LEARNED PROFESSIONS AND JEWS IN MODERN GERMANY AND THEIR HERITAGE FOR ISRAEL

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The study of professions has become a preoccupation of many modern historians in recent years. This new interest comes partly in response to new questions raised by the "new social history," partly in attempts to investigate the phenomenon in geographical areas (such as central Europe) where it was traditionally neglected, and partly in recognition of the claim made by such prominent social scientists as Talcott Parsons "that the professional complex ... has already become the most important single component in the structure of modern societies." One may quarrel with Parson's view that "the massive emergence of the professional complex, not the special status of capitalistic or socialistic modes of organization, is the crucial structural development in twentieth-century society." In face of a post-industrial "information revolution", however, the creation, management and role of "expert knowledge" as well as the self-understanding and ethos of the bearers of that knowledge is of more vital interest than ever. And although not all experts are "professionals" (some might add, not all professionals are experts!), the academic professions in their modern form offer us one of the best approaches to understanding the development of certain kinds of expert knowledge and its application over a longer time-frame.

Theories and history of knowledge have undergone their own complex development over time. From at least the age of the Protestant Reformation in Europe, "profession" in Europe has been associated with a strong ethical imperative, somewhat analogous to the religious "calling" with which the German word for occupation, _Beruf_, is affiliated. Knowledge is power, and the accumulation -- especially of esoteric or existential (life-and-death) knowledge has usually required both socially-sanctioned acculturation and a "professional ethic" to militate against abuse of "expert power". The traditional learned professions -- priestly, legal and medical -- still bear at
least nominal signs of a special ethical code. Indeed earlier reflections on the nature and evolution of professions dwelled on the self-regulating activity of professional groups as an "essential characteristic", so much so that it was widely assumed that such professions are exclusively a feature of modern free-market societies (such as England and the USA). ii

A more recent analytical vogue sees professions and their characteristic organizations as comparable to other lobbies in pluralistic societies or even as aggressive powers bent on monopolization of the market in their services, more concerned with the maximization of their collective income, prestige, and immunity from ethical control than altruistic goals. In this view, professional groups not only can coexist with bureaucratization, they can under favorable circumstances harness the power of the state to affect their "professionalization project." iii In this view, modern learned professions are not limited to the so-called "free" or "liberal" ones (i.e. those using a fee-for-service model) but also can include graduate chemists and engineers who work for large corporations, teachers who work for the state, and many other "new professionals."

The German experience of professionalization, entailing the creation of some new and the transformation of some traditional learned occupations, took place under a mixture of free-market and bureaucratized conditions and thus has, in my view, a more universal validity for comparison with other cases (including Israel's) than the narrow Anglo-American ones. Modern professions arose in German-speaking Central Europe over a fairly short period of time, concentrated in the era of national unification and Empire, reaching a kind of fitful maturity in the difficult years of the Weimar Republic, and facing a crisis coincident with the Hitler Era, from which they have recovered in altered form in the last half-century. I will focus particularly on the Imperial and Weimar eras not only because of their crucial formative importance for German learned professions, but also because of the very significant, if uneven involvement of Jews in the process. This involvement had many important consequences, and I shall attempt to address these also at the end of this lecture.

BEFORE MODERNIZATION

Professions have been present throughout recorded history,
but the term is not an easy one for historians to use. The older meaning of profession in German as in French describes a trade, usually a skilled one, for which apprenticeship normally provided preparation. Beyond that, some professions traditionally required some level of "university" training. In Europe from the late Middle Ages the need to master and even interpret classical texts of law, medicine and religion created a link with, if not yet a prerequisite for, the practice of those three professions and, in a broader sense, administration, teaching, and science. Despite efforts by church and state authorities to require certifiable competency from ecclesiastical and bureaucratic office-holders, which became ever more insistent in the eighteenth century, professions in the early-modern era lacked the symmetrical features they would acquire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. University-graduated professional men had no monopoly on the "practice" of caring for souls, bodies, and legal relationships. Nor did "learned expertise" have a monopoly on the activities of professional men, who lacked one of the characteristic experiences of their modern brethren, the prospect of a life-long career in their chosen discipline. Clergymen often began their careers as teachers, waiting for a parish or other office; university professors often had to double as firewood or beer-and-wine merchants, and rarely remained in the same discipline they started in; physicians and lawyers were also often distracted by secondary occupations. Economic rewards were low, preparing for professions was expensive, success had as much to do with good fortune and patronage as skill or merit, and public honor and esteem were notably low.

