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# A Study of Factors Conducive or Non-Conducive to the Recruitment and Retention of Public Professional Personnel in the City of Albuquerque

James W. Carroll

PUBLIC PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL IN ALBUQUERQUE - CARROLL

# IMPORTANT!

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# A STUDY OF FACTORS CONDUCIVE OR NON-CONDUCIVE TO THE RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF PUBLIC PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL IN THE CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE

By

James W. Carroll

A Thesis
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DATE July 5, 1963

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The city manager's office helped distribute the questionnaires which were sent to all of the City's administrative, professional and technical (Group I) employees, and the city manager urged them to complete and return the questionnaires.

Arthur Jones, Administrative Assistant to the City Manager, and Donald House, Wage and Salary Supervisor in the Personnel Department, were especially helpful and provided much information in interviews.

The writer also desires to thank all those employees who took the time and effort to return completed questionnaires which form the basis of Chapter III.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

# LIST OF TABLES

# INTRODUCTION

This thesis concerns, as the title aptly describes, factors conducive or non-conducive to the recruitment and retention of public professional personnel in the City of Albuquerque. The interest here is with those employees in the City who are classified as Group I (administrative, professional, or technical) and not those in the Group II classification which includes the manual and secretarial workers. About 70 of the approximately 1800 City employees fall into the Group I category.

The Municipal Manpower Commission, an independent study group sponsored by the Ford Foundation, found that the governments in 212 metropolitan districts now employ about 230,000 administrative, professional and technical (APT) persons out of their total of 1,700,000 non-school employees. The total will reach nearly 400,000 by 1980.[1]

Urban governmental problems are becoming more acute as a result of mushrooming population growth. More and more services are needed to meet growing demands, and with this greater urban responsibility comes a need for highly competent brainpower to fill the upper echelons of municipal government. APT people are

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[1]Municipal Manpower Commission, Governmental Manpower for Tomorrow's Cities; A Report of the Municipal Manpower Commission (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962), p. 20.

more urgently required now than ever before. Albuquerque, with its rapid population growth rate, cannot escape the need.

To secure high-quality APT personnel, the Commission points out, local governments face severe difficulties in times of full employment and widespread economic opportunity. There is widespread concern and outright fear that the quality of APT people is too limited to administer programs which will grow larger and more complex.[1] The environment offers present officials and prospective employees more frustration than challenge.[2]

Brunton and Schwab write that "good government is conditioned by many factors, chief among which is personnel. Personnel has a direct influence on the prestige of a city, its ability to function, and its recruitment program."[3] With the emphasis that is placed on the importance of personnel, one might wonder what caliber of personnel Albuquerque is attracting to its government and what favorable conditions the City can offer its current and prospective employees.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the positive and negative factors which might contribute to or detract from the City's ability to attract and retain high-caliber employees in the vital policy-making positions. Where possible, comparisons are made with other municipalities. Chapter I begins with a discussion of the negative factor of low prestige attached to government service. Other factors examined in the opening chapter concern the

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[1]Ibid., 25.

[2]Ibid., 46.

[3]Robert L. Brunton and Eleanor A. Schwab, "Evaluation of Municipal In-Service Training," Public Management XLII, No. 5 (May, 1960), p. 102.

amount of recruiting, the number of training programs, salaries, fringe benefits, financial limitations, and overall personnel policies. Other sections are devoted to an examination of the high Albuquerque turnover rate and the reasons employees give for leaving City employment.

The results of a questionnaire sent to all the City's Group I employees are presented in Chapter III. Multifarious questions were included in an effort to determine the backgrounds, caliber, and opinions of Albuquerque's executives as indicators of conducive or non-conducive factors influencing the City's ability to recruit and retain them. The thesis questionnaire was patterned, for comparative purposes, after the one devised by the Commission and sent to executives in municipalities throughout the nation.

A separate chapter is devoted to the position of city manager, the top administrative official in the City. The manager position is unlike any other in the City and merits a separate chapter. Many additional factors are influential in the manager's work environment that are not confronted by the professionals under him.

The manager is hired and fired by the governing council. Two of the important factors for the manager, therefore, are his relationship with the council and the general political atmosphere. Sections of Chapter II deal with these aspects. Many other factors are examined. Comparisons, if possible, are made with manager conditions in other communities. City manager Edmund L. Engel of Albuquerque was interviewed for his evaluations of his own working conditions.

Throughout the thesis, the reader will encounter similarities and dissimilarities between Albuquerque and other cities. The dissimilarities tend to indicate that Albuquerque is in many ways a unique community. It is hoped that this thesis will provide insight into the meaning of the dissimilarities as they affect the City's ability to recruit and retain professional personnel.

# CHAPTER I

## OVERALL RÉSUMÉ OF EMPLOYMENT FACTORS

### Prestige of Public Service

The Albuquerque municipal government, like all governments, including the federal, must contend in its recruiting efforts with a stigma of low prestige. The Commission, hereafter referred to as MMC, asserts that low prestige of government employment adversely affects the quality of local government personnel.[1]

Seligson found that public service seldom evokes admiration, and attitudes towards employees working in public service run the gamut from complete indifference to hostility and contempt.[2] Janowitz and Wright, however, report that research evidence indicates that since 1930 the prestige value of public employment has risen markedly.[3]

### Ability to Recruit

Ability to recruit no doubt depends on a tangled web of factors. The Public Personnel Association studied personnel recruitment in 227 local governments of more than 50,000 popula-

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[1]Municipal Manpower Commission, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

[2]Harry Seligson, "Bureaucracy in Big Business," Good Government LXXIV, No. 5 (September-October, 1957), p. 41.

[3]Morris Janowitz and Deil Wright, "The Prestige of Public Employment," Public Administration Review XVI (Winter, 1956), p. 21.

tion in 1961. Major deterrents to effective recruitment were found to be low salaries, limited recruiting staff and budget, low prestige of government employment, local residence restrictions, and shortages of trained manpower in specific fields.[1] Subsequent parts of this chapter will attempt to evaluate these major deterrents in the Albuquerque perspective.

City personnel director Joe L. Freeman thinks that Albuquerque does not have major trouble in filling Group I positions, although in some cases a "little more time" is needed.[2]

Like most municipal governments, however, there is no active recruiting effort made by City officials on the campus. H. M. Campbell, Director of Placement at the University of New Mexico, said that he is not kept informed of job openings with the City and that he has regarded the local government as a "closed corporation--too tied up in politics and favor."[3]

The Public Personnel Association[4] and MMC[5] both found that campus recruiting was not an effective recruitment device for local governments. The MMC's staff visited 60 units and discovered that only two had continuous college recruiting programs and six occasionally recruited on campus for engineers and

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[1]Municipal Year Book 1962 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1962), p. 176.

[2]Interview with Joe L. Freeman, Personnel Director, City of Albuquerque, February 18, 1963.

[3]Interview with H. M. Campbell, Director of Placement, University of New Mexico, March 29, 1963.

[4]Municipal Year Book 1962 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1962), p. 175.

[5]Municipal Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 81.

other critical specialists. The rest did no recruiting.

Additionally, MMC found that "courses in urban economics, urban sociology and local government, offered in too few universities, are generally not functionally or operationally oriented."[1] This is generally true at the University of New Mexico, although local government students have on occasions engaged in research in City offices with supervision from department heads. Discussions are underway between the manager's office and Dorothy I. Cline, professor in the Department of Government, on the establishment of an intern program.

MMC concluded that "the schools and colleges are failing to equip young men and women for careers in the specialized fields of local government."[2] Janowitz and Wright reported that "strikingly enough, only for those individuals with some college or with completed college education did the reputation of government employment drop off sharply. These findings raise a strong presumption about the inability of higher education to foster a balanced evaluation of the prestige of government employment."[3]

The problem of getting academically top college graduates is a difficult one for local governments. Freeman believes the City is getting the "average" college graduate. The employment and academic backgrounds for Albuquerque Group I employees are examined in Chapter 3.

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[1] Ibid., 59.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Janowitz and Wright, op. cit., p. 20.

## Significance of Training Programs

A minority of cities have arrangements with colleges whereby an employed individual can take courses at public expense. Assistance to public employees in furthering their formal education takes three basic forms: payment of tuition or a portion of tuition, provision of all or a portion of books and supplies, and rearrangement of working-hour schedules.[1]

Except in specifically job-centered courses, such as those offered for policemen and firemen, public personnel are usually expected to pay at least a minimum tuition fee even in courses closely related to job requirements.[2] Coral Gables, Florida, is extremely unusual, insofar as persons other than those directly in municipal employment may also participate. For example, children of employees and spouses or children of deceased employees are eligible to take courses at municipal expense at the University of Miami.[3]

The City of Albuquerque will pay the cost of tuition and books, if the person is enrolling for a job-connected course. Low participation has characterized this educational possibility. There is no City employee currently enrolled at public expense at the University of New Mexico. About 80 percent of municipalities permitting employees to take college courses grant the

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[1]Beatrice Dinerman and Eugene Dvorin, "Formal Education Programs for Local Government Employees," Public Personnel Review XX, No. 1 (January, 1959), p. 36.

[2]Robert L. Brunton and Eleanor A. Schwab, "Municipal In-Service Training," Municipal Year Book 1960, 255.

[3]Dinerman and Dvorin, op. cit., p. 35.

employee a full choice as to the educational institution he attends.[1] In Albuquerque, the only public institution of higher learning is the University of New Mexico.

This type of undertaking has yet to gain nationwide popularity among local governments. The trend, however, is toward a growth of such programs. Unfortunately, in many cases formal educational programs were adopted due to deficiencies in existing in-service training facilities.[2]

Group I employees have no in-service training programs available to them, although $1000 was allocated by the City Commission last summer partly for this purpose. The thesis questionnaire sent to the Group I personnel revealed that the lack of in-service training was a major source of dissatisfaction for local employees. Don House, Wage and Salary Supervisor in the Personnel Department, says he does not know when in-service training will be introduced--that too many other things have to come first. He said that a limited size of personnel staff (four professionals) was a handicap to the inauguration of in-service training at this time.[3]

When in-service training is instituted, responsibility for administering the program will lie with the personnel director. The vast majority of cities which maintain any type of training program indicated that individual department heads are responsible

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., 36.

[3] Interview with Donald R. House, Wage and Salary Supervisor, Personnel Department, City of Albuquerque, February 20, 1963.

for this function. The lack of an adequate central organizing unit for training within the municipality is cited as a major training deficiency by most cities.[1]

City-operated training programs for local government employees are for the most part a postwar development. These programs have generally received low priority by most cities. Brunton and Schwab conclude that "few cities have a training program approaching adequacy, a situation reflected in the attitude toward training in many cities and in the limited staff and appropriations for such a program."[2]

In 1960, the International City Managers' Association (ICMA) surveyed 1,044 cities in the United States over 10,000 population on their in-service training programs. ICMA found that 436 cities (42 percent) had some kind of in-service training. Of these cities, in about one-third the only type of training given was for firemen and policemen. Albuquerque by no means stands alone in its absence of in-service training for APT personnel.

There is no doubt that in-service training could be a highly valuable addition to the Albuquerque City government. Where organized, training programs have been justified for many reasons: (1) increased worker effectiveness, (2) improved morale, (3) decreased labor turnover, (4) frequent impossibility of recruiting persons who have precisely the background of education, training, and experience needed for the position that is open,

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[1]Robert L. Brunton and Eleanor A. Schwab, "Evaluation of Municipal In-Service Training," Public Management XLII, No. 5 (May, 1960), p. 103.

[2]Ibid., 102.

(5) facilitating the screening of new employees, (6) enabling workers to step into positions of greater responsibility.[1] An organization cannot function above the level of competence of the people on whom it depends.

Among local governments having formal educational programs, a vast majority of supervisors support such undertakings with great enthusiasm and feel that programs inaugurated in their respective jurisdictions have generally lived up to original expectations. Several local governments indicate that municipal provision of educational assistance stimulates recruitment by offering educational advancement as an added incentive for entering the public service.[2]

## Importance of Personnel Policies

MMC maintains that the recruitment practices and career development of most local governments are unequal to the task of getting and retaining the number and caliber of APT personnel required.[3] Despite their growing responsibilities, political and administrative executives in local government are not supported by personnel systems aimed at providing personnel of superior ability.[4]

The Public Personnel Association reports that only about five percent of the public personnel agencies in the U.S. conduct

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Dinerman and Dvorin, op. cit., p. 37.

[3] Municipal Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 69.

[4] Ibid., 60.

planned recruitment programs--that is, estimate personnel needs in advance, determine the most efficient recruiting techniques, and evaluate the results of recruiting efforts.[1] Albuquerque formally does not have a planned recruitment program. House says that a surface evaluation of recruiting techniques is made, but there is no formal research.

Many cities are handicapped in their recruiting programs by the requirement that candidates for employment be city residents. One year is the most common requirement, but some two-year residence provisions are still being enforced. A 1958 Municipal Year Book survey revealed that 51.3 percent (527 of 1,028 reporting cities) have a residence requirement for initial employment. Cities indicating a residence requirement for employees after appointment constitute 54.8 percent (565 of 1,031).[2] Albuquerque is not hampered by either of these residence requirements. The City is free to recruit for Group I on a nationwide basis, although the Personnel Department tries the local area first.

The City tries, when possible, to fill vacant jobs by promotion from within. In the past year, the positions of fire chief and planning director were filled in this manner. If the City cannot hire locally, it usually publicizes a job opening by advertising in a professional publication.

Many other personnel policies can affect a city's ability to recruit and retain individuals. The University of Connecticut's

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[1] Municipal Year Book 1962 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1962), p. 175.

[2] Municipal Year Book 1958 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1958), p. 142.

Institute of Public Service conducted extensive research in this area in 1960. Questionnaires on personnel practices were sent to chief executive officers of all cities in the state over 5,000 population--a total of 92. Replies were received from 64 municipalities representing 70 percent.[1]

Twenty of 64 (31 percent) Connecticut municipalities reported that part or all of their public employees were under a formal merit system and 33 (51 percent) had job salary classification plans. Albuquerque has a formal merit system for its Group I employees and they are paid by a job salary classification arrangement. However, there are clearly defined job descriptions for only about 75 percent of the Group I positions, and they are not up to date, according to House.

A majority of Connecticut local governments (64 percent) reported having competitive entrance examinations for at least some job vacancies. Albuquerque gives examinations only for some Group II openings. Freeman says that "politics" is kept out of the Group I selection process, and Paul Wieck concluded in the Journal in August, 1962, that the personnel office had in fact been taken out of the realm of politics.[2]

Fifty-five percent of Connecticut reporting cities have formal provisions for the handling of employee grievances. Albuquerque's formal grievance procedures are spelled out in the Merit System Ordinance.

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[1]Rosaline Levenson, Municipal Personnel Practices in Connecticut (Storrs: University of Connecticut, 1961), p. vii.

[2]Albuquerque Journal, August 19, 1962.

Although City employees are permitted to join a union, Albuquerque's administrative personnel do not have the right to bargain collectively since collective bargaining agreements are forbidden. The National Civil Service League, a non-profit organization devoted to municipal government, has drafted an 11-point Statement of Policy concerning employee organizations which states, among other things, that "persons in public employment should have the right to organize and to present proposals through representatives of their own choosing."[1]

Twelve states have legislation favorable toward collective bargaining. In three states there are prohibitory statutes.[2] Unionization could become a more important factor in the future if and when labor organizers turn their attention in a greater degree to white collar workers.

In Connecticut, 23 of 64 cities permit their employees a wide latitude in political activities, ranging from taking an active part in campaigns to running for office. Seventeen cities placed some measure of restraint upon political activities of employees. Albuquerque's Merit System Ordinance states:

> No person shall continue in his City employment with pay after such employee has filed a declaration of candidacy or is nominated by a party convention or by other means, for any public office. No employee of the City shall hold any official position in a political party. Partisan political activity of any kind during working hours is strictly prohibited to all employees.[3]

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[1]Levenson, op. cit., p. 15.

[2]Ibid.

[3]City of Albuquerque, Merit System Ordinance, 6.

The federal government has instituted incentive awards to a considerable extent as a spur to employee effort and morale, but municipal governments have generally not tried to encourage employees with incentive awards. An exception is Decatur, Illinois, which provides for recognition over the local radio station to a city employee who has been singled out for exceptional service each month.[1] No incentive awards program exists in the Albuquerque government.

Professional employees, more in demand and always desirous of moving up, like to get information on job opportunities elsewhere. The City does not provide this information, but departments may subscribe to publications in their fields which presumably include data on employment opportunities. Through these publications the Albuquerque professional can keep abreast of developments in his line of work. According to information gathered by MMC, Albuquerque's government is no more lethargic than other municipalities in distributing news about job openings.[2]

## The High Turnover Rate

Albuquerque's high turnover rate would seem to indicate that employees are somehow managing to find out about other job possibilities. Everett Dillman, former City personnel director, conducted in 1960 a detailed study of comparative rates of turnover among cities in the U.S. with a population of 50,000 or

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[1] Municipal Year Book 1962 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1962), p. 7.

