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Public Frames and Message Outcomes in a Policy Oriented Social Movement

Danielle Albright

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PUBLIC FRAMES AND MESSAGE OUTCOMES IN A POLICY ORIENTED SOCIAL MOVEMENT

by

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PUBLIC FRAMES AND MESSAGE COOPTATION IN POLICY ORIENTED
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

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Abstract

In the early 1980s, scholars declared the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM) co-opted by institutional response. However, domestic violence policy proposals proliferated in the decade which followed, culminating in the adoption of the Violence Against Women Act by the U.S. Congress in 1993. While there was no evidence of resurgence, the BWM was anecdotally credited with these policy accomplishments. The current project is a qualitative interpretative policy analysis aimed at evaluating these seemingly contradictory claims by assessing the congruence of the content of domestic violence related policy proposals with the public messages of the BWM.

Findings suggest that the BWM influenced federal domestic violence policy in both direct and indirect ways. Consistent with prior research on social movement influence on public policy, the BWM played a direct role in bringing the issue to Congress and setting the agenda for possible intervention. Movement frames also defined the contours of the larger policy domain by identifying a number of policy and institutional targets. Although members of the movement coalition were consistently involved in agenda setting, BWM influence on policy proposals lessened over time. The decrease in influence was facilitated by the influx of new institutional interests created by
movement claims-making and decreasing resonance of the movement’s claim to exclusive knowledge over issues of woman battering. These dynamics resulted in a mixed set of simultaneous movement frame outcomes including success, cooptation, and failure. More research is needed to improve our understanding of how changes internal and external to the policy domain mediate the influence of movement claims-making.
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Chapter One

Introduction

I. Background

Fear of cooptation and references to its inevitability are common themes in the literature on the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM). Amid the proliferation of state-level policies related to domestic violence in the early 1980s, scholars began to declare the movement coopted by “institutional response” (Johnson 1981; Tierney 1982). This charge implied that as states responded to BWM demands, the movement itself lost momentum and entered a period of decline. Two arguments were offered as evidence of this decline. First, state funding for shelters and domestic violence programs undermined the ability of these organizations to serve as centers for mobilization and direct action (Johnson 1981). Second, government intervention redefined domestic violence as a legal-, medical-, and social service-based problem traceable to the pathology of offenders and victims rather than as a condition of patriarchy (Miccio 2005; Sack 2004; Tuerkheimer 2004).

These claims of cooptation suggest the movement had largely disappeared by the beginning of the next decade. Yet, national policies on domestic violence continued to develop. In 1993, President Bill Clinton signed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) into law. The act brought widespread attention to domestic violence and dedicated federal monies for a diverse set of prevention, intervention, and suppression efforts. While there was no evidence of movement resurgence in the sense of re-emerging BWM social movement organizations, the “movement” was anecdotally credited with this accomplishment (Dobash and Dobash 1998; Sack 2004; Schneider 2000). Thus, in an analytic sense, these claims suggest the movement’s influence outlived the cooptation of its organizations.
This creates somewhat of a puzzle for current explanations of social movement influence. We know little about what happens when organizations are no longer viewed as effective carriers of the movement message. While much has been written about the influence of the BWM on federal policy, no empirical study has examined national-level policy activities. As an historical note, it may be enough to acknowledge that a public policy would not have materialized without the attention brought by the movement. However, acceptance of this type of reasoning as a statement on social movement outcome does little in the way of explaining the mechanisms through which movements sustain support and interest among policy-makers and other institutional actors over time, or how they achieve structural impact on society. Further, loose pronouncements of policy success generally fail to assess the consistency or disjuncture between movement demands and the products of resulting policy.

II. Purpose of the Study

This study strives to fill a gap in the analysis of social movement outcomes, through an examination of BWM claims-making and federal lawmaking on domestic violence. The purpose of this work is not to provide a general study of the movement, but rather to examine the extent to which policies proposed in the U.S. Congress addressed or failed to address the grievances of the BWM aimed at federal lawmakers. I propose that one way to better understand the mechanisms of social movement influence on public policy outcomes is to trace the relationship between movement prognostic frames and the subsequent public policy debate and outcomes. This requires examining outcomes by following not just movement actors and organizations, but also the movement’s grievances and related prognostic frames. 

Movement prognostic frames or messages are how a movement publicly communicates its identification of a problem or grievance, its attribution of responsibility for
solving the problem, and/or its prescription of social, political, or cultural change(s) that must occur to resolve the targeted problem (Johnston 1995). Although limited in scope, prior research on the outcomes of social movement messages has yielded three theoretical precepts that provide a framework for examining this question. First, social movement messages are empirically observable expressions of the movement’s goals and expectations for target action (Trumpy 2008). Second, we can learn about social movement outcomes by examining the outcomes of movement messages and target response frames over time (Trumpy 2008). I use the term target response frame to refer to proposed policy changes within the domestic violence policy domain by members of Congress. And third, there are underlying mechanisms leading to movement outcomes that result from the persistence of message making and the interaction of those messages with target response frames (Stratigaki 2004; Trumpy 2008). A longitudinal assessment of BWM message outcomes may help us account for the contradictory perceptions that the movement was coopted during early stages of the challenge but influenced domestic violence policy development in the long term.

III. Research Questions

This study is guided by two research questions. First, to what extent do subsequent federal policies on domestic violence represent favorable responses to the Battered Women's Movement? And second, how can we reconcile or otherwise assess both the claims of movement cooptation and the perceptions of movement influence on continuing policy development in the domestic violence policy arena? To accomplish this task, empirical evidence will be investigated to address five sub-questions:

1. What were the goals of the BWM?

2. What demands did the BWM make on federal lawmakers?
3. How did federal lawmakers respond to the prognostic messages of the BWM?

4. What were the outcomes of BWM prognostic messages in Congressional policy proposals?

5. In what ways do these outcomes represent the continuing influence of the BWM on domestic violence policy?

IV. Scope of the Study

This research centers on national policy messages about battered women or domestic violence. I have limited the parameters of data collection and analysis to public messages that were relevant to and accessible for conversations in the national domestic violence policy domain. Specifically, I focus on the messages attributed to the BWM. In this work, the Battered Women’s Movement is defined not as a specific set of organizations, but rather as a broad political effort to change the social conditions that perpetuate women’s experience of violence in the domestic sphere. The movement was initiated and supported by a complex field of individual victim-survivors and allied activists and organizations—which I refer to as the movement coalition. I include some background on the origin of the national agenda. However, this work does not examine the internal selection or construction of messages by movement actors.

The BWM was in part a policy-oriented social movement. Policy-oriented social movements are coalitions of actors or organizations who mobilize to either challenge a particular policy or set of policies or to realize a new policy goal. The BWM targeted a number of social institutions including local, state, and federal governments. I identify some of these demands where they overlap with the national policy domain, but the target under examination in this work is the U.S. Congress and demands on other targets are outside the
scope of this work. Movement-target interactions are analyzed to determine outcomes for the movement’s public policy-oriented prognostic messages.

V. Methodology

This project is an interpretative policy analysis of a single-case study, the Battered Women’s Movement’s targeting of federal policy related to domestic violence. Interpretative policy analysis is a qualitative approach to identifying the “architecture” of policy arguments, aimed at exposing the symbolic and consequential meanings embedded in policy work (Yanow 2000). This method is an extension of traditional policy analysis in that it allows for identifying how meanings are created or changed through the policy process as different “interpretations” of a policy issue are transmitted during policy formulation, consideration, and action.

Movement policy-oriented messages were derived from two sources. First, I identified newsletters, monographs, books, and other published works produced by members of the movement coalition and intended for a national audience. Selected movement publications are largely those intended for both movement and public audiences with regional or national distribution. These documents helped identify policy messages and connect them to the movement’s broader goals and agenda. The second source for movement message data was comprised of transcripts of hearings before committees and subcommittees of the U.S. House and Senate with testimony by members of the movement coalition. The determination of outcomes relies heavily on the testimony data. Both of these data sources were coded for BWM public prognostic messages relevant to national policy concerns. Two data sources were utilized to ensure that the messages relayed in public testimonies were consistent with the movement’s public articulation of a national policy agenda.
Target response data were culled from bill proposals introduced in the U.S. Congress. This work utilizes the population of bills that addressed battered women’s issues or domestic violence prevention or intervention programs introduced into the U.S. House and Senate between 1977 and 1994 (95th through the 103rd Congresses). First, I identified bills that were coded by the Congressional Bills Project with the index “domestic violence.” Second, I searched the full bill texts for each Congressional session using key words to identify bills attending to issues of woman battering, domestic violence, or violence against women in LexisNexis Congressional Universe and Thomas.gov. After reviewing each bill description, I identified 214 bills relevant to the study. In order to compare target responses with movement prognostic messages, each bill was coded and then broken into the distinct provisions addressing domestic violence or target response frames as defined above. I used a system of emergent coding to identify and document both movement prognostic messages and target response frames. The record of movement messages and target response frames was arranged chronologically and divided into periods corresponding to Congressional sessions.

An outcome determination was made for individual movement messages for each Congressional session. Message outcomes refer to the status of the movement’s prognostic claim following the target’s response. The outcomes are determined using an adapted version of Gamson’s (1975) outcome matrix. Within the marked analytic periods, I examine movement messages and target response frames to determine whether each frame received Congressional acceptance (or non-acceptance) and new advantages. In this work, acceptance refers to whether or not movement messages draw the attention of lawmakers. Acceptance is documented affirmatively when lawmakers introduce proposals to address the prognoses
articulated by members of the movement coalition. Since this work is examining outcomes for the messages themselves, I utilize the term *inclusion* rather than the traditional label of *new advantages*. Inclusion here means new advantages consistent with the movement’s prognoses are included in the policies proposed by members of Congress.

The matrix of acceptance (non-acceptance) and inclusion (non-inclusion) yield four possible frame outcomes: success (reform), cooptation, preemption, and failure. *Frame success* occurs when the movement’s message receives both acceptance and inclusion in Congressional proposals. Because this work is focusing on *message* outcomes, policy adoption is not required for a frame to be identified with an outcome of success. I reserve the use of the term *reform* for cases where both frame success and policy adoption occur. *Message cooptation* happens when the target, Congress, recognizes and accepts the movement’s prognostic message, but the proposed policy either contains no policy change or proposes changes that are inconsistent with those of the movement message. *Frame preemption and failure* both occur in instances where the target does not introduce proposals consistent with the movement frame. In the case of *preemption*, the target rejects the movement’s prognosis but subsequent proposals include alternative elements that yield a benefit for battered women or the movement. *Frame failure* occurs when neither acceptance nor inclusion are present.

**VI. Delimitations and Limitations**

This work deals specifically with messages derived from the movement associated with woman battering by an intimate partner. Domestic or family violence is a broad concept that includes woman battering. The term violence against women is also an expansive concept that includes both physical and sexual violence and violence perpetrated by both
those known and unknown to the woman. While many BWM actors recognized the
relatedness of these types of violence to the status of women in society, the movement
discussed in this work was very specific in its focus on ending violence against women
perpetrated by intimate partners—predominantly, husbands and boyfriends. Further, I chose
to define this movement as a coalition of actors. This means no single organization or type of
organization is identified as “the movement.” This decision may complicate comparing the
findings of this work with the body of research that situates an organization or set of
organizations as the movement actor, but has the distinct advantage of treating the movement
as a broad cultural phenomenon that transcends any one set of organizations.

Interpretative policy analysis requires the researcher to assume that policy frames
have multiple and sometimes competing meanings that require interpretation by the observer.
I chose interpretative policy analysis and emergent coding over a more traditional content
analysis for two reasons. First, there were no previous accounts of the BWM’s federal policy
agenda available. Movement policy frames were not known in advance and had to be
identified from the source data. Second, lawmakers often used different language to
demarcate woman battering. As such, matching the movement’s demands to policy
provisions required identifying corollaries to movement frames and understanding the
context of the provisions within the larger proposal. For example, proposals to fund shelter
would yield different outcomes on the basis of whether or not the provision specified battered
women’s shelters or funded homeless shelters more broadly.

The research questions guiding this project are limited to determining outcomes for
the movement’s publicly articulated demands. As such, data sources are restricted to the
public record. This work cannot account for negotiations or alliances that take place outside
of formal publications or events. This work also seeks to understand movement outcomes from the standpoint of the movement’s grievances and prognoses for change. The findings presented here do not address outcomes for movement organizations, enacted policies, or the actual benefits accruing to the population of battered women. The focus on message outcomes is also limited to federal lawmaker response. As a result, I have limited movement data sources to those that were intended for a national (or nearly national audience) or those that were direct appeals to members of the U.S. Congress. This decision was motivated by the focus on federal policy-making. As such, discussion of the “movement message” and the “policy agenda” should be interpreted in this manner. Except for a few instances of intersection, this work does not take into account movement policy-oriented message making at local and state levels, nor do I address messages aimed at other institutions.

Battered women’s activism as a whole addressed a wide variety of cultural and structural problems that contributed to the persistence of violence against women. This work does not answer the question of whether or not the movement was influential in the broad sense. We know that violence against women is still a serious problem throughout the United States and the rest of the world. Rather, the findings of this work are narrowly focused on the movement’s targeted challenge of federal laws and programs in the U.S. Although narrowly focused, the type of challenge examined in this work is a common strategy employed by policy-oriented social movements. Additional insight into how these challenges play out can contribute to a broader understanding of movement outcomes in policy domain contests.

VII. Chapter Outline

In the next chapter, I review the literature related to the study of social movement message outcomes, specifically focusing on the conceptualization of message cooptation and
the mechanisms through which message outcomes are derived. In Chapter Three, I operationalize the key concepts defined above as necessary for examining message cooptation. I also detail data sources, identify data collection strategies and discuss coding and analysis techniques, and examine issues related to validity and generalizability. I present findings in three chapters. Chapter 4 details the origins and history of claims-making of the BWM, including the documentation of the goals of the movement and the development of movement preferences for social interventions related to those goals. Chapter 5 provides a description of movement prognostic frames aimed at federal public policy on domestic violence and Chapter 6 documents frame alignment outcomes for movement messages across nine congressional sessions. The Conclusion (Chapter 7) explores the significance of these findings for understanding movement messaging and policy outcomes, and considers the generalizability of these findings for conceptualizing outcomes in policy-oriented movements more broadly.
Chapter Two
Conceptualizing Message Cooptation

I. Introduction

In the last chapter, I documented contradictory claims about movement cooptation and influence on the Violence Against Women Act. This contradiction led to the questions guiding this work. First, to what extent do subsequent federal policies on domestic violence represent favorable responses to the Battered Women’s Movement? And second, how can we reconcile or otherwise assess both the claims of movement cooptation and the perceptions of movement influence on continuing policy development in the domestic violence policy arena? In this chapter, I examine the theoretical development of the concept of social movement cooptation. I begin by providing a brief discussion of the policy-making process as a social movement target. I will then review existing typologies of social movement outcomes and definitions of cooptation. Next, I present a model for examining policy-oriented movement outcomes as a series of interactions over time. The final task of this chapter is to address the limitations and benefits of this perspective for explaining policy-oriented movement outcomes.

II. Public-Policy as a Social Movement Target

Policy change is often dubiously linked to social movement presence and activity. While the goals of social movements are often revolutionary in nature (e.g. overturning governments, eliminating patriarchy), movement scholars generally recognize policy reform as part of the legacy of movement actions. Increasingly, policy-oriented movements are becoming a common form of democratic politics (Meyer 2003; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Sometimes public policy is an unintended consequence of a social movement
challenge (Andrews 2001). At other times, policy change is the result of a direct challenge to the state, intended to either change an existing policy or enact a new policy to address a movement grievance (Grattet and Jenness 2001; Jenness 1999). Policy changes at all levels of government have the potential to create a constituency of both supporters and opponents. Sometimes these movements take up policy challenges as a means to a larger end. At other times, the policy challenge is an end unto itself. Constituencies opposed to the status quo at times will coalesce into policy-oriented social movements, or coalitions of actors or organizations who mobilize to either challenge a particular policy or set of policies or to realize a new policy goal (Meyer 2003).

Scholarship examining policy-oriented movements largely treat the political process as a static, linear, bureaucratic practice engaged in by a set of actors who evaluate the need for and consequences of a policy from a rational perspective. But in practice, the policy process is perhaps more accurately described as “a battle among various actors seeking to please distinct constituencies” (Meyer 2003, 5). While the U.S. legislative policy-making process has a set of procedures for generating, amending, and repealing laws—defining the boundaries of both individual and collective constituencies is less clear cut. What makes movements a special case in the study of the policy process is the presumed “outsider” status of the constituency.

The definitional requirement of locating constituencies and organizations as outsiders to the policy-making apparatus complicates the study of policy-oriented social movements. King, Cornwall, and Dahlin (2005) suggest that the policy process is subject to a legislative logic. As the policy process proceeds, each stage becomes more rule driven, but also more consequential. Assessments of challenger influence suggest that these organizations have
more influence at earlier stages, including getting an item on the legislative agenda and formulating an actual proposal. A movement may be successful at getting an issue on the agenda; however, the proposal itself can be revised inside the process in ways that diminish movement input. In order to extend movement influence, actors sometimes form alliances with policy-makers and others with deeper connections inside the process. Firm ties with individuals or political coalitions inside the policy process can diminish the movement’s claim of “outsider” status. For this reason, theories of social movement mobilization articulate a fragile relationship between movement influence and institutional response.

