A Rhetorical Analysis Of Selected Senate Speeches On The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Timothy A. Browning
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A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS
OF SELECTED SENATE SPEECHES ON
THE 1963 NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

By
Timothy A. Browning

A Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Speech

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MASTER OF ARTS

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Aug. 16, 1966

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To Dr. Cullen B. Owens, without whose able and continuous assistance this study would not have been possible.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. THE PROBLEM

Statement of the Problem

This paper is a rhetorical analysis of the Senate debate over ratification of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In July, 1963, most Americans seemed to favor ratification of the treaty, but Senate administration forces were not certain that they could muster the necessary votes for ratification. By September, although public opinion had begun to shift against the treaty, the Senate voted overwhelmingly for ratification. The motion for ratification received 13 votes over the necessary two-thirds.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of the speakers for the opposing sides, and to determine as much as is possible, the part that the debate had in the eventual outcome. The debate is analyzed by a comparison of the rhetorical qualities of selected speeches from both sides. The rhetorical qualities examined are: (1) issues and contentions, (2) proof and (3) disposition. Close consideration will also be given to the social setting of the debate and to the backgrounds of the speakers.
Justification of the Problem

The discovery of nuclear energy is certainly one of the single most important events of the Twentieth Century. Its potential for both peaceful and non-peaceful purposes is incalculable. Equally as important as the discovery of nuclear energy was the attempt to develop international controls to arrest the development of its non-peaceful potential. The destructive potential of nuclear weapons is incredible, and attempts by nations to control such weapons instead of destroying one another are milestones in the history of international relations.

Scholars have recognized the importance of disarmament and the test ban. In the United States alone several studies have been made on the topic. All of the studies of the post-war era, however, have been concerned only with the political issues involved in disarmament and the test ban.

The question of ratification of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, or the Treaty of Moscow, was considered on the Senate floor, officially and unofficially, for more than fifty days. Three Senate committees conducted hearings on the test ban. In the last week of the debate, every Senator except the ailing Clair Engle of California rose to speak on the treaty. Opposition to the treaty was adamant. But in the end, the Senate voted for ratification, placing the United States firmly on the side of international cooperation. Barry Goldwater called this treaty the most important question which the United States Senate had to face in a century. Certainly the rhetoric involved in such an important step warrants consideration.
A rhetorical study of the debate can yield information that is unobtainable in a political sketch. Such a study can determine the major issues, the argumentative strength of the respective sides, and the strategies that were employed.

Previous Research on the Problem

There have been three doctoral dissertations on the American involvement in post-war international efforts toward peace. These studies are: Inspection and Control of Nuclear Armaments in a Nation-State System: United States-Russian Disarmament Negotiations, 1945-1962, T. W. Bailey, University of Washington, 1963; The Test Ban: A Study in Arms Control Negotiations, C. E. Zoppo, Columbia University, 1963; and British Peace Politics: The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Committee of 100, F. E. Meyers, Columbia University, 1965. In addition, there is one doctoral dissertation in progress concerning the international implications of the topic. It is The Test Ban Debate: United States Position on World Disarmament, W. D. Johnson, New York University. All of these studies are concerned with the political analysis of the topic, and do not concern themselves with the rhetoric involved in the decisions.

There has been only one rhetorical study of the disarmament and test ban topic. David F. Jordan at Northwestern University has a dissertation in progress entitled A Critical Analysis of the Senate Deliberations leading to the Ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963.
II. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Limitation of the Number of Speakers

Because all but one of the Senators participated in the debate, it is impossible to analyze the presentations of every Senator in a paper of this scope. Four speakers, two from each side, are discussed in this analysis. These speakers were chosen because they represented the floor leadership of the respective sides and because their speaking is representative of that heard throughout the debate.

The two speakers chosen to represent the proponents of ratification are Senators J. William Fulbright from Arkansas and Hubert H. Humphrey from Minnesota. The two speakers chosen from among those who opposed the treaty are Senators Barry M. Goldwater from Arizona and J. Strom Thurmond from South Carolina. These four men participated in a substantial portion of the floor debate on the test ban question.

Limitation of the Number of Speeches

Because so many speeches were delivered during the consideration of the treaty, this paper is limited to four major addresses and four extended floor debates by each speaker, with the exception of Senator Fulbright who delivered only one major address. These speeches were chosen as representative of each Senator's speaking.

It should also be noted that each of these four men, in addition to many of the other Senators, spoke on this subject to numerous audiences outside the Senate. As many of these speeches as were available were read and used as background for this paper.
Availability of Materials

Most of the material on this topic was available only in current periodicals. These accounts reported the progress of the treaty deliberations in the Senate and commented or reported upon the major issues that were presented. In only a few cases was there information which attempted to analyze the proceedings in the Senate.

Background material on the history of the question has been published in numerous books dealing with the general subjects of disarmament and international relations. There were only two brief accounts in these books of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The biographies of the Senators were obtained from both periodicals and books. Good biographies of Thurmond and Fulbright were unavailable, and their backgrounds were reconstructed mostly from periodical references. In addition to periodical materials, information about Humphrey is limited to one biography, which appears to be somewhat partisan. Goldwater was the only Senator about whom there was adequate information available.

The texts of the speeches used in this analysis are taken from the Congressional Record.

III. METHODOLOGY

The first step in the preparation of this study was to obtain the necessary background material relating to the Senate debate. Here two areas required exploration. The first was the national and international actions which had
precipitated this treaty. The second was the background of each of the Senators used in the analysis.

The Senate deliberations were read and the rhetorical qualities were noted. The debate was then analyzed under the headings of: issues and contentions, proof, and disposition.

**Issues and Contentions**

An analysis was made of the ability of the opposing sides to identify and recognize the issues. Then the contentions upheld by the respective sides were presented. Finally the contentions of the opposing sides were compared.

**Proof**

The ability of the speakers in supporting their contentions and in contributing to the strength of their position was analyzed. Proof was analyzed around the Aristotelian scheme of ethos, pathos and logos.

**Disposition**

The disposition of the debate was analyzed from two points of view. The first was an examination of the craftsmanship and effectiveness of the individual speakers. The second was a consideration of the plan, or strategy, that the respective sides followed during the course of the debate.
CHAPTER II

BIOGRAPHIES

JAMES WILLIAM FULBRIGHT

James William Fulbright has spent twenty-three years in Congress, twenty-one of them in the United States Senate. "During those two decades, Fulbright has spoken wisely, frequently, and bravely on the central problems of a troubled time --- and this in an arena where a man's political life can hang on each sentence he utters."¹ Senator Fulbright has risen from a freshman Representative to become Chairman of the powerful United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On the basis of his ability and experience, Fulbright became one of the leading choices for Secretary of State under the Kennedy Administration.

Within a year after his birth in Sumner, Missouri, the family moved to Fayetteville, Arkansas, where the family prospered. By the 1920's, the Fulbrights were one of Arkansas's wealthiest families, having invested in innumerable enterprises. After the death of his father, his mother, Roberta Waugh Fulbright, became editor of the family owned Northwest Arkansas Times. Under her guidance the

paper became noted for its high quality and its progressive-
ness. "His mother's Missouri liberalism left a mark on
Fulbright."²

Fulbright graduated from Fayetteville High School at
sixteen and immediately enrolled in the University of
Arkansas. He was an outstanding scholar, and by 1925 he had
earned a bachelor's degree and a Rhodes Scholarship. He then
studied at Pembroke College, Oxford University, for three
years. At Pembroke he acquired "not only bachelor's and
master's degrees, but later the highest honor the college
confers --- an honorary fellowship."³

His mother joined him in Europe, where they travelled
for more than two years, with extended stays in Vienna and
the Balkans. Later, reflecting upon his return from the
five year trip abroad, he was prompted to say, "I didn't
know a darn' thing about the United States."⁴

Shortly after his return, he enrolled in George Washing-
ton University law school and graduated in 1934, "placing
second in his class of 135."⁵ For two years after graduation
he worked in the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
and taught at George Washington University. In 1936 he
returned to Fayetteville to enter the family business and to

²Ibid., p. 15.
³Jerome Beatty, "Washington's Cleanup Man," American,
CLII (June, 1951), p. 105.
⁴Ibid., p. 106.
⁵Meyer, op. cit., p. 16.
teach part-time at the University of Arkansas.

In 1939 the President of the University was killed in an automobile accident. Fulbright, thirty-four years old, the "home-town-boy-made-good," was selected to become President of the University.

The 1940 Gubernatorial election in Arkansas was extremely bitter and hard fought. The Northwest Arkansas Times, under the liberal hand of Fulbright's mother, was particularly outspoken against Homer Adkins, the man who eventually won the election.

On the basis of this opposition, an open feud developed between the Fulbrights of Fayetteville and Governor Adkins in Little Rock. The Governor sought to retaliate against the Fulbrights by having the University Trustees, his partisan appointees, request President Fulbright's resignation. "The President refused and demanded that he be publicly fired." On commencement morning 1941, at Governor Adkins' request, President Fulbright was officially dismissed by the University Board of Trustees. His refusal to resign exemplified two personal characteristics that were to become by-words of his service in the United States Senate: his high sense of personal integrity and his obstinacy in the face of opposition.

In 1942 Fulbright ran for election as a Representative. He won and immediately attracted national attention. On September 21, 1943, the House of Representatives adopted

6 Ibid.
the "Fulbright Resolution," which sought "to place Congress on record as favoring United States membership in a world organization with powers adequate to keep the peace."7 This piece of legislation, Fulbright's first, revealed his foresightedness, his keen interest in international affairs, and his liberal philosophy.

In the Congressional election of 1942, Fulbright spurned any help from the established Democratic Party machine, demanding that he be responsible only to himself and his constituents. Fulbright once summed up his political philosophy by stating:

A good party man is at peace with himself. His thinking is done for him by the leaders. He votes along with the party, and he has lots of jobs and appropriations to hand out to his constituents. I don't like machines, I don't like party organization, and I don't like patronage. I want to be free to vote as I please on every issue --- and the conflicts that result tear me apart. The party leaders give me the feeling that I'm not on the team. The administration wants men that it can count on --- and that doesn't mean me.8

In 1944, without overt help from the Democratic Party, he won a Senate seat against former Governor Adkins, the man who had fired him as President of the University of Arkansas.

Fulbright's career in the Senate has been a long and rewarding record of service. He is perhaps most famous for the establishment of the Fulbright Scholarships.9 After his


appointment to the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he became a critical yet sympathetic opponent of the foreign policy of five successive administrations. He has always emphasized long-range programs, rather than the adoption of expedient solutions.

His years in the Senate have been consistently dotted with controversy. In 1946 he co-sponsored a resolution favoring European political, economic, and social unity, which was soundly defeated. In 1951, after extreme criticism of the Truman Administration had prompted President Truman to call him "that over-educated Oxford s.o.b.," Fulbright rose to support Truman's dismissal of General MacArthur. In 1957 he created another furor by openly criticizing the Eisenhower administration for mishandling foreign aid to Egypt. He stood resolutely against the Bay of Pigs invasion. President Kennedy is reported to have told him "You are the only one who has the right to say 'I told you so.'" In each case, Fulbright played a significant role in the formation of national and international policy. He approached each issue with characteristic foresightedness, integrity, and steadfastness.

Fulbright is known as one of the finest speakers in the Senate. His addresses are consistently calm, cool,

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12 Kopkind, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
analytical presentations. He does not have a dynamic and commanding delivery, but his calm, precise speeches have come to be widely respected by both national and international leaders.

There is little information available concerning Fulbright’s training as a speaker. Literature about him does not contain any notation of speech training at either the University of Arkansas or at Pembroke College. His speeches tend to read and sound like scholarly essays, not the work of a rhetorician. Perhaps this is exactly what his speeches are.

In April 1966, Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha, a national forensic society, recognized Fulbright’s skill and contribution as a speaker by naming him the 1965 Speaker-of-the-Year. In making the presentation, Mrs. Annabel Hagood, University of Alabama, said of him:

Senator Fulbright is one of the most important and perhaps one of the most influential men serving in national politics . . . To many J. William Fulbright is a wise leader in a vital phase of the American political system; to many he is a man ahead of his time; to the Speaker-of-the-Year Board of Award he is a man who has spoken with intelligence, responsibility, and effectiveness on significant issues of the day. 13

It would be difficult to find a better description of Fulbright’s speaking abilities.

Fulbright did not become actively interested in the disarmament and test ban issues as soon as did his colleague

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey. In fact, he made no significant public utterance on the topic until the initialing of the Treaty of Moscow. In the ratification controversy, he found himself in concurrence with Administration policy, a rather unusual occurrence for the Senator. His position as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee naturally thrust him deeply into the ratification debate. Basing his arguments on his liberal philosophy, he played a significant part in the floor debate over approval of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

JAMES STROM THURMOND

On September 16, 1964, James Strom Thurmond created a political turmoil in the United States. With the 1964 Presidential election only weeks away, Thurmond formally resigned from the Democratic Party and joined the Republicans. In recent times, only one other Senator, Wayne Morse of Oregon, has switched party affiliations. Thurmond's action gave South Carolina her first Republican Senator since 1872.

Thurmond was born in Edgefield, South Carolina, the son of a prominent attorney. Thurmond's grandfather was an officer in the Confederate Army, and the family cherished their traditional "Southern Heritage." Thurmond was raised in the atmosphere of the ruling White gentry. One of his father's friends was "South Carolina's Senator Benjamin Ryan ("Pitchfork Ben") Tillman, one of the most unabashed racists
in Southern history."14 Thurmond accepted without question the beliefs and way of life taught to him during childhood. Years later, one of his Southern colleagues in the Senate was reported to have said "Strom really believes that stuff."15

Thurmond was a mediocre student in high school. After graduation, he enrolled in Clemson College and received a degree in Agriculture. For two years he taught school, and then became Superintendent of Schools in Edgefield. During these years he spent most nights in his father's law office studying for the state bar, which he passed in 1926.

He became active in Democratic Party politics on the state and local levels, and he soon embarked upon a political career of his own. He was a State Senator for one term and then was appointed Circuit Court Judge. His promising career was arrested by the beginning of World War II.

He enlisted in the Army and became an officer in the 82nd Airborne. Thurmond flew a glider into Normandy on D-day and was wounded as he led his men in securing their objective. For his gallantry he was awarded a Bronze Star and a Purple Heart. After the War he continued to serve in the active Reserves and today "holds 16 medals and decorations and the rank of Major General."16

Soon after Thurmond's return to South Carolina, he entered the 1946 Gubernatorial election and was victorious.


In 1948 he led the South Carolina delegation to the National Democratic Convention. It was there that he led the Southern walk-out protest over the Civil Rights plank of the party platform. When the Southerners reconvened three days later, they formed the States' Rights Party and nominated Governor Strom Thurmond for President. He received 1,169,063 popular votes and the electoral votes of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina. The brief national spotlight persuaded Thurmond to leave the state capitol and enter the forthcoming Senate election.

Thurmond was popular in South Carolina, but so was the man that he faced, incumbent Senator Olin Johnson. During his term as Governor, Thurmond had supported a relatively liberal program, in fact much the same program that Senator Johnson supported in the Senate. The campaign failed to create any significant clashes, and Thurmond was soundly defeated. He retired to his law practice to wait.

Early in the 1950's, forces in the state of South Carolina began to develop a conservative wing in the Democratic Party. Thurmond, recognizing this element as a potential source of support, began to make overtures to them. By early 1954 he was solidly in the conservative camp. When incumbent Senator Ben Maybank died during the 1954 Senatorial election, Thurmond launched a massive write-in

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18 Ibid.
campaign, receiving support and financial subsidy from the conservative wing of the party. He won the election and happily set off for Washington, D. C.

Thurmond reached Washington as a conservative and has become stronger in his convictions each year. He has stood resolutely against Medicare, Civil Rights, and the test ban treaty. In 1957 he received national prominence, or maybe notoriety, for a filibuster against pending civil rights legislation.

Thurmond kept talking for 24 hours and 18 minutes, stoked himself through the night with pumpernickel, hamburger meat and malted-milk tablets ... His performance set a new Senate filibuster record.19

He is a self-chosen apostle of the defense of the Southern cause.20 He once claimed that all of the nation's problems were caused by "the silent socialists in the White House, the Defense Department, everywhere."21

Thurmond's critics have claimed that he is not the most perceptive of observers. One over-excited critic once exclaimed that "Strom is just plain old-fashioned dumb."22 Such criticism is unwarranted. Thurmond does, however, tend to view all activities from an extremely narrow base. While Goldwater argues that Communism is an enemy that must be defeated,

20McMillan, op. cit., p. 11.
21Ibid.
Thurmond argues that all of the world's problems are created by communism. This belief led him into the national limelight in 1962 when he criticized the Defense Department censorship of the speeches of military leaders.

Although Thurmond's frequent filibusters have gained him a reputation for windiness, this reputation is somewhat misleading. The prepared speeches that he occasionally presents are generally quite cogent and concise. His speaking is probably most notable for his drawling Southern accent, which prompted one critic to label Thurmond's speaking as "country-coony."\(^{23}\)

Thurmond's view of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was substantially in agreement with that of Goldwater, his colleague in opposition to the treaty. They both view communism as an enemy and, therefore, advocate a strong and prepared military force to fend off any possible advances. Anything which might aid communism or hurt the military must be avoided at all costs, so Thurmond opposed ratification of the treaty.

