FAMILY POLICY IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF XENOPHOBIA

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To my husband KC. Thank you for your patience, love, and support.

To my wonderful children Ben, Alex, and Polina. You are my pride and joy.
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation emphasizes the comparative aspect of family policy, with a regional focus on post-communist Europe. Following the turmoil of transition, many social welfare programs were transformed and often scaled back. Family policies, however, were largely carried through the initial period of transformation, despite the economic difficulties and the dramatic decline in birth rates in a course of several years. This study was inspired by the seeming contradiction between falling birth rates and increasing generosity of family policy provisions across the former communist European countries. This dissertation uses original data, which includes levels of benefit provision as well as national political and economic characteristics, and views on immigration from 1990 to 2010.

Contemporary scholarship emphasizes the gender equality aspect of family policies while understating the political and policy implications of the state's goal of
maintaining stable populations. I address this shortcoming by assessing the interconnectedness of the family policies and fertility rates and by acknowledging the current rise of xenophobia that stems from the increasing transparency of borders. I utilize both quantitative and qualitative methodology to support my argument. Chapters 2 and 3 of the study present the time-series cross-sectional analysis of the demographic, socio-economic, political, and policy influences on fertility rates and family policies, respectively, in fourteen countries. Chapter 4 is a case-study of Russia, which hosts the largest share of immigrants in Europe and provides generous family benefits.

My central argument – and finding – is that anti-immigrant sentiment is an important consideration for family policy considerations. I find that xenophobia is a meaningful predictor of family policy generosity in the CEE, especially in the countries where the proportion of foreign-born population exceeds five percent. I also find that party politics matters for the generosity of family policies. Despite conventional expectations, I find that Right parties have been more instrumental in increasing family policies in the CEE. I argue that family policies fit well within the conservative party policies of the traditional male breadwinner family model, which has replaced the former communist paradigm of full labor participation among men and women.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet bloc set in motion the political and economic transformation processes that affected all aspects of citizens’ lives. National gross domestic products (GDP) fell and unemployment rose amid the turmoil of transition. Several countries experienced state-building that involved redrawing borders. The former communist countries initiated massive reforms that sought to liberalize markets and streamline government social welfare policies. Family policies were an important component of the Soviet system of social benefits. By 1989 all the countries of the Soviet bloc had instituted paid maternity leave, compensated at the levels of 85-100% of mothers’ wages and lasting from 16 to 26 weeks. Additionally, Communist states provided paid parental leave, family allowances, government-sponsored preschool facilities, and guaranteed job protection for new mothers. Despite the dramatic changes, two decades later Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries continue to provide comprehensive family policies.

This dissertation explores the factors that influence the generosity of family policies in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. I bridge the existing accounts of determinants of family policy generosity advanced by feminists and gender scholars, as well as welfare scholars with the views of demographers and scholars of contemporary parties in CEE. The main research focus is on investigating the complexity of determinants of family policy generosity in the CEE and determining whether and how CEE are different from Western Europe in the determinants of family policy.
1. Determinants of Family Policies.

Demographers have been pondering the sources of birth rate declines throughout Europe in the second part of the twentieth century. The extant literature explains the decline in birth rates via a variety of socio-cultural and economic explanations. The consensus has been reached that industrialized western countries have completed the second demographic transition, an ideational change in norms and family ideals driven by the economic progress, advances in birth control and medicine that prolongs life expectancy, female employment, gender equality, rising commonality of single-headed households and non-traditional families (van de Kaa 2002). Thus, the popularity of large traditional families in western societies has declined, driving the drop in fertility rates across Western Europe. Soon after the transition, fertility rates in all post-communist Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries including the European countries of the Soviet Union fell dramatically. In a matter of several years birth rates plunged from levels close to reproduction equilibrium to well-below the target of 2.1 children per family: by the year 2000 the Czech Republic’s birth rate fell to 1.14 and Ukraine’s birth rate was 1.1 children per woman. The drop in fertility rates can lead to the decline in population and have economic implications such as shrinking cohorts of active labor force and an increased burden on social welfare systems to support heavier proportions of the elderly (Demeny 2003; Dormont, Grignon, and Huber 2006; Kildermoes et al. 2006; Kravdal 2010; Muhleisen and Faruqee 2001).

Family policies are a part of the policy menu available to governments that wish to stimulate birth rates to influence population levels. Active government support of increased birth rates is referred to as pronatalism. Family policies can also be viewed as
an issue of gender equality being a part of women’s social citizenship rights (Orloff 1993). In post-WWII Western Europe family policies have been promoted by feminists arguing for facilitation of women’s workforce participation. Their main argument is that in modern society women should have state and societal support to combine paid work and childrearing. Family policies, such as paid maternity leave and parental leave, paternity leave, and affordable and accessible childcare facilitate mothers’ employment and share responsibility for raising children, thus increasing the chances of higher birth rates (Gornick and Meyers 2008).

In CEE, during communism, family policies were commandeered by the pronatalist state which sought to increase productivity by including women in the workforce. The effort was made to promote gender equality by emancipating women to fully participate in the labor force. At the same time women were expected to combine work and childrearing duties as the state actively promoted the goal of a two-child family (Glass and Fodor 2007; Kligman 1994; LaFont 2001; Rivkin-Fish 2010). Since the collapse of communism, the gender equality discourse has been notably absent from the political agenda due to the resurgence of conservative political forces and ideas, the revival of the Church authority, and the tainted association of feminism and gender equality with the communist regime (Saxonberg and Sirovatka 2006). Family policies were seized by the renewed nation-building efforts and conservative party politics.

The welfare state literature, focusing primarily on the Western democracies, established the relationship between party politics and welfare spending. In the West, Left parties are characterized by the emphasis on social justice through the redistribution of resources, secularism, and the adherence to democratic institutions and democratic
procedures of solving contentious issues (Cook, Orenstein, and Rueschemeyer 1999). Scholars have established a positive relationship between Left political parties and government spending on social welfare programs (Esping-Andersen 1990; Garrett 1998; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi and Palme 2003; Pierson 1996). This relationship is traditionally explained by the class-based conflict between interest groups in a given society. The power-resources theory builds on interest group logic and argues that actors in the capitalist system, labor and capital, have power resources (Korpi 1983; Korpi and Palme 2003). These resources are the characteristics that the different groups in society use to reward or punish other actors or as leverage in negotiations with other groups (Korpi 1983, 14-15). The more concentrated that power is, the more leverage the actors have. Labor in established Western Democracies has been able to leverage and invest its strength into the organization of power resources through the creation and participation in unions and through the backing of Left political parties in governments. In turn, Left parties promote social welfare policies generally valued by Labor, including spending on family policies.

The increasing relevance of globalization in the last decade produced an informative debate about the effects of globalization on the national welfare states. The “new politics” argument describes diminishing relevance of class-based conflict on welfare provision. Transparency of borders and capital mobility, it contends, push governments towards austerity. Thus, the old institutional and class-based factors of influence become less relevant. The political clout of the Left parties and labor became less important than the politics of blame avoidance by political parties. Demands from
groups organized around welfare benefits provision supersede the classic class-based interest groups (Burgoon 2001; Hicks and Zorn 2005; Pierson 1996).\(^1\)

While the debate is not over, the relevance of Left parties for social welfare spending in industrialized societies persists. In light of this discussion, the question to answer is whether one can generalize these relationships and assume them true for the Central and Eastern European countries given their recent history of transformation from Communism. While the scholars are cautiously optimistic that the established political Left-Right dimensions in the CEE are comparable to the west, a number of regional peculiarities still exist.

Scholars contend that CEE party politics are influenced by the communist legacies of single party authority and repression of opposing views (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Minkenberg 2009; Tismaneanu 2007). In his seminal article, Jowitt (1992) argues that the ‘Leninist legacy’ of society fragmentation, distrust in government and disconnect between individual and public affairs shapes political life in Eastern Europe and explains the growing popularity of nationalism and right wing radicalism. According to scholars, elements of the Leninist past are extensive: “intolerance, exclusiveness, rejection of all compromise, extreme personalization of political discourse, and the search for charismatic leadership” define political life in many post-communist European countries (Tismaneanu 2007, 36). The extant literature points to the pervasiveness of the issues of nationalism, and the appeal of traditional cultural values in the post-communist political discourse. Szeleniy, Fodor, and Hanley (1997) argue that

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\(^1\) Geddes (1995) reports that the ‘capital/labor cleavage has yet to emerge as the dominant in Eastern Europe… Communist-dominated unions are declining and fragmented in Eastern Europe. New Unions are being formed, but overall membership in unions has declined” (Geddes 1995, 256).
nationalism and religious rights were supported by the Eastern European intelligentsia and dissidents as elements of civil society, which were not supported by the communist interest-group politics. Others argue that right-wing ideas such as nationalism and social conservatism were the ideas that were used by all the electorally successful parties in Central and Eastern Europe following the first free elections (Vachudova 2008, 389). Thus, in addition to the left-right political cleavage, which is based on economic interests, there is a distinct liberal/conservative cleavage that represents cultural differences, values, and religions (Szelenyi, Fodor, and Hanley 1997).

I draw attention to the phenomena of heightened appeal of nationalism in political discourse, which manifests itself, among other ways, through heightened xenophobia and the resurgence of populist radical right parties and ideas in the CEE. In general, radical right parties can be characterized as parties subscribing to cultural conservatism and exclusionary politics in relation to religious or ethnic minorities and immigrants (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Minkenberg 2009). Studies show that it is not unusual to moderate right-wing CEE parties\(^2\) to use nationalism and anti-immigrant appeals for political advantage, most recently as a reaction to the European Union (EU) membership (Vachudova 2008, 388). In my analysis, I show the considerable levels of xenophobia in CEE and its political relevance for the advancement of nativist and conservative pronatalist agenda that emphasizes the threat of shrinking native populations against the potential inflow of immigrants. Therefore, I argue that given the complex legacies of communism, increased border transparency, active nation-building, and the increased

\(^2\) Such as Fidez in Hungary, PiS (Law and Justice) in Poland, and ODS (Civic Democratic Party) in the Czech Republic (Vachudova 2008, 388-389).
immigration, xenophobia is one of the important determinants of family policies in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe.

2. Data and Methodology

This analysis bridges an existing gap in the literature that, to my knowledge, lacks a comprehensive large-N analysis of the CEE countries due to the deficiency of readily accessible data, especially for the non-EU members. My data were collected from various national and international sources of statistical information, including national laws on family programs. The dataset includes information for both EU and non-EU member which were former-communist countries, including the former Soviet Union states. The data include levels of benefit provision and the duration of maternity leave and parental leave, amounts of family allowances and birth grants, fertility rates, national political and economic characteristics, and views on immigration from 1990 to 2010. Much of the comparative research on family policies focuses on the OECD and the EU countries, which collect data on a regular basis. Studies of fertility in CEE focus primarily on demographic determinants, leaving out family policy benefits.

I utilize a mixed-methods approach in this research by combining quantitative analysis of the CEE countries with a case study of Russia as a typical case (Gerring 2007). Two substantive chapters present a time-series cross-sectional analysis of determinants of fertility rates and family policy generosity in fourteen Central and Eastern European countries. The time-series cross-sectional analysis acknowledges the complex nature of the data through the specification of an error-correction model (Beck and Katz 2011; DeBoef and Keele 2008). The time-series cross-sectional data includes information for fourteen CEE countries in the time period from 1990 to 2010.
Additionally, I address the issues of unit heterogeneity. As suggested by the literature, CEE countries are not monolith. They are different historically, economically, and culturally. Some are members of the European Union, which imposes its own social welfare policy guidelines and democratic governance mandates. Most have advanced toward democratic statehood, while few still struggle with the establishment of a stable liberal democracy. Therefore, there may be different mechanisms that drive the determinants of policy generosity. For example, xenophobia may be a more salient issue in countries with a high immigrant concentration because of their increased visibility or in non-EU member states, which are not bound by the EU rules and regulations on combatting racism and xenophobia. To explore the differences and highlight similarities between CEE countries, different model specifications are presented and discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.

In this dissertation I argue that the analysis of family policy generosity should include the analysis of the determinants of fertility rates. Fertility rates are thought to be influenced by generous family policies. This circularity of family policies and fertility rates creates an endogeneity problem. Endogeneity can be defined as circular causality: family policies determine fertility rates, and fertility rates determine family policies. I address this problem by including separate analyses of the determinants of fertility rates and family policies, as well as a simultaneous equations model that takes endogeneity into account.

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Finally, I employ the qualitative technique of process tracing to illustrate the connection between xenophobia and family policy. Process tracing methodology is used to strengthen the validity of the quantitative analysis results discussed in Chapter 4 (Bennett and Checkel 2014; Lieberman 2005). Process tracing is an analytical technique that involves analyzing large amounts of detailed information, often in chronological order, in order to establish critical pieces of evidence that can be used to validate the statistical results.

3. Chapters Outline

This dissertation is organized into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the central puzzle, as well as providing background information about the political and policy context in the post-communist Central and Eastern European countries. Chapter 2 describes the fertility rates dynamics, discusses the known determinants of fertility rates, and assesses the competing theoretical explanations of fertility rate decline in the CEE. I argue that family policies and fertility rates are interrelated. To address this endogeneity problem, I first describe the dynamics of the fertility rates and assess the applicability of the known determinants of fertility to the CEE region. Existing research on fertility determinants reports that birth rates are influenced by a set of demographic variables such as maternal age at first birth, a country’s economic conditions (rate of economic growth and unemployment rates), as well as family policies such as maternity and parental leaves, childcare availability, and family allowances. Scholars of the CEE transition have argued that the sharp drop in fertility rates is a temporary reaction to the shocks of economic transition. My findings support the importance of economic shocks and their influence on suppressing fertility rates in CEE. These findings lend support to the
proposition that economic stability is an important condition for raising fertility rates. Additionally, however, paid parental leave and the availability of childcare have been found to be positively associated with increased birth rates in Central and Eastern Europe.

Chapter 3 discusses the determinants of family policies in the CEE. The extant literature on family policies in the developed democracies of the west emphasizes the following determinants of family policies’ generosity: the impact of party politics and women’s representation in national parliaments; economic factors, such as the growth of gross domestic product and levels of unemployment; and the various demographic determinants, such as fertility rates and female employment. I test the existing arguments and add another dimension, xenophobia, to the list of viable determinants of family policy generosity. I show that the political and societal processes that feed into the formulation and generosity of family policies have differences and similarities from the west. Additionally, I support the argument that CEE countries differ from each other due to the different paths of development during communism and the uneven successes of post-communist transformation. I expand the understanding of political party influence on family policy outcomes by arguing that, despite common expectations of the Left’s generosity, in CEE radical populists and conservatives are the champions of comprehensive family policies. This political dynamic distinguishes CEE family policy formulation from other established welfare states of the west. I show that xenophobia is a relevant determinant of family policy in those CEE countries, where there is a greater representation of foreign-born in the population (over 5 percent). The results of simultaneous equation analysis largely support these findings.
In Chapter 4 I present an in-depth qualitative analysis of the case study of the Russian Federation. Russia hosts a considerable population of immigrants, the largest in Europe in 2013, has generous family policies, and has experienced a rise in xenophobia in the past decade. I base my analysis on interviews with Russian legislators and elected officials and members of academia. In addition, I provide content analysis of mass media and official government data and documents, which provide evidence of xenophobia in Russia and its connection to public policymaking. The case study of Russia utilizes the process tracing technique to tease out the relationship and clarify the direction of causal inference between xenophobia and family policy generosity in Russia. I discuss heightened levels of xenophobia in Russia that coincided with the growing labor migration from the former Soviet states to Russia. I show that xenophobia is used by the right-wing nationalist forces to influence the generosity of family policies. Chapter 5 presents some concluding remarks and direction for further research.
Chapter 2

Policy and Economic Determinants of Fertility in the post-communist Central and Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union

1. Introduction

After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the USSR, former communist countries embarked on liberal economic and democratic political reforms. In a situation of political and economic instability, fertility rates fell sharply from at- or above-replacement levels to well-below replacement. With subsequent economic recoveries, some observers predicted improved birth rates, but the results have been mixed and there has not been a return to replacement levels. In Estonia, Bulgaria and Russia, fertility rates are slowly creeping up towards replacement levels. In other countries, however, like Romania, Hungary, and Latvia, fertility rates have settled below 1.35, far below replacement levels. According to the latest projections from the Population Research Bureau, “Europe is likely to be the first region in history to see long-term population decline as a result of low fertility, largely due to the countries of Eastern Europe and Russia” (Population Reference Bureau 2010).

The issues of low fertility in the industrialized countries have been given considerable attention in the literature (Bongaarts 1982; 2002; Butalao and Casterline 2001; Caldwell and Shindlmayr 2003; Coleman and Rowthorn 2011; Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002; Morgan 2003; Smith 1989; Van de Kaa 1994; 1996). The impact of low fertility has far-reaching consequences for policymakers. Declining populations imply future troubles with sustaining economic growth as existing populations age and fewer younger workers can contribute to national GDPs or serve in
national militaries. As such, fertility is an important component in the socio-economic and military power structure of modern states.

Sociologists, demographers, and political scientist have produced volumes describing the social, economic, and normative origins of fertility decline and investigated various policies that would be able to address low fertility and reverse populations decline. Extensive studies focused on the subset of developed industrialized countries, but the European countries of the former communist bloc are underrepresented in these studies due to lack of data. This dissertation contributes to the pool of large-N quantitative studies of determinants of fertility by analyzing the sub-set of Central and Eastern European countries using an original dataset, collected from international and national sources. It includes the length and compensation of maternity and parental leave, family allowances, and childcare enrollment rates.

In this chapter I provide a description of patterns of declining fertility in post-communist Central and Eastern European countries and review the demographic and economic transition explanations of fertility decline. The demographic literature explains low fertility in terms of normative shifts in family formation and postponement of childbirth. The economic transition scholars emphasize the unique features of CEE and the shocks of economic and political transition that are believed to have caused a temporary decline in fertility rates. The uniqueness of studying Central and Eastern European countries lies in its history of closed authoritarian governance under communism and the major overhaul of all aspects of political and economic life following the collapse of the Soviet bloc. As such, these countries represent a sort of a
natural experiment in their transformation from the closed to open democratic and economic systems (Orenstein 2008).

The cumulative importance of fertility to many aspects of modern governance demands states to mediate and attempt to raise fertility through the introduction and/or expansion of family policies. The existing literature on Western Europe provides evidence that family policies can increase fertility rates (Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Gauthier 2007). Comparative cross-sectional studies of the former CEE are limited due, in large part, to the lack of data. This chapter addresses this challenge by presenting a time-series cross-sectional analysis of determinants of fertility rates in CEE that includes not only demographic and economic factors but also major elements of family policies such as maternity and paternity leave, childcare availability, and family allowances.

The main contribution of this chapter is that it considers the joint influence of socio-cultural, economic and policy determinants on fertility in the region that is unique due to its recent massive transformation. Emerging differences and similarities between fertility patterns and policy responses in Western Europe and CEE are highlighted. I find that the economic shocks of transition persisted twenty years past the start of the transition. Unemployment has a negative impact on fertility rates, as well as the overall economic growth. The recent trends of childbearing postponement, common across Western Europe, contribute to the decline in fertility rates, while family policies are shown to have a positive impact on increasing fertility rates. The next section outlines the main theoretical explanations of fertility and details patterns of birth rates in CEE. It is followed by the empirical analysis of fertility determinants in CEE, and a discussion of results.
2. Theory and Background

2.1. Why Fertility Rates Are Important

As fertility levels continue to decline around the industrialized countries, volumes have been written to describe and establish the causes.\textsuperscript{4} Fertility rates are an important component of the overall population size, the stability of which has serious socio-economic consequences. Currently many European countries experience the lowest-low fertility; that is fertility levels at or below 1.3 children per woman. Sustained lowest-low fertility leads to yearly population declines due to the smaller size of future cohorts of reproductive capacity, absent immigration to off-set declining births (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002; UN 2013).

The negative effect of declining fertility is amplified by the trend of an aging population in Europe (European Commission 2012). According to UN projections, the population aged 60 and older is expected to rise 45 percent by the middle of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century (UN 2013, 3). Median age in Europe is reported to be the highest in the world at 40 in 2010 and expected to remain such through 2050 at 46 years (UN 2013). Total population of Europe is expected to decline by 2050. According to projections, the old age dependency ratio\textsuperscript{5} will double in size by 2050 in Europe, while the proportion of young persons to overall population will shrink. These trends inevitably will burden social security systems and will negatively affect economic growth (European Commission 2012).

\textsuperscript{4} Fertility decline is mostly affecting the industrialized European countries, Canada, Japan, China, and Taiwan. Thus, as Demeny (2003) briefly notes, fertility decline is perceived as problem to scholars and governments from the industrialized countries of the North. Fertility rates are projected to remain high throughout the 21\textsuperscript{st} century in India, Nigeria, Niger, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Congo, and Uganda (UN 2013).

\textsuperscript{5} That is the ratio of older people (over 65) to the younger economically active cohort (15-64 years old) (World Bank).
Such demographic prospects can lead to a negative economic impact. The increased social welfare obligations caused by declining fertility and aging stifle GDP growth\(^6\) (Demeny 2003; European Commission 2012). As life expectancy rises and birth rates decline, social welfare systems become overtaxed with the burden of providing social benefits to growing numbers of elderly, while cohorts of citizens engaged in the labor market shrinks (Demeny 2003; Dormont, Grignon, and Huber 2006; Kildemoes et al. 2006). Pensions and healthcare programs represent a significant part of social welfare obligations. Smaller cohorts of working young persons, compared to groups of economically active workers, can lead to a diminished tax base and fewer contributions to social security funds. For many European pension systems, which incorporate pay-as-you-go financing of pensions, this situation threatens insolvency of government pensions, as illustrated by the study of the UK pension system (Blake and Mayhew 2006) and projected from the analysis of the pension system of Japan, the fastest aging society in the world (MacKellar et al. 2004). Aging population is expected to add significant burdens to providing health care for elderly populations that are projected to live longer (Kildemoes et al. 2006).

More populous countries have greater labor pools. Labor is an important component of production, thus more labor translates into greater economic output, assuming these workers can be employed (Coleman and Rowthorn 2011, 226-227). Greater populations also imply increasing consumption potential, thus attracting capital investment. Conversely, an aging and declining population leads to reduced output because of the shrinking labor pool, reduced productivity of the older population due to

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\(^6\) Some authors argue that this is not to be confused with GDP per capita.
higher age, stagnating economies of scales, and shrinking markets (Kravdal 2010; Muhleisen and Faruqee 2001). According to IMF estimations, Japan’s GDP may fall by as much as 20% in the next century as a result of negative demographic trends of a declining and aging population (Muhleisen and Faruqee 2001).

However, not all researchers are pessimistic about the impact of aging and low fertility on national economies. For instance, some argue that governments may be able to save on education expenditures and redistribute funds to other areas (European Commission 2012; Lee and Mason 2010), although research from Japan shows that savings may be only temporary (MacKellar et al. 2004). Others point to the possible positive environmental impact, as slowing production may lead to less consumption and a smaller ecological footprint (McDonald et al. 2006).

Population decline is argued to have geopolitical consequences, such as the loss of power, prestige, influence, and military might on the global stage. Concepts of power are central to the explanations of international politics for realist theories of international relations. According to the structural realism theory of international relations, states base their behavior on calculations of own power. Stable population is a major contributing factor to a country’s military and economic power, which ensures stability and security of a country on the international arena (Mearsheimer 2001; Schmidt 2005). Military power is a direct reflection of the size and capacity of a state’s armed forces, which includes land, army, navy, air power, and nuclear forces (Mearsheimer 2001, 66). Population levels translate into military strength not only in the number of conscripts, but also through contributing to the capacity of military-industrial production. Scholars of international relations refer to population resources as latent power.
Latent power constitutes the social resources that a state has available to build military forces. Although there are always a variety of such resources, the size of a state’s population and its wealth are the two most important components for generating military might. Population size matters a lot, because great powers require big armies, which can be raised only in countries with large populations. … Population size also has important economic consequences, because only large populations can produce great wealth, the other building block of military power (Mearsheimer 2001, 60-61).

Based on power calculations, population decline poses a significant challenge to states. Fewer young people may mean less innovation, shrinking armed forces, smaller production capabilities, and less output for national security needs. From this point of view, a large population at equilibrium contributes to the stability of labor supply, ensures the presence of bright and innovative people to drive the economy forward, contributes to a growing GDP, and provides a personnel pool for the nation’s military (Demeny 2003; Jackson and Howe 2008; Morgan 2003).

In addition to military capacity, from the perspective of a global balance of power, population size has important effects on membership and influence in global governing bodies. It is projected that, owing to its growing population and growing GDP, that Brazil and India have the potential to become leading world powers, thus challenging the global balance of powers. One such challenge may come through obtaining a permanent seat at the UN Security Council for India by arguing that it will have become a major world player backed by people and resources (Demeny 2003). India is projected to

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7 Unless foreigners are permitted to serve in the military.

8 Research distinguishes between country’s wealth as measured by national GDP and contributes to its projected power and individual wealth (GDP per capita). Studies show that there is no positive relationship between GDP and individual wealth and that individual preferences might be quite the opposite from those envisioned by governments (see discussion in Coleman and Rowthorn 2011, 230-231 and the study by Shultz 2005).
become the most populous country after 2030, surpassing China and leaving
industrialized countries of the West far behind (UN 2013).

In Europe, population dynamics may challenge the existing balance of powers in
the European Union. According to the Lisbon Treaty, country-members receive seats in
the European Parliament proportional to their population size. The maximum number of
members of parliaments from any country has been capped at 96. Germany currently is
the most populous country in the EU. However, if Turkey were to become an EU
member, it will potentially gain more influence as its population is projected to grow at a
faster pace than any other EU member. This appears to be a sticking point for some
European leaders and the general population because Turkey is culturally and religiously
different from mainland Europe, as a predominantly Muslim country (Casanova 2006).
The prospects of Turkey dominating the EU in the future is not agreeable to the current
EU leaders, who presently struggle to integrate and accept their existing minority Muslim
population (Adida, Laitin, and Valford 2015). From this standpoint, maintaining and
balancing own population levels may represent a priority issue for the European
governments that are interested in ensuring the preservation of balance of powers and
interests in Europe.

The above discussion summarizes socio-economic and geopolitical consequences
of low fertility. These considerations justify the increased importance policymakers and
social scientists attribute to the issues of fertility decline. The following section will
review existing theoretical arguments advanced by demographers and political scientists
regarding possible determinants of fertility rates around the world and in post-communist
Central and Eastern European countries in particular.
2.2. Describing Fertility Rates in Central and Eastern Europe

Pre-transition, fertility rates in Central and Eastern Europe remained at or close to replacement levels of 2.1 children per woman. Appendix B details dynamics of fertility rates in the past 30 years. The data illustrate a steep downward trend starting in the late 1980s and continuing through the 1990s. In 1981, the following CEE countries had total fertility rates (TFR) below replacement level of 2.01: Czech Republic (2.0), Hungary (1.88), Croatia (1.99), Slovenia (1.99), Russia (1.91), Ukraine (1.93), Latvia (1.88), and Lithuania (1.98). The European countries of the former Soviet Union – Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus Estonia and Moldova, registered an increased total fertility rate during the 1980s. Scholars argue that the upturn was due to increased welfare in the USSR, a successful anti-alcoholism campaign, and the implementation of paid parental leave for the first year of a child’s life in 1981 (Avdeev and Monier 1995; Rimashevskaia and Milovidov 1988).

Fertility rates plunged in the early 1990s, a trend attributed to the economic hardship of transition (Deacon 1992). TFR bottomed out in the early 2000s, before beginning a slow climb upwards. By 2012, many Central and Eastern European countries were on the slow recovery path registering raising fertility rates. However, several countries seem to have settled in the pattern of lowest-low fertility at or below 1.3: Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Latvia, and Moldova (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002; Golstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009). Below, I review theoretical arguments that explain fertility decline around the world and in CEE.
2.3. *Demographic Transition Theories and Lowest-Low Fertility*

Existing literature on fertility decline can be roughly divided into two camps:
1. those that assessed low fertility in terms of the ideational change driven by economic progress, and 2. those that explain low fertility as effects of economic hardship brought by economic recessions. Demographic Transition theories of fertility decline explain fertility in terms of technological progress, as well as normative changes in family formation and fertility postponement. *Demographic transition theory* was developed to explain fertility trends of the pre-urbanization and industrialization past, when populations did not grow substantially due to the poor economic, social, and health conditions which equalized the death and birth rates (van de Kaa 2002). Its explanatory power is based on fertility and mortality dynamics. In the 19th Century, populations began to grow steadily due to the increased living standards and medical advances that allowed the treatment of infectious diseases, better hygiene and public sanitation, and improved nutrition. The improved living standards brought down mortality rates, and birth rates gradually declined. This shift from high to low mortality and from high to low fertility is known as the [first] *demographic transition* (Butala and Casterline 2001; Kirk 1996).