In addition to the rule-based nature of the process, it is often difficult to locate movement organizations and actors. Studies that focus on determining movement organization influence on policy-outcomes must be able to identify organizational presence inside the process. Studies of cooption at times focus on what happens to the organization or actor, rather than the actual outcome of the challenge. Conclusions about social movements as either a co-opted or ineffective require that we also examine the ways in which challenger claims are treated by policy-makers, and the ways in which institutional response stimulates or inhibits continued claims-making. When these organizations are given a platform inside the process, their efforts can potentially play a larger role in shaping policy outputs (Rochon and Mazmanian 1993). However, continued external claims-making and insistence on a particular set of prognostic frames can also spur policy-makers to incorporate movement demands in either symbolic or substantive ways—which constitute rather different outcomes.

One result of this perspective is that scholars have begun to recognize the need to examine movement policy-oriented activities in a similar way to investigations of other more
routine forms of policy-oriented group political behavior (Andrews and Edwards 2004, Burstein and Hirsh 2007, Rochon and Mazmanian 1993; see also Meyer et al. 2005). The primary mechanism connecting conventional political interest groups to policy outcomes is the role of these groups as information brokers for legislative decision-makers (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). Research on interest group activities suggests that not only do these organizations commit a great deal of resources in generating information, but their principal activities involve presenting relevant information to decision-makers (Schlozman and Tierney 1983).

Not all movement groups utilize conventional political strategies, but most have a message and take measures to relay that message to an identified target. By message, I am referring to the public transmission of the movement’s identification of a problem or grievance, an attribution of responsibility for solving the problem, and/or prescription of social, political, or cultural change(s) that must occur to resolve the problem (Johnston 1995). How movements relay messages (strategy) has received a great deal of scholarly attention. But when it comes to assessing movement influence on policy outcomes, most scholars have so far failed to incorporate not only the structure of the policy process, but also how these messages travel back and forth between the movement and policy-makers (King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005). This line of work is important to understanding both social movement outcomes in general, and more specifically the mechanisms connecting institutional response to movement claims-making. Meyer (2003) contends that in order to fully understand social movement influence on policy production, researchers must go beyond the examination of discrete outcomes and find ways to account for how complex and iterative interactions
between movements and policy-makers produce potentially dynamic outcomes over time. This dissertation strives to do just this.

Situating the relationship between movements and public policy as longitudinal allows for an assessment of the evolution of movement positions, policy alternatives, and changing relationships among the coalitions that make up the movement itself as well as changes occurring in the larger policy domain (Grattet and Jenness 2001). In their study of the development of hate crimes policy, Grattet and Jenness (2001) aimed to document “the birth and structuring of a domain of public policy” (669). They describe the creation and implementation of hate crime legislation as a process which required “a significant mobilization of people, bureaucracies, and institutions” (669). Further, Grattet and Jenness found that different segments of the coalition that constituted the hate crimes movement took center stage at different points in time, and in different political environments. The same could be said of political actors and public support for the policy. Further, the structure of the resulting policies and policy domains determined not only the response to a problem, but also defined the scope of the problem itself. These authors conclude that “the causes and consequences of a problem cannot be fully comprehended apart from an understanding of the larger processes that identified, defined, and ultimately propelled it” (669). In other words, in order to understand the “outcomes” of policy-oriented social movements and determine which of these outcomes constitute “success” we have to go beyond examining the prevalence and content of the final adopted policy, and look into the process from which the final policy was formed.

McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) put forward a generic model of “contentious politics,” in which they argue that regardless of the type of challenger, episodic political
challenges by groups without routine access to the decision-making apparatus are similar in nature. Social movements, external governments or government agencies, political interest groups and other actors differ in terms of their position within political process, the strategies that they employ, and the make-up of their respective constituencies. However, they propose that we can better understand political actions of all kinds, if we examine political challenges by putting “each of the actors in motion,” allowing for the formation, negotiation, and disintegration of coalitions over time, and examining the ways these boundaries “blur, organization changes, and political position shifts (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 12). These authors argue that the goal of this examination is to identify reoccurring mechanisms that connect challenges to outcomes. In the current project, an assessment of these mechanisms may help us better understand the underlying process—specifically as it relates to movement messages. In order to accomplish this task, we have to define social movement outcomes and distinguish between forms of success and failure, including cooptation.

III. Defining Social Movement Cooptation

Cooptation is commonly understood both as an action taken by the state or other targets of social movement demands and a possible outcome of social movement challenges. Phillip Selznick (1948) defined cooptation as “the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence” (p. 34). If the organization's legitimacy is threatened by a challenge, they will co-opt "elements which in some way reflect the sentiment, or possess the confidence of the public" (34). In this sense, cooptation is a strategy that is deployed in order to decrease risk for the target. The picture that forms is one in which the target attempts to capture the movement in some way—a keep your enemies close philosophy.
While Selznick was focused on the formal target's outcomes, social movement scholars have focused on how movements can avoid being coopted by their targets. Three perspectives are relevant to the current discussion. First, in the resource mobilization tradition, organizational and financial autonomy were important to the resiliency of social movement organizations faced with an attempted cooptation (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973). This perspective defines a movement in terms of the development of organizations to procure, manage, and expend resources. The organization carries the movement challenge. As they form and grow, they increasingly must take on tasks and expend resources in ways that contribute to organizational maintenance. Targets at times will make concessions to challenge groups, concessions that carry additional resource burdens that will ultimately limit the organization’s ability to continue acting as a challenger. Concessions are generally offered to the more conservative segment of the movement and may entail offering an insider role to a leader, providing funding to an organization, or some similar action.

For example, if the state provided funding to a women’s organization to run a battered women’s shelter, the shelter might be asked to develop a professional staff to carry out bureaucratic tasks, conform to industry standards on emergency housing, etc. The group accepts the money, but these tasks combined with laws regulating lobbying by organizations receiving state support prevent them from making further challenge. At best, the capture of one movement organization represents the fracturing of a coalition that forms the movement. This outcome will be viewed as compromise by some actors and cooptation by others; analytically, the key difference may depend on whether the new ‘insider’ demonstrates ongoing autonomy sufficient to allow him/her to raise new challenges to the status quo, in
keeping with movement priorities. It may also be determined by whether the fracture represents a widespread reduction in autonomy for the movement as a whole. In other words, whether or not “capture” of one person or organization can be viewed as cooptation of the movement also depends on the centrality of the person/organization to the movement’s strategy.

A second perspective appears in Doug McAdam’s (1982) articulation of the political process model. McAdam observed the use of what he described as coercive cooptation of movement leaders and organizations in the U.S. Civil Rights movement. Sometimes referred to as “divide and rule,” this strategy is intentionally utilized by the target of the challenge as a social-psychological mechanism to create a conflict of interest among challengers (Lawler 1983). The resulting conflict decreases solidarity and thereby damages the movement and ultimately inhibits action against the target of the challenge. From this perspective, cooptation is a gentler version of repression. Outright suppression of a movement is not always in the best interest of policy-makers, especially where the movement’s message is culturally resonant, appealing to both targeted and broad audiences (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986). Cooptation is still articulated as an intentional effort to inhibit or bring about the decline of a social movement—but with the hope of making it look like a compromise to the movement’s supporters and the public at large (Marx 1979).

In both of the previous explanations for cooptation, the decline of the movement or discontinuation of the challenge is situated as the outcome in need of explanation. Cooptation is viewed as a mechanism that can lead to movement decline. A third approach to conceptualizing cooptation is offered in William Gamson’s (1975) Strategy of Social Protest. Gamson defined social movement outcomes in terms of two types of institutional response:
acceptance and new advantages. Acceptance refers to the acknowledgement by the target that movement actors are legitimate spokespersons on the issue at hand or for the population to be affected by the outcome of the desired change. New advantages are identified when the movement gains something it sought during the challenge. Gamson was not concerned with determining “success” or explaining decline. Rather, his focus was on assessing how organizational form and strategy impacted the outcome of a challenge. While recognizing that both acceptance and new advantages may occur on a continuum, Gamson produced a typology by treating each as either present or absent. Collapse is defined as the absence of both acceptance and new advantages. Full response is defined as the presence of both. Pre-emption is an incomplete form of full response, where the movement is not accepted as a legitimate spokesperson, but the target eventually grants new advantages. In this formulation of movement outcomes, cooptation occurs when institutional response is limited to acceptance and no new advantages are gained.

Gamson’s analysis of the impact of organization and strategy deployment suggests that group size is an important determinant for whether partial response comes in the form of preemption or cooption. Small groups tend to get preempted, and large groups tend to get coopted. Another distinction can also be found by examining group strategy. In some movements, organizations are committed to autonomy and eschew any attempt to be viewed as cooperating with the target of the challenge. These groups primarily use “outsider” strategies, like protest demonstration. Where response from the target is forthcoming, challenges by such groups are more likely to result in preemption than cooption. A group for whom legitimacy and acceptance are important will give up new advantages in order to secure and maintain acceptance. Assessing outcomes and their effect on determining
movement success or failure requires that we take into account the movement’s goals, actions, and response to target concessions.

Although cooptation has been a central concern to those who study social movements, few have conceptualized the process through which cooptation is achieved. Cooptation has largely been treated empirically as a single observation or event. Recent work on the cooptation of movement messages has provided some guidance in terms of conceptualizing the process of cooptation in policy-oriented or policy-process involved movements. These approaches have expanded the discussion of cooptation to include recognizing the process even in challenges where institutionalization of movement demands is the goal.

A. Co-opting Movement Messages

Building on Gamson’s typology of social movement outcomes, others have begun to assess the outcome of movement messages in policy-oriented challenges. In these works the movement message is often conceptualized in terms of diagnostic and prognostic frames. Frames are “interpretive orientations” that “organize interests, values, and beliefs” to “organize experiences and guide action” (Snow et al. 1986, 464). Frames are a heuristic that provide a basis for mobilization—aligning individual orientations to those of an organization or group. Not only are these appeals used to aid in building the organization’s resource base, but they are also employed in competition with opponents over meaning. Two core tasks for a challenger group are diagnostic and prognostic framing. A diagnostic frame involves the identification of the problem and the attribution of the problem to a source (Benford and Snow 2000). Once the source/target is identified, challenger groups must develop and
disseminate a prognostic frame—the identified solution or what can be done to address the problem (Benford and Snow 2000).

Stratigaki (2004) examined the cooptation of work-life reconciliation in European Union social policy. She defined *message cooptation* as adoption of and/or use of movement ideas, concepts, and messages by policy writers but without maintaining the meaning or intent of movement. At times, message cooptation leads to the use of the movement’s terminology to refer to ideas that contradict those of the movement. She found that the concept of reconciliation proposed by activists was intended to promote gender-equality in both home and work life; however, as policy-makers debated work-life reconciliation and constructed policies related to the concept, the definition changed. The adopted policies defined work-life reconciliation in terms of workforce flexibility, a market-oriented objective—making the workplace more woman friendly as opposed to balancing gender equity. Stratigaki’s work highlights the manipulation of public acceptance for the movement’s message by policy-makers. Action was taken and potentially some new advantages resulted (just not the ones the movement desired). This is more akin to the concept of “borrowing” (Holzer 2008, 197). Holzer’s work suggests that movement targets will at times “borrow” movement resources (here a culturally resonant message) without actually aligning itself with the movement. Once the resource has been effectively borrowed, the target may use it to its own end.

Trumpy (2008) examined message cooptation where the target of the movement (Greenpeace) was a corporation (Coca Cola and their refrigeration practices) rather than the state. She defined cooptation as “the ability to maintain SMO [social movement organization] support without acquiescing to SMO demands” (Trumpy 2008). Using this...
definition she proposed that cooptation can be accomplished by the target when it accepts the movement’s attribution of blame for the problem and articulated solutions but without any actual change in practice with regard to the aggrieved behavior (e.g. a media campaign acknowledging the industry’s role in the perpetuation of the problem and claiming that change is needed; but no actual policy or practice change).

Message cooptation can render a movement (or at least the movement’s message) impotent. The use of the movement’s terminology, with a transformed meaning, can lead to the deterioration of its policy impact (Stratigaki 2004). In the case of EU policy, the movement was seeking a policy to address “work-life reconciliation.” A policy identified by work-life reconciliation language was written and adopted; however, the content of the policy was not what the movement was seeking. The use of the movement’s language increased the difficulty of continuing to argue for work-life balance policies—even where gender equity issues at home had not been addressed. Similarly, the acceptance of the movement’s message without any action can still serve as an alibi of sorts for policy-makers, who can point to the adopted message as evidence that they are addressing the movement’s issue. Coca Cola accepted the attribution of blame for the use of ozone depleting chemicals in their product dispensing refrigerators (a fact that could not easily be denied) and indicated that the company, like Greenpeace, was committed to a sustainable environment. However, they continued to make and distribute the equipment without changes to the refrigeration unit. Certainly, the cooptation of a movement message can decrease the potency of a challenge for the target constituency, some or all of the movement constituency, and the public at large. However, one instance of message cooptation is not enough to end a challenge or mark the decline of a movement.
While these works both focus on the movement’s message, these definitions of cooptation are tied to what happens to the movement or the movement organization. This is consistent with Gamson’s definition, but lacks conceptually clarity. I define message cooptation as the recognition and acceptance of a movement’s prognostic message by policymakers, where the proposed policy solution contains either no policy change or changes that are inconsistent with those of the movement message. In the next section, I will draw on Trumpy’s analysis to further clarify the difference between cooptation and other possible outcomes for the movement message and then extend this idea to allow for identifying outcomes for the prognostic frame rather than organizational outcomes.

IV. Modeling Movement Messages in Corporate Target Interactions

Alexa Trumpy (2008) articulated a model of corporate cooptation of social movements in her examination of Greenpeace’s challenge to Coca Cola’s refrigeration policies and practices. Trumpy set out to improve understanding of how corporate targets respond to social movement messages. The purpose of this work was to assess the efficacy of movement actions where access to and participation in the policy making process are limited or even non-existent. Following Gamson, she defined challenge outcomes in terms of not only the target’s response to the movement (acceptance and new advantages) but also in how the movement reacts to the target’s response (acceptance or non-acceptance of the target’s response and whether or not there was a continued challenge).

Like Gamson, Trumpy was interested in movement strategy. Specifically, she wanted to understand the mechanisms that link movement messages to challenge outcomes. She presupposed that movements use frames to make demands of a target and to reward targets for conforming to movement goals. The movement frame may be used for cooptic purposes
by the target. She suggested that identifying the mechanisms linking movement messages to challenge outcomes could reveal the circumstances under which a movement organization would switch message deployment strategies and targets. As such, she focused on the content and manner of deployment of Greenpeace’s message over time. The model advances the analytic scope of Gamson’s strategy by returning to the examination of a single case and focusing on outcomes for individual interactions within a movement challenge and by following these interactions and outcomes over the life course of the challenge. Further, by situating movement messages as a central feature of the interaction, she was able to assess whether the message itself received acceptance as a legitimate prognosis for the problem.

This model requires an examination of both social movement organization and target frames, an assessment of whether or not these frames align with one another, the target’s action regarding the fulfillment of the prognosis in the movement frame, and the movement’s response to the target’s action. The model for examining each interaction is summarized below in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Model for Assessing SMO and Target Interactions, Trumpy (2008)

SMO Demands (Frames) → SMO Action → Target Frames → Target Action → Outcome → SMO Response (continued challenge or acceptance of target action and end to the challenge)

Trumpy contends that movement response to a target’s prognostic frame and any subsequent action can lead to four primary interaction outcomes: failure, cooptation, compromise, and reform. Defining the opposite ends of the spectrum is easy. *Failure* occurs when the target rejects the challenger’s prognosis (failed frame alignment), and the target either takes no action or offers a contradictory prognosis and related action. *Reform* occurs when the target accepts the challenger’s prognosis (frame alignment) and takes action
consistent with that defined in the frame. Trumpy did not examine outcomes that correspond to Gamson’s criteria for preemption, where the target rejects the challenger’s prognosis, but takes action congruent with movement demands.

Both cooptation and compromise outcomes require the alignment of challenger and target prognostic frames. A message is *coopted* when the target aligns its prognostic frame with that of the challenger but fails to take action to alter policies or procedures that address the prognosis. *Compromise* occurs when the target’s frame mirrors the frame of the challenger (in whole or part) and the target takes action that partially fulfills the challenger’s prognosis.

Trumpy proposed examining movement/target interactions over time to determine long-term process and outcomes of claims-making. The determination of challenge outcomes depends on the movement’s response to the action (or lack thereof) taken by the target in the interaction. An interaction with a failed alignment only results in challenge failure if the movement discontinues efforts to bring the target’s frame in line with their own. The same can be said for interactions that lead to cooptation. Interaction outcomes only come to define the challenge outcome when the movement discontinues their efforts to obtain acceptance for their prognosis or new advantages from the target. Continuing with this line of reasoning, an interaction ending in compromise may not signal the end of challenge. If the challenger continues to pursue the other elements of the original prognosis, the challenge may eventually reach the level of full reform. However, continued challenge may also lead to a roll back of earlier compromise and the challenge could result in failure.
A. Limitations of Trumpy’s Approach

There are some aspects of movement policy-oriented challenges that Trumpy’s approach does not address. First, assessing policy-oriented movement outcomes requires some accounting of the political environment. Since Trumpy’s analysis was aimed at understanding corporate cooptation of social movements, she did not account for the potential for conflict or change for the target, outside of those resulting from pressure by the movement. Trumpy examined an alternative opportunity structure she identified as “corporate industry structure”, which is similar to political opportunity in the sense that it establishes the field of interaction and placed limitations on permeability of the decision-making process (Trumpy 2008, 20).