**HUBERT HORATIO HUMPHREY**

Hubert H. Humphrey "... is regarded as a first-rate 'idea man,' a one-man brain trust, and one who has the ability to attract loyal supporters to his cause."\(^{24}\) In 1964 President

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Lyndon Johnson needed a running mate who was talented, experienced, qualified and acceptable. He chose Hubert H. Humphrey to fill the position.

Humphrey was born in 1911 in Wallace, South Dakota, a small town nestled in the midst of the vast Dakota plain. His father was a druggist, who was barely able to make a living for his family. When Humphrey was four years old, the family moved to Doland, South Dakota, where he lived a typical Midwestern life. The only thing that seems to have distinguished the young Humphrey was his "exuberant energy."\(^{25}\)

Humphrey entered high school and soon distinguished himself as an excellent student. He participated in numerous activities, starring in the school plays and earning letters in every sport.

The Humphrey family, like most of the nation's farmers, began to feel the pinch of the depression in the early 1920's. Nevertheless, after graduation from high school in 1929, Humphrey enrolled in the University of Minnesota, with the little financial help his family could afford. Within two years, the lack of money forced him to return home. Certain that he would never return to college, Humphrey took the last of the family's money and went to Denver to obtain a license in pharmacy. He returned home a few months later as a qualified pharmacist and joined his father's business.

In 1937 the opportunity to re-enter college finally arose, and Humphrey returned to Minnesota to finish his course in

political science. In less than five years he completed his Bachelor's and Master's degrees. He next enrolled at Louisiana State University, but soon became dissatisfied, and transferred back to the University of Minnesota. Within the next year he had completed all requirements for his doctorate except his dissertation.

When the financial burden of his education began to weigh on Humphrey, he began teaching full-time at the University of Minnesota. He next joined the inter-program staff of the New Deal programs as a teacher and made his home in Minneapolis.

In the 1940's Minneapolis was in the hands of a corrupt government headed by Mayor Kline. Organized crime controlled the city. As a gesture of dissatisfaction and as a method of enlightening and arousing the public, Humphrey ran for mayor of the city in 1943. He lost, but received an astonishing number of votes. In 1945, he ran again and was elected.

At that time the mayor of Minneapolis was accorded only one source of power. He had the right to name the chief of police. Humphrey, however, selected a chief who aided him in effectively cleaning up the city. As mayor, he led the City Council in passing some of the first effective civil rights laws in the nation. The renowned John Gunther once described Humphrey's term of office as one of the most effective and

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efficient mayoralities in the history of the United States. 27

1948 was a significant year in the political life of Humphrey. That summer at the Democratic National Convention, he presented a speech which triggered the adoption of a strong civil rights platform and the walkout of many Southern delegates. These delegates, led by Governor Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, soon formed the Dixiecrat, States' Rights, Party. 28 In the fall, Humphrey battled incumbent Republican Senator Joseph Ball for a Senate seat. During the campaign, Humphrey's prowess and energy as a campaigner and politician were vividly illustrated.

He visited in all but three of the state's counties, traveled more than 31,000 miles and made 691 speeches. Truman, by comparison, traveled 31,700 miles and made 356 speeches campaigning across the entire nation for the Presidency. 29 Humphrey defeated Ball by more than 243,000 votes.

Humphrey arrived on Capitol Hill fresh, idealistic, and definitely liberal. He had helped establish the DFL, an amalgamation of the Democratic, Farm and Labor Parties in his own state. The party, though liberal, was definitely anti-communist. The Labor sector of the party, however, had been infiltrated by Communists and the DFL seemed particularly weak in coping with the situation. Humphrey, therefore,

helped to form the ADA, Americans for Democratic Action, as a tool to purge the DFL in his home state.

The normal set-backs of a freshman Senator calmed Humphrey, but did not diminish his zeal. He soon distinguished himself as a "skilled politician and an unfailing party man." He rose rapidly in power and stature. During Lyndon Johnson's term as Majority Party Leader, it was Humphrey, the "old workhorse," who served as Party Whip. Humphrey was responsible for an amazing amount of legislation, although he has possibly not received for it the recognition that he deserves.

Perhaps no other major politician suffers so great a disparity between the high quality and broad range of his legislative and political accomplishments and the general public's mis-apprehension of him and his record. He has been largely responsible for such major pieces of legislation as the Peace Corps, Medicare, Civil Rights Legislation, the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, the National Defense Education Act, and the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Humphrey is a liberal in the truest sense of the word: not a leftist or a socialist. Every subject seems to interest him. William Shannon once said of him "He is that rare man, the happy crusader."

Humphrey, now a gifted and respected speaker, was a member of his high school debate team. He twice won the

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32 Ibid., p. 11.
the Minnesota State Oratorical Contest. In addition to belonging to two debating societies while in college, he frequently attracted large crowds to hear speeches on government that he delivered from the steps of the Political Science Building. Humphrey has a natural talent for speaking, and he has carefully cultivated it. Even though he spoke frequently and on a wide range of topics,

Colleagues in the Senate often have given him high marks for the quality of his speeches and have praised the thought and research that have gone into them. Humphrey was certainly one of the foremost speakers in the United States Senate.

Before Humphrey arrived on Capitol Hill, his past efforts had indicated his future role in the Civil Rights Movement. Certainly no one other man did more to aid the passage of the last Civil Rights Bill than did Humphrey. He never faltered in his support of civil rights. Another subject, however, soon assumed an equal position in his program. He became the only Senator in the 1950's to become actively concerned with disarmament and a nuclear test ban.

Humphrey's role in the history of the nuclear test ban showed his philosophy of political leadership, which he once described to a group of teachers in his home state.

33 Griffith, op. cit., p. 143.
It is the duty of a leader to get just a bit ahead of the people on an issue. And then it is his duty to educate the people. He can't get too far ahead, or he'll be alone, and he can't lecture to them or talk over their heads. I try to be a leader by staying just a bit ahead of prevailing public opinion at any time. And I try to get the people interested and involved in an issue, so they will educate themselves. 36

Following his own tenets, he immediately began informing the entire nation, as well as the Senate, of the need for a nuclear test ban treaty.

In 1950 he was far ahead of prevailing public opinion when he made his first formal statement in Washington on the issue of disarmament. At a time when most Americans, and most Congressmen, were determined to build a bigger and more powerful nuclear arsenal, he pleaded for "universal disarmament," a "halt to the terrifying arms race," and "an unequivocal agreement to abolish war." 37 For the next five years Humphrey literally carried the enlightenment program alone. Not one other Senator rose to support him in his campaign.

The first result of Humphrey's efforts was the establishment of a Senate Disarmament Subcommittee in 1955. In 1956 Humphrey was offered the chairmanship of the committee, which he eagerly accepted. He began a concerted campaign for the adoption of an international nuclear test ban. In the waning days of 1956 his committee issued a report including a

36 Griffith, op. cit., p. 260.
37 Ibid., p. 259.
suggestion that the United States Government pursue a policy aimed at obtaining an international test ban treaty. President Eisenhower and the Republican Administration officially termed this policy "extremely dangerous."\(^{38}\)

The year 1958 was the turning point in the Humphrey campaign for a nuclear test ban treaty. On February 4, with the support and aid of Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, twenty-two Senators were marshalled to speak for over four hours on the topic. Every day during the week before Easter, Humphrey made a major address in the Senate on the nuclear test ban proposal. Later in the year he scored the coup de maitre. On a trip to Moscow he asked for and received an unscheduled audience with Premier Khrushchev, which lasted eight and one-half hours. Humphrey left the meeting with Khrushchev's tacit approval of an international test ban treaty. The ball was rolling, and Humphrey began to slip into the background.

When the final draft was signed in Moscow on July 25, 1963, Humphrey was not even a member of the special delegation, led by Averell Harriman, which President Kennedy sent to the negotiations.

Humphrey began the Senate debate on the Treaty of Moscow with a liberal philosophy in favor of ratification and outstanding ability and experience. Humphrey's interest and knowledge of the topic should have made him the floor leader in the debate. He was not. That privilege fell to

\(^{38}\)Ibid., p. 261.
Senator Fulbright, who frequently yielded the floor to Humphrey in favor of his vast knowledge.

After ratification, the treaty was often referred to by the press as Kennedy's "triumph." The triumph was Humphrey's and President Kennedy recognized it.

In a White House ceremony at which the President signed the treaty, Humphrey stood behind Harriman, Fulbright, and others who had made a very real contribution to the effort. As the ceremony ended and the witnesses filed out of the President's office, Kennedy called Humphrey back for a moment. "Hubert," he said quietly, "this is your treaty."39

BARRY MORRIS GOLDFWATER

When Barry Morris Goldwater was elected to the United States Senate in 1952, most Americans paid little attention to the Arizonan who had beaten the reigning Democratic Majority Leader. Within eleven years, after one of the most spectacular rises in American political history, Goldwater stormed the Republican National Convention and became the 1964 Presidential nominee. The nation seemed to be overflowing with eager and avid Goldwater supporters. Yet Goldwater lost the 1964 Presidential election by the biggest margin of popular vote in the history of the United States.

On January 1, 1909, Barry Goldwater was born in Phoenix, Arizona Territory. Arizona Territory, the last of the Old West, did not become a state until 1912. The Goldwaters, of immigrant German Jewish stock, were among the earliest settlers in the Territory. They remained in Arizona and

39Ibid., p. 266.
prospered as the territory progressed. When Goldwater was born, the family already owned a lucrative chain of stores. The original Goldwaters were active participants in civic affairs and frequently holders of political offices.

Goldwater was imbued with the spirit of the enterprising, rough-and-tumble West. The family still lived and worked by the discipline of their pioneering era. While the foundations of the family's future affluence was being laid, "the members of the family were indistinguishable from any other inhabitant" of the territory.

Goldwater attended Phoenix Union High School and worked in the local radio store in the afternoons. When he was thirteen years old, he became a licensed radio operator and began to operate an amateur station.

Goldwater's activities with his radio station, in addition to an academically unsuccessful year at Union High, prompted his father to send him to Staunton Military Academy, Virginia. Goldwater continued to perform poorly in his studies, and voiced an intense dislike for them. He devoted his time to athletics. At Staunton he developed a love for military life which he was never relinquished. He is an active member of the Air Force Reserve, has been awarded the rank of General, and still maintains credentials as an active jet pilot.


After graduation from Staunton, Goldwater returned to Arizona. In the fall he enrolled in the University of Arizona at Tucson, where he participated in athletics and again paid little attention to his books.\textsuperscript{42} That spring his father died, and Goldwater withdrew from the university, never to return to take his place in the family business.

Goldwater distinguished himself in three areas during the next thirty years. He proved to be an industrious worker, and a foresighted, competent businessman. He was an active and dedicated member of the Army Reserve. He became one of Tucson's outstanding civic leaders. Under Goldwater's guidance, the family became one of the most influential in the state.

Following the American tradition, Goldwater began his career at the very bottom, as a mailroom clerk. After nearly five years he was promoted to a responsible position. When Goldwater finally became director, the business was a sound enterprise, and after a few years of his leadership, it became extremely lucrative. The Goldwater stores became a leader in merchandising and marketing. It was renowned for its superlative labor relations, having instituted one of the first profit-sharing plans in the nation.\textsuperscript{43} During the Depression, the Goldwater Corporation bought two farms for its employees, one for agriculture and one for vacationing. The Goldwaters quietly looked the other way when the employees used the farms

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., p. 61.

\textsuperscript{43}Shadegg, op. cit., p. 234.
for their unemployed and less fortunate friends. Although Goldwater has stood firmly against Federal Minimum Wage Laws, "the Goldwater business has consistently paid wages considerably above any standard the national government has invoked."\textsuperscript{44} Goldwater built the family business by his own labors, and his political philosophy was partially determined by this fact. He had succeeded by his own initiative, and he demanded that any welfare or social assistance should be given as a result of labor and not as a gift from the Federal Government.

Goldwater enlisted in the Army Reserves soon after leaving the University of Arizona. He served during World War II as a pilot, and flew some of the most hazardous and difficult missions in the war. He volunteered during the Korean War, but was rejected for active duty because of his age. In the 1960's there was much controversy regarding the service of Congressmen and their staffs in the Washington-based Air Force Reserve Unit 9999, but Goldwater's service was not challenged. He was recognized as a qualified and hard-working officer.

The influential Goldwaters were understandably drawn into the political activities of the city and state. In 1946 Goldwater led a successful campaign to pass a right-to-work law. During the same period, the irate citizenry of Phoenix decided to investigate vice conditions in the city. Goldwater led the Reform Committee which "brought order out of chaos, \textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 122.
drove crime back underground, and allowed law abiding citizens once again to hold up their heads.\textsuperscript{45} Goldwater then served as campaign manager in the 1950 Gubernatorial election of Howard Pyle. In 1952 Goldwater decided to run for the Senate against incumbent Ernest McFarland. When it appeared that Goldwater would be a serious contender, the Democrats sent in such notables as Senators Lister Hill and Robert Kerr, Speaker Sam Rayburn, and Vice President Alben Barkley to plug for McFarland. Goldwater campaigned on the conservative plank which he has never abandoned. His critique of the Truman Administration was telling, and he was elected to the Senate by a substantial majority. He became a self-appointed proponent of the Conservative cause in America.

Goldwater, who continually espoused the conservative platform in his years in the Senate, has been branded as an arch-conservative opposed to any social legislation. This reputation is somewhat unfounded, since he has publicly favored nearly every piece of social legislation proposed, but has advocated state laws and state control rather than increased federal control.\textsuperscript{46} In the area of international affairs Goldwater has argued from a single premise: maintenance of American national security against all enemies is vital.

It is possible to determine many of the reasons behind Goldwater's philosophy, as the preceding information

\textsuperscript{45}McDowell, op. cit., p. 91.
\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., p. 121.
illustrates. However, it is much more difficult to determine what shaped him into the speaker that he is today. Perhaps one of the significant factors was the frequent barnstorming trips that he took as a young man with his uncle. His uncle's political campaigns included, at every stop, a public debate with the Democratic opposition. The debates harkened back to another era, with each debater, supplied with considerable amount of alcohol, using cool logic, fiery words, and dramatic pleas. Goldwater's public speaking does not contain all of these elements, but his style is very similar to that of his uncle.

Goldwater did not become involved in the test ban controversy until the treaty actually existed. Then he unleashed his arguments against it. He had been content to hope that the treaty would never be signed. Goldwater's belief was simple: communism, in all forms, was America's enemy, and anything that might give aid to it should be immediately and completely rejected. He did not trust communists, he hated communism, and he refused to accept coexistence as a workable long-range proposal for international policy. With regard to the Cold War, he asked: Why not win? He believed communism could be and should be defeated. Goldwater was certain that the Russians would not have accepted the treaty if it had not been to their advantage. If that were so, Goldwater argued, it could not possibly be to America's advantage to accept the same treaty. Goldwater set out to educate the Senators and the public about the dangers of ratifying the treaty. The treaty
was ratified, but the opposition, led by Goldwater, had raised such important arguments that nearly one-half of the Senators voting for ratification did so with reservations which included the significant points of opposition that Goldwater had presented.
CHAPTER III

BACKGROUND

Eighteen years after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with nuclear bombs, further testing of atomic weapons in outer space, in the atmosphere, and in the sea was outlawed by mutual agreement among the nations of the world, with France and Communist China being the major exceptions. The treaty was drafted by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and signed in Moscow on July 25, 1963. After the formal signing, East-West negotiators "drank toasts to 'peace and friendship,'"¹ and one negotiator solemnly stated "Peace --- it's wonderful."² Most of the world believed, at least for the moment, that "peace" had been attained in their time.

The Treaty of Moscow was hailed, in some quarters, as the most important document since the Magna Carta.³ The world's pacifists were ecstatic. Most of the population caught the fever, and allowed themselves to think that all war had been ended. The small, the neutral, and the unimportant nations engaged in a frantic race to ratify the treaty. By the time

²Ibid.
the treaty actually reached the Senate floor for consideration, eighty-one nations had ratified it. The United States, as a depository nation, had received nineteen instruments of ratification.

A nation-wide poll taken by Harris Surveys during the first week in August indicated over sixty per cent of the population favored the treaty, and most who did not favor the treaty were not opposed to it. The few Americans who rose to speak out against the treaty were immediately labeled "warmongers." Nevertheless, the treaty received a critical appraisal in the United States Senate. This chapter presents the background material that is necessary for an understanding of the Senate debate over ratification of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

Attempts at disarmament were not unique to the Twentieth Century. The United States first engaged in a treaty of disarmament in 1817 with the Rush-Bagot Treaty. It provided for disarmament on the Great Lakes by the United States and Great Britain. This treaty is significant more for its success than for its importance. The United States next participated in disarmament negotiations at the turn of the century when she was represented at the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907.

The First Hague Conference unanimously passed a resolution expressing "the wish that the Governments, taking into consideration the proposals made at the conference, may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed
forces by land and sea, and of war budgets. This resolution was the extent of the Conference's consideration of disarmament. At the Second Hague Conference, disarmament "was discussed for exactly twenty-five minutes ... another innocuous resolution was passed, and the subject was laid to rest."  

