The Causes and Consequences of State Repression in Internal Armed Conflict: Sub-State Capacity and the Targets of State Violence

Philip Hultquist
Philip Hultquist
Candidate

Political Science
Department

This dissertation is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication:

Approved by the Dissertation Committee:

Christopher K. Butler, Chairperson

William Stanley

Mark Peceny

Neil Mitchell
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF STATE REPRESSION IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT: SUB-STATE CAPACITY AND THE TARGETS OF STATE VIOLENCE

by

PHILIP HULTQUIST

B.S., Government and Public Affairs, Missouri Western State University, 2004

M.A., Political Science, University of New Mexico, 2007

DISSEMINATION

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ABSTRACT

Using a mixed-method design, my dissertation examines three interrelated puzzles of state violence during counterinsurgency campaigns. First, why does state repressive violence effectively thwart rebellion in some cases while escalating it in others? Using simultaneous equation modeling on 139 cases, I find that collective (or indiscriminate) state violence is associated with a long-lasting backlash effect against the government, while selective (i.e., individual-level) state targeting is expected to deter rebellion effectively. The second puzzle is why are states so seldom selective and so frequently collective in their use of violence? I argue that the scope of state violence is in, in part, a function of the capacities of the state agencies in the security sector tasked with counterinsurgency. State agents with high coercive capacity (e.g., national militaries) tend to lack sufficient local sources to identify and target insurgents at the individual level. Most local security organizations (e.g., police) that would otherwise have access to local intelligence lack the organizational competence to exploit this knowledge and
become an efficient counterinsurgency force. The result is to rely on information about collectives (locations, ethnic groups, etc.) and target accordingly, which is associated with an escalation of the threat. This argument is supported by the first two stages of the Punjab crisis in India, where initial police attempts at thwarting rising extremism were incompetent and the army’s heavy-handed approach produced a backlash against the government. Selective targeting requires local intelligence capacity and competent organizational capacity. The third puzzle is how do states (or state agents) effectively overcome these obstacles to carry out selective targeting? Using qualitative process tracing supplemented by elite interviews in India, I explain how the Punjab Police built organizational and intelligence capacity over the ensuing years to identify insurgents effectively at the individual level, which is often credited for the eventual defeat of the Khalistan militancy in Punjab, India.
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Three Puzzles of State Violence in Internal Armed Conflicts

Modern states are surprisingly incompetent at combating internal challengers to their sovereignty or territorial integrity. Incumbents overcame only 25% of the insurgencies they faced between 1946-2005.¹ In three out of every four internal conflicts, insurgents were able to defeat the incumbent outright or more commonly extract significant concessions. Since the state’s primary function is providing political order by establishing a monopoly of violence, this is a puzzling observation.

It is not immediately obvious why states so often fail to suppress internal challengers. A cursory look at the strengths of even weak states vis-à-vis the challengers suggests states have serious advantages against insurgents. Insurgents are almost always weak compared to states. They are often incoherent organizations, lacking the ability to govern if they were to win. Many lack coherent ideological foundations and overlap with, or become, criminal organizations. The ones that do have coherent ideological foundations suffer from the opposite problem of being too rigid, resulting in splintering and infighting. States’ lack of ability to defeat insurgencies is even more puzzling when you consider the collective action problem that rebels face (or should face) when recruiting.² Convincing civilians to take on additional risk and to support an unlikely rebel cause should be difficult.

¹ Number based on data compiled by Kreutz (2010).
States are ineffective at counterinsurgency\(^3\) because they lack the *capacity* to react to internal armed challenges effectively; in fact many are designed primarily for defeating external challengers.\(^4\) But it is not the lack of coercive capacity where states are found wanting; state militaries almost always outnumber insurgents,\(^5\) have better access to tanks, bombs, heavy artillery, air and sea power, as well as having clearer channels for acquiring and using assistance from international allies with such power.

Instead, modern states, especially relatively new states in the Global South\(^6\) lack the capacity to provide effective deterrence to internal challengers, once established, because effective deterrence requires the state to target insurgents selectively (i.e., at the individual level). Insurgents do not generally wear uniforms and are difficult to distinguish from the general population. Since states cannot identify individual insurgents, they often rely on a shortcut by collectively targeting people that look like insurgents (e.g., of the same sex, age, and ethnicity) or where insurgents are thought to be located (e.g., villages thought to support the insurgency). But collective violence is counterproductive and is often, although not always, associated with a backlash against the government, which can actually strengthen the insurgency and leave the government in a worse off position.\(^7\)

\(^3\) I use the term counterinsurgency broadly to mean any measures states take to manage, contain, or defeat an armed opposition group. This term is not synonymous with U.S. policy of population-centric, hearts and minds campaigns as some analysts imply.

\(^4\) There is variation among regime types to which threats they are designed to face (see Andreski, 1980).

\(^5\) By one count, state militaries outnumber rebels 5 to 1 on average from 1989-2004 (Hultquist, 2013).

\(^6\) A modernization theory approach would call these states semi-modern: they no longer represent traditional societies but have not reached modernity. See Huntington (1968) for one of the first works to advance this view.

\(^7\) I should note that collective violence can hurt the operational capacity of the insurgent group and if overwhelming may be able to thwart insurrection entirely, but this requires
This dissertation is about the nasty business of how states respond to internal threats, the type of violent response they employ, and the results of that violence. Why do states respond to internal threats with the violence that we observe? Who does the state target with that violence? What are the consequences of who the state chooses to target? And how is that violence actually carried out?

The next section lays out the three puzzles of state violence in counterinsurgency that this dissertation seeks to answer (or help answer) empirically. For each puzzle, I review the state of the literature on the puzzle, define the relevant terms, describe how I attempt to address it theoretically or empirically, and summarize the findings. The following section discusses and justifies the theoretical approach, scope conditions, and the methods employed. I end the introductory chapter with a roadmap for the dissertation.

Three Puzzles of State Violence

What are the consequences of state violence? Selective versus collective violence

States almost always employ violence in response to armed challengers in an attempt to affect the challenger’s viability (Davenport, 2007b). The literature on state repression and civil war shows that the type of state repression or state violence can have varying effects on the viability of the opposition.

Violence directed solely at the individual insurgents or perhaps their direct supporters (i.e., selective violence) is expected to have a deterrent effect. Individuals sympathetic to the rebel cause who are considering supporting or joining the rebellion should be reluctant to do so since it comes with greater risk. If selective violence

obscene levels of violence and is often only a short-term advantage (Francisco, 2005; Goodwin, 2001; Peceny and Stanley, 2010)
outpaces new recruitment, the viability of the opposition is damaged and we would expect a de-escalation of the conflict. I expand on this hypothesis in Chapter 2 to posit a “positive counterinsurgency cycle,” whereby selective violence establishes the effectiveness of the security forces, increasing civilian confidence and their willingness to provide information, which reinforces the ability of security forces to execute selective strategies.

Selective violence is juxtaposed with collective violence (often called indiscriminate violence), which targets groups of people based on their ethnicity or location. Collective targeting is associated with the “negative counterinsurgency cycle.” Collective targeting necessarily kills civilians because one cannot distinguish between the innocent and the guilty when targeting at the collective level. Collective targeting is expected to backfire against the government, because civilians and potential rebels are incentivized to join or support the rebellion actively. When one is targeted for who they are or where they live, they have little choice but seek security by leaving or joining the rebels. This process simultaneously strengthens the rebels while hurting the government’s ability to extract individualized intelligence from the civilian population. Both of these processes together should reinforce the problem for the government leaving them with few options but to continue collective targeting.\(^8\)

The question of whether collective or indiscriminate violence is counterproductive is certainly a familiar one. This question was once commonly believed to be resolved, with numerous studies showing the counterproductivity of collective or

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\(^8\) While this process should be reinforcing, it should not be expected to go on indefinitely. Governments should learn that collective targeting is counterproductive if their gamble did not pay off, incentivizing them to find alternative strategies like finding a way into the positive counterinsurgency cycle.
indiscriminate violence across a variety of cases.\(^9\) However, this question has gained new life in the recent literature on civil wars, state repression, and counterinsurgency. A new strand of research has emerged that studies the use of violence against civilians and, drawing on rationalist assumptions, finds collective, even massive, repression to be effective (Downes, 2007; Lyall, 2009).

Since the literature has focused on the mechanisms of violence and mobilization, it has relied on case studies – both qualitative and quantitative – providing internal validity to their findings. However, both arguments lack a general, cross-national study to establish external validity of the findings. Cross-national analyses have suffered from endogeneity problems, since state repression is also a response in internal threats. Chapter 3 seeks to overcome both problems using cross-national, time-series data to test whether higher levels of indiscriminate repression are associated with an increased threat to the state, while controlling for the endogeneity between state repression and rebel threat.

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\(9\) Chapters 2 and 3 go into greater depth into the state of the literature.
civilians at the individual level. Since insurgents have the advantage of being clandestine, hiding in safe havens, or being the fish in the sea of the people, they are difficult to identify. Since most states lack the capacity to distinguish between actual insurgents, their supporters, and neutral civilians, and they must respond somehow, they rely on what they may consider to be the next-best-thing: collectively targeting the rebel recruitment pool. Branch and Wood (2010) provide a clear summary.

States unwilling or unable to build up sufficient knowledge of their citizens tend to understand their insurgent adversaries in the abstract, depicting them in collective terms—religious, ethnic, regional, ideological, class, or national. But successful implementation of counterinsurgency is dependent on viewing actors embroiled in an insurgency as individuals, not simply as members of some identity-based collective (Branch and Wood 2010, 6).

While viewing the insurgency in collective terms appears to be the next best thing, it is still associated with a backlash effect because targeting those demographic groups who could be sympathetic to the insurgents actually forces them to be so.

Note that the reason states cannot effectively target selectively is not because of a lack of firepower; it is a lack of local intelligence. This is where the answer to the second part of the puzzle lies. Since security forces vary in their ability to extract local intelligence, we should not expect them to be uniform in their inability to target selectively. Rather, some should be better at it than others. Chapter 2 develops the sub-state capacity approach to identify the strengths and weaknesses of different agencies in the security sector.

Agents built for their coercive capacity (such as national militaries) often lack the local intelligence capacity to identify individual insurgents, resulting in often counterproductive collective targeting. Of course, they are designed for coercion with
heavy artillery, tanks, planes, and bombs, in order to counter external threats. Since internal wars are fundamentally different from international wars, we should not be surprised to learn that national militaries are not well suited for counterinsurgency.

Local security forces (like police) naturally have better access to local intelligence and should be expected to target insurgents more selectively. However, they often lack the organizational control over the rank and file and suffer from the related principal-agent problems and they often lack operational competence necessary for counterinsurgency, since they are designed for civil policing functions. The result is incompetent targeting and private violence by local forces, rather than effective selective targeting.

The status quo in most countries facing internal armed challengers (that is those relatively weak states in the Global South) is highly coercive national security forces that lack intelligence and corrupt, inept local forces that lack organizational and operational competence. This is why collective violence is more common than selective; the political leadership does not have a viable option for selecting an agent with the appropriate skill set.

Chapter 4 applies this framework to the beginning stages of the Khalistan conflict in the Indian state of Punjab (~1981-1984). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Indian central government and the Punjab state government saw what they deemed a troubling rise of Sikh ethnonationalism. This ethnonationalism manifested itself in a number of Sikh opposition groups, some of which called for an independent Sikh religious state to be named Khalistan. These groups began an escalating number of agitation campaigns of protest and civil disobedience for political concessions, which eventually evolved into

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10 Khalistan literally means “land of the pure.”
militant violence targeting civilians and police forces. Early attempts to counter the rising Sikh ethnonationalism employed the local Punjab Police. They clearly lacked the ability and willingness to fight against the growing threat to the state. Instead, they engaged in incompetent targeting of anyone they could pass off as militants due to a refusal to engage the actual militants, showing clearly that having access to local intelligence is insufficient for effective targeting. The radical elements in the Sikh population ratcheted up their violence in the face of state impotence to the point where the local forces could no longer be used as the primary counterinsurgents.

In 1984, the political leadership employed the Indian Army to counter the armed Sikh militants when it was clear the Punjab Police were incapable of managing the rising threat. The Army pursued two operations of collective violence against the Sikh collective identity – Operation Bluestar and Operation Woodrose. Operation Woodrose, in particular, was a direct result of the Army’s lack of local intelligence. Instead, it targeted what it considered to be the recruitment pool of young Sikh men, especially in rural areas. The operation led to the disappearances of around 8,000 young Sikhs (Jaijee, 1995). Since the armed contingent of Sikhs was fairly limited at this time, the targeting necessarily cast a net far too large to be effective. Instead, it pushed many young Sikhs into the welcoming arms of the regrouping militants, contributing to a significant backlash effect against the government that set the stage for eight more years of brutal insurgency and counterinsurgency.
Why do some security forces target selectively while others do not? Through which mechanisms does it occur?

Even though collective violence is relatively common, some state agents do target selectively. I argue that those most likely to do so, at least for low-intensity conflicts (see below), are local forces that have the organizational and operational capacity to exploit their intelligence advantages.

Indeed, Chapter 5 demonstrates how the Punjab Police was able to reform itself in order to pursue a selective strategy by investing heavily in organizational and operational capacity. Though it took time to develop these capacities, the Punjab Police was able to effectively, albeit brutally, mount a selective campaign against the leadership of the various armed groups (Khalistanis for short). The selective campaign allowed the Punjab Police to break into the positive counterinsurgency cycle, whereby they were able to demonstrate their effectiveness, leading to increased civilian tips, which led to increased capacity for selective targeting. Although there were other factors that contributed to the victory, the selective campaign thwarted Khalistani recruitment efforts, de-escalated the conflict by keeping the armed groups on the defensive, and contributed to the dissolution of the insurgent organizations. Given the dearth of information on how selective campaigns are actually conducted, this chapter also details the actual operations that were found to be effective.

The state-centered approach, scope conditions, and methods

The state-centered approach

With so much recent theory on the strategic or dyadic causes of violence in civil wars, one might wonder why I have chosen to pursue a largely one-sided, state-centered
approach to state violence. Following Goodwin (2001), I argue that the state-centered approach is actually a quite powerful theoretical tool given that it can explain a great deal of variation without unneeded complexity.  

11 In fact, one of its key advantages lies in the fact that the state-centered approach is fairly simple. More importantly, states are the primary institution in any society and the power they amass to affect society is unchallenged. “[N]o other institution [in history] had sufficient infrastructural power – with the exception of the Catholic Church – to reform extensive social arrangements in more or less fundamental ways” (Goodwin, 2001, 41). Because the state has the greatest amount of power, it plays a significant role in shaping identities, goals, and strategies of social actors, though not all such shaping is done intentionally (Skocpol, 1985). Since every other part of society must at least react to varying degrees of state power, it deserves are a greater share of the theoretical attention.

This is not to imply that other actors do not matter or have no agency; rather, I simply argue the state is primary. Other actors’ behavior, sources of power, and character matter as well, but relatively less. For a fuller understanding of state violence and its effect on the collective action of the opposition, one does need to address the opposition. I do so here in two ways that represent scope conditions for the arguments presented. One scope condition derives directly from theory, while the other is necessary given the within-case design I employ in Chapters 4 and 5 (see below).

Scope Conditions

The sub-state capacity approach that I explain in Chapter 2 ought to apply only (or at least primarily) to relatively non-territorial clandestine stages of civil conflict. Since some of these conflicts never leave the clandestine stage, some scholars prefer the term low-intensity conflicts (Thompson, 1989; Chadha, 2005) or asymmetrical internal conflict (Thorton, 2007). I prefer the terms non-territorial or clandestine to low-intensity or asymmetrical because it is the clandestine nature of the opposition that makes this approach most useful. Certainly, the terms are related. The asymmetry of power in the conflict (where the opposition is much weaker in material terms than the government) leads to a clandestine strategy of terrorism or guerrilla warfare and results in relatively lower intensity conflict than conventional warfare (Butler and Gates, 2009; Hultquist, 2013).

This scope condition to the sub-state capacity approach is based on the theory of internal clandestine wars where locating the actual insurgents is difficult. The approach should not be useful for large-scale, more conventional civil wars where each side controls pieces of territory that the other cannot operate within. These wars, or this stage of any war, begins to resemble the logic of international war and requires the coercive capacity of national militaries to take, clear, and hold territory (Kalyvas, 2006).

Nonetheless, few wars begin with these dynamics and most armed conflicts that are ongoing at any particular time do not have these conventional territorial dynamics. The

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12 Thompson’s (1989) edited volume and Thorton’s (2007) book discuss several types of low-intensity conflict short of conventional international war. Here, I use it to apply to only non-conventional, non-territorial internal warfare.
sub-state capacity approach is meant to apply to non-conventional, (relatively) non-territorial wars.¹³

The second scope condition applies specifically to the positive counterinsurgency cycle and the likelihood that selective targeting will result in the disintegration of the opposition organizations.¹⁴ Whether this occurs may be dependent on the character of the opposition. The supporting evidence for this argument in Chapter 5 comes the Khalistan movement that had become particularly factionalized, criminalized, and violent toward its purported social base. The fact that it began to look like a criminalized terrorist movement ostensibly played a role in losing civilian support and the subsequent increase in civilian tips to security forces. I argue in Chapter 5 that this negative change in character of the movement is, at least in part, due to the effectiveness of the security forces. Still, the within case design does not allow for multiple types of opposition and further research on additional cases is required to examine if the argument is contingent on opposition character flaws.

**Methods**

This dissertation uses a mixed-method research design devised specifically to contribute to gaps in the literature on each particular puzzle above. Chapter 3 uses a cross-national statistical approach to provide external validity to the question of whether state repression is counterproductive. This was designed specifically because the literature has sufficient

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¹³ There are always some territorial dynamics, since insurgencies are local phenomena, some areas are more affected than others, and even clandestine insurgents seek territorial safe havens.

¹⁴ The dissolution of the opposition is not central to the argument of the dissertation; rather achieving selective targeting is the value of the dependent variable that I am most concerned with here. Since Chapter 5 shows how selective targeting played a significant role in the dissolution of the Khalistan movement, it must be addressed.
theories and case studies, but insufficient cross-national evidence given the endogeneity issues between state repression and internal armed conflict.

For the second two puzzles, I use a within-case design of the Khalistan conflict in the Indian state of Punjab. I rely on both primary and secondary sources, each in the form of written works and personal interviews. Several of the written works are by first-hand practitioners in the Indian Army, Punjab Police, and National Security Guards during the conflict, while others are secondary. The interviews I conducted over the summer of 2012 in India are equally diverse, though most of the information cited from interviews is from members of the Punjab Police during the Khalistan conflict.

Interviewees were selected based on their expertise on the specific subject matter, often on the specifics of the Khalistan conflict, but also on general Indian politics or security affairs. The interviews included security expects and analysts at several think tanks and universities in New Delhi, a legal expert on security matters, former Army officers, and several members of the Punjab Police that were active at the time of the insurgency, including the Director-General during the conclusion of the conflict, K.P.S. Gill. There is some selection bias in who was interviewed. As one would expect, those with relatively positive stories to tell about themselves are more likely to give access to foreign researchers. Thus, the majority of the interviewees were with the Punjab Police. However, since the description of how the Punjab Police reformed itself in the later stages of the conflict is particularly important and former officials are in a unique position to provide that detail, the oversampling of the Punjab Police is appropriate in this case. Still, one must acknowledge the biases inherent to interviewees, who often have incentives to overemphasize their contribution and downplay their negative role. To
counteract this bias, I sought corroborating evidence in the form of secondary research whenever possible.

The within case design allows the researcher to examine the mechanisms of the argument more closely. Since I examine the Khalistan conflict over time, I identify distinct periods based on which type of security force is primarily tasked with the counterinsurgency. I can then connect that force and their particular distribution of sub-state capacity to observable types of violence and the result of that violence. Since the state agent and type of violence vary over time within the same conflict, this method helps control for omitted variable bias (Van Evera, 1997, 51-53). Many of the variables of alternative explanations, especially structural and national-level ones, are held constant.

While this within-case design allows me to establish the plausibility of the approach, it suffers from a lack of generalizability. Still, this type of design is necessary and appropriate for evaluating the sub-state capacity approach developed in Chapter 2 at this stage in its development. Another limitation of within-case temporal designs is that observations are not independent and there is no way to control for this. States are clearly learning as they go through the process of countering an armed opposition movement and it will clearly affect the violence we observe.

This multi-method research design was chosen specifically for how each method contributes to the literature on the various aspects of internal conflict. The literature of Puzzle #1 concerning the consequences of state repression on the armed conflict is saturated with qualitative case studies and quantitative subnational designs, but lacks a general study that manages the reverse causality issue. Chapter 3 fills this gap. Puzzles #2
and #3 require an in-depth investigation into the dynamics of the security forces and their use of violence. Chapters 4 and 5 fill this gap and provide corroborating evidence to the theory posited in Chapter 2. Further research will address whether these internal dynamics are more generally applicable, but first one must establish their plausibility.

**Why study the Khalistani movement?**

The Khalistani movement provides an excellent case study for the propositions in the theory chapter. While each case has its own peculiarities, the Khalistan case is fairly consistent with the pattern of ethnonationalist insurgencies in the Global South, at least in the initial stages. The Khalistan insurgency grew out of a peripheral ethnic group, upset over an unfair distribution of resources and rising immigration that threatened its majority status (Wallace, 1986). The trajectory of the conflict also provides useful variation along all variables to explore. Over the period of 15 years, the conflict experienced the emergence of limited violence, major spikes and downticks in violence, and the eventual defeat of the movement, which is sufficiently rare enough to warrant investigation. There is also variation in the state agent tasked with counterinsurgency, allowing the researcher to evaluate the performance of each, as well as the sub-state capacity approach more generally.

The largely non-territorial nature of the Khalistan case also makes it useful for a study of counterinsurgency. Many contemporary conflicts are not symmetrical conflicts, where each side occupies large territories and then faces off in conventional warfare. Rather, many counterinsurgencies are fought against much weaker opponents whose strategy is to remain clandestine and use intermittent terror or guerrilla tactics. By default, territory remains in government hands. Since these conflicts can grow into large-
scale civil wars, understanding the mechanisms through which they are defeated, thwarted, or otherwise stabilized is particularly important. As discussed in the theory chapter, most contemporary explanations and prescriptions for counterinsurgency are drawn from large-scale symmetrical civil wars. Since the territorial dynamic does not exist in many contemporary conflicts, it is important to investigate clandestine, asymmetrical conflicts as well. Haines (2009, 43) makes the point:

The nations most likely to be affected by insurgencies, those without extensive resources, refined organization, or a responsible political environment, need a more realistic counterinsurgency strategy than that articulated in classic and contemporary theory. The former authors wrote exclusively from a colonial perspective, while the latter write overwhelmingly on the experiences of foreign powers abroad.

Selecting cases of internal armed conflict in India is also advantageous. While India, writ large, is often the anomalous case in many of social science findings,\(^\text{15}\) in the subfield of conflict studies it provides useful leverage for applying lessons to other insurgencies in the Global South. India represents a middle ground on the spectrum of overall state capacity and it is a multiethnic society. India is clearly ahead of many other developing countries in the Global South in terms of governance and military capacity, but certainly lags behind the industrialized states of the West. This middle ground provides an important rationale for study. Whereas much of the counterinsurgency policy literature has focused on how powerful industrialized countries fight insurgencies outside the homeland or metropole, many lessons learned from them cannot easily be transferred.

\(^{15}\) Its low per capita income defies both the endogenous and exogenous explanations for democratization (Lipset, 1960; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). It has the most national-level political parties of any democracy with single-member districts and is often listed as a counterexample to Duverger’s Law (Duverger, 1954). Its 1999 Kargil War with Pakistan seemingly contradicts neorealist nuclear deterrence arguments (though this is still debated) (Sagan, 2003; Tellis, Fair, and Medby, 2001; Waltz, 2003).
to weak post-colonial states. Although foreign-led counterinsurgencies often deal with
the similar insurgent dynamics, the policy prescriptions do not apply since most states in
the Global South lack the ability to reasonably pursue such policies, like the “hearts and
minds” approach, which requires the ability to control territory and develop it
economically, socially, and politically. While India does tend to have more capacity than
many of these weak post-colonial states, it is in the same league.

India also has a similar multiethnic composition that matches those of most new
post-colonial states. Its conflicts involve a central government fighting against a
peripheral ethnic minority. This is important, not only because this scenario is fairly
common among modern civil wars in the Global South, but also because the main
belligerents are within the same country, not foreign-led counterinsurgencies like those of
the U.S. in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam or colonial wars like those of the British in
Malaya, Kenya, and Palestine. Foreign-led counterinsurgents tend to have a different
distribution of sub-state capacity. They should have less access to local sources of
intelligence making the identification of insurgents particularly difficult, but they also
tend to have better organizational capacity. To reiterate, the lessons learned can be more
reasonably applied to other cases of modern civil conflict in the Global South, although
further application to those cases is necessary since the within-case design used here does
not permit generalizability by itself.

_Insurgency or Terrorism?_

The familiar cliché that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter happens to
be particularly true in the case of the Khalistan conflict. For some observers and Western
academics, the internal conflict in the Punjab was a “national struggle for freedom” (Pettigrew, 1995, 4) that grew out of decades of oppression by first the British and their successors: the Hindu-dominated Indian state controlled by the Indian National Congress party. For others, the Khalistanis represented nothing more than brutal terrorists, bent on enforcing a strict religious code, not unlike Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Others view the terrorist groups as opportunistically pursuing criminal activities or gratifying individualistic sadistic desires such as rape rather than espousing a coherent ideology.

The academic work on this case (among many others) has been drawn into the fray. Partisans, even within the academic community, seem to take an ideological stand and criticize the terminology one uses to refer to the Khalistan movement, which was diverse enough to encompass over 150 groups at one point (Wallace, 2007). For the hardliners, the use of anything other than the term terrorist is to somehow legitimize the movement, while, for others, the use of the word terrorist somehow implies that one ignores the abuses of the state.

I join no side in this debate; my purpose is purely empirical and academic. The terms insurgency and terrorism denote tactics, but most definitions that try to separate them revolve around two dimensions: popular support and targets of violence. Theoretically, insurgents rely on some level of popular support and target the state apparatus (if guerrilla warfare, this implies hit and run tactics). Terrorists, on the other hand, target civilians due to their lack of popular support.

From my investigation, the Khalistani movement was both an insurgency and a terrorist movement. Although no good measures exist, popular support waxed and waned based on other developments in the conflict, while the targets of Khalistani violence
included a mixture of both the state apparatus and civilians, sometimes within the same period. The academic exercise would be well served if its practitioners could stay above the fray and avoid casting all actors as good guys and bad guys.

**Plan of the Dissertation**

The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents a theory of state violence during internal conflicts. It posits, theoretically, two competing cycles that counterinsurgents may find themselves in: the negative cycle of collective targeting and backlash or the positive cycle of selective targeting and deterrence. It then builds on that theory to advance the sub-state capacity approach to explaining the type of state violence in an attempt to explain why governments find themselves in one cycle versus the other.

Chapter 3 tests the key proposition of the negative counterinsurgency cycle – that collective violence is counterproductive – on cross-national, times series data. Chapter 4 introduces the Indian experience with counterinsurgency and the origins of the Khalistan conflict. It then analyzes the first two stages of the conflict in terms of the sub-state capacity approach developed in the second part of Chapter 2. Chapter 5 covers the remainder of the conflict and analyzes how the Punjab Police were able to reform themselves from an incompetent civil force into an effective counterinsurgency force and execute a high magnitude selective targeting campaign. Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of the lessons learned, the generalizability of the findings, areas for future research, and policy implications for states, opposition movements, and even the United States.
Chapter 2: Counterinsurgency Cycles and Sub-State Capacity: A Theory of the Consequences and Causes of State Repression

This theory chapter lays out the theoretical expectations that will be addressed empirically in the next three chapters. To begin, it sets up the rationalist foundations of the rebel recruitment problem, which informs how state actions will affect potential rebels and the general civilian population. Building on this framework, I posit two self-reinforcing cycles of counterinsurgency: the negative cycle of collective targeting and a backlash effect and the positive cycle of selective targeting and a deterrent effect. I then explain why the negative cycle is more common, and review the existing explanations for breaking into the positive cycle before developing a proposal focused on sub-state capacity – that the choice of state agent affects the type of state violence we observe.

Rationalist Foundations: The Rebel Recruitment Problem

Scholars have long argued that violence is a strategic rational decision to achieve broader goals, but the rationalist expectations vary depending on which actor is theorized and at which unit the analysis takes place. This research will follow the majority of the literature who theorize at the state level and assign rational preferences to the state. Even though other studies successfully show that the unitary actor assumption is not always true, it is still useful for general theory. It is difficult to create a general theory of intra-elite politics or establish principal-agent dynamics across multiple cases, since each

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16 Other rationalist studies have shown that when multiple actors are involved, the preferences of actors in charge of policy may not match those of the state. Some studies break open the state to show how intra-elite political interests may diverge and result in some outcomes that would not be rational if one theorized the state as a unitary actor (e.g., Chima, 2010; Stanley, 1996). Principal-agent arguments point to the implementation of state preferences to show how agents’ varying preferences may determine outcomes not preferred by the principal (e.g., Mitchell, 2004). The sub-state capacity analysis to come is similar to the latter.

17 Even though other studies successfully show that the unitary actor assumption is not always true, it is still useful for general theory. It is difficult to create a general theory of intra-elite politics or establish principal-agent dynamics across multiple cases, since each
the context of civil conflict – where an armed organization challenges the sovereignty of
the state – the state goal is essentially to thwart rebellion and return to a status quo where
no armed challenge persists. The strategic short-term goal of the armed challenger(s) is to
build a strong enough movement to carry out its primary long-term objective: revolution
or secession. A common counterinsurgency paradox is that some state measures to thwart
insurgencies can have the perverse effect of strengthening the armed opposition by
helping to solve their collective action problem of recruitment and support, what I call the
rebel recruitment problem.

