossed the disputed border between the two countries, seizing a large chunk of territory and depriving Ecuador of a port on the Amazon. The ill-prepared Ecuadorean military suffered the humiliation of losing territory and having a treaty imposed in the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro. It also felt betrayed by the civilian government's withholding of troops from the front lines. Thus the conviction was bred that the Armed Forces must look to their own institutional needs, which must be isolated and protected from the whims of politicians.

During the next two decades, a host of important corporate benchmarks were realized. An expanded educational system was stressed, with the Army school joined by the Escuela Naval and the Escuela Aérea, both located on the coast in Salinas. They were four-year programs for high school graduates, but the Colegio Militar (War College) in Quito required five years, with the equivalent of the last three years of high school being followed by
two of strictly military coursework. After 1950 all officers were required to be products of their respective service schools, where a tradition of socialization emphasized the national, moral, and professional responsibilities setting them apart from ordinary citizens. Additional training became available at the Academia de Guerra, a general staff school for senior officers (it was closed between 1952 and 1956, however, following an outburst of insubordination against the democratic government of Galo Plaza Lasso). The more promising officers were often sent abroad for advanced training, most frequently to the United States, Brazil, or Argentina. Not until 1972 did Ecuador establish its own advanced war college.

Although educational expansion in the 1940s and 1950s left Ecuador with a military that still lagged behind most South American countries in this regard (much of the education was, after all, at the secondary level), overall progress was undeniable. Much the same was true of the military's size and organizational structure. By 1972, on the eve of a golpe de estado, military manpower had reached some twenty thousand. Two-thirds belonged to the Army, with the remainder divided almost equally between the Navy and the Air Force. Military service was required by the constitution; and the Ley de Servicio Militar defined the conscription period as one year. This requirement made the Ecuadorean military relatively small by continental standards but still constituted an advance over the situation in 1941.
Charged with defending the independence and integrity of the nation, the Armed Forces were also held responsible for executing both constitutional and ordinary legislative rules. In assuming such duties, they had recognized the need for greater organizational precision in the wake of the 1941 defeat. Changes were gradually introduced, most notably in the series of reforms introduced in 1956. These innovations merged with earlier practices to produce the organizational and administrative configuration in place when the 1972 intervention took place. The president of the republic continued to be commander in chief of the military and responsible for National Security Article 116 of the Constitution of 1945. The chain of command continued through the minister of national defense to the joint command, which at that time was composed of the three service commanders.

The minister of defense was held responsible for realizing presidential policies and was usually a civilian (only three exceptions occurred between 1948 and 1972, although the pattern later changed in the direction of retired generals). The minister's principal military advisor, variously titled subsecretary or vice-minister at different times, was to be a senior active-duty officer. The highest positions within the military establishment were those of the high command (here too the labels have changed over the years), which consisted of the chief of the general staff and the three service commanders. The senior active-duty officer was expected under most circumstances to serve as chief of the general staff but lacked hierarchical authority over the Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders. Although the defense ministry and the three
subdirectors of the Armed Forces general staff were made responsible for coordination, in practice it was often minimal. As will be noted subsequently, even during the 1980s, interservice rivalries and erratic communications have continued to weaken the potential for unified action.

The country was divided geographically into five regional zones, with Army headquarters in Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca, Loja, and Machala. The first three zones have customarily been commanded by generals. Both Quito and Guayaquil have a number of separate infantry, artillery, and armored units located strategically nearby. To the south in Cuenca and environs are additional smaller garrisons. Especially crucial to the entire zone is the El Oro division of Loja, which deploys nearly half of the Army's troops along or near the Peruvian border. Despite its distance from the capital, this outpost has sometimes asserted major political influence in recent years. Other centers of strength within the Army have included the Academia de Guerra and the Colegio Militar in Quito. By the 1970s and thereafter, the paratrooper school and the Instituto Militar de Geografía, also located in Quito, have sometimes acted with relative independence in times of crisis, although they are nominally joined to the general staff.

The significance and influence of the Navy and the Air Force have understandably been secondary until recent years. At politically delicate moments, their roles have often been exercised only to the extent that an individual service commander at the time might be a strong or decisive personality. Nevertheless, institutional traditions were slowly building by the 1950s and
after. For the Navy, its chief and the squadron commander in Guayaquil have generally been the only officials likely to exercise political clout (again excepting the later experience with military government). The Navy covers three separate districts that are responsible for the coast, highlands, and the Amazon River and waterways. The Air Force (which was founded by the Army in 1920 and declared a separate branch in 1944) has moved progressively toward overt competition with the Army. The base at Taura near Guayaquil has ordinarily been the home base for most of the combat planes; its commander is frequently an important officer, as are the second zone commander in Guayaquil and the chief of the air transport base in Quito.

These events constituted the important developments in the three decades after the war with Peru, although a misleading interlude of constitutional government suggested greater political institutionalization than actually existed. Beginning in 1948 with Galo Plaza, however, three successive elected governments served their full four-year terms and handed over the reins of power to leaders who had in fact been strong critics. But when this chain was broken in 1961, the Armed Forces played a major role in terminating the fourth presidency of the ineffable José María Velasco Ibarra. Two years later, the military became the decisive actor in a still-controversial ouster of Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy, the former vice president who had replaced Velasco.27 Assuming power on 11 July 1963, the junta represented the first such institutional intervention since 1925.
Declaring its intention to exercise more than the customary role of temporary guardianship, the junta pledged itself to an array of reformist objectives. According to the Army's Colonel Marcos Gándara Enríquez:

A long series of defects and errors obliged the Armed Forces to judge the national reality and, consequently, to assume not only the responsibility for ending the chaos and rectifying mistaken paths, but also the responsibility for promoting a new socioeconomic structure that would permit the State to comply with its function of serving the common interests of its citizens, thus laying the foundation for a true democracy.  

The junta retained power for nearly three years, during which time it "allied with technocrats and adopted policies that were in vogue under the Alliance for Progress," which implied a firmly anticommunist foreign policy and a "series of moderate reform laws dealing with agrarian structure, taxation, and administration." In the end, however, the junta's best efforts were largely frustrated, and on 29 March 1966, it threw up its hands and quit—so abruptly that Ecuador actually experienced more than twenty-four hours without a government. 

Following two years of interim government, constitutional order was restored when Velasco Ibarra was elected to his fifth term as president. Almost immediately the tirelessly demagogic and indomitably personalistic "Gran Ausente" plunged into his usual administrative mistakes, stubbornly antagonizing the opposition while grievously mismanaging the economy. By 1970 the Armed Forces (always handsomely treated during Velasquista governments) remained virtually his only significant source of support. On 22 June 1970,
Velasco used military support to engineer his so-called autogolpe, closing down Congress, dismissing the courts, and assuming unchallenged power of decree power for himself. This occurrence was far from the end of military involvement in affecting the fate of the regime.

A civilian minister of defense, the president's nephew Jorge Acosta Velasco, had been shrewdly and assiduously manipulating promotions and assignments to assure continuing loyalty. But when he sought to force the resignation of the director of the Army war academy, he provoked a crisis that led to his resignation and that of several ranking officers. In late March of 1971, Velasco was clinging to power without the aid of a skillful minister, and the military had been angered and its hierarchy disrupted. Furthermore, the new Army commander was Colonel Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, who became the main defender of military independence and institutional legitimacy. As President Velasco encountered escalating greater popular protests and civilian opposition and continued to manhandle economic policy, prospects mounted for another golpe.