American interest in disarmament next appeared in President Woodrow Wilson's proposals. His plan for disarmament, somewhat amended, became article 8 in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The salient points were:

1. The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.
2. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans for such reduction...
3. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections...

There were two important ideas in this article. The first was that armaments cause war. The second was that "collective security required the retention of national armaments." This apparent contradiction between the evil and the necessity of arms was never resolved. Even though the United States did

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5 Ibid.
not become a member of the League, she was influenced by the world concern over armaments. The Washington Naval Conference of 1922 was an outgrowth of this concern. The Four Power and Nine Power Pacts were direct results of the Washington Conference. These agreements, it should be noted, were short-lived and relatively unsuccessful.\(^8\) The concern over disarmament continued until the Second World War, but these were the only agreements that were initialed.

The Charter of the United Nations neatly avoided the conflict existing in the League Covenant. Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations states:

> In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating ... plans to be submitted ... for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.\(^9\)

Disarmament negotiations involving the United Nations were conducted during three periods: 1945-1950, 1954-1957, and 1958-1963. There has been no significant disarmament bargaining since the signing of the Treaty of Moscow.

The first period officially began on January 21, 1946, when the General Assembly directed the Security Council to establish an Atomic Energy Commission. The Commission included the members of the Security Council, plus Canada when she was not a Council member. The Security Council was charged to formulate plans for

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1. The control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only
2. Elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other weapons adaptable to mass destruction
3. Effective safeguards through inspection and other means to protect states against violations and evasions.

This charge to the Security Council was prepared by the United States, which held undisputed superiority in nuclear weapons, and was concerned over their control. The Soviet Union, holding a relative superiority in conventional armaments, demanded that any reduction of nuclear arms must be simultaneous with the reduction of conventional arms. Consequently, on February 13, 1947, the Commission for Conventional Armaments was formed.

By mid-1948 negotiations reached an impasse. The only significant plan that had been advanced was the Baruch proposal. The Baruch proposal, originated by the United States, called for the establishment of an international atomic development authority. The authority would have owned, operated, and controlled all facilities, except mines, for the production of atomic energy. This proposal assumed that controls were unnecessary. However, negotiations soon proved that controls were important to the other nations. The commission continued to meet regularly until 1950, but failed to reach any concrete agreement. When the Korean War broke out, the meetings were suspended indefinitely. During this period, few Americans other than international representatives

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10 Schleicher, op. cit., p. 422.
and diplomats were concerned with the possibility of disarmament.

The first serious American consideration of disarmament in the post-World War II years began in the early 1950's with proposals for a nuclear test ban. As noted earlier, Hubert Humphrey, a relative newcomer to Congress, began a personal program to arouse Congressional and national concern. As the fifties progressed, the problems surrounding nuclear armaments became apparent to the American people. With steadily increasing national interest, America entered the second phase of the disarmament negotiations.

By the end of the Korean War the United States and the Soviet Union had both accumulated sizeable nuclear stockpiles, and both had exploded hydrogen bombs. In 1952 Great Britain entered the atomic bomb family. The United Nations, concerned with the atomic weapons race, established the Disarmament Commission to complement the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. Negotiations held in the Five Power Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission represented the second period of disarmament negotiations sponsored by the United Nations.

The members of the Disarmament Subcommittee included Canada, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The meetings, held in London, were all closed sessions. They continued from May 13, 1954 to September 6, 1957. In May, 1955, published statements by both American and Soviet delegates indicated that agreement had been reached. The committee adjourned for the summer and returned home for
consultation. When the committee reconvened in September, negotiations collapsed. There was never any substantial progress after that point. "The 'inside story' of what happened in the period between May, 1955 and September, 1955 has never been made public..."\textsuperscript{11} Whatever happened, the instructions that the negotiators carried back to the conference effectively destroyed the previous agreement.

In 1957 the Soviet Union, having negotiated for three years as one communist nation against four Western nations, began to insist upon parity of representation. The London talks were scuttled, ending the second period of disarmament negotiations.

The third and last period of disarmament negotiations began with the convening of the Geneva Conference. The Geneva Conference grew out of an agreement between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev. The first conference, composed of scientific experts from five nations in each bloc, discussed the possibility of the prevention of a surprise attack. The additional communist representatives only served to confuse matters, and little agreement was reached. The second conference, The Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violation of a Possible Agreement on Suspension of Nuclear Tests, met from July to September, 1958. The experts were able to reach substantial agreement, which led to the meeting of the Three-Nation Nuclear Test Ban Conference in late 1959. The experts agreed that the present

\textsuperscript{11}Schleicher, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 425.
detection devices, plus ones in the developmental stage, made it possible to substantially identify nuclear testing without on-sight inspection. The one exception was small payload underground explosions.

In 1958 Senator Hubert Humphrey achieved a major victory for his disarmament cause. On a trip to Russia he received an unscheduled personal audience with Premier Khrushchev. Khrushchev gave his tacit agreement to an international test ban treaty. It was the first time that Khrushchev or any high level Soviet leader had agreed to such a proposal. With Khrushchev's approval on record, the Three-Nation Conference began to negotiate in earnest.

In the meantime, a Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference had been called in Geneva. In 1960, it collapsed along with the proposed Summit Conference, over the famed U-2 incident. The Three-Nation Conference, however, survived. By now the conference members agreed substantially, although there were periods of open conflict. The agreements finally reached in this conference supplied the basic tenets around which the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was developed. It is interesting that the controls which both the United States and the Soviet Union had demanded fifteen years earlier were completely absent from the treaty.

The Treaty of Moscow marked the first success in seventeen years of concerted effort to reach a satisfactory

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13 Ibid., p. 80.
agreement with the Soviet Union for the control of nuclear weapons. Although the treaty did not require any radical concessions on the part of the Russians, it did at least signal a willingness to take the first step in disarmament proceedings. It was, as President Kennedy put it, "a shaft of light,"\textsuperscript{14} in what had been a "darkness of disagreement."\textsuperscript{15}

Another noteworthy aspect of the treaty is that it rests on the fine line between political advantage and risk. The problem is that there can't be absolute certainty that every test explosion which might take place will be detected and identified. Despite the fact that scientists are continually perfecting detection systems, the treaty does not assume the existence of a comprehensive network of detection, but rather accepts the risk of some test explosions passing unnoticed. American officials charged with the responsibility for negotiating the treaty concluded that the risk was acceptable for a number of reasons:

1. The United States was superior to the Soviet Union in overall military capacity.
2. A test ban ... would help to freeze that superiority.
3. By outlawing testing in the three environment treaty ... the cost, difficulty, and political risks of clandestine testing increased so drastically as to reduce its significant military value.\textsuperscript{16}

The negotiators were not relying on vague "world opinion" to control the Russians. They were fully cognizant that it was

\textsuperscript{15}Dean, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 81.
\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 82.
the Russians who had broken the Voluntary 1958 Test Moratorium. In addition they realized that the nonaligned states could not be counted upon for support. India, for example, had led the fight in the United Nations to keep the Soviet Union from being severely censured for breaking the 1958 moratorium.

No, it was not on an uncertain world opinion that we who favored the partial test-ban treaty relied for an inhibiting effect but on realistic calculations of where both American and Soviet national interests lay in this matter. 17

The advantages of the nuclear test ban treaty are both political and military. Military experts testifying in subcommittee hearings, begrudgingly favored the treaty by agreeing that the advantages of the treaty outweighed any military risks. The advantages accruing from the adoption of the treaty might be summarized as follows:

1. The treaty would open the way for further disarmament agreements.
2. The treaty would help to reduce tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.
3. The treaty would strengthen the international image of the United States.
4. The treaty would help to check the arms race.
5. The treaty would reduce radioactive fallout.
6. The treaty would inhibit the further proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations.
7. The treaty would stave off the demands of the irresponsible and naive "ban the bomb" movements. 18

These advantages represented a significant portion of the arguments of the Senators supporting ratification of the treaty.

17 Dean, op. cit., p. 83.
18 Summary is mine, TAB.
There is one more factor that supported the existence of such a treaty. The treaty helped "to contribute to an emerging atmosphere of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union and to strengthen, at least for awhile, those elements in the Soviet Union which were in favor of shaping better relations with the West." 19

AMERICAN ARMS POLICY

 Concurrent with the developments in international negotiations on disarmaments was the American national arms policy. The changing and fluctuating American arms policy, in addition to international negotiations, is necessary background for any discussion of the Senate debate over ratification of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

 As the military cut-backs after World War II began, the Truman Administration was forced to make certain decisions on the future level of armaments. On September 30, 1946, President Truman gave an indication of the future when he approved a permanent task force for the Mediterranean. 20 Former Secretary of War Stimson suggested that the United States build as many atomic bombs as possible, maintaining that the bombs would be needed to thwart the communist threat to peace. 21 Only one year earlier, before the Russian expansion

19 Dean, op. cit., p. 84.
21 Ibid.
in Europe began and before the Soviet Union blocked negotia-
tions, Stimson had openly espoused international control of
nuclear weapons. Now he was convinced that the "bomb was the
equalizer to the Red Army."\textsuperscript{22} By 1947 "the prospects of any
meaningful international action ... were largely gone."\textsuperscript{23}

During the next few years the impasse between the United
States and the Soviet Union grew deeper. These were the years
of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Czechoslovakian
Coup, and the Berlin Blockades.

As the Cold War heated up, America stabilized her military
forces and dug in throughout the world to thwart the communist
offensive. By 1949 the United States had an atomic arsenal
with the capacity to completely level every city in the world.
In addition, government sources soon realized that Russian
spies had been active in the United States and that American
atomic secrets were being relayed into the Soviet Union. In
August, 1949, long-range detection equipment of the Air Force
recorded the first Russian atomic bomb explosion.\textsuperscript{24}

Even the most careful observers of the Soviet Union were
shocked. The Russians were at least two years ahead of the
development schedule upon which American observers had placed
them.\textsuperscript{25} The war with Japan had created a necessity for a

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., p. 107.
\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 108.
\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 109.
\textsuperscript{25}Schleicher, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 460.
crash development program by the United States, but years from Hiroshima until the Soviet atomic explosion had provided no incentive. The first Soviet test provided the stimulus for American scientists. The Air Force, prompted partially by the desire for acceptance of the B-36 intercontinental bombers, supported further expansion of nuclear power. Although a significant number of scientists and laymen disapproved of the proposed arms race, the United States soon embarked on a program of all-out development of the hydrogen bomb. On March 10, 1950, the construction of the Savannah River reactors began. By June the Korean War had begun, and the arms race sped on.

The Korean War illustrated a problem other than that of atomic development. The War was fought with conventional weapons. The conflict showed that a nation could not rely upon nuclear weapons alone, but must also maintain its conventional arms strength. An increase in the level and supply of United States conventional arms soon followed. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization began to develop conventional alternatives to nuclear defense of Europe.

The pace of development in the nuclear race was rapid. By spring, 1951, Dr. Teller reported that a hydrogen bomb was feasible. In the fall of 1952 the United States exploded the first thermonuclear, hydrogen bomb. Less than ten months later the Soviet Union exploded its version of the hydrogen bomb. At this stage the United States and the Soviet Union were described as "two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of
killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life." 26

The speed of the nuclear race accelerated beyond control. In March, 1954, the inevitable accident occurred. During the Bikini Island tests, the Japanese fishing vessel Lucky Dragon was contaminated. The horrible effects of contamination upon the seamen of the Lucky Dragon seemed to shake the United States and the Soviet Union out of their stupor. This accident touched off the London negotiations discussed earlier in this chapter.

Since 1954 the arms race has been characterized by delivery and defense systems development, rather than by nuclear research. The United States has developed a steady flow of missiles, each bigger, more accurate than the last and with varying ranges. There are surface to air missiles, air to surface missiles, air to air missiles, surface to surface missiles, sea to air missiles, and a long series of outer space rockets and missiles. From all reports, the Soviet Union has developed a counterpart to every American missile. The space race of both countries has been called scientific and exploratory, and it may be. However, no one denies that the information obtained from space research can be used in weapons development.

A unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing began in 1958, only to be broken by the Russians in late 1960. The United States began testing again within ten months. In addition, France emerged as a member of the atomic club. Testing

26 Heinrichs, op. cit., p. 114.
continued sporadically until the Senate ratified the test ban treaty. The Russians even conducted one last explosion on August 10, 1963, almost two weeks after they had signed the treaty in Moscow. When the United States ratified the treaty, it became formally effective, and all signatories to the treaty have adhered to its provisions as far as can be determined.

COSTS OF THE ARMS RACE

BRINKMANSHIP. The tensions of the Cold War have led to the development of a new kind of foreign policy, which political scientists call "brinkmanship." As the name implies, the new policy of international relations results in pushing national demands until the nations involved reach the very brink of disaster. The Russians and Americans have been on the verge of war numerous times since World War II, with Berlin, Korea, Cuba, and Laos as notable examples. Nuclear weapons, with their mass destructive potential, make the best possible tools for brinkmanship, for with their threat, the game becomes completely mental. The only question is whether or not the opposition will drop the bomb. There is little wonder that nerves became frayed, and that diplomats began to demand action to reduce world tensions. Whether the test ban treaty was the answer to their problem is, of course, another question.
FINANCES. By the late 1950's Americans were becoming concerned with the extreme costs of the arms race. The cost of the development of the first atomic bomb, well over one billion dollars, was insignificant compared with armament expenditures in later years. It was estimated that the total world expenditure for armaments in 1962 had soared to nearly two hundred billion dollars.\(^{27}\) In the 1962 fiscal budget of the United States \("$47.1 billion were appropriated for defense, of which 15.7 was for procurement, 6.9 was for research and development, and the remainder was for maintenance.\)\(^{28}\) Economists feared that the nation could not endure this distribution of assets. American citizens, facing pressing internal problems, wondered if the defense expenditure was necessary. One noted economist maintained that

The evidence is overwhelming that the nation's limited resources for research and development have been increasingly diverted from civilian production to defense and space work; as a consequence, America is now far behind other major countries of the west in research for civilian purposes. America's effort is only one-half that of West Germany.\(^{29}\)

If the arms race could be halted, money could be channeled into civilian expenditures.

FALLOUT. After the contamination of the Lucky Dragon in 1954, Americans became increasingly aware of the potential danger of nuclear contamination of the atmosphere. In


addition, the results of scientific experiments with radiation illustrated mutations and other physiological changes which resulted from radioactive exposure. In the summer of 1963 "the Federal Radiation Council revealed that radiation fallout in many parts of America ... probably exceeded the exposure limit that was set in 1958." 30 Fallout had not reached the danger level yet, but Americans could see no sense in getting any closer to it.

ERROR. With the armaments of both East and West poised for immediate attack, people began to worry about the possibility of human or mechanical error which would accidently touch off a nuclear war. Scientists and military men were quick to assure the public that adequate safeguards had been developed. The public, however, was not satisfied, especially when news of the error in Tule, Greenland, leaked out in 1960. For nearly two hours radar devices in Tule had indicated that a fleet of jet bombers was approaching from Europe. Only at the last minute did the radarmen discover that the "bombers" were actually a flock of migrating sparrows. 31 Though the probability of error was extremely small, it did exist, and few people could see any reason for living with the danger.


American negotiators had been busy for years attempting to reach a satisfactory disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union. The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, although limited, seemed an adequate first step toward alleviating some of the problems created by the arms race.
CHAPTER IV

ISSUES AND CONTENTIONS

The question of ratification of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty involved a major policy decision by the United States Senate. Before the Senators could reach a decision, they needed to analyze the treaty and discover the issues inherent in the proposition. The issues "are the ultimate, irreducible, essential matters of fact or of principle upon which the conclusion of the question hinges."

After discovering the issues, the affirmative is obligated to consider those issues and propose contentions supporting its position. On the other hand, the negative must present contentions that deny the affirmative case.

METHODOLOGY

The critical scheme in this chapter is:

1. Discovery of the issues.
2. Discovery of the affirmative’s contentions.
3. Discovery of the negative’s contentions.
4. Comparison of affirmative and negative positions.

The analysis will seek to discover whether both sides recognized the issues, whether they established contentions that would support their respective positions, and which side presented the most effective case.

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THE ISSUES

An analysis of the question of ratification of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty reveals a number of issues. During the debate nine of these issues became important. Both sides noted the issues during the first few days of the debate. Later they proposed contentions to support their positions on the issues. The following paragraphs include the major issues, with a specific reference from the speech of a member of each side to illustrate identification of the issues.

I. Why did the Soviet Union sign the treaty? Humphrey carried the bulk of the affirmative argument on this issue. His continued involvement in the treaty negotiations, in addition to his personal conference with Premier Khrushchev, made him particularly knowledgeable on this issue. He identified this issue by suggesting that

Many reasons can be advanced as to why it was possible to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on a nuclear test ban. I believe...  

Goldwater, on the other hand, was particularly concerned that the Russians had signed the treaty for reasons unknown to the United States. He stated:

We do not need the Soviet attitude toward this treaty alone as a test of their intentions...  

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II. Will the treaty reduce international tensions?