In the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century, however, learned professions began to acquire some of the characteristics that mark them off as "modern": continuous and practically exclusive work in the service sector, based on extensive, specialized tertiary education and the demonstration of adequate cognitive knowledge by an examination and licensing process. Reformed universities, infused with an ethos of Wissenschaft and a mission to discover new knowledge, attracted a larger student body, which in turn had to face more systematic examination and licensing requirements demanded by the state. Carried out in large part at the initiative of the German states' civil service (arguably the first important occupational group to be professionalized in Central Europe), this "professionalization from above" (H. Siegrist) provided the necessary framework for a more autonomous, self-conscious kind of professional activity beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century.
In this phase of "professionalization from above," Jews were not yet allowed to play a significant role shaping the modernization of academic professions; but the same can also be said of the existing Christian members of those professions. While "emancipation" measures before and during the Napoleonic era meant that Jews could begin to study in university faculties other than medicine, their numbers remained small and their career chances very limited either by law or by administrative manipulation. University-educated Jews were generally excluded from the civil service, Gymnasium and university teaching, the officer corps, the Christian clergy (obviously), as well as large state-controlled sectors of the medical and legal professions. The German states during the reactionary "pre-March", i.e. pre-1848 era frowned upon efforts by professional men to form local, regional and (especially frightening) national congresses and organizations, and largely ignored mounting demands for reform from such professional organizations, which burst forth in a number of national professional congresses in the revolutionary period 1848-9. Even in the following decade of renewed reaction, however, the genie could not be put back in the bottle, and professional men (notably working in fields of the private sector, such as engineering and chemistry, over which the bureaucracy had no control) began to found national organizations such as the VDI and DCV. Ultimately the changed political landscape of the North German Confederation and the German Reich would free many professions from the heavy hand of government regulation so common in the pre-March era.

IN THE GERMAN REICH

The concession of equal citizenship rights to religious minorities by the new German state in 1869 coincided with the liberalization of laws and attitudes toward professions. The Reichsgewerbeordnung (also 1869) declared medicine to be a "free" profession (as demanded by the influential liberal Berlin Medical Society). An overhaul of the national legal system beginning in the 1870s produced a Reichsanwaltsordnung (1878) that effectively privatized the occupation of attorney. The teaching profession -- or to be more exact the various branches of it -- also witnessed great expansion, as enrollments increased dramatically at every level. But education (along with religion) was still a matter for the member states of the Reich and remained fissured by the different socioeconomic realities of its clienteles (i.e. students at different levels and their parents), by confessional differences, gender issues, and pedagogical presuppositions reflecting the wide variety of
Weltanschauungen in the new Germany. Such "new" academic professions as engineering and chemistry received a boost from the expansion of natural science both in traditional universities and the burgeoning technische Hochschulen (polytechnics), which were recognized as equal to universities in 1900. Partly as symbol of their determination not to surrender their jealously guarded cultural and artistic sovereignties, the states of the new German Reich poured unprecedented resources into their universities, research institutes, as well as art education and patronage.

Despite the official recognition of equal citizenship rights for Jews, however, unofficial discrimination against them persisted in most of the professions. Jews could freely study, obtain the highest degrees, and go through the process of qualification for all professions. But they were not welcome in the higher civil service, the officer corps, or virtually any of the highest levels of any profession requiring appointment to a state-connected office. Even as some distinguished Jews were knighted by grateful governments, even the most distinguished Jewish academics discovered a "glass ceiling" in universities: unbaptized Jews could be associate professors forever, but not usually Ordinarien (full professors). They could sit as judges on the lower benches of the court system, but not the highest. They could be consulted and listened to on the highest government levels, but not become "ministers of state." Although Catholics in Protestant states, Protestants in Catholic states, politically left-liberal personalities, democrats, and socialists, and of course all women suffered similar overt prejudices, a few of these could begin to find a foothold somewhere in the German Reich before 1914, or at least earn a place in German historical mythology for the eclat their challenges made. German Jews, eager to accept the signs of acceptance-for-acculturation in the nervous and insecure world of "modern German culture", understandably pinned their hopes on what Max Weber somewhat bitterly but probably correctly called the "rationalization" and Entzauberung of contemporary life.