Political opportunity is a common, but contested, concept in the study of policy-oriented social movements. Political activities can spur mobilization; likewise, movement decline can be linked to a number of endogenous and exogenous factors that include shifts in the political landscape (Meyer 2003). For example, elections may change the composition of Congress and shift support among policymakers for a movement’s cause. Goodwin and Jasper (1999) argue that political opportunity is “built into the definition of social movement” (31). Opportunity is necessary for movement emergence and sustained challenge. As such, they suggest the idea of political opportunity be thought of as a “sensitizing concept” (28).

I will use a broad definition of political environment that will allow me to analyze how changes in the “world outside” the movement may impact message alignment and policy production (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1457). Like Trumpy, I will identify changes in the social, cultural, and political environment over the course of the challenge and when
illustrative discuss how these changes contribute to an understanding of movement/target message alignment and interaction outcomes.

The second limitation is that Trumpy takes mobilization, movement cohesion, and message consistency for granted. By the late 1990s, Greenpeace was a well-established organization with substantial resources. Clearly, the dynamics of initial and sustained mobilization are important to carrying out a long-term institutional policy challenge, whether the target is a corporation or the state. The Battered Women’s Movement is a coalition movement. It has no static form over time. Further, Trumpy centralized the movement message in her analysis, but the message was essentially synonymous with the organization. As such, there was no need to examine or account for the persistence of the message outside of Greenpeace’s activities. The current work will have to define the parameters of the coalitions that comprise the Battered Women’s Movement and allow for the possibility of multiple messages at any given interaction or challenge. When we define movement success by the success of an organization, acceptance can be construed to represent a symbolic gain for the movement, one that may have real consequences for the organizations and actors themselves. It is not clear how messages are impacted by attempted and successful cooptation by a movement’s target. This work will attempt to assess whether and how messages change as a result of target framing and response.

V. Modeling Movement Message/Target Response in Public Policy Interactions

Trumpy focused on corporate framing; but public policy-makers also engage in diagnostic and prognostic framing. Public policy change is typically a gradual and incremental process. Baumgartner and Jones (1991; 1993) suggest that “policy entrepreneurs” (typically outsiders to the policy making process) are at times successful at
refashioning “policy images” (to bring policy-maker’s frames in line with their own). Alignment of these images can result in seemingly dramatic policy changes. Policy issues are defined and redefined as they “rise and fall” in importance on the public agenda (True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007, 156). As a result of fluctuations in public interest, policies attending to issues are subject to re-evaluation. If an issue and its policy prescription falls from favor or the problem is viewed as less important, then associated policies may be dramatically eliminated; similarly, if a new and urgent issue arises policies may be created rapidly to address the problem. For example, McCammon and colleagues find that where suffrage advocates utilized “separate spheres framing,” promoting the special knowledge of women on domestic matters over arguments for equality, states more quickly adopted laws that gave women both the rights to vote and to serve on juries (McCammon et al. 2001; McCammon et al. 2007). The success of framing on political outcomes depends then on creating congruency between advocate beliefs and those of political actors and the public more generally.

A. Conceptualizing Movement Message/Target Interactions and Outcomes

This project will utilize Trumpy’s conceptualization of a movement challenge as a series of interactions. The matrix in Figure 2 details possible interaction and challenge outcomes for each identified path extending from the movement’s prognosis. The matrix represents the order of operations for observing the process of movement message interactions with the policy-making apparatus. It provides a rubric for systematically assessing the interaction of movement messages with the policy process and outputs. One column must be preceded by the other in time. If an interaction ends, but the movement continues to press the challenge then subsequent interactions will be tracked along the same matrix, from the beginning. Challenges can then be described chronologically as a series of
interactions. By assessing outcomes of interactions over time, we may improve our understanding of final outcomes (like cooptation).

The application of this matrix to coalition movement challenges in the public policy realm requires some modification from Trumpy’s original design. In the sections which follow, I will define each part of the interaction/outcome matrix and identify deviations from Trumpy’s conceptualization of the process and its outcomes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenger Frame Development</th>
<th>Challenger Action</th>
<th>Target Frame</th>
<th>Target Action</th>
<th>Challenger Response</th>
<th>Interaction Outcome</th>
<th>Challenge Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic and Prognostic framing</td>
<td>Prognostic frame deployed</td>
<td>Rejects challenger prognostic frame</td>
<td>No action</td>
<td>Prognostic frame deployed</td>
<td>Failed Alignment</td>
<td>Challenge Continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic and Prognostic framing</td>
<td>Prognostic frame deployed</td>
<td>Rejects challenger prognostic frame</td>
<td>No action</td>
<td>None/ Target Supportive</td>
<td>Failed Alignment</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic and Prognostic framing</td>
<td>Prognostic frame deployed</td>
<td>Rejects challenger prognostic frame</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Prognostic frame deployed</td>
<td>Failed attempt at preemption</td>
<td>Challenge Continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic and Prognostic framing</td>
<td>Prognostic frame deployed</td>
<td>Rejects challenger prognostic frame</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>None/ Target Supportive</td>
<td>Preemption</td>
<td>Preemption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic and Prognostic framing</td>
<td>Prognostic frame deployed</td>
<td>Accepts challenger prognostic frame</td>
<td>No action</td>
<td>Prognostic frame deployed</td>
<td>Failed attempt at cooptation</td>
<td>Challenge Continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic and Prognostic framing</td>
<td>Prognostic frame deployed</td>
<td>Accepts challenger prognostic frame</td>
<td>No action</td>
<td>None/ Target Supportive</td>
<td>Cooptation</td>
<td>Cooptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic and Prognostic framing</td>
<td>Prognostic frame deployed</td>
<td>Accepts challenger prognostic frame</td>
<td>Partial action</td>
<td>Prognostic frame deployed</td>
<td>Failed attempt at compromise</td>
<td>Challenge Continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic and Prognostic framing</td>
<td>Prognostic frame deployed</td>
<td>Accepts challenger prognostic frame</td>
<td>Partial action</td>
<td>None/ Target Supportive</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic and Prognostic framing</td>
<td>Prognostic frame deployed</td>
<td>Accepts challenger prognostic frame</td>
<td>Full action</td>
<td>None/ Target Supportive</td>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>Reform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Challenger Frame Development

The first column in the matrix represents the movement’s internal framing activities. Initial diagnostic and prognostic framing is largely accomplished outside of the policymaking process and may not involve direct interaction with decision-makers. Prognostic frames are the result of internal movement work, or activities that produce what Johnston (1995) calls private frames. Private frames are those articulated during conversations among and in meetings and internal correspondence by leaders, organizational staff, membership, and constituents. Public frames are those for which the movement intends for either indirect or direct consumption by the target (e.g. announcements to media, announcements to public, conference proceedings, movement publications). During a challenge, movement actor(s) must relay the prognostic message to the target identified in the diagnosis of the problem. In evaluating message cooptation, we are evaluating the outcome of the public frame.

This work will focus on following the public message once it is deployed. Battered Women’s Movement historians have already documented mobilization and grievance construction within the movement (see Martin 1976; Schechter 1982; and Miller 2010). This column is included to allow for the possibility that movement frames can be internally renegotiated over the course of a challenge. Observed changes in the movement’s public message may require some investigation in order to separate shifts in movement position from those that derive from internal tensions as opposed to efforts to align with target frames.
2. **Challenger Action**

The deployment of the message (making the message public) can be accomplished through a variety of strategies. Organizations may produce informative literature and/or engage in media campaigns in their attempts to influence public opinion and/or decision-maker beliefs about the problem and its solutions (Benford and Snow 2000). Protest activity is at times utilized to draw attention to problems and the failure of the political system to address the concerns of the aggrieved group (McAdam 1982; Piven and Cloward 1977; Tarrow 1998); an activity carried out in hopes of creating “bargaining leverage” with policy-makers (Lipsky 1968; McAdam 1982). Challengers may also seek alliances with individuals inside the policy process (see King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005 on suffragist participation in candidate campaigning; and Tilly 1978). This is what Trumpy identifies as the movement’s action. Trumpy was concerned about the effects of different types of deployment. The current project seeks to evaluate whether and in what form messages themselves appear, reappear, and disappear in policy debates. As such, I will define challenger action as the presence of a message or set of messages in the public realm, where it has the opportunity to intersect with the policy process. I will give attention to the strategy of deployment where needed to understand observed interactions and outcomes.

3. **Target Frame**

The public frame of policy-making targets (here the U.S. Congress) are contained in policy proposals and official communications related to the introduction, consideration, and decisions on legislation. Like movements, policymakers also engage in diagnostic and prognostic frame development. Regardless of how they are developed,
proposals represent a publicly articulated prognostic frame. The target frame may mirror that of the challenger, encompass some of the attributions proposed by the challenger, or offer a completely different take on the solution for the problem.

4. Target Action

In the current project, target action is also embedded in the policy proposal and subsequent actions of Congress on the proposal. Target action will consist of whether or not policies contain actual prescriptions consistent with the challenger’s prognosis for addressing the grievance. The classification of a prescription as action also depends in part on congressional activities related to the consideration of a policy proposal after its introduction—including holding committee hearings, committee votes, floor votes, proposal amendments, and the ultimate passage or rejection of policy proposals. Similar to the target frame, target actions may be either partially or fully consistent with or in opposition to the challenger’s message.

5. Challenger Response

The challenger response column represents the assessment of challenger action subsequent to the target’s response to the prognostic frame. The challenger can offer no response, a target supportive response, or a reassert the prognostic frame. The former two responses indicate an acceptance of the target’s frame and action. The continued promotion of the prognostic frame represents the rejection of the target’s response, which may lead to the continuation of the challenge.
Outcomes

The matrix includes five possible outcomes: failure, preemption, \(^1\) cooptation, compromise and reform. These outcomes are defined using Gamson’s conceptual rubric, while maintaining the possibility of reform being either partial or complete. Acceptance and non-acceptance will be identified by frame alignment between challenger messages and policy proposals. New advantages will be identified by whether or not the policy proposal provides an action consistent with the challenger’s prognosis. In order to determine the outcome of a challenge, outcomes from interactions within the challenge will be assessed over time.

B. Conceptualizing Outcomes in a Coalition Movement

Cooptation is a dynamic process which may be illuminated by examining challenger/target interactions. By articulating a challenge as a series of interactions, it creates the possibility of identifying new challenges and new challengers. This takes us beyond attempts to define movements and movement outcomes as predetermined static elements, freeing the analysis to explore shifts in movement composition, messages, and strategies over time. The primary benefit to this approach is the potential to refine concepts for which social movement research has primarily ceded to proxy measurement, while at the same time drawing out mechanisms that connect movement messages to policy outcomes.

\(^1\)Similar to failure, preemption occurs when the target rejects the challenger frame (failed frame alignment). But unlike outright failure, the target takes action that is consistent with the challenger’s prognosis. So the interaction is a failure for the challenger, because and the resulting action cannot be attributed to the acceptance of the prognosis and thus the challenger cannot easily take credit for the outcome. This is less important in the current work, since the focus is on message persistence rather than attribution of influence. I include it to allow for the possibility that the target may take action without acknowledging the challengers message.
For a number of practical reasons, research often treats single organizations as lone movement actors. Trumpy (and Gamson for that matter) postulated a one to one correspondence between a single organization and a single target. The relationship between interaction and challenge outcomes may play out differently where the challenge is being carried out by multiple movement actors. Scholars also recognize that most movements are comprised of coalitions of actors and organizations with varying degrees of connectivity and coordination (McCammon et al. 2001; Meyer 2003; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005). There has also been some recognition of movement/policy-maker coalition formation (Sterns and Almeida 2004; Santoro and McGuire 1997). For coalition movements, multiple types of responses may follow an attempted cooptation, since each segment of the coalition can choose a different response. The composition of a coalition at any given point in time is an empirical question.

Trumpy’s approach can be extended to be more consistent with the idea of a social movement as a coalition of actors and organizations. The extent of cooperation in any coalition varies both in degree and over time. Cooptation attempts may be rejected by part or all of a movement coalition, yielding a more complex story on movement influence and outcomes than has previously been examined. In the proposed approach, whether or not the challenge continues is a variable that requires assessment of the presence of challenge, which may be carried by different challengers in different places and time. Identifying the carrier of the message at each interaction is a deductive process, where the carrier is included as a movement actor not by organizational affiliation, but rather by whether or not they carry the movement’s message (excluding the target of course).
C. Frame Alignment

In order for the BWM to be considered “influential” in the federal public policy domain, one would also expect to see the inclusion of movement prognoses in the proposals themselves. *Frame alignment* is defined as the outcome of strategic efforts to link diagnostic and prognostic frames with those of actual or prospective constituents, resource providers, or targets (Snow et al. 1986). The interaction of policy-oriented movements with the political process can be thought of as an attempt to align policy with the movement’s ideas on the source of the problem and what can be done to bring about a remedy. These efforts are carried out through the movement’s public activities and can involve numerous interactions over time. The goal of these interactions is to transform the target’s diagnostic and prognostic frames to match those of the movement. Benford and Snow (2000) describe frame alignment as contested processes, both in the development of movement frames internally as well as in the broader public sphere where the target, competing movements, the media, public opinion, and other socio-cultural structures all play a role. As a result of the contested nature of the process, the outcome of alignment efforts are never guaranteed and may require an extended challenge to achieve success. These qualities suggest the need for continued assessment of the movement’s role in agenda setting and proposal content over time—documenting both movement participation in the policy debate and analyzing the provisions of policy proposals for congruence with movement prognostic frames.

Challenges that are sustained over long periods of time pose additional challenges for understanding success and failure for social movements. Following Gamson (1990), movement scholars have assessed the role of organizational variables (size, stability,
strategy, leadership and access to decision-makers) in determining social movement influence on public policy (for examples of this work see Burstein and Linton 2002; Johnson 2008; King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005; Staggenborg 1988). Like Trumpy, these works generally define the movements by organizations. However, it is possible that individuals, other types of social institutions, and/or broad shifts in socio-cultural understanding of the problem can sustain the message over time. So in one period, the movement may have to work hard to promote their message, but over time the idea may take hold outside of the movement community. The message can become a common interpretation of the problem; and rather than something in need of promotion, the “settled” idea is a resource for subsequent movement action (Swidler 1986).

Public frames not only become embedded in the public discourse, but also become part of the political discourse as well (Johnston 1995). When policy-makers accept the movement message, even in the absence of subsequent action, the message is no longer dependent on the movement actor for persistence (Zucker 1977). Phillips and Grattet (2000) argue that once a movement deploys a frame into a “legal environment,” the frame is either accepted (aligned) or rejected by the legal discourse surrounding the issue. They suggest that if the frame is accepted, then the movement’s message begins to “settle” into legal meaning. Over time, these meanings are institutionalized in legal discourse on the issue, becoming a script for subsequent legal debate. By aligning (either in part or in full) with the movement’s frame, the target contributes to the institutionalization and cultural persistence of the movement’s message. Even if frame alignment does not lead to policy reform (like in Trumpy’s observation of attempted cooptation), it may lead to the message taking on the characteristic of objectivity. If the
challenge continues, coopted interactions may be one important step toward policy reform.

VI. Conclusion

Early in this chapter, I presented the question: how can we reconcile or otherwise assess both the claims of movement cooptation and the perceptions of movement influence on continuing policy development in the domestic violence policy arena? I propose that one way to answer this question, and thus to create a better understanding of the mechanisms of social movement influence on public policy outcomes, is through the examination of prognostic frame interactions that focus on the presence and outcomes of the messages themselves. Although limited in scope, the recent research on the outcomes of social movement prognostic messages has yielded three theoretical precepts that provide a framework for examining this question. First, social movement messages are empirically observable expressions of the movement’s goals and expectations for target action. Second, we can learn about social movement outcomes by examining the outcomes of movement messages and target response frames over time. And third, there are underlying mechanisms leading to movement outcomes that result from the persistence of message making. A longitudinal assessment of BWM message outcomes may help us account for the contradictory perceptions that the movement was coopted during early stages of the challenge but influenced domestic violence policy development in the long term. To accomplish this task, empirical evidence will be investigated to address five sub-questions:

1. What were the goals of the BWM?

2. What demands did the BWM make on federal lawmakers?
3. How did federal lawmakers respond to the prognostic messages of the BWM?

4. What were the outcomes for BWM prognostic messages in Congressional policy proposals?

5. In what ways do these outcomes represent the continuing influence of the BWM on domestic violence policy?

The current work extends the analysis of policy-oriented movement/target interactions in a couple of ways. First, I will use Trumpy’s model and strategy to examine a case study. However, the unit of analysis will be the prognostic frame, rather than the particular social movement organization. I will also look at multiple policy challenges within the case of the Battered Women’s Movement. This will allow for a comparison not only of message outcomes at different interactions, but also allow for an examination of how messages persist, differ, or evolve across challenges. Second, addressing movement outcomes based on a single organizational outcome is misleading. I will use this approach to assess interactions that involve different organizations and to answer questions regarding not only whether or not cooptation happened, but also to whom it happened, what message was coopted, and whether or not cooptation actually represented compromise or reform for any particular part of the movement.

In addition to resolving the inconsistency between claims of movement cooptation and movement influence on policy outcomes, this approach also contributes to the theoretical development of three additional areas of social movement scholarship. First, examining movement interactions with policy-makers may help us improve the conceptualization of movement policy oriented strategies and reconcile these strategies with an otherwise “outsider” status. Second, examining movement challenges as a series
of interactions may lead to a better understanding of how and why movement messages change over time as policy challenges play out. Lastly, the approach can lead to a better understanding of how a once “radical” message becomes commonplace or institutionalized through the policy process.