Humphrey, a functionalist and in favor of international cooperation with the Soviet Union, identified this issue in the first Senate session after the signing of the treaty in Moscow.

The nuclear test ban agreement is consistent with our national interest and is an integral part of our national security... It is a giant step forward toward better understanding between nations and for the health and protection of mankind."

The opponents of the treaty, especially the leaders, were greatly concerned that international cooperation was to the advantage of communism and to the disadvantage to the United States. Thurmond, arguing particularly effectively on this issue, identified it as

The fact that this treaty is a first step, and the contemplation --- fond or foreboding --- of what the succeeding steps may be...

III. Can the United States maintain her ability to resume testing? Fulbright had participated in the committee hearings on the proposed treaty. When he officially presented the treaty to the Senate with his committee's recommendation, he identified this issue.


The major technical problem of special concern during the hearings on the treaty was that of our capacity for prompt resumption of atmospheric testing in the event of Soviet violation or withdrawal from the treaty.\(^6\)

Goldwater, and the remainder of the opposition, feared the United States would not be able to resume testing promptly enough to be effective. He suggested:

Another area that is crucial involves our readiness to test --- the readiness regarded as a vital safeguard in the negotiation of the treaty so far. Can we in fact assure a perpetual readiness to test which would preserve us should another party to the treaty violate it, as the Soviets violated the test moratorium?\(^7\)

IV. Will this treaty restrict the use of atomic weapons in time of war? This issue was raised by the opposition. The affirmative, approaching the treaty much as the negotiators had, did not expect this issue to be raised.\(^8\) The intent of the treaty was not to outlaw wartime use of atomic weapons, but the negation argued that it would, in effect, do so. This issue was raised early in the debate, and Fulbright recognized it when he presented the treaty to the Senate.

There arose during the hearings and the subsequent deliberations ... a question as to whether the language of Article I of the treaty prohibiting any nuclear test explosion, "or any other nuclear explosion," might have the effect of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in time of war.\(^9\)

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\(^9\) Fulbright, op. cit., p. 16526.
Thurmond, in identifying the issue for the negation, stated that

The executive branch of the U.S. Government has taken the position that the words "or any other nuclear explosion" do not include nuclear explosions during actual hostilities between nations. 10

V. Does the United States need further developmental testing? Both the proponents and opponents of the treaty agreed that the treaty would create a relative "freeze" in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. A dispute arose, however, over whether or not the state of American development and research was adequate for the proper defense of the country. This issue was of particular interest to Fulbright in his position as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. He recognized this issue as being particularly important.

As to the effects of the treaty on this military balance, the key fact is that whatever opportunities for progress in nuclear technology are opened or closed to the United States, the same opportunities will be opened or closed to the Soviet Union. 11

The opposition approach to the issue was somewhat different, but the issue was the same. Goldwater was very much concerned over this issue. He identified the issue by asking

First would be the need to test. We often ask if we can safely continue. We must ask also if we can safely stop. Is there a danger of a weapons gap... 12

11 Fulbright, op. cit., p. 16525.
12 Goldwater, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part II, p. 14545.
VI. Is the nuclear debris in the atmosphere harmful? The accidental contamination of the Japanese fishing boat, the Lucky Dragon, created interest in the effects of nuclear contamination. The proponents of the treaty believed that the level of nuclear debris in the atmosphere should be stopped at its present level, and not increased by any further testing. On the surface this issue might seem to be rather insignificant, since neither side would deny that radioactive fallout was harmful. The issue, however, was whether or not the degree or amount of debris in the air was actually significant. Humphrey had identified this issue years before the signing of the treaty, and had used it in his national education program on the dangers of continued nuclear testing. During the Senate debate he recognized the issue by arguing that

Radioactive pollution of the atmosphere is something that we cannot ignore.\(^\text{13}\)

The negation also recognized the issue. Thurmond pointed to the treaty itself when he recognized it.

The preamble of the treaty states... "to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances."\(^\text{14}\)

VII. Is the United States militarily superior to the Soviet Union? In accepting the "freeze" mentioned earlier, both sides desired to know about the military strength of the

\(^{13}\)Humphrey, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 10, p. 13396.

\(^{14}\)Thurmond, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 13, p. 17611.
United States, in addition to the need for further testing. They recognized that the primary responsibility of the U.S. Government was to protect its citizens. Fulbright, speaking for these in favor of the treaty, identified the issue when he suggested that

It is the strongly held conviction of the officials who have the main responsibility for our national defense, both civilian and military, that the American nuclear force is manifestly superior to that of any other nation. 15

The negation had grave doubts about American superiority. Thurmond identified the problem in one short sentence.

It is not enough to say that we have a clear nuclear superiority in weaponry. 16

The two remaining issues that were brought out in the debate are particularly important, since each side failed to respond to the challenge of the issue raised by the other side.

VIII. Will the treaty halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons? The affirmative was particularly concerned over this issue. The proponents considered the halting of proliferation as one of the important reasons for acceptance of the treaty. Humphrey noted

Finally the treaty would be an important step toward halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons among other nations. 17

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15 Fulbright, op. cit., p. 16525.
16 Thurmond, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 12, p. 16795.
17 Humphrey, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 10, p. 13998.
The negative regarded this issue as irrelevant. The issue was never identified in any of the negative's addresses. The only time that the negation discussed the issue was when they were directly examined by members of the affirmative.

IX. Should political considerations have superiority over military considerations? This issue became particularly important after the testimony of some military officers indicated that they favored the treaty only because of the political advantages. Goldwater vividly pointed out this issue when he stated:

The job of the Senate is to make absolutely sure that, beyond the shadow of doubt, the political optimism and military reservations do not conceal any significant disagreements as to the impact upon this Nation's security... 18

The affirmative proponents of the bill carefully skirted this issue and never really attempted to answer the question involved.

These were the nine major issues upon which the Senators debated the ratification of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

THE AFFIRMATIVE'S CONTENTIONS

The affirmative proposed a large number of arguments to support its position that the treaty ought to be ratified. Some of the arguments proved to be irrelevant or of minor importance, others became extremely significant. The arguments that were important to the development of the debate are the ones that are presented in this chapter.

18 Goldwater, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 12, p. 15743.
Perhaps the most natural question that anyone might have asked after the treaty was signed, was why the Russians had signed it. Russian-American relations in the years preceding the treaty were not particularly peaceful. The affirmative presented two explanations of the Russian action. The first was that the treaty was the result of years of labor by American disarmament negotiators.¹⁹ The second was the Russians recognized the same necessities for a test ban as did Americans. ²⁰ While admitting the relevance of some of the negative questions, the affirmative maintained that the important fact was that the Soviet Union had signed the treaty. If adequate safeguards existed to protect the United States, as the affirmative held, then whatever motivation had prompted the Russian acceptance was unimportant.²¹

Led by liberals Humphrey and Fulbright, the affirmative forces believed that international cooperation would eventually lead to world peace. They presented one major contention: international cooperation would lead to understanding and reduced international tensions.²² Proponents of the treaty also argued the corollary argument: if the nations of the East and the West did not cooperate, then they would inevitably misunderstood and mistrust each other. The assumption in this argument,

¹⁹Humphrey, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 10, p. 13998.
²⁰Ibid.
²¹Fulbright, op. cit., p. 16526.
which the negation frequently attacked, was that armaments created international tensions. The affirmative, however, was already firmly committed to maintenance of the present level of armaments. The affirmative was thereby faced with the same dilemma concerning armaments that the League of Nations had been unable to resolve forty years earlier. Proponents of the treaty seemed content to merely assume that armaments create international tensions, rather than to present a logical argument to support their claim.

The Soviet Union has a record of broken and abrogated treaties, a fact well-known by the Senators. Since it was highly probable that the Soviet Union would violate the treaty, many Senators questioned the ability of the United States to maintain her capability to resume testing. The affirmative argued that continued underground testing and government support of research programs, would be sufficient to maintain testing capability. 23

Another issue involved an interpretation of the treaty. Article I of the treaty prohibits nuclear testing and "any other nuclear explosion." 24 There was considerable dispute about whether this provision prohibited the use of nuclear weapons in time of war. The affirmative contended that it did not, and pointed to two facts which supported this claim. The first was that the negotiators of the treaty did not intend

23Fulbright, op. cit., p. 16527.

24See Appendix III.
to include this prohibition. This belief was based on the interpretation of international law which holds that the "intent" of a treaty has precedence over literal meaning. The proponents also argued that Article IV of the treaty, relating to abrogation under "extraordinary circumstances," showed that both the intent and the literal meaning of the treaty allowed wartime explosions. Eventually an accord between the affirmative and negative was reached on this issue. They both agreed that the United States should not sign any treaty outlawing all nuclear explosions. The issue, however, developed into a question of attaching a substantive amendment to the treaty stating that the United States reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in time of war. Supporters of the treaty argued that the intent was sufficient to guarantee the right of wartime use, and that there was no reason for the amendment. The amendment, they contended, would have to be passed by the signatories to the treaty, and its inclusion might scuttle the entire treaty.

One bitterly contested issue was whether the United States needed further testing. Much of the testimony in the Senate Armed Forces Subcommittee on Military Preparedness was concerned with the relative defensive capabilities of the United States


27See Appendix III.

and the Soviet Union. The affirmative argument upheld the contention that the United States exceeded the Soviet Union in missile development and in sophistication of atomic warheads. In addition, the proponents contended that the Soviet Union would be as restricted as the United States in further testing. The United States, therefore, could establish a sort of permanent superiority, or "freeze," by accepting the test ban treaty.

Another highly controversial issue had to do with the danger of nuclear debris and radiation in the atmosphere. Several experiments, published in the months preceding the Senate debate, indicated that radiation could cause significant mutation and mutilation in human beings. The supporters of the treaty maintained that the radiation level in the atmosphere was reaching the danger point, when significant damage would be caused to humans. They argued that a suspension of testing would reduce the amount of debris in the atmosphere.

The issue of the relationship of the military superiority of the United States and the Soviet Union was a major area of clash. Each side in the debate differed in their interpretation of the same facts. The affirmative argued that the United States had sufficient nuclear power to defend the

29 Fulbright, op. cit., p. 16525.
30 Humphrey, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 10, p. 13397.
nation, and conventional forces adequate to meet military alliance commitments.  

Proponents of ratification also contended that the possibility of stopping the proliferation of weapons among nations was a significant issue, and that the treaty would effectively do so. The negative, on the other hand, maintained that the issue was irrelevant, since the nations that had the capability to develop nuclear bombs either had them or would not sign the treaty.

With the one exception listed earlier, the affirmative proposed arguments to support its position on each of the issues raised in the debate. The position of the supporters of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty might be summarized as follows:

1. The Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Moscow for the same reason as the United States, for peace, safety, and economy.

2. The ratification of the treaty will substantially reduce international tensions.

3. The United States will be able to maintain her ability to resume testing if she accepts the treaty.

4. Adherence to the treaty will not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in time of war.

5. The United States needs to test further only if the Soviets continue testing, and both would be equally restricted by the treaty.

6. The radiation level in the atmosphere is reaching the danger point.

7. The United States is militarily superior to the Soviet Union in all important areas.

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31 Fulbright, op. cit., p. 16526.
8. Acceptance of the treaty would reduce proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nations of the world.

THE NEGATIVE'S CONTENTIONS

The opponents of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty proposed many arguments which they felt militated against its ratification. Many of the negative arguments, however, were irrelevant to the real issues in the debate. Goldwater, for example, presented an amendment demanding that the Soviet Union leave Cuba before the United States ratified the treaty.\(^{32}\) At another time he proposed the Soviet Union tear down the Berlin Wall as an indication of their good intentions toward the treaty. The negative also spent a significant amount of time with arguments that reflected the general dissatisfaction and problems of the Cold War, but which did not have any substantive relationship to the issues in the test ban debate. The opposition, nonetheless, recognized the issues, and presented arguments to support its position on them.

Although the affirmative had reached the conclusion that the Soviet Union had signed the treaty for reasons acceptable to the United States, the negative rejected this conclusion. Since it was impossible to know why the Soviet Union had signed the treaty, the negation claimed that the United States should be exceedingly skeptical of Russian intentions. They claimed that there could be only two possible reasons for

\(^{32}\)Goldwater, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 12, p. 15927.
Russian acceptance. The first was that the Sino-Soviet split forced the Russians to sign the treaty to maintain their position of prominence in the communist world.\textsuperscript{33} The negative maintained that if this were true, then the United States should keep the Russians in a weakened position by not signing the treaty. The second possible reason was that the Soviet Union held an unknown military superiority over the United States and were trying to freeze that superiority. If this were the case, then, of course, the United States could not ratify the treaty.\textsuperscript{34}

As indicated earlier in this paper, the negative forces led by Goldwater and Thurmond did not accept the idea of perpetual coexistence with communism. They believed cooperation between the East and the West would only help to strengthen communist control. The negative maintained that the communists had not given up their goal of controlling the world; therefore the United States should not abdicate its responsibility to defend freedom, and cooperate with the communists to their advantage.\textsuperscript{35}

Those opposed to ratification of the treaty firmly believed that the United States would not be able to indefinitely maintain her ability to promptly resume testing. They pointed to the periods in history when lack of stimulus

\textsuperscript{33}Goldwater, \textit{Congressional Record}, op. cit., Part 11, p. 14545.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35}Thurmond, \textit{Congressional Record}, op. cit., Part 12, p. 16795.
had slowed down development. They also pointed to the nearly ten months that it took the United States to resume testing after the Soviet Union broke the Voluntary Moratorium in 1960. The opponents of the treaty argued that the Soviet Union need only wait a few years and then resume testing. By the time the United States could begin testing, the Russians would have such a commanding technological lead the United States could be blackmailed into submission.36

The opposition forces were extremely concerned that acceptance of the treaty would force the United States into a position where she would be unable to use atomic weapons in wartime. They argued that the wording of the treaty was such that, strictly interpreted, it would outlaw all nuclear explosions. Total prohibition, of course, would include defensive purposes. The negation finally agreed with the affirmative that the intent of the treaty was not to outlaw wartime atomic weapons. The negative, however, still sought to clarify this position. The opposition argued that world opinion would oppose American use of atomic weapons in war, unless the United States attached an amendment clearly stating that she retained the right to use nuclear weapons in time of war.37

Another important issue was the necessity of continued developmental testing. The negation maintained that the

36 Goldwater, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 12, p. 15927.

37 Ibid., p. 15928.
United States needed to continue testing. Two arguments were presented to support this contention. The first was that the Soviet Union had developed an effective anti-ICBM system that the United States had not, as yet, found a method of penetrating.\textsuperscript{38} The second argument was that recent tests had shown that high-yield hydrogen bombs developed electronic screens and electrified air pockets, both of which effectively distorted the electronic mechanisms in ICBM systems. Opponents of the treaty maintained that this effect would have to be studied further, for it might be that a large scale nuclear attack on the United States would effectively destroy her second strike power by scrambling the electronic control devices in the missiles.\textsuperscript{39}

Opposition forces argued that the level of radioactive debris and particles in the air was insignificant. They argued that although the radiation level in the United States was somewhat higher than it had been ten years before, it was still insignificant. They pointed out places in the world where radiation levels were nearly ten times that of the United States, and had been for centuries. The inhabitants of these areas had not been harmed by the radiation.\textsuperscript{40} The negative forces also argued that radiation levels had been substantially higher at different times in history, and had

\textsuperscript{38}Thurmond, \textit{Congressional Record}, op. cit., Part 12, p. 16795.

\textsuperscript{39}\textit{Ibid.}

not caused any serious effects. A passing comet, for example, was known to increase the radiation count by nearly 100 times, and no cases of contamination had been reported. Although the negation admitted the danger of an increase in radioactive debris, it maintained that the danger was not significant enough to overcome the other drawbacks to the treaty.

In opposing ratification, the negative forces assumed the position that the more and bigger armaments, the better. They argued that the United States could never have an adequate military defense unless her destructive capability was substantially greater than that of the Soviet Union. They maintained that the United States military forces did not hold a significant superiority over the Russian forces, and ought to be increased.41 The test ban treaty restricted opportunity to increase military potential; therefore the negative maintained that it ought to be rejected.

The negative also raised the issue of which considerations should have precedence, military or political. The negation maintained that since military forces were necessary to defend internal security, military considerations should have precedence.42 The affirmative indicated that the decision could not be made. Affirmative forces indicated any decision would have to rest upon a balance between the two considerations.

41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p. 17557.
The opponents of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty proposed contentions on each of the issues surrounding the ratification controversy, with the one exception listed earlier. The opposition's position might be summarized as follows:

1. The Soviet Union signed the treaty for ulterior motives, none of which could be to the advantage of the United States.

2. Ratification of the treaty will not eliminate the real cause of international tensions, which is communism.

3. The United States will be unable to maintain her ability to resume testing.

4. The treaty, as it stands, outlaws the use of nuclear weapons in time of war.

5. The United States definitely needs to continue nuclear testing for her own defense.

6. The radiation level in the atmosphere is insignificant.

7. Whatever military superiority the United States might have over the Soviet Union is insignificant.

8. Military considerations should have precedence over political considerations.

**ANALYSIS OF CONTENTIONS**

The debate over ratification of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was unique because many of the political deals usually involved in Senatorial decisions were noticeably absent from the consideration. There was pressure from Administration forces for adoption of the treaty. But despite his desire for ratification, President Kennedy urged thorough consideration of

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the question, and the Senate did just that. An analysis of the respective arguments of the opposing sides sheds some light upon the vote over ratification.