In the meantime, openings for academically-trained Jews in Imperial Germany appeared most promising in the professions least staatsnah, least close to the state. It is also useful to recall the fact that what historians call "Germany" was then undergoing one of the most drastic demographic shifts in its history. Not only German Jews, but most Germans, including such "new Germans" as Poles, joined the migration from country to city, from village to industry, from agriculture to urban culture by about 1900. 

German Jews not only took the chance to become, more than ever, urban Bildungsbürger by attending and getting degrees from
German universities, they confidently entered the non-state professions open to them. It is well-known that they did this in a few urban settings in a particularly noticeable way, such as Berlin. What is less well appreciated is that in academic professional fields open to them, such as law and medicine, and in the professional organizations that were reaching maturity in the late German Empire, they began to gain acceptance as ebenbürtig and to be accorded high voice and office in the common struggle to establish "professional standards", or in the terms of 1900, die Hebung des Standes. German Jews were perceived as being on the cutting edge of excellence and high standards, and made excellent allies for the (largely Protestant) elite of professional organizations working toward the same goals. It is significant that Jewish doctors and attorneys were locally confined in their practice to several German cities, but the national organizations of doctors and lawyers in Germany sought more than a token representation of Jews in the higher levels of their councils. For somebody like me, who has probably sacrificed my vision in advance of the joys of reading in my old age just to scan several decades of the Ärztliches Vereinsblatt and the Juristische Wochenschrift, it is remarkable that professional deference and courtesy, not antisemitic outbursts, grace these millions of pages. Nobody seemed to take much notice if the authors were Jewish or of some other background. The shared ground was the common ethos of introducing science and reasoned discourse into public life. As well as the increasingly obvious demand for the "raising of the profession" in terms of economic rewards, recognition of expertise in public and private decision-making, and taking the word Bildung seriously.

One measure of both the assimilation of Jews into the professions and their influential role in them may be taken from the legal field. On the eve of World War I, a majority of attorneys in Berlin, as well over one-fourth of the Prussian bar, came from Jewish backgrounds. Nationally, Jews (who never exceeded one percent of the Reich's citizens) constituted about fifteen percent of all attorneys. By contrast, estimates of the number of barristers of Jewish descent in Britain indicate a minuscule proportion of the entire profession by 1900. Even in the 1980s, active barristers made up around 8% of the national total; if one also includes solicitors (since German attorneys fulfilled both roles), the proportion increases only to about 12%. Figures for France are more difficult to obtain, but in a society with a relatively small Jewish population and official emancipation, no more than 10 percent of Paris' 25,000 Jews were in the liberal professions in 1861, chiefly in medicine, law and engineering.
Some recent studies also indicate the likelihood that Jews constituted a larger percentage of attorneys at higher courts than at the less lucrative lower ones, and that their gains may have come at the expense in some cases of lawyers of Catholic background.\textsuperscript{x} Similarly, the highest levels of the German Bar Association (Deutscher Anwaltverein, or DAV) were graced by prominent Jewish attorneys elected by their largely non-Jewish peers.\textsuperscript{xi}

The success of Jews in the legal profession produced, in addition to the accompanying background tones of anti-Semitism in broader German society, even complaints within the profession, often coded in such words as "the commercialization of the bar". Yet over one significant issue, the DAV (to which three-quarters of all attorneys belonged by World War I) consistently refused to yield: it would not advocate the reintroduction of a \textit{numerus clausus} or numerical limit on practicing attorneys to stem rising competition. While it would be misleading simply to equate advocates of \textit{numerus clausus} with antisemitic attitudes, the continuation of open access (\textit{freie Advokatur}) had traditionally been associated with its liberal origins and Jewish success in the profession. The successful resistance of the (generally older, better-established) leadership of the DAV to the growing complaints (often from younger, less-well established, and Gentile attorneys) attests to the symbiotic relationship of German Jews with the lawyer level of the legal profession.