Potential or nascent insurgent groups face a considerable collective action
problem when attempting to mobilize sufficient forces for rebellion (Lichbach, 1995). A
political entrepreneur or would-be rebel leader attempting to recruit potential insurgents
has a considerable obstacle to overcome. He must convince potential recruits to risk their
lives for an improbable cause while they correctly believe that their personal contribution
is not likely to have a determining effect on the success of such a cause. The rational
citizen, as much as he prefers the cause, chooses to not participate in the insurgency
given the risks of supporting or joining an insurgency. After all, the risk to life and
property should be greater to insurgents than to nonparticipants. The difficulty of
overcoming the insurgent collective action problem explains, in part, the relative rarity of
large-scale civil wars (Lichbach, 1995).

The insurgent collective action problem is most formidable at the earliest stages
of mobilization. Revolutionaries and the grievances they expose are a near constant. The

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18 I make no assumption what the “cause” is or whether it is just. The logic requires only
that the potential recruit prefer the realization of the cause to the status quo.
difficulty is attracting large numbers of followers willing to take the risk. How then can we explain the insurgencies and full-scale civil wars that do occur? How can political actors affect the cost/benefit ratio of the individual?

The logic of insurgent collective action problems rests on the balance between the costs (or risks) of participation versus nonparticipation. The logic requires that free riding is relatively costless while any act of rebellion comes with high risk. Insurgent strategies attempt to overcome the collective action problem by 1) providing selective benefits to participants to materially incentivize participation or reduce the physical risk of rebellion (Lichbach, 1995; Weinstein, 2007) and 2) attack nonparticipants to increase the costs and risk of nonparticipation (Kalyvas, 1999; Lichbach, 1995; Wood, 2010).

Since counterinsurgents have the opposite incentives, an effective counterinsurgency strategy would try to reinforce the insurgent collective action problem. It should increase the risk of insurgent participation and decrease the risk (or provide benefits) to those who do not collaborate with the insurgents. The latter is accomplished by protecting civilians from insurgent violence and retaliation (Kalyvas, 2006). The former is done through selective violence; meaning state violence is targeted at and limited to those individuals who are “guilty” of rebel membership or collaboration (DeNardo, 1985; Goodwin, 2001; Kalyvas, 2006; Mason and Krane, 1989). Thus, the state’s use of violence can affect the likelihood of an individual civilian to join or support the rebel cause – ceteris paribus.

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19 Participation here can refer to any level of support for the insurgents from active membership to providing intelligence.
While states can deter defection to the rebels through selective violence, they can encourage it through collective violence. In contrast to selective violence that targets only insurgents and their collaborators, collective violence targets at a higher level of aggregation and thus cannot sufficiently distinguish between the guilty and innocent at the individual level. Two types of collective violence are most common: those that target collectively by location (e.g., village) and those that target collectively by identity (e.g., ethnicity). In each case, innocent villagers or co-ethnics are killed alongside those who support the insurgency. As problematic as this is for humanitarian and moral reasons, it is quite problematic for strategic reasons. Rather than reinforcing the problem of insurgent collective action, collective state violence helps them solve it (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007). Under conditions of collective state violence, rational individuals determine that nonparticipation is perhaps more costly than, or just as risky as, participation. While collective violence may deter some individuals, the net effect under most conditions fosters material and intelligence support for rebels from

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20 I use the term “collective” rather than “indiscriminate” to more accurately convey the level of aggregation at which states target. The term indiscriminate connotes random violence, which is not accurate. Very little, if any, violence in civil war is random or actually indiscriminate. Most violence discriminates at some level, whether it is targeted at a specific village thought to be a stronghold of rebel support or at some ethnic or other identity level.

21 No use of violence discriminates perfectly either. As Kalyvas (2006, 174) argues, the perception of selectivity is what matters and, in reality, there will always be some level of uncertainty.

22 These categories overlap, in many cases. For instance, targeting by ethnicity is often done by targeting locations populated by that ethnic group.

23 The evidence that some locations/villages are targeted over others does not make the use of this violence selective. Since civilians in contested locations and those who are co-ethnics with insurgents represent the rebel recruitment pool, when they are targeted while innocent, it fits the logic of collective or indiscriminate targeting. We should still expect it to strengthen the insurgents.
noncombatants and bolsters the ranks of the insurgency (DeNardo, 1985; Kalyvas, 2006; Mason and Krane, 1989).

The Negative Counterinsurgency Cycle: Collective Violence as Equilibrium

Collective targeting not only strengthens the insurgents in the near term, it confounds future counterinsurgency efforts to move toward more effective selective targeting. The use of collective targeting comes from two factors: 1) the necessity to act against a threat to the state and 2) the lack of individualized intelligence necessary to target selectively. The negative counterinsurgency cycle illustrates how collective targeting is counterproductive to overcoming either obstacle, rendering collective targeting self-reinforcing.

It is useful to separate how state targeting strategies will affect civilians in general and from the rebel recruitment pool. The rebel recruitment pool consists of those individuals meeting the characteristics of likely or possible rebels. While there is some variation across sex, age, and class, the modal category of rebels tends to be male youths from the lower classes – i.e., those with lowest opportunity cost (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). In the context of ethnic-based insurgencies, we could add the characteristic of co-ethnicity with the ethnic group the rebellion claims to represent.

Targeting the rebel recruitment pool appears to have a motivating logic. Assuming the lack of ability to target at the individual level, one might expect targeting the group of people most likely to be rebels to be the next best thing, since there is some probability that individuals matching this description are actual insurgents. However, this is problematic for two reasons. First, the actual insurgents matching these characteristics
will be the hardest to locate thereby creating a selection process that biases toward locating innocent, or at least not fully committed, individuals that meet the rebel pool characteristics. Second, targeting the people that are the most likely to become actual insurgents essentially ties their hands into becoming actual insurgents. If one is targeted for their identity, which is difficult to change in the best-case scenario and impossible in the worst, they have really only two choices: flee the area (Moore, 1995) or join the armed organization that can provide some security. Predicting the balance of the pool that flees versus fights may be difficult, so predicting how strong the backlash effect is problematic.

Still, it is important to show that targeting the rebel recruitment pool does not provide a credible deterrent to the recruitment pool. Deterrence theory requires that states making deterrent threats must clearly establish that defection will be costly and the threat to impose those costs is credible (Schelling, 1966). It also requires that costs imposed on defectors will not be imposed on those who do not defect (Machain, Morgan, and Regan, 2011). Classic deterrence theory was developed for international statecraft, where it was (somewhat) reasonable to assume states were unitary actors. Following this assumption, using violence against any state asset would be detrimental to the leadership actually making the decisions about their use of violence or negotiation. However, the unitary actor assumption breaks down in internal rebellion, whether applied to ethnic groups, villages, or economic classes. Punishing a village for an individual’s action cannot be a deterrent to that individual, especially when that punishment may push recruits to his cause, thus solving his rebel recruitment problem. In internal rebellion, deterrent threats
must be individualized to be effective. A collective targeting strategy clearly signals the opposite.

Since collective targeting increases the insecurity of the members of rebel recruitment pool, and armed insurgents provide some security, collective targeting increases rebel recruitment. This increases the viability of the insurgency, the fear and frustration of security forces, and by extension the threat to the state. States must act against internal threats since not responding is a de facto surrender of sovereignty that invites a near certain escalation of that threat if armed challengers can use violence with impunity. Figure 2.1 illustrates this relationship.

Figure 2.1. Negative counterinsurgency cycle – Net effect on rebel recruitment pool
Not only is collective violence counterproductive when considering how it affects the rebel recruitment pool, its effect on the general civilian population makes it counterproductive because it makes intelligence gathering at the individual level more difficult, rendering the use of more effective selective targeting less likely. Since collective targeting kills and terrorizes the general civilian population, it increases and deepens grievances against the government. Outside of the condition of government military control of the area – in which case, collective targeting would be unlikely (Kalyvas, 2006) – we should expect the increase in grievances to decrease the level of civilian cooperation with the government, thereby reducing the information they provide. Since many counterinsurgency theorists view the civilian population the most important source (and for some the only source) of individualized information about the insurgents, losing the ability to extract information such information is highly problematic (Johnson, 1962; Kalyvas, 2006; O’Neil, 1990; Petraeus and Amos, 2006; Trinquier, 1964; Wickhm-Crowley, 1992; ). Since tactical intelligence at the individual level is necessary for selective targeting and the lack of such intelligence is the primary reason states resort to collective targeting, it is clear that this process is self-reinforcing.\footnote{It’s worth noting that I do not expect collective targeting to continually increase indefinitely. In fact, states should recognize the counterproductivity and implement more selective targeting over time (Kalyvas, 2006, 167-169).} Figure 2.2 shows this part of the negative counterinsurgency cycle visually.
Figure 2.2. Negative counterinsurgency cycle – Net effect on civilian population

Hypothesis #1: The net effect of collective violence by state forces increases the threat to the state.

The proposition that indiscriminate or collective violence is counterproductive is supported by numerous studies employing a variety of methods. A similar logic of the backlash effect has been laid out through a variety of rational choice game theoretic models (DeNardo 1985; Lichbach, 1987; Machain, Morgan, Regan, 2011; Mason and Krane, 1989). Several qualitative case studies (e.g., Goodwin, 2001; Peceny and Stanley, 2010; Pettigrew, 1996; Stanley, 1996) and quantitative subnational designs (Balcells, 2011; LaFree, Dugan, and Korte, 2009; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas, 2011) find
supportive results. Thoms and Ron (2007, 697) provide cross-national evidence for the relationship but acknowledge that it suffers from endogeneity problems.

To be fair, this empirical evidence is not completely conclusive because it is difficult to isolate the effects of collective repression from a variety of other variables, many of which are endogenous to conflict dynamics. Moreover, there are some counterarguments that expect or find collective violence to be successful under certain circumstances.

Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004) argue that mass killing of civilians is the result of deliberate counterinsurgency policy when facing formidable guerrilla threats. Since guerrilla warfare relies on the population for support, it may productive (from a military viewpoint) to deny insurgents access to a supportive population (see also Downes, 2007; 2008). The proclivity to do so rises with guerrilla threat.

Similarly, others have argued that the counterproductive effects of collective violence are contingent upon rebel strength. When rebels are weak, the security gained from joining or supporting the rebels is questionable (Kalyvas, 2006, chapter 6; Wood, 2010, 604). If rebels offer no protection, civilians who support them get no benefit of security when the state uses collective violence and may turn on rebels for inciting the attacks (Kalyvas, 2006, chapter 6; Wood, 2010, 604).

Since both participation and nonparticipation are highly insecure, flight is less costly and is therefore the more likely outcome (Moore, 1995; Wood, 2010). In fact, flight may be the intended purpose. Downes (2008) argues that states use collective violence to get potentially supportive civilians to flee so they cannot provide material or intelligence support to insurgents. In line with this argument, Lyall (2009, 336) argues
that “[s]uch [forced recruitment] efforts complicate insurgent strategy by making it difficult for insurgents to maintain supply lines, protect safe refuges, and concentrate their forces.” Downes (2008) expects this in rebel strongholds characterized by overwhelming civilian support, not necessarily when rebels are weak.

These arguments provide some rationale for states to use collective violence and expect militarily productive results. Still, I argue here that even under these conditions the use of collective violence is a gamble. Finding that this gamble pays off sometimes may help explain why states often use collective violence, but the gamble should not be expected to pay off most of the time. Despite the possibility that it may work, in general, collective violence is counterproductive in that it creates avoidable risks for states and is no more likely to be effective than selective repression. Moreover, as Peceny and Stanley (2010) have shown in their analysis of the Salvadoran counterinsurgency, the counterproductive effects of indiscriminate repression can be long lasting, imposing ongoing disadvantages to the state even after the state shifts to a more selective approach.

Essentially the arguments above concerning rebel power reduce to two alternate hypotheses. The first is that collective violence works when rebels are weak and cannot protect their members/supporters. It rests on the security benefits (or lack thereof) of supporting or joining the insurgency. It argues that weak rebels provide no security benefit when, in reality, joining even a weak insurgency provides security, but only in the face of collective violence. Actual members of the insurgency, especially a weak one, are generally not present when state forces come with collective violence. During Nepal’s decade long civil war, for instance, the Maoists fled the village when state forces came and returned when they left. Even relatively strong insurgent groups have difficulty
defending a town and flee when government forces attempt to take the town back (Kalyvas, 2006, 213, especially note 2). Those who actually joined the insurgency, or those among the strongest supporters were not present, thus more secure (ibid). Without collective violence, the logic of the insurgent collective action problems stands and joining the insurgency is seen as more risky. Thus, collective violence would still increase rebel membership, but perhaps not other types of support from civilians in the village since they would not have an increase in security.

The second alternate hypothesis is that collective violence works where rebels are strong and are highly supported by a given population. This hypothesis is implied from studies whose actual dependent variable is the use of collective or massive violence (Downes, 2004; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, 2004), not the effectiveness of such violence.\textsuperscript{25} The fact that it happens, despite its often counterproductive effects, is an interesting puzzle, not a sign it must be effective. Kalyvas (2006, 222-224) demonstrates that incumbents tend to use indiscriminate violence in areas where rebels exercise full control because states lack the information to target selectively (which is consistent with my proposition above that collective violence results from a lack of individualized intelligence). Downes (2004) argues that states revert to targeting civilians out of desperation during long wars of attrition or in attempt to take territory from a stronghold. Neither of these studies shows that it was effective counterinsurgency. Rather, it may be rational component of counterinsurgency strategy when the state is up against the ropes. It should be regarded as a gamble given the absence of better options.

\textsuperscript{25} Lyall’s (2009) article is a notable exception. It finds that indiscriminate repression was not counterproductive in the second Chechen War. Instead, it was associated with a decrease in the likelihood of an insurgent attack within a given time period.
The Positive Counterinsurgency Cycle: Selective Violence as Equilibrium

The discussion of state violence thus far has presumed that selective targeting is the most productive form of state violence when facing an insurgency. This section outlines the positive cycle of counterinsurgency: the processes for how selective targeting is expected to affect the general civilian population and the rebel recruitment pool.

Unlike collective targeting, selective targeting is expected to deter those from the rebel recruitment pool from becoming active members of the opposition. Selective targeting signals to the rebel recruitment pool that active rebellion will be costly (death/arrest) and that those costs are not paid if one does not rebel. Collective targeting cannot promise the latter.

In line with deterrence, selective targeting should also incentivize active rebels to defect to the government. As long as the selective targeting strategy allows for some degree of leniency or amnesty for surrender, those rebels who have already become active can avoid paying the costs and save their lives. Both of these processes together should lead to weaker rebels, via decreased rebel recruitment and increased rebel defections. The weakening of rebels increases state control, which is expected to lead to more selective targeting through civilian collaboration (Kalyvas, 2006). Figure 2.3 illustrates the positive counterinsurgency cycle for the rebel recruitment pool.
Figure 2.3. Positive counterinsurgency cycle: Net effect on rebel recruitment pool

As noted above, most counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners believe information from civilians to be the Holy Grail for successful counterinsurgency. This is because individualized intelligence is necessary for achieving selective targeting and civilians from areas that encounter insurgents are thought to be the greatest source of such information.

Civilian tips come in a variety of forms, but I’ll focus here on two scenarios. In the reactive scenario, the government security forces descend on a village (or other location) and question the civilians. Unless those security forces plan to stay and control the area for the long term, getting them to denounce the insurgents is unlikely since the
insurgents will quickly return and punish those who talk when the security forces leave. In the proactive scenario, civilians tip off the security forces on their own volition (e.g., when insurgents come to the village, at the nearest police post, or through information reward systems). This scenario under most conditions of insurgency is also rare, since its use depends on the ability of the security forces to respond in a timely manner and be capable of neutralizing the suspected insurgent(s) before retaliation. This capability is often lacking among security forces.

This highlights the circular nature of the positive counterinsurgency cycle. Once achieved, selective targeting demonstrates that security forces can be effective, thus civilians can believe that their tips will be acted on. In conjunction, security forces need the capability to respond quickly. If they can respond to tips fast enough to neutralize insurgents, civilian confidence in the security forces increases, thereby increasing the likelihood of getting more tips in the future as well as more cooperation when security forces come to the village for questioning. In this sense, information from civilians is both a precondition for selective targeting and a symptom of selective targeting.
Hypothesis #2: The net effect of selective violence by state forces reduces the threat to the state.

Why does the negative cycle appear to be more common?

If selective violence is more effective at thwarting an insurgency, why are states so seldom selective in their use of violence? The preliminary answer is that the use of selective violence is extremely difficult and exceptionally costly. In short, most states lack the capacity to execute a selective strategy effectively.

The difficulty of selective targeting derives from the necessity to target at the individual level. A selective repression strategy prefers to target insurgent leaders, rank
and file insurgents, and civilians that collaborate with the insurgents in that order. More importantly, it must distinguish between the people that belong to these groups from those that either support the government or are neutral. Obtaining adequate information to distinguish between large numbers of individuals is particularly difficult. While the information required to target selectively can come from several sources and through a variety of means, the most commonly invoked strategy for information is to get the civilian population to denounce the rebels and their collaborators (Galula, 1968; Kalyvas, 2006; Petraeus and Amos, 2006).

The added difficulty of countering insurgent threats is that civilian denunciation is thought to be a precondition for selective targeting and a symptom of selective targeting (see Figure 2.4). The defeat an insurgent movement requires a cycle of interactions between security forces and the population, whereby civilians provide intelligence to security forces, the security forces act on that intelligence to target insurgents selectively, thereby increasing confidence in the forces, which leads to increased intelligence through civilian denunciation. Establishing this positive counterinsurgency cycle of interactions with the population is quite difficult since civilians will rightly fear rebel retribution and we can assume that civilians prefer life to death.

The difficulty of selective targeting suggests two reasons why collective violence is used in its place. First, when states do not have access to the intelligence necessary to target selectively, they rely on collective violence – one of their few options. Lacking intelligence, states can choose 1) to target at a collective level that may have a chance, however slim, at succeeding or 2) to not respond. However, doing nothing is not realistic since the state is responsible for thwarting internal threats. Allowing armed challengers to
operate in the state is tantamount to surrendering sovereignty. Further, immunity for
armed challengers invites an escalation in the conflict. In states with multiple cleavages,
governments must also signal their resolve to other potential challengers in the state
(Walter, 2009).

The second related reason is that the process of achieving the intelligence to target
selectively is extremely costly and collective targeting provides a less costly substitute
(Kalyvas 2006, 165). As the next section and Chapter 4 will show, the available means
for states to achieve selective targeting are not available to most states. Existing
explanations, such as the hearts and minds approach and the territorial control approach,
require investments that few states have access to. Even the sub-state capacity
explanation, which I propose below and examine empirically in Chapters 4 and 5,
requires significant investment in organizational and operational capacity as well as time.

Collective violence is less costly because it does not require individualized
intelligence. Instead, it targets the group of people that are thought to be likely rebels or
likely supporters. Figuring out which groups of people are most likely to join or support a
rebellion is not hard. It is the male youth of the identity or social group that make up
likely rebels and it is villages or other locations made up primarily of that identity/social
group that provide support. The latter is especially vulnerable if there is evidence that the
rebels have organized there or received support (Stoll, 1992). But repressing the most
likely rebels and most likely supporters is still likely to be counterproductive for the
precise reason that they are the most likely. Survivors and witnesses of such violence will
rightfully feel targeted for their identity, which makes them the exact people who will
have the incentives to join or support the rebellion. Thus, they are the most likely to act
according to the negative counterinsurgency cycle.

These explanations require that states prefer selective to collective violence to not
responding with violence, at least if costs were equal. This preference order passes *prima
facie* investigation. The logic laid out above demonstrates that states should prefer
selective targeting due to its effectiveness. Kalyvas (2006) corroborates with evidence
from the Greek Civil War, where he finds that incumbents used little violence where they
enjoyed full control, selective violence where they enjoy dominant (but not complete
control), and indiscriminate violence where they did not have access to information to
target selectively. In other words, where selective targeting was possible, governments
acted according to this rational preference ordering. Even under conditions where the
literature has found some utility in collective violence, selective targeting would have
been far more effective without taking the risks associated with collective violence. The
Guatemalan Army, for instance, may have kept some legitimacy if were able to suppress
the guerrillas without resorting to massive massacres.

**Breaking into the Positive Cycle**

*Information at high cost*

The most familiar approaches to achieving civilian denunciation of the rebels require
substantial costs to the government. Many counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners
have focused on the “hearts and minds” approach, where the government provides public
goods in exchange for intelligence about individual rebels or rebel plans. This approach
often attempts long-term development projects (such as schools and infrastructure) as
well as less costly short-term “good will” projects (such as candy, health-clinics). Even if the approach does not require long-term investments, it does require some degree of territorial control to distribute even the most basic public goods.

Perhaps the most important public good the government can provide in exchange for information is security, which requires a substantial degree of territorial control in the face of an insurgency. Kalyvas (2006) argues when the military sufficiently controls an area, it can provide much needed protection from insurgents. It can also provide selective benefits for its supporters and informants, and equally important, selective punishments for defectors or insurgent collaborators. For most counterinsurgency theorists, physical military occupation\textsuperscript{26} and territorial control are necessary to achieve the adequate intelligence to target insurgents and their collaborators selectively.\textsuperscript{27}

Limited Scope

While civilians remain an important source for acquiring the information necessary to target selectively, the logic of territorial control for both above-mentioned approaches may be limited in scope to high-intensity, high stakes irregular warfare. Both types of arguments rely on empirical studies from a relatively small number of high profile cases; many of which are cases of foreign counterinsurgency forces. The most familiar cases include the British in Malaya and Kenya, the French in Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as well as the occupation experience against resistance

\textsuperscript{26} The term military occupation implies a non-sovereign force, which may be inappropriate for many civil war scenarios that do not exhibit major foreign intervention. I use the term to indicate the level of the military presence that would be required to achieve the level of territorial control needed to pursue intelligence through the this method.

\textsuperscript{27} This near consensus of conventional wisdom applies to both academic analyses and policy prescriptions; both of which widely overlap in the existing literature.
movements during major international wars such as World War II. There is good reason to focus on this subset of cases, since many studies were written specifically to influence the policymakers engaged in these types of conflicts. Furthermore, the consequences of these conflicts probably have had the most significant impact on international politics, which certainly warrants investigation.

However, selecting these relatively extreme cases of insurgency and foreign counterinsurgency limits our understanding of many, if not most, cases of internal conflict where the specific dynamics of territorial control discussed by much of the literature are less relevant. Many modern insurgencies are small, clandestine movements that do not have meaningful territorial control. Yet the insurgents’ lack of control does not necessarily mean the incumbent has full or dominant control. That internal conflict is more likely in less-developed countries is one of the most consistent findings in the quantitative, cross-national literature (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre, et al, 2001; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), though the mechanism remains disputed. What is clear is that the selection process through which states encounter insurgencies also selects less capable states, where the state is unlikely to have sufficient control to provide protection rackets in exchange for civilian denunciation, at least across the entire territory.28 Since many states are incapable of providing physical control, territorial control may not vary adequately to provide a sufficient explanation of state violence. Further, the territorial control variable has limited application as a prescription in low-intensity conflicts, since a military occupation of areas that house clandestine insurgencies may be seen as overkill and actually increase popular dissatisfaction with

28 See Kalyvas (2006, 138-141) for a more detailed discussion of military constraints on territorial control.
the state. Last, and most importantly, it is important to understand the dynamics of low-intensity insurgency given that many large-scale civil wars begin with low-intensity dynamics, and then escalate to major civil wars, in part due to counterproductive state repression.

Rather than focus on the military capacity for territorial control, I advance an alternative account of state capacity that breaks open the unitary actor assumption and examines different types of sub-state capacity. It is meant to apply to a subset of all conflict cases characterized by low-intensity, clandestine, irregular warfare where direct territorial control via physical occupation by the state is too difficult and may be undesirable. Thus, it is intended as a complement to the territorial control approach rather than be a substitute. The next section briefly discusses the state capacity approach to civil war and then provides an overview of three types of sub-state capacity – coercive, intelligence, and organizational – and their effect on counterinsurgency practices.

State and Sub-State Capacity

The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government.

Huntington (1968, 1)

Weak state capacity has been linked to domestic conflict by numerous studies (Gurr, 1986; Tilly, 2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; DeRouen and Sobek, 2004; Buhaug, 2006; Hendrix, 2010). Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that weak states provide an opportunity structure that favors rebellion because potential rebels view the state as an “easy prize.” Essentially, potential rebels are undeterred by weak states, which they view as more
easily defeated. Potential rebels will get this signal by observing an incompetent, corrupt, and mismanaged bureaucracy (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; DeRouen and Sobek, 2004). Once an insurgency begins, weak states are less capable of using repression as rationally and effectively as they may prefer. That is, even if they prefer selective violence, their skill-set does not allow them to pursue the selective strategy effective. Without the capacity to gather adequate intelligence, weak states substitute indiscriminate or collective violence for selective, which can strengthen the insurgency (see Figure 2.1).

State capacity approaches provide a necessary corrective to the open-ended rationalism that once predominated the rational-choice approach. Theorizing actors’ options as unlimited mistakes how certain conditions can constrain their choices. When dealing with state behavior one must take into account how varying degrees of capacity or “stateness” affects the ability of the state to respond to various challenges. This problem is particularly acute in conflict studies where the subject matter spans across the globe, but most prominent analysts are from countries that have greater capacity to deal with social problems. Instead, state capacity approaches contribute by pointing out the choice-set of each state is not necessarily the same.

There has been a recent surge in works on state capacity that attempt to disentangle the variety of types of state capacity (Sobek, 2010; Hendrix, 2010; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010). These new studies recognize that states can vary in different types of capacity. States like North Korea may be administratively and institutionally weak but militarily strong. Still, these studies aggregate at the national level and ignore variations in sub-state capacity or the capacity of state agents/bureaucracies. While sub-state capacity could include any government bureaucracy, I focus on state agents in the
security sector and how they vary across three types of sub-state capacity – coercive, intelligence, and organizational.

The principal argument of this dissertation is that state agents with greater intelligence capacity, coupled with competent organizational capacity, are more effective at countering clandestine insurgencies than are highly coercive agents with less intelligence, or agents with good intelligence that lack the organizational capacity to act on the information available. If successful counterinsurgency is the identification and neutralization of insurgents and their collaborators, counterinsurgents require little more coercive capacity than that needed to win firefights, seal off escape routes, and pursue targets; it is not necessary to have enough soldiers to hold the entire area under martial law.

Sub-State Capacity: Definitions

Coercive capacity refers to the overall fighting capacity of an agency in the security sector. It is the capacity to inflict damages through the use of force. If conceptualized as a continuum, coercive capacity could range from a weak agency with few, unarmed members to a strong one, great in numbers with powerful weapons (e.g., tanks, planes, nuclear bombs). States vary in the coercive capacity in general, but agencies within states vary as well.

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29 Coercive capacity could be delineated along several dimensions, such as number of personnel, sophistication of weaponry, lethality of weaponry, range of power projection, etc. Such distinctions are less useful for the present study; therefore, I will refer to coercive capacity as the aggregate of all of these types of hard power.
Intelligence can be defined broadly as information about one’s opponent.\textsuperscript{30} For the purposes of this dissertation, I will use the term to connote “tactical intelligence” – the purpose of which is “to identify and locate terrorist [or rebel/insurgent] cadres so that these can be neutralised by direct action” (Mahadevan, 2012, 5). Tactical intelligence can be separated from “strategic intelligence” which refers to the “long-term assessment of the threat that an opponent poses to national security” (ibid, 5). Intelligence capacity, then, is the ability to gather useful and actionable information about one’s opponent. In this regard, information is actionable if it leads to the identification or location of selective targets. It is actionable information from tactical intelligence that is necessary for effective counterinsurgency. Since this information is most likely to come from local sources, those agencies with greater access to local sources should be expected to have greater intelligence capacity.

State agencies also vary in their organizational capacity, or the capacity to execute policy effectively. Several factors may impede bureaucracies from implementing policy, such as lack of resources, lack of autonomy from the political process, lack of consensus among political elites, and principal-agent problems (Peters, 2001). Among these issues, principal-agent problems are paramount for agencies in the security sector. Organizational capacity can be thought of as tightness of control from principal to agent. Loosely controlled agents have more leeway to exploit their information advantage in the pursuit of their individual motives, which may vary greatly from the principal’s goals and

\textsuperscript{30} This definition is nearly identical to Troy’s (1991) definition: “knowledge of the enemy.” It should be noted that there is little consensus among intelligence scholars concerning the definition of intelligence (see chapters in Gill, Marrin, and Phythian, 2009, for example). I define it here broadly as information about one’s enemy in order to encompass many types of information, relevant or not, but also to distinguish it from the activity of gathering intelligence or espionage (Mahadevan, 2012, 4) or “warfare by quieter means” (Warner, 2009, 16).
motivations (Mitchell, 2004). For counterinsurgents, this has been associated with the abuse of human rights. Studies that test this argument cross-nationally find that a higher level of bureaucratic corruption, a measure for organizational control at the state-level, increases sexual violence and human rights violations in general (Butler, Gluch, and Mitchell, 2007; Bohara, Mitchell, Nepal, and Raheem 2008).

**Sub-state capacity and counterinsurgency**

The first two dimensions of capacity – coercive and intelligence – can be thought of, more or less, as a trade-off (although theoretically an increase in one does not necessarily decrease the other). State agencies that are built for their coercive function tend not to be designed for local intelligence extraction, while those agencies with local ties are not often equipped with the coercive capacity found at national agencies. Greater levels of organizational capacity, however, should increase the likelihood that the agent will carry out the principal’s preferred policy. This section briefly identifies security agencies in terms of capacity and their use as counterinsurgents.