In Chapter Three, I operationalize the key concepts defined above as necessary for examining message cooptation. I also detail data sources, identify data collection strategies and discuss coding and analysis techniques, and examine issues related to validity and generalizability.
Chapter Three

Methodology

I. Introduction

In this dissertation, I analyze the relationship between social movements and public policy; more specifically, I explore how public policy responds to movement messaging (and vice versa), and the mechanisms through which this occurs. Specifically, I focus on two overarching questions: (1) to what extent do federal policies on domestic violence represent favorable responses to the Battered Women's Movement? And (2) how can we reconcile or otherwise assess both the claims of movement cooptation and the perceptions of movement influence on continuing policy development in the domestic violence policy arena? My interests here focus on but are not limited to social movement cooptation. This work specifically looks at the extent to which the content of domestic violence policy proposals represents either favorable response to or cooptation of the public messages of the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM) from 1977 to 1994. This chapter describes the research strategy including case selection, study design, data collection, and method of analysis.

II. Case Selection

The BWM is an appropriate case for examining the model of cooptation proposed in this research for several reasons. First, evaluating policy production requires having a significant period of time in which to observe both outcomes and the presence of interested parties as proposals are revised and reintroduced. The BWM began policy-oriented claims-making in the mid-1970s. The first substantial policy achievement in the
U.S. Congress, the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). Between the initiation of movement claims-making and the adoption of VAWA, numerous related policy proposals were introduced.

Second, while scholars continue to link the battered women’s movement and its activists to both state and federal policy change, there is little to no empirical evidence to support this connection. Only a handful of published works examine this connection (see Gagne 1998 on a single-state movement for clemency for women who kill their batterers; Jenness 1999 on advocate participation in VAWA proceedings; Murphy 1997 on state-level adoption of police reform laws; Reinelt 1995 on single-state coalition formation; and Schechter 1982 on the origins of the BWM movement). BWM advocates participated in Congressional hearings on domestic violence proposals. Schechter (1982) documents the participation of BWM advocates in the first Congressional hearings on federal domestic violence legislation in 1978. Jenness (1999) found that advocate participation in VAWA hearings in the early 1990s was limited, but advocates were represented in these hearings prior to proposal adoption in 1994. Furthermore, there were a number of domestic violence bills introduced during intervening Congressional sessions. These proposals and the participation of BWM advocacy have not been compared over time.

Third, BWM advocacy has routinely targeted government response to violence against women in society. In so doing, the movement offers an excellent case study of the blurring of boundaries between conventional politics and outsider activism. This is in part derived from the relationship between BWM advocacy and the larger Women’s Movement, where the feminist conceptualization of violence against women sees such violence as rooted in systemic patriarchy (Gagne 1998). As such, advocates have targeted
the state to secure equal rights for women. In doing so, BWM advocacy has involved the
constant integration of activism with conventional politics (Reinelt 1995). Furthermore,
this work was undertaken by a variety of institutions and organizations, so much so that it
is frequently dismissed as either social service provision or criminal justice interest group
politics. The BWM movement is comprised not only of SMOs, but also a diverse base of
non-profit organizations that provide services, support, and system advocacy to women
and families affected by domestic violence (Broad and Jenness 1996). The suggestion
that the BWM movement was co-opted by institutional response (Johnson 1981; Tierney
1982) is rooted in the blurring of the boundaries between outsider advocacy and
conventional politics. Gagne (1998) suggests that the national representation of the BWM
movement was compromised when the NCADV accepted funding from the Department
of Justice in the 1980s. While this may have prohibited representatives from direct
lobbying, it does not exclude NACDV or any other such organization either from
advocating movement goals or participating in Congressional hearings. The proposed
question specifically requires an exploration of the interweaving of activism with
conventional politics and conceptualizes the movement as a broad coalition of
organizations and agents in order to allow an investigation of these boundaries.

III. Study Design

The current project utilized a qualitative research design. First, I used a case study
design to document the origin, mobilization, and claims-making history of the BWM.
The case study approach is appropriate for the production of a macroscopic overview of
particular movement or movement component where the goal is to illuminate “focal
actions, events and/or processes” (Snow and Trom 2002). For this work, I focused on
producing a rich description of the origin and evolution of the BWM’s claims-making over time. Historical case studies produce context-dependent knowledge. And while this type of knowledge is rooted in time and space, it improves the ability of research to assess the relevance of and understand the impact of discrete events (Flyvbjerg 2006). Historical documents produced by movement activists and organizations, published movement histories, research reports, and records of public testimony by movement activists were collected, coded and analyzed.

Second, a longitudinal interpretative policy analysis method was used to examine the outcome of movement claims-making on the content of federal policy proposals. “Interpretative policy analysis” is a qualitative approach to identifying the “architecture” of policy arguments, aimed at exposing the symbolic and consequential meanings imbedded in policy work (Yanow 2000). The method extends traditional policy analysis strategies to include the goal of identifying how meanings are created or changed through the policy process as different “interpretations” of a policy issue are transmitted during policy formulation, consideration and action. Yanow (2000) contends that understanding policy-making and outcomes requires conceptualizing these activities within the community context both in which the issue arose and in which the policy would be enacted. Congressional bill proposals related to the issue of woman battering and domestic violence were retrieved and ordered to construct a chronological history of federal policy-making. The legislative history was then compared with chronological development of BWM messages derived during the movement case study. These intertwining histories of public claims-making were analyzed to evaluate the dynamics of
policy response to movement prognostic messages. The details of data collection, coding, and analysis are discussed in detail below.

IV. Data Collection and Coding

I collected multiple sources of data in order to document both movement and target messages. The project involved two separate data collections: (1) publicly available works by activists, organizations, and scholars of the battered women’s movement, and (2) congressional bills data, proposals, and related documents.

A. Identifying the Battered Women’s Movement Coalition

The first step was defining and conceptualizing the boundaries of the movement. As discussed in the previous chapter, movements are comprised of coalitions of actors and organizations with varying degrees of connectivity and coordination (McCammon et al. 2001; Meyer 2003; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005). Movements also may organize within a particular policy domain which is defined as “a component of the political system that is organized around substantive issues” (Burstein 1991, 328). Furthermore, movements function in larger organizational fields. The organizational field is defined as “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 148). Noy (2009) studied homeless policy in San Francisco and identified the “field” as all of the “organizations and political offices within San Francisco that were someway involved in (1) shaping the city’s homeless policy; (2) providing input to policy makers about city homeless policy and programs; or (3) implementing city homeless policy” (226). By this definition, both movement and target (policy makers/gatekeepers) are part of the organizational field, along with a host
of other agencies that work in the area of homeless services (advocates, service providers, businesses, and government agencies).

Thus, the battered woman policy domain or organizational field includes not only social movement organizations, but also local, state, and federal government policy-makers and agencies, civic organizations engaged in social problems interventions, medical, mental health, and social service agencies and practitioners, researchers and educators engaged in both knowledge production and training of professionals in a variety of fields. The domain would include any individual, group, or agency with a stake in social policy related to the problem of woman battering.

The composition of a coalition movement is an empirical question to be answered by observation of movement activities at any given point in time. For the purpose of this data collection, the BWM is the coalition of individuals and organizations that organized to challenge the social conditions that caused, facilitated, and normalized woman battering in society. Some components of the movement coalition are easy to identify: feminist shelter activists and feminist organizations with platforms on sexism, sexual assault, sexual harassment, and pornography. Not all feminist groups articulated a public message on woman battering, but many did. Others are more difficult to distinguish from other types of groups in the organizational field. For example, battered women’s shelters are considered to be the primary incubators of the movement (Schechter 1982). But, shelters with different ideological orientations formed simultaneously with those that would be considered part of the movement (e.g. Al Anon, Community Crisis Center in Elgin, IL). The approach to determining carriers of the movement message centered on whether the publicly articulated message presented a challenge to existing norms,
policies, or practices related to the social reproduction of woman battering. The provision
of shelter or services alone was not enough to be included in the movement coalition.
Additionally, these groups at times provided competing or counter messages. Chapters 4
and 5 will provide a more detailed identification of actors and organizations that
influenced, shaped, and carried the movement’s message.

As stated above, the organizational field includes those that would be considered
the target of social movement activity. For this work, the target is specifically identified
as the policy-makers in the U.S. Congress. The movement also targeted other
stakeholders within the policy domain: professional medical, social work and criminal
justice organizations, non-feminist oriented civic groups, local and state governments and
their agents. While many of these groups began their own public advocacy related to
issues of domestic and family violence, they were not part of the movement coalition.
Evaluating the outcome of movement challenges across all possible targets is beyond the
scope of this work. However, the movement’s public claims frequently criticize and call
for reform among these areas of the policy domain. The tension between the movement
and this group of allies/competitors is discussed in the description of the movement’s
public messages in the first section of Chapter 5.

**B. Movement Messages and Action**

The documentation of movement prognostic frames (movement messages) for the
coalition of actors engaged in BWM work required a focus on public sources rather than
organizational specific sources. Public movement messages were derived from original
source documents, including: published books, newsletters, transcripts from testimony at
public hearings, research articles and reports, manuals on policy and program strategies,
and personal papers of movement activists.\textsuperscript{2} Documents were collected for years 1972 to 1996. This time period allowed for the identification of early public messages of the movement prior to the introduction of domestic violence related legislation in the U.S. Congress and those that continued to be offered after the passage of the Violence Against Women Act in 1993.

Movement data was collected in three stages. First, I began data collection by identifying existing written histories in book or monograph form. These documents included Del Martin’s (1976) \textit{Battered Wives, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the Battered Women’s Movement} by activist Susan Schechter (1982), \textit{Women, Violence, & Social Change} by historians Emerson and Russell Dobash (1992), Donileen R. Loseke’s (1992) \textit{The Battered Woman and Shelters: The Social Construction of Wife Abuse, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking} by Elizabeth Schneider (2000), Kirsten Rambo’s (2009) \textit{Trivial Complaints: The Role of Privacy in Domestic Violence Law and Activism in the U.S.} and additional works focusing on particular aspects of the BWM or its policy history. Some of these works were more than historical references; those published during the time frame of this analysis were also considered movement message sources. Second, I documented and downloaded transcripts of congressional or other government agency hearings and testimonies where battered women and their advocates made claims directly to lawmakers. These documents provide insight into direct movement/policy-maker framing opportunities. The third stage of data collection was to procure movement literature to supplement the historical and official policy record. Articles related to woman battering were abstracted from \textit{Aegis: Magazine on}

\textsuperscript{2} A complete list of source documents can be found in the references under the heading Data Sources.
Ending Violence Against Women, monographs and research reports produced by movement organizations produced between 1974 and 1996. In total, 81 documents were included. Table 1 shows the distribution of movement data sources by type. Citations for movement data sources are provided in Appendix A.

Table 1. Number of Source Documents for Movement Data by Document Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Source Document</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement histories, books, chapters, theses/dissertations</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional or government agency hearing transcripts</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement Publications (newsletters and monographs)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Coding Movement Messages

Movement documents were coded using a conventional qualitative content analysis coding technique. Conventional content analysis technique involves the identification and systematic categorization of themes or patterns from the text itself as opposed to beginning with key concepts or categories from coding as they are defined in theory (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). This approach is appropriate where the goal is the interpretation of the content of text data and the aim of research is describing a phenomenon for which existing research is limited (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1278). While themes were coded inductively, I approached movement documents looking specifically for three categories of information: movement definition of the problem, movement prognostic framing of the solution, and movement policy preferences. Many of the documents used in this effort were in book or monograph form, some on loan from libraries. As such, it was not feasible to utilize coding software. The

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3 Ageis: Magazine on Ending Violence Against Women was published between 1978 and 1987 and is archived online by the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence and can be found at [http://pubs.pcadv.net/AEGIS_Newsletters/](http://pubs.pcadv.net/AEGIS_Newsletters/).
information derived from documents was abstracted onto coding forms and entered into a spreadsheet matrix. The matrix was organized by categories reflecting the type of information contained in the document: definitions of woman battering or domestic violence, diagnosis of the problem, prognostic messages, and policy preferences. As themes emerged, the matrix was expanded to include codes for common themes within these categories. Some material contained overlapping themes; these items were entered into all relevant areas of the matrix. In addition, mentions of specific events, policies, or organizations were documented and included in the movement history time line (see Appendix B). I have provided a description of movement data sources and thematic categories of diagnostic and prognostic messages in Chapter 5.

**D. Target Messages and Action**

The primary data source for target messages are the documents making up the official Congressional record for policy proposals involving domestic violence prevention, intervention, and service provision bills introduced between 1975 and 1994. I generated a complete list of bills for each Congressional using two methods. First, I searched the bill database maintained by Congressional Bills Project at the University of Washington and located at [www.congressionalbills.org](http://www.congressionalbills.org). These datasets are organized by Congress and index all bills introduced during each session in both the House and Senate between 1947 and 2002. In addition to bill identifiers (number, title, and topic), the database documents bill sponsor, demographic and committee assignment information for the sponsor, the number of co-sponsors, committee assignment information, and actions taken on the bill during the session. I began bill identification by pulling all bills coded

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4 E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson, *Congressional Bills Project: (1976-1994)*, NSF 00880066 and 00880061. The views expressed are those of the authors and not the National Science Foundation.
by the Congressional Bills Project with the index: “domestic violence.”\(^5\) Second, I searched the full bill text for key word combinations using the LexisNexis Congressional Universe and Thomas.gov.\(^6\) I reviewed the bill descriptions and selected those pertaining to domestic violence, violence against women, intimate partner violence, sex assault, rape, victim rights for further review. The results of this search were compared with those found using the congressional bills index. Since the goal was to identify all domestic violence related bills, including broad bills with domestic violence related provisions, the results of both searches were combined and duplicate entries were deleted. Further, bills using the term “domestic violence” to distinguish violence within the United States as opposed to foreign conflict were also deleted. In total, I identified 150 House and 105 Senate bills that met the search criteria. Citations for target data sources are provided in Appendix C.

Once I identified the population of domestic violence bills, I retrieved all related congressional documents for each bill, including (when applicable): the bill text as originally introduced, committee reports and transcripts of public hearings, reports compiled by the Congressional Research Service, bill mark-ups (revisions) completed in committee, the final bill text as considered in floor votes, including any amendments, and roll call voting records. These documents are mostly available in full-text from LexisNexis Congressional Universe (Proquest). LexisNexis indexes Congressional

\(^5\) I excluded a number of bills that were indexed as “domestic violence,” including: bills concerned exclusively with child or elder abuse, bills wherein the term “domestic violence” connotes acts of domestic terrorism against U.S. citizens, and bills broadly related to violence and violent crime not specifically aimed at woman battering or household/domestic violence against women.

\(^6\) Search terms were divided into two categories: one representing woman (woman, women, sex, gender, domestic, spouse, spousal, marriage, martial, wife, sexual, intimate, family, household, victim), one representing battered (abuse, assault, battered, battery, violence, rape, offend, offense, crime).
documents and publications from the 91st Congress (1969-1970) to the present\textsuperscript{7}. In some cases, identified documents could not be retrieved in full text from this source. Some documents were retrieved from hard copy government documents available through interlibrary loan or the University of New Mexico Libraries.

\textit{E. Coding Target Messages}

As bill documents were collected, I assembled a record for each domestic violence proposal introduced between 1977 and 1994. The record was arranged chronologically, documenting Congressional consideration and decision-making for each bill. For some bills, this was relatively simple, including only the original proposal as introduced, the bill sponsor, and perhaps the committee to which it was assigned. Multiple bills with similar content were often introduced during the same session. Some of these bills did not result in any formal action beyond the bill introduction process. For others, the record is much larger as committee hearing transcripts, reports, and bill mark-ups were added.

Similar to the movement data, bills and related policy documents were coded using the conventional inductive content analysis coding technique. Also similar to movement document coding, these documents were approached with broad analytic categories: definition of the problem, prognostic framing of the solution, and policy products aimed at addressing the problem. During coding, 41 additional bills were identified as unrelated to this project. The elimination of these cases resulted in a final count of 214 bills (House N = 124, Senate N = 90). In total, 248 separate codes were assigned to one of the six categories of prognostic frames identified during movement.

\footnote{Indexed documents include: committee prints, Congressional Research Service reports, hearing transcripts, House and Senate reports, bill text, and legislative histories.}
coding: (1) awareness, research, and education; (2) civil rights; (3) crime, criminal
justice, and crime victim reforms; (4) social welfare, services, and public health
initiatives; (5) shelter and domestic violence service programs; and (6) social, economic,
and cultural change provisions. In addition to the six prognostic frame categories, I also
coded definitions of the problem (when provided in the bill) and identified
implementation preferences. Codes were added to an SPSS database that was constructed
with the bill descriptors obtained from the Congressional Bills Data project.

The history of federal domestic violence lawmaking has not been well
documented. Assembling this record allowed me to establish a descriptive account of the
volume, types, and the evolution of BWM proposals over time. Chapter 6 provides a
description of the number of bills introduced each interaction period and the
characteristics of these introductions (Congressional body of introduction, types of policy
changes proposed, sponsor characteristics, committee activities, Congressional voting
activity, and whether or not the bills became law).

V. Method of Analysis

Interpretative policy analysis is conducted in a number of ways. The basic outline
of the approach involves analyzing policy artifacts, objects, language and acts and trying
to understand the meanings from the standpoint of one or more interpretive communities
(Yanow 2000). I approached the analysis by first assembling interaction periods. The
next step was to assemble coded data for prognostic frame category comparisons between
movement messages and policy proposals. These activities are described in detail below.
A. Assembling Interactions

Interactions were assembled by “Congress.” Each two year Congressional session was treated as the period of target response to BWM claims-making. BWM messages prior to and during the congressional period were considered prognostic framing or claims-making for the period under analysis. Movement messages following the period were interpreted as movement response (or non-response) to the target’s action. In total, ten periods of interaction were constructed. Table 2 provides the breakdown of years by message/action type by Congress.

