BETWEEN ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE UMMAH: HOW SPANISH MOROCCANS ARE NEGOTIATING THEIR IDENTITIES IN POST 3-11 MADRID

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BETWEEN ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE UMMAH:
HOW SPANISH MOROCCANS ARE NEGOTIATING THEIR
IDENTITIES IN POST 3-11 MADRID

by

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Abdulmajid and Faouzia Ouassini. They have taught me how to laugh, love, and appreciate all that life has to offer. Their unconditional love, support, sacrifice, and compassion are unending. I will be forever grateful.

To my family: Thank you for your unending support and love: Nabil Ouassini, Adil Ouassini, Raghda, Zaine, and Amine Ouassini, Hanan and Mehdi, and M Ouassini.

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Finally, I would like to thank Nabil Ouassini, Elena Windsong, and Jeff Nowacki for their encouragement and support since day one. I couldn’t have done it without you.
This dissertation explores how Spanish Moroccans are negotiating their identities in post 3-11 Madrid. In doing so, I explore and capture the lived discourses that reveal the underlying processes that are shaping their identities at the micro, meso, and macro level. The data for this research was collected through in-depth interviews with 33 Spanish-Moroccans residing in Madrid, Spain. Results revealed that Spanish Moroccan identities are increasingly racialized towards a Muslim-Arab religious identity by two ideological currents found at the local and the transnational level: Islamophobia and the Ummah. The Islamophobia racial project was experienced by my participants at the micro-level of everyday interactions including at work, educational institutions, and public life. This strengthened an attachment to a Muslim first identity. At the transnational level, Ummah ideological scapes shaped my participants identities via Arabic Satellite television and transnational Islamic movements. These scapes reinforced a Muslim-Arab first identity among my participants. These findings indicate that Spanish Moroccans are experiencing what I coined as dual communal racialization, a process wherein individuals are exposed
to two racial projects that are simultaneously racializing my participants’ identities towards a Muslim–Arab ethno-racial identity. Moreover, at the meso-level, I found that my participants lacked any active participation in voluntary associations; but did belong to what I call immigrant community spheres, which include the mosque, Muslim monuments, and the Moroccan café. These ‘institutions’ are often cites of contention for dual communal racialization and work to reinforce identity ties and claims towards Islam and the Spanish state.
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Chapter 1

Mapping Spanish Moroccan Identities in Contemporary Madrid

Introduction

I asked a first generation Spanish Moroccan who joined a group of Moroccans in an open soccer game against Ecuadorians and Mexicans in Pinto, a small pueblo outside of Madrid why he migrated to Madrid rather than Barcelona where a large number of Moroccan migrants have recently settled. He took a moment to think about the question and blurted with pride, first in Moroccan Arabic and then Spanish as to also inform the Ecuadorians and Mexicans who the true Spaniards are and said, “I came to Madrid to look for work of course but I also came because it was founded by Muslims and God-Willing has blessings.” He would reaffirm with me twice more that Madrid is an Arabic word before continuing on with the soccer game. The contested city of Matrit in Arabic or in the modern Spanish lexicon Madrid, was a small garrison post that was historically an insignificant town in the eyes of the ruling Visigoths until Emir Muhammad I of the Umayyad empire in the late ninth century settled and established the city that pervasively transformed the course of history and implicitly shaped the next millennium. Nearly four hundred years after the nearly 300,000 Muslim’s were formally expelled from Spain under the decree of King Phillip III in 1609, North African Muslims and Moroccans in particular are again the second largest religious minority in contemporary Spain.

The objective of this dissertation is to examine the emerging dynamics of Spanish Moroccan identity in present-day Madrid. This dissertation comprehensively explores the following questions that address Spanish Moroccan identity formation and negotiations in
contemporary Spain in order to construct a new analytical framework to capture the intricacies of Spanish Moroccan identity:

1. **How do Spanish Moroccans in Madrid negotiate their identities in post 3-11 Spain?**

2. **What are the discourses of racial, ethnic, and religious identity among Spanish-Moroccans in Madrid?**

3. **What are the contextual and structural factors that shape the layers of racial and ethnic identity?**

4. **How do discourses and lived experiences differ if at all by race, generation, ethnicity, or gender?**

These questions are particularly important because the long established scholarly research has held that Muslim migrants in Europe anchor their racial identities in their religious identities (Madood & Werbner 1997; Cainkar 2009; Mandeville 2009). Yet little research has been done on how racialization processes are impacting contemporary Spanish Moroccans. In examining the mechanisms of racialization, the scholarly research generally concludes that racializing processes are always experienced by the racialized group through racist, anti-racist, and/or benign racial project(s) constructed and organized by the State or an institution of the state (Winant 2001). This is accomplished, "through classification systems inscribed in law, through bureaucratic procedures, educational structures, and social rituals," (Bourdieu 1998: 45-46) that reify and “reproduce hierarchical social structures based on essentialized racial categories” (Winant 1998: 761). The responses of the participants in this study indicate a similar pattern in the ways the Spanish state and society racialize my participants’ identities towards Islam.
However, other studies on Muslim minorities in Europe did not take into account how Muslim migrants are often entangled and exposed to benign and racist racial projects that are transnational in origin and submerged in ideological flows and movements that are tied to the concept of the Ummah or the collective Muslim community.

This transnational racializing ideology has its origins in traditional Islamic empires and is hegemonically bounded and internalized in the logic of many contemporary Muslim states and movements. The saliency of the Ummah identity among the Spanish Moroccan community also cultivates a process in which Islam becomes racialized (Lawrence 2005). In this dissertation, I argue that their transnational disposition allows for the Spanish Moroccan community to be racialized by two simultaneous racial projects, one in the Spanish state and society via Islamophobia and the second through religioscapes that have their sources outside of Spain i.e. the Muslim world. The evidence presented in this study suggests that both racial projects racialize my participants towards a Muslim-Arab religious identity while facilitating attachments and affinities toward the Spanish state and the global Muslim community. My data and findings comes from interviews with 33 Spanish Moroccans from 1st, 1.5, and 2nd generation living in Madrid, Spain and collected from the dates of March to May 2011.

The sociological contributions are multi-faceted. First, it is an empirical contribution that lends to research of an understudied Muslim minority in Europe. Theoretically and analytically, I offer two new conceptual categories that capture the lived realities of Spanish Moroccans: Dual Communal Racialization (DCR) and Immigrant Community Spheres (ICS).
For the rest of this chapter, I begin with a discussion of the context of Islamophobia in contemporary Spain then detail the sociological theories and conceptual tools that inform my analysis, specifically racial formation, segmented assimilation, and symbolic ethnicity. Next I introduce DCR to build on the existing theoretical and analytical frameworks to understand how this concept captures the structural and cultural dynamics shaping the identities of my participants. Finally, I reveal how the concept of racial projects in my study is attached to a particular structural level of analysis. I first make the argument about why Islamophobia is primarily found and experienced at the micro-level of analysis in my participants’ social, interactional experiences at work, with educational institutions, and in the public sphere. I then discuss the Ummah at the macro-level of analysis to reveal how Arab Satellite TV and Islamic Movements are shaping Spanish Moroccan identity dynamics; and finally I discuss the meso-level, where I introduce the concept of Immigrant Community Spheres (ICS) to reveal how Spanish Moroccan institutions facilitate the negotiation of both the Islamophobia and Ummah racial projects. I end the chapter with a brief discussion on translocality and dual communal racialization.

Contemporary and Historic Islamophobia: The Political and Economic Context of Spanish Moroccan Identities.

On the morning of March 11th 2004, three days before a decisive and fiercely contested general election in Spain, ten bombs exploded on four of Madrid's busiest commuter trains killing one hundred ninety-two civilians and injuring thousands (Jordan 2006). This appalling act would be the largest and most fatal attack on Spanish soil since the Spanish Civil War. Immediately following the attacks, many political pundits and terrorism experts ignominiously pointed at the ‘Basque Homeland and Freedom’
movement, an organization fervently opposed to a Franco-uesque centralized Spanish state. While the reigning Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar of the conservative Popular Party also joined the chorus and impulsively presumed a domestic organization was responsible; the evidence began to mount and point towards an admixture of obscure Islamic fundamentalists in and outside of Spain. For the conservative Popular Party, an attack by Al Qaeda or any international Islamist organization would be interpreted by the Spanish public as collective punishment for policy measures that aided and supported American war efforts in Iraq (Jordan & Wesley 2006).

The resulting investigations would confirm the attacks were conducted by Al Qaeda in Spain for Spanish involvement and support of America’s War on Terror. The public’s anger against Aznar and the conservative Popular Party escalated following the attacks and would eventually result in a shift in political administration towards the left-leaning socialist party. While the immediate knee-jerk reaction of the populace was to vote in the party that was ‘friendlier’ to the Muslim world; questions began to arise about who participated in these horrific acts. Investigations by the Spanish judiciary and policing institutions would systematically reveal that a loosely knit group of Moroccans, Spanish Moroccans, and Spaniards were ultimately responsible (Jordan & Wesley 2006).

As the Spanish nation collectively grieved over the tragedy, media institutions and politicians alike began to question the motivations and ideological reasoning that rendered the murderous acts possible. For the Spanish Moroccans, this event would have a ‘doubling effect’ on their lives as Spaniards and Muslims as they tried to employ strategies to address and resist the sustained and enduring campaigns that marginalized and problematised their presence in Spanish society. The totalizing narratives that
emerged from media institutions, political organizations, and government would reinforce and politicize a historically bounded, Eurocentric chauvinism that vividly portrayed the Muslims as Outsiders. These ubiquitous discursive acts employed on Spanish Muslims are not new and have been anchored in Spanish-Muslim historical memory dating back to the initial Reconquista against the Moors\(^1\) after the fall of the Visigoths in 711. However, this was new in the post-Franco, democratic Spain where structural political developments gave way towards inclusive suffrage and economic liberalism that allowed for an immediate shift from a country of emigration towards immigration.

The discourse that emerged after the 3-11 attacks trumpeted nationalist and rightists sentiments for ‘expelling the Moors’ and re-cultivated a perceived homogeneous character of a Catholic, white Spain (Flesler 2008). In a talk given at Georgetown University after his reign as prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar perniciously stated that Spain's internal problems with Muslims did not begin with the inception of the Iraq War but rather in 711 when Spain refused to be a part of the Islamic world\(^2\). While the right-wing in Spain essentialized the cultural commonality of their Muslim minorities and

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1 In this dissertation, I utilize the concept of the Moor interchangeably with Spanish Moroccans when discussing a historical event in the context of the Muslim rule in Spain. However, when discussing the present I use, Spanish Moroccan. The Moors are historically identified as the Arabs and Berbers who conquered and controlled the Iberian peninsula beginning in 711. The use of the concept of the Moor in Spain generally has negative connotations as its associated with "the idea of the Moor as attacker or invader, encapsulated in the saying "hay moros en la costa" (Flesler 2008: 3).

2 José Maria Aznar said: “The problem Spain has with Al-Qaeda and Islamic terrorism did not begin with the Iraq crisis. In fact, it has nothing to do with government decisions. You must go back no less than 1300 years, to the early 8th century, when a Spain recently invaded by the Moors refused to become just another piece in the Islamic world and began a long battle to recover its identity. This Reconquista process was very long, lasting some 800 years. However, it ended successfully. There are many radical Muslims who continue to recall that defeat, many more than any rational Western mind might suspect.” For the complete text, see “Seven Theses on Today’s Terrorism.” Georgetown University. Web. 09/25/2012. <www3.Georgetown.edu/president/aznar/inauguraladdress.html>. 


espoused their removal, the leftists questioned the failure of Muslim migrant integration and assimilation into Spanish society. These intellectuals and activists cited institutional failures but also implicated the ‘repressive nature’ of Muslim cultural and religious practices (Arigita 2006). These rhetorical and institutional hegemonic practices emerging in post 3-11 Spain would reinforce and internalize ideological aims and objectives that align with the rest of Western Europe in addressing what is often called in academic and political circles as the “Muslim problem” (Klausen, 2005:5).

While many Spaniards vividly portrayed the Muslims and especially Spanish Moroccans as a negative social and political development in contemporary Spain, they also pointed to a larger historical narrative that is beset with conflict vis-à-vis the Muslims (Flesler 2008). The construction and formulation of contemporary Spanish national identity has always rested on its anti-Moorish, anti-Muslim past. The Muslim presence in contemporary Spain lasted for nearly 900 years from the initial conquest in 711 to the final expulsion in 1609. This 'coloniality of power' (Quijano 2000) that has its origins in the ideologies of Reconquista and spread to the rest of the Americas to regulate and privilege white- Catholic identity over all religious, racial, and ethnic variations. The policy of dislocation and distanciation from anything Islamic would endure through the Barbary wars, Spanish colonization, and the Spanish civil war where relations between the Spanish state and Morocco would further internalize the rhetoric of the Other. As Flesler states, "the ghost of the Moor inhabits precisely that "disadjusted now," a space deeply infiltrated by a past and inextricably entangled with it” (2008: 56). These historical encounters that have shaped the present day discourse and narrative on Spanish
Moroccans is embedded and anchored on these previous collective memory events (Harvey 2005).

The contemporary shift in religious and ethnic diversity in Spain is reflective of the increase of migration of Moroccans, Romanians, and Latinos in the past thirty years. There are currently around 700,000 Moroccans and nearly one million Muslims in Spain or 2-3 percent of the population (Pew Research Forum 2010), and in 2006 there were nearly seventy thousand people of Moroccan origin in Madrid (Gest 2011:133) positioning Islam to be the second largest religious tradition after Catholicism (Arguijo 2008). This was a five time increase in the numbers present from 1996 (Gest 2011:133). According to Vegas & Planas (2012) most Moroccan migrants are concentrated in the low-wage labor sector including construction, industrial work, and agriculture; while women worked in service related fields.

Not since the fall of Granada in 1492 and later forced expulsion in 1609 were Muslims present in such a critical mass in Spanish society. Beginning in the 1980’s, the demographic growth of migrant populations and Muslims in particular has dislodged and contested the traditional spatial and ideological boundaries of Spanish national identity. The implication of the socio-political transformations and shifts are not only dislocating the sanctity of the traditional Catholic Spanish state but also fertilizing multiple narratives that are critically reflexive and inclusive beyond the traditional boundaries. For the Spanish Moroccan community, the process of adjustment to Spanish society created new discursive repertoires on citizenship and identity that challenge and reshape religious and racial Otherness. Moreover, the 3-11 attacks exposed the vulnerabilities and struggles experienced by the Spanish Moroccan community, while also allowing for critical
engagement to understand the precipitating causes behind their alienation. Accordingly, the Spanish Moroccan community responded to imposed group differentiation by shifting narratives of place and reimagining and reshaping the historical boundaries of state and society to include and ground their identities to the Spanish state and the larger global Muslim community.

Understanding Spanish Moroccan minorities’ identity demands will elucidate how Muslims are claiming their right to citizenship and belonging by engaging and managing their multiple identities in contemporary post-colonial Spain. This is possible primarily because Spanish Moroccan identity is not immutable but rather self-conscious and symbolic and is a direct product of their lived realities in Spain. This 'reality' makes it critical and relevant to understand and situate the Spanish Moroccan migrant within a national and transnational setting to understand the conscious and purposeful identity creations that reinforce social solidarity and meaning making.

**Conceptualizing Spanish Moroccan Identities: Sociological Tools and Theoretical Guideposts**

According to recent research on Spanish Moroccans, economic alienation, cultural and religious discrimination, and ethno-racial marginalization characterize their lives in Spain (Munoz 1999; Zapata-Barrero 2004; Arigita 2006; Garcia 2002; Sayahi 2005). Given these contradictions, it is important to enquire how Spanish Moroccans are navigating and negotiating their identities in the post 3-11 Spain. Scholarly work on racialization and Muslim minorities generally portrays Muslim minority communities as increasingly racially stigmatized in contemporary Europe (Winant 2001; Winant 2004; Cesari 2004; Modood 2006; Wodak 1999).
Race is a concept then that, “signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies” (Omi and Winant 2001:9). To understand and disaggregate how racial repertoires are constructed, mobilized, and formulated in time, the concept of racialization becomes fundamental because it extends, “racial meaning to previously unclassified relationships” (Omi & Winant 1994:64). This divergent representation of race operationalizes racial formation as a “socio-historical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.” (Omi and Winant 1994:55) and enables the researcher to understand how state formulations, cultural processes, movements, and independent actors construct, constrain, and enforce racial categories. These racial categories are often historically situated racist racial projects in which the physical body becomes classified and marked by stratified social structures. These ‘structures’ shape and inform our realities about identity and race at the micro, meso, and macro contexts while reifying the stratified, racialized systems.

The hegemonic disposition of racial formation provides a perspective of agency and positionality on how Muslim minorities are engaging with and re-articulating their own reflexive counter-identities in relation/reaction to the racialization process (Omi and Winant 1994). While the literature on racialization accurately captures the lived experiences of Spanish Moroccans in Spain, it tends to ignore racial projects that do not have their origins in Western European political and economic dominance which is formulated around the State as the primary mechanism that creates complex distinctions between the dominant white majority and the Others (Vertovec & Rogers 1998; Werbner and Modood 1997). Winant furthers this inquiry by confirming, “each nation-state, each
political system, each cultural complex necessarily constructs a uniquely racialized social structure, a particular complex of racial meanings and identities” (Winant 1994: 123).

Nevertheless, how do we understand racist racial projects that have their origins in non-Western civilizations and are not a direct result of European white privilege? This is a difficult task indeed as European colonialism has shaped and molded modernity, which has globally structured and accentuated an overarching and analytically imposing paradigm of Western ‘white’ dominance. On the other hand, the global rise of China, the demographic shifts in Europe, the emergence of indigenous mobilization in Latin America, and the rise of Islamic politics and identities are actively challenging these hegemonic Western projects by cross-fertilizing perspectives or articulating concomitant paradigms.

The racist racial projects that emanated from Islamic imperial conquests in the eighth century constructed a civilization that emphasized and privileged Muslim/Arab racialized identities. While the onset and institutionalization of European colonialism eviscerated these ideologies in many Muslim nations; the conceptual framework embedded in Islamic law and history has facilitated the continuity and production of these ideologies in many Middle Eastern and North African states. These ideologies are further accentuated with the emergence of globalization and transnational migration in which the migrant’s political and social identity and membership are a function and result of the complex interplay between the home and receiving nation. These processes cultivate a trans-local experience as it, "draws attention to multiplying forms of mobility without losing sight of the importance of localities in peoples’ lives” (Oakes and Schein 2006: 1). The trans-local space occupied by Spanish Moroccans informs and shapes their
individual agency and the social processes that create and reinforce attachments to localized institutions and transnational scapes and networks.

I found the Islamic commitments of my participants in this study revealed the importance and extractive power of theory to coherently understand their lived experiences beyond the traditional concepts. The starting point in most literatures on Muslim minorities has generally focused on assimilation and integration studies. In the last couple of years, many academics and scholars of Muslim minority studies have asserted the failure of linear assimilation models to understand Muslim minorities in Europe (Rumbaut 1997; Zhou 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Other theories that propose bumpy line theory of migration (Gans 1992), or transnational social fields (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Blanc 1995), or the 'assimilation without accommodation paradigm' (Gibson 1988), have tried to capture the lived realities and experiences of transnational, first, and second generation migrants. But, as I will argue here, these approaches do not accurately capture the unique intricacies of Spanish Moroccan identities.

Assimilation approaches in Europe generally articulate symbolic citizenship through how much or to what degree the migrant is close to ‘whiteness' (Omi and Winant 1986, 2001; Gilroy 2000; Almaguer 1994). Thus, assimilation is decidedly dependent on a conception of whiteness that is arbitrarily operationalized and is often aggregated through cultural forms. In the Spanish context, assimilation and integration are dependent on this axis where whiteness as defined by phenotype are primarily the mechanisms applied vis-à-vis Latin American minorities, who are also excluded from full assimilation. For Spanish Moroccans, the new racist discourse (Gilroy 1990, Balibar
1991) replaces the attachment to physical characteristics and emphasizes religious and cultural differences to restructure whiteness and Spanish identity via one’s attachments to the Christian/European tradition (Flesler 2008). Balibar states,

“New Racism is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural difference, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but only the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of lifestyles and traditions”


The shifting meanings and regulative practice of whiteness employed by Europeans/Spaniards have informed multiple migrant responses to their hegemonic and oppositional ideologies.

Segmented assimilation, symbolic ethnicity, and reactive ethnicity (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2006) are three theoretical perspectives this dissertation considers in trying to understand how Spanish-Moroccan identities are shaped and formulated in contemporary Madrid. Segmented assimilation seeks to unbind the differences that may exist among generations of immigrants in the assimilation process to see how minority identity narratives are dependent on multiple forms of capital. Portes and Zhou (1993) maintain that the differentiated assimilation process is not always upward toward the dominant white middle class but is a variegated process that can move upwardly or downward. Hence, these scholars would conclude that any differences that may exist in the assimilation process between the first, 1.5, and second generation minorities is a segmented and fragmented process dependent on ethnic and
racial community networks and access to various forms of capital. Moreover, the assimilation processes represented through forms of acculturation can also lead towards differing standpoints or positionalities within a given ethno-racial structure; to produce significant differentiation toward upward or downward mobility between and among the immigrant group. These pathways include the classical assimilation perspective, which posits that new immigrants may achieve upward mobility toward the dominant white middle class. The second pathway is the selective assimilation route, which predicts that children of immigrants will move up the socioeconomic ladder but maintain close ethnic ties to their immigrant communities and culture and finally the third pathway includes the downward assimilation route, in which children of immigrants assimilate toward a minority working class identity and structure; reinforcing ties to disadvantaged groups in society (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou and Bankston1998).

The segmented assimilation theoretical perspectives is often criticized by scholars for not succinctly taking into account the importance of religion and ethno-religious institutions in the acculturation process (Warner 2008). The conceptual categories Portes and Rumbaut constructed in trying to understand the textured processes of immigrant assimilation is dependent on parental human capacity, family structure, and the modes of incorporation that refers to the reception provided to immigrants by state, societal, and preexisting co-ethnic community members (2001:63). The importance of religious communities in Portes and Rumbaut’s assimilation trajectories are often ignored and at times even rejected by the authors (Warner 2008). Beyond the question of religion and its utility in understanding assimilation processes; the models presented by Portes and Rumbaut (2001) do not adequately capture the experiences of Spanish Moroccans in
contemporary Spain. The dissonant, consonant, and selective models presented by the authors were not present among my participants as described by the authors as all my participant’s experienced downward mobility while maintaining attachments to both Spanish and Muslim identities. Thus, this lends for the need of a new theoretical and conceptual formulation that can account for the similarities in identity claims across generational divides, address the importance of religion and collective memory in the assimilation process, and finally ostensibly capture the impact of racial projects in the domestic and transnational context that work to inform and shape the modes of incorporation in the national setting.

Another important theoretical perspective that informs this dissertation but does not adequately capture the full picture of Spanish Moroccan identity negotiation and construction is the symbolic ethnicity model (Gans 1994). This model promotes an emphasis on understanding the contextual and structural factors that shape the multiple layers of racial and ethnic identities. As societies democratize and liberalize, they cultivate societies that embody multiculturalism and greater cultural and social associability. This universalizing freedom for minority groups allows minorities (racial/ethnic/religious) to fervently express their own identities and construct an identity tool kit to accomplish their ethnic and racial performances.

These ‘tools’ are often dependent on the discursive practices of the local and the global to create and transmit "products" for the group’s consumption. For our study, understanding the intricate dynamics of these ‘tool kits’ Spanish Moroccans employ and incorporate in identity construction becomes imperative as the range of products (material and ideological) from "back home" become markers of race for the Spanish and
the Spanish-Moroccans communities. Thus, the networks maintained with Muslims domestically and globally shape and facilitate the construction of symbolic racial identities among Spanish Moroccan’s. Another theory that this dissertation builds on is Portes and Rumbaut’s (2006) reactive ethnicity theory. They argue that when immigrants experience alienation, discrimination, and racism they increase their identification with their ethnic group to construct defense mechanisms and communal solidarity, “highlighting the role of a hostile context of reception in accounting for the rise rather than the erosion of ethnicity” (Rumbaut 2001: 148).

They suggest that reactive ethnicity occurs primarily among the second generation as it allows them to negotiate their discriminatory experiences through their ethnic identities as they seek a psychological bond within their group formation. Moreover, they also argue that religion can be reactive for new immigrant populations; however this reaction is a disassociation from traditional religious institutions in order to integrate into society. The two processes described by Portes and Rumbaut (2006) was not present in this study as my participants across the generational divide revealed similar response patterns that were often structured around traditional religious identities rooted outside of the nation-state and the home setting.

A Note on Race, Ethnicity, and Religion

In trying to conceptualize race, ethnicity, and religious identity for this study, I found that my participant’s socio-historical backgrounds made it increasingly difficult for them to differentiate between the three identifiers. These variables are critical for understanding the emerging racial-ethnic and religious stratification that is emerging in contemporary Spain. However, while I tried to approach these variables as independent
of each other, they were all collapsed and interchangeable as the racialization process facilitated an internal and external self-definition as racialized religious minorities. Thus, this allowed my participants to move away from self-categorizing as only ethnic or racial groups and created a “layering of identities” (Nagel 1994), “that are fluid and in constant negotiation, creation, and re-creation (Trieu 2009: 41).” Almaguer’s (1994) study of racial minorities in nineteenth century California reveals the ways in which racist ideological positions of the white majority towards Native Americans, Mexicans, and Asians facilitated the Othering of these minorities that would a century later define and shape identity dynamics of these communities. The socially and legally imposed religious identities on my participants in this study are a reflection of the institutionalization of racist racial projects from both Spanish and Islamic imperial projects of the past. Thus, the racialization processes impose their own structures that permit the fusion of racial, ethnic, and religious identities for my participants.

**Dual Communal Racialization and Muslim Minorities**

Accordingly, while the proposed theories above provide the explanatory tools to understand how my participants are negotiating identity dynamics in contemporary Madrid; they do not fully theorize the intricate and complex realities that contemporary Spanish Moroccans occupy. Thus, I propose the concept of *dual communal racialization* (DCR) to capture the racialized experiences indicative of Spanish Moroccan trans-local realities. Dual communal racialization convincingly demonstrates the central theoretical claims of this project by capturing the processes wherein an immigrant community engages and negotiates with two simultaneous racial projects that have their origins within and outside the nation-state. DCR core attribute as a concrete analytical tool that
describes the profound impact of racial projects in their structural and cultural sources, reveals how they may impact the identity dynamics and assimilation processes of the community or group affected by the racial projects. DCR provides the researcher the ability to disentangle and deconstruct racialized identities and perceived racial boundaries to understand the internal logic, variation, and sources of the racial projects experienced by the given group or community. This concept provides the breadth that moves beyond the traditional diasporic theoretical models in which family connections and economic and social mobility become the site of identity analysis including the hybridization of cultures (Hannerz 1992), flexible citizenship (Ong 1999), and transnational social fields (Levitt and Waters 2002). DCR provides the theoretical grounding to situate assimilation and identity construction outside of the traditional models (segmented assimilation, reactive ethnicity, and symbolic ethnicity) and to locate my participants trajectories as they are shaped by racial projects (Ummah and Islamophobia) from within and outside of the nation-state. DCR provides this study the conceptual rigor and boundaries to understand how these racial ideologies are negotiated and shape the assimilation process.

My key analytical findings convincingly demonstrates how the DCR framework explores the experiences of Spanish Moroccans by revealing the ways Islamophobic and Ummah racial projects disseminate and reinforce the same identity point of reference for my participants. This facilitated a relational connectedness to their Muslim-Arab religious identities as their foundational identity before all racial, ethnic, or national claims. The consequences of disentangling two internally distinctive racial projects becomes increasingly difficult especially because the two ideologies theoretically affirm (Ummah)/ and reject (Islamophobia) Muslim identity. Accordingly, each component of
the dual communal racialization concept is racializing my participants towards Islam and Muslim identity by mediating the impact of the others racist racial project. How can two opposing and contesting racial projects reinforce a similar identity? Central to the conceptual rigor of DCR are identity dynamics and negotiation at the micro, meso, and macro level.

Individual and collective identities exist in social relationships and are established through the mechanism of social interaction. Social interaction allows for individual strategies of negotiation between how others construct and embody categories about the self and how individuals hermeneutically see themselves. This allows for identities to be variegated and reflexive depending on the narratives given or constructed about themselves and the Other. The migrants maintenance, resistance, and reconfiguration of identity is key to understanding the intricate dynamics of self as identities are always embedded in multiple structural levels and bounded by variegated forms of capital (Bourdieu 1977). Thus, the repertoires of identities artificial or real become salient according to context and setting (Stryker 1980) and "use the resources of history, language, and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not “who we are” or “where we come from,” so much as what we might become, how we have been represented, and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves" (Sollors 2003: 4).

The metanarrative identity claims of Spanish Moroccans can only be understood and objectively studied in the context of larger post-colonial projects. According to Chambers this, “involves a movement in which neither the points of departure nor those of arrival are immutable or certain, it calls for a dwelling in language, in histories, in identities that are constantly subject to mutation” (1994: 5). In experiencing and
internalizing DCR, the Spanish Moroccans negotiation of self and place allows for individual agency to legitimate their presence and situatedness in contemporary Spain. The attachment to Muslim identity through DCR processes creates the necessary associational autonomy for Spanish Moroccans to contest the historical and ideological positionalities of the State in order to reaffirm and bound Islam and Muslims to Spanish history and society.\textsuperscript{3}

To further understand how DCR impacts and shapes Spanish Moroccan identity we must situate their lives at three structurally relevant contexts at the micro, meso, and macro levels. This section provides further details about the structural realities wherein DCR is lived, experienced, and negotiated. In the Spanish Moroccan context, the structural levels reflect the locality and formulation of the two simultaneous racial projects Islamophobia and the Ummah. Islamophobia is lived and experienced at the

\textsuperscript{3} This is very similar process found in Kurien’s (1998) research on Indian Americans he shows how Hinduism facilitated assimilation toward an Indian-American identity by allowing them to claim a “position for themselves at the American multicultural table” (1998:37).
micro level interactions. The ideological impacts of Islamophobia shape the everyday social interactions of Spanish Moroccans at school, work, neighborhoods, and with media institutions. Moreover, the complex distinctions Islamophobia employs in *Othering* the Spanish Moroccans reinforces and shapes their identities to Islam and Muslims.

At the meso-level, I introduce the concept of *immigrant community spheres* to address the encounters between my Spanish Moroccan participants and ‘institutions’ they had social encounters with including the mosque, Moorish monuments, and the cafe. This will allow us to see how Islamophobia and the Ummah ideology shape identity negotiations in relation to these institutions. Finally, the Macro-level of analyses will address the impact of Arabic satellite TV and Islamic movements in anchoring the Ummah ideology among and within the Spanish Moroccan community. These three structural categories will reveal how Spanish Moroccans are negotiating identity production in the context of DCR; while also defining the parameters of these two distinct racializing ideologies (Islamophobia and the Ummah ideology).

**Micro Level: Islamophobia and Spanish Moroccans**

The visibility of Spanish Moroccans in Spanish society is shifting the racial fault lines in contemporary Spain. The Islamophobic ideological rubric underlying and managing this shift is experienced and affirmed in everyday social interactions. The production of knowledge forms surrounding Islamophobia racializes the Spanish Moroccan minorities towards an Islamic religio-ethnic identity that is positioned and framed as the Other vis-à-vis the white majority (Silverstein 2005; Bail 2008). The stigmatization of Muslim identity as the religious Other allows for Muslim identity to become the master status that dominates all other identities in most social situations.
(Halliday 1999; Werbner 2005; Frost 2008). Scholars and analysts have concluded that this type of racism via Islamophobic ideologies creates “an irreducible identity marker between us and them” (Paris La Decouverte 2003: 10).

Since the fall of the last Moorish kingdom of Granada in 1492 and the ensuing imperial regimes thereafter, Spain has accentuated the orientalist legacy of Europe by regarding the presence of their Muslim minorities (historically and contemporarily) as an all-encompassing Other (Sayad 1991: 292-299) neither belonging to the nation’s imagined community nor racially or culturally fit to be a citizens. The nuanced process of ‘Othering’ is a reflexive configuration “of fluid categories of difference into fixed species of Otherness” (Silverstein 2005:364), which is supported and manufactured through European Muslim’s occupation in the ‘racialized slot.’ As Gema Martin Munoz states, “we have internalized a reductionist and monolithic image of "us" and of "them". It is as if these were closed universes in which millions of human beings are designated as “Western” or “Muslims” and represent alien and even antagonistic cultures (2010:4).”

Islamophobia as a sustained political and social process in post 9-11 Europe has exacerbated a xenophobic oppositional ideology toward Muslim minorities, acrimoniously situating them as a threat to the survival of Western civilization and geographic Europe (Runnymede 1997; Chapman 1998; Kepel 2004; Bennet 2005). According to Cesari (2003:21), this “opposition forms the basis of orientalism, which has implicitly informed many subsequent theories on Islam and politics” in Europe. The orientalist dispositions (Said 1979) toward Muslims has not changed in content from the past as new media and political pandering to the Right facilitate the production of
negative images, policies, and ideas about Muslims contamination in Europe (Hippler and Lueg 1995).

Consequently, stigmatization of the Muslim as the Other dislodges the Islamic faith into a distinct ethno-racial identity where Islam becomes the nodal point (Sayyid 1997:44) for identity construction and resistance to hegemonic practices emanating from the state (Roy 2004). This “anti-Islamic racism as racialization,” (Dunn et al 2007: 567)

1. Upholds the idea of European racial superiority over all Muslim minorities (Hubbard 2005) whose “bodies are marked as Muslim” as they are presented as brown skinned, bearded, veiled, and Arab (Razack 2008: 150); 2. Supports Islamophobia as an ideological response to stereotypical perceptions on the ‘dangers’ of Muslim immigration to Europe (Frost 2008); 3. Employs racist actions that rely on the physical features of the migrants (Madood 2005:12, Dunn et al 2007: 567).

It is these structural conditions that allow for the construction of what Portes and Rumbaut (1996, 2001) call “reactive ethnicity” a propensity in which Muslim minorities construct defensive identities to self-identify with the affiliation for which they are most attacked by the mainstream majority in order to “feel solidarity; gather together, mobilize, encourage each other and take sides” (Maalouf 1998: 34). The literature on the impact and profusion of Islamophobia on European Muslims are primarily descriptive (Rattansi 1994; Nielson 1995; Vertoc &Peach 1995; Albedin & Sardar 1995; Hunter 2000; Al-Azmeh & Fokas 2007). While there is no micro-analytical study that addresses how Spanish Muslim minorities negotiate their racially stigmatized identities in contemporary Spain, there is a body of literature that reveals the variegated components of racialization in relation to the conceptual framework of the ‘immigration paradigm’
often focusing on the presence of these minorities in regards to legal status (Alwall 1998; Aluffi & Zincone 2004) and recognition struggles (Martinez 2000; Moreras 2002; Jimenez-Aybar 2004; Deitz 2004).

In her study of contemporary Muslim minorities in Spain, Gema Martin Munoz found that while some Muslim minorities may be integrated into Spanish society, they still have difficulties finding jobs and creating ‘meaningful relationships’ with the general Spanish population (2003: 49-51). This reality is also supported in the contents of Spanish school textbooks in which the denial of Muslim presence and history paradoxically the norm (Flesler 2008: 2). Moreover, Zapata-Barrero’s (2006:14) study of Muslim-Christian relations in Spain demonstrates how negative historical perceptions of the ‘Muslim moor’ are consistently reinforced in media discourses on the question of immigration and Moroccans leading to what he calls Maurophobia or the fear of the Moor (Nederveen-Pietersen 1997; Martinez-Torron 2000; Schmitt 2003; Deitz 2004; Arigita 2006). This collective feeling towards Moroccan immigration has afforded the Spanish Moroccans to be an 'unwanted' minority with the lowest level of acceptance as neighbors and citizens (Flesler 2008: 2).

Bowen’s notes the resonance of these debates about the place of Muslims in European society are a means to frame and target the public presence of Muslims and Islam while addressing internal questions of national identity and meaning. Islamophobic ideologies and practices become the 1. Discursive acts that shape and define European national distinctiveness along ethnic and racial lines (excluding the contaminated Muslim (Razack 2008)); 2. Shape and control “Islamic norms” within their national borders; and,
3. Address gender related norms in order to regulate the Muslim minority community (Bowen 2006: 242-243).

The impact of racialized social boundaries and institutions that regulate Muslim identity has only recently been attended to by academics (Mirdal 2000; Naber 2005; Peek 2005; Koenig 2005; Duderija 2007). Eid states that racialization via legal and cultural stigmatization allows “second generations of Muslims (in America) to re-assign new meanings and roles to Islam as an ethnic identity marker to re-appropriate and transform ethno-religious identity origination in the community” (2002: 45-46). Thus leading to what Naber problematically noted as the normative Muslim first, ethnic/national identity second phenomenon among Muslim youth in Europe and the United States (2005). The internalization and profusion of Islamophobia in the lived experiences of Spanish Moroccans in contemporary Spain has reinforced identification with and towards Islam and Muslim identity.

