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Nineteenth Century New Mexico**

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WE COME AS FRIENDS:
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Nineteenth Century New Mexico

The central purpose of this work is to define several of the broad contours of New Mexico's social history from 1810 to 1910. This period was marked by radical social change and by manifestations of deep social conflict. An explanation of the social context in which certain events took place, illustrating change and conflict, will help clarify one chapter of New Mexico's intricate story.

The larger saga of nineteenth century New Mexico, yet to be written, is about a people who struggled to live honorably under difficult conditions. There was a society not of consensus, but of conflict; important patterns and themes in their lives derived from social upheaval and disruption, from the imposition of an economic and political system, and from ideological and religious questions. As their world changed, they acted as people everywhere have acted when confronted with similar problems. Their response to change and conflict reflected a universal theme, for they participated in the making of their own history.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, traders

and merchants from the U.S. established regular trade. In a study of the political economy of the Southwest, Raul Fernandez analyzed this gradual change as the "beginning stage in the ultimate victory of one system of production and land tenure over another."¹ By the mid-1840s, a new era had emerged; the process of economic transition had been firmly established. According to Fernandez, this development was the "initial stage of the antagonism between two socio-economic formations or modes of production: a predominantly capitalist system and a variant of feudalism."²

Mexico's trade policies in the 1820s allowed entrepreneurs from the U.S. to transport textiles, hardware and tools, exchanging them for Mexican silver, blankets, hides and mules. Hence, profitable trade was established not only in Santa Fe and Chihuahua, but links to Durango, Sonora and California were also created. The effect of this economic development, according to Fernandez, was disintegration of the Mexican subsistence economy. The increase in the commercial exchange between the two unevenly developed areas did not encourage establishment of local industries in the less developed area.

Of course, the process of changing the system of production continued after the War of 1846, during the second half of the century. Eventually, capitalism dominated the social

organization of production as the arrival of railroads stimulated cattle and mining industries. Freight transportation opened new markets and intensive capitalistic enterprises became a reality. Those with capital or financial support had advantages in the competition for economic control because, by the late nineteenth century, a currency-based system had been established and corporative interests dominated the economy. This marked the final stage of the defeat of a variant of feudalism by capitalism. During this latter period of rapid flux and upheaval, legal and extralegal means of coercion and an accompanying ideology were employed to gain control of the land and its resources. Life and death struggles ensued.

The wholesale transfer of land ownership and control from Mexicano communities to Anglo dominated corporations played a central part in the victory of capitalism. And the rule of law, as instrument and as ideology, became important in the transformation. The rupture began when the so-called Army of the West invaded New Mexico in the summer of 1846. Even though the U.S. was at war with Mexico, the U.S. commanding officer told the people that their civil, political, property, and religious rights would be protected. "You are now American citizens," he said, "subject only to the laws of the U.S. WE COME AS FRIENDS and in our government all men are created equal." He called upon the people to

"exert themselves in preserving order, in promoting concord, and in maintaining the authority and efficiency of the laws." But in an unequal society in which private property was sacred, equality before the law would be rendered impossible.

The strategy in gaining control of New Mexico called for limited use of military force. Attempts would be made to persuade a majority of the people that it would be in their best interest not to resist, but to pledge loyalty to the new regime. To persuade the people, the rule of law was introduced as evidently impartial and just, and to function as ideology, as mediator of class relations, the law had to demonstrate a certain distance from direct intervention. The law could not be openly abused, because then it could not disguise unequal relations. Nevertheless, the new ruling class, collaborating with powerful Mexican families, legally defined property rights in accordance with their particular interests. Domination was the primary goal in these changing power relationships.³

In the second half of the nineteenth century, New Mexico was a society of conflict, not of consensus; accordingly, the law was used directly as an instrument of class power, but within limits, so as not to arouse deep dissatisfaction which could develop into sustained mass protest. Those limits were circumscribed so that the law, hypothetically, could be used

by poor people, but even then, only infrequently. The ruling class would "present itself as the guardian of the interests and sentiments of those being ruled." To establish and maintain hegemony those in control had to reconcile popular ideas of justice with absolute claims of property.⁴

Interrelationships between property and the law and between consensus, coercion, and ideology constituted the basis of the central historical problems of nineteenth century New Mexico. Controlling interests placed supreme value upon property, using the law to justify actions motivated by an amalgam of those values. Moreover, in nineteenth century North America, men of property presumed they were free from political and moral restraints. These "robber barons" and "captains of industry" took great ideological pains to explain that God and Nature had sanctioned the unfettered accumulation of land.⁵

The men in power applied discretionary rules, but always used the law as an instrument of authority. In doing so, they molded social consciousness, thereby consolidating and maintaining their domination. Their goal was to persuade by subtle means or to coerce by crude measures, frequently alternating discretion and force, the many to submit to the few. For as one historian wrote: "'Hegemony' implies class antagonisms; it also implies the ability of the ruling class

to contain those antagonisms on a terrain in which its legitimacy is not dangerously questioned."⁶

In nineteenth century New Mexico, intricate and ingenious legal procedures and technicalities, employed judiciously by those who possessed "superior knowledge" of the law, contributed toward the transfer of property ownership. But when the law could not be used as instrument, or as ideology, coercion was employed. Knowledge of federal land laws such as the Donation Act (1854), the Homestead Act (1862), the Timber Culture Law (1873), and the Desert Land Act (1877) permitted surveyors-general, other public officials including several governors, the so-called Santa Fe Ring, and less important rings to gain possession of vast amounts of land. Abuses of the law included perjury, forgery, and false pretense. But the law was not desecrated to the extent that it lost its value to the ruling class. If the law had functioned partially and unjustly all of the time, it could not have masked, disguised or legitimated class hegemony. The object was to present the law as being independent from gross manipulation. When it became clear to many people--including some from the ruling class--that the law was being unduly abused, reformers responded by investigating fraud and by changing unimportant procedural aspects of the law, yet arguing for continued deification of the law and for the sacred right to property.⁷

Conflict before the War of 1846

Before the large-scale transfer of land ownership and before the rule of law became firmly established, several conflicts set the stage for patterns which later became tightly woven. Pedro Pino from Santa Fe analyzed conditions in a report submitted to the Spanish C3rtes in 1810. Two years later, the report, Exposici3n Sucinta y Sencilla de la Provincia del Nuevo M3xico, was published; it contained the most valuable information available on New Mexico just prior to the arrival of North Americans.⁸

Pino foresaw conflict between New Mexico and North America, citing as evidence Lieutenant Zebulon Pike's secret mission of 1806. When Bartolom3 Fern3ndez arrested Pike's party on the west bank of the Rio del Norte in northern New Mexico, Pike insisted he was lost; but his presence was disquieting to officials. As one writer noted, Pike's mission forecast the war of conquest which took place forty years later.⁹

Treated more like a guest than a prisoner, Pike recorded his observations while traveling from Santa Fe to Mexico City. In 1810, Expeditions, a journal of his sojourn, was published. It provided valuable information for North American traders who began entering New Mexico in greater numbers after the United States acquired the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803.