Discrimination against Jews (and not only Jews) continued throughout the Empire on the bench and in state prosecutors' offices, the qualifications for which were the same as for lawyers, but for which government approval was required. Although Prussia counted about a hundred Jewish judges around 1880 and 200 forty years later, almost none in higher courts, the percentage of all judges, in stark contrast to lawyers, never topped four per cent.\textsuperscript{xii} It must also be added that German judges were much slower to achieve professional self-consciousness than the lawyers: only in 1909 did they succeed in founding the \textit{Deutscher Richterverein} (Judges' Association), since before 1908's \textit{Reichsvereinsgesetz} governments had still regarded professional associations of state employees as subversive.\textsuperscript{xiii}

A similar pattern of high Jewish entry and success in "free" academic professions can be discerned in medicine, as elsewhere in central and western Europe. By 1907 about six percent of physicians and dentists in Germany were Jewish. It should also be born in mind that this proportion would likely have been closer to that in the legal profession (about 14% nationally the same year)\textsuperscript{xiv} had not the medical profession as a
whole expanded in the early phase of the new German Reich much more rapidly than the legal profession. The number of physicians per 100,000 population had fluctuated between 30 and 35 from the 1848 Revolution until 1887, but had reached 40 in 1892 and 50 in 1900, where it stabilized until after World War I.\textsuperscript{xv} By way of contrast, after rising only very slowly in the first three decades of the Reich, the number of lawyers lept from 13:100,000 to 19:100,000 only between 1900 and 1913.\textsuperscript{xvi}

By the last decade of the German Empire Jews also constituted a high percentage of some other "private sector" professions that had come increasingly to be associated with university-level education: private scholar, author, and journalist (at about eight percent).\textsuperscript{xvii} This corresponds roughly to the percentage of Jews among higher school pupils (6-8\%) and university students (7-8\%). At the same time, careers as teachers in elementary, secondary and higher education remained severely limited.

\section*{IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC}

As Peter Pulzer recently summed up the German Empire, it "was a land of opportunity, not least for its Jews. ...But it was a land of unequal opportunity, with most branches of the public services ... virtually barred to the unbaptized Jew."\textsuperscript{xviii} The end of the Obrigkeitsstaat of 1871 meant the end of unofficial and unconstitutional discrimination against religious minorities (for that is what it had traditionally been). The Weimar Republic, while still not \textit{de facto} a land of equal opportunity, operated under a constitution drafted by a Jewish lawyer (Hugo Preuß). But party-political factionalism, weak and unstable coalition governments, and recurring economic crises did not provide the fertile ground for achieving the "professionalizing project" that many professionals had hoped for. Unprecedented waves of higher-education graduates flooded the market for professional services, exacerbating generation-gap resentments.\textsuperscript{xix} Structural changes in both the economy and the education system also meant that increasing numbers of academic professionals were coming from a background in science and engineering, while members of occupational groups such as elementary schoolteachers agitated for the university-level educational requirements that would secure their claim to full professional status. In this climate the professional organizations of the Wilhelmian Bildungsbürgertum appeared to many to be outworn and insufficiently radical gentlemen's clubs of Honoratioren. Already before World War I, labor-union tactics had been invoked, by of all groups, the German Medical Association in successful strikes during disputes with medical
insurance funds. Under the Weimar Republic, which was friendlier to labor unions than the Empire had been, the "professional union" made its first appearance, about which more later.

The success of Jews in the "private sector" professions increased under the Weimar Republic in many ways. The percentage of Jewish private-practice physicians has been estimated to have reached nearly 16% of the Prussian total by 1925; nearly 15% of the dentists; and about 6% of the pharmacists. (Except for physicians, the percentages in public health offices was considerably lower.) Jews comprised nearly 29% of Prussia's lawyers (and about half of Berlin's) by 1933. In the DAV, eleven of 25 members of the executive committee were Jews. Such figures are relativized a little by the Reich's disproportional loss of Gentile population as a result of the Versailles Treaty, but also by the decline of the Jewish population in ratio to the overall population even before the beginnings of emigration in 1933.

The picture in public-sector professions appears more complicated. Although opportunities for Jews on the bench and in the public prosecutors' offices opened noticeably in the first years of the Republic, improvement toward its end did not continue, as one might logically expect from a combination of openings, more than enough qualified Jewish graduates, and an officially more accepting attitude. Logic, however, had little to do with reality. Entering the judicial or administrative branches of government still required a legal education equal to that of attorneys. But it also required -- as had been the case under and even before the German Empire -- an extremely long and wretchedly remunerated "waiting period" as Referendar and Assessor -- before any chance of being raised into the security of permanent Beamter status. This period was so long that very few Jewish law graduates entering the "waiting line" would have had a chance, even under the improved access of the Republic, to qualify for permanent civil service appointments before the onset on the Great Depression and its accompanying reduction-in-force policies.