WHY DID THE SOVIET UNION SIGN THE TREATY? The affirmative’s answer to this issue seemed to be stronger than that of the negative. The negative’s contention that the Russians had some ulterior motive seemed plausible, but did not seem highly probable. The negative was only able to establish that there was some doubt as to the Russian actions. The affirmative, on the other hand, carefully presented arguments to show that the Russian action was parallel to that of the Americans.

WILL THE TREATY REDUCE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS? The trend of the times supported the affirmative’s position on this issue. Whether the negative was willing to accept it or not, the American Government was firmly committed to a policy of coexistence with communism. In fact, many of the members of the opposition had played a major part in the development of that policy. As long as the United States supported coexistence, international cooperation was a necessary outgrowth of American foreign policy.

CAN THE UNITED STATES MAINTAIN HER ABILITY TO RESUME TESTING? The affirmative answer to this question was somewhat weak. The proponents of ratification never showed that there was a difference between their proposal to maintain testing capability and the ineffective programs which the United States had financed during the preceding fifteen years. The negative, on the other hand, pointed to the periods in the
past when development had lagged despite government planning. The negative appears to have had a much stronger position on this question.

**WILL THE TREATY RESTRICT THE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN TIME OF WAR?** Because both sides agreed that they would not accept a treaty which would restrict wartime use of atomic weapons, the question became merely procedural.

**DOES THE UNITED STATES NEED FURTHER DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING?** The negative raised several significant arguments which indicated that the United States needed to conduct further tests. The affirmative answer to the issue, that the United States and the Soviet Union would be in equivalent testing positions, was weak, and did not truly answer the negative's arguments. If the affirmative forces had maintained that the Soviet Union would not attack, then their position against a need for further testing would have been tenable. However, they did not. The negative's contention that further testing was needed in several areas was never effectively refuted by the affirmative.

**IS THE NUCLEAR DEBRIS IN THE ATMOSPHERE HARMFUL?** The affirmative appears to have slightly exaggerated its case on the harmful level of radiation in the atmosphere. The negative was unable to show that radioactive fallout wasn't dangerous, but it was able to show that the amount of nuclear debris was not yet close to the danger level. The affirmative forces were able to successfully show that nuclear debris was increasing, and that it would eventually reach a harmful level.
They successfully argued that it was better to alleviate the problem at once, rather than in the future.

**IS THE UNITED STATES MILITARILY SUPERIOR TO THE SOVIET UNION?** The affirmative's argument that the United States was superior in the "important" areas was not sufficient to establish its position. To successfully establish this position, the affirmative should also have shown that the other areas were unimportant. The negative's argument for unlimited armaments was equally unsuccessful. By the last days of the debate, this issue and its arguments had been virtually forgotten by all but Goldwater.

**WILL THE TREATY HALT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?** The negative contended that this issue was irrelevant. The affirmative maintained that the signatories would adhere to the provisions of the treaty. The negative argued that those nations which wanted the bomb, and had the capability of developing one, would not sign the treaty. Thus, this issue became meaningless, since neither side could determine who would sign the treaty. In view of the fact that both France and Red China, the two newest members of the atomic club, did not sign the treaty, the negative seems to have assessed the situation correctly.

**SHOULD POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS HAVE SUPERIORITY OVER MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS?** The negative contention seemed a little out of place in the 1960's. The world desired peace, and striving for peace was the avowed policy of the United States Government. The assumption that political decisions should be
secondary to military reasons was somewhat contradictory since peace could be achieved only by positive action in both areas. Affirmative forces wisely avoided any specific consideration of this question. They merely asserted that a balance would have to be reached, and then quietly moved to a discussion of other issues.

In the last analysis, the affirmative seems to have successfully supported the political issues and the negative, the military issues. Perhaps this is one reason why the negation was so insistent upon raising the issue of military versus political precedence. In a time filled with hope for peace, the affirmative approach was more successful. The real dilemma of the negative was: if the Russians neither abrogated the treaty nor attacked the United States, its answers to the political issues were irrelevant and its answers to the military issues were unnecessary.
CHAPTER V

PROOF

The previous chapter did not attempt to reach any conclusions about the methods that the speakers used to establish the contentions. This chapter will analyze the proof used to establish those contentions and determine its relative effectiveness.

The analysis of proof in this chapter will follow the Aristotelian scheme of ethos, pathos and logos. It should be noted that these three areas of proof are not mutually exclusive and cannot be absolutely separated. This chapter separates them only for purposes of analysis.

I. ETHICAL PROOF

Thonssen and Baird suggest that ethos, ethical proof, is characterized by what a speaker does in his speech to develop audience respect for his character, sagacity and good will.¹ A good speaker should use ethical proof to establish the credibility of what he has to say. The audience will tend to believe a speaker who has developed a satisfactory image, and, conversely, an audience is inclined to discount the words of a speaker who has not established ethical credibility.

Both sides in the ratification debate were speaking to two audiences: their colleagues in the Senate and their constituencies across the nation.

The national and Senatorial image of any one Senator is continually changing. The position that each Senator assumes on every question is an additional piece of information by which people ascertain his ethical character. The debate on the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was particularly important in developing the image of the major participants because of the importance of the treaty. But to pinpoint any single element of a Senator's speaking that established his ethical image is very difficult.

The image of the speakers was an important part of their ethical appeal, whether the image was static or developing. The reputation that Goldwater obtained in this debate played an important part in his campaign for the Presidential nomination. His clear thinking and sound presentations were probably an important part of achieving this favorable response.

Many people had antecedent opinions of these Senators, and, therefore, judged what they had to say on the basis of these opinions. This judgment had either a positive or a negative effect upon the speaker's ethical image. To some people the very stature and importance of a Senator was an important ethical element that would sway them to favor the position of the speaker. A newly-elected Democratic Senator, who was a strong party man, would tend to be persuaded by the position

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and words of Humphrey and Fulbright. A similar response might have also been evoked in Republican Senators by Thurmond and Goldwater.

The public also reacted to this same ethical element of antecedent opinions. And just as one person would favor the treaty because Humphrey did, another would oppose it because Humphrey favored it. Americans had recently elected a Democratic Congress and President, and could, therefore, be expected to react favorable to the words of the Democratic leaders.

There is little doubt that ethical proof played an important part in this debate, but the special characteristics of the speaking situation make it nearly impossible to assess the specific effects of the ethical proof in the Senators' speeches.

II. PATHETIC PROOF

Pathetic, or emotional, proof generally refers to the manner in which the speaker chooses to present his topic to the listeners. He is always interested in relating his arguments to the audience in an interesting and captivating manner. The importance of this type of proof cannot be underestimated, for an audience reaches conclusions based upon its own particular needs and how well they are fulfilled by the speaker's proposal. If a speaker fails to understand and take account of these interests, he frequently fails to persuade his audience to accept his position.
The analytic approach in this section is divided into two parts. First, the basic attitudes of the Senators and the national audience concerning this topic are established. The second part is an analysis of the ways in which the speakers adapted to these attitudes.

A. AUDIENCE ATTITUDES

Americans held several attitudes which were relevant to the test ban treaty. The attitudes included a wide range of beliefs and goals, contradictory as well as complementary. It was to these attitudes that both the affirmative and the negative appealed during the debate.

I. FALLOUT. The American public was alarmed over the increasing level of radioactive material in the atmosphere. Because of the highly technical nature of the problem few people were able to really understand it. Some believed that fallout was just beginning to represent a problem, while others believed that the world was in imminent danger of contamination. The general consensus, however, was that radioactive debris in the atmosphere should be reduced in any way possible.³

II. MILITARY EXPENDITURES. With the national budget for military expenditures at nearly $50 billion, the public was becoming increasingly concerned with wasted and unnecessary expenditure. Internal and national problems caused the citizenry to wonder if the money might not be better spent in other areas.

The increasing burden of national taxation, coupled with rising state and local taxes, had led to discontent among the taxpayers. There is little doubt that the public was in favor of reduced military spending if it could be accomplished without jeopardizing national security.⁴

III. COEXISTENCE. Americans had come to accept the existence of communist countries as an unavoidable evil. After the extremism of the McCarthy Era, most people seemed content to halt the spread of Communism without attempting to destroy it.

IV. SOVIET UNION. Americans, and particularly politicians, had become wary of all the actions of the Soviet Union. The events in Cuba, the unrest in Laos, the Berlin Blockade, and the U-2 incident had created a feeling of insecurity. Americans viewed the Soviet Union with a jaundiced eye, and feared its attempted territorial expansion.

V. INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. Unrest in international relations had led to a general feeling of insecurity. People were ready to accept any type of plan which might result in reduced international tensions.⁵

VI. NUCLEAR WAR. In the early 1960's, Americans were convinced that any large-scale disruption of international relations would result in an atomic war. They feared the catastrophic results of nuclear contamination. It was during this era that the nation spent millions of dollars building

⁴Ibid., p. 181.
⁵Ibid., p. 176.
VII. NATIONAL SECURITY. The American people were concerned over the defense of the country and had spent billions of dollars on numerous missile programs. The existence of Russian missiles 90 miles off the Florida coast in Cuba raised grave doubts about the security of the country. Americans were willing to accept the high costs of military programs if they proved necessary for the defense of the nation.

B. AUDIENCE ADAPTATION

The adaptation of a speaker's arguments to the attitudes of his audience is an important part of the persuasive element of his speech. An analysis of this debate and the adaptation by the Senators reveals some of the strengths and weaknesses of the respective speakers.

Both sides in the debate recognized that they were appealing to two separate audiences. Goldwater noted this fact on the Senate floor.

The idea ... is to lay before this body and before the American people all of the facts, to weigh them, deliberate them, debate them, and prepare for one of the most fateful decisions the Senate ever has been called upon to make.  

Affirmative

The affirmative speakers were extremely adept at relating


their arguments to a wide range of attitudes in both the national and Senatorial audiences. Rather than placing any one idea in a position of primacy, they varied their approaches and their appeals. The affirmative used six of the seven attitudes having a direct relationship to the treaty.

I. FALLOUT. The commonly held opinion of the danger of nuclear fallout was a particularly strong point of appeal for the affirmative forces. They were able to appeal for acceptance of the treaty by pointing to the danger of contamination from radioactive debris in the air. A typical example was Humphrey's appeal at the conclusion of his contention that the treaty would arrest the proliferation of nuclear armaments among nations.

This treaty would be a first and important step toward halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons among other nations. It would halt the pollution of the air by atomic testing.

Earlier in the same speech, he had vividly described the possible results of continued contamination of the air. He concluded his contention that the amount of debris in the atmosphere was reaching the danger point by appealing to the people's fear of nuclear fallout.

Clearly one of the principal benefits of this treaty accruing to mankind everywhere is the gradual reduction of the levels of radioactivity present in our atmosphere, food, water, and bodies. Since the dawn of the atomic age, hundreds of atmospheric tests have radically increased levels of radioactive contamination in many areas of the world. If unrestricted atmospheric testing continued

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indefinitely, particularly if atomic devices fell into the hands of irresponsible nations, the eventual effect of rising fallout levels on the human race could be catastrophic.\(^9\)

Once the affirmative had established that American national security would not be imperiled if the treaty were accepted, this affirmative appeal to the fear of nuclear fallout was one of the most effective used.

II. MILITARY EXPENDITURES. The rising costs of the national budget and particularly the rising costs of military expenditures represented another effective appeal for the affirmative forces. It also created a dilemma for the negative. Nearly all of those who openly opposed the treaty were either Republicans or Southern Democrats like Thurmond. These Senators had criticized administration spending and had clamored for a reduced national budget. When the affirmative argued that the treaty would reduce expenditures, the opposition forces could not argue against the treaty and for continued spending without contradicting their already established positions.

In arguing against the need for further developmental testing, Fulbright concluded his remarks with an appeal based upon the amount of money that reduced testing would save.

To continue progress in both an anti-missile system and in penetration capability depends hardly at all on the testing of nuclear warheads, but almost entirely on the improvement of delivery systems and of techniques of detection, identification, discrimination, and interception. Such

information as to effects as may be required can be largely obtained through extrapolations based on previous testing experience, and, as Secretary McNamara put it, "Through designing around our uncertainties."

Stopping nuclear testing would significantly reduce expenditures, savings might accrue to nearly $6 billion a year. This savings could either be returned to the taxpayer in reduced taxes or spent on other national programs.\textsuperscript{10}

There are numerous other instances of the use of this appeal, but this example should illustrate the effectiveness of the affirmative's use.

\textbf{III. COEXISTENCE.} The affirmative assumed that this was the publicly accepted policy of the United States and did not discuss it until the negative challenged the basic idea of coexistence. Goldwater's speech, for example, which maintained that the United States should move to destroy communism throughout the world, denied the idea of coexistence. However, "Americans were not yet ready to accept an ideological war."\textsuperscript{11}

This attitude strengthened the affirmative's case, since many people assumed that the negative was determined to destroy communism by armed force. The affirmative, then, began to appeal to the public's desire for peace and coexistence.

\textbf{IV. INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS.} The numerous crises of the years immediately preceding the signing of this treaty were also a strong point in favor of the affirmative. Americans were willing to try anything that might reduce international tensions. A typical example of the affirmative adaptation to this attitude was Humphrey's statement that

\textsuperscript{10}ibid.

\textsuperscript{11}Erskine, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 187.
American military strength and national determination were a vital element in securing this long sought objective. Continued strength and determination may --- after long and difficult negotiations --- produce other areas of mutual agreement. Whether or not additional steps toward a reduction in international tensions will be possible depends primarily upon the Soviet Union; nevertheless, the pending treaty represents a step back from the approaching brink of mutual nuclear annihilation. As such, it is a step worth taking.12

Eventually, the goal of reduced tensions became an issue in itself. The negative questioned the very premise of the argument: that armaments create tensions. The affirmative could not establish this premise, and, in the later days of the debate, the affirmative did not often appeal to apprehensions of international tension.

V. NUCLEAR WAR. The fear of war gripped the nation. To some, it was only a continuous and nagging problem, but to others it was the most significant problem of the times. A continuous flow of novels exposing the dangers of nuclear war had awakened the public. The manifestation of this fear was shown in "ban-the-bomb" movements, demonstrations, and writings.

Fulbright, in answering the issue of Russian motives for signing the treaty, concluded with a plea against war. The appeal that concluded this argument was perhaps one of the most effective in the entire debate.

It is true that in a relatively short period --- a rather turbulent period --- the Soviet Union has violated a number of international treaties, including such important political agreements as the non-aggression pacts with Lithuania, entered into

12Humphrey, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 10, p. 13997.
September 28, 1926, Latvia, on February 5, 1932, and Estonia, on May 4, 1932 the arrangements for access to Berlin, and the Potsdam Declaration relating to the establishment of a Central German Government.

However, to obtain a proper perspective, it should be noted that, to all appearances, the Soviet Union has satisfactorily observed a significant number of multilateral and bilateral agreements to which it has been a party...

I do not think that we can be so self-righteous as to say this country has never violated a treaty.

I did not follow it too closely, but I believe the Seneca Indians have been saying that this Government violated its treaty with the Seneca Indians in New York...

I think that the same situation applies here. In other words, there is a mutual interest. I am not saying that this treaty is exclusively in our interest. I do not believe the Russians would have signed it if they had not thought they had a common interest in the treaty.

Perhaps we would do well ... to remind ourselves that we are talking about weapons which would bring upon mankind a visitation of horror beyond anything ever approached or even conceived in all the wars of human history.\(^\text{13}\)

VI. PEACE. To appeal to the hope for a reduction in international tensions or to the fear of nuclear war is one thing, but to clamor for "peace for mankind" is quite another. Peace, in 1963, was a dream that seemed beyond the hope of most Americans. Many of the affirmative appeals for peace were ineffective. The affirmative seemed to have recognized this, and generally used an appeal for peace as a final summation. A good example of this type of appeal was Fulbright's concluding statement at the end of a long floor debate.

I think that it is rather appropriate to the preamble of this treaty to look to a short quotation from Isaiah,

\(^\text{13}\)Fulbright, op. cit., pp. 16526-7.
"And He shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, and neither shall they hear war any more."

Negative

The negative forces did not appeal to as many different attitudes as did the affirmative. They referred to only two of the opinions held by the American people. This lack of a wide appeal indicates part of the weakness of the negative position.

I. SOVIET UNION. The negative was concerned with the motives and actions of the Soviet Union, and it brought this concern to the attention of the American people and to its Senate colleagues. Opposition forces noted the activities of the Soviet Union, most of which had been to the disadvantage of the free world. The opponents frequently appealed to the American fear of the power of the Soviet Union and to the spread of communism into satellite nations. Goldwater used this appeal when he argued:

If the Soviets want this treaty, and if they are interested in steps toward easing tension, should we not talk here and now about some proof in Cuba? There are Soviet troops in Cuba whose removal would speak louder than conference table words. There is Communist agitation throughout Latin America whose cessation would speak louder than words in terms of real steps toward an easing of tension. The Soviets speak with the voice of a dove when it comes to the proposed test ban treaty. They speak with the voice of violence and with the clang of

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bayonets when it comes to their other actions in the world...