National armies have the greatest levels of coercive capacity in most countries, though they tend to lack high levels of tactical intelligence capacity. National armies have more advanced weaponry, including automatic weapons, tanks, heavy artillery, a variety of explosives, and the ability to use air and sea power, to name a few. While highly coercive agencies like the national armies tend to be the utilized when facing any serious threat, they do not have a particularly good track record with countering internal threats like insurgencies given their generally low intelligence capacity.
Lyall and Wilson (2009, 72) argue modern militaries are less successful at defeating insurgencies in the past century due to the changes over time in the nature of force structures—"the specific mixture of materiel and personnel that compromises a military’s war-making capabilities." In the period before World War I, national armies were often structured to "forage" for supplies, which required large infantries with ongoing (and often unwelcome) interactions with the local population, but little technological sophistication (ibid, 73). World War I introduced numerous technological innovations and eventually the change in force structure to a mechanized structure for "machine war.” Lyall and Wilson (2009, 75) note:

Mechanization was not a one-time shock, however. Rather, the lessons learned by the Great Powers in World War I were codified in World War II and then gradually diffused throughout the international system during the Cold War. In particular, the practice of modeling client states’ militaries in their patrons’ image ensured that the modern system was emulated throughout Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. The art of foraging was lost as state militaries became increasingly mechanized and as the number of mechanized militaries climbed.31

The mechanization of modern militaries among middle and great powers is certainly justified by the necessity to keep up defenses against potential adversaries in a “self-help” international system (Mearsheimer, 2001). As militaries become increasingly mechanized, their ability to wage effective conventional international war increased, but their ability to conduct effective counterinsurgency was compromised by the lack of ties to local populations. The diffusion of the mechanized force structure may not have been

31 This quote should not be taken to imply that the mechanization process was uniform or complete. Colonizers certainly varied in their strategy for colonial control, which implies some variation in the degree to which the post-colonial state adopted their force structure. In short, the degree of mechanization varies across countries and time.
appropriate to newly formed states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where international wars are relatively rare and internal wars are far more frequent.\(^{32}\)

If the state finds itself in a high-intensity, territorial counterinsurgency (discussed above), the national army is still necessary, since it has soldiers trained in controlling territory – a critical component for obtaining the information required to target insurgents and their collaborators selectively in these types of conflicts (Kalyvas, 2006). Still, mechanized militaries favor mobility over manpower and thus often provide military presence over a large territory without sufficient manpower to provide successful control (Lyall and Wilson 2009, 77).

While there is variation across states, modern militaries tend to favor coercive mechanized capabilities at the expense of developing local intelligence capacity. As mentioned above, the main method for intelligence from coercive agents – territorial control – is difficult, costly, and with increased mechanization it becomes less likely to be effective outside of high stakes counterinsurgency of international importance.

Agents with greater local intelligence capacity will naturally be local security agencies like the police. All insurgencies have local dynamics, but access to local intelligence is particularly stark in multi-ethnic societies. Local forces may be comprised of members largely from the same ethnic group as the locals, or perhaps, speak the local language. “Co-ethnicity” has been identified as an effective way to achieve intelligence

\(^{32}\) That newly formed states in the Global South have attempted modern mechanized forces is not necessarily surprising. Many de-colonized states inherited force structures and military organization from their colonizers. More recent attempts by the international community and great power patrons to modernize new state forces through training would be highly unlikely to include foraging force structures. It also may not have been obvious that their involvement in international war would be rare and producing a pre-modern military may invite more international war. Last, newly formed states may be concerned with international image and adopting foraging force structures would appear to be less modern.
during counterinsurgency campaigns and has been found to be more successful at military operations (Lyall, 2010). While the use of co-ethnics for counterinsurgency is controversial, their ability to speak the local language, interact with the local population, and infiltrate rebel networks is highly useful (Lyall, 2010, Sahni, correspondence, 2013). Members of local security forces may be recruited from the local population, who may individually know useful information or know which civilians have such information. Knowing which civilians hold local power, thus whom the state can ally with, may be obvious in some cases but only apparent to locals in others.  

Local forces, too, have a poor track record with counterinsurgency in general, though they are employed as the primary counterinsurgents less often than national militaries. Local forces clearly have less coercive capacity than national armies designed for conventional warfare, but it is not their lack of hard power that has been found wanting. Local forces often suffer from low levels of organizational and operational capacity – that is, they are plagued by corruption, incompetent leaders, unclear channels of authority and communication, weak mid-level (non-commissioned officer) ranks, illiteracy, poor health, poor skills and training, inadequate supplies, and mismatched or inoperative equipment. Though there is variation, these problems are particularly acute among new states in the Global South, where developing bureaucratic capacity has lagged behind their European counterparts. While they may be “first responders” to local violence, their ability to fight back effectively is often inept. Local police forces are not

33 As I will show in the Chapter 5, co-ethnicity can also be useful for counterinsurgency through other mechanisms. If counterinsurgents and insurgents are recruited from the same population, counterinsurgency provides an alternative to young men who may otherwise be recruited into insurgent ranks. The presence of co-ethnics as counterinsurgents also provides an important counter to rebel rhetoric claiming that they represent the entire ethnic or religious group as well as making the “insider-outsider” polarization pursued by rebel rhetoric less effective (Sahni, correspondence, 2013).
generally structured to be counterinsurgent forces. They are usually structured and trained
to be civil police in order to manage regular law and order issues. Thus, many local
forces may find counterinsurgency beyond their mandate, hence their willingness to fight
may be lacking. Given this poor organizational capacity and local roots that may raise
questions about loyalties, central governments often do not trust counterinsurgency to
local forces.

Selecting Agents

This presents an important tradeoff when it comes to selecting the appropriate agent for
implementing the state’s counterinsurgency strategy. Where national armies have the
ability to control territory, they may lack direct local intelligence capacity that facilitates
identifying selective targets. Gathering intelligence via these highly coercive agents
requires a great number of armed troops on the ground, who constantly interact with the
public, and essentially run a protection racket for information. Local police may have the
opposite strengths: much lower coercive capacity but perhaps stronger local intelligence
capacity. The selection of the appropriate agent may depend on the nature of the
insurgency and the specific situations that a state faces. A state facing a strong insurgency
that controls significant territory may find the coercive capacity of the national army
necessary to take back the territory. States facing clandestine insurgencies that do not
hold territory may find agents with local intelligence capacity more suitable for achieving
selective targeting.

In the case of the latter, selective targeting will require organizational capacity on
the part of local security forces. Organizational capacity interacts with intelligence
capacity to facilitate pursuing individual insurgents while minimizing undirected private violence by security forces.

The preceding discussion leads to four specific hypotheses that will be addressed empirically in this dissertation (specifically in Chapters 4 and 5). Each hypothesis derives from combinations of sub-state capacity and each is expected to apply only to internal civil conflicts characterized by irregular warfare (i.e., non-conventional), with clandestine insurgents rather than those holding and controlling territory. State agents that are designed for coercive capacity to fight international wars are unlikely to have local intelligence capacity, resulting in collective targeting and observed collective violence. The combination of local security forces with strong intelligence capacity and strong organizational capacity should be more likely to achieve selective targeting. Without organizational capacity, however, local security agents are more likely to carry out private violence that is not directed by the state (in line with principal-agent arguments) or incompetent targeting of non-insurgents who carry less risk of violently resisting or harming officers.

Hypothesis #3: Agents with strong coercive capacity, but weak local intelligence capacity are more likely to conduct collective targeting strategies.

Hypothesis #4: Agents with strong local intelligence capacity and strong organizational control are more likely to execute selective targeting strategies.

Hypothesis #5: Agents with strong local intelligence capacity, but weak organizational control over the rank and file, are more likely to execute selective targeting strategies incompetently.

Hypothesis #6: Agents with strong local intelligence capacity, but weak organizational control over the rank and file, are more likely to abuse their power in the conflict environment and pursue private violence.
Table 2.1 shows the theoretical relationship between coercive, intelligence, and organizational capacity, though each potential box was not discussed above since several boxes are unexpected.

Table 2.1: The relationship between sub-state capacity and the expected type of violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coercive Capacity</th>
<th>Intelligence Capacity</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Private Violence †</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Selective Violence †</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CV / PV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collective Violence *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Incompetent Targeting / PV *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Selective Violence *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Incompetent Targeting / PV</td>
<td>Collective Violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: CV = collective violence; PV = private violence (undirected by the state, thus not selective).
* Indicates capacity distribution that is examined empirically in Chapters 4 and 5.
† Indicates capacity distribution that is theoretically unexpected to occur.

Breaking into the Positive Cycle through Intelligence and Organizational Capacity

The previous discussion of sub-state capacity suggests another difference between this approach and traditional counterinsurgency approaches. While most accounts focus on ways to develop better relationships with civilians in order to extract information (that is, increase civilian cooperation), the sub-state capacity approach suggests one could break into the positive cycle by exploiting their own intelligence capacity to target selective and/or through establishing the effectiveness of the security forces if organizational or operational capacity is strong. In this sense, the way to establish credibility for civilian cooperation is to start targeting selectively first. While this is certainly a difficult task for
most states facing insurgencies, employing local agents that have some access to tactical intelligence that is not dependent on civilians can break into the positive cycle. Once in the positive cycle, intelligence from civilians is more likely and can contribute to more selective action. While this approach may be less costly than establishing direct military control required for the “hearts and minds” approach and Kalyvas’ (2006) territorial control approach, it does suggest significant investment in organizational capacity among local security forces, which in many parts of the Global South tend to be inept even in dealing with common criminals, much less armed insurgents.

**Conclusion**

This chapter theoretically examines the causes and consequences of state repression in internal armed conflicts. It built upon the logic of rebel recruitment problem to posit two alternative cycles of counterinsurgency, one negative and one positive, deriving from the state’s attempt to influence the behavior the general civilian population as well as the rebel recruitment pool. I establish that the negative counterinsurgency cycle – where collective targeting causes a backlash effect – is more common, not because it is expected to be effective, but because the state lacks the necessary intelligence to pursue selective targeting. Once accomplished, selective targeting leads to the positive counterinsurgency cycle, thereby increasing civilian confidence and eventually new intelligence.

This chapter also argues that the reason the negative cycle is more common is because the distribution of sub-state capacity among security forces in most countries is not conducive to the efficient intelligence gathering necessary to target selectively, and thus be in the positive cycle. Security forces with the strongest coercive capacity –
national militaries that tend to be the agent of choice once a threat becomes significant – lack the local intelligence capacity to find and use local information. Instead, they rely on their comparative advantage of coercion. Local agents who have the ability to use and exploit local information are commonly inept organizationally – at least for counterinsurgency purposes. Hence, I argue that security forces that combine access to local intelligence with capable organizational strength should result in selective targeting. Building that capacity, it must be acknowledged, is difficult and costly.

The next three chapters examine these propositions empirically. Chapter 3 examines hypothesis #1 – that collective violence is counterproductive – using a simultaneous equation model on cross-national time-series data. This hypothesis has been addressed in a number of case studies using both qualitative and quantitative designs. But the literature lacks a cross-national study that provides generalizability or external validity. Simultaneous equation modeling is necessary because of the endogenous process of rebel threat and state repression.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide evidence in support of the sub-state capacity argument, and hypotheses #2 through #6, by means of a case study of the state response to the Khalistan insurgency fought in the name of the Sikh ethnoreligious identity in Punjab, India. Chapter 4 examines the first two stages of the Khalistan insurgency in light of the state agents tasked with counterinsurgency, their relevant capacity distributions, their observed type of violence, and the consequences of that violence. It also provides context to insurgency and counterinsurgency in India, the Khalistan insurgency, and the relevant actors. Chapter 5 examines the third and final stage of the insurgency during which the state invested in the organizational capacity of the Punjab Police, who once strengthened
were able to exploit their local intelligence capacity to eventually target high-ranking insurgents selectively and thereby bring the conflict to a close, providing supporting evidence to hypothesis #2.
Chapter 3: Unpacking the Conflict-Repression Nexus

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I presented a theory of the consequences of different types of state repressive violence in the face of an armed internal challenger. In the theory leading up to hypothesis #1, I argued that the net effect of collective violence is counterproductive in that increases the threat to the state. In making this argument, I join other researchers who have argued that state repression is the mechanism through which conflicts escalate (Goodwin, 2001; Kalyvas, 2006; Mason and Krane, 1989). However, a debate remains about whether this effect is generally applicable. State repression has also been found to be the means by which opposition movements are defeated, thwarted or deterred (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006, 522; Lichbach, 1987; Lyall, 2009). Further complicating the issues, state repression has also been found to have no effect on conflict (Gurr and Moore, 1997), competing effects (Rasler, 1996), and varied effects based on whether dissent is rising or declining (Sullivan, Loyle, and Davenport, 2012).

Any investigation of the repression’s effect on conflict requires dealing with the reverse relationship. Research on the causes of state repression has concluded that state repression is a consequence of threats to the state (Tilly, 1978; Poe and Tate, 1994; McCormick and Mitchell, 1997; Regan and Henderson, 2002; Davenport, 2007a; Davenport, 2007b), where armed threats are clearly more threatening than unarmed

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Some of the statistical results presented below were presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in San Diego, CA, April 1-4, 2012 as part of a stand-alone paper. I received helpful comments from the discussants, Andrea Lopez and Reed Wood, as well as the audience. Not all suggestions made it into this version, so those making comments bear no responsibility for the errors or shortcomings presented below.
threats (Gurr, 1986). This finding is so consistent that Davenport (2007b) has termed it the law of coercive responsiveness (Davenport, 2007b).

The purpose of this chapter is to examine further both directions of the relationship between state repression and armed conflict, while testing the collective violence hypothesis (#1) from the theory chapter. Despite its consistency, the law of coercive responsiveness requires further investigation because studies of state repression tend to treat the presence of armed conflict as a control variable without taking into account the endogeneity between the two variables. It is necessary to model this relationship simultaneously.

Studies of state repression’s impact on conflict, for their part, have relied on case study research, which have provided rich, detailed, and disaggregated evidence for their arguments. Both arguments for repression’s effectiveness and its counterproductive effects have logical mechanisms that have been supported by in-depth qualitative interviews, process-tracing research, and sophisticated subnational quantitative designs. While it is possible that both arguments are accurate for their individual cases, a broader investigation is necessary to identify whether there is a general pattern. Here, an aggregated study can contribute additional insights, despite the otherwise laudable direction of the research program towards disaggregated research designs.

This chapter contributes to the study of the conflict-repression nexus by providing a general, cross-national study of repression’s effect on conflict and vice versa. I model the endogeneity between state repression and conflict using a simultaneous equation estimation technique – bivariate ordered probit (Sajaia, 2008). The simultaneous equation findings support the argument the proposition of a negative counterinsurgency cycle by
demonstrating that both directions of the relationship between state repression and conflict are positive and significant, establishing that greater repression is associated with greater conflict. I then use a lag structure with single equation models to establish that the effect of repression on conflict is greater than the reverse. Taken together, this study finds that greater levels of repression lead to greater levels of conflict and, by implication, that the cases of high levels of repression providing effective deterrence or suppression are too few to significantly affect the results. Further, the law of coercive responsiveness is supported, but should be qualified because conflict’s effect on repression is smaller than repression’s escalation effect on conflict.

This chapter proceeds in five sections. First, I briefly review the relevant parts of the negative counterinsurgency cycle leading to hypothesis #1. I then outline the state of the literature on state repression as a dependent variable, which demonstrates the reliability of the law of coercive responsiveness across a varied set of measures. Third, I discuss data and the methods employed followed by a discussion of measurement issues and the endogeneity problem. I then present results for several statistical tests and alternative models or specifications. I conclude with a discussion of the contribution of the study and the limitations of the research design.

**Review of theoretical argument to be examined in this chapter**

*Negative Counterinsurgency Cycle*

Chapter 2 presented a theoretical argument for what I termed the negative counterinsurgency cycle. In the negative cycle, collective violence by the counterinsurgents is expected to be counterproductive in that it increases the threat to the
state by strengthening the insurgency. The primary mechanism for this effect concerns how collective targeting affects the behavior of the rebel recruitment pool – those civilians that could possibly join the rebellion (e.g., co-ethnics with militants). Collective targeting of the rebel recruitment pool dramatically increases the insecurity of this group and, since the armed rebels can ostensibly provide some security, collective targeting actually increases rebel recruitment and helps solve their collective action problem. By increasing rebel recruitment, the viability of the rebellion is strengthened, which represents a direct increase in the threat to the state. Because a stronger rebel group is generally associated with an increase in violent activity as they turn to conventional warfare (Butler and Gates, 2009) and they can sustain much greater casualties during battle, a useful indicator of their strength is the intensity of the conflict. Thus, conflicts of greater intensity represent a greater threat to the state than conflicts that inflict relatively small damages or cannot sustain multiple battles with conventional warfare.

The negative counterinsurgency cycle also expects collective violence to be self-reinforcing. This process occurs through two mechanisms because collective targeting affects the rebel recruitment pool differently than the general civilian population. Since collective violence increases the threat to the state through increased rebel recruitment, it also necessitates an armed response from the state. States must respond to armed challenges or surrender their sovereignty. However, the state’s ability to respond effectively (i.e., with selective repression) is weakened, because of how collective targeting affects the general civilian population. Collective targeting decreases civilian cooperation with the state due to new grievances, resulting in less access to the local
intelligence necessary to target selectively and, thus, a higher likelihood of collective targeting.

The negative counterinsurgency cycle is juxtaposed with the positive counterinsurgency cycle whereby selective state violence that targets only individual insurgents decreases the threat to the state by deterring potential rebels from joining. The discussion of the positive counterinsurgency cycle lead to hypothesis #2 – that the net effect of selective violence by counterinsurgents reduces the threat to the state. For the same reasons discussed above, if rebel recruitment is reduced, the threat to the state is reduced, and the effects of this process should show up in indicators of conflict intensity.

**Challenge to the State and the Law of Coercive Responsiveness**

In order to examine whether collective repression does in fact have the effect posited above and in Chapter 2, one must also examine the reverse of the relationship – that armed challenges to state increase the likelihood of state repression. Note that this is consistent with negative counterinsurgency cycle presented above.

The state repression literature – a large and progressive research program – has provided several explanations for state repression. Among the more prominent explanations for state repression concern the role of democracy (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2005; Davenport, 2007a; Davenport, 1999; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004), variations in autocratic regimes (Davenport 2007c), economic development (Mitchell and McCormick, 1988), state capacity (Englehart, 2009), and international factors (Hafner-Burton, 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Keith, 1999).
While these factors rightfully gain significant attention in the literature, the proximate cause of state repression is usually, if not explicitly, some perceived challenge to the political order. According to Gurr (1986, 51), “the necessary condition for state terrorism is the existence of a group, class, or party that is regarded by ruling elites as an active threat to their continued rule.” Indeed, the variables of interest listed above are often theorized to influence state violence indirectly. They constrain or facilitate the use of state repression given the presence of a challenge – whether latent, nascent, or actualized.

On its face, the notion that state repression follows a challenge is straightforward: the greater the threat to the existing regime, the greater the level of state repression.\(^{35}\) Gurr (1986) develops this argument more precisely. Threats to the regime are greater when the objective of the challenger is regime change, when challengers are greater in number, and when challengers are armed. Other dynamics of the challenger’s relationship with the population can increase threat, such as when popular support for challengers is larger and whether the challenger uses the population through guerrilla warfare.

As noted above, Davenport calls this robust finding “law of coercive responsiveness” (2007b). While the hypothesis is specified in continuous terms, the findings are dependably strong across a variety of measures. Most commonly, studies reliably find that the presence of a civil war, measured conventionally by 1,000 annual battle-deaths, increases the severity of state repression, human rights violations (broadly conceived), and/or state terror (Davenport, 2007c; Kathman and Wood, 2011; Krain, 2016).

\(^{35}\) Not all threat hypotheses are framed as straightforward. For example, Gartner and Regan (1996) argue the severity of the domestic threat (or the size of the opposition demand) interacts with domestic and international costs producing the observed level of state repression.
Other studies lower the threshold for civil violence to 25 annual battle-deaths and use the concept either dichotomously (e.g., Mitchell, Carey, and Butler, n.d.) or continuously (e.g., Engelhart, 2009). The consistency holds when more nuanced versions of dissident behavior are introduced to include strikes, guerrilla warfare, and protests (e.g., Davenport, 1995; 1999). Findings regarding variations in type of armed challenger also support Gurr’s (1986) theory. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004), for instance, find that when domestic challengers use guerrilla warfare and when civilian support is great, the state is more likely to resort to mass killing.

**Data and Methods**

By reviewing the counterinsurgency cycles, this chapter has identified two propositions to be examined empirically: that collective violence increases conflict intensity and that selective violence decreases conflict intensity. By reviewing the state of the literature on the law of coercive responsiveness, this chapter has also provided a puzzle. Given the dual expectations that greater rebel threat causes greater repression and that greater repression causes greater rebel threat, the question of which direction, if any, is strongest remains open.

To provide evidence that sheds light on these issues, I employ a cross-national, time-series research design aimed at identifying generalities of the relationship between repression and armed insurgency. Since previous research on the effectiveness of repression has tended to be in the form of qualitative case studies or quantitative subnational designs, where multiple studies have demonstrated the internal validity of
their findings, this chapter seeks to test this argument for generalizability or external validity. In doing so, I recognize the tradeoff of losing measurement specificity for generalizability.

The data I have compiled consists of a country-year dataset from various sources that includes 2524 observations from a sample of 138 countries covering 28 years (1976-2004).36 To construct the dataset, I begin with Uppsala’s Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al, 2002), which uses the country-year as the unit of analysis. The sample is limited spatially to 138 countries and between the years 1976 and 2004 due to available data for the measures presented below.

Since the hypotheses above refer to the endogenous process of conflict escalation and state repressive violence, we use two dependent variables, each measured in multiple ways for robustness checks.

Dependent Variable #1: Measures of Conflict Escalation

The primary dependent variable is conflict intensity or the battle death rate, which proxies rebel strength. New recruits increase how many attacks a rebel organization can execute as well as how much battlefield experience it can sustain (Lyall, 2009, 336). Furthermore, the intensity of conflict is an indicator of rebel strength due to the tactics employed. It takes a strong rebel group to fight the government conventionally (that is, directly), which produces the most battle deaths. When very weak and moderately weak, rebels rely on terror tactics that target civilians (but do not count as battle deaths) and

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36 The number of observations, countries, and years varies by the availability of data; hence, several models below have fewer observations. These numbers come from the most inclusive model.
guerrilla warfare-style hit and run tactics, respectively (Butler and Gates, 2009; Wood, 2010).

I follow the literature in assuming that states are rational and prefer the absence of an armed threat. Therefore, an increase in the intensity of an armed conflict represents a greater threat to the state. The reverse is true as well. State strategies attempt to reduce the threat posed by an armed rebellion. The intensity, or battle-death rate, is one indication of whether or not these strategies are working.

For the main models, I measure the intensity of armed conflict by constructing two ordinal versions of the annual battle deaths (with different levels of precision) from a continuous measure of the annual number of battle deaths (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005). I use ordinal versions for two reasons. First, while all measures are imperfect, a continuous, count measure of battle deaths has problems of false specificity. Battle death data are best estimates. An ordinal version suffers less from this problem because the order of values is much more likely to be accurate. Second, the measures for repression (as discussed below) are ordinal and there is no available simultaneous equation method to my knowledge that is designed for one ordinal dependent variable and one that is continuous.

I use Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) from Iacus, King, and Porro (2012) to construct ordinal versions of the battle death measure. CEM can be used to create cutpoints from continuous variables, among other uses. To make comparing models easier below, I created two ordinal versions that match the number of values for the repression variables – one with five values and one with nine. Some of the alternative alternative

37 However, an ordinal version does suffer from the opposite problem of discarding potentially useful information.
models presented for robustness checks use different, non-ordinal, versions of the battle death rate. One is the raw count of battle deaths in that year and the other is divided by the country’s population.

**Dependent Variable #2: Measures of Repression**

For measures of repression, I use two human rights’ sources that measure the degree of state repression in a given year. The concept of human rights is very broad, so I limit the measures specifically to violations of physical integrity rights. I use measures from two widely used data series: the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and the Cingranelli and Richards’ (CIRI) project.

PTS reports an ordinal 5-point scale of the severity of actual state violence rather than the general level of political repression or violence from non-state actors (Gibney, Cornett, and Wood, 2011; Wood and Gibney, 2010, 370). The PTS reports estimates based on Amnesty International reports and, separately, from the US State Department. I use the data from the Amnesty International reports because state sources may introduce bias regarding allies and adversaries. Despite the common use of the PTS, I report the coding rules from PTS since it will be important for interpretation in the results and discussion section below. Wood and Gibney (2010, 373) report the levels as:

- **Level 1**: Countries…under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional…Political murders are extremely rare….
- **Level 2**: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, a few persons are affected; torture and beating are exceptional…Political murder is rare….
- **Level 3**: There is extensive political imprisonment…. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted….
- **Level 4**: The practices of Level 3 are expanded to larger numbers.
Murders, disappearances, and torture are part of life…In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. Level 5: The terrors of Level 4 have been extended to the whole population…The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Because the PTS is a relative score that places state repression on a continuum, it is clearly ordered from little repression (1) to extreme repression (5). However, it aggregates the severity of repression along three dimensions: scope, intensity, and range (Wood and Gibney, 2010, 373). Scope refers to the severity of the type of repression (from imprisonment to killing) while intensity refers to the frequency of state repression (ibid). Last, range refers to the selectivity of the targets, with higher values indicating less selectivity (ibid). The main models presented below generally take the PTS as ordered in its selectivity; higher values indicate less selectivity. For our purposes, the categories of 4 and 5 connect most closely with collective or indiscriminate repression. Victims, at level 4, are targeted by the state due to their political ideas, rather than their involvement in an armed movement and are in large numbers. At level 5, state violence has “extended to the whole population,” clearly indicating collective violence. Wood and Gibney (2010, 373, fn 20) note that while range (or selectivity) of state violence can affect scores at all levels, the distinction is most obvious between levels 4 and 5. I do present some alternative specifications that separate the effects of PTS level 4 and level 5.

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38 The PTS reports the scale from both Amnesty International reports and U.S. State Department reports. The reports are quite similar and correlate at 0.79 (Poe, Carey, and Vazquez, 2001). I use the scale based on Amnesty International reports and do not report the State Department scale for space limitations, but the models were performed with each and report very similar results. See Poe, Carey, and Vazquez (2001) for a quantitative assessment of both sources.
I view the Political Terror Scale to most closely match the concept of state repression, so it is used in the majority of models. However, I also report a 9-point scale that measures respect for physical integrity rights (inverted to measure violations) from the CIRI project (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010) for additional reliability.

Modeling Strategy

Since we should expect rebel strength and collective repression to be interrelated, I employ a simultaneous equation model to control for the endogeneity of these two dependent variables. Simultaneous equation models jointly run two regressions, one for each dependent variable. The model reports how related the two equations are and whether that relationship is statistically significant. I use a seemingly unrelated bivariate ordered probit estimation technique (Sajaia, 2008), which allows the researcher to examine jointly determined ordinal dependent variables with multiple independent variables.\(^\text{39}\)

The Identification Problem

Simultaneous equation modeling requires solving an identification problem: that at least one variable in each equation is thought to affect the dependent variable in that equation, but not the other (Paxton, Hipp, and Marquart-Pyatt, 2011). For the conflict intensity equation, the identification problem is solved with number of years the country has been at peace (Peace Years). Peace Years has been found to affect the likelihood of civil war as well as the likelihood of reoccurrence, so theoretically we should expect it to affect the intensity of violence within the conflict. However, Peace Years should have no direct

\(^{39}\) The “bivariate” in bivariate ordered probit refers to the number of dependent variables.
effect on a state’s human rights record since many states violate their citizens’ human rights through state repression in the absence of conflict.

The human rights equation is identified with acceptance of international criminal court (ICC) jurisdiction and the proportion of intergovernmental organization (IGO) membership (Engelhart, 2009). Acceptance of ICC jurisdiction is thought to indicate a respect for human rights and should be negatively associated with the human rights violations of state repression. Similarly, the more IGOs a country is a member of should indicate greater socialization of international norms of human rights. However, neither of these indicators should affect conflict intensity directly. The results for these simultaneous equation models are reported in Table 3.2.

Assessing the Impact

Finding that the two equations are related is probably not surprising to conflict scholars. What is more important than showing they are related is identifying which direction is strongest. To do so, I report single equation models with multiple (i.e., one year and five year) lagged versions of the main independent variables. Since coefficients across different estimation techniques and dependent variables are not comparable, I estimate and report standardized coefficients of the effect. The standardized coefficient is calculated by subtracting the $\beta$ of the marginal effect when holding the independent variable (lagged) at its mean from the $\beta$ of the marginal effect when holding the independent variable at two standardized deviations above the mean and dividing that
result by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. In equation form, the standardized coefficient equals:

\[
\frac{(x\beta_1 - x\beta_2)}{\sigma_y}
\]

where:
- \(x\beta_1 = x\beta \) of the marginal effect given \(x = 2\sigma_x + \bar{x}\),
- \(x\beta_2 = x\beta \) of the marginal effect given \(x = \bar{x}\),
- \(\sigma_x = \) the standard deviation of the independent variable,
- \(\bar{x} = \) the mean of the independent variable,
- \(\sigma_y = \) the standard deviation of the dependent variable.

In other words, the standardized coefficient creates a unitless Z-score of the marginal effect of moving the independent variable from the mean to two standard deviations above the mean. I use \(x\beta\)s instead of predicted values of Y (\(y\)-hat) because ordered probit produces separate values of \(y\)-hat for each outcome. The \(x\beta\)s most closely approximate the linear prediction of the non-linear model. We then can compare the standardized coefficient for \(x_{i\text{lag}1}\) (PTS) against \(x_{j\text{lag}1}\) (Intensity) and so on for each lag level.

Control Variables

For the simultaneous equations models (i.e., Models 1 and 2), I nest my model in recent studies. I nest the conflict equation in Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) and the repression model in Englehart (2009). Both equations use five of the same variables: tax

\footnote{I use two standard deviations above the mean instead of one to reach a level of human rights violations that would most obviously count as collective violence.}
capacity, Polity, Polity-squared (Marshall and Jaggers, 2006), the natural log of the country’s population (Gleditsch, 2002), and the natural log of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (Gleditsch, 2002). The conflict equation adds the Peace Years and associated splines (see “The Identification Problem” above). The repression equation includes the acceptance of international criminal court jurisdiction and the proportion of IGO membership (Engelhart, 2009).