The current situation in developed countries, where fertility has fallen below the two–child per family replacement level, is referred to as the *second demographic transition* (van de Kaa 1987; 2002). The causes of fertility decline have been linked to greater education and employment opportunities for women, the contraceptive revolution of 1960s, increased proportion of births taking place out of wedlock, increased divorce rates, higher economic costs of having children, and normative shifts towards
individualism and materialism (Caldwell and Shindlmayr 2003; McDonald 2002; Morgan 2003; van de Kaa 1987).

The contraceptive revolution of the 1960s allowed families to plan children, which eventually lead to widespread postponement of childbirth until parents received education and gained work experience so that they could achieve an aspired socioeconomic status (Goldin and Katz 2002). The pressure to achieve higher education, develop a professional career, and reach greater socio-economic status ultimately characterized the way of life for families in the developed countries of the second part of the 20th Century (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; Caldwell 1982; Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2003). McDonald (2006) reviews empirical evidence of childbirth postponement as a way to reach a higher economic status and/or acquire higher education. Other scholars argue that childbirth postponement, the *postponement transition*, may be contagious - once it becomes acceptable more and more women view it as a new societal norm (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002). What once was an exception becomes an accepted norm, as evident from the rising average age of mothers at the birth of their first child across Europe (Billingsley 2010). Average maternal age of first birth in Western Europe was 30.5 in 2010. It rose up one year from 2000 (Eurostat 2013).

The communist governments of Central and Eastern European countries actively promoted large families and provided complex family support programs. Pre-1989, age at first birth remained lower than in Western Europe, but crept up once state socialism had been abolished (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; Goldsein, Sobotka and Jasioniene 2009). Table 1 details first birth timing in CEE countries.
Table 1. Age at First Birth in CEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Average 1990-2010</th>
<th>Average 1990-1999</th>
<th>Average 2000-2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNECE Transmonee Database.

Overall, average age at first birth in CEE since 1990 is 24.25 with substantial variation. Age at first birth has been steadily rising since the mid-2000s. Several researchers distinguished two sub-groups within post-communist European countries (Billingsley 2010; Sobotka 2003). They argue that Central European countries Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary display different fertility behavior that is characterized by postponement of births (high age at first birth) and low mortality. As Table 1 illustrates, age at first birth increased by an average of 2 years between the periods of 1990-1999 and 2000-2010 in Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia experienced an increase in age at first birth by three or more years. Correlation between average age of women at birth of first child and fertility rates reveal a negative trend overall, with a more profound trend in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Czech Republic, and Latvia (Figure 1).
2.4. Fertility Decline in CEE and the Role of Economic Recession

Extant literature is far from the consensus on the causes of fertility decline in CEE. Some predict that fertility decline will continue due to rising average age at first birth leading to long term decline in fertility rates (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002; Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009, 666-337), while others argue that childbirth postponement may be a temporary phenomenon brought by the high economic uncertainties and hardships of transition (Billingsley 2010, 204). Globally, fertility has been linked to economic growth. Existing literature argues that fertility rates are pro-cyclical, rising in good economic times and falling during recessions (Fokkema et al. 2008; Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene 2009; Ogawa 2002; Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2010). Adsera and Menendez (2009) find a positive relationship between GDP growth and first births in
Latin America. Fokkema et al. (2008) report a similar relationship, arguing that the fertility rates rise in the Netherlands can be attributed to the upturn in the economy.

In CEE, extant research emphasizes the profoundly severe impact of economic transformation and restructuring, such as the soaring unemployment, sharp decline in standards of living, inflation, high economic uncertainty, and anomie\(^9\) (Deacon 2000; Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002; Sobotka, Skirbekk and Philipov 2010; Sobotka 2011; UNECE 2000). The loss of income that the former Soviet countries experienced during the transition 1988-1995 was compared to the Great Depression in the US (Aslund 1992; Milanovic 1998). “Real per capita income declined between 1988 and 1993 by 54 percent in the Slavic republics including Russia, by 41 percent in the Baltics, 54 percent in Central Asia, and 25 percent in Eastern Europe” (Deacon 2000, 148). Income inequality rose significantly, as measured by GINI coefficient (Billingsley 2010, 197). Earnings were eroded by galloping inflation and in some locales wages were not systematically paid, contributing to rising economic uncertainty (Gimpelson 2001).

In addition to economic collapse, social safety nets and support systems became overburdened and underfunded, thus could not keep up with the increasing demand. As a result of liberalization and economic recession, health care and education systems became underfunded and unable to fit into the new market reality, while the state was overburdened by increased demand on social resources (Baxandall 2003; Standing 1997). State support for families eroded quickly as funding declined; payments and social services were scaled back, discontinued or became fee-based services (Deacon 2000).

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\(^9\) Anomie is defined as the social uncertainty due to the breakdown of previously existing social ties and values (Perelli-Harris 2006).
Research suggests that high economic uncertainty, loss of social safety nets, and breakdown of previously available support networks, makes people more risk-averse, so they forgo childbearing to minimize costs that are associated with children (McDonald 2002). Subjective well-being has a strong effect on the likelihood of childbearing as it relates to a positive outlook of one’s employment prospects, and thus future economic stability that is linked to successful ability to raise children (Bhaumik and Nugent 2002; Perelli-Harris 2006). Young men and women postpone fertility decisions due to rising uncertainty triggered by economic recessions and rising unemployment, especially evidenced by studies from southern Europe (Ahn and Mira 2001; del Boca 2002). High economic uncertainty causes individuals to seek cost minimizing behavior as well as pursue training and education in order to increase odds of employment. In CEE, scholars argue, education became a good investment and highly-valued insurance against market insecurities, thus a greater proportion of women chose postponing childbirth to receive education in post-transition countries (Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002, 655). CEE case studies confirm that in bad economic times, highly educated women tend to postpone childbearing in order to secure employment and financial stability (Kreyenfeld 2005; Perelli-Harris 2006, 2008). Lack of work tends to deter young males from union formation and childbearing decisions. Women are likely to postpone childbearing, especially higher order births, to reduce uncertainty (Deacon 2000; Caldwell and Shindlmayr 2003; Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002; Standing 1996). Eun (2003) shows the negative relationship of rising overall unemployment and falling fertility rates in Korea. In a study of French women, Meron and Widmer (2002) find that young French unemployed women tend to postpone first birth longer than employed women.
Existing empirical studies report a negative impact of unemployment on fertility rates (Adsera 2004; d’Addio and d’Ercole 2005; Andersson 2000; Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Kravdal 2002; Rindfuss et al. 1988; Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov 2010). In CEE, unemployment emerged as a significant negative force that depressed economic prospects of many CEE citizens. Researchers note that unemployment was expected to rise during the transition, but few predicted the depth of the problem (Baxandall 2003). Large groups of unemployed workers emerged as the industrial sector declined due to low competitiveness, privatization, and rapid dissolution of previous economic cooperation mechanisms. Public sector employees became unemployed as factory-financed primary-care hospitals, preschools or children’s summer camps, which they carried, were discontinued.

Table 2 provides a snapshot of unemployment in CEE. During the 1990s, unemployment soared to over 21% in Bulgaria while it remained under 10% in Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Estonia, and Czech Republic. UNECE (2000) reports no clear patterns in male and female unemployment rates in most CEE countries, noting some evidence that females fared worse than males in Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. These findings are supported by Fodor (2001), who reports that women not only tend to be laid off first but also remain unemployed longer in Central Europe.

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10 It was not uncommon for large factories to maintain their own child-care facilities, primary-care hospitals, resorts, summer camps for children, etc.

11 Unemployment data for this project was taken from World Bank projections. The literature points discrepancies between reported and real unemployment and reporting omission across countries during the 1990s (UNECE 2000, Gimpleson 2001). Some sources report higher unemployment than represented in dataset, but due to inability to confirm higher unemployment percentages, I use WB data.
Table 2 CEE Unemployment, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>St.Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>14.49</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>11.66</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>7.16</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7.84</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>10.08</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>11.45</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>11.89</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank

2.5. Policy Responses to Declining Fertility

As discussed earlier, low fertility rates present a set of political and economic challenges for governments. In response, governments can influence fertility levels through adopting family policies to stimulate birth rates. Family policies help parents reduce direct and indirect costs of children (Cigno 1991). Specifically, governments can offer: paid maternity and paternity leave, affordable and accessible childcare, prohibition of discrimination based on childbirth, flexible working time arrangements and reduced workplace discrimination, tax credits, and other resources available for families to encourage sharing of responsibilities among both parents (Gornick and Meyers 2008; McDonald 2002; PRB 2004; UN 2003).

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12 Of course, governments can also be concerned with too much fertility and adopt policies to reduce fertility, i.e. Chinese policies of imposing fertility restrictions on families (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985; Feeney and Feng 1993).

Empirical research offers further detail on the efficacy of different family policies as they are linked to fertility rates. Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) find that child allowances have a small positive influence on raising fertility rates. Maternity leave duration and compensation has been found to positively affect fertility rates in European countries (Andersson 2000; Ermish 1988; Larocque and Salanie 2004; Whittington 1992; Zhang, Quan, and van Meerbergen 1994). Gerber and Perelli-Harris (2012) find that Russian paid maternity leave, up to 36 months, had a positive impact of women’s labor force attachment following first birth and increased chances of second conception. Lalive and Zweimüller (2005) find that the duration of parental leave has a positive effect on fertility in Austria, while Barmby and Cigno (1990) conclude that the presence of child benefits speeds up the onset of childbearing in the Great Britain. Ronsen and Sundstrom (2004) analysis of Norway and Finland finds that parental leave has a small positive effect on fertility rates.

Childcare availability provides care for children while women return to work, thus reducing direct cost of children, and alleviating such negative consequences of childbirth as loss of tenure and promotion due to lengthy breaks from work to care for children. Empirical evidence suggests that childcare availability has a significant positive effect on fertility (Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Kravdal 1996). Del Boca (2002) describes the negative consequences of limited government assistance, including childcare, for young Italian mothers and links it to low fertility. Rindfuss et al. (2007) find strong positive association between childcare availability and transition to motherhood using the example of Norway. According to the literature, childcare plays an important role in sharing caring responsibility thus reducing the negative impact on earnings, tenure, and
promotion opportunities for mothers (Brilli, del Boca, and Pronzato 2011; Rindfuss 1991; Estevez-Abe 2006).

2.6. An Overview of Family Policies in CEE

The CEE region shares a unique history of communist governance imposed in the aftermath of the WWII. The development of family policies in Central and Eastern European countries were heavily influenced by Communist ideology. General features of the Communist social welfare systems were: highly subsidized prices on food and housing, guaranteed employment, universal health and education provision, and generous maternity leave policies (Rivkin-Fish 2001; Standing 1997). The state desired to control many faucets of citizens’ lives, including participation in the labor market and family size. Full employment was a goal and unemployment officially did not exist (Baxandall 2001). The Communist governments viewed family policies as a stimulus for individuals to form families and have children, at the same time promoting dual-earner families. High female workforce participation rates were encouraged by governments to remain at high levels (LaFont 2001). “Working women … received favorable treatment, such as three-year child-care grants and the right to resume their previous employment; however, there was an obligation on women not only to work but to remain responsible for family care, and the division of labour remained sexist” (Deacon 2000, 147). Government pronatalism was the main driver of family policies, and fertility rates remained an area of concern for Communist governments (Avdeyeva 2011; Glass and Fodor 2007; Kligman 1994; Rivkin-Fish 2001).

Two-child families were considered a goal and the state actively encouraged the achievement of this image through the provision of family assistance (Avdeev and
Monier 1995). Comprehensive family policies were adopted and gradually expanded to include paid maternity and parental leaves, government subsidies and meal supplements to families, family allowances, childcare, and preferential housing allocation for families with children. These government measures allowed women to combine childrearing and employment, although feminists criticized soviet-style pronatalism as short-sighted as it did little to address gender inequalities at home, where women were still expected to perform a majority of housework (Gal and Kligman 2000).

After the collapse of communism, the newly-formed democracies initially adhered to the principles of economic liberalism aiming to substantially reduce welfare state (Standing 1997). Social programs, including family support programs were scaled back or eliminated, as in a case of subsidies for families, e.g. free school lunches and school supplies and uniforms. Most notably, the availability of childcare was sharply reduced (Deacon 2000, 155).

However, despite the economic hardship and liberalization of many social welfare programs, such as pensions and health care, data reveal that family policies were not universally cut. Duration and compensation of key policy pieces, such as maternity and parental leave have not been eliminated, but expanded once economic recoveries were achieved. In addition, efforts to increase childcare availability have been made, and several governments introduced additional monetary measures of birth stimulation, such as birth grants (Kingsbury 2015).

*Maternity leave* is a social benefit entitling women to take paid time off to take care of a newborn child. In many CEE countries, it is mandatory and usually starts several weeks before childbirth. Besides monetary compensation, it provides job security
to new mothers. At the moment of transition all countries had established paid maternity leave. Since transition began, CEE countries engaged in updating the legal framework pertaining to family and fertility policies. Its length was either left intact or has been increased. Figure 2 shows that most countries increased the duration of paid maternity leave in the late 1980s (Czechoslovakia 1988) or the early 1990s (Estonia 1992, Hungary 1992, Russia 1992, Belarus 1992, Lithuania 1992). Romania (2001) and Bulgaria (1999) increased paid maternity leave at the end of 1990s. Poland increased leave in 2000 and 2001, which was scaled back in 2002, only to be increased again in 2007 and 2009. Bulgaria and Latvia substantially expanded maternity leave duration again in 2007.

**Figure 2. Length of Maternity Leave in Weeks**

Maternity leave compensation is tied to previous wages in all CEE countries, ranging from 65 to 100% of previous wages. The modifications to maternity leave compensation included either the decrease of compensation levels or the introduction of
maximum payment ceilings.\textsuperscript{14} For example, in Russia, Romania, Belarus, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the level of wage replacement rates during maternity leave stayed unchanged at 100 percent from the pre-transition levels. The following countries decreased maternity leave compensation as the percent of average salary paid: Hungary (once from 100 to 70\% in 1997), Czech Republic (from 90 to 69\% in 1993 and a 1 percent increase to 70\% in 2008), Slovakia (once from 90\% to 55\% in 2003), Albania (once from 95 to 80\% in 1993), Bulgaria (once from 100 to 90\% in 2001).

Paid parental leave follows maternity leave and usually is paid at a smaller rate than maternity leave, but lasts longer. A common trend in paid parental leave is allowing mothers to stay at home to attend to their small children up to 3 years, of which usually up to 2 years are compensated, and the 3\textsuperscript{rd} year doesn’t have monetary compensation but provides job security benefits.\textsuperscript{15}

CEE countries had paid parental leave policies in place before the dissolution of Communism. In the 1980s, Poland and Czechoslovakia offered paid parental leave until a child was two years old. Hungary’s parental leave lasted for 3 years. The USSR introduced paid parental leave in 1981, in addition to a paid maternity leave of 16 weeks. The first regions to implement the measure were the low-birth countries: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic states. The Central Asian and Transcaucasus implemented paid leave in 1983. The reason for delayed implementation in Central Asia and Transcaucasus is that these regions had higher fertility rates. The measure was targeted at the low birth

\textsuperscript{14} The following countries reduced the percent of compensation for maternity leave: Hungary reduced compensation from 100\% to 70\% in 1998, Czech Republic – reduced compensation from 90\% to 69\% in 1993, Slovakia reduced compensation from 90\% to 55\% in 2003, Albania reduced compensation from 95\% to 80\% in 1993, and Bulgaria reduced compensation from 100\% to 90\% in 20001.

\textsuperscript{15} See my discussion of refamiliarization in Chapter 3.
rate regions of the USSR (Avdeev and Monier 1995; Rimashevskaya and Milovidov 1988, 74). At the end of 1990, the Soviet government increased paid leave to 18 months. Russia retained paid parental leave until a child is 18 months, which was generously increased to 40 percent of mother’s salary in 2007. Parental leave can be extended until a child is three years old, with job security benefits, but the compensation is symbolical – 50 rubles which is less than $2 - and largely remains unclaimed. The Czech Republic increased paid parental leave in 1990 and 1996 and then decreased it in 2008. Currently, Czech parents can stay at home caring for a child for three years. Slovakia increased its parental leave to 3 years in 1989. Paid parental leave currently ranges from 6 months in Albania to three years in Estonia, Belarus, Czech Republic, and Moldova.

*Family allowances* (FA) refer to the payments per each child, granted after the paid parental leave is over, and, in most countries, until a child is done with secondary school. Before the dissolution of the Communist bloc only the countries of the former USSR and Romania had means-tested family allowances. The rest of the countries had a universal system of FA. Family allowance benefits and eligibility may differ based on the number of children. For instance, Hungary only paid family allowances for a second and third child until 1987 and Albania until 1992, when family allowance was expanded for the first and second child.

Single-headed households have traditionally been targeted as FA recipients. The USSR introduced a special allowance to low-income families in 1974 and soon expanded it to single mothers (Rimashevskaya and Milovidov 1988, 74). The countries of the former Soviet Union took divergent paths after breaking up. For example, Lithuania terminated family allowance in 1991. In 1996, it re-introduced family allowance
payments for a third child only, and in 2004 family allowance payments were allotted for the first and second child in a family. The rest of the CEE countries introduced means-testing of family allowances in 1990s, though in Hungary it was short-lived (1996-2000) and in Estonia and Latvia means-testing was abolished in 1991. Albania terminated family allowance altogether in 1999.

**Figure 3. Ratio of Family Allowance to Average Wage 1980-2010**

Aside from the eligibility requirements and means-testing, the elephant in the room is the size of the allowances. The economic shocks of transition and reforms significantly reduced the value of these allowances. The governments’ attempts to keep up with inflation were not always successful. Figure 3 captures the impact of family allowances by showing the dynamics of family allowance as compared to average wages. It indicates that most CEE governments struggled to keep the values of family allowances relevant by increasing the values and indexing as evidenced from the spikes on graphs. In most countries FA stays well below 10% presently, however, the values tend to diminish
over time. Additionally, reports show that in countries where the value of these allowances are low, many women do not bother to apply, given the considerable time and effort required to collect all the supporting documentation and filling out the application (Rivkin-Fish 2010).

Central and Eastern European countries inherited a comprehensive framework of childcare institutions. As discussed above, Communist governments aimed for full employment among men and women. To facilitate high workforce participation among females of reproductive age, childcare facilities were instituted which included nurseries for infants and preschools for children ages 3-6 (Kogan, Gebel, and Noelke 2008). Figure 4 provides a visual summary of childcare enrollment rates in CEE from 1990 to 2010.

**Figure 4  Childcare Enrollment Rates in CEE 1990-2010**

Research of cases from across Europe supports the hypothesis of a positive relationship between childcare availability and fertility. A growing consensus among researchers posits a positive relationship between women’s workforce attachment and fertility.
Across Europe, maternal employment reaches 68 percent (OECD 2014), providing powerful support for a thesis that the traditional male breadwinner model of family gave way to the dual earner family structure (Gornick and Meyers 2008).

Research shows that where rigidities in labor markets, workplace promotion practices, educational and training programs, and gender roles force a choice between work and family, women often choose work, foregoing childbearing altogether (Billari and Kohler 2004; Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Gauthier 2007; Gerber and Perelli-Harris 2012). Childbirth significantly disrupts work careers of women and decreases opportunities for women to advance, or provides less choice of the field of employment. For instance, studies of the occupational segregation in Western Europe suggest that childbirth most negatively affects the opportunities of women to advance in certain occupational fields, usually those based on apprenticeship training and experience (Estevez-Abe 2006). Childcare availability can facilitate women’s labor force attachment through reducing the time-off taken to care for children as evidenced by research (Randall 2000; Rindfuss 1991; Rindfuss et al. 2007; Szelewa and Polakowski 2008).

To summarize the existing arguments, the decline in fertility rates in CEE can be explained using the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) theory which focuses on a normative revolution of changing family structures, dual income families, fertility planning and the increased value of education. Countries that experienced SDT display significantly higher ages of first birth among mothers. A substantial segment of the literature points to the negative consequences of post-communist economic transformation and resulting recession. The literature also discusses policy mechanisms that can alleviate negative socio-cultural and economic trends through supporting
families with direct payments and public programs. Communist CEE states traditionally acted in the pronatalist manner by encouraging births within the confines of the established balance between social responsibility and market forces.\textsuperscript{16} After the transition, CEE states continued providing family policies instituted during Communism. The following is an empirical analysis of the economic, socio-cultural and policy determinants of fertility rates in CEE.

3. Data, Variables, and Measurement

I use original data, which was primarily collected during the time period from 2010 to 2011. The most recent year included in this dissertation is 2010 due to lags in official data reporting. The information on the duration and compensation levels of maternity leave, parental leave, and family allowances was coded from international reporting agencies, such as the European Union’s Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC), the European Commission’s Mutual Information System on Social Protection in the Central and Eastern European Countries (MISSCEEC), and the US Social Security Administration’s yearly editions of the Social Security Programs throughout the World (SSPTW). The data was then cross-checked for validation and missing values were corrected through accessing information from national statistical offices, direct requests for information to national social welfare administration ministries, combing through texts of national family policy laws for the formulas of compensation of maternity, parental leave, and family allowances, and consulting national budgets for actual sizes of allocations, such as subsistence levels and/or minimum wage values. Appendix A summarizes data used for the analysis.

\textsuperscript{16} For more on these see the welfare regime literature, i.e. Esping-Andersen 1990; 1996; Liebfried 1993.
The following countries are included in the sample: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia lead to the minimum disruption in data reporting, allowing the analysis of fertility trends in the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic since 1993. Former Soviet Union (FSU) Republics began forming governments and re-writing laws in the 1990s. Some were quite swift in parting with anything and everything Soviet, like the Baltic States where separation movements were brewing before the official 1991 dissolution. Estonia and Lithuania adopted laws on social insurance and family benefits in 1991. The common legacy of the Soviet policies and gradual reforms of family policies allowed for the minimum disruption in data collection.

Countries of former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) were dropped from the analysis because of lack of consistent data for the period of the 1990s due to the territorial and statehood changes, including armed conflicts, during the last two decades. The USSR ceased to exist on December 26, 1991. Central Asian countries and the Caucasus are excluded from the analysis due to insufficient data availability for family policy provisions during the 1990-1999 period as these countries went through significant economic and political turbulence including armed conflicts. Albania is excluded due to a higher fertility pattern and smaller scope of family policy provision than the rest of the CEE.

The dependent variable captures fertility by a commonly used measure of total fertility rates (TFR) (d’Addio and D’Ercole 2005; Billingsley 2010; Bongaarts and Feeney 2000; Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Sobotka 2003). TFR reflects the number of
children a woman would have if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and if the age-specific fertility rates observed in a given year applied throughout the childbearing years” (Bongaarts and Feeney 2000, 560). As discussed in the previous section, fertility rates in the CEE region fell sharply following the collapse of the Communism (Appendix B). Most countries registered a slow recovery by the late 2000s, while a few seem to have settled into a pattern of lowest-low fertility at or below 1.3 children per woman. No country in the sample achieved the coveted population replacement level of 2.1 children per woman since transition from communism.

To capture the shock of economic hardship, I measure the overall growth of the economy and rates of unemployment. The literature suggests that declining fertility could be attributed to the turmoil caused by the rapid liberalization of economic policies. Transition to a market economy meant a major transformation of economies that included closure of inefficient state-run enterprises and reorganization of existing companies. Industrial output fell sharply and inflation soared in many countries (Amsden, Kochanowicz, and Taylor 1994; Baxandall 2003). These changes created a growing pool of unemployed. In concert with the existing research, I expect negative consequences of increased unemployment and negative GDP growth. I measure economic growth in terms of growth of gross domestic product (GDP), data taken from the World Bank database. Unemployment statistics were taken from multiple sources including United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), International Labor Organization (ILO), and national statistical offices. It refers to total percent of unemployed in a given country.

**H1:** Positive GDP growth will contribute to higher fertility rates.

**H2:** The increase in unemployment will negatively affect fertility rates.
As existing literature argues, family policies can have a positive effect on fertility rates. I measure major components of family policies, such as: childcare availability, paid maternity leave, paid parental leave, and family allowances. The availability of childcare eases the restrictive demands of childrearing on working mothers, thus reducing costs of having children and contributing to higher birth rates. It decreases the need for women to choose between work and family, thus decreasing the negative effects of childbearing on labor force participation and advancement (Blau and Robins 1989; Del Boca 2002; Del Boca et al 2003; Gauthier and Hatzius 1997; Kravdal 1996; Rindfus et al. 2007). To measure childcare availability, the UNICEF Transmonee project measure is taken, pre-primary enrollments as percentage of population aged 3-6.

*H3: Greater childcare availability will lead to higher TFR.*

As illustrated above, CEE countries continue to provide generous paid parental and maternity leave as well as family allowances. Maternity and parental leave allow women to take paid time off to care for an infant while enjoying job security. These policies also reduce direct costs of having children by compensating the new mothers’ time off work. Most CEE countries compensate maternity leave in the amount of 100% percent of previous wage; parental leave is compensated based at different levels, ranging from flat fees to 100% of average wage. Maternity leave is a measure of average compensation in constant purchasing parity (PPP) dollars. Parental leave is a measure of impact; it represents the percentage of wage replacement by parental leave payments. Family allowances measure the impact of benefits as related to an average wage; the measure represents family allowances for a first child. I expect all three measures to positively influence fertility rates.
**H4: Maternity Leave compensation will positively influence fertility rates**

**H5: The impact of parental leave payments will positively influence fertility rates**

**H6: The impact of family allowances will have a positive relationship with fertility rates**

I control for *maternal age at first birth*, which is used to measure possible demographic transition. Demographers posit that postponement of childbirth leads to reduced fertility rates. The later women have children, the fewer children they have in total. Data indicates that average age at first birth is lower in CEE than in Western Europe. Mean age at first birth between 1990 and 2010 varies between 22 (Moldova) and 25.5 (Slovenia). As literature suggests, there is still room for increases in fertility rates following the rebound in economic health.

**H7: Increased age at first birth will lead to lower fertility.**

4. Empirical Analysis and Results

Analysis below presents the results of pooled regression of time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data of 14 countries over the period from 1990 to 2010. Panels are unbalanced with some missing values that are due to the underreporting during the chaos of transition in the early 1990s. Analysis of TSCS is a tangled endeavor given the complexity of problems and the lack of easy solutions to these problems (Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 1996; 2009).

The common issues with TSCS data are: panel heteroscedasticity (each country may have its own error variance), contemporaneous correlation of the error terms (errors of one country may be correlated with errors of other countries in the same year), and serially correlated errors (within one country errors may be correlated for different years). The recent scholarship on the topic advances our understanding of these issues and
advocates for modeling dynamics in TSCS data and addressing unit heterogeneity (Beck 1991; 2001; Beck and Katz 2009; Wawro 2002).

Modeling temporally dependent observations, or dynamics, include, at minimum, the use of a lagged dependent variable (Beck and Katz 1996). Other specifications imply estimating a variation of a single equation error correction model, such as an autoregressive distributive lag (ADL) model17 (De Boef and Keele 2008; Wilson and Butler 2007). Wooldridge’s test for serial correlation indicates the presence of serial correlation when the lagged dependent variable is included in the regression: $F = 27.06$ ($p = 0.0002$) (Wooldridge 2002). I also tested for stationarity, which is argued to be an important concern for TSCS analysis (De Boef and Keele 2008; Im, Pesaran, and Shin 2003; Maddala and Wu 1999). Data is said to be nonstationary when the distribution changes over time and is not constant, thus shocks have a tendency to accumulate forever. Even distant shocks can persist for many time periods and thus distort results. Fisher-type unit root test indicates the presence of nonstationarity in all panels (Im, Pesaran, and Shin 2003).