Later, in 1821, formal trade agreements between the U.S. and Mexico were executed. Mexican officials agreed to establish trade with Missouri merchants, but they had no intention of losing control of New Mexico, the northernmost province or department.

By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, however, traders and merchants were participating in the economic and political life of the province. New settlers included Charles Beaubien, Ceran St. Vrain, both French-Canadians, Kit Carson and the Bent brothers; later this group, forming a fifth column, would support the U.S. military occupation. According to historian Howard Roberts Lamar: "They were the spearheads of the American invasion of New Mexico."¹⁰ Antonio Jose Martinez from Taos referred to them as the "American Party," and in a report to Mexican president Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, Martinez recounted their powerful economic and political influence.¹¹

Consequently, conflicts arose as Americans pressured Mexican officials for grants of land. As Lamar wrote: "In Taos, where no less than fifteen grants had been made in six years, the issue caused a deep split between the 'American Party'...and the Martinez family and their allies." Because "a friendly justice of the peace, prefect or governor meant the difference between a confirmed grant and a rejected one," intense campaigns for political control were waged and violence erupted frequently.¹²

A popular revolt in 1837 against Governor Albino Perez's policies increased the tension between extranjeros and natives.¹³ When opposition forces, comprised of Mexicans and Indians, occupied the capital on August 9, the political crisis climaxed. But, according to Philip Reno, "No outrage of any importance was committed upon Americans."¹⁴ One American, however, reported that some Mexicans had called for death to the "Americanos and gringos."¹⁵ What Americans feared most was confiscation of their goods; hence, they supported the wealthy Mexican families who protected their economic interests. "Any relations the Anglo-Americans had were with Governor Manuel Armijo rather than with the rebels, and their attitude toward the Gonzales government is shown by their cooperation in overthrowing it."¹⁶ Armijo, of the ruling class, led the counter forces against the popular takeover captained by Jose Gonzales.

Antonio Bustamante, secretary to a Mexican general, "told the American Consul in September 1837 that the government felt confident that Americans had taken no part in the recent upheaval in New Mexico but a 'different opinion prevailed among the mass of the people, who attributed all popular commotions occurring in the northern states' to the scheming Americans."¹⁷ El Imparcial said that "Violence in New Mexico was caused by Americans who conquered by sponsoring such uprisings."¹⁸ Of course, Mexicans had not forgotten that in 1836 Texans had

seceded from the Republic after surprising Santa Anna's forces in a battle at San Jacinto.

In 1841, the Lone Star Republic sent an expedition to New Mexico, straining relations between extranjeros and natives to the breaking point. The Texans sought to extend political control over New Mexico territory east of the Rio Bravo. This was an audacious move since the area contained half of New Mexico, including Santa Fe and other old settlements established in the first decade of the seventeenth century. The Texans argued that Article 3 of the 1836 Treaty of Velasco, which Santa Anna was forced to sign, guaranteed them all lands north and east of the Rio Bravo. The Mexican Congress had not ratified the Treaty and some political leaders disagreed vehemently with the Texans' illogical argument.

Ostensibly, one of the primary motives for dispatching the expedition was to establish commercial ties with Santa Fe merchants. "If the purpose of the expedition was to establish commercial relations," Charles McClure wrote, "it is interesting to note the emphasis placed on the sending of troops, not merchants."¹⁹ It was true, however, that Texas was bankrupt.

William Dryden, a Texas trader and advance agent, shed light on the Texans' motives when he reported that every American in New Mexico would support the overthrow of the government. Evidently motivated by self-interest, Dryden also reported that two-thirds of all the Mexicans and all of the

Pueblo Indians were with Texas "heart and soul." Indeed, there was fear, as McClure wrote, "that many Mexicans were sympathetic to Texan and American schemes of annexation. But while there was some discontent on the part of a few New Mexicans it was not as great as Dryden reported." He angered Mexicans when he circulated propaganda citing the advantages of Texas-style "freedom and democracy." Dryden became even more controversial when he accused Mexican officials of malfeasance in an investigation following the murder of a fellow American.²⁰

Historian Gene Brack wrote that the expedition had not surprised Mexicans, since they had suspected for some time that Americans wanted control of Mexico's northern provinces. General Jose Urrea, for example, believed Americans and Texans (who were the same to him) were sympathetic to their fellow Americans in New Mexico and California. Indeed, Mexicans perceived Texas secession as thinly disguised American aggression, and the Expedition of 1841 confirmed to them that Anglo-Americans were now conspiring to take over New Mexico; hence, there was hostile opposition to Texas and U.S. policies.²¹

In New Mexico rumors spread that Americans were in sympathy with the Texas cause; therefore, Governor Manuel Armijo issued a proclamation: "Foreigners who are naturalized citizens have the same obligation as Mexicans of natural birth"; i.e., to fight against the invaders. Foreigners not naturalized were ordered to observe complete neutrality. Tension increased

as news of the expedition spread.²²

Juan Vigil from Taos accused Thomas Rowland, William Workman and Charles Bent of collaborating with Tejanos. Soon after, Rowland accused Vigil and others of stealing his property. Rowland, a seven year resident of New Mexico, then proceeded to beat Vigil with a whip. Bent witnessed the beating; and although he was arrested as an accomplice, he bribed officials, thereby avoiding a jail sentence. After being accused of conspiracy, Workman and Rowland "thinking it prudent to depart, led a well known immigrant party to California."²³

Josiah Gregg commented that the most "glaring outrages" committed against American citizens took place in 1841; intense anti-American feelings endangered American lives, he wrote. Consequently, Americans demanded that Manuel Alvarez, a Spaniard serving as U.S. Consul in Santa Fe, ask Governor Armijo for protection. Armijo agreed to do so if the Americans refrained from supporting the Texans. The governor was mistrustful, however, because as the expedition floundered across the llano estacado, two members deserted, arriving in Santa Fe ahead of the others and naming several extranjeros as Texas spies.