Political fissures in the Republic, as well as its professional organizations, may have played as significant role as overt anti-Semitism in explaining the declining numbers of an already-low percentage of Jews in the higher civil service and bench. Ironically, one of the few (and of course baptized) Jews to reach high office in the last days of the Empire, Curt Joel, as Brüning's State Secretary in the Ministry of Justice, pursued a ban on appointment to judicial posts of members of the Republikanischer Richterbund, which not only held politically leftist leanings, but many Jewish members.
conservative Deutscher Juristenbund (founded 1919) and the liberal DAV managed to protest together an early Prussian government proposal to open judgeships to any citizen even lacking academic legal training who could pass state juridical examinations as an unacceptable "Americanization" and democratization. And women, irrespective of their background, suffered even greater overt discrimination in the civil-service and judicial branches despite their legal equality after 1918.

The fate of Jewish teachers at all levels, including the highest, was similarly checkered under the Weimar Republic. While 6.9% of full professors in Germany were estimated to be of Jewish descent in 1909 (presumably almost all baptized), the figure had fallen slightly to 5.6% in 1931. Jews comprised a higher percentage of the Privatdozenten, the unsalaried lecturers from which most full professors were later recruited - about 10% in 1909 -- and of "extraordinary" professors (7%), but the tendency of the proportion from then onwards was downward. The number of Jewish secondary and primary schoolteachers (except for Jewish schools) had always been kept minuscule by the religious-confessional principle of German schooling -- among over 200,000 elementary and secondary teachers in Germany by 1933, only 1,200 were Jewish, half of those in Jewish schools.

Teachers belonged to one of the "new professions" in the sense that it became an academic occupation later than such traditional ones as medicine and law. There were others worth mentioning briefly, in which German Jews played more or less significant roles. Dentistry, as already mentioned in connection with medicine, was a "new profession" in which Jews played a significant role. On the other hand, German Jews appear not to have been attracted strongly to engineering. By 1933, there were barely 1,400 Jewish engineers in Germany, about half of one percent of the total. Jews however played a very significant role in occupations that were only beginning to be professionalized in this period -- the creative and performing arts.

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, one of the new trends in professional organizational life during the Weimar period was the rise of unions. The typical development included professionals other than just academically-trained and/or had a social and political orientation more toward the left. This trend is worth noting here because Jewish professionals were prominently represented in some of them, such as the Republikanischer Richterbund already mentioned. Nearly seven percent of Prussia's chemists in 1925 were Jewish, and it would not be surprising to find many disgruntled younger employed technicians joining the League of Technical Employees and
Officials (BUTAB) closely tied to the socialist Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund.

The ultimate crisis of the Weimar Republic coincided with a crisis for the professions, with a horrendous upwardly-spiraling surplus of professionals being trained by a higher education system unwilling to impose limits on Lernfreiheit and, thanks to the Great Depression, a downwardly spiraling market for professional services. One contemporary study estimated that there were altogether about a third of a million positions for academic professionals in Germany in 1932, and that at current rates of production there would soon be one million qualified candidates for them. Sentiments for reducing competition could also, in a most virulent form, be twisted into calls for reduction or removal of groups from university admission who were allegedly "disproportionately" represented (meaning Jews) or whose social "place" was elsewhere (meaning women). Although the NSDAP made some of its earliest inroads in the late 1920s at universities, even taking over the national student organization, Nazi followers had little luck subverting professional organizations before 1933 -- one reason they were forced to go forth and found their own.

LEGACIES FOR TODAY

The brutal National Socialist road to the Holocaust began at the doorstep of German professions. The expulsion of Jews from universities, the civil service and virtually all "public" professional occupations was already a first Nazi priority in the spring of 1933. The forced resignations of Jews from prominent office in the "free" professional organizations took a little longer, and the virtual elimination of Jews from practicing their profession a bit longer still. There are indications that the Nazi promise of "reprofessionalization," which in practice meant decreasing competition and increasing the economic security of many so-called "Aryan" professionals and conceding long-standing demands by some professional groups (e.g. for a national Lawyers' Chamber and Code, and a Physicians' Code, in the mid-1930s or a numerus clausus on admissions), was fulfilled in some ways, at first. But the Nazification of all professional life effectively nullified any gains, and already before the outbreak of World War II one could say that the effect of Nazism was to promote "deprofessionalization".