Analysis of the forces and factors that played a part in this sequence of events lies beyond the purview of this study. But among the more important were widespread fears over the anticipated 1972 presidential election of the Lebanese populist from Guayaquil, Assad Bucaram;³⁰ the accumulated Velasquista failures; and the advent of petroleum wealth as a source that might transform the nation.³¹ On 15 February 1972, over Carnival weekend, the military moved to seize power. This time, the leaders of Ecuador's military brought with them even more programmatic views than in 1963. Although
tendencies diverged within this group (as will be seen), the ranking officers agreed on their right, even their duty, to assume policymaking authority. Within a month, this perspective was made explicit in the initial Filosofía y plan de Acción del Gobierno Revolucionario y Nacionalista del Ecuador:

The constant failures of governments, absence of the people in centers of decision, administrative immorality and inefficiency, the incapacity and insincerity of political parties and groups to interpret popular aspirations and the fundamental economic structure have determined the existence of an unjust and backward society, with small oppressing groups and the majority oppressed . . .

Facing this situation, the Armed Forces, responsible for the survival of the Ecuadorian State, having assumed power with leaders or caudillos but as an Institution, is prepared to implant a new national, ideological political doctrine that will permit it to carry out the substantial transformation in the socioeconomic and juridical order that the Republic demands.32

At this point, Ecuador entered an era of military authoritarianism and bourgeois statism unlike anything it had experienced before.

POLICY: MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND STATISM, 1972-1976

From the outset, the self-styled Gobierno Revolucionario y Nacionalista declared itself in favor of socioeconomic reforms broadly paralleling those of the military regime in Peru. Describing itself as committed to "energetic action against socially and economically privileged groups," the new government described a set of programmatic specificos on 29 December 1972 in the Plan integral de transformación y desarrollo, 1973-1977. It targeted three basic goals: national integration, improved living conditions, and greater economic output through a more rational use of natural
resources. This agenda was to be funded by the petroleum boom that was just beginning. During the life of the Rodríguez Lara government, constant competition went on between progressive reformists and traditionalists (labels that are admittedly simplistic). While this dispute was being played out, however, the Armed Forces moved decisively in the direction of a statism previously unknown in Ecuador.

Reformists and Traditionalists

As David Schodt has written, the cornerstone of the Plan Integral was decidedly state-led development. Ecuador required "more decisive intervention by the State in the economy . . . to promote new reforms necessary to expand the potential for national growth. The strategy implies transferring to the Public Sector those fundamental decisions that affect the economy and Ecuadorean society, those that today are made in foreign centers."33 While promises were made to enhance the private sector, the Plan and other official statements made clear the intended transferal of major economic decisions away from a national bourgeoisie purportedly incapable of producing the desired modernization.

Traditional forces reacted for the most part with predictable apprehension, and these fears were heightened when General Rodríguez Lara removed several rightist officers from the initial government team. This preoccupation was further underscored by official verbal emphasis on the government's?] nationalist and revolutionary quality. Yet Ecuadorean leftists and avowed progressives remained skeptical from the very beginning, interpreting policy proposals as
a modernizing desarrollismo linked particularly to industrial and impresarial elites. As the noted Ecuadorean Jesuit Luis E. Proaño wrote two months after the golpe, the official program of action was not revolutionary but tended instead "to be reformist, with its characteristics being those of efficiency, administrative honesty, and bureaucratic technification."34

In the months that followed, Rodríguez Lara, a moderate nationalist, wavered between the reformist and traditionalist elements. With the senior leadership divided and incapable of uniting behind a single vision, Rodríguez Lara could only shift opportunistically with the winds of the moment. But despite discord over the policy perspective, procedural matters and government decision-making aroused less controversy. In fact, few disputed the Armed Forces' belief in "hierarchy, discipline, subordination, and mutual respect, which . . . contribute decisively to . . . preventing the destruction of the human species while restoring internal and international order . . . ." The military also assumed responsibility for reinstituting national morality. Rodríguez Lara declared in a typical statement in October 1973 that for Ecuador, "the vital elements of the equilibrium of the lives of the people and their aptitude for progress lie in restoring an invulnerable disciplinary conscience in the country."35

The military government also assumed broad societal responsibilities, moving into banking, basic industries, taxes, agriculture, fishing, cement, and, of course, petroleum. During the seven years after the military government seized power, whether dominated by reformist or traditionalist officials, the regime
created more than a dozen new public enterprises. Its methods included nationalizing existing businesses, as with the Ecuatoriana airline, and creating new enterprises like the petroleum corporation, the Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana (CEPE).

Value added by public enterprises as a share of gross domestic product rose substantially, coming primarily from petroleum, transport, communications, and public utilities. Public financial institutions were strengthened and served as a channel for state investment. The Corporación Financiera Nacional alone, a major public institution by 1974, held shares in more than two dozen firms. In 1973 the Armed Forces created the Dirección de Industrias, whose management fell mainly to the Army. As one spokesman said, it was "the duty of the Armed Forces to contribute to the socioeconomic development of the country, creating organisms that will promote, organize, and administer basic industries . . . through owned enterprises or association with the private sector."37

Two major examples of military statism also highlight the struggle over basic policy, exemplifying the gradual retreat of the reformists in the face of strong societal pressures favoring more traditionalistic perspectives. The areas involved were agriculture and petroleum. Regarding agriculture, the Plan Integral was to eradicate rural poverty and increase productivity. It sought "an immediate redistribution of income in favor of the large peasant population . . . [that] will lead to creating a broad internal market. . . . The agrarian structural change will thus be transformed into a basic motor capable of expanding the productive
process and energizing the national economy." Proposed reforms were prepared early in the Rodríguez Lara period, and its resemblance to the Peruvian version immediately produced cries of outrage from large landowners.

This outcry led to a much gentler document, which was issued in October as the Ley de Reforma Agraria of 1973. It did not represent a significant departure from earlier legislation in most regards, falling far short of its official self-description as a "strategic instrument for transforming the present economic and social structure of agriculture into the fundamental base for the development of Ecuador." Minister of Agriculture Guillermo Maldonado Lince, a nationalistic spokesman for sweeping action, was soon caught up in the vortex of the storm. Conditions were aggravated by government attacks on landowners for allegedly reducing production as a form of protest. Officials tried to argue that the government was not really in the process of altering the size of existing individual holdings, but they were unsuccessful in quelling the cries of outrage.

Traditional landowners displayed an almost paranoid fear that modernizing agribusiness might be encouraged so much that it would overwhelm its more orthodox competition. They feared that massively financed agricultural interests, aided and abetted by government support of cooperatives, would break their historic dominion over rural areas while endangering the long-standing marriage of convenience between traditional landowners and exporting interests. If these worries were not enough, reports also surfaced that alleged leftists in the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y
Colonización (IERAC) planned to incite the peasants toward land seizures and other illegal acts. By March of 1974, the coastal and highland chambers of agriculture proclaimed Minister Maldonado Lince "persona non grata" and a "traitor influenced by foreign ideologies alien to the national revolutionary government." \(^{40}\)

The military government angrily retaliated by canceling aid to the growers' association and even jailed the president of the Guayaquil Chamber of Agriculture briefly. Nevertheless, the opposition soon succeeded in getting Maldonado Lince removed. His resignation led to the naming of Colonel Raúl Cabrera, the fourth head of the embattled ministry in less than two years. It also symbolized further official retreat from its initial reformist nationalism. Maldonado Lince was soon joined in the ranks of former top officials by IERAC Director Marco Herrera Escalante. His forced resignation, however, did not pass without an angry response from Herrera:

> In this country, the oligarchy is a lion that impedes transformations and development, one against whom it is necessary to launch a hard struggle to introduce changes regarding agrarian reform. I believe that I have committed a grave error in having touched the ears and the tail of this animal. . . . Those who come after us should mount a frontal attack if they want to defeat the lion. \(^{41}\)

In the final analysis, the Agrarian Reform of 1973 achieved only a limited impact, as many had predicted. Total land redistribution fell far short of specified targets, and rural poverty continued unalleviated. According to one prominent Ecuadorian commentator, the law failed in practice as both an economic and a social document. Benjamin Ortiz commented that
widespread feudalism could be confronted with either a liberal or a socialist approach, but "The Ecuadorian law and its rulings have been neither of these. They merely reject the notion of a true agrarian reform." For General Rodríguez Lara, the experience with agricultural policy amply testified to the constant opposition of oligarchical sectors whenever true reformism was broached. In the case of petroleum policy, even greater economic stakes were being contested by reformist and traditionalist forces. Here again, the early impetus from nationalistic progressives was gradually undermined by traditional attitudes and orthodoxy both inside and outside the government.