On 16 September, Armijo rode towards Las Vegas to meet the Texas "rag-tag" army. Simultaneously, several Mexicans entered Alvarez's house questioning his alliance with the foreigners. According to Gregg, "A fellow named Martin, his

nephew and confidential agent, aided by a band of ferocious sans culottes, and armed with a large knife, secretly entered the house of the Consul." The Consul, he wrote, "received a severe blow to the head, and instead of being punished for the diabolical act the principal assassin was soon promoted in the army." Others also opposed to Alvarez's actions shouted: saquenlo afuera! matenlo! But Guadalupe Miranda, Armijo's aide, dispersed the group thus saving the Consul's life. Two days before, Alvarez had "demanded that foreigners in New Mexico be treated as neutrals...."²⁴

Alvarez again antagonized Mexican officials when he demanded the release of George Wilkins Kendall, a journalist who had accompanied the Texas-Santa Fe Expedition. Alvarez argued that since Kendall was an American, he should be released. The strategy called for using Antonio Navarro, a Mexican with the expedition who had also been captured. Charles Bent, James Wiley Magoffin and Alvarez asked for Navarro's release "to shew [sic] that we were not altogether partial to the Americans." However, Governor Armijo refused to free them, and Kendall and Navarro were forced to march to Mexico City with the other prisoners.²⁵

Kendall later wrote Narratives of the Texas-Santa Fe Expedition, exhibiting "the well-known Anglo prejudice against New Mexicans." The reporter had been captured by Captain

Damasio Salazar near Anton Chico, and, no doubt, that humiliating experience fueled his racial attitude. Salazar had ordered that Kendall and four members of an advance party be shot as spies and trespassers: "Had not Gregorio Vigil interceded and argued that only Governor Armijo had authority to execute prisoners, all five most certainly would have been shot." Kendall said Salazar was a "most ignorant man, unable to read or write." According to McClure, however, "Salazar wrote complete reports to Armijo." Kendall's experience had not been pleasant; hence, his one-sided personal account may have been an attempt to even the score.²⁶

On the other hand, Los Tejanos, a play written sometime between 1841 and 1846, kept the memory of the expedition alive among Mexicanos. In the play, Navarro is a character portrayed as a soldier in the Texas army, a traitor to Mexico. At the end of the play, one of the characters turns to a Tejano and says, "You insolent Texans, how dare you profane the territory of the Mexicans."²⁷

The Tejanos returned to Texas after their release from a Mexico City jail, planning retaliation against the alleged treachery of Armijo and Salazar. Authorized by Lone Star officials to steal from Mexicans who traveled through Texas on trading journeys, Jacob Snively's band of thieves "killed and robbed a prominent Mexican merchant and attacked militiamen on the Cimarron cut-off of the Santa Fe trail. When the shooting

was over, twenty-three Mexicans, many from Taos, lay dead." In 1843 other Tejano bandits led by A. Warfield pillaged the northern town of Mora, killing several persons and stealing horses.²⁸

In the aftermath of the expedition, Mexican newspaper editors feared that war with the U.S. was imminent, not distinguishing between Texas and U.S. actions. The attempt to conquer Santa Fe had been expected; yet it was viewed as a concrete example of aggression. Some Mexicans believed it would better "to be furied under the shattered remains of the nation than to surrender to insolent pretensions of perverse neighbors." Five years after the Texas-Santa Fe Expedition, Mexicans had their chance when the U.S. declared war on Mexico.²⁹

Social Protest in Northern New Mexico

The commanding officer of the United States Army of the West proclaimed to the Mexican people in August 1846 that the U.S. had taken possession of New Mexico and that henceforth it would be under U.S. rule. "We come as friends," he said, "however, those of you who take up arms or encourage resistance will be treated as enemies." Since no outbreak of resistance took place immediately, Stephen Kearny, the commanding officer, left for California, reporting to the Secretary of War that New Mexico had been conquered "without firing a single shot

or spilling a single drop of blood." Five months later, however, the U.S. Army repressed a mass uprising, causing a blood bath.³⁰

One month before violent popular protest reached a climax, Colonel Sterling Price, then U.S. Army commander, discovered that Mexican ruling class families were planning opposition to U.S. occupation. Evidently, the aim of the scheme was forceful submission of the newly instituted regime. But before the strategy could be implemented, Col. Price intervened, arresting several of the leaders.

Not long afterward, on 19 January 1847, collective violence erupted in Taos. Charles Bent, a merchant who had been appointed governor by Kearny just five months before, and others, including Mexicans who had declared allegiance to the newly imposed authority, were killed. In nearby Arroyo Hondo protestors attacked a whiskey distillery and general store owned by Simeon Turley, originally from Old Franklin, Missouri. Turley and others barricaded inside were killed and the building destroyed. As the protest spread, several Americanos were killed in Mora, southeast of Taos, across the Sangre de Cristo Mountains. U.S. troops retaliated, killing 25 persons, capturing seventeen prisoners, razing several homes and buildings, and destroying fields of crops.

Word of the fighting reached Col. Price in Santa Fe, and he left immediately towards Taos with 500 troops and four howitzers. At Santa Cruz, 25 miles north of Santa Fe where

opposition forces had gathered, a battle took place. Price reported that two U.S. soldiers had been killed and seven wounded; he also reported that 36 "rebels" had been killed and 45 taken prisoner. As the sides maneuvered for strategic position, another short battle took place at Embudo, between Santa Cruz and Taos. Finally, on 3 February, Price and his troops arrived in Taos, finding several hundred armed Mexicans and Indians in a defensive position inside the Pueblo church. After a prolonged attack on the church, U.S. troops stormed inside and hand-to-hand combat ensued. Price reported that of the six or seven hundred Mexicans and Indians, 150 had been killed. Seven Americans were also killed and 45 wounded, most of the wounded dying later, including Captain S.H.K. Burgwin.³¹

After the battles, some of the participants were arrested and tried for treason and murder. Several were hanged. By the spring of 1847, intense fighting had subsided; still sporadic violent confrontations took place during the summer months in Red River Canyon, in Las Vegas, in Anton Chico, and in La Cienega.