For tax capacity, I use Englehart’s (2009, 169) measure of tax extraction as a proportion of GDP, which is provided by the “World Bank’s World Development Indicators, supplemented with data from the African Development Indicators, IMF Country Reports, and the Asian Development Bank.” While the Englehart (2009) study is interested in human rights protection, tax capacity is also found to be negatively associated with civil wars (Hendrix, 2010).

The ordinal probit models (3 through 6) each use the same minimal control variables that are present in both simultaneous equation models. It is important that these models have the same control variables and number of observations in order for the \( xbs \) of the marginal effects to be comparable. Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensity (5-value)</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity (9-value)†</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRI PI†</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Capacity</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity²</td>
<td>187.95</td>
<td>153.83</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>9.58</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>14.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/capita (ln)</td>
<td>8.23</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>10.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Years*</td>
<td>17.66</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO Membership*</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC Jurisdiction*</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Descriptive statistics are from observations present in Model 3, which includes 2245 observations (country-years) over 138 countries. * From observations present in Model 1, which has 2097 observations. † From observations present in Model 2, which has 2136 observations.

Results

The results from the simultaneous equation models (Models 1 and 2 reported in Table 3.2) demonstrate that both equations are interrelated, providing statistical support for the negative counterinsurgency cycle. This is true regardless of whether PTS or CIRI scores are used to proxy repression. Model 1, which uses PTS as the repression variable reports a positive $\rho$ correlation, which is a correlation of the residuals, of 0.48. The Wald test of independent equations confirms the equations are dependent by reporting a $\chi^2$ value of 63.22 that is significant at 99% level. Model 2, which uses CIRI as the repression variable, presents very similar results. The $\rho$ correlation is 0.48, while the Wald $\chi^2$ value is 68.04 and significant at the 99% level.

The control variables act largely as the literature has found. Tax capacity is not associated with either conflict intensity equation, but is negatively associated with human rights violations at the 90% confidence level (Englehart, 2009). Polity scores are also not
associated with conflict intensity, but suggest a curvilinear relationship for the repression equations. Population is positive and significant for all equations. GDP per capita is negative and significant in the intensity equations but not significant for the repression equations. The length of time a country has gone without a war (Peace Years) is negatively associated with conflict intensity. Indicators of international respect for human rights (IGO proportional membership and acceptance of ICC jurisdiction) are not significant in either equation suggesting Englehart’s (2009) findings may be sensitive to modeling approaches.
Table 3.2: Simultaneous Equations – Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Ordered Probit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intensity (5 value)</td>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>Intensity (9 value)</td>
<td>CIRI Physical Integrity (inverted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Capacity</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-1.55*</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-1.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.3***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity²</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.014***</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/capita (ln)</td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.25**</td>
<td>-0.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Years</td>
<td>-0.74***</td>
<td>-0.71***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_spline1</td>
<td>-0.018***</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_spline2</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0008)</td>
<td>(0.0008)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_spline3</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO membership</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC jurisdiction</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence tests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63.22***</td>
<td>69.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi²(1)†</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.57***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (country-years)</td>
<td>2097</td>
<td>2097</td>
<td>2136</td>
<td>2136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Rho reports the correlation of the residuals. †Chi²(1) reports the Wald tests of independent equations for bivariate ordered probit models.
Table 3.3 reports four single-equation ordered probit models with lagged independent variables that assess the strength of each direction of the relationship. In the repression models (4 and 6), I report only the PTS and leave out CIRI because the conceptual fit is better.\textsuperscript{41} As expected by the literature and the simultaneous equations, PTS is positively associated with conflict intensity and vice versa in all four models.

For this table, we are most interested in comparing the standardized coefficient of the main independent variables across comparable models (3 versus 4 and 5 versus 6). Comparing models 3 against 4, we find that the standardized coefficient of PTS (t-1) on intensity is 1.46, which is 37\% percent higher than the standardized coefficient of conflict intensity (t-1) on PTS (at 1.06). This demonstrates that the one-year lagged effect of state repression on conflict intensity is stronger than the reverse.

Models 4 and 5, which use 5-year lags, report the similar result that repression has a greater impact on intensity than vice versa. The standardized coefficient for PTS (t-5) is 1.14, which is 29.5\% greater than the coefficient of conflict intensity (t-5) on PTS. This finding suggests that the counterproductive effect of state repression is long lasting.\textsuperscript{42}

Models 3 through 6 are specified with the same control variables to ensure the standardized coefficient is comparable; any difference in the number of variables and the number of observations can affect the $xb$ of the marginal effect. I hold them constant to make sure the only difference in $xb$s is being produced by the difference of the independent variables. The control variables for Models 3 through 6 act as expected and are very similar to the results from models 1 and 2.

\textsuperscript{41} I have conducted the analysis with CIRI as well and the results are very similar.
\textsuperscript{42} I only report 1 and 5 year lags for space considerations. Lags for 2, 3, 4 years reports similar results. Increasing the lag reduces the size of the standardized impact and the pseudo R-squared, but the effect of repression on conflict intensity is consistently stronger than the reverse.
### Table 3.3: Ordered Probit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Standardized coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intensity (5 value)</td>
<td>PTS</td>
<td>Intensity (5 value)</td>
<td>PTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS (t-1)</td>
<td>0.71*** (0.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.56*** (0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity (t-1)</td>
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<td>0.54*** (0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS (t-5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.56*** (0.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity (t-5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.42*** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Capacity</td>
<td>1.38 (1.13)</td>
<td>-1.46** (0.71)</td>
<td>1.01 (1.27)</td>
<td>-1.37* (0.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.03 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.24*** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.039 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.24*** (0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity^2</td>
<td>-0.0003 (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.012*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.0009 (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.01*** (0.003)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>0.16*** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.16*** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.18*** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.18*** (0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/capita (ln)</td>
<td>-0.23** (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.25** (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.12* (0.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut1</td>
<td>3.18*** (1.09)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.71)</td>
<td>2.67** (1.15)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.73)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut2</td>
<td>3.32*** (1.09)</td>
<td>1.74** (0.73)</td>
<td>2.79** (1.15)</td>
<td>1.65** (0.74)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut3</td>
<td>3.95*** (1.08)</td>
<td>2.9*** (0.73)</td>
<td>3.38*** (1.14)</td>
<td>2.75*** (0.74)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut4</td>
<td>5.12*** (1.16)</td>
<td>4.03*** (0.75)</td>
<td>4.47*** (1.18)</td>
<td>3.85*** (0.76)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>.1970</td>
<td>.1918</td>
<td>.1521</td>
<td>.1653</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Countries</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (country-years)</td>
<td>2245</td>
<td>2245</td>
<td>1852</td>
<td>1852</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standardized coefficient = (x\(\hat{\beta}\)\(\mid\)x=2SDx+x-bar) - (x\(\hat{\beta}\)\(\mid\)x=x-bar) / SDy.
Table 3.4 reports a single equation model (Model 7) of conflict intensity, but disaggregates state repression by PTS level, reporting each level of the PTS as a separate binary variable. In doing so, we can isolate the effect of PTS level 5 versus level 4, since the coding scheme describes repression at level 5 as being specifically collective while repression at level 4 in limited to those that interest themselves in politics (Wood and Gibney, 2010, 373). I use level 4 as the baseline to directly compare level 4 versus level 5. Each level of the PTS is lagged one year. For continuity with the models presented above, the dependent variable is the 5-value version of the conflict intensity measure. I present alternative versions below in Table 3.6.

The results for Model 7 are consistent with the theory presented in Chapter 2 and above. Because PTS level 4 is the baseline we can interpret the coefficients of the other levels as compared to PTS level 4. The most important coefficient is for PTS level 5, which is positive and significant at the 99% level. The positive coefficient shows that state repression at level 5, which clearly represents collective violence, increases the intensity of the conflict, providing additional support of the backlash effect hypothesized in Chapter 2 (hypothesis #1). Each of the other levels of the PTS score are negative and significant at the 99% level, indicating that compared to level 4 lower levels of repression are associated with decreases in the intensity of the conflict.

The control variables act largely as expected. Consistent with the models presented above, tax capacity is not significantly associated with conflict intensity. Polity and Polity$^2$ are positive and negative, respectively, indicating a curvilinear relationship. However, these variables are only significant at the 90% level and are not consistently significant across models, indicating that their significance in this model is not robust.
Consistent with the models presented above and the literature, population is positive and significant while GDP per capita is negative and significant. Overall, the statistical evidence presented in this section supports the arguments of the dissertation.
Table 3.4: Ordered probit: Conflict intensity with binary PTS levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 7 Intensity (5 value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PTS Level 1</strong> (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.87**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PTS Level 2</strong> (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.96***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PTS Level 3</strong> (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PTS Level 5</strong> (t-1)</td>
<td>0.97***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tax Capacity</strong></td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity</strong></td>
<td>0.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity^2</strong></td>
<td>-0.007*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (ln)</strong></td>
<td>0.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP/capita (ln)</strong></td>
<td>-0.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>cut1</strong></td>
<td>2.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>cut2</strong></td>
<td>2.35**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>cut3</strong></td>
<td>2.93***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>cut4</strong></td>
<td>4.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudo R-squared</strong></td>
<td>.1846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Countries</strong></td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N (country-years)</strong></td>
<td>2,870</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. PTS level 4 is omitted. Each PTS coefficient is interpreted against PTS level 4.
Alternative models and specifications

Like any empirical exercise in the social sciences, there is some uncertainty about the most appropriate modeling strategy, specification of control variables, and case selection. This section presents 6 alternative models in 2 tables to help ensure the results are not driven by a specific modeling strategy.

Table 3.5 reports three models that replicate the primary analysis above but with two changes. First, there is some concern that the full dataset may not report appropriate coefficients because the data is overrepresented with countries that never experienced any conflict and no-conflict observations of countries that did experience conflict. The models presented in Table 3.5 include only observations that experience some conflict. It necessarily reduces the observations a great deal. Second, I wanted to control for potential rebels, since Walter (2006; 2009) finds that states repress self-determination movements more forcefully when they are signaling to potential rebels that the costs will be high. The models included here include Walter’s (2006) variable for the number of disaffected minority groups, which she codes from the Minorities at Risk project. Because her data only includes self-determination movements, it limits the number of countries that show up in these models.

The results are consistent with models presented above and the hypotheses of the dissertation. The bivariate ordered probit model (Model 8) shows that the conflict intensity and repression equations are positively related (rho=.46; Chi2(1)=29.17 and significant). Table 3.5 also reports single-equation models and the standardized coefficient as above in Table 3.3. The results are similar. The standardized coefficient for PTS’ effect on intensity is larger (more than double the size) than the standardized
coefficient for Intensity’s effect on repression. The variable Disaffected Groups is not significant in any model and does not affect the results of the other variables.
Table 3.5: Alternative models: Conflict-only observations / Controls for potential rebels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 8 Bioprobit Intensity (5 value)</th>
<th>PTS</th>
<th>Model 9 Oprobit Intensity (5 value)</th>
<th>PTS</th>
<th>Model 10 Oprobit PTS</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PTS (t-1)</td>
<td>0.51*** (0.09)</td>
<td>0.38*** (0.07)</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity (t-1)</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>-3.8** (1.69)</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>-4.02** (1.79)</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Capacity</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.0072 (0.005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/capita (ln)</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaffected Groups (count)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Years</td>
<td>-0.34*** (0.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO membership</td>
<td>-0.053 (0.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC jurisdiction</td>
<td>0.12 (0.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence tests</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rho .46</td>
<td>29.17***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi2(1)†</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.49** (0.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.0967</td>
<td>0.0994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (country-years)</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>479</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standardized coefficient = \((\overline{\hat{x}} - \overline{x}) / SDy\).
Table 3.6 reports three models that use alternative versions of the intensity
dependent variable and alternative estimation techniques for robustness checks, but uses
the full dataset as described above (under Data and Methods). Models 11 and 12 use a
logged version of the battle death per capita rate at the dependent variable. Each of these
models uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression because the dependent variable is
continuous. Model 13 uses a count of the battle death rate and, because of this, uses
negative binomial regression as the estimation technique. Model 12 reports the PTS from
the U.S. State Department reports rather than the Amnesty International reports.

The results of each model are consistent with theoretical expectations and the
main results reported above. Models 11 and 12 replicate Model 7 above and find very
similar results. Whether the Amnesty International reports are used (Model 11) or those
of the U.S. State Department (Model 12), PTS level 5 (lagged) increases the intensity of
the conflict, while PTS levels 1-3 are associated with a reduction in the intensity of the
conflict. The results are consistent with a negative binomial regression on the raw count
data. The robustness of the results across multiple data selections, model specifications,
and estimation techniques provide additional confidence in the findings, especially
regarding the negative counterinsurgency cycle posited in Chapter 2.
Table 3.6: Alternative Models: Robustness checks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 11 OLS Regression</th>
<th>Model 12 OLS Regression</th>
<th>Model 13 Negative Binomial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battle death / capita (ln)</td>
<td>-0.008***</td>
<td>-2.21**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS Level 1 (t-1)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle death / capita (ln)</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
<td>-2.26***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS Level 2 (t-1)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle death (count)</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS Level 3 (t-1)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS Level 5 (t-1)</td>
<td>0.071***</td>
<td>1.68***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS Level 5 (t-1)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS SD 1 (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.04***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS SD 2 (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.04***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS SD 3 (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTS SD 5 (t-1)</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensity (5 value) (t-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Capacity</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>9.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(3.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.008*</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>1.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity^2</td>
<td>-0.0004*</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
<td>1.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/capita (ln)</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-1.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaffected Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.079**</td>
<td>-1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(2.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Pseudo) R-squared</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (country-years)</td>
<td>2,870</td>
<td>2,864</td>
<td>2,870</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. †cutpoints omitted. R-squared reported for Models 11 and 12. Psuedo R-squared reported for Model 14.
Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter set out to weigh in on a well-known puzzle of state repression in civil conflict. Does state repression of civilians effectively weaken rebels or strengthen them through increased participation? The statistical results reported above support the theoretical argument that large-scale state repression is counterproductive in fighting an armed insurgency. In fact, repression of civilians actually increases the threat to the state by strengthening the rebels to the point where they can escalate to more conventional warfare.

Perhaps the most important contribution of this finding is that it is a “general” finding. Previous studies on the issue have been confined (for good reason) to qualitative case studies or subnational quantitative designs that provide internal validity and a clearer connection to the theoretical mechanism. However, they lack the generalizability of an aggregate, cross-national study. While I applaud the recent trend in civil war literature away from cross-national studies, the research program on repression and civil war is precisely in the position of requiring an aggregate, cross-national study.

Attempts at an aggregate study have been troubled by the endogenous nature of civil war and repression. Using standard single-equation models has been insufficient to isolate the effects of repression on civil war since the state repression literature has long held civil war to be a cause of repression (Poe and Tate, 1994; McCormick and Mitchell, 1997; Regan and Henderson, 2002; Davenport, 2007a; Davenport, 2007b). The findings presented here do not negate the state repression findings, but rather present a qualification to them.
Still, there are several weaknesses to the present study that must be discussed. The primary weaknesses of the study come from the other side of the generalizability tradeoff. While an aggregate, cross-national study contributes to external validity, it suffers from three particular limitations. First, the aggregation to the national level combines data across large spaces and, for some countries, multiple conflicts. In small countries fighting a single armed rebellion, connecting overall state repression to the dynamics of a conflict is quite feasible. In large countries with multiple conflicts, this is much more difficult. For instance, in India, with several ongoing insurgencies, the national level aggregates do not tell us very much about the specific dynamics. While the worst repression tends to be where the conflict is, it is possible that one conflict could experience greater battle-deaths while another is responsible for the most severe repression.\textsuperscript{43}

Second, this study necessarily aggregates at the annual level due to data constraints. With so much going on in a country over an entire year, it is difficult to isolate precisely the effects of repression on conflict intensity. This problem is difficult to overcome, as most of the literature has found, but nonetheless must be addressed. In the case of repression and conflict intensity, this may present less of a problem than many other studies. Theoretically, it should take time to witness greater intensity after collective repression. It takes time to mobilize new recruits and it may not immediately result in a change in tactics.

Third, like many aggregate studies, there is a limitation of conceptual fit with measurement. The theory presented in Chapter 2 is about the selectivity of repressive targeting and the strength of the rebel organization. The PTS and CIRI physical integrity scores measure the general level of state repression, which includes imprisonment and imprisonment and

\textsuperscript{43} See Beer and Mitchell (2006) for subnational analysis of India’s human rights record.
torture in addition to extrajudicial killing. The conceptual fit is better with PTS, but even there selectivity of targeting is only one dimension that influences the score (scope and intensity are the other two) (Wood and Gibney, 2010). Likewise, conflict intensity proxies rebel strength imperfectly. Theoretically, it takes a larger rebellion to inflict and sustain larger casualties. Still, future research will be strengthened by a more direct measure of rebel strength.

Despite the limitations inherent in aggregate, cross-national designs, the findings presented in this chapter should increase our confidence that large-scale, collective state repression is counterproductive at fighting an insurgency and should be avoided when possible. The direction of the relationship is clearly and consistently positive that state repression increases the severity of conflict. This positive relationship is also consistently statistically significant. If the opposite argument (that indiscriminate repression is effective) were correct, this relationship would be negative or at least not significant. This counterargument that is discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that repression is a gamble that may be effective under certain circumstances. If correct, these circumstances are not common enough to reduce the significance of the findings presented in this chapter.

This chapter has also addressed a secondary puzzle concerning the direction of the conflict-repression nexus. While the findings that repression follows conflict have been more consistent than those arguing that repression increases conflict, this study demonstrates that the repression-causes-conflict direction is stronger. Future studies of state repression should acknowledge the endogeneity and model it accordingly.
Chapter 4: The Khalistan Conflict: 
Introduction and Analysis of Early Stages

Introduction

This chapter examines the Khalistan conflict (often called the Sikh insurgency) in the state of Punjab, India in light of the theoretical expectations presented in Chapter 2. I begin by providing some context to India’s experience with internal conflict. I then provide somewhat in-depth context to the Sikh religion, the Punjab region, sources of grievances, and the key actors of the Khalistan movement. I then analyze the first two stages of the conflict, broken up by the state agency (i.e., state police v. army) tasked with countering the insurgency. This allows me to examine hypotheses #3, #5, and #6. In Stage #1, the Punjab Police – which was characterized by weak coercive capacity and weak organizational capacity, despite local intelligence advantages – were the first responders to rising Khalistani violence. Consistent with hypotheses #5 and #6, the observed action from the Punjab Police was generally incompetent and/or abusive of power. In Stage #2, the central government employed the Indian Army to counter the rising internal threat. The Indian Army – characterized by strong coercive and organizational capacity, but a lack of local sources of intelligence – carried out collective targeting of the Sikh ethnoreligious group, consistent with hypothesis #3.

I should note The Khalistan conflict does not represent a test of these hypotheses. After a cursory reading of the conflict, this case initially served as the hypothesis-generating study. Since the initially theorizing, however, I have carried out a much more thorough investigation of the case, including conducting semi-structured interviews with
experts and counterinsurgents in India. I return to the implications of the design in the conclusion and discuss future research avenues.

Case Study Evidence and Levels of Explanation

Theoretically, there exist many levels of explanation for a given phenomenon, from the structure of the international system to individuals on the ground. This case study of the Khalistan conflict in Punjab, India involves four levels of explanation: international, national, Punjab, and the specific security forces used.\textsuperscript{44}

The theory chapter lays out hypotheses regarding the observed state violence based on which specific state agency, and its current levels of sub-state capacity, is primarily tasked with the counterinsurgency efforts. Thus, this case study of the Khalistan conflict focuses at the proximate, meso-level, observing which actors are physically carrying out the violence and which type of state violence – incompetent, collective, or selective. While I believe this proximate level is most appropriate for understanding the observed type and scope of violence, it would be naïve to believe that actions taken on the ground are not influenced by strategic decisions made by higher-level actors. Though I make no effort to model the strategic decisions of higher-level political actors, the case study presented below will demonstrate how the interactions of political elite can affect the type, shape, and level of state violence. The most obvious way this occurs is by choosing which state agency is charged with specific operations, but also by constraining on-the-ground forces, loosening the reigns on their action, providing resources to security forces, or creating laws that affect their range of motion.

\textsuperscript{44} Lacking individual-level data (though some individual leaders are discussed), the primary analysis takes place at the meso level – in this case, the state’s security forces that are primarily employed in counteracting the internal threat.
Table 4.1 shows a timeline of political and conflict developments. It notes the political control at the Indian central government, and the state of Punjab. It also notes developments and operations of the opposition and security forces, as well as the conflict intensity.

**Contextualizing India**

National unity has been an obvious and difficult problem in India both before and after its independence from the United Kingdom. It remains one of India’s most difficult tasks to this day. India is one of the most diverse countries in the world, second only to Indonesia in ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Fearon, 2003). The idea of India as one united country is a concept constructed by a history of invaders, conquerors, and colonizers. Maintaining a united (and mostly) democratic India while attempting to manage various nationalist demands – voiced by a majority group as well as the minorities – is an impressive achievement. However, many of these nationalist demands have at times become quite violent and several have taken the shape of armed challenges to the territorial integrity of India. While federal democracy may be credited with the management of some nationalist demands, it also provides a context for extraordinary expectations that outpace the ability of India’s developing political institutions to effectively incorporate them into the political system.

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45 Emergency rule from 1975-1977 presents an exception to the otherwise democratic experience of post-independence India (though it was not extra-Constitutional).
46 See Varshney (1993) for a discussion of India’s issues with national identity and the various nationalist and sub-nationalist sentiments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National Political Control</th>
<th>Punjab Political Developments</th>
<th>Opposition Character and Developments</th>
<th>Security Forces Operations and Developments</th>
<th>Conflict Intensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Emergency Rule – Indira Gandhi</td>
<td>Congress – Zail Singh</td>
<td>Bhindranwale begins rise</td>
<td></td>
<td>Near zero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Janata Party</td>
<td>Akali Dal – Badal</td>
<td>Akali Dal passes Anandpur Sahib Resolution / Communal clashes / Some radical groups formed</td>
<td>Police defections</td>
<td>Some communal clashes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Communal clashes / Police targeting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Congress – Gandhi</td>
<td>Congress – Darbara Singh</td>
<td>Plane hijacked / Targets Journalists</td>
<td>Refusal to engage militants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Targets Hindus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fortification of Golden Temple / Bombs Hindu events</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Indira Gandhi Assassinated / Anti-Sikh Riots</td>
<td>President’s Rule (1983-1985)</td>
<td>Bhindranwale killed / Movement splintered</td>
<td>Operation Bluestar / Woodrose</td>
<td>Spike in violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Rajiv Gandhi</td>
<td>Akali Dal – Barnala</td>
<td>ISI backing / Khalistan declaration / Rape begins</td>
<td></td>
<td>Steady escalation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AK-47s / Machine Guns</td>
<td>Bullet for Bullet policy begins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grenade Launchers / Civilian groupings targeted</td>
<td>Operation Black Thunder</td>
<td>Spike in violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
<td>President’s Rule</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Violence subsides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Janata Dal – V.P. Singh/ Chekhar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Violence spikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Congress – Beant Singh</td>
<td>Congress – Beant Singh</td>
<td>Group infighting Decapitated leadership / Many surrenders</td>
<td>Joint Police, Army final offensive</td>
<td>Victory declared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
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The experience of minority groups in India is characterized by an underlying omnipresent fear that they cannot maintain their identity or otherwise protect their interests in a Hindu-dominated state, despite a secular Constitution. Due, in part, to this long-term and underlying fear (as well as a great number of other factors), India has experienced several ethnic-based insurgencies aimed at greater autonomy or secession. Additionally, India has faced a Maoist-inspired insurgency aimed complete revolution.\(^{47}\)

However, it was not until fairly recently that these insurgencies, especially in Punjab and Kashmir, presented serious threats to the Union. The northeast section of India – a piece of land barely connected to India and characterized by numerous ethnolinguistic groups – has been home to active insurgencies since independence. The Maoist insurgency had been mostly confined to less developed tribal areas. In each case, they did not present serious threats to the Indian central government nor did they exist in places that mattered to the political elite based in New Delhi and obsessed with Pakistan. The central government addressed them with a mixture of repressive and political tactics.\(^{48}\) Organizationally, the Indian central government did not want to use the Army for these operations (though they did occasionally), since they were to be prepared for international war.

The Indian government mostly responded by refocusing paramilitary forces (e.g., Assam Rifles) or central armed police (e.g., Central Reserve Police Force) to counterinsurgency missions in the spirit of the British colonial counterinsurgency model.\(^{47}\)

\(^{47}\) It is worth mentioning that the mobilization strategy of the Maoists is based on this same fear. More specifically, it is aimed at low-caste or tribal populations that have been largely neglected by the high-caste Hindu dominated national elite.

\(^{48}\) In making this point, Staniland (2009) argues that state-building and hearts and minds approaches to counterinsurgency do not have a history of working in South Asia. Instead, most were ended with serious state repression and the violations of human rights.
What is most important about these organizations is that they are organized by the central government, without large local recruitment that would provide a co-ethnicity advantage.

Instead, the Indian central government was concerned with external threats and built its sub-state capacity to deal with them. India shares borders with two major rivals: China and Pakistan. India has fought and lost a border war against China (1962). While Chinese power overshadows that of Pakistan, the Pakistani threat is the foremost concern of India’s strategic elite (Cohen, 2002).49 The Indo-Pakistani rivalry has resulted in four international wars (1947, 1965, 1971, 1999). Three of the four involve the Kashmir issue, which remains the primary source of contention. The contention manifests itself in other issues. India accuses Pakistan of subversive involvement in many issues. Most important for this dissertation, Pakistan has provided material support and safe havens for several insurgencies that India faces, including the Khalistan and Kashmir insurgencies.

The Indo-Pakistani rivalry provides the main source of the international explanation for the Punjab conflict. Notably, the rivalry determines the how the Indian government invests in the Indian Army, focusing on combat capacity over intelligence gathering.50 Over the course of the Khalistan conflict, Pakistan ostensibly provided varying levels of support to insurgents. Although it did not appear to play a role in instigating the insurgency as it has in Kashmir on several occasions, it provided arms,

49 Cohen (2002, 200) sums up this obsession: “One of the puzzles of India-Pakistan relations is not why the smaller Pakistan feels encircled and threatened, but why the larger India does. It would seem that India, seven times more populous than Pakistan and five times larger, would be more secure, especially since it defeated Pakistan in 1971. This is not the case, and Pakistan remains deeply embedded in Indian thinking.”
50 This pattern fits most national armies, since they are mostly responsible for defense from external threats. Pakistan and China are simply the proximate motivations for such investment.
training, and a safe haven for Khalistanis. Ending Pakistani influence proved to be an important operational factor in ending the insurgency.

The Punjab Crisis in Historical Context

Sikhs in the Punjab - A brief history

Punjab’s tragedy is that there are no Punjabis any more in Punjab – only Sikhs and Hindus.

Kuldip Nayer (in Kuldip Nayer and Khushwant Singh, 1984, 7)

This brief historical context begins in the 1920 when leading Sikhs began organizing protests to wrest control of the Sikh temples (gurudwaras) from corrupt priests loyal to the British. The Gurudwara movement succeeded in 1925 and established two important Sikh institutions: the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) to oversee the temples and the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD, Akali Dal, or Akalis hereafter) to organize and mobilize Sikhs on the ground and later politically. The Akali Dal has since become the primary political party claiming to represent Sikh interests using an ideology that merges religion and politics. The SGPC controls funds from all Sikh temples in India, which finances the politics of the Akali Dal who operate mostly in the now-Sikh majority state of Punjab (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 31). Importantly, the 175-member SGPC also appoints the head of the Akal Takht, the most sacred shrine in the Sikh religion. The Akal Takht is the “primary seat of Sikh religious authority” (Singh, Harbans, 1998, 56, quoted in Chima, 2010). The shrine sits within the Golden Temple Complex in the holy city of Amritsar, Punjab, India. The head of the Akal Takht is

51 The SGPC is elected from a Sikh-only electorate while the Akali Dal contests elections for public office within a multi-ethnic Punjab electorate. As such, the SGPC is consistently more conservative than the relatively moderate Akali Dal.
important because he can issue edicts that provide guidance on religious issues (Chima, 2010, 26).

The modern Indian state of Punjab is about 14% of the area of the historical region named Punjab. When the British Raj ended in 1947 and British India was partitioned into Pakistan and India, the Punjab region was split in two. Predominantly Muslim West Punjab (60% of land area) went to Pakistan, while majority Hindu East Punjab went to India. Sikhs were stuck in the middle with about 60% of their population on the Indian side of the partition line (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 35). The horrors of ethnic cleansing that accompanied partition took an estimated 500,000 lives.52

The Sikh population, led by the Akali Dal, reluctantly went to the Indian side of partition. There was not a specific affinity for Hindus, (though some had affinity for Mohandas Gandhi and the national liberation movement more generally), but rather the choice was the result of a long-term rivalry with the region’s Muslim population.53 The Sikh religion, in fact, was formed during Muslim rule (i.e., the Mughol Empire) in the 15th Century, and it was under Muslim rule that Sikhs and their founding Gurus were originally persecuted.

After independence and partition, the Indian state of Punjab primarily spoke the Punjabi language, but still had a Hindu majority. Sikhs represented around 35% of the population (Brass, 1974, 301). The Akali Dal, convinced that a Sikh majority state was the only way to preserve the separate Sikh ethnoreligious identity, led the non-violent Punjabi Suba (or province) movement for a further bifurcation Punjab (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 35) note, it “has not been effectively contested.”

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52 This number is disputed and may even be conservative. But as Tully and Jacob (1985, 35) note, it “has not been effectively contested.”