Because the simple correction – the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable – does not eliminate serial correlation, regression is estimated using an error correction (EC) model with AR1 panel-corrected standard errors (Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 2009, De Boef and Keele 2008). A general form of an error correction model is:

$$\Delta Y_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Y_{t-1} + \beta_0 \Delta X_{i,t} + \beta_1 X_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}.$$ 

17 Estimating serial autocorrelated errors using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) has been cited in the literature, but critiqued by Beck and Katz (2004) as inefficient. Following recent methodological debates, I instead focus on modeling dynamics.
Error Correction models are appropriate to use when data displays signs of persistent serial correlation. By first-differencing the dependent variable, EC addresses the serial correlation problem. Scholars argue that the EC model is appropriate if the data is nonstationary (unit roots) (De Boef and Keele 2008). The EC model addresses issues of nonstationarity by estimating the dependent variable and other slow-moving variables in first difference (Beck and Katz 2011, 343-344). Additional advantages of the EC model lie in its ability to estimate both long-term and short-term dynamics. The short-term effects are represented by the first-difference measure and the long-term dynamics captured by lagged values of independent variables (De Boef and Keele 2008, 191).

For theoretical reasons, I include two-year lags (t-2) of independent variables to account for the timing of fertility decisions. As researchers argue, it takes approximately two years from the time families start thinking about having a child to the birth: an average 5 month waiting period for conception plus a nine-month gestation period. The two-year lag also accounts for mid-year timing of births (Bongaarts and Potter 1983; Rindfuss et al. 2007).

The model specification is presented below. Each explanatory variable is represented in the first-difference form and with a two-year lag, following the general EC specification (above):

$$ \Delta TFR_{ln_{t,i}} = \Sigma Economic\ Variables_{t,i} + \Sigma Family\ Policies_{t,i} + \Sigma Demographic\ Variables_{t,i} + \varepsilon_{t,i} $$

First-differencing the dependent variable as a part of the error correction model eliminates serial correlation, as indicated by the Wooldridge test of serial correlation. Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data: F=1.430 (p= 0.2549). A full set of
country dummies was included in the regression to account for fixed effects, or the individual effects of each country. The use of country dummies is warranted because, as evident from the above discussion of trends in fertility rates, the outcomes of economic transition and generosity of family policies, CEE countries are not a monolith entity (Beck 2001).

The model was estimated using panel-corrected standard errors with panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure (model 1), Arellano-Bond GMM method of dynamic panel estimation with robust errors (model 2), and feasible generalized least-squares regression with panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure (model 3). Dummy variables for Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Belarus, Latvia, and Romania are significant. The values are not displayed in the Table 3 to preserve space. Results of the regression analysis are consistent regardless of the method of estimation. These different methods of specification are presented here as a robustness check. Consistency of estimates contribute to the validity of findings given many methodological concerns expressed in the TSCS literature (Beck and Katz 2011; Wilson and Butler 2007). Specifically, PCSE regression is a common instrument; it has been argued to remain accurate in the presence of panel heteroscedasticity (Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 2011) while panel specific AR1 account for temporal correlation of the errors (Plumper, Troeger, and Manow 2005). Arellano-Bond GMM estimation is commonly recommended to alleviate what is known as Nickell Bias. The bias arises when dummy variables are used together in models with a lagged dependent variable making least squares regression inconsistent because the lagged dependent variable correlates with the
error term (Nickell 1981). Generalized least squares regression has been common to use to address serial correlation in time-series cross-sectional data (Beck and Katz 2001).

Table 3. Determinants of fertility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>(1) PCSE ΔTFR_{ln-1}</th>
<th>(2) ArellanoBond ΔTFR_{ln-1}</th>
<th>(3) GLS ΔTFR_{ln-1}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ΔTFR_{ln-1}</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>-0.184***</td>
<td>-0.188***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFR_{ln-2}</td>
<td>-0.203***</td>
<td>-0.184***</td>
<td>-0.188***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔAge 1st birth</td>
<td>-0.039**</td>
<td>-0.035***</td>
<td>-0.037***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 1st birth_{ln-2}</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔParental Leave_{ln-1}</td>
<td>0.022***</td>
<td>0.021***</td>
<td>0.022***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental Leave_{ln-2}</td>
<td>0.009**</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
<td>0.008**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔMaternity Leave_{ln}</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternity Leave_{ln-2}</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔChildcare</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childcare_{ln-2}</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔGDP growth</td>
<td>-0.001***</td>
<td>-0.001***</td>
<td>-0.001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth_{ln-2}</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔUnemployment</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment_{ln-2}</td>
<td>-0.003***</td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
<td>-0.003***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFamily Allowance</td>
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<td>-0.00167</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Allowance_{ln-2}</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.23***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations | 238 | 224 | 238 |
| R-squared    | 0.558 | 14 | 14 |
| Number of Countries | 14 | 14 | 14 |

Note: Country dummies omitted to conserve space.
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All three models in Table 3 indicate the persistence of the economic hardship hypotheses, represented by statistically-significant coefficients of measures of unemployment and first-difference of GDP growth. The interpretation of results appears to be tricky: short-term influence of the change of GDP growth is negatively associated with the change in fertility rates.

A look at the dynamics of GDP growth in the sample reveals that GDP growth exhibits periods of sharp declines followed by periods of slow growth. Thus, the negative sign of the coefficient may reflect the severity of economic recessions as measured by negative GDP growth. These results may suggest parameter heterogeneity and warrant further testing (Plumper and Troeger 2007). To tease out the effects of GDP growth, I include the temporal measures of GDP growth for 1990-1995, 1996-2000; 2001-2005; 2006-2010. These time terms correspond roughly to periods of economic decline caused by the initial transition (1990-1995) and the relatively prosperous periods of economic growth of subsequent periods. These time periods also provide a measure of the influence of world economic cycles, such as the economic crisis of 1998 and the economic recession of the late 2000s. Table 4 reports the results of PCSE regression with panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure. Model (1) is the base model reported in Table 3. Model (1) is included for reference and Model (2) accounts for parameter heterogeneity in the measure of GDP growth.

The results reported in Table 4 confirm my findings of the base model as maternal age at first birth, paid parental leave and childcare availability, unemployment and economic stability remain significant. The coefficient for short-term impact of GDP grown is still significant and negative ($\beta = -.0024$) implying the overall negative
short-term influence of economic shocks (measured by negative GDP growth).

Table 4. Determinants of Fertility with Parameter Heterogeneity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>ΔTFR&lt;sub&gt;ln&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>(1) PCSE</th>
<th>(2) PCSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TFR&lt;sub&gt;ln t-2&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.203***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔAge1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; birth</td>
<td>-0.039**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; birth&lt;sub&gt;t-2&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔParental Leave&lt;sub&gt;ln&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.022***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental Leave&lt;sub&gt;ln t-2&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.009***</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔMaternity Leave&lt;sub&gt;ln&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.015</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔChildcare</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childcare&lt;sub&gt;t-2&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
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<td>0.001**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔGDP growth</td>
<td>-0.001***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991-95</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>0.002**</td>
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<td>GDP growth</td>
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<tr>
<td>ΔUnemployment</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment&lt;sub&gt;t-2&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
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<td>-0.002**</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ΔFamily Allowance</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>240</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.599</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Countries</td>
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<td>14</td>
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</table>

Note: Country dummies omitted to conserve space.
Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

However, when decomposed into periods, periods of 1996-2000 and 2006-2010 are positively correlated with the change in fertility rates. One percent growth in GDP
contributed to the 0.3% growth in fertility rates in the period 1996-2000, and once percent growth in GDP contributed to the 0.4% growth in fertility rates. These results affirm the hypothesis of the importance of economic growth for fertility rates growth and confirm the existing studies of fertility determinants that focus not only on CEE but also on Latin America (Adsera and Menendez 2011) and Western Europe (Fokkema et al. 2008).

Statistical results presented in Table 3 and Table 4 affirm the significance of short-term effect of childbirth postponement. Changes in the age at first birth negatively affect changes in TFR across the region; one year change in age at first birth is predicted to suppress change in birth rates by 4 percent. Interestingly, the past values of maternal age at first birth (measured by the second lag) are not significant but the sign is positive. The effect of a maternal age increase is realized immediately and does not extend into the future as indicated by significance of the first-difference value but not the lagged value of maternal age. These results may signify the relatively recent development of the negative relationship between age at first birth and fertility levels, as the rapid increase of maternal age at first birth began only in the recent decade.

As theory suggests, family policies can mitigate economic hardship by offsetting costs of having children and supporting modern families where mothers participate in the workforce. I included several family policy provisions in the model. As results show, neither changes in maternity leave compensation nor past values of maternity leave compensation have an impact on changes in fertility rates. However, parental leave compensation is an important determinant of fertility rates both in short-run and long-run dynamics. The immediate effects of one percent increase in parental leave compensation
increases fertility rates by 2%. Past values of parental leave compensation contribute to growth of fertility rates by about 1%. These results are consistent with the study of fertility determinants in OECD countries. Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) find that both maternity leave length and maternity leave compensation are not significant determinants of fertility rates.

The positive impact of childcare availability is entirely attributed to the future years: the coefficient of lagged childcare is positive and significant ($\beta=0.001$). This finding is well-explained once the measurement of the variable is considered. It measures the availability of childcare enrollment of children aged 3-5 years old. Parents cannot use this benefit until a child is born and has achieved the minimum age of enrollment, which is 3 years. However, this finding is an important confirmation of the extant feminist literature which posits the paramount importance of female labor attachment for increasing birth rates. The availability of childcare provides a valuable resource for working mothers who wish to return to work following childbirth. Contrary to expectations, family allowances have no direct impact on fertility rates in the region.

The effects of past levels of unemployment are significant and negative, implying the continuing significance of economic shocks in CEE. This finding confirms the expectations advanced by the existing studies: both cross-country statistical analyses and country cases. Table 3 also reports the significance of a short-term change in unemployment for fertility rates. However, this effects disappears when time is accounted for in Table 4. The loss of significance for change in unemployment in Table 4 may have been capturing the short-term fluctuations of the business cycle. By introducing the time-
specific GDP growth variable, I take business cycles into account, thus, the loss of significance in short-term change in unemployment.

5. Conclusion

This chapter explores important economic, demographic, and family policy determinants of fertility rates. By combining demographic and economic determinants of fertility and policy variables in the study, I aim to create a more complex understanding of how demographic trends and government policy influence birth rates. Fertility influences population levels, which creates an important political and economic resource for countries. Thus, governments have been actively supporting fertility through policy provisions. I show how family policies matter even when demographic and economic determinants are taken into account.

My findings support those scholars who underscored the importance of economic shocks for the explanation of fertility rate decline in the CEE. A measure of economic stability, GDP growth, is a significant predictor of fertility rates, which suggests that the shock of transition has not gone unnoticed for these countries. Economic stability is an important factor that influences fertility decisions. Additionally, economic uncertainty which commonly manifests itself in unemployment has both short-term and long-term effects on fertility rates in CEE.

This study affirms the importance of both monetary compensation of women through paid parental leave and the provision of childcare. These policies are aimed at reducing the direct costs of having children and at supporting mother’s labor force attachment through sharing childcare responsibilities between family and a state. According to the neoclassical economic theory of fertility, policies that aim at reducing
the cost of having children have a positive effect on fertility (Becker 1981; Cigno 1991; Gauthier 2007). The importance of childcare availability has been confirmed by many studies of European countries. More so, gender scholars argue that childcare is an important mechanism for achieving gender equality through furthering maternal employment. As feminists pose, women react positively to more opportunities to combine paid employment and childbearing that are afforded through the provision of family policies (Gornick and Meyers 2008). The next chapter investigates the determinants of family policies in post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Chapter 3

Family Policy Determinants in Post-Communist European Societies

1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the factors that determine generosity of family policy in a large sample of post-communist European countries. During communist rule, family policies were explicitly pronatalist: governments used family policies to stimulate stagnating birth rates. Women were encouraged to return to work following childbirth, while governments provided childcare facilities and other family support services. Following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, Central and Eastern European countries underwent massive transformation in all aspects of political and economic spheres. Social welfare policies have been tailored to the new reality. Despite transitions that signified cutbacks in most social welfare programs, countries of post-communist Europe continued supporting the family policy framework established during communism. Family policies have been repurposed to support the building of new national identities. The unique conditions of post-communist national state building, such as the upsurge of the nationalist political rhetoric and the strengthening of conservative and far right parties and the Church, brought family policies at the forefront of the national debate by centering on the vision of traditional families as a stepping stone to successful independent future (LaFont 2001).

Drawing on an original dataset, I analyze the determinants of family policies in the following CEE countries: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Albania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine.
for the period from 1990 to 2010.\textsuperscript{18} These countries inherited a similar legacy of comprehensive family policies,\textsuperscript{19} a legacy of state pronatalism, and a similar pattern of low fertility.

I draw on a divergent set of literature, including feminist writings as well as studies of nationalism and xenophobia to explain the continuous support of family policies in the CEE. I discuss the rise of nationalism in the post-communist search for identity and argue that nationalist rhetoric and anti-immigrant sentiment is an important determinant of family policies in post-communist countries. I pose that anti-immigrant sentiment contributes to the pressures on governments to support native families. Utilizing the power-resources theory (Korpi 1989, Korpi and Palme 2003) I propose that anti-immigrant sentiment unites a broad group of constituents around their fear of immigrants, creating a form of power-resources that is based not on class but on shared anti-immigrant attitudes. Additionally, I evaluate the relevance in the CEE cases of determinants of family policy generosity in Western European countries, such as total fertility rates, economic growth, strength of Left party politics and women’s representation in national parliaments.

An important contribution of this Chapter is in providing empirical evidence to the assertion that the CEE countries are not monolithic. They differ from each other in several important ways, such as the levels of family policy generosity, fertility rates,

\textsuperscript{18} The countries of the former Yugoslavia were omitted due to the lack of reliable data because of the political and security instability and the continuing state-building throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. The Central Asian Republics and the Caucasus were excluded due to lack of reliable data and also on theoretical grounds as these countries exhibit a different pattern of fertility, family structure, and the views on the role of females in family and society. Belarus is excluded due to the lack of reliable elections data and the increasingly authoritarian nature of President Lukashenko’s leadership.

\textsuperscript{19} This is not to say that there were not differences. For instance, some countries provided universal provision of benefits (Hungary) while others tied provisions to employment status (Romania, Poland, and USSR) (see Fodor et al. 2002 for a discussion).
political influence and electoral success of radical right parties, and the salience of immigration for the provision of social policies. I address the issues of unit heterogeneity through presenting the different statistical results of the whole sample versus the countries with significant proportion of immigrants. Also, I provide the evidence that the influence of voter preference changes with time and create different impulses that impact family policies in different ways.

In the first section of the paper, I recap feminist literature and studies of xenophobia and right-wing populism, showing how they intersect, and substantiate the argument that xenophobia and nationalism matter for family policymaking. The second part describes the major components of family policies in CEE countries, outlines the continuation of former paternalistic attitudes, and discusses their implication for gender equality in CEE countries. The following two sections summarize existing arguments for the importance of Left parties and women’s representation to family policy generosity in the OECD countries and present data showing the lack of success of the Left party ideology and the low female representation in most CEE parliaments. The fifth section discusses the level of xenophobia and its relevance to family policies. The chapter concludes with a time-series cross-sectional analysis of family policy generosity. The statistical analysis results support the significance of xenophobia in the countries where share of foreign-born population exceeds 5 percent. I find that Left parties spend significantly less in the post-communist countries, while members of the European Union spend more. Women’s representation in national parliaments, albeit declining, still has a significant positive effect on family policy generosity in Central and Eastern European countries.
2. Theory and Background

2.1 Power Mobilization Theory

One of the leading explanations of welfare state outcomes is the power mobilization theory. It explains policy outcomes based on class mobilization, which creates power resources (Esping-Andersen 1990). The power-resources argument (PRA) explains the outcomes of welfare provision through class-based conflict (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 1979; 1989; 2006). Social classes are the main agents of change, according to PRA. Class is defined as “categories of individuals who share relatively similar positions or situations, in labor markets and in employment relations” (Korpi 2006, 174). Different socio-economic groups utilize available recourse as leverage to influence political outcomes, including social welfare provisions. In labor market settings, actors engage two major types of power resources: economic resources and human capital. Holders of human capital, workers, usually have little control over remedies to the life risks such as unemployment, sickness, aging, etc. By banding together, employees can create powerful resources via cooperation, thereby creating more leverage. This leverage allows labor to successfully bargain with the state and market for social welfare protection and social citizenship rights through participation in unions and association with parties on the Left (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 2006). The welfare state literature used the PRA to explain the positive relationship between social democratic politics, the strength of unions and Left parties overall, and the growth of the welfare state in industrialized democracies of the post-WWII period. Thus, through capitalizing on its power, the organized working class was able to achieve greater social protections with support from the unions and labor parties.
2.2. Gender and Politics Literature

Gender scholars critique the PRA approach by noting its lack of focus on gender equality. According to critics, PRA assumes equal access to civil and political rights and that men and women have the same potential to realize their social citizenship rights (Orloff 1993, 308). Feminists argue that women’s rights in the spheres of reproduction, family rights and control of the physical body are contested in a particular way that men do not face. These ways of male-state domination limit women’s ability to fully participate in policymaking and advance women’s issues. To achieve gender parity, social citizenship rights must include recognition of mothering and care work, whether in the form of paid leave or pension credits (Knijn and Kremer 1997; McDonald 2002; Orloff 2009).

Gender scholars argue that the realization of social citizenship rights for women in large degree depends on the policies that ensure the opportunities for women to participate fully in the labor force. The promotion of women’s workforce participation can be achieved by the rejection of maternalism, a male breadwinner model of family relations where women are defined as housewives and caregivers (Orloff 2006). The examples of policies that promote gender equality are those that engage both men and women in “both paid work and unpaid caregiving” (Gornick and Meyers 2008, 322; Morgan 2008). They include paternity leave that encourages fathers to take time off work to care for children, as well as availability of quality childcare facilities, and flexible work time and part-time work opportunities for women. It is important to note that these theoretical debates were formed based on the experience of the Western developed
democracies and did not include the experience of the Central and Eastern European countries, then under communist rule.

2.3. CEE Family Policies: Pronatalism, Post-Communism, and Nationalism

The development of family policies in Central and Eastern Europe is significantly impacted by the communist past. Scholars describe the communist family policies as explicitly pronatalist (Avdeyeva 2011; LaFont 2001; Saxonberg 2014). Communist governments considered family policies instrumental in modeling population replenishment thus providing support for families in the form of paid maternity leave, parental leave, family benefits, childcare, family allowances and subsidies. The communist family policies were thus driven by demographic and economic factors. Full employment of men and women represented a way to increase productivity, especially as innovative technology was lacking (Gal and Kligman 2000; Kligman 1994).

The Soviet ideology proclaimed gender equality as an attained goal in the 1950s and thus projected an image of a caring state where women had equal opportunities to engage in paid work (Einhorn 1993; Kligman 1994). Gender scholars critiqued these claims by pointing to the double burdens women carried at the workplace and at home. Little was done to promote shared responsibilities in housework and caregiving at home as well as gender discrimination in pay and promotion at the workplace (LaFont 2001). The Soviet reality differed from the west in a key way – women had little choice as they were required to participate in the workforce (Einhorn 1993, 113-147).

Following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the new governments engaged in reshaping and redefining family policies. The policy rhetoric pivoted towards the return to pre-communist traditional family values in an effort to erase all things communist
In contrast to the communist full employment push, women in post-socialist countries were called to return home to give birth to and care for the new generations of citizens of the independent nations. Nationalism and traditional values, supported by the Church, dominated the family policy discourse following the transition (Inglot, Szikra, and Rat 2011; LaFont 2001).

The extant studies show that in post-communist CEE women’s social citizenship rights were overshadowed by socially conservative values of traditional family as the foundation of communism-free societies (Goven 1993; 2000). This phenomenon was dubbed “refamiliiazation” (Javornik 2014; Saxonberg and Szelewa 2007; Teplova 2007). The recent studies argue that the return to traditional values and the male breadwinner model worsened gender inequality and contributed to the feminization of poverty in the region (Kligman 1994; LaFont 2001; Saxonberg and Sirovakta 2006). Researchers show that even women welcomed the liberation from the state’s prescription for full maternal employment and embraced the freedom of decision for mothers to stay home and rear children while fathers earned the living (Angelova 1994; LaFont 2001; Kligman 1994).

Family policies in post-communist Europe are actively used by far right political forces in conjunction with the Church through the reduction of funding for childcare, increasing of the parental leave length, and restriction of abortion rights (Gal and Kligman 2000; Goven 2000; LaFont 2001; Morvai 1994; Inglot, Szikra, Rat 2012). A growing body of literature is devoted to the issues of the rising conservative radical right politics throughout Europe, including the post-communist European countries. The swelling dissatisfaction with globalization and political and economic integration led to the electoral success of the radical right parties which campaign on nationalist, anti-
globalization, and xenophobic platforms (Kitschelt 1995; Mering and McCarty 2013; Mudde 2005; Wodak, KhosraviNik, and Mral 2013). The far-right conservative agenda influences social welfare policies, including family policies, through an attempt to limit redistribution of social benefits based on the recipients’ perceived worthiness. Worthiness is often assessed based on membership in certain ethnic or economic groups.

Women are viewed as incubators for future generations of a family of citizens possessing innately native national qualities (Goven 2000, 296-301; Hankivsky and Salnikova 2012). The CEE countries experienced diminishing fertility rates that fell below replacement levels after the end of communism. This trend has been found alarming by many politicians. It was related to the social ills of communism, which forced women to work while neglecting family and reproductive responsibilities (Gorbachev 1987). Since the collapse of communism, women were called back to the hearth to rectify these “national losses” and ensure stable future of newly democratic states. Modeling fertility behavior once again became the main motif of family policymaking. For example, the 2003 Estonian parliamentary debates over the parental leave policy were dominated by the dangers of falling fertility rates (Karu and Pall 2011). The Hungarian parliamentary debates over parental leave focused on two different understanding of parental leave: a form of social assistance to those in need vs. the understanding of family policies as foundation of a nation (Goven 2000). Russian family policy packages of the second half of the 2000s that included an increase in parental leave pay and “baby bonus” legislation were driven by political concern about the population decline (Avdeyeva 2011; Kingsbury 2014). The adoption of the baby grant program (becikowe) in Poland after the 2005 elections was premised by a media
campaign stressing the “demographic emergency” of dropping fertility rates and the persisting year-to-year population decline, which was first registered in 1999 (Inglot, Szikra, and Rat 2012, 29-30).

The urgency of declining native birth rates has been stimulated by the perceived threat of increased immigration. After the fall of communism, borders opened up. The former communist countries became increasingly involved in the globalized world, integrated in the free movement of labor and capital. With the free flow of immigrants and dropping birth rates, populists concerned for the future of their nations agitated against the threat of the influx of immigrants. Pundits, elected officials, and bureaucrats invoked xenophobic images of immigrants overtaking shrinking native populations (Goven 2000, 297-298; LaFont 2001; Kingsbury 2014).

I argue that the post-communist social conservative tilt toward maternalism is reinforced by xenophobia and nationalism in post-communist CEE societies. The literature on CEE family policies shows that conservative populist politics, religious conservatism, and population decline have been the major concerns of family policy politics in the CEE since transition to democracy. I propose that xenophobia is a contributing factor in decisions of expanding family policies out of fear of national population declines. This dynamic is reinforced by the electoral success of radical right parties throughout Europe and the overall rise of conservative right-wing parties (Mudde 2005; Wodak, KhosraviNik and Mral 2013). Anti-immigrant sentiments represent a new type of power resource that unites a broadly defined group of citizens based not on class, but on their fear of immigrants. Ruth Wodak (2013) argues that growing right-wing populist parties base their success on pitting native versus ‘others’ in pursuit of electoral
gains. These political parties are capitalizing on the common fears of globalization and immigration, loss of national sovereignty and identity.

These nativist moods in society may translate into support of more generous family policies targeted at strengthening and enlarging native populations. As Korpi and Palme write (2003, 431):

[I]n a society where potential cleavages such as socioeconomic stratification, status, ethnicity, religion, economy sector, and region form a mosaic of cross-cutting lines among citizens and provide competing bases for the formation of citizen’s identities and interests, welfare-state institutions can be used to emphasize some of these potential lines and bases and to suppress others.

In such context, women and family are conceptualized as an important element of defense of the native population against the threat from the ‘others’ (Wodak 2013, 26-28).

3. Family Policies in CEE.

3.1. Maternity Leave and Parental Leave.

The former communist CEE countries, although historically and culturally different, share a similar legacy of pronatalist family policies created during communism. The policies had a dual aim of stimulating population reproduction and reinforcing labor supply through encouragement of female employment (Avdeyeva 2011, Fodor et al. 2002; LaFont 2001, Rivkin-Fish 2010, Saxonberg 2014; Šiklová 1994). Family policies pre-dissolution commonly included paid maternity leave and paid parental leave with varying levels of wage replacement, government subsidized childcare, cash family allowances per child, and various subsidies for school uniforms, lunches, books, etc. Following transition, the reformed governments carried over the basic structure of family benefits that include paid maternity leave (ML), parental leave (PL), family allowances
per child (FA), and a variety of birth grants and family benefits. The financing schemes were restructured to reflect market economic realities and now rely on social insurance schemes for financing (Aidukaite 2011; Fodor et al. 2002; Fultz, Ruck, and Steinhilber 2003).

**Figure 5. Duration of Maternity Leave in CEE 1980-2010**

Maternity Leave length has been expanded in length since 1990 in all countries but Albania (remains at 26 weeks), Slovenia (remains at 15 weeks), and Latvia (remains at 16 weeks). Maternity leave compensation is commonly calculated as percentage of previous earnings for economically active population. Nine countries in the sample (more than half) continue compensating maternity leave at 100% of previous wage and
Romanian ML compensation remains at 85% from 1980s to 2010. ML pay was reduced since 1989 in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Albania, and Bulgaria.

Parental leave (PL) benefits have been changed in more ways in length and compensation since the collapse of communism. Currently, the PL formula is either tied to the previous earnings, minimum wage or subsistence levels designated by the government. Additional conditions impose payment ceilings and requirement of minimum employment history. For example, in Poland only women who were employed one year prior to pregnancy are eligible for maternity and parental benefits. Poland also relies heavily on means-testing as eligibility criteria (see Inglot, Szirka, and Rat 2012, 29-32). In Russia, the reformed parental leave benefits compensate mothers at 40% of previous earnings with a maximum ceiling. In Romania, the value of PL benefit is 85% of previous earnings with a maximum ceiling and a minimum one-year employment requirement.

Several countries implemented differentiated parental leave plans that let parents choose leave length. Shorter PL is compensated at the highest rate. For example, in the Czech Republic and Romania parents can opt for a shorter leave (24 months in Czech Republic and 12 months in Romania) with higher compensation levels or choose to stay at home longer but receive a smaller monthly compensation (48 months in Czech Republic and 24 months in Romania). Additional post-transition changes include more means-testing of benefits, reduced funding for childcare facilities, and reduced or temporarily eliminated family allowances.  


Existing literatures argue that post-communist transformation brought little change to the status quo of and, in some countries, increased gender inequality (LaFont 2001; Rivkin-Fish 2010; Saxonberg 2014; Saxonberg and Sirovatka 2006). In an effort to reject the Soviet-style pronatalist focus on female employment, the new CEE governments moved towards a neo-familialist strategy\textsuperscript{21} of re-emphasizing women’s role as caretakers and homemakers (Inglot, Rat, Szikra 2011; Teplova 2007; Szelewa and Polakowski 2008; Glass and Fodor 2007). Women are encouraged to take care of young children at home. Lengthy paid parental leaves and declining availability of childcare facilities contributed to the return to the traditional understanding of gender responsibilities. For example, since 1995, parents in the Czech Republic have had the option to stay at home to care for a child until her fourth birthday. Parents in Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus are afforded PL until the child’s third birthday. The rest of the CEE countries afford parental leave in the range between 26 weeks in Albania and two years in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Poland.

Cuts to childcare financing, especially nurseries for babies under 3 years old, reinforced the push towards women staying at home to take care of small children throughout the 1990s. The transfer of nursery financing to the municipal levels further exacerbated shortages of care provision as municipalities struggled to find adequate funding (Saxonberg and Szelewa 2007). The literature suggests that since accession to

\textsuperscript{21} However, research warns us from treating the re-familialization trend as common, showing important distinctions between clusters of countries grouped around the extent women could combine work and home life and the sharing of care functions by government and families (Szelewa and Polakowski 2008).
the European Union, country-members have had to increase spending and provision of family policies to coordinate programs with the EU social policy directives. These efforts are especially relevant in the area of childcare provision. To date, none of the EU members from the former communist bloc have been able to fully meet the *Barcelona Targets* on childcare, which call for the provision of childcare in member-states at 33% of children under the age of 3 years old and 90% for children between 3 and school age by 2010.