Do the words of this test ban proposal mean anything when they echo from the Berlin wall? We want to take a step toward ending the Cold War but we cannot step across the barbed wire in Berlin. Let the wall come down and the negotiations over this treaty might make some commonsense. Let the wall remain up, let new bodies be piled at its mockery of peace in a world of violence. 15

This seemed to be a particularly persuasive appeal because it gave specific examples of communist threats to the free world. It is strange that the negative was not more effective with it. Perhaps the reason was that Goldwater proposed two amendments which demanded the removal of Russian troops from Cuba and the destruction of the Berlin wall. As members of the affirmative forces pointed out, such amendments would have been unacceptable to the Soviet Union and would have destroyed the treaty. A majority of Americans still favored the treaty, so those proposed amendments weakened the negative contention.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY. The negative forces concentrated their appeal to the public and to the Senate on this one particular idea. They attempted to show in every portion of the debate that the treaty would weaken American security. They were aided in this appeal by the report of the Senate Armed Forces Subcommittee on Military Preparedness. Senator Stennis, reporting for the committee, noted:

After carefully weighing all of the evidence, the majority of the subcommittee has concluded that the proposed treaty will affect adversely the future

quality of this Nation's arms, and that it will result in serious, and perhaps formidable, military and technical disadvantages. Any military and technical advantages which we will derive from the treaty do not, in the judgment of the majority, counterbalance or outweigh the military and technical disadvantages. It appears that the Soviets will not be inhibited to the same extent in those areas of nuclear weaponry where we now deem them to be inferior.

Both Goldwater and Thurmond were members of this subcommittee.

In discussing the Soviet Union's motives for signing the treaty, Goldwater suggested that national security was jeopardized. He argued:

But, of course, it is the recognition in the State Department and on the floor of this Chamber that the Soviet purpose cannot be trusted --- it is that very recognition, that very truth that causes such anguished cries when someone asks only to claim our share of justice, our price of justice in giving the Kremlin this paper pie-in-the-sky... In this treaty we give up our defense potential, and, after a few years will be openly vulnerable.

In the same speech while discussing the relative military strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union, Goldwater again referred to the possibility of the destruction of American defensive potential.

We hear that the sheer numbers of our nuclear weapons outweigh any qualitative gains that the Soviets may make under the treaty, and then we read that the Department of Defense is studying a cutback in our weapons procurement. We heard last year that maintenance of our readiness to test on an indefinite standby basis would be impossible. Now we hear that such readiness is guaranteed...


17 Goldwater, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 12, p. 16900.
Serious consideration in the subcommittee hearings illustrated that there were significant military drawbacks to this treaty.\(^{18}\)

At another time, considering the proliferation of weapons among nations, Goldwater again appealed to the desire for national security.

So, frankly, I do not see a promise of peace in this treaty. I see a proliferation of weapons. I am concerned about that particular point. I see a reduction in the relative military strength of the United States. I see...\(^ {19}\)

Thurmond and the other opponents of the treaty also relied heavily upon this appeal. Over-emphasis of the national desire for security was one of the weaknesses of the negative attack. Their arguments were persuasive only if the Soviet Union did abrogate the treaty or did attack the United States.

Even though the other opponents of the treaty relied heavily upon this appeal, they did not raise enough doubt to counter some of the attitudes to which the affirmative appealed.

III. LOGICAL PROOF

Aristotle maintained that logical proof was the most important part of any speech. Other rhetoricians have placed less emphasis upon it, but have agreed that it is one of the most important elements in any speech.

McBurney and Mills suggest that logical proof is composed of two parts: evidence and reasoning.\(^ {20}\) The analytical method

\(^{18}\) Ibid., p. 16898.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 16899.

in this section is to discover the abilities of the speakers to use evidence and reasoning.

A. EVIDENCE

AFFIRMATIVE

The proponents of ratification used a variety of different types of evidence. They attempted to use material which was acceptable to their audience and which would support their arguments.

ANALOGY. The affirmative did not frequently argue from analogy. However it proved persuasive when used. Fulbright employed analogy to show that the Soviet Union would adhere to the treaty.

In considering the question of Russian violation of treaties, it will be noticed that she has lived up to a number of them...

We have been a very fortunate country in many respects. We have been free to a greater degree than most countries --- certainly more than the European countries --- of attacks on our border. So I do not think we ought to be too self-righteous on the question. I admit that the Russian record is not very good, particularly in an earlier period, not too many years ago, when the head of the Government was not Mr. Khruschev. We made a treaty with Russia about 2 years ago relating to Antarctica. At that time people said that we could not trust the Russians. I do not recall anyone talking about the slightest violations by Russia of that treaty. I do not think there is much incentive to violate. I think the same situation applies here. In other words, there is a mutual interest. I am not saying that this treaty is exclusively in our interest. I do not believe that the Russians would have signed it if they had not thought they had a common interest in the treaty. 21


This was a particularly effective analogy because it forced the negative to deny that any mutual interest for the United
States and the Soviet Union existed in the test ban treaty before it could deny the contention.

EXPLANATION. Humphrey used explanation to support his contention that the treaty would inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons:

Initially, it is well to recognize that with this treaty in effect, there would certainly be greater pressures to desist in any testing than would exist in the absence of an agreement. But with continued testing by France, or the initiation of tests by Communist China, there are a dozen or so other technically able countries which, in light of this action by the three nuclear powers, may well forego development of an individual nuclear capability. This alone is a significant gain in efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to many countries.22

The affirmative also used explanation to support other arguments. This type of support was particularly well-suited to the topic, since one of the biggest factors in the discussion was an interpretation of the treaty.

TESTIMONY. The affirmative did not rely heavily upon testimonial evidence, but they did use it at times. Numerous witnesses had spoken before the three Senate committees, and their testimonies were used in the debate on the Senate floor. Fulbright supported the affirmative position on the military defense capability of the United States by noting:

In the words of Secretary McNamara:
"This prolongation of our technological superiority will be a principal direct military effect of the treaty on the future military balance."23

22Humphrey, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 10, p. 14000.

23Fulbright, op. cit., p. 16525.
However, Humphrey, on the other hand, never used testimonial evidence in any of his speeches.

PRESTIGE SUGGESTION. Both Humphrey and Fulbright relied rather heavily upon prestige suggestion to support their arguments. Fulbright used it to support his contention that the treaty would not adversely effect the military position of the United States.

As to the effects of the treaty on this favorable military balance, the key fact is that whatever opportunities for progress in nuclear technology are opened or closed to the United States, the same opportunities will be opened or closed to the Soviet Union. In the judgment of the Secretary of Defense and most of his military and scientific advisers, the most probable result of limiting the Soviets to underground testing, which is more difficult and more expensive than atmospheric testing ... we can retard Soviet progress and prolong the duration of our technological superiority.24

Fulbright again used prestige suggestion when he argued that the American missile programs were satisfactory.

On the basis of expert scientific advice, both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations have concluded that both for our attack capability and for the survival capability of our forces in the event of attack, large numbers of smaller missiles are much more desirable than smaller numbers of larger missiles.25

Humphrey, even more than Fulbright, used this kind of support. A typical example was used to support the claim that a majority of the American people were in favor of the treaty.

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 16526.
It is particularly heartening to read the editorial support coming from such newspapers as the Houston Chronicle, the Dallas Times-Herald, the Little Rock (Ark.) Gazette, the Des Moines Register, the Atlanta Constitution, the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the Denver Post, the New York Journal-American, the Charlotte News, the Salt Lake City Tribune, the Omaha World-Herald, the Greensboro News, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Nashville Tennessean, the Louisville Courier-Journal, and the Dayton Journal Herald --- to mention only a few of the hundreds of newspapers throughout America that are editorializing favorably on this most important issue of foreign policy and peace...

Let me note briefly certain of the principal themes running through these editorials:

First, that the treaty represents a minimum first step on the road to peace...

Then the editors note that the increasing danger of radioactive fallout will be controlled...

Third, that the technical risks relating to Soviet cheating are far outweighed by the certain grave risks of continuing the testing, development, and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

I am confident --- and this outpouring of favorable editorials bolsters this confidence --- that ... the Senate, for these reasons, will vote overwhelmingly in favor of this first small step toward a more peaceful world.26

In another speech, he called for the acceptance of the treaty by noting:

Dozens of the Nation's leading businessmen, religious leaders, scientists, and civic leaders have recently demonstrated their support of the test-ban treaty through newspaper advertisements and official pronouncements. Executives of such companies as Inland Steel, Eastman Kodak, the Pennsylvania Railroad, the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the Illinois Central Railroad have publicly endorsed the treaty. The Federation of American Scientists recently issued a statement urging ratification of the treaty. Many individual scientists, including three Nobel laureates, have indicated their support. Clearly there is a large body of informed scientific opinion in favor of the test ban.27

26Humphrey, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 10, p. 14000.

27Ibid., p. 13998.
The use of prestige suggestion added to the strength of many of the affirmative arguments. In some arguments, however, the affirmative seemed to be content to rely completely on the strength of this evidence, without discussing the reasoning used to reach the conclusions. In these instances, the affirmative arguments were weakened.

NEGATIVE

The negative speakers frequently supported their arguments with only personal opinion. When they did use evidence, however, they effectively employed a variety of types.

The evidence that the negative used falls into three categories: facts, testimony and prestige suggestion.

FACTS. The facts that the negative used centered around information released by the United States military forces. Goldwater presented the facts about the American missile program, and then discussed his personal opinion concerning the implications of the facts.

What is our delivery position overall? The B-47 and B-52 programs are being phased out. Three Titan missile squadrons, previously programed, have been cut out. Our Polaris program remains the same 41-boat program as during the previous administration. Skybolt, a highly-sophisticated attempt to preserve the utility of our manned bomber force into the 1970's, has been cancelled --- and with it much of the delivery capability of our British allies. Our orbiting space program, which would be a step, at least, toward preventing a space weapons gap has been dropped, and dropped in priority in America, while similar programs are advancing in the Soviet Union.

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Thurmond also used the same type of evidence and argument. He was worried about the validity of American intelligence estimates on the Russian military capabilities. In one speech he presented this set of facts:

Our official intelligence estimates were wrong as to when the Soviets would be able to detonate an atom bomb.

Our official intelligence estimates were wrong as to when the Soviets would get the thermonuclear bomb. They missed by a mile.

Our official estimates were wrong in predicting that Communists would not invade South Korea, and were again caught unprepared.

Our official intelligence estimates were wrong about Soviet capabilities to put a satellite in orbit, and Sputnik I caught us by surprise.

Our official intelligence estimates were wrong...

Our official intelligence estimates were wrong...29

Thurmond used these facts to build an analogy showing that the United States estimates of the Russian potential were probably also wrong in this instance.

TESTIMONY. Goldwater did not use testimonial evidence in his speeches. Thurmond, however, employed it frequently. In his speech on August 23, he used testimonial evidence thirty-one times.30 Two examples from this speech are:

The statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, delivered by General Taylor, included this statement on weapons effects:

"It is indicated that the U.S.S.R. is ahead of the United States in the high-yield (tens of megatons) technology, in weapons effects knowledge derived from high-yield nuclear explosions."


Thus, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assert categorically and without equivocation that the Soviets are ahead in weapons effects technology in the high yields.\footnote{Ibid., p. 15809.}

Dr. Edward Teller put it even more emphatically, and I quote from his publicly released statement:

"There is one field of particularly great importance where we have reason to believe that the Russians have acquired a decisive lead. This is the investigation of the effects of nuclear weapons.\footnote{Ibid.}"

In this same speech, Thurmond did a particularly effective job of using the testimony of General LeMay to illustrate the reason why the Joint Chiefs of Staff had finally voted in favor of the treaty.

General LeMay stated:

"But the net result is that there are military and technical disadvantages to the treaty. All of the Joint Chiefs agreed on this point. However, there are political advantages that may accrue from the treaty. This is a field that I don't consider myself an expert in, and I have depended to a large extent on the advice of others."

General LeMay stated that he and the other Chiefs had been briefed on the political, or nonmilitary considerations, by both the Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Under Secretary Harriman. General LeMay was interrogated further with regard to this matter by Senator BYRD of West Virginia, who posed the following question:

"You have indicated, General LeMay, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not to confine their judgment in connection with the treaty before us on the basis of purely military considerations, but that political considerations were also to be thought about.

"Is this normal, General LeMay, or has it been the practice in the past for the Joint Chiefs to attempt to assess political considerations in reaching their judgments?"
General LeMay responded: "It certainly has been true since President Kennedy came into office, because this is one of the first things that they told the Joint Chiefs they expected them to do. They expected them to put the political factors in at their level. "They told us this verbally many times. Actually I think that we have a note in writing on the subject."

Quite obviously, therefore, the testimony of the Joint Chiefs does not conflict with the findings of the Preparedness Subcommittee.33

PRESTIGE SUGGESTION. The negation also used prestige suggestion to support its contentions. In his final speech on the treaty, Goldwater pointed to several prominent personalities who opposed the treaty.

Ask the men who must man the missiles and they say tests are needed...

Ask the man upon whose command rests 90 percent of the strategic striking power of this nation: ask General Power the impact of this treaty upon the strength about which he knows as much as any man. We have all heard his answer. The treaty is not in the national interest.

Ask the man whose job it has been to work with the most advanced weapons system: ask General Schriever the impact of this treaty. We all have heard his answer. He felt he could protect his country better without the treaty.34

It is worth noting that the personalities to whom the negative referred were all military men, an approach consistent with the negative emphasis upon military considerations.

When Thurmond used this type of evidence, he claimed that the military leaders of the country who had supported ratification


of the treaty had been forced to do so. He was pleased that some had refused to succumb to pressure, and pointed to this fact in opposing the treaty.

The Air Force Association passed a resolution in opposition to the treaty, based on reasoning not unlike that of General Power.\footnote{Thurmond, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 13, p. 17138.}

The negative speakers used a variety of types of evidence to establish their contentions, though in many cases they relied upon personal opinion as a basis of support. Although the use of personal opinion may have weakened some negative contentions, the negation generally presented well-supported contentions.

B. REASONING

Both sides in the debate generally relied upon causal reasoning. A causal argument attempts "to account for the truth"\footnote{McBurney and Mills, op. cit., p. 123.} of a contention.

Such an argument does not attempt to establish the proposition as being true, but, assuming its truth, attempts to show what causes it to be true.\footnote{Ibid.}

In the test ban debate, the speakers generally assumed that their contentions were true and attempted to establish them.

As has been noted earlier in the paper, both sides occasionally used other types of arguments, but they normally employed causal reasoning.
Both Humphrey and Fulbright were adept at presenting arguments to develop their contentions. In one speech Humphrey pointed to the reasons why the treaty would not jeopardize the military position of the United States. He argued:

Third, does acceptance of this treaty, on balance, strengthen the security of the United States more than an unrestricted continuation of the arms race? For years the Soviet Union and the United States have been unable to agree on the need for and number of onsite inspections that would be essential to a treaty which included underground tests. This disagreement still exists. But the present treaty specifically attempts underground tests and moreover, President Kennedy has indicated that the U.S. underground tests would continue and that other testing facilities would be kept on ready-alert. This treaty covers the types of tests which can be detected by scientific instruments outside the borders of the Soviet Union. In short, the number of onsite inspections is not relevant to effective enforcement of this treaty...38

Thus, Humphrey showed the reasons why onsite inspections were unnecessary and why the treaty was not disadvantageous to the United States.

Fulbright’s speeches contained particularly concise reasoning. He believed that the United States was militarily superior to the Soviet Union and substantiated this belief by arguing that

It is the strongly held conviction of the officials who have the main responsibility for our national defense, both civilian and military, that the American nuclear force is, and under the treaty will remain, manifestly superior to that

38 Humphrey, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 10, p. 14000.
of any other nation. As the Secretary of Defense pointed out in his statement in support of the treaty, the U.S. nuclear force now contains, in addition to tactical, airborne, and other nuclear weapons, more than 500 missiles --- Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, and Polaris --- and it is planned to increase this number to over 1,700 by 1966. In addition, the United States has nuclear armed SAC bombers on air alert and over 500 SAC bombers on quick-reaction alert.

By contrast, Secretary McNamara pointed out, the consensus is that the Soviets could place less than half as many bombers over North America on a first strike. It is estimated that the Soviets have only a fraction of the number of ICBM missiles that we have and that their submarine-launched ballistic missiles are short range, require launching from the surface, and are generally not comparable with our own Polaris force. According to the best available estimates, our numerical superiority in ballistic missiles will increase both absolutely and relatively between now and 1966. In short, our nuclear superiority is both great and growing.39

These are but two examples of the causal reasoning that the affirmative employed.

NEGATIVE

The negative used causal reasoning in two ways: first to establish their contentions, and second, to challenge the affirmative's reasoning.

The affirmative maintained that the Soviet Union had signed the treaty for reasons acceptable to the United States. The negative disagreed. Thurmond attacked the affirmative by asking a series of questions.