**Meso-level: Immigrant Community Spheres and Collective Memory**

The meso-level analysis provides a coherent formulation of how DCR is negotiated by Spanish Moroccans. The Spanish Moroccan community is a newly established immigrant community thus understanding their diasporic realities is important in order to contextualize their immigration experiences and to understand relations with localized institutions and organizations. The literature on Spanish Moroccan immigration to Spain generally portrays their individual strategies and social encounters as primarily concerned with economic motives and intentions (Jimenez-Aybar 2004). However, the transnational realities experienced by Spanish Moroccans affirm a positive rhetoric towards anchoring and situating their lives in Spain. The Spanish Moroccans interviewed
for this research internalized these sentiments by emphasizing the importance of specific institutions that they feel represent them. When I asked my participants in this study which institutions had a predominant influence on their lives, the majority of the respondent mentioned mosques, Muslim monuments, and cafes.

These responses vividly portray the importance of community level ‘institutions’ that provide meaning but also facilitate via DCR their assimilation and integration in their new host societies. There are two empirical variables that further this unique perspective Spanish Moroccans maintain in their relationships with these institutions and organizations including 1. Immigrant Community Spheres 2. Collective Memory. The literature in immigration studies contends that immigrant institutions are important for multiple reasons including facilitating migrant assimilation processes in the home contexts (Portes and Zhou 1992) and provide social services to the community (Mohl & Betten 1981). These scholars also paid attention to the multiple roles religious institutions partake in facilitating immigrant assimilation including middlemen minority theories (Bonacich 1973), enclave economy hypothesis (Piore 1979), family institution (Nee & Sanders 2001) and voluntary organizations (Brettel 2005). Moreover, the literature on religious organizations and institutions primarily focus on the particular ways they reinforce ethnic and racial identity construction and maintenance (Min 1992; Ebaugh & Chafetz 2000) rather than religious identity formation. However, these generalizations do not capture the unique and complex experiences of Spanish Moroccan immigration to Europe.

The non-existent Spanish Moroccan formal economic sector in Spanish society ceases the utility of the middlemen and or enclave economic theoretical approaches to
understand the aforementioned institutions. Moreover, while the family institution was important for most of my participants, the realities of Spanish Moroccan migration to Spain meant that most of my participant’s familial networks, primary and secondary were not intact as most immigrants are single men (Gest 2011). Finally, voluntary organizations are important for immigrant assimilation and adaptation in new migrant contexts, however for my participants the lack of participation in any mainstream organizational capacity was the norm for my participants. In fact a survey of Moroccans in Spain found that only 2.4 percent of all respondents had ever voted in an official election (Gest 2011: 139). Gest found in his study on Moroccan associationalism and activism in Spain, “not a single respondent once mentioned any of the aforementioned institutional structures when prompted about their political involvement or the structures of involvement in their local community” (Gest 2011: 139). Moreover, in Gest’s interviews with an unidentified Spanish minister he bluntly stated, “The Moroccans have no idea, no vision, of where they want to direct their people. What status or posts do Moroccans occupy in their own communities? Syrians are doctors! Engineers! Moroccans who are working 12- hour days don’t have the time for this stuff….The parents can’t be bothered with participation. There are zero Moroccan organizations in the hands of the second generation of Moroccans in Spain. They’re not even active or socialized in the civic communities of their own locality: the mosques. They need to be leaders” (Gest 2011: 140).

The realities for my participants meant that the institutions of importance are often demarcated and bounded around differing cultural, religious, and political frameworks and commonalities that reflect localized provenance of the Spanish
Moroccan community. This institutional form and structure deviates from traditional organizational cultural frameworks and manifest themselves differently with each institution (mosque, café, monuments). The analytical concept needed to capture this development is Immigrant Community Spheres (IC spheres). IC Spheres are institutions that individual migrants and movements employ to have access to variegated forms of capital without any formal membership. These institutions act like informal social services for migrants providing direct assistance and social networks that lead to economic and social adaptation (Bankston & Zhou 2000). The IC spheres have fractal like dimensions and are bounded by Muslim imagined solidarities provided by the concept of the Ummah. My participants utilized these institutional arrangements in order to pursue assimilation and integration in their host societies. These spheres of capital allow individuals and movements a presence in their host societies but also impose their own socio-historical and religious constraints on the individual’s identity construction.

The second important framework was the factor of collective memory.

The importance of collective memory in identity construction is noted in the literature by sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (Halbwachs 1992; Anderson 2004). In, “Collective Memory,” Halbwach’s discusses how groups in set cultures construct ‘memory communities that shares the ‘space’ of a geographical context (Halbwachs 1992). This space, “creates fluid, transnational spaces, which are defined as both a social terrain that reflects migrants’ bi-culturality and a fragmented, diffused geographical reality” (Mendoza 2006: 539). In contemporary Spain, memory is increasingly playing a dynamic role in how the Spanish nation-state is overseeing their minorities and inversely how Spanish-Moroccan minorities are collectively responding to
the hegemonic formations of national identity construction via racialization/Islamophobia.

Moreover, the process of remembrance is very difficult as Muller asserts, “memory shapes the present constellations,” specifically in these contexts because, “collective memory constrains, but also enables new policies” (Muller 2002: 2). Accordingly, in modern Spain the hegemonic memories produced by the state are progressively evolving as Spanish society is compelled and often times forced to engage in a dialogue with its past both as colonizer and colonized. In this respect, Spanish Moroccan communities in Spain are not only challenging the ‘collective memories’ of a hegemonic Christian Spanish state but are also in the process of recreating and reconstructing what it means to be a “Spaniard” in the modern world. Therefore, “when a society undergoes rapid developments that shatter its social and political order, its need to restructure the past is as great as its desire to set its future agenda” (Gillis 1996: 105-106). The history of Islam and the Moors in the Spanish context allows identities to evolve through the dynamics of inclusivity and exclusivity to reformulate meanings that restructure and unify the Spanish imagined community around their presence. This is important because the Muslim memories of Spain’s glorious past also situates and anchors the identity of Spanish Moroccans toward an inclusive Spanish state.

Beyond the historical consciousness, the existence of physical monuments including Sufi shrines, mosques, tombs, and linguistic influences consciously and unconsciously impose a Muslim-Moroccan link to the greater Spanish national narrative. These ‘monuments’ facilitate identity negotiation that allows for the Spanish Moroccans to obtain agency in defining their presence and grandeur narrative. Olin and Nelson’s cite
three components of interaction with the “monument” as represented in travel, time, and
destruction and reconstruction that facilitates this process of memory construction and
provides greater insight into the intricacies of DCR and Spanish Moroccan minority

**Macro-level: The Ummah: Islamic Social Movements and Arab Satellite Television**

Transnational scapes are increasingly playing a dominant role in shaping and
formulating contemporary Spanish Moroccan identities. This dissertation utilizes the
concept of the Ummah to develop and shed light on the second racializing ideology in the
DCR formulation that is steeped in Islamic history and society. I utilize the concept of
Ummah to describe the imagined solidaristic ideological strains that exist among and
within Spanish Moroccan communities. The basis of the Ummah in Islamic legal theory
is its emphasis on the primacy of Muslim identity and practice as it signifies all members
of the Muslim community in its broadest frames (Lawrence: 2005; 2). Moreover, it seeks
to superimpose the primacy of Muslim religious affinities; whilst congealing other
identity forms as secondary (Lewis 1994). The Ummah is constituted through ones tie to
a larger historical imagination which reinforces ones affiliations to a collective identity
bounded by Islamic institutional and cultural norms.

In the case of Spanish Moroccans, the impact of the Ummah is a direct product of
Islamic history and politics in the historical Maghreb region. Since the establishment and
institutionalization of Islam in the early 8th century, through to the present monarch
Mohammed VI of the Alawi dynasty; the Ummah has consciously and unconsciously
shaped state, communal, and individual identities around the supremacy of Islamic
religious identity over all racial, ethnic, and national identifiers. However, the spread and
impact of the Ummah on a given community is always shaped by the ideologies of those imposing and defining the concept in a given community. Thus, understanding who or what is appropriating and transmitting the Ummah to the Spanish Moroccan communities via transnational networks and state actors identified in my research is critical to understand how identity is negotiated in this context. This dissertation found three major transnational scapes transmitting the Ummah ideology that have their origin in the Muslim world but are internalized and grounded in the Spanish Moroccan social experience. These scapes include the racialized nationalist ideologies originating from the Muslim world and reinforced through travel, Arab Satellite television, and Islamic movements and networks.

**Morocco, Ummah, and Racialization**

Racial and ethnic ideologies have been steeped within the past formulations of a ‘Moroccan’ national identity since the advent of Islam in the eighth century. The Moroccan state has pursued policies throughout its history to reinforce political and economic domination over the non-Arab populations of Morocco by emphasizing Islamic-Arab identity over other all ethnic and racial identities. This policy was driven by a desire to unify the fluid territorial boundaries of what is today modern Morocco, and to co-op the large Berber population who opposed the central government on ethnic claims. This insuperable emphasis on Islamic identity via the Ummah not only delegitimized resistance towards the State it also racialized the Moroccan population towards being Muslim/Arab first.

In the past twenty five years only a handful of books and articles have addressed the normative question of race and ethnicity in the Moroccan context (Ennaji1999; Hamel
2002). In his analysis of race and slavery in the Middle East, Lewis pointed out three developments of why and how the Arabs (North African and Levant) constructed a superior attitude towards the Black/Berber indigenous African population including: 1. Fact of conquest which divided the Arabs from the non-Arab; 2. The Arab slave trade; 3. The need for a united cohesive centralized State apparatus (Lewis 1994), which is tied to what Ali Mazrui (1973) calls Arabism. Arabist ideology, which is at the core of governing regimes in the Arab world, has two main components 1. The racial definition in terms of membership, or claimed genealogical membership to an Arab tribe in the Arab Gulf where we find the origins of Islam (Moroccan King claims direct lineage to the Prophet Muhammad); 2. Subjective linguistic definition supported by religious ideology i.e the Ummah (Mazrui 1973:68).

These racialized ideologies via the Ummah have governed Moroccan lives since the eighth century and have structured the political and social arrangements in Moroccan history. These policies have had a dramatic impact on a country that is 60-70% ethnically Berber. In this dissertation, the strategies employed by Spanish Moroccans of Berber heritage reinforced these racialized paradigms as nearly all claimed a Muslim/Arab identity over their Berber ethnic identity. As Deng explains this is primarily because, “Islam (and its principle religio-principle the Ummah) is a total system, a religion, a civilization, a way of life, and a polity, was the central fact in life and the main object of loyalty. It was through its association with Islam that Arabism also had become a subject of pride, not only among the Arabs but throughout the Muslim world where people proudly explain their Arab connections and ancestry (true or imagined) as well as their Islamic identity" (Deng 1995:423).
**Arab Satellite TV**

The impact of globalization and mass media has proliferated the transmission of Islamic symbols across transnational boundaries reinforcing and exposing new landscapes to alternative collectivities and memorial practices (Allievi & Nielson 2003). The revolution in mass media in the Muslim world has challenged the traditional hierarchy of control within the State as it allowed for greater social and political inclusiveness; while also triggering and subsequently facilitating the construction of new identities. The emergence of Al Jazeera News Channel, MBC, 2M, Al Arabiya, Iqra religious programming and hundreds of other channels have facilitated for the emergence of multiple discourses that essentially decentered the grand narratives in the post-colonial Arab world; while simultaneously allowing for multiple actors to superimpose their political and social projects.

The democratization of Arab satellite TV has facilitated the capacity of multiple actors to exercise direct and in-direct political control of the “Arab street” by shaping the competing narratives and prevailing ideologies. For example, Al Jazeera News Channel is often cited as the foreign policy arm of the Qatari government, one only has to compare their coverage of the conflict and revolutionary activity in Libya in which the Qatari government wholly supported and the revolution in neighboring Bahrain in which the Qatari government was communicably and actively against. Moreover, the religious programming organized and funded by Saudi Arabian Salafi and Wahabi organizations serve the hegemonic ideological interests of the Saudi state as they are successful in spreading a literalist interpretation of Islam, while also reinforcing an interpretation that is supportive of the monarchy and their supposed leadership in the Muslim world (Al-
Rasheed 2004). This recent technological revolution in the Arab world has a far-reaching, pervasive effect on Spanish Moroccan migrants as their access to Arabic satellite television is gradually amalgamating the capabilities of international Arab media to racialize their social experiences around Islamic and Arabic identity.

Multiple scholars have documented the rise of Arabic satellite television and how its symbolic power is shaping Arab identity and politics (Rugh 2004; Seib, 2007, 2008; Kraidy & Khalil 2009). The television has become the systematic medium for the transmission of knowledge and identities in our modern world fostering and constructing, “the rise of hundreds of 'minorities' who in perceiving a wider world, begin to see themselves as unfairly isolated in some pocket of it” (Meyrowitz & Maguire 1993: 42). This is important because the television medium produces competing narratives and implicit references that are often presented to the viewer as declaratively neutral but are in reality comprehensive communicable structures that are appropriated by various political and economic actors to hegemonically shape individual and collective identity.

While many scholars have highlighted the tremendous impact of Arabic satellite television on the future trajectory of the Arab world there are no major studies that have analyzed the impact of Arab satellite TV on Muslim or Arab migrant identity in Europe (Ayish 1997; Alterman 1998; Campagna 2001). The themes that emerged in the literature reaffirm the relational connectedness of these satellite channels in shaping the transnational Arab viewer. In the seminal study on satellite TV and Al Jazeera, Lynch found that Al Jazeera promotes distinctive transnational identities by embedding the oriented news frames with Islamic issues and causes (2006). Cherribi argues that Al-Jazeera’s goals are to “build a global Muslim identity, mobilize a shared public opinion,
and construct an imagined transnational Muslim community” (2006: 121). The symbolic powers experienced by the viewers are perniciously shaping their cultural and political realities towards schemas that are construing commonalities and affinities with the Ummah.

When I asked my participants about their experiences with media institutions in Spain nearly all stated they were not active viewers of Spanish television but primarily viewed Arabic satellite TV. These channels are playing an essential role in informing Spanish Moroccan identities by selectively reinforcing a common discourse on religion and ethnicity that are affiliated with identities outside of the Spanish state. The hegemonic frames produced by State and private actors reinforce pan-Islamic /Arabic identities among and within the Spanish Moroccan community. This allows a banal form of Islamic collective identity to emerge which explicitly references the Ummah in superimposing cultural and religious commonality; in order to exercise political and social control. Spanish Moroccan identity formation and negotiation is thus fragmented and consolidated around the far-reaching projections of the Ummah ideology which besieges and decenters the State as the primary source of identity.

The symbolic and ideological power of media institutions has become problematic for Spanish Moroccans who are nearly 60 - 70 percent non-Arab and speak a regional dialect of Arabic as their second language. For the Berber speaking Spanish Moroccan minority, they often have no choice but to depend on these Arabic satellite channels as an alternative to Spanish TV. Moreover, there are no Berber satellite TV channels as they are officially banned in Morocco and other North African states with a
significant Berber presence. Consequently, these channels are able to fashion the Spanish Moroccan experience by manufacturing racializing discourses that are distinctively bound by the Arabic language and Islamic identity and practice. The Arab satellite channels project Islamic unity as Arab unity and thus reinforce Islamic-Arab racial identity claims over all ethnic and racial identities. For Moroccans, who are predominantly Berber, this transnational communicative scapes allows for hegemonic Islamic and Arab discourses to shape affinities and narratives beyond their Spanish Moroccan realities. As a result, Arab majority states and non-state actors employ new-media mechanisms to reinforce identity claims in order to close, “the sense of distance among Arabs and Muslims, bringing them together in real times and in a common language alongside intense images and a shared political discourse (Lynch 2006: 41).” The Ummah ideology is transformed and appropriated by the powers behind these television channels and racialize the Spanish Moroccans towards a pan-Islamic Arab identity. My research suggests the homogenizing effect of these satellite channels in reinforcing pan Arab/ pan Islamic identities among Spanish Moroccans has become normative and real in racializing Spanish Moroccan social experiences.

**Islamic Social Movements**

The globalization of religion and in particular the rise of religious movements has allowed for new questions to arise regarding the role and impact of transnational movements on European Muslim communities (Wiktorowicz 2004). A unique development and underlying characteristic of all Islamic movements is their transnational disposition, rendering movement frameworks that move beyond primordial loyalties

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4 This is no longer the case especially after the reforms instituted by the King Muhammed VI where Berber language is now recognized as an official national language.
traditionally inherent in Muslim societies (Wictorowicz 2004). The movements’
detachment from the nation-state, tribe, race, ethnic identity, and family has allowed for
the construction of new ideological sentiments and discourses that are grounded in the
Islamic faith, or the perceived commonness that exists between and among Muslims.
Thus, allowing Islamic movements like the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), Dawah
Salafiyya (Saudi Arabia), Adl Ihsan (Morocco), and the Tablighi Jamaat (Pakistan) to
sustain their presence and objectives within Muslim communities in various socio-
political and economic contexts including contemporary Spain. For this dissertation, I
define Islamic movements as any collective group action with some relative degree of
organization that seeks to promote a conception of Islam into the public sphere. This
broad definition accommodates a variety of contemporary Islamic movements that I have
found to have a presence in Madrid, playing a critical role in shaping religious identity
and discourse among Spanish Muslims.

Islamic movements perpetuate and reinforce their Islamic ideologies by
employing the Ummah in movement frames and action (Meijer 2005). This totalizing
narrative is reinforced by subjective and objective repertoires that are supported by global
economic transformations and the cultural and social impact of globalization which is for
the first time allowing Islamic movements and Muslims in general to actualize and
construct a truly global imagined community. For the first time in history, a Spanish
Moroccan Muslim is a potential member for a movement that seeks to fight in
Afghanistan and Iraq or is actively supporting rebel movements in Kosovo, Kashmir,
Chechnya, or Mindanao (Kepel 2002).
Since Islamic movements seek to promote Islam in the public sphere and State, the importance of the Ummah takes precedence over other primordial identities, which allows Islamic movements to construct their objectives within an Islamic ethos. These movements are able to use the IC spheres to spread their ideologies and create and reinforce a multiplicity of nodes that are no longer distinctively defined by racial, ethnic, or national claims but are bounded by Muslim solidarities as represented by the Ummah (Wiktorowicz 2004). These movements have a tremendous impact on Spanish Moroccan identity as they have access to institutions (mosque) that are central to Islamic religious norms while also defining and fashioning their interpretation of who or what should consist of the Ummah. The transnational character of these movements and its ideological frames which emphasize Islamic religious unity allow for the movements to not only shape identity but also be more inclusive of Muslim racial and ethnic groups that may be alienated migrants in their new societies (Bayat 2005). Consequently, these movements "work for the recognition of Islam or as its spokesperson in dealing with European states or with the majority of Muslims who are not concerned with political Islam" (Boubekeur 2007: 14). Thus, in questioning my participants about the impact of Islamic movements on identity construction, I found a positive indication that the presence and interaction of these movements in Muslim community life shapes identity dynamics among Spanish Moroccans in Madrid.

A Note on Trans-locality and Dual Communal Racialization

It is important to situate this research in the concept of trans-locality to understand how DCR as an analytical category is capturing Spanish Moroccan identity negotiations in the grounded realities of trans-local networks. The concepts afforded by transnational
migration studies systematically explore minority migration and integration as embedded in the migrant’s experience and socialization in the home and receiving countries (Schiller, Basch & Blanc 1994). This is important because the study of “immigrant populations, their patterns of social relations and systems of meanings have continued to be enmeshed within theories that approach each society as a discrete and bounded entity with its own separate economy, culture and historical trajectory” (Schiller, Basch, & Blanc 1994: 6).

The recent shift in transnational migration studies toward what Levitt and Jaworsky (2007), call the third perspective reveals how migrants are active in both the homeland and the receiving countries in relation to the cultural, political, and economic arena (Smith & Guarnizo 1998; Kivisto 2001; Kyle 2000; Levitt 2001). This encapsulates the notion that nationalism is not always defined strictly by territorial boundaries but also by different forms of loyalties that exist among variegated groups of people who experience identity politics differently than what is expected of the state. In trying to understand DCR, what immediately emerged in the field was the station Spanish Moroccans occupy in contemporary Spain, which included a localized provenance while simultaneously being situated in global processes and scapes that move beyond the nation state.

Cultural studies scholars have been at the forefront in locating this distinct landscape that is often fluid and constantly shifting (Appadurai 1996; Bhabha 1990). Trans-locality brings this research together as it allowed this study to link the experiences and ideological negotiations Spanish Moroccans collectively participate in at the micro, meso, and macro level of analysis; while detaching from often-used theoretical paradigms
and theories of assimilation and integration that are commonly used to describe the experiences of first and second generation communities in the West. Brickell and Datta suggest, "that localities need not necessarily be limited to the shared social relations of local histories, experiences and relations, but can connect to wider geographical histories and processes – in a way that articulates a ‘global ethnography of place (2004:3)." Thus, in viewing my participants from within the paradigmatic lens of trans-locality, I was able to gain tremendous insight into the manifold ways identities are being produced and reproduced.

Nevertheless, while studies that emphasize trans-local experiences tend to 'ignore' the local, Kastoryano suggests that in no way has this led to the erosion of the local as it only facilitates change and redefinition of how states are shifting in order to adapt (2003:4). The evidence presented in this study suggest that the local, micro level experiences of Spanish Moroccans are shaping their identities via Islamophobia towards Islam and Muslim identity; however the emergence of this localized identity allowed for Spanish Moroccans capacity for memory to mobilize new collectivities which reorder their relationships toward Spain by claiming authentic Spanish Muslim identity that goes back 1300 years. Thus, how the Spanish state monopolizes identity and how these localized identities are challenging it are yet to be seen.

The other component of DCR that emphasizes the interactions and experiences of my participants at the transnational level is also perpetuating multiple questions for Spanish Moroccans in regards to identity frames that have their origin beyond the nation-state. The Ummah and its ideological commitments allows itself to perpetuate its presence in Spanish society through the flows of people, movements, ideas, practices that
the bounded nation-state can no longer control. Consequently, breaking down traditional identities and allowing for a proliferation of competing voices to be heard. Thus, racializing programs that exist at the transnational level via movements, media, and travel that permeates through the movement of people and ideas must be understood and evaluated on its own standing. Understanding the dualistic processes that shape the lives and identities of Spanish Moroccans is critical to understand how negotiation is managed and structured in contemporary Spain.

**Plan of the Dissertation**

In my quest to present how DCR is lived by Spanish Moroccan communities in Madrid, I organized the dissertation into seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides a background and logic behind my research. This chapter will introduce the grounded theory method along with sampling issues and data analysis. I will also discuss how DCR emerged in the data, positionality, and difficulties encountered in the field. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth analysis on historical relations between Spain and Morocco with an emphasis on how Spanish national and racial identity was constructed in the context of Othering the Muslim populations in Spain.

This chapter provides a background not only to the understanding behind Spanish racial ideologies but also gives a greater context to the persistence of these ideologies in contemporary Spain. The chapter situates the above in the context of a general survey of Spanish Moroccan historical relations. Chapter 4-6 are my substantive chapters and address the specific components of Dual Communal Racialization at the micro, meso, and macro levels with each chapter providing the ideological landscape that encompasses DCR among Spanish Moroccans in Spain.
Chapter 4 will present the discourse produced by Spanish Moroccans in response to Islamophobia in Spanish society. I reveal how Spanish Moroccans are racialized via everyday social interactions at work, educational institutions, and in the public sphere. This chapter discloses how Islamophobia is internalized and experienced vis-à-vis processes within the Spanish state and society that shape their Muslim racialized identities. Moreover, I address the impact of Islamophobic aggression on my female participants and how that impact gender relation for the Spanish Moroccan community. I end the chapter by discussing the multiple ways my participants responded to Islamophobic aggressions by internalizing claims that resisted Islamophobia while linking identity to the larger Spanish narrative.

In Chapter 5, I examine the ideology of the Ummah as its produced by transnational racial ideologies emerging from Morocco, Islamic Movements, and Arab Satellite television. This chapter reveals how the Spanish context facilitates the movement of these transnational ideologies and how they are internalized and experienced by my participants. I show how multiple identities from different regions of the Islamic world are racializing Spanish Moroccans towards a Muslim-Arab identity shaping ideas about Islam and the Ummah. In addition, I discuss the ways these identities also shape Islamic norms for my female participants in their gendered relations with other Muslims and non-Muslims. Finally, I conclude how the Ummah facilitates and shifts Spanish Moroccan identity towards the Spanish state and the global Muslim community.

In Chapter 6, I examine Spanish Moroccan relations and interactions with institutions that provide community, meaning, and variegated forms of capital for my participants. I utilize the aforementioned concept of immigrant community spheres to
demonstrate how the mosques, cafes, and monuments become sites where dual communal racialization is often revealed. I first talk about the mosque, monument, and cafe institutions in Spain with an emphasis on the interactional experiences of my participants to reveal the particular ways they have shaped identity and integration in Spain. I also discuss the perceived ethnic and racial neutrality of these institutions for not only my Spanish Moroccan participants but the global Muslim community to show how Muslim religious imagined solidarities are central to understanding IC Spheres in contemporary Spain. I end the chapter with concluding remarks about the existing relationships between dual communal racialization, immigrant community spheres, and Western Muslim immigration.

In the final chapter, I end with a succinct summary of the main points of the previous chapters and draw out the theoretical implications of dual communal racializations and immigrant community spheres in the Spanish context and how similar research models utilizing dual communal racialization and immigrant community spheres can be used in variegated global contexts. I will end with a discussion on further research suggestions and critiques of dual communal racialization and my overall research.
Chapter 2: Researching Spanish Moroccan Identity: Design and Methods

In moving beyond what Wimmer and Schiller (2002) call methodological nationalism or ‘simplistic national comparisons,’ this dissertation research sought to “conceptualize spaces as bounded in the ways that the people living within them actually perceive them” (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007:142). This study on Spanish Moroccan identity negotiations employs multiple methods including historical research and qualitative research strategies in order to theorize and understand the “pluri-local spaces” that Spanish Moroccan minorities occupy in contemporary Spain (Pries 2005).

In doing so, I avoid what Comaraff calls the “Ethnographic present” (1992) by situating minority identities in the past to shed light on the present (Chapter 3). Accordingly, this dissertation investigates and develops an understanding of the processes and meanings through which Spanish-Moroccan minorities negotiate and articulate racial, religious, and ethnic identities in contemporary Spain. By examining the multiple projects that are shaping the lives of Spanish Moroccans, we are able to understand how they are racialized in their lived trans-local realities.

I accomplished these goals through qualitative research strategies as they are based on interpretive philosophy and the inductive method of research. In utilizing qualitative analysis, my research was able to capture and understand how people interpret events and lived experiences that shape meaning in their interpersonal lives while also allowing me to capture their identities through the concept of dual communal racialization. Thus, this study addressed the research gaps in the following areas: 1) a lack of research on Muslim minorities in Spain; 2) very little research has been done on European Muslim negotiation of their ethnic and racial identities as they are perceived to
only be formulated in the sending or receiving nation; 3) previous research lacks a focus on the processes and meanings associated with European Muslims identity at the intersection of history, collective memory, and transnational migration.

The following questions that guided this research explored how Spanish Moroccans are negotiating their identities in the post 5-11 context:

1. How do Spanish Moroccans in Madrid negotiate their identities in post 3-11 Spain?
2. What are the discourses of racial, ethnic, and religious identity among Spanish-Moroccans in Madrid?
3. What are the contextual and structural factors that shape the layers of racial and ethnic identity?
4. How do discourses and lived experiences differ if at all by generation, ethnicity, or gender?

The above research questions were designed to provide the initial impetus and focus to determine the scope of the study. Moreover, these questions provided the flexibility to expand and explore new theoretical developments and concepts that emerged in the field and in the data analysis in order to reach new areas of inquiry (Strauss & Corbin 1998). The study utilized important methodological components of grounded theory to develop an in-depth understanding of the lived experiences surrounding identity negotiation of the participants in this study. A total of 33 interviews were conducted between March 2011 and May 2011 to understand the discourses that situate identity construction in post 5-11 Spain. The criteria of this study required that each participant be a Spanish citizen of Moroccan descent, be of first, 1.5, and second generation, and be 18 years or older.
Understanding Qualitative Methods

Qualitative research methodology is, “multi-method in focus and involves an interpretive and naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994:2). Thus, to fully understand and grasp how meaning and perspectives on identity and race were constructed, negotiated, and internalized by the participants, Geertzian thick description was needed. These “socially constructed meanings” are created and formulated in the process of social interaction (Guba and Lincoln 1989:86) and thus are windows into the participant’s lives as they are developed, experienced, and perceived by the participants. The importance of allowing for setting and context to dictate theoretical construction is important especially because of the lack of theoretical models that exist in the study of Muslim minorities in Europe. Moreover, imposing a set theoretical framework on this study using deductive methodologies does not allow me to address the research questions postulated. Due to the nature of my research questions, I have utilized many components of grounded theory (Glaser 1978) to capture the lived experiences of Spanish Moroccans in contemporary Spain.

In utilizing components of the grounded theory method allows a researcher to develop theory from the systematic collection and analysis of data (Glaser 1978). I was able to build theoretical frameworks and concepts to explain the data collected in the field in order to continually refine and develop the research outcomes and findings into my main theoretical paradigm of Dual Communal Racialization (Glaser 1978). As a result, there is an intricate relationship between collecting data, analysis, and concept
construction to develop new and emerging theories to explain the social phenomena studied.

This allows for meaningful insight into the data collected, while also capturing the participant’s agency in meaning construction. This component of grounded theory was critical in my research as it allowed me to always go back to my notes, observations, and my interviews during the research process to develop concepts that allowed me to change and explore different directions emerging in the data that reflect the unique lives of Spanish Moroccans. I also found that this approach was faithful to my participants as it allowed for accurate interpretations of the relationships and lived experiences observed and to “offer insight, enhance understanding, and provide a meaningful guide to action” (Strauss & Corbin 1998:12) and theoretical development and analysis.

A key component of grounded theory is the constant comparative method. This was employed throughout my research process to look at the interplay between data, codes, and analyses at all levels of theoretical development (Glaser 1978). I was able to do this by reviewing the recorded interviews, reading field notes, and journal to look at the interplay of these three components of the research process. The constant comparative method allowed me to fine tune and develop theoretical categories and concepts but also shift in different directions during the research process to explore the emerging questions.

I tested the emerging concepts and phrases and then compared and contrasted the actions, views, and perspectives that emerged in the data. For example, when I asked my participants about their leisure activities, many cited the importance of Arabic satellite TV as it addressed their connection to home, political perspectives, and source of information about the world. After reviewing my interviews, I decided to include a set of
questions on Arab media and satellite television to capture these processes. This happened many times during the research process wherein I found the implicit and often ignored practices of my study participants.

The key findings that emerged from this process allowed for multiple conceptual and theoretical dimensions to emerge that were essential in framing the central theory of DCR. Another important component of grounded theory that guided my research process was the concept of theoretical sensitivity. This component helps the researcher to inductively be open to and test multiple explanations against the emerging data through my daily interview analysis (Strauss & Corbin 1998). The researcher is able to sensitize oneself to the emerging data through interaction with the ongoing and developing analysis to allow access to variegated meanings and concepts (Glaser 1978).

Theoretical sensitivity is derived from numerous sources including literature, personal experience, life history, and biography (Strauss & Corbin 1998). This was important to my overall study, as I had previous experiences visiting Spanish Moroccan communities, an in-depth knowledge of Moroccan and Spanish history, and a personal biography connected to the region, and finally I was aware of the cultural norms that exist within and among Spanish Moroccan community. As a result, one of the unexpected developments that emerged during my research process was the general ease I had in having access and maintaining rapport with the Spanish Moroccan community.

Finally, memo writing was critical for my research as it situated and contextualized the emerging data in order to connect the interpretation with observation in trying to develop and formulate ideas and properties surrounding the emerging concepts. Strauss and Corbin state that, "Memos are important documents because they
record the progress, thoughts, feelings, and directions of the research and researcher— in fact the entire gestalt of the research process (1998:218).” I always kept a journal with me at all times to capture and describe every setting I attended that was significant to my overall research goals. The notes in my journal included descriptions of mosques, cafes, sports events, rallies and protests, the urban environment, social interactions, family homes, buses, and finally the physical and emotional developments and changes that occurred during the interview. I also took notes during speeches at the mosque, interactions at the café, a protest in Plaza Del Sol against Syrian brutal tactics against the civilian population.

This was critically important as it allowed me to contextualize the data and provide an analysis of the setting which was important in later interpretations of the interviews. I also reviewed my interviews daily and made notes on the participant’s responses in order to formulate concrete ideas, concepts, and potential irregularities. Moreover, this tremendously helped when doing transcription as I was consistent in the process of translation.

**Date Collection**

Qualitative methods and grounded theory in general recognize the multiple mediums for data collection; however the primary mode of research inquiry is the interview. The goal is to attain a personal interactional perspective of the subjects’ experiences and interpretation of his/her life. The interview process allows the questions to flow by gathering information and analyzing it until one achieves theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss 1967). The interviewing method used in this dissertation research follows the general interview guide and informal conversational interview. This allowed
me to engage in in-depth conversations to explore the parameters of identity negotiation and construction while also to build a personal relationship with my participants. The general interview guide (See Appendix) allowed me to develop and outline a systematic and comprehensive approach to understanding Spanish Moroccan identity negotiations by building conversations on predetermined subjects that were gathered and collected prior to the interview. The informal conversational interview was utilized with participants before and after the interview to follow through on questions that I asked during the general interview.

My criteria for inclusion (i.e. Spanish Moroccans from Madrid) sought to make sure that my data collection is inclusive of all possible participants in order to construct as many categories and concepts as possible. I included only Spanish Moroccan citizens who are 18 years old and older. This was important as I wanted to emphasize and include only adults Spanish citizens in my study. The sample was limited to Spanish Moroccan citizens primarily because I wanted individuals who were legally viewed in Spanish society as citizens and who understood that their citizenship at least theoretically should not differentiate them legally, socially, and/or politically from any other Spaniard.

I tried to include an equal ratio of males and females, although I settled with a smaller female sample (12), compared to (21) males in which I fully expected; however my sample does represent the gender gap in migration patterns from Morocco to Spain. I nearly interviewed an equal number of participants among the various generations. I defined 1st generation as anyone who was born and raised in Morocco and came to Spain
as an adult (18+) years old. For the 1.5 generation, I constructed very open parameters to include Spanish Moroccans who came to Spain up to the age of 13.5.

Finally, my second generation participants were all born in Spain. To be considered second-generation, participants had to have at least one parent born in Morocco. Moreover, my focus on generational differences reflected the immigration patterns to Spain by Spanish Moroccans and also sought to address the question of assimilation which maintains that the second generation community is decisively in greater control in shaping their assimilation and integration processes in their “home” settings (Portes & Zhou 1997). Since Spanish Moroccans are recent migrants, it would nearly be impossible to find a third or fourth generation Spanish Moroccan who was not from one of the Spanish enclaves in Ceuta and Melilla. Consequently, the focus on first, 1.5, and second generation Spanish Moroccans is a reflection of the immigration realities of Spanish Moroccans.

I also tried to find participants who can represent the Moroccan regional differences to capture whether the history of French colonialism in Southern Morocco and Spanish Colonization in Northern Morocco had an impact on identity negotiation. My ultimate sample represented Northern Moroccans; although this does not represent the general migration patterns from Morocco to Spain, it means that I can say little about the impact of differential colonial histories. The latter remains for future research to explore. Finally, my sample sought to include a representative sample of Arab and Berber Spanish Moroccans. This was important because ethnic identity negotiation and

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5 I chose thirteen as the cutoff date primarily because eight out of the ten 1.5 generation participants were 12 and 13 years old when they migrated to Spain. Out of the eight participants, three did not know their birth age when they migrated to Spain and guessed their ages to be between 11 and 13 years old.
construction is quite politicized in contemporary Morocco and to understand how these identities were played out in the Spanish context reveal the dynamics behind the negotiations. Twenty out of the thirty-three participants in my study were of Berber origin which also represents the ethnic divide presently in Morocco.

Theoretical sampling was employed to facilitate the discovery process, “for generating theory whereby the researcher jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges” (Glaser 1978:36). Furthermore, theoretical sampling allowed me to follow where the data is “guiding me,” which requires a process of ongoing modification and re-modification of the theory developed in the data collecting process. Theoretical sampling allowed me to select participants based on their ability to contribute and develop the evolving theory to identify conceptually rich categories.

This was really important in my study as the challenge of finding particular participants in order to be inclusive in my analysis was quite difficult in regards to gender and second generation Spanish Moroccans. However, after multiple interviews with both of these categories I found that my female participants and second generation Spanish Moroccans conformed in their answers on identity and place in contemporary Spain and thus saturation was realized and I no longer sought to continually focus on these categories. Most of these participants were found in a number of sampling categories which include Moroccan eateries and cafes, Moroccan sporting events, and mosques.