The organized mayhem and destruction wrought by the "Third Reich" left German professions in shambles. Under the "restaurationist" policies of Adenauer in the Federal Republic, they often reverted to their Weimar models, but with a much
higher degree of realization of their "professionalizing projects" thanks in large part to political stability (i.e., having a stable government to "lobby") and economic prosperity. At the same time, many professional groups drew the lesson from history that a labor-union model was the best guarantee of professional advancement, as with schoolteachers organized in the GEW (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft).

It is hardly necessary here to do more than mention the massive loss to Germany that the emigration of probably the majority of its Jewish professionals and the subsequent murder of the rest. It may be equally unnecessary to recall that so many countries, including Israel and my own, experienced a great enrichment of their professional, scholarly and cultural life as a result of this emigration.

On the other hand, there is not much evidence of German-Jewish émigrés bringing the forms of professional life they had helped develop in Germany to their new home countries, where the development of professions had in any case already taken on indigenous shapes. This was not so firmly the case in Palestine before the founding of the State of Israel. Indeed, in the view of Peter Medding, "The pioneering ethos of the country's major political movement was based upon a revolt against such /professional/ occupations as being unnecessary and unproductive...." A modern state, however, soon needed the skills of professionals, and they in turn made claims consistent with the "professionalization project" internationally -- for respect, recognition, special income and security status -- and were in some cases, like some German professions we have discussed, willing to use or at least threaten strike action to achieve them. The somewhat uneasy relationship of professionals and the Histadrut since the mid-1950s and developments since have produced a situation comparable in some ways to that of the postwar Federal Republic of Germany: professionals are to be found grouped in "unions, associations that are both 'professional' and unionized, and organizations focusing solely on professional issues." As in Germany, teachers are unionized, but physicians have their own independent medical association. Engineers in Israel have both a relatively autonomous Engineers Federation within the Histadrut and an Engineers Bureau outside it, whose existence gives the Federation considerable leverage. Although there is also a Lawyers Federation in the Histadrut, most Israeli lawyers belong to the independent Bar Association, which has many parallels with the German equivalent.

This is not to say that the shape of Israeli professional life can be traced directly back to influences brought to bear by German émigrés, although it would be most interesting to
track it. More importantly than direct, personal influences would be the loosely shared experience of professionalization models throughout Central and Eastern Europe before migration to Eretz Yisrael. While it would be incorrect to speak of a "German model" adopted by neighboring societies to the east, the German experience of professionalization (as well as the similar Austro-Hungarian one) clearly left its mark on, for example, interwar Czechoslovakia and Poland more than did the British or American experience. Thus studying the heritage of professional life for Israel would have to encompass both similarities and dissimilarities experienced in professional life among several countries of Central and Eastern Europe, not just Germany. And needless to emphasize, such a study would also have to recognize manifold other influences, such as the evolving nature of Israeli society, education, economic structures, and influences from other modern professional cultures (such as Britain).

What we can clearly distinguish, however, is the fact that Germany was not only the country that most systematically and ruthlessly removed Jews from its professional life sixty and more years ago, but also the country that opened the largest scope for professional activities by Jews in modern history up to that time. The processes of professionalization and assimilation were roughly synchronous for German Jews, not accidentally but integrally so. For the professionalization process entailed most of the same values as were necessary for assimilation, values we identify as "liberal," rationalist, meritocratic, homogenizing, civic and urbane. Just as German Jews played a role in the modern professionalizing process incomparably larger than in nearby countries, the "professional crisis" of the late Weimar era heralded a crisis for German Jews, just as Hitler's promises to "re-professionalize" academic occupations were made at the expense Jews.