In specific terms, however, no witness before any committee was able to back up these generalities, which are not more than a dream of "pie in the sky."

39Fulbright, op. cit., p. 16525.
Will this treaty get the Russian troops out of Cuba?
Will this treaty stop the sabotage in Venezuela?
Will this treaty eliminate the Communist subversion and espionage in Peru and Ecuador?
Will this treaty stop Communist agitation in Africa?
Will this treaty free any of the people enslaved in eastern European countries? How many?

Will this treaty...\(^\text{40}\)

Thus, Thurmond questioned the affirmative position and attempted to strengthen his own. Goldwater also employed this technique.

The negative's use of causal reasoning to support its own contentions can be illustrated with Goldwater's suggestion that the United States needed further testing.

We are not talking about a direct hit. We are talking about the electromagnetic impacts, which some scientists say can travel 1,100 miles and which some scientists agree can have an effect of 1 megaton of fusion in a low altitude burst at 20 miles. In fact...

We know enough about effects to know that all modern circuitry --- all circuits in radios, all circuits in radars, all circuits in inertial guidance systems, as well as the electronic triggers which cause missiles to travel --- is now in the process of being redesigned, because we do not know enough about the effects of the electromagnetic pulse to defend and protect the systems we now have.\(^\text{41}\)

III. CONCLUSIONS

Although both sides used proof well, in the final analysis it seems that the affirmative supported its contentions somewhat

\(^\text{40}\)Thurmond, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 13, p. 17137.

\(^\text{41}\)Goldwater, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 13, p. 17559.
more effectively than the negative. The negative appealed to fewer audience attitudes than the affirmative. In addition, the negative was slightly weaker in two areas of logical proof. The negative did not always present evidence to support its claims, and relied too heavily upon personal opinion. It also failed to present concrete arguments which could have negated the affirmative contentions, and relied instead upon questioning the affirmative conclusions and adding unrelated reservations.
CHAPTER VI

DISPOSITION

Rhetorical critics generally agree that the disposition of a speech is important. While some writers refer to it as merely "organization," others assert that it includes much more than organization. ¹ C. S. Baldwin suggests that disposition "refers not to the arrangement of details, but to the plan of the whole."² This definition includes the "plan," or strategy, in the meaning of disposition. Alan H. Monroe suggests the basis upon which the strategy ought to be developed.

The detailed development of any particular speech to convince as it will actually be delivered, however, must be adapted to the audience's attitude toward the speaker's proposal.³ Monroe's concern for the audience implies that there is much more involved in disposition than merely organization.

Russel H. Wagner perhaps gave a clear meaning of disposition when he argued that


It is concerned with the principles of disposing the materials invented for a speech, in the best possible manner, for the purposes of effecting the end intended by the speaker in any given situation.

This last description indicates the real problem of the speaker: to determine the disposition of his speech which will be most effective in achieving his purpose.

The Senators involved in the debate over the test ban treaty faced a particularly difficult problem in constructing effective arguments. They were speaking to two audiences: their colleagues and the nation. The methods by which they developed their arguments played an intrinsic part in the debates on the question of ratification.

METHODOLOGY

Thonssen and Baird suggest three general criteria that can be used to judge disposition in a speech.

Disposition embraces the following matters: the emergence of a central theme, the general method of arrangement adopted for the speech, and the order in which the parts of the discourse are developed.\(^4\)

This chapter will analyze the disposition in the speeches of the Senate debate using these three criteria, with close consideration given to the adaptation of the disposition to the audience. Each of these three areas will be approached from two points of view:

1. The speeches of each Senator.
2. The speeches of the respective sides in the controversy.

\(^4\)Wagner, _op. cit._, p. 293.

I. THE SENATORS

J. William Fulbright

Fulbright presented only one major address on the test ban treaty; however, it was very persuasive. The speech showed careful construction based on recognition of the audiences' needs and attitudes.

Fulbright had participated in several floor debates before this address and had indicated his support of the treaty. He began the speech by noting the importance of the treaty.

This treaty, if it received the approval of this body, may well prove to be a turning point in history of incalculable significance to the human race — and especially to all Americans, who, because of our strength, bear a special responsibility for the prevention of a nuclear war. 6

He followed this pronouncement with a clear statement of his thesis:

In a few words, this treaty makes sense under the conditions confronting the world today. I shall try to develop, in my remarks, the reasons why it makes sense... 7

He clearly indicated the path that his speech would follow.

Fulbright followed the normal rhetorical order of introduction, body and conclusion. His speech contained a somewhat lengthy introduction, which accomplished several purposes. He created a feeling of good will with his fellow Senators by his humble opening statement.


7 Ibid.
Mr. President, I consider it a high honor to have the privilege of presenting to the Senate, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.  

He established common ground with his audience by admitting that the final decision on the treaty had not yet been made and that careful consideration would still have to be paid to the treaty.

But I urge Senators to give serious consideration to all aspects of this treaty and to develop, as fully as possible, every facet of the questions involved.

Rapport with the audience was further strengthened when he stated:

At the outset, I should like to commend my colleagues on the three committees which heard testimony on the treaty for the responsible and bipartisan spirit of the proceedings.

Fulbright then restated his basic thesis and began his arguments.

The body of Fulbright's speech illustrates the effective manner in which he arranged his arguments. Thonssen and Baird suggest that there are three characteristic types of division and arrangement: historical, distributive and logical. These three types are generally not mutually exclusive, but frequently overlap. The approach that Fulbright took to the major arguments in his speech was

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8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
particularly persuasive. He adopted an arrangement that followed the basic distributive pattern, coupled with some aspects of the logical pattern.

Fulbright adhered to the distributive arrangement of arguments when he divided his speech under three headings:

1. Military implications of the treaty.
2. Reservations that had been raised about the treaty.
3. Political implications of the treaty.

The military implications of the treaty were discussed by Fulbright in the following manner:

It is the strongly held conviction of the officials who have the main responsibility for our national defense ... that the American nuclear force is ... manifestly superior to any other. As the Secretary of Defense noted...\(^12\)

The consensus of expert opinion on the antiballistic missile problem is that it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union will have the capacity in the foreseeable future to develop an antimissile system...\(^13\)

As to the problem of high-yield nuclear weapons...\(^14\)

The major technical problem ... was that of our capacity for prompt resumption of atmosphere testing in the event of Soviet violation...\(^15\)

After discussing these military questions, Fulbright turned to the reservations that had been suggested as amendments to the treaty.

\(^{12}\text{Fulbright, op. cit., p. 16525.}\)
\(^{13}\text{Ibid., p. 16526.}\)
\(^{14}\text{Ibid.}\)
\(^{15}\text{Ibid.}\)
In addition to these military questions, there arose during the hearings and the subsequent deliberations a suggestion that certain reservations...  

The remainder of the speech was concerned with a discussion of the political considerations in the treaty.

In the remainder of my remarks, I should like to suggest some positive reasons for our adherence to this treaty and set forth some of the possibilities for advancing the aims of American policy and improving the world environment.  

Fulbright, thus, clearly divided his speech under headings which contained a common thought.

Fulbright arranged these distributive headings into a logical order for presentation. He presented the objections to his case, and then turned to the positive reasons for its acceptance. To quiet the fears of Russian power, Fulbright first minimized objections based upon military considerations. He did this by suggesting that the treaty would be totally unacceptable if it significantly weakened American defense. He then presented information and arguments to show that the treaty wouldn't weaken the defense capability of the nation.  

After dispensing with the military questions, Fulbright turned to the possible objections to the affirmative position. He presented arguments to show that such fears were unfounded. He then turned to the third part of his speech and the discussion of the benefits that would accrue from the adoption of the treaty.

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., p. 16527.
18 Ibid., p. 16525.
Fulbright arranged his arguments to dispel any fears of the treaty. He relieved this fear in his opening arguments, and then discussed the concrete reasons for ratification of the treaty.

The effectiveness of the conclusion of Fulbright's speech is difficult to assess. As he neared the end of his speech, he yielded to questions several times, which broke the continuity of the speech. It should be noted, however, that it did not break the continuity of his arguments. When Fulbright relinquished the floor, a debate began that lasted for nearly two hours. He never really gave the prepared conclusion to his speech.

The disposition of Fulbright's speech adheres to the rhetorical requirements of craftsmanship and audience adaptation.

J. Strom Thurmond

Thurmond's four speeches on the test ban treaty reveal some characteristics of his speaking. His speeches showed much consideration and research, but lacked the subtlety and polish that would have made them excellent speeches.

Only in the first of his addresses did Thurmond present any introductory remarks before stating his thesis and beginning his arguments. His second speech, presented on September 11, countered the affirmative's claim that the treaty was "a first step to peace." His thesis statement contained an unnecessary touch of sarcasm.
The President of the United States has characterized the three environment test ban treaty as a first step, and if he says it is a first step, I, for one, am quite willing to take his word for it ... In view of the report's warning to the Senate that excessive reliance on military considerations could undermine national security, it is particularly interesting to note that the majority of the space in the report is devoted to explaining away the military implications of the treaty.19

In another speech, he began with this brief statement of his theme:

Mr. President, the treaty which the Senate is now considering constitutes major risks and jeopardizes the capability of the United States to deter nuclear war in the future.20

Thurmond's position in each of his speeches was clearly stated, but he was blunt, even rude, in his presentations. His themes are not stated as part of a carefully prepared introduction, but are merely stated as the introduction, and are directly followed by his arguments.

One cause of the weakness of Thurmond's speeches was his failure to follow rhetorical order. When he did present an introduction, it was weak. None of his four speeches contained any attempt to establish common ground with his audience or to create good will. His final speech did not contain an introduction. He merely began with a one sentence statement of his thesis. Thurmond failed to capture the interest and respect


of his audience in any of his speeches.

Thurmond's addresses were principally concerned with the presentation of his case, or with what rhetoricians call the "body." Thurmond generally used a distributive arrangement of his arguments. On August 23, speaking of the defensive capability of the United States, he divided the body of his speech into three parts.

1. The history of disarmament negotiations.
2. The question of military superiority.
3. The effects of the treaty on the military capability of the United States.

In another speech he discounted the affirmative contention that the United States held a military superiority over the Soviet Union by discussing two fallacies in the affirmative reasoning. He introduced his discussion of the first fallacy by stating:

In assessing either the present or the future balance of strategic military power, a most distorted picture will result from any oversimplified comparison of weapon for weapon or weapon for target...21

He began the discussion of the second fallacy by suggesting that

The second fallacy of numerical comparison of weapons, and weapons against potential targets, is most apparent in the arguments of those who dwell on what they mistakenly call the overkill capability of the United States.22

Thurmond's use of the distributive arrangement of his arguments was appropriate for the material that he discussed in his speeches. However, other aspects of his disposition weakened the effectiveness of his addresses.

21Thurmond, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 12, p. 16795.
22Ibid.
One aspect of Thurmond's argumentative arrangement deserves special note. Thurmond reduced the effect of his speeches by failing to directly clash with the affirmative claims. It is frequently very difficult to determine the specific affirmative contention with which Thurmond disagreed. This failure to clearly indicate the relationship between his arguments and those of the affirmative weakened Thurmond's speeches.

The conclusions to Thurmond's speeches were generally brief appeals for acceptance of his point of view. They also frequently contained "loaded words," a technique that was particularly out of place in the Senate. A typical example was

The Senate must not permit itself to be "conned" on such a vital matter. 23

Thurmond's frequent conclusion that any belief other than his own was the result of delusion did not greatly appeal to his audience.

Thurmond's approach to this speaking situation seems to have followed one line: present the evidence and arguments and they will speak for themselves. His failure to involve the audience in his speeches, by taking account of their ideas and beliefs, definitely weakened the effect of his presentations. Thurmond's speaking did little to aid the negative cause.

Hubert H. Humphrey

Humphrey presented several major addresses on the test ban treaty, each one covering a somewhat different aspect of the issues. As was noted earlier, Humphrey has been praised for his excellent speeches, and those he presented during the test ban treaty were no exception. One of the reasons for the esteem in which his addresses were held was their superb disposition.

Humphrey's statement of his theme was very smooth, particularly compared to the blunt style of Thurmond. His speeches seem to flow from beginning to end, with no break in continuity. On July 25, he presented the first Senate speech on the test ban treaty, clearly stating the thesis for this speech and indicating the approach that he would take in all succeeding speeches.

The agreement on a draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater represents the first significant breakthrough in the field of arms control since World War II. I remind my colleagues in the Senate that we have been trying to do this ever since the Baruch plan of 1946, 1947, and 1948. We have been trying to obtained some kind of control over the great, powerful force contained in the atom. Today it appears that we have taken the initial step.24

The speech that followed this introduction was general, discussing the highlights of the negotiations and raising some of the important issues to be discussed. Humphrey was also

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adept at stating the theme for speeches on specific issues. He began a discussion of what he considered to be the fundamental issues by stating:

It is essential that the fundamental questions relating to the decision be kept in clear and accurate focus. What are these fundamental questions? As suggested by President Kennedy in his recent address to the Nation in support of the treaty, there are four basic areas of concern.25

Thus, Humphrey clearly announced the position that he was going to take in this speech and the issues that he was going to discuss.

Humphrey's speeches are examples of the proper use of rhetorical order. He carefully divided his speeches into three parts: introduction, body and conclusion. The introductions of his speeches were especially timely and adapted to his audience. A good example was

Mr. President, in today's Washington Post there appears an editorial entitled "Test-Ban Treaty." That editorial summarizes for us the issues involved in the proposed test-ban treaty. The test-ban treaty is in our national interest.

I believe that within the hour the negotiators in Moscow will initial the draft treaty. When that is done, our negotiators will return to the United States for consultation with the Members of the U.S. Senate. Subsequently the delegation will return to Moscow for the signing ceremony. It will then be our responsibility in the Senate... 26

In another speech he used his introductory remarks to establish common ground with his audience.

25Ibid., p. 13397.
26Ibid., p. 13395.
I hope that the Senate's consideration will be searching, objective, and fair. This is an extremely important document --- a treaty that will affect our national security and, of course, our international position. It is my personal opinion ... But I also will expect the various representatives of the administration to establish the case for this treaty before the appropriate committees ... Nothing should be taken for granted in a matter of such importance to this nation and the world.27

He recognized the right of opponents of the treaty to have opinions of their own and their duty to examine it carefully. When Humphrey finished his introductions, his audiences were generally ready to listen to what he had to say, despite any possible opposition to his stand.

The arrangement and the approach that Humphrey used in the body of his speeches is very similar to that of Fulbright. Humphrey also used a distributive arrangement of his arguments, using each issue that he planned to discuss as a major topic area. Perhaps the best illustration of Humphrey's organizational pattern is the speech he presented on "The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty --- Questions and Answers." He organized the arguments in this speech in the following manner:

First, is this treaty a first step toward reduced tensions and broad areas of agreement?28

Second, is this treaty a means of freeing the world from the fears and dangers of radioactive fallout and contamination?29


29 Ibid.
Third, does acceptance of this treaty, on balance, strengthen the security of the United States more than an unrestricted continuation of the nuclear arms race? 30

Finally, would the treaty be a first and important step toward halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons among other nations? 31

The arrangement of these arguments was also effective. Humphrey began with two issues that related to the audience's desire for the treaty: the hope of peace and the fear of nuclear fallout. He then turned to the two issues pertaining to the military capability of the United States. This particular approach shows a recognition of his audience and an adaptation to desires.

Humphrey also included a direct reference to the negative arguments in his speeches. Unlike Thurmond's speeches, in Humphrey's, the relationship of his arguments to those of his opponents was always clear. The last speech that Humphrey presented before ratification was a good example of his ability to establish direct clash.

After I returned to the Chamber, I told the Senator from Wyoming that I wished to make a comment or two on one or two portions of his address, and that my comments would be related to certain testimony which had taken place before the Senate committees.

The Senator from Wyoming said ... Mr. President, I merely rise to state what I know to be the factual record. First of all... 32

30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 13998.
The bodies of Humphrey's speeches were also clearly organized so that the audience could understand the full meaning of his arguments.

Humphrey concluded his speeches in a manner appropriate to his arguments and his audience. The appeal was never radical or exaggerated. He merely stated his position and what he felt ought to be done. He concluded his "Questions and Answers" speech with

I am confident that this treaty --- in a sense initiated by the United States --- is in the interest of the United States and consistent with our national security policy. And there can be no doubt that this treaty is in the interest of mankind and an imperative for the safety of our children and all future generations.\(^{33}\)

Humphrey's addresses were prepared with foresight and understanding. His individual speeches may not have immediately swayed any opinions, but the clear and thoughtful presentation of the issues, and the affirmative answers to them, certainly played an important part in setting the tone of the eventual affirmative victory.

Barry M. Goldwater

Goldwater clearly stated his thesis in each of his speeches. Though he had previously indicated his opposition to the treaty, he always restated this position and the particular topic that he was going to discuss as he began each address. In his first speech about the test ban, he listed

\(^{33}\)Humphrey, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 10, p. 13998.
several questions to be answered before the treaty could be
ratified.

