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The Problem of Time in the Philosophy of William James

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

THE PROBLEM OF TIME IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM JAMES

BY

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INTRODUCTION

"The problem of time" has continued to be a puzzle in the history of philosophy, just as "the problem of Being" has. The time which we experience in ordinary life -- not only emotionally, such as we feel, endure, anticipate or regret, but also intellectually, such as we measure and calculate -- is not a "Time itself" but consists in individual, concrete movements and changes.

The human concern about the nature of time can be traced back to the remote past of human history when people began to wonder about the ultimate reality or principle behind phenomenon. It is quite natural for people to adopt the circulation of the sun as a most universal pattern of all movements and to consider it as a natural standard of time, because the rhythms of this movement not only influence the performances of social life, but also correspond to physiological rhythms of private life.

Systematic inquiry to the problem of time began with the Greek when they wondered about the paradox inherent in the concept of continuity of movement, and the relation between movements and time itself. Aristotle, following Zeno's argument, pointed out the paradoxical nature of time, its double character, namely, the continuity and discontinuity, and being and non-being, of time.[1]

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[1] Aristotle, Physics (Edited by W. D. Ross, Oxford: 1936), 219, b. 1.

Later, Augustine pondered the same question and, as Husserl said,[2] even today, we remain in almost the same predicament as Augustine when he asks: "What is Time? If no one asks me, I know; but if I wish to explain to one who asks, I do not know."[3]

Thus the problem of time involves many difficulties. Does time itself exist independently apart from the concrete movements or changes? If so, what is the nature of it and what is the meaning of its existence? Does it have an absolute speed and how does it relate to actual movements? If it exists as an ever-flowing, continuous flux, is there the beginning and ending of it? Leibniz, for example, attributing a horizontal character to time, considered time as form or quality of objective world. Time, like space, does not exist independently from the concrete movements, but contains them in it. Depending on this horizontal character, time is also considered as subjective form, namely, the form of perception and then of reality.[4] On the other hand, as Hegel presented his view, time is considered as that "Aber nicht in die Zeit entsteht und bergeht Alles, sondern die Zeit ist diese Werden, Entstehen und Vergehen, das sehende Abstrahieren, der Alles gebährende und seine

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2 Husserl, E. "Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins," Sonderdruck aus Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Förschung, Bd. XI. p. 2.

3 St. Augustine, Les Confessions (Paris: Garnier, 1950), II, p. 194.

4 Lalande, A., Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1938), p. 872.

Geburten zerstörende Chronos."[5] Is time nothing but a form or horizon which was abstracted and generalized from concrete events or changes, or is it some substantial entity or principle of all events? How did James answer to these problems?

As Heath and Heidegger have pointed out,[6] the nature of time or idea of time of each philosopher depends on or is determined by the general character of his philosophy, i. e., by his epistemology and metaphysics. Hence, it is indispensable to examine James' philosophy before entering into the nature of time.

The order of this study will be as follows:

I. Historical background and motivation of William James.

2. The nature and significance of pragmatism and metaphysics as conceived by James.

3. The nature of time.

4. Comparison with other philosophies:

   A. Other pragmatists, especially, Dewey and Peirce.

   B. Other Temporalists, especially, Bergson and Heidegger.

5. Conclusion.

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[5] Hegel, G. W. F., System der Philosophie, Zeiter Teil. Die Natur-philosophie (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommanns Verlag, 1929), p. 80.

[6] Heath, L. R., The Concept of Time (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1936), p. 210.

CHAPTER I[1]

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION

I. BACKGROUND OF WILLIAM JAMES' IDEAS

Original thought is seldom born from tradition. It is born primarily from one's own experience and reflection. But it is impossible for any ideas to develop completely in isolation from the traditions and spiritual tendency of age. Particularly James, who was a "tough" minded thinker, never tired of absorbing new ideas. He avoided closing his philosophy into a fixed system, accepted knowledge from various fields with an open mind, and formed his own original conclusions. Hence, some acquaintance with his inherited thoughta as well as the "Geistige Situation" of his age is indispensable to understanding his ideas. James was not a solitary meditator, but rather an industrious researcher with a keen sensibility regarding every fact of reality. Needless to say, the backgrounds of his ideas are manifold and various: from the materialistic natural sciences to spiritualistic religion, from German idealism to British empiricism, from his American colleagues to French thinkers.

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[1] The materials in this chapter are derived mainly from R. B. Perry's elaborate work, The Thought and Character of William James (Boston: Little, Brown, And Company, 1936).

Roughly speaking we can outline his background as follows: Father's influence in early period. School education. Evolutionalism. Visits in Europe. Renouvier. British empiricism. Bergson. Peirce.

A.

James grew up in a household which relished ideas and made argument about them its normal form of family intercourse. James' father was religious and drew his religious ideas out of the depths of his own reflections and personal experiences. James, however, did not accept wholly his father's theology. But he respected religious experiences as worthy of a hearing and as being data for which philosophy must supply a fitting hypothesis. He sought his own conclusions in a different way from his father; that is, turning from the theistic tradition of European philosophy, he found his hypothesis through studies in psychology and psychiatric research.

His father gave his children, on principle, a highly irregular education. Furthermore during James' childhood the family moved restlessly to and from Europe, and James acquired a taste for cosmopolitanism and an idiomatic facility in several languages which gives to his thoughts an international character. James' resemblance to his father in personal flavor and genius is unescapable. He wrote that "For me, the humor, the good spirits, the humanity, the faith in the divine, and the sense of his right to have a say about the deepest reasons of the universe, are what will stay by me."[2] Like

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[2] Perry, ibid., I. p. 152.

his father he was warm blooded, effervescent and tenderly affectionate. Both men were unstable and impatient. Both were men of extreme spontaneity. Thus his inheritance from his father is less in philosophical ideas than in a religiously oriented frame of mind and in his attitude toward life. But this father's influence decided, in a sense, whole his spiritual life.

B.

As his brother testified,[3] James' interest in natural science, like his interest in painting, dated from boyhood. He entered Lawrence Scientific School, Harvard, in 1861, and then Harvard Medical School in 1864. James devoted himself thus to the natural sciences, first to chemistry, then biology, and he was confronted with the Darwinian theory of evolution. The implications of this conflict turned James to a serious study of philosophy, which he began while he was concentrating on the study of biological sciences.

While James was a student, the physical principle of the conservation of energy was wining wide acceptance as well as the biological principle of evolution, and science was assuming a militant tone whereas religion was on the defensive. Philosophies of a naturalistic and materialistic sort were spring up. James was never converted to any of these, but he was at first involved in them.

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[3] Ibid., I. p. 205.

[3]

Ibid., p. 80.

C.

Darwin's Origin of Species appeared in 1859 and Herbert Spencer announced his Synthetic Philosophy in 1860. When James entered the Lawrence Scientific School, he studied naturally these newly developed experimental and positivistic theories of evolution. Later, from 1872 to 1873, and from 1874 for five consecutive years, James gave a course in Harvard College on "Comparative Anatomy and Physiology." The doctrine of evolution which James taught was, of course, Darwin's, and in 1868 he had written reviews of Darwin's Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, in which he praised Darwin as a scientist. "The influence of Darwin was both early and profound, and its effects crop up in diverse and often unexpected quarters."[4]

James read Spencer's First Principles between 1860 and 1862 and was "carried away with enthusiasm by the intellectual perspectives which it seemed to open."[5] In 1876-1877, James offered an undergraduate course on "Physiological Psychology," in which Spencer's Principles of Psychology was used as text. James showed his sympathy to Spencer's theory: First, Spencer's dealing with the physiology of the nervous system, that is, the mind as a function of an evolved organism dealing with a physical environment, corresponded closely to James' biological approach to psychology. Second, Spencer's voluntа-

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[4] Ibid., I. p. 469.

[5] Ibid., I. p. 474.

ristic psychology suited the mind of James. James seems to adopt the notion of a priori factors in human knowledge from Darwin's notion of spontaneous or accidental variation. He believed that the essence of Darwinism lay in the idea that whether individual variations are great or slight, they prove and disprove themselves -- survive and disappear -- as their environment dictates.[6] But a materialistic connotation of Darwinism did not satisfy him.

He was also dissatisfied with Spencer's neglect of the problem of consciousness. Spencer, and the more consistent evolutionary school as well, failed to explain how conscious molecules "run together and form a unified consciousness."[7] Evolutionalism, in this sense, can not prove the uniqueness and originality of consciousness against its physiological basis. James continued to use Spencer's works in class, but dissatisfactions with Spencer's theory increased more and more. "Spencer served James in the role of a punching bag, and for many years he kept him in his intellectual gymnasium. Spencer's thinking irritated him and at the same time convinced him that he was competent to form a judgment of his own. He acquired a sense of his own philosophical power through feeling so confidently, and seeing so clearly, that Spencer was wrong. Thus Spencer's part in James' development was the complementary opposite of Renouvier's: the one repelled

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[6] Ibid., I. p. 470.

[7] Ibid., I. p. 490.

him and the other attracted him, while both excited him."[8]

D.

For two years (1867-68) he was in Germany, hoping to continue his studies while regaining his health. He attended a Heidelberg University course in physiology. Meanwhile he read intensively in general literature and philosophy and studied the new technical works on psychology which was being established as an independent branch of science in Germany and France.

During this period, James recorded his reading of Kant and the beginning of his acquaintance with Renouvier, which had great significance for the formation of his philosophical ideas. James read Otto Liebmann's Kant und die Epigonen, and confesses the admiration for the strength of this Kantian critique of Hume. He agreed with Kant that there are structures in the mind not derived from experience, without accepting Kant's synthetic judgment and also Kant's transcendent, noumenal reality.[9]

James' spiritual crisis (1869-72) came after a decade of acientific studies. It was precipitated by ill health. His spiritual crisis may be thought of as something like a religious conversion. It is a quite important factor in understanding the development of his

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[8] Ibid., I. p. 475.

[9] Ibid., I. p. 500.

ideas. Philosophy is not, for James, a detached and dispassionate inquiry into truth. It is a "Weltanschauung. an intellectual attitude towards life."[10]

The pure objective and disinterested research of science did not satisfy his mind. He began to ask the meaning of human existence and his own existence. "How other people could live, how myself had ever lived, so unconscious of that pit of insecurity beneath the surface of life?" He then turned his attention to the problem of morality and the importance of the will to believe. His experience made him a philosopher by necessity as well as inclination. He said himself that "I originally studied medicine in order to be a physiologist, but I drifted into psychology and philosophy from a sort of fatality."[11] His philosophical interest burned continuously, but not regularly. As with Maine de Biran, the gravity of his philosophical task varies with his moods, and with the condition of his health. His philosophy was never a mere theory, but always a set of beliefs which reconciled him to life and which he proclaimed as one preaching a way of salvation. He was too profoundly human to find a consolation in heaven and too intellectual to become submerged in emotional beliefs. He tried to find the way of salvation in the philosophical investigation of mind and life.

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[10] William James, Some Problems of Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1936), p. 6.

[11] Perry, op. cit., I. p. 288.

B.

During the struggle with whether he should "frankly throw the moral business overboard" or "follow it and it alone, making everything else merely stuff for it," James found Renouvier, who exercised the most important personal influences upon the development of his thought. He said, "I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I finished the first part of Renouvier's second 'Essai' and see no reason why his definition of Free Will -- 'the sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts' -- need be the definition of an illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the present -- until next year -- that it is no illusion. I will go a step further with my will, not only act with it, but believe as well; believe in my individual reality and creative power."[12] Renouvier's phenomenalism, his pluralism, his fideism, his moralism, and his theism were all congenial to James' mind. James wrote that Renouvier "was one of the greatest of philosophic character, and but for the decisive impression made on me in the seventies by his masterly advocacy of pluralism, I might never have got free from the monistic superstition under which I had grown up. The present volume, in short, might never have been written. This is why, feeling endlessly thankful as I do, I dedicate this textbook to the great Renouvier's memory."[13]

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[12] Anderson, P. R., and Fisch, M. H. Philosophy in America (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939), p. 521.

[13] James, Op. cit., p. i.