Who participated in the violent social protest in northern New Mexico? Contemporary accounts are not helpful in answering this question. Neither are secondary interpretations. Not surprisingly, U.S. military reports and stories told by contemporaries, who were not friends of the protestors,

created a stereotype, thereby leaving no face on the protestors. Without discriminating, their enemies labeled them "rabble," "mob," "undesirable ruffians," "assassins," "bloodthirsty cowards," "criminal elements," and, consequently, left them without an identity. As George Rudé explained in another context, they became "a disembodied abstraction and not an aggregate of men and women of flesh and blood."³²

In his study of popular disturbances in France and England between 1740 and 1848, Rudé observed that another approach, rooted in the liberal tradition, has also been utilized to describe "pre-industrial" protestors. In this view, the participants also lose their identity and become stereotyped, variously described as "working class," as "the people," as "patriots," or as "freedom fighters." These vague labels, which are extensions of particular motives or interests, are not useful in describing the participants; yet they do reveal the views of writers and observers who use such inadequate generalizations.

The following subjective descriptions by contemporaries, for example, reveal their particular attitudes. A friend of Bent, Dick Wooton, living in the Taos area in 1847, said that on the morning of the 19th, the Americans (numbering less than 15 at the time) woke up to find Taos surrounded by "as merciless a band of savages as ever went on the warpath." The

"butchers," he said, then proceeded to Arroyo Hondo to "massacre innocent souls."³³ And, in an account of the Turley distillery fight, George Ruxton, reportedly an eyewitness, referred to participants as "barbarous and cowardly assailants." One man was called an "inhuman wretch" by Ruxton because apparently the man refused to help Turley escape death.³⁴ Other observers commented that on the eve of the attack, the protestors had "drank themselves to a frenzy." Evidently, if one were to believe this account, alcohol led to the "irrational behavior."

Donaciano Vigil, of the Mexican ruling class who assumed command after Bent's death, blamed the "lower order of Mexicans" for Bent's demise. In an official report to U.S. authorities, Governor Vigil wrote that a "gang" composed of "scoundrels," "desperadoes," and "vagabonds," had declared war against "honest and discreet men."³⁵

Secondary interpretations do not tell us much more about the participants' identity. One writer, for example, said that "treacherous men," "insurrectionists," and "murderous bands" had been responsible for creating the "irrational disturbances."³⁶ Ralph Emerson Twitchell, nineteenth century compiler of information, referred to the participants as "the enemy" as "insurrectionists," as "rabble," and as "revolutionists." In his introduction to The History of the Military Occupation of New Mexico, published in 1909, Twitchell left no doubt that

his main purpose was not to write history, but to glorify the "deeds of men who won the West, men whose courage, devotion to country and true citizenship enabled them to accomplish the greatest military achievement of modern times...." Although Twitchell spuriously said he made "no special pretense as an historical writer," his unbalanced interpretation has influenced uncritical writers and students of New Mexico history. The courageous acts of the U.S. Army, he wrote, "should appeal to every loyal American and should find portrayal in every school house throughout the land, thereby inspiring and instilling the lessons of patriotism, honor, valor, and love of country." Twitchell dabbled not only in historical writing, but in politics as well. As a petty functionary in the Republican Party, he was frequently a confidante of Thomas Benton Catron, political boss and Santa Fe ring leader. The paisanos and small farmers who participated in the protests could not have fared well in Twitchell's "history."³⁷

More recently Warren A. Beck, author of New Mexico: A History of Four Centuries, described the participants in the protests as "ignorant natives." This book, now in its fourth printing, is a standard text in courses on New Mexico history.³⁸

Although Angélico Chávez's description of the participants and his judgment of their behavior is similar to those mentioned, he contributed what is perhaps the least tenable comparison

of all. Bent and the others, according to Chávez, were "cruelly massacred by a rebel mob of Mexicans and Indians."³⁹ What happened beginning in December 1846, Chávez explains, "reminds one strongly of the modern young terrorists throughout the world today...a cabal of hot-headed younger caballeros with their humbler followers hatched a plot to kill all the Americanos as well as the native leaders who were collaborating with them."⁴⁰

On another occasion, Chávez said that "New Mexico's people had quickly accepted the Anglo-American intrusion.... True, a few Hispanos plotted a rebellion, but this fizzled out and the plotters were pardoned by an American court for having acted as 'patriots' and no mere rebels."⁴¹

For many years now, Chávez has been cast in the role of apologist, constantly trapped in a swarm of logical inconsistencies and contradictions. His interpretation of the Uprising is an example of his intellectual contribution to the preservation of illusions which some "Spanish-Americans" have fervently guarded, perhaps to soothe the pain which is inherent in the experience of conquered people.

Indeed, most of New Mexico's storytellers have been plagued by what David H. Fischer calls the "pragmatic fallacy." That is, they have distorted events to fit subjective, inappropriate assumptions, which, in turn, bolster their cause. Whether conservative (and most writers on New Mexico have been conservative) or liberal (with one or two exceptions none have

veered from these perspectives), those who have written about New Mexico usually have excluded objective descriptions of the people who resisted the imposition of exploitative U.S. institutions. Perhaps these ahistorical interpretations have been inevitable, serving particular interests, but they do not help to clarify New Mexico's past.⁴²

The question remains: Who were the protestors? Perhaps some of them were, indeed, "assassins," "rogues," "sans-cullottes," or "patriots," but imprecise categories like these remove people from their social and historical context, characterizing them not as human beings, but as objects.

Simply, of the Mexicanos who protested, living in pre-industrial times, most were small landowners, heirs to community land grants, farmers who had always lived in the same place, people with a close attachment to the land and its resources. They were not in human bondage, inextricably bound to a few ricos or patrones, nor were they indebted to the newcomers, the extranjeros. They were, in fact, relatively free. As one Nuevo Mexicano said shortly before his death several years ago: "Yo creo que la gente que peleo en esos tiempos era gente pobre, rancheros que sembraban, que tenian su ganado, sus vacas y gallinas, y que usaban la floresta y las mercedes para mantenerse. La gente habia vivido en sus propias casas y terrenos por mucho tiempo. No serian santos, pero tampoco fueron salvajes

o gente mala--en fin, eran ser humanos, de carne y hueso, que se defendieron como pudieron." The man, Manuel Romero y Atencio, who, as his ancestors, lived on the east side of the Sangre de Cristos, believed that the people who fought were poor; yet they owned land, a few animals, and survived very well. They were people closely attached to their homes, mostly self-sufficient. The people, he said, then as now, were probably not saints, but neither were they inherently evil or savage. They were, simply, like other people, of flesh and bone, who, at that moment, believed they had to protect and defend their homes and interests, and they did it the best way they knew how. As far as I know, hermano Manuel concluded, people have always done this. Is that so unusual?⁴³

What motivated the participants? What moved the "common" people to protest? This complex question will not be resolved easily. We have yet to formulate questions which would be helpful in explaining actions of the "inarticulate participants." Contemporary accounts were written by the protestors' enemies; therefore, as might be expected, their versions were distorted. And most explanations since then have been based on prejudicial assumptions and on particular interests. Writers' support of the controlling class shaped their research and writing; hence their interpretations have been attempts to justify actions motivated by those class interests.