In very broad outline, these are the areas
in which we must find full answers if our vote,
or the treaty itself, is to be based upon facts
and not upon fictions, fears, hopes, whims, and
pressures.\(^\text{34}\)

He then proceeded to list the issues that he felt were
important. In another speech he was concerned with the mili-
tary defense capability of the United States. He stated his
thesis in this manner:

I would like to cite here one area in
which such a disagreement might be possible.
I refer to the difference between the sec-
retary's assurances regarding our tens of
thousands of warheads and the foreseeable
future in which delivery vehicles for those
warheads may significantly be diminished in
number and quality in comparison to the
delivery systems of the Soviet. No number
of warheads can truly be reassuring if we do
not have adequate means of delivering them ...
Let us, in considering this treaty, then dis-
cover if the military disadvantages mentioned
by the Joint Chief's have anything to do with
such areas.\(^\text{35}\)

Goldwater's speeches contained a thematic emergence which
allowed the audience to anticipate the path that he would
follow.

Goldwater's speeches were clearly divided into three
distinct parts.

\(^{34}\) Barry M. Goldwater, "Proposed Nuclear Test Ban," U.S.,
Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, CIX,
Part 11, p. 14545.

\(^{35}\) Barry M. Goldwater, "Proposed Limited Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty," U.S., Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess.,
1963, CIX, Part 12, p. 15743.
The introductions to Goldwater's addresses were particularly effective in establishing the tone of his speeches. A good example was the introduction to his first major address on the treaty. He began

Mr. President, consideration of the proposed partial nuclear test ban is not a matter of partisan concern. It is a matter of national concern --- and deep concern at that. The Constitution demands of us advice on this treaty. The citizens of America demand of us a clear statement of conscience ... The impact of this treaty is not just for today. Its impact will be felt from here out. It is, as the President of the United States has said, proposed as a first step --- simply a first step. It must be a proper step, a sure step, a truly meaningful step, or we should not take it.\(^3\)\(^6\)

On another occasion, Goldwater began his speech with

Mr. President, we have heard so much expert testimony regarding the proposed limited nuclear test ban treaty --- and so much conflicting testimony --- that I wonder if it might be permissible to apply some commonsense to the situation. I have heard many of my colleagues express their sense of confusion concerning the uncommon amount of disagreement. I wonder if some down-to-earth areas of agreement might not appear if we look closely at the record.\(^3\)\(^7\)

After these introductions, he carefully presented his thesis and moved into the body of his speech.

The body of Goldwater's addresses contained his major arguments, generally arranged in distributive order. Goldwater used two patterns in arranging his speeches in a topical order. He either argued the topic of affirmative

\(^3\)\(^6\) Goldwater, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 11, p. 14545.

claim-negative contention or accepted facts-implications of the treaty. Both of these patterns were effective, because they allowed the audience to contrast the negative contentions with those of the affirmative.

Goldwater used the affirmative claim-negative contention pattern to arrange his arguments concerning America's ability to maintain defensive potential.

My point simply is this: The assurance that this treaty has no adverse military impact is so far backed by imposing statistics of numbers of warheads. My question is whether these assurances will hold as strongly if we direct our questioning toward delivery systems. Is it [sic] not enough to talk of our strength in numbers alone. Nor is it enough to speak of readiness to test. It is the readiness to strike, the real readiness to defend ourselves that counts. What steps to assure that readiness have to be guaranteed under such a treaty as the one we are considering?38

Goldwater followed these comments with a detailed examination of the affirmative claims and then turned to the negative contention: that the affirmative had failed to consider the truly important factor of the ability to deliver warheads.

Goldwater's speech on Russian reasons for signing the treaty was particularly well-organized. He used a distributive arrangement of his arguments around the second pattern that he normally used, accepted facts-implications of the treaty.

Commonsense always has told us that actions speak louder than words ... In Laos, just a few days ago, the British virtually threw up their hands over hope that the Soviets would fulfill their part of the efforts to stabilize the situation there. Do the words regarding the test

38Goldwater, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 12, p. 15743.
ban treaty sound louder than Soviet actions in Laos, in Cuba, along the Berlin Wall, at their newly built Jet airstrip in Yemen? 39

He maintained that the Soviet Union was still committed to the destruction of the free world, and concluded these remarks by stating:

If they want this treaty and if we are to want it also, this is the time to talk of real deeds and to reject mere paper talk. 40

Goldwater then discussed the implications of the test ban treaty, deducing that it would be worthless unless the Russians made concessions similar to those the United States had to make in accepting the treaty.

Goldwater's speeches in opposition to the test ban treaty were soundly organized, and well-adapted presentations of the negative contentions and reservations.

His speeches were notable for their concise conclusions, always with a direct relationship to the topic of discussion. He concluded his initial speech on the test ban with these remarks:

Peace is not the easy way, the glib way. Peace means hard work. And in terms of this treaty, particularly, it means hard answers. We cannot stop until we have them. We should not vote until we have them. No mind should be closed. No heart should be closed.

We begin, here today, our greatest debate. Let no man stop it. Our world and our lives, and our honor as Members of this body, depend upon it. 41

39 Goldwater, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 12, p. 15927.

40 Ibid.

41 Goldwater, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 11, p. 14545.
This challenged the Senate to thoroughly consider the treaty despite political affiliations or preconceived attitudes.

Of all the speeches presented during the debate, Goldwater's final speech was perhaps the most moving. A clear statement of his position marked the body of the speech, and his conclusion was particularly stirring.

I do not vote against the hope of peace, but only against the illusion of it. I do not vote for war, but for the strength to prevent it. I have been told, as have others, I am sure, that to vote against this treaty is committing political suicide.

I will vote against this treaty because in my heart, mind, soul and conscience, I feel it detrimental to the strength of my country. If it means political suicide to vote for my country and against this treaty, then I commit it gladly. It is not my future that concerns me. It is my country --- and what my conscience tells me is how best I may serve it.

Goldwater's speeches were well-planned and organized, and met the requirements of good disposition. They represented the most effective portion of the negative attack.

II. AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE

Affirmative

The Senate debate over the test ban treaty lasted for nearly two months. The development of the affirmative case in full took nearly the entire period. The case changed emphasis between the first presentation of arguments and the final speeches on the topic. There were two factors that played an

important part in this shift. One was the arguments and con-
tentions of the negative. The other was the continually
shifting public opinion of the nation.

The original affirmative strategy seems to have been to
1. Gain the public's attention.
2. Establish the issues.
3. Establish the affirmative contentions and wait
   until public opinion forced Senate ratification.

The affirmative succeeded in arousing public attention in
three areas: costs of the arms race, dangers of nuclear fall-
out, and rising international tensions. A typical example of
the affirmative's reference to the danger of nuclear fallout
appeared in Humphrey's address on July 25. He stated:

I call to my colleagues' attention an article
which appeared in the Washington Post entitled
"Radioactive Rain Tied Statistically to Malforma-
tions, Doctor Believes." Radioactive pollution of
the atmosphere is something that we cannot ignore.
We have a responsibility to see to it that it is
stopped. 43

Nearly every one of the affirmative speeches delivered during
the first two weeks contained a similar reference.

The citizens of the United States had not yet become
adjusted to the brinkmanship that had developed during the
preceding few months. The affirmative capitalized on these
fears when they argued:

For many years the testing of nuclear weapons
has represented a constant reminder of antagonism 44
existing between the Communist and the free world.

43 Humphrey, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 10, p. 13396.

44 Humphrey, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 10, p. 13997.
The final attention-getting topic was particularly effective in arousing the general public. The Senators needed only to make brief mention of the costs of the arms race, and the resultant burden of taxation, and the public was quick to listen. Even more appealing was the suggestion that a significant amount of money could be saved if the treaty were signed.

We spend nearly $40 billion a year on our military budget. A substantial amount of that money could be spent on national programs if the arms race could be called off. Taxes might even be reduced.45

The affirmative succeeded in attracting public attention. Weekly news magazines published cover stories on the treaty, and newspapers throughout the nation ran commentaries on the progress toward ratification. One Congressman estimated that the Senators were receiving 40,000 letters a week.

The affirmative plan next called for stating the issues and then developing its contentions. The proponents succeeded in building a strong case for the ratification of the treaty. By the first of September a national poll indicated several points increase in the percentage of people who favored the adoption of the treaty. It was at this time Humphrey reported to the Senate that he was receiving mail which contained a 10-1 favorable response for the proposed test ban.

Shortly after the first of September, however, two things happened which disturbed the affirmative plan of action:

45 Ibid.
1. The report of the Senate Armed Forces Subcommittee on Military Preparedness indicated that there were numerous military disadvantages to the treaty.

2. A national body opposing the treaty was formed and began growing rapidly.

Both of these occurrences strengthened the negative case, and caused the affirmative forces to add another stratagem to their plan of action. The affirmative began to force the opposition Senators into the position where a vote against the treaty was a vote against peace. They hoped that few Senators would be willing to take the risk of being labeled as warmongers. The effectiveness of this affirmative tactic can best be illustrated by Goldwater's final remarks.

I do not vote against the hope of peace, but only against the illusion of it. I do not vote for war, but for the strength to prevent it.46

The negative never found a successful response to this affirmative tactic.

Negative

The negative strategy to obtain rejection of the test ban treaty had two steps:

1. To inform the public of the "truth" about the affirmative contentions.

2. To develop the negative contentions.

The negative deviated from its original plan because of the affirmative shift to the "vote against peace" attack.

The negative, it will be remembered, maintained that nuclear fallout did not represent a significant danger and, therefore, could be discounted as a major factor in the debate.

46 Goldwater, Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 13 p. 17557.
It also maintained that international tensions were not caused by the arms race, and that this issue, too, was an insignificant factor. The negation evaded answering directly the affirmative question of armament cost. Goldwater, however, indicated that the cost of weapons was merely a burden that the nation had to bear to maintain adequate military defenses.\textsuperscript{47}

The negative developed contentions which it felt militated against ratification. The effectiveness of these arguments was clearly indicated by the growing number of people who opposed the treaty.

When the affirmative began suggesting that voting against the treaty would be a vote against peace, the negative was out-maneuvered. The affirmative had seized the initiative. In addition, nearly 100 nations had ratified the treaty as a means of obtaining "peace." To counter this affirmative tactic, the negative began to raise an issue that had had minor significance prior to this point --- the supremacy of military over political considerations.

The negative never gained any significant advantage from this issue because it failed to answer the affirmative attack. The opposition never recovered from this affirmative tactic.

\textbf{III. CONCLUSIONS}

In contrasting the speakers for the respective sides in the debate, it appears that the affirmative's presentations

contained better disposition than did the negative's. The negative, particularly Thurmond, was somewhat blunt in its speeches, almost as if it recognized that defeat was inevitable. The speeches of both Humphrey and Fulbright were excellent, and they represented only a portion of the affirmative forces. The negative, on the other hand, was represented almost exclusively by Goldwater and Thurmond, Thurmond's speeches being comparatively ineffective.

The strategy and tactics used in the debate itself were masterful. One writer commented "The strategy of the proponents of the treaty was to postpone the vote until they could win."48 The affirmative immediately seized the initiative in the debate, lost it, and then regained it. The plans of both sides approached success. In late August the affirmative could probably have gained a favorable vote. The negative, however, expecting a long debate, did not attempt to gain control until early September. It succeeded then in launching a telling attack upon the affirmative.

The turning point in the debate was the final affirmative tactic. The negative, placed in a position where it had to vote against peace to vote against the treaty, was hard pressed for an answer. The negative's weak response that military considerations were more important than political considerations was ineffective and out of tune with the times. The failure of this argument precipitated the collapse of the negative attack.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY

The American ratification of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty culminated nearly twenty years of labor by international disarmament negotiators. The United States, the original instigator of the negotiations, had sent her statesmen around the world to participate in international conferences in an effort to reach some agreement on the control of nuclear weapons. After the treaty was initialed in Moscow, it was sent to the United States Senate for ratification.

During the summer of 1963 the American people waited expectantly for word from Moscow that the treaty had been signed. When the news was received, the treaty was hailed as the most important document of the Twentieth Century and the first step toward international peace. The treaty received bipartisan backing and President Kennedy mustered administration forces to lead the Senate debate over ratification. But in the midst of this approval, there were those who stood back to calmly survey the implications of the treaty. Many of those who refused to give immediate endorsement were United States Senators. In fact, Capitol analysts publicly wondered if the treaty would ever be ratified. Yet two months later, the Senate voted overwhelmingly in favor of ratification.
This paper is a rhetorical analysis of selected speaking in the debate over ratification of the treaty. It has sought to discover the rhetorical elements which induced the Senators to vote for the treaty.

The backgrounds of the four major leaders in the debate were explored. The study found that the affirmative speakers, Humphrey and Fulbright, were well-educated and scholarly men. Both held liberal political philosophies. They espoused social legislation for the nation and international cooperation in foreign relations. Humphrey was found to be an excellent speaker who had received speech training during his school-days. Fulbright was found to be a rhetorician whose addresses were respected for their craftsmanship and information. On the other hand, the principal opponents were not particularly educated men. Thurmond earned a Bachelor's degree in agriculture, but did not pursue his academic career beyond that point. Goldwater attended college for only one year, and his academic record was poor. Both Thurmond and Goldwater espoused conservative doctrines, and both were vitally concerned with the military potential of the United States.

The analysis of "Issues and Contentions" yielded some important information concerning the speaking abilities of the respective sides. It was found that both sides, with one exception each, recognized the salient issues in the proposition. Both presented contentions to support their positions on the issues. During the course of the debate, it was noted that the affirmative and the negative were able to reach an understanding
upon one issue: that the treaty did not outlaw the use of atomic weapons in time of war.

A comparison of the contentions that the two sides presented showed one of the weaknesses of the negative case. Many of its arguments were only valid and relevant if the Soviet Union abrogated the treaty or attacked the United States. This left the negative in a weak position, since they had no concrete basis for their opposition to the treaty. The affirmative, on the other hand, proposed specific arguments in favor of the treaty.

Ethical proof was an important part of the persuasiveness of the speeches, but the characteristics of this debate made it difficult to determine its effectiveness. The Senators were speaking to two audiences: their colleagues and the nation. Each member of these audiences developed his personal opinion of the credibility of the Senators' ethical characters, and reacted to the speeches accordingly.

A number of important attitudes, directly related to this treaty, were held by the American public. The affirmative used a wide variety of these attitudes in its pathetic appeal to its audiences. The negative, on the other hand, placed an emphasis upon only two of these attitudes: the ulterior motives behind the Soviet Union's signing of the treaty and the possible reduction in American military potential caused by the treaty. These ideas were very important, but the negative was unable to counter the entire affirmative case with only these two.

Both sides in the debate used a variety of evidence to support their contentions. The affirmative supported its
contentions particularly well. The negative, on the other hand, relied somewhat heavily upon its own personal opinions.

In the final analysis, the negative use of proof proved to be slightly weaker than that of the affirmative. The speakers relied primarily upon causal reasoning in their contentions, arguing from their evidence or their personal opinions. They did use other types of reasoning, but only infrequently.

Excellent strategy was characteristic of both sides. The negative plan to eventually raise enough questions and reservations to throw doubt upon the treaty succeeded. To counter this negative success, the affirmative forces introduced a new element in their attack. They forced the opposition into the position where a vote against the treaty would be a vote against peace. The negative never recovered from this affirmative tactic.

The weakness of the negative case can also be found in the disposition of its speeches. Goldwater's speeches were properly organized and well-planned, but, alone, he was unable to counter the entire affirmative attack. Thurmond's speeches did not meet the requirements of accepted rhetorical order. In addition, his blunt style was ineffective in meeting the opposition of such skilled speakers as Humphrey and Fulbright.

It is impossible to attribute the ratification of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty completely to the persuasive speaking of its proponents. In fact, this study revealed some significant weaknesses of the affirmative speakers and in the affirmative case. Nevertheless, there were more weaknesses in the negative
approach. This major difference between the two sides played an important part in the reactions of the Senators.

Unless there is some factor of great importance which was overlooked in this study, the effectiveness of the affirmative speakers in supporting ratification of the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty must have played an important part in achieving the final favorable vote for the treaty.
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# APPENDIX I

## THE SPEECHES USED IN THE ANALYSIS

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**APPENDIX II**

**SENATORIAL SPEAKING ON THE 1963 NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY**

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APPENDIX III
TEXT OF TREATY

TITLE

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water

PREAMBLE

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties,"

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explo-
sions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each of the parties to this Treaty undertakes to pro-
hibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon
test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion at any place
under its jurisdiction or control:

a. in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including
outer space, or underwater, including territorial waters or
high seas; or

b. in any other environment if such explosion causes
radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits
of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion
is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the
provisions of this sub-paragraph are without prejudice to the
conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all
nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions under-
ground, the conclusions of which, as the Parties have stated
in the preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties of this Treaty undertakes further-
more to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way par-
ticipating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test
explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere, which
would take place in any of the environments described, or have
the effect referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.
ARTICLE II

1. Any party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depository Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all the original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all the original Parties.

ARTICLE III

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any state which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be open to all States subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the original Parties --- the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics --- which are hereby designated the Depository Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the treaty three months in advance.

ARTICLE V

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by Depository Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in triplicate at Moscow, this twenty-fifth day of July, one thousand nine-hundred and sixty-three.