Childcare enrollment rates vary in the region by age group, with more childcare available for older children and substantially less enrollment for children under 3 years old (Table 5 and Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5 Percentage of Children Under 3 Enrolled in Childcare</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>Moldova, Republic of</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<td>Russian Federation</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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Source: UNECE Statistical Database, compiled from national and international sources.

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22 The targets were set at the Barcelona Summit in 2002 and (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-592_en.htm?locale=en). Currently, only Slovenia is close to meeting these guidelines at both enrollment ages.
The availability of childcare has been linked to the greater gender equality opportunities for women. They ease the restrictive dichotomy of caretaker vs. working woman.

Childcare is an important public good for women. It enables them to successfully combine work and family life. Where childcare is unavailable, women rely on family members, quit work or forgo childbearing altogether.

Table 6. Percentage of Children Aged 3-6 Enrolled in Childcare

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>76.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>90.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova, Republic of Poland</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>80.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>77.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>60.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>55.8</td>
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<td>77.9</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>89.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>75.1</td>
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</table>

Source: TransMONEE

Family policy formation in the post-communist CEE was affected by the economic difficulties of transition. The economic transition was accompanied by a jump in unemployment in the CEE countries. Average registered unemployment throughout 1990s was at 10.5%. Unemployment was as high as 27% in Albania in 1992 and 26.5% in Ukraine in 1999. As a policy strategy to curtail unemployment pressures, women were encouraged to exit the workforce by offers of lengthy maternity and parental leaves. Also, women in CEE were more likely to be laid off, and remain unemployed longer than men (Fodor et al. 2002; Kozina 2009; LaFont 2001). Once unemployed, women faced difficulties re-entering the workforce due to the loss of tenure, skills and networking
opportunities. Scholars note common gender discrimination at hiring and in promotion decisions for women, especially women with young children due to stigma of unreliability associated with frequent requests for time-off to care for sick children and potential work interruptions due to pregnancy and childbirth (Einhorn 1993; Kozina 2009).

The extant literatures underlines the general lack of support for gender equality policy initiatives throughout the post-transition period, which is connected to the rejection of the Soviet-style declarations of gender equality through promotion of female labor participation (Kamerman and Moss 2011; Saxonberg 2014; Gal and Kligman 2000). It is only recently that the public in the CEE countries-members of the European Union (EU) were encouraged by the EU to consider gender equality initiatives. Such initiatives include instituting paid paternity leave and mandating a part of the parental leave to be taken up by fathers (Karu and Pall 2011, 80-81; Kocourkova 2011, 63).

Table 7 Paternity Leave

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year Established</th>
<th>Length (days)</th>
<th>Compensation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5 *</td>
<td>100% wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>15/75</td>
<td>90% of wage/unpaid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>90% of wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100% of wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td>80% of wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100% of wage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Benefits have to be taken up within the first two months of child’s life.
Source: ILO, European Commission.

To date, six CEE countries established paternity leave with the aim of promoting shared childcare responsibility among parents. Table 7 details paternity leave provisions in CEE. It shows that paternity leave is quite small, averaging at two weeks of paid leave. Such a gesture accomplishes little to signal real change. Nonetheless paternity leave can
be an important first step on the road to a greater balance of gender roles. Other initiatives include the encouragement of women to take shorter parental leaves, as in the Czech Republic where mothers who chose to take up the shortest parental leave are compensated with largest monthly payments. Another example is the establishment of incentives for employers to hire young mothers by reducing mandatory social security and health contributions, as in Hungary (Korintus and Stropnik 2011).

3.3. The Impact of Women’s Representation.

Feminists focus on the women’s political agency by emphasizing the ways that women can influence policy formation. For example, scholars present evidence that women’s representation in national parliaments and cabinets contributes to the advancement of women’s issues in addition to the strength of Left parties in government and the varieties of structure of electoral systems (Duhlerup 1988; 2006; Childs and Crook 2008; Kittilson 2008; Lambert 2008; Mansbridge 2005; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). Greater female representation translates into more generous family leave legislation, including paid parental leave and expanded childcare (Bolzendahl 2009; Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007; Duhlerup 1988; 2006; Kittilson 2008; Lambert 2008; Morgan 2008; 2013; Weldon 2011).

As Figure 6 below indicates, women’s representation in legislative bodies in CEE fluctuated through the last two decades. The communist governments had quotas for women’s representation in national parliaments as a way of showing the superiority and fairness of the communist systems to the Western bourgeois inequalities. Researchers dubbed it the “milkmaid’s syndrome” referring to the practice of forced descriptive representation of women that bore no significance for the advancement of women’s
interests (Mansfeldová 2003). The new political landscape of CEE countries is predominantly masculine, and women have been losing ground in parliaments in many of the CEE countries (Fuszara, 2000; Pascall and Kwak 2009).

Figure 6. Women’s Representation in National Parliaments since 1990

Female representation recovered from a post-transition slump and improved in Poland, Slovenia, Latvia, Moldova, Czech Republic, Belarus, and Estonia, while other countries continue to elect fewer females to national parliaments. Representation of women members of parliaments (MPs) fluctuated between 5 and 30 percent in the last two decades. Existing research suggests that a ‘critical mass’ of upwards of 10-40% women may be needed for effective influence, citing the seminal work of Drude Dahlerup (Dahlerup 1988, Kittilson 2008). Others point to institutional opportunities and constraints and nuances of conservative male-dominated party politics, arguing that a few
women in high and appropriate posts can better advance women’s causes (Childs and Krook 2008; Childs 2004; Dahlerup 2006; Norton 1995; Rosenthal 1998).

In sum, CEE countries continue providing generous family policies, which originated during the communist rule. Feminist scholars have criticized post-communist family policy developments by pointing to falling labor participation opportunities for women and increased dominance of a male breadwinner system. Gender equality issues in many post-communist CEE countries have been trumped by the emphasis on traditional gender roles within family. Soviet-style state pronatalism has been replaced by post-communist familialism. Both approaches have in common the emphasis on women as caregivers and the return to traditional gender roles and the idealization of traditional family as a foundation of society. The impact of the EU membership is unclear at this point, but its potential for influencing greater gender equality will be considered in the statistical analysis below by separating EU members from the non-EU members.

4. Party Politics and Family Policy Spending

4.1. Left Parties and Social Spending in CEE

The CEE countries underwent political transformation in the early 1990s following the dissolution of the communist bloc. Communist authoritarianism was abandoned in favor of democratic governments and free and competitive elections. The first semi-free elections were held as early as 1989 in Poland. By 1993, all CEE countries held free elections. The literature cautiously concurs that these political systems, albeit young, created democratic institutions and parties comparable to the established Western
Democracies by the end of 1990s\footnote{This statement does not fully apply to Russia where the quality of democracy degraded in the 2000s (Diamond 2015, 144-145). Nonetheless, Russia is included in the study due to the significance of party competition for social policy: Communist opposition resulted in social policy stalemate in the 1990s (Cook 2000) and the recent studies of Russian legislature indicate the significance, albeit limited, of the mainstream party competition, including the Communists (Reuter and Robertson 2014).} (Cook, Orenstein, and Rueschmeyer 1999; Evans 2006; Huber and Inglehart 1995, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009). The Polity scores for 2010 range from 4 in Russia and 6 in Ukraine to 10 in Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic (Polity IV).\footnote{The Polity scores characterize political regimes, 0-5 characterize anocracies and 6-10 are democracies.} The countries of the former Yugoslavia, except for Slovenia, are excluded due to the lack of continuous and consistent data reporting during the transition and statehood building in the region.

Analysts differ in their conclusions of the relevance of cleavages for party competition in CEE. The four cleavages that reflect societal divisions and that shape political party competition in established Western democracies are the center-periphery, state-church, urban-rural, and owner-worker (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The presence of stable political cleavages signals stability of party systems as parties are able to clearly align themselves with political grievances of different strata of the population. Arguments range from a claim that there is no common cleavage, to a claim that there is a single divide on the issues of economic (re)distribution (see overview in Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009, 283-289). However, most recent research agrees that economic (re)distribution of wealth is the common denominator and the main demarcation line for CEE politics. The standoff between market liberalism vs. redistribution produced a winner-loser dichotomy among the voters and tends to be the defining distinction among parties (Cook and Orenstein 1999; Kitschelt 1995; Marks, Hooghe, and Nelson 2006).

Public opinion studies show that the majority of CEE citizens are able to discriminate
between parties and correctly place them on the left-right scale (Evans and Whitefield 1998; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Kitschelt et al. 1999; McAllister and White 2007). CEE countries are comparable to Western Europe in this regard, having developed a political party system with clear demarcation lines between party political platforms and the selective electorates.

The understanding of political Left and Right in CEE is different from the established Western democracies. Given the history of communist emphasis on redistribution coupled with suppression of political freedoms, the post-communist Left is aligned around the issues of redistribution and nostalgia for Communist-era state authority, while their opponents rally support around democracy and a clear break from the state control over the economy (Marks, Hooghe, and Nelson 2006, 158-159). In this situation, support for the traditional Left ideas of equality, egalitarianism and democratic rule has been assumed in some CEE countries by the center-Right parties following the CEE-peculiar trend of demarcation with communist ideology. The Left then represents the transition losers who are nostalgic for the former communist order, rejecting markets and democratic competition, while the Right represents the proponents of democratic transformation (Cook and Orenstein 1999; Szelenyi, Fodor, and Hanley 1997). According to the scholars, Modern Left in CEE countries consists of the reformed former Communist parties, unreformed communist parties, and social-democratic parties of pre-communist formation (Kitschelt 1995; Tzeglov 2011).

What is then the connection between Left parties and social policy spending in CEE? Immediately following the collapse of the old order, Communist successor parties (CSP) faced popular rejection and the need to reform and adapt (Evans and Whitefield
These developments influenced policy decisions that differ from what is conventionally expected of the Left in the west: protect or increase social assistance programs. CSPs in Central European countries have been actively working to distance themselves from the past and in some cases acted as the most active proponent of drastic market reforms and austerity measures subscribing to fiscal conservative views (Cook and Orenstein 1999; Lipsmeyer 2009; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009). For example, having won backlash elections, the Polish former Communists in 1993 and Hungarian Socialists in 1994 drastically cut welfare spending (Szelenyi, Fodor, and Hanley 1997). Examining partisan effects on social spending in 13 CEE countries, Tavits and Letki (2009) find Left governments spent significantly less on healthcare and education. Strong party organization and loyal electoral base as well as lack of competition among Left parties made it possible for the post-communist Left to pursue drastic policy cuts without the fear of political backlash\(^{25}\) (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Kostelecký 2002; Tavits and Letki 2009).

### 4.2. Right-wing Parties in CEE

A number of authors argue that, along with the economic (re)distribution cleavage, there are socio-cultural issues that provide identifying features to CEE political parties: nationalism, the role of church and religiosity, minority rights, and the eradication of communist legacy (Hanley 2004; Marks et al. 2006; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009; Szelenyi, Fodor, and Hanley 1997). These issues shape the liberal-conservative political divide and often represent the forte of the CEE Right parties: clear

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\(^{25}\) Of course, the influence of economic pressures and the international creditors, IMF and WB, should not be discounted. Countries facing hyperinflation and falling economies in the first decade of transition were often constrained in policy decisions by externally dictated economic conditions (Deacon 1997, Vachudova 2008).
conservative message of defense of national identity and national security, traditional values and religious rights (Marks, Hooghe, and Nelson 2006, Vachudova 2008). Accession to the EU prompted center-right parties in Hungary (Fidez), Czech Republic (ODS) and Poland (PiS) to announce their agenda to protect national interests and identity against the rising immigration that European integration brought along (Vachudova 2008, 388-389). Parties on the Right, due to a fragmented support base, extreme volatility, and increased competition, have been more responsive to citizens’ economic hardships brought by the transformation and, when in power, voted for the expansion of social spending (Lipsmeyer 2009). Lipsmeyer finds a positive significant relationship between the strength of Right parties in parliament and pension spending in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (Lipsmeyer 2002).

The rise of conservative, male-dominated politics and the emphasis on traditional values played a role in the post-communist reforms of family policies as well. Conservative Catholic and Christian Democratic parties in the Czech Republic and Poland have been persistent in their emphasis on traditional values and negotiated the continuation of paid parental leave schemas (Kocourkova 2009; Inglot, Rat, and Szikra 2011). Conservative party politics (i.e. Law and Justice (PiS) and the League of Polish Families in Poland, Christian Democrats in the Czech Republic, the Hungarian Democratic Forum in Hungary), and the broader involvement of non-government actors, such as the Catholic Church, especially in Poland, and most recently the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia, and conservative family support groups became instrumental in shaping family policies since the collapse of communism (Deacon 1992; Glass and Fodor 2007, 328; Inglot, Szikra, and Rat 2011; Korintus and Stropnik 2011, 141).
Right-wing parties throughout CEE have embraced the traditional family as the new ideal. Through extending parental leave and de-funding childcare, conservative politicians were able to regulate the work-family balance for women in favor of the traditional caretaker model. For instance, the conservative approach to women’s role as caregivers in Poland trimmed parental leave and childcare provisions and emphasized means-testing thereby hampering opportunities for women to participate in the labor market. The traditionalist approach to family policy in Poland was strengthened by the influence of the Catholic Church and the weakness of active women’s groups (Glass and Fodor 2007). Conservatives in Hungary encouraged women to stay home with children by maintaining the provision of paid parental leave (GYED and GYES) until the child’s third birthday while effectively closing childcare facilities by devolving unfunded responsibility to local governments (Korintus and Stropnik 2011, 138). Childcare facilities provide opportunities for women to share childrearing responsibilities with the state while women participate in the workforce. This is what the post-communist conservatives argue against. In their minds, mothers should be the primary caregivers to young children while men should be rightfully reinstated to the role of breadwinners (Glass and Fodor 2007).

Increased spending on family policies such as maternity and parental leaves and baby grants fits well into the conservative-nationalist socio-cultural agenda of the Right parties in CEE. Many CEE states face dwindling population. The renewed conservative pronatalist rhetoric stems from several factors such as the worsening demography caused by the declining birth rates, the revitalized conservative family values, and the new threats of immigration caused by opening of borders to the EU and former USSR.
countries fall on fertile soil in these countries. Inglot, Szikra, and Rat (2012) show that in Poland, the conservative League of Polish Families (LPR) pushed through birth grant legislation in 2005 and a tax credit in 2007 to help Polish families off-set costs of having children. In Hungary, Victor Orban’s first conservative cabinet (1998-2002) increased maternity leave and restored parental leave (GYED) after reduction under the Bokros austerity plan initiated by its Socialist predecessor. Subsequent Hungarian cabinets returned to the conservative family agenda. The Right-center government of Orban restored in 2009 some previously cut parental leave benefits and introduced tax benefits for families with children (Inglot, Szikra, Rat 2012, 35). In Russia, the United Russia party pushed through a series of packages aimed at increasing birth rates and encouraging large families. The measures included a generous federal birth grant implemented in 2007, regional birth grants since 2011, and sizable parental allowances for the birth and upbringing of a third child since 2013 (Avdeyeva 2011; Kingsbury 2014).

Benoit and Laver’s study (2006) describes the Right party prevalence in CEE, as experts classified 60% of parliamentary parties as being on the Right. Median voter preferences coded by the Manifesto Project paint a similar picture: the Right-leaning party partiality in the sample countries (Volkens et al. 2012). Figure 7 below shows fluctuation of government ideology as measured by the median voter preferences. The data point to a Right party preference in many CEE countries since the transition to democracy. The zero grid represent the central reference point, with the positive values representing the Right political ideology, and the negative values represent the Left political ideology (Klingemann et al 2006, 5-27). Median voter position is calculated based on the coding of party positions on the Left-Right scale. Commonly, parties on the
Left are Communists and Social Democrats, while market Liberals and National-Conservatives are on the Right. The Manifesto Project codes party position on a scale 0 to 100 on the Right and 0 to -100 on the Left. “The Scale generally opposes emphases on peaceful internationalism, welfare and government on the Left to emphases on strong defense, free enterprise, and traditional morality on the Right” (Klingemann et al. 2006, 5).

**Figure 7. CEE Median Voter Positions 1990-2010**

Following conventional logic, one would expect a decrease in social benefits, especially family benefits, given the relative weakness of the political Left in CEE. But the literature on CEE party dynamics indicates that, in fact, some of the most radical reforms were introduced by the Left governments as they were striving to distance themselves from the Communist past and to appear pro-reform (Lipsmeyer 2009; Tavits
and Letki 2009). Contrary to the established relationship, Right parties have been found more supportive of spending on social programs (Tavits and Letki 2009). Among the reasons to increase family policy spending are falling birth rates and increased public dissatisfaction with immigration. The discussion below describes popular xenophobia in CEE and demographic trends.

5. Immigration and Xenophobia.

5.1. Xenophobia

For decades, European countries have been coping with waves of migrants and debating the best ways to integrate them (Hansen 2003; Kymlicka 2010). The shortcomings of the implementation of multiculturalism policies heightened the visibility of immigration issues, often putting them at the forefront of political debate (Bauböck 2002; Write 2011; Write and Bloemraad 2012). The common outcry over the failure of multiculturalism and the fears among the natives that their own way of life is threatened, contributed to the rise of nationalist populism and electoral success of far-right populist parties throughout Europe (Kymlicka 2010; Mudde 2005). While not all CEE countries experienced mass immigration, tensions already exist between local and foreign-born or minority populations26 as well as between the native citizens and the immigrants and asylum seekers, especially from Africa and Asia (Mikulska 2008; Mukomel 2014). Existing research reports higher levels of xenophobic attitudes in CEE than in Western European countries due to the experience of isolation and the perceived homogeneous identity, lack of debate about and organizational and community support for immigrants,

26 Some examples include Roma in Hungary, Russians in Latvia and Estonia, and Central Asians in Russia.
and larger of rural populations which have been found to be less tolerant to immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Wallace 2002).

Figure 8 presents results of surveys that gauge opinions about immigrants in CEE countries. European Value Survey (EVS) asked respondents if they would not want immigrants or foreign workers as their neighbors. Data indicates fluctuation of public opinion, with several countries standing out for having a clear upward trend. Animosity towards immigrants as neighbors keeps rising during post-communism in Albania, Estonia, Russia, and Ukraine (EVS 2012). The public in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania appears to have become more tolerant as the years have passed.

**Figure 8 Percent of Respondents Who Would Not Want Immigrants or Foreign Workers as Neighbors**

![Graph showing trends in attitudes towards immigrants in CEE countries.](image)

Sources: WVS and EVS (last wave conducted in 2012)

Negative attitudes towards immigrants on average are the highest citizens of the Czech Republic (twenty year average 25.42%), Lithuania (twenty year average 24.41%), and Romania (twenty year average 24.30). On average in the period of 1990-2008,
between 16-25% of citizens of CEE countries did not want to have immigrants or foreign workers as their neighbors. Anti-immigrant sentiment is visible in everyday life via anti-immigrant, anti-minority, and/or anti-Muslim rhetoric inspired by organized groups and popularized by the mass media, for example, the so-called “Russian Marches” sponsored yearly by the Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) in Russia. These marches attract wide media coverage and exemplify the growing frustration over the flood of immigrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The communist past echoes in the state-level responses to treating foreign-born populations. The unique post-communist problems include the common authoritarian past and the mixed ethnic composition of states that emerged from the former Yugoslavia and the USSR. While many ethnic conflicts have been resolved with the emergence of new independent states, ethnic and religious minority rights have not been equally protected. Researchers point to the inadequate legal basis for prosecution of racism and xenophobic hate speech while local political elites and citizens use racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-immigrant language in everyday life and on political campaign trails (Bernath, Miklosi, and Mudde 2005; Ivanov and Ilieva 2005, Kiaulakis 2005; Kingsbury 2014; Mares 2012 Wodak, KhosravniNik and Mral 2013). CEE public space is often ambivalent toward anti-Semitic, anti-Roma, and anti-Muslim escapades by politicians and public figures while the radical-right racist skinhead public manifestations are common on the streets (Amnesty International 2013; ETH 2013; Mudde 2005; Pelinka 2012; Spiegel 2014).

5.2. Radical Right Parties

The growing dissatisfaction of native populations with the issues and problems of immigration has also been linked to the resurgence of populist radical right parties
The communist past still echoes in weak civil society but also in the rampant populism that caters to a significant segment of populations who suffered from the negative outcomes of economic transformation, restructuring, austerity, and unemployment. “Uprootedness, status loss, and uncertainties about identity provide fertile ground for paranoid visions of conspiracy and treason; hence the widespread attraction of nationalist Salvationism” (Tismaneanu 2007, 36). Data on the recent parliamentary elections provide evidence of various degrees of support for PRRPs in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, NSA in Bulgaria gained 9.4% of votes in 2009 Parliamentary elections; in Croatia HSP got 3% in 2011; Sovereignty in Czech Republic in 2011; PRM in Romania with 3.2% in 2008; Order and Justice (PTT) in Lithuania with 7.3% in 2012; LDPR in Russia with 11.7% in 2011; SRS in Serbia with 29.5%; and SNS in Slovakia with 4.6% of support in 2012 Parliamentary elections (Mudde 2012, 6; electionresources.org). There is no consensus among researchers that nativism translated into mass support for the populist radical right (Mudde 2005, Mudde 2012, Mudde 2013). However, studies show increased popularity of such parties in recent history, which helps these parties reach the electoral thresholds and receive parliamentary seats. While in parliament, these small parties, as members of broader coalitions, can pursue populist projects (Inglot, Szikra and Rat 2011; 2012).

PRRPs popularity is a telling sign of heightened levels of xenophobia, because it gauges public anxiety caused by immigration and the perceived loss of national identity. Populist right parties often run on anti-immigrant and anti-globalization platforms. These

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27 Following Mudde, I define radical right as parties that subscribe to the anti-immigrant, nativist, populist and authoritarian views (see Mudde 2012, 1).
parties do not object to high levels of re-distribution and as such are not against welfare. They object to high levels of distribution to the “undeserving” groups. Scholars use the term ‘welfare chauvinism’ to describe the demands to limit access to welfare benefits for immigrants; a group viewed least deserving to receive public support (de Koster, Achterberg, and van der Waal 2013). Such a position appeals to a growing number of Europeans (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013).

Kitschelt (1995) connects competition over economic resources to ethnic heterogeneity. In societies experiencing economic and cultural change, parochial interests of ethnic groups will bring tensions over access to resources and entitlements. Individuals define their issue positions in terms of whether their ethnic group has easy access to resources, and whether their ethnic group is in majority (Kitschelt 1995, 463). Political elites will, consequently, pressure for policies of liberalization, citizenship rights, and channel resources according to (mis)fortunes of their ethnic constituency.

5.3. Declining Population.

The current demographic slump reinforces fears of native populations and gives grounds for support of welfare chauvinism. The CEE countries are facing declining populations as fertility rates plunged in the 1990s to below-replacement levels. Population replacement levels in developed countries are at 2.1 children per woman and refer to the average number of children families should have in order for a country to sustain population levels (PRB). Persistent below-replacement levels forecast population decline. At present, all CEE countries are struggling with below-replacement fertility rates (Figure 9). In 2010, the average total fertility rate (TFR) was 1.45 with the smallest TFR of 1.26 in Hungary and largest TFR of 1.63 in Estonia. In CEE, as in the rest of
Europe, declining birth rates are accompanied by the challenges of aging population. The share of young population is shrinking, while the amount of elderly (65 years old or older) is expanding.

**Figure 9. Total Fertility Rates in CEE 1980-2010**

According to UN projections, without sustaining population levels either through immigration, an increase in natural birth rates, or a combination of immigration and sustainable fertility rates, countries with below-replacement fertility cannot preserve their present economic and military strength and stability (UN 2001). In response to the worsening demographic situation, all CEE governments in the sample, except Albania, expressed concern over the levels of birth rates and report intention to actively raise fertility rates (UN 2013).  

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28 As of 2005, only Albanian government reported its satisfaction with population growth levels and fertility levels. The rest of the countries in the sample report a high level of concern and a wish to raise their fertility and population levels.
This section discussed evidence of heightened levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and described its relevance to family policymaking. Welfare chauvinism, protecting the interests of the native population while excluding the immigrants (or other undeserving groups), and populist radicalism is a growing trend across Europe, including post-communist Central and Eastern European countries. The sections below discuss the measurement of these proposed determinants and the results of statistical analysis.

6. Model and Variables.

6.1. Variables

I argue that a variety of factors influence generosity of family policies in CEE. The equation presented below summarizes the general form of the proposed model.

Family policy generosity is a function of the political variables, demographic variables, xenophobia and economic stability:

\[ Policy \text{ generosity} = \sum Political \text{ variables}_{i,t} + \sum Demographic \text{ variables}_{i,t} + \sum Xenophobia_{i,t} + Economic \text{ stability}_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \]

Measurement of family policy generosity varies in research (Ferrarini et al. 2013). A common instrumentation of family policies is government spending on family policies as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (D’Addio and D’Ercole 2005). However, the shortcoming of such measure is that it lumps spending on different programs, such as education, health, pensions, and family benefits, together. The main critique of this approach is that party politics and financial considerations of healthcare spending may be different from the family benefits justifications. Other common measures include length of maternity leaves or wage replacement levels of maternity and parental leave compensation (Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997; Rovny 2011; Weldon 2011). Using a
comprehensive dataset of CEE family policies developed for this project, I propose using the generosity of maternity leave measured as the total payments paid during maternity leave duration in weeks. That is *leave length × amounts paid at wage replacement rate in ppp dollars*. I argue that the proposed measure captures both length and compensation levels which helps gauging the volume of support received by mothers. Maternity leave is a mandatory policy in the CEE countries, and as such it is an appropriate instrument of assessing generosity of family policies across different countries.  

**Figure 10. Generosity of Family Policies**

![Box and Whisker Chart showing levels of generosity for different countries](image)

Note: There are some outliers, so the variable is log-transformed for statistical analysis. The outliers (shown by dots and excluded from the data represented in the box and whisker chart) are cases affected by the increases in ML compensation in the 2000s.

*Political variables* are the measurement of partisanship in parliaments and percent of women in national parliament. Partisanship is measured by two different variables:

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29 Versus parental leave that varies greatly by length, compensation and income levels, and child’s age.
median voter and strength of Left parties in national parliaments. The measurement of *median voter* on the right-left scale is taken from the Manifesto Project data that codes party manifestos and election data throughout Europe, including CEE countries (Klingemann et al. 2006, Volkens et al. 2012; Volkens et al. 2014). This measure is composed using the Kim and Fording method (Kim and Fording 1998, 79-80). It calculates preferences of a median voter based on the left-right placing of party manifestos, votes casted for these parties, and the position of the median voter located in the interval directly to the left and to the right of median voter. This measure allows making cross-country comparisons of median voter ideology, which is closely related to the ideology of party in power. This variable measures the relative strength of position of parties on the left-right ideological continuum. The CEE median voter scores indicate an overall Right ideology preference in the CEE countries, as shown on Figure 7. Brief swings to the Left appear in the study period. They have been linked to the harsh realities of transition when many countries plunged into hyper-inflation, negative GDP growth, and unemployment, during which Left parties have been able to rally support behind their political ideas (Haggard and Kaufmann 2008).

An additional measure of party ideology measures representation of Social Democratic and other Left parties in national parliaments (henceforth Left Government) as proportion of all parliamentary seats (Armingeon et al. 2011). The reason to include two party ideology variables is to address the shortcomings of the median voter preferences indicator, as median voter preferences do not always coincide with the parliamentary vote alignment. Left Government data are not available for non-EU member countries. Both measures of voter preferences seek to explore the relationship of
party strength and family policy generosity. I test the established notion that Left parties spend more generously on social policies, as well as my alternative argument that, in CEE, Right parties are more likely to increase family policy generosity based on the conservative ideals of traditional family and national preservation.