[2] Municipal Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 78.

more as noted in the 1960 Municipal Year Book. At least some data were received from 106 cities.[1]

Dillman discovered that only 1.02 percent of the surveyed cities could be expected to have a higher resignation rate for all employees than Albuquerque. He found that while cities' turnover rates were substantially below the rates for manufacturing establishments, the Albuquerque turnover rate was higher. However, the City rate did not exceed the rate for local manufacturing establishments. Table 1 gives the figures.

TABLE 1.--A comparison of average monthly total separations and resignation rates (expressed as a percentage) for all employees.[a]

| Total Separations[b] | | Resignations[c] | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Albuquerque | 2.03 | Albuquerque | 1.70 |
| Surveyed Cities | 1.10 | Surveyed Cities | .61 |
| National Manufacturing | 3.60 | National Manufacturing | 1.20 |
| Local Manufacturing | 3.99 | Local Manufacturing | 2.05 |

[a]Everett Dillman, A Study of Turnover Rates in Municipal Government: Albuquerque Comparative Analysis (Albuquerque: City of Albuquerque, 1960), p. 18.

[b]8.38 percent of cities have higher rate than Albuquerque.

[c]1.02 percent of cities have higher rate than Albuquerque.

Table 2 indicates that the largest proportion of Albuquerque turnover is in the unskilled job classifications where the rate is about three times as high as for the Group I employees.

[1]Everett Dillman, A Study of Turnover Rates in Municipal Government: Albuquerque Comparative Analysis (Albuquerque: City of Albuquerque, 1960), p. 6.

TABLE 2.--Average monthly resignation rates by job category in Albuquerque.[a]

| Job Category | Rate |
|---|---|
| Unskilled | 3.16 |
| Semi-skilled | .54 |
| Skilled | .42 |
| Supervisory | .45 |
| Inspection | 2.13 |
| Clerical | 1.59 |
| Protective Forces | 1.25 |
| Group I | 1.05 |

[a]Everett Dillman, A Study of Turnover Rates in Municipal Government: Albuquerque Comparative Analysis (Albuquerque: City of Albuquerque, 1960), p. 23.

Before the City is criticized for its abnormally high turnover rate, attention should be called to a few of Dillman's explanatory remarks. He writes:

> The large resignation rate for the City of Albuquerque can be largely attributed to resignations during the probationary period . . . . As long as the City continues to increase its total authorized force at a rapid pace there will be a relatively large number of short service employees. Since the turnover rates of probationary employees will normally be great it can be expected that the overall turnover rate will be relatively high. An overall average separation rate approximating national norms will not be achieved until the organization has been stabilized at a given size for a number of years. This does not mean, however, that steps to reduce the present rate should not be taken.[1]

Dillman further points out that it would be unhealthy for a low turnover rate to exist during the probationary period, and that turnover, both abnormally high and abnormally low, is very costly to an organization, although the cost cannot

[1]Ibid., 25.

always be calculated.[1] A low turnover rate, Dillman claims, may mean that the organization is paying too high a wage. Managerial controls may be extremely lax, resulting in inefficiency. In addition, according to Dillman, new persons with new ideas will be lacking, which may result in stagnation of productivity.[2]

Judging from the fact that Albuquerque, unlike most cities, has hired most of its APT people in recent years, the high turnover rate is not surprising, nor does it seem to mean the factors non-conducive to retention are excessively preponderant. Private industry in Albuquerque has an excessively high turnover rate also. High turnover is possibly a phenomenon of a growing community.

## Why They Leave

Why do persons leave City employment? The question is a difficult one to answer because the terminating employees may not always give frank reasons, especially when the information is being given to the employer. Table 3 lists the reasons given in exit interviews by resigning employees in the period from July, 1959 to October, 1960. The reasons given do not cover the full range of negative or non-conducive factors which might lead to an employee's termination. A more accurate view of employee dissatisfactions can be found in Chapter 3 where responses to the questionnaire are found.

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[1]Everett Dillman, A Study of Turnover Rates in Municipal Government (Albuquerque: City of Albuquerque, 1960), p. 16.

[2]Ibid., 4.

TABLE 3.--Reason for resignations, all departments, for the City of Albuquerque as noted in the exit interviews from July, 1959 to October, 1960.[a]

| Reason for Resignation | No. | % |
|---|---|---|
| Have better job (local) | 75 | 27.5 |
| Have better job (out of state) | 24 | 8.8 |
| Starting private business | 4 | 1.5 |
| Insufficient wage[b] | 8 | 2.9 |
| Leaving city[b] | 47 | 17.2 |
| Disagreeable working conditions | 11 | 4.0 |
| Work not to "liking" | 4 | 1.5 |
| To go into armed services | 12 | 4.4 |
| To go to school | 31 | 11.3 |
| Health (self or family) | 20 | 7.3 |
| Personal reasons | 11 | 4.0 |
| General dissatisfaction | 10 | 3.7 |
| AWOL | 6 | 2.2 |
| No reason given | 4 | 1.5 |
| Not classified | 6 | 2.2 |

[a]Everett Dillman, A Study of Turnover Rates in Municipal Government: Albuquerque Comparative Analysis (Albuquerque: City of Albuquerque, 1960), p. 21.

[b]With no immediate prospects of another job.

Since exit interviews are given to the employer, their accuracy as to the real reasons motivating an employee to leave must be doubted in many cases. However, the researcher has little else on which to rely. Past City employees have left Albuquerque and the City does not keep track of their locations. An effort was made to contact some of the former Group I employees known to be residing in the Albuquerque area. Occasionally, another source of information is the press when a statement by a disgruntled employee makes the headlines before he departs.

Richard Heim, personnel director from November, 1957 to January, 1961 and now a vice-president of the First National Bank,

was one person interviewed.[1] Heim said that he never thought he would be permanent with the City, but took the position because it would be a "good experience." He says he left because he received a position at the bank at a "more handsome" salary and with a "better future opportunity."

Heim claims that one of his major problems as personnel director was the recruitment of qualified Group I personnel. He believes that one of the reasons is that, unlike some cities, there is little respectability in working as a City professional in Albuquerque. As Heim explains it, Albuquerque is "immature." "We have a small-town mentality. People are not ready for professionals. Persons from outside are suspect. The result is that professionals are unable to gain acceptance for needed programs."

Another former employee, who wished not to be identified, said that he left because of the lack of support by his superiors and the lack of an opportunity for advancement and a "decent" salary.

Senior planner John Udy resigned from the City in September, 1962 with a statement that made the newspapers. Resigning to take a similar position in St. Paul at a $2500 increase in salary, Udy was quoted as terming the pay differential "more a commentary on the low salaries paid to professional employees in Albuquerque."[2] Planning director Bernie Jones acknowledged that

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[1]Interview with Richard Heim, Vice-President, First National Bank and former Personnel Director, City of Albuquerque, March 12, 1963.

[2]Albuquerque Journal, September 25, 1962.

he was "doubtful" that he could replace Udy at the $7908 salary.[1]

A month later, assistant planner Raymond Meketa resigned to go to Bakersfield, California, at $30 more per month, but he claimed that neither salary nor working conditions prompted his decision.[2]

In March, 1963, Clifford Brew, Jr., announced his resignation as an associate planner. He said his new Forest Service work would be "better" both from the standpoint of salary and working conditions.[3]

## Salaries

Dillman concluded that about 40.7 percent of all employees resigning from the Albuquerque City government rate low pay as a primary reason for leaving.[4]

MMC believes that the salaries paid to APT personnel are inadequate to enable local governments to compete for scarce talent. The differentials in compensation between those in the employ of local governments and private firms in the same community tend to be greatest for public officials at the highest levels. At a time when the federal government is seriously concerned with the compensation of its federal executives, there is scarcely

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Albuquerque Journal, October 19, 1962.

[3] Albuquerque Journal, March 8, 1963.

[4] Everett Dillman, A Study of Turnover Rates in Municipal Government: Albuquerque Comparative Analysis (Albuquerque: City of Albuquerque, 1960), p. 20.

any evidence that local governments have even considered the principle that public executives should receive salaries comparable to those of men and women doing similar work in private positions.[1]

MMC notes that any financial sacrifice in local government service is borne most heavily by APT personnel inasmuch as office workers, laborers and skilled craftsmen usually have powerful political weapons to advance their wage demands with governments. APT personnel lack a lobby or a trade union,[2] and have fewer members to make their influence felt. House thinks that only in the case of manual workers is the City very competitive with other local industries in the matter of salaries. Albuquerque is therefore not atypical.

MMC learned that many of our more progressive cities now base pay rates for personnel in clerical, stenographic, skilled and unskilled labor jobs on an annual pay survey which discloses the average of wages paid by private employers. These studies seldom extend to the upper APT echelons.[3] However, House in 1961 compared Albuquerque governmental APT salaries with the results of a nationwide survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor in 1960 of wages paid managerial and professional employees in non-public organizations.[4]

For comparative purposes, House used an index number. An

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[1]Municipal Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 70.

[2]Ibid., 72.

[3]Ibid., 112.

[4]Donald House, Managerial and Professional Regional Survey March, 1961 (Albuquerque: City of Albuquerque, 1961).

index number of 100 indicates that Albuquerque meets the median salary. Any number above 100 means that the City does not meet the median and numbers below 100 indicate that Albuquerque exceeds the median. For instance, a number of 108 would mean that Albuquerque is eight percent below the median; a number of 92 would mean the City is eight percent above the median.

As indicated by Table 4, House found that in almost every

TABLE 4.--Comparison of City of Albuquerque actual monthly rates paid (in dollars) for selected managerial and professional personnel[a] with comparable positions for private industrial concerns.[b]

| Job Title | City of Abq. | Nat. Survey | Index |
|---|---|---|---|
| Accounting and Budgeting Officer | 755 | 819 | 108 |
| Finance Director | 1015 | 1000 | 99 |
| Assistant Attorney | 541 | 607 | 112 |
| Associate Attorney | 575 | 1105 | 192 |
| Deputy City Attorney | 765 | 1677 | 218 |
| City Attorney | 1085 | 1913 | 176 |
| Chemist | 600 | 645 | 108 |
| Design Engineer | 650 | 699 | 108 |
| Water Engineer | 791 | 966 | 108 |
| Personnel Technician | 495 | 652 | 132 |
| Personnel Director | 750 | 1092 | 146 |
| | Average Index: | | 138 |

[a]Donald House, Managerial and Professional Regional Survey March, 1961 (Albuquerque: City of Albuquerque, 1961), p. 13.

[b]As reported in Department of Labor National Survey of Professional, Administrative, Technical and Clerical Pay, Winter 1959-1960.

case the average salaries paid in private industry exceed those paid by the City. The City's wage rates were 38 percent below the average of those for comparable positions in the private sector of the economy.

In many cities, and especially in large cities, municipal employees with jobs comparable to those in private business sometimes receive a salary above the going market price.[1]

Each year House undertakes a comparative study of wage rates paid APT personnel by western cities. The last report was issued in May, 1962. House's sample consisted of 86 cities west of the Mississippi River with a population range of from 25,000 to over a million (Los Angeles). House observed that:

> A conscientious effort has been made to acquire the most comparable data possible. Brief job descriptions were used to obtain the data; scope of organizational operations have been taken into consideration; and all data received with qualifications noted has been analyzed to determine its comparability. Not all Group I jobs have been surveyed. Those surveyed were picked to represent the entire structure because of their hypothesized comparability to jobs in other organizations.
>
> Regardless of the precautions taken it is obvious that differences in organizational structures, procedures, and scope of offered services will affect the overall compensable nature of the jobs. Complexities and responsibilities are difficult to measure by a survey device. For this reason, the survey figures must only be looked upon as a guide for any <u>specific</u> job. However, the overall structural comparison should have a high degree of validity.[2]

House's comparison of Albuquerque salaries with those of the 86 cities, see Table 5, revealed that Albuquerque was 10 percent below the median rate, although a few specific jobs exceeded it. The 1961 survey indicated that Albuquerque was 13.3 percent below. House recommended a wage structure to bring the City within two percent of the "going rate."

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[1]Charles R. Adrian, <u>Governing Urban America</u> (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), p. 342.

[2]Donald House, <u>Managerial and Professional Regional Survey May, 1962</u> (Albuquerque: City of Albuquerque, 1962).

TABLE 5.--Comparison of wage survey salary rates of 86 western cities with Group I salary rates for Albuquerque, May, 1962, (dollars per month).[a]

| Job Title | Survey Rate | Abq. Rate | Index |
|---|---|---|---|
| City Attorney | 1074 | 900 | 119 |
| Director Public Works | 1023 | 825 | 124 |
| Finance Director | 858 | 825 | 104 |
| Planning Director | 833 | 750 | 111 |
| Fire Chief | 861 | 675 | 128 |
| Police Chief | 882 | 675 | 131 |
| Personnel Director | 750 | 750 | 100 |
| Chief Water Engineer | 785 | 675 | 116 |
| Traffic Engineer | 727 | 675 | 108 |
| Supervisor--Building & Inspections | 746 | 675 | 111 |
| Deputy Director of Law | 770 | 625 | 123 |
| Librarian | 739 | 625 | 118 |
| Supervisor--Parks & Recreation | 728 | 625 | 116 |
| Deputy Police Chief | 714 | 575 | 124 |
| Administrative Assistant | 659 | 625 | 105 |
| Supervisor Data Processing | 572 | 625 | 92 |
| Superintendent Refuse | 595 | 625 | 95 |
| Auditorium Manager | 625 | 625 | 100 |
| Supervisor Sewer | 631 | 625 | 101 |
| Purchasing Agent | 629 | 575 | 109 |
| Chemist | 492 | 575 | 86 |
| Supervisor Vehicle Maintenance | 586 | 525 | 112 |
| Supervisor Municipal Court | 538 | 525 | 102 |
| Associate Planner | 590 | 475 | 124 |
| Zoo Superintendent | 425 | 425 | 100 |
| | Average Index: | | 110 |

[a]Donald House, Managerial and Professional Regional Survey May, 1962 (Albuquerque: City of Albuquerque, 1962), p. 4.

The City's Group I employees received a 2½ percent pay raise last summer to bring them now, according to House's estimate, to within 7½ percent of the median found in western cities. House indicated that another Group I raise probably will be recommended for July, 1963.

Additional comparisons can be made for salaries of selected

positions reported in the 1962 Municipal Year Book. Table 6 shows that for the positions indicated, only Albuquerque's

TABLE 6.--Comparison of Albuquerque annual salaries as of May, 1963 with annual salaries of selected municipal officials as of January 1, 1962 in cities of 100,000 - 250,000 population.[a]

| Position | No. Cities Reporting | 1962 Salary | Low | High | Abq. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Clerk | 68 | 8,422 | 4,568 | 14,325 | 7,440 |
| Finance Director | 40 | 11,570 | 7,500 | 16,860 | 10,464 |
| Auditor | 28 | 9,947 | 4,260 | 15,000 | 7,236 |
| Treasurer | 49 | 9,272 | 6,600 | 15,000 | 9,684 |
| Director of Public Works | 52 | 12,437 | 7,100 | 20,341 | 12,960 |
| Superintendent of Streets | 49 | 8,696 | 5,760 | 15,168 | 7,428 |
| Fire Chief | 69 | 10,266 | 5,280 | 15,672 | 9,900 |
| Police Chief | 70 | 10,518 | 5,280 | 15,750 | 10,200 |
| Planning Director | 56 | 11,124 | 6,900 | 16,786 | 10,716 |
| Personnel Director | 48 | 9,418 | 4,040 | 14,100 | 9,456 |
| Health Officer | 49 | 12,799 | 5,028 | 22,600 | 9,768 |
| Parks & Recreation Director | 45 | 10,027 | 4,150 | 15,420 | 9,408 |
| Librarian | 52 | 9,591 | 4,900 | 15,000 | 9,228 |
| Engineer | 59 | 11,374 | 5,437 | 20,160 | 10,440 |

[a]Municipal Year Book 1962 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1962), p. 186.

treasurer and director of public works make more money now than the average 1962 salary of nationwide municipal employees in similar positions in cities of similar size.

Tables 4, 5 and 6 indicate that Albuquerque offers a comparatively undesirable salary situation for its top personnel. What are the reasons?

## Inadequate Financial Resources

Personnel director Freeman complains that financial resources are inadequate for the personnel function, although

figures show that more than half of the City's operating budget goes for payroll.[1]

Financial problems beset most municipalities. MMC emphasized that state constitutions, laws and procedures limit local governments' ability to act to solve urban problems by imposing limitations on tax sources, tax rates and the extent of local government debt. All but 16 of the 50 state constitutions specify limitations as to the debt local government may incur in relation to the property tax base.[2] And there is more direct state fiscal supervision over cities in New Mexico than in the typical state.[3]

Arthur Jones, Administrative Assistant to the City Manager, found that per capita revenue for operation of the Albuquerque government is considerably less than that of eight surveyed cities of comparable size.[4] Albuquerque's total per capita revenue for general operations, excluding debt service and utilities, in 1962-63 is $50.40 compared to an average of $63.66 per capita for the eight cities.