For this dissertation, I interviewed 33 people, 21 Males and 12 females; 20 Berbers and 12 Arabs and 1 mixed Arab-Spanish; 15 first generation, 10 1.5 generation,
and 8 second generation. In terms of region I interviewed 22 from northern Morocco and 11 from southern Morocco. Please see appendix.

Table 1: Ethnicity of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Berber</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>Arab-Spanish Mix</th>
<th>Arab-Berber Mix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33 Participants</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Gender of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33 Participants</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Self + Researcher Racial Classification of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>White Arab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Regional Origin (Morocco)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Origin</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33 participants</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Spanish Moroccan Generations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>1.5</th>
<th>Second</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33 Participants</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Purposive sampling was also utilized in order to select participants who are, “information-rich cases” to develop the concept of dual communal racialization to the next level. This was important especially with my ethnic categorizations, as the Berber and Arab ethnic identity orientation became increasingly important in understanding racialization at the trans-local level. In order to accomplish this, I initially utilized snowball sampling to, “locate key informants who provide useful insights into the group and
can steer the researcher to information and contacts” (Creswell 1998: 60). Snow-ball sampling was utilized when I made contacts in the mosques in Madrid, eateries and fruiteria’s, and cafes. Maximum variation was utilized to gain informants who represent diverse backgrounds within the set criterions constructed for my research.

I integrated theoretical and purposive sampling throughout the research processes and I explored what became quite clear as two racial projects (Ummah and Islamophobia) were racializing the Spanish Moroccan community. These units became the basis of this study and shaped the further selection of participants (Glaser 1978). In my study, the sample size included 33 participants and theoretical saturation was reached at interview 19 and an additional 14 interviews were conducted to test emerging concepts and clarify theoretical developments especially on the questions surrounding gender and the generational divide between 1.5 and 2nd generation populations. No incentives were offered, beyond noting that this study would shed light on Spanish Moroccan identity negotiations and constructions in contemporary Spain. Permission to conduct research was given from the Institutional Review Board at the University of New Mexico. The information letter were developed and approved by the IRB. The information letter was given to my participants as signed consent was waived primarily

**Context**

My research study took place in multiple neighborhoods and pueblos in and around Madrid. Madrid was chosen for this study because:

1. Madrid has one of the largest Spanish-Moroccan populations in Spain at 70,000 (Gest 2011:133).
2. Geographically in Europe and not Spanish Africa where large Moroccan minorities reside.

3. Spanish-Moroccans are a small demographic minority in Madrid at nearly 70,000 in 2006 (Gest 2011:133), as opposed to other Spanish cities like Ceuta and Melilla where Spanish Moroccans are nearly half of the population.

4. There has been very little ethnographic research conducted on the Spanish Moroccan community in Madrid.

5. The majority of Spanish-Moroccans in Madrid are of first, 1.5, and second generation immigrant backgrounds.

The Spanish Moroccan community in Madrid primarily lives in pueblos surrounding the city including in Fuenlabrada, Getafe, and Pinto. In metropolitan Madrid, the Spanish Moroccans primarily reside in the neighborhoods of Tetuan and Levapies. When I first came to Madrid, I lived in an apartment in Levapies with a 1.5 generation Spanish Moroccan student attending University. He was my agent of entry as he introduced me to many Spanish Moroccan cafes, hangouts, and mosques where the Spanish Moroccan community primarily resides in Madrid. After a couple of weeks, I learned that the majority of Spanish Moroccans live in the outskirts of Madrid, particularly in the pueblos surrounding city. I would find that in these small communities outside of Madrid, Spanish Moroccans congregated around the mosque institution and cafes after work. I would spend a lot of time in the unofficial mosques and cafes establishing rapport and networks with these Spanish Moroccans in both the pueblos and in the city center. I would meet Spanish Moroccans of all backgrounds and generational divides in these institutions.
My original plan for entering my study sites was through organizations and institutions that represent Spanish Moroccans. However, when I first contacted the sampling categories through telephone, email, and even visited their offices I found that either their offices do not exist or they were closed. I also tried to connect with Spanish organizations that address migrant community needs and found that it was easier to connect with a broad range of Spanish Moroccans of differing socio-economic backgrounds at the mosque, cafes, eateries, halal shops, and at sporting events. While there are many organizations that address migrant needs they are mostly run by non-Spanish Moroccans and have few Spanish Moroccan participants thus it was quite difficult to obtain access. The only times that I found Spanish Moroccans who were actively participating in these institutions and organizations was when they set-up booths at the large mosques in Madrid as leftist political parties, unions, and migrant organizations sought to recruit Spanish Moroccans for their organizations. As an insider, I found that building and establishing trusting relationships in institutions that the Spanish Moroccans see as important provided me with greater access to the community than passing flyers out in neighborhoods or going to Spanish run institutions.

I had many difficulties finding and interviewing second generation Spanish Moroccans as they are a relatively new migrant community however I made attempts at Spanish universities where I mostly came across Moroccan exchange students. I would find more second generation Spanish Moroccans through my contacts at the sampling categories mentioned below. The question of gender was the most difficult aspect of my study as it was initially quite difficult to find female participants moreover it was very difficult to find women who were just “hanging out” at the main sampling categories.
except the Mosque where women had a positive and public role. Most of the female participants in my study were also found at these institutions either as workers or through my male contacts. The difficulties of having access to women was generally expected but fortunately I was able through contacts and my own positionality to create rapport with the men and women to conduct the necessary interviews.

**Sampling Categories**

I heavily sampled from three mosques in Madrid that have high Spanish Moroccan attendance. The first mosque is one of the newest and biggest mosques in Madrid. This mosque was funded by a multiple foreign governments and agencies to serve the larger Muslim community. The mosque is one of many cultural, religious, and political representatives of the Muslim community in Spain and is thus seen as the most important institution for the Spanish Moroccan community. The mosque participants had included many participants from many ethnic and racial communities however the Spanish Moroccan community were the largest. I attended daily prayers, Friday prayers, and talks given by Islamic scholars every Thursday night. I created connections with many people associated with the mosque including one of the prayer leaders. Five of my participants came from connections from this institution.

The second mosque attended had a very large non-Moroccan, African black population but was still dominated by the Spanish Moroccan community. This mosque is affiliated with a moderate international Islamic institution but is wholly independent. Two of my participants came for my connections with this institution.

The third mosque was an ethnically run mosque of non-Arab/Berber origin. This mosque has a strong influence from the Tablighi Jamaat movement from the Indian
subcontinent. The mosque is situated in one the largest immigrant neighborhoods in Madrid and is primarily attended by Spanish Moroccans and Indo-Pakistanis. Three of my participants came from my connections with this institution.

**Selected cafes and Moroccan centers**

The neighborhoods of Lavapies and Tetuan, and the pueblos of Fuenlabrada and Pinto all had “Spanish Moroccan localities” that connected anywhere from 5-10 shops that were owned by Spanish Moroccans. These shops almost always included a halal market, Moroccan barber, cafes, Moroccan eateries, and an unofficial prayer space/mosque. The majority of my participants in my study were found and or connected to these institutions. These cafes always had Arabic satellite TV on. Even when the Spanish Moroccan community gathered to watch the most important games of the year, the Classico, which matches Barcelona F.C from Catalonia and Real Madrid F.C. they tuned into Al Jazeera sport rather than Spanish TV. Moroccan Arabic was the primary language spoken in these neighborhood clusters.

These sampling categories not only provided me with potential participants, but also allowed for greater observation of Spanish Moroccan communities in their everyday lives to see how race and ethnicity is lived. The time I spent at the mosques, cafes, restaurants, and general hang out sessions has provided me with an insight into the everyday struggles that Spanish Moroccans experience. For example, whenever I would join a group of Spanish Moroccans in public we would be stopped by the police, questioned, and searched. I would ask the police officers why they stopped us and they would usually respond in a rude tone or manner and tell me to be quiet. However, their demeanor would change especially with me once they found out I was an American
national in which they would ease up and practice their limited English with me. This was so recurrent that whenever I would be with two or more Moroccans, I would expect to be stopped by the police. Thus, in interacting and observing the Spanish Moroccan communities in their lived contexts, I was able to understand and experience what they were relating to me in the interviews.

**Interviews**

The interviews lasted on average between 40 minutes to 1 hour and fifteen minutes and were usually conducted in cafés or at the participant’s home. Most of the participants preferred to talk at home however many of my interviews also took place at Café Espana in Fuenlabrada mall and Centro, Madrid. Prior to the official interview, I would engage with the participant in an informal interview discussing their life history, migration experiences, and my background as an American Moroccan Muslim. Once rapport was established through informal conversation, I would give the information letter to my participants to read and look over. Then I would go through all the points in the letter and ask for verbal consent. I did this in order to protect my participant’s identities in order to de-link them from any tie to the study and safeguard anonymity in the post 9-11 context. The interviews were conducted in Moroccan Arabic which I believe facilitated greater openness especially in the Spanish cafés as the Spanish couldn't understand what was being said. As one of my participants Mehdi (Int .25) said, “it doesn’t matter if I speak aloud they don’t understand nothing anyway.” The interviews generally followed the interview guide however if I believed during the process of the interview there was an important point that needed to be expanded upon I would delve deeper into the topic to get a greater understanding of their responses.
I recorded the interviews onto my laptop and would review them throughout the research process to understand the ideas and categories that may be formulating. I didn’t include four participants in my overall sample as they chose not to be recorded out of fear or discomfort of what might be said during the interview process. I didn’t include them primarily because it was really difficult for me to write notes while conducting the interviews. It took me a total of seven months after my last interview to transcribe and translate my interviews into English. It was a difficult process as I had to make sure that I was translating concepts succinctly throughout every interview.

I reviewed each transcript twice to ensure accuracy of the transcription and translation. Once all my interviews were completely transcribed and translated, I deleted the audio recordings as promised to my participants. The profiles of each interview’s do not use the actual names of individuals that I interviewed. Everything was coded to protect the identity/ anonymity of the participant. In the present transcribed data no identifiable markers are on my documents.

**Content of the Interview Guide**

The interview guide reflected the theories posited about the place of Muslim migrants in contemporary Europe while also capturing the realities of how identity is negotiated among Spanish Moroccans. Beyond the demographic questions, the interview guide focused on Spanish Moroccan perspectives on race, ethnicity, religion, and Spanish society. Moreover, it captured perspectives on Muslim-Non Muslim social relations, impact of media institutions, and relations with state institutions and finally transnational ideologies and flows. While I believe the interview guide was fairly comprehensive, I had to adapt and change it throughout the research process as new developments emerged.
regarding the importance of transnational movements, media, and ideologies. I included questions that reflected their trans-local realities to capture their lived experiences. The interviews brought to light how Spanish Moroccan actors perceive and construct identity at the micro, meso, and macro levels.

The interviews were designed to provide qualitative insights and findings in order to accumulate enough information about the Spanish Moroccan population to confidently project results. Moreover, concepts like racial identity and ethnicity were difficult to get across to my participants. For nearly all of my participants, when I asked about racial identity and or questions about racism they unanimously explained racism via Islamophobia; however, when I asked what race they would identify themselves with nearly ninety percent of my participant’s responded white and light brown even though nearly half of all my participants had darker skin and/or were black.

I would receive the same responses when I would ask about questions of race in Morocco. All the participants in my study acknowledged that racism is non-existent in Morocco. However, when I would pose a follow up question and ask what race do Moroccans in your experience were considered to be ‘pretty’ they generally stated the “lighter skinned one is always more beautiful.” Moreover, beyond their own traditional understanding of race and racial identity I found that the majority of my participants understood race in the Spanish context to reflect their religious identities while also including culture, skin color, name, and language.

The intersectionality of race, religious identity, and culture then created a difficult query in the research process as I tried to figure out how to exactly capture the negotiation of race, ethnicity, and religious identities as distinctive concepts from one
another. However, when my respondents viewed all three to be essentially informing one another then I began to think about the racial projects that are shaping these ideologies about race, religion, and ethnicity which eventually led me to think about dual communal racialization.

Accordingly, in trying to understand how they perceived their racial identities in Spain, I had to adjust and reconstruct the questions in a way that would allow me to capture this process. More importantly in doing so one must untangle these concepts from an American context which can be quite difficult and challenging but in doing so I was able to develop my interview guide to capture how race is lived, experienced, and understood in their context.

**Data Analysis**

Coding was used in data analysis in order to construct sound concepts and theoretical categories (Strauss & Corbin 1998). These codes are important in qualitative studies as they provide a systematic method to determine meaning of people’s actions moreover it allows for research subjectivities to be monitored and controlled. This study employs the grounded theory procedures included in the following:

1. Build rather than only test theory.
2. Give the research process the rigor necessary to make the theory “good” science.
3. Help the analyst to break through the biases and assumptions brought to, and that can develop during, the research process.
4. Provide the grounding, build the density, and develop the sensitivity and integration needed to generate a rich, tightly woven, explanatory theory that closely approximates the reality it represents (Strauss & Corbin 1990: 57).
The data analysis occurred in several different stages described further below. I first began by coding the data collected; the codes primarily emerged from the research questions and literature. Drawing on Omi and Winant’s (1994) work allowed me to frame race and racialization in developing ongoing categories and concepts. The coding procedures allowed me to probe and understand how Spanish Moroccans are constructing meaning around their lived realities in Spain. Once my interviews were transcribed, I utilized Hyperresearch software to code my transcribed data. This allowed me to see different patterns and themes more efficiently. However, I also utilized hand-coding as I re-read the transcripts to look over any themes I may have missed.

The specific process that I followed in coding included open coding where data "are broken down into discrete parts, closely examined and compared for similarities and differences" (Strauss & Corbin 1998:102). I examined the words expressed by participants that described their perspectives and experiences of the world they live in. Thus, each concept and important sentence is labeled as a distinct concept. I did this by reviewing the interviews multiple times to see the terminology and concepts that emerged in the initial process so I can begin jotting down concepts that I believe socially situate the Spanish Moroccans in their localities. I ended up with 26 broad-based concepts.

Once these concepts were clustered together in groups, I began to create categories that reflect the emerging data. Then I followed axial coding method to relate the categories constructed and make connections to develop a complete understanding about the lived experiences of Spanish Moroccans. I clustered the 26 concepts into 8 major concepts/themes. Finally, selective coding involves the process in which, "selecting the core category, systematically relating it to other categories, validating those
relationships, and filling in categories that need further refinement and development" (Strauss & Corbin 1990:116).

The core categories were needed to examine the patterns that developed in the data in order to identify larger themes that can characterize and uncover the questions being explored. The core categories that emerged fit within the larger goals of the project to see exactly how Spanish Moroccan identity is negotiated within the micro, meso, and macro levels. The conceptual categories on racial and ethnic identity, gender, citizenship, immigration, religion, politics, economics, travel, and historical memory were all categorized into the following core themes/topics that emerged in the data including but not limited to: Ummah, Islamophobia, translocality, new media, Islamic movements, community life (mosque and café), racialization, and racism.

The relationships between these categories allowed me to construct the dual communal racialization concept and social movement spheres to explain the lived realities of Spanish Moroccans in contemporary Spain. The emergence of various concepts and a major theoretical paradigm are represented in the words and explanations my participants shared with me about their lived identities. In order to select the quotes that best represent the core categories and concepts that emerged in my data, I created a Word doc to place the quotes I want to use in the dissertation project to explain and describe how identity is negotiated among Spanish Moroccans.

**Media and Mosque Analysis**

Some of the emerging components that were critical in my research and developed along with the research project were the impact of media institutions and the mosque sampling category. I found one of the most important racializing mechanisms
shaping Spanish Moroccan identities was Arab satellite television. Although media content analysis was not used in this study to see and listen exactly to what the Spanish Moroccans are listening to on satellite TV, I found that satellite television plays an increasingly important role in Spanish Moroccan lives. I sought to address the question of media analysis as it emerged in the data by relying on secondary sources and asking the Spanish Moroccans about their viewing experiences.

I asked questions on how much satellite television they watch, channels, type of programming, language and Arab regional preference. Then I immediately researched the satellite programs to gain a greater understanding of the satellite programs and their funders. I found the Moroccan satellite TV 2m was the most popular, Al Jazeera news and sports was second and various religious programs to be the third most popular. Another channel MBC 1, 2, 3 also were attentively watched for the free American movies and shows transmitted daily. I joined many of my participants in watching television programming especially as the Arab revolts were enveloping the Middle East.

Another unexpected development that emerged in my research that was important in my overall research study was the importance of the Mosque institution and Islamic movements in Spanish Moroccan identity negotiation. I increasingly found the mosque to be cited among my participants as the most important institution in their lives. Furthermore, I found many of participants identified with multiple strains of Islam that have their origin in many geographic regions of the Islamic world. As a result, I explored this by questioning how the Spanish Moroccan community claimed multiple religious identities that do not have their origins in Spain or Morocco. Consequently, I included questions about the institutions they find to be important in their lives, how they interpret
their religious identities and their involvement in movements in general (secular or religious) and then specifically discussed their involvement and influences.

**Establishing Rapport, Positionality, and Transparency**

Glesne and Peshkin (1992) argue that rapport is critically important to qualitative research and plays a crucial part in the data collection process. In reducing the distance between researcher and participant, the participants are able to open up with the researcher and convey their perspectives, inner feelings, and insights to the questions explored. This relationship is marked by confidence, understanding, loyalty, and trust to establish a mutually beneficial relationship. Conveying empathy and understanding is also another key strategy that is crucial in this process (Glesne and Peshkin 1992). I established rapport by emphasizing my identity links to the participants which had a tremendous impact on the personal relationships that developed and formed between me and the participants.

In order to secure the participants voice and perspective in my data, I tried to show cultural sensitivity and openness with my participants in order to prevent marginalization. My racial, religious, and gendered identities played a tremendous impact as many Spanish Moroccans viewed me as a Moroccan American Muslim. The participants were very much interested about my life as an American Muslim often thinking that American Muslims have it worse than they do in Spain primarily because of the 9-11 attacks and the immediate aftermath which targeted Muslims domestically and internationally. They viewed my beard as a sign of religiosity and thus believed that my own identity struggles and difficulties in the post 9-11 attacks in America mirrors their realities in post 5-11 Spain. They would ask me if I experienced any racist attacks during
or after the Afghan and Iraq wars. Moreover, they were thrilled that I spoke Moroccan
Arabic and held on to my 'culture' and 'religion.'

In order to maintain access and reinforce the rapport established, the researcher
must act in culturally appropriate ways that reflect understand and empathy of the
participant’s life world (Glesne and Peshkin 1992). The perception of religiosity or
traditional American Moroccan identity also facilitated greater contacts with female
participants as they perceived me as someone safe to converse without being negatively
labeled in the community. I interviewed mostly 'practicing, married women' although I
was successful in interviewing two single Spanish Moroccans. The interviews with
female participant often took place in front of their husbands so the interviews were laden
with religious terminology to reinforce religiosity and piety. However, many women
were frank about their experiences in Spain and were assertive and not passive in relaying
their perspectives. For example, with many men in my study it took a long time before
they warmed up to the interview and began speaking about their lives. However, for most
of my female participants they usually were not shy and opened up immediately as soon
as the interview commenced.

Beyond my own personal identity, my engagement and participation in the
everyday life world of the community through the networks of Spanish Moroccans
generated provided greater rapport with the individuals that compose it. It was generally
known when I lived or visited the given community what my intentions were and found
that many Spanish Moroccans welcomed my openness and wanted to tell their story.
There was a perception of mutual solidarity and interests in the community matters
through my engagement in informal community activities. This engagement was
primarily through conversations, watching soccer games, going to mosque activities, listening to talks given by Spanish Moroccans community leaders at mosques, going to protests (pro-Arab Spring protest 04/2011), and attending sporting activities. This participation allowed me to participate in community life.

**Study limitations**

This research on Spanish Moroccan negotiation of identities in post 5-11 Spain had many limitations. The noteworthy limitation lies with generalizability and researcher impact on narrative construction by the participants. The question of generalizability is often limited in research wherein qualitative inquiry is exploratory and unknown. However, because my inquiry and theoretical framework generated a clear grounded theory that can be applied to the lives of Spanish Moroccans I believe it should be relatively easy to replicate. The second limitation is the impact of researcher on the participant’s responses. This is a limitation that reflects the concerns of all researchers using qualitative methodologies. While the researcher can have both positive and negative impacts on the participant, it is important to be fully aware of all influences that shape ones data. A perfect example that occurred often throughout the interview process were the difficulties associated with translating concepts for my research questions as they were often structured in a way that was influenced by the English language rather than the local dialect.

A third limitation of this study is my female sample. While the numerical representation of females in my sample reflects the migration patterns from Morocco to Spain, I believe that my sampling of women from mosques and 'religious' oriented men may not fully capture the female Spanish Moroccan voice in my study. While there are
women who are living on their own it was rare to meet them or have access to them as they are usually on the periphery and are not involved in community life. Fourth, the use of Moroccan Arabic language may have also shaped the answers that I received from my participants as language shapes the realities and worldviews of communities. The use of Moroccan Arabic language in the interview process also limited my ability to capture concepts like race in which the Moroccan Arabic colloquial language does not elucidate accurately. Thus, I had to use many concepts in the Spanish language including race and immigration (la raza y migración). This allowed a mutual understanding of concepts not utilized in colloquial Moroccan Arabic while also facilitating the emergence of core concepts in my study.

Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest that a consideration and assessment of the grounding of a study include multiple criteria that elaborate on the analytic logic utilized by the researcher. This chapter sought to address multiple issues raised in qualitative and grounded theoretical approaches including the concepts generated, rationale for sample, elaboration of major categories, conditions of variations, and significance of theoretical findings (Strauss and Corbin 1998). While this study utilized aspects of the grounded theory method in developing our theoretical orientations, I believe my inclusive methodological approach that included the impact of social structures on my participant lives were key to understanding how Spanish Moroccans are negotiating their identities in contemporary Spain.
Chapter 3: Spanish Muslim History: Between Islamophobia and the Ummah

“I feel a deep sadness whenever I go to Toledo. And I try to go at least once a month to visit and also take my family out. It’s a great sadness that Spain was once a great Arab country. While Spain was in light the whole of Europe was in darkness. When the Muslims were scientists and scholars they can do anything. Now we look to America for everything that we do. But this is history and now is now. But going to these places reminds us of our past and who we were. This country unlike many Moroccans and Spanish don’t like to hear this when I say that this is my country. I don’t care about borders this country has my past and my kids are its future.”

Abdul Qadr (Int. 24).

To understand how dual communal racialization is impacting identity negotiations among the Spanish Moroccan community, we must take into account the history that has shaped the contemporary relationship between Spain and its Muslim minorities. This history which pre-dates modernity and European colonialism not only set the foundation and ideological justification for European imperialism but also shaped and formulated the racial ideologies and ensuing hierarchies that enslaved millions in the Americas and around the world. This chapter will situate the contemporary experiences of Spanish Moroccans in a historical context to reveal how these racialization processes, “shape the trajectory of historical experiences” (Almaguer 1994: 3), and institutionalize these ideological processes in contemporary Spain. In doing so, it will trace the history of the Muslim/Moroccan presence in Spain from the beginning of the Moorish empire through the Reconquista, 1609 expulsion of Spanish Muslims, Colonialism, and finally detail the
post-colonial context where Moroccans are once again one of the largest minorities in Spain. This history will reveal how racial and religious stigmatization and simultaneous structural subordination, the white Catholic Spanish populations were able to justify a Spanish manifest destiny to sow the seeds of white supremacy, domestically and globally.

The racist racial projects of white supremacy has its roots in 13th and 14th century Spain, as the Reconquista needed the ideological justification to construct a State that is exclusively Catholic and white (Harvey 2005). The anti-Muslim, anti-Jewish religious discourses reinforced racialized ideological frames to include only the Catholic faithful who had untainted, pure “Spanish” blood (Majid 2009). These policies were institutionalized with the downfall and takeover of every major city in Moorish Spain and would eventually justify the murderous inquisition campaigns of 1478 which ‘cleansed’ every Spanish Jew from the land of Spain either through conversion, migration, or death. This policy would later be formally applied to the Spanish Muslim populations beginning with the fall of the last Muslim kingdom of Granada in 1492 until the forced conversion and expulsion of all Muslims was accomplished in 1609. One only has to attend the tens of festivals in contemporary Spain and in the former empire that emulate and celebrate the Moorish versus Christian battles in which the Spanish Catholic faithful symbolically rid Spain of ‘Muslim impurity' but also constructed their new found nation on Moro blood (Fuchs 2009).

The Muslim conquest and centuries long presence in Moorish Spain is not only important in the construction of contemporary Spanish identity but is central in contemporary Muslim collective memory as its often highlighted in Muslim intellectual discourses and Islamic movement frames (Majid 2009). Islamic Spain is still considered
the Muslim beacon and highlight of Muslim civilization in the modern Muslim world. The foundation of Maliki Islamic law which governs many contemporary Muslim states was formulated in Islamic Spain, as were the ideas of some of the greatest Islamic philosophers and scholars who are foundational to contemporary Islamic philosophy and law. As one of my participants Amin (Int. 2) stated, "Spain is in the blood of every Muslim not just the Arab but every Muslim." Amin statement exemplifies not only the position of contemporary Muslim thinkers but also of Muslim movements who point to Spain to reconstruct and reclaim the glories of the "Ummah."

These attitudes are not only shaped by a historical buried memory but are foundational in the oppositional rhetoric constructed about the Other. As a result, this history has a dramatic impact on contemporary Spanish identity politics as they are opened up to multiple interpretations in the post-Franco era that is often not inclusive of its Muslim past. Moreover, this history also shapes the experiences of Spanish Moroccan minorities in contemporary Spain as their presence is bounded to the political projects that emanate from these multiple and sustained discursive frames about belonging and commonality. I constantly found myself as a researcher referring to the importance of this historical imagination in the consciousness of Spanish Moroccan Muslims as it contested the dominant narratives and the temporal dualism that Spanish history has constructed of Us versus Them.

Contemporary Spanish Moroccan identity is as much formulated in the contemporary socio-political and economic contexts as it was in the past and as much as I tried to delink contemporary identity negotiation practices from its historical context, I found that the symbolic power of this historical narrative is real and lived in both the
Spanish and Spanish Moroccan community. The trajectories of the Islamophobia and the Ummah racial projects are real in their lived consequences but have their origins in the political projects of the past and thus to try to understand and construct any credible reality to what it means to be a Spanish Moroccan in contemporary Spain, this chapter unearths and chronicles the embedded historical presence of Moroccans and Islam in Spanish history. This history as Mohamed (Int. 19) stated, "does not belong only to the Spanish but the world, Muslim and non-Muslim and even if Alejandro or Marco want to deny it they can't because every day when they go to work or shopping they see Morocco." This is the relational connectedness many of the Spanish Moroccans who I spoke with maintained when trying to understand their narrative in a country that has denied their collective memory and histories in contemporary Spain.

**Muslim Spain and the Ummah Racial Projects**

The Muslim venture into the Iberian Peninsula commenced in 709 through the appeal of Julian, the Count of Ceuta who requested the support of advancing Arab and Berber armies from modern day Tunis and Algeria to challenge the coercive and oppressive power of the Visigoths. This large contingent of Arabs-Berbers campaigning westward toward the North African coast were led by the Umayyad general, Musa ibn Nusayr and a newly converted Berber lieutenant, Tariq bin Ziyad, whose name is still attached to the southernmost city on the Iberian peninsula; Gibraltar or *Jabil al Tariq* (Mountain of Tariq) in Arabic. According to Harvey (2005), in Spain the ruling King of the Visigoths, King Roderick created tremendous enmity among his vassals through systematic violations of over-taxation, oppression of minorities, forced service in state
military institutions, and in the case of Count Julian, the kidnapping and forced marriage with his daughter without provincial approval of the local ruling lords.

In the ensuing two years beginning in 709 through to 711, the Umayyad Army with the explicit support of their Christian and Jewish Visigothic allies would systematically conquer and sustain a hold over the entire Iberian Peninsula and parts of Southern France for the next seven centuries. The comprehensive and categorical Umayyad takeover of the Iberian Peninsula did not follow the idealistic narratives and myths many Muslims and my Spanish Moroccan respondents often retold to me regarding the capture of Spain from the Visigothic armies. The allegorical memory practices often cite the venture of a religiously inspired Tariq bin Ziyad landing on the shores of Southern Spain and giving his beleaguered and outnumbered Muslim followers no choice of return but to continue northward to liberate Spain from the vastly superior military machine of the Visigoths.

The reality of conquest dispenses with the historical imagination of a symbolic collective Muslim effort towards an alternative narrative which was inclusive, accommodating, and heterogeneous in orientation. The authentic historical account dispenses this formulation embedded in Muslim consciousness and chronicles a concerted collective communal effort in which all three faith communities took part (Harvey 2005). For the contemporary Muslim/ Moroccan, the collective remembrances of this age induced the beginning of the golden age of Islam, while for contemporary Spaniards this historical moment demarcates the domain which references loss of function and control whilst living through Muslim domination, servitude, and superstition. In addition, for many Spanish traditional historians, Spanish history begins
around the national saga of the glories of Ferdinand and Isabella in the fall of Muslim
Granada in 1492 (Harvey 2005). While this history has socially shared nodes between the
two communities, its fragmented and differentiated narrative is vital to understanding
present Spanish Moroccan identity constructions and affinities.

The reigning Umayyad Empire would leave a lasting legacy that not only shaped and manufactured new ideological and political collectivities in the Islamic world but also systematically shaped European identity, politics, and science. The general political and religious tolerance experienced by Christian and Jewish communities reflected Umayyad political and social institutions which sought to accommodate heterogeneity and reject simplistic temporal dualisms which espouse Othering these communities. Thus, the philosophical underpinnings of Umayyad rule experimented in new discourses and actions which tolerated difference and permitted the Christians and Jews to have their own legal courts, govern their own religious institutions, and speak their own languages in their communities (Harvey 2005, Menocal 2002).

As Umayyad rule was solidified in Cordova in the middle of the eighth century under the direct leadership of Abdur Rahman I (750-780), Abdur Rahman II (822-852), and Abdur Rahman III (912-961), they also sought to impose distinctive policies of Arabization via Islam. Harvey describes this policy of Arabization to reference a common critique of the Umayyad who limited social mobility and positions of political administration to Arab families and 'Arabized' converts (2005). These far-reaching and imposing policies of Arabization followed similar practices pursued by the Eastern Umayyad Kingdom in Damascus which in its early years did not differentiate between the Islamic faith and Arab tribal culture and would not accept religious conversions of
Persians and Greeks to Islam unless they 'joined' an Arab tribe. This policy was not enforced in Spain as the Arab elites who controlled the political and economic institutions were numerically a minority and needed its new converts for imperial expansion, however it did shape who had access to social and political mobility (Harvey 2005).

This policy would dramatically shift with the emergence of the Berber led *Murabitun* and *Muwahidun* movements in the 12th and 14th century who would vanquish the Umayyad leadership and manufacture and impose a religious fundamentalist alternative for Spain. Under their rule they dispensed with the ethnic stratification systems intrinsic in Umayyad institutional structures and sought a purely Islamic state defined by religious characterizations and emphasis on the Ummah. This allowed Berber and Spanish white Muslims social mobility; however claiming Arab identity was still a common practice which validated religious inclinations, practices, and ties to the spiritual center of the Islamic world (Harvey 2005). This is a common recurring theme in Moroccan and Spanish Muslim history as all converts and tribal institutions would claim a link to “Arabia” and the Prophet’s family to justify religio-political rule, including the contemporary Monarchical institutions in Morocco.

The presence of a Muslim- Arab empire in Europe not only shaped Muslim identity dynamics but also European and Christian identities. The Muslim presence in the Iberian Peninsula unified and centralized a fragmented and significantly differentiated Europe. This facilitated the manufacturing of a European political and religious collectivity to be materialized in its anti-Muslim stance leading Anouar Majid to explicitly state, "without Islam there is no Europe” (2009:4). The configuration of
'European identity' as an analytical, political category was developed in the process of trying to redefine and reconstruct what it means to be a European vis-à-vis the Muslim Other and thus prior to the Muslim presence; 'Europe' did not configure as a political or even ideological concept. This was coupled with the narratives on Muslim occupation of the Holy Lands and the “menacing” Turkish imperial hordes at the steps of the holy city of Constantinople (Said 1979; Lewis 2003).

This far-reaching discourse on the Muslim as anti-European or non-European was first conceived in the mobilization of French and Basque forces in the Battle of Poitiers in which Charles Martel of France assembled an army and successfully quelled the Moorish/Umayyad advancement into France in 732 (Lewis 2003). The presumptions about what a collective European identity ought to be is still debated and referenced in European policy circles, right wing movements, and political parties. Consequently, European anti-Muslim sentiments and attitudes are cemented in the construction and consolidation of identity which consolidated European identity as Christian and White.

La Convivencia

One of the greatest achievements of the Moors in medieval Spain was the institutionalization of the *convivencia* (Menocal 2002). The *convivencia's* ideological foundations sought to create harmonious relations between faith communities vis-à-vis their communal, legal, and justice systems. In the spirit of the height of medieval tolerance, non-Muslim minorities were readily accommodated politically, socially, and economically. Moreover, social mobility and intellectual engagement was not reserved for only Arab Muslims as Christians and Jews also reached substantially high positions in Umayyad courts, their accompanying administrative apparatuses, and universities.
(Menocal 2002). The *convivencia* was the declarative and established institutional norm under Umayyad rule epitomizing the potential of cultural commonality and community cohesion not found in other Islamic imperial settings in the Levant, Iran, Central Asia, and Africa. Moreover, European societies would not engage with similar discourses nor practices of the *Other* until the post-enlightenment era and would not be actualized in policy until the late twentieth century.

The political climate of tolerance and communal acceptance of alternative voices allowed for the emergence and development of multiple interpretive religious discourses and the philosophical engagement with Aristotelian and neo-platonic philosophy to produce treatises that not only challenged societal and religious norms but readily accommodated opposing ideologies and narratives. One of the greatest achievements in Islamic thought during this period was the formulation and development of the Maliki Islamic school of thought. This school of thought in Islam is presently the methodological schema of contemporary North and West Africa and is the school of thought that is currently taught in many mosques throughout contemporary Spain. This school of thought was developed and advanced by Moorish Islamic thinkers who created and advanced a methodology in jurisprudence that was unique to Muslim Spain and North Africa as it took into account the role and presence of non-Muslim minorities in configuring Islamic religious rulings.

Beyond the Islamic intellectual sphere, Spanish Muslim intellectuals would tremendously influence the development of Western philosophy and science. These scholars include the philosopher Ibn Rushed (*Averroes*), Ibn Sina (*Avicenna*), and the sociologist (Ibn Khaldun) shaped Islamic and Western discourse concerning religion,
philosophy, and science and their methodologies and critiques of Islamic jurisprudence are still utilized in the great universities of the Muslim world. This interactional trajectory forever connects the Hispano-Muslim civilization to the rest of the Islamic world through geography and time.

Beyond the institutional transformations and intellectual influences, the presence of a uniquely 'eastern' Islamic architecture in Spain has demarcated and embedded the influence of the Muslim presence in the physical landscape of modern Europe. The architecture which mesmerized medieval European travelers and scholars alike has a salient impact on Spain's collective memory and historical imagination. The reality of the Muslim presence is embedded in the magnificent Cordova Mosque/Cathedral which was modeled on the same architectural design of the Omar Mosque in Damascus, Syria or the Alhambra palace which reveals in its architectural geometric designs the art of the most sophisticated mathematicians of medieval European and Islamic civilizations. The symbolism embedded in these structural feats have not only challenged and shaped the development of Spanish medieval identity but implanted the Umayyad and later Murabitun and Muwahhidun Muslim kingdoms in Spain through to the 21st century.

By the end of the tenth century, the Umayyad Empire was increasingly fragmented by internecine strife while succumbing to the failure of the ruling elite to institutionalize a localized provenance which emphasized a strong military culture. The ethnic, religious, racial strife was primarily between Arabs, Berbers, African Blacks, and the White Spanish Muslims converts. The perception of Arab dominance over their Berber and White Spanish co-religionists would shape the underlying social and political conflicts that would characterize Moorish Spain in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth
century. The essence of these conflicts did not always resonate around a religiously superfluous ideology. As Payne (2011) argues most of the conflicts from the 10th to the 14th century in Moorish Spain did not consist of a Muslim versus Christian divide but were conflicts that mobilized and bounded solidarity around political and ethnic identifiers. This conflict would fracture and fragment Moorish Spain until the total takeover by a politically unified Spanish state in 1492.

**Christian Spain, the Reconquista, and Islamophobia**

The Reconquista of land lost by the Christian Visigoths began immediately after General Musa Ibn Nusayr successfully captured and controlled Spain in 711. Beginning in the early 9th century, Pope Gregory VII declared and imposed an edict that religiously sanctioned the first crusade against the Muslim presence and rule in Spain. In the edict, he called for a holy war that would repel and remove the Muslims from Spain while proposing that it was every Christian’s religious obligation to heed this call (Emerton 1990). Numerous monarchs and provincial lords throughout the centuries would embody this demand and be in a constant state of permanent mobilization to reconquer Spain from the Moors. The eventual fall of the Moorish empire was first accomplished with the major Umayyad defeat of the city of Toledo in 1085 at the hands of the traditionally fragmented and fractured kingdoms of Castille, Leon, Aragon, and Galicia. The collective advancement of the Christian armies from the north produced numerous counter edicts by Muslim states and scholars who reinforced the legitimacy of *jihad* and the retaking of lost territory as a religious obligation of all the Muslims.