The complexities of the nascent national industry and the significance of the petroleum boom were profound, and the array of disputatious domestic and international interests were striking, making succinct synthesis difficult at best. The Plan de Acción originally promised a central role for the state, with responsibility for setting and implementing policy soon delegated to the new state-operated Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana (CEPE). Its duties included

... establishing programs for exploration, ... intensively exploring resources in order to sustain an adequate balance between reserves and production, building state refineries to meet domestic petroleum needs, ... studying markets for Ecuadorian crude petroleum, and establishing a system of auditing investments by foreign companies in Ecuador.

It was further stated that "Petroleum policy will be based on the inalienable interests of the state, rational exploitation, [and] the maintenance of reserves for future generations, without forgetting the just income from investments of the petroleum companies."
The early nationalistic period transpired under the aegis of Navy Captain Gustavo Jarrín Ampudia, who had originally been appointed to head the education ministry until a dispute between the Army and the Navy over other top positions led to a shuffle of personnel. A former commander of the Naval Academy and an avowed nationalist, Jarrín soon demonstrated his policy convictions while assembling a qualified team of Ecuadoreans and foreigners. This team achieved an impressive array of accomplishments, among them retroactive application of 1971 petroleum regulations, creation of CEPE, membership in OPEC in November 1973, purchase of 25 percent of the shares in the Texaco-Gulf consortium, collaboration in founding of the Organización Latinoamericana de Energía (OLADE), construction of the Esmeraldas refinery, and exploitation and management of the nation's first wells in the Oriente fields.

In pursuing these objectives, Jarrín and the reformists supporting his initiatives followed a tough nationalistic line toward petroleum multinationals. Recognizing the need to proceed while the bargaining leverage rested with Ecuador—and also sensitive to the benefits of conservationist measures over the long haul—Minister Jarrín and his companions best personified the progressive element in the military. General Rodríguez Lara was scarcely unhappy with the achievements gained, and even traditionalistic critics could do little more than grumble ungraciously in the face of earnings that increasingly financed both developmental growth and greater institutional benefits for the Armed Forces. Symbolic prestige was also gained when Ecuador hosted the OPEC meeting in Quito in June 1974, where Gustavo Jarrín
(recently elevated to Rear Admiral) was elected president of the cartel.

This point effectively marked the apogee of both Jarrín and the reformist thrust of petroleum policy under military rule. Late in 1974, a combination of international and domestic forces caused his removal. Playing a part in this campaign were the growing international surplus of petroleum played a part and quiet pressure from the United States. Compromises with the multinationals were sought, provisions for royalty payments were modified, and petroleum policy was substantially moderated in a host of other ways. The ministers of natural resources who followed Jarrín—all of them senior military officers—varied somewhat in their policy preferences but basically hewed to a defensively cautious and unaggressively orthodox approach.

As the withdrawal from reformism gradually gained momentum in all major policy areas, this trend did not imply any softening of military adherence to statism. With the advent of petroleum earnings, the Ecuadorean state for the first time in its history possessed enough resources of its own to exercise developmental options free of the usual dependence on the whim and will of the private sector. By way of illustration, the total value of exports in 1971 was $242.9 million; a year later, petroleum earnings had raised the figure to $326.3 million, although the pipeline only opened in August. By 1974 exports reached $1.123 billion, with some $692.8 million of coming from petroleum. This dramatic expansion nourished an accompanying boom in the state budget: between 1971 and 1974, it grew by 178.6 percent, from 4.103 million sures to
11.428 million.

Government expansion included the founding of several new entities: the 1973 founding of the Superintendencia de Precios to help administer price controls; the Empresa Nacional de Productor Vitales (ENPROVIT) for the domestic handling and distribution of foodstuffs; and the establishment of CEPE as well. State participation in mixed enterprises was also encouraged, and the regime sometimes disregarded hostility from the private sector, which was exacerbated by the increasing shift of economic power from Guayaquil to Quito. All these changes nevertheless occurred when the Armed Forces were lacking programmatic unity on issues other than nationalism. For instance, even the early reformist period presented a somewhat inconsistent picture. Barely two months after the seizure of power, the ministers of government and production, who had both been following the Peruanista tradition, were forced out of the government just when official rhetoric became most radical. On the other side, in January 1973 the leader of the hardliners, Defense Minister General Víctor Aulestía Mier, was summarily fired.

The statist thrust of government, anathema to the private sector, was in considerable part a pragmatic response designed to deal with problems susceptible to petroleum-financed government intervention. As Danilo Carrera of the Banco Central told interviewers early in the Rodríguez Lara period, the regime was not dedicated to a particular ideology and would undertake public intervention only when it seemed necessary. Nonetheless, the state did enter areas traditionally regarded by the private sector as
privileged terrain: "the dominant economic groups did not hesitate to adopt a position that defied the actions," frequently resulting in nothing less than "an open challenge to the authority of public power." This challenge was first manifested for all to see in September 1975 and came to fruition four months later.

Institutional Orthodoxy and Consolidation

It would be fair to conclude, in the words of David Schodt, that "although the 1972 military government expanded the economic functions of the Ecuadorean state beyond that accomplished by any previous government, its achievements in the area of social reforms were limited, particularly in view of the generally propitious conditions surrounding the installation of this government." Furthermore, neither the uncharismatic General Rodríguez Lara nor the Armed Forces in general had sought or achieved substantial support. They had built up neither political movements nor personal popularity and achieved only limited success in reaching out to workers and peasants for broad-based support. The middle sectors and impresarial nationalists were more inclined to enjoy the benefits of prosperity than to fight in their defense. By early 1975, the "nationalistic revolutionary" government had been converted into little more than an administrator over the internal factionalism of the Armed Forces.

As one Ecuadorean observer astutely noted, Rodríguez Lara was increasingly faced with the need to choose between alternatives, either radicalizing the policy process while organizing popular and working-class support or casting aside all nationalistic
pretensions. His reluctance to choose one course or the other effectively hastened the end of his rule.\textsuperscript{49} A series of tax, import, and exchange measures taken in August of 1975 produced great hostility. The nationalistic technocracy of the military government found itself deserted by the previously supportive industrial bourgeoisie, while traditional socioeconomic elites concluded that a return to civilian rule was necessary. Thus a conjunction of interests between much of the private sector and the ambitions of more authoritarian military officers led to political crisis and rumbles of a new golpe.

Tensions became public on 31 August 1975, when troops commanded by General Raúl González Alvear, chief of staff of the Armed Forces, attacked and seized the presidential palace. But although the minister of defense and the Army chief of staff were both captured, the uprising was otherwise botched. Rodríguez Lara was away from the palace, not even in Quito, and key garrisons in the capital city remained loyal to the president. The Air Force ignored González Alvear's orders to overfly key units with combat planes, and the lack of popular support for the insurgents was notable. In the aftermath of the uprising, González Alvear and others believed to want a lasting military government under avowedly rightist authoritarianism were purged. Those dismissed included the ministers of finance and natural resources.