Albuquerque's operating revenue per capita in 1962-63 is $71.39, including utilities, compared with average per capita revenue of $77.49 for 21 comparable cities with a median population of 230,000 persons reported in a survey of 1962-63 budgets

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[1] Albuquerque Tribune, June 22, 1962.

[2] Municipal Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 40.

[3] Adrian, op. cit., p. 298.

[4] Arthur E. Jones, "Comparison of Revenue and Expenditures of Albuquerque and Various Cities," The City Manager Reports (February, 1963), pp. 3-4.

made by the Tucson, Arizona, municipal budget division.

Jones writes that the primary reason Albuquerque's operating revenue is below that of comparable cities is the constitutional limit of 20 mills on each dollar of assessed valuation which may be levied for all state and local government operations. Property tax revenue composes only 3.4 percent of Albuquerque's operating budget in 1962-63, whereas property taxes for general operation represented 41 percent of the budgets of all cities in 1960.

Complicating the problem is that New Mexico communities have not been willing to make the most of the property tax. Holmes comments:

> The assessment of property is a disagreeable function at best, and is doubly disagreeable to an assessor to keep abreast of values when it appears to him that other sources of public revenues are available to take up any slack. At any rate it has been the tendency for most New Mexico assessors to relax.[1]

The sales tax is the most important source of operating revenue for Albuquerque, according to Jones. Per capita sales tax payments by Albuquerque residents in 1962-63 will total an average of $17.91 compared with an average of $18.88 paid by residents of the 21 cities compared in the Tucson budget survey.

One of the major factors which has cut City revenues, according to finance director Montrose Simms, was a change in the state sales tax law in 1959 which reduced revenue by $200,000. The state law stipulates that municipalities cannot

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[1]Jack E. Holmes, "The Property Tax in New Mexico: Orphan and Whipping Boy," New Mexico Tax Bulletin XL, No. 2-7 (Summer, 1961), p. 105.

levy the sales tax on anything on which the state does not charge it.[1]

City commissioner W. W. Atkinson has pointed out that some taxes are earmarked, that the City is already raising the maximum in sales taxes, and that the legislature has never approved the income tax for municipalities.[2]

Present legal restrictions have clearly created a major difficulty for the Albuquerque municipal government if it hopes to bring salaries into line with those of other cities.

## Advantages of Fringe Benefits

Municipal governmental employees undoubtedly anticipate less than the best in salary levels. It is far from a secret that governmental wages for administrators generally fall below those of private industry. However, certain advantages of governmental employment are usually recognized, particularly the fringe benefits.

How does Albuquerque rate when it comes to these other perquisites? Albuquerque offers no exceptional benefits, but the evidence to be presented in this section implies that the City ranks well in comparison with benefits usually found in most cities.

Albuquerque Group I personnel generally work 40 hours per week. Table 7 reveals that this is typical for cities in the 100,000 to 250,000 population range. Nearly 70 percent of the

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[1] Albuquerque Tribune, June 28, 1962.

[2] Albuquerque Journal, October 5, 1962.

cities reported a 40-hour week.

TABLE 7.--Hours worked per week by city hall employees in cities of 100,000 - 250,000 population. Based on 66 reporting cities.[a]

| Number of Hours | No. | % |
|---|---|---|
| 35 or less | 5 | 7.6 |
| 35½ to 39½ | 14 | 21.2 |
| 40 | 46 | 69.7 |
| 40½ to 43½ | 0 | 0.0 |
| 44 or more | 1 | 1.5 |

[a]Municipal Year Book 1962 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1962), p. 192.

However, Group I employees do not receive any form of compensation for any hours above the normal. Table 8 shows that

TABLE 8.--Methods for paying overtime in cities of 100,000 - 250,000 population. Based on 64 reporting cities.[a]

| Overtime Method | Number |
|---|---|
| Cities with some plan | 60 |
| Compensatory time off | 37 |
| Straight time | 10 |
| Time and one-half | 10 |
| One and one-half and double | 3 |
| No plan for paying overtime | 4 |

[a]Municipal Year Book 1962 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1962), p. 193.

the City falls into a minority classification (6.2 percent) in this respect. House says that there is an "informal" compensatory time off situation for Group I.

Albuquerque is liberal in its leave provisions. The City grants a minimum of 12 days and a maximum of 40 days vacation annually. Sick leave may be accumulated up to 90 days. Buffalo and St. Paul in granting up to 300 days are exceptional.[1]

The City provides group health insurance and federal social security coverage for all groups except policemen and firemen. Approximately five cities in six of similar size have some social security. Policemen and firemen are usually excluded.

Albuquerque has a retirement plan that covers everyone. A survey revealed that only 91 of 1,115 reporting cities had no retirement plan for any employees and 75 of the 91 were of less than 25,000 population.[2]

Most retirement systems are "contributing" plans, that is, both the city and the employee contribute part of the cost. In Albuquerque, the employee and the City each contribute five percent of the salary.

Retirement plans also provide for payments to persons who are permanently disabled before retirement, for payment to survivors if the employee dies before retirement, and for the return of funds invested in the system by the employee who is separated from service before retirement.[3] Albuquerque's system includes all three benefits.

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[1]Adrian, op. cit., p. 342.

[2]Municipal Year Book 1962 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1962), pp. 195-196.

[3]Adrian, op. cit., p. 348.

## Conclusions

Employment conditions for the City of Albuquerque are far from the ideal. However, in aspects of employment that could be rated as particularly poor, the City shares the distinction with most other local governments. All governments must contend with a stigma of low prestige. Albuquerque and its urban counterparts suffer from meager recruiting efforts. Most cities, including Albuquerque, have no in-service training programs.

As an indicator of factors non-conducive to recruitment and retention, Albuquerque's high turnover rate is deceiving. The City severely trails its urban counterparts only in the factors of salary and statutory fiscal limitations. Admittedly salary is a primary consideration in a person's career. In the thesis questionnaire returns, more Albuquerque executives expressed displeasure with salary than any other factor. No attempt, however, is made in this thesis to weigh the various factors. It may well be that salary, rated a negative factor, far outweighs other more favorable factors.

In a few instances, Albuquerque's more favorable factors place the City in a minority category. Few cities, for example, have no residence requirement, and few cities will go so far as to pay tuition and books for formal education at public expense. The City operates under a merit system and ranks well in fringe benefits.

Ideal conditions are far from being attained, but the subjective factor of "sunshine pay" may be helping the City to overcome some of its other handicaps to the employment, recruitment and retention of its Group I personnel.

# CHAPTER II

## THE CITY MANAGER

Any study of factors conducive or non-conducive to the recruitment and retention of public professional personnel in the City of Albuquerque would be imcomplete without a section devoted to the city manager's position. The city manager is not only the principal administrative officer of the community, but he frequently is the major innovator of policy. His actions closely affect the professionals under him. The manager is undoubtedly the most important person in the City's employ.

An attempt is made in this chapter to relate to the Albuquerque situation some major considerations gathered from a number of different sources regarding the city manager's post. Initially some of the factors involved in the hiring of city managers are considered, followed by facts and figures concerning tenure. Later the chapter deals with the hard facts of working conditions, i.e., salary, fringe benefits, relations with the council, political atmosphere, charter provisions, etc.

### Hiring of a City Manager

The search for a capable city manager involves to some degree competitive bidding among communities. What do cities look for in potential or likely managers? Floro writes: "Once

a manager has served in a manager city, he is considered by city councils to be an 'experienced' manager and much preferred to an 'inexperienced' person."[1] The International City Managers' Association (ICMA) adds:

> The most valuable experience to seek in a prospective city manager is that of having served successfully as a manager in a city comparable in size or in a smaller city. Because of the broad experience which service in another city affords, it is advisable for larger cities to give first consideration to experienced managers. Only when a candidate has had broad executive experience, in addition to special training, should he be selected as manager of a larger city.[2]

Albuquerque would appear to have a low rating in this respect since not one of its nine managers at the time of his initial appointment had previous manager experience. Some applicants did have this experience, but the City for a long time believed in hiring engineers[3] which was in accord with the national trend in the early years.

ICMA also says that "while theory and practice both strongly favor the nonresident, a city council should not refuse to consider a man having the requisite training and experience merely because of his local residence."[4] Edmund L. Engel, the present

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[1]George K. Floro, "Continuity in City Manager Careers," American Journal of Sociology, LXI (November, 1955), p. 246.

[2]International City Managers' Association, The Selection of a City Manager: Suggested Procedure to Aid City Councils in Appointing a Manager (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1957), pp. 8-9.

[3]Dorothy I. Cline, Albuquerque and the City Manager Plan 1917-1948, Division of Government Research Pub. No. 28, University of New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1951), pp. 18-19.

[4]International City Managers' Association, The Selection of a City Manager: Suggested Procedure to Aid City Councils in Appointing a Manager (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1957), p. 9.

manager incumbent, was promoted to the top administrative office in 1952 from his position as Albuquerque planning director. MMC found that less than half the city managers were appointed from within. MMC pointed out that because of the special training and experience required for this position, cities go outside to meet recruitment needs.[1]

The 1962 Municipal Year Book contains later statistics on this subject. Seventy-four percent of all city manager appointments in 1961 were from outside the city as compared to 80 percent in 1960 and 73 percent for the 10-year period 1950-59, inclusive.[2] Men with previous local government experience are usually appointed.[3] For reasons to be noted later, the City might have had difficulty in 1952 in hiring an experienced manager from outside the city. Engel had planning experience elsewhere, having worked at Long Beach and Los Angeles. Less than 50 percent of city managers, however, have stayed with their initial local government.[4]

Floro says that the appointment of a person not already committed in "local politics" is generally understood to be in accord with the "spirit" of the manager plan and the meaning of legal charter provisions which permit the hiring of outsiders.[5]

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[1]Municipal Manpower Commission, Governmental Manpower for Tomorrow's Cities: A Report of the Municipal Manpower Commission (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962), p. 153.

[2]Municipal Year Book 1962 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1962), p. 518.

[3]Municipal Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 151.

[4]Ibid., 149.

[5]Floro, op. cit., p. 240.

Engel, however, when asked if he was already committed in local politics prior to his appointment, said that he felt that only his views on planning matters were known to the Albuquerque citizenry.[1]

## Factors of Tenure

Managers, according to Floro, are faced with the problem of regulating their involvement--of becoming substantially involved in local affairs but not too involved. In colleague relations the dualism is reflected in questions concerning movement--whether a fellow manager has "stayed too long," for example.[2] The manager who "stays too long" or has become "married to the local job" is involved in local affairs to the extent that he cannot do many things that he and other managers think a manager "should do." Furthermore, the manager is expected to remain sufficiently free from local commitments so that he can use a resignation threat (usually indirectly or in a preventive way) if the special character of the office is in jeopardy or if the city council becomes committed to a course of action which supposedly would require the manager to violate his ethical code.[3] Manager colleagues assume that the manager shall maintain a "potential to move" until he reaches the most prized cities or until he retires. A "potential to move" is a

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[1]Interview with Edmund L. Engel, Albuquerque City Manager, December 7, 1962.

[2]Floro, op. cit., p. 241.

[3]Ibid., 243.

summary statement of a set of conditions representing some combination of aspiration (willingness to move), opportunity, and controlled involvement (freedom to move).[1] Ordinarily a manager has more opportunities to move while in the small cities. They are more numerous and there is less competition for their manager positions.

Colleagues appear to be most critical of managers who move "too often," among whom are those who are judged to "hurt the profession" most. The opinion is based upon the judgment that the manager has not contributed substantially to a city's development.[2] Nevertheless, a manager can be criticized if he "stays too long" or "moves too soon." Whether a manager exploits opportunities to move to other cities is a matter of colleague concern.[3] Engel, however, who has had longer tenure than most city managers, apparently is not guided by beliefs on tenure held by colleagues. He said when interviewed that he was in his present position as long as the City would have him, adding that he has no "conceptualization of tenure" in terms of neat packages of accomplishment. He does not think managers should move if they are accomplishing something, unless they are young and at the same time in a small city. His opinion, in any case, is that they should stay at least three years.

Engel apparently feels that he has a sufficient challenge in Albuquerque. He marked his 10th year anniversary in the City's

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[1]Ibid., 245.

[2]Ibid., 243.

[3]Ibid., 241.

top spot with a series of newspaper articles in which he outlined past progress and future aspirations, emphasizing the All-American City Award of 1957. Like most city managers,[1] Engel frequently measured progress in terms of "hardware"--improvements of a physical and visible nature. "This community has made great strides and continues at an increasingly rapid pace--but each step confronts the municipal administration with a whole new range of problems and potential for progress."[2] ICMA reveals that in choosing a new city, managers give considerable weight to factors of more challenging opportunities.[3]

City manager statistics relative to turnover give the immediate impression that most managers are enamored with the idea of movement. Virginia managers' average tenure was found to be 5.49 years to 3.66 years for Florida managers.[4] The average tenure for city managers in 17 California cities was 4.6 years.[5] In an ICMA study, of 849 managers reporting information on tenure, 71, or only eight percent, had served more than 10 years in their present city. Conversely, 259 (31 percent)

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[1]Jeptha J. Carrell, "The Role of the City Manager: A Survey Report," Public Management, XLIV, No. 4 (April, 1962), p. 78.

[2]Albuquerque Journal, January 31, 1962.

[3]International City Managers' Association, Trends in Salaries of City Managers (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1957), p. 4.

[4]John M. DeGrove and Gladys M. Kammerer, Florida City Managers: Profile and Tenure, Studies in Public Administration No. 22, University of Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1961), p. 20.

[5]Calvin Eugene Perkins, The Effect of Charter Provisions on Appointment and Removal of the City Manager, John W. Donner Pub. No. 8, University of Southern California (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1959), p. 15.

had served in their present city two years or less.[1] Engel obviously is in the elite of long-term managers. Judged by the length of his stay, Engel has found the Albuquerque environment a pleasant one. Other Albuquerque top administrators have not. One manager appointed in the late 1940's resigned on the twelfth day: "No man with any principle," he said as he left the city, "would remain in a job while his boss was undermining his work."[2] Consecutive terms for individual Albuquerque managers have ranged from 12 days to 13 years and four months. Several have served less than one year. Engel with 11 years is now second to Charles E. Wells in terms of time served.

Engel seems not to conform to the manager "prototype." Stene found that a manager is more likely to stay three or more years in his second or later city than in his first.[3] He found that 60 percent of the "short-term" managers were serving in their first city.[4]

The factors at work in the matter of tenure are subtle, and their interactions are difficult to trace. One increasingly significant factor is the impact of professionalization upon managerial satisfaction. City managers are becoming more highly trained, and matters concerned with administrative procedures

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[1]International City Managers' Association, Trends in Salaries of City Managers (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1957), p. 17.

[2]Cline, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

[3]Edwin O. Stene, "Short-Term City Managers," Public Management, XLIII, No. 7 (July, 1961), p. 149.

[4]Ibid., 150.

and powers of appointment and removal of subordinates are sensitive matters to managers with professional outlooks. Localities which subject the manager to limitations, legal or practical, not usually found in "typical" council-manager cities are apt to find competent managers harder to find and to hold.[1]

Another factor affecting tenure might be termed the "organizational condition" of a city's government. The vitality of a municipal administration is affected by both the elected representatives and the administrative personnel of the city, as well as by the environment of the community in which it operates. These factors have a bearing upon manager-council relationships, communication systems, press and public relations, and employee morale. A professionally trained manager ought to be concerned about both the formal and informal organization with which he is to work. Some councils consider managers expendable, and they are sometimes chosen for that reason.[2] The Albuquerque Citizens' Committee, the controlling political body in Albuquerque since 1954, is, however, pledged to adhere to the manager plan as set forth in the City Charter.

The manager profession is in a certain sense a worrisome and ulcerous one. Managers' first thoughts must constantly turn to survival. Some of the most outstanding managers have found themselves summarily dismissed for reasons that can be explained only in terms of caprice. Yet the average tenure has gradually increased, and it would seem that this is one occupation where

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[1] Ibid., 152.

[2] Ibid.

getting fired can be a badge of merit.[1]

Good qualifications and high professional standards tend to increase managers' tenure in office. The higher a manager's qualifications and skills the more confidence and respect his community will have in him.[2]

Kammerer and DeGrove identified four sets of factors that might affect tenure:

> (1) structural, by which we meant charter provisions governing selection of the mayor, independence of departments from control by the manager, etc.; (2) environmental, which included rate of population growth, demographic changes, social and economic changes; (3) personal, that is relating to the background of the manager himself; (4) political, which embraced all relating to the struggle for power to control the public policy of the community.[3]

This thesis will subsequently examine numerous of these and other factors mentioned in manager tenure in the hope that it will provide insight into city manager employment conditions in Albuquerque.