**H1: Left parties in CEE will spend more on family policies**

**H1a: Right parties in CEE will spend more on family policies**

The representation of women variable measures the percentage of members of parliament (MPs) in national parliaments who are women. Data are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI), the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), and websites of Parliaments of individual countries. As feminist literature indicates, greater women’s representation in parliaments leads to policies that promote women’s issues. Previous research finds a positive influence of women in parliament on social welfare policies. I test this relationship on the CEE sample.

**H2: Greater representation of women in national parliaments will positively affect family policy generosity.**

The anti-immigrant sentiment is measured by two variables. The first, xenophobia, comes from the World Values Survey waves conducted between the years 1990 and 2012. I include the percent of respondents who responded positively to the inquiry of whether they would not want their neighbors to be immigrants and/or foreign workers (Wallace 2002). Another measure of anti-immigrant sentiment is the proportion of foreign-born population in the country, migrant stock data from the World Bank. The measure is included to control for the overall influence of the presence of immigrants/foreign-born population on public opinion. Presumably, the more visible
immigrants are, the more xenophobia should ensue and more generous family policies would be pushed through by radical populist nationalist parties in government.

**H3: Greater percentage of xenophobia will lead to more generous family policies.**

**H4: Greater proportion of migrants in a country will lead to more generous family policies.**

The demographic and economic factors are total fertility rates and growth of GDP, respectively. *Total fertility rates* (TFR) refer to the number of children per woman assuming she lives to the end of her childbearing age and bears children according to the current age-specific fertility rates. It is expected that TFR will have a positive relationship with generosity of family policies because contemporary CEE governments continue on the pronatalist path of encouraging childbirth. Contemporary CEE governments inherited the policy concern for declining birth rates from the communist regime, albeit flavor it with the traditionalist/national preservation rhetoric. I argue that there is a positive reinforcement loop in the policy provision here: growth in birth rates stimulates the government to spend more having seen that the desired result. These countries have experienced a sharp decline in birth rates despite the existing system of support, so the governments are working to reverse the trend by encouraging more births through even more generous family policies. This policy mechanism may be peculiar to the CEE countries, since they already have quite elaborate family policies. However, existing policies were not enough to keep the birth rates from declining during the transition from communism. As I show earlier in this chapter, this policy behavior is familiar – first implemented as a pronatalist policy driven by communist ideals, now it is a familialist policy driven by the traditionalist and conservative interests of national preservation.
**H5**: The rise in TFR will lead to greater generosity of family policies in CEE.

**H6**: GDP growth will positively affect family policy generosity.

The state of the economy is controlled for in the form of the GDP growth to reflect the financial ability of the governments to fulfill social obligations (Deacon 2000). Additionally, I control for *female employment*. Female employment represents the ratio of women employed to the total workforce. This measure reflects the historically high female employment patterns inherited from the communist period. It captures the general dynamics of family policy generosity as differences in the family policy provisions because in all the countries, maternity benefits are tied to mother’s previous wages.

### 6.2. Models

The statistical analysis uses data from fourteen countries: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Albania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine. The time period is between the years 1990 and 2010. It is a time-series cross-sectional dataset (TSCS). The panels are unbalanced with missing values due to lack of data on some elections and on generosity levels, especially during the transition period of the early 1990s. There are also gaps in the year and country coverage of public opinion surveys that measure xenophobia.

Ten countries were EU members as of 2010: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Researchers argue that these countries developed stable affluent democratic regimes, which tend to spend more on social welfare programs as a way of addressing citizens’ demands. EU members also experience pressures from the other Union members to maintain higher spending on social policies, including paid leave and childcare provision, to match the general levels.
Additionally, the literature suggests that the new EU members had a history of social welfare systems that preceded communist rule, whereas the rest of the former USSR states did not (Orenstein 2008).

Several models were specified: (I) a full sample of 14 countries and the median voter party ideology measurement, (II) a subset of 7 countries with high levels of migrant stock, over 5% of population, (III) EU-member\textsuperscript{30} countries only, and (IV) EU-member countries using an alternative measure of Left party strength. Models (I) and (III) are included to analyze any potential differences between EU and non-EU countries, specifically, the full sample includes the former USSR republics of Russia, Moldova, and Ukraine, plus Albania. Treating the European Union members as a subsample is preferable to the commonly used fix of including a dummy variable. Because of the nature of the data, using dummy variables runs a risk of running high standard errors because of correlation with fixed effects, thus losing explanatory value and running a risk of a Type II error of rejecting the meaningful relationship (Beck 2001; Plumper and Troeger 2007; Wilson and Butler 2007, 105).

Additional differences between models are in the way party influence is measured. Specifications (I) full sample and (III) EU-members include the measurement of median voter preference as defined by Kim and Fording\textsuperscript{31} and calculated by the Manifesto Dataset (Kim and Fording 1998; Klingemann et.al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2014; Volkens et al. 2012). Model (IV) estimates the influence of Left parties in the sub-sample of the EU countries.

\textsuperscript{30} Membership as of 2010.
\textsuperscript{31} It estimates the median voter preferences of the electorate based on the assumptions of voter’s rational choice and stable party cleavages among the Left-Right spectrum (see Kim and Fording 1998, 2003).
Figure 11. Proportion of Foreign Nationals by CEE Country

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
Note: Estonia and Latvia have a large proportion of population born outside of these countries due to the migration of Russians during the Soviet period. Since regaining their independence, ethnic Russians have been encouraged to leave by denying citizenship rights. Many ethnic Russians remain non-citizens, thus are considered foreign-born population (Cianetti 2014).

Specification (II) estimates the determinants of generosity in the subset of countries with high levels of migrants (over 5% of population). Seven countries of the sample host a larger number of immigrants, as measured by the migrant stock variable, which accounts for the proportion of foreign-born population in a given country (Figure 11). Slovenia, Moldova, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine host a significant amount of foreign-born population, ranging from an average of 6.29% in Lithuania to 18.89% in Latvia and 18.45% in Estonia. Others, like Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Albania, and Bulgaria have a small number of immigrants as a proportion of their population, less than 5% of the whole population. My theory points to the influence of xenophobia on family policies. Anti-immigrant sentiment may be influenced by higher
levels of immigrants in societies, thus I am looking at determinants of family policy
generosity in a subset of countries with large foreign-born populations.

6.3. Estimation methods

Time-series cross-sectional data often present methodological challenges because
of the complex nature of the intersection between time-series and cross-sectional
properties (Beck 2008; Beck and Katz 1995; Beck and Katz 2011; Wilson and Butler
2007; Wooldridge 2010). The Breusch and Pagan Lagrange test for panel effects is
significant, thus rejects the null hypothesis of constant variance of errors and signifies
that OLS estimations will be inefficient. A number of variables (TRF, Female
Employment, and Generosity of Policy) were transformed using natural logarithms to
correct for the non-constant variance of the error term (Wooldridge 2002).

I include a full set of country dummies to account for the individual country
differences. Unit heterogeneity refers to the ways the country-specific effects are
important for the explanation of regression outcomes and are not captured by the
independent variables (Wilson and Butler 2007, 105; Wooldridge 2002). Post-
communist countries are not a monolithic entity (Saxonberg and Sirovatka 2006). CEE
countries have different histories of pre-communism and even communist welfare state
development (Orenstein 2008), including varying characteristics of welfare state regimes
(Aidukaite 2011; Esping-Andersen 1990). As scholars point out, the use of fixed effects
aids in addressing the omitted variable bias, that is the unobserved local factors not
included in the model. The use of fixed effects is methodologically appropriate in the

32 Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000
absence of the temporary invariant variables in the dataset (Plumper and Troeger 2007, 124-125).

I take the advice of Plumper and Troeger (2007) to consider variance in time on important political variables. It is plausible that the influence of the political variables varies depending on time periods, indicating that Left policies change over time. To address parameter heterogeneity, I include the measures of party strength and Left party ideology at 5-year intervals\(^{33}\) to capture the electoral cycles that contribute to party strength and median voter position. The results are reported side by side and provide more information on the changing influence of the party variable on generosity.

Time-Series Cross-Sectional datasets frequently present challenges with the issues of time dynamics, or the time-series properties of the data that might reveal serial correlation. The research literature concurs that dynamics should be taken into account through appropriate choice of modeling (Beck and Katz 2004; Beck and Katz 2011). The Wooldridge test for serial correlation, or the interdependence of error terms over time, indicates the presence of serial correlation\(^{34}\) (Drukker 2003; Wooldridge 2010). A straightforward and common way of dealing with serial correlation is the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable to the set of independent variables (Beck and Katz 1996; 2011). Wooldridge tests for serial correlation was performed to test if the inclusion of the

\(^{33}\) These intervals are fixed for all countries.

\(^{34}\) Results of the Wooldridge Test of serial correlation in the base model: F=92.043, p=0.00; Results of the Wooldridge Test of serial correlation with the inclusion of lagged dependent variable: F=38.85, p=0.00; \(\phi=.98\).
LDV fixed the serial correlation problem; it shows the persistence of small amount serial
correlation even after the LDV correction, with a large coefficient.  

Although an easy fix, LDV regression is insufficient for modeling dynamics if
data is nonstationary because it produces spurious regression results (Beck 2008, 479;
Beck and Katz 2004). I conducted several stationarity tests to check for potential
problems (Im, Pesaran, and Shin 2003; Maddala and Wu 1999). A simple
autoregression to logarithm of generosity reveals the autoregressive coefficient of 0.99
with a standard error of 0.014. These results indicate non-stationarity and the presence of
unit roots. Alternatively, Fisher-type unit root test based on the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test fails to reject the null hypothesis regarding presence of unit roots (Im, Pesaran
and Shin 2003).

7. Results and Discussion.

Given the complexity of data and the problems of serial correlation and unit-
roots, common stationary methods of estimating dynamic models, such as autoregressive
distributed lag (ADL), lagged-dependent variable (LDV), and simple model with
autoregressive error process (AR1), will most likely produce spurious results. Beck

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35 See a discussion in Beck and Katz 2004 (pp. 19-20) about serial correlation and the conditions under
which a small amount of serial correlation still warrants OLS regression with LDV. For a critique of the
LDV inclusion, see Achen 2000.

36 Various unit root tests are available in Stata, but researchers acknowledge their limitations as the TSCS-
applicable methods are under development (see Im, Pesaran and Shin 2003; Persyn and Westerlund 2008).
For example, Maddala and Wu (1999) discuss the shortcomings of the popular tests, such as the Dickey-
Fuller, to distinguish between the null hypothesis of the unit root and the stationary alternatives (page 631).
Beck (2008) proposes running an auxiliary regression to assess the coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable. If it is close to 1, then the data is not stationary.

37 See an informative discussion of the applicability of unit-root concepts to the political economy data in
Beck and Katz (2011, 343). The authors discuss the natural limits many political economy variables have in
the forms of spending limits within a country budgets.
(1991) shows that the error correction model shows the best properties when dealing with complex time-series cross-sectional data.

Table 8 presents results of several models are specified to address the nonstationarity, serial correlation, and heterogeneity concerns through modeling the error-correction model with panel-specific AR1 error processes and fixed effects (Beck and Katz 2011). As argued in Chapter 2, error correction model has an additional advantage in its ability to estimate both short-term and long-term dynamics. The short-term dynamics is captured by the first-differenced values of the variables, and the long-term dynamics is captured by the lagged values of the variables (De Boef and Keele 2008, 191).

As a robustness check, a generalized method of moments (GMM) model was specified (Appendix E); also often referred to as the Arrelano-Bond (A-B) model specification (Arrelano and Bond 1991). A-B is commonly advised as an alternative to the LDV specification for dynamic TSCS and panel data that includes fixed effects (Wilson and Butler 2007). This method of estimation addresses what is known as the “Nickell Bias” (Nickell 1981). It comes from the potential correlation of the centered lagged dependent variable with the centered error term. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is insignificant, supporting the null hypothesis that the model and overidentifying restrictions are correctly identified (p=0.31). The results of robustness checks support the findings presented in Appendix D.

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38 More models were tested, including OLS with Huber-White (robust) errors; first-difference model; and an autoregressive distributed lag model specified by OLS Prais-Winsten regression.
Table 8. Determinants of Family Policy Generosity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(I) Full Sample</th>
<th>(II) High % Migrants</th>
<th>(III) EU-members</th>
<th>(IV) EU-members</th>
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Dependent Variable: ΔGenerosity

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<tr>
<td>Generosity$_t-1$</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>-0.12***</td>
<td>-0.074*</td>
<td>-0.075*</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
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<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
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<td>(0.048)</td>
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<td>ΔGDP growth</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.009***</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.007***</td>
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<td>GDP growth$_t-1$</td>
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<td>0.013***</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.009***</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
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<td>ΔTFR$_{ln}$</td>
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<td>0.745***</td>
<td>0.442***</td>
<td>0.489***</td>
<td>0.818***</td>
<td>0.818***</td>
<td>0.895***</td>
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<td>(0.163)</td>
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<td>TFR$<em>{ln</em>{t-1}}$</td>
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<td>0.263***</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.328***</td>
<td>0.294***</td>
<td>0.276**</td>
<td>0.370***</td>
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<td>(0.109)</td>
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<td>0.004</td>
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<td>WomPARL$_{t-1}$</td>
<td>0.009***</td>
<td>0.009***</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.005**</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
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<td>ΔXenophobia</td>
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<td>0.002</td>
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<td>0.020***</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
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<td>(0.004)</td>
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<td>0.007**</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
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<td>ΔFemEMPL$_{ln}$</td>
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<td>2.284***</td>
<td>-0.00548</td>
<td>-0.253</td>
<td>2.534***</td>
<td>2.522**</td>
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<td>(1.026)</td>
<td>(0.997)</td>
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<td>FemEMPL$<em>{ln</em>{t-1}}$</td>
<td>1.560***</td>
<td>1.559**</td>
<td>1.877</td>
<td>2.118**</td>
<td>2.251**</td>
<td>2.111**</td>
<td>2.444***</td>
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<td>(0.642)</td>
<td>(0.728)</td>
<td>(1.195)</td>
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<td>(0.957)</td>
<td>(0.983)</td>
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<td>ΔMigrant%</td>
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<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.165**</td>
<td>0.109*</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
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<td>0.021***</td>
<td>0.017***</td>
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<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
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<td>0.004***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Med Voter$_{1991-95}$</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Med Voter$_{1996-00}$</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Voter$_{2001-05}$</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Voter$_{2006-10}$</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.014***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

97
Table 8. (Continued)

| ΔLeft GOVT | -0.002** | -0.0003 |
| Left GOVT 1,1 | (0.0004) | (0.0003) |
| Left GOVT 1991-95 | -0.001** |
| Left GOVT 1996-00 | (0.0003) |
| Left GOVT 2001-05 | -0.001** |
| Left GOVT 2006-10 | (0.0004) |
| Observations | 206 | 206 | 103 | 103 | 155 | 154 | 154 | 154 |
| R-squared | 0.397 | 0.402 | 0.550 | 0.620 | 0.331 | 0.332 | 0.368 | 0.459 |
| Countries | 14 | 14 | 7 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |

Note: Country dummies were included in all models (results not presented for space conservation reasons).
Specification (I) includes the full sample of 14 countries with median voter party ideology measurement; Specification (II) includes a subset of seven countries with a high proportion of migrant population (see Figure 11); Specifications (III) and (IV) include the EU-member countries and differ in the measure of party ideology. Each of the four specifications includes two models: without and with parameter heterogeneity.
Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Findings presented in Table 8 uphold the commonly held view of the positive association between the economic growth and social welfare. Short-term changes in generosity of maternity leave policies are dependent on the health of the economy. These results need little explanation, as social benefits are financed by national budgets.

Consistent to my expectations, family policy generosity is directly proportionate to total fertility rates. It is important to note that the relationship is positive, indicating that an increase in fertility rates prompt expansion of benefits. These results support my prediction of the reinforcement loop mechanism, which suggests that policy reacts to an increase in fertility rates with greater generosity to further stimulate births in the effort to achieve replacement levels (2.01).
The reason for such a reinforcement loop can be illustrated by the common fertility decline throughout CEE countries. The post-communist European states are actively working to increase birth rates that have fallen below replacement levels since the early 1990s. All the sample countries have officially expressed their intent to raise fertility rates, deeming population decline a national priority. Therefore, these governments are actively engaging in stimulating reproductive behavior through the increased generosity of family policies. This points to political calculations behind the decisions to reward growing fertility rates with more generous family policies in an effort to further stimulate birth rates. CEE countries do not risk overpopulation, as TFR is below replacement across the region. Therefore, stimulating fertility growth with more generous family policies serves the political goals of CEE governments, which are concerned about population decline. The underlying logic of such policy decisions is political populism that pursues the goal of growing the native population. It is important to note that the coefficients are very close across models and samples, regardless of the EU membership or the proportion of immigrants in the CEE countries.

The results of all models are consistent in predicting that the long-term impact of women’s representation in national parliaments has a positive significant impact on generosity of maternity policy. This finding has several important implications for the gender and politics literature. First, it contributes to the comparative study of the CEE countries, by providing empirical evidence in support of the feminist theory that argues the importance of women’s representation for advancing women’s causes. Family policies have been shown to increase women’s opportunities to combine family and career in western industrialized countries, thus contributing to gender equality. My
findings extend the validity of this theoretical argument to the sample of post-communist European countries.

Second, these results provide some understanding in the mechanism of women’s influence on policy. The impact of women’s representation in parliaments is only significant as a long-run indicator. The long-term impact of women’s representation, measured by the lagged value of the variable, is directly related to the increased generosity of family policies in the EU countries, irrespective of the measurement of political variable. Third, these results are significant and warrant further exploration of the impact of women’s representation on policy as that the overall trend of representation has been declining across the CEE since the collapse of communism. The overall average representation in CEE is about 13% (standard deviation 6.67) down from close to 30% - formerly a communist party target. Future investigations are warranted into exploring the policy outcomes of various levels of women’s representation, specifically women in cabinets versus national parliaments. Following the argument of Drude Dahlerup (1988), women may be better positioned to positively influence family policies from a cabinet-level position than as a MPs voting along the party lines.

The changes in levels of immigration are a significant predictor of policy generosity in the full sample (I) and in countries with high proportion of foreign born population (II). The long-term impact of the proportion of immigrants to overall population in CEE countries does increase generosity of family policies in both the full CEE sample and the high migrant stock countries. An interesting distinction arises between models (I) and (II), which include all 14 CEE countries, and models (III) and (IV) which include only the EU members. At the first glance, the distinction is clear – it
is the EU membership that makes the difference. However, migrant stock variable is significant in model (II) which include both EU and non-EU countries. The EU countries in that sample are: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. Therefore, I pose that the EU membership is not as significant as the proportion of migrants living in a country.

Additionally, in support of my argument, the statistical analysis shows that levels of xenophobia positively influence the generosity of family policies in high-migrant countries presented in specification (II). These results render support to my proposition of the connection between xenophobia and family policies. I argue that xenophobia matters. Native populations feel threatened by the growing amounts of immigrants and nationalists in governments push for the increase in family benefits to stimulate native birth rates. These results find support in case studies of xenophobia and welfare chauvinism throughout contemporary Europe (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007; Kingsbury 2014; Koster, Achterberg, and Waal 2013; Mudde 2005). These results contribute to the study of family policies by showing the connection between rising immigration, and xenophobia, and family policies in the CEE countries. This connection is largely triggered by conservative parties, which emphasize radical right nationalism and call for the restrictions of benefits to immigrants in favor of channeling benefits to native population only.

The results underline the importance of party politics, especially Right-party strength that connects the issues of family policies and immigration. The inclusion of party variables tested several theoretical propositions, which include the widely-discussed argument that Left parties increase social welfare spending in established democracies and the recent evidence that Right-party politics may contribute to the increased welfare
spending in the CEE. Each model is presented with two alternative specifications: one that investigates the short-term and long-term impacts on family policy generosity, and the other that decomposes political influence according to time periods. It is noteworthy that government ideology on the Left-Right scale, as measured by short-term changes in median voter preferences, has no significant effect on the family policy generosity in CEE countries (1) or the EU-members (5). However, the long-term influence of party politics, as reflected in the median voter position, is positive and significant in models (1) and (5), proposing the positive relationship between the leaning of the median voter to the Right and the increase in family policy generosity. The time interaction with median voter provides additional information on the strength and direction of the relationship indicating the structural difference in slopes depending on the time period. The change in median voter preference is significant and negative in high-migrant countries (model (4)), but the time interaction show a positive relationship in periods 1996-2000 and 2006-2010. I explain the overall negative relationship by the path dependency of post-transition Left parties, which positioned themselves as proponents of liberal economics and free market in an effort to distance from the communist past. The Left party interaction with the early transition period 1991-1995 has a negative sign (albeit insignificant).

When Left party strength was measured in a more direct way, as the proportion of seats held by Left parties in models (7) and (8), there is a significant negative relationship between Left party strength and family policy generosity. I interpret these results by emphasizing influence of post-communist legacies on party policies in CEE countries. Left parties in the region were largely discredited following the collapse of communism.
To regain voter confidence and distance their image from the communist past, Left parties often voted for harsh austerity measures, thus reducing social welfare programs.

8. Addressing Endogeneity

The results of the statistical analysis (Table 8) support my hypothesis of the relationship between fertility rates and family policy generosity. However, Chapter 2 also shows that family policies positively influence fertility rates. I argue that there is a double feedback loop between how family policies and fertility are measured, predicted, and conceptualized. This double causality is referred to as endogeneity (Greene 2003). Family policies are endogenous because they are influenced by levels of fertility in a given country. At the same time, fertility rates are influenced by governments’ pronatalist efforts aiming to stimulate birth rates in the form of various programs, which fall under the umbrella of family programs. The bulk of existing research conventionally attacks one side of the problem: either focusing on exploring the determinants of fertility rates or studying the predictors of family policy generosities. Employing the simultaneous equations model (SEM) approach will afford a new look at investigating the determinants of family policy generosity while at the same time accounting for the way family policies affect fertility rates.

The empirical puzzle here is the direction of causality. Do falling fertility rates drive more generous spending or does more generous family policies increase fertility rates? As shown earlier in this chapter and in the Russia case study (Chapter 4), policymakers are concerned about the falling fertility rates and are using birth rates to justify more generous family programs. At the same time, fertility rates are affected by
family policies, such as paid parental leave and availability of childcare. The direction of causality flows both ways: low fertility rates cause CEE governments to consider more generous family policies, while more generous policies are shown to lead to the growth of fertility. Thus, when investigating the determinants of family policy generosity one must at the same time consider the determinants of fertility rates. Methodologically, this could be done by estimating a simultaneous equation model, which uses all the information available to determine the endogenous variables (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Gujarati 2003; Wooldridge 2010). Failing to estimate a system of equations in cases where joint determination of variables is suspected may lead to simultaneity bias. The simultaneity bias results from the correlation between explanatory variables and disturbance terms, thus potentially producing inconsistent regression estimates (Wooldridge 2010).

The system of equations is based on the previously estimated models of fertility determinants in the CEE (Chapter 2) and determinants of family policy generosity earlier in this chapter. Having shown that both models of determinants of family policy generosity and determinants of fertility are statistically valid and have economic meaning on its own, I satisfy the autonomy requirement (Wooldridge 2010, 239). Appendix E provides a visual representation of the determinants of family policies and fertility rates as a system of equations.

Simultaneous Equations Models are commonly estimated using two-stage least-squares regression (2SLS). During the first stage, this method estimates the predicted

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39 Methodology to estimate SEM and instrumental variables (IV) is very similar, some texts use SEM and IV terminology interchangeably (Angrist and Pischke 2009).
values for the endogenous variables.\textsuperscript{40} These values are used as the instrumental variables during the second stage.\textsuperscript{41} As Greene notes, absent heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation, 2SLS produces “the most efficient IV estimator that can be formed using only the columns of $X$” (AlDakhil 1998; Greene 2002, 398). In the presence of heteroscedasticity, other tools are useful, like the use of three stage least squares (3SLS) or Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Baum et al. 2003; Baum et al. 2007; Greene 2002, 400-415). As a robustness check, I present the results of 2SLS and GMM regressions side by side. There are four specifications in the table, the models correspond to those reported in Table 8.

The results in Table 9 support the main findings presented in Table 8, pointing to the robustness of my main findings, even when simultaneity is accounted for. All four specifications report a positive significant relationship between the change in fertility rates and family policy generosity. Also, the importance of xenophobia remains significant and positive for the countries with high proportion of foreign-born population. Unlike in Table 8, only the long-term impact, measured by the time lag of xenophobia, is significant, implying the long-lasting societal mechanisms in place. The role of economic conditions remains significant in both long-term measurement and the short term (change in GDP growth). However, the role of women in politics loses significance, perhaps due to the diminished proportion of women’s representation in national parliaments.

\textsuperscript{40} Endogenous variables are identified within the system. Exogenous variables are given from the outside of the system.

\textsuperscript{41} The predicted values obtained from the first stage along with the set of exogenous variables are used to estimate the dependent variable in the second stage. A good discussion of the methods is in Greene 2002, Chapter 15.
Table 9. Simultaneous Equations, Determinants of Family Policy Generosity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(I) Full Sample</th>
<th>(II) High % Migrants</th>
<th>(III) EU-members</th>
<th>(IV) EU-members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2SLS</td>
<td>GMM</td>
<td>2SLS</td>
<td>GMM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔTFR&lt;sub&gt;ln&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>3.103***</td>
<td>1.496***</td>
<td>1.154**</td>
<td>0.657**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.921)</td>
<td>(0.555)</td>
<td>(0.578)</td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generosity&lt;sub&gt;Δ&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.147**</td>
<td>-0.0518</td>
<td>-0.124**</td>
<td>-0.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔGDP growth</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth&lt;sub&gt;Δ&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.008**</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
<td>0.008*</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFR&lt;sub&gt;ln t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.662***</td>
<td>0.406***</td>
<td>0.445*</td>
<td>0.591**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔWomPARL</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WomPARL&lt;sub&gt;Δ&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔXenophobia</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia&lt;sub&gt;Δ&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.007*</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔFemEMPL&lt;sub&gt;ln&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>1.551</td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td>-0.570</td>
<td>-0.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.432)</td>
<td>(0.969)</td>
<td>(1.550)</td>
<td>(1.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FemEMPL&lt;sub&gt;Δ&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>2.364*</td>
<td>1.475</td>
<td>2.203</td>
<td>1.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.291)</td>
<td>(1.060)</td>
<td>(1.758)</td>
<td>(1.238)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔMigrant%</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant%</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔMed Voter</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Voter</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-95</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Voter</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-00</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Voter</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001**</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-05</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Voter</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-10</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable: ΔGenerosity
Table 9. (Continued).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.001** -0.001*</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Country dummies were included in all models (results not presented for space conservation reasons). Specification (I) includes the full sample of 14 countries with median voter party ideology measurement; Specification (II) includes a subset of seven countries with a high proportion of migrant population (see Figure 11); Specifications (III) and (IV) include the EU-member countries and differ in the measure of party ideology. Each of the four specifications includes two models: without and with parameter heterogeneity.

Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Finally, political party influence results are remarkably similar to those reported in the Table 8. Especially, I would like to point out the consistency of the results of the positive coefficients for the median voter preference in the years 1996-2000 and 2006-2010 in the high-migrant countries and the results of the Left-party strength in the EU countries for the years 1991-1995 and 2001-2005. These results support my hypothesis of the relevance of the Right-party politics for the family policies. As earlier CEE studies suggest, Right parties in the CEE champion social welfare spending using it as a way to stand out and appeal to the electorate (Ezrow, Homola, and Tavits 2014; Tavits and Letki 2009).

9. Conclusion

This chapter contributes to scholarly understanding of family policies in Central and Eastern post-communist societies in several ways. First, it presents the overview of family policies in the former communist countries of Europe, focusing on a broad sample
of countries, which does not limit itself to the commonly-used EU members. I show that family policies in former communist European countries continue from the Soviet past in scope and in purpose. Contemporary policymakers emphasize traditional gender roles and encourage women to have children through the provision of family benefits. Lengthy paid parental leave programs foster the primary role of mothers in the children’s upbringing, and the increasingly generous baby bonus programs alleviate the direct costs of having children.

Second, I find support to my argument that immigration and xenophobia matter for family policy decisions. Statistical results show that migrant stock numbers positively influence generosity of policy. These results are true for the CEE countries where immigrants constitute more than 5% of population. I show that xenophobia is widespread in post-communist Europe and argue that anti-immigrant sentiment creates pressures to increase generosity of family policies. The presence of immigrants mobilizes populists and conservatives to demand more protection to native families in the form of generous family policies. These conditions are amplified by declining birth rates and sluggish recovery of native births. The combination of declining birth rates, aging population, and increased immigration provides fertile ground for xenophobic fears. In this context, xenophobia is relevant to family policy decisions. The next chapter investigates the causal mechanisms between xenophobia and family policies in a case-study of Russia.
Chapter 4.