Renouvier, started from Kant's philosophy, considering philosophy as a criticism of science. He proclaimed the principle of discontinuity in science and recognized the existence of freedom in the phenomenon. For him the freedom is the first principle of knowledge, because knowledge depends on a choice of free will when thought confronts contradictions. He proposed also the principle of relativity for the metaphysics.[14] For the James, Renouvier was first of all an empiricist. "M. Renouvier's polemic against the metaphysical notions of substance, of infinite in existence, and of abstract ideas seems to us more powerful than anything which has been written in English."[15] The ideas of freedom come from the argument that thinking must be free if it is to be either true or false; so it can mean nothing to discuss the question of freedom unless one is free to affirm or deny it. More important for James' pluralism was Renouvier's argument that the world may compose a whole without being determined by it. Therein lies the whole ground of that priority of part to whole which James concluded was the essence of empiricism.

But divergence appeared when Renouvier tended toward monadism. Monadism is definitely contrary to James' view of an interpenetrating and continuous flow of existence, where causality is a real transition

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[14] Perry, op. cit., p. 656.

[15] Ibid., I. p. 41.

and where two can be both the same and not the same. Renouvier was more rigorous and systematic, but less bold. James felt himself to be too "bottomless and romantic" to suit Renouvier's intellectualism.

F.

Though James was stimulated and influenced by the various schools, he belongs unquestionably to the British empirical school. He said, "I am happy to say that it is the English-speaking philosophers who first introduced the custom of interpreting the meaning of concepts by asking what difference they make for life.... I sincerely believe that the English spirit in philosophy is intellectually, as well as practical and morally, on the saner, sounder, and truer path."[16] He dedicated Pragmatism to Mill with the words, "from whom I first learned the pragmatic openness of mind and whom my fancy likes to picture as our leader were he alive today."

But his attitude toward British empiricism is both negative and positive. He opposed its nominalism, associationalism and positivism. According to James, the empiricists are wrong when they insist that the mind is merely a passive repository of experience, when they affirm some sort of outlying order of existence, constituting nature or the world. He abandoned the notion that mind is a tabula rasa and recognizes the importance of inborn traits and subjective interests.

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16 Ibid., I. p. 544.

Also he considered experience, not a series of distant impacts, but a being which is combined by some ulterior agency, and which yields connections as well as terms -- journeys as well as stations.[17]

C.

"Without doubt, the most important philosophical and personal attachment of James' later years was that which he formed with Bergson."[18] Both men developed almost same idea about time and reality, and the influences between them were mutual.[19] They respected each other's philosophy and evaluated each other highly even when they had difficulty in understanding each other's standpoints.

James did not hesitate to admire and praise Bergson's ideas. He said, "I have to confess that Bergson's originality is so profuse that many of his ideas baffle me entirely.[20] Also when Bergson sent him Matiere et Memoire, he wrote to Bergson that "It makes a sort of Copernican revolution as much as Berkeley's Principles or Kant's Critique did, and will probably, as it gets better and better known, open a new era of philosophical discussion."[21] These words of praise suggest how much James understood Bergson's thought and sympathized intellectually with him. They had almost the same mentality. James recognized Bergson's ideas as a turning-point of history of ideas -- a turning from the substantial, static world-view to a functional, dynamic one.

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17 Ibid., I. p. 571.

Needless to say, Bergson respected James' original and profound insight to the reality. Bergson compared James to a fire-place and said "Un foyer ardent etait la, dont on recevait chaleur et lumiere."[22] They discovered not only their doctrinal agreement, but their deep personal affinity too. Both are men of profound humanity. Each possessed a degree of artistic sensibility unusual other philosophers as well as keen insights and intuitions.

H.

The life-long intercourse with Peirce also had great importance for James' thought formation. The influences between them were reciprocal. Peirce's earliest writings and conversations seems to have left an unmistakable imprint on James. Both developed the idea of pragmatism at almost same time but with somewhat different connotations.

Peirce seemed to help him to free himself from his early admiration for the empiricism of Chauncy Wright, whom Peirce represented to James as a superficial mind because of his attempt to reconcile the "really incongruous" ideas of Darwin and Mill. James admired Peirce's self-assurance and intellectual boldness. For example, after attending to his lectures on "British Logicians," James wrote to his brother that Peirce "is certainly <u>très fort</u>. I never saw a man go into things so intensely."[23] Of all colleagues with whom James had a re-

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[18] <u>Ibid</u>., II. p. 599.

lationship, Peirce was his most intimate friend intellectually, and their mutual stimulation to a large extent helped each other to develop their philosophies.

James, however, did not agree with Peirce's extremely logico-mathematical philosophy, which will be discussed later at Chapter IV. Nevertheless, their similarity is more obvious than profound and certain. Many of the terms which James was most fond of employing -- terms such as "pragmatism," "tychism," and "synechism" -- were derived by him from Peirce.

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19 Milic Capek distinguished three main mutual influences between James and Bergson. " (1). The influence of old James upon Bergson. Bergson not only quoted James' The Feeling of Effort but also was stimulated by certain passages in his psychology in setting up several important problems which Matière et Mémoire tried to answer. (2). James expresely admitted his debt to Bergson in his last two books: A Pluralistic Universe and Some Problems of Philosophy. (3). The influence of Jages' philosophy of religion on the author of Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion, whose central problem of the mystical experience and divine personality was set by The Varieties of Religious Experience -- as well as A Pluralistic Universe. Capek Milic, "Stream of Consciousness and 'duree reelle,'" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (New York: University of Buffalo Press, 1950), Vol. X, p. 331. But we can not overlook the influence of James' Principles of Psychology upon Bergson's ideas of consciousness.

20 William James, A Pluralistic Universe (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1916), p. 226.

21 Perry, op. cit., II. p. 606.

22 Ibid., p. 636.

23 Ibid., p. 321.

II. MOTIVATION OF JAMES' PHILOSOPHIZING

We have surveyed James' background, emphasizing mainly the influences and stimulations which he received throughout his career. Let us now review briefly and summarize his primary motivation for philosophizing.

When James began to study philosophy, the counter-movement to romantism and idealism had appeared and Western thought seemed to be defenseless against the powerful influence of the newly systematized and solidly grounded forces of sciences. In Germany, D. F. Straus, L. A. Feuerbach and Karl Marx developed materialism from the Hegelian left, and J. Moleschott, L. Buchner and E. F. Haeckel proclaimed the new materialism. In France, the positivism of Auguste Comte was being continued and popularized by H. Taine and E. Renan, and Le Dantec and Abel Rey proclaimed Scientisme. In England Spencer's and Darwin's prestige increased and were being diffused by T. H. Huxley. James, as a trained scientist, inclined naturally to these movement.

Thus, James had to face two dominating thoughts of the later Nineteenth Century, i.e., (monistic and deterministic) idealism and materialism (including scientism and evolutionalism). James' main concern was, therefore, how to defend his realism and pluralism against monistic philosophies on the one hand, and freedom and autonomy of mind, that is, humanism, against deterministic philosophies on the

other hand.

According to Hegel, reality is not static and permanent, but is in the process of dialectic development or becoming (Werden). But this becoming takes place within the permanent absolute mind and, therefore, Hegel's philosophy is monistic and deterministic. On the other hand, James was much disturbed by the allegedly "materialistic" and "deterministic" implication of the evolutionary theories. The main trend in James' philosophical development consists, then, in his persistent effort to find a psychological and philosophical justification for his initial feeling or hunch against current materialistic automation theory of mind.

In conclusion, James had two purposes in his philosophy: namely, to justify pluralism, the infinite potentialities and possibilities of the reality and life, and the freedom and autonomy of mind.

These motivations are related also very intimately to his therapeutic concern. He intended his philosophy to be the defender of humanism. He rejected monistic doctrines because of their anti-humanistic nature. According to James, monism "does not account for our finite consciousness.... It creates a problem of evil.... It contradicts the character of reality as perceptually experienced.... It is fatalistic...."[24] Pluralism, "on the other hand, is neither

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[24] William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York: Longmans, Green And Co., 1922), p. 138.

optimistic nor pessimistic, but melioristic, rather."[25]

We might say that he was a physician of the soul more than a metaphysician. He came into philosophy from the medical science, and had a basically therapeutic concern in all his reflections. He wished to help his fellow men, as well as himself, to live more vigorously and more wholesomely.[26] He would never take any scientific conclusion as the final truth about the life and universe. He emphasized the importance of inner life rather than social life, feeling rather than reason, will rather than intellect. For these purposes, he accepted and absorbed theories from every field tirelessly, with a broad and elastic mind. Experimental study of mind, psychological study of mystical experience, new discovery of "unconsciousness or subconsciousness" theory of psychiatry, the criticism of science by Renouvier, Bergson's theory of life, the suggestions of physics admitting an indeterministic interpretation, and the suggestion of Mach that the ultimate subject matter of physics consists in our elementary sensations.

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[25] Ibid., p. 142.

[26] Lamprecht, S. P., Our Philosophical Tradition (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), p. 454. With regard to this therapeutic concern, James and Descartes had much in common. Both studied medicine and intended to make philosophy for the service of "bien Vivre."

CHAPTER II

PRAGMATISM AND METAPHYSICS OF WILLIAM JAMES

I. THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF PRAGMATISM AS CONCEIVED BY JAMES

James was by training a scientist. He qualified as a medical doctor, and then turned to psychology. However, against his scientific background, James was never largely influenced by the spirit of the laboratory and as never drawn to reflect closely on its methods. His mentality is quite different from the mathematical and logical way of thinking. On the contrary he possessed an unusually developed sensibility to the predicament -- moral, political and religious, as well as philosophical -- of his age.[1] He devoted his whole life to the task of creating what it seemed to him his age so sorely needed, a new philosophy. These therapeutic concerns had much influence on the character of his Pragmatism.

James applied his pragmatic method to his theory of the "Will to Believe" in an earlier period and then to his theory of "Radical Empiricism." Both of these theories had their origin and explanation in the fact that James was, first and foremost, a very eminent introspective psychologist and a therapist of the soul. Thus his pragmatism can rightly be characterized as a humanism. The difference of his pragmatism from that of another pragmatists will be discussed later

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[1] Gallie, W. B., Peirce and Pragmatism (Middlesex: Penguin Book, 1952), p. 22.

in Chapter IV.

Pragmatism depends primarily on modern empiricism which originated in England. But it rejects the sensational, passive and intellectualistic characteristics in the notion of empiricism. It considers experience as a challenge to adoptation by living beings to their environment. It regards consciousness and intellect, which happen in the processes of these experiences, as a tool or an instrument for the adoptation to or control of nature. Experiences are not the materials or constitutive elements of intellect or knowledge. On the contrary, intellect or knowledge are regarded as materials or constitutive factors of experiences.

As these characteristics indicate, pragmatism was influenced also by the new biology, physiology or psychology which started from the evolutional theories. But it diverged from the irrational and extreme voluntaristic philosophy of life by adopting the experimentalistic methodology of modern science. That is, it intended to use a scientific method in dealing with concrete experience and tried to be an experimental rationalism.

The beginning of "Pragmatism" can be traced to Peirce.[2] Peirce's pragmatic principle was a maxim designed to promote the clarification of the meaning of conception and proposition. The meaning of an intellectual conception or idea is the envisaged

practical consequences of the conception. His famous maxim was: "In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception."[3] Also "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."[4]

Pragmatism, for Peirce, is a method and a theory of meaning derived from the natural sciences and applicable to philosophy. It was enunciated with remarkable theoretical precision by Peirce and developed and applied by James. The pragmatic maxim is, for James as it had been for Peirce, a method of making our ideas clear and a test of the meaningfulness of our concepts and propositions. And

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[2] Peirce adopted the term "Pragmatism" from Kant's "Pragmatische" in Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, and in Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Trans. Methodenlehre, Ch. II. Sec., III. But this term can not be found in "How to make our ideas clear." It was expressed for the first time by James when he exposed the theory of pragmatism in his article "Philosophical conceptions and practical results (1898)." Peirce did not use this term until 1902 when he was asked to contribute to the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology by M. Baldwin. However this term was already used in ordinary conversations and it was spread anonymously.

[3] Charles Sandres Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), 5.9.

[4] Ibid., 5.2.

James proposed the pragmatic test of meaning as "a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable."