The German experience of professionalization, led initially and always accompanied by a state sector, later balancing between public and private sectors of professional activity, gave Jews significant opportunity in certain modern occupational roles. The German Empire (as elsewhere in the world) at the same time unofficially discriminated against Jews refusing to abandon their religious confession by limiting advancement in such public areas as the high civil service, courts, armed forces, and teaching. While the Weimar Republic offered excellent prospects for improvement, it was also unable to master the economic and social problems that increasingly shook the world of professionals and caused increasing resentment of oppressive competition from what one might call "non-traditional" practitioners, whether Jews, women, or children of the working class. The crisis of German professional life was thus
especially fateful for German Jews, who not only suffered with their fellow-professionals but were made the scapegoat by Nazi propaganda. When German professional life had to be rebuilt, slowly and with difficulty, in the wake of Hitler's thoroughgoing "deprofessionalization," one of the hardest tasks was to reconnect with the fundamental values of modern professional activity without the emigrated and murdered German Jews who had been so instrumental in sustaining those values.

ENDNOTES


ii Eliot Freidson, a leading contemporary sociologist of professions, for example regards professionalism as "an Anglo-American disease" and in any case not compatible with other modes of organizing expert knowledge such as the continental European, where "the status gained by elite education," not professional identity, was paramount. See Freidson, "The Theory of Professions: State of the Art," in Robert Dingwall and Philip Lewis (eds.), The Sociology of the Professions (New York, 1983), pp. 24-26.


iv For a further discussion of defining characteristics of modern professions, see Charles E. McClelland, The German Experience of Professionalization. Modern Learned Professions and their Organizations from the Early Nineteenth Century to the Hitler Era (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 11-27.


vi See Kenneth Barkin, The Controversy over German Industrialization, 1890-1902 (Chicago, 1978).

which traces the rise of the Jewish percentage of the Prussian bar from 3% in 1872 to a high of nearly 29% in 1933.

viii The estimates found in Asher Tropp, Jews in the Professions in Great Britain, 1891-1991 (London, 1991), pp. 20 and 97, are admittedly based on enlightened guesswork, using purportedly Jewish surnames in registers for extracting statistical approximations.


x Kenneth Ledford, From General Estate to Special Interest. German Lawyers 1878-1933 (Cambridge, 1996), presents interesting evidence from the Province of Hanover, pp. 149-54. See also Peter Pulzer, Religion and Judicial Appointments in Germany, 1869-1918," Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute, 28 (1983), pp. 185-204.


xii Ernst Hamburger, Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands. Regierungsmittglieder, Beamte und Parlamentarier in der monarchistischen Zeit, 1848-1918 (Tübingen, 1968), p. 44.

xiii McClelland, German Experience, p. 162.


xv McClelland, German Experience, p. 80.


xvii Segall, op. cit.

xviii Peter Pulzer, Jews and the German State. The Political History of a Minority, 1848-1933 (Oxford, 1992), p. 44.

xix For a carefully-argued analysis of such fissures in the legal profession, see Ledford, General Estate, Chapters 7-8. The most exhaustive study of cyclical mismatches between production of academics and employment chances for them is Hartmut Titze, Der Akademikerzyklus (Göttingen, 1990), for this period especially pp. 263-290.


xxi Krach, Jüdische Rechtsanwälte, pp. 414ff.

xxii Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 275.


Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 276.

Hamburger, Juden im öffentlichen Leben, p. 55.


Comité des délégations juives, Schwarzbuch, p. 84.


See McClelland, German Experience, p. 220f.


Niederland, "Emigration of Jewish Academics," indicates that already in 1933 Jewish professionals, who made up an estimated 13% of all Jewish breadwinners in Germany, constituted 20% of the émigrés. About 45% of the dismissed Jewish academics and university students and 40% of the roughly 1,000 chemists and engineers left already in the first year of Hitler's regime. Many went to neighboring European countries, Britain or America. Emigration to Palestine was limited, as in the case of a 1935 quota which allowed only 400 Jewish physicians, most of them from Germany, to move. See Niederland, pp. 286-98.

See, for example, Ernst C. Stiefel and Frank Mecklenburg, Deutsche Juristen im amerikanischen Exil (Tübingen, 1991) or Mosse (ed.), Second Chance, as well as the exhaustive references to literature in both volumes.


Ibid., pp. 75-6.
For an international approach, see Charles E. McClelland, Stefan Merl and Hannes Siegrist (eds.), Professionen im modernen Osteuropa/Professions in Modern Eastern Europe [Gießener Abhandlungen zur Agrar- und Wirtschaftsforschung des Europäischen Ostens, vol. 207], Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995).