But it can be demonstrated that the participants and their

leaders acted rationally to redress social grievances as they perceived them, destroying enemies and property when appropriate, thereby alleviating the immediate problem. Furthermore, interrelated motives, not single reasons as some writers have argued, contributed to social protest. Ultimately, the protestors defended their interests much like people have done throughout history, particularly during times of disruption and deep conflict.

Over a decade after the U.S.-Mexico War the coals of conflict were stoked once again; this time the Civil War acted as catalyst. The Confederate plan was to take control of New Mexico for its strategic value. The Union also believed the area was key in the entire war effort. Neither side could win without the support of the Mexican people, but because Confederate troops were Texan, most of the Mexicanos declared in favor of the Union.

"During the War," according to a recent study, "the Hispanos provided both manpower and supplies to the Northern war effort, but initially Union officials voiced conflicting opinions concerning their loyalty and military efficiency."⁴⁴ Colonel Edward R.S. Canby, in command of the Military Department of New Mexico, viewed Mexicanos as apathetic, doubting their military competency. Although plans were to use Mexicans as auxiliary troops, Canby believed they would be unreliable. Just before the battle at Valverde in southern

New Mexico, Canby reported that Mexicans had "no affection for the institutions of the U.S. and, indeed, exhibited hatred for all Americans." "Lower class" Mexicans were suspected of plotting against the existing government, and a military officer reported that Mexicans would "eventually rise and cut all white men's throats."⁴⁵

By February 1862, however, nearly 2,800 Mexicans had volunteered to fight for the Union. Some Mexicans from the patron group volunteered to fight with the Union, demonstrating their patriotism. Others, however, saw the Civil War as an extension of the conflict with Texas: "The Civil War was never mentioned as such among the natives of New Mexico. It was, instead, more commonly called the war against the Texans."⁴⁶ For, according to M.A. Otero, Mexicanos "still remembered acts of actrocity by Texans which had occurred twenty years before, and mothers would often warn young children to behave or else the Tejanos would come to carry them away." Governor Henry Connelly exploited the bitterness against Texans by emphasizing that Mexicans ought to fight in defense of their territory against the second Texas invasion.⁴⁷

After the Civil War, people from the U.S. entered New Mexico in greater numbers, engaging Mexicanos in life and death social struggles.

Violent Social Conflict in the late Nineteenth Century

Collective violence became a fact of life by the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Of course, violence was not unique to New Mexico; rather, it was an integral part of U.S. nineteenth century history.⁴⁸ At least four major forms of violent social conflict were evident in New Mexico during the past century: popular protest, political assassination, racial hostility, and vigilante activity. The Uprising in Taos and the activities of Las Gorras Blancas (the White Caps) and their allies in San Miguel County manifested widespread social protest. The assassination of a Santa Fe political leader, one in a series of politically motivated murders, dramatically illustrated the struggle for control and power. And battles in Lincoln County, vigilante lynchings and related unsolved murders in Colfax and Socorro counties revealed deep racial strife.⁴⁹

White cap activity was an important source of protest. An organization of small farmers, mostly land grant heirs, the White Caps fought against land encroachment and against corporations in the 1890s, a fluid and unstable decade.⁵⁰

Another pattern, political violence, became endemic in the last quarter of the century. Francisco Chavez was ambushed in 1892, but his murder was only the most sensational. He was a Santa Fe political leader, a member of the White Caps, the Knights of Labor and a powerful opponent of Thomas Catron and the Santa Fe ring. Four Mexicanos, pawns in complex

machinations, evidently were hired to murder Chavez; five years later these men were executed. Although not proven in a court of law that powerful political groups, which included bosses like Catron, had planned Chavez's murder, the people who opposed these reactionary cliques believed there had been a conspiracy to eliminate the strong leader.⁵¹

Racial hostility wove a pattern in the late 1870s, during Anglo-American expansion into newly created Lincoln County, Mexicanos battling Tejano "outlaw gangs" and cattlemen for land and water. Many Mexicans died in the struggles during the chaotic settlement of the southeastern region, including a young leader Juan Patron.⁵²

Racial conflict also intensified in the northeastern region in the last quarter of the century. Mexicano rancheros fought to live on land they had occupied for generations before people from the U.S. began arriving after the Civil War. Struggles raged for control of the extensive Maxwell Land Grant, vigilante activity periodically surfacing and Mexicanos frequently caught in the middle.⁵³

Vigilantes also organized in Socorro in the Rio Abajo area in 1880. Three brothers of a Baca family fled to El Paso, Texas, after being accused of murdering a newspaper editor, A.M. Conklin, vigilantes demanding that the brothers hang. Eventually, one brother died in a shoot-out; a second brother was hanged by vigilantes; and the third left Socorro after acquittal by

a Mexican jury. This vigilantism, which was solidly entrenched in the violent traditions of the U.S., greatly exacerbated relations between Anglos and Mexicans.⁵⁴

Additionally, so-called law and order leagues (like the Knights of Liberty and various Button Gangs), "bandit societies," (like la Gavilla de Silva), political gangs, and personal vendettas dotted New Mexico's landscape. In 1894, Governor William Thornton expressed frustration because several racial and political murders in various parts of the Territory remained unsolved.

Besides the "mysterious" murders, others like the Otero-Whitney shoot-out demonstrated widespread discord. Manuel B. Otero, the only son of wealthy landowner Miguel Antonio Otero and son-in-law of Antonio Jose Luna, powerful patron from Valencia County, was shot and killed in 1883. A gun battle between Otero and J.G. Whitney, brother of Bostonian Joel P. Whitney, president of the Silver City Deming and Pacific Railroad, stemmed from a fight for control of the Estancia Land Grant. J. Francisco Chaves, powerful politician for forty years, interviewed by the Albuquerque Morning Journal, explained the Otero-Whitney legal entanglement. Ironically, Chaves himself was mysteriously killed twenty years later in the same general area.