However, Pragmatism as developed by James embraces not only a theory of meaning but likewise a theory of truth, and in thus extending the scope and function of it, James went far beyond Peirce. Truth is, for James, a good guide to conduct, falsity is not.[5] Pragmatism is thus a method of determing the truth or falsity of propositions according as they do or do not fulfill our purposes and satisfy our biological and emotional needs. A true proposition is one the acceptance of which leads to success, false proposition is one which produces failure and frustration. Truth is a relation completely immanent to a human experience. Ideas are instruments of the activity, and thinking is teleological. The truth of a proposition, therefore, consists in the fact that it is "useful," "sucessful" or "gives a satisfaction."[6]

The pragmatic test, then, must be its effects on us, its practical consequences. True ideas are those that we can "assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify." The true is useful because it is true and it is true because it is useful.

James showed here his therapeutic concern, because, for James, pragmatism is not only the theory of meaning as Peirce insisted, but also a theory of truth. An idea is true when it works; and an idea

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[5] William James, Pragmatism (New York: Longmans, Green And Co., 1919), p. 209.

[6] Ibid., p. 203.

works when it leads to satisfactory outcomes. We may consider any idea true if it "proves itself to be good in the way of belief."

In introducing a reference to satisfactions, expediency, practicability and also instrumentality in his definition of truth, James expanded Peirce's original meanings. Peirce considered Pragmatism as a method of "clarifying ideas," and regarded it as the core of his doctrine. It is a method of clarifying conceptions or of getting at the distinctive meanings of words and statements, and contains no direct reference to tests of the truth or reasonableness of statements or beliefs. Although James claimed that pragmatism is merely a method and a theory of truth, he applied this method to the problems of metaphysics, and developed his theory of reality in Essays in Radical Empiricism and A Pluralistic Universe.

II. OUTLINE OF HIS METAPHYSICAL IDEAS

James' metaphysics supported his own native conviction that the reality is an infinitely richer, warmer, more varied and potential one than Nineteenth Century materialists would have us believe. James finds pluralism pragmatically preferable to monism. The "block-universe," the rigoristic, deterministic system of both materialistic and idealistic monism, did not satisfy him. Such systems cannot give satisfaction to all the demands of our nature, and hence they cannot be wholly true. Successful action presupposes the recognition of variety and diversity in the world.

Thus the main outline of James' ontology is fairly clear. The world is a living and active many-and-one, "strung-along and flowing," with real possibilities and indetermination. The ultimate reality is "that sense of our own life which we at every moment possess," and all other forms of reality derive their quality from this. He puts his faith in a living native human experience. Reality is experience itself prior to human thinking about it. Here we can find his epistemological theory of the limits of conceptual knowledge. "...reality cannot be thus confined by a conceptual ring-fence. It overflows, exceeds, and alters."[7] We may glimpse it, but we can never grasp it by concepts. "Conceptual knowledge is forever inade-

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[7] James, Some Problems..., p. 99.

quate to the fullness of the reality to be known. Reality consists of essential particulars as well as of essences and universals and class-names, and of existential particulars we become aware only in the perceptual flux."[8] What we grasp by concepts is always some substitute for it which previous human thinking has peptonized and furnished for our understanding. At the basis of his ontology, thus, lies the insight into the finitude of our concepts and of our conceptual apprehension. The world which we arrange in categories is "selection within the superabundance on the unselected."

Reality, thus, cannot be confined by a "conceptual ring-fence." It overflows, exceeds and changes. It may turn into novelties, and can be adequately known only by following its singularities from moment to moment. The conceptual world is a kind of cut, or exerpt, or selection from this flux or continuum. It is instrumentally useful in representing reality externally, statistically and schematically. But it fails "to touch even the outer hem of the real world, the world causal and dynamic relation of activity and history."

Then what is this flowing and ever-continuous reality? James advocates here a very important and new concept, that is, the idea of pure experience. He reaches this idea from a radical or pure empiricism, which opposes both the classical rationalism and also the

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[8] Ibid., p. 78.

traditional English empiricism. For James empiricism is wrong in saying that our psychic life consists of a multiplicity of independent sensations, and rationalism is wrong in saying that these are combined by categories resident in the mind a priori. The immediate experience is a unity in diversity. For James, whatever is experience is real. We must take experience as it exists before it has been manipulated by conceptual things — experience in its purity and innocence — if we would reach reality. We must go behind the conceptual function altogether and look to the more primitive flux of the sensational life for reality's true shape. Experience in its metaphysical signification — as it is finally represented in James' last publications, is, thus, that potency in man through which he seeks to the Real, to the absolute — beyond the schematism of concepts, defined by pragmatism. It is a kind of process of absorption or absorption of the shaped world into the worldless immanence of becoming, into the demonical stream of creation.

James, therefore, did not accept the atomic structure of experience. He began with a formless continuum. That reality is composed of "pure experience" means at least that it is like experience in being through and through fluent and qualitative. Also, experience as a whole is self-containing and leans on nothing. Pure original experience is neither subjective nor objective. It is the primordial stuff from which consciousness and things emerge.

Then what is experience? Here James seems to vacillate between two views. That is, reality is pure experience, which is independent of all thought, to which the life of the infant or semi-comatose person approximates; on the other hand James stated that reality is the entire field of the adult consciousness, experience permeated with thought.[9] If reality is composed of experiences and so of consciousness, what is the nature of consciousness for James?

Even though his ideas about consciousness are not consistent, they have a revolutionary significance. James was unalterably opposed to the traditional supposition that consciousness can be correctly described in terms of simple ideas or sensations or any other mental elements which later come to be built up into complexes in accord with psychological law. He said, "No one ever had a simple sensation by itself. Consciousness, from our natal day, consists of a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations, and what we call simple sensations are results of discriminative attention, pushed often to a very high degree." Simple ideas or other mental elements may indeed be carved out of the stream of consciousness. But they are not original building blocks. They are artificial entities, discriminated by attention for the practical purpose of guiding phases of consciousness to more satisfactory outcomes. It is not a chain of discrete entities but a flowing stream

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9 Thilly, Frank, and Wood, Ledger, A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt And Co., 1957), p. 641.

of interpenetrating pulses of awareness. Fluency, continuity and change are the dominant characteristics of mental life.

The second respect in which James' theory of consciousness distinguishes itself from other empirical theories is in that he protests against treating the stream of consciousness as a function of the brain and nervous system of the organic body, though James always pays much attention to physiological facts. He firmly insisted that there is much more to consciousness than is represented by brain processes and other bodily functionings, and he claimed that there is no evidence to show that the brain produces consciousness. Rather the indications are that the brain is an instrument which consciousness uses in its efforts to act efficaciously upon the external world. Thus body and brain are the tools of consciousness, and consciousness is fuller and richer than the organic body in its dynamic occurrence and can never be exhausted by the processes of physical elements.[10]

Consciousness, also, for James, is not primarily a matter of intellectual activities or cognition as traditional theories of mind argued it. It is rather impulsive, affective, passional, and volitional throughout its course, and only intellectual at times when their problems are given; that is, when they are con-

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[10] Lamprecht, op. cit., p. 457.

fronted with a situation which requires help from intellect.

However James never solved the problem of consciousness to his own satisfaction. "He analyses quite adequately the function of consciousness, but he had a difficulty in defining what is the nature of consciousness. He had succeeded in describing consciousness as a 'stream,' as something continuous, whose parts were organically related and which might, therefore, be expected to function as an 'organ.' But when he attempted to fit this unified mental activity into a physical world, whose elements were atomic and whose relations were external, he saw the hopelessness of his task."[11] James, then (at the time of his The Principles of Psychology) rejected the assumption that consciousness is a distinct order of existence and adopted a relational theory of consciousness. "There is no thought-stuff different from thing-stuff..., but the same identical piece of 'pure experience' (which was the name I gave to the materia prima of everything) can stand alternately for a 'fact of consciousness' or for a physical reality, according as it is taken in one context or in another."[12] In the world of mind stuff, as in a world of a matter, any individual field of consciousness must be a relational complex, distinguished from the other furniture, not by its

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[11] Schneider H. W., A History of American Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), p. 540.

[12] James, Essays in Radical..., p. 137.

elements, but by its structure. He denied that consciousness is an entity or stuff or subjective existence, such as Locke and his followers supposed to be the immediate facts of experience, and considered it as a function. There is indeed a function in experience which we may call by the name "consciousness." The field of consciousness is a collection of physical things cut out from the rest of the physical world by virtue of new functional relations which our perceiving or knowing those objects establishes among them. Consciousness is thus a function which objects not previously mental come to have when grouped in certain way. Mind and consciousness occur in the natural world in which also all sorts of other non-mental relations occur, and they are as natural in their occurrences as those other non-mental relations. Perceiving and knowing, meaning and believing, living and hating are the processes which have the same complex of events in which walking and shining or raining occur. Experience, in this sense, is in effect a system of relationships.[13] "Ces experiences pures existent et se succedent, entrent dans des rapports infinement varies les unes avec les autres, rapports qui sont eux-meme des parties essentielles de la trame des experiences. Il y a 'Conscience' de ces rapports au meme titre qu'il y a 'Conscience' de leurs terms."[14]

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[13] Lamprecht, op. cit., p. 459.

[14] James, op. cit., p. 226.

What James did in Essays in Radical Empiricism was to expand his psychological theory of consciousness into a metaphysical doctrine of pure experience, and he tried to overcome the dualism of individual consciousness and universal consciousness as well as of subject and object, body-mind.

We have now surveyed James' theory of reality and its development. Let us review briefly the development of his metaphysical ideas. James started his meditation from the immediate evidence of self-consciousness. He analysed introspectively the naive, immediate consciousness and grasped it as a continuous flux of multiplicities of sensations, of interpenetrating qualities. He developed this ideas of "the stream of consciousness" and came to the idea of "pure experience." James frequently argued as though experience and conscious experience were the same thing.[15] James elevates the concept of experience to the rank of the ultimate reality. It is an integral whole from which subject and object come out. "It is a that, an Absolute, a 'pure' experience on an enormous scale, undifferentiated and undifferentiable into thought and thing."[16] "As 'subject' we say that the experience represents: as 'object' it is represented. What represents and what is represented is here

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[15] Ibid., pp. 46-47, 65-66.

[16] Ibid., p. 134.

numerically the same.... Its subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely, realized only when the experience is 'taken,' i. e., talked-of, twice, considered along with its two different contexts respectively.... The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the 'pure' experience. It is only virtually or potentially either object or subject as yet."[17] The difference of subject and object or thought and thing is, therefore, nothing but functional and not substantive. "Les attributes sujet et objet, represente et representatif, chose et pense, signifient donc une distinction pratique qui est de la derniere importance, mais qui est d'ordre FONCTIONNEL seulement, et nullement ontologique comme le dualisme classique se la represente...."[18]

We may distinguish three stages in the development of his philosophy. The pluralism of the Psychology (1890); his theory of "pure experience" (1904-5); and finally the theory of "compenetration" of the moments of experience with each other, in the last three years of his life.[19]

This relational theory of consciousness afforded the possibility of escape from the solipsism and also from dualism. For this

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17 Ibid., p. 23.

18 Ibid., p. 232.

Purpose James intended to be very faithful to experience itself. "To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced."[20]

According to the scheme of James' metaphysics, "consciousness" equals "experience" equals "reality," and they are temporal. "...reality is created temporally day by day." "Experience in its immediacy seems perfectly fluent..., 'pure experience' is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of life."[21] "Je crois que la conscience...comme fluide, inétendu..., que cette conscience est une pure chimere, et que la somme de réalitiés concrètes...."[22]

We have noted that the essential features of reality in his metaphysics are, at the same time, those of time, because reality is fundamentally temporal. Temporality is thus the principle of all consciousness, or pure experience, and therefore, reality.

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19 Perry named these three stages as psychological, phenomenalistic and metaphysical. The Spirit of William James (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), Ch., III.