53 The Sikhs, represented by the Akali Dal, did seek an independent homeland at the time of partition, but the prospect was never taken seriously (Singh, 2004)
This Punjabi Suba movement was eventually successful in 1966 bifurcating Punjab into Hindi-speaking Haryana and Punjabi-speaking Punjab. The Punjabi Suba movement was clearly for a Sikh majority state; that is, on a communal (not linguistic) basis. Prime Minister and India’s founding father Jawaharlal Nehru was adamantly against communally based states, but had conceded to linguistically based states with the States Reorganization Act of 1956. He had rejected the call for a truncated Punjabi state at that time, claiming it was obviously a communally based movement (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 39-40). It was Indira Gandhi who oversaw the implementation of the Punjabi state. Tully and Jacob (1985, 42) argue this was due, in part, to the performance of Sikh troops and rural Sikhs during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 (Ibid, 42). Another factor was the communalization of language. While most people in the post-independence, pre-Punjabi Suba state spoke Punjabi, during the 1971 Census Hindus in the southern portion (now the state of Haryana) claimed Hindi as the first language and Sikhs claimed Punjabi. Still, it is important to understand that the Punjabi linguistic group is not synonymous with Sikhs as an ethnic group.

While this twice-truncated current state of Punjab represents 14% of the area of the original Punjab, the Sikhs finally represented a majority (60.2%) in their state (Wallace, 1986, 364). While Sikhs can be found all over India, they are principally concentrated in the modern state of Punjab. In 1971, around 8 million of India’s 10.5 million Sikhs lived in Punjab (ibid, 364).

Despite the majority status of Sikhs, the Akali Dal does not dominate the politics of Punjab because the Sikhs in the Punjab are not exactly a coherent, homogenous
political group. Despite a relatively greater sense of “peoplehood,” the Sikh social and political group has “cross-cutting cleavages, including caste, class, and partisan affiliation” in addition to the regional identity of Punjabi and national identity of Indian (Chima, 2010, 23).

There is also a religious dimension to the Sikh ethnic group that will become important in order to understand state targeting described below. Essentially, there are four groups of Sikhs, ordered, more or less, by religious orthodoxy: amritdhari, keshdhari, sahajdhari, and “various ‘Hindu-Sikh’ sects” (Chima, 2010, 23). The first two are particularly important because they are easily identified with visual markers. Amritdhari, meaning baptized, Sikhs are the pure orthodox variant and are required to live by a strict code, which requires certain dress (called the five k’s). Of particular import is the unshorn hair that is kept in a turban. Keshdhari Sikhs also keep unshorn hair in a turban, but have not been baptized and could be interpreted as being less pious than Amritdhari Sikhs. Amritdhari Sikhs are “small portion of the total Sikh population,” while Keshdhari Sikhs make up “two-thirds to three-quarters” (Chima, 2010, 23-24).

On the caste dimension, the most important of these intra-Sikh groups for this narrative are the Sikhs of the Jat caste. Jat Sikhs are the dominant Sikh caste in Punjab, but do not necessarily lead other Sikhs politically (Wallace, 1986). They tend to be in the agricultural sector and are commonly described as the land-owning caste (Chima, 2010; 54 The term comes from Chima (2010, 23), who notes that Sikhs tend to be more self-aware than other groups in North India.

55 For an alternative categorization, see Singh, Gurharpal, 2000, 86).

56 All amritdhari Sikhs wear what is called the five K’s: “kesh (unshorn hair), kirpan (a ceremonial dagger), kara (a steel bracelet), kacchara (a military-style underpant), and kanga (a wooden comb) (Chima, 2010, 22-23).

57 The Sikh religion was created on egalitarian grounds in protest, partly, of the social hierarchy of the Hindu caste system and “Sikh theology does not subscribe to the existence of caste” (Chima, 2010, 23).
Wallace, 1986). As the land-owning caste, they are largely located in rural Punjab.

Because India does not take a caste-based census, the estimates of their proportion of all Sikhs vary: from about 33% (Wallace, 1986) to 50% (Jeffrey, 1986) to 66% (Amrik Singh, cited in Wallace, 1995, 377, fn: 76).

Jat Sikhs are the principal social force behind the Akali Dal political party (Wallace, 1986). The other Sikh groups are politically heterogeneous, so the Akali Dal had not been able to secure political dominance, even in a majority Sikh state. In the Punjab state elections following the Punjabi Suba (1967), the Akali Dal won 24 of the 117 seats compared to the Indian National Congress (Congress hereafter) Party’s 48. It was able, however, to form a short-lived government through a coalition.\(^{58}\) “So the Akalis [finally] had their homeland but could not govern it” (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 43).

Because the Akali Dal mostly represents Jat Sikhs, who are conservative land-owning rural agriculturalists, it is not surprising that the Akali Dal is a vocal advocate of devolution of power to Punjab, especially regarding agricultural issues. The main political opponent of the Akali Dal is Congress. The social support for Congress in Punjab comes from “Hindus and Sikhs other than ‘Jats’” (Chadha, 2005, 194). Hindus in the Punjab live primarily, though not exclusively, in urban areas and are engaged in commerce (Chadha, 2005, 194).

*Rise of ethnonationalism: Underlying Grievances and Political Demands*

The years after the implementation of the Punjabi Suba to the beginning of conflict went well for Punjab economically. Punjab was the heart of India’s Green Revolution in wheat

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\(^{58}\) State elections in India follow the same Westminster format as the national Indian parliament (Lok Sabha): single-member districts within a parliamentary system.
during the 1960s and 1970s and is known as the breadbasket of India (along with Haryana). “One [statistical] highlight is that Punjab in 1980-81, occupying 1.6% of the area of the country and with 16.7 million people (1981 census), provided 73% of the India-wide procurement of wheat, and 48% of rice” (Wallace, 1986, 367).

However, Pettigrew (1995) argues that the origins of the conflict lie in agrarian policies of the Indian central government toward the riparian Punjab's water rights. Jat Sikh farmers produce mostly wheat on small, owner-occupier farms using irrigation from the state’s rivers (ibid, 5; H.K. Manmohan Singh, 2013). The Indian central government mandated that 75% of Punjab water be allocated to non-riparian states, meaning there would be less irrigation for Punjabi farmers (ibid, 5). This contributed to a general sense that the Indian government would not allow the Punjab to keep its resources or the wealth generated within. Complimentary to the issue of water rights, farmers in Punjab experienced a significant rise in the cost of production (due to diesel and power shortages) accompanied by a low price for wheat. 60

Despite impressive gains in agricultural productivity during the 1960s, the Green Revolution brought rising indebtedness and increasing economic grievances based on the fact that Punjabi farmers could not control their own destiny. The indebtedness might not have been a huge problem if the benefits of the Green Revolution had continued. However, the output during the Green Revolution could not keep up with rising expectations, which follow a classic Davies’ J-curve theory of grievance leading to violence (Singh 1984; Davies 1962). As Punjab’s agricultural success stagnated, it highlighted the fact that Punjab is “industrially backward,” which was blamed on the

59 See also Singh, Daljeet (1992) for a discussion of the Punjab river-waters dispute.

While some Punjab-level grievances seem rooted in the lack of modernization, the modernization that had taken place threatened the orthodox Sikhs and with it the socio-religious base of the Akali Dal (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 37; Chadha, 2005, 194).

So why did the Sikhs become so disenchanted with life that they felt they had to take on the Indian government? The short answer is that most Sikhs did not. But there was an important section of the Sikh community, identified with the Akali Dal, which saw the modernism that came with prosperity as a menace to their faith, a threat to their identity. Terry-cotton shirts, jeans, motorcycles and whisky do not go with the observance of the five ‘k’ s. Modern life is too fast for cumbersome processes like tying turbans, and washing waist-length hair. So to many Sikhs the safety razor became the symbol of modernity, and this alarmed the orthodox (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 37).

These Punjabi, Sikh, and Akali Dal grievances manifested themselves in the political demands of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR). The demands of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution were for the devolution of power to Punjab short of succession. But within the federal structure of India, the demands would extremely limit the power of the central government beyond anything that could possibly be agreed upon by the center. Under the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, the role of the central government would be limited to “defense, foreign relations, currency, and general communications” (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 46).

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61 The resolution was originally passed by a subcommittee of the Akal Dal in 1973, but later became the principal document of political demands against the state.

62 The Anandpur Sahib Resolution (as amended and passed in 1978) demanded: 1) the transfer of Chandigarh, the shared capital with Haryana, to Punjab exclusively; 2) the transfer of Punjabi-speaking areas surrounding Punjab to Punjab; 3) Punjabi control of water rights; 4) that the ratio of Sikh men in the Army be maintained (around 10%); 5) more industrial investment in Punjab; 6) revisions of land reforms; 7) the enactment of an all-India temple act; and 8) the protection of Sikhs outside Punjab. The full document is
Rise of Bhindranwale, the Emergence of Khalistani Groups, and the Cynical Role of National-Level Politics

Despite these underlying grievances against the state of India, the beginnings of religious violence did not target the state. Instead, the first acts of violence were communal clashes, especially with Nirankari Sikhs (a “Hindu-Sikh” sect considered heretical by orthodox Sikhs) and later Hindus (Chima, 2010, 41). The violence against communal groups was a reflection of the growing religious radicalism merging with the political demands.

The undisputed leader of religious extremism was Sant (or Saint) Jarnail Bhindranwale, a radical but charismatic Sikh preacher. Bhindranwale was not part of the Akali leadership, but he became the face of the demands by outflanking the Akalis. That is, he took over as champion of the ASR by refusing any concessions except full implementation of the ASR, when the more moderate Akalis saw the ASR as a starting point in negotiations.

In April 1978, the first and most important Nirankari-Sikh clash occurred in Amritsar, Punjab. The clash occurred between Nirankaris at a Nirankari convention and “a procession of Sikhs” (Chima, 2010, 42). The clash resulted in the killings of 13 Sikhs, four of which were members of Bhindranwale’s seminary.

Because the violent clash was viewed as a Nirankari attack on Sikhs, it had several interrelated effects on the coming militancy. First, it gave the conflict its first martyrs. Second, it resulted in the strengthening the Sikh radicals vis-à-vis the moderates available online: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/document/papers/anantpur_sahib_resolution.htm.
who led the Akali Dal in a coalition government in Punjab. Third, the SGPC instructed the head of the Akal Takht to issue an edict to use “all appropriate means” to counter the Nirankaris, which was seen as a justification for violence (quoted in Chima, 2010, 43). Fourth, the edict justified the formation of several Khalistani groups who later became notable armed groups in the Khalistan conflict.

The Nirankari-Sikh clash also provided the Congress Party the opportunity to undermine the moderate Akalis and improve their own electoral prospects. In 1978, Congress was out of power for the first time since independence at the federal level, but also out of power in Punjab. In an effort to destabilize the Punjab coalition government, to which the Akalis were a partner, Congress supported Sikh religious radicals, including Bhindranwale, to “out-radical” the Akalis. The goal of such a political move was to force the Akali Dal to the right, which would alienate the moderate supporters of the Akali Dal, and split the Sikh vote with Congress. To enact this policy, Congress reportedly supported the emergence of two radical groups in addition to supporting Bhindranwale. The most important of these was the Dal Khalsa, which was one of the first groups to explicitly push for a separate, sovereign Sikh state to be named Khalistan (and still does so within Punjab and internationally). The extent of Congress support for the radicals is not clear. It appears that Congress operatives provided financial support, political support in the form of campaigning resources (e.g., for the 1979 SGPC elections) and perhaps some cover from prosecution/arrest for their violent activities (Chima, 2010, 47; Nayer and Singh, 1984, 30-34; Tully and Jacob, 1985, 57-61).

Though not critical to this dissertation, the main actors within Congress responsible for this policy were Sanjay Gandhi (Indira Gandhi’s late son) and former Punjab Chief Minister and future India president Zail Singh (Nayer and Singh, 1984, 30-32).
Other important radical (and later militant) groups emerged after that Nirankari-Sikh clash of 1978, but were not aided by Congress. The Babbar Khalsa originally organized to enforce the edict against the Nirankaris and avenge the death of the martyred (Chima, 2010, 47-48). The All-India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) had been the student wing of the Akali Dal for decades, but radicalized after the clash when Bhindranwale’s close friend became the president and began organizing an independent base of support (ibid, 47-48).

While not every organization was explicitly loyal to Bhindranwale, he had certainly emerged as an important radical to counter the moderates in the Akali Dal. His notoriety as the religious radical was cemented with two prominent assassinations. The first was the 1980 assassination of the Nirankari guru and the second was the 1981 assassination of Lala Jagat Narain, a prominent Hindu leader and former Member of Parliament. I will return to the latter below as I describe key events in Stage #1 of the conflict.

The previous sections outline the key political actors in Punjab, the Sikh community, and the grievances that were drawn upon for recruitment and popular support during the insurgency to come. With such a variety of grievances, it would be unwise to draw anything more than tentative conclusions about the one true cause of the conflict. Instead, the wide range of grievances, whether they were states’ rights issues, agricultural policies, or religious tensions, meant that they affected large sections of Punjabi society and that the Khalistani proponents could draw upon these grievances to create, at least initially, some cross-class support for the movement.
Overview of the Khalistan Conflict – Stages and Trends

After Bhindranwale emerged as the leader of the budding ethnonationalist movement, the character of the movement transformed into more violent stages, starting in 1981. The previous sections provide context from the pre-independence period until the period where ethnonationalist violence emerges, at which point we can evaluate the state response in terms of the theoretical expectations laid out in Chapter 2. This section overviews these stages briefly to help set the stage for the empirical evaluation of the conflict that will follow.

This dissertation divides up the Khalistan conflict into three stages that correspond to the state agency in the security sector tasked with counterinsurgency – the independent variables outlined in the theory chapter. The first stage (1981-1984) saw the emergence of ethnonationalist violence directed at communal groups (usually Hindus), state authorities (i.e., Punjab Police and politicians), and other groupings of civilian populations (e.g., market). The local security agents tasked with countering the violent actors were the Punjab Police. The response by the Punjab Police was mostly inept, which led to a moderate escalation effect by allowing effective impunity for militants. The second stage was the summer of 1984, where the Indian Army was tasked with removing the militants from the Golden Temple and other counterinsurgency measures. The result of Stage #2 was a serious backlash effect against the government, the proliferation of militants, civilian supporters, and the use of violence. Stage #3 (1985-1993) represents the return of the Punjab Police as primary counterinsurgents. Throughout this period, the Punjab Police invested in organizational and operational capacity, which eventually led to selective targeting of militants. This process evolved
throughout stage #3, so it is given specific attention in Chapter 5. Figure 4.1 shows the trajectory of the conflict with yearly data on civilian deaths (dotted line) and militant/suspected militant deaths (solid line).

Figure 4.1. Trends of civilian and militant deaths, 1981-1993.

Stage #1: Emerging Violence, Police Incompetence, and Moderate Escalation (1981-1984)

Theoretical Argument, Coding Sub-State Capacity, and Police Action
The theoretical argument developed in Chapter 2 outlines expectations of state violence based on which state agent is tasked with counterinsurgency and their relative balance of strength along three dimensions: coercive capacity, intelligence capacity, and organizational capacity. While most of the theory focused on which configurations
produced collective violence and selective violence, one key implication was that agents without strong organizational capacity are unlikely to be effective, even if they have strong intelligence or coercive capacity. Hypothesis #5 expected that agents with weak organizational control are more likely to execute selective strategies incompetently, while hypothesis #6 expected these agents to also abuse their power in the conflict environment to pursue private violence.

The Punjab Police were the primary counterinsurgents during Stage #1, although counterinsurgent is not really the appropriate term for this stage. First, the Khalistanis could not be thought of as an insurgency during this period, though they were developing into one at this time. Bhindranwale, for instance, was free to roam the state, give passionate anti-India speeches, and was accompanied by armed bodyguards. It was not until later that the movement went completely clandestine. Second, the Punjab Police did not respond to the Khalistanis as if they were insurgents fighting for a homeland. Instead, the emerging violence was treated as a law and order problem. The Punjab Police were a civil police force, a group of bureaucrats not recruited for counterinsurgency.

The Punjab Police can be coded during the early stages as having weak coercive capacity and weak organizational capacity, despite several inherent local intelligence advantages. In relative terms, the Punjab Police, like all police, have much less coercive capacity than the Indian Army or other official paramilitaries in India. As noted in the theory section, this is by design. State and local police are not built for taking and holding territory, nor are they built for counterinsurgency. Still, the coercive capacity of the Punjab Police in absolute terms was relatively weak. About 58% of police in India are categorized as unarmed, though they have access to a weapon at their police post
When armed, they usually have access to a bolt-action .303 rifle (Gill, 1999). Most duties of the police were performing static roadblocks, which is a common policing tactic across India. Since Punjab had been peaceful for most of its post-independence history, the general weakness of police is not shocking, nor necessarily inappropriate.

The Punjab Police do have inherent intelligence advantages that were not used properly given its weak organizational capacity during this early stage of conflict. The composition of the Punjab Police reflects the Punjab social composition. It was comprised of mostly Sikh men (approximately 60%); giving it the co-ethnicity advantage discussed the Chapter 2. Further, even non-Sikh members of the Punjab Police speak Punjabi, providing additional ability to extract intelligence not found at national-level security organizations.

The weak organizational capacity of Indian police and other bureaucracies is well established and the Punjab Police was no exception. Indian police have a poor reputation for corruption and politicization (Bayley, 1983). Verma (1999) argues that the British first established an organizational culture of corruption in the police, which had the purpose of isolating them from the community. Corruption is a symptom of weak organizational control. While corruption is the easiest to document, since there appears to be a consensus on the issue, it is not the only form of organizational weakness. Other organizational issues plagued the Punjab Police and manifested themselves in a variety of ways. Among the most important for this study are the lack of control of rank and file constables, who engaged in numerous excesses, the unwillingness to engage the

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64 Punjab is the only state that counts a policeman as armed if it has such access. This distorts the statistics, which is why I use all-India data here. Punjab is not an outlier on other measures reported in the Bayley’s (1969) comprehensive study of the Indian Police.
perpetrators of violence, and as a result the targeting of vulnerable nonviolent populations. The events discussed below demonstrate these points.

*National- and Punjab-level politics*

The demand for implementation of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution took two forms simultaneously. First, the Akali Dal negotiated with the central government while concurrently pursuing mass protests to strengthen its position. The radicals, on the other hand, started using an increasing level of violence. The dissertation, of course, is focused on the latter, but it is important to understand the former as well.

In 1980, PM Indira Gandhi and Congress returned to power at the national level after their first absence since independence. They ousted the weak coalition headed by the Janata Party alliance, to which the Akali Dal was a minor partner. The central government then dismissed the Punjab state governments, among others, and called for elections. Congress won and the Akali Dal was out of power again in Punjab.

The Congress-led government tried to appear serious about addressing Sikh grievances, but failed to do so. Between 1980 and 1984, there was a recurring pattern of 1) national government-Sikh negotiations (led by Congress and the Akali Dal political parties respectively) to implement the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, 2) an agreement to implement most of it, 3) reneging by the national government, and 4) renewed Sikh agitation protests (*morchas*) and strikes, leading to new negotiations and the pattern

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These two points are somewhat contradictory, since one demonstrates too much action and the other not enough. The latter is somewhat a result of the former, although there is evidence that they happened concurrently as well. Militants assassinated police officers accused of the excesses and this did paralyze many in the police to not act.
starting over again. One count lists twenty-five official or unofficial meetings between the Akali Dal and the Indian government (Dhillon, 2005).

Key Events and Observed State Action

The AISSF started an anti-tobacco agitation in May 1981 that corresponded with their demand that Amritsar be designated a holy city, subject to orthodox Sikh religious laws. The agitation was inherently communal. Tobacco is forbidden for Sikhs and the primary sellers and users of tobacco were Hindus. The agitation sparked counter demonstrations by Hindus and Hindu-Sikh clashes. It represented the first turn toward violence against Hindus in Punjab, a development that was part of a strategy to encourage Hindus to leave Punjab to the Sikhs.

In carrying out that Hindu strategy, Sikh radicals assassinated Lala Jagat Narain, a prominent Hindu and critic of the far-right Sikh ethnonationalists, in September 1981. Narain had run a newspaper critical of the Sikhs radicals, which was the justification given for his murder, the first of many (successful) attempts to silence the media. Bhindranwale was most likely responsible for the assassination and was to be arrested for the crime. The first attempt at his arrest was telling of the police’s lack of organizational control. Bhindranwale managed to escape the area before police arrived, prompting the police to burn two buses, beat up some Bhindranwale followers, and burn copies of the Sikh holy text (the Guru Granth Sahib) (Chima, 2010, 63; Gill, 1997).

These events highlight different developments that were important to the escalation of the conflict as well as demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the police. His escape has been cited by many observers as evidence of protection from high-ranking Congress politicians (Chima, 2010; Gill, 1997; Nayer and Singh, 1984; Tully and Jacob, 1985).
The uncontrolled “rampage” of the police was emblematic of police excesses and
the lack of control of rank and file police. As the violence continued, the police
“retaliated by raiding the houses of suspects, beating up the inmates and even killing a
few of them in faked ‘encounters’” (Nayer and Singh, 1985, 54-55). Some of these
encounters were faked, in the sense that suspects were killed in custody, and passed off as
if they had been killed in a standoff. Other encounters occurred outside of custody, but
were extra-judicial executions. Others were actual violent encounters sparked when
police attempted arrests.\textsuperscript{68} The Chief Minister, Darbara Singh, admitted that encounters
occurred and that he ordered them (Tully and Jacob, 105-106).

The result of these police excesses led to an escalation in the conflict, at least
between Bhindranwale’s men and the Punjab Police. Bhindranwale used the signs of
torture on the bodies to enflame anti-Indian sentiment and began selectively assassinating
police who were thought to be the perpetrators (Chima, 2010, 55). Still, this escalation
was minor in comparison to later years.\textsuperscript{69}

These police assassinations had a paralyzing effect on the Punjab Police,\textsuperscript{70} though
some continued the circle of Khalistani-police escalation. A few examples will
demonstrate their condition. In 1981, when police approached Khalistanis to arrest them
for political violence, the police dropped their weapons and fled if they were fired upon
(Sahni, author interview, 2012). In the early stages, a common source of Khalistani
weaponry came from attacking police posts, which were often abandoned without a fight.

\textsuperscript{68} It is very difficult to tell which type was most common or what the distribution was.
\textsuperscript{69} Police/militants killed in 1981, 1982, 1983, respectively: 2/14, 2/7, 20/13 (Wallace,
2007, 432).
\textsuperscript{70} This is consistent with the logic of hypothesis #2. Opposition selective violence should
have similar deterrent effects on security forces.
complex attacked and abducted 6 police officers. The only retaliation was to beg for the
men back. They did not even attempt to negotiate for the weapons (Gill, 1999).

As Bhindranwale and his followers increased their level of violence, the Punjab
Police were too inept to counter them effectively. For the most part, the Punjab Police
was not prepared for ethnonationalist violence through either recruitment or training.

The police were badly organized, with no clear chain of command, and
they interacted ineffectively with other security agencies…They were also
infiltrated by militant sympathizers, and there were communal rifts both
within and between the police and paramilitary organizations (Fair, 2008,
47).

The Punjab Police’s lack of organizational capacity not only led to an
unwillingness to fight or pursue intelligence leads, but to incompetent targeting of anyone
they could pass off as militants. Tully and Jacob (1985, 108-109) recall their interview
with a senior police official after they learned that the police had been arresting petty
criminals and passing them off as Khalistanis.

He [a senior official in the Punjab government] said, ‘We must appear to
be doing something. But the trouble is that the Punjab Police are
demoralised. So many of their colleagues have been killed by
Bhindranwale's men that they have no faith in our ability to protect them.’
When I asked about the paramilitary police [the Central Reserve Police
Force, CRPF] who had been moved into the state to stiffen the backbone
of the Punjab Police, he replied, ‘What can the paramilitary police do on
their own? They do not know the state and have to rely on the local
knowledge of the Punjab Police.’…The paramilitary police never believed
that the Punjab Police were serious about stamping out terrorism. In fact
many paramilitary police officers believed that the Punjab Police were on
Bhindranwale’s side.

In addition to the Khalistani-police action, the humiliation of Sikhs en route to the
Asian Games in Delhi was crucial in setting the stage for the coming Army action and
growing insurgency. In 1982, New Delhi hosted the Asian Games, which came with
serious international media attention. As part of the Akalis negotiations with Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi, they threatened to take their agitation/protest to Delhi. On
direction from the Prime Minister, the Haryana Chief Minister, sealed the
Punjab/Haryana border to screen Sikhs on the way to the Asian Games.\textsuperscript{71} Chima (2010)
describes the collective nature of the targeting well.

\textit{All Sikhs} traveling from Punjab to Delhi, including those legitimately
doing so to attend the Asian Games, were searched and often humiliated at
scores of checkpoints set up by the Haryana police. Those searched
included sitting Sikh MPs and retired senior defense force personnel.
Others were forced to return back to Punjab. In contrast, \textit{no Hindus}
were stopped or searched while traveling through Haryana (Chima 2010, 73,
italics added).\textsuperscript{72}

This collective screening appeared to be a success for the Prime Minister. There was little
disruption at the actual Asian Games. It culminated in the arrest of 1500 Sikhs on
suspicion of intent to demonstrate (Tully and Jacob 1985, 87).

This success, however, was a short-term success. The backlash effect among the
Sikh population was clear. Recall that the Akali Dal did not dominate politics even in a
truncated, Sikh majority state. There were many Sikhs in Punjab who supported other
parties, including Congress, and many more who opposed the radicals and militants.

“…[T]he psychological and symbolic impact of the discriminatory
treatment meted out to Sikhs, including non-Akalis, during the Asian
games was immediate and would be long-lasting. Many Sikhs previously
unsympathetic to both the Akali \textit{morcha} [or agitation] and Bhindranwale
began actively sympathizing with them after the Asian Games, having
experienced humiliation by the government first hand” (Chima 2010, 73).

Beyond building ethnonationalist sympathies among the general Sikh population, the
collective screening of Sikhs had a demonstrable affect on the fighting capabilities of the

\textsuperscript{71} Haryana surrounds about three quarters of Delhi and is the direct route through which
Punjab citizens would travel.

\textsuperscript{72} Other prominent Sikhs that were humiliated include the former head of the Indian Air
Force, Air Chief Marshal Arjun Singh; Lieutenant-General Jagdit Singh Aurora; a judge
of the High Court; and Kuldip Nayar, a Congress MP (Tully and Jacob 1985, 86-87).
coming insurgency. After the Asian Games, the Akali Dal called for a meeting of ex-
servicemen at the Golden Temple in Amritsar. The turnout was apparently much larger
than anticipated. The numbers are disputed, but the journalists’ figure, considered
conservative, is around 5,000 (Tully and Jacob 1985, 89). Most notably, in attendance
were “170 retired officers above the rank of colonel…Many of them fell under the spell
of Bhindranwale at that meeting in the Gold Temple” (ibid, 88). Several ex-servicemen,
including prominent ones, stayed in the Temple and assisted with training young Sikhs
with weapons. A retired Major-General, who had been humiliated on the way to the
Asian Games, became Bhindranwale’s “informal military advisor” (Chima, 2010, 74).

The increased ranks of the militants coincided with the transformation of the
Golden Temple complex, whose sacredness is “universally acknowledged,” into a
militarized fortress for the Khalistanis (Fair, 2008, 42). Bhindranwale moved his
headquarters to the Golden Temple after the arrest of his closest compatriot, the president
of the AISSF. That arrest came one day after Zail Singh, the Home Minister and
purported patron of Bhindranwale, left the post of Home Minister to become the
President of India, a more visible but less powerful position. This is evidence that now
Bhindranwale and his associates were no longer protected by Congress officials.

The Golden Temple became the operational base for several militant groups to
carry out political violence—mostly in the form of assassinations and bombings—but
there were also airplane hijackings and shooting sprees during this time period.
Bhindranwale and the Khalistanis stockpiled weapons in the Golden Temple, smuggling
them in through vehicles carrying the day laborers. “The police dared not search the
vehicles for fear of reprisals. Past experience had shown that those policemen who had
arrested Bhindranwale’s followers and close associates, had sooner or later been eliminated” (Brar, 1993, 28).

*Moderate Escalation*

The early years of the militancy reflected a comparatively small, but growing level of violence. This violence reflected the increased power of the militants as well as the incompetence of the state response (politically, strategically, and tactically). The radicals were growing powerful, not only within the Sikh political system by crowding out the moderates, but also in material terms. The ranks and sympathizers of militants grew after the humiliation at the Asian Games and they began amassing serious weapons capabilities, including AK-47s and a grenade factory in the Golden Temple.

The state response during the years 1980-1983 reflected a general sense of non-urgency by the central government. The continual reneging on the agreements with the Akali Dal was a clear symptom of its attitude. There are a couple reasons for this state non-response. Violence – even the extremist variety – is not uncommon in India and the relatively low casualty figures may not have been particularly alarming. I should note that violence in Punjab, which had been generally peaceful and prosperous, was a new phenomenon. Between 1980 and the summer of 1983, the central government led by Congress may have believed the ethnonationalist violence was less of a problem than it appeared since the radicals originally enjoyed Congress protection. They were not troubled by the violence until after Zail Singh, one of the alleged key Congress patrons of Bhindranwale, left the Home Ministry, which ostensibly cut off support, and yet the violence continued to escalate.
In the fall of 1983, after escalating communal violence, the central government began taking the problem seriously. Sikh militants hijacked a bus, separated the Hindus from Sikhs, and killed 6 Hindus. PM Gandhi quickly dismissed the Congress-led Punjab government and imposed President’s Rule (which means rule by central government). She also restarted negotiations over the ASR with the Akali Dal.

However, the militants continued to gain in strength and in their use of violence. The year 1983 saw the total number of deaths at 88 (55 of which were civilians) (Wallace, 2007, 432). This number rose threefold in the first five months of 1984 alone. It was this quick escalation after the imposition of President’s Rule that really alarmed the central government into action. As the next section shows, however, the government replaced its under-reaction with an over-reaction; what Paul Wallace (1995; 2007) calls sending an elephant to catch a mouse.