Other Dimensions of Social Change and Conflict

Social change and conflict in New Mexico signaled the appearance of questions beyond economics and politics, although all were intertwined. As R.L. Duffus wrote: "The sentiment represented by Native Americanism, Know-Nothingism and in the later days by the A.P.A. and the Ku Klux Klan was often carried across the plains with the caravans...." Of interest here is the relationship between Anglo-Saxonism, anti-Catholicism and imperialistic expansionism.⁵⁵

Anti-Catholicism and Anglo-Saxonism, interrelated traditions and doctrines discernible in mid-nineteenth century America, were, of course, transplanted into New Mexico. Reginald Horsman in a recently published study, Race and Manifest Destiny, wrote that by mid-nineteenth century, during the era of the U.S.-Mexico War, rhetoric in the U.S. emphasized that American Anglo-Saxons were a "separate, innately superior people who were destined to bring good government, commercial prosperity and Christianity to the American continents and the world." The "American Anglo-Saxon race" was superior to all others, and inferior races were doomed to subordination or extinction. According to Horsman, these rampant Caucasian, Aryan doctrines flourished in nineteenth century America.⁵⁶ Similarly, John Higham, in an earlier study, wrote that by mid-nineteenth century, the Anglo-Saxon tradition had become a reactionary slogan, constituting "one of the manifold ironies of intellectual history."⁵⁷

Nor did logical inconsistencies and contradictions bother Anglo-Saxons. As "chosen people" they produced "abundant empirical proof" that they were, in fact, chosen by God. Intellectuals provided "scientific theories" based on the success, inevitable it seemed, of Puritan settlements, the triumph of liberal republicanism, extensive material prosperity, and rapid territorial expansion. Research by Anglo-Saxon scholars proved beyond any reasonable doubt that Anglo-Saxons were descendants of those Aryans who had "carried civilization to the entire world." America's racial theorists were an integral part of society, not lunatics on the fringe, and their new racial ideology was used to justify "exploitation and suffering of blacks, Indians and Mexicans."⁵⁸

"Agrarian and commercial interests were at the heart of the expansion," Horsman correctly wrote, "but the new accompanying racial ideology permeated these motives and determined the nature of America's specific relationships with other people they encountered in surge to world power." Moreover, the need to justify unjust actions was particularly pressing in a country which professed certain democratic ideals.⁵⁹

Together with other doctrines, Anglo-Saxonism, as ideology, was used to justify U.S. imperialism. The "ideology of American expansion," wrote Albert K. Weinberg, "is its motley body of justificatory doctrines. It comprises

metaphysical dogmas of a providential mission and quasi-scientific laws of national development, conceptions of national right and ideals of social duty, legal rationalizations and appeals to the higher law, aims of extending freedom and designs of extending benevolent absolutism."⁶⁰

Manifest Destiny, coined by the press in early 1848, became the rallying cry of expansionists. Its postulates were outlined by Professor Frederick Merk: Anglo-Saxons were endowed with innate superiority; Protestant Christianity held the keys to heaven; only republican forms of political organization were free; and the future--even the predestined future--could be hurried along by human hands, and the means of hurrying it, if the end be good, need not be inquired into too closely. Anglo-Saxon nationalists believed "one nation had a preeminent social worth, a distinctively lofty mission, and consequently unique rights in the application of moral principles."⁶¹

Before the war against Mexico, U.S. policy limited expansion to "unoccupied or sparsely settled areas." U.S. Representative Alexander Duncan, Ohio, articulated this rationale:

There seems to be something in our laws and institutions, peculiarly adapted to our Anglo-Saxon American race, under which they will thrive and prosper, but under which all others wilt and die. Where our laws and free institutions have been extended among the French and Spanish

who have been on our continent, they have and are gradually disappearing; not that they move away, but they neither prosper or multiply, but on the contrary dwindle.⁶²

It was believed that "democratic institutions functioned best among a racially homogeneous...population." Weinberg correctly noted that "a supercilious theory of racial inequality, had been current in the land of political equalitarianism for years."⁶³

Florida, Louisiana and Texas were incorporated without changing traditional U.S. national policy and without justifying morally what was otherwise being accomplished. The extension of "freedom" to areas with American pioneers required no justification. The "foreigners" (in their own land) did not pose a problem or threat to national unity or survival since they were few in number, hence they could be rendered politically and economically powerless.

A few months after the outbreak of the War of 1846, the U.S. cited the principle of territorial indemnity, demanding Upper California. Consistent with established policy, there was no mention of amalgamation with "inferior peoples." All the U.S. wanted in early 1847, according to U.S. Senator Lewis Cass, was "a portion of territory, which they [Mexicans] nominally hold, generally uninhabited or, where inhabited at all, sparsely so, and with a population that will soon recede, or identify itself with ours."⁶⁴

New Mexico became the second territorial demand. Like California, New Mexico was viewed as sparsely populated; therefore, expansionists again saw no need to modify traditional policy. Moreover, American "pioneers" had already settled in the Spanish-Mexican northern province, thus satisfying the second policy requirement.

As the war continued, however, the rhetoric of regeneration became prevalent. This became necessary because by the winter and spring of 1847, expansionists had increased the indemnity demands. They then said that the people, along with the natural resources, ought to be "uplifted."

In order to secure the best possible treaty, talk was heard of occupying all of Mexico. In late spring of 1847, the Herald announced: "The universal Yankee nation can regenerate and disentrall the people of Mexico in a few years; and we believe it is a part of our destiny to civilize that beautiful country and enable its inhabitants to appreciate some of the many advantages and blessings we enjoy." To regenerate the masses of the people, but not the "evil and corrupt" rulers, was the least a "Christian nation" could do to redeem itself for usurping land.

This paternalistic viewpoint was expressed in a letter published by the Washington Daily Union: [It is] "The religious execution of our country's glorious mission, under the direction of Divine Providence, to civilize and Christianize

and raise up from anarchy and degradation a most ignorant, indolent, wicked and unhappy people."⁶⁵

However, the sure possibility of conquering California and New Mexico militarily took away the temptation of occupying, even if temporarily, all of Mexico. "In proposing to acquire New Mexico and California it was known that but an inconsiderable portion of the Mexican people would be transferred with them."⁶⁶ At that point regeneration was dropped as a justificatory motive. Self-interest prevailed and the conquest of land and its resources was unabashedly revealed as the primary motive. The people who came with the territories would then face a dilemma.