In 1086, Yusuf Ibn Tishfin, answered this call and advanced from his imperial seat in Marrakesh and conquered Andalucía from the failing and disintegrating Umayyad
city states that emerged as a result of the collective Christian push southward. The Berber led movement from Southern Morocco reinforced a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam to bring back Islamic purity and what was seen as God’s grace into their mission in 'reconquering' lost lands (Lowney 2006). However, the Murabitun and later Muwahidun dynasties were only successful in keeping the Christian armies at bay for forty years before losing Portugal in 1249-50, Cordoba in 1236, Seville in 1248, and Granada in 1492.

The year 1492 would be a defining year for Spain, Europe, and its Muslim minorities. This was the first time in European history that a European state had a large contingent of Muslim minorities who were now fully under the control of a non-Muslim state. In the initial years of Spanish rule, the Spanish government was divided by multiple ethnic and political collectivities tolerated the presence of Muslim minorities providing a generalized legitimacy that framed their presence as necessary to the economic success of the Spanish state (Harvey 2005). The Muslims were allowed to maintain their religious norms and economic practices within their communities as long as they didn't propagate their faith, wield political power, expand economically beyond village life/ existing business, or travel to the Muslim world (Echavarria 1999, Harvey 2005). These policies were pursued as a result of the fear of a potential Muslim Reconquesta driven by the world’s new military and economic Muslim power, the Ottoman Empire.

However, the foretelling of the Muslim inquisition and expulsions that would transpire throughout the 16th century first began with the Jews in 1478. As Spain consolidated more power from the Moorish Kingdoms in Iberian Peninsula, they sought to demarcate and construct a unified Catholic Spanish state. This unification and eventual
centralization of the Spanish state politically materialized in 1469 with the marriage of Isabel and Ferdinand who unified the Kingdoms of Castile and Aragon. The hierarchy of control that the Spanish state immediately imposed created generic categories of authentic Spanish identity which was primarily legitimated on ones profession of the Christian faith. The discursive frames that defined the reality of Spanish citizenship, ethnicity, and race were racialized through Catholic religious narratives and ideologies (Majid 2009). Accordingly, the inquisition represented a racial project that racialized Jews and Muslims as outsiders in order for the Spanish state to construct a racialized commonality that is internally homogenous, white, and embedded in the Catholic faith.

Prior to the 1492 conquest of Granada, Ferdinand and Isabelle signed a treaty with the last reigning Muslim monarch of Granada, Bo Abdil (Abu Abdulllah) in which the stipulations of the surrender guaranteed the Muslims of Spain freedom of worship and the ability of maintaining thriving communities in a unified Catholic state (Harvey 2005). However, these conditions would be formally rescinded and retracted in 1518 by Charles V by upholding the legality of the forced conversion law which initially passed in 1502 but was not officially enforced (Echavarria 1999; Harvey 2005). The processual changes in the law were the first of many taken by religious and political authorities to ensure that the ethnic and religious cleansing of Muslims from Spain was accomplished. As result by 1525, Islam ceased to exist as public faith tradition (Flesler 2008; Harvey 2005). The Reconquista and ensuing inquisition took on particular racialized forms congealing the comprehensive power of the state to define who can be included in the Spanish imagined community. The Spanish racial projects that emerged as a result sought to construct a
Spanish identity that defined whiteness through membership in the Catholic faith community.

Consequently, these polices racialized Spanish Jews and Muslims as impure and spiritually unclean (Echavarria 1999). The racial projects were always informed by an ideological framework that explicitly referenced Islamophobia demarcating the domain of the Muslim Other and actively opposing anything perceived to articulate “Muslim” or “Islam.” In her seminal text on Spanish perceptions of Muslims in 15th century, Ehchavarri shows how Spanish political institutions reinforced their anti-Muslim campaigns via multiple mechanisms including politics, academia, media, public debates, letters, reports, and physical libraries to fashion and politically sanction a analytically distinctive image of Spanish Muslims and Jews (1999). These methods were used to shape the perceptions and practices of ordinary Catholic Spaniards who previously coexisted under Muslim rule.

The Spanish Islamophobic campaigns towards the Muslims highlighted the coercive power and perpetual threat of the Ottoman Empire, Islamic religious and temporal law, and the potential surfacing of a fifth column of crypto-Muslims in Spain (Echavarria 1999). Moreover, the Spanish authorities exceptionally differentiated the Islamic faith by expounding a pernicious perception that constituted Islam as a "a heresy, a sect, a false religion, a superstition, an error, an invention of the devil, a deadly poison, an iniquitous law, a sacrilege a forgery” (Echavarria 1999: 103). As a result, Harvey argues the foundations of the modern Spanish state were built in opposition to the Muslims whom they viewed as inassimilable and problematic (2005).
The Spanish state sought to construe sameness and difference through measures of how one embodied the Christian faith and identity. Thus, the state formulated conceptual categories to describe the "former Muslims" in Spain as Moriscos (Flesler 2008). Even though these Muslims were forced to outwardly profess their coerced Christian faith, suspicion of their attachment to Christianity and Islam remained and was always questioned by political elites. The term Moriscos has multiple meanings in the Spanish lexicon with the primary standard definition to denote "little moors "(Flesler 2008: 6). However, it was also a politicized category to describe crypto- Muslims and/or Christianized Muslims in 16th century Spain. Interestingly enough, the concept was also employed by the Spaniards in their colonial lexicon to describe the Muslims in the Philippines and mulatos in Mexico (Harvey 2005: 6).

As a result of the policies of the inquisition, the Moriscos were forced to either convert, die, or find refuge and escape to present day Morocco. Throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the small number of Moriscos that remained in Spain and lived their lives as crypto-Muslims were increasingly targeted in their forms of dress, religious habits, and linguistic capabilities. As Flesler notes, "in order to identify such deviations, the Inquisition moved further and further into the private lives of the community, asking Christians to watch for and denounce Moriscos, as crypto-Muslims not only on the basis of straight religious practices… but also on the basis of cultural practices" (2008: 7). Furthermore, the high birth rates among the Morisco community furthered hostilities and suspicion toward the Muslims as they were often described by politicians and religious leaders alike as a swarm on the Spanish Kingdom (Lea 1968). The political and societal push to further Christianize the Muslim populations were
successful in demolishing any outer traces of Islamic culture and religious practices among the crypto-Muslims. As Majid recounts,

“the mingling of races and intermarriage were forbidden. No moorish names and surnames, dress, or musical dances known as Zambras and Leilas were allowed. Marriage between cousins was invalidated. The Moriscos were also prevented from bearing arms, leaving them defenseless and vulnerable in a country rife with banditry, they couldn't be butchers and couldn't slaughter animals. Civil ceremonies, such as marriage, birth, and death, were scrupulously monitored for signs of deviance or heresy" (2009:33).

However, while there was a concerted effort to Christianize the Muslim population, the Spanish Muslims in many ways still maintained a grasp onto their religious and cultural identities inside their homes and within the confines of their community (Harvey 2005). This led to greater suspicions of the forced Muslim converts to Christianity and thus were continually denied full membership and rights vis-à-vis the Spanish state as their attachment to their Catholic faith was always questioned (Harvey 2005:33). As a result of these policies, the Islamic faith was racialized in Europe as the 'faith became a racial category' defined by the 1449 statute that emphasized Spanish identity via the 'purity of blood statute' (Majid 2009:34). This statute sought to differentiate and systematically categorize the differences between the new Christian converts who had Muslim and Jewish ancestors and the old Christians whose blood was considered pure and untainted. Thus, the "indeterminability of faith apparent in the
Inquisition's inability to determine dissimulation, and its effort to circumvent this by continually increasing its demand for proof of orthodoxy, meant the definition of orthodoxy would migrate to genealogy: Moriscos were not and could not be "truly" Christian because of their ancestry, and they were by definition reduced to impenitent heretics and dangerous outsiders. This polarity that had been constructed became impossible to deal with except by violent and coerced "amputation" and the "casting out" of the deviants" (Root 1988: 30). This policy would also inform racial politics in the decades ahead towards the Americas.

The racialization of the Muslim faith was thus not solely based on one’s phenotype or physical characteristics as for many Spanish scholars in the post-reconquista age would be surprised to learn of "white moors" (Harvey 2005:58). The extent that Islamic rituals were racialized forced the inquisitors to check whether babies were circumcised, the Moriscos drank alcohol, and made sure that when parishioners attended mass they were not washed or clean to prove they did not emulate Islamic prayers. The only way to 'racially distinguish' between the Muslims and the Christians was through emphasizing cultural differences to define racial purity in order to systematically racialize the social experiences of not only the crypto-Muslims but also the Catholic white imagined community (Majid 2009).

In 1567, Phillip II renewed and enforced a long standing religious and political edict which pronounced that the public display of Arabic and Muslim Moorish culture a crime punishable by death. This led to the last great Moorish rebellion against the state which reached its height in 1571 with the defeat and massacre of the Alpujarras Muslim rebels. This rebellion while led by nominally practicing Muslims, the mobilizing
grievance was produced through the increased profiling and discrimination by the Spanish state towards the Muslim minority. By 1571, nearly 150,000 Moriscos from Granada were deported to Northern Morocco (Harvey 2005). A letter found on Abed Daud, a Morisco captured and imprisoned by Catholic forces recounts the misery experienced by the Morisco's in late sixteenth century Spain:

“you must know, our lords, that the Christians have ordered us to abandon our Arabic language. He who loses his Arabic tongue loses his faith. We must uncover our faces and we can no longer greet each other, even though such greetings are the noblest of virtues. They have forced us to open our doors so that we may suffer misery and sin. They have increase their exactions and our drudgeries, and wanted to change our attire. They settle in our homes and unveil our honor and our shame and demand that we not complain from the pain in our hearts. All of this after they had taken our property, captured our people, and expelled us from villages. They have thrown us in despair and they separate us from our brothers and friends" (Harvey 2005:36).

Many crypto-Muslims invariably maintained an attachment to their Islamic identity as a result of the policies of the state which coercively differentiated the Muslims as Others and thus bounded a previously irreligious and racially and ethnically diverse community towards a racialized Muslim identity. Harvey recounts the village of Bunol in Valencia, where in the late 16th century the Moriscos built a secret mosque in an attempt to revive their religious identities which were constructed and formulated by the Spanish states understanding of their Muslim past. Many Moriscos who fled Spain in the late 16th
century actually returned to Spain primarily because the "Islam" and/or religious practices of neighboring Morocco were foreign and unbeknownst to the Morisco minority (2005: 238-40).

The Spanish justified their discriminatory and genocidal policies on the fear of a potential Muslim fifth column who would subvert the State and support the emerging Ottoman Empire to reconquer Spain for the Muslims. Thus, Moriscos were perceived by the Spanish elite to belong only to the Muslim world as it was 'only possible for Muslims' to identify with their co-religionist or the Ummah (Harvey 2005; Majid 2009). While many Morisco Muslim leaders did request the Ottoman and Saadi empires to intervene on their behalf vis-à-vis the Spanish state, the reality was the Muslims were an isolated minority whose wealth and land was desired by the Spanish elite (Harvey 2005: 38-39). The arguments put forth by the Spanish landed class and political elites included xenophobic claims that the Moriscos controlled the Spanish economy and agriculture, Muslim banditry and crime flourished, trumpeted fears of the over sexualized Muslim male raping and forcibly converting Catholic women to Islam, and escalated demographic threats via reproductive myths about Muslims producing more children than the average Catholic Spaniard (Majid 2009: 39). These exceptionally capacious ideologies would spread throughout Spain and would eventually lead to the final and total expulsion of Muslims from Spain.

In 1609, Phillip II would succumb to pressure from the Catholic Church, the landed classes, and the political elite to expel or exterminate the Morisco populations. The mass deportation of all remnants of Islam and Muslims would shape the historical imagination of both the Spanish and Moroccan communities who received the last of the
Moriscos centuries later. Henry Charles Lea (2001) in his, “The Moriscos of Spain,” found that nearly half a million Moriscos out of a total Spanish population of 8 million became refugees between the years of 1609-1614. These crypto-Muslims would find conditional independence in new lands throughout the Mediterranean with the vast majority settling in Northern Morocco, particularly in the cities of Tetuan, Tangiers, and Chefchaoun. Ironically, once these Christianized Morisco refugees reached Muslim shores they would suffer to integrate into Muslim society and would be identified by the Muslims as "Spanish Christians" (Flesler 2008: 9).

In the process of consolidating and constructing an imagined community around Spanish identity and state, the racial projects that emerged as a result of this process reinforced ideological frames that emphasized White Spanish Catholic identity over all other identifiers. However, the racialized hierarchies that developed in the post-1492 context were not necessarily dependent on one’s physical characteristics but cultural frameworks that allowed for the racialization processes to sanction categories of us versus them although the Moriscos were legally and outwardly professed Christians and many times phenotypically white (Echavarria 1999; Majid 2007; Harvey 2005). It is in this context that we must understand racial identity dynamics in contemporary Spain and how it shaped racial discourse not only vis-à-vis the Muslims but also in the Americas in the 16th and 17th century.

The Spanish Moriscos who reluctantly established their communities in Morocco and Algeria as refugees would turn to piracy to enact revenge on the Spanish state and the ever-growing and expanding Spanish empire. The Barbary corsairs as they were called at the time were a loosely networked group of pirates from Morocco, Algeria, and
volunteers from across Europe who focused their attacks on Spanish and British merchant ships (Oren 2007). After the expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609, the Spanish government sought to focus their imperial ventures in the Americas and ignore any Muslim incursions out fear of being entangled in a conflict with the Ottoman Empire and the Alawi dynasty across the Mediterranean.

The Barbary pirates were often led by Morisco refugees from Spain and would disrupt commercial routes and enslave and ransom nearly one million Europeans from the late 17th century to the early 19th century (Oren 2007). The ransomed Spaniards, French, Portuguese, and British were held in prisons throughout Northern Morocco and were often subjected to horrible conditions which intentionally furthered the necessity of paying off the ransom by the Spanish government and adjoining elites. These pirates often described their attacks on the Spanish as *jihads* and retribution for their experiences of discrimination and ethnic cleansing in Spain (Oren 2007). The Spanish would never put a stop to this thriving industry until the early nineteenth century in the Barbary Wars wherein the United States, Britain, and France defeated and destroyed pirate outposts throughout the North African Mediterranean coast. The 'menacing Moors' thereafter would always be seen by the Spanish as potential adversaries and the epitome of the Other (Oren 2007). The Spanish would not venture into a direct confrontation with Morocco and the 'Moor' until the early 20th century wherein the Spanish begin to seek colonial territory and compete with other European powers for African territory and resources.
Spanish Colonialism

Beginning in the early 19th century, the Spanish empire succumbed to the underlying pressures of military digression, fragmented political structure, and states limited capacity to exercise political and military control. In the American colonies, revolutionaries under the leadership of Simon Bolivar and San Martin would achieve independence from Spain throughout South and Central America; domestically the French under Napoleon would dominate the Mediterranean close at home and even take political dominion over Spain for most of the early 19th century (Balfour 2002). As Spain's power waned over the course of the 19th century, there were renewed calls by the Spanish political and economic elite to pursue an imperial venture closer to home. With the French consolidating control in Algeria by 1839 and the British and Germans systematically taking stake in their colonial objectives in Africa, Spain perceived that a colonial venture into Morocco would not only revitalize empire but produce a financially profitable venture.

The Spanish always sought to establish a colony in Morocco, however the historical memories and negative relations between the Moroccan state and the Spanish crown always conjured memories of a potential far-reaching attempts by the 'Moors' to declare a Jihad and an ensuing counter-Reconquista. Moreover, any attempt by the Spanish to intervene in Moroccan affairs was fiercely resisted by the Moroccan state. Beginning in the late 19th century, Spanish policy makers perceived it was a strategic necessity for Spain to establish a colony in Northern Morocco. The justifications provided by the Spanish political establishment included manufacturing collective memory ties of a unified Visagothic state which historically included North Africa
(Payne 2011: 74) and having access to Morocco's mineral wealth in which the Spaniards were in dire need especially after losing access to mining centers in Bolivia and Peru and the loss of territory as a result of the Spanish American wars in 1898.

Spain would formally colonize Northern Morocco in the early 20th century with the signing of the Treaty of Fez on March 30, 1912 in which sultan Abdelhafid under the pressure of a potential invasion from both the French and Spanish divided the control of Morocco to two spheres of influence (Balfour 2002). Spain would exercise control over Northern Morocco and the Western Sahara and France would control the rest of the country. The Moroccan colonial acquisition would be seen in Spanish policy and intellectual circles as a form of revenge against 900 years of Muslim rule finally accomplishing the Papal Bull of 1457; which provided the religious and political justification to conquer contemporary Morocco (Balfour 2002: 10). For the first time since the fall of Granada in 1492, have the Spanish ventured into a Muslim majority territory and accomplished 'a moral and military victory,' which not only gave the Spanish control over Moroccan mineral resources but also the ability to vanquish the buried memory of shame over the 'presence of Muslims' in Spanish territory.

For the Spanish government, the cities of Northern Morocco were viewed as an extension of Andalucía and the two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (Payne 2011). The Spanish colonial policy towards the Moroccans sought to reinforce a readily accommodated perception of Muslims as monolithic and internally homogenous in belief and culture. This view is informed from their own colonial experiences with Muslim populations in the Philippines, Ceuta and Melilla and the manufactured ideologies of orientalism present in European literature and thought. Thus, the emphasis on Islam
especially the establishment of educational institutions in Morocco would have tremendous impact continuing on to the present.

The Spanish policy which reinforced Northern Morocco as an extension of Andalucia also emulated the French model of 'internal migration' to Algeria by shifting hundreds of thousands of Spanish settlers to the Northern cities of Tangiers and Tetuan (Balfour 2002). These cities were also ironically the same locations that took in the largest amount of Muslim refugees from Spain in the 16th and 17th century. While the French colonial policy sought to construct an administrative apparatus in Central and Southern Morocco, the Spanish colonial project was clearly and wholly a military enterprise with “civilizing effects.” The initial perspective adopted by Spanish colonial leaders framed an ideological program that facilitated a perspective of Moroccan’s as ignorant in their tribal traditions and practices, religious, and in need of western civilization (Balfour 2002).

This conception of empire reflected the traditional anti-liberal, conservative ideals of previous imperial ideologues in Spanish empires; however unlike previous imperial actions in the Americas, the Spanish were exceptionally hesitant and respected the Moroccan's as worthy rivals. Therefore, unlike other colonial territories, Morocco was unique in scope as it was never seen as a proselyting outpost for Christian beliefs (Balfour 2002). Rather, the colonial administration sought to reinforce loyalty to the State through education and the establishment of Islamic educational institutions that reinforced Islamic thought and Arab culture (Sayahi 2005).

This was perceived to be the best way to exercise political control whilst pacifying the Moroccan population. The Islamization and Arabization projects
established by the Spanish via educational institutions would last through independence and would later dramatically shape religious identity politics in Moroccan reunification between the North and South of Morocco. As a result, this policy mediated any religious resistance to be co-opted by the Spanish via the religious and traditional tribal establishment which were directly controlled by the Spanish administrative apparatus (Balfour 2002). Nevertheless, the policies that reinforced religious identities over ethnic and tribal affinities did not dissipate the use of violence and communal punishments.

The historical references to resistance and rebellions against the Spanish state are numerous, however only Abdel Karim Al Khatabi, a rebel leader and former Spanish administrator was successful in organizing a force that defeated the vastly superior Spanish military forces throughout Northern Morocco. In the Battle of Annual, the fully equipped Spanish forces lost more than 20,000 soldiers, to a loss of only 1,000 of Khattabi’s men (Long 2002: 393). The heavy losses suffered by the Spanish in Morocco discredited and undermined the Spanish monarchy and contributed to the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic and would serve as a catalyst to the Spanish Civil War.

The victories of Abdel Karim Al Khatabi over the Spanish resonated in Moroccan society as an ousting and revenge for the expulsion of Muslims from Spain. For the Spanish colonial administration, the Moroccan victories manufactured fears and nationwide patriotism in Spain in support of Spanish forces to bequeath and re-establish their dominion over the Moors as the great Ferdinand and Isabella done in 1492 (Balfour 2002).

The heavy dose of nationalism that underpinned the Spanish colonial response to the successes of Abdel Karim led to one of the least known tragic events of twentieth
century colonialism. In an attempt to formulate a response, the Spanish military and political elite utilized biological weapons including mustard gas and rudimentary form of carpet bombing tactics. The Spanish perniciously used biological weapons to subdue and reconquer the Moroccan colonial subject. As Ignacio Hidalgo de Cisneros, a pilot who dropped mustard gas on Morocco Rifian forces loyal to Abdel Karim said, "I have to confess that not for one second did it occur to me that the mission I had been given was an abomination or a crime; I have to say that I do not remember having had the slightest remorse over what I was doing. It is incredible how naturally one can commit the greatest barbarities when one has a certain mentality," recounting the ideas of Spanish racial superiority over the Moor (Balfour 2002:138). The Spanish response decimated Moroccan resistance and the by the late 1920's all formal resistance to Spanish rule ended.

The victory over Abdel Karim Al Khatabi consolidated a greater role for the Spanish in fashioning the cultural, educational, and administrative apparatus of Morocco to reflect Madrid. Consequently, greater Spanish immigration was encouraged, as well as transforming colonial city structures to reflect a new and emerging Spanish Morocco by building Churches, Catholic schools, and monuments for patron saints. Often these structures were named after iconic figures of the *reconquista* for example in the Northern Moroccan city of Nador, the Spanish constructed a church with a large, outwardly displayed sculpture of St. James, the *Matamoro* or Moor killer.

Moreover, during this period, Spanish popular culture identified the Moor with hatred, enmity, and deep rooted prejudices (Flesler 2008). In Balfour’s seminal text on the Spanish Civil War, he recounts a passage in a private diary of a new military officer
making his way to Morocco for the first time, in it he describes how the officer first responded to meeting a 'Moor' for the first time, “with what astonishment, I see a huge moor blacker than pitch, reach out his arms to help me disembark; I stay rooted to the spot looking at him, not daring to accept his protection because I thought at the time that all moors were enemies, and that this one would seize the opportunity of having me in his arms to throw me into the water” (2002:195). This attitude was reflected in the colonial micro-interactional practices of everyday phrases to denote a negative image of the Moor to using the picture of a 'Moor' for military target practice (Balfour 2002: 195-196). These perceptions and attitudes toward the local Moroccan population would become even more problematic with the proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic on April 14, 1931.

**The Spanish Civil War**

Whilst the Spanish dominated Moroccan political and economic institutional structures, Moroccan 'Moors' would be embroiled in another defining war in Spain between the Communist and the fascist forces of General Franco. Franco framed the Civil War as a second *Reconquesta* against communist heathens, godless liberals, reds, and separatists similar to the medieval discursive practices of the *Reconquesta* against the Moors (Beevor 2006:4). Franco would formulate a war in which he symbolically presented the elite Moorish *Regulares* as the main protagonists in his social struggle against the Republicans. Franco was able to employ a dualistic narrative that sought to capture and mobilize the memory of Muslims in Spain for his political benefit. The problematic symbolic power cultivated from these memory projects was utilized to mobilize his Moroccan regiments to fight for the Fascists under the guise of the
convivencia while also using the image of the Moor to reinforce a negative, violent image to the opposing Spanish audience.

Franco’s use of the Moors in the Spanish civil war manufactured and supported negative stereotypes that continue to live with the peoples of Morocco to this day. An example is illustrated in Josep Luis Mateo Dieste’s study, where he relates how Franco used empty lorries equipped with loudspeakers that repeated the Muslim call to prayer non-stop when he entered Republican Barcelona (1997:25). This operation of psychological warfare frightened the Barcelonans by playing on their fear of a Moorish invasion due to the stereotypical images attributed to Franco’s Moors. In night time talks over the radio, some of Franco’s generals would urge their troops to rape Republican women and would recount the systematic rape by Franco’s Moors in detail and sarcasm (Beevor 2006: 77). A Moorish lieutenant-general in Franco’s army who encouraged such systematic rape by his Moorish troops was made an ‘honorary Christian’ by the nationalists for his service (Beevor 2006:92).

The founder of the Spanish Foreign Legion, the Nationalist General Millan Astray even said, "the gallant Moors, although they wrecked my body only yesterday, today deserve the gratitude of my soul, for they are fighting for Spain against Spaniards…I mean the bad Spaniards…because they are giving their lives in defense of Spain’s sacred religion’ (Beevor 2006: 243). It was the dehumanization of the Moors by the Republicans via the colonial administration and the terror tactics used by Franco against the Republican civilians that furthered these stereotypes and stories about the Moors. In his essay called, “General Franco’s Moors,” Hughes relates his feelings of distress in seeing the Moors fighting inadvertently against their own freedom. In the “Letter from Spain
Addressed to Alabama,” Hughes captures the feelings of an African American who relates to a captured and wounded Moor.

He answered something in a language/ I couldn’t understand.
But somebody told me he was sayin’/ They nabbed him in his land
And made him join the Fascist army/ And come across to Spain
And he said he had a feelin’/ He’d never get back home again.
He said he had a feelin’/ This whole thing wasn’t right.
He said he didn’t know/ These folks he had to fight.
And as he lay there dying/ In a village we had taken
I looked across to Africa/ And seed foundations shakin’.
Cause if a Free Spain wins this war,/ The colonies, too, are free –
Then something wonderful’ll happen/ To them Moors as dark as me.
I said, I guess that’s why old England/ And I reckon Italy, too,
Is afraid to let a worker’s Spain/ Be too good to me and you-
Because they got slaves in Africa – / And they don’t want ‘em to be free.
Listen, Moorish prisoner, hell!/ Here, shake hands with me!
I knelt down there beside him,/ And I took his hand-
But the wounded Moor was dyin’/ So he didn’t understand (Rampersad 1994: 201).

The Spanish sought to anchor their relations with the Moors vis-à-vis the buried memory of the Muslim presence in Spain. In fact, the Spanish colonial administration would frame the Republicans as enemies and are worse than the Muslims as the Muslims still believe in God (Balfour 2002). Moreover, Spanish colonial officers were often cited
stating that the Spanish and Moroccans originated from the same people and are united by geography and history (Balfour 2002). The nationalist generals would support the Moroccans *regulares* memorial connection to Spanish Muslim symbols by permitting the Moroccan soldiers to pray at the mosques turned cathedrals in Seville and Cordoba while also removing traditional anti-Muslim statues in churches and city centers that represented historical images of the slayed and defeated Muslim Moor with demeaning images of Stalin and Marx (Balfour 2002). The attempts by the nationalist military establishment to mobilize Moroccan soldiers necessitated constructing ideological frames that sought to reduce religious, ethnic, and racial difference in the minds of the Moroccans while still internalizing and externalizing racist policies towards the Moroccan volunteers.

The legacy of the Spanish Civil War still has a negative impact on national politics and identity in contemporary Spain. In 2007, Spanish Prime minister Jose Zapatero passed the Law on the Historical Memory of Spain to officially recognize and investigate atrocities committed by the nationalists in the hopes of healing the open rift that still shapes Spanish identity and politics (The Economist 2008). The Spanish are not the only ones seeking answers to Franco’s war. Recently a non-governmental Moroccan rights group called the Center for Common Memory and the Future (CMCA) has called for an investigation for the fate of the thousands of Moroccans in Franco’s army, including more than 10,000 children under the age of 12, who also disappeared during the Spanish Civil War (Abdennebi 2009). Franco’s use and exploitation of the Moroccan *Regulares* cost numerous lives and has created negative images of Moors as it was Franco’s soldiers recruited from Morocco who reinforced the historical stereotypes and
fears of the Moor in Spain’s collective memory. By using Spain’s history to frame the war and the different protagonists, Franco was successful in winning the psychological war for Spain and securing his fascist state for the next 40 years.

**Post Colonialism**

In the post-civil war era, Morocco actively fought for and demanded independence from the Spanish and French. The independence leaders lead by the Moroccan Istiqlal Party sought not only a united Morocco but also one free from the coercive power of the French and Spanish. In 1956, the French and Spanish formally recognized Moroccan independence and reinstated the exiled monarch Muhammed V. This period in Spanish and Moroccan history would be characterized through highly structured political centralization programs which sought to dispense with any resistance and opposition. The Spanish would ground nation building on a particular Castillan narrative discounting other relevant ethnic and political groups including the Basques, Catalans, and the Andalucían's. Moreover, in granting independence to the Moroccan state, the Spanish were reluctant to give up their perceived territorial integrity in Ceuta, Melilla, and Western Sahara.

In the Moroccan post-independence, post-colonial context, Hassan II continued his repressive policies against ethnic Berber communities in Northern Morocco and any political opposition in order to maintain and reinforce a centralized state apparatus under his rule of thumb. The Moroccan state reinforced Arabist claims to national and political identity and outlawed the use of Berber in educational and political institutions. The state 'arabization' programs sought to align with other nations in the region that emphasized the socialist-Arabist programs of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The impact of the Arabization
campaigns in Berber communities and major cities in Morocco reinforced ideologies of Arab ethnic and racial superiority via the Ummah. Moreover, the Moroccan monarchy justified their position of power via the monarchies supposed link to the Prophet Muhammad which has provided political and religious legitimation in Moroccan politics for centuries.

In 1975, an ailing and sick General Franco passed away and left a beleaguered Spain with questions about its future course. The Franco regime left power to a young and charismatic monarch, King Juan Carlos who would take courageous steps to cede his powers and guide the country towards a constitutional democracy. The establishment of a constitutional democracy shifted the course and direction of the nation towards economic liberalization, democratic reform, and the enduring growth of civil society. This would re-shape Spanish economic success and growth for the next twenty years while Morocco would continue down the path of autocracy, dictatorship, and nationalization.

The strong economic growth of the Spanish economy throughout the late 1970s and 1980s has accelerated the need for migrant labor especially in its agricultural and construction sector. Throughout the twentieth century, Spain was primarily a country that relied on exporting emigrants rather than receiving them and thus this reversal and shift in migration patterns to provide cheap labor for a growing Spanish economy has allowed the 'post-colonial' encounters to take place at the home. The presence of foreigners and especially of Moroccans was initially viewed as a temporary phenomenon that would not shape or affect the character of Spanish society.

The obvious option for cheap migrant labor would be to look southward to Morocco. Not only was there a historical relationship, language capacity, and
geographical ease in migrant travel but also a failing Moroccan economy meant that there would be an influx of workers that would keep labor costs down. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Moroccan economy faced a down turn that increased unemployment and poverty as citizens had to resort to the informal black market economy vis-à-vis the borders with Ceuta and Melilla to etch out a living. Moreover, any attempts by the masses to protest economic conditions resulted in harsh repression by the Moroccan Army (Lopez, 2000: 300-301). Consequently, beginning in the 1980s, thousands of Moroccans began migrating to farming and agricultural regions in Spain including the Malaga, Cadiz, and Granada and or establishing communities on the city outskirts of Madrid and Barcelona. This migrant group more than any other would be the focal point over the questions of assimilation, integration, and Spain historical relations with the Islamic faith (Munoz 2003).

It was not until 1985, that the Spanish government began trying to address the question of immigration in the Spanish state as before 1985 there was a not a formal legal definition of what constitutes an immigrant. In 1985, the "estranjero law" was constructed to formulate a legalization path for many migrants who had resided in Spain for at least five years. This law provided the legal mechanisms to make it possible for migrant and children of migrants to apply for citizenship and/or permanent residence. However, the legal specificities of this law were counterproductive as it provided labels of the Other by increasingly making it difficult for Moroccan migrants to qualify for Spanish citizenship and naturalization (Barahimi 2009). As Gest states, “the law would create the category of legal immigrant and, accordingly, illegal immigrant based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* rather than *jus soli*. Indeed, unless an individual has ‘Spanish
blood,’ the law made it difficult to attain citizenship. Children born on Spanish soil to illegal migrant parents were not recognized, nor were spouses married to Spaniards (Gest 2011: 135).” This would eventually change as the need for labor demands forced the Spanish state to regularize the immigrant populations numerous times since 1985 (Gest 2011).

However, while many migrants sought to establish their roots in a growing Spanish economy, many Moroccans were forced to move back to Morocco due to specific visa requirements passed in the 1985 ‘estranjero law’ which always kept the Spanish Moroccan population in legal limbo (Barahimi 2009). Moreover, the legal migrant status of Moroccans according to Spanish law was explicitly racist and rendered a double standard primarily because citizens, “of other former Spanish colonies only need two to five years of Spanish residence before being able to apply for Spanish nationality, Moroccans must be full time, uninterrupted residents for ten years. Also, unlike other former Spanish colonies, dual nationality is not recognized with Morocco (Gest 2011:136). In addition there was a blatant differential standard when it came to the Spanish Moroccan Muslim community as Moroccan Sephardic Jews can gain residency and citizenship in Spain without the hurdles Moroccan Muslims are forced through (Harvey 2005; Gest 2011).

This trend in Moroccan migration into Spain would continue throughout the eighties and nineties as Moroccan families intermarried and established familial links with local Catholic Spaniards, established businesses, married Spanish Moroccans from the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, and obtained degrees of higher education. Moreover, the geographical proximity between Morocco and Spain, allowed for Spain to be an easy
country of legal and illegal migration as going back "home" was not an arduous journey and coming back legally or illegally was just as simple. As a result, Moroccan migrants were able to go to Spain to find work, establish networks rooted in their common national and religious origin and solidify their social capital through these networks to find jobs and necessary resources (Putnam 2003:13-14).

Beginning in the mid-nineties a population shift of Spanish Moroccans occurred from the Spanish enclaves in Ceuta and Melilla to mainland Spain. This was important as the Spanish Moroccans who held Spanish citizenship and had direct links with Morocco would eventually lead and play a facilitating role for Moroccan migrants who would come in the late nineties and in the 2000’s. Moreover, during this period, Morocco’s failing economy would further the government to encourage its citizens towards migration as remittance rates increased and became an important factor of Moroccan economic growth (Baldwin-Edwards 2005:4). This trend would continue to the present as Moroccan migration to Spain is still encouraged by the Moroccan state and is seen as a bargaining tool against the E.U and the Spanish state.

Beginning in the 1980s, we find that the small and increasingly growing Spanish Moroccan community were primarily concerned with building Islamic institutions that not only provided an opportunity to establish and perform religious duties but also become the political and civil society representatives of Muslims in Spain. This development is important on multiple fronts primarily because when the state deals with the question of Muslim or ethnic Muslim migrants, they immediately address religious community figures to negotiate place and presence in Spain reflecting colonial policy in Morocco. Moreover, the Spanish Moroccans would also turn to these institutions for
representation. In April 28, 1992, 500 years after the Spanish Christian conquest of the last Muslim Kingdom of Granada, Spanish Muslims with the support of the Spanish State would organize an official representative body for Muslim minorities called the Islamic Commission of Spain. This institution’s goal was to create a charter to regulate and monitor cooperation between the State and its Spanish Muslim citizens. The Laws 26/1992 agreements recognized the historical presence and contributions of Muslims to contemporary Spain stating in article 13 that the, "state and the Islamic commission of Spain shall cooperate to conserve and further the Islamic historic, artistic, and cultural heritage in Spain, which shall remain at the service of society" (Spanish Min. of Justice 1992: Law 26 of 10). It also provided the legal guarantees of freedom of religion established in the post-Franco 1978 constitution. Some the clauses included in the charter allowed the State to provide:

1. Islamic religious instruction
2. Religious assistance which extends to prisons, army and hospitals
3. Right to marriage ceremonies celebrated under Islamic custom
4. Can address labor questions as they pertain to religious norms.

These religious institutions would become primary socializing places for Spanish Moroccans and would serve as community centers that represented their interest vis-à-vis the state (Zapata-Barrero’s 2006). However, because the majority of Moroccan and Muslim migrants are not university educated (Gest 2010) they often have to depend on representation from Imams and civil servants who are sent by foreign embassies. This has allowed international actors; state and transnational movement actors to control the most important institutions for Spanish Moroccans throughout the 1990s and early twentieth
century. Spanish national intelligence believed this was such a problem that in one communiqué they stated that, "Rabat has as its main objective the control over its colony (of the one million Moroccan immigrants in Spain) to detect opposition movements to the regime and to prevent the emergence of Islamic currents that depart from the dominant one in Morocco" (CNI 2011). These community centers would increasingly play an important role in Spanish Moroccan community life and would dramatically change in the twenty first century as we begin to see the Spanish Moroccan community gaining a greater foothold in Spanish society.