Table 2. Interaction Periods for Movement Framing and Target Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Period of Movement Prognostic Framing</th>
<th>Period of Target Response</th>
<th>Period of Movement Response Framing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Clearly, one period of target response overlaps with the next period of movement framing. I will also be looking at movement messages relayed through testimony at Congressional hearings within the time period of target response. On the surface, overlapping time periods may seem problematic. Quantitative event history analysis models require discrete time periods with a clear demarcation of the occurrence of independent and dependent variables. However, the project of conceptualizing social movement message framing and a qualitative analysis of frame alignment requires a more fluid approach. The dates of each period are rough estimates meant to preserve an idea of
proximity of message deployment to the development and introduction of policy proposals. Analyzing hearings held during the target response period provides the opportunity to observe direct debate, alignment, or disagreement between movement actors (when they are included) and policymakers. The overlapping nature of these categories reflects the social and political reality of framing activities.

**B. Comparison**

The goal of the comparison was to document correspondence with, divergence from, and cooptation of movement messages by federal policy proposals. The first step in this process was to document and compare the categories of prognostic messages that emerged from the respective document sources. A rubric of movement message themes and target policy themes across interaction periods was constructed. An example of the rubric is provided in Figure 3. Each movement and target frame was entered as a row in an excel spreadsheet with the time period and prognostic frame category so that the rubric could be manipulated by both time period and dimension. Messages were then grouped into interaction periods for analysis of the movement message outcomes. The success of policy proposals was not the primary focus of this work; however, the rubric also includes fields to document the progression of bills through the policy process (e.g. hearings, votes, and adoption of public laws). Tables were constructed to compare the “architecture” of the primary categories and dimensions of prognostic frames appearing in both movement and policy sources. From these tables, interactions with findings of prognostic frame alignment were identified. The documents making up the record for these items were explored more in-depth to determine whether the alignment yielded actions consistent with new advantages or attempts at cooptation.
**Figure 3. Sample Rubric for Comparing Movement and Congressional Messages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prognostic Frame Dimensions</th>
<th>Claims-maker</th>
<th>Document ID</th>
<th>Prognostic Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Crisis Intervention Resources</td>
<td>Movement</td>
<td>Tinker 1978, EDL-0016</td>
<td>Government funding should be provided to battered women’s shelters as directly as possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Crisis Intervention Resources</td>
<td>Movement</td>
<td>Fields 1978, TEC-0040</td>
<td>Shelter should be available to all women without income eligibility requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Crisis Intervention Resources</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>HR 7927, 1978</td>
<td>Grant program for emergency or crisis shelter and services for domestic violence victims</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C. Frame Alignment and Outcomes**

Frame alignment is defined as the outcome of strategic efforts to link diagnostic and prognostic frames with those of actual or prospective constituents, resource providers, or targets (Snow et al. 1986). The interaction of policy-oriented movements with the political process can be thought of as an attempt to align policy with the movement’s ideas on the source of the problem and what can be done to bring about a remedy. The outcome assessment matrix adapted from Trumppy and presented in Chapter 2 includes five possible outcomes: failure, preemption, cooptation, compromise and reform. These outcomes are defined using Gamson’s conceptual rubric. For simplicity, I have dropped Trumppy’s designation of compromise as a separate outcome and merged partial reform with full reform. The distinction of partial and full success will still be noted in the text. The rubric in Figure 4 details the definitions used to determine four frame outcomes: frame success, frame cooptation, frame preemption, and frame failure.
Acceptance and non-acceptance will be identified by comparing prognostic frames between movement messages and policy proposals. Acceptance is the acknowledgment by the target that movement actors are legitimate spokesperson on the issue at hand or for the population to be affected by the outcome of the desired change. In this work, acceptance is demonstrated by Congress articulating a proposal to address an issue raised by the movement. For example, the movement demands direct funding for shelter operations and Congress introduces a bill related to the need for shelter. Counter-framing by policymakers or a failure to address the movement’s prognostic frame altogether constitutes non-acceptance.

Inclusion is identified when target policy proposals contain prescriptions for change consistent with the challenger’s prognosis for addressing the grievance. Since this

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acceptance</th>
<th>Inclusion</th>
<th>No Inclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Success</strong></td>
<td>Proposal introduced into congress to address the problem identified by the movement; Proposal prescription for change is consistent with that requested in the associated movement diagnostic and prognostic frames</td>
<td><strong>Cooptation</strong>: Proposal introduced into Congress to address the problem identified by the movement; Proposal prescription for change is inconsistent with that requested in the associated movement diagnostic and prognostic frames</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Acceptance</td>
<td><strong>Preemption</strong>: Proposals introduced in Congress that address issues not raised by the movement, but providing a prescription for change that would yield advantages for the movement or the beneficiary population</td>
<td><strong>Failure</strong>: No proposals introduced into Congress to address the problem identified by the movement; or proposals are introduced in Congress that demonstrate a rejection of the movement diagnostic and prognostic frames—proposing an alternative solution that would not yield advantages for the movement or the beneficiary population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
work is dealing with messages and not the actual products of the policy, I will refer to inclusion rather than the traditional new advantages. Inclusion accrues when the movement gained something it sought during the challenge. Here this means Congress included a prescription for change in the proposal that was consistent with the change requested by the movement. For example, the movement demands direct funding for shelter operation and congress introduces a bill to provide direct grants to shelters for funding operations. Bills that do not include such prescriptions would be defined by non-inclusion.

Since the focus of this work is on the outcome of movement prognostic framing, the identification of acceptance and new advantages does not require the policy proposal to be successful. Johnston (1995) recommends studying frame alignment by analyzing the details of movement frames—rather than focusing on trying to reconcile outcomes with a movement’s global goal. In other words, evidence of movement influence through frame analysis requires assessing the micro-level aspects of the frame instead of trying to match the movement goal to a policy accomplishment. The latter is too abstract and requires a more speculative and subjective interpretation. By tying frames to their empirical expressions, we can better assess agreement between the movement frame and proposed policies. In this study, the presence of movement messages in policy proposals (whether enacted or not) constitutes evidence of acceptance of the movements claims and therefore can be identified as an indicator of influence. However, it is still important to recognize that an adopted policy may carry more impact in future frame interactions than a frame alignment in a failed proposal. To capture these dynamics, two types of outcomes will be discussed: frame outcomes and policy outcomes. Frame outcomes will be
determined as described above. I use the term success rather than reform to distinguish between the outcome of the frame and the outcome of the policy overall. Policy outcomes, including policy reform, preemption, cooptation, and failure will also be noted in the findings. Policy outcomes are determined based on the frame outcome and whether or not the bill is adopted by Congress and signed into law.

VI. Validity

One of the strengths of this method is the inclusion of diverse sources of data. My goal was to provide “substantive validation” for my findings. Angen (2000) describes substantive validation as having three components: the researcher must identify their own interpretations, clearly present the understandings derived from other sources, and account for the process of generating these understandings in the written record of the research. I have included a number of historical works on the BWM in the data collection process. While none of these works examine both the movement and policy history over the same period of time, these sources can be used collectively to verify divergences between my interpretation and those of activists and policy makers producing the artifacts subjected to interpretation. Diversions of my representation of movement messages and policy content presented in this work from those of existing works will be noted.

VII. Generalizability

The presumed lack of generalizability of a case study is perhaps the most frequent criticism of this type of work. However, Snow and Trom (2002) note that the case study is an appropriate method for making generalizations about theoretical refinement. This is particularly the case when the context of the process under study is subject to changing conditions and contexts (Cress and Snow 2000). This work seeks to improve the
conceptualization of message cooptation and other outcomes that result when social movements make public messages about social policy issues. While the conditions of this case are contextually bound, the theoretical refinement of the concept may be generalized to future works examining social movement message cooptation.

VIII. Conclusion

I present findings in three chapters. The next chapter details the origins and history of claims-making of the BWM, including the documentation of the goals of the movement and the development of movement preferences for social interventions related to those goals. Chapter 5 provides a description of movement prognostic frames aimed at federal public policy on domestic violence and Chapter 6 documents frame alignment success and failure across different messages and congressional sessions. The Conclusion (Chapter 7) explores the significance of these findings for understanding movement messaging and policy outcomes, and considers the generalizability of these findings for conceptualizing outcomes in policy-oriented movements more broadly.
Chapter Four

History of a Publicly Articulated Message on Battered Women: Movement Origins, Evolution, and Ideological Orientations

I. Introduction

This chapter details the origins of the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM). For the purposes of this work, I defined the Battered Women’s Movement not as a specific set of social movement organizations, but rather as a broad political effort to change the social conditions that perpetuate women’s experience of violence in the domestic sphere. The movement was initiated and supported by a complex field of individual victim-survivors and allied activists and organizations that worked toward the goal of ending violence against women. While women’s movement activists and organizations often addressed issues of violence against women in general, the BWM was primarily focused on violence that occurs in the “domestic sphere” meaning spousal or intimate partner violence against wives and women by their husbands or intimate partners. The movement was political in the sense that the targets for change were external to the individuals and groups involved in the movement, and often focused on social policy at the state or federal level. A good portion of the dialogue in this movement and about this movement had a feminist orientation. However, there were numerous participants and allied parties that did not adopt feminist principals or forms of organization. Nonetheless, the ideas of the women’s rights and women’s liberation movement are central elements to the movement’s story. First, I provide a brief description of other social movements and events that created the foundation for the development of a social critique of woman
battering. In the second section, I cover the sources and development of Battered Women’s Movement messages in the latter half of the 20th Century, focusing on the publicly articulated call for a policy response to the problem of domestic violence. Other works have documented the development of the Battered Women’s Movement and associated organizations (Schechter 1982; Miller 2010). For reference, a time line of key events in the movement is provided in Appendix B.

II. Social Criticism of Woman Battering

Feminist scholars identified the rise and dominance of the patriarchal family and the centrality of this unit to social organization as the underlying source of women’s oppression (Pleck 1987; Rambo 2009; Schechter 1982; Shepard 2005). The patriarchal family has been defined as one in which men have “control over the labor of women and children” (Coontz 2000). Stephanie Coontz (2000) argued that in early American society the patriarchal family combined with a preference for a social order with an “insistence on hierarchy, inequality, and the forcible subordination of “inferiors” to “superiors” (291). The result was both a family and social structure that dictated the role of women as subordinate and subject to socially sanctioned forcible correction if needed. This family form was supported by cultural expectations of a “true womanhood” that defined women solely by their roles within that family structure. Ideally this meant that women would be submissive, chaste, and focused on the domestic duties of wife and mother (Pleck 1987; Rambo 2009; Welter 1983). As property, women were subject to
chastisement by men (fathers and husbands) when they waivered from this role (Pleck 1987; Rambo 2009; Welter 1983). Physical abuse or battering was both an acceptable deterrent to and punishment for violating one’s role in the family structure.

These dynamics combined with both a social and legally supported ideal of “domestic privacy,” where families were seen as autonomous units to be protected from government and outside intrusion (Rambo 2009). Women and children were denied public redress of any grievance arising in the home (Pleck 1987). In the 19th century, even when women would have their husbands arrested and charged with battery, husbands were typically not convicted. When women appealed these court decisions, state supreme courts would ultimately defer to the right of privacy in the family household. Not only did these early rulings support the husband’s right to discipline his wife, the justices offering opinions suggested that such privacy protected battered women from the negative impact public knowledge of their misbehavior and subsequent correction would have on their reputation (Rambo 2009).

In the 19th century, social agitation on a variety of other problems created a foundation for a publicly articulated message about battered women. Three social movements contributed to a shift in the way woman battering was perceived and discussed in the wider society: the abolitionist/anti-slavery movement, the temperance movement, and the women’s suffrage movement (Rambo 2009; Young 2007). These movements differed in terms of ideology, grievances, and strategies, but overlapped in some areas, including membership. This section briefly summarizes how others have recognized these movements as laying the groundwork for the social (and later legal)
rejection of women as property subject to chastisement by men and moved the issue of woman battering into the public realm.

**A. Abolition/Anti-Slavery, Temperance, and Women’s Suffrage**

The abolitionist or anti-slavery movement (1830s to 1860s) articulated a counter argument to the “right of chastisement” as it related to slaveholders. This movement connected the ideas of personal freedom and bodily integrity (Sanchez-Eppler 1993). Specifically, abolitionists associated interpersonal violence and social control by highlighting the use of violence against slaves as a tool for achieving submission and therefore preserving the relations of power between slaves and slaveholders (Sanchez-Eppler 1993). This critique called into question the conceptualization of a woman’s behavior as the cause for her husband’s exercise of the right of chastisement. The public response to the problem began to shift and the right to chastisement began to lose support in society and eventually the courts as well (Rambo 2009).

The temperance movement sought to prohibit the sale and consumption of alcohol (1820s to 1930s). Temperance activists questioned the accusation that it was a woman’s aberrant behavior that led to physical punishment by her husband. Rather, wife beating was most often the result of men’s consumption of alcohol (Giele 1995). The contention was that alcohol-fueled misbehaviors were a threat to family structure and social order. This argument framed woman as a victim, but never articulated the problem as one of women’s oppression (Pleck 1987). The temperance movement did not challenge the idea of “true womanhood” but rather suggested men’s drinking was interfering in their ability to fulfill the domestic role (Rambo 2009). This movement was significant to the
development of a public message on woman battering because it was the first to identify violence in the home as a problem requiring a policy solution (Rambo 2009).

The women’s suffrage movement (1840s to 1920) challenged the government for woman’s right to vote. The suffrage movement emphasized a broad concept of equality between women and men in both the public and domestic spheres (Buecheler 1990). The connection between their cause (winning the vote) and woman battering was less direct. Suffragists would use extreme stories of injury and death to make the case that women needed to have more power to define their own lives both in and outside of the home: equal partners in marriage, right to divorce, and the right to seek redress for their grievances independent of their husbands (Pleck 1987; Rambo 2009). They offered these examples as a criticism of men’s oppression over women, but never fully took on the issue of battering as tool used systematically in order to maintaining male dominance. Rambo (2009) contends that these movements broke through the existing narrative on woman battering by creating a “climate of social change,” which resulted in shifts in popular and legal attitudes about violence in the domestic sphere (43).

Perhaps more fundamentally, if less directly, all three movements generated both a perception and a reality of women as public actors and players in a political drama that mattered for the nation as a whole. This newfound status – forged by women’s own agency in the public arena – helped lay the foundation for public recognition of battering as a denial of women’s public moral status.

**III. Taking Action Against Oppression**

As these movements came to a close in the early 20th century, public acceptance of the right to chastisement declined and women began to take a larger role in public life.
But the explanation for woman battering continued to focus on the behavior of the woman, rather than that of the batterer. Family courts staffed by social workers gained popularity as a method for dealing with disruptive families. The fields of social work and psychiatry approached family violence as a problem between individuals (not a systemic oppression of women). This approach reinforced the idea that battering and a generalized propensity for “family violence” was the result of personality or personal pathologies—for both offender and victim (Pleck 1987; Rambo 2009; Schechter 1982). Feminists and grassroots activists objected to pathology-focused, victim blaming explanations for woman battering that appeared in the work of psychologists, sociologists, and social work practice (Schechter 1982). In addition, state supreme courts further solidified the insularity of the family—establishing the right to privacy in the family as covered by the 14th Amendment (Rambo 2009). This development would aid feminist activists in some areas of concern in the latter half of the 20th century (reproductive rights) but continued to cause problems for social intervention in situations of family violence (Rambo 2009). While these professions focused on treating or otherwise dealing with personal pathologies, a new cycle of social movement activity drew attention to the ways in which pathologizing individuals based on group membership (racial group, sex/gender) aided in systematic exclusion of some from the activities (and subsequent achievements) that were perceived as markers of superiority for others.

A. Late 20th Century Civil Rights and Liberation Movements

Following the end of World Wars II, a new cycle of social movements emerged, focused largely on status-based social inequalities. A number of these movements shaped the message and strategies of what would become the BWM. The black civil rights
movement and the anti-war movement contributed organizing structures and provided a normalization of protest among groups with social grievances. But perhaps the most significant contribution of these movements was the explication of a message that promoted civil rights, and therefore policy solutions, to addressing structural inequalities. The civil rights frame proposed that, “blame is externalized in that unjust differences in life circumstances are attributed to encrusted, discriminatory structural arrangements rather than to the victim’s imperfections” (Snow and Benford 1992, 139). The civil rights frame dominated public movement messages during this period, but not without counter-framing and resistance. Civil rights oriented solutions acknowledged group discrimination, but still relied upon individuals to take the initiative in order to bring about corrective action. Liberation movements questioned the viability of using the existing system to bring about a solution to oppression (Bumiller 1992; 2008). The more radically minded liberation frame focused on raising women’s consciousness about the connection between their experience of violence and their status as women and desired solutions that involved dismantling existing structures and replacing them with alternative institutions (Rambo 2009; Schechter 1982). Both civil rights and liberation oriented messages influenced the development of prognostic frames related to the problem of woman battering. Specifically, three movements had direct influence on the BWM framing of the problem, including: women’s rights, women’s liberation, and anti-rape activism.