Engel's tenure would seem to pose a problem of achieving regulated involvement, although the "prominent" one-city manager may become to some degree dissociated from former local associates (if he had been a local resident at the time of his appointment) during a long period of tenure or even abruptly. He may survive a local crisis in a distinguishing way and rather quickly achieve a reputation locally as a "big man." He may achieve somewhat the same reputation over a much longer period as programming gains

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[1]John M. Pfiffner, "The Job of the City Manager," Public Management, XLII, No. 6 (June, 1961), p. 123.

[2]Stuart A. MacCorkle, "Tenure of City Managers," Public Management, LXIV, No. 7 (July, 1962), p. 153.

[3]DeGrove and Kammerer, op. cit., p. 21.

momentum at a time when most one-city managers are supposedly "wearing out their welcomes" or "using up their ideas" as far as a particular locality is concerned.[1]

Engel believes that he has controlled his involvement. He points to the fact that he belongs to only one local organization--the Albuquerque chapter of the American Society for Public Administration. One of the aspects of the position about which there has never been agreement is the extent of the manager's civic role. A division of thought, as well as of action, is evident on whether the manager should become a civic leader or

TABLE 9.--Florida manager participation in group activity.[a] (Each percent based on 76 as a total)

| Group | No. Mgrs. | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Church | 32 | 42.1 |
| Fraternal | 42 | 55.3 |
| Civic | 45 | 59.2 |
| Country Club | 1 | 1.3 |
| Chamber of Commerce | 37 | 48.7 |
| Veterans | 17 | 22.4 |
| Catholic | 2 | 2.6 |
| Jewish | 0 | 0.0 |
| Professional | 9 | 11.8 |
| Other | 29 | 38.2 |
| None | 4 | 5.3 |
| No Response | 2 | 2.6 |

[a]John M. DeGrove and Gladys M. Kammerer, Florida City Managers: Profile and Tenure, Studies in Public Administration No. 22, University of Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1961), p. 16.

[1]Floro, op. cit., p. 244.

should remain an inconspicuous administrator.[1] A Florida study revealed that managers often do become involved in community group activity even to the extent of taking group leadership positions. Tables 9 and 10 indicate this.

TABLE 10.--Number of group leadership positions held by Florida managers.[a] (Each percent based on 76 as a total)

| No. Leadership Positions | No. Mgrs. | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 20 | 26.3 |
| 2 | 19 | 25.0 |
| 3 | 9 | 11.8 |
| 4 | 2 | 2.6 |
| 5 | 1 | 1.3 |
| None | 22 | 28.9 |
| Other | 3 | 4.0 |

[a]John M. DeGrove and Gladys M. Kammerer, Florida City Managers: Profile and Tenure, Studies in Public Administration No. 22, University of Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1961), p. 17.

## Considerations of Salary

The perusal now begins of some of the specific "hard" facts of manager life. An important factor--perhaps the most important--is salary. MacCorkle suggests that the salary incentive may be "far greater than we are often willing to admit . . . Any community refusing to pay an adequate salary in most circumstances will find it difficult to attract and retain

[1]Harold A. Stone, Kathryn H. Stone and Donald K. Price, City Manager Government in the United States: A Review After Twenty-Five Years (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), p. 72.

capable managers."[1]

Engel expressed satisfaction with his present $19,000 annual salary. Municipal Year Book figures reveal that the average salary for managers in 40 cities of from 100,000 to 250,000 population as of January 1, 1962, was $20,399. The low was $12,192 and the high $28,800.[2] Wood found a positive correlation between the size of the city and salaries of managers.[3] A city may have special problems resulting from rapid growth. According to some observers, managerial problems and responsibilities in an expanding community are greater and warrant a higher salary.[4] Albuquerque is a rapidly growing city, but the manager's salary is somewhat below the mean.

Using average salary, there is a consistent increase in the city manager's salary as the number of city employees increases. ICMA reports that for cities having 1,500 to 2,000 employees (Albuquerque has 1,800), the average manager's salary in 1957 was $17,300.[5] The only comparative data available in many cases pertained to 1957. It should be assumed that 1957 salary figures have risen to some extent since that time. By education level,

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[1]MacCorkle, op. cit., pp. 151-152.

[2]Municipal Year Book 1962 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1962), p. 186.

[3]John Wood, Employment Conditions in the City Management Profession in Oklahoma (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1961), p. 12.

[4]International City Managers' Association, Trends in Salaries of City Managers (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1957), p. 40.

[5]Ibid., 14.

Engel fares well. The average 1957 salary for managers with work toward a Master's (Engel took post-graduate work in public administration at the University of California) was $10,522.[1] Engel has served only Albuquerque in the position of manager. In 1957, one-city managers averaged $8,278 with a high of $25,000.[2] Managers aged 50 to 60 in 1957 (Engel is now 53) averaged $17,654.[3]

Figures show a consistent and direct relationship between the size of the operating budget (excluding capital improvements), the wage and salary budget, and the manager's salary. Albuquerque's operating budget is $19,700,000. The average manager salary for cities with operating budgets of from $10,000,000 to $20,000,000 in 1957 was $18,415.[4] The City's wage and salary budget is about $8,500,000. Wage and salary budgets of from $7,500,000 to $10,000,000 produced an average manager salary of $18,611 in 1957.[5] In 30 cities ICMA found one or more department heads receiving as much or more as the manager. Such is not the case in Albuquerque where the salary next highest to the manager's is that of city attorney Frank Moran at $13,344.

Engel's salary when he was hired in 1952 was $8,000. This represented an increase over his salary as a planner, but experienced managers elsewhere would not have regarded the salary highly. Five later salary increases have brought the position more in line with comparable communities. The manager's salary has been increased in the past 11 years more than it was during

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[1] Ibid., 16. [2] Ibid., 17. [3] Ibid., 15. [4] Ibid., 12.
[5] Ibid., 13.

the first 34 years of the city's manager history. Albuquerque's initial manager, employed February 2, 1918, was paid $4,500. Commissions failed at one time to raise the manager salary during a 20-year period.

Engel, however, has not been the only manager experiencing a rising salary. ICMA says that for the manager who stays in the same city the salary tends to increase through the first eight years of service.[1] An example of the magnitude of salary hikes is the fact that in 1948 the average manager salary for cities of from 100,000 to 250,000 population was $13,750 compared with $20,036 in 1957.[2] An interesting statistic is that about 95 percent of 849 reporting managers received one or more salary increases during the two-year 1955-56 period.[3]

Few managers, including Engel, have contracts covering salary. Salary increases are the responsibility of the city commission, and Engel does not believe that the manager should ever take the initiative in attempting to get a salary increase. City commission chairman Archie Westfall said that the commission was aware of the manager's salary needs and that he personally believed Engel was now worth about $25,000.[4]

## Importance of Fringe Benefits

Managers are also concerned with fringe benefits. Benefits most frequently supplied are an automobile or traveling expenses,

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[1]*Ibid.*, 17. [2]*Ibid.*, 11. [3]*Ibid.*, 20.

[4]Interview with Archie Westfall, Chairman, Albuquerque City Commission, December 13, 1962.

and in some instances hospitalization insurance and life insurance.[1] ICMA offers some valuable data obtained in 1957 on fringe benefits. Over 95 percent of 889 managers report they are covered by some type of pension system. Engel is covered by a pension system. A total of 361 are covered only by federal social security, 217 by federal social security plus some other type of public pension system (Engel falls into this category), 274 by a state system, 124 by a city system, and 16 by some other type of governmental pension system such as military or county.[2]

In the overwhelming majority of cases (761), retirement premium payments, as is the case in Albuquerque, are made jointly by the manager and the city. Thirty-one managers pay all the premium, while only 13 cities pay the entire premium.[3] The premium payments are evenly divided in Albuquerque. Twenty-nine percent of 889 reporting cities carry some life insurance for the city managers and pay part of the premiums.[4] The City of Albuquerque pays all the premium. Twenty-five percent provide accident insurance. Most of these cities carry workmen's compensation and pay 100 percent of the cost.[5] The City of Albuquerque does not provide accident insurance exclusively, but does pay 100 percent of the cost of workmen's compensation. Thirty-one percent pay the premium for either hospitalization or surgical

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[1]Wood, op. cit., p. 13.

[2]International City Managers' Association, Trends in Salaries of City Managers (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1957), p. 31.

[3]Ibid., 31-32. [4]Ibid., 32. [5]Ibid.

insurance or both. This applies to Albuquerque. The most common arrangement is for the city to pay either one-half or all of the premium for both types of coverage.[1] Albuquerque pays 20 percent.

The 1957 ICMA survey, which included 28 managers in cities in the 100,000 to 250,000 size range, revealed that two of these managers worked 40 to 50 hours per week, 22 worked 50 to 60 hours and four worked over 60 hours.[2] Engel estimates that he works an average of 45 to 50 hours each week. This indicates that he has more free time than most managers in comparable cities. About three percent of reporting managers are granted one week of vacation or less annually, 72 percent have two weeks, and approximately 25 percent have more than two weeks. Managers in larger cities generally have longer vacations, but actually take about the same amount. The average number of working days actually taken by managers in cities in the 100,000 to 250,000 range was seven days per year.[3] Engel has 15 working days annual leave (three weeks), but records reveal he actually has taken six days in both 1961 and 1962.

Of the total of 889 managers responding, 335, or 38 percent, either were not covered by a fixed sick leave policy or did not reply. Among the 554 remaining managers covered by a sick leave policy, as is Engel at the rate of one day per month, 405, or 73 percent, earn sick leave at the rate of one day or less per month. Slightly over 21 percent earn more than one day a month, but not more than one and one-quarter days. Concerning total accumulation of sick leave, a majority of managers (60 percent)

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[1]Ibid., 32-33. [2]Ibid., 35. [3]Ibid., 33.

can accumulate up to 60 days, 25 percent can accumulate 60 to 90 days (Engel can total 90 days), and 15 percent more than 90 days.[1]

About two-thirds of the managers use a city car during the work day (a car is available to Engel), and of these 30 use a city car on a 24-hour basis (Engel does not have a 24-hour privilege). Slightly more than one-third of the 889 managers receive a car allowance (Engel gets seven cents per mile if he uses his own car). Car allowances range from a low of $100 per year to a high of as much as $1,800 per year.[2]

Forty-two percent of reporting managers received city payment for some or all of the expense of moving household effects to the city. About twenty-five percent of these managers had some or all of their traveling expenses paid.[3] Albuquerque does not provide either of these benefits.

Seventy-six percent of reporting managers will receive 40 percent or less of their current salary on retirement (Engel will get a maximum of 40 percent if he stays 20 years). Most persons, including actuaries and economists, consider 40 percent to be a minimum for retirement pay. Some managers will receive less than 10 percent of current salary.[4]

Managers generally are reimbursed by the city for all expenses incurred in attendance at state municipal league meetings, annual conferences, and other travel on city business (Engel gets a flat amount per day, but says it is hard to

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[1]Ibid., 34-35. [2]Ibid., 36. [3]Ibid., 37. [4]Ibid., 32.

travel anywhere without some coming out of his own pocket). Most managers are not reimbursed, however, for the expense of attending special luncheons and dinners or for taking officials from other cities to lunch. This applies to Engel. Only three percent are allowed a flat amount per year for miscellaneous expenses; Engel is not given a flat amount. Unlike Engel, 14 managers have allowances for living quarters and nine for home telephones.[1]

Managers are more concerned about retirement than any other fringe benefit. Only one-third of the city managers believe they have adequate coverage under their present plans. With this exception, managers appear to be reasonably satisfied with their fringe benefits.[2] Engel replied affirmatively when asked if he was satisfied with fringe benefits in general and retirement coverage in particular.

## Relations with Council

The manager's relations with the council, or the city commission as the governing body is called in Albuquerque, are a vital aspect of the working environment of the chief administrative officer. City managers report that one of their most important and difficult tasks is to maintain good working relationships with councilmen.[3] Nothing disturbs managers more than evidence of strain in their relationship with council.[4] Success

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[1]Ibid., 37.

[2]Ibid., 38.

[3]Carrell, op. cit., p. 75.

[4]Ibid., 78.

or failure in their position may hinge upon this relationship. Clearly the attitude of the councilmen in the city is the all-important factor. The council determines the manager's scope of authority and action, his salary, and much of the manager's personal satisfaction or dissatisfaction in his job.[1]

Engel and Westfall were asked to describe current commission-manager relations in Albuquerque. Their responses (in parenthesis) are related to responses of managers obtained in the Florida study indicated in Table 11.

TABLE 11.--Florida managers' relations with the council.[a] (Each percent based on 76 as a total)

| Type of Relationship | No. Mgrs. | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Full confidence of the council and/or support on major issues (Engel and Westfall) | 54 | 71.1 |
| Conflict situation identified but still indicate council support | 12 | 15.8 |
| Conflict with council faction or the mayor | 8 | 10.5 |
| Other | 2 | 2.6 |

[a]John M. DeGrove and Gladys M. Kammerer, Florida City Managers: Profile and Tenure, Studies in Public Administration No. 22, University of Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1961), p. 15.

Engel said his relations have always been "good" with a majority of commission members. He added that he generally has been given a free reign. When asked if he tries to adapt his performance to the whims of changing commissions, he replied

[1]International City Managers' Association, Trends in Salaries of City Managers (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1957), p. 4.

that he always has to make some changes, but that they generally involve minor matters. Westfall termed commission-manager relations as "excellent" and said that Engel is "doing a good job." Maurice Sanchez, commission chairman for eight years (1954-1962), spoke equally highly of Engel and concurred that Engel was given a free reign during his (Sanchez's) eight years.[1]

Manager theory requires that a manager have the confidence of the council majority at all times, and his learned response to a negative vote on a major policy recommendation is prompt submission of his resignation.[2] However, one study found that there is a definite split in the opinions of managers as to whether a manager should immediately resign when he finds himself in disfavor with a majority of the council.[3]

Engel said that he has received negative votes on major policy suggestions, although Sanchez could not remember any, and that a manager should "not necessarily" resign under these circumstances because he "could be wrong." Westfall said that Engel has not received a major negative vote since he (Westfall) joined the commission in April, 1962. He does not believe a "yes" or "no" answer can be given as to whether the manager ought to resign on such an occasion because many circumstances can be involved.

Should a manager resign if he finds himself in disfavor

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[1]Interview with Maurice Sanchez, Former Chairman, Albuquerque City Commission, February 20, 1963.

[2]Ibid., 25-26.

[3]Perkins, op. cit., p. 47.

with a majority of the commission? Engel hinted that the manager might as well resign because he will be fired anyway. Westfall thought the manager might try to stick it out if commission members have little time left to serve.

Studies have shown that the manager and his operating personnel are the major source in initiating policy for council-manager cities.[1] Councilmen who seek to lead in this respect, one study revealed, tend to place their political careers in greater jeopardy.[2] Through the budget, and in a number of other ways, almost every manager seems to conceive of his job as including the responsibility for initiating policy proposals, whether or not the charter spells it out.[3] Not only do managers feel a definite responsibility to participate in policy, but a vast majority, 77 of 88 in one study, stated that they as a "matter of course initiate policy."[4]

Table 12 shows Florida managers' perception of policy initiation in their communities. The interesting fact is that in over 75 percent of the cases, the manager was identified as of special importance in policy initiation, either alone or in combination with the council and/or the mayor.

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[1]Clarence E. Ridley, The Role of the City Manager in Policy Formulation (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1958), p. 18.

[2]Charles R. Adrian, "Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities: A Study of Three Communities," Public Administration Review XVIII, No. 3 (Summer, 1958), p. 208.

[3]DeGrove and Kammerer, op. cit., p. 13.

[4]Ridley, op. cit., p. 19.

TABLE 12.--Florida managers' perception of policy initiation in their communities.[a]

| Source for Policy | No. Mgrs. | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Council-manager as a team, proposing jointly or alternately | 32 | 42.1 |
| Mayor and the manager | 8 | 10.5 |
| Manager, because he proposes major policy which is usually accepted by the council | 7 | 9.2 |
| Council and mayor | 6 | 7.9 |
| Council | 5 | 6.6 |
| Mayor, playing strong mayor role | 2 | 2.6 |
| Other, including combinations of the above | 16 | 21.1 |

[a]John M. DeGrove and Gladys M. Kammerer, Florida City Managers: Profile and Tenure, Studies in Public Administration No. 22, University of Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1961), p. 12.

Engel, Westfall and Sanchez were asked their judgment as to the manager's role in policy making. Their answers (in parentheses) are related in Table 13 to the Florida study.

TABLE 13.--Judgment as to manager's role in policy making.[a]

| Preference Expressed by Managers | No. Mgrs. | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| YES--manager should have role because: | | |
| manager knows problems (Westfall and Sanchez) | 25 | 32.9 |
| council wants it (Westfall and Engel) | 2 | 2.6 |
| other reasons | 14 | 18.4 |
| NO--manager should not have role because: | | |
| policy is council's job | 16 | 21.1 |
| bad for public relations | 4 | 5.3 |
| No Response | 15 | 19.7 |

[a]John M. DeGrove and Gladys M. Kammerer, Florida City Managers: Profile and Tenure, Studies in Public Administration No. 22, University of Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1961), p. 14.