A new set of financial and monetary decrees were issued, but by this point, the fate of the Rodríguez Lara government had been sealed. Rising constitutionalist sentiment in the Armed Forces, encouraged by major economic groups, sought a return to civilian
normality and the rule of law. This surge was inevitably combined with a determination to eschew the more progressive policies of the past. At the same time, the first strike by the three national federations collaborating with one another took place in November, further agitating domestic politics. Even the ultraconservative archbishop of Guayaquil demanded a restoration of "the full exercise of our liberties," while the press squirmed under heightened official censorship. The denouement came on 9 January 1976. The scheduled wedding of Rodríguez Lara's daughter in the presidential palace was allowed to take place, but afterward he was hustled away, and a three-man Consejo Supremo de Gobierno assumed power.

The Consejo's membership included the Army commander, General Guillermo Durán Arcentales, who had previously served as minister of both education and government and was viewed as a hard-line traditionalist. Many had advocated that he replace Rodríguez Lara, but enough opposition emerged to require a compromise. Crucial to such an adjustment was Vice Admiral Alfredo Poveda Burbano, chair of the joint chiefs of staff since the September uprising and another former minister of government. He was regarded as flexible in outlook and staunchly dedicated to restoring civilian government (a questionable issue with Durán), a senior Navy official who represented the most progressive branch of the services at that time. Once the compromise began to take shape, it became logical to round out the Consejo with Air Force Commander Luis Leoro Franco, a newly promoted general who was much younger than his two counterparts.
Rodríguez Lara was allowed to issue a final resignation message, and he produced a final nationalistic document denouncing the enemies of the public as well as national imperialism. Afterward, the Consejo Supremo de Gobierno moved to assert its own identity. It came to power under circumstances in which the industrial bourgeoisie had little to lose in opposing the Rodríguez Lara government. The willingness of the military from 1972 onward to subsidize expansion of the private sector had never been in doubt, and it was logical for structural reasons that even the receding vestiges of military reformism were under sharp attack. As the rule of the Triumvirate gradually unfolded, much of its time and attention was devoted to formulating and implementing methods to negotiate the Armed Forces' withdrawal from power. This phase was also marked by sporadic exertions by less traditionalistic officials to spark new reforms, for even Rodríguez Lara's removal and the forced retirement of some of his main military and civilian aides did not automatically end the factionalism.

The relative balance within the government that existed between General Durán and Admiral Poveda was circumscribed not only by the greater openness and flexibility of the latter but by the widely-held suspicion that Durán did not truly support military withdrawal from power, whereas Poveda seemed inclined to do so. The new government was not totally bereft of nationalistic figures; three of its key figures during the early months were Colonels René Vargas Pazzos, Richelieu Levoyer, and Oliverio Vasconez. Vargas, longtime chief of CEPE until transferred to command the influential El Oro infantry brigade in November 1975, became the new minister of
natural resources. His first official declaration advocated higher royalties and the possible purchase of an additional 26 percent of Texaco-Gulf shares.

While falling short of demanding outright nationalization, he continued to espouse firmly independent policies while mobilizing public support from none other than retired Gustavo Jarrín and former members of his team. Vargas's role became central to Ecuador's resisting the constant pressures and threats of Gulf Oil, which finally pulled out of Ecuador. Vargas's basic orientation was paralleled on a quieter (and ultimately less successful) level in the ministry of agriculture by Vasoonez, who had earlier served as agriculture undersecretary to the ill-fated Minister Maldonado Lince. The third nationalist, Richelieu Levoyer, was an acknowledged reformist who was first given authority to reopen a dialogue with civilian groups and chart a course toward restoring constitutional rule. But within a few months, he was reassigned, and the reformist banners largely fell to Vargas, who remained in office until February 1977, when he was replaced by a more conservative officer, Army General Eduardo Semblantes Polanco.

Almost from the outset of the Triumvirate, however, most economic policy reflected a revival of traditional orthodoxy--now maintained by a state far larger and more powerful than ever before. Strict austerity measures were decreed as a form of "economic purification"; the Junta Monetaria toughened its import controls; and current spending was curbed. In due course, a conflict with powerful, but scandal-ridden, bank consortia from Guayaquil caused ministerial shifts, which produced a new minister of finance who
swiftly stepped up international borrowing. Santiago Sevilla Larrea, a reputed "boy wonder" of thirty-seven, soon devised an expansionist policy. This direction was well-received by the Consejo Supremo de Gobierno, especially in 1978 and 1979, when it was seeking to buy popularity on the brink of leaving power.

During the first six months of 1977, foreign loans were contracted for some four hundred million dollars. Sevilla told interviewers that his responsibility was to finance the government's developmental projects. As a former minister of finance aptly commented:

It seems that the military government, having pledged a return to constitutional government, would like to capitalize on the remaining months of its administration to carry out as many projects as possible. To do so naturally requires spending a large amount of money that, being unavailable through ordinary sources of income, must be obtained through foreign credit.50

From the beginning of 1976 until it left power, the Consejo Supremo de Gobierno produced an expansion in the public external debt of more than 50 percent per year. It also decreed in January 1979 a one-third increase in the nation's minimum wage while adding another extra month's bonus payment to the salary of public-sector workers.51 All these measures were accompanied by a progressive retreat from even the rhetorical nationalism of the Rodríguez Lara years.

The Triumvirate's increasing need for greater income, which gradually became its major priority, stimulated a new series of foreign loans dating from May 1977. Sevilla, the architect of the economic policy, was toppled by a scandal over contracts and alleged
influence-peddling, and in October 1978, his replacement declared that the petroleum boom had ended. Amid widespread consternation and anger, he contended that more borrowing and added domestic tax revenue would be necessary to sustain infrastructural development and ongoing government projects. It would have been far more accurate to speak of a recession in prices and world demand, but that is not the point. Rather, this perspective further bespoke the orthodoxy of ranking officers once the Triumvirate had solidified its control and charted the path toward constitutional restauración, as it was commonly called.

In withdrawing from the reformist impulses that had spurred policy initiatives erratically during the Rodríguez Lara years, the Consejo Supremo de Gobierno abandoned redistributive policies, turned away from social problems with disinterest, and furthered its own institutional interests. At the same time, the Armed Forces themselves were less than monolithic, mirroring the hegemonic instability of Ecuadorian society. As two students of the military have expressed the matter:

The diverse modalities of social forces existing on the political battlefield were approximated . . . by the tensions, contradictions, and struggles within the Armed Forces. . . . The struggle among dominant or subordinate social forces extended their battlefield to the barracks. . . . This situation determined that the hegemonic crisis was transferred to the interior of the Armed Forces, under the dual form of a military secular incapacity to implement a determined hegemony and a progressive ideological and doctrinal fragmentation.52

It had, perhaps inevitably, proven impossible to meet even the demands of economic elites alone. For instance, attempts to court the nation's industrialists included a shift of policy toward
foreign investment and export markets. In 1976 the new Industrial Development Law set forth incentives, but its results were modest. Coastal industrialists wanted to favor processed agricultural exports, while sierra industrialists demanded stimulation of the manufactured goods industry.53 Similar circumstances were prevailing in other sectors as well. As a particular result of the earlier boom years that nourished the Ecuadorian elites with generous infusions of petroleum earnings, they became more fragmented and fractious than ever. The final legacy of the Triumvirate in socioeconomic policy was a situation of stagnation, highly uneven growth, mounting foreign debt, shrinking petroleum reserves without further exploration, and popular discontent over unrealized expectations dating back to 1972 and the beginning of military rule.