The Spanish Moroccan community would maintain a relatively low profile in the 1990s until three murders would bring the Spanish Moroccan community and the question of immigration to the forefront of national media. In the small town of El Ejido, a mentally disturbed Moroccan migrant was accused of murdering a Spanish woman. This event led to outrage throughout the whole country as a number of the town's citizens went on to burn the 15,000 migrants homes, shops, and mosques. This riot was in the forefront of Spanish media as the discourse on Spanish Moroccan migrants turned publicly negative as historical stereotypes and images shaped the perception of Spanish Moroccans in the larger Spanish community. The violence also conjured rhetoric in protests and skirmishes that echoed calls to "hunt the Moors" and "death to the Moor" (Flesler 2008:84). This riot resulted in numerous other skirmishes between Moroccan migrants and the local Spanish population which for the year 2000 really shaped the relations and discourse on the visible presence of Spanish Moroccan migrants in Spain. As the question of immigrants and immigration in Spain became heightened in the media, an image of Islam emerged as a threat to national identity and cohesion and was
consistently tied to the anti-immigration discourses which legitimized the rejection of Muslims (Flesler 2008).

The negative experiences of the Spanish Moroccan community would tremendously shape identity and politics in the post-El Ejido riots. Moreover, the influx of international Islamic movements, the success of Spanish right wing politics in targeting the Moroccan migrant, the Moroccan States utilization of the migrants for political ends, and the general experiences of Islamophobia would all play a tremendous role in shaping perception and identities of Spanish Moroccans. Moreover, Jose Maria Aznar's political parties’ support of the American led War on Iraq drew further divisions in Spanish society between the Spanish Muslim community and the larger Spanish society. These forces would all collide on May 11, 2003, when a loose knit group of Spanish Moroccans and Moroccan migrants would be responsible for the worst attack on Spanish soil since the Spanish civil war. This event would produce critical juncture for the Spanish Moroccans as their communities, Mosques, and general presence all came under attack by media and political institutions.

Public opinion on immigration and more specifically the Spanish Moroccan community turned negative as anti-Muslims perceptions and attitudes increased ten-fold (Flesler 2008:1-10). Moreover, this event called into question their loyalties and presence as they would come to experience racist attacks and arbitrary stop and frisks by the police which I experienced throughout my research. The media and policing institutions would

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6. In one instance my male cousins and I were at Retiro Park after sunset walking around the central attraction, the manmade lake in the center of the park. In one moment, four police officers approached us from behind, threw us on the ground without any prior warning, frisked us, took our wallets, searched our backpacks, kept us on the ground for nearly ten minutes before letting us go without apologizing and without any formal explanation. When I started arguing with one of the police officers my cousin
construct criminalization campaigns (Zapata-Barrero 2003) and shift the balance of migrant invitations towards South Americans, Romanians, and Filipino’s to fill the low-skill labor demand. As a result, the Spanish Moroccan community would be dramatically affected by the ethno-religious-cultural stereotypes that are anchored in the past but are re-lived in present moreover reel from conditions that create conflict and enmity between the Spanish Moroccan communities and other minorities including the Latinos and Romanian.

For the Spanish Moroccan community, this attack would allow for self-reflection about their presence in Spanish society as they internally began to address the vital issues that shape their lived realities and communities in Spain. As a result, we find the emergence of non-profit and non-governmental organizations that fight against the stereotyping of Muslims and Moroccans. The religious institutions traditionally controlled by outside state actors were no longer in the post -2003 context as Spanish Moroccans and Muslims began taking a proactive approach in trying to define their presence.

While the experience of racism and discrimination is a fact of life for many Spanish Moroccans, their attempts to take control of their own realities whilst etching out a living in the post 3-11 Spain is the primary challenge. In the context of this unique historical relationship between Morocco and Spain, the majority of the Spanish population viewed the presence of Muslims and especially the Moroccan community with suspicion and a threat to national security (Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Estrategicos).

immediately grabbed me and essentially told me, “this is not America, they can do whatever they want to you here and get away with it.” We just learned to take the abuse.
However, their experiences vis-à-vis legal and cultural institutions in Spain and relations with Morocco and the larger global Islamic community have a tremendous impact on identity dynamics and are producing numerous avenues that allow both the Spanish Moroccan community and the local population to redefine and reconstruct a sense of self and community as Spanish citizens.
"Spanish people are stupid they think they know us and who I am. To them we are Moroccan, we are not worth the shit of the dogs they can't live without and treat better than us. I swear by Allah that they see Muslims like that dogs shit. To the Christians (Spaniards) his shit is better than me."

This statement from Amin (Int. 2), a second generation Spanish Moroccan reveals the sense of alienation and resentment experienced by my participants in contemporary Spain. The historical and contemporary categorizations of the Spanish Moroccan as the Other and their daily experiences with Islamophobic aggressions has shaped their diasporic consciousness and lived realities. The exclusionary tone of Spanish cultural and political discourses of anything Moroccan i.e. Muslim has racialized the communal tensions between the Spanish and the Spanish Moroccan community. In building off Urciuoli’s understanding of racialization as a process that is often, “typified as human matter out of place” (1996: 15), I will reveal how my participants’ experiences with Islamophobia manufactured symbolic identity links to Islam and the Muslim world, while also shifting and challenging the discourse on contemporary Spanish identity. Furthermore, this chapter will address the first component of dual communal racialization by emphasizing the local, domestic racializing processes that are shaping my participants’ identities. This chapter’s emphasis on micro-level interactions and lived-experiences reflects the lived-realities of my Spanish Moroccan interviewees in contemporary Spain and reveals their limited access and dearth of organizational
experience with the kinds of associational institutions that other Spaniards take for granted (Gest 2010). Hence, the emphasis on micro-level interactions and perceptions becomes imperative in order to fully grasp the narratives of my participants. Consequently, I will first discuss and contextualize the emergence of Islamophobia to show how the socially constructed spatial boundaries in contemporary Madrid are reinforcing and sustaining Islamophobic micro-aggressions. Then I will address the substantive questions of this chapter to reveal how Islamophobia is experienced by my participants at the work place, educational institutions, and in public in the emerging enclaves Spanish Moroccans occupy.

As previously established in chapter 3, Islamophobia has always been closely attached and rooted in Spanish history and society. However, the historical examinations and negative experiences of European Muslim minorities only became popularly conceptualized when the Runnymede Report was published in 1997; when a conceptual framework of Islamophobia was defined and employed. In the seminal piece, they defined Islamophobia as, “the shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam—and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims.” Maussen builds on this definition and states that Islamophobia, "groups together all kinds of different forms of discourse, speech, and acts, by suggesting that they all emanate from an identical ideological core, which is an "irrational fear" (phobia) of Islam" (2006:6). These definitions capture the dynamic interplay between contemporary Spanish Moroccan lived-realities and the changing social, political, and culturally racist frameworks that Spanish Muslims have experienced in contemporary Spanish history. As Layla (Int. 4), a first generation Spanish Moroccan stated, "the Christians (Spanish) hate us when this was
Arab land and they still hate us for bringing Islam here." The perception that contemporary Islamophobia is historically linked to a collective tragedy of Muslim expulsion reveals a deep suspicion of the Spanish state and society.

Moreover, recent policies passed by local and provincial bodies increasingly resemble Islamophobic legislative practices in France, Germany, and Switzerland that marks the body as a site of contention. In April 2010, a public high school in the city of Madrid with the support of many local legislators denied entry to a Moroccan girl because she adorned the hijab; whereas many cities throughout Spain went as far as to ban the full face veil, citing security and cultural concerns. Additionally, the difficulties experienced by the Spanish Muslim community to construct mosques and community center’s cultivates resentment and anger towards the Spanish state and society often forcing many Spanish Muslim communities to develop what are often called 'underground, store-front mosques.'

The sense of insecurity and fear was further exacerbated by the 5-11 terrorist attacks that were orchestrated by young Spanish Moroccans. The attacks reinforced historically entrenched stereotypes and racially driven policies that bolster the anti-Muslim climate in Spain. As one Spanish Moroccan stated in reference to the impact of the attacks on the overall Spanish Moroccan community, "these people (terrorist) ruined our lives here…do they think they are helping Islam, they are not, they are helping themselves and their pockets while making all of us suffer." These attitudes are further reinforced by Islamophobic ideologies that essentialize Muslims and Moroccans as homogenous entities with identities rooted in a temporalized Muslim world. This is increasingly causing daunting problems for the Spanish State and community leaders as it
facilitates the Muslim community to construct a closed communal mentality that is detached from the larger society; whilst supporting multiple transnational ideological sentiments to reinforce their aims within the community.

Many academics and scholars alike challenge this premise by asking how, "do we begin to isolate and categorize the complex and multilevel practices of more than one billion Muslims living in so many different social, cultural, and geographical conditions? How are we to designate a specific attitude as "Muslim" and "Islamic? (Roy 2004:6)."

Accordingly, understanding how Islamophobia delineates difference and determines which races and cultures are legitimate provides the necessary explanatory tools to understand the signifying processes that are entrenched in white-supremacist and imperialist ideologies of the past that views Muslim culture as, "compact, bounded, localized, and historically rooted in a set of traditions and values transmitted through the generations (Stolcke 1995: 4)."

The Islamophobic aggressions (Nadal, Issa, et al., 2010) experienced by my participants at work, school, and in the public sphere have shaped their life outcomes and incorporation into the larger Spanish community. As Schein notes, “ideas such as race and racism do not emerge unprompted from individual minds, but are thoroughly embedded in our collective everyday lives and in the very structures of our social, political and economic activities” (2004:4). However, unlike previous research, which finds that perceived religious discrimination shapes mistrust and dislike of the state and society in their host nation (Rippy & Newman 2006), in Spain my participants’ negotiations with Islamophobia, Spanish Muslim collective memory, and the Ummah have allowed them to emphasize their Islamic identity claims to Spain rather than exclude
their narratives from the larger imagined community. While the detrimental effects of Islamophobia are present in community life; what was fascinating was uncovering the negotiative processes wherein history, memory, and transnational forces play in mitigating that effect.

**Islamophobic Micro-aggressions at Work**

My participants’ concentration in low paying, non-professional positions, reflects the racialized structure of the Spanish labor market. The ethno-racial hierarchical formulations were embedded in the everyday work experiences of my participants and shaped their diasporic consciousness regarding their status in Spanish society. The sensitivity of perceived exploitation was not lost on my participants, as there was a generalized acknowledgement of their lower class, social positioning in contemporary Madrid vis-à-vis the white majority. Aisha (Int. 23), a first generation Spanish Moroccan with four children exemplified this feeling of marginalization and trepidation that her children will not have the same opportunities toward upward mobilization. She emphatically articulated, “our kids have to study and learn anything they can in order to be successful and even then they will not be like the Spanish, Romanians, and even Pakistanis and Syrians. Their kids will be doctors and businessmen while our kids will break their backs.” This attitude reflects the impact of the segmented workforce in which Spanish Moroccans lack access to the same institutional avenues and opportunities that are afforded the white majority populations and other ‘favored’ minorities.

The systematic practices endorsed through the structural arrangements found in the labor workforce is maintained and based upon immigration policy (Gest 2011) and the historically regulated positions Moroccans held in Spanish society. The ‘regulated
positions’ Spanish Moroccans occupy were referenced as the sites where Islamophobic attitudes and interpersonal experiences primarily lie. These Islamophobic micro-aggressions were normalized in the structural arrangements of the segmented workforce and are shaped by negative Spanish societal and cultural attitudes towards the Islamic faith (Flesler 2008). This lived reality was best explained by a Spanish Moroccan migrant who worked in a Spanish farm in Murcia before saving enough resources and acquiring the adequate paper work to move his family to Madrid. He states,

“I worked at the Alexandria farm in the Murcia region for nearly eleven years… yes, eleven years. I was treated like a slave. I worked twelve, sometimes fifteen hours a day. I tried to find a good job in Valencia or Granada… because I have my cousin living in Granada who is married but I couldn’t go. I wanted to leave when I got my five year papers but my boss would threaten to cancel my contract and not pay my immigration fee for that year, if I leave. He would curse at me and threaten to kick me out of the country like they did with the Muslims before. He would get drunk with some of the Latino workers and would dare me to drink and go against my religion. He would taunt me and say if I drank with him, he would give me a day off. But this was mostly when he was drunk.”

The systematic exploitation of Spanish Moroccans is reproduced and experienced through multiple forms in the workplace including: the lack of religious accommodation, taunting and demeaning statements from bosses and co-workers, and the denial of positions toward upward mobility.
The lack of religious accommodation was experienced by all my participants who held formal economic positions. It did not matter whether my participants were practitioners of the ritualistic elements of the Islamic faith; as many were formally warned that prayers and rituals should be ‘practiced’ at home. Abdullah (Int. 12) stated, "I can't pray at work, I mean the boss is always complaining that the 10 minutes I take to pray the Dhur prayer is too much and makes me lazy. Even the people I work with are racist and think if someone prays they are religious which means they are in Al Qaeda. So I do not want to deal with that stuff and I just wait until I get home and pray all the prayers together."

Consequently, these experiences superimposed a confrontational environment at work for many of my participants who expressed that co-workers and employers are actively and perniciously denying them their religious and cultural rights. Hamza (Int. 1) infers, "my work scheduler purposely schedules me to work on Friday, I ask him every month to give me Friday off and he doesn't; even though he knows I have to go to Friday prayer. I work at a restaurant that is not busy on Friday afternoons. All we are doing is preparing food for dinner. All I asked for was a day off or a one hour break and I get nothing." Other participants cited fear of retaliation and/or possible sanction from their employers as the primary reason they did not request time off. This was further exacerbated for those who did not hold official positions and worked ‘under the table’ as they did not have the means or capability to redress the presence of blatant systemic racism.

Mohamed (Int. 19) further exemplified this situational dynamic in the following statement. He states, “May Allah forgive me, but I don’t even try (to practice his faith at
work). What's the point? They will find a reason to fire me, if I am too bothersome. I just put my head down, work, and save money. That’s all I can do." The lack of religious accommodation at the workplace was coupled by taunts and anti-Muslim, anti-Moroccan aggressive behavior that often challenged the place of Islam and Muslims in Madrid and Spanish history. Abdul Jabbar (Int. 13) remembers:

"for the first three years when I came to Spain as a young man, I worked in Costa del Sol, my boss called me Moro or saying, hey...like he would a dog. He never called me by my name. I was 24 years old. Whenever something happens he would come to me and tell me, see what you people do, and or threaten to nullify my contract and send me back to Morocco. This was especially heightened when the terrorist attacks occurred. That was a bad time, if we couldn't respond in normal times (to aggressive taunts and verbal attacks) imagine what it was like after the attacks."

The repetitive racist discourses shaped the demeanor of white Spaniards who would often label Spanish Moroccans as slow, unreliable, and cunning. Sufyan (Int. 31), a second generation Spanish Moroccan said in a laughing tone, "at my job, I am always observed they never let me work the register because Moroccans in the past stole from the store... I think it was one Moroccan who worked a couple of months before me. But this year two Spaniards and one Romanian stole not only money but also radios, TVs, and phones and they do not treat the other workers like they do with me." Other participants explained that unfounded indifference and discrimination was the norm subjected towards Spanish Moroccan and when I specifically asked about whether racism, stereotyping, and prejudice was a part of their everyday work experiences; they
replied in an affirmative stance that Spanish racism via Islamophobia was the lived reality.

Another form of discrimination experienced by my participants reflected Spanish exploitation of another demonized community in Spain, the South Americans. My participants complained that Spanish business owners would often refuse to employ Spanish Moroccans because they hold South Americans as an army of reserve labor and thus can employ them at a much cheaper hourly rate; while simultaneously threatening Spanish Moroccan employees who 'complain' with layoffs and firings. Latifa (Int. 10) said,

"I have worked in De Maria restaurant for 7 years, I have never missed a day, never get in trouble, and always do my best at the job, even customers ask for me. Anwar, I never, ever got a raise or recognition. Ecuadorians come and start from the bottom and in months they are working over me. When I ask my boss for a raise or promotion, he says No! And I have to stay frustrated at myself and be quite."

The competition in the workplace has produced antagonistic identity discourses, especially as they relate to the social positioning and status of South Americans in contemporary Spain.

A quite revealing historical arrogance emerged in the interviews with a couple of my participants when discussing the marginalized position of South Americans in contemporary Spain. The emerging attitudes direct byproduct of the systemic racism present in workplace dynamics between and among the immigrant communities and the larger white-Spanish population. My participants cited the historical continuum between
what they saw as the 'slave like nature' of the South American vis-à-vis the Spaniard; citing history and contemporary politics. Mehdi (Int. 25) states, "I feel sorry for the Latinos, they have no strength to face these Spaniards... they work like slaves for the Spanish and get paid nothing… I would never work like that. They do it because they are used to it and the Spanish have been doing it to them for six hundred years. The Spanish could never control Moroccans and Moroccans have too much pride."

Beyond the feelings of empathy, many of my participants complained about the Spanish recruiting Latinos and Filipinos for traditional labor positions that Moroccans occupy, pointing to their faith as the primary motivator. Abdul Qadr (Int. 24) states, "they want their own Christians to work for them instead of the Muslims because they don't want us to grow and establish Islam in Spain... they just don't want us." This assertion by Abdul Qadr reflects the multiple sites that Spanish whiteness employs its advantages and privilege across the increasingly segmented workforce in contemporary Madrid. The transparent dominance of whiteness is contextualized in individual interactions and operating procedures of day-to-day actions that shape possibilities for work promotion, work place tolerance, and opportunities for wage increases. Moreover, the micro-level Islamophobic aggression experienced by many of my participants had a great impact on their perceptions of Spanish society; while also facilitating the feelings of exclusionary commonalities with other minorities in Spanish society and state. This was best captured in Sulayman’s (Int. 8) statement regarding work life interactions the white majority. He said, “the Spanish don’t accept us and that is fine. But we must show them that we are not villagers who don’t know a phone from a TV. We have to be better than the Romanians and Ecuadorians in our day-to-day interactions with them; we are Muslims...of course
that is what we are supposed to do. They treat us bad, yes, but unfortunately we do the same thing and do just like them to everybody (Spanish, Romanians, and Latinos). Once they see we are better in our actions then they will respect us and treat us as equals. Until then we have to suffer here.”

For my male participants who were unemployed, the realities of unemployment were also contextualized as a byproduct of Spanish Islamophobia. My first and 1.5 generation participants generally cited work as the most important reason for migration to Spain; referencing the need to financially provide for their families in Madrid and Morocco. In addition, for my male participants the cultural and religious dictates surrounding the norms of the "bread winner" has bounded and solidified the male gender role as the primary income winner in the Moroccan household. Hence, the question of unemployment as it was tied to Spanish Islamophobia challenged the predominant cultural and religious norms surrounding Spanish Moroccan male identity. As Mustafa (Int. 7) an unemployed mechanic stated, "I don’t have a job right now, I have to depend on the government to give me money. I can't go back to Morocco because there is nothing there... So what do I do? I have to live like I am dead here. We are living worse than Morocco." When I asked if his wife was working he ashamedly turned away from me and said “yes” as if to acknowledge a loss of pride and its accompanying ‘manhood’.

Incidentally, most of the men and women in my study noted how easy it was for Spanish Moroccan women to obtain jobs as opposed to the men. Khadija (Int. 26) states, "I got my current job in the first application as a cook in an Ethiopian restaurant while my husband has applied for every job available in Spain (laughing) and could not get anything. They give us jobs maybe because we are hard workers." For my male
participants, this ‘accommodation’ was often explained in the context of Islamophobia and Spanish orientalist ambitions to “save” the Muslim female from ‘Moroccan Muslim male treachery’. Seven of my married participants cited a perceived sense of State/cultural intrusion into their marital affairs via the employment/unemployment status of Spanish Moroccan women vis-à-vis their husbands. When I pressed this issue with Abdul Jabbar (Int. 13) he explicitly stated, "the Spanish only put our women to work in order to humiliate us. They think that this will make them Christians or leave Islam. They want to challenge us in our house. They are not going to win."

My female participants also cited Spanish racism as a reason for their employment as opposed to their husbands. Latifa (Int. 10) states,

"I know why they don't give our husbands jobs and you find all the Moroccan women working. My husband has tried for two years and all he can get is menial jobs with his friends or sell things in Morocco. But we (women) can get jobs easily. In fact my friend told me that factories were in the (neighborhood in Fuenlabrada?) asking if any women wanted to go to school and or needed jobs. They will never do this for the men. They think we need to be free and liberated so the government helps us more than them. It's unfortunate because I don't want to work and I believe that my husband should support the family but I guess for now at least we can pay the bills."

The gendered work dynamic present in Spanish Moroccan households is challenging and reshaping gender relations in the community. Many of my female
participants sought to reinforce an Islamic identity in order to convince the family and community that honor is maintained while also providing and garnering greater support from their husbands and family members. Latifa (Int. 10) states, "I started wearing hijab when I came to Spain... About a year after I came to Spain. My husband and I thought it was the best thing to do, especially because I work with a lot of men at the restaurant.... I find that a lot of the Spanish people treat me with more respect and even call me a saint (laughing). Plus, it makes Allah and my husband happy with me, which is more important."

The resistance at work to micro-aggressive Islamophobic expressions and behavior has taken on various forms including passive submission, active resistance, and manipulation. The majority of my participants were passively submissive to overt and covert Islamophobic actions. This does not mean they accepted their exploitation. My participants spoke with pride to not accept the working conditions they found themselves in, and in unemployment they a found a semblance of respect as opposed to other exploited minorities. Ahmed (Int. 20) stated, "Moroccans are not like others. Look at our history we never sat back and let the Spanish do as they will with us. We always fought back. I will not sell myself to the Spaniard and I am sorry to say this, but I would rather sell marijuana then go clean Spanish toilets." Others cited the growth of Islam in Spain as the source of tension experienced at the work place as Tariq (Int. 3) articulated, "the government is purposely not giving anybody jobs, so we would leave the country voluntarily; and if we don't, then as you see the economy is dying and they are blaming the immigrants for all the problems. They will have another inquisition to kick us out. But the people will do it (Spanish people)."
The centrality of work for my participants was shaped by traditional cultural norms and their migrant identities. Moreover, the variegated experiences of Islamophobia at the workplace is creating a context of resentment and resistance that is reorienting my participants identities towards Islam and Muslim identifiers; while generating rifts between the Spanish Moroccan community and the larger society. I found very similar patterns and developments when I probed my participant’s interactions with educational institutions.

**Experiences with Islamophobic Micro-aggressions at Educational Institutions**

My participants’ narratives situate their relationships with Spanish educational institutions at two levels, as students and parents of students. Thirteen of my participants attended Spanish public schools, while another 10 have interactions with educational institutions in the capacity as current parents or guardians of students. The experiences of my participants reveal that Islamophobic micro-aggressions were present at the bureaucratic and at the micro-interactional level of analysis, often determining which races and cultures are legitimate. An important component in understanding the scope of their experiences reflects Bourdieu's notion of symbolic violence; wherein classroom curricula and instruction represented a selective tradition that entrenches Spanish cultural and religious paradigms over all other forms.

The way this symbolic violence was actualized in educational institutional settings was through religious stereotypes, assumptions of religious homogeneity, feelings of cultural superiority, and through the language of Othering (Nadal, Issa, et al 2011). The feeling of difference as a minority in the classroom setting was best described in Maha’s (Int. 32) description of her experience at school. She states,
"it was in school, I learned I was different. I didn't wear hijab and most people couldn't tell where I was from but as soon as the teacher would say my name or they would see my mom with hijab when she picked me up they knew I was a Muslim. When I went to high school there were not many Moroccans in my school, I think there four students in my whole class. But I learned about my identity in school."

Amin (Int. 2) further explains, "it didn't matter if I looked like them (Spaniards), even though most Spaniards look like us, my name identified me as Muslim and so we were different, like from another planet." Schools as racializing agents categorize the identities of my participants as bearing different expectations from the Spanish students. Thus, the racializing messages resulted in overt discrimination and biases which cements the low status of Spanish Moroccans in Spain. Amin (Int. 2) statement captures the negative interactions with teachers that often reinforce low expectations and instill doubt. He states,

“I will never forget this… we had a day where my teacher asked us about our career ambitions and stuff like that. She walked around the room and told all the Spanish kids, “you will be a doctor and engineer,” and whenever she would come to the Moroccans she would say all the low paying jobs like; waiters and construction workers. There were many Moroccans in the class. When she came to me she said you can be a restaurant manager. I didn’t think about that until years later.”

The racial micro-aggressions resulted in teasing and name-calling, which would often result in fights and conflicts between the Spanish Moroccans and other Spanish/
ethnic minority students. Amin (Int. 2) states, "we had our own Moroccan gang and anybody who messed with us, especially if they messed with Moroccan girls, then they would get a beat down... I mean this was the only way to defend ourselves from their insults." The manufactured differences reinforced at school resulted in mental and physical segregation as violence and in-group –out group hostilities emerged.

The Spanish Moroccan students would only ‘hang’ around each other and were broadly considered the 'hashish sellers' or ‘terrorists’ taking on mediatized images of the Moroccan drug dealer and Muslim terrorist. Anas (Int. 15) recounts how Spanish students would label, tease, and bully Spanish Moroccan students with no administrative sanctions given to the students who perpetrated the bullying and teasing. He states, “Terrorist, terrorists... were the names that kids would call us, they were playing, but I would get mad and would want to fight.” When I followed up with a question about what course of action the teachers and administration took in addressing the matter, he emphatically said, “nothing”. Other interviewees, often internalized these images to evoke respect and power in a context that offered very little of each. Fareed (Int. 28) states, "school made me proud to be Moroccan because everybody feared us, they saw us as drug dealers, terrorists, gangsters... the Spanish girls liked us too. Nobody messed with us because they thought we were crazy." Another form of protest cited by participants was the emphasis in their support of Barcelona F.C soccer club. Every participant who attended school in Madrid was an avid Barcelona F.C. fan and when I would infer why, they would respond that it was a form of protest against their treatment and lives in Madrid or as Amin (Int. 2) stated in definite terms, "to go against Madrid, meant that we were different."
Several of the participants interviewed indicated that the negative stereotyping and ethno-racial climate conjured feelings of difference and self-loathing. For instance, Sumaya's (Int. 29) states in response to the negative hostility experienced at school, "I didn't learn anything in school except that you need money to get a good education; you need to be Spanish to get a good education, and that at the end of the day even if I did get good grades, I was not going anywhere as I was seen as second class. I have applied for many jobs and didn't get anything. What is the education good for?"

The ethno-racial messages were also conveyed in the curriculum and classroom instruction. I asked my participants how Spanish-Moroccan history and relations was presented in the classroom and all my participants felt that it was never portrayed accurately. Anas (Int. 15) states, "Moroccan and Muslim history was never presented in the classroom, it is as though we were never here, like the civil war never happened, or colonization, or the Islamic history.. It’s funny really." The curricula valued mainstream Spanish narratives while discounting Spanish Moroccan knowledge forms by downplaying and subverting their history and contemporary presence.

Thus, historical memory was contained and constrained by constructing a singular narrative of Spanish history that was composed of absolutist identities. For my participants, the teachers’ lack of acknowledgment of the historical presence of Muslims inferred that Spanish Moroccans did not belong to Spanish national identity. Moreover, when the Muslim world or Morocco was discussed in the classroom setting, it was always in a negative context. Anisa (Int. 30) articulated,
"I remember we were once talking about human rights in the Western Sahara and the way the teacher talked about us would make it seem like we were animals in thirst of blood and that we were killing the Western Saharan with no impunity. She said things like Moroccans don't know diplomacy, they only know tough action among...other things. But she doesn’t talk about how they treated us in the Spanish civil war or how Franco killed thousands of Moroccans for ‘freedom.’"

In the face of these pervasive feelings of classroom discrimination, my participants were not passive as they actively resisted negative classroom instruction about Spanish Moroccan-Muslim history. In fact it was a point of pride, as Faouzia (Int. 33) states, "my father always reminded us of our history in Spain and how the Arabs built a strong society that had science and culture. I once told my teacher, Mrs. Reyes I think her name was. Anyways she was talking about Spanish history and how Spain was once a great empire and I told her, do you forget who helped built the Spanish empire? The Muslims. She looked at me with a stunned face... I will never forget that. She didn’t say no, but she didn’t say yes, either.”

This attempt by my participants to include their narrative in the national imagined community allows them to assert their identity as Spanish Moroccans and as Muslims. In fact, as Malkki explained "the construction of a national past is a construction of history of a particular kind; it is one that claims moral attachments to specific territories, motherlands or homelands, and posits time-honored links between people, policy, and territory" (1995:6).
The experiences for my female participants who wore the headscarf were incessantly difficult and often placed them in a position where they were seen as ‘representatives’ of the Muslim community and the Muslim world. Moreover, the mediatized ideologies attached to the headscarf also meant that they became central subjects in their schools relationships with the Muslim community. This point of contention allowed the Spanish Moroccan girls to be in the forefront of the daily discrimination and aggression experienced at all levels in both the educational settings and in society.

This is illustrated in Sumaya’s (Int 29) statement about her relationship with the hijab,

"I could never hide in the hijab like my brothers. I was always a Muslim first no matter what I may claim to be and it's what I am, a Muslim. But my friends and teachers would have assumptions about me even before knowing about me. I was treated as though I was oppressed but they don’t know that my parents treat me like a queen. That really hurt me because they would look at my father like he abused me when in reality I was a queen. I felt my teachers think I was always forced to put on my headscarf and that my parents did that to me."

Moreover, both parents and former students complained that there is an active campaign to "out" conservative parents who do not allow children to attend dances, mixed swimming lessons, and who have daughters who don the hijab. Layla (Int. 4) stated, "they (school officials and teachers) meet with my daughter’s and ask them if I don’t let them go to school events... they want are kids to participate in the filth. My kids
don't want to go to that stuff anyways; but they make sure to ask them because they don't believe that they wouldn't do it without my pressure on them." When I asked Amin (Int. 2) and Faouzia (Int. 33) about this, they both confirmed that school counselors would request private meetings and ask if their parents are resisting school activities they deem to be un-Islamic and or not culturally befitting like dances or field trips. Faouzia (Int. 33) further stated, “the school acts like being Arab (Moroccan) and Muslim is a disease that can affect everybody. But I don’t care about them we are Muslim, Arab, and Spanish, all in one. If they don’t like it, then they don’t like it. It does not bother me.”

The specific ways my participants responded (active/ benign) to ethno-racial micro-aggressions indicated they are internalizing Islamophobic racializing ideologies by challenging the dominant cultural and political frameworks that are dominant within educational institutions. The internalization of a Muslim-first identity mediated the ongoing racialized experiences to legitimate their presence in contemporary Spain as Spanish Muslims and thus allowed resistance to be explicit and public. The narratives presented in the above had a tremendous impact in their lived realities as adults in Spanish society and are central to any future analysis of the poor educational outcomes of Spanish Moroccans.

Experiences with Islamophobic Micro-aggressions in Public Life

The emergence of Spanish Moroccan satellite public sphere’s (Squires 2002: 448) in the city of Madrid is an important component of the ways Islamophobic micro-aggressions are increasingly shaping their public lives. The public targeting of Spanish Moroccans structures the ways we think about the processes of racialization in the cities landscape. The harassment by policing and security institutions and the consistent
badgering and name-calling by fellow citizens has facilitated the construction of communities that are built and imagined in the context of the wider sphere.

The city of Madrid has gone through a dynamic transformation in the past thirty-five years as migrants from all over Europe and the developing world have filled the multicultural canopy that Madrid is today. The Spanish Moroccan communities racializing experiences have largely been shaped by the neighborhoods and the social positions they occupy in the present landscape. The community is geographically scattered throughout the city of Madrid primarily residing in the city outskirts. They often occupy spaces in and outside of the city in areas locals colloquially called barrios or the ghettos. When I asked a random Moroccan migrant during a soccer game where most Moroccans live in the pueblo of Fuenlabrada, he immediately responded with a grin on his face stating, “if you want to find Moroccans go to any barrio and you will find plenty of them.” This turned out to be legitimate advice as most of my participants either lived in poor neighborhoods in the city or in the pueblos in the outskirts of Madrid.

The economic and social exclusion of Spanish Moroccans is beginning to manifest in the structural divisions in the physical landscape of contemporary Madrid. In central Madrid, minutes from the tourist haven of Plaza Del Sol, Levapies sits as the multicultural hub of Madrid. Often touted in tourist guides as the example of the ethnic and racial center of Madrid to reinforce the well generated multicultural shift Spanish politicians and liberals alike have been touting throughout the past 15 years. Nonetheless, the realities on the ground tell a different story.

It is here where I met Amin (Int. 2), a second generation Spanish Moroccan who works and lives in Levapies. Amin (Int. 2), a waiter and student; who goes to school in
the day time and works as a waiter at night described his experiences as a youth in the neighborhood of Levapies, “This was the place that all the foreigners would come to live Ecuadorians, Pakistanis, Algerians; but it was always dominated by Moroccans until 10 years ago when the bombing occurred and the police started giving us a hard time here…many times the Spanish and even Moroccan owners of apartments would refuse to rent to Moroccans because we were seen as a liability.”

In my time with Amin, I felt his sense of urgency to leave Levapies and move to the outskirts of Madrid to enter the spatial boundaries the Spanish Moroccan community occupies. In many ways, this shifting of place provides sanctuary from an increasingly racially divided city of Madrid. As Amin (Int. 2) and I walked throughout the tight knit neighborhoods of Levapies; he pointed with a sense of nostalgia and sadness at former apartment blocks that were solely occupied by Moroccans. He explained how in the course of ten to fifteen years the Moroccan community became internal exiles in their own city, as the Spanish Moroccan population began moving outside of the city center in response to increased police harassment, lack of employment opportunities, and communal ties.

This lived reality is actualized in the day to day run-ins with the police and everyday life course activities, which were experienced firsthand as an American Moroccan. Nearly every time I ventured out in public with two or more of my Spanish Moroccan peers we were stopped, frisked, and questioned about our identities and possession of paperwork. During one of my interviews at an open air cafe in the center of Madrid, two police officers approached us as my participant and I was in an informal conversation and rudely asked us for our paper work in front of a large crowd of café-
goers. When we initially refused, they told us to stand up, walk outside of the perimeters of the café, frisked us in front of everybody, looked at our documentation, and after waiting twenty minutes to check with authorities they finally apologized when it was confirmed that I was an American citizen and my passport was not ‘fake’. These events shaped my perceptions and experiences of life in the public sphere and made me curious to understand how my participants were impacted by such hostile interactions.

I would come to find these experiences represented the ways racism was a fundamental part of Spanish culture and is spread throughout the everyday social fabric of my participants’ lives. It would have a defining impact on how they crafted and negotiated identity, while simultaneously challenging dominant narratives. Tariq (Int. 3) states, "our public encounter with the police happens all the time... we can be standing waiting for the metro or going to work and the police would purposely hassle you, especially in the city center. They do this to make sure we feel like we are not welcome." My participants often cited their problems with the police and their racial profiling policies, which often accuse the Spanish Moroccan community of theft and drug sales without evidentiary proof. Marwan (Int. 9) infers,

"the police you know can’t even tell the difference between us, that is why they wait until we are in groups and speak Moroccan Arabic. A cop once told me that they know how to identify Moroccans by the language and names. That is why they never stop us by ourselves but when we are in groups; because it is easier for them to identify us. They do this because they think we have no
value for nothing. But they don't see the Romanian mafias who are actually killing people, while we may steal 10 Euros."

While Moroccan men are often harassed by policing institutions, women are often hassled by fellow citizens either because the hijab is viewed as a symbol of Islamic political ideology and active resistance to Spanish identity; or as a tool Muslim men utilize to dominate and control women's bodies. As Anisa (Int. 30) states, "most of the time, I am stopped at the shopping mall or school and people are nice, but always ask, why I wear hijab and if my husband told me to put it on…And then I have to tell them it's my choice. When they see me with it, they think I have no brain." The symbol of the hijab evoked sympathy for many of my female participants from Spanish citizens, however even when the Spanish Moroccan women did not wear the hijab they received similar responses from non-Muslims. For Amal (Int. 17), the Spaniards she interacted with in the public sphere often think she is rebelling against her familial norms for not donning the hijab. She emphasized that such perceptions reinforce the notion that, "all of us (Muslim women) are supposed to be hijabis. They think that not wearing the hijab is going against my religion and culture. That is not true, in Morocco and around the world; hijab is dependent on the women, not family. How many women wear the hijab in Morocco, I mean it's ridiculous." The racialized stereotypes enforced upon Amal are covert discourses that create and justify social inequities and feelings of difference in the public sphere.

**The Emergence of Spanish Moroccan satellite public spheres**

These public perceptions surrounding the Spanish Moroccan community are important because these daily experiences shaped their collective identities around their
ethno-racial and religious characteristics, thus reinforcing structural and social difference in Spanish society. This differentiation of the Moroccan-Muslim as the Other is facilitating the emergence of Spanish Moroccan ‘areas’ or neighborhoods in Spain; ironically, this in turn allows for the community to challenge stereotypes and accompanying racializing mechanisms. The development of Moroccan ‘areas’ in Fuenlabrada and Levapies are not only generating a strong communal bond but also forging strong links to resist obtrusive and alienating policing and state practices. My participants revealed that the benefits of 'living as a community' allows for a collective response to Islamophobic aggressions. As Maryam (Int. 5) stated, "living together in Fuenlabrada is great, we watch out for each other. Nobody threatens us, even the cops don't bother my brothers or the guys in the community; we can live as we are, comfortable."