Engel stated that he initiates policy "as a matter of course," but believes the commission at times also initiates policy. The replies of Westfall and Sanchez to this inquiry backed up Engel's view. Westfall thinks that the manager should initiate policy and said that the commission seeks his policy suggestions. Engel and Westfall both think that teamwork is essential. Engel emphasized in response to one question that he does not wish to be designated a community leader or to challenge the power of the commission.

Managers are agreed that a manager seldom if ever should lay a new policy before the council "cold."[1] Engel says he discusses major policy items with the commission in advance and gives "all the facts" to the commission. Westfall and Sanchez indicated that they agreed with Engel's statement. The three men agreed that the manager deals with the commission as a group rather than through certain members individually.

Engel said he would welcome more active participation by the commission in initiating and promoting policy matters although, he said, they do "a great deal now." Westfall, interestingly enough, said he would welcome more active participation by Engel in initiating and promoting policy matters.

Engel, Westfall and Sanchez concurred that the manager defends and explains policy proposals approved by the commission, and that he gives the commission credit for all that goes well. The limelight of publicity on a city manager may be a hindrance.

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[1]Ridley, op. cit., p. 24.

The managers accordingly make every effort to give the council all of the credit for what goes well and for sound decision-making.[1]

One study revealed that contrary to the prevalent view, managers regard the council's concern with administrative matters as natural, inevitable, and healthy.[2] Engel, Westfall and Sanchez believe the commission should be concerned, but should not direct. The overlapping of administrative and legislative functions was one of the principal weaknesses in the operation of the manager plan in Albuquerque from 1917 to 1948.[3] A much closer harmony of interests apparently has been achieved during the Engel period.

The present commission did, however, assign members responsibility to find out about various operating departments, but Engel and Westfall deny that this tends to bypass the manager. Westfall says the system is purely "informational."

The preceding paragraphs would seem to indicate cordial conditions in which the commission and the manager interact. This does not mean, however, that Albuquerque is blessed with an abundance of cordiality not found elsewhere. In many cases, provisions of the City Manager's Code of Ethics[4] are being adhered to:

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[1]Ibid., 20.

[2]Carrell, loc. cit.

[3]Cline, op. cit., p. 24.

[4]International City Managers' Association, The City Manager's Code of Ethics.

4. . . . . The city manager defends municipal policies publicly only after consideration and adoption of such policies by the council.
5. The city manager realizes that the council, the elected representatives of the people, is entitled to the credit for the establishment of municipal policies. The city manager avoids coming in public conflict with the council on controversial issues. Credit or blame for policy execution rests with the city manager.
. . . . . .
8. The city manager, in order to preserve his integrity as a professional administrator, resists any encroachment on his responsibility for personnel, believes he should be free to carry out council policies without interference, and deals frankly with the council as a unit rather than with its individual members.

In other cases, Engel is typical of a synthesis of experience and judgment revealed in a study of 88 city managers. Some of the more pertinent points are quoted.

1. Councilmen and city managers both realize that teamwork is essential in formulating policies.
. . . . . .
5. Regardless of the method, the goal is that the council know all the facts.
. . . . . .
7. Managers strongly favor dealing with councilmen as a group on policy matters for fear of giving any impression of favoritism.
8. Most managers are unsympathetic to secret precouncil session, but they do strongly favor so-called study or work sessions on a basis agreeable to the press.
9. Most managers discuss the more important budget items informally with the council in advance.
. . . . . .
12. Virtually every manager would welcome more active participation by council in initiating and promoting policy matters.
13. City managers refuse to get excited over unsound policies sponsored occasionally by some councilmen, presumably to meet partisan political promises. They are not frequent.
. . . . . .
15. On policies approved by council, managers are willing both to explain and to defend policy projects, especially if requested to do so by their councils.
16. Managers recognize few but very important limitations on participation in policy formulation, either self-imposed or by council. Obviously they know better than to become involved in a partisan political controversy, and councils do not expect them to enter into such controversies. On

the other hand, few managers shy away from an important policy simply because it is controversial.
17. Managers indicate no desire whatever to be designated as leaders in their communities or any interest in challenging the power of the council.[1]

Adrian writes that "among managers themselves there are two philosophies (perhaps it is more a matter of two personality types) which deal with the proper relationship of the manager to the council. Some managers center their attention on administrative operations and routine matters, carefully avoiding taking a stand on any city issue; others center their attention on policy matters and the development of the city."[2]

Engel seems to prefer to operate out of the limelight and in harmony with the more conservative mandate of the Albuquerque Citizens' Committee governing coalition. If he can be classified by Adrian's criteria, the group of managers who keep to administrative operations and routine matters to the possible detriment of city development seems to be more apropos.

Heim is one who believes Albuquerque is a leaderless community. "A strong city manager could do so much for the city," Heim believes. Heim blames the lack of leadership on the city's "small-town mentality" which, he claims, frustrates the professional personnel.

Some of the questionnaire comments by City planners (Albuquerque still has no master plan) lend credence to Heim's views. One planner said, "Local public and political attitudes

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[1]Ridley, op. cit., pp. 3-6.

[2]Charles R. Adrian, Governing Urban America (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), p. 225.

toward city planning and related fields do not encourage high standards of work." Another listed as a source of dissatisfaction the "inaction of higher public officials."

## Influence of Politics

Most city managers tend to play major policy roles in the making of the principal decisions of the city and, as a result, face serious political risks. The only certainty before the voters is the figure of the manager, who can be converted into a readily accessible scapegoat for the actions of the councilmen.[1] Councils retreat from policy positions or allow managers to be identified as the principal public advocates of policy in order to protect themselves from electoral defeat.[2] Engel denied that commission retreat occurred in Albuquerque.

The manager's ability to carry out his program may depend to a considerable extent on the political environment in which he works. Florida managers were asked to estimate the politics of their communities. Responses of Engel, Westfall and Sanchez are related to those in Table 14.

Average community manager tenure tends to be longer in cities with noncompetitive politics and a low level of interest conflict.[3] Kammerer and DeGrove summed up their study of Florida managers by saying:

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[1]DeGrove and Kammerer, op. cit., p. 33.

[2]Ibid., 34.

[3]Ibid.

In summary, we can say, therefore, that of all the electoral changes in terms of true factional changes that occurred in our study cities, less than 10 percent of the cases represent a public ideological commitment by the dominant faction to the council-manager plan that restrained it from firing an incumbent manager. In 54.5 percent of the cases managers were fired following such electoral changes. In 18 percent of the cases managers survived change in control of the council by reason of having been installed prior to the accession to power of the new faction or actually being a member of the ruling political group.[1]

TABLE 14.--Politics of the community in Florida council-manager cities.[a]

| Manager's Estimate of Community | No. Cities | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Very stable, few issues that divide (Westfall) | 27 | 35.5 |
| Stable, despite a few divisive issues (Sanchez) | 22 | 28.9 |
| Subject to marked change--Issue based (Engel) | 6 | 7.9 |
| Subject to marked change--Personality based | 17 | 22.4 |
| Other | 4 | 5.3 |

[a]John M. DeGrove and Gladys M. Kammerer, Florida City Managers: Profile and Tenure, Studies in Public Administration No. 22, University of Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1961), p. 15.

Does the Albuquerque manager ever become involved in political questions? Engel, Westfall and Sanchez all answer "never." Engel feels that he has not alienated any significant part of the Albuquerque population "over the long pull." Kammerer and DeGrove concluded that the "alienation of important local citizens is almost inevitable no matter how skilled the

[1]Ibid., 31.

manager may be in so-called public relations."[1]

Engel, in assuming the City's chief administrative job, said that only time would tell whether he would be allowed to operate as chief executive free of the political pressures which reportedly forced the resignation of his predecessor.[2] Ordinarily a manager is not expected to remain in a city if it is necessary to "fight" to retain his appointment. Engel thinks he has been able to operate free of political pressures. This does not mean that all has been rosy. Probably Engel's biggest crisis came prior to the last commission election held in April, 1962, when minority commissioner James O'Toole said he was seeking to weld together a ticket of candidates who would "go along with the firing of Engel." O'Toole said he thought Engel was the source of troubles at City Hall.[3] A local newspaper had previously uncovered some irregularities in City purchasing and other matters. Another minority member and a long-time Engel foe, Clarence Davis, who was seeking re-election, also placed the blame on Engel.[4]

The crisis, judging by newspaper accounts, appears to have withered away before election day. At a pre-election meeting, candidates representing all slates said they would at least give Engel a chance before firing him, and Davis was quoted as

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[1]Ibid., 34.

[2]Albuquerque Tribune, January 5, 1962.

[3]Albuquerque Tribune, January 25, 1962.

[4]Albuquerque Tribune, December 15, 1961.

saying Engel "isn't an issue."[1]

The Tribune, in a post-election summary by political editor A. C. DeCola, said: "The prospect of any top level changes at City Hall today appeared to have vanished as the City Commission slate backed by the Albuquerque Citizens' Committee swept to an easy victory in a crowded field. There were prospects, too, that City Commission operations might be a little smoother over the next term as the newly elected members have a holdover commissioner, W. W. Atkinson, who was elected 30 months ago with ACC support."[2]

Election results, insuring ACC of a majority for at least four more years, appear to have boosted Engel's security. Journal reporter Wieck commented as follows: "Engel's security is beginning to show itself in little ways. He shows more initiative in his direction of city government, a point particularly noticeable at city commission meetings where he now speaks out without prompting."[3]

The ACC has been able to have the candidates it supported win control of the City since it originally took over in 1954--undoubtedly a major explanation of Engel's tenure. The Florida study revealed that managers can usually expect to be ousted when there is a factional change on the city governing body.[4]

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[1]Albuquerque Journal, March 25, 1962.

[2]Albuquerque Tribune, April 4, 1962.

[3]Albuquerque Journal, May 13, 1962.

[4]See the paragraph from this study previously quoted

Staggered commission terms probably help to perpetuate the faction. So does the multi-candidate election which forces a spreading out of any opposition vote.

Engel revealed that his only other job "crisis" came in 1954 when city commissioner Clyde Tingley tried unsuccessfully to install a majority on the commission. Although Tingley appointed Engel, the city manager says disharmony soon resulted.

## Role of Charters

The charter provides the overall framework within which the manager and the council interact. Many city charters follow the general pattern of a simple statement to the effect that "the City Council shall appoint a City Manager who shall be the administrative head of the municipal government under the direction and supervision of the City Council, and who shall hold office at the pleasure of the City Council."[1] The Albuquerque Charter would seem to fall into this category. Manager provisions are not overly verbose and are quoted in full:

> Article V
>
> Sec. 1. There shall be employed by the Commission a chief administrative officer to be known as City Manager. He shall be employed for an indefinite term, and shall hold office until a vacancy is created by death, resignation or removal by the governing body of the city.
>
> Sec. 2. The Manager shall be chosen solely on the basis of administrative qualifications. The choice shall not be limited by reason of former residence.
>
> Sec. 3. The Manager shall receive an adequate salary, to be fixed by the Commission.
>
> Sec. 4. The Manager shall be responsible to the governing body of the City for the proper administration of all the affairs of the City; all persons engaged in the administrative

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[1]Perkins, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

service of the City shall be employed and discharged by him, and he shall be charged with the enforcement and carrying out of all the ordinances, rules and regulations passed and enacted by the governing body of the City.
Sec. 5. The Manager shall prepare and submit the annual budget. He shall make recommendations to the governing body on all matters concerning the welfare of the City, and in all cases, except when clearly unnecessary or undesirable, it shall be the duty of the governing body to request the opinion of the Manager on any proposed measure. The Manager shall have a seat, but no vote, at every meeting of the governing body.
Sec. 6. The administration of the affairs of the City shall be divided into as many departments as may be deemed desirable by the governing body, each under the charge of a director employed by the Manager.

No mention is made of the vote by which the commission can remove the manager. Most charters specify a majority vote, although some require a higher margin.[1] The Albuquerque manager, as is usual elsewhere, can be removed at any time. Most managers oppose having a definite term of office or a contract.[2] The Albuquerque Charter seems in no way different from many others. Some charters do have certain unusual provisions. In answer to a question as to whether any of the charter provisions had kept a manager on the job, or resulted in his resignation or removal, most managers give a flat "no" answer.[3] Engel believes the charter has in no way affected his tenure.

Jones compared Albuquerque's charter with the National Municipal League's Model City Charter.[4] Jones concluded that Engel has, in effect, virtually the same powers recommended in the Model City Charter, with a few minor exceptions. The most notable differences appeared to deal with dismissal of the manager.

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[1]Ibid., 43. [2]Ibid., 32. [3]Ibid., 22.

[4]Interview with Arthur Jones, Administrative Assistant to the Albuquerque City Manager, December 6, 1962.

Article II, Section 10 of the Model City Charter says:

> The council shall appoint the city manager for an indefinite term and may remove him by a majority vote of its members. At least thirty days before such removal shall become effective, the council shall by a majority vote of its members adopt a preliminary resolution stating the reasons for his removal. The manager may reply in writing and may request a public hearing, which shall be held not earlier than twenty days nor later than thirty days after the filing of such request. After such public hearing, if one be requested, and after full consideration, the council by majority vote of its members may adopt a final resolution of removal. By the preliminary resolution the council may suspend the manager from duty, but shall in any case cause to be paid him forthwith any unpaid balance of his salary and his salary for the next three calendar months following adoption of the preliminary resolution.[1]

Jones pointed out that the Albuquerque Charter contains no mention of prior notice, right of public hearing or additional salary. Cline concludes: "Albuquerque's is not a model charter, for it does not contain the many new provisions which could be included; yet it is broad enough to allow Albuquerque nearly all of the functions or powers usually accorded cities."[2]

## Functions of Personnel Management

The selection, hiring, promotion and disciplining of personnel, a fundamental element of management in any enterprise, is in too many urban governments artificially separated from and independent of the chief executive.[3] Approximately 70 percent of cities over 100,000 population have vested final decision on dismissal and disciplinary appeals in an independent appeals

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[1]National Municipal League, Model City Charter (New York: National Municipal League, 1941), p. 6.

[2]Cline, op. cit., p. 17.

[3]Municipal Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 64.

body.[1] Denying management authority over the personnel function constitutes a common problem for the local executive who has the responsibility to satisfy a demanding public. The creation of an independent Civil Service Commission does anything but help him in this matter.[2] Albuquerque's chief administrative officer is not limited in this respect. Albuquerque has a personnel board appointed by the commission, but its functions are advisory to the manager. All department heads are appointed by Engel, with, he says, virtually automatic commission approval. The Florida study found that in 40.8 percent of the cities, one or more of the department heads were not under the manager.[3] Engel said the commission assumes a "hands off" policy in regard to hiring and firing. Employees must get the city manager's approval before approaching individual commissioners to seek advice or give out information.[4] Westfall said the commissioners have no criticism of this order.

The Public Personnel Association reported that in most jurisdictions personnel directors held attitudes of distrust and trepidation toward their government's chief administrator.[5] Apparently this is not the situation in Albuquerque with Engel describing his relations with past personnel directors and the present one as "excellent."

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[1] Ibid., 65.

[2] Ibid., 69.

[3] DeGrove and Kammerer, op. cit., p. 18.

[4] City of Albuquerque, City Policies: A Compilation, 3a.

[5] Municipal Manpower Commission, op. cit., p. 68.

## Other Factors

Several other factors must be considered in trying to determine whether the Albuquerque atmosphere is favorable or unfavorable to the employment of city managers.

The power of the press should not be underestimated. Engel described his press relations as "reasonably good," but he felt the press could be more constructive in some cases. Prior to the last election, a perusal of newspaper clippings uncovered some uncomplimentary stories, but criticisms in the two dailies seem to have died down since that time.

Engel does believe that meager financial resources have restricted his opportunity, but he believes that this dilemma applies everywhere.

Engel said he is concerned with public apathy about City business on some things such as the budget. He pointed out that budget hearings are practically unattended. "There certainly isn't apathy on many issues, however," he said. Engel feels that his staff is generally of adequate size. Asked if he has enough time for family life, he indicated that his family "grumbles," but that he thinks this is a price paid by all city managers. Engel, as revealed earlier, spends less time at his desk than most managers in cities of comparable size.

City managers as a whole have a surprisingly limited concern with problems of security, state laws or the city charter as it affects the council-manager plan, or the caliber of their associates. They also have a relatively low concern with the location of the city (perhaps this tends to negate Albuquerque's climate

advantage). This factor may point up the truly professional approach managers now have to their positions.[1]

## Professional Aspects

City management is not a profession in the sense that medicine, law and engineering are professions. To become a city manager a man is not required to complete a standardized training, and he does not gain admission through examination (or the awarding of a diploma or certificate) into a closed professional order whose members have exclusive legal right to practice in a special field.[2]

Stone writes that judgment can be made in a vague way whether a particular city manager can be classed as a professional manager. For this purpose four criteria may be applied; namely, (1) training for the profession, (2) evidence of a career intent, (3) ICMA membership, (4) a constant striving for self-improvement as evidenced by attendance at conferences and schools for city managers.[3]

Engel received a B. S. degree from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1931. He took post-graduate work in public administration at the University of California and participated in city planning studies at the University of Southern California and the University of California at Los Angeles. He worked at city

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[1]International City Managers' Association, Trends in Salaries of City Managers (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1957), p. 4.