It is a truism that the military establishment, as a separate force in society, cannot hold itself aloof from other sectors even when it is not attempting to rule the nation. One of the basic lessons to emerge from the period between 1972 and 1979 was the extent to which the Armed Forces were influenced in policy choices by the external preferences and pressures in which they were enmeshed. When a conjuncture of forces and circumstances led the military toward a return to the barracks, military reactions were significant in at least two ways. The first reaction of interest was the effort to protect its accumulated corporate interests by playing a decisive role in choosing a new president; second was the
determination to consolidate further its growing professionalism while seeking yet greater modernization. These self-imposed duties were foremost in the minds of both policy reformers and traditionalists in planning the return to constitutional government.

The Parties and Military Interests

The three-year process whereby the Armed Forces negotiated the reestablishment of civilian government was slow and tortuous—excessively so. The accompanying figure summarizes a brief chronology of events during this period. Throughout thirty-nine months, constant speculation churned over the intentions and sincerity of the Armed Forces, possible divisions within the Triumvirate, and a host of related questions. Predictably, the military leadership was divided. The true hard-liners hoped to extend the process indefinitely while putting their own leaders in place. By all indications, General Durán believed in this tactic as well as in his own credentials to become unchallenged chief of state. Other officers were willing to leave power, but only after establishing a set of conditions providing ironclad guarantees for military corporate interests. Yet a third current of thought held that military departure should be relatively swift and unconditional.
DEFINITION AND SEQUENCE OF THE RESTAURACION

Jan. 1976 Internal coup; constitutional government promised by February 78
Feb-Mar. 78 Military-directed dialogue with civilian sectors
June 78 Richelieu Levoyer announces plan for restoration; hard-liners oppose; Levoyer relieved and reassigned
Dec. 78 Three commissions appointed to write law of parties and elections, reform 1945 constitution, write new constitution
May 77 Commissions deliver reports to Consejo Supremo de Gobierno
Dec. 77 Consejo Supremo de Gobierno suspends transitory disposition, rules that new election will not apply to electoral process
Jan. 78 Referendum held; new constitution approved
Feb. 78 Consejo Supremo de Gobierno issues own electoral regulations, barring candidacy of Assad Bucaram and all former presidents
Mar.-May 78 Consejo Supremo de Gobierno directs Tribunal Supremo Electoral to eliminate selected parties and candidates
July 78 Jaime Roldós and Concentración de Fuerzas Populares win first round of elections
July-Sept. 78 Regime seeks to alter results; Tribunal Supremo Electoral delays count; conservatives demand annulment of process
Sept.-Oct. 78 Tribunal Superior Electoral replaced; vote-counting renewed; run-off elections promised for April 79
Nov.-Dec. 78 Defeated candidate Abdón Calderón assassinated, Bolívar Jarrín implicated
Jan.-Apr. 79 Consejo Supremo de Gobierno repeats promises; conservatives urge annulment; Velasco dies
Apr. 79 Roldós wins
Aug. 79 Roldós inaugurated; military to the barracks

The last group was the least influential, as events were to prove. Over the long run, however, and despite the issue being in doubt for more than three years, the commitment to withdraw gradually became dominant. This position was quietly but firmly backed by Admiral Poveda. Accompanying this trend was an increasingly unqualified determination that the process could not
operate freely but demanded careful guidance and control by the Armed Forces. Consequently, both hard-liners and moderates were able to join in efforts to exercise veto power over undesirable candidates, parties, and coalitions. But by the time the process finally ended, the Armed Forces had misjudged public sentiment, been outmaneuvered by civilian forces, and been forced to accept an outcome that they found highly distasteful.

Given the limits of space, a few words about candidacies must suffice. Despite almost incessant meddling and gratuitous insults to public opinion, the military's succession of arbitrary actions were ultimately frustrated. First, the Consejo Supremo de Gobierno refused to apply new electoral and party regulations to the forthcoming process, a decision that enabled them to issue their own dispositions. The still-feared and mistrusted Assad Bucaram of the Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP) had to be excluded from the presidency. An extraordinary exercise in warped logic barred first his candidacy because his parents were foreign-born; later he was prohibited from running for mayor of Guayaquil, then for vice-mayor. Finally even his wife was banned from running for mayor on the grounds that she lacked a high school diploma from an accredited institution.

Further government interventions included the prohibition on all former presidents from resuming the presidency. This category included some half dozen at the time, several of whom were contemplating another race. There was even fear of a return by eighty-four-year-old José María Velasco, who had already declared from exile in Argentina that his health prohibited further political
participation. By means of the subservient Tribunal Supremo Electoral, both a small Maoist party and the small reformist Christian Democratic party were ruled ineligible on concocted charges. When the Partido Liberal Radical were about to run a bearded young centrist named Francisco "Pancho" Huerta, further legal finagling eliminated him, leading the PLR to choose his uncle, traditionalist Raúl Clemente Huerta. All this maneuvering was designed to produce a first-round presidential election in which Huerta and conservative candidate Sixto Durán Ballén would lead the field, thus assuring a civilian president fully acceptable to the Armed Forces, no matter which of the two won.

Among the many miscalculations was the assumption that the CFP would crumble without Bucaram as candidate. Instead, the husband of his niece, Jaime Roldós Aguilera, was tapped to carry the banner. Following an alliance with the Christian Democrats that produced a ticket pairing Roldós with Osvaldo Hurtado, the Tribunal Supremo Electoral barred the Christian Democrats as well. They in turn joined the CFP for the duration of the campaign, leaving the coalition intact. Even so, the elections were expected to resolve the issue. To the surprise of all and the dismay of the military, the Roldós-Hurtado ticket won by a comfortable margin. This outcome in July 1978 produced attempts by the Tribunal Supremo Electoral first to taint, then to disallow the elections. Conservative politicians and their followers also disseminated government-inspired charges of Marxism and extremism, especially against Osvaldo Hurtado and international Christian Democracy.
Only after these and related efforts failed did the Triumvirate recognize the inevitable—including their own miscalculations and tactical errors—with the inauguration in August 1979 of a president and vice-president (both in their thirties) who were avowedly committed to "La Fuerza del Cambio" (usually capped in Spanish?), the force of change. The effort to control the restauración might have succeeded in theory. The basic strategy seemed sound, but the tactical execution was seriously flawed. The CFP did not collapse when Bucaram was banned; nonrecognition of the Christians ultimately strengthened the alliance with the CFP; and Pancho Huerta's being replaced by his uncle did not produce another strong traditionalist candidate but merely weakened the prospects of Sixto Durán. Moments when the Armed Forces might simply have canceled the entire process were numerous, but as time passed and opportunities were lost, the hesitation proved fatal.

Uncertainty plagued the military throughout the three-year process. Its internal disunity, symptomatic of the deepening decay of authoritarianism in Ecuador, mirrored a lack of will at critical moments. As each step of the restauración was progressively accomplished, it became more difficult to interrupt the process. In the end there was no viable alternative to acquiescence.56

By the time the seven years of military rule came to a seemingly ignominious conclusion (certainly, to a less than glorious one), the unpopularity of the regime had become manifest. Even the more nationalistic and reformist era under General Rodríguez Lara had created little popular support for the military. Meantime, business sectors that benefited most criticized the regime nonetheless "for policy inconsistencies, poor administration,
corruption, and waste of resources on armaments." More broadly, as Thomas Sanders observed, a desiagaste occurred that, especially by 1979, constituted undeniable attrition for military rule. Yet in light of the institutional progress made during its time in power, much remained to preserve, including many levers of influence on national affairs and policy-making.