In Fuenlabrada, I spent a lot of time with Yousef (Int. 27), a first generation Spanish Moroccan who owned a Barber shop in Fuenlabrada's, “Moroccan sector”. The market-place area primarily serviced the Moroccan community and was made up of a mixture of Spanish Moroccan citizens and Moroccan migrants of all generational divides. Yousef (Int. 27) lived in Levapies for nearly four years until early 2001 when he moved to Fuenlabrada to “change his environment” and living arrangements because his teenage sons were increasingly getting into trouble. When I asked Yousef (Int. 27) how and why he decided to make the move to Fuenlabrada, he answered with a simple statement that there are, "many Moroccans here (in Fuenlabrada) and my kids can feel protected with each other (with other Moroccans)."
When I further inquired what he meant by protection, he explained that he wanted his kids to feel a sense of community and experience what Patricia Hill Collins calls, “safe spaces.” These neighborhood ‘areas’ allow an oppressed group to find spaces in society, in which they can express identity and create community networks in the face of hegemonic, oppressive superstructures (Collins 2000). Yousef (Int. 27) states in definite terms, “in Fuenlabrada, I can have my business that Moroccans come to, if I want harira (traditional food), or my wife wants to go out, she can with her friends without me thinking some druggie or racists is going to assault her.” Consequently, his decision to move to Fuenlabrada was made in order to be closer to a growing Moroccan community and away from the unreceptive ‘old neighborhood’.

These Moroccan ‘areas’ reinforced identity practices in the structure of the neighborhood, to reconstruct a ‘social life’ and community networks that they often missed in their immigration from Morocco to Spain. As Yousef (Int. 27) stated, "in Morocco we had a lot of fun, there are people everywhere, and we know everybody in the neighborhood. Here in Spain you don't even say hi to neighbors. So having Moroccans close by is blessing thank God." The social networks created in these small and emerging Moroccan neighborhoods reinforced solidarity and identity in the face of Islamophobic aggressions. He further stated, (Fuenlabrada) “is a neighborhood that allows us to be who we are. You see people with kandorras, hijab. You have shabakiya (Moroccan candy) and harira (Moroccan Soup) everywhere and nobody judges you, not even the Spanish here; because they are used to us… in Levapies the people were nice, but the Spanish that lived around us always caused trouble and hated us because we are
Muslims.” I followed up the above statement by asking, “why did they hate you?” and he simply responded, “because we are Muslim.”

My female participants often felt excluded from the predominant leisure activities of the Spanish, the Spanish Moroccan, and Moroccan migrant community. Whilst employment restricted free time for many of my female participants, the demands of home life consumed the remaining time available. However, the demographic shift and emergence of Spanish Moroccan areas in Madrid has generated greater ties to the Moroccan community; while facilitating a public presence for many of my female participants. Aisha (Int. 23) states, "I don’t really have any Spanish friends and only started going out…to the park when we moved to Fuenlabrada. I made friends with other women who live in our neighbor and thank God we go to the park or walking… or go to each other's house." In addition, many of my female participants lamented the fact that public life in 'conservative Morocco' was more conducive to their public participation than Spain; where most of the women stay indoors and do not experience a sense of community life and belonging. Latifa (Int. 10) explains the subtle differences between lifestyles in Morocco and Spain, "in Spain, no one communicates with each other. Everybody goes to their apartment and shuts the door. I don't even know the neighbors. When I say hi, they smirk, put their heads down, and walk away. I sort of became like that. It’s different in Morocco. Everybody knows you. You feel safe and protected because there is always somebody from the neighborhood who knows you and people trust you. Here everybody is on their own."

Furthermore, the support networks present for many of my female participants in Morocco were non-existent in the Spanish context. These support networks in the
Moroccan context often presented a counter balance to traditional cultural norms as women were ‘allowed’ and even supported by families to expand their gendered centered networks in Morocco. In Spain, their experiences with Islamophobic aggressions, coupled with traditional cultural frameworks on gender is limiting access to the public sphere. As a result of their experiences many of my female participants internalized an Islamic identity as a way to negotiate patriarchy in the Spanish Moroccan context. Aisha (Int. 23) states, "my husband is protective of me, but that is a good thing. He trusts me… when I work and go to the metro, as I am a hijabi, which gives me honor and also my husband. He knows I am a good Muslim." The female respondents in my study did not just give in to patriarchal structural norms that exist in the cultural and political frameworks shaping public life in Madrid, but they created their own spaces and utilized Islamic norms to negotiate patriarchy with family and Spanish society (Mahmoud 2004). As Anisa (Int. 30) explains,

"to tell you the truth, if I dressed like Spanish people or was not religious, then I don’t think my family would be happy or even let me go out on my own. They know I am righteous and I follow Islam. My father doesn’t have to worry that I will do something bad. How could I, I do my prayers, read Quran, and love the prophet. I don't do it for my dad, I do it for Allah. So they know that. My sister recently got an opportunity to go to Granada for a university event and when she asked my dad, he didn't even question her because he knows us."

The feeling and experiences of social exclusion via Islamophobia resulted in the construction of Spanish Moroccan social networks in neighborhoods and in public that
provided identity, meaning, and belonging. Furthermore, the public spaces that Spanish Moroccans occupy provided sanctuary from not only "competing minorities," but also perceived physical and psychological safety from policing institutions, immigration officials, and Moroccan and non-Moroccan gangs. As Abdullah (Int. 12) noted, “the police don’t mess with us here (Fuenlabrada) unless we are in the city. Neither do the Romanians or Ecuadorians, because they see that all Moroccans are together, so we leave each other alone.” The experience of Islamophobic aggressions on Spanish Moroccan lived realities allowed for my participants to develop networks in their neighborhoods that reflected an embodied sense of solidarity in the face of anti-Muslim, anti-Moroccan sentiment. This was further evident in the practices that emphasized Islamic identity as a basis for social cohesion and communal integration. Amin (Int. 2) states,

“As Muslims we only want peace, we lived with the Spanish when they were in Morocco and now we are here…we know each other very well there is no difference between the Spanish and Moroccans except religion but we lived with each other for years…why not now? If you go to Tangier or Tetuan the biggest buildings in the city are churches even though there are not many Christians in Morocco today. We don’t want to be isolated and not part of society. We want the same things that everybody else wants and that is to be a part of the country we are now citizens of.”

Life in the public sphere for my participants revealed how their racialized social experiences impact identity negotiation and construction in contemporary Madrid. The meaningful narratives employed by my participants to describe the micro-level
interactions and experiences reveal the ways they are constructing and negotiating identity in the context of racializing Islamophobic micro-aggressions. While the emerging satellite public spheres and Spanish Moroccan areas are communities of refuge for the community they also reflect the emerging ghettoization of their ethno-racial identities in Madrid. The Spanish Moroccan community’s shift from the city center to the outskirts is an ongoing phenomenon that is beginning to reflect similar racializing processes found in the French Muslim experience in the 'banlieues' of contemporary France.

Conclusion

As Spanish Moroccans negotiate for a place in Spanish society and thus gives meaning to identity, we find their difficult experiences in the face of Islamophobic aggressions are shaping Spanish Moroccan responses toward Islam and generating an imagined solidarity that lies in both the private and public sphere. Consequently, in formulating their identities within an Islamic framework, my participants were able to transcend the interpersonal discrimination while constructing an identity that is anchored within and beyond the Spanish nation state. There are consistent structural barriers towards integration and assimilation often leading toward downward mobility and exclusion from the larger imagined community (Portes & Zhou 1993).

I found my participants in the context of Islamophobia are not only heading toward increasing downward mobility at all generational levels, but also lacked any generational differentiation in identity responses (Portes & Zhou 1993). In addition, many of my participants found themselves in ethnic competition (Olzak & Shananann 2002) between themselves and the Latinos and Romanian ethnic minorities in Spain. The
preferential treatment of Latinos, Romanians, and Filipinos was seen by my participants as an attempt to placate and support Christian minorities over the Spanish Moroccan Muslim community. Another finding in this chapter emphasizes Smith’s assertions that immigration was a theologizing experience (1978:1175) for my participants in their attempts to define and negotiate identity in the face of Islamophobic aggressions.

As a response my participants increasingly relied on their racialized religious identity to promote group cohesion and community (Warner 1998). The participants also describe the emerging physical demarcation of Spanish Moroccan areas as beneficial towards the construction and support of communal identity and resistance to physical and ideational aggression. However, it can also have negative effects in possibly ghettoizing the community and creating reactive enclave mentalities that may support negative dissonant acculturation (Portes & Rumbuat 2001). Finally, this chapter reveals that the female participants in this study utilized and managed their Muslim identities to stave off and control Islamophobic aggressions; while also mediating cultural and religious traditions in order to negotiate their role in family life and as citizens in contemporary Spain (Mahmoud 2004).

The Muslim first identity framework provided my participants the necessary coping tools to help shape their precarious marginalized identities in an increasingly de-territorialized Spain. The desire for narratives and expansion of cultural and religious borderlands allowed for a reconciliation and internalization of a negative label, which served as a mechanism to construct rich and complex identities. The identity dynamics at the micro-level interactions, revealed how the first component of the dual communal racialization concept is racializing my participants towards Islam and Muslim identity.
This Islamophobia racial project was mediated by the other component of dual communal racialization, the Ummah racial project. The responses that were presented in this chapter need to be evaluated in the context of the Ummah racializing ideology in the next chapter in order to truly understand how my participants’ negotiated their identities in contemporary Spain.
Chapter 5

The Ummah racial project, Spanish Muslim identity, and the Spanish State

"Allah glorious may he be said, we are the best ummah that came to mankind to forbid what is wrong and ensure what is good. This is the reason why we are here in Europe. So we can establish Islam and make sure we are on the straight path. The only way Muslims in the world will have honor and dignity is through Islam."

This quote by Abdullah (Int. 12) represents the emerging importance of transnational Islamic identities among my participants in contemporary Spain. These transnational flows reflect their contemporary lives in Madrid and have their origin in the traditional territorial boundaries of the Muslim world. This is important primarily because the racialization of Spanish Moroccans in Spain is not only a result of the domestic experience; but also the transnational scapes that are shaping Spanish Moroccan identity and community. These scapes are attached to multiple mechanisms that enable previously enclosed, traditional religious and national identities to move beyond transnational borders to shape and formulate new identities. This facilitates, “transmigrants to take actions, make decisions, feel concerns, and develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously” (Mendoza 2006: 539).

In the Spanish context, these religio-scapes (McAlister 2005) accomplish two goals: The first is the creation of new communal identities that move beyond traditional identity categorizations in the Moroccan sending context (ethnic, racial, regional); and secondly, these scapes allow for discourses that attach ones newly reformulated identity
to the Spanish state. The impact of these scapes on my participants’ identities was best represented by Latifa (Int. 10) who revealed the level of negotiation present in the Spanish context between her religious, ethnic, and national identities. She said,

“I wasn’t proud of my Muslim identity until I came to Spain. I learned, I was a part of something bigger than just my village or Moroccan culture. I learned Islam and who I am as a person. I learned that I am not different from the people in Spain or other Muslims from around the world. We are all the children of Adam and we all have our groups, except our group is the Ummah of the messenger of Allah.”

In the following chapter, I will build on Latifa’s statement to address the second component of dual communal racialization to capture how the Ummah ideology is internalized in my participants’ identities and conception of self in the Spanish context. This will be accomplished by revealing the multiple mechanisms that are shaping these processes, which include Arabic satellite television and Islamic movements. These developments for the Spanish Moroccan community reinforce the Ummah ideology and identity among my participants’ and further reinforce attachments, networks, and ties to the global Islamic community. I found that Arabic satellite T.V. and Islamic movements are appropriated by multiple global actors in order to co-opt and shape the ideational logic of the Ummah; and to also create and allow for the manifestation of multiple variations of the ideal Islamic community. I will conclude by discussing how these variations of the Ummah reflect contemporary pan-Arabist ideologies and interact with the domestic racializing ideology of Islamophobia.
Understanding the Ummah, Transnationality and the Spanish Moroccan

Transnational scapes (Appadurai 1996) are increasingly allowing the Spanish Moroccan community to become a contested site for multiple domestic and international actors as they seek disseminate and solidify narratives in the community. As Mohamed (Int. 19) stated, “I get confused sometimes what Islam is … here is a Hanafi, a Shaafi, a Salafi, one is Saudi and he says my scholars are right, the other is a Sufi and he say his scholars are right… its confusing… all I know is to follow Quran and Sunnah that’s it.” The multiple expressions of the Islamic faith that Mohamed experienced is a reflection of the general impact that religio-ideological flows from across the Muslim world are having on my participants. These ‘ummah’ ideologies are racializing the Spanish Moroccans towards a Muslim-Arab first identity set. The racialization from abroad is being done through multiple mechanisms that are a natural part of the migrants experience in moving from one national context to another. Moreover, these ideologies play a dominant role in shaping their paradigmatic view of their life-world. The mechanisms employed by nation states, movements, and individual actors to shape identity and belief among the Spanish Moroccan community are mobilized through the all-encompassing concept of the Ummah.

The Ummah historically signified a symbolic Muslim collective consciousness that was sanctioned by Islamic Law and was never a politically or socially neutral concept; as it has always been appropriated by multiple actors in the contemporary and historical global Muslim community. For many of my participants’, the European context enables the Muslim individual to experience the Ummah firsthand via the diverse Muslim collectivities gathered in the variegated European postcolonial context that can never be
experienced in the home context where ethnic and religious homogeneity is the norm. This individual and communal introduction to global Islam and its attached ideological sentiments decenters traditional identity towards competing narratives that embody the experiences and reality of life in the new home context.

This mentality was best represented in the responses of Fareed and Sufyan, two second generation Spanish Moroccans who differed on who should have ultimate authority in Islam and how it should be practiced ‘authentically’. Fareed (Int. 28), a fervent watcher of Iqraa Saudi-Egyptian television stated, “Moroccans don’t understand the Islam of our pious predecessors, look at the mosques in Tangiers and in fact throughout the whole of Morocco. More than half of them have graves where they worship the graves and saints this is not in Islam.” He goes on to discuss how Islam in Morocco contains elements of idolatry and is no longer ‘authentic’ stating, “the only true scholars who are on the right path of the Quran and Sunnah are the scholars of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.” However, when I asked Sufyan (Int. 31) the same question surrounding who has ultimate authority in Islam and how it specifically ties in with his Tabligh identity he stated, “we need to go out and propagate to everybody, that is the way the companions of the messenger of God did it and that is the way we should do it. It is our duty as Muslims. We should take what we can from our elders who spent years doing this work and implement what they do, as they are the revivers of our faith in this day and age.” The elders, he regarded as his spiritual and religious guides are found in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. Thus, we find that my participant’s identities are being predisposed and shaped by identities rooted in the transnational context but disseminated via the Ummah ideology.
As Sreberny (2002) infers in her research on identity, immigration and religion, she finds that identity construction among migrant and immigrant populations vary on three conceptions of the self; the inward gaze, which looks at the new home context; the backward gaze, which seeks the homeland; and the looking all around gaze, which denotes a transnational hybrid self-conception. The Ummah in many ways occupies and colonizes these gazes to formulate and construct new identities. The Ummah racialization project(s) in this study presents multiple assumptions about how identity is constructed and solidified in the Spanish context: 1. Muslim identity is subjective and controlled by the appropriator of that identity. 2. In all circumstances, the Ummah project reinforces Muslim identity over all identifiers. However, this Muslim –first identity is almost always synonymous with Arab racial and ethnic identity 3. The Ummah project moves beyond the confines of the nation state to become an important component of the racialization process and mediated with Islamophobia. 4. These flows not only counter Islamophobic ideologies but rearrange and shape how Islamophobic experiences and ideological affinities are internalized in contemporary Spain.

**Arab New Media**

The impact of Arab new media on my participants was exponential, especially as transnational media has increasingly become central to European immigrant cultural and political frameworks. The Arab satellite revolutions not only transformed and changed the political and cultural realities of the contemporary Arab world but are also actively impacting Muslim minority communities in contemporary Europe. The new media forms emerging from the Arab world are providing new spaces for "communication flows" that
transcend territorial boundaries (Castells 2009) while shaping and mobilizing new identity forms.

The Arab satellite revolutions have reconfigured the geo-political structures of the modern Middle East and have produced dynamic changes in socio-political and economic life. The recent political and economic transformations which emerged in 2010 as a result of gradual democratization of media institutions in the Arab-Muslim world has allowed multiple actors to shape the realities of not only their target audiences, but the global community. The Spanish Moroccan communities benefit from access to differing media forms as they provide means for entertainment, leisure, and cultural ties to their ‘home’ community. This ‘relationship’ for my participants is increasingly playing a defining role in crafting not only national identity in Spain but also Spanish Moroccan religious, social, and political directives and norms. This is important because the Spanish Moroccan is no longer attached to one state, the Spanish or Moroccan, but to the global community. These technologies provide symbolic space and identity for communities that feel estranged from their new home contexts, while also creating new identities as a response (Georgiou 2005).

Understanding identity discourses among the Spanish Moroccan community allowed me to characterize their identities in relation to Arabic satellite television as, “constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference” (Hall 1990:235). This development transpired early on in my research, as I was surprised to find none of my participants actively watched Spanish media/ television. This immediately led me to ask questions pertaining to this neglect of an important national socializing source, especially for language and cultural acquisition. Moreover,
the Spanish Moroccans I resided with during my research had Arabic satellite television on twenty-four hours a day. Additionally, I found that my participants’ television viewing habits exercised a central role in their lives as immigrants to Spain; revealing the emergence and consolidation of critical transnational forces and ideational influences in their lives.

When I asked Abdul Qadr (Int. 24) about the importance of satellite television in his life, he immediately responded to my query before I could even finish my sentence by emphatically stating, “let me tell you something. I can’t live without it, the apartment owner wanted to get rid of the satellite dish and I told him if he does, I swear I will move and every other Moroccan in this building will move. This is the only thing that allows us to connect to our people plus it gives us things to do here.” This statement resembled the interactional dependence that was often shared with me by Spanish Moroccans in relation to their viewing habits surrounding satellite television.

For many of my participants, the primary reason they viewed Arabic satellite television is because they believed that watching Spanish TV is immoral, ‘*haram,*’ and filthy. Adil (Int. 11) lamented,

“how can I let my children watch Spanish TV? They show naked people, people in relationships (sexual), and bad stuff that is against our culture and religion. The Spanish used to be conservative but are no longer. They are just like other Europeans, especially the French, who are worse. I do not allow Spanish channels in my house because Muhammed (pbuh) said if you have no shame, you have nothing.”
Another participant Amal (Int. 17) revealed little or no divergence between herself and Adil stating,

“I was born here and I rarely watch Spanish television. I just can’t. It’s embarrassing, especially in front of family. I remember one time when I was young and we turned on the TV and after a few minutes there were women with no clothes, showing everything… and I remember my dad yelled at us and almost threw the TV away. He yelled and said these people are like animals. I remember we would only watch movies on tape until we got satellite TV.”

When I asked my participants’ if they occasionally watch Spanish television nearly all stated they exclusively watch Arabic satellite TV, and the few that did, only watched Spanish TV to catch local soccer games that are not shown on Al Jazeera sport. Abdul Haqq (Int. 22) stated, “I only watch Spanish TV 5 when there is a game and since I love Getafe, I have to watch it on Spanish TV because they don’t show them on Al Jazeera.”

This was the underlying sentiment revealed by my participants regarding their experiences with Spanish TV. Moreover, many of participants were disconnected from the programming and stated they preferred to watch American TV on Arabic satellite television than Spanish TV, which tries to emulate American programming. Anas (Int. 15) inferred, “why would we watch European TV?” It’s not good at all. All the good shows are American and we can watch all those shows on MBC 3 and 4.” MBC satellite is a Saudi funded satellite channel that provides popular American TV programs with Arabic captions; moreover the content is regulated and reviewed by editors at MBC and
thus all scenes that are deemed culturally offensive/inappropriate are cut from the programming. This revealed that even Western programming was viewed in the context of Arabic satellite TV.

All my participants viewed Spanish TV with suspicion as it countered the traditional, cultural, and religious norms of Muslim-Moroccan culture. This disposition was important because the emphasis on satellite television ostensibly becomes the primary mode of socialization for my participants and enjoys a centralizing role in shaping identity; while providing the necessary framework to address the rupture of identity in the migration process. Conversely, these channels have the ability to exercise control and shape my participants worldviews and identities that are often taken for granted and not explored. These satellite channels are not neutral in their messages as my participants revealed and often include built in ideologies and worldviews in their programming that shape how the Spanish Moroccan community is contemporarily constructing identity.

**Becoming Arab and Learning Arabic**

For my participants, the Arabic satellite channels all reinforced Arabic cultural norms and identity; while providing an alternative vision and understanding of the ideological worldviews that they received and were socialized into in their home country. The alternative narratives presented in Arab new media that are not directly controlled by state institutions allows for a proliferation of voices often not heard in Spanish nor Moroccan state media institutions. This development has far-reaching impacts on the Spanish Moroccan community especially as all my participants received their news and knowledge about the world, Islam, and Morocco through the vehicle of satellite T.V.
The narratives surrounding events including the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Arab revolutions, and European life are shaped by these mediums. When I asked Marwan (Int. 9), a follow up question on why he does not regularly view Spanish news television, which is quite diverse in perspectives and viewpoints he stated, “are you going to tell me that Spanish TV Antenna is better than Al Jazeera or even Al Arabiya? They don’t show anything except for Rajoy’s political views about Muslims and how much terrorism we do every day.” In viewing Arabic satellite channels, many of my participants understood their relationship to these channels as a means to employ and participate in a counter narrative to what is experienced in Spanish media. As Abdul Jabbar (Int. 13) states, “2M, Al Jazeera, Al Manar show us the reality in Iraq and Libya. They show us what happens every day in Iraq. How Americans are killing Iraqi’s every day. You don’t see that in BBC or CNN…. I also love the show, ‘travelling with the Quran.’ Did you ever see it? It shows you how Muslims all over the world who don’t even speak Arabic and know Quran better than us. It’s amazing. I can’t watch that unless I have this (pointing at the satellite box)”.

The counter narrative against mainstream Spanish media sources for many participants’ reinforced ideologies and direct ties to the global Ummah; while emphasizing Arab identity and language. For many of my Berber participants, the only access to alternative media sources available was Arabic satellite television. This is important primarily because all of my Berber participants had Arabic satellite television and all confirmed that this was the primary medium for consuming their news and entertainment. Many of my participants stated that they only learned ‘real Arabic’ when
they migrated to Spain, as they were only conversant in Moroccan Arabic dialect or a variant of the Berber language. As Sulayman (Int. 8) states,

“I didn’t learn Arabic... fusha (Quranic Arabic) until I came to Spain and got satellite television. My family and I would watch 2M and the news and my wife would watch a lot of MBC, LBC, and IQRA. This was the way we learned strong Arabic. Thank God, it is a blessing because I always wanted my kids to learn *fusha* as it’s the language of the Quran.”

Another participant, a Spanish Moroccan Rifi Berber forcefully reaffirmed when I reproached him about his acquisition of the Arab language via Arabic satellite TV. He responded, “you tell me that Moroccans are not Arabs? Our *darija* (Moroccan Arabic) is close to the *fusha*, even closer than Egyptian Arabic! I teach my kids *darija* Arabic so they can know their religion and culture. As long as they know that I would have done my job in the world with Allah.” When I asked him about the Rifi Berber dialect, he immediately responded that his kids do not know it and “do not really need it, as Morocco is an Arab country and ‘Berbers are historically Arabs anyway’.

The emphasis on Arab ethno-racial identity on Arabic Satellite TV is coercively reinforcing a symbolic link between Arab ethno-racial identity and Islam. For my Berber participants, the satellite channels variegated narratives of the Ummah were linked to Arab identity, especially for those who viewed religious programming. When I asked Hamza (Int. 1) about how he differentiates between Arab identity and Islam, he quoted a popular *hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad in which he states, “whoever speaks Arabic is
an Arab.” Beyond the hadith, he cited the shurafa symbolic status that is popular in Moroccan religious and cultural context. The shurafa status is applied to anybody who can link their racial-genealogical identity to the Prophet Muhammad and was often used to legitimize leadership in tribal communities; while bestowing honor and religious legitimacy to individuals and community members. This symbolic link declaratively places Arab identity in the center of Islam and Islamic religious norms. For Latifa (Int.10), a first generation Spanish Moroccan Berber, it was not religious programming, but entertainment shows like Star Academy on Lebanese channel LBC that shaped her connection to Arab and Muslim identity. While she discounted the idea that she was an ‘Arab,’ she immediately countered that assertion by stating, “they say Berbers are Arabs… I don’t know...what I do know and thank God for is that I am Muslim.” The confusion and conflict that often erupts between Arab and Berber ethno-racial identities was mediated by the Muslim-Arab identity label, which these satellite channels covertly reinforce.

Islamic Satellite Programming

Beyond the general impact of Arab satellite television on identity construction, nearly all my participants stated that they watch Islamic religious programming on this medium. This is crucial because each satellite programming channel (IQRA TV, Al Jazeera, and Moroccan TV 2m) have their religio-ideological strains within the Islamic world and reflect geographic and political motives of the States from which they are broadcasted. Most of my participant’s watched IQRA TV, a channel funded by Saudi Arabia, produced in Egypt, and espouses Salafist literalist interpretations of Islam. My participants cited “authenticity” and “valid scholarship” as the primarily reason why they
viewed this channel. Layla (Int. 4) stated, “the best scholars are on IQRA TV… they follow the Quran, Sunnah, and the pious predecessors. Plus, they have good programming for kids and even English shows.”

This channel espouses a Salafist-literalist approach to Islam by bringing conservative Muslim scholars from Egypt and Saudi Arabia to discuss pertinent issues that shape Muslim lives; while simultaneously being very Arabo-centric in their positions and ideologies. Ahmed (Int. 20) once called into a show holding a live fatwa session to ask personal questions about his Islamic faith and tradition. When I pressed him what question he entertained he refused to tell me, nevertheless his response was telling as he stated, “these shows inform us how to be real Muslims and to know what Allah wants us to do in the world.” For the majority of my participants, the sources for their Islamic ‘guidance’ were not the local imams in Madrid’s mosques, but the TV imams who are shaping religious identity, discourse, and practice. In fact, the participants who were regular viewers of this channel often criticized scholars from the local Muslim community as proponents of a watered down Islam.

This widespread perception is reflected in the following statement by Abdul Qadr (Int. 24) who said, “the local imams are shipped in from Rabat (referring to the capital in Morocco), they are all government Imams and don’t really have legitimacy among the community as they are seen as government mouthpieces and probably are just spying on us to make sure we don’t follow true Islam.” Ironically enough he also touted the lack of knowledge Moroccan Imams have in the traditional Islamic sciences and in the Arabic language while emphasizing Islamic authority and legitimacy to Saudi Arabian Imams and Shiekhs.
For my male participants, many exemplified and internalized what Echaibi (2011) called as transnational Muslim masculinity; wherein many of my male participants structured their familial relations on the ‘advice’ of preachers and Islamic scholars on TV, outside of their localized cultural and traditional settings. The emerging discourse where Gulf Arab Islam was the ideological apparatus that provided and crafted notions of honor and dignity, further reinforced traditionalist perspectives on gender norms and relations. The way my participants internalized messages regarding what they perceived to be authoritative and legitimate Islamic moral norms, allowed them to reinforce gendered ideologies that are often reflective of cultural paradigms from the Arab world. For example, three of my male participants wanted their spouses to wear the full face veil. The full face veil is not unique to Moroccan religious norms however it is a religious dictate that is enforced in the Arab gulf and through the medium of satellite television. The process of internalization of these beliefs were best explained by Sufyan (Int. 31) who articulated that it was his viewing and listening to Islamic multimedia sources that shaped his Islamic identity and practice. He said,

“before I was religious I was bad, I mean really bad if you go to my old neighborhood and ask about me they will tell you I was bad. But I was guided by learning Islam on my own on the internet then at the mosque which allowed me to change the way I live. It was also Muhammad Hasan. He had a nice and gentle approach that can really change ones heart easily. And he did. The first thing I did was, I stopped hanging out with women, I mean thank God I never done anything bad, bad. But I
stopped interacting with women, shaking hands, and started lowering my gaze. It changed my life and made me a better Muslim.”

While my male participants gravitated toward conservative scholarly figures, my female participants were almost all viewers of Al Jazeera’s most popular Islamic personality, Yusuf Al Qardawi.

Most of my female participants viewed Al Jazeera’s religious programming in which the top rated show was hosted by Yusuf Al Qardawi. Qardawi is known in the Islamic world as a liberal on many social issues and questions regarding Muslims and modernity. However he has been criticized for his religious edicts that supported violence and suicide bombings in contextual settings of ‘self-defense’. However, the way my participants spoke of their endearment toward Qardawi is important for this study primarily because I found that my participants, Berbers and Arabs were keen on his approach and attitude towards Islamic life. However, as Cherribi states Qardawi’s notion of the ‘Islamic’ also contains what he found to be, “a decisive element in the construction of the dominant narrative on Al Jazeera is the channel’s religious voice as represented by Al Qardawi. The reruns of Qardawi’s weekly television program and the content on his website form a rich source for evidence of how Al-Jazeera is focused on Islamizing pan-Arabism” (2012: 477).

The female participants reasons for viewing and listening to his show was shaped primarily by his lenient and ‘liberal’ approach to questions of gender and marital relations. When I asked Sadaf (Int. 21) about her satellite viewing habits she immediately blurted out without any hesitation,
“I love to watch Al Jazeera’s, ‘Life and Islamic Law.’” She further explains, “I know many people say that he is an easy scholar but he understands our religion and shows us a balanced middle way, the Prophet was… how the prophet treated his wife and says its ok to shake hands with men if you have to, or work with men if you have to … he doesn’t say everything is forbidden as the Saudi’s or Emirates do.”

For many of my female participants, taking on religious norms and practices empowers their capability to counter cultural and religious hegemonic norms that can only be challenged on religious grounds. Qardawi’s TV program on Al Jazeera provides them the Islamic jurisprudential justification and legitimation of their counter-hegemonic positions. Amal an avid supporter of Qardawi’s religious views (Int. 17) states,

“my brothers are very strict, but they know I am a good Muslim and they know I will not do anything against Islam and never do, so they don’t worry about me working with Spanish guys or going to (Spanish) café because they know I honor myself and it’s my rights because I know what Islam says to do and not to do. Plus we are living in the West, in a non-Muslim country I don’t understand those people who think they are living in villages that is why I like Amr Khaled and Yusef Qardawi they understand. ”

Amal (Int. 17) further stated that traditional Moroccan scholars do not consider women to be an object of mention when it comes to religious life, unless the women is in her home or raising kids. The ability to shape her religious identity with religioscapes that are unique to her life in Madrid is a result of her links to new media in a context that
facilitates interaction with multiple perspectives and views while also providing legitimacy for those positions.

**Moroccan TV**

My participants’ links to their nation of origin was also strengthened via Moroccan trans-national satellite channels (Levitt 2002). The Moroccan satellite channels reinforced conceptions of home and the Ummah. 2M and Al Maghrebiyya are two of the main Moroccan channels that were mostly viewed by my participants. Al Maghrebiya is owned by the Moroccan state and 2M is a privately owned channel. However, many entities that have a stake in 2M are owned or partially owned by the King Muhammad VI or linked to one of his subsidiary corporations that he indirectly controls. These channels for many of participants reinforced Moroccan cultural norms and language. Latifa (Int. 10) stated, “2M is my favorite channel, they show all the programs and soap operas in Moroccan Arabic and that is a lot easier to understand than shamsi (Levant) Arabic.”

Beyond the cultural programming, many of my participants perniciously spoke out against the religious programming as, “a performance on stage, rather than religious programming.”

When I reproached this subject with my participants, many felt uneasy discussing the Moroccan context but Abdullah (Int. 12) replied in a statement that I believe was quite reflective of the overall sentiments of my participants. He said, “these scholars who talk about Islam are all paid by the King, so they can support his power. They are afraid of the growth of Islam and so they want to control it by selling us traditional Sufism and the Maliki school of thought.” I found that most of my participants felt a general disgust and ambivalence toward Moroccan Islamic scholars primarily because these scholars are
seen as representatives of an authoritarian, autocratic state. However, outright rejection or ambivalence toward Moroccan TV discourses did not stop my participants from viewing their general programming.

For the Spanish Moroccans who viewed Al Maghrabiya TV channel they often described it as Moroccan propaganda TV. However, two of my participants cited how the Moroccan channels made them proud of Morocco and its current economic and political developments. In fact, the Spanish Moroccan family I would often visit in Madrid during my stay had Al Maghrabiya TV channel on whenever I would visit; and in conversation with members of this family on why they continued to view its programming when there were obviously better options. They replied that the channel reminded them of ‘home’ and made them proud to be Arabs from Morocco (although they were a Berber family from Tangier’s, Morocco).

**Arab Revolutions and Satellite Television**

The level of engagement my participants had with satellite television programs was especially heightened during the Arab spring revolts. The specific way these revolutions were portrayed in Arab media were critical in shaping my participants views of their individual lives in Madrid in relation to the Arab street protestors. The Arab Spring and its minute by minute portrayal on Arab media displayed and evoked pan-Arab, pan-Islamic affinities and ideological sentiments that my participants identified and internalized as real. My participants all linked there individual struggles with the protests and revolts in different ways depending on the satellite programs one viewed. I found that the majority of the participants that were of Salafi orientation and watched Saudi/ Arab Gulf supported programming were generally against the revolutionary protests, especially
in Shiite Bahrain and Mubarak led Egypt. The participants who were of Sufi orientation and primarily viewed Moroccan TV supported the revolutions but rejected protests in the Moroccan context. For example, Nora (Int. 18) a self-identified Salafi whose favorite scholar is Saudi Arabian Shiekh Muhammed Al Arifi on Iqraa TV; unabashedly stated that it is forbidden to protest against a leader unless the government was hostile towards Islam and Islamic law. She said, “Yes, Mubarak was bad but he never stopped people from praying or paying Zakat?” No, he didn’t brother. Now just like the prophet said they will have nothing but anarchy there, especially under the secularist and brotherhood who want only to cause problems for all the Muslims.” Abdul Jabbar (Int.13), who mostly watches 2M Moroccan TV supported the protest and revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia because they were autocratic, dictatorial regimes but when I asked him about Morocco he firmly stated,

“they should never protest against the King in Morocco, there is no reason. The King (May God be pleased with him) is doing his best for us. Just watch 2M, every day, every week, he is doing projects and building the country. They just built a freeway from Marrakesh to Tangier and now they want to have a fast train. He is doing what he can with whatever he has. The corruption is from the people around him, not him.” Abdul Jabbar (Int.13) went on to criticize Al Jazeera’s coverage and its supporters, while Nora provided a sectarian slant in her analysis she said, “do you think this is a real revolution…? This is the Iranians trying to ruin the Arab world and the Muslims. They are working with the Americans to make sure that peace will never happen in our countries.”
My participant’s sentiments are reflective of the ideological discourses that are displayed in media institutions of selected nation-states that control the satellite programming that they respectively viewed.

My participants’ generally supported the Arab Spring revolts and were hoping it would spread to Morocco. These individuals all received their news from a variety of sources, but nearly all stated they watched Al Jazeera regularly at the height of the revolts in early 2011. Amal (Int. 17) stated, “I am really excited; I mean when did you ever think Ben Ali or Mubarak would ever leave power? I just wish this can happen and the February 20 movement is successful in Morocco to get rid of our own dictator.” This was the general sentiment among my participants’ who were not avid Sufi’s or Salafi’s in religious orientation and did not watch one channel explicitly over the other. Another participant Mehdi (Int. 25) stated, “to tell you with full certainty and honesty Anwar, I can’t sleep,” he said laughing…especially when Mubarak left. It was a pure miracle. I was watching Aljazeera in my house, on my phone; everywhere I went, I had the news on. Waiting to hear who would go next… it was and it still is like a drug. Gaddafi is next.”

My participant’s attachments to news events and religious programming from the Arab world reflect the realities that Arab new media has on my participants’ interests and identities in contemporary Madrid. It reflects the impact and ability of religioscapes increasing prominence in solidifying attachments to communities and sentiments beyond the fold of the home and sending nation. These transnational flows allow my participants’ to strategically encounter and engage their identities to reflect the multiple scapes that are in our global system. Just like new media, transnational movements are increasingly
shortening the distance between the local and the global and in the case of SpanishMoroccans, reinforcing flexible identities that expand within and beyond the nation-state.