Stage #2: Intransigent Insurgents, Collective Targeting, and Backlash Effect (1984)

Theoretical Argument, Coding Sub-State Capacity, and Army Action

Hypothesis #3 expects state agents with weak local intelligence capacity to be more likely to use collective violence. The absence of the ability to distinguish between targets at the individual level, regardless of coercive or organizational capacity, means the

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73 The federal structure of India allows the central government to dismiss state governments and appoint a governor. While this is called President’s Rule, it is more like prime minister’s rule, since the President does not make this decision and the Prime Minister’s administration will appoint the governor. President’s Rule is allowed for several reasons, including the break down in law and order, but is often used for political purposes. That PM Gandhi would dismiss a Congress government in Punjab is a serious step, since it implies that Congress cannot handle the problem.
agency cannot target selectively. And because it is both unlikely to not act at all and concede sovereignty to the rebels, the agency is likely to target at some collective level.

In Stage #2 beginning in June of 1984, the Indian Army is selected as the primary counterinsurgent. For the operations discussed below, all central police, state police, and paramilitaries are put under the Army’s command. The Indian Army has a respectable distribution of sub-state capacity. With tanks, missiles, heavy artillery, air power, and an active duty roster topping one million servicemen, the Army certainly has stronger coercive capacity compared to any Indian state agency in security sector. Compared to other countries, India is considered a middle power, but rising steadily (Cohen and Dasgupta, 2010). While a lot of modernization has taken place since the 1980s (ibid), the Indian Army was already capable in coercive terms in the 1980s. This was demonstrated most apparently when they fought Pakistan on two fronts and forced a surrender that granted independence to East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971.

The Indian Army would also be coded as having relatively strong organizational capacity. While corruption is not unheard of in the Army, it does exercise a strong chain of command. One would expect the rank and file to do as commanded and be punished within the law if and when they did not. This is not to claim that the Indian Army is not without organizational faults. It has been accused of human rights abuses in the terrorism- or insurgency-affected areas, such as Assam and Kashmir.

The Indian Army, like most armies, would be considered to have weak local intelligence capacity. This is not to say that it cannot handle tactical intelligence in

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74 While it is not part of my argument, Paul Staniland (2009) argues that there is a history of internal conflicts actually stabilizing in this type of equilibrium in South Asia. While I believe states are unlikely concede de facto sovereignty, the conditions under which they do warrant further investigation.
international warfare or crisis situations. Rather, specifically for clandestine
counterinsurgency situations, it lacks local sources of knowledge to be able to distinguish
between insurgents and civilians at the individual level.\textsuperscript{75} While I expect most armies to
lack these sources of intelligence, India’s military intelligence was weakened by design at
independence in order to prevent potential military overreach into civilian-controlled
government (Maxwell, 2000).\textsuperscript{76}

In the summer of 1984, the Army carried out two cases of collective violence –
Operation Bluestar and Operation Woodrose. Each contributed to the backlash effect that
strengthened the insurgency and dramatically increased active popular support and tacit
sympathy. Operation Bluestar, in particular, led to two more watershed events that
affected the trajectory of the conflict, the assassination of PM Indira Gandhi and the
resulting anti-Sikh riots of 1984.

\textit{Operation Bluestar and Operation Woodrose}

Based on his seemingly invulnerable position, Bhindranwale ratcheted up the action in
late 1982 through early 1984. Bhindranwale’s men murdered a senior police officer
outside the Golden Temple (in addition to many non-senior officers throughout the
previous years) and appeared to be responsible for the aforementioned bus hijacking.

\textsuperscript{75} As Kalyvas (2006) argues, however, armies may be better at gathering intelligence in
large-scale civil wars where intelligence is acquired through providing selective benefits
and punishments under the condition of territorial control.

\textsuperscript{76} I thank Stephen Wilkinson for pointing this out to me. See Mahadevan (2012) for an
analysis of the national level intelligence agencies – the Intelligence Bureau and the
Research & Analysis Wing – in counterterrorism. One main point worth mentioning is
that he finds that India’s counterterrorism failures are not the fault of national-level
intelligence agencies. They perform well as strategic intelligence, but tactical intelligence
(the kind that matters for selective targeting) must come from one the ground security
forces.
After the bus hijacking and imposition of President’s Rule, the new centrally-controlled
government gave the Punjab Police unquestioned authority to “shoot who they wanted
when they wanted and search where they wanted” (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 107). Bhindranwale was undeterred by the imposition of President’s Rule and continued his
militancy, the assassinations, and most importantly his fortification of the Golden Temple
Complex and the Akal Takht in particular – the holiest of Sikh shrines. These actions
were tantamount to taunting the Prime Minister to actually act beyond imposing
President’s Rule, which was a clear failure.

After escalating violence and Bhindranwale’s taunting, PM Indira Gandhi finally
gave the order to invade the Golden Temple, which occurred on June 5, 1984. The Prime
Minister was fully aware of the risk she was taking. The national government and the
Punjab Police were reluctant to enter the Guru Nanak Niwas – a rest house in the hostel
part of the larger complex but not part of a holy shrine – to arrest Bhindranwale in fear of
a backlash effect (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 98-99). They waited too long. As Bhindranwale
became less secure in the rest house, he sought and achieved permission from the High
Priests to live in and fortify the Akal Takht. This made entering the Complex much more
difficult politically since most Sikhs would have understood raiding the rest house but the
Akal Takht was strictly sacrosanct.

Operation Bluestar was an Army operation that raided the Golden Temple
Complex to “flush out” Bhindranwale and his followers. The goal of “flushing out”
quickly evolved into a lethal mission. The complex was fortified through the help of
former Army Major-General Shabbeg Singh. The operation took three days and nights

77 These preceding events and the actual Operation Bluestar are documented with much
greater detail in other works, including, but not limited to: (Tully and Jacob, 1985;
Chima, 2010; Brass, 1988; Gill, 2001).
and cost substantial casualties. It was, however, ultimately successful in defeating Bhindranwale and those of his followers who stayed to fight. The casualty numbers are still disputed, but, at minimum, the operation was responsible for 83 military lives and 493 militant or civilian lives. Tully and Jacob (1985, 184-185) note that these official numbers, published by the central government’s White Paper, leave at least 1,600 people unaccounted for. Pettigrew (1995, 8) cites, from human rights groups, figures as high as 4,000 killed. The Operation also left the sacred Akal Takht in rubble.

The Prime Minister’s counterinsurgency strategy, in this case, did not specifically target the Sikhs collectively. While it resulted in high civilian (and especially high Sikh) casualties, both intentional and unintentional, it seems quite clear that the objective was Bhindranwale and his followers, a perfectly selective target. However, there were three reasons that the Operation appeared to be targeting the collective Sikh community. First, the day of the assault was the celebration of Guru Arjun’s martyrdom, so it had religious significance. Second, there were a much higher number of Sikh civilians (i.e., noncombatants) in the Complex. Approximately 950 pilgrims were present for the Guru Arjun celebration (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 185; Chima, 2010, 93). Approximately 1,700 Akali Dal supporters were present to begin the new phase of the agitation (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 185). Third, the Army destroyed the Akal Takht with heavy artillery.

It is clear that the government truly did not want to damage the Akal Takht. One of the main objectives was to get Bhindranwale and his armed followers without damaging the Akal Takht or the actual Golden Temple. The mission was given the go-ahead based on the estimation that the Army could achieve their objective without damaging these shrines. Soldiers were ordered not to damage each shrine, and during the
first stages of the Operation, they refrained from doing so. After repeated attempts to
storm the Akal Takht to reach Bhindranwale’s position, the Army asked for permission to
use tanks and heavy artillery to achieve their goal. It took two hours for the central
government to approve it, reflecting their reluctance to damage the Akal Takht (Tully and
Jacob, 1985, 165).

This was an intelligence failure because there were plenty of opportunities for the
Army to find out how fortified Bhindranwale’s position was in the Akal Takht. The
Complex was not closed and many people, including those in the Army, were able to go
in and out of the Complex before the Operation. They should have known the damage
that was necessary to complete the mission.78

The second failure of the government was over information. Many Sikhs did not
believe that Bhindranwale had fortified the Temple, especially the Akal Takht. They did
not believe he operated a grenade factory in the Temple and was giving military training
to young Sikhs. The foreign press was not allowed. Numerous times, before and after the
event, PM Indira Gandhi framed her justification for the Operation against Sikhs – the
collective – and not against Bhindranwale and his militants (Pettigrew, 1995; Tully and
Jacob, 1985; Chima, 2010). Instead of convincing Sikhs that the assault on the Golden
Temple was a necessary cost to remove a militant threat that was abusing the Sikh
religious symbols, many believed that Bhindranwale was now a martyr who died
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*defending* the religion’s holiest site (Chima, 2010, 95).

In terms of the theoretical propositions above, how did Operation Bluestar
happen? The decision to enter the Golden Temple Complex was certainly a difficult one

78 See Tully and Jacob (1985, 185-191) for more detail on intelligence and operational
problems.
for the Prime Minister. In the face of rising violence in Punjab, she was under increasing pressure from the opposition, the media, and the rest of India to act.\(^{79}\) While she was selectively targeting an armed militant, she was fully aware that it might come across as collectively targeting Sikhs.

The preferred repression, in this case, was selective but had the backlash effect because it was executed as a collective targeting mission. The Army has high coercive capacity, but in the case of India, it acts much like an external intervener, a group that typically lacks local intelligence capacity. K.P.S. Gill (2001), who later directed the Punjab Police during the counterinsurgency, describes the use of the Army in Operation Bluestar and the subsequent Operation Woodrose.

The damage Bluestar did was incalculable. This was compounded by Operation Woodrose, the Army’s ‘mopping up’ exercise all over Punjab that sought to capture Bhindranwale’s surviving associates and to clear all Gurudwaras in the state of extremist elements. Woodrose suffered from all the classical defects of army intervention in civil strife – an extraneous and heavily armed force suddenly transported into unfamiliar territory; mistrustful (in this case, exceptionally so) of the local police and intelligence, but with no independent sources of information; dealing with a population, large segments of which had become hostile; and operating under a political fiat that not only condoned, but emphasised the use of punitive force. Operating blindly, the army arrested large numbers of people, many innocent, others perhaps sympathetic to the militant cause, but by no means associated with any terrorist or criminal activity. Lacking in adequate information to distinguish effectively at the local level, the indiscriminate sweep of Woodrose pushed many a young man across the border into the arms of welcoming Pakistani handlers (Gill 2001, 30).

The lack of intelligence capacity during the Army’s Operation Woodrose “mop up” led to the official targeting of Amritdhari (or baptized) Sikhs (who coincidentally dress the same as the majority of Sikh – keshdhari Sikhs). This official policy was even published in the July issue of an official Army magazine (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 204-79)

\(^{79}\) Her political predicament is explained further in Tully and Jacob (1985, ch. 10-11, especially 143).
205; Pettigrew, 1995, 10-11, see also endnote 16). Jaijee (1995) claims that 8,000 Sikhs were disappeared during the Operation, while Chima (2010, 95) notes that hundreds fled to Pakistan. They began to target at the collective level in the absence of the capacity to target selectively. Sikhs were baptized as a show of religiosity and commitment to Sikh identity, not militancy or separatism (Pettigrew, 1995, 10-11, 25).

The problem of using a coercive instrument like the Army is compounded by perceptions. The Army, being a fairly blunt instrument, perceived Sikhs – the collective – as the “other.” They, therefore, did not trust local police or local intelligence because local sources were Sikh sources. This perception biases against any and all intelligence that could actually distinguish between insurgents and civilians. Without such intelligence, selective targeting is impossible and collective targeting may appear to be the only option.

**Discussion and Conclusion: Evaluating the Backlash effect**

The events of 1984 had an obvious and long-lasting backlash effect on the trajectory of the conflict. Though the death toll caused by ethnonationalist violence was reduced immediately after the operations, it is clear that Operation Bluestar and Operation Woodrose had a clear local effect that strengthened the militants of the movement. By pushing the potential rebel recruitment pool into the rebel safe haven of Pakistan or by arresting and torturing them in prison (where serious radicalization takes place by itself), the strength of the coming militancy would be much stronger.

Army action in Punjab also led to the mutiny of “at least 2,000 Sikh soldiers,” though most were killed or arrested in the process as they battled Army troops (Chima,
2010, 95; see also Tully and Jacob, 1985, 194). The Operations also helped create and/or reinforce a dedicated Sikh diaspora, which provided substantial financial and diplomatic support (Fair, 2005b).

“Mrs Gandhi had ended one problem – Bhindranwale – but had created another — the basis for an overtly separatist Sikh enthonationalist movement for the creation of Khalistan” (Chima, 2010, 95). The death toll was reduced in the rest of 1984 and 1985, but this is misleading. Most organized militants were in the Golden Temple and died during Operation Bluestar. Violence in the name of Khalistan continued at low levels, but this was likely by newly radicalized, non-organized militants. The actual militants were regrouping, recruiting, and training in Pakistan or clandestinely. After a period of regrouping and the proliferation of new insurgent organizations, the insurgency entered a stage of intense violence, with over 1,000 noncombatants killed per year (1986-1993) (see Figure 4.1).

The year 1984 saw three distinct acts of collective violence, but it is unclear which had the greatest impact on the escalation of the conflict. In terms of the theoretical propositions in Chapter 2, Operation Woodrose most clearly fits the expectations of hypothesis #3. The Indian Army, lacking any ability to distinguish between insurgents and civilians that belong to the same ethnic group, specifically targeted all relatively young male members of the entire ethnic group that could be identified – keshdhari Sikhs who wear turbans. This group of young Sikh men is precisely the rebel recruitment pool, who after being targeted for their identity, have little choice but to be arrested, tortured, disappeared or flee to rebel safe havens in Pakistan for protection. Still, Operation
Woodrose is not as well documented and is often mentioned briefly alongside Operation Bluestar, around which there is consensus about its backlash effect.

While Operation Bluestar is infamous for its backlash effect, it does not fit the theoretical expectations perfectly. The operation preferred a selective target, but engaged in collective violence due to the great number of noncombatants at the Golden Temple during the operation. The perception of collective targeting was important and adds a new component to the theory about state violence — the social construction of state violence.\textsuperscript{80} Not only was Operation Bluestar collective violence against Sikhs, it was also seen as an attack on the most holy religious symbol – the Akal Takht. Therefore, we cannot disaggregate the motivating origins of the backlash of Operation Bluestar from the rationalist ones proposed in Chapter 2 and emotive ones like anger.

The third act of collective violence in 1984 was the anti-Sikh riots, especially in New Delhi. On October 31, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards in her residence.\textsuperscript{81} This assassination was in direct response to her order of Operation Bluestar. In response, “gangs of hooligans, often led by local Congress Party workers, roamed the streets, killing, burning and looting at will. In some cases the police actively joined in the mayhem, in others they turned a blind eye” (Tully and Jacob, 1985, 5). Around 3,000 Sikhs were killed (BBC, 2009). This act of collective violence was not led by the Army like the other two. In fact, the Army had to be called in stop the violence, which took four days. Nonetheless, this event was a massive blow to Sikhs in India and exacerbated the fear that Sikhs were lesser citizens, could not protect their

\textsuperscript{80} I thank Andres Vargas for pointing this out. See also, Kalyvas (2006, 174).
\textsuperscript{81} She was advised to replace her Sikh bodyguards, but chose to keep them.
identity, and were actively targeted by the state and Hindus. Clearly, this event contributed to the backlash effect alongside the Army operations.

The next chapter examines the remaining period of the Khalistan insurgency (1985-1993). The chapter will describe the national- and Punjab-level political developments as well as the changes to the Khalistan movement. It then explains how the Punjab Police developed sufficient organizational capacity to complement their intelligence capacity to achieve selective targeting. Building on interviews with former Punjab Police officers, it describes the how selective targeting was carried out and why it was employed relative to other state options.
Chapter 5: Sub-State Capacity and State Violence during the Khalistan Conflict (1985-1993)

Introduction

This chapter applies the sub-state capacity argument from Chapter 2 to the third stage of the Punjab Crisis. It demonstrates the plausibility of the sub-state capacity argument across several periods during the third stage of the Punjab Crisis (~1985-1993). I begin by briefly reviewing the theoretical argument and outlining the empirical argument as it relates to the Punjab Crisis.

I argued in Chapter 2 that state violence is a function of the ability of state agents to identify actual combatants and the ability to neutralize them effectively. Hypothesis #4 stated that state agents with combined intelligence and organizational capacity could execute selective targeting campaigns effectively. We saw in Chapter 4 that state agents that lacked these qualities were ineffective. In the first stage, the Punjab Police lacked the organizational and operational capacity to exploit their access to local intelligence. This resulted in incompetent targeting: private violence and excesses by some officers and an unwillingness to engage the militants for others. Stage #2 saw the introduction of the Indian Army that lacked local intelligence, resulting in two cases of collective targeting: Operation Bluestar and Operation Woodrose, each contributing to the backlash effect.

The third stage of the conflict, described and explained below, saw the Punjab Police transform itself into an effective, albeit brutal, counterinsurgency force by learning from early mistakes and investing in organizational and operational capacity. After doing so, it was able to target Khalistani militants selectively, which enabled them to break into the positive cycle of counterinsurgency and de-escalating the conflict, providing supporting
evidence to hypothesis #2. The third stage covers the lengthy period of Punjab Police action against the insurgency, which – after considerable waxing and waning – eventually contributed to the defeat of the Khalistan militancy.

The chapter will proceed as follows. First, I describe the nature of the militancy after Operation Bluestar and Woodrose and how the character changed over the remainder of the conflict. Second, I provide an overview of the conflict from 1985-1993, broken up by major changes in strategy by political forces. For each period, I provide context to political developments at the international-, national-, and Punjab-level (the latter two are highly interactive), as well as noting the changing characteristics of the Khalistani fighters. With the exception of describing the “final offensive,” this initial description will only touch on the role of the security forces briefly, mostly to note when and how the political landscape allowed for changes in strategy, major offensives, or détentes. These offensives help explain the level of violence and understanding the political forces that drive them is important. However, changes in the political forces cannot explain the ability of the security forces to target selectively. It was only toward the latter part of the conflict, after considerable investment in organizational and operational capacity, that the Punjab Police were able to target and neutralize militants selectively. In the third section, I draw on interviews with former senior and non-senior officials of the Punjab Police and experts on the case, to describe how the Punjab Police actually carried out selective targeting. In this section, I describe the intelligence advantages inherent to the Punjab Police, the organizational and operational investments that were made to exploit that advantage, and how these capacities manifested themselves in actual operations. I
conclude by evaluating the selectivity of the targeting and discussing the implications for human rights.

**Post-Bhindranwale Militant Groups, Popular Support, and Tactics**

While most agree that Operation Bluestar played a large role in creating the backlash effect against the government, the operation was successful at taking out Bhindranwale and many of the those radicals who had become active militants. Bhindranwale had come to be seen as, not only the leader of the movement, but its legitimating source connecting religious identity to a violent strategy. By creating a leadership vacuum that coincided with a greater demand for opposition, Bhindranwale’s death significantly reshaped militancy in the Punjab. The number of militant groups proliferated immensely, though most were recruiting and training clandestinely in India or in Pakistan during 1985. Paul Wallace (1995, 357) cites the militant figures as follows:

There are about two to three hundred ‘hard-core terrorists,’ who comprise the leadership of about 150 groups ranging in size from ten to four hundred. The total number of active militants engaged in political violence is probably around four thousand, plus supporting elements.

Not only did the number of groups and militants increase, the character of the militancy was restructured as opportunists and criminals joined the religious radicals to take advantage of the new conflict environment. Indeed, Dang (1988, 146) notes that there were three varieties of militants after Operation Bluestar: “religious fanatics,” unemployed youth, and criminals; the latter was thought to be the largest.

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^82 After his death in the Golden Temple, he not only became a martyr who was seen as defending the Golden Temple, but he also became a folk hero about which ballads and poetry were written (Chima, 2010, 114).
No one clear leader emerged to provide some centralization to the disparate groups, which also left the government without a credible negotiating partner (Wallace 2007). Several groups were founded in the early period of the militancy in supporting roles to Bhindranwale, but were not able to consolidate under a single leadership. The most well-known core organizations were the Babbar Khalsa, Bhindranwale Tiger Force, the Khalistan Liberation Force, and the Khalistan Commando Force, but as noted above, there were numerous subgroups that appeared to act autonomously (Wallace, 1995, 394; Marwah, 1995, 208-215).

In 1986, an umbrella body – the Panthic Committee – was created to coordinate and legitimize militant behavior, but this committee was never successful at centralizing authority within the movement (Wallace 2007, 443). It was from the Panthic Committee that Khalistan independence was formally declared. Later, the Panthic Committee broke apart into competing committees that reflected the intra-Khalistani violence that became common.

The popular support the militants enjoyed waxed and waned over the course of the conflict, though I do not pretend to be able to measure it. Even though Bhindranwale was an impressive charismatic character, the support for the militancy was fairly limited before 1984 (Pettigrew, 1995). As previously noted, Operation Bluestar, Operation Woodroose, and the Anti-Sikh riots of 1984 created widespread sympathy for the movement as well as considerable active support, especially in rural areas. Each of these events played into the ethnonationalist narrative that Sikhs were under attack by the Hindu-dominated state. Popular support appeared relatively high for the next few years
(approximately until the middle of 1987) as the Khalistanis could easily draw on this narrative about abuses against Sikhs (Dhillon 2005, 487-488).

Over time, however, it appears popular support eroded as Khalistani groups became more violent toward civilians, especially Sikhs, and depended more on external support from Pakistan and criminal activities (e.g., kidnapping, robbery, and extortion) for financial support. Of course, these processes are inter-related to each other and, as I argue below, to the effectiveness of the security forces.

The Khalistan Conflict After Operation Bluestar (1985-1993)

This section provides context to the last stage of the conflict by highlighting the political developments and characteristics of the Indian central government, Punjab, the Khalistan movement, role of security forces, and the level of observed violence. It breaks this stage into four periods: negotiation, “Bullet for Bullet,” return to negotiation, and the final offensive. Although Table 5.1 does not present the periods in these terms, it provides an outline of the developments of the national level, Punjab, Khalistanis, security forces, and conflict intensity to help the reader follow along.

83 To avoid confusing the reader and drawing attention away from the proximate level causes of violence, I try to detail the developments at the political level superficially. For an encyclopaedic study of elite politics and bargaining during the conflict, see Chima (2010).
<table>
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<th>Security Forces Operations and Developments</th>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>Janata Party</td>
<td>Akali Dal – Badal</td>
<td>Akali Dal passes Anandpur Sahib Resolution / Communal clashes / Some radical groups formed</td>
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<td>Congress – Darbara Singh</td>
<td>Fortification of Golden Temple / Bombs Hindu events</td>
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<td>1982</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>Indira Gandhi Assassinated / Anti-Sikh Riots</td>
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<td>Bhindranwale killed / Movement splintered</td>
<td>Operation Bluestar / Woodrose</td>
<td>Spike in violence</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>Rajiv Gandhi</td>
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<td>ISI backing / Khalistan declaration / Rape begins</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Congress – Rao</td>
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<td>Group infighting Decapitated leadership / Many surrenders</td>
<td>Joint Police, Army final offensive</td>
<td>Violence subsides</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Victory declared</td>
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The events of 1984 not only reshaped the Khalistan conflict, but India at the national level as well. Immediately following Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s assassination on October 31, 1984, her son Rajiv Gandhi was sworn in as interim Prime Minister. Rajiv was not an elected Member of Parliament at the time, but Congress officials viewed him as the eventual successor. He called for a general election to be held in December 1984 and his Congress Party won an overwhelming victory of nearly 50% of the votes and over 75% of the seats. After initial attempts to campaign by taking the hard line on the Punjab crisis, Rajiv moved decidedly toward a conciliatory negotiation approach in the spring of 1985. The government released the Akali leadership from jail in the spring of 1985. All of Akali Dal senior leadership had been arrested during Operation Woodrose in the summer of 1984.

Punjab was still under President’s Rule in 1985, but Sikh politics were factionalizing. The top leadership of the Akali Dal, notably Sant Longowal, had been delegitimized during Operation Bluestar. They had claimed that they would stay and defend the Golden Temple, but instead surrendered to the Army. Upon their release from prison in the spring, the Akali Dal split into two factions. The Akali Dal (Longowal) was the more moderate of the two while the Akali Dal (United) was the radical branch, led by Bhindranwale’s father.

PM Rajiv Gandhi attempted to strengthen the moderates in order to reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Rajiv Gandhi offered some initial concessions and was able to get Longowal to the negotiating table. Only two days later in July 1985, they

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84 See Chima (2010, 109, and endnote 19).
announced the Rajiv-Longowal Accord (aka the Punjab Accord). The Accord gave serious concessions to Longowal, but was short of the demands from the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (see Chapter 4) and was non-specific on most matters that it did address.\(^{85}\) The Accord did receive support among many Sikhs, but was chastised by the radical factions as a sell out. Longowal was assassinated a month later by Sikh militants, signaling that they would play spoiler to any attempts at concession. Like earlier agreements between the Congress-led central government and the Akali Dal, the Accord was never implemented.\(^{86}\)

Before Longowal was assassinated, Rajiv Gandhi’s government called for elections in Punjab to “accelerate the process of ‘normalization’” (Chima, 2010, 116). The more moderate Akali Dal (formerly Longowal’s) faction, now led by Surjeet Singh Barnala, won the September 1985 state elections and Barnala became the Chief Minister.

The Barnala administration continued the conciliatory approach. This was in part due Barnala’s belief that since radical ethnonationalism was the result of Congress meddling in the beginning, it would go away after the Akali Dal gained control of Punjab (Mahadevan, 2012, 80). However, as noted in Chapter 4, it appeared Congress had abandoned is support for Bhindranwale and the radicals by 1982. Barnala’s

\(^{85}\) Specifically, the Rajiv-Longowal Accord agreed to the transfer of Chandigarh and Punjab-speaking areas to Punjab, but without a timeline. The other matters it addressed, like adjudication of the river waters dispute, were to be sent to a non-specific commission without a timeline (Chima, 2010, 115-16). The full text of the Accord can be found in the appendix of Chadha (2005).

\(^{86}\) The settlement was unlikely to be successful under the circumstances of 1985. The opposition was very factionalized, even among politicians in the Akali Dal, which is not to mention the role of the militants who were just beginning to coordinate their offensive for an independent Khalistan. The more factions or warring factions increases the difficulty of implementing peace agreements (Downs and Stedman, 2002).
administration released around 2,000 detainees and allowed the SGPC to regain control over the Golden Temple (Chadha, 2005, 208).

With the resurgence of violence in 1986 and 1987, which had escalated beyond any level at that time in the conflict (see Figure 5.1), it was clear that the conciliatory negotiation approach failed. This was in part due to the release of Khalistanis that refilled the ranks and leadership of the militant organizations, some of which marched directly into the Golden Temple and declared Khalistan to be an independent state (Chima, 2010, 133). These elements also began rebuilding defenses in the Golden Temple. The second reason is that the Punjab Police who had resumed responsibility for law and order in Punjab could not apply adequate pressure to capitalize on the larger but still disorganized militancy. It was unclear that the Punjab Police were given a straightforward mandate to go on the offensive. The conciliatory negotiation approach “created confusion for the police regarding which type of action that they should pursue” (Fair, 2008, 51). Furthermore, the investment in organizational and operational capacity, detailed below, was in its infancy and the police were not capable of mounting a serious offensive. In an interview with this author, K.P.S. Gill recalls that the police arrested several migrant workers from Bihar (one of the poorest states in India) and tried to pass them off as the culprits of a railway bombing.

87 It is worth noting that it was the Indian central government’s reneging on the negotiated settlement (the Rajiv Gandhi-Longowal Accord) that helped sustain the conflict, not the negotiated settlement approach per se. Implementing the Accord could have strengthened the moderates within the Sikh political system and further isolated the militants (Chima 2010).
As the violence escalated to new highs in 1986, the central government signaled its attempt to change strategies, albeit gradually, to the hardline approach. It installed two new persons known for their hardline stance in leadership positions in Punjab. Of note, the government installed Julio Riberio as the Director General of Police (DGP). Ribeiro had earned a reputation for tackling organized crime in Gujarat. Upon his arrival in Punjab, he was said to have instituted the “Bullet for Bullet” policy to take out the...
Khalistanis. One year later, PM Rajiv Gandhi again signaled his turn to the hardline approach when he dismissed Barnala’s Akali Dal government in Punjab and reinstated President’s Rule.

Khalistani violence continued to rise, in part due to the weak capacity of the Punjab Police to carry out the policy (see Figure 5.1). Still, the police had begun their offensive, even if it had not yet become clearly successful. As K.P.S. Gill notes, “the police had begun to commit itself for the first time in the long-drawn war – and the conflict had certainly escalated to the level of warfare now” (Gill, 2001, 35). Figure 5.2 shows the increase in the number of the militant deaths. It rose from 78 in 1986 to 328 and 373 in 1987 and 1988, respectively. The number of arrests spiked as well during these years, in part due to increased police effectiveness at identifying and pursuing militants (see Figure 5.2).

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89 Ribeiro himself did not name the policy, but it was credited to him by a journalist (Ribeiro, 1998).
In 1988, the militants had again built serious defenses in the Golden Temple, though not to the extent of the defenses in 1984. This led to another operation in May 1988 – Operation Black Thunder – to remove militants from the Golden Temple and deny them a safe haven on holy ground. It appeared the militants calculated that the government would not enter the Golden Temple again after the backlash effect of Operation Bluestar and if they did, the movement would only be further strengthened (Chadha, 2005, 209-210; Marwah, 1995, 188). Furthermore, the motivation may have been directed at the increasingly competent police force.

[T]he terrorists wished to create a situation in which the Punjab police could be discredited. The police force had been reeling under the impact of terrorist violence aimed at them and their families. At the time of Operation Black Thunder the regrouping of the force was in progress, the
terrorists therefore felt that this was the ideal time to derail this process and deal the police a deathblow (Chadha, 2005, 210).