20 James, Essays..., P. 201.

21 Ibid., p. 93.

22 Ibid., p. 222.

Time occupies a central position in James' philosophy, not only in his metaphysics as we have already mentioned, but in his epistemology too, since truth is not absolute for James, but is relative to the process of verification. Pragmatism puts the basis of its theory in experience which depends, in turn, on evolution and experiments. "Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its validity is the process of its validation."[23]

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[23] William James, Pragmatism (New York: Longmans, Green And Co., 1919), p. 201.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF TIME

According to Millic Capek, "A future historian of ideas will consider James and Bergson as two founders and initiators of a new fresh movement in human thought to which Arthur Lovejoy has given a very appropriate name — temporalism."[1] Several great figures in the philosophy of the present and recent past, James and Bergson, Whitehead and Alexander, Husserl and Heidegger, have advocated this movement which stresses the importance of time and temporal considerations for metaphysics. Among these philosophers, James and Bergson are the initiators and have an important position because of their concept of time. Both developed almost same idea coincidently and gave remarkably new interpretations of time.

What is the concept of time for James? What is the nature and significance of the problem of time for James? How did James answer the traditional puzzles inherent in the problem of time?

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1 Capek, op. cit., p. 331.

I. GENERAL CHARACTER OF JAMES' IDEAS OF TIME

We can classify historical ideas of time into three main types. Time is considered as (1) the period between one event and another event, (2) the continual change by which the present becomes the past, (3) the indefinite sphere (field) in which the series of events develops, but which itself was given already as a whole and indivisible entity to thought (either it exists by itself as Newton and Clarke said or it exists only in thinking as Leibniz and, particularly, Kant said). James belongs in this second category.

James' idea of time has two distinguishing characters. First of all, his concept can be classified as psychological in the sense that time is originally and fundamentally found in consciousness. Secondly, he conceived time as a fundamental principle of reality. Reality itself is not static or permanent, but it is flowing and changing endlessly: that is, reality is inherently temporal.

All aspects of James' theory of time depend on his important discovery of the "stream of consciousness." Time is, like a stream of consciousness, a constantly changing and never-interrupted continuous flux. He said:

> The stream of our thought is like a river. On the whole easy simple flowing predominates in it, the drift of things is with the pull of gravity, and effortless attention is the rule.[2]

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[2] William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover Publication, Inc., 1950), II. p. 45.

Therefore it was impossible for James to reduce time to mathematical and quasi-spatial schemata. Time was to him the intrinsic quality of pastness, the all-at-onceness of the immediate present, the about-to-be of the impending future, or the continuous transition from moment to moment.

> Life is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected; often indeed, it seems to be there more emphatically, as if our spurts and sallies forward were the real firing-line of the battle, were like the thin line of flame advancing across the dry autumnal field which the farmer proceeds to burn. In this line, we live prospectively as well as retrospectively. The line itself is part of future, because the future, when it comes, will have continued it. At every moment, therefore, we can continue to believe in an existing beyond. This beyond can exist simultaneously -- since it can be experienced to have so existed -- with the experience that postulates it by looking forward to it, or by turning in the direction of what it is the goal.[3]

The Present, therefore, can not be a mathematical point. Mathematical time is not a real time but an abstraction by conceptual manipulation.

> Let anyone try, I will not say to arrest, but to notice or attend to, the present moment of time. One of the most baffling experiences occurs. Where is it, this present? It has melted in our grasp, fled ere we could touch it, gone in the instant of becoming.... The practically cognized present is no knife edge, but a saddleback, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and stern, as it were, a rearward -- and forward -- looking end.[4]

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[3] James, Essays in Radical..., p. 87.

[4] James, The Principles..., II. p. 608.

James considers time as perceptual flux. It is not a homogeneous continuity, that is, a horizontal or spacial continuity but a heterogeneous one which brings novelties always.

> Time keeps budding into new moments, every one of which presents a content which in its individuality never was before and never will be again.... The ever-lasting coming of concrete novelty into being is so obvious that the rationalizing intellect, bent ever on explaining what is by what was, and having no logical principle but identity to explain by, treats the perceptual flux as a phenomenal illusion, resulting from the unceasing re-combination in new forms of mixture, of unalterable elements, coeval with the world.[5]

Novelty, which is the fundamental character of time, is spoiled always by a conceptual approach to time.

> This novelty finds no representation in the conceptual method, for concepts are abstracted from experiences already seen or given and he who uses them to divine the new can never do so but in ready-made and ancient terms. Whatever actual novelty the future may contain..., escapes conceptual treatment altogether.[6]

> Conception knows no way of explaining save by deducing the identical from the identical, so if the world is to be conceptually rationalized no novelty can really come.[7]

The attempt to grasp time by concepts has necessarily failed. Time cannot be comprehended by concepts.

> That concepts are secondary formations, inadequate, and only ministerial..., that they falsify as well as omit, and

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[5] James, Some Problems..., p. 148.

[6] Ibid., p. 98.

[7] Ibid., p. 152.

> make the flux impossible to understand.... When we substitute concepts for percepts, we substitute their relations also. But since the relations of concepts are of static comparison only, it is impossible to substitute them for the dynamic relations with which the perceptual flux is filled.... The one is no full measure of the other, essential features of the flux escaping whenever we put concepts in its place.[8]

Thus conceptual treatment of time leads necessarily to paradox and incomprehensibility. The paradoxes of Zeno, according to James, comes from these conceptual apprehensions of time.

> In conceptual translation, however, a continuum can only stand for elements with other elements between them as infinitum, all separately conceived; and such an infinite series can never be exhausted by sucessive addition. From the time of Zeno the Eleatic, this intrinsic contradictoriness of continuous changes has been one of the worst skulls at intellectualism's banquet.[9]

Of course, concepts have, in James, "raison de l'être" in practical usage. They are necessary for guiding life.

> ...thought proper must have had an exclusively practical use. Men classed thir sensations, substituting concepts for them, in order to 'work them for what they were worth,' and to prepare for what might lie ahead.... Concepts not only guide us over the map of life, but we revalue life by their use.[10]

But as intellectual and discursive thinking is inapt for grasping reality, so time cannot be apprehended by a conceptual and logical mode of thinking. Because,

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[9] Ibid., p. 81.
Ibid., p. 88.

[10] Ibid., pp. 63, 71.

> The intellectual life of man consists almost wholly in his substitution of a conceptual order for the perceptual order in which his experience originally comes.[11]

To gain insight into moving life, we must run away from conceptual understanding and toward perception.

> The perceptual flux is but what is immediately is.... It shows duration, intensity, complexity or simplicity, interestingness, excitingness, pleasantness or their opposites.[12]

Time is, as reality, what is immediately given in experience. It is the experience-continuum.

Experience, in its immediacy, seems perfectly fluent. But when we are governed by practical interests, by the need of action, we "spacialize" in Bergson's language, the flowing continuum and treat it, in retrospective terms, conceptually. But if we wish to grasp the actual sense of life, if our purpose is insight and direct knowledge of reality, we must immerse ourselves in the temporal flux; the changing, interpenetrating particulars of given experience that form the experience-continuum.

The most characteristic feature of James' idea of time is the concept of novelty in temporality. According to James, time is novelty, which relates to the idea of irreversibility of time.

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[11] Ibid., p. 51.

[12] Ibid., p. 49.

> What has been will not, cannot, be again. Time moves on with an unfaltering tread, and never strikes twice an identical hour.... Time keeps budding into new moments, every one of which presents a content which in its individuality never was before and will never be again. [13]

When we grasp time in its naive immediacy, which reveals itself in the pure experience, it is a continuous flux of ceaseless changes. It is not a repetition of the same quality, but a ceaseless production of new qualities.

> ...within experience, phenomena come and go. There are novelties; there are losses. The world seems, on the concrete and proximate level at least, really to grow. [14]

It is clear, therefore, that time is not a continuity of homogeneous quantity but a continuity of heterogenous qualities, of which consciousness is composed. Time is something new, unique, and original in each moment and can not be predicted beforehand. It produces something new in each moment, and thus it is a principle of creation.

> Our 'multiuniverse'still makes a 'universe.' [15]

> The everlasting coming of concrete novelty into being is so obvious....[16]

How, then, did James argue the most difficult problem inherent in all psychological ideas of time, namely, how subjective, individual consciousness relates to the universal consciousness, if it exists?

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[13] Ibid., p. 148

[14] Ibid., p. 46.

[15] Ibid., p. 145.

[16] Ibid., p. 149.

In other words, how can get the objectivity and individuality of time from the particular, individual consciousness or experience of time? And how do they relate to each other? This problem was already answered principally when James advocated pure experience as an original reality from which subject and object or thoughts and things emerge. Time which reveals itself in the pure experience is neither subject nor object, but primordial, neutral and universal too.

James tried to solve this problem by the assumption of an universal consciousness and of a continuity of all consciousness. In his Essays in Radical Empiricism, he holds that the same percept may be an aspect of both physical and mental entities. Likewise, he maintains that the same percept may be an element of more than one consciousness. It is possible that any of my thoughts may be a part, not merely of my consciousness, but also of some higher and more inclusive consciousness. Thus there would appear to be the possibility of a world-soul embracing in one inclusive consciousness the thought of all human beings.

> Out of my experience, such as it is (and it is limited enough), one fixed conclusion dogmatically emerges, and that is this, that we with our lives are like islands in the sea, or like trees in the forest. The maple and the pine may wisper to each other with their leaves, and Conanicut and Newport hear each other's foghorns. But the trees also commingle their roots in the darkness underground, and the islands also hang together through the ocean's bottom. Just so there is continuum

> of cosmic consciousness, against which our individuality builds out accidental fences, and into which our several minds plunge as in a mother-sea or reservoir.[17]

If we substitute "experience" for this consciousness, all the above statements may apply to experience. James expanded the concept of experience to all beings and recognized the same quality of experience in all beings.

> I firmly disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is the highest form of experience extant in the universe. I believe rather that we stand in much the same relation to the whole of the universe as our canine and feline pets do to the whole of human life.[18]

Besides, James already suggested another way of solution when he thought of consciousness as function. For Bergson and Sartre, consciousness is not thought of merely as functional but as a conscious being or entity. They faced, consequently, the difficulty of explaining how an individual consciousness relates to the supposed impersonal und universal consciousness. James avoids this difficulty by admitting degrees of functioning in each consciousness and regards all consciousness as the same from the view-point of functional activity. In other words, the consciousness of one individual is the same as another's as a functional point of view and thus it communicates with the impersonal and universal consciousness from this angle.

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17 William James, As William James Said, Edited by E. R. Aldrich. (New York: Vanguard Press, 1942), p. 213.

18 James, Pragmatism, pp. 299-300.

19 Sartre, J. P., L'être et le néant (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), pp. 159-196.

In the same way, James avoided the difficulty by extending the meaning of consciousness to the notion of "pure experience," as we have already mentioned. Subject and object, or thought and things, are nothing but two different aspects of one immediately given reality and they differ from each other functionally because of their practical necessity. Time, therefore, is not merely subjective nor objective in its original state, but is grasped subjectively or objectively according with our interests.

How did he treat the problem of discontinuity or discreteness in experiences of time. James said that time in the stream of consciousness appears as discontinuous or discrete as well as continuous.

> In the experience of watching empty flow — 'empty' to be taken hereafter in the relative sense just set forth — we tell it off in pulses. We say 'now, now, now,' or we count 'more, more, more,' as we feel it bud. This composition out of unities is called the law of time's discrete flow. The discreteness is, however, merely due to the fact that our successive acts of recognition or appreception of what it is are discrete. The sensation is as continuous as any sensation can be.... The original paragon and prototype of all conceived time is the specious present, the short duration of all which we are immediately and incessantly sensible.... Let us sum up, now, by saying that we are constantly conscious of a certain duration — the specious present — varying in length from a few seconds to probably not more than a minute, and that this duration...is the original intuition of time. Longer times are conceived by adding, shorter ones by dividing, portions of this vaguely bounded unit, and are habitually thought by us symbolically. Kant's notion of an intuition of objective time as an infinite necessary continuum has nothing to support it. The case of the intuition which we really have cannot be the duration of our brain-processes or our mental changes. That duration is rather the object of the intuition which, being realized at every moment of such duration,

must be due to a permanently present cause. This cause--- probably the stimultaneous presence of brain-processes of different phases -- fluctuates; and hence a certain range of variation in the amount of the intuition, and in its subdivisibility accrues. [20]

This view meant not merely that we perceive time as if it were discontinuous but that because of the way that we perceive it, time was considered as discontinuous.