**B. Women’s Rights Movement**

The Women’s Rights Movement (1960s) drew its messages directly from the civil rights frame. These activists sought to bring about women’s equality through a process of
institutional reform aimed at procuring civil rights from the state (Buechler 1990; Daniels 1997; Freeman 1973). Freeman (1973) noted that the origins of the “liberal” feminist movement were tied to the 1961 establishment of the Commission on the Status of Women by President John F. Kennedy and the subsequent establishment of state level commissions. These organizations were formally structured and attracted professional, politically active women. Commissions prepared reports on the status of women on a variety of factors including: education, employment and wages, health, poverty, housing, and family life. Freeman (1973) argued that combined with the addition of sex to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, these commissions spurred the development of the National Organization for Women. Women’s rights groups focused on eliminating discriminatory laws and practices that inhibited women from reaching their natural potential to be equals with men.

The Women’s Rights Movement articulated the problem of violence against women as “an issue of rights and citizenship” (Naranch 1997, 21). Woman battering was the result of the subordination of her role in the patriarchal family, and perpetuated by her unequal status created by systemic discrimination against and lack of protections for women in public life. Like the Suffragettes before them, activists in this movement articulated solutions that called for women’s full inclusion and equal partnership with men in both private and public life (Schechter 1982). The push for equality included demands for equal access to housing, custody rights, and the right to seek a divorce without her husband’s agreement (Schechter 1982). Rights advocates also called for equal protection under the law with regard to criminal proceedings related to violence in the home. They pushed for increased responsiveness by police and the courts to battered
women as crime victims, while at the same time sought to improve the criminal justice system’s treatment of women who used self-defense against their batterers (Gagne 1998). Critics of the civil rights approach claim that this merely shifted patriarchal control from the family to the state. Civil rights were articulated as “legal protections” for individuals; the activation of such protections required a “victim” to lodge a complaint of some sort (Bumiller 1992, 2). Bumiller (2008) suggested that by aligning with the state, liberal feminists joined forces with “a neo-liberal project of social control” (15). The solutions that were offered for battered women by the civil rights approach depended upon framing women as “victims” in need of management of their personal problems. According to Bumiller (2008), these efforts redirected attention and resources away from disrupting the system of social control that systematically create women as an oppressed group. This perspective led some activists to adopt a more radical approach.

**C. Women’s Liberation Movement**

The Battered Women’s Movement was formed during the same time period as feminist activists began to divide into groups based on differing philosophies of women’s rights and women’s liberation (Schechter 1982). For some women in the movement, the idea of simply procuring the same rights as men in the public sphere was believed insufficient for bringing about gender equality. Activists in the Women’s Liberation Movement or “radical feminists” argued that a capitalist economy was male-dominated and male-preferential system. The maintenance of this system required a gender hierarchy in both public and private realms, including the continued use of women’s unpaid labor in the home (Bumiller 2008). In other words, the system was built for producing and maintaining a gendered hierarchy in all areas of life. From this view the
the idea that women could be “equal” to men was not possible as long as society was organized according to the needs of a capitalist economy. Radical feminists called for the restructuring of female and male relationships in both spheres and implied that public/private divisions were not separate spaces at all (Schechter 1982).

Proponents of the women’s liberation perspective offered a theory of woman battering that connected it to this gendered division of labor in society. Inequality was not just the result of public discrimination against women. Specifically, these activists suggested that men benefited both privately and publicly from the isolation and domination of women in the home. In their view, this was the purpose of the patriarchal nuclear family in the 20th Century. Violence was both evidence of that domination and a tool or “weapon that a man uses to control his wife” (Jones 1970, 47). Economic, social-political, and cultural systems are all implicated in the production of women’s disadvantage and either implicitly or explicitly promoted or at least assented in the use of violence against women in the home (Bumiller 2008). Liberationists sought to educate and empower women to recognize the inherent politics of the private sphere and the ways in which violence against women supported and facilitated the continuation of women’s oppression (Schechter 1982). These activists focused on dismantling the structures in society that perpetuated male dominance and as a result ending the systematic use of violence against women (Schechter 1982). The primary means of accomplishing this goal was the creation of consciousness of oppression and developing alternative institutions for women (Freeman 1973; Schechter 1982).

Those working in the movement from this philosophy eschewed reformist messages and their organizational structures. Freeman (1973) described the women’s
liberation groups as “younger” and consisting of “small groups—engaged in a variety of activities—whose contact with each other is, at best, tenuous” (796). Writing in the midst of this division, Freeman (1973) questioned the ability of liberationist or radical oriented groups to be viewed as a legitimate threat by existing institutions. Radical groups organized on the basis of local, friendship networks and group size stayed relatively small. Most organizations were based on a participatory democratic decision making structure, that allowed all participants to “voice” their experiences, their ideas, and their preferences (Schechter 1982). A preference for a decentralized decision-making structure had advantages for grassroots organization and building consensus within the group, but hindered the ability of these groups to organize on a large scale (Freeman 1970). The informality of these groups also led to frequent splintering. Freeman described these divisions as “friendly,” generally based on diverging interests on the issues (809). Some groups focused on developing centers, bookstores, or other alternative spaces for women, while others continued consciousness raising groups that focused on intersecting inequalities like race or sexuality (Fried 1994). Similarly, some groups turned their attention specifically to issues and services related to violence. Subsequent feminist analyses sometimes questioned the erosion of the public-private divide implied by the radical feminist position. Specifically, this view was problematized on the grounds that the distinction also helped shelter all individuals, including women, from the gaze of an intrusive state and society. Still, the radical feminist perspective intertwining home and family with the larger social structure exposed the way oppression is created and mutually supported in both realms.
D. Anti-Rape Movement

The Anti-Rape Movement originated in the 1970s through consciousness raising groups and autonomous service organizations like crisis hotlines, women’s counseling centers, and self-defense classes (Schechter 1982). Movement activists challenged the notion that rape was an “impulsive act” and that women who were raped had either provoked the attack or failed in some way to keep themselves from harm’s way (Schechter 1982). Instead, anti-rape activists put forward the feminist argument that rape is a particular form of domination based on gendered social relationships of unequal power. In her work detailing the social history of rape, Susan Brownmiller (1975) claimed that rape was a way of enforcing oppressive relations between women and men both in practice and as a constant threat to women’s safety. Brownmiller’s thesis also sought to shift the conversation about rape from one of sex to one of violence. Sexual acts of violence against women robbed them of one of the most fundamental dimensions of human dignity, their bodily integrity. Rape crisis services sought to empower women to restore autonomy over their own bodies and their own lives (Schechter 1982). While early organizational forms mirrored the loosely structured liberation philosophy, over time, the movement also articulated messages consistent with the civil rights frame (Fried 1994). Women’s rights advocates also embraced reforms related to legal statutes and procedures, the provision of victim advocates who would provide assistance to women in their encounters with law enforcement and prosecutor’s offices, and engaged in sensitivity training and education in public agencies (Fried 1994).

Both the anti-rape and the battered women’s movements grew out of an increased gender consciousness and the idea that women had the right to control their own bodies
Anti-rape activists led the dissemination of claims related to the feminist explanation of rape as an act of aggression and a crime, rather than the result of a woman’s own actions (Rambo 2009; Schechter 1982). This idea became a central tenet of messages related to woman battering (Schechter 1982). In some communities the relationship between these two movements was based on more than just a similar message about the gendered use of violence against women. Rape crisis hotlines and centers began hearing from battered women and identified a need for groups and services for these women (Schechter 1982). Small groups began to form specifically to address this form of violence. Emerging battered women’s groups borrowed strategies from the anti-rape movement and developed consciousness raising groups, crisis hotlines, and began conducting speak outs and other activities aimed at increasing public awareness about violence against women in the home (Rambo 2009).

Rape crisis centers frequently experienced the problems of organization identified by Freeman (1973). They faced challenges in funding, and even when funding was provided by local, state, and federal governments, the conditions of funding acceptance were often counter to the philosophy of center organizers. In one example, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration provided grants to rape crisis centers, but stipulated that victims would be required to report rape to the police in order to receive assistance (Schechter 1982). The usurping of victim autonomy was viewed as another form of denying women control over their bodies. Many organizations refused the money and collapsed as a result (Schechter 1982). In other cases, funder’s conditions led to changes in staffing and the transformation of the agency mission. Movement actors viewed the professionalization of service provision as an affront to the feminist analysis.
of rape. This movement exemplified the difficulties of engaging simultaneously in a political movement and the provision of victim services. Funding and support could be obtained (and were more easily obtained) by a focus on serving the victim without the need for feminist empowerment. As a result, the message of the movement itself was marginalized and feminist political work became increasingly separated from victim services (Schechter 1982). Thus, the key critical edge of the movement – the feminist critique of patriarchal dynamics in state and society – came into tension with the movement’s need to acquire resources from that very state and society.

IV. The Battered Women’s Movement

The beginning of the Battered Women’s Movement has been most directly tied to the consciousness raising and feminist service projects of the women’s liberation movement. The first publicly articulated messages identified with the movement appeared in the early 1970s. Over the course of the next two decades the messages of the movement began to diversify and included both liberationist and civil rights orientations. Regardless of the philosophical orientation, the BWM claimed two primary goals: the first goal was to provide immediate safety for battered women, and the second goal was to dismantle the institutions and/or institutional rules that facilitated woman battering by perpetuating women’s disadvantaged status in society. In this section, I describe three ideological orientations that shaped the BWM development of grievances. Next, I provide a description of the formation of the BWM (from the establishment of shelters to national organizations) and outline the emergent movement’s national platform.
A. Diagnostic Frames

In its struggle to control the explanation of the origin and perpetuation of woman battering in society, the BWM confronted three identifiable ideological paradigms about dealing with violence against women in society: clinical, feminist, and criminal justice paradigms (Cramer 2005; Tierney 1982). These three orientations are not exclusive to any particular group or organization but developed unevenly over time as family violence began to be viewed as abnormal (Tierney 1982). In some ways, the development of these ideological orientations followed the chronological development of a social critique of woman battering: challenging pathology, challenging existing social norms, and seeking legal and policy reforms. These paradigms diverged in their explanations of the origin of woman battering, the definition of battering, and the role of social institutions in the cause and solution for battering. All three threads were present throughout the development of the BWM and continued to surface in later conversations surrounding the issue of woman battering. Movement publications and the public testimonies of movement actors are also heavily shaped by either support or objection to specific proposals that fall within these paradigms. This section describes each paradigm and identifies the types of policy messages derived from BWM activities.

1. Social Work, Public Health, and Medical Perspectives

The clinical psychology/social work paradigm suggested individual-level explanations for family violence (like those expressed in the temperance movement). Individuals with psychological or pathological problems were either engaging in violence in the family or causing a disruption in the family unit (Cramer 2005). The logical inference was that individual pathology created stress that led to family dysfunction.
Battering, then, was the repetitive use of violence against a family member when the individual or the environment was stressed. When woman battering was viewed from this perspective, the solutions were primarily aimed at intervening in the individual problem with social work case management or psychological counseling (Schechter 1982). The goal of these interventions was to strengthen both individual and group coping strategies so that families would remain intact (Schechter 1982). Additionally, this perspective inferred that “family violence” was all the same regardless of which member of the family becomes the target (wife, husband, child, sibling, etc…) (Cramer 2005).

2. Feminist Perspectives

The feminist paradigm of woman battering suggested patriarchal social order and gender socialization create a cultural expectation of women’s submission to men. Woman battering was historically rooted in the cultural, economic, and legal history of women’s experiences. Batterers intentionally used violence to obtain and maintain control over their partners (Cramer 2005). Additionally, battering was viewed as more than just physical violence. Similar to the ways public discrimination disenfranchised women, batterers utilized isolation, economic coercion, emotional abuse, threats and intimidation to marginalize women from both public and private life (Pence and Paymar 1993). Since both batterers and battered women were subjected to the socialization to a gendered hierarchy, victims often minimized the abuse or believed they were at fault (Schechter 1982). As such, feminist solutions to battering depended on nurturing the battered woman’s consciousness so that victims recognized the reason for their victimization was external to their own behavior and therefore required a political solution (Cramer 2005; Gagne 1998). Specifically, proponents of this perspective held that battered woman must
develop a politicized identification of womanhood. Feminists sought to end violence against women by creating this consciousness of woman as a political identity that could be used to resist and challenge a male-dominated hierarchy (Gagne 1998).

3. Crime, Criminal Justice, and Crime Victims

The third ideological approach to the issue of woman battering was the criminal justice paradigm (Cramer 2005). This orientation viewed woman battering in terms of the criminal acts that constituted violence. Perspectives on the origin of violence were diverse. Advocates of this perspective articulated explanations for violence as the outcome of individual pathology, similar to that of the social work/psychiatry paradigm or as a frustration response to social strain or stressors like poverty or unemployment (Schechter 1982). Solutions to the problem of woman battering were oriented toward the provision of “protection for victims and consequences to abusers” (Cramer 2005, 276). Public responsibility for battering was limited to prevention and intervention activities for the components of battering that could be treated as a “crime” (Cramer 2005, 276). From this perspective, battering ceased to be viewed in terms of a systematic use of violence and became merely a series of incidents of physical violence. As a result, many of the behaviors batterers used to exert control (e.g. economic coercion, verbal abuse and isolation) would remain the personal problem of battered women (Cramer 2005).

B. Shelter as the Battered Women’s Movement Preferred Intervention

The BWM rejected the social service and criminal justice diagnostic frames and posited a prognostic claim that the problem of battering was best addressed through the development of an alternative institution — feminist battered women’s shelters. Early battered women’s shelters originated from women’s consciousness raising groups in local
communities. In a sense, the provision of shelter constituted the “protest” activity of the movement. Consciousness raising groups provided a safe space for women to disclose their personal abuse histories (Schechter 1982). As women began to share stories of battering and their lack of options for seeking safety, other women would offer refuge in their own homes (Rambo 2009; Schechter 1982). In many feminist communities, safety for battered women became a primary concern (Schechter 1982). Battered women’s shelters hardly seem delinquent today, but providing shelter to a woman (and her children) and hiding her from a lawful husband (and father) was a transgression that challenged the sanctity and privacy of the family.

Over time women engaged in providing refuge became overwhelmed by the demand for shelter and began to seek homes or facilities that would allow for the expansion of this activity. The first documented feminist shelters opened in the U.S. in 1975, Women’s Advocates in St. Paul, Minnesota (Johnson 1981, Martin 1976, Schechter 1982) and Transition House in Boston, Massachusetts in 1976 (Schechter 1982). Although both functioned as shelters for battered women, providing this service was neither the impetus for opening nor the sole purpose of these organizations. Rather, these groups viewed the shelter as a natural response to their “collective representation” of the problem of battering (Loseke 1992). The shelter was an alternative institution that served as a safe refuge and at the same time created an oppression free environment for women to experience equality, gain independence and self-sufficiency, and to develop a political awareness (Loseke 1992; Rambo 2009). The model of self-help, egalitarianism, and collectivist organizational structures developed by these first two shelters influenced shelter philosophy throughout the country (Schechter 1982).
The expansion of grassroots shelters in the U.S. also added to the feminist critique of existing social institutions. Just as consciousness raising groups provided a space for women to disclose battering, similar sessions within the shelter uncovered the ways in which battered women were marginalized from the assistance of civic organizations, family law, social welfare, and criminal justice agencies.

Prior to the development of women’s shelters, the only publicly available alternative for women fleeing abusive homes was to seek services from civil or religious groups who provided homeless services. Since these women technically had homes, they were often turned away (Schechter 1982). In 1960s, women in the Alcoholics Anonymous family support group Al Anon opened Haven House, the first shelter for women and their children who were fleeing alcohol-related violence in the U.S. (Johnson 1981; Schechter 1982). Similar to the temperance movement’s analysis of battering, alcohol was articulated as the underlying cause and the focus of these shelters was on providing safety for the family until the batterer sobered up. Early shelters, like those started by women from Al Anon influenced some of the characteristics that would define battered women shelters and services: use of a self-help model, promotion of peer support over “professional” interventions, and advocacy for treating women as adults, and therefore having the right to self-determination, including the decision of whether or not to leave their husbands (Schechter 1982, 57).

The criminal and civil justice systems were also targeted for criticism in shelters. Women discussed the failure of police to arrest batterers, their own arrests for engaging in self-defense, and the dismissal of criminal responsibility by prosecutors and judges (Gagne 1998; Schechter 1982). Women began to analyze the loss of individual status
once they became married. They learned from one another about the limitations of their rights to children, their homes, and other marital assets (Schechter 1982). In many places, married women were denied access to housing without their husbands’ permission. Women who chose to leave their husbands were socially stigmatized and denied social welfare services because of their husbands’ incomes (Schechter 1982). In addition, conflicts would occur in the family court over child custody when women were characterized as abandoning their families. The problems identified by women in shelter were not just the result of insensitive individuals in these agencies, but rather “agency specialization, rules, and regulations often prohibit them from offering real assistance” (Loseke 1992).

As battered women came together and discussed the similarities of their experiences, the notion that they were somehow at fault for their own condition began to fall away. A set of grievances began to form around the ways in which gender hierarchies in both public and private institutions contributed to the perpetuation of violence against women in the home. In this way, shelters also “served a symbolic purpose that furthered activists’ broader goal of taking domestic violence out of the private realm” (Rambo 2009, 70). Over time, these positions began to solidify and the shelters began to craft a political vision. Woman battering was articulated as the repetitive and systematic use of violence that was intentionally used to create and perpetuate male dominance across the spectrum of institutions. This definition clearly marks battering as an issue that affects all women either directly or indirectly, because it was a tool for maintaining gendered hierarchy. While not all women were battered, the permission or absence of dissent to the
practice by existing social, political, and cultural institutions meant that all women were under the constant threat of battery.