Guayaquil's well-informed Análisis Semanal observed that as the military left government, it was by no means returning to the barracks in a literal sense. In contrast to its situation in 1972, the military had greatly enhanced its institutional perquisites and prerogatives in a number of ways: the Armed Forces received 23 percent of annual petroleum revenue; they enjoyed the power to appoint members to the boards of directors of major state corporations; they held a near monopoly on transportation through control of air and sea transport; investments by the Dirección de Industrias made the Armed Forces a major industrial shareholder; and direct participation in the appointment of the minister of defense was assured. In addition, ties with civilian elites had been enhanced by the growing practice of retired officers entering businesses at influential levels of management. Other retired officers began to participate in politics. Among those who went on to become prominent figures in party affairs within the next decade were René Vargas Pazzos, Gustavo Jarrín, and Richelieu Levoyer.

Institutional and Societal Characteristics
The Armed Forces' experience during their seven years in power (setting aside for the moment debates over policy and the management of national affairs) were unquestionably marked by perceptible professionalization and modernization. As a corporate body, the military not only greatly enlarged its sphere of activity and the opportunity for material benefits but also moved steadily away from its previous internal condition and structural status. And while the expansive opportunities for individual and collective advantage were by no means ignored, the military did not engage in the massive build-up that often characterizes such circumstances in Third World nations.

It is true that the most significant increase occurred in the size of the Armed Forces, which grew from twenty thousand in 1972 to thirty-five thousand in 1979, as is shown in the data in Table 1. This rise in numbers represented an increase from 3.2 members of the Armed Forces per thousand Ecuadoreans to 4.5 members. Military expenditures rose from 71 million dollars in 1972 to 175 million in 1979. In constant 1979 prices, the total increased from 117 million to 175 million dollars. During the same period, however, the petroleum bonanza also produced an increase in central government expenditures from $750 million to $1,460 million. As a consequence, the relative importance of military expenditures to government spending actually dropped slightly from 12.1 percent to 12.0 percent.
TABLE 1  ANNUAL EXPENDITURES OF THE ECUADOREAN MILITARY, 1972-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military Expenditures Current 1979 (million $)</th>
<th>Armed Forces Members</th>
<th>Government Expenditures (million $)</th>
<th>Military-Government Expenditures (%)</th>
<th>Armed Forces per 1000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>13.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1,410</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>190</td>
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<td>1,392</td>
<td>13.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>1,460</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


More broadly, the Ecuadorian military during its seven years in power furthered its position and its linkages with civilian society while providing a basis for a better and more mature relationship with the political process. At the same time, the years since the military left power testify amply to the relative adolescence of the institution. Internally, the process of institutionalizing has largely supplanted the traditional military caudillo who would rouse his garrison with a "revolutionary proclamation" and march toward armed confrontation. When direct intervention takes place, it customarily results from a collective decision at the highest level of the hierarchy, as occurred in 1963, 1972, and 1976.

In the first instance, the senior commanders of the three branches constituted the initial junta. In 1972, a united decision to intervene included the designation of Rodríguez Lara as the senior officer. Although the situation in 1976 was more
complicated, strong agreement existed among a majority of senior officers, with Durán and Poveda being the dominant figures in the Armed Forces at the time. The experience between 1972 and 1979 also underlined the hierarchical character of decision making, when the regime placed ranking officers as undersecretaries or subdirectors in all ministries and agencies headed by civilians. Moreover, with the exception of the finance ministry, most cabinet posts actually went to military personnel.

During the course of the seven years, it was common for senior officers to move back and forth between major troop commands and government administrative posts. Also significant was the avowed expectation that henceforth, the minister of defense would be a military officer (albeit occasionally recently retired). This practice has been assiduously followed by the three civilian presidents who have held office to the present (1988), even though the incumbent has deviated from the strict reliance on seniority and institutional procedures in place since 1979.

On 27 February 1972, the new Rodríguez Lara government decreed the establishment of the Instituto de Altos Estudios Militares as a command and general staff school. Its objectives included investigating and analyzing national problems, studying policymaking, and improving execution and implementation. The military government also undertook an upgrading of the service academies. Such measures mitigated the military's previous reluctance to examine politics and policies. Furthermore, the success of officers' career paths has become decreasingly dependent on battlefield accomplishments or wartime experience. A greater
premium is placed instead on administrative competence and, to a lesser degree, on political skill in manipulating the system from within.

This trend is an aspect of institutionalization that has been affected by advanced training at home and especially abroad. Ecuador's military has evolved a bureaucratic system of professionalization that is eminently hierarchical from the moment of recruitment onward. Promotions and professional advancement rely on preordained regulations of seniority and service assignment, participation and achievement in courses of study in Ecuador and abroad, and disciplined efficiency in performing administrative responsibilities. This hierarchical bureaucratization of the officer corps is accompanied by a major emphasis on institutional pride and defense of the national patrimony. Osvaldo Hurtado has described this emphasis well:

. . . the military is an institution that works vigorously to keep alive patriotic sentiments in a society that is experiencing an increasing deterioration of national pride. Soldiers are indoctrinated in the daily veneration of national symbols: the national anthem, the flag, the coat of arms, national territory, history. It is therefore not surprising that the armed forces identifies completely with the country and feels its problems and frustrations more intensely than other Ecuadorians.59

Such sentiments are also buttressed by national security doctrine. A product of the Cold War, this doctrine contends that military success depends on the ability to assure the survival of a country and the protection of its vital interests. National defense and sovereignty are viewed as dependent on the condition of domestic affairs. An intellectual framework was therefore devised by
strategists and theoreticians setting forth terms of policy for coordinating economic, diplomatic, and military perspectives. What this perspective led to in considerable part was a growing interest in politics, with concern heightening at moments of apparent incompetence or corruption by civilian leaders.60

Echoing once again the analysis of former President Hurtado, one can say that Ecuadorean officers know their country far better than most other citizens: "Their constant wanderings enable them to observe firsthand the poverty, backwardness, exploitation, and in general the widespread conditions of injustice reigning throughout the land. . . . [Their] training is supplemented by that received in other American academies, where great emphasis is placed on questions of 'internal security' and the struggle against 'subversive movements.'"61 An inevitable result has been the politicization of the military, which has led officers to take policy preferences along with them when intervening to overthrow a government. Moreover, the preoccupation with national security doctrine is accompanied by the military belief that political leaders understand neither the concept nor its importance.

Nearly two decades ago, military officers said as much directly to Fitch in direct interviews. He cites one officer who lamented civilian leaders' inability to understand the character of national defense as a responsibility of political as well as military authorities. Another declared that the civilians "are not aware of their role in national defense. Economists, industrialists, agriculturalists, and government officials all have to take part in formulating and executing the national strategic plan."62
of the National Security Law under the Velasco administration in 1960 produced little of value at that time, and attitudes remained virtually unchanged until the military government of the 1970s. Since then, new age cohorts (promociones) emerging from the service academies continue to bring with them, more than ever, the attitudes and background typical of the middle sectors of society.