'Infinitum in actu perttransire nequit,' said scholasticism; and every continuous quantum to be gradually traversed is conceived as such an infinite. The quickest way to avoid the contradiction would seem to be to give up that conception, and to treat processes of change no longer as being continuous, but as taking place by finite not infinitesimal steps, like the successive drops by which a cask of water is filled, when whole drops fall it at once or nothing. 21

Time itself comes in drops. [22]

James divided the stream of consciousness into "substantive part" and "transitive part."

As we take, in fact, a general view of the wonderful stream of our consciousness, what strikes us first is this different pace of its parts, like a bird's life, it seems to be made of an alternation of flights and perchings.... Let us call the resting place the "substantive parts," and the places of flight the "transitive parts," of the stream of thought. [23]

What he means by these distinctions is that, when we try to perceive the time, we stop this flux and perceive it as a succession of discrete unities, and the transitive parts, that is, the flux itself,

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20 James, Principles..., I. p. 622.

21 James, Some Problems..., p. 172.

22 James, A Pluralistic..., p. 232.

23 James, Principles..., p. 243.

cannot be grasped by introspection.

> How it is very difficult, introspectively, to see the transitive parts for what they really are. If they are but flights to a conclusion, stopping them to look at them before the conclusion is reached is really annihilating them.... As a snowflake crystal caught in the warm hand is no longer a crystal but a drop, so, instead of catching the feeling of relation moving to its term, we find we have caught some substantive thing, usually the last word we were pronouncing, statically taken.... And the challenge to produce these psychoses, which is sure to be thrown by doubting psychologists at anyone who contends for their existence, is as unfair as Zeno's treatment of the advocates of motion.[24]

Undoubtly the true nature of time consists in these flying transitive parts of "the stream of thought," and these discrete parts of it are nothing but derivative facts added to the original and fundamental continuity of flux.

> If we represent the actual time-stream of our thinking by an horizontal line, the thought of the stream or of any segment of its length, past, present, or to come, might be figured in a perpendicular raised upon the horizontal at a certain point.[25]

We have now surveyed the general characteristic of James' ideas of time. Before we can discuss the nature of time further, we should clarify two different meanings of consciousness of time for James, namely, the consciousness which flows and the consciousness which is conscious of this flux.

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[24] Ibid., I. pp. 243, 244.

[25] Ibid., I. p. 629.

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[24] Ibid., I, pp. 249, 250.

[25] Ibid., I, p. 250.

> ...between the mind's own change being sucessive, and knowing their own sucession, lies as broad a chasm as between the object and subject of any case of cognition in the world. [20]

The former consciousness is a temporal sequence itself and its essential nature is continuity. On the other hand, the latter one is a consciousness of time, and is discontinuous and discrete. In an earlier stage, James was concerned himself with this latter aspect of consciousness and discussed an intentional character of consciousness. But with the increasing of his concern about metaphysical problems, he tended to treat consciousness not merely as an experience of time but as a "pure experience," not merely a necessary condition of experience but also of reality. And for James this flowing, continuous consciousness is fundamentally temporal and the original time.

> The discreteness is, however, merely due to the fact that our successive acts of recognition or apperception of what it is are discrete.... The sensation is as continuous as any sensation can be. [27]

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[26] Ibid., I. p. 623.

[27] Ibid., I. p. 622.

II. CONSCIOUSNESS AS TEMPORALITY

James intended his theory to provide a satisfactory solution for the problem of the immediately experienced continuity of consciousness. Continuity here is not understood in the mathematical sense, but is meant to designate organic or dynamic connection. It will be shown that continuity of consciousness is identical with that of an immanental time.

He started the argument from an immediately given inner experience and discovered that the principal fact of conscious life is the continuity and coherence of this life. Consciousness appears unbroken as it is immediately experienced and as the experiencing subject is aware of it in a "naive" way, that is, without or before resorting to reflection and introspective observation.

> The first fact for us, then, as psychologists, is that thinking of some sort goes on. I used the word thinking..., for every form of consciousness indiscriminately. [28]

> Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it present itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' or 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. [29]

Thus the continuity of the stream of consciousness or thought is an unbroken transition from one phase to another which is felt

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[28] Ibid., I. p. 224.

[29] Ibid., I. p. 239.

[28] Ibid., I, p. 254.

[29] Ibid., I, p. 259.

and experienced, in that past and future are organically united into the present. The present state appears in its inner constitution tinged by the reference which it contains to the present state, and every act experienced in the present also contains a certain foretaste, a certain anticipation, however vague and indeterminate, of what is going occur.

The present phase of conscious life is prevaded by reminiscences and expectancies.

> Our feelings are not thus contracted, and our consciousness never shrinks to the dimensions of a glow-worm spark. The knowledge of some other part of the stream, past or future, near or remote, is always mixed in with our knowledge of the present thing. 30

The present, thus, has reminiscences which have been present, that is, which had the temporal character of an "actual now," but no longer have it, being only retained as "having just been an actual now." Likewise, it has an expectancy of something which will be present, that is, which will have the temporal character of a "now," but which does not yet have it, being only anticipated as something which "will have an actual now soon." All these retentions and protentions are interconnected and interrelated so as to make every retention appear as a retention of a less remote one. From this James concluded that the real and actual present is not a "knife-edge."

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30 Ibid., I. p. 606.

There is no mental state which is entirely confined to the "present" and does not contain some elements pointing both to the past and the future.

One may see that the permanently experienced continuity of consciousness must be conceived in terms of temporality. The continuity is bestowed upon consciousness and therefore consciousness appears as a flow or a stream. Continuity and temporality are then two names for the same fundamental structure of conscious-life.

Besides Bergson and Husserl, it is James to whom we are indebted for the insight into the continuity and temporality of conscious life and the stream of character of the latter. This experienced continuity of conscious life cannot accounted for in terms of empiricistic psychology. Aiming at an introspective account more complete and more comprehensive than that of the traditional empiricists, James is the first Western thinker to call attention to the phenomena of imageless thought.

> The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms of water. Even were the pails and the pots all actually standing in the stream, still between them the free water would continue to flow. It is just this free water of consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook. Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows around it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead.[31]

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[31] Ibid., I. p. 255.

James explained this theory in relation to the physiology of the brain. That is, the intrinsic relationship between the experience of time and the transitive parts appear most clearly in the hypothesis which James advances as to the physiological facts underlying both phenomena. At every moment, brain-processes of different degrees of excitement occur together. While one of these processes is in the phase of maximal excitement, others have just been in this phase and now are warning, still others are waxing. All these processes overlap each other and thus form the total consition of the brain which corresponds to the total mental state experienced at that time. The submaximally excited processes underly both the "specious present" and the "transitive states" and form their cerebral substratum. [32]

James' assertion of his view of consciousness as a conscious stream, and his ideas of "transitive parts" in which this streamlike continuity appears and upon which it rests, brought him to the new idea of time. "Transitive parts" are pre-perceptive experiences of continuity: It is through them that the mental state, into which they enter as ingredients, appears connected with and linked to both what came before and what is to come after.[33] Since in the realm of con-

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[32] Ibid., I. pp. 246, 257, 635.

[33] Ibid., I. p. 255.

sciousness everything is what is appeared as and is experienced to be, the "transitive parts" by virtue of being experiences of continuity and temporality may be said to constitute this very continuity and temporality. Consequently every mental state consisting, although not compounded of, "substantive" and "transitive" parts appears, due to the latter, in continuity with other mental states and is experienced as pertaining to the conscious stream and as forming a phase of this stream. The "transitive parts" thus bestow a temporal aspect upon every mental state. Every mental state has duration on the one hand and is on the other hand intergrated into a temporal order, which is the continuous stream of conscious life. Temporality thus becomes the substance of consciousness. Whenever consciousness appears as a temporal flux, it is because of the omnipresence of specific facts through which at every moment time is experienced.[34]

What underlies the doctrine of the "transitive parts" is evidently a new conception of consciousness, the definition of consciousness in terms of temporality. Temporality was discovered thus as the fundamental structure of conscious life. James, however, was not content with generally and abstractly stating temporality as an all-important and characteristic fact of consciousness like Sartre or of human existence like Heidegger.[35] James tried to verify this

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[34] Ibid., I. p. 243

[35] Sartre, op. cit., pp. 150-218., Heidegger, M. Sein und Zeit (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1941), pp. 323-423.

fundamental feature of consciousness by pointing out concrete specific facts through which time and continuity are experienced psychologically. Accordingly, the brain-processes are conceived so that what underlies the specific psychic facts in question appears as a cause present at every moment. "Transitive part" has two meanings and accomplished a double function. First, "transitive parts" are immediate and pre-perceptive experiences of continuity and temporality; and they constitute this very temporal continuity. Second, it stands for imageless thought in the broad sense. Thus imagelessness and transitiveness in consciousness are two aspects of the same phenomena. Every mental fact which bears one of these features also exhibits the other. The genuine experiences of continuity, transition, etc., are in fact devoid of images and fall under the concept of imageless thought. On the other hand, the mental experience, characterized by the fact that images are either absent from it, or, if present, are irrelevant to its spedific nature, is an experience of continuity and transition.

Thus the essential nature and structure of consciousness is temporality and the main differences among conscious states can be found only in their pace. There are phases of comparative rest and phases of flight. There are psychological facts grasped in the immediacy of experience.

III. DIALECTIC NATURE OF TIME

As the theory of "substantive parts" and "transitive parts" of stream of consciousness suggest, James realized one of difficulties in time problem; the dilemma of the continuity and discontinuity of the temporal sequences. Whenever we try to apprehend time as consciousness and through consciousness, we inevitably confront this problem. Aristotle tried to solve this puzzle by attributing some special nature to "Now", namely, "Now" is not a part of time, nor is in time, but is something through which past and future are bound.[36] Augustine tried to settle this problem by reducing time to something mind and considered the continuity of time as the continuity of mind.[37] Kierkegaard also attributed a special quality to this "instant" and said. "Der Augenblick erweist sich nun als das wunderliche Wesen, ... welches zwischen Bewegung und Ruhe liegt, ohne in irgendeiner Zeit zu sein, und in diesem und aus diesem heraus schlägt das Bewegende in Ruhe um, und das Ruhende in Bewegung."[38]

James points out this paradoxical nature of time; that is, the conception of the sameness can arises only in an absolute irreversible stream of consciousness whose successive sections are

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[36] Aristotle, op. cit., 220. a. 14.

[37] Augustine, op. cit., pp. 220-202.

[38] Kierkegaard, Der Begriff Angst. Übersetzt. von. E. Hirsch. p. 84.

never identical. The conception of sameness is the same feeling, but in the mental flux, nothing returns. There are no recurrent psychological states.[39] But James proved in analyzing a concrete case that the antinomy is only apparent, arising from an attempt to express the dialectical structure of the temporal flux in isolated and mutually exclusive terms. The temporal fluidity is at the same time continuous and discrete, one and many, enduring and perishing, memory and novelty. All features appear contradictory and mutually exclusive and discrete only when they are carved out of concrete temporal experiences and expressed in isolated concepts and separate statements, while as a concrete intuition they not only do not exclude each other, but each is a necessary condition of the other. Also the judgment of sameness implies recognition. Recognition means activity of memory bringing the past idea into the focus of the present moment. But the very effort of "bringing into the present moment" adds an element of novelty which creates the difference between the idea originally perceived and the same idea recongized later. The reproduced idea, consequently, is no more the same in spite of its recognition, or because of its recognition.

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[39] James, Principles..., I. pp. 229-232.

These are the psychological explanations of the discontinuity of time. Time is, for James, continuous if we experience as it is without any purpose to grasp it intellectually or conceptually, but for the consciousness which is conscious of it, time appears as if were discontinuous.

What is, then, his metaphysical explanation of this problem? In other words, how did he conceive the intrinsic pastness and futureness independent of the present? If past and future are nothing but past and future of the present, how can the modality of both be established from the present?

As we have already mentioned, the present moment in James is not an infinitely thin instant, but a thick temporal whole tinged with "immediate recency." According to him, the distinctly intuited present merges into an penumbra of mere dim recency before it is turned into a penumbra which is simply reproduced and conceived.[40] In other words, there are two kinds of past for James. One directly intuited inside of the sensible present, and the second outside of the volume of the present which can be only indirectly reproduced, not immediately grasped. A returning recollection is a simple present state, symbolizing a more distant past.