Shelters operating with this philosophy engaged not only in peer support (and a preference for staff who were also violence survivors) but also provided political education to shelter residents. They rejected the label of social services, because the residents were not being served. Rather, shelter residents were given the opportunity to take care of themselves and others without the fear of violence (Schechter 1982). The idea was to provide safety and information and let women make their own, autonomous decisions about what they needed to move on with their lives.

As the shelters became more populous, and as the population of battered women diversified, internal conflicts about ideology arose. Not everyone using shelter services identified with or agreed with the feminist explanation for the origin of violence against women in society. Women of color and immigrant women saw oppression as more complex. These women did not experience the shelter as an egalitarian environment and felt pressured to leave their husbands with whom they shared other types of oppression (Rambo 2009). Additionally, some shelters were hesitant to get publicly involved in politics. Organizers understood that current laws were inadequate for helping battered women but saw their operation as too fragile and their positions on political issues were underdeveloped (Schechter 1982). In some locations (especially rural areas where the feminist movement was not entrenched), the efforts of battered women’s advocates to open shelters or provide crisis support required joining forces with conservative organizations: churches, the YWCA, the United Way, the Junior League. These alliances
often meant softening the feminist message of the movement and working toward ending “family violence” instead of violence against women (Rambo 2009).

Navigating the provision of shelter inevitably led to tense interactions with external institutions, including courts, schools, and social welfare agencies. These institutions would often undermine efforts to keep battered women’s refuges hidden from the batterers from whom the women were seeking shelter (Schechter 1982). A need to conceal their whereabouts cut battered women off from existing services in the community. As a result of these experiences, battered women and their allies started to develop public education efforts and materials aimed at increasing awareness about the need for sensitivity and confidentiality (Schechter 1982). They also worked on detailing problems faced when dealing with law enforcement and the lack of response by the criminal justice system. Now identifying themselves as activists, battered women and shelter staff would go to civic organizations, public institutions, community meetings and the like to speak about battering and the difficulties they faced in seeking safety and moving on with their lives.

Another tension arose over issues related to funding. Early shelters were operated out of rented apartments, motels, or the home of an activist. Shelter occupants were often evicted because of the number of women (and children) living in the dwelling (Schechter 1982). As shelters proliferated, the need for the service and therefore resources for operation increased dramatically. Zoning ordinances and public housing laws made it necessary to find reliable funding streams (Schechter 1982). One way shelters coped with this need was to seek funding from other organizations: foundations, mental health organization, charities, and government (Johnston 1981; Schechter 1982). But once
To a large extent, external funding redesigned the shelter environment. During the early 1980’s shelters became more focused on individual services and solutions for women (Schechter 1982). The decreasing focus on peer support and women’s empowerment led many to fear that shelters had been coopted by government and foundation funding and local laws and ordinances (Johnson 1981, Schechter 1982, Tierney 1982). In the 1980s, the emerging dialogue around the issue of wife battery had returned to a mental health or social welfare model that posited problems in the family as resulting from individual pathology rather than the family form itself (Gange 1998). This conclusion of cooptation was somewhat accurate if the movement was defined exclusively by shelters and service provision (Gagne 1998). However, by this time the movement was comprised of a number of other types of organizations and a national network of activists that grew around the shelter movement in the late 1970s. This warning of cooptation focused on the power to control organizations, but did not answer questions about whether or not the movement maintained the ability or legitimacy to define the message about the problems and solutions to woman battering.

C. Developing a National Policy Focused Constituency

Shelters provided a focal point for local organization of the growing constituency for battered women’s issues. But many recognized that shelter, while necessary, was not enough. Battered women and their allies began to engage in political activities. The production of publications including: “how to” manuals for shelters and advocates,
training curriculum for social workers, law enforcement, court personnel, and newsletters, books, organizational directories, and other works published to share information between shelters and other organizations (Schechter 1982). These materials pushed the ideas cultivated through services by and for battered women into public view. Furthermore, these activities led to networking between shelters and other organizations. It also moved the work of otherwise isolated groups across geographical boundaries, which led to regional, national, and international consideration of battered women’s issues at conferences and other public events.

The origins of a national battered women’s network can be traced to a series of projects, conferences, and public hearings where the messages of the national platform begin to take shape. In 1976, Transition House activist and formerly battered woman Betsy Warrior published the first issue of Working on Wife Abuse, a directory of battered women’s projects nationwide (Rambo 2009; Schechter 1982). Eight editions of the directory were published. The list was used by various groups for networking, exchanging ideas and building regional coalitions. The National Organization for Women (NOW) established a task force on battered women and household violence in 1976 and several regional chapters were opened (Martin 1976). That same year, the International Women’s Conference was held in Houston, Texas. A number of battered women’s activists attended the conference and discussed the need for a national organization to coordinate the movements social change efforts (Schechter 1982). The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence (NCADV) was formed shortly thereafter.

One of the primary concerns to come from networking and collaboration at this level was the difficulty of turning the movement’s vision of a home and public free of the
oppression of gender hierarchy into a reality (Loseke 1992). Conversations between movement activists at this stage centered on who was to be included as participants and allies in the struggle. At the same time, the movement was being pressured to compare and compromise their proposals with those of other interested groups. With state governments focusing on law and court reforms, the national conversation was almost immediately focused on these issues as well. The movement was barely off the ground before competing and counter arguments were being debated by academics and practitioners in professional service occupations.

As the need for public activities became more apparent, activists were overwhelmed with the dual tasks of providing shelter and other services, while also developing and disseminating public information. Early state-level coalitions, like the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence founded in 1976, formed to address immediate service provision issues, but also to relieve shelter staff from the tasks of challenging the systems and institutions that produced and perpetuated violence against women (Schechter 1982). The coalition was designed to deal with these “larger” issues so that shelters and service providers could continue meeting the immediate needs of battered women. State-level coalitions were generally unfunded, although some received support from member agencies. The formation of coalitions provided shared support systems for local shelters, coordinated local activities, resources, and labor (Miller 2010). By working with multiple groups in different communities, coalitions were able to generate and articulate problems beyond those observed in the trenches, so to speak (Miller 2010). These coalitions also engaged in technical assistance and public education. State-level coalitions actively engaged policy makers by providing public information
about woman battering and appealing directly to legislators on issues related to criminalization of domestic violence, stalking, family court issues, and other related matters (Schechter 1982).

In summary, the work of battered women’s organizations and the coalition of actors comprising the BWM focused on two primary goals: immediate safety for battered women and disrupting the institutional structures that perpetuated oppression and violence against women in society. As a national agenda formed, the public message focused primarily on issues related to the first goal, specifically the maintenance and expansion of battered women’s shelters and services. The development of state and national coalitions concentrated these concerns and focused activism around securing funding, while advocating for as much organizational autonomy as possible. Meeting the second goal of dismantling institutional oppression was tangentially tied to sustaining the peer support model and encouraging awareness in ways that empowered and politicized women and others who came into contact with the movement and its constituency.

V. Conclusion

A number of social movements laid the groundwork for challenging the right to chastisement and for the articulation of wife battering as a public issue. Both anti-slavery and temperance activists called into question the conceptualization of a woman’s behavior as the cause for her husband’s exercise of corporal punishment. The public response to the problem began to shift and the right to chastisement began to lose support in society (and eventually the courts as well). Both temperance and women’s suffrage activists framed the issue as the responsibility of women to ensure their husband’s moral rehabilitation (Gagne 1998, Pleck 1987). With few exceptions, women’s caretaking of
men’s failings was rejected by battered women’s movement actors. The women’s rights, women’s liberation, and anti-rape movements provided an environment for women’s political claims-making and the foundations for articulating woman battering in terms of men’s oppression of women in a society defined by gender hierarchy. As these movements unfolded, a grievance began to form. The allowance of violence against women in the home without intervention, punishment or reparation for women was framed as evidence that the use of violence against women was facilitated and/or protected by the state and other social and cultural institutions.

BWM activists and organizations targeted social change across a diverse terrain of social institutions. Perhaps the most recognizable component of the movement was the battered women’s shelter. Shelters were grassroots organizations that provided a public rejection of men’s right to control women’s lives. As battered women were brought together in search of safety, they learned from one another about the ubiquity of battering and the ways in which other social institutions either through action or inaction consented to the widespread use of violence against women. Over time, these criticisms became more specific and included an articulation of solutions consistent with the feminist explanation of battering. From the late 1970s through the early 1990s, both state governments and the U.S. Congress considered numerous proposals on battered women’s issues. Over the course of these challenges and movement evaluation of institutional response, a set of public messages about the role of the state and other institutions developed.

The history of the BWM’s development of public messages provides the foundation for determining whether target responses will constitute alignment with the
movement’s prognoses. Movement actors identified opposition to alternative interventions through their analysis of competing paradigms and existing social programs aimed at assisting families or homeless persons. BWM actors were opposed to collapsing woman battering with other “family problems” like child abuse. As such, efforts to combine battered women’s intervention with existing child protection programs would be inconsistent with the movement’s demands. Similarly, the movement was opposed to treating battered women (or their abusers) for individual pathologies of substance abuse or mental illness.

The ineffectiveness of these social programs was the impetus for movement forerunners to situate the battered woman’s shelter as preferred intervention. Shelter proponents and BWM actors also believed that battered women were the experts on what constituted appropriate response. The failure of existing institutions was linked to the imposition of interventions that the women themselves knew to be ineffective. As such, movement actors were opposed to placing existing institutions in positions to design or dictate intervention for battered women, even if the type of intervention itself aligned with the movement’s desired outcome. While not specifically prognostic frames, the parsing out of disagreements with the way existing institutions treated battered women forms the foundation for disaggregating alignment or divergence between movement prognostic frames and target response outcomes.

In the next chapter, I provide a description of policy oriented prognostic frames that emerged from the historical context sketched here, and that were articulated by BWM actors in movement publications and Congressional hearings on federal bills aimed at addressing domestic violence in the period from 1977 to 1994.
Chapter Five

Diagnostic and Prognostic Messaging: The National Policy Agenda of the Battered Women’s Movement

I. Introduction

The basic underpinnings of the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM) diagnostic and prognostic messages were generated through the internal workings of shelters, battered women’s advocates and service providers, and movement actors as they built grassroots projects and collaborated with one another in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This work was documented and disseminated through books, newsletters, and monographs that were publicly distributed, but primarily aimed at those engaged with addressing the problem. Movement actors also contributed to a national public dialogue regarding both the causes of violence against women and the existing and proposed new interventions designed to reduce it. That is, through their testimonies before the U.S. Congress, movement actors contributed to the diagnostic and prognostic frames through which public discourse came to address the issue of violence against women. No prior work has isolated the public deployment of policy-oriented frames in the BWM in order to assess movement message outcomes.

This chapter provides an analysis of diagnostic and prognostic movement frames targeting federal policy found in two crucial public arenas: BWM actor testimonies in hearings before the U.S. Congress and in publications of the BWM itself. Through both arenas, the movement strove to shape public perceptions and public policy regarding violence against women. Following a brief description of the public framing activities of
BWM actors, I examine the correspondence of public policy-oriented diagnostic frames with those identified in the movement’s history more broadly in Chapter 4. A similar examination of publicly deployed prognostic frames will show that the BWM policy message was both consistent with the overall movement platform, but also constrained by movement actor beliefs about the limitations of the government to solve the problem of woman battering. The result of these constraints was a more limited set of movement prognostic messages than those found in the historical documentation. This analysis of the diagnostic and prognostic frames aimed at federal lawmakers is the basis for analyzing movement outcomes in the next chapter.

II. Public Framing Activities

One of the first formal interactions between movement actors and the federal government occurred in January 1978, when the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights held a set of hearings titled, Battered Women: Issues in Public Policy. This was the first documented debate between movement actors, system actors, community groups, and lawmakers at the federal level. Between 1978 and the adoption of the Violence Against Women Act in 1994, movement actors would provide testimony in 36 hearings on topics related to woman battering or family violence before a committee or subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives or the U.S. Senate. Testimonies focused on providing a realistic picture of the social barriers that prevented battered women from leaving their partners, the failure of existing social institutions to provide intervention and relief, and the uniqueness of the battered women’s shelter in both providing crisis intervention and helping women to achieve an independent and self-sufficient life free of violence.
In order to assess the relationship of movement frames mobilized in Congressional hearings to the frames used by the BWM more broadly, movement publications from the same time period were also reviewed. In total, twenty (20) issues of *Aegis: The Magazine on Ending Violence Against Women* were published between 1978 and 1987. Articles from these issues were combined with monographs and books published by movement actors and organizations to provide insight into movement positions on policy proposals. Overall, the solutions presented in movement publications were aimed at generating and sustaining a commitment to feminist oriented solutions to the problem. Most of the frames provided in movement publications were diagnostic in nature and did not specifically advocate for federal policy intervention. Movement claims about the role of existing institutions were framed as criticism of existing policies and practices and only occasionally offered recommendations for policies that identified these agencies as agents for ending violence against women – that is, movement publications only rarely provided prognostic framing. Still, a number of authors addressed both the need for improved local and state agency and policy responsiveness to battered women and the roles of criminal justice, mental health, and social service agencies in providing aid.

In contrast, *speakers* in public hearings regularly engaged in both diagnostic and prognostic framing. Actors within the movement coalition were identified by documenting the affiliation of authors in movement publications and speakers in government hearings related to woman battering. In total, 162 persons were identified as representing one of six groups: shelter or domestic violence service providers (N = 48); survivors/formerly battered women (N = 35); self-identified movement activists (N = 31);

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9 A complete list of movement publications is provided in the data references.
local or state-level domestic violence coalitions (N = 21); national domestic violence organizations (N = 12); national feminist organizations (N = 8); or local or state-level women’s legal advocacy groups (N = 7). Table 3 provides a description of the affiliations of actors in each category. Throughout this work, I do not treat framing that occurred in publications and testimonies differently. Rather, I refer to the frames collectively as the movement diagnosis or movement prognosis. Distinctions between the messages by source are identified for instances where the difference contributes to the analysis.

Table 3. Categories and Affiliations of Battered Women’s Movement Coalition Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-identified Movement Activists</td>
<td>Includes contributors to <em>Aegis: Magazine on Ending Violence Against Women</em> and authors producing monographs or books intended to inform movement activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivors</td>
<td>Includes self-identified battered and formerly battered women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelters</td>
<td>Contributions from volunteers, staff, board members, and fundraisers for battered women’s shelters from 17 states and the District of Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local or State Coalitions</td>
<td>Ten (10) state-level and four (4) city or county level domestic violence coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local or State Women’s Legal Advocacy</td>
<td>Women’s legal aid advocates from seven (7) States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| National Domestic Violence Organizations | Family Violence Prevention Fund  
National Battered Women’s Law Project  
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence  
National Woman Abuse Prevention Project |
| National Feminist Organizations    | Center for Women Policy Studies  
National Organization for Women  
National Women’s Political Caucus |
It is important to note that not all of the actors identified as part of the movement 
cohesion shared the same perspectives. For example, while not all battered women agreed 
with the movement’s political messages, the movement defined itself as one comprised of 
battered women and advocating for their needs (Schechter 1982). For this reason, I have 
included the writings and testimonies of self-identified battered women in the movement 
coalition. Another area where some disagreement can be found is in the inclusion of legal 
aid advocates in the movement coalition. However, many of these advocates were 
formerly battered women or had previous ties to battered women’s shelters and presented 
themselves as working in concert with the movement. It was not uncommon for 
movement actors to take on roles in other institutions over time (e.g. a legal advocate 
became a judge, a shelter worker became a scholar, and a battered woman became a 
medical professional and spoke on public health related issues). These actors were 
identified with the movement in subsequent years regardless of their occupation at the 
time of testimony or publication.

Movement coalition members from each category put forward the initial policy- 
oriented prognostic frames in the lead up to the introduction of federal legislation in the 
95th Congress (1977-1978). Persons in all but two categories of movement coalition 
members put forward prognostic frames in hearings during each Congressional period. 
However, the carriers of the message across the majority of the hearings were 
concentrated in a few categories. Battered women’s shelter and service providers made 
up the largest proportion of witnesses testifying before Congress in hearings over the 
course of this challenge. Survivors comprised the second largest group, but were more 
prevalent as witnesses during the VAWA period (100 to 103rd Congresses). Survivors
were followed in prevalence by representatives of local or state-level domestic violence coalitions. Representatives of national domestic violence organizations were also present in hearings for each Congressional session, but were not as widely represented across hearings as coalition members in other categories. The two remaining categories, coalition members representing legal advocacy and national feminist organizations, also appeared in fewer hearings. Both of these categories were completely unrepresented in hearings on domestic violence related issues leading up to three Congressional sessions. Legal advocacy had no representation from the 97th to the 99th Congress. National feminist organizations had no direct representation in hearings from the 98th through the 100th Congress.

There were a number of other categories of interested parties appearing in congressional hearings. There were representatives of law enforcement, prosecution, courts, corrections, medical professions, public health agencies, state government agencies, state legislatures, and social service agencies. Others represented general purpose homeless shelters and shelters provided through governmental agencies or civic organizations (YWCA, churches, etc.). These actors were classified as system actors and community actors, respectively. Both categories were excluded from the movement coalition. For analytic consistency, scholars who had no other identification with shelters or movement organizations were also excluded from the movement coalition.
III. Diagnostic Frames from the National Policy Agenda of the Battered Women’s Movement

The movement’s diagnosis of woman battering derived from the feminist perspective on the cultural, social, and economic marginalization of women. BWM actors posited that the social subordination of women increased their vulnerability to abuse in the home and inhibited their escape from violent family lives. In Chapter 4, I presented a number of diagnostic frames about the source and nature of this marginalization and the types of prognostic messages the movement put forward as solutions. However, as BWM actors began advocating for federal public policy response, there was a narrowing of diagnostic messages. In particular, two diagnostic claims focused on the goal of providing safety for battered women dominated interactions with federal lawmakers. The first and primary message, which I have labeled crisis intervention frames, focused on the absence of real alternatives for immediate housing and basic needs for battered women who were in crisis. The second policy oriented diagnostic message, which I labeled institutional failure frames, pointed to the inability of existing institutions, specifically governmental agencies, to provide prevention and intervention services to battered women.