**Islamic Movements and Religioscapes**

The contemporary rise of Islamic movements and networks have profoundlytransformed and shaped contemporary Spanish Moroccan identities. While thesemovements and social networks vary considerably, they all propose religio-ideologicalparadigms in constructing their worldviews about Muslim identity and practice. Whetherthrough violent or non-violent means of political and social activism, these movementsand networks are aiming to Islamicize their societies in order to replace failing ‘systems’or provide alternative perspectives towards contemporary society. Alongside previousqualms with Western modernity, these movements and networks are challenging theepistemological foundations of Western cultures and ideologies that they increasinglyview as a source of Islamic societal degeneration and decline. In doing so, weincreasingly find that these movements and networks are confronting and resisting whatisperceived to be a western ‘hegemonic order’ by redefining and reconstructing Islamand Islamic practice according to their traditions and values.

Since the Spanish Moroccan community is a relatively young community, therehas been a very limited effort by Spanish Moroccan community leaders to reformulate aSpanish Islam. Thus, most of my encounters within and outside of religious institutionshave produced interactions with movements that are not indigenous to Spanish society.Therefore, the available expressions are primarily reflective of identities acquired throughmovement action and dissemination. Abdullah (Int. 12), a self-professed Tablighi states,
“this world needs Islam. Why do you think we have all the problems in the Muslim world? Why do you think that Muslims have become as the prophet said the foam left over on an ocean after a storm? This is because we have left our prayers. How many Muslims pray?” We have to call people back to Allah that is the only way. That is the way I came back to Islam in a non-Muslim country and that is how we will change the world.”

One feature of this contemporary revival in Islam is the efficient targeting of society more than the state. In calling to individual spiritual needs, these movements are constructing a religious discourse that seeks to alter prevailing paradigms. In the post-Islamist world (Roy 2004) these movements are producing new forms of religiosity that are engaged in discursive practices that are often solicitous in the public sphere, impacting not only individual practice and identity but also the socio-political and economic contexts.

The ‘Islams’ researched in this chapter are the given expressions that each individual Muslim produces in the Spanish context. While the Muslim religioscape is perceived as analogous in its global expression, the flows are invariably changing as they enter new spheres and fields, modifying the larger Spanish Moroccan religioscape. The dialectical relations between the local and global “religious flows” supports and constructs the proliferation of Islam’s that truly made my participants citizens of the Ummah. I found that the presence of multiple Islamic movements in and among the Spanish Moroccan community are playing an important role in racializing the minorities towards a Muslim-Arab first identity that seeks to move beyond the nation state of origin.
and or of place. The two movements that had the largest presence among the community were the Tablighi Jamaat and the Salafi movement network.

**The Tablighi Jamaat**

The Tablighi Jamaat is one of the largest Islamist movements in the world. Found in nearly every Muslim community, this religious movement aspires to revitalize and reorient the Muslim faithful back to the basic tenets of Islam. This traditional fundamentalist movement strives to reconstruct modern Muslim society in line with the temporal era of the prophet Muhammad in seventh century Arabia; a period that traditional Muslim jurists proclaim as the era of the ‘pious predecessors.’ The Tablighi movement’s presence globally and locally has reshaped Islamic activism as an apolitical movement/phenomena that does not outwardly profess political or economic ends/ideals. However, the profession of an apolitical position for the social scientist is incontestably a political one as Tablighi objectives warrants the total transformation of Muslim and non-Muslim societies by individual agents (Castells, 1997).

Nevertheless, the Tablighi movement is increasingly gaining ‘soft power’ in both Muslim and non-Muslim setting. The movement continues to grow with ever growing popularity in both the Muslim world and the West creating several issues of analytical significance. Many believe that the movement is exporting seventh century Islamic ideology and practice globally, transforming the local’s contexts mode of dress, language, and traditional practice of Islam; crafting a generation of Muslims who are increasingly looking to Pakistan and India for religious guidance and practice (Metcalf 2002). However, the movements goal and sought after legitimacy is through the recruitment of Arabs in the West and in the Arab world. A common perspective and belief taught by
Jamaat Tablighi elders are that Arab participation in the movement not only brings blessings to the movement but a critical precondition for Islam’s revival. Moreover, the historical context that the Tablighi’s want to reconstruct exists in seventh century Arabia; thus the emphasis on Arab recruits and the quest to harken back to the first three centuries of Islam allows for Arabs to have a perceived superior role in the movement structure; while acknowledging their presence as a form of divine grace.

Four of my participants claimed to participate in Tablighi activities and one actually went to Pakistan for four months to learn the Tablighi methodology but also became an active propagator of its methodologies. Sufyan (Int. 31) joined the Tablighi Jamaat and attends a mosque in Levapies that supports the movement’s activities. He states that it wasn’t until he joined the Tablighi Jamaat movement that he was able to find peace and a sense of self-worth. He stated,

“Oh Anwar, Go ask anybody here about me, before I started coming to the masjid, I was really astray. I did everything you can think of… drinking, selling hashish, going with women, everything! Thank Allah because he guides whom he wills, I found my religion because the brother would always visit me every Thursday and give me lesson about Islam and this world we live in.”

When I asked him if he would label himself a Tablighi, he adamantly stated that he is only a Muslim and does not belong to any movement or organization, as he is only doing the “prophet’s work.” This is poignant primarily because the way he is socialized into the movements goals and dynamics were through interpersonal networks that were supported and reinforced in his associations with other Muslims in Madrid.
Anas (Int. 15) and his wife are actively involved in trying to spread the Tablighi’s precepts and understanding of the importance of ritualistic Islam among the Spanish Moroccan community; to save them from a life of ‘crime’ and spiritual heedlessness. Anas stated, "if we follow Quran and Sunnah, we would wake up from our sleep and that means knowing our religion, knowing what rights Allah has upon me. If we just do the basics, God will give us his mercy, but we can only do that when we change our hearts towards him. Do you think we are in this position for no reason? There is a reason for everything." This statement is significant because his focus on reviving the Moroccan and Muslim community via the basic precepts of the Islamic faith conform to an Islamic tradition that is constructed and developed in the Indo-Pakistani context.

When I asked Anas (Int. 15) about Moroccan Maliki Islam he immediately stated, "There is no Moroccan Islam, Islam is Islam, and we are all Muslims, it doesn’t matter where you are from and what methodology you adhere to as long as our scholars legitimize it.” This was further reinforced by a statement he made that paradigmatically aligns his views on politics towards the traditional quietist forms that Tablighis are fairly known to hold, “Well if we Muslims did what we are supposed to do Allah will give us success in the world and hereafter…do you think if we practiced Islam that the Spanish would hate us? If we had the principles of the companions of Muhammad would they reject us or want to be us…? This is why we have to come back to Allah and his book.” This notion of Islam as being a tool of integration rejects Moroccan identity forms and equates integration and belonging to Islamic moral and spiritual practices.

The other Tablighi's I interviewed were attracted to the non-political, spiritual messages of the movement. When I asked Karim (Int. 14) what label he would attach to
his identity he immediately said, “Muslim!” When I pressed him and asked him why… he answered, “that is what I am.” This identity and lived consciousness of being Muslim first, developed in Sevilla, Spain where he worked for seven years for a local company.

He attributed his identity development to his relationship with a Syrian co-worker who would have the Tablighi’s visit him every Wednesday night at work and encourage him to participate in religious activities at the mosque. He goes on to say, “we would meet at a brothers house, then go the mosque, read Quran, *Riyadul Saleheen*, and then go visit brothers and invite them to the mosque.” He continued, “the presence of brothers from all over the world felt like a real Muslim community, not just Moroccans, we had Spanish, Arabs, Blacks, Indians everything.”

When I asked each of my participants to explain how the Spanish context differs from Morocco, Sufyan (Int.31) had the response that summed up their beliefs, feelings, and general experiences. He stated,

> “in Spain we have freedom of religion, they may not like us here, but most of my friends only became religious when we came here and the Spanish respect religious Muslims more primarily because they see we are not fake and stand by our beliefs no matter what happens. Plus, we don’t cause trouble like others. This is only possible here, in Morocco, the Moroccans laugh at you, if you have a beard because they see it as backward or if you dress in the clothing that is similar to the prophet.”

We find that the Spanish context creates and reinforces the perceived opportunity for these movements to establish their networks across racial and ethnic communities to construct and racialize the Spanish Moroccan community towards a Muslim first identity.
Dawa Salafiyya

Another ideological flow that is racializing the Spanish Moroccan community is the Salafist ideology and movements. The growth of Salafi Muslim networks has transformed the religious life and identity of many of my participants. The Salafist Muslim movement has its origins in the Arab Gulf and espouses a literalist, traditional interpretation of Islamic foundational texts and culture and is quite political in its ideological orientation. The literal meaning of Salafi is one who adheres to the traditions and interpretations of the pious predecessors which include the first, three generations after the Prophet Muhammad. As a movement that emerged under the auspices of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Al-Wahhab in the late 18th century, the Wahabis who are also known as Salafis sought to revive Islam via the purification of Islamic precepts and principles from what was framed by Wahabists as ‘foreign and idolatrous influences on Islamic tradition’. The Wahabi’s actively fought against and resisted any Islamic interpretation that did not conform to their methodologies including Sufism, traditional Islamic schools of thought, Islamic philosophy, and non-Muslim philosophical influences on Islam including Western and Asian philosophies (Schwartz 2002). This movement would have a significant impact on the global system with the rise of oil producing countries in the Gulf, which has provided and facilitated the proliferation of these fundamentalist, tribal Gulf based religious traditions to spread throughout the globe; via satellite television, funding of mosques, and mass dispersal of Islamic literature in Western languages including Spanish (Schwartz 2002).

Many of my participant linked their understanding and identities within Islam to Salafist interpretations. I found that most participants received their information about
Islam via their association with Salafi oriented media (Iqraa) or Salafi oriented individuals and networks. When I asked my participants where they received their Islamic knowledge they nearly all responded via social human networks and new media. Fareed (Int. 28), a self-identified Salafi said, “the internet is amazing, I can listen to Shiekh Albani, Bin Baz, Uthaymeen all the main scholars of our generation on my table. Allah made knowledge so easily accessible but we are all still ignorant.” He mentions that the internet has become his personal library in which he jokingly called “Sheikh Google”. He viewed these online Salafi networks as a means to address important faith based questions on identity and practice in Madrid.

Another Salafi, Muneer (Int.6) cited how “a brother” taught him Islam by advising him to approach the Quran and sayings of the prophet on his own with only the guidance of the ‘rightly guided scholars’ (usually in Saudi Arabia). He said, “my dear brother Hossam taught me how true knowledge is the knowledge of the companions of the prophet Muhammed not what these scholars who are paid by the government or learn superstition seek to teach us. If we want to know our religion then we must go straight to the source. If it’s there, I will do it. If it’s not there, then its innovation. Look at all the cultures that are influencing Islam, even in Morocco. May Allah forgive us but in some places they worship dead men, like Maulay Abdulsalam!”

The impact of Salafi Islamic networks is reinforcing the development of a unique confluence between Spanish-Moroccan culture and Gulf Arab interpretations of Islam that reinforce the primacy of Arab identity and interpretation over others. When I asked my participants how and when did they become conscious of their Salafi Islamic identity
they all said in one variation or another that the individual consciousness of their Muslim identity became real once they migrated into the Spanish context, as it was the first time they felt different. Ahmed (Int. 20) states,

“in Spain, we don’t have the King giving the Imams sermons and telling them what to tell us. We have access to scholars talking about important subjects not just how to pray or how to wash your feet. They taught us that Islam is more than that and if we want success in this world and the hereafter we have to understand and follow the specifics of our religion as it was in the past not how we like to draw it up to be as they do in Morocco and the Muslim world… There is an Imam from Ceuta who is amazing and comes to Madrid a lot and visits in the masjid in Parla and I would he say is my Imam, nobody from Morocco”

When I asked my participants what it meant to be a part of the Salafiya, they would often correct me and state that the Salafiya is synonymous with Islam and not a religious movement. Abdul Qadr (Int. 24) explained the intricate differences by stating, “Salafiyya is the Quran and the sayings of the prophet Muhammad, that’s it. We are careful about innovation and bringing something new to our religion. The prophet Muhammad said that Muslims will be in 73 sects and only one will be the saved one and so how are you saved, well you have to understand the true Islam, like the Prophet Muhammad understood it.”

The Salafi movements presence in Spain and among the Spanish Moroccan community has been accomplished through the influence of Saudi Arabian and Gulf funding of mosques, TV programming, Islamic material, and educational institutions for
the Spanish Muslim community. Accordingly, for many Spanish Moroccans who migrated to Spain with limited education and no formal Islamic knowledge. For many of my participants their first experience with ‘formal Islam’ was through these mechanisms that are often literalist in their interpretation of the source texts and culturally antagonistic against non-Islamic cultural norms, which often provide conclusive explanations for their alienation, discrimination, and ‘suffering’ in Spanish society. In response, the Salafi networks in Madrid reinforce narratives, religious practices, and a normative social order within and among the community of Muslims emphasizing the importance of Muslim-Arab identity i.e. the Ummah over all identifiers. Faouzia (Int. 33), a Salafi discusses how she started wearing the hijab in Spain,

"my parents never told me about the Muslim obligation of hijab, we grew up thinking it was only old women or village women who wear it. But when we came to Spain, I learned what Allah wanted from us and what my responsibility was as a woman and so I started wearing it. It’s not culture. It’s our religion and all Muslim women have to wear it."

Two of my male participants (Int. 1, Int. 20) reinforced gender roles that reflect the Arab Gulf region including influencing their wives decisions to wear the full niqab, while emphasizing traditional gender roles and male familial leadership in household duties. Others discussed how it was important to dress in the dishdasha, the traditional Saudi Arabian clothing to reinforce identity and self-control while reviving the prophet Muhammad’s practices. Abdul Qadr (Int. 24) stated, “the wisdom of wearing the dishdasha is that this is what the Prophet wore and so if you have similar intentions then Allah will reward you, plus it helps you control your behavior as you are not going to
look at women or smoke because you will have shame and plus the non-Muslims know you are Muslim and if you have good morals, then they will become Muslim too.” The form of dress is in many ways a rejection of both Spanish and Moroccan identities; whilst referring and reinforcing his ideas and notions about Islamic identity as a fusion of Islam and traditional Arab Gulf culture. Moreover, there was a general feeling in my own participation in community life that those who were outwardly religious were highly revered and may be a means to provide social and moral mobility in a tight knit community like the Spanish Moroccan community in Madrid.

For many of my participants, the basics tenets of their faith was learned via Salafist educational materials received for free in mosques, interpersonal networks, or satellite television. Tariq (Int. 3) explains how he learned how to pray ‘properly, “in Morocco we would do many innovations, like pray with your hands down like the Shiites, but it wasn’t until I read Albani’s, ‘The Way to Pray,’ book that I finally learned the real prayer. Can you imagine that I prayed the wrong way for most of my life! May Allah forgive me.” The emphasis on a pure and pristine Islamic identity for my Salafi participants also Arabized components of the Ummah as Islam is often equated with the Arabic language. This had an impact on my participants in how they espoused their own personal identities and the complex relationships that exist between Islam and Arab ethno-racial identity. Most of my Berber participants, in discussing their ethnic identities in relation to Islam often claimed both Arab and Berber identities and explained their attachment to Arab ethno-racial identity via Islam. The emphasis on Arabic identity is often tied to the importance of linking their own understanding of Islam to the pious predecessors (who were all Arab) and those Berbers who claim a genealogical link to the
prophet Muhammad. Tariq (Int. 3) for example, became a bit perturbed when I asked about his Berber identity in relation to Arab identity and Islam. He said,

“I am tired of people try to make us different. We are the same. Arab and Berber. This is the French and Spanish colonization. More, from the French. They tried to separate us and they did a good job. Now you have Berbers who say we are not Arabs and Arabs colonized us? This is crazy. We are all Arabs and more importantly we are all Muslims. We are all mixed and of the same people and we have Islam.”

The continuing growth of the Salafi ideology and identity among the Spanish Moroccan community is reinforced through Salafi networks and scapes via the mechanisms described in this chapter.

**Conclusion**

This chapter began with the question of how the Ummah racial project via the Arab satellite TV and Islamic movement’s religioscapes are racializing Spanish Moroccan identity. I found these religioscapes reinforced my participants’ identities towards Islam and an Arabized Muslim identity, highlighting the fluidity in the ongoing process of identity construction. The religioscapes presented (Arab satellite TV and Islamic Movements) reveal how Spanish Moroccan identity is being subjected by external social constructions that are produced and reproduced in multiple settings. Portes and Rumbaut (2006) conceptual framework of reactive ethnicity was necessary to provide the paradigmatic lens in understanding how these external ideational forces are shaping my participants it did not explain their reactions fully. This is because the reactive religious identity of Muslim via the Ummah 1. Are not localized religious
identities. The reactive identity was present in all three generational categories including the first and 1.5 generation. Thus, their feelings and reactions to Islamophobia facilitated an outward gaze towards the Ummah for my participants which explain how dual communal racialization was present.

Arabic satellite television is not only shaping religious identities but also reinforcing attachments to those identities that reflect transnational questions and flows that have their origin in neither the Moroccan nor Spanish contexts. I found that multiple actors’, nation-state and movement have a stake in shaping via the Ummah how Spanish Moroccans produce identity in contemporary Madrid. This facilitates the presence of multiple movements of differing origins to use the Ummah to have and gain entry to the Muslim community. For my female participants, the Ummah also facilitated multiple conservative and traditional gender ideologies to have a presence in the community.

We have established in chapter four and five how the Ummah and Islamophobia racial projects are shaping Spanish Moroccan identities in contemporary Madrid via the DCR. In the following chapter, we will explore how these two ideologies are interacting at the ‘institutional’ level to reveal the extent and ways dual communal racialization is shaping identity and belonging in contemporary Spain.
CHAPTER 6

Immigrant Community Spheres and Spanish Moroccan Identity Negotiation

The meaningful narratives evoked by the Spanish Moroccan community reflect the rich and complex ideologies that encapsulate the concept of dual communal racialization. The previous chapters revealed that the sharply contrasted and seemingly irreconcilable racial projects of DCR (ummah and islamophobia) are actively shaping Spanish Moroccan negotiation of identity, belonging, and conceptions of home. This chapter addresses the meso-level of analysis to reveal how my participants were shaped by and are actively shaping ‘institutions’ via the DCR thesis. This chapter adopts Jonathan Turner’s definition of institution’s to include, “a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organizing relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment” (Turner 1997: 6). The emphasis on ‘institutions’ conferred an important development in understanding Spanish Moroccan immigration and identity negotiations; primarily because previous research and my own time with the community revealed that there is limited organizational capacity and/or associational activities (Gest 2011).

However, when I asked my participants about their experiences and interpersonal interactions with institutions that they feel are important in their lives, they all relayed the prominence of what I call 'immigrant community spheres.' These institutions articulate and represent the Spanish Moroccan migrant’s social and political interests, while shaping meaningful narratives about the community in both the public and private
spheres. The dynamic and unconventional institutions discussed in this chapter include the mosque, Muslim monuments, and café institution. These institutions incorporate variegated forms of capital and accompanying frames that are central to Spanish Moroccan community and identity negotiation.

In the following, I will develop the concept of 'immigrant community spheres' to explore the complexities of identity negotiation with and around the selected institutions that Spanish Moroccans claimed as their own. Then I will subsequently assess how the flexible expression of identities acquired by my participants’ encapsulates the continuum between the recursive identity politics found between the local and the global. This chapter will then follow this discussion by evaluating my participant’s multilayered relationship with the mosque, Muslim monuments, and café institution. In doing so, I will try to present the interpersonal dynamics and interactions that my participants dispensed vis-à-vis these immigrant community spheres to reveal how these institution’s expanded access to space and various forms of capital in contemporary Madrid. In addition, this chapter will highlight how DCR is constructing and deterritorializing the 'immigrant community spheres' as neutral and fluid spaces.

Understanding Immigrant Community Spheres

Immigrant community spheres are institutions with symbolized spatial trajectories and permeable borders that facilitate individual and collective mobilization and the movement of scapes and flows from domestic and international actors. The immigrant community sphere as represented by the mosque, Muslim monuments, and the Café are open and constrained by the cultural and political framework wherein these institutions exist. The Spanish democratic context facilitates the opening of these physical spaces to
generate communal affinity and action, which becomes critical for immigrant integration and adaptation in new home contexts. These institutions also contain various forms of capital and can include any and all forms of mobilizing structures, access to institutional avenues, political and social alliances, and member’s individual networks.

These institutions were critical in containing the physical and ideological spaces of the DCR and are decisive in informing the available categories to craft meaningful narratives for my participants’ identity construction. For the Spanish Moroccans, the immigrant community spheres are bounded by imagined solidarities that exist between and among Muslims as represented by the Ummah racial project. These imagined solidarities allow access to the community spheres for all Spanish Moroccan immigrants and thus become expanded spaces for flexible expressions of identity. However, the immigrant community spheres are not neutral, stand-alone institutions as they impose socio-historical and religious constraints on immigrant identities and mobilization. Consequently, the immigrant community spheres historically rooted dispositions allows for the presence of multiple ideological and discursive strains to construct variously fluid Spanish Moroccan identities. In the following, I will discuss the mosque, Muslim monuments, and cafe institution to reveal how my participant’s perceptions and interaction with each institution has shaped contemporary identity.

The Mosque

I would come to learn early on in my study that the mosque institution was readily cited as the most important institution in the Spanish context for my participants. This was relayed in two different, yet similar comments referencing the mosque.
Mohamed (Int 19): “I don’t know what place I would say is important. There is not an organization that helps me and I hate going to the government offices as they just turn me back. I really don’t get involved in anything; I go to the Mosque, take kids to school, and come home. This is my life here.”

Aisha (Int 23): “I would say the mosque is really important for my family. It keeps us connected to Muslims and we have things to do. It give my husband a place to interact with people and my kids go there on Saturdays to learn Islam and Arabic. In fact, before I married Nabil I asked him how life was like in Spain and when he told me there was a mosque my heart became open to marrying him and coming to Spain.”

The complexity of understanding the importance of the mosque institution for my participants was explored by delinking the mosque from its traditionally perceived functions. In doing so, I asked my participants multiple questions regarding their interpersonal and symbolic relationship with the mosque institution and its functions. Additionally, I wanted to know how they perceived the mosques presence in contemporary Madrid and to what capacity they utilized the institution. My interviews revealed that while the mosque is variously fluid in ideological orientation, it is often the site wherein which DCR is symbolically embedded, negotiated, and internalized. This allows the mosque to transform into a site of contention as it strategically encounters pitch battles that represent the religious, cultural, and ideological difference and shifts in Spanish society and the global Ummah. Consequently, the discursive power of the mosque in contemporary Madrid for my participants has become an institution that is increasingly shaping Spanish Moroccan identities.
When I gauged Hamza (Int. 1) about his attitudes towards the mosque institution he elaborated,

"the mosque was the first place I went to when I came here. There was a Senegalese brother, I swear to God brother he let me stay with him for two months. For free. I would go out in the morning to look for work and come back and will find food ready. I went to the mosque with him because I was his guest. I didn't go when I was in Tangier. He made me a better person and a better Muslim. He took me to the mosque every day. Now I can't miss the night prayer. If I do, I feel like I lost something or did something very bad. I don’t know what I would do if the mosque was not here. I would probably move."

The importance of the mosque institution for Hamza only became relevant when he left Morocco and entered a new context where his religious and cultural identity was no longer the primary identifier. This reflects Warner's findings on diaspora communities and religion, where he found that immigrants often become more religious in their transnational disposition than they do in their home context (1998:3). This occurs because as Williams suggests in his work on migration and identity that, "religion is one of the important identity markers in helping them preserve individual self-awareness and cohesion in a group" (1988: 11).

According to Marwan (Int. 9), the mosque was his introduction to life in Spain and more importantly introduced him to Muslims of different backgrounds. He stated,

"it is wonderful. You see all of the sons of Adam. And brothers want to help you unlike others who don't come to the mosque. When I came to
Spain and I am not afraid to admit it the brothers collected money for me. I remember a Syrian doctor who came to me and gave me one hundred Euros. Just like that. That really made me feel the message of the messenger of Allah."

The sense of community articulated by Marwan was a result of his access to the mosque institution, which reflected internal diversity, while displaying the unity of the religious precepts of the Ummah. The mosque as immigrant community sphere also introduced my participants to multiple social mobility avenues and employment links that facilitated greater integration to the new home context. When I interviewed Karim (Int. 14), a second generation Spanish Moroccan activist, he stated in definite terms that all the opportunities he received and internships participated in was from his networks at the mosque. He said,

"many of my Spanish friends often ask me how do you know so and so or how did you get that opportunity and I didn't think about it before but it all came from the mosque. I know doctors, lawyers, businessmen, restaurant owner’s people in all fields... so when I need something I can always have access to it from the community."

Accordingly, the mosque institution allows my participants to solidify access to networks and share resources in order to facilitate community growth. Such perceptions of the mosque as an immigrant sphere allows my participants to bridge frames with the institution, reinforcing Muslim collectivities which becomes the driving force of sharing important and vital resources and network information for my participants.
Karim (Int. 14) continues by stating, "I am grateful to have the mosque. I feel like we have a place here that is our own and the government recognizes as important. Whenever there is an election politicians come to the mosque and makes the Moroccans here feel that we are represented in this country and we have somebody to speak for us." In short, the access the mosque provides to multiple forms of capital provides the generalized legitimacy of representation for my participants to the broader society.

This relational connectedness was also found with participants who were formal and informal members of domestic and transnational Islamic movements. These movements are able via individual Spanish Moroccan actors to move in and out of the immigrant community spheres to establish movement structures and participate in movement action in the Spanish context. This assertion was addressed in political and cultural discourse after the 5-11 attacks as Spanish politicians and Muslim community leaders questioned how Al Qaeda’s radical message and network schemas were able to infiltrate the Moroccan community, and have a strong presence among Spanish Muslims. As a result of my research, I found that the access my participants had to the mosque sphere in multiple sites in Madrid allowed for a proliferation of individuals representing movement causes that have a presence in Spain. The permeable, open boundary of the mosque institution allows for multiple identities; marginalized and mainstream, to maintain a deeper identification with the mosque. The centrality of the mosque sphere for immigrant adaptation and integration is often under theorized in Muslim minority studies.

The mosque institution has historically been the central foci of Muslim communities from the time of the prophet Muhammad until the present; fulfilling the
religious, social, and political functions of the community. The mosque, as an active agent in influencing and constraining Muslim collective behavior is central to understanding how immigrant community spheres are constructed and perpetuated by the Spanish Moroccan community in order to maintain a degree of legitimacy within the eyes of the Muslim community. In the contemporary context, the mosque apparatus has taken on two forms that are directly tied to the type of regime present in each context. The two types include authoritarian and non-authoritarian democratic regimes.

In Morocco, the mosque is primarily an open, ‘free space’ (Wiktorowicz, 2004) of worship with no one movement controlling the organizational structure and day to day operations of the mosque, as this responsibility is appropriated by the state. In non-authoritarian democratic contexts like Spain, the mosque institution is directly controlled by organizations and Islamic movements because the state does not generally interfere in mosque affairs. Abdullah (Int. 12) explained his interactional experiences with the mosque in Morocco in comparison to the Spanish context. He divulged,

"in Morocco there is no mosque as it was during the time of the Prophet Muhammed everything is controlled by the government, the imam, the times one goes to the mosque, and we were not free to do anything accept pray and leave. Even the speeches are given to the Imam. So everything is controlled can you imagine. Even the Friday speech? Can you just imagine? Here in Madrid, the mosque is everything I and my wife do. I go every day to see friends, read Quran, talk about the Muslim world, we have feeding program in Ramadan for the poor, and propagation table for the non-Muslims."
This development and redefinition of mosque/state relations in the Spanish context has allowed multiple movements and individuals to systematically control every aspect of the mosque apparatus. However, when I pressed my participants about their issues with the mosque institution in Madrid, they all lamented that Spanish Moroccan presence is minimal as the Syrians, Pakistanis, and local Spanish converts control the administrative and organizational apparatus of the mosque institutions in Madrid. Nevertheless, as Abdullah (Int. 12) reinforced, “the others (non-Moroccan Muslims) do control the mosque, no one can stop anyone from praying there or being part of the mosque because it doesn’t belong to the Pakistani or Moroccan but Allah.” Moreover, while certain individuals, organizations, and ethnic minorities may have institutional control over the day to day administrative tasks of the mosque institution; the mosque as a historical and religious entity has its own ideological constraints on individual believers and Muslim movements.

In the Islamic legal tradition, the mosque is theoretically supposed to fulfill not only the spiritual functions of the believers but also the communal priorities that emerge for the community. It is not an accident that Prophet Muhammad’s first political action when migrating to the city of Medina from Mecca was the construction of a mosque from which all the believers’ sought refuge. The mosque was theorized and currently understood in Islamic legal discourse as the property of the Ummah and no individual or movement could ‘theoretically’ claim the mosque institution as their own.

The mosque immigrant community sphere becomes a site where DCR is disseminated and internalized by my participants; encapsulating identity formation and narrative, while reifying the DCR ideologies to shape the mosque institution. This
process allows individuals and movements from variegated political and cultural contexts to utilize and shape the mosque *immigrant community sphere* for communal or individual interests. Even though the mosque legal (Islamic) and cultural constraints can be debilitating and supportive in individual and movement access to networks and resources; the costs of not centering one's identity and movements to the mosque institution is a lot higher. Such conclusions were qualified by multiple participants as individuals and movement actors.

This is illustrated in Muneer’s (Int. 6) account of how his mosque networks landed him his fruit business;

“I have had my fruteria business for four years and it has been huge blessing from Allah. I started by working here for another Rifi Berber, (Abdullah) who I met at the mosque when I first came here in 1997. He trusted me because I was always religious and he saw me praying at the mosque all the time. I asked for a job and he gave it to me with no hesitation plus we are both Rifi Berbers. I worked with him for ten years until finally he couldn’t handle many stores and offered to sell me this store. Anwar, he sold me the store with no interest! I mean who does that now day. No interest. This is what the prophet said when he said follow me and Allah will never lead you toward a negative path in life. It worked for me I came with nothing and Allah gave me everything. I even got my papers without marrying a Spanish woman. I got it through sponsorship and my own money. Thank God.”
Islamic movements also orient their social and political programs on the mosque institution as it facilitates and supports transnational Islamic movement actions in new settings to usurp symbolic, social, and political capital needed to sustain movement success.

When I asked my participants who claimed a movement identity, what role the mosque played in embedding the saliency of the movement identity in their lived realities; they all related that their mosque experiences exercised an active and transformative impact on their lives. Moreover, this question produced responses and critiques of not only the mosque institution, but also the general perception that the Spanish state is assuming control over the mosque via their support for some movements that they may oppose. In response to my query Yousef (Int. 27) responded, “the government is trying to control our mosques especially after the attack and now is working to even control our mosque in Pinto and Parla. They are demanding access to our imams and trying to change the *khutba* from being in Arabic to Spanish. They are getting involved in things that they don’t know about.” This generalized fear is reflective of Spanish Moroccan community apprehension over the government’s attempts to exercise political and social control of their religious lives.

Such perceptions are also realized in the positioning and encounters that my participants who represent movement interests generally have of the ‘other’ movement in the mosque institution. When I asked Yousef (Int. 27), who generally identifies himself as a Salafi Muslim activist how he feels about the presence of Tablighi’s and the Sufi Oriented Justice and Spirituality movement in the mosque (M13), he stated in definite terms that the Salafi’s must be patient and propagate the truth about real Islam to
everybody who visits the mosque. He went on to say: "brother, the reality is these groups are misguided but I can't say or do nothing except teach them Islam. That’s all I can do, but alhamdulilah at least they are Muslims and that makes it easier and shows our job is big." Mustafa (Int. 7) an active Sufi who identifies with the Justice and spirituality movement states as long as they say, "There is no God but Allah and Muhammed is his messenger is a Muslim right... Well who am I to say who can and cannot come here."

When I asked my Tablighi oriented activists they were accepting of all Muslims as they were, "fulfilling their obligations to the mosque" and presented promise for more recruits for their movement.

Another important component that I found to be quite interesting as it relates to the mosque immigrant community sphere is the internalized feeling of pride and security that existed in my participants responses regarding official representation by the mosque to the larger public. The affinities expressed toward the mosque, does not necessarily translate into high attendance for my participants but it does indicate the generalized legitimacy and symbolic solidarity that fulfills communal needs and representation in the larger non-Muslim society.

Such perceptions were articulated by Amal (Int. 17) who stated,

“I never go to the mosque. My family goes but I don’t go. But I follow them when it comes to Ramadan or ethnic events that we hold in plaza del sol. I understand I am Moroccan, Spanish and Muslim and as a Muslim the mosque is always the important because it is the life of the community. My mother begs me to go to Islamic classes but I just don’t have time
maybe one day I will go and even go regularly to Friday prayer but it is always there in my mind.”

Abdul Wahid another Spanish Moroccan who doesn’t describe himself as particularly religious stated, "I remember when the M13 mosque was being built and people were protesting and many saying it is not necessary to have a mosque of that scale in the neighborhood. This made me really mad and I would go to the other the Umar mosque just to support the community." This was also the general perspective among my participants who experienced daily forms Islamophobic micro-aggressions; the mosque in many ways was the institution that allowed them to find identity and place in Madrid.

Aisha (Int 23) stated,

"I love going to the mosque it makes me feel like I am not alone. Other women are wearing the hijab, praying, and going through the same experiences as I am. Even Spanish converts are going through the same thing, especially if they wear hijab or have hostile families who didn't want them to convert to Islam."

For many of my participants and the newly arrived illegal and legal migrants, the mosque becomes an institution that they seek out whether or not they are religiously inclined.

Moreover, the anti-Mosque protests coupled with daily experiences of Islamophobic aggressions has slowly prompted many of my participants to identify with the mosque institution primarily because it has become an integral part of their overall identity. This allows the mosque institution to not only be an important resource for variegated forms of capital for my participants, but also a site where identity narratives are negotiated and localized at the institutional level. The mosque as immigrant community sphere then is an
open place that allows for the sharing of important resources, identity, and sense of community and belonging for the Spanish Moroccans in my study.

**Memory and Monuments**

The second *immigrant community sphere* that is shaping Spanish Moroccan identity negotiations are what I call Spanish Muslim monuments of memory. These monuments are critical in the memory projects of both the Spanish and Spanish Moroccan communities, as these historical sites are facilitating the negotiation of DCR; while constructing new categories of Spanish Moroccan identities. Studies on collective memory have primarily focused on national contexts, the shift towards the relationship between national and transnational memory is an important development in the field (Nora 1996; West 2008). While visits to these sites are often characterized in the Spanish milieu as touristic sites; for my participants these sites of memory also functioned as pilgrimage spheres (Turner 1979).

Just like sites in the Holy Land associated with Christ have become sacred and integral to the Christian faith community over time (Halbwach's 1941), the sites that were identified by my participants to be important to their identities are often ruined mosques, mosques turned into Churches, and old Moorish palaces. Halbwach's articulates how a city like Jerusalem, full of historically significant sites of memory, real and unreal have become important and embedded in Christian consciousness and identity:

“For the Christian world, Jerusalem was the holy city par excellence. But this image vastly differed from the actual city of the epoch, with which the Christians who lived there were familiar. . .Time was at work here as elsewhere to erase more and more traces of the past. But when the
Christians living in Europe talked of Jerusalem, they had quite different mental representations: a supernatural city where the majesty of the Son of God had never ceased to radiate; an external city where what had been the framework and the support of the event told in the Gospels was expected to be miraculously preserved. It seems that they never doubted for an instant that the city would appear to them just as it had appeared in the past. What did they know of successive sieges that had left no stone unturned, of reconstructions, of changes in the direction of streets, in the situation and appearance of houses or districts? They knew very little of these matters” (Halbwachs 1992:230–31).

I asked my participants questions to explore this relationship between these institutions of memory and identity in order to understand how these spheres are providing the cultural and symbolic capital in shaping contemporary Spanish Moroccan narratives. Every single participant in my study stated that these sites played an important role in linking and consolidating their past to contemporary Spain. As Karim (Int. 14) stated, "Anwar, these are everything for all of us. Aren't you proud of this history when you see the Al Hambra? Did you see it? Aren't you amazed at what we once were as Muslims? These things are important because they show our history in this land. This is where our grandfathers were and now we are back." When I pressed him about what he means by grandfathers he said, "our people, the Muslims."

This textured understanding referenced the importance of his Islamic link to these sites as opposed to his Berber ethnic identity. These sites of memory have become critical institutions in the construction of identity for my participants as they are seen linking
their current ongoing presence in Spain to a “glorious Islamic” past. This sphere provides the Spanish Moroccan community tools to challenge the culture of marginality and feelings of exclusion from Spanish society. Conversely, it strategically constructs an encounter with the national culture to legitimize their migration, life, and citizenship in contemporary Spain. In Halbwach's research, he exposes the symbolic order created as a result of the encounter described above and shows how once the individual experiences and feels the site of memory; it shapes their emotions as result of that site being in an 'alien' environment. Thus, the individual participates in a process wherein there is a conscious attempt by the individual to reconstruct memory in the current socio-political and economic context. Halbwach's stated:

“inspired whenever possible by the traditions that still remained in regard to Christian monuments, if not also by the traditions pertaining to evangelical facts that could still be invoked at the time of Constantine. But they were not content with rebuilding the ruins in this manner. They instituted new localization's, guided no doubt by the Gospels, but also by apocryphal writings and legends that had circulated for some time in the Christian lands, and even by a kind of inspiration...The Crusaders behaved as if this land and these stones recognized them, as if they had only to stoop down in order suddenly to hear voices that had remained silent” (Halbwachs 1992:231–32).