[2]Stone, Stone and Price, op. cit., p. 67.

[3]Edwin O. Stene, "Experience and Training of City Managers in Kansas," Your Government, XVII, No. 7 (March 15, 1962), p. 3.

planning for Long Beach and Los Angeles from 1946 to 1950. Only about half the Florida managers who responded to a questionnaire had received at least an undergraduate college degree.[1]

Engel said that he would like to remain in the city manager profession, and he is an ICMA member. Stene estimated that of 32 managers in Kansas, about half looked upon city management as a probable life career.[2]

Concerning attendance at conferences and schools, Engel has gone to several, but not all, ICMA conferences. He always attends New Mexico Municipal League and New Mexico City Managers' Association meetings. He has not attended any schools because there have not been any in the area to attend, with one exception. He participated in a two-day Short Course for City Managers sponsored by the New Mexico Municipal League held at the University of New Mexico last spring.

By Stene's criteria, the City can be said to have a professional manager.

## Conclusions

This study has uncovered no major undesirable factors in the work environment of the city manager in Albuquerque as opposed to conditions in other communities. If managers rate highly the opportunity to meet a challenge, then Albuquerque with its rapid growth does provide such a challenge. Engel appears to recognize this. He already has what may be considered

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[1]DeGrove and Kammerer, op. cit., p. 5.

[2]Edwin O. Stene, "Experience and Training of City Managers in Kansas," Your Government, XVII, No. 7 (March 15, 1962), p. 4.

long tenure in a hazardous occupation and says he wants to stay as long as the welcome mat remains out. Managers, however, as the section on tenure revealed, are enamored with the idea of movement from city to city. Shorter manager tenure in other cities, therefore, does not indicate that these cities possess more unfavorable employment conditions than Albuquerque. Long tenure can cause problems, but Engel believes he has controlled his involvement in local affairs.

Undoubtedly the City has improved the desirability of its manager post. Albuquerque in 1952 promoted Engel, totally inexperienced as a manager, to the top administrative job from his position as planning director.

Engel's salary has since risen from $8,000 to $19,000 to bring it more in line with figures elsewhere. His fringe benefits are about on a par with other comparable cities. Perhaps most important, Engel has been able to work in an atmosphere of relative political stability as a result of continued ACC victories. His relations with the commission, a vital factor for a manager, are described as "excellent." Commissioners believe that he is "doing a good job." Only in 1962 was Engel an election issue, but that crisis withered before election day. The possible duration of this stable environment, however, cannot be determined. It is also impossible to determine the extent of future commission-manager cordiality, but doubts can be expressed that managers in other places have present conditions more favorable in this respect.

Engel has made changes to fit the desires of changing

commissions. Some managers lack this flexibility which is required if the individual is to enjoy subsequent long tenure. Engel seems to be quite aware of the managers' Code of Ethics and recent commissions have indicated an awareness of commission-manager boundary lines. Engel has powers similar to those recommended in the Model City Charter. He is not limited, as are many managers, in his control over the personnel function. The commission, he says, assumes a "hands off" attitude in hiring and firing.

The inference should not be made that improvements are impossible, but judging from an account of Albuquerque manager history, Engel is blessed with more favorable working conditions than any past incumbent of the City's highest administrative post.

# CHAPTER III

## COMPARATIVE PROFILE OF ALBUQUERQUE EXECUTIVES: CALIBER AND ATTITUDES

### Introduction

Two primary purposes are served in this chapter. First, an attempt is made to see how the characteristics of Albuquerque APT personnel compare with those of municipal executives nationwide in order to determine what clues this provides to the existence of conducive or non-conducive factors to the recruitment and retention of public professional personnel in Albuquerque. The second purpose is to see what such factors are, according to conditions referred to by Albuquerque questionnaire respondents. A questionnaire was sent to each of the 73 employees classified as Group I (administrative, professional or technical) at the time of the survey (March, 1963).

MMC in 1961 conducted an extensive questionnaire study of the backgrounds, experience, training and job attitudes of over 1700 municipal executives across the country. MMC hoped to find the answers to such questions as: Where do municipal executives come from? How are they educated and trained for their positions? What are the career routes leading to the position of municipal executive? For what reasons did these executives enter municipal service, and what do they believe they got out of it? The

results of MMC's questionnaire are included in Appendix I (pp. 127-166) of its official report: Governmental Manpower for Tomorrow's Cities.[1]

MMC's questionnaire provided extensive data on the backgrounds of municipal executives. For municipal personnel officers charged with the responsibility of hiring, often the only advance criteria for deciding on a job applicant's competency for a particular position is his background, with special regard to previous education and experience. It may be indicative of a preponderance of "conducive" hiring factors if a city can attract a large proportion of well-educated and highly-trained professional personnel.

For this reason, it seemed valuable to analyze the quality of Albuquerque's Group I personnel by delving into their backgrounds and comparing them with the findings of MMC's national survey. Facts and figures on Albuquerque executives' backgrounds would offer little insight by themselves. However, if Albuquerque's executives proved to have past experiences indicative of probable greater work competency than the former experiences of personnel hired elsewhere, perhaps a valid conclusion could be drawn that Albuquerque, comparatively speaking, has more desirable reasons for a person's accepting employment.

Once on the job, the previous job-seeker may find that he did not get much of a bargain. Perhaps he finds that office work conditions are poor or that he cannot get along with

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[1]Quotations in this chapter are from Appendix I, pp. 127-166.

co-workers. Many things could happen which might motivate the professional to move on. MMC inquired about the job attitudes of municipal executives. The maintenance of satisfactory job attitudes is important to cutting down turnover. If the job attitudes of Albuquerque employees could be found to differ greatly from those attitudes held by workers elsewhere, could it not be said that it probably reflects dissimilarities in conducive or non-conducive factors to retaining a job?

As nearly as possible, the Albuquerque questionnaire was patterned after the one devised by MMC for comparative purposes. Minor variations were made in some of the questions, and a few questions were added that MMC did not ask. Variations will be pointed out in the text. Completed questionnaires were received from 55 persons, a return of 75 percent. MMC received 1,725 of 3,000 questionnaires, or 58 percent.[1]

## Education

MMC's report emphasizes that "as the levels of technical and professional skills increase, higher education becomes increasingly both the medium through which men receive training and the gateway through which they must pass to achieve high occupational status. In Table 15, levels of educational achievement for municipal executives (nationwide and Albuquerque)

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[1]Helping to push the percentage return of the Albuquerque questionnaire above that of MMC's questionnaire was the fact of cooperation from City officials. The city manager approved of the study and urged employees to fill out the questionnaire, which his office helped distribute. Employees were also assured that their identity would be kept confidential.

are compared. Albuquerque executives have almost the identical amounts of education as municipal executives throughout the country. MMC found that 25 percent of the executives in its national survey had graduate degrees. Twelve Albuquerque executives, or 22 percent, reported a graduate degree. Five department heads, or 46 percent of the 11 who responded to the questionnaire, revealed they had a graduate degree. MMC stated that the educational levels of municipal executives are almost identical to those of business leaders. Albuquerque appears to be attracting municipal personnel of educational qualifications equal to personnel of private industry and other local governments.

TABLE 15.--Amounts of education for nationwide and Albuquerque municipal executives.

| | National Survey | Albuquerque | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | All | | Dept. Heads | |
| High School or Less | 21% | 12 | 22% | 3 | 27% |
| Some College | 20 | 10 | 18 | 0 | 0 |
| College Graduate | 59 | 33 | 60 | 8 | 73 |

MMC divided cities into two categories, i.e., those over 250,000 and those under 250,000 population. Albuquerque would fall into the latter category and would appear to rate favorably with respect to educational levels, but the category would include many cities of considerably smaller size since Albuquerque has over 200,000 population. MMC indicates that 65 percent of the executives from cities of over 250,000 population reported they were college graduates, compared to 49 percent in the cities of

less than 250,000. Thirty percent of all executives in the larger cities hold graduate degrees, but only 18 percent of executives in the smaller cities.

Examining the educational fields of specialization for municipal executives, MMC concludes that "municipal executives are selected for their present executive positions on the basis of narrow technical proficiency rather than on the basis of formal training in administration or in the social science fields such as political science, economics, or sociology. This is true at both the graduate and undergraduate levels." A glance at

TABLE 16.--College degrees: fields of specialization for nation-wide and Albuquerque executives.[a]

| | National | | Albuquerque | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Undergrad. | Grad. | Undergrad. | | Grad. | |
| Physical Sciences-Engineering | 46% | 23% | 16 | 50% | 5 | 50% |
| Professional | 11 | 45 | 6 | 19 | 4 | 40 |
| Environmental | 26 | 10 | 8 | 25 | 0 | 0 |
| Administration | 13 | 20 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 10 |
| Other | 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |

[a]The fields are defined as:
Physical Sciences-Engineering: engineering, physical sciences, mathematics, planning, architecture, medicine
Professional: accounting, library science, physical education, recreation, education, journalism, law
Environmental: economics, political science, government, sociology history, philosophy, psychology, English, languages
Administration: public administration, business administration

Table 16 indicates that this is true of Albuquerque. At the four-year level, 69 percent of Albuquerque's executives received training either in the technical or in the professional fields,

but only 25 percent received degrees in more general fields such as the humanities and the social sciences. Concentration in the technical fields is even more extreme at the graduate level. Of the 10 executives reporting a graduate degree, five were in "physical sciences-engineering," four in "professional," and none in "environmental." This is an even greater concentration in the first two categories than is found in the national statistics. Table 17 gives the major fields for department heads.

TABLE 17.--College degree fields for municipal department heads.

| | National | | Albuquerque | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Undergrad. | Grad. | Undergrad. | Grad. |
| Physical Sciences-Engineering | 45% | 24% | 1 | 1 |
| Professional | 9 | 49 | 1 | 2 |
| Environmental | 27 | 9 | 4 | 0 |
| Administration | 14 | 15 | 0 | 1 |
| Other | 5 | 3 | 1 | 0 |

## Social Origin

NMC asked, "What are the proportions of municipal executives recruited from the different social classes?" It regarded occupation as the best indicator of social class, and the occupations of the fathers of municipal and business executives are tabulated. In order to determine whether a professional position with the Albuquerque government might represent a rise in social standing for the individual, a similar question pertaining to fathers' occupations was asked in the Albuquerque questionnaire. The

necessary comparisons can be drawn from Table 18, but because of the large percentage (28) of Albuquerque respondents who placed their fathers' occupations in the "other" category, comparisons with the national percentages may be misleading. Forty-four percent of the national municipal executives reported their

TABLE 18.--Fathers' occupations for business leaders and municipal executives nationwide and Albuquerque.

| | Nat. Municipal Executives | Business Leaders[a] | Abq. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Clerk | 6% | 2% | 4% |
| Salesman | 7 | 6 | 6 |
| Farmer | 11 | 9 | 17 |
| Laborer | 30 | 15 | 6 |
| Professional | 13 | 14 | 22 |
| Government or Business Executive or Business Owner | 31 | 52 | 19 |
| Unknown | 2 | 2 | .. |
| Other | .. | .. | 28 |

[a]Warner and Abegglen, Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), p. 38.

fathers were in professional, executive and business owner categories compared with 41 percent for Albuquerque. MMC states that "given the proportions of the national population at the time when these men's fathers were occupationally engaged, sons of men from the higher occupational levels are over-represented among municipal leaders." Nevertheless, it is evident that for many municipal executives in Albuquerque and elsewhere, their position represents a rise in status over that held by their fathers if assumption is made that clerks, salesmen, farmers, and laborers rank below professionals on a status scale.

## Career Patterns

What types of career patterns have Albuquerque professionals had? Do they differ from patterns throughout the nation? MMC divided career spans into four major periods:

> (1) the period after completing formal education but before entering a local government, (2) the period between entering a local government and entering the particular government in which a man is now employed, (3) the period between entering his present government and achieving his present position, and (4) the period between the executive's assuming his present position and the executive's present age.

The average Albuquerque City executive who responded to the questionnaire[1] completed his formal education at age 24 compared to the national average of age 21 for municipal executives in larger cities and age 20 for those in smaller cities. The average present age of the City's Group I personnel is 44. Nationally the present age averages 51 in larger cities and 48 in smaller cities.

Table 19 compares the average number of years spent in each of the above four career spans for both national and Albuquerque municipal executives.

TABLE 19.--Average time spent in four major career periods for nationwide and Albuquerque executives.

| Period | National | Albuquerque |
|---|---|---|
| (1) | 9 | 8 |
| (2) | 3 | 1 |
| (3) | 9 | 6 |
| (4) | 7 | 5 |

[1]All conclusions drawn in this chapter about Group I employees are based on information provided by the questionnaire respondents.

The average Albuquerque executive waited eight years after leaving school to enter local government employment. One year later he joined the Albuquerque local government and reached his present position in six years. He has been in his current job for five years. The amount of time he has spent in each of the four spans is proportionately about equal to the national average. The Albuquerque executive experienced more rapid upward mobility after joining the City, having attained to his present executive position in three fewer years than it took executives elsewhere.

Table 20 gives a more complete breakdown of the ages of Albuquerque's executives as they moved through their careers.

TABLE 20.--Ages of Albuquerque executives in various phases of careers.

| | Teens | 20's | 30's | 40's | 50's | 60's | Ave. | Youngest | Oldest |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age completing formal education[a] | 12 | 32 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 15(2) | 40 |
| Age entering local govt. | 2 | 25 | 16 | 8 | 2 | 0 | 32 | 18 | 58 |
| Age entering Abq. local govt. | 2 | 22 | 17 | 11 | 2 | 0 | 33 | 18 | 58 |
| Age of attaining to present pos. | 0 | 7 | 24 | 15 | 7 | 1 | 39 | 23 | 60 |
| Present age | 0 | 3 | 21 | 16 | 9 | 5 | 44 | 25 | 69 |

[a]One person indicated that he has not yet completed his formal education.

MAC found that more than one-third of all municipal executives are within a decade of retirement age and that six

percent have reached or passed retirement age. While Albuquerque has two executives 65 years of age or older (4 percent), only an additional 17 percent are within a decade of retirement.

Albuquerque has attracted a much larger proportion of young professionals than have other cities. MMC revealed that only 19 percent of the municipal executives in its study sample were under 40 years of age. Forty-four percent of the Albuquerque respondents indicated that they are under 40 years.

MMC found that half the municipal executives in the national sample began their careers in private business, and that only 25 percent started in local government. Table 21 compares the career starts of Albuquerque executives with those nationwide.

TABLE 21.--Municipal executives nationwide and Albuquerque: Types of employment in which they began their careers.

| | National | Albuquerque | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Private Business | 51% | 23 | 42% |
| Local Government | 25 | 9 | 16 |
| Federal Government | 7 | 6 | 11 |
| State Government | 6 | 5 | 9 |
| Profession | 5 | 7 | 13 |
| Other | 6 | 5 | 9 |

In percentage terms, fewer Albuquerque executives were initially employed by private business and local government than is typical nationally, but more chose the federal government, a state government or a profession in which to begin their careers.

MMC surveyed the periods of entry into local government for municipal executives, dividing the periods by decades, and

concluded that "notable is the fact that today's municipal executives moved in at a fairly constant rate during the four decades." This is not true for executives entering into the Albuquerque local government, as Table 22 indicates.

TABLE 22.--Period during which present nationwide municipal executives first entered local government or present Albuquerque executives first entered Albuquerque local government.

| National (Entered Local Govt.) | | Albuquerque (Entered Abq. Govt.) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1930 or before | 22% | 1930 or before | 2 | 4% |
| 1931-40 | 25 | 1930-39 | 7 | 13 |
| 1941-50 | 24 | 1940-49 | 6 | 11 |
| 1951-61 | 29 | 1950-59 | 22 | 41 |
| | | 1960-63 | 17 | 32 |

Just in the short 1960-63 interval, the City has added 32 percent of its Group I work force. Another 41 percent entered in the decade of the 1950's. This is reflective of a growing city and a growing governmental operation rather than a sudden improvement in the work environment. More APT employees have entered in the past three years than in all the years prior to 1950 combined. Other local governments recruited almost half their executives prior to 1940 when, according to MMC, the competition of private business for able people was not as great.

"The average executive," MMC reports, "did not enter local government until nine years after completing formal schooling. Once entering, however, there was a pronounced tendency to stay in the same government." MMC found that over three-fourths of all executives have worked for only one city, and that less than

10 percent have changed local governmental units more than twice. Albuquerque executives proved not too dissimilar.

Table 23 shows that nearly three-fourths of the Albuquerque executives have worked for no other local government. Twenty-seven percent have gained experience with other local governments, but only nine percent have worked for three or more municipal governments.