Although data on the social bases of recruitment of the officer corps are softer than might be preferred, it is clear that a predominantly middle-class character has prevailed for at least a half-century with few signs of change. Moreover, the number of recruits whose fathers were officers has also remained small, documenting the lack of a hereditary trail in the formation of new officers. The influence of the middle class in the professional training and preparation provided at the military schools and institutes is also prevalent. One consequence has been the enduring inability of the military to create a unitary position in doctrinal or ideological terms. Thus "the effect of the middle class on Army officials--and by extension to the rest of the Armed Forces--effectively strengthens centristm. . . ."63

A second characteristic of Ecuadorean recruitment patterns, one already cited, is the continuing predominance of those military personnel from the highlands. Data collected by John Samuel Fitch on the 1960s demonstrated that the nation's demographic shifts (with the coastal population outstripping that of the highlands, as Guayaquil did Quito) have in no sense been reflected in the military. In fact, "the most striking feature of the army's geographical recruitment pattern" was exemplified by the fact that
Guayas province, with one-fifth of the nation's population, was providing barely 1 percent of new cadets. The same pattern was reported in the 1970s by Augusto Varas and Fernando Bustamante. As they argued, these patterns further exacerbated the Armed Forces' difficulties in achieving doctrinal unity to replace the prevailing ideological diffuseness.64

Another quality characterizing the Ecuadorean military is the imprint of contact with foreign military trainers and advisers. The Armed Forces of Ecuador have derived their modern formation from the Italians, Chileans, and North Americans, and in more recent times from both the Brazilians and the Israelis. Yet this openness to foreign influences has not translated into a sharply defined institutional outlook. Even the contact with the United States has been largely restricted to strictly professional training. To be sure, Ecuadorean participation on the Inter-American Defense Board, their extensive training in U.S. service schools, and local adoption of U.S. textbooks have partially predisposed the Ecuadorean military toward North American values. Such influence was notable in many of the policies of the military junta governing between 1963 and 1966. But this influence waned considerably by the time the Armed Forces returned to power in 1972. Even so, U.S. pressures on the Consejo Supremo de Gobierno to restore constitutional rule became unmistakable when Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency, and U.S. military personnel clearly shared in the presentation of Washington's views and preferences.
All these issues have affected the internal military structure, attitudes, and functioning of Ecuador's Armed Forces in recent and contemporary times. They have also been presented in considerable part as a manifestation of the nation's military institutions under conservative authoritarian rule. My analysis would be remiss, however, if it did not consider the Ecuadorian experience since the purported "return to the barracks" in 1979. During the subsequent five years of the Roldós-Hurtado administration, sensitive civilian handling of relations with the military were largely successful. The outbreak of another border skirmish with Peru in early 1981 led President Jaime Roldós to expand already generous appropriations and related support to the military. When in May, he and his wife perished in a plane crash along with the general serving as minister of defense, the Armed Forces closed ranks behind the politically insecure position of Osvaldo Hurtado as he assumed the presidency. The institutional loyalty of the military to constitutional legitimacy and the careful attention of Hurtado to corporate military concerns helped to assure his survival in office and the smooth transition to the administration of León Febres Cordero in August 1984.

Since that time, however, civil-military relations have been less than ideal from the moment of Febres Cordero's inauguration. His avowedly conservative civilian administration has suffered two major military uprisings, each one preeminently bizarre. While this paper is not the place for a detailed recounting of events, some major outlines need establishing in order to clarify present political tendencies. The first outburst came in March 1986, when
the commander of the Air Force, General Frank Vargas Pazzos, initiated a denunciation of other senior officers on the grounds of corruption. Before the affair was settled, the structure of civil-

military relations, as well as the alleged institutional unity of the Armed Forces, had been seriously questioned. These fissures in civil-military relations reflected to no small extent decisions made earlier by President Febres Cordero.

For example, General Luis Pineiros, in accord with personnel regulations, had been required to apply for retirement in July of 1984. Anticipating an appointment from Febres Cordero, he refused to do so and was angrily dismissed by outgoing President Hurtado by executive decree. But when Febres Cordero was inaugurated, however, he annulled Hurtado's decree and named the reactivated Pineiros as his minister of defense. This violation of military procedures and rules by Febres Cordero was subsequently repeated in similar presidential actions. In another instance, the same personnel law of the Armed Forces specified that the Army commander would be selected from the three most senior officers. Febres Cordero chose the third, General Edmundo Vivero, but immediately dismissed him and named his own candidate, General Manuel María Albuja, who ranked only sixth in succession.

Constantly under attack from the political opposition on the grounds of arbitrary rule, Febres Cordero continued to take a capricious path with the military. Bent on choosing personal friends among the senior officer corps for presidential favors, he proceeded according to his own whims of the moment. For example, he disrupted procedure and rules in matters of promotion. When the
Council of Army Officers recommended that one brigadier general be promoted to division general while denying the advance of another. Febres Cordero blocked the former and promoted the latter—General Gualberto Carrillo, who was then assigned as chief of the presidential Casa Militar. This action produced military protests, and subsequent negotiations included Minister of Government Luis Robles Plaza to safeguard presidential interests. The compromise solution was to promote both men, but members of the Army's high command pointedly absent themselves from the official ceremonies.

A similar episode occurred in the Navy, when Febres Cordero overrode the Council of Admirals to promote Navio García Mata from captain to admiral. By imposing his will, the president caused his Navy commander, Admiral Santiago Coral, to resign in protest. Executive favoritism was also demonstrated when Minister of Defense Pineiros kept two Air Force colonels on his staff who had not been approved for such positions by the service's Council of Generals.

Yet another violation of institutional procedures and practices came with the dismissal of General Homero Berrezuela as head of Army intelligence. He had privately objected to Febres Cordero's handling of a highly publicized kidnapping, which resulted in the captive, Nhaim Isaías, being killed. Berrezuela was neither reassigned nor placed at the disposition of the minister of defense, which made his the only option forced retirement.

All of these actions have violated military procedures and the accepted patterns of civil-military relations in Ecuador. They also came into play in the notorious affair of Frank Vargas Pazzos, which can only be sketched briefly here.65 Ecuador's most distinguished
Air Force officer, Vargas Pazzos had become the service commander as well as chief of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces. What ultimately became a major challenge to presidential authority began when he sought the removal of Minister of Defense Pineiros and Army Commander Albuja on grounds of corruption, illegal contracts, and influence peddling. After an angry confrontation with Pineiros on the morning of 7 March 1986, Vargas Pazzos then flew to the air base at Manta to continue his denunciations and demands. Meanwhile, Febres Cordero announced that he was replacing Vargas Pazzos, telling the nation that "aquí no pasa nada."

Only after Febres Cordero failed to mobilize other branches against Vargas Pazzos did he agree to negotiate. Vargas Pazzos returned to Quito on the understanding that the two officers he had denounced would be replaced and that they would be investigated and tried according to his allegations of corruption and influence peddling. When the president reneged, Vargas and loyal subordinates took control of the Quito Air Force base. Only on 14 March, after fighting that cost several lives, was the rebellious general forced to surrender. In the months following, his case and cause became an ongoing national controversy, serving as a political football for both the president and congressional opposition. Civil and military courts were involved, and the appearance of the Armed Forces' unquestioned probity and unity was effectively shattered.

While the furor was still going on, even more traumatic events broke loose when President Febres Cordero was seized by paratroopers loyal to Vargas Pazzos. On 16 January 1987, the president landed at the Taura coastal base on an inspection trip. He and his entourage
proceedings.

The general controversy was further heightened a day later when eighty of the rebel Air Force commandos were formally arrested and transferred to the Sucre base in Quito. Contradicting the presidential pledge of immunity, Febres Cordero's attorney general blithely remarked that the promise was not valid and the law had to be upheld. Perhaps more important, military officials felt that this breach of discipline and violation of hierarchy could not go unpunished. On 5 March 1987, the formal courtmartial of the troops participating in the affair was launched. Just as the process began to unfold, public attention was diverted by a major earthquake and the consequent rupture of the oil flow, which led to new government austerity measures.

Even so, the emerging political ambitions of General Vargas Pazzos kept the controversy simmering, especially after his public reemergence on 1 April 1987. The matter reassumed center stage on 21 July, when the Consejo de Guerra Verbal announced its verdict. Out of ninety-four paratroopers who had eventually been brought to trial, fifty-eight were found guilty. Seventeen received the maximum sentence of sixteen years' imprisonment; twenty-three got eight years; one received two years; and seventeen received six months. General Vargas Pazzos, who had already charged Febres Cordero with breaking his word, declared his solidarity with the paratroopers. Congressional critics were also vocal, although they prudently avoided any direct action. But the Armed Forces, preoccupied restoring discipline and internal order, considered the sentencing to be necessary. Yet institutional issues abounded, and
the relationship of the military to civilian authority remained tenuous.