But evidently to soothe their guilt, the "weaker expansionists did not, like imperialists later on in the same century, propose to assign to Mexico a permanent status of colonial dependency." And Weinberg has concluded that even though the U.S. eventually took only New Mexico and California "in contrast with the Philippine situation annexation could have been achieved with relatively little opposition from the Mexican people; for although expansionists invariably declare the ordinary people of the desired land to be in favor of its conquerors, it so happened that in this case they were largely right."⁶⁷

The history of Mexicanos in the conquered areas, however, shows strong opposition to U.S. domination. Whether these

areas became colonial enclaves is open to debate.

In any case, U.S. policy makers recognized the obvious: that Mexicans viewed Anglo-Saxonism and anti-Catholicism as antithetical to their own institutions. Gene Brack who studied the relationship between Anglo-Saxonism, anti-Catholic attitudes and expansionist policy, wrote that an examination of Mexican newspapers indicated that Mexicans were indeed troubled. A Puebla newspaper, for example, warned that if the U.S. acquired Mexican territory, the "Catholic religion will [would] disappear from Mexican soil."⁶⁸ And El Siglo said: "American politicians have declared themselves in favor of exterminating the 'odious Spanish race' along with their religion." Americans, the editor wrote, "shared eccentric beliefs and professed the most contradictory doctrines. They could be terrorized by the predictions of insecure religious fanatics, and they proclaimed liberty for all and yet had virtually annihilated the Indian."⁶⁹ Mexicans believed something similar would happen to them after the U.S. invasion. For example, the Mexican minister to North America during the Texas revolt said that the "struggle to halt American expansion was a war of 'race, of religion, of language and, of customs.'"⁷⁰ It seemed that the U.S. posed a danger like that of the "English under Henry VIII, the Irish under William and Quebec under Wolfe."⁷¹

In conquering New Mexico, President Polk and Secretary

of War, W.L. Marcy, embarked on a pacification strategy, pleading for the cooperation of the U.S. Catholic Church leaders:

The great care Polk and Sen. Benton took to prevent fighting was indicated both by the orders to Kearny and by the fact that the President invited the Catholic bishops of New York and St. Louis to the White House to ask their advice about the best means of placating the priests in New Mexico. Polk in particular was convinced--and correctly so--that the priests occupied such a dominant position in the lives and government of all Mexico that without their cooperation peaceful conquest of the provinces could not possibly be accomplished.⁷²

Anti-Catholicism, however, had acquired deep roots; therefore it could not be easily explained away. Conflict between Catholics and Protestants, evident around the turn of the sixteenth century, was exacerbated by the Reformation. At that time charges of corruption were levelled at the Catholic Church, and the dogma and practices related to the Mass, as well as the abuse of privileges, came under serious attack. The spiritual decline of the Church, real or alleged, was only one aspect of the conflict, for basic economic and political questions formed the core of the problem.

England was developing a national consciousness, vying for international power; Spain, the leading Catholic nation, was its main rival. To the English, Catholicism and Spain were synonymous. They believed the union of church and

state in Spain had produced the "Black Legend" and the Spanish Inquisition. These were viewed with rancor. "The Roman pontiff loomed in English eyes as the great foreign tyrant, menacing the nation and its constitution, his followers had the aspect of a fifth column."⁷³

This tenacious anti-Catholic heritage was brought to North America by English settlers, acquiring "a very real local significance in the New World, for the English colonies were wedged between two hostile Catholic empires, France and Spain."⁷⁴ Many of the settlers were staunch Puritans, the most zealous of those antagonistic to Catholicism, and their hatred of Catholicism was kept alive by reading literature from England. Additionally, they developed their own anti-Catholic propaganda. During the colonial period Protestant ministers denounced the Roman Church's moral and worldly practices; the Inquisition was soundly condemned, and Spain was characterized as "belligerent and possessed by Satan."⁷⁵

Later, "when Americans began actually to encounter Mexicans in Texas, Santa Fe, and other Mexican territories, their initial responses were conditioned primarily by the traditions of hispano-phobia and anti-Catholicism."⁷⁶ Moreover, as Cecil Robinson commented: "The first Americans to make contact with the Mexican civilization of the Southwest were homogeneous in their Anglo-Saxon Protestant tradition in a way that Americans have not been since. They approached Mexican

Catholicism with a pre-existing hostility."⁷⁷ John Higham underscored the point in another context; yet it is applicable here.

For two principal reasons an undercurrent Protestant nativism persisted into the new democratic America and revived in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. One reason lay in the character of American institutions. Catholic traditions continued to look dangerously un-American partly because they did not harmonize easily with the concept of individual freedom embedded in the national culture. Americans regarded political liberty as their chief national attribute and supreme achievement. Observing the authoritarian organization of the Catholic Church and its customary association with feudal or monarchical governments, they were tempted to view American liberty and European popery as irreconcilable.⁷⁸

Early travelers and writers from the U.S. were products of this anti-Catholic tradition. "The earliest literary references to Mexico mainly in journals of adventure, exploration and trade," wrote Robinson, "show American writers to have been in general accord with the ideology of their own society."⁷⁹ Josiah Gregg, for example, was appalled at the lack of religious freedom and toleration, which he considered contradictory to the "independent and tolerant spirit" in the U.S.

Gregg believed priests had too much power and control;

their "infallibility" was totally incomprehensible to him. It was disgraceful, he wrote, that priests were held in such high esteem. The clergy were, after all, guilty of corruption: These cunning and deceitful priests simply look the other way when sins are committed--as long as exorbitant fees for baptisms, marriage ceremonies and burials are collected, he wrote.

And Lieutenant Zebulon Pike believed the better informed Mexican clergy would eventually declare for religious liberty and "Mexican liberals would welcome help from the U.S. in overthrowing the yoke of the oppressive Catholic Church."⁸⁰

Rufus Sage, a traveler passing through Taos in 1842, condemned the priests for their tacit approval of superstitious and idolatrous practices. Furthermore, he said that education was non-existent. Sage's views were probably typical of Anglo-Americans in the 1840s.