TABLE 23.--Mobility of nationwide and Albuquerque executives: Number of local governments worked for.

| | Number of Local Governments Worked For | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | 4 or more | |
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| Nationwide | | 81 | | 13 | | 4 | | 2 |
| Albuquerque | 40 | 73 | 10 | 18 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 7 |

One of the dilemmas of a personnel office is whether to fill a top job vacancy by appointment from within the organization, or whether to hire from outside. Many personnel offices, including Albuquerque's, resolve the dilemma by giving in-service personnel the first chance to apply for upper-echelon job openings if they are deemed qualified.

NMC's study indicated that 65 percent of the top executive posts are filled from within. Nevertheless, to quote from its report: "About one half of the managers, chief assistants, and directors of personnel, planning, parks-recreation and health were directly appointed into their present positions. These

are the professions which increasingly require specialized academic training. For these functional fields, professional men tend to be sought, and in these fields there is more frequent lateral entry."

Sixty-three percent of the executives in Albuquerque were appointed from within. This percentage was derived from the number of respondents who reported they were not the same age when they first entered the Albuquerque local government and when they attained to their present position. While there is a chance that a person could have been promoted to his present executive job in less than a year, it is doubtful that the total number of these appointments would be large enough to alter significantly the 63 percent figure obtained for "promotions from within."

As far as the particular fields for which NMC believes there is more frequent lateral entry, this has been the case for Albuquerque's personnel and parks-recreation directors, but the manager, his administrative assistant, and the health director were appointed from within.

## Motivations and Attitudes

The motivations and attitudes of employees are examined in this section in the hope that these motivations and attitudes will reveal conducive and non-conducive employment factors. The first two subsections on reasons given for entering local government and reasons given for accepting present positions are pertinent to the City's ability to recruit top professionals. The third subsection on evaluations of the prestige of local

government are of special importance both to the City's capability of recruiting and retaining personnel. The subsection on sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction for present job holders as revealed by questionnaire respondents is an indicator of factors that might tend to retain or repel a professional from continued City employment.

Beginning its section on motivations and attitudes, MMC points out that "motivation and satisfaction are subtle and complex factors. A national survey based on the answers to mailed questionnaires can yield only crude measures of such factors."

Why they enter local government.--MMC concluded from its findings, as presented in Table 24, that "general career

TABLE 24.--Reasons why nationwide executives entered local government.

| Factor | Given as Primary Reason | Mentioned Most Frequently (Rank) |
|---|---|---|
| General nature of the work | 40% | 1 |
| Opportunity to help solve public problems | 13 | 3 |
| Only position available in your line of work | 11 | 8 |
| Opportunity for advancement | 10 | 2 |
| Job security | 8 | 6 |
| Salary | 7 | 4 |
| Important responsibility | 4 | 5 |
| Good experience for entering private business | 3 | 10 |
| Prestige | 1 | 7 |
| Political opportunities | 1 | 13 |
| Retirement benefits | 1 | 9 |
| Low pressure | * | 14 |
| Other fringe benefits (not retirement) | * | 12 |
| Co-workers | * | 11 |

*Less than one percent.

perspectives--as opposed to specific considerations such as salary and retirement benefits--were most important to initial entry.

The Albuquerque questionnaire contained the question: "Why did you enter the Albuquerque local government?" The respondents were asked to rank the five main reasons in the order of their

TABLE 25.--Reasons why executives entered Albuquerque local government.[a]

| Factor | Mentioned as 1 of 5 main reasons | | Mentioned as Primary Reason[b] | | Rank Mentioned Most Frequently |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| General nature of the work | 46 | 84% | 19 | 35% | 1 |
| Opportunity to help solve public problems | 30 | 55 | 4 | 7 | 2 |
| Only position available in my line of work | 12 | 22 | 7 | 13 | 1 |
| Opportunity for advancement | 28 | 51 | 2 | 4 | 2,4 |
| Job security | 19 | 35 | 3 | 6 | 3 |
| Salary | 22 | 40 | 1 | 2 | 4,5 |
| Important responsibility | 17 | 31 | 3 | 6 | 5 |
| Good experience for entering private business | 8 | 15 | 3 | 6 | 1 |
| Prestige | 6 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 4,5 |
| Political opportunities | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Retirement benefits | 9 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Other fringe benefits (not retirement) | 8 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 3,5 |
| Low pressure | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 4,5 |
| Congenial co-workers | 6 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 4,5 |
| Other (specify)[c] | 18 | 33 | 5 | 9 | 1 |

[a]Based on 55 respondents.

[b]Some respondents only checked (x) the alternatives without numbering them. This tends to reduce the figures in this column in some instances as one of the checked alternatives must be assumed to have been a primary reason.

[c]Seven of the 18 specified a preference for the city itself, primarily the climate or geographical location. See the appendix for a complete listing.

importance. The alternatives were identical to those provided by MMC except that an "other (specify)" alternative was added. Table 25 lists the results of the Albuquerque poll.

In proportions similar to the MMC respondents, Albuquerque executives seemed to stress the intangible benefits over the tangible as the foremost reasons for entering the City government. Over 50 percent mentioned "general nature of the work," "opportunity to help solve public problems," or "opportunity for advancement," whereas only 40 percent chose "salary," 16 percent "retirement benefits," and 15 percent "other fringe benefits (not retirement)." Only one Albuquerque official listed salary as the primary reason for entering the City government; most of those who rated salary at all ranked it fourth or fifth.

Why they accepted present positions.--MMC found, however, that "municipal executives accepted their present position for more definite and positive reasons than those given for first entering local government." MMC's findings are presented in Table 26. MMC points out that "salary and opportunities for advancement were also a relatively significant primary factor in attracting these executives to their present positions."

Table 27 presents the Albuquerque results to the question: "Why did you accept your present position?" Again, respondents were asked to number the five main reasons in the order of their importance, and an "other (specify)" alternative was added.

Again, Albuquerque executives rated the intangible over

TABLE 26.--Reasons why nationwide executives accepted present positions.

| Factor | Given as Primary Reason | Mentioned Most Frequently (Rank) |
|---|---|---|
| General nature of the work | 31% | 1 |
| Opportunity to help solve public problems | 21 | 3 |
| Important responsibilities | 10 | 2 |
| Salary | 11 | 4 |
| Opportunity for advancement | 10 | 6 |
| Prestige | 3 | 5 |
| Only position available in your line of work | 2 | 13 |
| Job security | 2 | 7 |
| Good experience for entrance into private business | 1 | 9 |
| Political opportunity | 1 | 12 |
| Retirement benefits | * | 8 |
| Other fringe benefits | * | 1 |
| Congenial co-workers | * | 10 |
| Low degree of pressure | * | 14 |

*Less than one percent.

the tangible factors for accepting their present position. However, as in MMC's study, salary was found a much more conducive factor for taking the present job with 56 percent naming it in the top five reasons. Comparing primary reasons, Albuquerque executives appear to have taken their present position for about the same reasons as executives nationally.

However, as stated earlier, an individual's job attitudes can change over a period of time since a contented worker can become a discontented one, and a discontented person can become happy. Job conditions and the resultant attitudes of employees are not static. Reasons for a person's taking a job may subsequently prove to be sources of discontent.

TABLE 27.--Reasons why executives accepted present positions in the Albuquerque local government.[a]

| Factor | Mentioned as 1 of 5 main reasons | | Mentioned as Primary Reason[b] | | Rank Mentioned Most Frequently |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| General nature of the work | 49 | 91% | 19 | 35% | 1 |
| Opportunity to help solve public problems | 32 | 59 | 5 | 9 | 2 |
| Only position available in my line of work | 8 | 15 | 5 | 9 | 1 |
| Opportunity for advancement | 30 | 56 | 4 | 7 | 4 |
| Job security | 11 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Salary | 30 | 56 | 5 | 9 | 3 |
| Important responsibility | 31 | 57 | 3 | 6 | 3 |
| Good experience for entering private business | 9 | 17 | 2 | 4 | 1,2,3,5 |
| Prestige | 7 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Political opportunities | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Retirement benefits | 11 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Other fringe benefits (not retirement) | 5 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Low pressure | 2 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4,5 |
| Congenial co-workers | 4 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Other (specify)[c] | 11 | 20 | 2 | 4 | 2,3 |

[a]Based on 54 responses.

[b]Some respondents only checked (x) the alternatives without numbering them. This tends to reduce the figures in this column in some instances as one of the checked alternatives must be assumed to have been a primary reason.

[c]Five of the 11 expressed a preference for the city itself.

Evaluations of Prestige.--MMC believes that "what seems to frustrate municipal executives is an 'image' that surrounds the employee of city government." In order to explore this non-conducive factor, MMC asked executives if they thought their prestige would be higher, the same, or lower in differing kinds of employment. A similar question was prepared in the

Albuquerque questionnaire. Table 28 represents responses of national executives, with those of Albuquerque listed in Table 29.

TABLE 28.--Prestige in other employment: Responses of nationwide executives.

| Employer | Prestige Would Be: | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Higher | Same | Lower |
| Federal Government | 32% | 47% | 21% |
| State Government | 29 | 55 | 16 |
| Private Business (National) | 33 | 40 | 27 |
| Private Business (Local) | 26 | 43 | 31 |

TABLE 29.--Prestige in other employment: Responses of Albuquerque executives.

| Employer | Prestige Would Be: | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Higher | Same | Lower |
| Federal Government | 29% | 51% | 20% |
| State Government | 18 | 39 | 43 |
| Private Business (National) | 51 | 31 | 18 |
| Private Business (Local) | 34 | 38 | 28 |

The Albuquerque government seems to hold its own and compare favorably with the national results in all instances except when compared to the national private business category. Over half (51 percent) of the Albuquerque executives believe their prestige would be higher in a national private business concern. Only one-third of the executives nationwide thought so. However, a sizable minority of municipal executives, both

nationally and in Albuquerque believe their prestige would be higher in the other forms of employment.

Sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction.--ICMC inquired about sources of dissatisfaction on the part of municipal executives about their jobs. It found, in order, that salary, advancement opportunities, fringe benefits (not retirement), job security, and retirement benefits were the main non-conducive factors.

In the questionnaire submitted to Albuquerque municipal employees, an attempt was made to try to determine if Albuquerque

TABLE 30.--Degree of satisfaction with conditions of work, Albuquerque executives.

| Factor | Satisfied | Neutral | Dissatisfied | No. in Sample |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| General nature of the work | 94% | 4% | 2% | 54 |
| Opportunity to help solve public problems | 77 | 19 | 4 | 53 |
| Opportunity for advancement | 48 | 35 | 17 | 54 |
| Job security | 70 | 23 | 8 | 53 |
| Opportunity for training programs | 37 | 33 | 30 | 54 |
| Relations with co-workers | 87 | 9 | 4 | 53 |
| Status and recognition | 70 | 17 | 13 | 53 |
| Salary | 25 | 33 | 42 | 52 |
| Responsibility | 83 | 9 | 8 | 53 |
| Retirement benefits | 70 | 17 | 13 | 54 |
| Other fringe benefits (not retirement) | 69 | 19 | 12 | 52 |
| Office work conditions | 55 | 15 | 30 | 53 |
| Amount of pressure | 70 | 17 | 13 | 53 |

executives were principally satisfied, dissatisfied, or neutral in their feelings toward various aspects of their work.

Albuquerque executives, as Table 30 shows, rank salary,

opportunity for training programs, office work conditions, and opportunity for advancement as the primary sources of dissatisfaction, in that order. In view of the fact that there are no training programs for Group I personnel in Albuquerque, it is not surprising to find that 30 percent of the executives are dissatisfied with the "opportunity" for training programs. Some of the executives indicating dissatisfaction with office work conditions said that they believed this would be remedied when a new city hall is built.

The major non-conducive factors of retirement benefits, fringe benefits (not retirement), and job security found in the national survey were not borne out here. Only 13 percent revealed dissatisfaction with retirement benefits, 12 percent with fringe benefits (not retirement) and eight percent with job security.

The Albuquerque executives were requested to list in the order of importance the three main sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with their present jobs.

Several other sources of discontent were revealed in the open-end question in addition to the dissatisfactions mentioned in Table 30. Many executives expressed displeasure at pressure exerted by the public and a lack of public understanding of problems. Other frequent responses centered around political pressure, red tape, poor relations with higher-level personnel, shortages of finances and facilities, and an unfair press. No one particular source of dissatisfaction was found to predominate in any single City department, except that there was general

complaint about long hours from members of the Fire Department.

While some employees complained of political pressure, others said a lack of this type of interference was a major source of satisfaction. Frequently what were important sources of satisfaction for some persons cropped up as main sources of dissatisfaction for others. Respondents, in general, were most satisfied with aspects of their actual work duties and responsibilities. Many listed certain accomplishments as providing the utmost satisfactions.

How serious a dissatisfaction is salary? About nine out of ten executives, both Albuquerque and nationwide, as Table 31 shows, believe that their salaries would be higher if they were working in similar positions in a national private business firm.

TABLE 31.--Proportion of national and Albuquerque municipal executives who indicate their salary would be higher, the same, or lower in other employment.

| If In-- | My Salary Would Be-- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Higher | | Same | | Lower | | No. Abq. Respondents |
| | Nat. | Abq. | Nat. | Abq. | Nat. | Abq. | |
| Private business-national | 88% | 92% | 10% | 4% | 2% | 4% | 49 |
| Private business-local | 78 | 61 | 19 | 29 | 3 | 10 | 49 |
| Federal Govt. | 60 | 75 | 30 | 21 | 10 | 4 | 48 |
| State Govt. | 48 | 41 | 37 | 39 | 15 | 20 | 46 |
| Trade or Non-Profit Association | 43 | 48 | 39 | 31 | 18 | 21 | 42 |

Proportionately fewer Albuquerque municipal executives believe that their salary would be higher in local private business than do executives across the country, but 61 percent of them still believe their salary would be higher in an Albuquerque private establishment. Seventy-five percent think they would make more money in the federal government, and nearly half of them rate state government and trade or non-profit associations as probably being more productive to them financially. However, the results outlined in Table 31 indicate a reasonable similarity between the views of Albuquerque and nationwide executives.

As Table 32 indicates, only 14 percent of the Albuquerque executives and 17 percent of nationwide executives would recommend local government employment to their own sons or daughters.

TABLE 32.--Executives' employer preference for their children.

| Employer | National | Albuquerque[a] |
|---|---|---|
| Private Business | 72% | 79% |
| Local Government | 17 | 14 |
| Federal Government | 8 | 2 |
| State Government | 2 | 2 |
| Trade or Non-Profit Association | 1 | 2 |

[a]Based on 42 responses.

Private business is the choice for 79 percent of the Albuquerque executives and 72 percent of those nationally. Albuquerque and national sample percentages correlate closely.

MMC concluded that "the reasons for this overwhelming preference toward private business are not perfectly clear. It

appears that low prestige of public employment--interpreted narrowly--does not rank as one of the most significant reasons. The reasons most frequently mentioned in comments attached to questionnaires involve (1) salary and (2) lack of recognition for a job well done--or the opportunity to move up on the basis of merit.

The Albuquerque questionnaire asked executives why they made the choices they did in Table 32. The same reasons for not choosing local government were dominant, with public and political pressure also named frequently. Of the six Albuquerque employees who would prefer to see their children enter local government, four of them gave details. One person said that "good work can be recognized and lead to successful career without disruption of changing resident locations." Another claimed that "this city is entering into a period of good opportunities for young people." A third replied: "Basic area needing improvement and permits a certain amount of satisfaction for accomplishments." The fourth responded: "Greater usefulness." All the responses to this question are recorded in the Appendix.

Some specific questions were raised in the Albuquerque questionnaire pertaining to possible subtle sources of dissatisfaction--factors that might not come out in other parts of the questionnaire.

When asked if they thought their present position enabled them to utilize their abilities to their fullest, 23 executives (42 percent) replied yes while 32 (58 percent) said no. MMC claims that "without the chance to exercise their fullest

abilities, APT people will continue to regard local government as too sterile an environment in which to work."

Most of the Albuquerque executives with college degrees (70 percent) do not believe their talents are being fully utilized, but most of the executives without college degrees (59 percent) think that their talents are being fully utilized. According to the information in Table 33, college-degree professionals

TABLE 33.--The numbers of Albuquerque municipal executives, by date of entry and amount of education, replying yes and no to question as to whether talents are being fully utilized.

N=54

| | Before 1958 | | 1958 & After | | Totals |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Yes | No | Yes | No | |
| College Degree | 5 | 5 | 5 | 17 | 32 |
| No College Degree | 10 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 22 |
| Totals | 15 | 12 | 8 | 19 | 54 |

entering the Albuquerque government before 1958 are equally divided as to whether or not their talents are being fully utilized. For those with college degrees entering in 1958 or later, however, the overwhelming majority do not believe their talents are being fully utilized. Most executives without college degrees, whether or not they entered before or after 1958, think their

talents are being fully utilized. The evidence indicates that the City is least able to please the recently-hired professionals who are college-educated. The evidence suggests that unless conditions are improved, the City faces the prospect of possibly losing some of the more-educated executives.

Twenty-two executives (42 percent) believe that the public is indifferent to their efforts, but 31 (59 percent) believe the public is not indifferent.