James was, of course, aware that the volume of the present

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[40] Ibid., I. p. 636.

is elastic, that its breadth varies and is different for different categories of sensation. He thought that its "backyard edge" is dim and that no sharp cut separates the immediate memory from the absolute past. However, he judged that, beyond this dim rim of the "immediate memory" which can condense only twelve seconds of the "public time," the past escapes the direct reach of our consciousness. While an impression, or, a certain mental quality which occured eleven seconds ago, still dimly persists on the hazy edge of our specious present, all that is beyond this rim is literally dead and perished forever, which James called the "genuine past."

For James, thus, the past beyond the edge of the specious present is dead and gone forever. All the past preceeding our sensible present exists only symbolically in actual cerebral modification. As far as its true mental ontological status is concerned, it is forever lost in the abyss of non-being. Only the immediate past is real, being perceived at the edge of the "specious present."

The theory of the stream of thought is, in this point, influenced by Renouvier's concept of discrete changes involving a radical annihiliation and subsequent "ex nihilo creation." James adopted Renouvier's idea of the absolute destruction of the past followed by a no less absolute creation of the present. In truth

the vanishing of the past is only relative, as is the novelty of the present. Novelty and retention of the past are, thus, two acts of a single dynamic process of time. The irreversibility of time is possible only when the past is preserved integrally.[41] Memory is preserving and creating at the same time and the act by which novelty emerges from the past is also the act of retaining the immediately proceeding moment.

James' duration is, therefore, essentially immanent and continuous within consciousness. Past does not have a metaphysical character like Bergson's ideas of time, nor the "ekstatisch" nature of Heidegger's time. The dialectical character of time can be discussed only when we are concerned with the epistemological status of consciousness.

James did not expound the metaphysical meaning of the dialectical nature of time. As a empiricist and also as a scientist, he did not draw the obvious conclusion from this analysis of the feeling of sameness, namely, that the irreversibility of time is impossible without a complete preservation of the past. He did not deduce the ontological meaning of past from the psychological phe-

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[41] Bergson said same thing. "Retenir ce qui n'est déjà plus, anticiper sur ce qui n'est pas encore, voilà donc premiere fonction de la conscience." L'Energie Spirituelle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1946), p. 5.

nomena of the past, and consequently, he failed to explain the principle of the creative processes of reality. There is no logical connection between his psychological time and ontological time.

The strictly empirical approach of James to the problem of time made him refrain from anything beyond a concrete and immediate introspective statements. As a consequence of his epistemological approach to time, the general character of his idea of time was oriented to the presentness, in contrast to future-oriented time as in Heidegger's philosophy and past-oriented time as in Bergson's view. [42]

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[42] Heidegger, op. cit., p. 331., Bergson, Matière et Mémoire (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1946), p. 166.

CHAPTER IV

COMPARISON

In this chapter we will compare James' pragmatism with the views of other pragmatists, particularly with those of Peirce and Dewey, and James' ideas of time with those of other temporalists, Bergson and Heidegger.

Pragmatism was developed in various ways by F. C. S. Schiller, George Herbert Mead and John Dewey. In addition to the works of authentic pragmatists, the pragmatic method was adopted widely in every field.[1] But Dewey is the most important writer among them because of his comprehensive systematization of pragmatism and his actual influence upon other thinkers. Unifing the theory of Peirce and Schiller, he applied pragmatism to education, ethics, aesthetics and political theory and obtained remarkable results.

Among the temporalists, Bergson and Heidegger expounded quite characteristic theories of time. This is the reason why we chose them for the purpose of comparison with James.

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[1] Morris, L. William James (New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1950), pp. 83-91.

I. OTHER PRAGMATISTS

A. Peirce

1. Peirce's Pragmatism.

Peirce protested against James' version of Pragmatism. He refused to accept the emotional gratifications of some beliefs as relevant to judgment upon the truth of those beliefs. That is, he protested that emotional gratifications vary with the personalities and temperaments of those who weigh the worth of beliefs. Truth, however, must be public and not private. Also truth is not equivalent to utility, because utility depends on the needs and interests of individuals and truth must be same for all individuals. Thus, Peirce even proposed to abandon the term pragmatism because of its indiscriminate use and suggested that he might better speak of his strict logical theory as "Pragmaticism."

Thus Peirce restricted pragmatism into the theory of meaning: "Pragmatism is not a Weltanschauung but is a method of reflection having for its purpose to render ideas clear." It is not even a theory of truth, but merely a technique for ascertaining the meaning of conceptions. If pragmatism "really made Doing to be the Be-all and the End-all of life, that would be its death."[2]

For Peirce, pragmatism is exclusively a method of logic.[3]

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[2] Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), 5. 428.

[3] Ibid., 5. 16.

suggested partly by the methods of the mathematical and natural sciences. It is a logical tool. Philosophers should deal with these problems as intellectual problems, unaffected as far as possible by personal feelings and loyalties, no matter how important and necessary these might seems to him to be for the practical use of life. In this respect, James stands in marked contrast to Peirce. For James, most of our intellectual beliefs can be justified only on ground of their social, moral and biological utility, and purely intellectual considerations afford virtually no guidance to our beliefs, thus, the claims of our "emotional and volitional" nature should be allowed to decide what we shall believe. This anti-intellectual view stands naturally in definite opposition to the intellectual character of Peirce's view. For James, human mental life has an intimate relation with men's biological needs and functions. And the sole function of thought is primarily and originally to satisfy certain interests of the organism; and truth consists in such thinking as satisfies these interests.

As we have already mentioned, for Peirce, pragmatism is a method of clarifying conceptions or of getting at the distinctive meanings of words and statements, and contains no direct reference to tests of the truth or reasonableness of statements or beliefs. It is true that no statement or belief can be true unless its mean-

ing can be articulated by means of the pragmatist maxim, that is, unless it has effects that might conceivably have practical bearings. But the fact that a given belief has such bearing is no evidence of its being true or even of its being such as to be reasonably accepted. The "effects having practical bearings" of an unreasoned, or logically non-defensible, belief may well turn out to be beneficial and justifiable by some tests and standards other than intellectual. But according to Peirce, we have to distinguish carefully between the belief which has no room for logical justification and the beliefs whose consequences can be tested for truth or falisity by acknowledged intellectual and experimental methods.

Furthermore, in the doctrine of The Will to Believe, James approached the problem of thought from a psychological view-point. He is interested in thoughts as elements or phases in the life-history of this or that particular individual. The weak point of this view is that it tends to neglect the essential generality and publicity of our thinking; that is, we usually think of things which are, to some degree, of common or public interest -- things whose relevance is certainly not confined to their impact on some particular phase of some particular person's experience or life-history. Peirce continuously emphasized the publicity of our thinking.[4] He proved this

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[4] Ibid., 5. 402.

thesis by the fact that language guides and controls the greater part of our thinking.[5]

Let us summarize the main different points between Peirce and James. James differs from Peirce in two respects: (1). For Peirce the meaning of a concept is construed in terms of conduct, and not in terms of sensation. (2). It is construed in terms of generality and not in terms of particularity. James, on the other hand, identifies the meaning of a conception with the practical consequences of its being true, but then goes on to specify "consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected." Thus for James, experience is comparatively passive, and thought points to sensory acquaintance. Peirce on the other hand, interprets thought, not in terms of immediacies to which it leads, but in terms of operation and control. Peirce also emphasized generalization, the general application and acceptance of idea. For James, the significance of a concept lies in its leading into the field of particulars. Peirce emphasized coherence, order, and unity, while James puts stress on the individuality, variety and satisfaction of concrete interests. James did not appreciate Peirce's logico-mathematical elaboration. James wrote to Peirce that "I am sorry you are sticking so to formal logic."[6]

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[5] Ibid., 1. 349, 5. 535.

[6] Perry, The Thought..., II. p. 418.

Thus James' pragmatism was, first, a theory of truth as well as of meaning, whereas Peirce's conception of truth as "that upon which public opinion would finally settle" was independent of his pragmatism, which was a theory of meaning only. In the second place, for Peirce, the meaning of ideas consisted in general modes of rational conduct in a community of selves, whereas for James they consisted in the particular experiences of individual selves. Peirce's theory of meaning was both social and realistic. Peirce was a "scholastic realist." James' theory, on the other hand, was individualistic and nominalistic, though Peirce's influence held James back from a thoroughgoing nominalism. Peirce's pragmatism was absolute and admitted no supplementary fideism. He had, in fact, nothing but contempt for James' "will to believe."[7]

2. Peirce's Idea of Time.

Peirce placed emphasis on the practical significance of time and the distinction between past and future in their relation to conduct. The past facts are facts we cannot alter, future facts are facts over which we have some measure of control, and present facts are those we are currently engaged in endeavouring to control. He pointed out that time is real and that this involves a certain indeterminateness in the future.

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[7] Peirce, op. cit., 5. 5.

> That Time is a particular variety of objective Modality is too obvious for argumentation. The past consists of the sum of faits accomplis, and this Accomplishment is the Existential Mode of Time.[8]

For Peirce, the mode of existence of past is actual and it is a real and vital factor in the concrete world.

> For the Past really acts upon us, and that it does, not at all in the way in which a law or Principle influences us, but precisely as an Existent object acts..., that the mode of the Past is that of Actuality.[9]

However, as for the future it can not be a real and actual same as present and past are.

> Nothing of the sort is true of the future.... Your necessitarianism is a theoretical pseudo-belief -- a make-believe belief -- that such a sentence does not express the real truth.... Be it true in theory or not, the unsophisticated conception is that everything in the Future is either destined, i. e., necessitated already, or is undecided, the contingent future of Aristotle. In other words, it is not Actual, since a law acts; but is either Necessary or Possible, which are of the same mode since Negation being outside the category of modality cannot produce a variation in Modality.... as for the Present instant, it is so inscrutable that I wonder whether no sceptic has ever attacked its reality.[10]

These views evidently suggest Peirce's pragmatic approach to the problem of time. At least he applied the maxim of pragmatism to this problem.

> Pragmatism consists in holding that the purport of any concept is its conceived bearing upon our conduct. How, then, does the past bear upon conduct?[11]

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[8] Ibid., 5. 459.

[9] Ibid., 5. 459, I. 325.

[10] Ibid., 5. 459.

[11] Ibid., 5. 460.

Thus he analysed the concept of present, future and past according to this maxim and put the stress on the actuality of past and present in time.

As we have already mentioned, time is, for Peirce, something real, a unique and vital principle of reality. He said:

> But how is Temporal Modality distinguished from other Objective Modality? Not by any general character since Time is unique and sui generis. In other words there is only one Time. Time, therefore, can only be identified by brute compulsion. But we must not go further.[12]

However, he avoided discussing the nature of time itself. Peirce, unlike James, admitted an independent, objective existence of time outside us and considered it as some vital force. But he did not expound this ontological time either psychologically, like James, or metaphysically, and he restricted himself to the description of time phenomena in terms of pragmatic maxims.

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[12] Ibid., 5. 463.

B. Dewey

1. His Metaphysics.

Dewey's "instrumentalism" is no less radical than James' pragmatism in rejecting traditional metaphysical and epistemological conceptions, which he conceived as aiming at ultimate realities lying behind and also beyond the process of nature. He revolted against research into these realities by means of transcendental modes of thinking. For Dewey, such problems have no meaning and cannot, therefore, be solved. Reality, for him even more than for James, is an evolving thing, and not a completely given, ready-made, fixed system. Things are changing, growing and developing.[13]

The sole verifiable and fruitful object of knowledge is, therefore, the particular set of changes that generate the object of inquiry, together with the consequences that flow from it. Ontology, in this sense, arises out of our interests and its concerns are practical, living, moral and social questions.[14]

According to Dewey, human experience and reality are not alien; rather experience and nature are essentially continuous. The human organism has a dynamic connection with nature, and mind and nature, thought and action, are correlated with each other. Like James, Dewey thought of the participation of human beings in the

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[13] Dewey, John, Experience and Nature (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1929), p. 275.