Two decades later, after the Civil War, Protestant missionaries arrived in New Mexico, also viewing the territory as a spiritual wilderness filled with Spanish-Mexican Catholics and Anglo settlers crying out for the "pure light of the new Christian gospel." The missionaries were products of a time when "Protestant thinking held an integral prominent part in the Anglo-Saxon American's expansionistic mentality, providing moral and evangelical grounds for territorial expansion and conquest."⁸¹ Nationalistic missionaries declared

that the U.S. was the great evangelist and teacher of democracy. They believed the idea of Manifest Destiny had religious implications because it "signified the triumph of Protestantism over Catholicism."⁸²

Conclusion

New Mexico remained a territory of the U.S. from 1850 until 1912. According to Robert Larson, "Nativism in America...was the major obstruction to the territory's statehood aspirations."⁸³ In this vein, Lamar, comparing New Mexico to Puerto Rico and the Philippines, wrote that these islands were "imperial possessions kept more for strategic and economic reasons than for the purpose of becoming states in the American Union." Similarly, in the first decade of the twentieth century, Theodore Roosevelt and U.S. Senator Albert Beveridge, chairman of the committee on territories, viewed New Mexico like they did the new empire. But, paradoxically, New Mexico did become the forty-seventh state of the U.S. in 1912.⁸⁴

The social transformation which took place in New Mexico from 1810 until 1910 profoundly affected all people. Most small farmers, land grant heirs, paisanos, and the poor generally responded to the changes rationally, courageously, and in the process became participants in the making of their own history. But that story has yet to be written.

Instead, historical literature reveals that interpretations of change and conflict in New Mexico are not entirely adequate. Some historians, for example, explain that conflict is an aberration, and they de-emphasize its role. They "magnified the process of selective recollection," owing to a historic vision of themselves as "latter-day chosen people...." The study of conflict has been eschewed, instead writers created and perpetuated the myth of "tricultural harmony" to suit particular interests. Furthermore, their work centers almost exclusively on North American behavior, and their "optimistic parochialism" has resulted in narrow explanations.⁸⁵

For example, one historian explained that "The dynamic and expansive force of Manifest Destiny made American occupation of the Rio Grande area well-nigh inevitable." Another historian wrote that when the United States Army occupied New Mexico, "an old era ended and a new one began." These "natural," "irreversible" and metaphysical laws have been utilized to explain a complex social history.⁸⁶

Additionally, a subjective comparison of "cultures" has been used to explain history. According to one historian, "The energetic and aggressive Anglo-American civilization would now be grafted on the aged and somewhat lethargic Spanish and Indian ones."⁸⁷ Another historian agreed: "Unlike the dynamic, individualistic, optimistic

society Anglo-American pioneers were creating for themselves in the Shenandoah and Ohio Valleys between 1760 and 1815, here was a stabilized, almost incestuous society existing in nearly total isolation."⁸⁸ It has been assumed that a nation populated with Anglo-Saxon Protestants defeated a traditional, stagnant civilization, comprised of racial mixtures and of Roman Catholics. And, as one writer said: "In the long run, most of the residents of the Territory--peasants, ricos, and clergy--accepted the situation because it seemed inevitable and there was no place else for most to go."⁸⁹ End of story.

These scholars anchor problems on simple and vaguely defined "culture clashes" between a "traditional, folk society and a modern, progressive one." Using this approach historians explain that when the "cultures" met competition followed, but that eventually there was accommodation and assimilation. Studies based on this inadequate framework view conflict as a temporary obstacle in the otherwise smooth evolution of history. That change took place would be difficult to deny. It is simply seen as orderly transition. Utopian in nature, this view portrays a harmonious world in which everyone has a place, accepts it, and acts out a prescribed role. The status quo is affirmed and sustained. Writers who adhere to this untenable design are complacent, conservative and unimaginative.

And, instead of clarifying history, these writers have mystified it. Their rigid, contradictory, and declarative statements result in foregone conclusions, and they have not been fruitful in opening up serious discussion of key historical questions.

More recently, the concept of "cultural pluralism" has been utilized to explain how people should be "incorporated into a stable, homogeneous society." One response to "militant and radical activity" has been to discard the melting pot theory which was employed to explain the accommodation of white European immigrants. Instead, the concept of pluralism portrays the United States as a multicultural society made up of diverse groups contributing and benefitting equally. Racism is acknowledged all too readily; however, the panacea is to encourage reforms that will "reflect the interests of all."

In this vein, one historian noted that New Mexico "came of age " in the last decades of the nineteenth century and so it came to pass in the grand design that "cultural pluralism," or the best of all possible worlds, became a reality in American New Mexico. When New Mexico, after sixty-four years, was finally admitted into the Union, a masterful compromise was worked out to everyone's satisfaction. The Spanish-Mexican culture had survived the nineteenth century. Although "Spanish-Americans"

may have "surrendered politically," the idea of the patron in a caste system remained strong. Public, non-sectarian schools were established, but the Mexicans kept their Catholicism and their archaic language; their simple folk culture and subsistence economy persisted in spite of the rise of industrial capitalism. A distinct, unique, folk group in a charming and picturesque region now could appreciate the conquest that began in 1846: "An invisible frontier of misunderstanding had at last begun to disappear."⁹⁰ And to this day all residents of New Mexico use Amigo bank cards, enjoy tamale bashes and Spanish fiestas where Mexican mariachis play "Spanish" music. At least once per year in the "Land of Enchantment" chambers of commerce of all stripes light luminarias and sing "De Colores" and the pepsi generation songs--all in harmony and brotherhood.

Frequently, however, events in the twentieth century illustrate that conflict continues to be prevalent. Racial, political, and class struggles have continued since 1912. For example, labor conflict, land grant battles, police violence, and, just recently, the Santa Fe prison riot--one of the most lethal penitentiary uprisings in the history of penal institutions--indicate that conflict is still a fact of life.

Studies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which extend beyond simple explanations for conflict must be woven within a clear analysis of social change. The

series of violent episodes in the nineteenth century, for example, must be related to larger economic and political processes and to race and class relationships. The complex social relationships between people, who, after all, were the sources of conflict, partly account for the difficulty in writing a more complete social history.

One central guiding principle could be the function of U.S. law: Its relationship to land grants, to criminal justice, to class control, and as a mediating force. Studies based on clear formulations of these and related problems will prove the most useful toward a deeper understanding of New Mexico's social history.

This is the challenge that awaits those who are motivated to tell the best story possible about the paisanos and the "inarticulate."

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