One of my participants Tariq (Int. 3) emphatically stated,
"even the Spanish know that we belong here, I mean everybody from northern Morocco has ancestors that are from here. The Spanish recognize
the Jews who were kicked out and even gave them citizenship but we
Muslim who were here and were also kicked out are not even mentioned in their books or the law."

Tariq was referring to the law of return legislation which the Spanish government passed in 1992 and more recently in 2012, which allows Sephardic Jews who can prove Spanish identity to receive full citizenship, while ignoring the other victims of the Spanish inquisition, the Muslims.

The way memory is deployed around these community spheres is important because these institutions anchor identity to the Ummah and Spanish history; while also providing a succinct response to the Spanish public who dismiss their presence. Anas (Int. 15) stated, "when I first visited Abdurahman park it was a good feeling to know that the city, the capital of Spain was established by Abdurahman. I mean, the fact that they changed the name to Abdurahman park shows that the Spanish acknowledge our presence." Another participant Ahmed (Int. 20) stated,

"the first time I visited the mosque of Cordoba, I was shocked that Muslims built the mosque the way it is. I mean it is better than any mosque I have ever seen in Morocco. This shows how strong the Muslims were, God willing this will be again… Look when we see the situation we find that the mosque is important because the Spanish can't deny we were here its right in front of them they can't deny it. ....You know I find it ironic that most of the Spanish I speak with don't know Muslim history in Spain, they think we were savages who just ruined everything and didn't
really have a civilization but I am say just see what is in front of your eyes."

These were the emotions displayed by many of my participants, a mixture of frustration at the Spanish attempt to de-link Spanish identity from Islam and pride in the historical rootedness of their identity in the land they now call home. Moreover, the strategic encounters with these spheres allows for DCR to be employed and negotiated by my participants. As Anas (Int. 15) states, “the Spanish may hate the fact that their skylines in the south look like Morocco for the world, but this is the reality of Spain." However, what emerged in the discourse often emphasized an imagined historical reality wherein the Muslims were always a part of historic and contemporary Spain. This sense of belonging was always articulated and attached to historical memory and the Muslim monuments which dot the physical landscape. This allowed the Spanish Moroccans to situate and cement their presence in contemporary Spain.

The rich and complex identities that emerged as a result, solidifies their presence in Spain as Sadaf (Int. 21) illustrates,

"when I came to Spain, my family in Morocco first asked me whether I saw the mosque (Cordoba) and they all asked me to pray two rakaats for them. I couldn't pray there, but it made me feel like Morocco and that we lost a lot but the fact I am here and we have mosques and a community of Muslims from all over the world makes me feel like this how it should be."

Another important component of the Muslim monument *immigrant community sphere* are the ways that my Berber participants characterized Moorish history as Arab-
Muslim history; discounting the role that Berbers played in the conquests and imperial rule. This flexible expression of identity employed by my Berber participants reveals how DCR is shaping identity negotiations. None of my Berber participants cited these monuments as Berber historical accomplishments under the Moorish empire. It was always framed as an Arab-Muslim imperial success rather than Berber and/or African venture. This is important as both the Ummah and Islamophobia racial projects shape and transforms memory for my participants, negating the accurate historical reference to Moorish accomplishments as a result of a union of Berber and Arab civilizations rather than just Arab civilizational progress. When I pressed this issue, nearly all my participants dismissed my questions and stated emphatically that, "it doesn’t matter, we are all Muslims." The few who did mention a role for the Berber ethnic minority in their historical role and presence in Muslim Spain claimed an ancestral link with the Arabs.

Another important component of the monument immigrant community sphere is the process of ‘travel’ that is tied to these sites. Eickelman and Piscatori (1990) argue that various forms of travel and what they call the; "journeys of the mind," have contributed to the Ummah disposition, while actively rejecting Islamophobia in their attempts to reclaim and reshape identity. Nearly all my participants have visited the monument spheres to address questions of identity and belonging. Abdul Qadr (Int. 24) stated that one of his first goals when he came to Spain was to travel to Al Hambra. It was a lifelong dream to see what his teachers in Morocco taught him about the Moors. He said, "I read so much about Al Hambra and I swear to God the first thing I did was move to Granada so I can be next to it. I left after a year but when I drive to Tarifa I stop in Granada and visit my brother and Al Hambra even though it’s expensive." Muneer (Int. 6) cited a
different reason for visiting the sites and that is to intimately get to know the monuments. He said, “I take my kids so they can get to know themselves and who they are in this country. So when they say you are different in school which happens to my kids a lot they can tell them do you know your history? Do you know who made Spain?” The process of travel not only is a means of internalizing the Ummah ideology but also challenges Islamophobic representations and discourses about the Muslim presence in Spain.

The symbolic and cultural capital emanating from these monument immigrant community spheres allowed my participants to challenge their societal standing, identity, and roles they occupy in Spanish society. For example, many of my participants when asked about the possibility of sharing the Cordoba mosque with the Catholic Church services were ecstatic about the possibility. Layla (Int. 4) stated, "I remember when I went to the Cordoba mosque, I wanted to pray just to feel connected and slap the Spanish in the face, but there were signs everywhere forbidding the Muslims from praying there, so I didn’t. But, I was about to and my brother was also telling me not too, as it's not our right. But I heard the politicians are at least discussing the possibilities.” Abdul Qadr (Int. 24) disagrees and states, "its better not to create problems, as the Spanish government and people recognize it as a historical site and the world knows it's a mosque. That is enough. As long as we have our own mosques that we can pray in, that's all that matters. But it would be a dream if it did happen.”

The importance of monuments and sites of memory as immigrant community spheres provides the necessary cultural and symbolic capital for my participants to negotiate the contested sites that are often stuck in between the discourses of the Ummah.
and Islamophobic paradigms in Spain. Whilst these monuments do support a conception of the Ummah that facilitates a religious/cultural identity attachment to these sites, it is primarily fixed within the national rather than transnational context. The ‘attachments’ are reformulated around a Spanish imagined community and to create conceptions of home, while fostering the emergence of a collective Spanish Moroccan identity. Moreover, it also challenges Islamophobic conceptions of these sites, which seek to deny the presence of Muslims and Moroccans from contemporary Spanish identity.

The Cafe

The third *immigrant community sphere* that has had a tremendous impact on how DCR is negotiated by my participants is the Cafe. While Spanish Moroccan cafes are highly gendered spaces that only men attend, they do play an important role in how identity is negotiated in what many sociologists call the 'space of sociability.' This physical space of the cafe encodes, "the cultural and social understanding of the behavior and actions appropriate to an environment” (Lee, Danis, Miller, & Jung 2001). Moreover, as an *immigrant community sphere* it facilitated the sharing of various forms of capital, ideas on assimilative processes, and a leisure refuge to provide an alternative to the culturally accepted leisure activities in the Spanish context; that often contradict tradition and religious dictates as structured by the Islamic faith and Moroccan culture.

I attended multiple Spanish Moroccan cafe sites in Madrid and found that there were very minimal environmental differences. In probing my participants use and relationship with the cafe *immigrant community sphere* my participants cited a number of reasons why they converged on the site including: to network with other Moroccans socially and professionally and to participate in leisurely activities including watching
soccer games, playing checkers, eat Moroccan food, access to a huge flat screen TV to enjoy entertainment programming including Al Jazeera news broadcasts, soccer games, Egyptian films, and religious programming. Most of my participants frequented the cafe in Fuenlabrada and were attended usually during lunch breaks, dinner, important soccer games, and the time between the mid-afternoon prayer and sunset. This cafe like all the other cafes I visited in Madrid was only frequented by Moroccans and occasionally by other North Africans.

The way this migrant community sphere facilitates and shapes identity among my participants is primarily through the physical demarcation of space from the larger Spanish context. Once one enters the field, one experiences a hyper-real transportation to Morocco, where only Moroccan language is heard and experienced. For my participants, this was important primarily because on hearing Moroccan Arabic they felt like they can get away from what Adel (Int.11) states is the a relatively harsh life in Spain. He stated, "I go to the cafe to relax, I work twelve hours a day doing whatever I can get my hands on and so I when I am done brother I just go to the cafe usually after work and sit for an hour before I come home. It really helps me because I see others who are doing the same thing as I and know that it's what we have to do."

Moreover, I found that while the majority of the cafe attendants were Berbers from Northern Morocco, the language of business was Moroccan colloquial Arabic. The emphasis on Arabic was also present in the satellite television offerings that were often set to Al Jazeera news and Al Jazeera Sport which broadcasted in modern standard Arabic. When I asked my participants what are the most important activities at the cafe,
they unequivocally responded that watching soccer and debating the news was the primary reason they attend the cafe. Marwan stated (Int. 9),

"I love to go to the cafe to watch La Liga games. It is fun when you watch the games with the crowd, we sing, scream, fight. We usually have Madrid fans and Barca fans in different sides and when we have the classic; it's an amazing atmosphere, even better than the games themselves."

For others, this immigrant sphere is where one "takes care of business." My own personal experiences with the cafe allowed me to have access to forms of capital that are often privileged to individuals of Moroccan descent. During the research process, whenever I wanted something done or I needed a place to stay during the research project, the Spanish Moroccans and Moroccan migrants I would come in contact with would point me toward the cafe or the Mosque. These spheres allowed me to get connections and have access to numerous resources to facilitate my stay in Madrid including a room to rent and/or access to rides/local restaurants and even cheap transportation links throughout Spain and even to Morocco. This was important because for many of my participants who were unemployed, the little work that could be found was often via the cafe networks.

Abdel Wahid (Int. 16) explains his personal relationship with the cafe,

"I have not worked a real job for nearly fourteen months, my contract ended and I find myself with no work. I go to the cafe every day and search for work. I am blessed to have people that know me and give me part time jobs. Right now I am working at a fruit shop whenever the owner needs some extra help." Marwan (Int. 9) who is also in state of economic limbo, states that the collectivities created provides an important deterrence for
participation in deviant and criminal activities that can lead to prison, "the cafe in Fuenlabrada is a blessing from Allah. If it wasn't here half of the people here would be out doing drugs or participating in criminal activities. This place really allows us to help each other out as a community." Consequently, the cafe sphere is important because it facilitates networking and the sharing of various forms of capital for my participants, which in turn allows for processes that facilitate integration and access to informal and formal capacities for individual and communal growth.

Adil (Int. 11), while grateful for the presence of the café, also has a more negative experience in relation to its role in Spanish Moroccan lives; arguing that his life in Spain parallels his struggles in Morocco. He said, "I suffered hard to come here, worked for nearly ten years in farming the Costa del Sol. Then I came to Madrid and worked in the restaurant business. Last year the restaurant closed and now I am here working whatever I can get. This is the same life that I lived in Morocco but at least in Morocco the cafe was cheaper, and we had the view of the ocean." Thus, for many of my participants it is an institution that has evolved to become a refuge for the community.

As an immigrant community sphere, the cafe is almost exclusively for Spanish Moroccans and Moroccans. I never saw an individual from any ethnic or racial group outside of the Moroccan/ North African mosaic. When I asked my participants about non-Moroccan participation in Cafe activities, they immediately argued that the barrier for many non-Moroccans is the language barrier, not religious or ethnic identity differences. Many non-Moroccan Arabs/ Muslims often find it difficult to find a place in the cafe as it was difficult for them to understand the Moroccan Arabic dialect. Sulayman (Int. 8) told me that he tried to bring his Syrian and Palestinian friends to watch soccer games and
they stopped attending after a while. He said, "my friend Hatem (Syrian) doesn't come to this cafe. I am sure it’s because of our Arabic. We can understand them but they can't understand us, so he probably felt left out." Thus, the cafe while constrained by many cultural and Islamic religious norms (no presence of alcohol/ strict gendered norms), it is still an institution that primarily represents the Moroccan rather than the general Muslim community. This for many of my participants allows the cafe to play a central role in individual and communal life.

Muneer (Int. 6) explained to me what it means to have Moroccan cafes for the community. He said,

"I have been all over Europe and lived with Moroccans in Belgium, Holland, Norway, France, and Denmark and in each country you know that we are a community and thriving when you see three things the first is halaal food shops, then masjids and finally the cafes. Every place where I saw a lot of Moroccans and they were doing well they had these things. Go to Brussels or Paris, the first thing you see are Moroccan shops with mosques below. Thank God you are beginning to see this in Fuenlabrada, Getafe, and Parla. This is truly a blessing from God."

When I asked a follow up question about how my participants feel the Spanish perceived the growth of Moroccan shops, cafes, and mosques in Spain; I received two opposing responses based on Spanish race and class distinctions.

The first type of response reflected a perspective that depended on the ethnicity of the Spaniard. Sulayman (Int. 8) stated,
"if they are regular working class Spaniards or the gypsies, or Romanians then they love to come here and buy our food, because its cheap. Where are you going to get a sandwich like this for three Euros”? If it's the rich Spaniards they would never step in here. Mostly they are afraid. If they go to Moroccan places they are usually in town and are owned by Spaniards with Moroccans cooking."

Muneer also reasserted what Sulayman said in his interview, but added "the Spanish, especially the people from Catalan and Madrid and the North are not like the Andalucian. In the South, the Andalucians are more comfortable with us than they are here. They love our tea and food. But then again they have Arab blood, so it makes sense."

The motivation to participate in the cafe immigrant community sphere is also shaped by my participants experience with Islamophobia. For many of my participants, when I asked if time spent in the cafe was a result of the negative experiences in Spanish spaces of sociability. They nearly all agreed and cited the cultural differences and experiences with racism as reasons for exclusively hanging out at the Moroccan cafe. Abdel Wahid (Int. 16) stated that he is often rejected by bouncers at clubs, especially when he goes to student night clubs with his Moroccan friends. The only time Abdel Wahid is allowed into the club and not questioned about paperwork or identity is if he is with other Spanish students.

Another Spanish Moroccan I met at the Fuenlabrada cafe stated that the owner of a small bar actually refused to serve him alcohol in order to force him to leave the establishment. He said about the incident, "I was really embarrassed. I know I am not supposed to drink but he used Islam to make me feel bad and get me out of the bar
because I was Moroccan. If it was about Islam then he wouldn't serve alcohol to my Turkish friend. He only did it because I am Moroccan and we have a bad reputation especially when we are drunk." The cafe for many of my participants was a place where one can find full acceptance and refuge from spaces in the Spanish public sphere that often rejected the presence of the Spanish Moroccan community.

Thus, the cafe immigrant community sphere is important for my participants as it provides a structural and symbolic reference towards assimilation and integration in the new home context, while playing an important role in providing alternative spaces of sociability for my male participants. The way my participants viewed and interacted with the cafe sphere reveals that the processes that shape and is shaped by the DCR; while facilitating measures that allows the migrants to employ, utilize, and expand their various forms of capital in a social context that is often hostile to their presence.

Conclusion

The immigrant community spheres as represented by the mosque, Muslim monuments, and cafe are important institutions in understanding Spanish Moroccan minority and immigrant integration and assimilation in contemporary Spain. My participant’s perceptions and interactions with these institutions are directly influenced and transformed by dual communal racialization, as I found that my participants often found refuge, community, and vital resources to enhance individual social mobility and identity. The lack of formal institutions present in these communities meant that formal and informal institutions developed as a response to Islamophobia and the Ummah. Only the cafe immigrant community sphere was unique to the Moroccan male experience, the
mosque and monument spheres were more expansive in their identity networks and frameworks and included the participation of women.

I found that the Ummah racial project coupled with my participants’ experiences with Islamophobia has permitted the Spanish Moroccan community-along with the larger Muslim community- to create spheres of symbolic, cultural, and economic capital around these institutions, thus reinforcing community and integration in contemporary Spain. While the immigrant community spheres were highly gendered spaces, my female participants found these sites to contain important symbolic and cultural capital that reinforced overall community identity. This is similar to Pena and Frehill’s (1998) findings which revealed the more their female participants were embedded in the Latino cultural community, the higher the level of religiosity was found. While female participation is definitely present at the mosque and monument sphere, this was often limited by male oversight in the dynamics and structure of these relationships. For example, travel to monuments was often controlled by the males in the family. Finally, this chapter reveals the conceptual categories necessary to understand immigrant community spheres, which in turn are shaped by context; thus these spheres may look different in other contexts where immigrants seek to establish communities, networks, and identities.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Spanish Moroccan Identity Negotiation, Dual Communal Racialization, and Immigrant Community Spheres

This dissertation maps how Spanish Moroccans are negotiating their identities in contemporary Spain. Specifically, this study addressed the following research questions:

1. How do Spanish Moroccans in Madrid negotiate their identities in post 3-11 Spain?

2. What are the discourses of racial, ethnic, and religious identity among Spanish-Moroccans in Madrid?

3. What are the contextual and structural factors that shape the layers of racial and ethnic identity?

4. How do discourses and lived experiences differ if at all by generation, ethnicity, or gender?

To address these research questions, I utilized components of the grounded theory method and in-depth interviews with thirty-three Spanish Moroccan citizens as well as participant observation in strategic places. This chapter will first discuss the empirical findings in my study then draw out the main theoretical findings and policy implications for my research. I also discuss areas of future research with a specific focus on other global contexts that may share similar characteristics and historical experiences with the Spanish Moroccan community.

Overall, this chapter reveals how the analytical concepts of dual communal racialization and immigrant community spheres emerged from the data and provided this research the appropriate conceptual tools to understand the complexities of contemporary
Spanish Moroccan minority identity negotiations in Spain. Additionally, in analyzing the components of dual communal racialization, this dissertation revealed the intersections between the global (Ummah) and localized (Islamophobia) ideologies in shaping identity dynamics at the micro, meso, macro level of analysis. The dissertation’s unorthodox view of institutions challenges traditional and readily accommodated perspectives of migrant institutions in new socio-political and economic contexts. These theoretical developments provided an alternative nuanced perspective on how identity is negotiated in Muslim minority communities in Europe.

**Empirical Contributions**

This dissertation explored Spanish Moroccan identity negotiations in the post 5-11 Madrid. This study found that Spanish Moroccan identity discourses are subject to the overarching ideological racial projects of Islamophobia and the Ummah. The process of negotiation of identity in response to these ideological constructs indicates my participants were racialized towards a Muslim first identity. This complex situation that presented itself in my research where a minority population is racialized by two simultaneous racial projects is called dual communal racialization. At the micro-level of analysis, Islamophobic racial projects were revealed in my participants interactional experiences at work, educational institutions, and in the public sphere.

The Islamophobic micro-aggressions experienced by my participants almost always structured and categorized their Otherness in conformity to their Islamic faith and were mediated by the Ummah racial project. My participant’s phenotype, linguistic capabilities, and culture became intertwined with their Islamic religious identities. At the macro-level of analysis, the Ummah racial project revealed that my participants’
interactions with Arabic satellite TV and Islamic movement religioscape’s structured Spanish Moroccan identities towards Muslim and Arab identities. The variously fluid ways these scape’s were able to reinforce and embed a Muslim first identity was often emphasized through Arab ethnic and racial (genealogical) identities, which many of my participants viewed as synonymous with Islam. This evoked and anchored identity attachments to the larger global Muslim community and to the Spanish state by linking their identities to Spanish Muslim history. The Ummah racial project was also mediated by the Islamophobic racial project, which enabled the internalization of Islamic/ Muslim identities.

I convincingly found that at the meso-level of analysis, the emergence of Spanish Moroccan institutions in Madrid are being reconfigured and reconstituted by the Ummah and Islamophobia racist racial projects. I called these distinctive formal and informal institutions i.e. the mosque, café, and monuments, *immigrant community spheres* to reveal the particular ways these institutionalized modes impact and socialize my participant’s identities. I argued that the immigrant community spheres are institutions that are discursively mediated and structured around Muslim imagined solidarities and thus impose ideological constraints on the institution; this allows all who share the ‘Muslim’ solidarity to have access to various forms of capital; this ensures and supports immigrant integration and assimilation in Madrid. IC Spheres have become focal institutions for my participant’s immigrant experiences, especially in its mediating role in the dual communal racialization thesis. IC Spheres are pervasively positioned to act as sites of contention, as they absorb, mediate, and employ the Ummah and Islamophobia racial projects.
Upon closer analysis, the internalization of Muslim first identity did not always produce a monolithic Islamic worldview. The immigrant community spheres allowed for multiple forms of Islam to have a presence as the imagined solidarities that structured the IC spheres was often expansive and inclusive of conservative and liberal Islamic traditions. Consequently, this allowed multiple scapes, movements, and ideologies to have a presence within and among the Spanish Moroccan community. The identities constructed are often centered on group affiliations and affinities found outside of the Spanish and Moroccan national context. This revealed and calls into question the impact that third party actors (state and movement) may have on the traditional immigration process.

Furthermore, in the context of Islamophobia, my participants with non-white complexions and ethnic cultural traits were always viewed in the context of their ‘Islam’ by their Spanish compatriots. In the Ummah racial project, the intertwining of Arab identity and Muslim also reinforced all my participants, Arab and Berber, to identify with Islam and Muslim first identity. These attachments to Muslim and Arab-Muslim identities negated histories and ethnic identity claims for all my participants of Berber heritage. However, my Berber participants also declaratively asserted that the Berber ethnic identity was synonymous with Arab identity and history.

The female participants in my study utilized and managed their Muslim identities to stave off and control Islamophobic aggressions while also managing cultural and religious traditions to allow a greater role in family life and as citizens in contemporary Spain. This further supports Chen’s (2005) study in which he found Taiwanese Buddhist and Evangelical Christians created spaces in their communities that reinforce identities
beyond the familial context. I also found that the dual racist racial projects shaped understanding of gender expectations and identity dynamics, as most of my female participants found empowerment in Islamic symbols and rituals in both the Spanish Moroccan community and in relation to the larger Spanish non-Muslim community. This supports the findings of George (1998) who found that religion was often a source of empowerment for migrant women while also allowing them to retain traditional cultural characteristics. Many of the female participants felt they were viewed in public as both vulnerable and a threat to Spanish society. Depending on the situational context, they were able to manage their identities and respond to variegated experiences by highlighting their Islamic identity to reinforce positive standing. This triggered greater assimilation and integration for the female participants as they were able to reconcile and negotiate through the dual racial projects to find a place in contemporary Spanish society.

**Building on existing theories**

This dissertation research builds on theoretical frameworks that have been utilized in studies of immigration and identity (Silverstein 2005) and fills important gaps in the sociological literature. The theories that informed this study include racial formation theory (Omi & Winant 2001), segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1993), symbolic ethnicity (Gans 1979), reactive ethnicity (Portes and Rumbaut 2006), religioscapes (Mcalister 2005) and collective memory (Halbwachs 1992). Racial formation theory was used in my study to understand how racial categories Spanish Moroccans employ are constructed, formulated, and internalized through racial projects. These racial projects produce and anchor ideologies that seek to shift the racial fault lines to redefine meaning and identity for my participants. This theoretical perspective was
foundational for my dissertation as dual communal racialization theory is built on pillars of racial formation theory. However, while this dissertation maintains its grounding in racial formation theory it also deviates from its traditional premises and argues that race and racialization processes are entangled with cultural, religious, and ethnic categories. This calls into question not only the view that race is a unique phenomenon on its own standing but it also challenges the way we understand how racial identities are being constructed and formulated in non-Western contexts. This has been demonstrated through the participants’ discussion and perspectives on Arab identity via genealogical ties.

The next theoretical perspective informing this study is segmented assimilation theory. This theory is most deserving of attention as it posits that intergenerational experiences of immigrants are differentiated and flexible at multiple levels, which challenge traditional straight-line, assimilationist paradigms that may not adequately capture the lived realities for most minorities (Portes & Zhou 1993). Portes & Zhou (1993) argue that in many cases there are many structural barriers for immigrants that can lead toward downward / upward mobility or follow multiple variegated paths towards assimilation. The significance of documenting Spanish Moroccan expressions on identity and integration calls for the need to study immigration and migrant assimilation in the European context. While Portes and Rumbaut (2006) situate their studies in the American context their proposed models did not capture the ways that my participants were assimilating in contemporary Spanish society. This has been demonstrated in the variously fluid process, wherein my participants’ responses revealed a consensus in orientation and paradigmatic views of their social, economic, and political lives. Hence, there were no major differences in identity dynamics as they all referred to their parallel
religious identity as the primary mode for incorporation and integration. Moreover, the second generation along with the first and 1.5 are all experiencing downward mobility as there were no generational differences in their experiences in Madrid.

Another important theoretical perspective that informed this dissertation is the symbolic ethnicity model (Gans 1979). This model promotes an emphasis on ethnic identity production and construction in democratic, liberal contexts. Gan’s argue that the universalizing freedom for minority groups allows minorities (racial/ethnic/religious) to choose an identity in order to create and transmit "products" for the group’s consumption. This conferred an important strategy in this dissertation to understand how narratives were articulated across multiple cultural and religious borderlands. While my participants were not fully assimilated they did have the means and abilities to inform and craft their own racial and ethnic identities. Another theory that this dissertation builds on is Portes and Rumbaut’s (2006) reactive ethnicity theory. Portes and Rumbaut (2006) maintain that as second generation immigrants experience discrimination they increase their identification with their ethnic group.

Portes and Rumbaut (2006) suggest that reactive ethnicity occurs primarily to allow the immigrant community to negotiate their discriminatory experiences with their ethnic identities to reinforce identity and belonging to the group. Religious institutions and religious identity are also taken into account in their theory as possible mechanism in shaping migrants’ the reactive identities; however for Portes and Rumbaut this reaction is disassociated from traditional religious institutions found in the home country, as they reflect modern religious traditions found in their host societies (Warner 2006) These two process described by Portes and Rumbaut (2006) were not fully present in this study as
my participants across the generational divide structured identity around religious
traditions rooted outside of the nation-state and embedded in traditional cultures.
Nevertheless, they do capture the importance of the potential of religion in the reactive
identity process which was significant for this study.

Another theoretical perspective that this dissertation builds off was the concept of
religioscapes. This concept first coined by McAllister (2006) is based on Appadurai’s
(1996) five scapes that explain the emergence of transnational flows that are increasingly
breaking down homogenous cultures and territorial boundaries and supporting
transnational spaces. Religioscapes captures the ways religious ideas and ideologies start
at one end of the transnational chain and end up at another. This was an important
concept as it revealed the specific transnational flows that permit religion and religious
institutions to evolve beyond the traditional structural perspectives in the sociology of
religion literature (Cadge & Ecklund 2007). It is also an important concept for my
dissertation because it reveals its breadth in the study of globalization, immigration, and
religion. Finally, the role of collective memory in shaping my participants identity was
essential to understanding their attempts to link the present with their Moorish pasts.
Their “memories” allowed my participants to anchor their identities to Spain via their
Islamic and Arabic identity claims. The way Spanish Moroccan collective memory
produced and manufactured identity links to Islam and Spain was central to the
theoretical concepts of dual communal racialization and immigrant community spheres.

Theoretical Contributions

This dissertation’s theoretical contribution to the literature includes the concepts of
dual communal racialization and immigrant community spheres. These theoretical
frameworks extend and develop from the literature to reveal the ways that my participants are negotiating identity in contemporary Spain. This study argues that Spanish Moroccans are negotiating their identities in the context of dual communal racialization. These negotiations revealed how their identities are shaped by transnational and domestic racist/benign racial projects that are increasingly shifting my participants’ identities towards Muslim and Arab identity. DCR provides insight into how intricate the process of identity construction is for my participants.

The negotiation includes processes that allow both racial projects to facilitate and manage the internalization of Muslim first identity over all identifiers. The specific ways my participants experienced Islamophobic micro-aggressions at work, educational institutions, and the public sphere reinforced feelings and attitudes that shifted their gaze not toward their ethnic identity but to their religious, Muslim identities. This is important primarily because the labels emerging from these micro-interactional settings reinforce and underscore the importance of these experiences in shifting identity discourses. However, for my participants the historical and memory (Spanish Moroccan) contexts mediated these labels as they were internalized by my participants. This ultimately meant that the Muslim ethno-racial label actually reinforces attachment to their current setting.

The Islamophobic aggression experienced by my participants at the micro level of interaction was also contextualized by transnational forces that lay within the Muslim world. This is development is important primarily because most studies on transnational migration address the questions that address relations between the home and sending contexts; however for my participants it included the Ummah in the larger geographical confines of the Muslim world. The religioscapes that entered into the Spanish context
competed for Muslim followers however these scapes were not neutral and were in fact bounded by hegemonic ideologies found in both the Arab and non-Arab contexts. The socializing impacts of Arab media and Islamic movements on my participant’s identities were important in shaping racial and ethnic belonging within the context of religious identities. Since most Spanish Moroccans understood modern standard Arabic; access to Arab media was often the only alternative to Spanish television. Thus, this meant that political projects emanating from the Arab world were also impacting Muslim-Arab-Berber minorities in the Spanish and European context. The Arab media transnational force was coupled with the impact and role of Islamic movements. These movements established networks and ties within the Spanish Moroccan community to shape not only religious practice but also identity. The Tablighi and Salafi networks emphasis on the Muslim identifier also reified the importance of Arab identity for my participants. This proved to be quite difficult as my participants who identified their ethnic identities as Berber often also claimed an Arab ethnic and racial tie.

When I examined the importance of institutions for my participants, I found that the dual communal racialization thesis enables the construction of immigrant community spheres to explain the emergence of informal and formal institutions in Spanish Moroccan communities. I found that the mosque, café, monument institutions are structured around Muslim imagined solidarities and are contested by DCR. The immigrant community spheres roles in facilitating and resisting Islamophobia and the Ummah ideologies is important as it was these institutions that allowed for the Spanish Moroccans to negotiate and actively respond to the Islamophobic micro-aggressions while providing space for transnational scapes to enter and shape my participants
identities. The theoretical findings in this study further reinforced and concluded that across the generational, ethnic, and racial divide, the Muslim religious identifier was the primary identity reinforced in the Spanish Moroccan community.

Finally, the negotiation of racial, ethnic, and religious identities in contemporary Spain led my participants to attach their identities to the Spanish Nation. The particular ways Spanish Muslim history and memory facilitates the DCR in contemporary Spain should not be understated. This history and memory that both the Spanish and Spanish Moroccans occupy has been an important mediator in shifting discourses of resistances to the ‘nation’ that we often see in other European contexts. Any future study on Spanish Moroccans or Muslims in Spain needs to account for this continuing historical legacy that shapes the lived realities of the population in question.

**Policy implications**

This study revealed important policy recommendations for European states and Muslim community leaders to address important and developing dynamics in the European Muslim community. The theories that emerged from this research offers a framework for understanding the particular ways Muslim communities are assimilating and integrating in their new societies. The similarities in identity discourses among the first, 1.5, and second generation are important primarily because they reveal alienation discrimination, and severe economic inequality in their communities. Moreover, many individuals in the Spanish Moroccan community are looking to the transnational context for identity and thus complicating efforts towards integration and assimilation.

This has been the most important European domestic question in the last ten to fifteen years as Muslim minorities are increasingly moving into the second and third
generation; while living in the context of alienation, discrimination, and economic inequality. The findings in this study suggest the following important recommendations for Spain, European states, and the Muslim/ethnic communities: The first recommendation situates the impact of DCR in shaping identity dynamics of Muslim communities. The experience of Islamophobia often shapes individual and communal identity towards Muslim religious identities. The Islamophobic aggression experienced by Muslims often creates a divide between them and the larger community especially if it is not mediated by collective memory as it was for my participants. Thus, understanding how Islamophobia and Islamophobic aggressions can lead to satellite public spheres and facilitate the construction of Muslim/ Moroccan ghettoes is important in the States attempts to integrate and assimilate their Muslim populations.

Secondly, the impact of the Ummah ideology while supportive of Muslim community claims can have both positive and negative impacts on the community. The movement and ideology flows and scapes from outside of the Spanish nation-state allowed the Spanish Moroccan community to experience multiple “Islams.” The impact of these religioscapes in the context of DCR also allows the presence of radical ideologies and movements in the Spanish context. The attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2005 exemplify this. A number of the individuals who participated in the attacks never stepped a foot outside of Spain or Morocco, but attached themselves to identities and movements at the other end of the transnational chain. Thus, acknowledging and working with the Spanish Moroccan community to understand and regulate radical ideologies that use the Ummah racial project would be of utmost necessity.
Third, the role of collective memory in identity construction was important for my participants as they almost always referred to the Spanish context and history with a sense of pride and nostalgia. Accordingly, the Spanish state should utilize this shared history to further integrate and assimilate the Spanish Moroccan and Muslim populations in Spain.

Fourth, understanding the specifics of how immigrant community spheres are constructed and are used in the local Spanish Moroccan community is imperative as the local governments can use these spheres to reach out to the community to enhance relations and integration while also regulating radical transnational movements and flows.

Fifth, understanding the impact of Islamophobia in the workplace and educational institutions may provide frameworks to understanding students and employee satisfaction and development. Educators and employers must understand the influences of Islamophobic experiences that discriminate and marginalize the Spanish Moroccan community and provide support networks that foster respect and mutual understanding.

Sixth, the Arabization of the Islamic tradition impacts ethnic and racial relations in Spain and the Muslim world. This may also provide insight into other global contexts like the Sudan and Mauritania where Arabized religious, ethnic, and racial identities have been central to conflicts and genocide. Finally, the main findings of this research suggest that DCR and IC Spheres are concepts that can be transplanted and utilized in many contexts to understand how immigrant translocality and dual racial projects may be affecting identity construction and negotiation. Moving beyond the Muslim communities in Europe and the United States, DCR can be used in multiple contexts including but not limited to
the American Southwest to understand Mexican American negotiation identity; Tamils in Sri Lanka; Uygers in Northwest, China, and Chinese immigrants in Malaysia and Indonesia.

Directions for future research

The main findings of this dissertation research suggests that DCR and IC Spheres are concepts that can be transplanted and utilized in other contexts to understand how dual racial projects may be affecting identity construction and negotiation. Spanish Moroccans are negotiating their identities in contemporary Spain in the context of dual communal racialization. This dissertation clearly needs more research to further explore the ramifications of the study. Questions that need to be explored include: In what ways are my participant’s racial identities informing Islamophobia for the Spanish community? How does socio-economic class influence these dynamics? What impact does the geographic proximity to the Moroccan context have on my participant’s identities and attachments to Islam? Are there regional differences in Spain that would affect the responses and outcome of this study? Does the DCR theory capture only Muslim minority experiences in post-colonial European contexts? What about memory, is it necessary for minority/immigrants to have an anchored memory in the new home context for DCR to be present? How will this differ for the third generation Spanish Moroccans? These questions only begin to address the need for more research on the concepts developed in this study. Perhaps, what is needed is a longitudinal study to understand how identity dynamics will change for each generation questioned in this research. The saliency of identity shifts especially as the Spanish Moroccan community
begins to build lasting institutions and partake in associational life beyond the immigrant community spheres cited in this study.

Furthermore, an analysis of family dynamics may reveal how racial identity is formulated in the context of DCR. A comparative analysis could similarly be needed to understand the vast experiences among the Spanish Moroccan community in different cities in Spain. For example, the Moroccans I met and befriended in Granada and Malaga tended to be satisfied with their life circumstances in general, more so than my participants in Madrid. This may be because of the proximity to Morocco or the differing experiences within an Andalucian cultural framework that may be friendlier to the Moroccan community. Moreover, national comparisons may also be in order with the large Moroccan communities in France, Belgium, and Holland who have different migratory experiences and also variegated ethnic and racial policies. For example, the majority of the Moroccans who immigrated to Holland in the past twenty to thirty years are from the Rif Mountains of Northern Morocco and tend to be very conscious of Berber ethnic identity claims vis-à-vis the Moroccan state and society.

Conclusion

The dissertation research explored how Spanish Moroccans are negotiating their identities in contemporary Spain. This study provided insight into how Spanish Moroccans are increasingly negotiating their identities in the context of dual communal racialization and immigrant community spheres. This dissertation research supported this theoretical contribution by reflecting the voices of my participants to offer new directions towards understanding how the Islamophobia and the Ummah racial projects are negotiated and internalized by the Spanish Moroccan community in Madrid.
Nearly four hundred years have passed since the Spanish monarch, King Phillip II, expelled all the Muslims from geographic Spain. Yet in the twenty first century Muslims are again the central foci of Spanish domestic and foreign policy imperatives. The path contemporary Spain takes with its Muslim minorities will not only define and address the Muslim question in the whole of Europe but also redefine the Spanish state. The opportunity to reconstruct a political and social project first imagined in the medieval cities of Cordoba and Toledo can once again be revived to create a new imagined community or a neo-convivencia as a model for an increasingly globalized, diverse Spain.
Appendices

Appendix A: Profiles of Participants

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### Appendix A: Profile of Participants

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Race: *W-WHITE    *BR- Brown *WA- White Arab *M- Mixed
*Attended Immigrant Communal Spheres
References


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