Let’s Have More Russian Babies: How Anti-Immigrant Sentiment Shapes Family Policy in Russia.

1. Introduction

This chapter examines family policies from the viewpoint of allocation of benefits to different segments of society, specifically native populations vs. immigrants. Public dissatisfaction with growing levels of immigration rocked many European societies in the recent past. The rising prominence of nationalism and xenophobia throughout Europe translated into increased electoral success for radical right populist parties campaigning on anti-immigration messages. Nationalists and populists in government and mass media often feed the fire by promoting nativist ideas of expanding benefits that primarily support local populations. Building on the volume of scholarship that studies both family policies and the alarming trend of the rise of xenophobia throughout Central and Eastern Europe, I examine whether swelling immigration influences family policies. I propose that the governments consider expanding family benefits to appease native families who feel threatened by the growing foreign-born population. This proposition is not to argue that immigration is the only consideration but an important component of the package of factors considered by governments.

The Russian Federation was chosen as a case study because it can be considered paradigmatic example of a country with high xenophobia and generous family policies.
Such cases can be labeled “extreme cases” because they represent the phenomena usually in its most pronounced, sometimes extreme, manifestations or an ideal type social mechanism (Bengtsson and Hertting 2014; Gerring 2007, 87-150; Weber 1949). A post-communist country, Russia exemplifies and amplifies demographic and socio-economic problems common to all CEE countries, such as low fertility rates and declining population despite generous family policies. Following the CEE-common post-transition trend, fertility rates in Russia dropped sharply. Although they are slowly recovering, to this day they remain below population replacement of 2.1 children per family.

Meanwhile, the general scope of family policies continued through the initial period of transition and expanded since the mid-2000s. The ongoing commitment to the continuation and expansions of family policies comes in contrast to the reductions and reforms in other social welfare sectors such as pensions, housing, healthcare, and education (Chandler 2004; Cook 2000; OECD 2001).

Facing a declining population during the economic boom of the 2000s, Russia became a reluctant host to an army of labor migrants coming largely from the former Soviet Republics. Currently, Russia absorbs the largest foreign-born population in Europe, 11 million, comprising about 10% of the labor force (UN 2013). The high visibility, rapid influx of immigrants, combined with corruption and less-than-successful integration and migration policies, has exacerbated the tensions between the shrinking local population and the growing mass of immigrants. Anti-immigrant sentiment has been on the rise in the past decade and is now a part of the daily political and media discourse. The problems of immigration are connected to low birth rate in debates about the future ethnic composition of Russia. Immigrants are feared to dilute the national identity and
replace the shrinking native population. In this context, the government announced that population decline is a matter of national security and has introduced a series of comprehensive policies aimed at supporting native families with children. This chapter contends that the anti-immigrant sentiment in Russia pressures the government to support generous family policies.

I use a mixed methods approach to tease out the proposed relationship between xenophobia and family policies. First, I analyze family policy provisions in Russia from 1991-2013. Second, I employ nine elite interviews with selected bureaucrats, policymakers and members of Russian academia to determine the current scope of family policies, as well as the presence and extent of xenophobia’s influence on family policies. Third, I conduct content analysis of official press releases, press-conferences, public opinion data, and academic journal publications.

Results reveal that anti-immigrant sentiment is prominent in Russian society, including at the top policymaking level. Policymakers on federal, regional, and municipal levels consider issues of immigration in their policy discussions about family policy provisions, such as increasing benefits in support of Russian families with children and restricting access to the regional Maternity Capital, land grants, family allowances, and slots in government preschools to local tax residents. Additional restrictive initiatives are undertaken by regional governments and concern labor market regulations, such as reducing foreign labor quotas altogether or reducing foreign labor quotas in front line service jobs. Analysis of public opinion and interview data reveals that the xenophobic pressures are channeled not only from the native population to the policymakers but also
from the policymakers to the native born population via anti-immigrant political statements.

An important finding of this chapter is that xenophobia has penetrated all levels of society. Anti-immigrant sentiment is skillfully manipulated by pundits and officials for political gain. Some policymakers are actively using the fear of immigrants to justify policies that favor native-born populations. Officials are exploiting the anti-immigrant phobias to shift the public’s attention from a variety of urgent problems that cause public discontent, such as corruption, lack of rule of law, rising utility prices, and lack of government preschools, among others. By focusing on the recent birth rate growth of the native population, and the successful implementation of additional family programs, the government hopes to capitalize on the positive pronatalist image of a caring state, while doing little to address deeper underlying socio-economic problems.

2. Background and Theory

Scholars and mass media rigorously explore the rising influence of xenophobia throughout contemporary Europe (Bustikova 2009; Kitschelt 1995; Mering and McCarthy 2013; Mudde 2007; Pelinka 2013; Wodak 2013). As the foreign-born population grows, so does the debate over the deservingness of foreigners to receive social welfare. Studies of public opinion find that the European public distinguishes between kinds of welfare recipients based on their perceived neediness. For example, studies show that programs for the disabled and elderly receive more support than programs for the unemployed (Oorschot 2006). The ethnic and cultural origin of welfare recipients also plays a role in public’s approval of social benefit transfers. Applebaum
(2002) and Oorschot (2000) find that immigrants are seen as less deserving of social assistance in Germany and the Netherlands. Researchers also note that this gap of ‘us vs. them’ is wider in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe (Oorschot 2006, 31; Oorschot and Uunk 2007, 72-73).

Public debates rage over the alleged abuse of social welfare by immigrants who are perceived to overburden the social welfare state, including education and health care, housing benefits, pensions, family support policies, and unemployment benefits. These debates allude to the assumptions that immigrant families are larger and poorer than local families and thus are using more benefits than locals (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Kitschelt 1995, 260-261; McLaren 2001, 89). Various political actors across Europe initiated public debates about restricting access to social benefits to native populations (Boreus 2013; Krzyzanowski 2013; Wodak 2013). Support for such restrictive measures is found primarily among blue-collar, less educated workers. According to the ‘ethnic competition theory,’ the less education natives have, the more they fear that immigrants will create unsolicited competition for resources and jobs, thus stirring insecurities (Kitschelt 1995, 260-273; Oorschot and Uunk 2007; Waal et al. 2010, 352). Locals fear that competition from immigrants will lead to the reduction of wages (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010) and welfare benefits (Hero and Preuhs 2007).

Research shows that fear of immigration is often manipulated by politicians and/or mass media (Fitzgerald, Curtis, and Corliss 2012). The propensity of populist politicians to demonize immigrants creates immediate exposure for those seeking easy political gain despite the fact that crime statistics do not support such accusations (McLaren 2001). Studies describe the common trend in Europe of demonization of Muslim immigrants for
their cultural and religious practices (Krzyzanowski 2013) and fear of other non-Europeans or non-EU citizens (McLaren 2001). Boreus (2013) details the ways politicians in Austria, Denmark and Sweden use discursive discrimination in portraying immigrants in an unfavorable light as undesirable people that should be discouraged from entering and settling.

On the political arena, anti-immigrant sentiment is proliferated by radical right parties and organized radical nationalists (Bustikova 2014; Kitschelt 1995; Mudde 2005; Pelinka 2013). Many European countries have seen their party politics surprised by electoral successes of radical-right (RR) parties such as Jobbik in Hungary, the Freedom Party in Austria, the Danish People’s Party in Denmark, the Golden Dawn in Greece, or the Sweden Democrats in Sweden. These parties are actively exploiting public fears of immigrants to further xenophobic agendas, such as limiting government benefits to immigrants, reversing the liberal asylum policies, and closing borders to immigrants (Jobbik nd; Koster, Achterberg, and Waa 2013; Waal et al. 2010; The Guardian 2014a). They strongly rely on nationalistic rhetoric, denial of rights to non-natives, and cultural conservatism through the exclusion of other non-traditional cultural elements, such as gays (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009). RR parties are in opposition to the consequences of modernization such as urbanization and industrialization, which causes destruction of old familial ties and fragmentation of society (Minkenberg 2002; 2009). At the same time, the populist far right does not oppose redistribution and the welfare state but rather argues for selective redistribution of welfare to natives and limiting benefits to immigrants and religious or ethnic minorities. This phenomenon has been dubbed ‘welfare chauvinism’ (Brady and Finnigan 2014; Bustikova 2013; Kitschelt 1995; Koster, Achterberg, and
Some recent examples include imposing ‘length-of-stay’ limitations for foreigners in Denmark (Koster, Achterberg, and Waal 2013, 5) or restrictions on the size and length of benefits for new immigrants in the UK (The Guardian 2014b).

Russian political and public discourse is commensurate with the rising European anti-immigrant sentiment. As the share of the foreign-born population increases in Russia, it expands the already complicated ethnic composition of Russia (Treisman 1997). It also increases competition for jobs and complicates the provision of health and educational services, while contributing to the tax burden on local residents. These consequences of immigration contribute to the recent popularity of right-wing populist ideology, public anti-immigrant riots, and a growing electoral success of the Radical Right (RR) parties. In the Russian parliament, the Political Party LDPR (formerly the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) holds 56 seats (12.44%); it is the closest to the radical right stance projecting the “the imperial nationalist” message (Minkenberg 2009, 506). The LDPR builds its rhetoric around the past imperial glory of the Russian motherland and the need for the preservation of the rights of Russians.

Modern Russian nationalist ideas rest on three tenets: nation, empire, and orthodoxy (Biechelt 2009). Contemporary conservative political elites are actively cultivating nationalism by emphasizing national greatness, the preservation and triumph of the Russian Orthodox religion, a special way of life different from the West, the importance of the Russian state and its technical progress and innovations, and the country’s unique and rich art, literature, music, science and architecture (Beichelt 2009, Devlin 1999). Most contemporary parties in Russia, including the ruling party, United Russia, manipulate public opinion with nationalist slogans, finding them beneficial for political
gain as trust in political institutions, political accountability, and party loyalty is low (Bidder and Schepp 2011; Biechelt 2009, 515; Bustikova 2009).

The authoritarian regimes’ goal is survival, thus they spend considerable efforts on efforts of diffusing social discontent. Researchers show that modern autocratic regimes are very sensitive to de-mobilizing social protest through coopting elites and mainstream political parties and utilizing democratic institutions, such as nominal multi-party elections (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Reuter and Robertson (2014) argue that by coopting the opposition’s elites and providing them with rent-seeking opportunities, the Russian government effectively reduces social protest potential. I argue that in addition to the elite cooptation, the Russian government uses diversion techniques by switching the object of public anger from the government to migrants.

The anti-immigration hype in the most recent years focused the public’s attention on immigrant crime, over-abuse of social welfare, education and health benefits, and the failure of immigrants to integrate into the society. Family benefits, among others, have been targeted by the anti-immigrant movement. Populists of different political flavors are arguing for excluding the immigrants from receiving state family benefits because immigrant children do not contribute to the reversal of the population decline trend for a variety of reasons, such as the failure to assimilate to the Russian language and culture, their temporary status in the country, and/or because of the wide ethnic and religious gap between native Russians and immigrants. The far-right Russian parties are arguing that family benefits should be channeled primarily to native Russians. This approach to family policy compliments the recent revival of state pronatalism. Pronatalism describes the state’s effort to stimulate birth rates through family support programs. Childbearing,
according to this view, serves the higher purpose of ensuring national interests through supplying a steady flow of labor force. For the contemporary Russian populists on the radical right, it is quite important that the majority of the future labor force is native-born.

The Russian state currently provides a generous package of family policies that includes paid maternity and parental leave, family allowances, a birth grant, and various small cash and in-kind distributions that are distributed at both local and regional levels. The generosity of the Russian family policies can be traced back to communist rule. The Soviet approach to families was explicitly pronatalist resulting from the demographic challenges of population shortages of the newly-formed Soviet state. In the aftermath of World War I and a bloody Civil War that raged for four years following the 1917 Revolution, women were recognized as a valuable resource for ensuring a stable supply of workers for the socialist motherland. The Soviet government formally declared full emancipation of women, which, in practice, meant women and men alike were obligated to participate in the workforce (Avdeyeva 2011; Rivkin-Fish 2010). Women continued to face a full load of domestic and child-rearing functions in addition to gainful employment. To facilitate these dual responsibilities, the government enacted family policies to assist women in managing work-life obligations through the establishment of housing programs, nurseries and childcare facilities, prenatal and postnatal care, lunch programs and inexpensive cafeterias, laundry services, and afterschool programs. The expansion of these policies in the 1940s was further urged on by the devastation of World War II (Avdeev and Monnier 1995; Avdeyeva 2011).

Post-war, the government enacted a partially-paid maternity and unpaid parental leave in 1976. The subsequent measures included the adoption of family allowances and
a paid one-year maternity leave. The government increased some programs in the early 1990s. Maternity leave was expanded to 140 days (20 weeks) in 1992, albeit compensation could not keep up with inflation. Paid parental leave, taken after the expiration of maternity leave, was expanded in early 1991 to last until a child reaches 1.5 years old. Despite the turbulence of economic and political transition, family policies carried through its major programs without substantial restructuring or scaling down the scope of programs. Currently, maternity leave provisions are among the most generous in Europe, at 20 weeks paid with benefits of 100% of previous salary (Figure 12).

**Figure 12. Duration of Maternity Leave in the European Countries**

![Graph showing duration of maternity leave in European countries](source: ILO, 1996)

Most recently, the government adopted a comprehensive enlargement of family benefits in 2007. The first initiative changed the rules for parental leave benefits calculation. Under the new rules, eligible parents received up to 40% of their average salary during parental leave, with a cap for the highest wage earners. The second initiative is called Maternity Capital, a baby bonus program for families having two or
more children. The program, which officially started January 1, 2007, entitles eligible families to receive a voucher amounting initially to 250,000 rubles, or approximately 10,000 US Dollars, for the birth of a second or a higher order child. The amount is indexed every year to reflect inflation. A family is eligible for the benefit only once. The Federal Law #256 *On Additional Measures of Government Support for Families with Children* restricts the application of the voucher to the following: improving housing conditions, i.e. serving as a down payment or paying down on a mortgage loan, investment into a mother’s pension fund, or paying for a child’s education (Russian Federation 2006). The third initiative, Birthing Certificate, started in 2006. It is a voucher program that compensates gynecologists, hospitals, and pediatricians involved in medical oversight of a pregnant woman from pregnancy to birth and infant well-visits for the first year of life (Russian Federation 2006).

In this chapter I trace the influence of public opinion about immigration on decisions about access and generosity of family benefits. Presently, family policies are at the forefront of the political debate as reversal in population decline has been announced a national priority vital to national security by President Putin. Family policies are also an important part of the national debate currently because of the increased share of immigrants in the workforce. Playing on irrational fears, pundits and media create xenophobic hype that may translate into welfare chauvinistic demands from the citizens.

Since the inception of the *Demographic Policy of Russia*, the reversal of the birth rate downfall became a priority on the government’s agenda (President of RF 2012). Despite a seemingly easy fix for the population decline, immigration, the government prefers to focus on the costly long-term strategy of stimulating native birth rates, while
immigrants are demonized in mass media. The illustration of this trend is not only supported by documenting the generosity of family policy components, but also by the manifestations of welfare chauvinism expressed by mainstream parties and radical-right movements.

The anti-immigrant rhetoric is omnipresent in mass media, in interpersonal communication, and official statements. Stories of immigrant crime, abuse of welfare benefits, and the lack of socio-cultural adaptation to Russian societal norms fuel anti-immigrant phobias. Public manifestations of xenophobia mostly target immigrants from the Central Asia and the Caucuses, as those are most different in language and religion. Public opinion polls indicate that Russians fear immigrants and are supportive of tougher regulation of foreign-born populations. Irrational fears of losing the Russian identity due to a high concentration of foreigners lead Russians to express xenophobic attitudes and demand protection and preferences from the government that support the native population.

I argue that the recent rapid influx of immigrants provides a common enemy – the immigrant. The term for these labor migrants, ‘gastarbeiter,’ carries a negative connotation, is adopted by mass media, and widely used in colloquial speech. It is a Russian adaptation of German word meaning ‘a guest worker.’ By invoking the negative image of a gastarbeiter, who commits crime and competes for jobs with the natives, the Russian political establishment shifts focus from the widespread corruption, inefficiency, and the overall lack of legitimacy of the government (see discussion in Beichelt and Minkenberg 2002, 10).
Experts point out that public spending, including spending on Russian families, is used as a diversion tactic for public dissatisfaction with the political system (email correspondence with Emil Pain 2013). Public programs ease citizens’ insecurities caused by the growing lack of trust in the political system, corruption, and inefficient law enforcement that they feel cannot protect the citizens from the mass influx of immigrants. I hypothesize that the perceived threats of mass immigration create pressures on governments for expanding family programs.

Several research questions are posed for this chapter:
1. Is there evidence that xenophobia influences citizens’ demands on public policy, specifically family policy, in Russia?
2. Are issues of national identity, immigration and anti-immigrant sentiment mentioned in government considerations, debates and the rhetoric of government officials regarding family policy packages?
3. What mix of family policy benefits does the state ultimately provide on federal, state and local levels?

3. Data and methodology

Data for this project were collected through a systematic review of mass media resources, official publications, videotaped press-conferences, and public lectures. To gain perspective on the views of Russian academia, I communicated with three Russian political scientists and demographers in person and via email. Additionally, I analyze a transcript of the Radio Svoboda interview on problems of immigration with Lev Gudkov, a prominent Russian sociologist, where he elaborates on xenophobia and links it to public policy decisions (Gudkov 2013). Six semi-structured interviews in Russian were
conducted with representatives of the Russian legislative and executive branches on the federal, regional, and municipal levels. An English-language sample questionnaire can be found in Appendix G. In general, I asked interviewees about their views on: the demographic situation in the country, family policies, and the rise of immigration and anti-immigrant sentiment. The interviews were conducted in fall-winter of 2013 in several regions, including the Central Region, North-Western, Siberia, and the Far East.

The semi-structured interview method is particularly well-suited to the research question at hand. By allowing for a free-flowing discussion without the constraints of a structured interview, the researcher creates an inviting atmosphere for a respondent to express opinions in his or her own terms (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 674). This research design is appropriate for the Russian cultural and political setting, as many public and elected officials are reluctant to participate in studies about immigration, a potentially inflammatory and politicized subject. Russian politicians and public officials are particularly hesitant to discuss these topics with an American-affiliated researcher (Goode 2010). As one contact put it, public officials prefer working with trusted members of pro-government media and tend to avoid collaborating with foreign researchers on sensitive topics, saying “the Russian political establishment shies away from foreign researchers as the devil avoids holy water.”

An innovative aspect of this project is the creative use of digital resources to increase accessibility to inaccessible politicians and to fact-check or validate the statements of interviewees who may be suspected of “social desirability” bias in their
To remedy the lack of accessibility, I used press-conferences with high-ranking public officials published on the internet, videos of public speeches, and other publicly available content on the topics of immigration and family policy, to allow analysis of information in a setting that in some cases may yield more authentic responses than an original interview with a politically suspect researcher. These sources of information were used to corroborate information received from direct contact with public officials and members of academia. As Bennett and Checkel (2014) suggest, researchers should consider the “potential biases of evidentiary sources.” Cross-checking the evidence strengthens the internal validity of the study (Gerring 2007).

I analyze the information using the method of process tracing. Process tracing (PT) involves investigating mass amounts of detailed information and carefully describing relevant events, usually in chronological order, with the purpose of establishing the causal chain of evidence from the hypothesized cause to the observed effect (Bennett 2010; Bennett and Checkel 2014; Collier 2011; Evera 1997; George and Bennett 2005; George and McKeown 1985; Mahoney 2012; Tansey 2007). Process tracing can be used to test existing theories or develop new theories that explain causal relationship between variables (George and Bennett 2005; Bennett and Checkel 2014).

Establishing causation depends on finding and describing “diagnostic pieces of evidence” (DPE) over time. Identifying DPE relies on prior knowledge, which can be in a form of existing conceptual frameworks, established patterns of relationship between phenomena, and existing theories (Collier 2011, 824). In this case, I aim to establish the

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42 See, for example, Gudkov (2013), Mizulina (2011), Lekareva (2013), Sobyanyin (2013).
causation between increased immigration and expanded family policy benefits by tracing the following causal chain of events: 1. Mass visible immigration to Russia leads to increased xenophobia, 2. Increased xenophobia creates protectionist pressures on politicians, and 3. Politicians respond to pressures from citizens by focusing on expanding and protecting programs and benefits for native-born Russian families. This causal chain is visualized in Figure 13.

**Figure 13. Modeling the Interaction between Anti-immigrant sentiment and Family Policy**

This case study is informed by the results of the quantitative study of the determinants of family policies in Central and Eastern European countries (Chapter 3). The large-n analysis confirms the importance of the presence of immigrants and xenophobia as significant determinants of family policy generosity in the Central and Eastern European countries where a share of immigrant population exceeds 5 percent. Process tracing in this study is utilized as a deductive tool of clarifying and elaborating on the direction of causality between xenophobia and family policies and an assessment of the direction of causality using the typical case of the Russian Federation.
As Mahoney discusses, process tracing can be used to show that the cause and/or outcome actually took place (Mahoney 2012, 574-578) and to infer a causal connection between causes and effects (Mahoney 2012, 578-583). The next section shows that both hypothesized effect (generous family policy) and cause (xenophobia) exist and unpacks the proposed causal connection between xenophobia and family policy through the analysis of data collected. I summarize the scope of government family policies, showing how they increase in generosity beyond the effect of parties, personalities, or the impact of economic transition. Also, I describe the origins, dynamics, and quantitative patterns of immigration in Russia and detail public opinion towards immigration, demonstrating a significant increase in xenophobia. To show causation, I trace the connection between immigration and family policy in Russia, triangulating methods using interviews and content analysis of politicians’ speeches, public statements, and documents. I show evidence that connects xenophobia and family policies. Additionally, I discuss the alternative hypotheses and their applicability in an effort to strengthen the validity of the main argument and address the potential omitted variable bias that could arise if important theories are not discussed during the process tracing analysis (Bennett and Checkel 2014, Schimmelfennig 2014).

4. Family Policies in Russia, a Case of Renewed Pronatalism

The discussion below shows that the hypothesized effect, generous family policy, exists and argues the pronatalist character of the family policies. The importance of showing the pronatalist character of the Russian family policies lies in the definition of pronatalism. It is the state’s effort to encourage childbirth for reasons of societal continuity and national security. For national security reasons, it is important for a pronatalist government to
ensure that the native population constitutes the majority of the future labor force and army recruits. Alternative explanations of family policy generosity, gender equality and fiscal considerations, are considered and argued against. Formally, these explanations can be spelled as following propositions:

*P1a: Family policy generosity is a function of the economy and budgetary constraints or lack thereof.*

*P1b: Family policy generosity is to promote gender equality*

*P1c: Family policy generosity is for pronatalist reasons*

The shock of economic and political turbulence of the early 1990s in Russia correlated with a steep fall in birth rates. In a matter of a few short years, Total Fertility Rate (TFR) plummeted in the early 1990s reaching a lowest-low level of 1.17 children per woman in 1999, while the economy spiraled into hyperinflation peaking at 1490% in 1992 (WB). In 1992 alone, prices grew by about 20 percent, while real wages declined at a fast pace, shrinking consumption by some 40-50 percent (Amdsen, Kochanowicz, and Lance 1994, 44-45). Real GDP of Russia declined by 40% between 1990 and 1998 (OECD 2001; Amsden, Kochanowicz, and Lance 1994). A modest recovery achieved by 1997 with a 1% growth in real GDP was largely wiped out by the economic crisis of 1998. Social spending, as a percentage of GDP, continued to decline after 1994. It achieved a 30% decline from 1994 to 1998 (OECD 2001). Budget revenues declined significantly due to, among other factors, inflation, inadequate capacity to collect taxes, drop in production, and the uncontrolled expansion of the money supply (Aslund 1999).

The economic crisis that followed the economic policy of rapid liberalization, dubbed “shock therapy,” and the pressure from the international lending institutions such
as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to cut down budgetary obligations negatively influenced spending on social welfare policies. Social welfare was underfunded and overdue for reforms to reflect the new social and political circumstances as well as the economic realities of the open market (WB 1994; Orenstein 2009). Most social welfare programs were deemed inefficient while the strained budgets could not collect enough revenue to cover existing obligations. Pensions became underfunded as Yeltsin’s government could not agree with the legislative branch, dominated by the Communist left, over the scope of the reform (Chandler 2001; Cook 2007; Dasai 2005; OECD 2001). As a result, pension arrears were common in the mid-1990s (Chandler 2001; 2004). A decade after the collapse of the USSR, Russia finally adopted a major pension reform in 2002 under the influence of World Bank recommendations. The new pension policy provided for several tiers of funding that included individually-funded defined contribution plans which could be invested by either private insurance plans or a government retirement plan (Chandler 2004; Eich, Gust, and Soto 2012; Williamson, Howling, and Marotto 2006). Government no longer was the sole source of old-age support; personal responsibility for future pensions officially became a part of future pension obligations.

During the prosperous years of the mid-2000s, pensions were regularly indexed while the government continued its pledge for supporting comfortable old-age. However, the world financial crisis of 2008 reinforced calls for the reduction of spending and streamlining government social welfare obligations. As a result of the economic crisis, the deficit of Pension Fund, the main depositary of funds, rose to 1% of GDP in 2010. The deficit could have been higher if the government had not increased payroll taxes
from 20% to 26% in 2011. According to research, the Russian pension system relies heavily on transfers from the budget, as the Pension Fund revenue is unable to cover existing obligations (OECD 2011). Financial crises can substantially affect the ability of the government to finance pensions, while the population continues to age and life expectancy continues to rise. To date, the government continues debates over the raising of the retirement age starting in 2018. Presently, retirement age in Russia is 55 years for women and 60 years for men, which is currently substantially lower than in other aging societies of Europe (RBC 2015). However, this issue continues to be highly politicized, as evidenced by the political struggle in the State Duma during the 1990s between the Communists supported by the retirees and the reformers. In the months leading to the 2012 presidential elections, the then-Prime-Minister Putin decided to postpone the discussions of retirement age increase until after the elections (RBC 2015).

Healthcare obligations were severely underfunded in the early 1990s due to budgetary crises. The Russian Federation introduced healthcare reform in 1991 by adhering to the insurance-based system of care provision while guaranteeing free healthcare as a constitutional right spelled out in the Article 41 of the RF Constitution. The insurance is run by the state insurance fund (OMS), which is financed through payroll taxes (Popovich et al. 2011). As a result of the reform, funding responsibilities were devolved to regional and municipal levels without affording adequate financial resources. The dispersion of funding sources created a substantial problem of an unfunded mandate, which contributed to further deterioration of the quality of medical services, crumbling facilities, lack of basic medicines and equipment, and salary arrears on already meager compensation for doctors and nursing personnel (Maltzeva 2011).
Overall, spending on healthcare during the 1990s was reduced by almost 2 percent of GDP (OECD 2001, Table 1.7). The Russian government embarked on a major healthcare expansion only in 2006, during the economically prosperous years, financed by the international oil boom. The 2006 National Priority Health Project (Natsionalnyi Prioritetny Proekt Zdorovie) initiative focused on creation of high-technology medical centers, prevention of accident mortality and communicable diseases, reformed payment schemas, and decreasing the number of specialists in favor of general practitioners. The reform also introduced the so-called monetization of benefits, which sought to streamline and reduce a myriad of soviet-era state obligations, e.g. free prescription drugs (Popovich et al. 2011; Tompson 2007). Further reforms have been proposed in 2011 with the emphasis on further optimization of services and eliminating redundancies, modernization of facilities, reduction in length of hospital stays, and emphasis on outpatient care (RBCb 2014; RIA 2011).