These damaging blows to civil-military relations, while resulting in considerable part from irresponsibility or misjudgment on the part of León Febres Cordero, severely taxed the internal unity of the Armed Forces. For example, suspicions were revived in the Air Force that the Army intends to reincorporate it as a means of diminishing the authority, strength, and budget of its rival. The Navy, meanwhile, has looked askance at the long chain of unsavory and undisciplined actions while holding itself aloof. This posture has scarcely endeared it to the other services. The Air Force has been disrupted internally, especially given the initial popularity of Vargas Pazzos, an emotionally unpredictable, but professionally superior, officer and commander. The investigation into his charges against Pineiros and Albuja could well turn up far more serious dishonesty than he indicated at the outset.

In short, there is no way that the Armed Forces, their corporate standing, their gradual modernization, and their institutional pride and self-esteem can escape long-term injury as the consequence of seemingly comic-opera events. The bitterness engendered was amply demonstrated on the night of 10 August 1987, following President Febres Cordero's annual presidential message to Congress. A host of opposition deputies threatened to require testimony from a number of cabinet ministers, including retired General Medardo Salazar, the minister of defense. He promptly retorted that Congress had no right to play games with the honor of the Armed Forces. Two days later, he added that "political
sectarianism" was demeaning the prestige of the military, to which congressional representatives responded that their problems were with the minister, not the Armed Forces as an institution.68 Thus the antagonisms remained keen as León Febres Cordero entered his final year in power and the election campaign began to unfold.69

CONCLUSION

I argued at the outset that linkages between regime types and models of policy-making require careful study. Although these topics have not constituted the major preoccupation here, they have nonetheless been relevant to assessing the Armed Forces in Ecuador. It would seem reasonable to conclude, at the least, that regime characteristics do have an impact on policy, although more refined analysis is sorely needed.70 Furthermore, something subtler than a simplistic dichotomy between authoritarian and pluralist regimes—or between military dictatorships and civilian constitutionalism—is required. Ecuador's experience during the 1970s demonstrated complexity and change in civil-military relations. Moreover, policy preferences also varied, even when assessing only the Rodríguez Lara government and not the contrasts revealed during the rule of the Triumvirate. The subsequent experience under civilian rule, most particularly the divisively pugnacious Febres Cordero administration, has further dramatized both the depth of internal military disunity and the tenuous character of civil-military relationships.
Consequently, the Ecuadorean case does confirm theories drawing sharp distinctions between the procedural and contextual dimensions of national policy. In terms of relationships between the military and civilian interest groups, they are diffuse and weakly articulated. Given the debility of Ecuadorean parties and interest groups, it is more fruitful to explore the links with major economic and business organizations. Yet the experience of recent years has leaned heavily on personalistic elements, including the style and character of President León Febres Cordero and the charismatic leadership of General Frank Vargas Pazzos. Much of the interplay between the two emanated from the absence of personal and institutional parallels. Granted the level of modernization in both political and military institutions, this outcome is scarcely surprising.

Without speculating about the course of the Ecuadorean military in the near future, it is at least undeniable that the institution is passing through a developmental adolescence. Just as Ecuador continues to struggle through the stresses and challenges of modernization, so are the Armed Forces pressing for further and clearer self-definition. While there has been increased professionalization, few other broad issues have been resolved. Unity thus remains superficial at best and transitory in duration. Whether functioning under conservative rule (let alone authoritarian conservative rule) or not, the Armed Forces have demonstrated perhaps less consistency than might have been hypothesized. The core of the question remains the military's decisive and inextricable interrelationships with civilian political forces and
prevailing social mores and attitudes.
NOTES

1. The point is far from unique. Perhaps the first time the author made it in print was in John D. Martz, "Political Science and Latin American Studies: A Discipline in Search of a Region," Latin American Research Review 6, no. 1 (Spring 1971): 73-99.


4. This support was demonstrated to the author when, during a White House orientation for Rosalyn Carter in which he participated, intelligence representatives explained that Ecuador had been included on her itinerary as a direct response to the anticipated but uncertain return of constitutional government.

5. As further information became available, it appeared that the earthquake and resultant mud slides in March 1987 constituted the most grievous natural disaster since the 1949 Ambato earthquake. The combined quake and mud slides left two thousand dead, twenty thousand homeless, and seventy-five thousand injured. The destruction of thirty miles of petroleum pipeline meant an immediate budgetary loss of at least two-thirds of national income for the year ahead.


7. Martz and Myers, "Understanding Latin American Politics."


23. For a rare interview fifteen years after the military golpe, see "Las confesiones de Rodríguez Lara," Vistazo, 13 Mar. 1987, 19-24.


25. See the discussion in ibid., 17ff.
26. Ibid., 19.


31. Conditions leading up to the 1972 golpe are described in John D. Martz, Ecuador: Conflicting Political Culture and the Quest for Progress (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972), chaps. 5 and 6, pp. 146ff.


34. Luis E. Proaño in El Mensajero, April 1972, p. 11.


41. Marco Herrera Escalante, Ficha de Información Socio-Política (April 1974), Pontificia Universidad Católica, 72.

43. An extended treatment is incorporated into several portions of Martz, Regime, Politics, and Petroleum.


45. República del Ecuador, Filosofía y plan de acción, 19.


52. Augusto Varas and Fernando Bustamante, Fuerzas Armadas y política en Ecuador (Quito: Ediciones Latinoamericana, 1978), 133-34.


54. For detailed treatment, see Martz, Regime, Politics, and Petroleum, chap. 8.

55. This outcome is described, along with an accounting of the forthcoming government, by a close observer in Nick D. Mills, Crisis, conflicto y consenso: Ecuador, 1979-1984 (Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional, 1984).


57. Sanders, in Handelman and Sanders, Military Government, 19.


60. An authoritative source is Alfonso Littuma Arizaga, La doctrina de seguridad national (Caracas: Oficina Técnica del Ministerio de Defensa, 1966).

61. Hurtado, Political Power, 261.

62. Fitch, Military Coup d'Etat, 141, emphasis in original.

63. Varas and Bustamante, Fuerzas Armadas, 149.

64. Ibid., 140ff.

65. An excellent journalistic treatment of the March 1986 events can be found in Gonzalo Ortiz Crespo, La hora del general (Quito: Editorial El Conejo, 1986).

66. Useful accounts from a leftist tradition appear in the weekly Punto de Vista, which is published in Quito. Among the best of the newsweeklies for pictorial treatment and political commentary is Vistazo, published in Guayaquil. The most detailed and useful treatment is Gonzalo Ortiz Crespo, Operación Taura (Quito: Editorial El Conejo, 1987).

67. An "instant book" that includes both earlier analyses and a blow-by-blow narrative is Fernando Artieda, Raúl Borja, José Steinsieger, and Alfredo Pareja Diezcanseco, El secuestro del poder (Quito: Editorial El Conejo, 1987). Another recent work that attempts to analyze the current administration and its chief in midstream is Guido Zambrano Castillo, León Febres Cordero: significación histórica (Quito: Editorial Vivanco, 1987). Among the more telling critiques is that by former Vice-President León Roldós Aguilera, El abuso del poder (Quito: Editorial El Conejo, 1986).


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2. Davidson, Russ "A Description of Rare and Important Medina Imprints in the University of New Mexico Library." May 1988.

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