The central government had learned their lesson for overly coercive operations on holy ground. Instead, Operation Black Thunder was carried out as a joint operation with the Punjab Police and the National Security Guards (NSG), an elite anti-terrorist force within the structure of the Central Armed Police Forces. Rather than enter the Golden Temple with tanks and heavy artillery, Operation Black Thunder laid siege to the Temple and pursued a “wait and kill” strategy (Chima, 2010, 164). They used intelligence of the Golden Temple to seal off the escape routes, cut off the Temple from food and water, and place snipers outside of the holy parts of the Temple (Fair, 2008, Marwah, 1995).

Although it took ten days to starve the insurgents out, the Operation was very successful at getting most of the insurgents to surrender (some were killed by snipers and some others committed suicide). “In all, over 200 militants, including 50 hardcore terrorists, surrendered” (Marwah, 2009). No damage was done to the Temple and there were no civilian casualties (ibid). The Operation was a major victory for the Punjab Police and the newly formed NSGs. It not only demonstrated the capability of the police force, but it discredited the militants who had sworn to die “defending” the Golden Temple. Because the Operation was conducted with the media present, it exposed 1) how Khalistanis were abusing religious symbols in the Temple, 2) the extent of the graves of their victims, and 3) the sex slaves held in the Temple (Mahadevan, 2012, 158). The Golden Temple would not be used as a Khalistani safe haven again.

90 Much has been written on Operation Black Thunder, for more details see: Chadha (2005), Fair (2008), Gill (2001), Mahadevan (2012), Marwah (1995; 2009), and Sarab Jit Singh (2002).
As Mahadevan (2012, 158) notes, “Operation Black Thunder marked a turning point, as it delegitimised the separatists at the very time the police was gearing up to hunt them down.” K.P.S. Gill was brought in to take over for Ribeiro as the DGP of the Punjab Police right before Operation Black Thunder. Gill mounted a serious and brutal offensive\textsuperscript{91} against the Khalistanis during the latter half of 1988 and almost all of 1989.\textsuperscript{92} He had been working for the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) where he earned a reputation for taking the hardline against separatists in Assam.

Gill’s appointment as the DGP of the Punjab Police was another serious signal that the government would take the hardline “bullet for bullet” approach to a new level. The number of suspected insurgents killed in 1989 nearly doubled to 703 reflecting the results of the offensive. Figure 5.2 shows this shift in strategy visually. While the number of suspected insurgents killed doubled, the number of arrests was cut by more than a third (from 3,882 in 1988 to 2,466 in 1989), reflecting the change to an elimination strategy. One indication the cost of the offensive is that Police deaths nearly doubled (from 110 in 1988 to 201 in 1989) (Wallace, 2007) (see Figure 5.3). Since the Police could sustain such casualties while the insurgents could not, the offensive appeared to be working.

Without the Golden Temple as a safe haven, the Khalistanis relied more so on the harbor of civilians (Marwah, 1995, 200-201) and were not able to keep up the same level of violence. In 1989, Khalistani violence against civilians was reduced back to 1987 levels (to 967 civilian deaths) after the spike that occurred during 1988 (to 1839 civilian deaths) (Wallace, 2007) (see Figure 5.1).

\textsuperscript{91} I provide some detail to the methods of the offensive below.
\textsuperscript{92} Gill is a Jat Sikh, originally from Punjab, but had worked outside the state in the IPS for most of his life.
It was also during this period that the Khalistan militants were exposed for their opportunist and criminal nature. It became apparent that a growing proportion of the recruits were only interested in the movement for the spoils of the criminal activities, the power or status that came from carrying weapons, and for the excitement (Gill, 2001, 48; Puri, Judge, and Sekhon, 1999, 68). The Panthic Committee designed to coordinate the movement had split. The leaders of each committee were hiding in Pakistan and attempting to orchestrate the movement in exile by providing guiding statements and threatening to punish those Khalistanis abusing the movement, but Gill (2001, 48-49) notes their statements “had no impact on the ground.” The split in the Panthic Committee was a reflection of how the movement had splintered and factionalized, which had resulted in mounting turf wars between Khalistani groups. It also became harder to
believe that the Khalistanis were fighting for the Sikh cause. Figure 5.4 graphs the number of “terrorist-caused” civilian casualties by ethnicity. The figure clearly shows an increase in Sikh targeting by Khalistanis. As a result of the discrediting of the Khalistan movement as well as the perception that the police were winning, civilians began to show signs of resistance. Gill (2001, 51) cites an example from July 1989, “when a terrorist opened indiscriminate fire in the Tarn Taran bazaar, he was over-powered and beaten to death by the shopkeepers – an event virtually unimaginable even a few months earlier…”

Figure 5.4: ‘Terrorist-caused’ civilian deaths by ethnicity, 1981-1992

Return to Negotiation, 1990-1991

The police offensive of selectively targeting Khalistanis was working to quell the Khalistani violence against civilians, but was becoming problematic for political forces
because of its brutality. The selective targeting campaign included a great deal of extra-judicial killing and the detaining of suspects without trial. In December 1989, Congress lost the general election and for the second time in post-independence history a non-Congress government was formed at the national level. The new National Front government was a loose coalition of opposition parties (from both the right and left of Congress) and wanted to distance itself from the ugly reputation the Punjab Police had acquired (Mahavedan, 2012, 82). The National Front sought a negotiated solution with the separatists and in the process released militants from jail, relieved the controversial K.P.S. Gill from the DGP of Punjab Police post, and ordered the police to ease up on the offensive (ibid). The Prime Minister, V.P. Singh, appeared to believe, like the Barnala government before him, that violence in Punjab was the result of Congress meddling and now that Congress was out of the picture at both the national- and Punjab-levels, the violence would decline (ibid). 93

Instead of drawing the Khalistanis to the negotiating table, this period saw an increase in Khalistani violence. The Khalistanis were too factionalized for meaningful negotiation. Instead, they used the political détente to regroup, rearm, and increase their violence against both police and civilian targets. Figure 5.3 shows that the number of civilians killed in 1990 and 1991 were the greatest of the entire conflict at 1,961 and 2,094, respectively. They also increased the spatial dimension of their violence beyond the border districts to include urban areas in previously little-affected districts.

Beyond increasing their levels of violence, Khalistanis appeared emboldened politically as well. Some leaders called for the U.N. to hold a referendum on succession

93 PM V.P. Singh failed to understand that the opportunistic militancy that characterized 1989 was quite a different animal. The causes that started the violence were not necessarily the same that sustained it.
Likewise, others claimed the only things to negotiate were the borders between Khalistan and India (ibid, 63). Given their strengthened position, Khalistani organizations, especially the more zealous ones like the Babbar Khalsa, began issuing and enforcing strict religious edicts. Joshi (1993, 5) recalls the killing of a school headmistress for not enforcing their strict dress code and the killing of 7 doctors “allegedly for promoting family planning among Sikhs.”

Gill (2001, 66) notes that the police did not become defensive during this period, despite the search for a political solution. In fact, the number of militants killed continued to rise steeply (see Figure 5.1). Instead, he argues that the political solution strengthened the insurgents’ ability to recruit since many believed a negotiated settlement – possibly to include autonomy or independence – was imminent. Gill (2001, 71) estimates that the militants’ ranks grew five-fold. The increased recruitment did not necessarily reflect increased popular support. Joshi (1993) argues that popular support remained low during this period. Civilians did not speak out against the Khalistanis because doing so would mean the certain death of themselves and their families, but he notes that voluntary acts of support had ceased.

Final Offensive, 1992-1993

In 1991, the National Front coalition government fell apart and new elections brought Congress back to power in Delhi. PM Narashimha Rao abandoned the conciliatory

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94 The 1990-1991 spike in violence during the rise in the number of terrorists killed shows that the magnitude and selectivity of targeting are not the only things affecting recruitment, larger political issues matter as well.

95 This rise in recruitment that coincided with increases in militant deaths indicates that the magnitude and selectivity of targeting cannot solely explain recruitment patterns. I return to this point in the conclusion.
approach and sought to give the hardline approach another chance. He also wanted a clear political mandate, so he called for state elections in Punjab to be held in February 1992\(^{96}\) and an end to President’s Rule. In an attempt to discredit the elections, most Khalistan organizations ordered a boycott of the elections and threatened violence against voters. The result was an election with a clear urban bias and a poor turnout (~20%). Nonetheless, it brought in a fiercely anti-Khalistani Congress government and the appearance of a political mandate to go on the offensive against the Khalistanis. The government also brought back K.P.S. Gill as the DGP of the Punjab Police and gave him a free hand to go on the offensive against the Khalistanis.

The final offensive took about 18 months of joint Police-Army action, where the police were to take the lead in targeting Khalistanis. They were backed up by the paramilitary forces of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Border Security Force (BSF). The Indian Army was deployed in November 1991 (Operation Rakshak II) with a four-fold mission (Joshi, 1993, 12). First, the Army was to help the BSF secure the Indo-Pakistani border in Punjab to deny a safe haven and end the transnational arms transfer. Part of this mission was to build and guard a border fence in conjunction with the BSF. Second, the Army was to “create conditions for a free and fair election” (Joshi, 1993, 12). This included security to candidates as well as maintaining a patrolling presence.

Third, the Army was to “undertake civic actions to develop local contacts” (ibid, 12). To paraphrase K.P.S. Gill from an interview, the mission was to allow the Army to do the pleasant things so the Police could do the unpleasant things (Gill, author interview, 96). The elections were suspended until February 1992 to allow the Army deployment to provide security.
He added that it is important to national security that the Army is credible and popular with the people of Punjab where wars with Pakistan tend to be fought.\textsuperscript{97} The civic actions included reopening schools with Army teachers, providing medical care in rural areas, and simply clearing drainage canals (Joshi, 1993, 13).

The fourth part of the Army mission was to “aid civil authorities in anti-terrorist operations” (Joshi, 1993, 12). This took the form of providing static security posts and roadblocks that allowed the Police to be mobile in their manhunts. The Army provided the outer cordon for cordon and search operations (Gill, author interview, 2012; Joshi, 1993, 13). Last, they provided coercive power in the form of Quick Response Teams to aid the police in firefights. To facilitate this coordination and intelligence sharing, some police were stationed with Army units and Army personnel were present during interrogations (Joshi, 1993, 13; Mahadevan, 2012, 159).

The primary role of the Punjab Police during the final offensive was to hunt down top Khalistanis – or “hardcore terrorists” (detailed below) while low-ranking Khalistani militants were allowed to surrender and receive some level of amnesty (Gill, 2001, 80-91; Telford, 2001). While the leaders of Khalistani organizations were being hunted, 916 members surrendered during 1992-1993.\textsuperscript{98}

By the middle of 1992, many of the top-ranking militants were killed, while numerous others surrendered and fled. Symbolically, the February 1993 killing of the leader of the Bhindranwale Tiger Force, one of the few remaining Khalistani leaders,\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{97} A war with Pakistan seemed possible in the near future. The Kashmir insurgency that was clearly supported by Pakistan had become a serious issue and threatened to pull the two countries into another war.

\textsuperscript{98} This is not to suggest that no low-ranking Khalistanis were killed by the Punjab Police during this period. Rather, they made up the majority of the 2911 militants killed in 1992-1993 (Singh, 2000).
marked the end of the insurgency. Most of the Khalistani organizations had disintegrated and the Khalistani insurgency was declared defeated (Singh, 1996, 414; Fair, 2005; Gill, 2001). Though there was some residual violence (e.g., bombings, high profile assassinations) over the next decade, the Khalistani movement has never recovered. No political concessions were given and the Rajiv-Longowal Accord was never implemented.

Stage #3: Developing Organizational Capacity, Exploiting Intelligence, and the Evolution of Selective Repression

As the counterinsurgency theory discussed in Chapter 2 argues, the defeat of an insurgent movement requires establishing the positive counterinsurgency cycle whereby civilians denounce the insurgents, the counterinsurgents target insurgents selectively, which increases confidence in the security forces, leading to more intelligence. The difficulty is establishing this cycle of interactions with the population in any counterinsurgency, though it is especially true given the lackluster performance of the Punjab Police during the early periods of the insurgency. Eventually, the Punjab Police broke into the positive cycle by establishing their effectiveness to respond to civilian tips. This happened in conjunction with the brutal “bullet for bullet” policy, which sought to seek out and kill high-ranking insurgents, while offering some leniency/amnesty to rank and file insurgents (Telford, 2001). This police strategy required investing in organizational

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99 My interviews of former Punjab Police officers that were active during this time resulted in some conflicting accounts as to whether they preferred arrests to kills. One interviewee in particular maintained that the goal was arrest and trial rather than kill. Others implied that killing was the goal, but did not explicitly confirm that preference. Instead, they acknowledged that arresting the suspects was useless since the judicial
capacity, which allowed them to leverage their intelligence capacity, leading to the increased use of selective targeting and eventual suppression of the Khalistani militancy. The next two sub-sections outline the inherent intelligence advantages and organizational investment, respectively, while the third discusses tactical innovations that allowed the Punjab Police to break into the positive counterinsurgency cycle.

**Inherent intelligence advantages: The role of co-ethnicity**

If successful counterinsurgency is the result of a positive counterinsurgency cycle, then some capacity building must be necessary to achieve this cycle of interactions. However, as the theory in Chapter 2 indicated, local forces have an advantage when it comes to intelligence and the Punjab Police were no different. In particular, the Punjab Police had the advantage of “co-ethnicity.” The majority of fighters on each side were Jat Sikhs, a group that maintains a majority of Sikhs in the Punjab.\(^{100}\) Having a largely Sikh police force was useful for intelligence, rhetorical, and recruitment reasons.

For intelligence, Sikhs in the Punjab Police were able use their co-ethnicity advantage for identifying individual militants. After learning some specifics on a particular enemy, such as age and where they grew up, the police tapped officers from the same village to identify them by face. Local co-ethnic security forces also help establish credibility when extracting information from civilians. For Mahadevan (2012, 128-129), it is a necessity to incorporate co-ethnic policemen, especially leadership, for successful system was ineffective (see discussion below under the heading: Evaluating the Selectivity of Targeting).

\(^{100}\) Jat Sikhs are commonly referred to as the dominant land-owning caste in the Punjab. Estimates of their proportion of Sikhs in the Punjab vary, due to the lack of a caste-based census, from 50% (Jeffrey, 1986) to 66% (Amrik Singh, cited in Wallace, 1995, 377, fn: 76). Ribeiro (1998, 276), who was the leader of the police in mid 1980s, claims 80% of the Punjab Police force were Jat Sikhs.
counterterrorism. Co-ethnics give a sense of legitimacy to the operation, but also provide some cover to informers who may otherwise feel they are abandoning their identity group (ibid, 128-129; Kitson, 1977).

Beyond bringing inherent intelligence capacity to the security forces, co-ethnicity provides useful rhetorical and recruitment advantages that ought to be mentioned. Because Sikh forces were predominant in the local police, militants have much harder time proclaiming they are acting on behalf of the entire ethnoreligious group. Similarly, it is difficult to sustain the common “insider-outsider” polarization strategy employed by militants (Sahni, author interview, 2012). Recruiting co-ethnics also provides an alternative for young Sikhs who may otherwise be recruitment targets by militant groups and gives them a stake in the security of their state.

Organizational and Operational Investment

The necessity of investment in organizational and operational capacity of the Punjab Police during the late 1980s is difficult to overstate. The same organization that often abandoned its post in the face of minor threats and hid in shops during the assassination of the Director-Inspector General (Atwal) was able to defeat the Khalistan movement. How was this accomplished?

One clear component of organizational investment was simply the recruitment of new officers. In 1989, the size of the Punjab Police force was increased from around 35,000 to around 60,000 (Fair, 2005; Gill, 1997; Mahadevan, 2012, 133; see also Singh, 1996). While increasing the size of the force is a considerable investment in coercive capacity, the nature of recruitment and retention policies were a marked investment in
organizational capacity. Under K.P.S. Gill, the Director General of the Punjab Police, the personnel strategy was not only interested in increasing the size of the force, but transforming the nature of the force from civil police to counterinsurgent police.

The prominent strategy of transforming the police capabilities was finding forces that would fight – a considerable challenge since police officers and their families were targeted in high numbers. During much of the insurgency period, even senior police officials were static, often would not even go to the office, and attempted to run the operations from their homes (Sahni, author interview, 2012). Rank and file police were tasked with dangerous counterinsurgency operations that they were not trained for and that were beyond the scope of their expected duties. As noted above, the militant strategy of successful execution of police officers, their families, and informants had paralyzed police in the early years.

In the later periods, senior police officials were required to patrol or be assigned to other tasks. While deputations – the process of taking a similarly ranked position in another state – are usually discouraged, the Gill strategy encouraged them in an attempt to purge the force of those not willing to fight (Sahni, author interview, 2012). In the new recruitment phase, Gill sought out to enlist young officers who were not afraid and had the personal capacity to fight (ibid). He also brought in members of the CRPF that had more combat experience in other Indian theaters (ibid). Beyond bringing in new recruits willing and able to fight, the Punjab Police began to empower and protect their officers and rank and file. The Police leadership provided additional protective gear to officers (Sahni, author interview, 2012), created safe houses for police families in protected
enclaves (Mahadevan, 2012, 133), and demonstrated their commitment to shared burden/vulnerability by patrolling in public (Sahni, author interview, 2012).

In line with mobilizing counterinsurgent personnel, the Police invested in developing mobile units that could be better utilized in the counterinsurgent warfare. Police in India are commonly resigned to static forces that perform checkpoints, barricades, etc. During the early years of the Punjab crisis about half of the Punjab Police were performing these duties, due to belief that showing police presence to the population increases their perception of security (Mahadevan, 2012, 132). Gill disagreed with this fake show of force because it harasses the innocent population without providing serious benefits and can actually be counterproductive (Gill, author interview, 2012). To paraphrase Ajai Sahni, an Indian security expert: only the dumbest terrorist gets caught by a roadblock (Sahni, author interview, 2012). Under Gill’s direction, most static forces were reassigned to mobile units, designed to pursue targets once identified (ibid). The investment in mobility also included tripling the vehicle fleet (Mahadevan, 2012, 133; Marwah, 1995) and introducing mobile communications – where ineffective landlines were previously used – that allowed not only the pursuit of targets from behind, but to cut off militants (through mobile roadblocks) in real time (ibid).

Another important investment was in increasing its intelligence management system. While the Punjab Police enjoyed some inherent advantages discussed above, increasing their capacity to exploit it systematically was essential. It was not until late 1984 that the Punjab Police started systematically maintaining records of militant activities (Mahadevan, 2007). The beginning of such a system was, by itself, an important investment in organizational and intelligence capacity. They began building a
database of individual terrorists, the groups they belonged to, and their activities (ibid). The database also separated individual militants by rank, especially as hardcore or non-hardcore (Anonymous Punjab Police Officer, interview, 2012).

This database was crucial for noticing the patterns in the militants’ organization and cooperation with organized crime, which was exploited for the success of rebel infiltration operations (ibid). The record-keeping system was expanded in 1988 to include publishing and disseminating reports of patterns in a Monthly Terrorism Review (Mahadevan, 2012, 132). This village-level record keeping identified the 10% of the 6000 villages in Punjab that were most affected by violence where the police could concentrate efforts (Gill, author interview, 2012).

In conjunction with the intelligence management system, the police also used, and most importantly, reformed an incentive system for the capturing or killing of militants. This reward system put the emphasis on the elimination of selective targets rather than those the rank and file Police could claim were militants. In the later stages, these rewards increased, but were limited to only A and B-list Khalistanis (Sahni, author interview, 2012). This is only possible through the use of the intelligence management system as a way to verify the identity of the militants. In its absence, constables would be incentivized to capture/kill non-terrorists and pass them off as terrorists, which was not an uncommon occurrence.101

The Punjab Police built the deterrence logic of the selective targeting directly into the man-hunting reward system. They established and publically stated goals of a

101 In an interview, Ajai Sahni of the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi, claimed passing off “any Tom, Dick, and Harry you could call a terrorist” was fairly common before KPS Gill initiated the change in the reward system. During my interview with K.P.S. Gill, he recalled a story where the police arrested migrant workers from Bihar (among the poorest states in India) for a railway bombing.
“terrorist lifespan” of around 8 months (Chadha, 2005, 215; Gill, author interview, 2012). This was to specifically alter the calculations of potential Khalistani recruits to decide it was not worth the risk (Gill, author interview, 2012). As part of this strategy, they sought to spend their resources pursuing Khalistanis that were currently active (approximately previous fifteen days) (Chadha, 2005, 215). Since groups and individuals varied in their activity, the Police believed pursuing active Khalistanis would pay higher dividends in terms of deterrence as well as give previously active insurgents incentive to remain inactive.

The final element of organizational investment coincides with an investment in coercive capacity. Most policemen carried bolt-action rifles that were outdated and certainly no match for the Kalashnikov assault rifles that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) began providing for the Khalistanis in May 1987 (Gill, 1999; 2001). The Punjab Police were required to upgrade their weaponry to automatic rifles or Light Machine Guns (LMGs), though these too were from the pre-independence period (Gill, 1999; 2001). This represented a necessary, but ultimately modest improvement in the coercive capacity of the Punjab Police relative other agencies in the security sector. On the continuum discussed in the theory from Chapter 2, this improvement and the increased force strength still do not compare with the coercive capacity of the national military services. Each of the above-mentioned investments in organizational, operational, and coercive capacity required navigating difficult bureaucratic channels. However, the demand for LMGs was met with particular resistance from a state
bureaucracy and political leadership that did not want to arm its civil police with automatic weapons.\textsuperscript{102}

\textit{How intelligence and organizational capacity interact: 4 types of operations}

The theoretical section in Chapter 2 argues that the combination of intelligence and organizational capacity interact to achieve selective targeting. This section outlines four Punjab Police operations that utilized their inherent intelligence advantages and their organizational/operational capacity.

First, the Punjab Police coupled their co-ethnicity advantage with their intelligence management system in “spotter operations.” According to interviews with former officers, these operations proceeded by placing the spotter in a car with tinted windows or in an open-backed military vehicle at some place the militant was expected to be (e.g., bus stop). These operations identified specific terrorists from their database by face. Then other officers stationed nearby would capture or eliminate the militant.\textsuperscript{103} In some cases, the actual spotter in these operations was a police officer from the same village or school as a suspected militant. In others, spotters were turned militants or turned criminals, who were willing to cooperate in exchange for some leniency.

Co-ethnicity also provides the enhanced capacity for infiltration of rebel networks. These operations, termed “Cat operations” or “Cat systems,” were commonly used by police forces during the Punjab crisis (Mahadevan, 2007). These infiltration

\textsuperscript{102} See Gill (1999) for more discussion of the bureaucratic battles for equipping counterterrorism operations.

\textsuperscript{103} One former police officer claimed that arrests were attempted, but killings in self-defense were still eligible for the reward system. Another acknowledged that since the judicial system ceased to function, hard-core terrorists unlikely to be turned would be eliminated by starting an encounter the police expected to win.
operations, which were carried out by police forces, turned criminals, and turned insurgents, were met with notable success even as the Punjab Police’s investment in organizational capacity was in its infancy. In 1986-1987, the police tapped into the organized crime networks, to which the insurgents relied on for logistical support and smuggling of weapons. These sources provided specific intelligence identifying high-ranking terrorists leaving the Golden Temple, which was again being used as a safe base of operations for militants (Mahadevan, 2007). These operations were essential in developing the intelligence management system used later for other operations.

Third, Sikh forces could be used as plain-clothes officers in order to allow closer interaction with civilians or suspected terrorists, which allowed for more accurate identification before engaging in an encounter. Ribeiro (1998, 274-275) notes that uniformed policemen were too scared to approach civilians or suspected militants at night or in areas highly affected by violence, because militants showed no restraint in firing upon police, while police were required to “challenge” before using force. Using plain-clothes police at night helped solve this problem (ibid, 275).

Fourth, Operation Night Dominance used the information from the intelligence database to establish the perception of police effectiveness in specifically affected villages (Gill, author interview, 2012). The operation consisted of police holding senior-level meetings in highly affected areas in the middle of the night. In certain parts of Punjab (notably the Pakistani-border regions), it was common that the police controlled the daytime, while the militants controlled the night. This made intelligence gathering in the important areas especially difficult, since even state-supporting Sikhs were reluctant to give information to police in the day, when they knew the militants would be back at
night for retribution.\textsuperscript{104} Since the operations required senior officers to attend, they also required many of their armed contingents to accompany them. This amounted to a great number of police vehicles descending upon a village at night, when the villagers otherwise thought the police were scared of the insurgents. It helped establish the perception that the police were in control and not afraid to operate anywhere in Punjab. It also came at time when the police were more effective and they could claim they were winning. Since popular support tends to follow the stronger party, these operations were important for establishing police credibility and resulted in greater numbers of tips.\textsuperscript{105}

\textit{Breaking into the positive counterinsurgency cycle}

The combination of intelligence and organizational capacity played an important role in breaking into the positive counterinsurgency cycle, whereby civilians denounce the insurgents, the counterinsurgents target insurgents selectively, which increases confidence in the security forces, leading to more intelligence (see Figure 2.1). Despite the human rights abuses that occurred through this violent policy, the Punjab Police established their ability to target insurgents individually as well as respond to civilian tips effectively. During the final eighteen months of the insurgency, the Police began to get more tips than they handle (Gill, author interview, 2012).

The Punjab Police were able to break into this cycle by establishing their effectiveness, if not their legitimacy. Initially, civilians did not provide intelligence for fear of retribution from the militants, but also from the knowledge that the police could not follow up on the tip nor protect them, leaving them especially vulnerable (Sahni,\textsuperscript{104} Interview with former police officer.\textsuperscript{105} These last two points were supported by interviews with KPS Gill and a Punjab Police officer from the conflict. See also Joshi (1993) and Mahadevan (2012).
author interview, 2012). This situation was exasperated because the police also lacked legitimacy given their brutal methods. Whereas alternative accounts of breaking into this cycle like the hearts and minds approach focus on ways of getting civilians to denounce the militants, the approach in Punjab worked by becoming effective at targeting at the individual level. Once they broke into the cycle, the civilian tips emerged as the greatest source of intelligence (Gill, author interview, 2012). This coincided with the delegitimation of the militants as they began targeting Sikhs with greater frequency, including rape, and increased the share of their criminal activity *vis a vis* anything that could be considered toward the pursuit of Khalistan (Telford, 2001) (see Figure 5.4).

Ajai Sahni’s narrative of the harboring militants before and after the police became effective highlights the coincidence of delegitimation of the militants, police effectiveness, and civilian denunciation, as well as the power of the gun in achieving civilian support. According to Sahni (author interview, 2012), the Khalistani militants used a common pattern of sexual violence during their harbor whereby they would arrive to stay in a home and separate the females from the males for rape. The males would willingly leave their female family members behind because they knew resisting meant certain death for themselves and their family. When police asked for information, they were silent given their fear of reprisals. This lack of intelligence was taken as a measure of popular support for the militancy, but as soon as the police demonstrated they could respond to denunciations quickly and effectively, these families began reporting the abuses and tips from civilians began flooding in.

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106 Interview with the author.
107 This story highlights the difficulty of ascertaining popular support for an insurgency or the state. Rather, the threat and credibility of violence are more likely determinants of civilian actions (Kalyvas, 2006).
Evaluating the Khalistani Defeat and Alternative Explanations

Although the type of state violence (selective or collective) is the actual dependent variable, it is important to address alternative explanations of the actual defeat. The narrative above has argued that the large-scale selective targeting campaign led to the dissolution of the Khalistani organizations by targeting the leadership of the numerous Khalistani organizations, providing some leniency to low-ranking members who surrendered, and creating a “terrorist life-span” for those who did not. This is consistent with the majority of the case histories as well as personal interviews (Chadha, 2005; Fair, 2005; 2009; Gill, 2001; author interview 2012; Joshi, 1993; Mahadevan, 2012; Marwah, 2009; Sahni, author interview, 2012). I have argued that the ability to achieve this selective targeting was through the interaction of the local Police’s intelligence advantages with conscious investments in organizational and operational capacity.

The primary alternative explanations have, to some degree, been built into the narrative in Chapter 4 and above. They include the role of political forces at various levels, the role of democracy, and the army role. Most accounts of the Khalistani defeat acknowledge, and some highlight, the cynical role of national-level politics. Since Congress helped prop up Bhindranwale, some argue that there was really never a social base for the insurgency and thus it was an easy case. This was the view of the Akali Dal Punjab government in 1986 and PM V.P. Singh in 1990. In both cases, the conciliatory actions derived from this belief were associated with strengthening the militancy. The Sikhs have long had a social base for insurgency given the various underlying grievances outlined in Chapter 4 and the long-held belief that maintaining their identity in a Hindu-

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108 Keep in mind that the single-case study design does not allow the researcher enough leverage to adjudicate between alternative explanations with full confidence, but it can address them for their validity.
dominated country was under threat. Believing the Congress support for Bhindranwale was the root cause of the insurgency, rather than the proximate “spark,” is a misreading of the case.

Other political arguments are largely in line with the arguments made here. The interaction of national-level politics with Punjab politics helps explain when the police were allowed to pursue their offensives and when they were restrained. They must be discussed to understand these dynamics, but changes in political leadership cannot explain the ability of the Punjab Police to make the offensives *selective in their targeting*. One factor within the Sikh political system was particularly important and may be a scope condition to the argument developed here. Chima (2010) documents how factionalized the various actors within in the Sikh political system became. As the various Khalistani organizations were being hunted, they continued to unravel, fight each other, and commit serious violence against their previous base of rural Sikhs. Some of this factionalization can be accredited to effective police action, but political infighting within Sikh politics was common from the start, while Operation Bluestar actually furthered this process greatly. I return to the question of decapitation and the limits of this case in the concluding chapter.