Economic reforms and changing political party balance, however, did not affect the scope of the family programs, instituted during the Soviet regime. While during the transition period of the 1990s the benefits did not catch up with the galloping inflation, the government continued the provision of benefits without reducing or eliminating programs.43 A vast majority of contemporary benefits were carried over from those offered in the USSR, many were expanded following the post-transition recovery, and more were added in 2007. The global economic crisis of 2008 did not affect the implementation of the last wave of generous family policy initiatives despite the negative

43 Some CEE governments did reduce family benefits in the times of financial crisis. For instance, the government of Lithuania in 2011 cut maternity benefits citing budgetary constraints as a result of economic crisis (DELFi 2010))

The government announced the success of the family benefit package as early as 2010,\(^{44}\) citing increased birth rates in Russia. President Putin expressed confidence that the government programs, including the Maternity Capital (MC), are “effective” in the reversal of population decline. Other government officials, regional Governors, and State Duma representatives concur with this assessment (Itar-Tass 2013; Rossiyskaya Gazeta 2011). Premier-Minister Medviev, for example, enthusiastically assessed the impact of Maternity Capital program in following terms:

I can tell you honestly, in my opinion, there are two instruments that turned out to be the best of all those invented in the last years in support of motherhood and childhood. They are Birth Certificate and Maternity Capital (Rossiyskaya Gazeta 2011, November 25).

The head of the State Statistical Agency, Surinov, argued that there is evidence that Maternity Capital increased birth rates starting in 2008 (Rossiyskaya Gazeta 2014b).

As of September 2014, 5.5 million Russian families received Maternity Capital certificates, its value increased from 250,000 Rubles in 2007 to 429,408.4 Rubles in 2014 (Pension Fund 2014). Table 10 (next page) details benefits available for families with children in Russia as of the year 2013.

\(^{44}\) The program is set to finish in 2016.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Federal benefits</strong></th>
<th><strong>Year: 2013</strong></th>
<th><strong>Notes</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal one-time payment for early prenatal visits</td>
<td>515.33 rubles</td>
<td>Must see an OBGYN before 12 weeks of gestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternity leave</td>
<td>100% of salary or average of 23927.49 Rubles</td>
<td>Cash paid for 140 days: 70 days before birth and 70 days after birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baby bonus</td>
<td>13741.99 Rubles, one-time payment</td>
<td>Cash, no restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternity Capital</td>
<td>429408.53 Rubles, one-time benefit</td>
<td>Spending restrictions: can be used on 1. Mortgage, 2. Mother’s pension fund, or 3. Child’s education after the baby is 3 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid Parental leave for a baby under 1.5 years old</td>
<td>Up to 40% of Mother’s salary a month, but no less than 2578 Rubles for the 1st baby, 5200 Rubles for the second and subsequent babies.</td>
<td>Cash payments without restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental leave to take care of a child 1.5-3 years old</td>
<td>60 Rubles a month</td>
<td>Cash compensation is meager, more valuable is the job guarantee for a woman taking the leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthing Certificate</td>
<td>10000 Rubles, transfers to medical facilities</td>
<td>Transfers to medical facilities split between prenatal clinics (3000 Rubles), hospital where delivery takes place (6000 Rubles), and pediatrician’s services (1000 Rubles). Only Russian citizens are entitled to this benefit. The Certificate is issued at 30 weeks pregnancy (28 weeks if multiple fetuses).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Regional benefits

| **Regional Maternity Capital**                           | Granted for 3rd baby Ranging from 25,000 to 300,000 with most common payment of 100,000 Rubles | Restrictions vary by region: from no restrictions on spending in Kaluga, Tyumen and Volgograd Oblast, to such restrictions as earmarking the funds for the cost of building a house, purchasing a vehicle, medical treatment, purchase of land, agricultural equipment, or running a gas line to one’s home. Some states grant this payment for a higher order childbirth only, i.e. in Tuva families having a 5th child are eligible. Other regional restrictions grant the money only to families adopting orphans, like in Bashkortostan. |
| **Land Grants**                                          | Regions grant families with 3 or more children parcels of land for homestead | Substantial barriers to acquisition and use exist including long wait periods, difficulty of access to land due to remote location, and lack of available infrastructure around. |
Table 10. (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional parental allowance for the 3rd child</th>
<th>Minimum subsistence level, averaging 6000 rubles, paid to families having 3 or more children born after December 31, 2012 and who meet poverty guidelines.</th>
<th>65 regions with ‘unfavorable demographic situations’ are eligible for co-financing from the federal budgets for these programs. Recommended for implementation by Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 7 мая 2012 г. N 606 “О мерах по реализации демографической политики Российской Федерации.” As of end of 2013, only several regions implemented this measure: Permskaya Oblast, Kamchatsky Krai.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies</td>
<td>Families with 3 or more children receive discount on utility payments up to 30%</td>
<td>The size of payments depend on regional laws and are means-tested. As a rule, payments are higher for single-parent households. Large families, with 3 or more children, in some regions, qualify regardless of income. Benefit sizes vary: basic payment in Moscow Oblast is 800 rubles and 1500 for single-parent household. Basic payment in Primorsky Krai is 269.99 and 808.99 respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Child Allowances</td>
<td>Means-tested cash payments for children of school age (till 16 years old)</td>
<td>The size of payments depend on regional laws and are means-tested. As a rule, payments are higher for single-parent households. Large families, with 3 or more children, in some regions, qualify regardless of income. Benefit sizes vary: basic payment in Moscow Oblast is 800 rubles and 1500 for single-parent household. Basic payment in Primorsky Krai is 269.99 and 808.99 respectively.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: exchange rate as of late 2013 is 33.5 Rubles to 1 USD.

The extant feminist research extends critiques of the Russian family policy labeling it as pronatalist and familialist (Saxonberg and Sirovatka 2006; Teplova 2007).

The Russian state enforces the state vision of the family having two or more children with monetary compensation in form of a sizable baby grant and increased maternity pay.

According to critics, a single program that prioritizes monetary incentives to give birth is not capable of solving quality of life problems and lack of opportunities to combine work and home life (Avdeyeva 2011; Temkina 2012; Vishnevsky 2012). Feminist literature argues that only comprehensive state efforts to enforce gender equality promote sustained birth rates. Where women are forced to choose between participating in gainful employment and having children, women frequently pick work, delaying childbirth or
foregoing it altogether. Market rigidities, workplace discrimination, lack of childcare and workplace security all work against women’s decision for childbirth (Estevez-Abe 2006).

While the Russian state offers fully paid maternity benefits, partially paid parental leave, baby bonus and legally guarantees job protection for new mothers, it lacks commitment to enforcing all aspects of it. Especially insufficient is the effort to enforce gender equality and workforce participation opportunities for mothers of young children. The loss of career opportunities is a formidable obstacle for career aspirations as women of childbearing age take frequent breaks for childbirth, childcare and sick leave and thus often face hiring discrimination, loss of tenure and promotion opportunities (Gornick and Meyers 2008, 317). The shortage of available childcare, scarcity of non-government care opportunities, and an underdeveloped part-time and flexible employment job market are all real problems facing Russian families.

Women’s employment data in Moscow show an 11% decline in the workforce participation of women with children (66% against 77% for women with no children). Workplace discrimination on the basis of gender and family status is widespread. Despite formal prohibition by the Labor Code, antidiscrimination efforts are insufficient. Employers are reluctant to hire young women or women with small children because of workflow interruptions as women take maternity or sick leaves (Rossiyskaya Gazeta 2008). Kozina (2009) reports that only 40% of study participants, who were working mothers, reported the ability to take sick leave to care for a family member without fearing negative consequences. Others, when needed, took unpaid leave (20%) or took leave with an obligation to work missed hours in the future (35%). The Labor Code
guarantees sick leave; however, women often opt out of using it for fear of repercussions and job loss.

In private conversations with me, Russian women agree that gender bias is common and family discrimination is rampant in hiring and promotion decisions. Recent research shows that discrimination exists also on the perception level and is fueled by rumors. For instance, Pishniak (2013) argues that most women in 10 focus groups from four cities in Russia have heard of such discrimination, but few actually faced or personally witnessed such offences. The expectation of discrimination contributes to low expectation of fairness in the job market. It may contribute to an uneasy decision to forgo childbearing or seek employment, while having young children out of expectation of possible discrimination.

Additional efforts to taper discrimination were implemented in July 2013, making it illegal for employers to post gender and age requirements in job postings. However, government lawyers point to the rarity of workplace discrimination legal claims. Unless the violation is clear, e. g. firing of a woman because of pregnancy, it is very hard to prove discrimination at hiring or promotion decisions as employers do not openly explain their decision in gender or family discrimination terms.45

Despite the feminist critique, the government remains committed to its pronatalist agenda. President Putin continues his offensive on falling birth rates by, among other tasks, ordering the Administration to reach TRF of 1.753 by 2018. This measure is part of a Demographic Policy package that also outlines steps to increase life expectancy to 74

45 Private conversation with a government lawyer, fall 2013.
years by 2018, decrease infant mortality, support childbirth through the introduction of a generously paid parental leave for the third child, calls for measures to help women combine childrearing and work, including encouragement of part-time employment and training, and streamlining migration policies (President of RF 2012). Such declarations present a balanced approach but the reality of policy implementation reaffirms the predominantly pronatalist character of Russian social welfare with heavy emphasis on childbirth encouragement and a vision of women as caregivers (Teplova 2007). The pronatalist attitudes of the Russian government can be summed up by the words by Elena Mizulina, State Duma Deputy, and head of the Family and Children Committee:

There are people who want to work, have a career, and there are women – born to be Mothers. Therefore, let them give birth and nurture children, and the government must create all appropriate conditions [for it]… families with many children – it is a very sizable resource. I reckon, it is the golden stock in the Russian government’s hands (Mizulina 2011).

It is not uncommon for the political and military establishment to view women as a resource for production of future workforce and conscripts for the armed forces (Rivkin-Fish 2003). For example, Valentina Matvienko, speaker of the Federal Assembly, upper chamber of the Russian Parliament argued: “Of course, for the country with such territory, families must be bigger. It is not a social, but an economic and political consideration. We must settle territories and develop the economy” (Pension Fund 2013).

To summarize, the collapse of communism did not produce a significant difference in the government’s approach to showing support to women and families
unlike many other social welfare programs such as pensions, healthcare, and housing\textsuperscript{46} which were substantially reformed. On the contrary, family benefits and the government’s attitudes toward families made a seamless transition from communism, having kept and expanded maternity and parental leave, family allowances, and other payments. The heavy emphasis on the monetary side of benefits confirms the uninterrupted continuation and expansion of state pronatalism – dubbed the “re-feminization” of social policies. The government persists in defining the roles of women as caretakers and encourages women to take on such responsibilities (Borozdina, Zdravomyslova and Temkina 2012; Zakharov 2006).

The government’s approach to family issues appears bifurcated. The state focuses mostly on monetary forms of birthrate encouragement, while lacking a comprehensive plan to address workplace gender discrimination and difficulties for women in earning an income while having children. It may be argued that these policies fit well into an overall conservative traditional orientation of the contemporary Russian society, such as the support of the traditional family, hostility towards surrogate motherhood projected by the Russian Orthodox Church, and the ban on LGBT propaganda. The traditional societal orientation has been reinforced recently by the President’s call to return to conservative spiritual values during the 2012 address to the Council of Federation (President of the Russian Federation 2012). Such developments are possible because of the low issue salience of gender equality in Russia. Russian gender scholars note that the Soviet government granted women equal opportunities to participate in the workforce, thereby denying the necessity for social mobilization for gender equality. Thus, gender inequality

\textsuperscript{46} See a review of housing reform in Cook (2000).
is not a political issue in contemporary Russia and family policy issues are not linked to
the gendered understanding of social problems (Temkina 2012).

This section tells a story of pronatalism in Russia. The description of reforms and
the current levels of family policy provision support the pronatalist argument. The
alternative explanations such as gender equality and fiscal responsibility are considered
and argued against. Economic difficulties, budgetary constraints, and external influences
of the world business cycle may affect the levels of replacement but seem to have little
effect on the overall scope of family programs. Unlike two other major social welfare
policies described above, pensions and healthcare, the scope of family policies has not
been altered in any substantial way. The contrast is even more evident when one
considers the pension reforms which were undertaken, albeit with delay, against the stark
opposition of the politically active segment of elderly voters. The target group of family
policies recipients does not amount to a unified political force given vast differences in
political views, age, and income. Despite formal declarations of the goal of gender
equality and promotion of work-family balance, little is done to actually enforce even the
existing laws. The rhetoric coming from the policymakers, officials, and church leaders
supplements the conservative view of women as caregivers and their importance for
future population reproduction. The government offers monetary benefits to mothers with
young children, thereby aiming to supplement mothers’ income and make motherhood
more financially attractive.
5. Population Decline, Immigration and Xenophobia

This section describes immigration in Russia, its origins and dynamics, and the anti-immigrant sentiment in Russia. The evidence below shows that there is a significant number of immigrants in Russia, which supplies the necessary condition for the existence of xenophobia. Without the visibility of immigrants there would be no noticeable manifestation of xenophobia. I show that xenophobia exists on many levels, among policymakers, and among the general public. Immigrants’ presence is connected to negative developments in society and the economy. Gastarbeiters compete with the local population for jobs, speak poor Russian, practice foreign religious publicly, and allegedly commit disproportionally more crimes. This section describes mass opinion towards immigrants and manifestations of xenophobia, which amount to evidence of the existence of xenophobia in Russia. Formally, I focus on the following propositions of observable conditions:

*Proposition 2: There are a large number of immigrants in Russia.*

*Proposition 3: Xenophobia is growing in society.*

*Proposition 4: Xenophobia is prominent in the government and among policymakers.*

As the USSR broke down, the Russian Federation (RF) faced problems of declining population and plummeting birth rates. Fertility rates started their free-fall in 1988, as families reacted to the economic difficulties of Perestroika. The decline in TFR continued for almost a decade, bottoming out in 1999 (Figure 14). The population growth in the RF has been negative since 1993 and only in 2013 did it show a positive population dynamic (Figure 15). According to the Russian Statistical Agency, Russia recorded positive
population growth of 13,000 in 2013 for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Rosstat 2013).

**Figure 14. Total Fertility Rates (TRF) in Russia 1980-2010.**

![Graph](image)

Source: World Bank

**Figure 15. Rate of Population Growth in Russia**

![Graph](image)

Source: Russian Statistical Agency

The positive population growth rate in the recent years can be explained by a combination of factors, such as an increase in life expectancy due to better health
practices among men and women, decreased mortality rates due to improved automobile safety and better emergency care for victims of traffic accidents, a decrease in mortality due to better treatment of tuberculosis and cardiovascular disease, and a fall in infant and maternal mortality due to prenatal and infant screening and investments in building new cutting-edge neonatal centers across Russia. Many of these initiatives were realized under the umbrella of the National Priority Health Project launched in 2006 by President Putin (RIA 2009, Itar-Tass 2013, Rossiyskaya Gazeta 2014a).

In the first several years following the dissolution of the USSR, the decreasing birth rate was offset by the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians, who found themselves unwelcome in the former USSR republics and moved back to Russia to escape violence and instability. At least half of all the ethnic Russian population left conflict-torn Tajikistan and the Caucasian Republics by 1995. About 40% of all Russian repatriates came from Kazakhstan in 1990-2001. However, repatriation of ethnic Russians slowed significantly by 1995 and all but dried up by 2001: 612,400 Russians returned from the former USSR republics in 1994 and only 76,900 compatriots repatriated in 2001 (Vishnevsky 2002, 5.4.3).

As the Russian economy picked up pace following the recovery of the 1998 financial default, it attracted migrant workers from former Soviet satellite countries. This wave of immigration was different from the repatriation migration. Migrants from Central Asia are the fastest growing group. According to the Federal Migration Services (FMS), most migrants currently working in Russia are from the Central Asian Republics: 2.3 million Uzbeks, 1 million Tajiks, 553 thousands Kazakhs. Additionally, migrants from Ukraine and Moldova account for another 2 million migrants (Federal Migration
Scholars stress a substantial level of illegal, or “irregular,” migration in Russia between 3 and 5 million (Ivakhnyuk 2009, 51’ Zaionchkovskaya 2014).

Researchers stress that comprehensive long-trend migration data is not available because the Russian federal government has not collected comprehensive until recently. Prior to 2011, data on immigrants is available based on experts’ estimations or only a small segment of registered migrants. However incomplete, data on net migration, compiled based on the information collected during the 2010 Population Census, indicates the growth of net migration47 in Russia since 2001, which was only broken by the economic recession caused by the 2008 world financial crisis (Rosstat 2012). Figure 16 illustrates the net migration trend.

**Figure 16. Net Migration in Russia 2002-2012**

![Net Migration in Russia 2002-2012](image)

Source: Rosstat 2012  
Note: data for 2011 is based on the current registration information, not from Population Census.

---

47 Net migration is the difference between immigrants and emigrants.
Since 2011, Federal Migration Services started collecting a more complete data that includes foreign students and migrants registered for short-term stays in Russia, defined as 9 months to 1 year (Zaionchkovskaya and Florinskaya 2014, Chapter 6). Table 11 details the numbers of immigrants in Russia for the period of three years.

**Table 11. Immigrants in Russia 2011 -2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners in RF: total</td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>10,085,049</td>
<td>11,200,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners in RF: legally employed</td>
<td>1,3000,000</td>
<td>2,685,108</td>
<td>2,482,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners in RF: overstayed visas/illegal</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compatriot settlers with families:</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>56,874</td>
<td>23,406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: FMS (2012), Romodanovskiy (2013), Rossiyskaya Gazeta (2012)

Data presented in Table 11 and Figure 16 illustrate the growth in migration into Russia in the last decade. The influx of immigrants from Central Asia (CA) and the Caucuses caused the most tensions in society highlighting cultural, language, and religious differences between the natives and newcomers (Gudkov 2006). According to research, many of the Central Asian migrants are unskilled, speak Russian poorly, especially the youngest migrants, and often agree to perform work without social benefits or official contracts, which dampens salaries for the whole segment of the low-skilled job market (Denisenko and Varshavskaya 2014; WCIOM 2012; Zaionchkovskaya and Florinskaya 2014, 353).

Aside from job competition, a common complaint of the native population is that the CA migrants may carry contagious diseases such as tuberculosis and typhoid, having arrived from regions with poor public health. They are also associated with drug
trafficking as some come from regions bordering Afghanistan, the largest source of opium in Europe. Central Asians differ significantly from the local population in religious practices. Russians are uncomfortable with manifestations of religious ceremonies that are uncommon for the modern urban environment, such as the public ceremonial slaying of livestock.

Scholars note that the burst of xenophobia in the 2000s can be connected to several societal and political factors which are related to the decreased democratic features of the current political regime in Russia. For instance, the notable reduction of freedom of the mass media squeezed out of public discourse opposing points of view. The views of government officials became the prevailing points of analysis of problems, absent meaningful debate from political opposition and academia. Mukomel (2011) discusses that in the early 2000s, Putin’s government made a pivot towards linking the problems of immigration to the problems of national security, thereby signaling the importance of the issue. The 2002 migration law contained such stringent requirements that it effectively squeezed out a large segment of migrants to illegal status (Zaionchkovskaya 2014, 62). As of the early 2000s, the problems of immigration were referred to in the context of illegal immigration and mentioned in conjunction with crime and drug trafficking: “the consequences of drug trafficking touch upon the most sensitive spheres of life in our state, such as public health and potential of the nation, total crime, illegal migration and economic cooperation” (President of RF 2008). Mukomel (2011) discusses examples of Putin’s speeches throughout the year 2004, which emphasized the dangers of illegal immigration, such as drug trafficking and crime. Such discourse initiated by government officials and further reproduced by a sensationalist and biased mass media became
prevalent since 2004, contributing to the rise in popular xenophobia (Gudkov 2006; 2013; Mukomel 2011; 2014).

One of the recent examples of the heightened relevance of nationalism and the anti-immigrant moods in contemporary Russian politics is the emphasis on the negative consequences of immigration during the high-profile 2013 Moscow mayoral race. Content analysis of election materials shows that xenophobia is a fertile ground for easy political gain in Russia.

Table 12. Moscow Mayoral Race 2013: Candidate Positions on Immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate name and party affiliation</th>
<th>Percent of electoral votes</th>
<th>Position on Immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexei Navalny, RPR-Parnas</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>Campaigned for visas for migrants from the Central Asia; work for Russians first; no to migrant slave labor; migrants need to be controlled, educated and integrated; reduce illegal migration which negatively influences the labor market, breeds crime and ethnic tensions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergei Sobyanin, United Russia</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>Campaigned for visas for migrants from the Central Asia; limit unqualified labor migration, closing of street markets where migrants predominantly work; stressed the importance of qualified labor migration and for the significant reduction of the amount of migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikhail Degtyarev, LDPR</td>
<td>2.86%</td>
<td>Campaigned to fight legal and illegal immigration; eliminate work quotas for immigrants: throw them all out. “We have 2 million Muslims, of them 1.5 million are illegal. We will build no Mosques in Moscow, just [Christian] Cathedrals,” Moscow as the capital for Russians only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergei Mitrokhin, Yabloko</td>
<td>3.51%</td>
<td>Campaigned for fighting illegal migration; advocates criminal prosecution for employers hiring illegal immigrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolai Levicev, Spravedlivaya Rossiya</td>
<td>2.79%</td>
<td>Stressed importance of throwing out illegal immigrants, but favored integration of migrants without letting them to create ‘ethnic enclaves’ in the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Melnikov, KPRF</td>
<td>10.69%</td>
<td>Stressed importance of effective and strict migration policy, drastic reduction of the number of immigrants and migrant quotas, and visas for immigrants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: official party publications, interviews of candidates, public debates Channel Moskva Doverie.

The often-cited incumbent mayor Sobyanin’s May 2013 interview resonated well with the citizens of Moscow (RIA 2013). In his speech, Sobyanin argued that migrant workers from Central Asia should return to their homes once work is completed. He argued against attempts to integrate them into Russian society, emphasizing the
temporary seasonal work they perform. Mayor Sobyanin said, “Moscow is a Russian city, and should remain such. Not Chinese, not Tajik, not Uzbek” (Nikolaeva and Bogomolov 2013). Sobyanin was not alone in his emphasis on the negative consequences of immigration. All registered candidates dedicated space in their official manifestos to the problem of increased immigration. Many of them projected harsh anti-immigrant, xenophobic attitudes (Table 12).

According to scholars, post-communist countries with unfinished democratic consolidation, high levels of corruption and fragile rule of law are fertile ground for the right-wing ideology. The nationalist issue is an easy political trump card for political elites with weak legitimacy who “seek to enhance political legitimization via recourse to national traditions” (Beichelt and Minkenberg 2002, 10). Politicians in modern Russia are skillfully using the nationalist issue for political gain in the context of protecting the native population against the threat from the “others” (Gudkov 2006, 863-865). As I show in this paper, Russian nationalism flourishes on a public policy level and is sanctioned by the parties represented in the Russian Parliament. Calls for mass deportations, curbing social benefits, and demonization of migrants by equating them to criminals were frequent during the 2013 elections of the Moscow mayor and debates on the floor of the State Duma in 2013.

Although, recent political developments Europe indicate that right-wing nationalism is not an exclusive characteristic of weak undemocratic regimes. Examples include the substantial electoral success of the Austrian radical right party FPÖ, overwhelming electoral success of Jobbik in Hungary, the growing political weight of the FNP in France, and radical right Swiss People’s Party’s success in 2014 anti-immigrant referendum.
A survey of 2013 media headlines about immigrants reveals a steady stream of negative messages about the crimes migrants commit.\textsuperscript{49} Scholars emphasize that xenophobia reproduced by the mass media usually originated in the government offices (Mukomel 2014, 156). The mainstream media outlets kept immigration at the forefront of public consciousness throughout 2013 by emphasizing that immigrants commit a disproportionally high number of crimes, cause societal instability, and threaten the very core of Russian values and national identity through public practice of own religion and traditions such as mass celebrations of Muslim holidays on the streets of Moscow and other cities. There is an active discussion of the public health threat that migrants potentially pose coming from regions with active tuberculosis and other infectious diseases and often unable or unwilling to seek medical attention (Rosbalt 2013a).

Crime statistics were cited arguing, often out of context, that a sizable portion of crime is committed by migrants. For instance, in May 2013 Moscow Police reported that 20\% of all investigated crimes in Moscow are committed by migrants and the Investigative Committee reported that every other rape in Moscow is committed by immigrants (Interfax 2013; Rosbalt 2011). Media also foments such issues as medical tourism: pregnant migrant women come specifically to Russia for free medical care. Another hot-button issue is the number of migrant children in Moscow schools and government-subsidized preschools. The issue revolves around the cost of educating children of illegal migrants, who do not pay taxes, and the difficulties teachers face.

\textsuperscript{49} For example, news articles titled: “One half of rapes in Russia committed by Gasterbeiters” or “[Governor] Poltavchenko: Crimes Committed by Migrants Rose by 49\%” (Rosbalt 2013b)
providing instruction to children with limited knowledge of the Russian language and culture (Turovskiy 2013).

State Duma and Federation Council representatives are exploiting anti-immigrant sentiment by issuing xenophobic statements and proposing anti-immigrant legislation. Duma Representatives Aleksei Zhuravlev (Rodina) and Sergei Zigarev (LDPR) sponsored a bill in October 2013 that would limit the opportunities for children of migrants to take slots in government preschools only if their parents can prove that they pay Russian taxes and were tax residents for at least one year. Among reasons behind these restrictions the authors cite shortage of preschool slots for the native population, low educational levels of migrant children and cultural differences, such as problems that children from Central Asia have with taking directions from female teachers.

The authors of the bill argue that the influx of migrants and their children cause societal tensions (Duma FR 2013). The former State Duma representative, now adviser for the Head of Rodina party, Vera Lekareva argued that the “indigenous population” of Russia is afraid for their lives due to the influx of migrants (emph. Author). “It is the citizens of the Russian Federation [unhappy about the migrants] whose balanced and comfortable rhythm of life has been violated by the impudent invasion, ignorance of tradition and disrespect to our laws [by the migrants]” (Lekareva 2013).

City Mayors and municipal heads often were mentioned in mass media during 2013 in connection with anti-immigrant initiatives. As discussed above, the Mayor of Moscow Sobyanin openly opposed assimilation and integration programs for labor migrants, proclaiming that they are not welcome to stay in Moscow (Sobyanin 2013). In the
summer of 2013, the municipality of Kronshtadt, a part of Saint-Petersburg, made headlines with a controversial experiment that replaced all migrant street cleaners with Russian citizens (RIA 2013b). The apparent populist initiative was favorably met by the citizens, as evidenced from public comments on news sites, news coverage, and personal conversations (The Village 2013). Additionally, two of my interview respondents expressed enthusiastic support for the initiative when asked to evaluate it.

The official position of the Kremlin on immigration, although inconsistent, strives to send a politically-correct message that the Russian Federation needs migrant workers because of the demand for workforce as a result of the economic growth and the drop in fertility. Such sentiment began in the 2007 when shortages of workers became apparent amidst the economic boom (Putin 2012). The rational economic argument is supported by such high-profile figures as President Putin, the Labor Minister Maxim Topilin, and the Head of the Federal Migration Services Konstantin Romodanovsky. However, Putin and his cabinet also give in to the popular anti-immigrant sentiment, when challenged by the public, by calling for removing migrants from working in sales or constantly calling for the tightening and restricting of migration quotas and migration laws.\(^{50}\)

In this information continuum, xenophobia flourishes. Public opinion polls indicate steadily rising popular xenophobia since 1995. For instance, the percentage of Russians who thought that there were a significant number of immigrants rose from 28/% in 1995 to 38% in 2003 (Gudkov 2006, 845). Since 2004, there was a 13% increase in the

\(^{50}\) See, for example, Putin’s remarks following the more-frequent high-profile crimes and ethnically-charged public unrest riots, like the October 2013 ethnically-charged riot in Moscow’s Birulyovo, the July 2013 conflict between migrant workers and police at the Matveevsky open-air market in Moscow, the 2013 ethnic riots in Pugachev or Nevinnomyssk.
number of respondents who agreed that migration laws should become stricter to hinder migration of Newly Independent States (NIS) citizens no matter their country of origin (WCIOM 2013).

According to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center’s (WCIOM) longitudinal data 2005-2013, positive attitudes towards large number of foreigners in Russia fell between 2006 and 2008, while negative attitudes rose (Table 13).

Table 13. Public Attitudes of Foreigners in Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall, do you think that a large number of foreigners is a positive or negative development for Russia?</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rather Positive</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather Negative</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to Answer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WCIOM (2013), The All-Russia Public Poll, N=1600

Table 14 illustrates the rise in anti-immigrant sentiment from 2003 to 2013 through gauging the public opinion on immigration laws. The data indicates the growth in restrictive attitudes towards immigration.