[14] Dewey, John, Creative Intelligence (Henry Holt And Co., 1917), p. 55.

making of the world. That is, philosophy must become a method of moral and political diagnosis and prognosis -- the world is in the making, and we must help in the process. In this process, the thinking and beliefs of each conscious personal being plays an active part. Thinking, for Dewey, has a special mission. It is an instrument for the removal of collision between what is given and what is wanted -- a means of realizing human desire, of securing an arrangement of things which means satisfaction, fulfillment and happiness.[15] Such a harmony is the end and test of thinking. When the ideas, conceptions, hypotheses, and beliefs which we frame succeed, secure harmony and adjustment, they are called "true." Thus the test of a true idea lies in the harmonized reality effected by the idea. All things are what they are experienced as being. Things are experienced as known, but they are also experienced aesthetically, morally, economically and technologically.

Pragmatism for Dewey seems to be divided into two directions: namely pragmatism as a theory of meaning and truth and pragmatism applied to the theory of reality in the broadest sense. Pragmatism as epistemology is, for James, quite operationalistic, but the contribution of Dewey lies in his application of pragmatism to the theory of the relation between thinking and reality. "Instrumentalism" is

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15 Ibid., p. 66.

the extension of James' "pragmatism" into the whole field of human experience of nature.

2. Dewey's Pragmatism.

Dewey arrived at his version of the doctrine of "Instrumentalism" through the influence of Hegelian idealism, of James and later of Peirce. He describes his basic method as follows: "Instrumentalism is an attempt to constitute a precise logical theory of concepts, of judgments and inferences in their various forms, by considering primarily how thought functions in the experimental determination of future consequences." Dewey, thus, more rigorous, if less clear, than James, preferred to eliminate the concept of truth. In its stead he substituted a concept of "warranted assertibility," which, in conjunction with Peirce's pragmatic account of meaning, seemed to Dewey an adequate explication of the conditions of successful thinking.

The essential feature of pragmatism in its instrumentalist version is its reference to consequences. The term "pragmatic" means only the rule of referring all thinking, all reflective considerations, to consequences for final meaning and test.[16] Thus the meaning of a judgment consists of its anticipated consequences, and its truth is established by the actual verification of these. A judgment of any type -- including a categorical judgment of fact -- is to be construed

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16 Dewey, John, Essays in Experimental Logic (New York: Dover Publication Inc., 1953), p. 330.

as a set of hypothetical judgments embodying anticipated consequences of the judgment in question. And the consequences by which the meaning and truth of a judgment is tested are not restricted to those yielding an emotional or aesthetic satisfaction. He tried to formulate a theory of meaning and of truth which looked to the model of disinterested scientific inquiry. James on the other hand was concerned with concrete exigencies, the either-or decisions which are forced upon us, whereas Dewey was thinking of the long-run consequences which would follow from related trials of a given hypothesis.

At the earlier stage of his pragmatism, his operationalism seems to complement and reinforce his instrumentalism. Dewey quoted with approval Bridgman's contention that "we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations."[17] In his book, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, he tended to avoid the term "pragmatism" because of the many misconceptions associated with this label. But he stated in the "Preface" of this book that in the proper interpretation of "pragmatism," namely, the function of consequences as necessary tests of the validity of propositions and such as to resolve the specific problem evoking the operation, the text that follows is throughly pragmatic.

Let us summarize Dewey's criticism of James' pragmatism. Dewey

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17 Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Minton, Balca & Co., 1929), p. 209.

did feel greatly indebted to James' philosophy, but he acknowledges that James frequently lapsed, certainly in his vocabulary and probably in his thought, into the subjective attitude of the pre-biological school of psychologists. He also deplored the sentimentalism which James mixed up in a confusing way with his pragmatic ideas. In this sense Dewey was very much closer in his intellectual affiliations to Peirce's pragmaticism than to James' pragmatism.

Likewise, Dewey criticized James when James commended beliefs for the emotional satisfaction they produce in the minds of those who entertain them as finalities, and thus confused the genuinely pragmatic value of an idea and the quite non-pragmatic value of a belief. Dewey, therefore, labeled and called himself an "instrumentalist" or "experimentalist."

The interest of James is strongly metaphysical and religious, that of Dewey is strongly social and logical. James was influenced by British empiricism crossed with the voluntarism and fideism of Renouvier, Dewey has his roots in Hegel,[18] though he modified Hegel's abstract and idealistic approach of the reality to more natural and biological one. To James the ultimate vision is intuitive, while to

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18 Lamprecht pointed out three important influences of Hegel's ideas upon Dewey. (1). Dewey was led through his study of Hegel to reject the dualism between experience and nature. (2). Dewey learned from Hegel that thought participates in the historical process, and that it is one of the potent factors in shaping the course of events. Thought enters into the determination of what things become and hence truly are. (3). Dewey learned from Hegel that thought is a social affair and is a phase of culture. Lamprecht, S. P. op. cit., pp. 499-500.

Dewey it is discursive. With James the essence of life and experience can be grasped only in the living and in the experienced, and this conviction springs from the abundance and vividness of personal living and experience; whereas with Dewey the essence of things emerges only upon reflection, and this conviction springs from his characteristic and personal thoughtfulness.[19]

Before we enter into the subject of Dewey's conception of time, it is convenient to survey his concepts of experience, nature and consciousness. Dewey's metaphysics is more biological in character than any other philosophy since Aristotle. Nature is, according to his view, not a static, uniform, or homogeneous being, but a dynamic, growing process and real existence of history in its entirety. Experience is not coextensive with nature. Rather life or experience occurs within a system of nature. But Dewey extended the concept of experience from that of an interaction of organism and environment to the meaning of the natural scene, or of that portion of the natural world, within which the process of interaction of organism and environment occurs. Nature becomes experience in this sense. In Experience and Nature, the terms "nature," "experience" and "existence" are used almost interchangeably. Nature or reality are understood as the seat of potentialities which have been, are, and will be, actualized. In

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19 Perry, op. cit., II. p. 515.

experience, many of the characteristics and traits of nature are laid bare. Experience thus reaches down into nature, or possesses some portion of nature.

Since reality or nature is fundamentally temporal and historical, consciousness reveals the temporality of reality.

> The union of past and future with present manifest in every awareness of meaning is a mystery when consciousness is gratuitously divided from nature, and when nature is denied temporal and historic quality. When consciousness is connected with nature, the mystery becomes a luminous revelation of the operative interpenetration in nature of the efficient and the fulfilling.[20]

3. Dewey's Idea of Time.

Dewey's ideas of time can be found in his earlier writings. In his article, "Psychology as Philosophic Method" (Mind, Vol., XI, 1886), he explored the temporality of human experiences. Man's experience is a succession of "presents," in each of which he is conscious of a "before" and "after" external to the duration he then occupies.

> Dealing with an individual universe, one of whose functions is time, philosophy knows nothing about any consciousness which is out of relation to time.[21]

Thus Dewey thought of time as a fundamental feature of consciousness, and as with James, time is a necessary condition of individual consciousness.

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[20] Dewey, Experience..., pp. 352-353.

[21] Ibid., p. 167.

Dewey extended this basic conception to the doctrine of reality and regarded the world as unfinished, a world in the making. He is tireless in insisting that the real is in a constant process of change. All existences, all realities, are in transition just as human experiences are.

How, then, did Dewey think about the relation of this temporality as an individual experience to the flux of reality and how the temporal flux contains within itself the elements of stability needed for the construction of a temporalistic metaphysics?

Dewey's answer to this question is not always clear, partly because of his equivocal attitude towards metaphysics, partly because of his failure to draw the full implication of his temporalistic premise. In Experience and Nature, he considered experience as a component segment of nature and its characters as assignable by an assumption of continuity to the whole of nature. And the most distinct feature of experience is its temporality.

> The denotations that constitute experience point to history, to temporal process.... Anything denoted is found to have temporal quality and reference; it has movement from and towards within it; it is marked by waxings and wanings.... Objects of present experience have the actuality of a temporal procession, and accordingly reflection may assign things an order of succession within something which non-reflectively exists and is had.22

Nature, which includes experience, must be also temporal.

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22 Ibid., p. 26.

> If we trust to the evidence of experienced things, these traits (the precarious and the assured, the incomplete and the finished, the repetitious and the varying, the safe and sane and the hazardous) and the modes and tempos of their interaction with each other, are fundamental features of natural existence.[23]

All existents are in constant "passage." Those apparently permanent are those which undergo change extremely slowly.

> A thing may endure secula seculorum and yet not be everlasting; it will crumble before the gnawing tooth of time, as it exceeds a certain measure. Every existent is an event.[24]

It is quite evident that James and Dewey explored quite similar ideas about time. Both believed that the problem of time started from a naive and immediate experience and both considered temporality as a necessary condition of consciousness. They expanded this idea to include reality and grasped reality as everlasting flux, changing without any permanent substantial principle. And time as a flux in individual consciousness and time as the flux of the reality correspond and correlate with each other.

However, we could easily notice some basic differences between James' and Dewey's ideas of time. For James, time has a more psychological character. On the other hand, Dewey's time is more biological, sociological and ontological. Dewey said that "The problem is neither psychological nor epistemological..., it is metaphysical or existential."[25] For James temporality is primarily a necessary condition of mental life,

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[23] Ibid., p. 75.

[24] Ibid., p. 71.

[25] Ibid., p. 110

while for Dewey temporality is a principle of historicity.

II. OTHER TEMPORALISTS

A. Bergson

Bergson and James follow similar modes of thinking. For both philosophers, ultimate reality is grasped in the immediacy of experience. They find that thinking, since it distinguishes, specifies, and arrests, is alien to the genius of existence, which is inter-penetrative and flowing. Both men have the same sense of the copiousness of reality, and of the pathetic thinness of the concepts with which the human mind endeavors to represent it. They both reject the dualism of subject and object, and of body and mind, by appealing to a concrete reality that embraces both pairs of opposites. The true reality which is felt or intuited or experienced is a temporal, changing continuum from which the mind, governed by its practical necessity, selects what is relevant. These modes of philosophizing, the change of mental attitude from intellect to emotion, from spatial to temporal, from social and public to individual and personal, namely from conceptualized reality to true reality, proved that both have so-called "tough-minded" mentalities. Both show remarkable similarity in explaining the nature of time. Their difference is rather in their ways of explaining -- Bergson explicitly and systematically and James implicitely and fragmentally.

As we have already mentioned in Chapter II, the influences between James and Bergson were mutual, with the initiative passing

alternately from one to another. The notion of the "stream of thought," as well as that of "duree reelle," were established independently, though both philosophers already knew each other at that time.[26] Bergson himself was aware of how close his concept of duration was to that of James. However he was always ready to emphasize and even exaggerate the difference between himself and James on this point.[27]

What was considered by Bergson as a "basic difference"? He refers to the statement where James distinguished between "substantive" and "transitive" parts of the stream of consciousness. According to James, the main end of our thinking is at all times the attainment of some other substantive part than the one from which we have just been dislodged. And we may say that the main use of the transitive parts is to lead us from one substantive conclusion to another. By focusing our attention on the feeling of relation (the transitive parts), we arrest it in flight and transform it into something fixed and crystallized which has always a character of a sensory image. Thus by the act of introspective focusing, its real dynamic nature is destroyed.

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[26] Capek, op. cit., p. 332.

[27] In a letter to H. M. Kallen (published in The Journal of of Philosophy, Oct., 28, 1915), Bergson distinguished the metaphysical meaning of his notion of duration from the merely psychological meaning of James' stream of consciousness. Also in the letter to M. Delattre (Aug., 23, 1923), he speaks of this as a "fundamental difference."

Bergson criticised this idea of James and said, "I see in the 'resting places' themselves a 'place of flight' on which a fixed regard of attention confers an apparent immobility." That is, he mentioned that the "substantive parts" of the stream of consciousness were something static and resting. Bergson's attention seems to be caught exclusively by a metaphor "place of rest" and he overlooked the adjective "comparative" which James joined to the word.

For the consciousness, a substantive part, or "sensorial kernel," have naturally a certain temporal breadth. They are not instantaneous; they have a certain temporal whole even when they are glimpsed at once. No one was aware of this more clearly than James who emphasized that the shortest sensation lasts at least o.oo2 of a second. "At once" never amounts to a mathematical instant. The meaning of James' distinction is that while "substantive parts" are more easily observed and recalled, the transitive parts evaporate when the attention is focused on them. The moving surface between two successive crests would illustrate the "feeling of tendency" or "transitive parts" of the stream of thought.