Local democracy, via the Punjab elections of 1992 and the removal of President’s Rule, is also cited as an important factor. That fiercely anti-Khalistani Congress governments came to power in Delhi and Punjab was certainly important for providing the political consistency and some semblance of an anti-Khalistani mandate necessary to mount a serious offensive. However, the case overall does not provide a promising case for the role of democracy in internal wars. The 1992 elections had only 21% turnout, so
the mandate was questionable. Punjab also had local elections in 1986 with the opposite results. Furthermore, the Khalistani conflict may never have been serious if PM Indira Gandhi had implemented the various agreements between the central government and the fairly moderate Akalis. But doing so would have been the end of Congress rule in the neighboring state of Haryana. The electoral prospects of Congress hindered the ability of the government to negotiate a (potential) solution to rising ethnonationalism in Punjab. Instead, reneging on the agreements discredited the moderates and strengthened the radicals beyond what the government could control.

Since the final offensive involved both the Punjab Police and the Army, the role of the Army needs to be addressed further. As noted above, the Indian Army was deployed in substantial numbers in Punjab in late 1991, but their primary role in anti-terrorist operations was to assist the Punjab Police. The Army did provide important backup in firefights and their Quick Response Teams no doubt helped in the pursuit and neutralization of Khalistani targets. This role does not damage the argument presented above.

However, their massive deployment and undertaking of civic actions requires further attention since it appears to fit the alternative explanations – territorial control and “hearts and minds” – discussed in the Theory chapter. First, the rapid dissolution of the Khalistan movement occurred less than 18 months after the deployment of the Army, which would be remarkably fast if it relied on first building good will with the population before intelligence was provided. The territorial control argument has more purchase, but still requires an intelligence-gathering process that should take more time. In my interview with K.P.S. Gill (2012), he noted that the Army did gather useful intelligence
from civilians through these operations, but the proportion was somewhat small compared to what was needed. Joshi (1993, 13) notes that the Army was responsible for 120 militant deaths and 175 arrests. While these numbers are impressive and certainly helped the effort, they should be thought of as a complement to the Police efforts, since the total number of militants killed over this period of time was over 2,500. This is not to suggest that the Army role was not critical to overall defeat of the Khalistani movement. But it does not appear critical to the selective targeting effort. In discussing the primary factors for the Khalistan defeat, Joshi (1993, 20) claims, “[i]f the Army was the catalyst, the main element was the revitalization of the Punjab Police.”

*Evaluating the Selectivity of Targeting and Addressing Human Rights Violations*

Despite the counterinsurgency success of selective targeting, Singh (1996; 2000) notes that this violent policy was not as perfect as it may appear. “[T]he ratio of ‘hardcore terrorists’ to ‘non-hardcore terrorists’ killed varied from 1:9 to 1:18, respectively” (Singh, 1996, 415). If the second half of these ratios were, in fact, non-hardcore terrorists, the policy would still be considered selective targeting. It is difficult to evaluate *how selective* the entire police campaign was toward the end of the insurgency. From the beginning, the Punjab Police was known to lie about the militant credentials of whom they arrested. They also lied about the nature of how they were killed, according to human rights groups (Gossman, 1994). “Faked encounters” – where a suspect was killed in detention but officially reported to be killed in an armed encounter with the police – were reported from the beginning. The police lied about these events but did not appear

109 This casualty figure covers the range of the first 6 months on 1992, which is within the overall range when counterinsurgency targeting became more selective.
to make great efforts to conceal the truth, evidenced by the clear signs of torture on the bodies of the dead (Gossman, 1994; 2000). Further, we know that the police were not perfectly selective, which would imply they targeted only known insurgents. There is evidence that they targeted the family members of suspected insurgents as well as informants (Gossman, 1994). However, both of these categories, despite breaching international law, fit with the deterrent logic of selective targeting stated in the Theory chapter and in the literature.

Although several human rights reports have documented the extent of human rights abuses of government forces, most do not claim the victims were not selective targets.\textsuperscript{110} Mostly through exploring single incidents, they provide evidence that the security forces had engaged in encounter killings (discussed above), disappearances, torture, and detentions without trial (ENSAAF, 2005; Gossman, 1994; 2000; Kumar and Singh, 2003). Silva, Marwaha, and Klinger (2009) use quantitative analysis of the asymmetrical casualties that Khalistanis suffered compared to the Punjab Police during encounters to suggest that the encounters were not fair firefights. Most of these incidents appear to involve selective targets that were not given their full rights under the law, though there are accusations of targeting human rights workers (Silva, Marwaha, and Klinger, 2009).\textsuperscript{111} Although there have been some trials and convictions against police officers (Telford, 2001), the Government of India treats these violations as unavoidable aberrations (Silva, Marwaha, and Klinger, 2009).

\textsuperscript{110} That the targeted killings campaign was a breach of human rights is not being disputed here. Clearly, extrajudicial killings are a breach of international law.\textsuperscript{111} It is not within the scope of this dissertation to evaluate the legality of any cases or the entire campaign. The Indian government passed some draconian laws that provide immunity for some abuses, though some have resulted in prosecution. For more legal information, see the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1985 (updated 1987) and the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance (1984).
The process of selective targeting through human rights abuses (i.e., extrajudicial killing) suggests serious limits to the utility of the case for prescribing policy to other states facing internal threats. While I argue here that selective targeting played a contributing role at defeating the Khalistan insurgency, I am resistant to recommend the way this policy was carried out as a model. The investment in organizational and operational capacity allowed the Punjab Police to exploit their intelligence capacity to identify individual insurgents and the leaders of various Khalistani organizations. Identifying insurgents at the individual level is essential, and I would recommend these investments to increase the capacity of local forces to do so. The policy of elimination of these targets, over other options, is not preferable. Ideally, once identified, the insurgents should be arrested and tried through the regular judicial process. This would provide the moral high ground to the state as well as serving as a potentially clearer deterrent, since one would be more confident in the selectivity of the targeting if there was a trial to establish guilt.

However, the ideal scenario is not a realistic scenario in most cases. Once extremist violence emerges, many administrative functions of the state cease to be effective. For the ideal liberal scenario to be effective, the state needs a functioning judicial process. Rather, in Punjab, the judicial process was paralyzed as militants targeted judges, prosecutors, and the administrative staff who refused to enact their edicts. Joshi (1993, 5) quotes the Indian government through the National Integration Council: “the courts and judicial system have been subjected to intense pressure by terrorists that their functioning has been severely affected.” Dhillion (2005, 488) notes that the “failure of the courts to dispense speedy justice had made a mockery of judicial

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112 Given the single case study design, I cannot control completely for other explanations.
processes. Only the police and central armed forces seemed to be functional.”

Furthermore, the jails served to radicalize other criminals and may have increased Khalistani recruitment.\footnote{The points made in this paragraph are supported by nearly every interview I conducted, even from human rights academics that were otherwise critical of the Police campaign.} This observation calls for more research into the conditions that allow for functioning government institutions during internal conflicts. A well-functioning judicial system would, not only remove the excuse for police abuses, but also curb them, as violators within the security forces too could be held responsible. Without effective judicial processes, however, it is difficult to prosecute abusers since they have few legal options to contain ethnonationalist violence.\footnote{A former police officer made a statement with similar sentiment in an interview. He felt it was wholly unjust to prosecute the only arm of the government that actually worked during the insurgency. K.P.S. Gill made a similar statement: “a mechanism must be found to obviate the legal harassment of those who put their lives at stake during low-intensity conflict…Otherwise, who is going to fight terrorism tomorrow” (quote from Vanayek, 1997, cited in Telford, 2001).}

**Conclusion**

This chapter set out to apply the theory from Chapter 2 to the third stage of the Khalistan conflict. Specifically, this chapter provides plausibility to two hypotheses from Chapter 2. Consistent with hypothesis #2 – that selective violence by state forces reduces the threat to the state – the selective targeting of insurgents, especially high-ranking Khalistani leaders, led to a reduction of Khalistani violence against civilians and contributed to the disintegration of the organizations. This third stage in the conflict is also consistent with hypothesis #4 – that state agents with combined intelligence and organizational capacity could execute selective targeting campaigns effectively. Although it took several years to
accomplish, the investments in organizational capacity helped the Punjab Police exploit their intelligence advantages to identify and target individual insurgents.

The third stage of the Khalistan conflict also led to new revelations that were not originally theorized. The investment in organizational capacity was necessarily accompanied with investment in operational capacity. The ability to pursue targets once identified was an important investment that was initially overlooked. Similarly, the investment in organizational capacity did not end human rights abuses by the Punjab Police. There is evidence of some officers pursuing private violence even in the latter stages of the conflict, casting some qualification to hypothesis #6. The Punjab Police did not become a respected law enforcement institution; rather, they became feared for their ruthless anti-Khalistani measures. The concluding chapter addresses other unanswered questions regarding the application of the theory to the Khalistan conflict and the strengths and limitations of a within-case design.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

**Summary of Findings**

This dissertation sought to contribute to puzzles of state violence against internal armed challengers. First, is collective violence really counterproductive? Chapter 2 spells out the theoretical expectation (hypothesis #1) that collective violence (or state repression that results in the casualties of civilians) should be associated with a backlash effect that actually strengthens the opposition by convincing civilians to seek the protection of the opposition. Chapter 3 tests this proposition with cross-national time-series data and finds, after modeling the endogeneity, that large-scale state repression is associated with strengthening the opposition as evidenced by their ability to inflict and sustain greater battlefield casualties.

Second, the dissertation advanced a novel theoretical approach to explain why states use different types of violence against the armed opposition, including why states often use counterproductive collective violence when selective violence is much more effective. By focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of the state agency tasked with counterinsurgency, the sub-state capacity approach helps us understand why we observe the type of violence that we do. In short, agents that recruit from national recruitment pools are less likely to have local intelligence. These agents (especially the national army) are instead built for their coercive capacity and are better suited for countering and deterring external threats. Counterinsurgency, at least when the opposition is clandestine and not territorially based, does not require extensive coercive capacity.
Since internal threats require local intelligence, local security forces may be more effective since they naturally have better access to local populations and a better understanding of local dynamics. However, most local forces are not designed for the battling even weak armed opposition fighters. They often lack the organizational and operational competence to even attempt combat them seriously. The combination of local forces with competent organizational and operational capacity allows for the security forces to target insurgents selectively in relatively high numbers. However, local forces with these attributes are relatively rare.

Lessons Learned

Overall, the evidence presented in Chapter 3-5 corroborates the theory presented in Chapter 2. However, the case study chapters in particular brought to light some aspects that did not fit the theory flawlessly. Since no theory is expected to fit evidence perfectly (then there would be no need for it) and theory should be refined with new evidence, it is important to address these areas directly to learn the appropriate lessons.

First, earlier iterations of this research did not allow for the police incompetence value of the dependent variable; it followed the literature and only focused on the dichotomy between collective and selective violence. This category of incompetence is actually an important contribution because it highlights the main argument of the dissertation – that many state agents, despite their best intentions and local intelligence capacity, cannot actually target selectively. The functionalist strand of the rationalist literature that has searched high and low for a strategic logic to collective violence is missing the simple answer: most states lack viable alternatives to collective targeting.
Second, the evidence that the humiliation of Sikhs en route to the Asian Games in 1982 caused a “mini” backlash effect fits somewhat uncomfortably with the theory proposed. Collective targeting – in this case all Sikhs traveling to New Delhi were stopped, searched, and humiliated – is expected to cause a backlash, but not necessarily through the mechanisms through which it actually occurred. While unlawful detention is one form of a violation of physical integrity rights – and thus violence – increasing the radical sympathies of Sikhs in this case was not due to a fear of death based on their identity. Instead, it fits other, non-rational, mechanisms of the backlash effect, especially humiliation and anger. It does help the intelligence capacity argument in some respects. For the purpose of screening Sikhs that were planning to protest at the Asian Games, the identification of individuals is nearly impossible. Even if it were possible, the Haryana Police would not be likely to do so, since they are drawn from a different population than Punjabi Sikhs. Collective targeting of Sikhs was the only option to accomplish the goal of avoiding an anti-India protest at the Asian Games.

Third, the perception of collective or selective state violence matters as much (or more) than actual violence. Operation Bluestar contributed to the backlash effect even though it sought a selective target – Bhindranwale and his armed followers. Since so many of the victims of Operation Bluestar were non-militant Sikhs in the Golden Temple and the government lost the information battle, Operation Bluestar was viewed as an attack on the entire Sikh community, instead of on the radical armed preacher abusing Sikh religious symbols.

\[115\] This observation is not necessarily new, but this case highlights the point. See Kalyvas (2006, 174).
The perception of selective targeting was important during the final stages of the Khalistan conflict as well. Even when security forces achieve selective targeting, we would expect there to be a time lag until civilians and potential rebels adjust to this reality. Even though the targeting in the final periods of the conflict was actually selective, the Punjab Police attempted to speed up the learning process by publicizing their kills (Gill, author interview, 2012). They also sped up this process by spreading propaganda that the people had turned against the Khalistanis and they should join or help the state, since helping the Khalistanis would be a losing proposition. While this situation was accurate during the final offensive, the Police used it well before it was true in an attempt to affect civilians’ perceptions of the war (Gill, author interview, 2012).

A fourth factor that the case study highlights was the role of operational capacity, which was not originally theorized. I was originally concerned much more with the role of state agents with access to local intelligence and their ability to control the lower level police from abusing human rights. But the addition of operational capacity plays an important role if local agents like the police are to be effective counterinsurgents. Identifying insurgents is one thing, but being able to pursue and capture/kill them is another. One example from the Punjab Police in the late period helps illustrate this importance. Khalistanis had frequently used roadside ambuses as a successful tactic, since they could flee through the sugarcane fields, making them nearly impossible to pursue. The Punjab Police created a special cell that focused on technological solutions to operational problems like these. The solution was to armor a tractor that could pursue Khalistanis through the sugarcane field. The success of this tactical innovation ended sugarcane ambushes as a tactic (Gill, 1999; author interview, 2012.)
Fifth, the end of collective targeting after 1984 presents a contradiction to the negative counterinsurgency cycle presented in the theory chapter (Figure 2.1). The negative cycle expected collective targeting to be self-reinforcing, since its use would create a greater need for state response and reduced access to intelligence. Even though both of these effects occurred after Operations Bluestar and Woodrose, the Army was pulled out of Punjab in 1985 and the Punjab Police resumed operational command as the primary counterinsurgents. These operations had created a backlash that required a state response and directly damaged the ability of security forces to get tactical intelligence. But the peculiarity of Punjab’s location on India’s geostrategic border with Pakistan meant other national security interests were at play. It was and is important for India’s national security that Punjabis not view the Indian Army as hostile. Punjab is an important theater for international wars with Pakistan and it is imperative that the Army is able to operate in Punjab with the support of the Punjabi population.

Last, the criminal and violent nature of the Khalistan movement, especially toward the end, may suggest a limitation to some of the arguments made in Chapter 5 and to the positive cycle of counterinsurgency more generally. The Punjab Police were able to break into the positive counterinsurgency cycle by establishing their effectiveness, specifically to target high-ranking Khalistanis and reduce their response time to Khalistani violence. The willingness of the Khalistanis to use violence against civilians stopped civilians from initially providing intelligence, but once the police showed they could follow up on the information, civilian tips became the dominant source of intelligence. This observation is consistent with arguments by Kalyvas (2006, 90-104) and observations by Stoll (1993, 20), that civilian collaboration is a result of the
conditions on the ground in the conflict. Still, one wonders if police effectiveness would have been sufficient for civilian collaboration if the Khalistanis had been an institutionalized, ideologically coherent group capable of nurturing rather than “using up” civilian support. If the opposition group maintained popular support, selective targeting might not have led to the dissolution of the organization and recruitment might have kept up with Khalistani deaths.

Similarly, the ability to target Khalistani leaders seemed to play a direct role in the disintegration of the militant organizations, though the literature on decapitation is mixed on whether this strategy is effective. Insurgent organizations that are more institutionalized and ideologically coherent should be less likely to be susceptible to decapitation, thus the strategy used by the Punjab Police might not have worked if the opposition had been more institutionalized. However, Johnston (2012) shows that decapitation has been a more successful strategy than often argued, but does not find any difference between ideological and ethnic-based insurgencies. The former was thought to be more resilient to decapitation since communist insurgencies tended to have more institutionalized structures as well as an accompanying political party. The Khalistan case was clearly a case of decapitation working, but it is unclear if it would have worked if the Khalistanis had been less factionalized. Still, the sheer number of high-ranking Khalistanis that were killed during the campaign makes one wonder if any insurgent organization could have survived.116

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116 I should note that the reason there were so many high-ranking Khalistanis killed was in part due to the fact that there were so many high-ranking Khalistanis in the conflict. Since the militant organizations proliferated and many only had a few members, the number of leaders was exceptionally high. So, the fact that many Khalistani leaders were killed was in part a symptom of a factionalized insurgency.
On Generalizability: External Validity, External Expectations, and Case Peculiarities

If social science is supposed to propose general theories and explanations of social phenomena that apply to the population of cases beyond the sample, then generalizability must be addressed. In fact, whether one’s findings are generalizable is often seen as a crucial judgment on the value of the work. However, it is specific hypotheses of an entire research program, not every individual study, that require generalizability or external validity. Each individual study can pursue a variety of purposes for the entire research program on a particular question or hypothesis. Whereas large-N, cross-national studies provide eternal validity, they tend to lack measurement specificity and cannot establish how the mechanism works. Where within-case designs are generally better at establishing the mechanisms and describing how processes work, they are difficult to generalize to other cases. Each method (among others) provides a specific utility and eventually, every research program in comparative politics ought to use each of them. The appropriateness of each design is dependent on the state of the literature within the research program.

The state of the literature on hypothesis #1 – that collective violence is counterproductive – is fairly advanced. Numerous studies have established the mechanisms (either in support or against this hypothesis) within specific cases using both qualitative and quantitative within-case designs (Downes, 2008; Goodwin, 2001; LaFree, Dugan, and Korte, 2009; Kircullen, 2009; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas, 2011; Lyall, 2009; Mason and Krane, 1989; Peceny and Stanley, 2010; Wood, 2003). Others have turned to game-theoretic models to establish theoretical plausibility (DeNardo, 1985; Machain, Morgan, and Regan, 2011; Mason and Krane, 1989). What was lacking from the research program was a cross-national study for external validity that appropriately
dealt with the endogeneity issues between state repression and rebel threat. The quantitative cross-national study in Chapter 3 sought to fill this gap in the literature to advance the research program.

The other puzzles from the literature on state violence are less advanced. Few have established credible mechanisms that can explain why states pursue collective violence when it clearly comes with a risk of a backlash or why some achieve selective violence at other times. Some search for conditions in which it may be effective (Downes, 2008; Kalyvas, 2006, chapter 6). Perhaps the most developed explanation on the issue is Kalyvas’s (2006) theory of territorial control. It has a logical mechanism based of the difficulty of identifying individual insurgents and argues that the principal variation causing the difference in observed violence is the degree of territorial control each actor enjoys. He provides fairly convincing evidence from the Greek Civil War and comparative evidence from other large-scale territorial wars. Some have been able to apply this approach quantitatively to establish further credibility (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2009), but such attempts require amazingly disaggregated data that simply does not exist in most cases.

But since territorial arguments do not apply well to lower levels of conflict, where insurgents remain clandestine and never seriously control any territory, the gap in the literature is presenting a theoretical approach than can explain the type of violence in low-intensity, non-territorial conflicts. This dissertation has advanced an explanation based on the capacity of agents in the security sector, but the explanation is still in its infancy. I have provided within-case evidence from the Khalistan conflict in India to establish the plausibility of the approach. The next step is to evaluate the sub-state
capacity approach across a greater number of cases and diversify the methods employed (see further research section below).

Still, only part of findings from the Khalistan conflict on sub-state capacity are expected to generalize. As the theory chapter notes, most states that experience serious internal threats in the form of low-intensity conflict are generally weak states. Most states should have a somewhat similar sub-state capacity distribution, where the army has the coercive capacity, but lacks access to local intelligence, while local security forces will lack organizational and operational capacity. I, therefore, would expect experiences of stages #1 and #2 of India in Punjab to be somewhat common. However, the experience of stage #3, where the local forces invest in organizational and operational capacity and eventually defeat an armed movement, is not found in many other parts of the world. Why some agencies in the security sector can reform in the face of a new threat while others cannot is another area of research to be explored in the future.

**Future Research**

The discussion above (and in the conclusion of Chapter 5) has identified four areas for future research. As noted, the sub-state capacity approach, and its contribution to the research program on varieties of state violence, is in its infancy. The first step for future research is to diversify cases and methods. Future research will apply this framework to other cases of low-intensity conflict in the Global South. The next iteration of the project will continue to apply the framework on subnational quantitative designs on two other internal conflicts in India, particularly in Assam and Kashmir. These conflicts have seen significant variation in intensity and the security forces employed. Each has had local and
national level agencies tasked with the efforts, though none to has achieved the success of the counterinsurgency campaign in Punjab. The subnational quantitative design would test whether the sub-state capacity approach has purchase across cases of Indian counterinsurgency. The following step would branch out to other cases of low-intensity conflict beyond India. Here, a medium-N study identifying broad patterns of sub-state capacity and state violence would add external validity to the argument. Each step will refine theory as new lessons are learned.

For both avenues of future research, more objective measures of sub-state capacity are required. For the case of India in the Punjab coding the relevant actors is quite obvious, but to expand the argument beyond qualitative case studies will require clearer measures. Measures of coercive capacity for the national level agencies like the military do exist for cross-national comparison (e.g., military expenditures, personnel). Lyall and Wilson (2009)’s inverse measure of military mechanization – soldiers per vehicle – may be useful for this purpose. Intelligence capacity at the national level is more difficult. I argued in Chapter 2 that national militaries would have less access to local intelligence. I believe this to be true, but some measure of intelligence capacity across militaries may be useful. Since insurgencies rely on local dynamics, the intelligence capacity of local forces should uniformly be higher than national militaries. However, coding organizational capacity, *ex ante*, may be more difficult. The literatures on bureaucratic effectiveness may be useful here, and standard measures such as relative budget size and autonomy from political pressures may be of some use.

A second line of further research will apply the sub-state capacity approach to other security agencies, especially militias and village defense forces. Theoretically, local
defense forces should have even greater access to local intelligence and could help the state achieve selective targeting (thus reduce collective targeting) (Clayton and Thompson, n.d.), but they should also have even weaker organizational capacity. The latter may be one additional reason they are associated with greater human rights abuses (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler, n.d.). Thus, future research would do well to examine the conditions under which local defense forces are well controlled by the state and when they are not.

A third avenue for further research would examine security sector reform given internal armed challenges. As stage #3 of the Khalistan conflict demonstrates, reforming the local forces to be useful counterinsurgents was costly, time-consuming, and difficult to manage bureaucratically. Without the direct threat to one of the most important provinces in India, it is difficult to see how the reform would have been possible. Punjab’s essential role as the primary wheat-producing state and its critical placement along the Pakistani border provided the motivation for political forces to overcome traditional barriers to security sector reform. Furthermore, examining how local forces are “re-reformed” back to civil police may useful. The Khalistan conflict showed that local forces could be useful counterinsurgents, but counterinsurgents may not be good civil police in peacetime. Applying the literature on bureaucratic and security sector reform to forces active in conflicts could be fruitful.

Last, selective targeting may be effective counterinsurgency but the cases of extrajudicial killing by the Punjab Police during the Khalistan conflict raise serious human rights issues. As I discussed in the conclusion of Chapter 5, the police’s resort to lethal force in the form of encounter killings was in part due to the lack of functioning
institutions in Punjab. The judicial system especially ceased to be a useful way to deal with Khalistani militants, due to the targeting judges, prosecutors, and administrative staff. Without the ability to prosecute militants under the normal liberal law and order model, security forces felt justified in their resort to extrajudicial killing of militants given the lack of legal options. Functioning government institutions are necessary to protect human rights. Future research would do well to study the conditions that allow governing institutions to continue to function in the face of civil conflict or extremist violence. This issue is not limited to the developing world; the United States’ (political) difficulty in trying terrorists in regular courts contributes to human rights abuses in military detention facilities (e.g., Guantanamo Bay).

Policy implications

Even though research on sub-state capacity is in its infancy, the study does suggest some policy implications; mostly for states in the Global South but also for opposition movements and even the United States.

The most obvious policy implication for states facing an armed insurgency is that they should avoid using collective repression. This is a no-brainer on moral and humanitarian grounds, but is also a strategic imperative. States facing internal armed challenges should not be tempted to follow in the footsteps of the few cases where collective repression was found to be effective. Chapter 3 shows that there are not enough of these cases to regard the strategy as effective. Instead, it is a gamble that one does not have to take if they could develop viable alternatives to collective violence.

Following the first, the second policy implication is that states, particularly in the Global South, should develop viable alternatives to collective repression by investing in
the organizational capacity of your local forces. Even if your state is not currently facing
an armed opposition group, one cannot afford to be complacent about the lackluster
performance of local institutions, especially security institutions. Since these agents will
have the better access to local intelligence than their national counterparts, you may need
to rely on them if internal conflict erupts.

This is not to say that states should turn their local forces into militarized
counterinsurgent forces before an insurgency erupts. Rather, by developing the
organizational capacity to encourage meritocracy, control low-ranking forces, and
provide competent public security, those local forces will be able to adapt to the
unfortunate scenario of an insurgency if one occurs. By having well-functioning local
security institutions, one may avoid the escalation move beyond small-scale law and
order problems. However, if serious armed opposition emerges, the Punjab case shows
that it is not too late to invest in these capacities.

Third, states should play an active role in the propaganda battle, especially as it
concerns their use of violence. The difference between collective violence and collateral
damage is in the eye of the beholder and the state should play a role in constructing what
that beholder sees. The Indian state may view the pilgrims who were killed in the Golden
Temple during Operation Bluestar as collateral damage, but that is not how the average
Sikh understood it. This was exacerbated by the fact that Khalistani sympathizers were
able to control the story in Punjab and abroad to portray it as collective violence.

Fourth, states should invest in other functioning local governing institutions that
can be maintained in the face of insurgent or terrorist violence. While the Punjab Police’s
ability to selectively target Khalistanis with lethal violence toward the end of the conflict
played a role in their disintegration, being able to carry out a similar strategy that arrested them could have been just as effective while maintaining the legitimacy of the Indian state. Maintaining well-functioning institutions like the judicial system would have allowed the Police to be less violent (or at least gave them the option to be) and allowed India to avoid the allegations of human rights abuses.

The last implication for states is in regard to the political leadership. Toying with sensitive ethnic politics is a dangerous proposition. A simple political move by Congress to force the Akali Dal to the right resulted in radicalization that quickly got out of Congress’ control. This highlights the fact that the dynamics of conflict are not necessarily the same as the dynamics that start it. The cynical role that Congress officials played at the beginning of the Khalistan conflict is far too common in India, where parties have played up ethnic sentiments for political purposes as a matter of normal business (in some areas, but not all) (Varshney, 1993; 1999; 2001; Wilkinson, 2006).

This study also provides implications for opposition groups that take the form of political parties or armed movements. Moderates in the political system need to find a way to not let the violent extremists take over the movement. The evidence from this dissertation offers no specific advice in this regard, but once militants take over the demands, it becomes especially difficult to find a moderate solution to the problem. Sikhs in the Punjab had serious grievances that the Indian state should have taken more seriously. In the end, they did not get any of the policy concessions that the state would have likely been able to concede if the moderates were in control.

Along similar lines, the militants of a movement ought to find ways to maintain a singular movement with clear demands. If the Khalistan movement had been a coherent
organization, it could have exacted more concessions from the Indian state by being a
credible negotiating partner while providing more pressure to compromise. I understand
that many violent actors specifically did not want a negotiated settlement and that many
others needed the conflict environment to exploit their other, often criminal, intentions. In
this regard, opposition movements should develop more organizational capacity to
clearly get rid of criminal elements and control their rank and file from exploiting the
conflict environment. It would allow them to maintain popular support, negotiate a
solution so they get something out of the conflict, and potentially withstand a government
selective targeting campaign.

This dissertation built in an explicit scope condition that the arguments set forth in
the sub-state capacity approach were to apply to states in the Global South facing internal
non-territorial armed opposition groups. Still, the dissertation offers some implications
for states that pursue counterinsurgency abroad like the United States. This dissertation
highlights the difficulty of counterinsurgency by pronouncing the absolute necessity of
identifying actual insurgents and avoiding shortcuts like collective targeting. The primary
implication of this for external interveners is that these states should avoid
counterinsurgencies abroad. Despite massive coercive capacity, they are largely
incapable of executing an effective counterinsurgency strategy because they are greatly
disadvantaged at accessing local intelligence. External interveners have even more
disadvantages than national militaries on their home soil. External interveners have far
more coercive capacity than the insurgents they face abroad, but having stronger relative
power is not only not sufficient, it is almost a nonfactor. While this coercive advantage often convinces external interveners that they are omnipotent, this is not the type of capacity that is required for effective counterinsurgency. Occupation-style counterinsurgency may provide the territorial control necessary for some selective targeting (see Kalyvas, 2006), but it also increases the presence of a government to which local resistance is specifically opposed.

Being foreigners, external counterinsurgents have even less access to local intelligence than the national militaries of host nations. They must rely on local sources for intelligence, but this often creates principal-agent problems that are particularly difficult to overcome in a foreign situation. External interveners must trust local sources who often exploit that trust for their personal purposes. This is a precarious position to put one’s state in and should be avoided unless it is clearly connected to a well-defined national interest. The proposed future research on controlling civilian defense forces may provide some leverage into how external interveners can control local forces in foreign counterinsurgencies, but it is not immediately obvious that it is even possible.

117 Hultquist (2013) in a study of relative power on civil war outcomes finds that relative power is not related to government victories, indicating that the stronger the government is compared to the insurgent plays no significant role in defeating them.

118 Other “smaller footprint” operations appear to have more success like the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) (Lewis, Lambert, and Sewall, 2012), since they are built to strengthen the operational capacity of local forces to target insurgents/terrorists or to assist host nations in selective targeting. But it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to evaluate their utility in any comprehensive form.
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