Table 14. Public Opinion about Immigration Regulations in Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which statements about the immigration regulations into Russia do you agree the most?</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration laws should be abolished so that everyone can come live in Russia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration laws should be softened, first of all, the registration procedure for migrants</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration laws should stay as they are now</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration laws should become stricter</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration should be stopped altogether</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to answer</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WCIOM (2013) The All-Russia Public Poll, N=1600

Additionally, the growing salience of immigration stands out in the Research Holding Romir longitudinal survey of the most prominent societal problems: while in 2005 the problem of migrants was not mentioned, it was ranked among the top ten most urgent
societal problems by 19% of respondents in 2013 (ROMIR 2013). Longitudinal studies support the growing sense of animosity towards foreigners among Russians (Table 15).

Table 15. Animosity to Foreigners among Russians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite often</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never/Practically never</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard to tell</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ROMIR (2013)

Mass manifestations of nationalism expanded dramatically since the early 2000s through demonstrations like the yearly “Russian Marches”\(^ {51}\) that often unite various ultra-radical nationalist groups under the umbrella slogans of “Russia for Russians” and demands for the protection of the rights of native Russians (Kommersant 2013). Public opinion polls indicate a growing familiarity of the mainstream Russian public with the slogans of the Russian Marches, such as “Russia for Russians.” What started as a radicalized marginal movement for uneducated youth now has gained a tacit acceptance among educated middle class, pointing to the wider appeal of xenophobia to wider audiences (Gudkov 2013).

Opinion polls reflect Russians’ increasing sense of insecurity and dissatisfaction with quality of life. By the autumn of 2010, pollsters registered growing insecurities

\(^{51}\) The so-called ‘Russian Marches’ are held yearly across Russia on November 4\(^{th}\) during the national holiday the Day of National Unity. The first March was held in 2005. The participants support a wide variety of slogans under the umbrella theme of protection of the rights of native Russians. A leading Russian polling organization, Levada Center, 40% of polled Russians support the idea of such marches (Levada Center 2013a).
about the future, partially caused by the world economic crisis and partially by the perceived worsening quality of democracy (Gudkov 2013). Rosstat, the government statistics agency, reports that 34% of women and 32% of men say that insecurities about the future prevent them from having children (Nikitina 2013). My interview respondents echoed this notion. Five of seven respondents (two legislative representatives, two public servants and one mayor) stressed corruption, economic insecurities, lack of access to government preschools and housing shortages, poor quality health care, and education as major areas of concern for Russian families.

The interview respondents sounded out the common frustration over the large number and visibility of immigrants. However the levels of frustration differed from region to region. Xenophobia varied with the size, location and the economic development of a particular region, with more economically advanced localities exhibiting more xenophobia as expanding markets attract more migrants. The respondents’ attitudes toward immigrants ranged from neutral to negative (Table 16).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview responses reflecting attitudes toward immigrants</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“don’t see particular problems with migrants,”</td>
<td></td>
<td>“we need to reduce the amount of migrants so that the city becomes safer… migrants parasitize on public benefits… we should not allow immigrants to exploit our public benefits system,”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“no particular problems, not many migrants, they are mostly seasonal”</td>
<td></td>
<td>“migrants do not respect the law; they are dangerous and impudent… as every patriot I think that [local governments] should hire the Slavs first and foremost,”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“there are too many of them and they are too visible,”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“migrants use corruption to their advantage to gain scarce public resources for bribes, such as slots in government preschools without waiting,”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“our goal it to push out all migrants from the labor market,”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“we receive many letters from constituents with requests to limit immigration and deport migrants.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16. Responses of Russian Government Officials Regarding Immigration
Given widespread xenophobia, I asked respondents to assess the overall preferences of the government and elected officials to the components of the official demographic policy. The Government’s Conception of the Long-Term Socio-Economic Development identifies two main challenges to the stability of the Russian Federation: the fall in birth rates and the overall decline in population (Russian Federation 2006). The solution to these problems, according to the *Plan of Demographic Development*, consists of two parts: migration management and increasing birth rates (President of the Russian Federation 2007).

Six of seven respondents expressed definite opinions that the emphasis is, and should be, on stimulation of *native* birth rates while migration should be strictly controlled and/or drastically reduced. More than half of respondents pointed out the restrictions that are implemented in their regions to limit immigrants’ access to family benefits while favoring the native population, such as the regional or city residency requirement of three to five years. Additional restrictive rules included requirements to prove that taxes have been paid in the region. These measures resemble the October 2013 initiative of Duma Representative Zhuravlev of the Rodina party to require immigrants everywhere to prove tax residency status before gaining access to government preschools (Duma 2013).

The data presented in this section establishes evidence of a substantial immigration presence in Russia (Proposition 2). The number of immigrants is the largest in Europe, they are omnipresent and cause public frustration (Levada Center 2013a; UN 2013). The growing penetration of xenophobia in Russian society is measured by public opinion
polls, evidenced by the growing popularity of the “Russian Marches,” and assessed by experts. More so, experts agree that what once was an attribute of marginalized informal groups now receive open support by the educated middle class. The direct measurement of xenophobia through public opinion polls provide convincing evidence of growing xenophobia in society (Proposition 3).

The interviews and content analysis of mass media and public documents also support the claim that xenophobia is prominent among policymakers and bureaucrats (Proposition 4). This analysis presents evidence that suggests that policymakers are responding to the influx of immigrants by restricting access to benefits for immigrants, what the literature refers to as welfare chauvinism (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007; Kymlicka and Banting 2006). These prohibitive moves coupled with the reluctance of some elites’ to integrate migrants and the calls to eliminate migration point to the anti-immigrant sentiment among the Russian political elite. Policy implementation clearly favors stimulating the natural growth of the Russian population given the negative attitudes towards immigrants. In this light, this research suggests that xenophobia stimulates government pronatalism as policymakers are seeking a way to address the negative consequences of population decline by stimulating the native birth rates.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter presents evidence sufficient to establish presence of both the outcome, family policy generosity, and the hypothesized cause, xenophobia. The Russian government supports a generous system of family benefits as outlined in Table 10. According to the United Nations and Russian Federal Migration Services, about 12
154 million immigrants live and work in Russia. The Russian society harbors a sizable amount of anti-immigrant sentiment as recorded by the longitudinal studies of public opinion towards immigrants (Levada-Center 2013, WCIOM 2013, ROMIR 2013) and my interview data.

Evidence from the field, public opinion polls, and the opinions of experts strongly suggest that xenophobia in 2013 was at its historical height in Russian society. Xenophobia channels dissatisfaction and distrust in government. It is “a rationalization of own insecurities caused by the sense of vulnerability against the tyranny of the police, unfairness of the legal system, and widespread corruption” (Gudkov 2013). The feeling of insecurity and vulnerability to threats of immigration prompts citizens to demand more privileges and programs for native Russians. Public spending on family programs is one of the areas highly valued by the Russian citizens. It is also a favorite populist project of the current Administration. Efforts are made to distinguish between native families and immigrants as possible recipients of family benefits. As shown above, State Duma Representatives and regional governments are active in introducing anti-immigrant legislation that restricts access to family benefits for immigrants.

Russian experts agree that the government is skillfully manipulating the fears of citizens in order to shift blame for the poor socio-economic conditions to the external enemy – the gastarbeiter – while focusing on the positive achievements of monetary compensation for families (Gudkov 2006; Mukomel 2014). In heated debates, the influx of immigration is juxtaposed to falling native birth rates. Fear mongers, ultra-conservative partisans, and xenophobes argue that immigration will inevitably bring
death to Russia, the Russian nation, and the Russian state.\textsuperscript{52} and that immigrants abuse the limited public resources like public preschool and school slots, medical services, and family benefits (Fontanka 2011).

This chapter shows the dual direction of xenophobic pressures: the bottom-up public expression of anti-immigrant sentiment is complimented by the top-down xenophobia from the officials at different levels of government. The experts I interviewed stress that xenophobia is artificially inflated by the mass media and politicians seeking approval. Russian capital, Moscow, was rocked in late 2011 and 2012 by the largest anti-government mass protests since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Treisman 2014). President Putin’s approval rating had fallen by nine percent in late 2011 (Levada Center 2012). Given the growing lack of support for the government, the increased spending on popular social programs, especially the much touted success of Maternity Capital, gives the government a chance to appear accountable to public grievances with immigrants and report a significant achievement, a feel-good strategy, in the uncertain times of growing prices, stagnated economy, and the deficiency of rule of law. For the government, it is also an efficient way to reach its own pronatalist goals of population stabilization.

I argue that xenophobia is an important consideration for current family policy discourse in Russia. It pressures the government’s decisions on family policies from the two fronts: from population and from the bureaucrats and policymakers who embrace the anti-immigration rhetoric. While demographers and economists are in agreement that a sizable influx of immigrants is needed to maintain economic growth short term and to

\footnote{For example, Zhirinovsky of LDPR claimed: “In 50-70 years they will replace us and [our land] will become one big Central Asia” (LDPR 2013). fontanka.ru/2011/07/28/128/}
stabilize population numbers long term.\textsuperscript{53} political elites focus on increasing monetary benefits to families while calling for limiting immigration. Xenophobia is a convenient smoke screen for such an economically-risky maneuver to focus on costly long-term projects of stimulating native birth rates, while immediate fixes to population stability through immigration are being demonized.

The current pronatalist agenda is about ideology as much as it is about birth rate. The government is intent on stimulating the native birth rate. Heated debates throughout 2013-2014 about extending the Maternity Capital program through the year 2016 illustrate the vacillation of the government between pragmatics who call for an end to the program due to budgetary restraints, and populists who lobby for the extension of the program until 2025, beyond its original expiration date, to pacify citizens (Rossiyskaya Gazeta 2014).

This chapter documents the relevance of immigration to family policy generosity. As my interviewees and media reports confirm, immigration and xenophobia are relevant for policymakers concerned with family policy implementation. Alternatively, one might argue that the generosity of family policies is a function of the health of the economy, i.e. GDP growth as measured in large-N quantitative studies (Gauthier and Hatzius 1997, Kingsbury 2014). However, as I show, even during the recent economic crisis, which started in 2008, the government did not divert from its course of generous spending on family policies: the amounts of Maternity Capital and the Birthing Certificate as well as family benefits were adjusted yearly for inflation. Therefore, the economic explanation

\textsuperscript{53} S. Zakharov, personal correspondence.
fails to prove its importance even during the recent world economic crisis when GDP growth became negative in 2009.

Part 3 of this chapter convincingly shows that gender equality is not a primary driver of family policy generosity in Russia. The government bases its arguments on the pronatalist rhetoric of economic necessity, not gender equality. The President does make a point in mentioning the importance of the state supporting women in balancing work-family obligations. But these remarks as well as the gendered social discourse are outside of the main focus of the government’s family policy. Russia’s efforts in enforcing anti-discrimination laws are insufficient and remain a low priority. As research shows, women are discriminated against based on gender and family status. Gender equality bears little importance for family policy generosity in Russia. Family policies are firmly grounded within a pronatalist framework of the state’s need for resources and national geopolitical and demographic stability.

This chapter argues that family policies present a convenient tool for managing public discontent with the government. The ruling elites attempt to magnify the responsibility for societal ills, such as crime or public health, and shift the responsibility for problems onto the immigrants. Generous family policies are visible, tangible, and easy to understand. They make a positive impression of a caring state. The invocation of a negative image of immigrants helps the government to consolidate public support behind the initiative and appear accountable when touting the success story of the increased birth rate among those encouraged by the heightened support for families.
Chapter 5
Conclusion

The current family policies in CEE continue the provisions of paid maternity and parental leave, and family allowances inherited from the past communist regimes. But new policies have also been adopted. Birth grants, for example, are becoming a more popular measure as several CEE governments introduced the measure post-transition. Several European Union members have introduced paternity leave, a new family policy component not inherited from the Communist past. More research is warranted into the impact of different types of family policies not analyzed in this dissertation, such as birth grants and other forms of family assistance, such as tax credits, as well as policies aimed at helping women reconcile work and care through the development of part-time employment, tax breaks to companies which employ young mothers, and training and retraining opportunities for women who take substantial time off work to care for young children. This dissertation focuses on family policies inherited by the Central and Eastern European countries from the Communist regimes and the interplay between policy and fertility rates in these countries.

Fertility is proven to be an important policy and political consideration. As I show in Chapter 2, low fertility can bring about population decline, which can lead to a drop in economic output. Thus, low fertility could be considered a national security priority, given that modern nations strive for economic prosperity and competitiveness in the global balance of powers. Immigration can be a viable policy solution to declining birth rates, but has proven to be a formidable and complicated task in Western Europe.
Immigrants of different religious and cultural backgrounds can be difficult to integrate causing spikes in nationalism and popular xenophobia, and lead to the insurgence of electoral populist radicalism.

Central and Eastern Europe displays high levels of xenophobia due to the ethnic tensions inherited from the post-WWII European divisions and state formation. In the EU-member countries, anti-immigrant stances have an additional EU-skepticism flavor: protection of national identity and national markets from the influence of the EU (Vachudova 2008). Falling fertility contributes a new flavor to the conservative nationalist rhetoric – the threat of national decline. In this light, family policies become the talking point of conservatives, even radical conservatives who emphasize national greatness, traditional family values, and traditional gender roles. Women are the big losers in this political dynamic, as rightly pointed out by scholars (Saxonberg and Sirovatka 2006; Saxonberg 2014, LaFont 2001). While during Communism family policies were the subject of the greater Communism-building project, after the transition family policies were hijacked by nation-building projects. Gender equality issues, which could have taken the lead as the center goal of family policies, are rarely considered. As such, communist legacies are pervasive in the region, not only in their long-lasting impact on party politics and the formation of civil society, but also on the issues of gender equality. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, current leaning of the many CEE countries tilts toward familialism, which focuses on traditional gender roles within families.

Family policies also prove to be a salient policy issue for traditional conservatives. This saliency contradicts the common understanding of the Right parties
as socially conservative and Left parties as the champions of social welfare programs. Because family policies are used as instruments of nation-building, they appeal to the parties on the Right, pointing to an interesting policy phenomena. I argue in this dissertation that family policies’ appeal to conservatives and radical populists is in supporting native families to ward off the threat of being overcome by immigrants. Chapter 4 provides an example of the use of family policies by populists in Russia. This analysis untangles the evidence in support of the argument that xenophobia is an important consideration for family policy generosity in contemporary Russia. It informs future research opportunities into the contemporary European societies that share some of the characteristics of contemporary Russia. The electoral and popular support for xenophobic politicians and radical-right parties may make the issue of immigration ever more important when it comes to the redistribution of social welfare benefits across Europe that attracts more immigrants every year.

The results presented in this work highlight both the differences and similarities between the post-Communist countries and the West. I show that party politics does matter, but matters in a particular way that needs to be further explored. My results affirm existing studies which suggest that social welfare policies appeal to Right parties in post-communist societies (Tavits and Letki 2009, Lipsmeyer 2002). Existing studies show that most conservative Right parties are able to push through and implement more generous family policies (Rat, Szikra, Inglot 2013). However, it is difficult to measure their influence as often far right parties are small and participate in policymaking as parts of larger coalitions, given that most CEE countries have adopted some variation of the proportional representation institutional design. Additionally, lack of reliable election
data for non-EU member countries make large-N comparisons difficult. More research is warranted on both country level and a large-N comparative scale throughout post-communist Eastern Europe to discern the influence of Right parties and radical-right parties and the ways these political agents conceptualize and operationalize nationalism, populism, and xenophobia as applied to social policies, and family policies in particular.

Finally, this dissertation contributes to the understanding of the complexities of the countries that are grouped under Central and Eastern Europe. Within the region, there are member states with very different packages of family policies, economic characteristics, party competition, and demographic dynamics. More work is warranted into the small-n comparative studies of post-communist countries, especially on the topic of the influence of xenophobia on social welfare policies.
### Appendix A

**Data Description: Determinants of Fertility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Descriptives</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Fertility Rate (TFR)</strong>: the</td>
<td>Mean=1.70; min=1.09; max = 3.9; N=450</td>
<td>World Bank, Eurostat, Council of Europe, Transmonee, PRB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average number of children an woman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>would bear over the course of her</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lifetime if current age-specific fertility rates remained constant throughout her childbearing years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age at 1st birth</strong>: mothers’ mean age at first childbirth</td>
<td>Mean=24.22; min=21; max=28.8; N=301</td>
<td>UNECE Transmonee Database, Eurostat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parental Leave Impact</strong>: measure of impact of parental leave as a percent of average wages</td>
<td>Mean=33.32; min=0; max=113; N=439</td>
<td>Data on parental leave length and payments compiled from various sources, including national statistical offices and Social Security Programs Throughout the World (SSPTW).</td>
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<td><strong>Maternity Leave Generosity</strong>: wage compensation measured in constant purchasing parity dollars (ppp) * length of maternity leave</td>
<td>Mean=2627; min=315.5; max=11007.9; N=327</td>
<td>Data on maternity leave length and payments compiled from various sources, including national statistical offices and Social Security Programs Throughout the World (SSPTW).</td>
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<td><strong>Childcare Availability</strong>: Pre-primary enrolments (net rates, percentage of population aged 3-6)</td>
<td>Mean=65.89; min=28.4; max=93.2; N=328</td>
<td>UNECE Transmonee, national statistics</td>
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<td><strong>Family Allowances</strong>: measure of impact of allowances for 1st child as a percent of average wages</td>
<td>Mean=7.64; min=5.75; max=9.31; N=327</td>
<td>Data on family allowances compiled from various sources, including national statistical offices and Social Security Programs Throughout the World (SSPTW).</td>
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<td><strong>GDP Growth</strong>: annual growth of the Gross Domestic Product</td>
<td>Mean=1.59; min=-32.12; Max=13.3, N=380</td>
<td>World Bank, World Development Indicators</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment</strong>: registered unemployment</td>
<td>Mean=9.18; min=0; Max=27, N=307</td>
<td>UNECE Transmonee, ILO, WDI, national statistics</td>
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## Appendix B

### Total Fertility Rates in CEE and FSU, 1981-2010

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Source: World Development Indicators, National Statistics Offices.
Appendix C

Data Description: Determinants of Family Policy

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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Descriptives</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>Median Voter: left-right ideology position of the government based on the median voter preferences.</td>
<td>Mean=2.78; min=-16.89; max = 44.05; N=250</td>
<td>Manifesto Project, Klingemann et al (2006), Volkens et al 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women in Parliament: proportion of women members of national parliaments.</td>
<td>Mean=13.61; min=3; max=32; N=314</td>
<td>Inter-Parliamentary Union (<a href="http://www.ipu.org">www.ipu.org</a>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xenophobia: anti-immigrant sentiment measured by response to the survey question whether respondents would not want their neighbors to be immigrants and/or foreign workers. Natural logarithm of the measure used.</td>
<td>Mean=20.80; min=6; max=40.6; N=250</td>
<td>WVS (2009), EVS (2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrant Stock: percent of foreign born population in a country. Natural logarithm of the measure used.</td>
<td>Mean=7.53; min=0.25; max=24.34; N=315</td>
<td>World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) Database</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female Employment: percent of women in employment. Natural logarithm of the measure used.</td>
<td>Mean=46.93; min=39.50; max=51.10; N=426</td>
<td>World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Policy Generosity: length × amounts paid at wage replacement rate in ppp dollars. Natural logarithm of the measure used,</td>
<td>Mean=7.64; min=5.75; max=9.31; N=327</td>
<td>Data on maternity leave length and payments compiled from various sources, including national statistical offices and Social Security Programs Throughout the World (SSPTW).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left Government: Social democratic and other left-wing parties as a percentage of parliamentary seats of all government parties, weighted by the number of days the government was in office in a given year</td>
<td>Mean=38.44; min=0; Max=100, N=202</td>
<td>CPDSIII, 1990-2011: Klaus Armingeon, Romana Careja, David Weisstanner, Sarah Engler, Panajotis Potolidis, Marlène Gerber</td>
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Appendix D
Robustness Checks

Table D.1 Determinants of Fertility, Arrelano-Bond Estimation

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<th>(III) EU-members</th>
<th>(IV) EU-members</th>
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<td>A-B Robust</td>
<td>A-B Robust</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generosity_{t-1}</td>
<td>-0.041**</td>
<td>-0.043**</td>
<td>-0.063*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ΔGDP growth</td>
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<td>0.009***</td>
<td>0.006**</td>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
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<td>GDP growth_{t-1}</td>
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<td>ΔTFR_{ln}</td>
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<td>0.663***</td>
<td>0.725**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
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<td>TFR_{ln-t-1}</td>
<td>0.254***</td>
<td>0.234***</td>
<td>0.270**</td>
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<td>(0.083)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ΔWomPARL</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WomPARL_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ΔXenophobia</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
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<td>ΔFemEMPL_{ln}</td>
<td>2.003*</td>
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<td>(1.098)</td>
<td>(1.215)</td>
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<td>FemEMPL_{ln-t-1}</td>
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<td>(1.142)</td>
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<td>(1.454)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ΔMed Voter</td>
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<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Voter</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-95</td>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Voter</td>
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<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.005</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996-00</td>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Voter</td>
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<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-05</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Voter</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-10</td>
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<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔMigrant%</td>
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<td>0.078</td>
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<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant%_{t-1}</td>
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<td>0.020*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Voter_{t-1}</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔGenerosity_{t-1}</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
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Dependent Variable: ΔGenerosity
Table D.1 (Continued)

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<th></th>
<th>ΔLeft GOVT</th>
<th>Left GOVT&lt;sup&gt;1,1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Left GOVT&lt;sup&gt;1991-95&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Left GOVT&lt;sup&gt;1996-00&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Left GOVT&lt;sup&gt;2001-05&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Left GOVT&lt;sup&gt;2006-10&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<td>Left GOVT&lt;sup&gt;1991-95&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.001**</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left GOVT&lt;sup&gt;2001-05&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>-0.001*</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left GOVT&lt;sup&gt;2006-10&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.892</td>
<td>-3.365</td>
<td>-6.024</td>
<td>-5.166</td>
<td>-6.450</td>
<td>-1.578</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(4.304)</td>
<td>(4.263)</td>
<td>(5.568)</td>
<td>(5.509)</td>
<td>(4.302)</td>
<td>(2.707)</td>
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<td>190</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>142</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: three models are presented here model (I), which represents the whole sample, and the models (III) and (IV), which represent the EU-member countries. This robustness check aims to support the validity of the political variables. Specifically, the results reported above support the notion that Left parties spend less on family policies in the CEE.
Appendix E  Modeling Simultaneity

Figure E1. Modeling Simultaneity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Fertility Rates (TFR)</th>
<th>Family Policy Generosity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Age at First Birth</td>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental Leave Compensation</td>
<td>Total Fertility Rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternity leave compensation</td>
<td>Women in Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Care Enrollment</td>
<td>Xenophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>Female Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>Measure of Left Parties Strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Allowances</td>
<td>Migrant Stock</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Simultaneous Equations Model**

To study the determinants of generosity in CEE, I develop the following simultaneous equations model:

\[ Fertility_{t,i} = \sum \text{Economic Variables}_{t,i} + \sum \text{Family Policies}_{t,i} + \sum \text{Demographic Variables1}_{t,i} + \varepsilon_{t,i} \]

\[ Policy Generosity = \sum \text{Political Variables}_{i,t} + \sum \text{Demographic variables2}_{t,i} + \sum \text{Xenophobia}_{i,t} + \text{Economic stability}_{i,t} + u_{i,t}. \]

Where:

\[ \sum \text{Economic Variables1}_{1,i} = \text{GDP growth and Unemployment (first difference and two-year lags)} \]

\[ \sum \text{Family Policies}_{i,t} = \text{Maternal and Parental leave compensation, Family allowances and Childcare enrollment (first difference and two-year lags)} \]

\[ \sum \text{Demographic Variables1}_{t,i} = \text{Maternal Age at first birth and lagged fertility rates (first difference and two-year lags)} \]

\[ \sum \text{Political Variables}_{i,t} = \text{Measures of partisanship in national parliaments and Percent of women in national parliaments (first difference and one-year lag)} \]
\[ \Sigma \text{Demographic variables}_{t,t} = \text{Total fertility rates and Female employment (first difference and one-year lag)} \]

\[ \Sigma \text{Xenophobia}_{i,t} = \text{Measure of Xenophobia against neighbors-immigrants and Migrant Stock (first difference and one-year lag)} \]

\[ \text{Economic stability}_{i,t} = \text{GDP Growth} \]

\[ \varepsilon_{i,t} \text{ and } u_{i,t} \text{ are the error terms.} \]

In this model, first-difference of TFR is an endogenous variable, it is determined jointly within the system (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 120). The estimation of simultaneous equations requires that the each equation in the system is identified, meaning that each equation should not produce the “same probability distribution of the endogenous variables” (Chow 1974, 4-5). The conditions for identifying equations stipulate that the reduced form for Generosity must contain at least one term not included in its original equation (Wooldridge 2010, 242). The model as a whole is identified if each equation in it is identified (Gujarati 2003).

\[
\Delta G = \alpha_2 \Delta Gr_{i,t} + \alpha_3 Gr_{i,t-1} + \alpha_4 \Delta F_{i,t} + \alpha_5 F_{i,t-1} + \alpha_6 \Delta W_{i,t} + \alpha_7 W_{i,t-1} + \alpha_8 \Delta X + \alpha_9 X_{t-1} + \alpha_{10} \Delta Fem + \alpha_{11} Fem_{t-1} + \alpha_{12} \Delta Gov + \alpha_{13} Gov_t-1 + \alpha_{14} \Delta Ms + \alpha_{15} Ms_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}
\]

\[
\Delta F_{i,t} = \beta_1 F_{t-2} + \beta_2 \Delta A_{i,t} + \beta_3 A_{i,t-2} + \beta_4 \Delta P_{i,t} + \beta_5 P_{i,t-2} + \beta_6 \Delta M_{i,t} + \beta_7 M_{i,t-2} + \beta_8 \Delta C_{i,t} + \beta_9 C_{i,t-2} + \beta_{10} \Delta Gr_{i,t} + \beta_{11} Gr_{i,t-2} + \beta_{12} \Delta U_{i,t} + \beta_{13} U_{i,t-2} + \beta_{14} \Delta Fa_{i,t} + \beta_{15} Fa_{i,t-2} + u_{i,t}
\]
Appendix F

Sample Interview Questions.

The interviews were conducted in the fall-winter 2013. I selected candidates using the snowballing method when interviewees recommending someone else for contact. The first interview was granted through a personal contact with the following interviewees referred by the study participants. I also made some cold-calling to the regional parliaments, which yielded two interviews with policymakers responsible for social welfare and family policies, a 70% rejection rate. The interviews were conducted in person, via email, telephone and Skype videoconference. On average, the interview lasted 25-30 minutes.

- The Government’s Conception of the Long-Term Socio-Economic Development identifies two main challenges to the stability of the Russian Federation (FR): the fall in birth rates and the overall decline in population. The solution to these problems, according to the Plan of Demographic development, is in migration management and increase in birth rates. In your opinion, what is a preference between these solutions among the government administration and politicians? Among Russian citizens?

- Could you describe a typical public complaint about family benefits?

- Could you describe a typical public complaint about immigrants? -Tell me what your organization did/plans on doing in response to the increasing number of migrants in the region/city/federal level (the territory will be adjusted depended on the source affiliation).

- The [Russian Federation] National Strategy In the Interest of Children for 2012-2017 mentioned the “inequality of the subjects of the Russian Federation in the volume and quality of services for children and their families” as one of the main problems for children’s policies. In your opinion, what exactly needs to happen on the federal level/state [oblast]/city[municipality]?

- The mass media, including official media, often reports on the immigration issue, mainly in the unfavorable light of crime by migrants. Have you experienced in you work anti-immigrant demands from citizens and if so how did this affect your official business?

- Could you comment on the observation that the main government effort for stabilizing population growth should focus on increasing birth rates rather than increasing immigration?

- Could you please comment on the recent petition to the Legislative Assembly of Saint Petersburg about the unduly strict registration requirements for families wishing to apply for child benefits? The authors of the petition implied that these restrictions are aimed at limiting immigrant’s eligibility.

- Could you please comment on the July 2013 experiment by the town of Kronshtadt where migrant street cleaners were replaced by native Russians?
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