Therefore the difference between James and Bergson does not consist in the fact that for James the "substantive parts" are immobile, while for Bergson they are moving. For both of them the immobility of the "substantive parts" is only relative. However, while for Bergson their apparent immobility is produced by the fix-

ing of our attention, for James it has foundation in a real differentiated structure of our consciousness. It is a difference between a homogeneous, undifferentiated, ever-flowing current and a stream on which a smooth surface alternates with whirls and waves.

Apparently, Bergson, more fascinated than James by the continuous fluidity of a metaphysical time, overlooked the relatively steady, though still temporal, whirl-like structure in the fluidity of the stream of consciousness. Bergson developed the idea of "tension" and "detension" of consciousness and duration, and seems at this point to approach James' idea.[28] But James puts the emphasis on the difference of paces of the duration according with the consciousness which is conscious of this duration, while Bergson thought of the difference in duration as a difference of degrees of tension and detension of consciousness itself.

When Bergson insisted on heterogeneity of duration of consciousness against homogeneous and mathematical continuity of time, he agreed with James about the discrete structure of psychological duration.[29] Psychological duration is not an amorphous fluidity, but a drop-like succession of temporal wholes which can be divided into two distinct groups. The first group consists of more or less clear

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[28] Bergson, Matière..., pp. 227-235.

[29] Bergson, H. Essai sur les données immédiates de la Conscience (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1946), pp. 90-92.

sensorial images, easily observed and recalled, which, being replicas of the direct sensorial impression, borrow their apparent immobility from the external objects which they represent. The second category is represented by the vague and fleeting "feeling of relation," "halos," "fringes," devoid of sensorial character, impossible to observe by a prolonged attention which disturbs and solidifies their fleeting mobility. Both the temporal pulsations of the stream of consciousness and the spurious immobility of the first group are rather imagined than directly experiences; only by an unconscious association with the idea of an external object do "the places of rest" appear static.

Thus both James and Bergson, while insisting on the continuity of time, admit at the same time its discrete structure. But this dialectical character of time, the heterogeneous continuity, was considered by James as an essential of the nature of the consciousness of time, while for Bergson, it is the nature of time itself.

Bergson took as his point of departure the logico-mathematical way of thinking, which, in neglecting real time, missed the very essence of things. James did not, as is commonly said, begin with experimental psychology, but rather with British empiricism, which, in neglecting felt relations, also missed the essence of things. In other words, while for Bergson the crucial truth was temporal passage, for James time was only one of many cases of that transitiveness or

continuity which was his crucial truth.

Both philosophers found the key to metaphysics in a certain aspect of conscious experience, namely, its continuity. James saw in this continuity a way of coping with hereditary difficulties of empiricism -- such as dualism, and the problem of one and many. Bergson, on the other hand, used it first as a means of correcting the abstract timelessness of intellectualistic view. Both attached importance to biological evolution, but with a difference. Bergson was more biological than James. Furthermore, James' biology was Darwinian -- stressing accidental origins, variations, adaptation and survivals; while Bergson's biology had more affinities with Lamarck and emphasized the dynamic and creative character of the vital impulse.

James and Bergson agreed, as against Peirce and Dewey, in assigning a cognitive role both to concepts and to immediate experience. So James thinks of concepts as cuts or excerpts from the continuum, while Bergson thinks of them as instantaneous fixations of the flux.

Bergson made a more radical attempt to purify our notion of time from all visual and geometrical imagery.[30] James, though he

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30 Bergson was very anxious to distinguish very sharply true time and its spatialized ones. He spoke of spatialized time as "temps spatialisé, temps mesurable, temps abstrait, temps quantité, temps mathematique," Bergson (Durée et Simultanéité, p. 63. L'Évolution Créatrice, p. 9. La Pensée et le mouvant, p. 3. Essai sur les...,pp. 85, 96.).

rejected the artificial concept of a point-like instant, did not succeed in getting ride of all subconscious visual representations. His views of present moment retains definite spatial characters.

As for the past, it is obvious that in James the successive moments are completely external to each other, being linked only by the intermediate terms. On the other hand, for Bergson, these moments interpenetrated each other, and the posterior moments "prehended," in Whitehead's language, the anterior moments. Thus James' stream of thought can very nearly be defined as a one-dimensional succession of moments, whereas Bergson's duration appears as an extremely comlex "polydimensional network of temporal bounds of unequal intensity and unequal span.[31]

Their differences concerning to the problem of sub-consciousness are very distinct. James, at least in his Psychology, denied any ontological status to the distinct past except the physiological one, though he admitted a psychological status for the "non-present equals non-conscious equals non real." On the other hand, Bergson advocated the automatic self-preservation theory of past and distinguished two kinds of past, namely, the personal souvenir and the impersonal motor mechanism.[32]

James stressed mainly the character of restless change and fluidity; Bergson emphasized the persistence as much as flux. For James, the past was restlessly flowing away and disappearing. For

Bergson as his metaphors of a melody or growing-snowball suggest, the past merges into the present and conserves itself automatically.

These differences in the idea of time correspond to their attitude toward reality. Though James' notion of belief has a character similar to Bergson's intuition, James' method was essentially empirical. At least in the earlier period of his philosophical development, James restrained himself from asserting anything beyond a concrete and clear introspective statement, and thus the problem of time remained for him the purely psychological problem of experience of time. On the other hand, time is the ultimate subject of Bergson's philosophy and his methodology is precise, intellectual and deductive. Though Bergson claimed to stick to the "données immédiates de la conscience," he tried to rationalize and systematize the structure of the immediately given and considered time as the principle of reality beyond the immediate experience.

For both philosophers, reality revealed itself in its authenticity in experience. The outstanding problem for James is the interpretation of such experience as lies beyond the periphery of human

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31 However in a later period. James agreed with Bergson concerning the problem of personality, considering it as a condensed past, a dynamic continuity of efforts, not an accumulation of an atomic-like, simple, self-identical monads. James, Essays..., p. 48.

32 Bergson, Matière..., p. 82.

consciousness. Bergson, however, emphasized the importance of memory in mental life, introduced the hypothesis of an independent past. For James, consciousness is functional, while for Bergson it is substantial. Time, discovered psychologically by Bergson in Essai sur les données immédiates de la Conscience, grasped as a duration with two directions, tension and detension, in Matière et Mémoire, was developed in L'Évolution Créatrice into the "élan vital," the ultimate principle of evolution of the life, and finally was identified with an "élan d'amour," God himself, in Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion.[33] For James time is a necessary condition of consciousness, but for Bergson, consciousness is time itself. For James time is continuity of novelty, while for Bergson time is creation and the principle of life. This difference evidently suggests their respective philosophical attitudes; empirical and metaphysical.

B. Heidegger

The common character of James and Heidegger concerning the problem of time is that both tend to approach reality through the understanding of an immediate given experience; also they consider temporality as a necessary condition or meaning of human experience and existence.

However, they show quite characteristic differences between them because of their different philosophical standpoints. Heidegger, as a phenomenological ontologist, regards time as the sole and fundamental meaning of human existence and considers temporality as the structure of human existence,[33] while James, as a biological and psychological evolutionalist, considers time as a principle not only of human beings, but also of all reality. Heidegger's time is essentially transcendental because of its "ekstatisch" nature of human existence,[34] but James' is immanent because of the continuity of reality. Heidegger emphasizes futurity as an essential factor of temporality,[35] while James advocates present-oriented time idea.

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33 "Nur sofern das Dasein als Zeitlichkeit bestimmt ist, ... Zeitlichkeit entfüllt sich als der Sinn der eigentlichen Sorge." Heidegger, op. cit., p. 326.

34 "Die Phänomene des zu.., auf.., bei.., offenbaren die Zeitlichkeit als ἐχστατικόν schlechthin. Zeitlichkeit ist das ursprunglich "Ausser-sich" an und für sich selbst." Ibid., p. 329.

35 " Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich ursprunglich aus der Zukunft.... Ihr Existenziälitat primärer Sinn ist die Zukunft...." Ibid., pp. 327. 331.

As an existentialist, Heidegger thought of human beings as "Sein zum Tode," and insisted on the finiteness of temporality.[36] While, as a humanist, James advocated the melioristic world-view and insisted on the potentialities and indeterminism of the future, namely, time as a principle of freedom.

James, Bergson and Heidegger have in common the view that the more we live close to true reality, that is, to true time, the more we live authentically. They distinguished two types of reality, of time, and of ways of life. James said "The deeper features of reality are found only in the perceptual experience."[37] It seems to me James' distinction between deeper and superficial features of reality corresponds to Bergson's distinction between "moi profond" and "moi social," and to Heidegger's distinction between "eigentliche" and "Alltaglichkeit."

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[36] "Nur eigentliche Zeitlichkeit, die zugleich endlich ist, macht so etwas wie schicksal d. h., eigentliche Geschichtlichkeit möglich.... Das eigentliche Sein zum Tode d. h., die Endlichkeit der Zeitlichkeit.... Ibid., pp. 385-386.

[37] James, Some Problems..., p. 97.

CONCLUSION

The significance of the philosophy of James in general lies not in the doctrine which he formulated but rather in the way in which he opened and posed problems. James, as Whitehead said, inaugurated a whole new era in thought.[1] He intended to initiate a new type of philosophy against the traditional ones, which were, according to Hegel's metaphor, like an owl of Minerva that begins to fly at dusk. "Understanding backwards is, it must be confesses, a very frequent weakness of philosophers, both of the rationalistic and of the ordinary empiricist type. Radical empiricism alone insists on understanding forwards also, and refuses to substitute static concepts of the understanding for transitions in our moving life."[2]

The impact of the new science, the weakening of old religious faiths, the swift changes overtaking the society in which they lived, seemed to James to require a new philosophy. James was answering to the needs of the age. He tried to transform the character of philosophy from a purely theoretical concern for knowledge and reality to one with practical meaning. Converting the mathematical and logical character of Peirce's pragmatism into a psychological one, James popularized pragmatism, changing it from an academic investigation to practical usages. He oriented his philosophy in

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1 Whitehead, A. N. Science and the Modern World (New York: The New American Library, 1958), p. 143.

2. James, Essays..., p. 238.

a practical direction, so that it would satisfy his humanistic and therapeutic concern. Besides these humanistic contributions, his philosophy stresses openness toward the future. In other words, he initiated changes in the traditional ways of thinking; from a static to a dynamic world, from the substantial to the functional principles, from the absolute and deterministic to a relative and indeterministic scheme, from a closed world to an open one. Time, consequently, was grasped as a principle of freedom.

The significance of his theory of time consists in these primary factors. (1) His discovery of the stream of thought proved the fluidity and essential continuity of consciousness and time empirically. Time was grasped immanently in the naivete and immediacy of experience and was apprehended as true duration. (2) He proved that temporality is a necessary condition of consciousness and also of reality. Time is not an abstract form or horizon, but a real and vital factor in all realities. It is a part of what is meant by experience. (3) As a result of his postulation of "pure experience" as an ultimate reality, he overcame the difficulties of dualism in the problem of time, namely, the subjectivity as against objectivity, and individuality as against universality of time, by treating them as two different aspects of one original time, which authentically reveals itself in "pure experience."

However, James did not investigate the nature of time as an isolated subject. He avoided the intellectual approach to the time problem and did not define time directly. Though he tended to argue about ontological time seemingly under the influence of Bergson, he carefully avoided talking about things beyond empirical and phenomenological facts. He restricted himself to describing and did not try to explain the ontological nature of time. Consequently James could not explain mathematical or physical time, on the one hand, and historical time, on the another. How these two aspects of time come out from the original temporal experience, and how they are related to each other, remains unclear.

On the other hand, as a consequence of his empirical and psychological attitude, he overlooked the "ecstastic" or "transcendental" character of time. He explained this character psychologically and avoided going further into the metaphysical argument. Likewise, the metaphysical problems, such as those of eternity, the origin of temporal world, the absolute speed of time, etc., remain untouched. Though he talked about the irreversibility of time, he did not talk about the directionality of time.[3] This means that James neglected any direct attention to the aspect of historicity in temporality.

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[3] The law of thermodynamics in physics suggests the irreversible direction of time in the physical world as a phenomenon of a direction of entropy.

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