Of 52 persons responding, 30 (58 percent) think they are being paid fairly in relation to other City employees, 21 (40 percent) do not think so, and one (two percent) answered this question "yes and no." Fay emphasizes that "it is easy to trip into the pitfall of generosity toward salary rates for familiar or glamorous classes, or incumbents who are rendering the high level of service expected of all city employees. But many city jobs have equal responsibility and demand equal skills but are performed out of the public eye. Favoritism shown to an individual or a group becomes, under the conditions of public administration, immediately public knowledge and can cause serious grievances, loss of morale, and loss of faith in municipal government."[1]

The executives were asked: "If you are a director, do you believe that you have enough employees?" Only nine (27 percent) gave an affirmative reply with 25 (74 percent) responding no.

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[1]Lew Fay, "Policies and Methods for Salary Setting," Public Management XLIII, No. 12 (December, 1961), pp. 274-275.

## Conclusions

This chapter has presented a profile of the Albuquerque municipal executives. Striking similarities have been noted between the results of the MMC and Albuquerque questionnaires. Percentage variations, in many cases, are negligible when it is considered that a few Albuquerque respondents could alter the Albuquerque questionnaire percentages considerably.

The chapter has revealed that Albuquerque executives possess similar amounts of formal education in similar fields of specialization as executives nationwide. Albuquerque executives entered local government and accepted their present positions for reasons not dissimilar from those given by MMC respondents.

Sizable minorities of nationwide and Albuquerque respondents believe their prestige would be higher in other forms of employment, and about the same proportions in both groups believe their salaries would be higher. Proportionately many more Albuquerque executives believe their prestige would be higher in a national private business concern and lower in state government than do nationwide executives. Fewer nationwide executives believe their prestige would be lower in state government than in other forms of employment, but more Albuquerque executives believe their prestige would be lower in state government than in other forms of employment. Albuquerque and nationwide executives seem to perceive of their jobs in different ways with respect to comparative prestige of other forms of employment. Few executives local or nationwide would recommend local government employment to their children.

There are some other salient differences that have been indicated in this chapter. Albuquerque executives are younger and have had less experience in local government and in their present positions than executives elsewhere. Unlike other communities, most Albuquerque executives have been added to the payroll in recent years.

While salary is a major source of dissatisfaction for both Albuquerque and nationwide executives, office work conditions and the lack of opportunity for training programs are cited by Albuquerque executives as primary sources of dissatisfaction; they are not leading sources of dissatisfaction for other municipal executives. The data at the end of the chapter on possible subtle sources of dissatisfaction in Albuquerque and the data provided in response to open-end questions need to be evaluated in the light of the other differences that have been pointed out.

Most Albuquerque executives do not believe their talents are being fully utilized. This feeling is especially prevalent among the college graduates. Forty-two percent of the Albuquerque executives believe that the public is indifferent to their efforts, 40 percent do not think they are being paid fairly in relation to other City employees, and 74 percent of the directors do not believe they have enough employees. Many other dissatisfactions came out in the open-end questions, i.e., public and political pressure, red tape, poor relations with higher-level personnel, shortages of finances and facilities, and an unfair press.

What do the differences mean in regard to Albuquerque's municipal government as an employer? Do they indicate that the

City is in some respects unlike other municipal governments? Do they indicate a preponderance of conducive or non-conducive factors to recruitment and retention of professional personnel? The time has come to try to evaluate the meaning of the differences in the concluding chapter.

# CHAPTER IV

## CONCLUSIONS

Factors influencing the City's ability to recruit and retain professional personnel have been compared with conditions in other communities, and characteristics of Albuquerque APT personnel have been compared by means of questionnaires with those characteristics of municipal executives nationwide in order to determine what clues this provides to the existence of conducive and non-conducive elements. The second purpose of the comparison of personnel was to see what factors could be rated conducive or non-conducive to recruitment and retention on the basis of conditions referred to by Albuquerque questionnaire respondents in comparison with results obtained by MMC in its questionnaire sent to municipal executives throughout the country.

Despite the many similarities between Albuquerque and other cities that have been revealed in this study, the evidence indicates that Albuquerque is in certain respects a unique community with unique problems. Albuquerque is one of the fastest growing areas in the United States. Its city government in recent years has grown much more rapidly than other municipal governments. Thirty-two percent of its Group I employees have entered since 1960 and another 41 percent became employed in the 1950's. Other communities have added professionals at a more even rate in the past few decades. Albuquerque executives are less experienced in their present jobs

and less experienced in local government than executives in other places. Executives nationwide have spent an average of seven years in their present positions and 19 years in local government employment. Albuquerque executives have had only five years in their present positions, on the average, and have averaged only 13 years in local government employment.

At the same time, it is evident that Albuquerque is inexperienced as an employer of public professional personnel. This conclusion is reflected in the data which shows Albuquerque far behind other communities. The City suffers from an excessively high turnover rate. Only about one percent of other municipalities have a higher rate. Low salaries are an acute problem. The last survey showed that Albuquerque Group I salaries are 10 percent below the going rate in other local governments. The salary drawback may increase the seriousness of the other negative factors in the minds of the City's Group I persons. Forty percent of the Albuquerque executives do not even believe they are being paid fairly in relation to other City employees. Most of the Group I job descriptions are outdated. The City does not pay overtime to Group I personnel, an inadequacy which was a complaint listed in many of the questionnaires. Most cities of Albuquerque's size, 93.8 percent, pay overtime. Office work conditions and the lack of opportunity for training programs are cited by Albuquerque executives as primary sources of dissatisfaction; they are not leading sources of dissatisfaction for nationwide executives. ICMA in 1960 surveyed 1,044 cities in the U.S. over 10,000 population and found that 42 percent had some kind of in-service training.

Nearly three City directors in every four believe they do not have enough employees to accomplish their tasks.

Albuquerque hired its present city manager in 1952 despite his lack of any previous experience in a manager position, and despite the fact that ICMA believes the top qualification to look for in a prospective city manager is successful experience elsewhere. He was hired before the greater influx of new personnel began. A manager with previous experience as a manager in other cities might have had a better chance to become aware of the conditions affecting the morale of professional personnel. Many of Engel's Group I colleagues, 58 percent of whom do not believe their abilities are being utilized to their fullest, complain of a lack of public understanding of problems, the excessive influence of pressure groups, political pressure, an unfair press and lack of backing from the "upper-echelon."

The University of New Mexico's director of placement says he would not recommend that a graduate seek a career in the Albuquerque government and believes the City is too tied up in "politics." The present City personnel director thinks the college graduates coming to work for him are just "average."

The City seems to be least able to please its professionals who have college degrees. Seventy percent of them do not believe their talents are being fully utilized. Most Albuquerque executives without college degrees believe their talents are being fully utilized. The City may face the prospect of losing many of its more highly-educated employees.

The city manager is working currently in an atmosphere of political stability with cooperation and backing from the governing commission. These factors alone have provided a highly desirable work environment for him. This study uncovered no major undesirable factors to be faced by the Albuquerque manager that are not confronted by city managers elsewhere.

While Engel enjoys a favorable atmosphere, parts of this study suggest that his strategy of non-involvement in controversy and his acceptance of the stability-minded mandate of the ACC may be detrimental to the work environment of professionals under him who want to get things done, and detrimental to the recruitment of ambitious and highly-competent college graduates. A former City personnel director, now a high bank official in the city, has frankly termed Albuquerque a "leaderless community," and claims that professionals are unable to gain acceptance for needed programs.

Engel says he does not want to be designated a community leader or to challenge the power of the commission. He can be classified in the group of managers who keep to administrative operations and routine matters and place less emphasis on city development. The present commission chairman would welcome more active participation by the manager in initiating and promoting policy matters. Engel feels that he has not alienated any significant segment of the Albuquerque population over the long run and describes his press relations as "reasonably good."

In one respect, Engel significantly differs from his professional manager colleagues. Unlike other managers, Engel

has arrived at his position as manager of a city with 200,000 population without having to follow a pattern of advancement by moving. Manager tenure statistics reveal that managers switch locales frequently, and they can be criticized for "staying too long." Engel now has longer tenure in one city than most managers and apparently has no orientation to move elsewhere.

Engel's salary has risen since he became manager from $8000 to $19,000. Engel has profited by staying where he is and has gained in Albuquerque what other managers frequently have to move to achieve. Opportunities to move are more numerous in smaller cities. The fact is that, frankly, Engel's chances of moving to better himself are limited. There just are not too many larger cities employing the manager plan.

Engel's job looks safe unless there is a factional change on the commission. If that happens, according to the Florida study, the manager could expect to be dismissed. At the present time, commission-manager relations are described as "excellent." The current commission chairman, as well as the preceding one, believe Engel "does a good job." Along with the manager's unobtrusive role, it appears that while commission and ACC cooperation has provided him with an "umbrella" to shield his office from public criticism, this may have left his subordinates "out in the rain."

The factors presently non-conducive to the employment of a professional staff can be seen to result from the convergence of several circumstances. The City has only recently begun to professionalize; it lacks the experience that other communities have had.

Albuquerque's political stability is not conducive to aggressive innovation on the part of governing commissions, and the manager finds himself in a situation where it is easier and safer to contribute to the stability than to pursue an innovating policy that would be more rewarding to the professional personnel.

If conditions are improved, it seems obvious that Albuquerque will stand a better chance of recruiting and retaining capable APT personnel.

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# APPENDIX

## THE ALBUQUERQUE QUESTIONNAIRE, ACCOMPANYING LETTER, AND RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE QUESTIONS OF OPEN-END VARIETY

University of New Mexico

February 27, 1963

Dear Professional City Employee:

I am presently engaged in research for my Master's thesis at the University of New Mexico on important aspects of employment for professional (Group I) personnel in the City of Albuquerque.

In order to facilitate this project, I am asking that the City's approximately 70 Group I employees fill out the attached questionnaire and return it by March 13.

Completion of the questionnaire should not take much time. City Manager Edmund Engel, recognizing the importance of this study, encourages employees to complete and return the questionnaire. When you have finished, please mail the questionnaire yourself in the stamped, self-addressed envelope provided.

The information you give will be used in statistical compilations only. You may be certain that your identity will be kept entirely confidential.

Your participation in this study will prove invaluable to me. Thank you.

Yours truly,

James W. Carroll

James W. Carroll
Assistant to the Director
Division of Government Research
University of New Mexico

# QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTIONS: To be completed by all Group I employees. In questions with alternative answers, please circle the best or most appropriate answer.

1. What is your job title?

2. How much education do you have?

   a. High School or Less

   b. Some College

   c. College Graduate

   d. Graduate Degree

3. If you have an undergraduate degree, in what major field was it?

4. If you have a graduate degree, in what major field was it?

5. What was your father's occupation?

   a. Clerk

   b. Salesman

   c. Farmer

   d. Laborer

   e. Professional

   f. Government or Business Executive, or Business Owner

   g. Other

6. What is your present age?

7. How old were you when you completed your formal education?

8. How old were you when you first entered local government employment?

9. How old were you when you first entered the Albuquerque local government?

10. How old were you when you attained your present position in the Albuquerque local government?

11. When you began your career, were you first employed by:

a. Private Business

b. Local Government

c. Federal Government

d. State Government

e. Profession

f. Other

12. Why did you enter the Albuquerque local government? Please number the 5 main reasons in the order of their importance.

____ General nature of the work
____ Opportunity to help solve public problems
____ Only position available in my line of work
____ Opportunity for advancement
____ Job security
____ Salary
____ Important responsibility
____ Good experience for entering private business
____ Prestige
____ Political opportunities
____ Retirement benefits
____ Low pressure
____ Other fringe benefits (not retirement)
____ Congenial co-workers
____ Other (specify)

13. Why did you accept your present position? Please number the 5 main reasons in the order of their importance.

____ General nature of the work
____ Opportunity to help solve public problems
____ Only position available in my line of work
____ Opportunity for advancement
____ Job security
____ Salary
____ Important responsibility
____ Good experience for entering private business
____ Prestige
____ Political opportunities
____ Retirement benefits
____ Low pressure
____ Other fringe benefits (not retirement)
____ Congenial co-workers
____ Other (specify)

14. If you worked for the Federal Government in the same kind of position, do you believe your prestige would be:

    a. Higher than it is now

    b. Same as it is now

    c. Lower than it is now

15. If you worked for the State Government in the same kind of position, do you believe your prestige would be:

    a. Higher than it is now

    b. Same as it is now

    c. Lower than it is now

16. If you worked for a national private business concern in the same type of position, do you believe your prestige would be:

    a. Higher than it is now

    b. Same as it is now

    c. Lower than it is now

17. If you worked for a local private business concern in the same type of position, do you believe your prestige would be:

    a. Higher than it is now

    b. Same as it is now

    c. Lower than it is now

18. If you worked in the same kind of job in the following employments, do you believe your <u>salary</u> would be higher, the same, or lower than it is now? (Please circle)

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| a. National private business concern: | Higher | Same | Lower |
| b. Local private business concern: | Higher | Same | Lower |
| c. Federal Government: | Higher | Same | Lower |
| d. State Government: | Higher | Same | Lower |
| e. Trade or Non-Profit Association | Higher | Same | Lower |

19. How many different local governments have you worked for?

a. 1

b. 2

c. 3

d. 4 or more

20. Please list in order of importance what you consider to be the 3 main sources of satisfaction you have about your present job:

a.

b.

c.

21. Please list in order of importance what you consider to be the 3 main sources of dissatisfaction you have about your present job:

a.

b.

c.

22. Into which one of the following employments would you prefer to see your children enter? (Circle one)

a. Private Business

b. Local Government

c. Federal Government

d. State Government

e. Trade or Non-Profit Association

Why did you make the above choice?

23. Do you believe that your present position enables you to utilize your abilities to their fullest?

24. Do you believe that the public is indifferent to your efforts?

25. If you are a director, do you believe that you have enough employees?

26. Do you believe that you are being paid fairly in relation to other City employees in Albuquerque?

27. Are you satisfied, dissatisfied or neutral (indicate by S, D or N) toward the following aspects of your job:

_____ General nature of the work
_____ Opportunity to help solve public problems
_____ Opportunity for advancement
_____ Job security
_____ Opportunity for training programs
_____ Relations with co-workers
_____ Status and Recognition
_____ Salary
_____ Responsibility
_____ Retirement benefits
_____ Other fringe benefits (not retirement)
_____ Office work conditions
_____ Amount of pressure

28. Please include here a brief resume of your work history:

| Employer | Location | Position | Salary |
|---|---|---|---|

Space below reserved for additional comments if desired:

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE QUESTIONS OF OPEN-END VARIETY

# 12.--Why did you enter the Albuquerque local government? Please number the 5 main reasons in the order of their importance. (Comments to "other-specify" alternative)

Rank
1 Was working way through school
1 1942, World War II opening occurred and I wanted to get away from accounting in auto firm
1 Desired to move back here because of better climate
1 Early 30's, depression, take any job
1 Geographical location
2 Desire to stay in Albuquerque
2 Being able to establish permanent residence instead of relocating with each new assignment
3 Experience and practice for greater challenge than Albuquerque has to offer
3 Experience before degree
3 Location
3 Was then looking to return to Albuquerque
4 Not subject to transfer out of city or state with resulting disruption of family life
4 Climate
4 Working hours
4 Opportunity to gain experience in chosen career
5 Daughter's health
5 The type work I was most interested in
5 Experience

#13.--Why did you accept your present position? Please number the 5 main reasons in the order of their importance. (Comments to "other-specify" alternative)

Rank
1 A desire to return to active engineering work in the Engineering Department
1 Geographical location
2 Sold the City on establishing the Department, for efficiency and the saving of thousands of dollars--This was an out-and-out promotion for me
2 Opportunity to progress in chosen career and remain in Albuquerque
2 Being able to establish permanent residence instead of relocating with each new assignment
3 Gaining experience and practice for greater challenges than Albuquerque has to offer
3 Location
3 Was then looking to return to Albuquerque
4 Climate
5 The only job opening in the Assistant Chief rank at the time of my promotion
5 Experience

#22.--Into which one of the following employments would you prefer to see your children enter? Why did you make the choice?

Private Business

Stay out of public limelight
Too much government and too little true private enterprise today
Less irrational public pressure
More reward for deserving
More opportunity for advancement, higher pay
Accomplishments are better recognized and rewarded
Diversity
Greater challenge
Higher pay, higher profeasional status
Better opportunity for advancement (3)
To utilize their ability (2)
Independence
More executive ability and chance to use it
Independence, higher salary, no petty politics involved
Better salary, benefits and security
Higher pay, better security, less political pressure
Individuality (2)
Better opportunity (2)

Local Government

Greater usefulness
This city entering into period of good opportunities for young people
Basic area needing improvement and permits certain amount of satisfaction for accomplishments
Good work can be recognized and lead to successful career without disruption of changing resident locations

Federal Government

Job security

State Government

Greater usefulness
Good work can be recognized and lead to successful career without disruption of changing resident locations

Trade or Non-Profit Association

Better living, less public pressure