A. Crisis Intervention Diagnostic Frames

Crisis intervention claims held that there were insufficient existing community resources for battered women who were attempting to escape violent relationships and homes. These claims were based on the position that any form of effective intervention for battered women required that they first have access to immediate refuge from violence. Safety was articulated as a necessary condition for providing women with any
other services that may be required to facilitate regaining control of their lives. For example, in a 1978 hearing of the Senate Committee on Human Resources, “Harriet”, a formerly battered woman, testified about the need for battered women’s refuge:

To me, the shelter was a blessing, my only way of escaping my situation, which before I discovered the Battered Wives Organization, seemed inescapable. I needed a safe place to go, where I would not have to worry about my husband finding me, as he had previously been able to do. I had tried staying with relatives and friends, but my husband would either assault them or convince them to support him in getting me to return home. So I was made to feel unsupported and guilty about what I had done. So, after realizing that I had gone through all the people I thought I could depend on for help, I decided the situation was hopeless. I felt that I would never be able to get away from him safely. After the last return, my husband warned me that if I left again, I had better leave the State so that he could not find me. I thought about how would I survive and where would I go and where would I stay with my children (“Harriet” 1978, SHR-0034: 350-351).

Harriet’s testimony made the case that friends and family were unreliable resources for assisting a battered woman in crisis. Seeking assistance from her family had been unsuccessful largely because her abuser would target those who tried to help her. It was only after she found physical safety in a battered women’s shelter that Harriet could begin to build a life apart from her abuser.
From the standpoint of battered women active in the movement, immediate refuge was only the starting point for crisis intervention. Acquiring basic needs was identified as an important component of achieving safety both initially and in the long-term. One survivor testified:

Once a woman has found a temporary, safe place to stay, she must begin to think about pushing her case through the legal system. She must think about finding affordable housing for her and her children. She must begin applying for financial aid and/or food stamps. She must begin looking for a job and/or training for herself, and, in order to work, she must find affordable childcare. Completing all these tasks can take months and sometimes years (Reaney 1991, SAP-0019: 118).

In this sense, crisis intervention was more than just achieving safety from immediate abuse. The abuse disrupted the life of the family and required an assembly of resources to rebuild the home-life foundation for battered women and their children.

These brief examples demonstrate the basic contours of the crisis intervention diagnosis. Namely, battering creates an emergency situation for women and children. The short and long-term safety of domestic violence victims was contingent on the existence and availability of a social safety net that could respond immediately to the crisis created by battering. The need for social intervention was in part based on the economic marginalization of women—which keeps them from having the resources to leave a violent home. But, the crisis was also the result of another social problem, namely, the inability of existing institutions to respond to battered women in informed, efficient, and effective ways.
**B. Institutional Failure Diagnostic Frames**

The second BWM diagnosis articulated the ways in which existing institutions failed to respond to battered women. In Chapter 4, I examined the ways in which movement actors implicated existing institutions in the creation and facilitation of women’s subordinate status in society. Dismantling the structures that made women specifically susceptible to battering without consequence for their abusers was a global goal of the movement. These arguments were not entirely absent from movement testimonies before Congressional committees; however, testimony in these hearings was generally focused on the ways in which the policies and practices of existing institutions failed to provide an adequate response to battered women in crisis.

Survivors often described negative interactions with police, prosecutors and courts. One survivor recalled an incident where after procuring a domestic violence protection order, her husband refused to leave the home. When the police arrive, they stood by and watched her husband disable her car (Wright 1987, EDL-0027: 73). Another called the police after an assault by her husband and was taken to the officer’s church where “they laid healing hands on me, spoke in tongues, and pulled the evil spirits out of me so my husband wouldn’t have to beat me anymore” (Doe 1992, HJH-0003: 5). She went on to note:

My experiences with people who were supposed to be there to help me, the police, reinforced what, through my husband's psychological abuse, I had come to believe; that my husband had every right to beat me, rape me and hurt our children. No matter what he did, no matter how many times the police were called, it seemed that he had all the rights, that he would
be advised to get custody. I can understand how I may have seemed to the police. I was out of control by the time they arrived, which was all part of my husband's plan. So they listened to him and never took me aside and offer to listen to me. Society said it was OK. (Doe 1992, HJH-0003: 58).

Another survivor testified about how racial and ethnic stereotypes affected police response:

I was treated like I was the one who had the problem, like I was the criminal. The police were more interested in knowing whether he had a drug problem or if he was on drugs than him assaulting me. I was also informed by a police officer as to why was I even filing charges, I'm a Hispanic female and that was part of my culture. That was news to me (Baca 1993, SJS-0015: 12).

In the view of this diagnosis, the failure of law enforcement to respond to battered women in these moments of crisis placed them at increased risk for ongoing abuse, both by failing to intervene in the reported crisis and by sending the message that there would be no consequences for the abuser’s behavior. The effect of this message for many was an avoidance of interactions with the police, thus cutting off one of the only publicly available services for crisis intervention.

Movement actors framed family court as fraught with obstacles for battered women seeking to protect themselves and their children. Wife beating was not considered by law or members of the judiciary to be evidence of parental unfitness (Hendrickson and Schulman 1982). The threat of a custody battle was often used as a means to intimidate a
battered woman (Hendrickson and Schulman 1982). In a hearing before the Education and Labor committee, a battered woman testified:

I had been married six years, had two daughters, and was seven months pregnant. My husband and I had separated two months earlier and had an informal arrangement around child visitation and support. In an earlier separation, when I had turned to the courts for legal disposition, a Queens, New York Family Court judge ordered support in the amount of $50 a month and told me that my husband seemed like a nice guy, so work out visitation between yourselves. When we separated the second time, I was reluctant to use the court system again” (Wright 1987, EDL-0027: 73).

Another battered woman pointed out that judges “lack an understanding of the effects of domestic violence on children, the connections between domestic violence and child abuse, and the dynamics of domestic violence which do not end with divorce” (Price 1992, HJH-0057: 75). Courts were depicted as hostile toward battered women when they tried to bring evidence of battering into divorce and custody proceedings.

At my own attorney’s advice, I agreed to judge’s chambers to hear our case so as to avoid publicity for my family. But as the months and years dragged on, I realized my attorney was not bringing up the counselor’s report on my husband’s behavior…I finally blurted out during the trial that I feared for my children if he had custody; that, for the first time I said it out loud, he beat me. Surely, he would do the same to them. Instead, a restraining order was put against me in perpetuity for attempting to tarnish my husband’s public image” (Bauer-Hughes 1991, SAP-0019: 81).
Many women spoke about the fear of sharing custody with their batterers and the ways in which family courts helped men keep track of them and maintain control over their lives. These testimonies were attempts to persuade legislators that current institutional practices were coercive attempts to force women to stay in bad relationships and in practice obstructed a battered woman’s ability to escape a violent home. This critique extended beyond the criminal and civil justice systems.

As discussed in the previous chapter, movement actors were generally opposed to locating solutions to domestic violence in mental health, medical, or social service agencies. Much of the movement literature discussion of health and welfare solutions focused on criticism of these agencies for treating women as children who needed protection from their own decisions with policies that would require mandatory reporting by health and welfare agencies. They also complained that these agencies largely ignored domestic abuse altogether and when they did identify battering, they often tried to “fix” the victim. One victim talked about her lack of success in getting help from her medical provider: “I discussed what was happening with our family physician who suggested that my husband was frustrated and had other things on his mind that were troubling him. My doctor gave me pills” (McMahon 1979, EDL-0021: 137). Another woman testified:

The hospital doctors were rude to me, made very rude comments to me while they were doing the physical examination, yet in their report it says nothing in it. There's hardly any evidence that I was seriously hurt that night, and yet had they taken a proper statement, I could have used that in prosecution (Baca 1993, SJS-0015: 11-12).
Another survivor demonstrated this problem in recounting her experience with couple’s counseling:

During one of our sessions we began arguing. My batterer became so enraged that the therapist asked him to leave. Then the therapist turned to me and said, "He really wants to beat the shit out of you. I don't think he would ever really hurt you, but you just better straighten yourself out"

(Benguerel 1994, HJH-0038: 12)

Not only were medical and behavioral health care providers misinformed about the nature of battering, evidenced by their attempts to “fix” the victim of abuse, but the assistance offered by these agencies also failed to recognize the immediacy of the crisis.

The public diagnosis of institutional failure was consistent with the overall criticism of the medical, behavioral health, social service, and criminal justice systems in BWM literature. In this view, social and cultural institutions including family law, religion, education, and economic policy were designed to maintain widespread beliefs and values about the institutions of marriage, family, and the naturalness of sex roles; as a result, all these institutions work together to keep women in a subordinate status (Martin 1976; Schechter 1982a; Shechter 1982b; Women in Transition 1972). More specifically, these institutions were believed to be set up to favor men through non-inclusion and discrimination; the result was the entrapment of women in domestic life. Institutional entrapment was articulated as the primary barrier to a woman’s escape from a violent home. In public testimonies, movement actors relayed to members of Congress personal
experiences that showed everywhere a battered woman turned for emergency assistance, she was rejected and blamed for the violence being committed against her. Worse, each instance of failed contact only served to cut battered women off from any path that may provide them with the resources needed to leave a dangerous home and find safe refuge elsewhere.

These two diagnostic frames were very much tied to the feminist diagnosis of the global problem of woman battering — women were not provided full citizenship in social institutions. Because of this marginalized status, many women could not procure the resources to leave their husbands and start over. Further, they were treated with hostility by actors in public institutions who perceived them to be transgressing the normative boundary of the institution of family. The injustice of this situation was not widely accepted during the early days of the movement’s agitation for public policy change. As a result, a great deal of movement actor testimony in Congressional hearings was diagnostic in nature. Battered women and their allies told their stories in an effort to improve understanding about the nature of battery, the impediments to getting out of a violent home, and the need for immediate response when one was able to leave. Prognostic frames were extrapolated from these stories.

IV. Policy-Oriented Prognostic Frames from the National Policy Agenda of the Battered Women’s Movement

A clear national policy agenda for addressing the crisis created by woman battering was not immediately obvious. There was a long-standing perception that existing intuitions were inadequate. As such, the predominant movement prognostic frame called for the development and expansion of alternative institutions (shelters, peer-
counseling groups, and similar organizational resources) in local communities to provide emergency assistance to battered women. Making a claim for federal government involvement in this solution was not easy. Even so, movement actors combined the diagnoses identified above and the short-term goal to create immediate safety for battered women to put forward number of prognostic messages aimed at federal lawmaking.

I structure the following discussion of BWM prognostic frames in three groups: (1) prognostic frames demanding direct resources for battered women in crisis; (2) prognostic frames calling for improved public knowledge and existing agency response; and (3) prognostic frames requesting legal protections for battered women as they navigate criminal and civil legal systems.

A. Prognostic frames demanding direct resources for battered women in crisis

1. Fund community-based crisis shelters for battered women

The most strongly supported policy intervention among movement actors in early public messaging was the request for funding battered women’s shelters. BWM actors were not asking the government to create new forms of refuge. In fact, testimonies were often explicitly supportive of the characteristics that made these shelters alternative institutions when compared to other types of homeless services and shelter operations. Specifically advocating for shelters that would be governed by peer support with battered women in leadership positions (Dames 1979, EDL-0021; Steytler 1978, EDL-0016), available in local communities 24 hours a day (Steytler 1978, EDL-0016), and provide free services to all battered women without income eligibility requirements (Fields 1978, EDL-0016; Fields 1978, TEC-0040; Johnston 1987, EDL-0045).

2. Fund community-based crisis intervention services for battered women

Mirroring the request for shelter, the demand for funding to provide services for battered women also appeared in each Congress. This prognosis largely came from the testimonies of survivors or agents of organizations that were already engaged in securing or providing direct services for battered women, including: shelters, local and state coalitions, and legal advocacy groups. Movement actors articulated a need for a wide range of services that would help meet the basic needs of battered women and facilitate the move from crisis refuge to self-sufficiency. Some specific types of services identified by members of the movement coalition included: food and other necessities related to shelter (Muniz 1978, SHR-0034; Noffsinger 1978, EDL-0016), transportation (Peck

In contrast to its position on shelter provision, the movement coalition was split on who should be providing these services. Most agreed that battered women lacked access to existing resources. As a result, some argued for new service systems. But others suggested money would be better spent on improving access to existing services rather than developing new delivery systems. These actors often noted that funding should be designated to shelters and other battered women’s service providers to serve as a liaison between battered women and existing community service providers during the crisis transition (Brygger 1990, LHR-0035; Gourdeau 1987, HJH-0064; Hart 1991, LHR-0026; Jackson 1991, LHR-0026; Kelley-Dreiss 1987, EDL-0027; Moore 1979, EDL-0021; Stahly 1979, EDL-0021; Whalen 1991, LHR-0026; Williams 1991, LHR-0026). I consider how this split may have affected outcomes for the movement’s prognosis in the next chapter.

3. Create exceptions to make battered women eligible for government assistance without the consideration of spousal income

BWM actors called on the government to remove barriers for battered women who were seeking resources from government assistance programs such as food stamps, income assistance, and Medicaid (Clinch 1978, SHR-0034; Dales 1978, SHR-0034; Fields 1978, EDL-0016; Martin 1978; Monasmith 1978, SHR-0034; Noffsinger 1978, EDL-0016; Ramos 1978, SHR-0034). For many women the condition of poverty was new, a result of leaving her husband (Dales 1978, SHR-0034). As such, the movement requested extension of these programs to cover battered women based on their individual
resources and excluding those of their husbands. The barriers to government assistance programs were discussed in more depth in movement publications. For example, there was a call to exempt battered women from the welfare eligibility requirement to identify and collect child support from non-custodial parents (NCN 1978). Policies that required continued contact with the batterer were believed to place women at risk for continued abuse. For this reason, there was also a call for educating welfare agencies and economic policy makers about the nature of battering and the obstacles to safety faced by battered women (Erler 1978). Another policy idea originating in movement publications called for broadening the population of women eligible for economic assistance for displaced homemakers (Martin 1976; Martin 1978).

This prognosis received broad support from the movement coalition and appeared in each congressional period with the exception of the 98th Congress (1983-84). The message was carried primarily by agents providing direct services for battered women, including shelters, local and state coalitions, and legal advocacy groups. Supporting testimonies from survivors appeared in the 95th and 96th Congresses (1977-80) and again in the 102nd and 103rd (1991-94). Representatives of the National Organization for Women also supported this prognosis during their participation in hearings in the 95th and 96th Congresses.

4. Include domestic violence in eligible offenses for crime victim compensation programs

From the 96th to 100th Congress, both the National Coalition against Domestic Violence and local and state coalitions made demands for including battered women in the eligible population for crime victim compensation programs (Frederick 1980, LHR-0023; Flynn, 1984, SJS-0037; Grace 1987, HJH-0064; Medley 1984, SJS-0037; Nuriel
These programs were government funded and provided financial restitution to victims for certain types of crime. The Victims of Crime Act of 1984 included a prohibition against awarding compensation to victims who were related in some way to their offender (42 USC. 10601). The impetus for this clause was to prevent offenders from benefiting from their crimes. Movement actors argued that this prohibition unfairly penalized battered women, who were victims of crime. They held that direct financial compensation was not only appropriate, but necessary for women to move beyond crisis. Compensation for medical bills, property damage, and lost wages were seen as an important step in improving a battered woman’s capacity to achieve self-sufficiency.

Discussion of Direct Resource Demands and Movement Goals

There was broad movement coalition support for federal funding to fill a gap in the availability of direct crisis intervention resources for battered women. Shelters and basic needs services were intended to allow battered women access to refuge and smooth the transition to a non-violent home. Financial assistance would facilitate getting reestablished and on the path to self-sufficiency. Movement actors demanded that these resources be supplied as directly as possible (Tinker 1978, EDL-0016). This request was tied to the fear that government intervention would lead to treating battered women as a “problem” that needed to be solved through managed social services, rather than competent actors able to make decisions in their own interests.

The call for direct resources was primarily addressing the diagnosis of an absence of crisis intervention resources. However, part of this deficit was the result of exclusion of battered women from existing services. By framing these institutions as non-
responsive to battered women, the movement was simultaneously making a case for alternative institutions while also agitating for reform of existing programs. In their testimonies before Congressional committees, movement coalition actors asked lawmakers to accept that battered women needed resources (not just the desire) to escape violent homes.

B. Prognostic frames calling for improved public knowledge and existing agency response

1. Fund public education and media campaigns to raise awareness about domestic violence


The call for public awareness campaigns was present in all Congressional sessions. Primary support came from members representing shelters and national domestic violence organizations. A representative of a national domestic violence
organization identified the federal government as the only source able to provide adequate funds for a national campaign (Brygger 1990, LHR-0035). There was some support from local and state coalitions and legal advocates beginning in the 99th Congress (1985) and continuing until the end of the challenge. Survivor support was also present, but not prolific. Over time, movement actors offered additional prevention oriented prognostic claims, including: creating and implementing an age appropriate public school curriculum on domestic violence (Baca 1993, SJS-0015; Buel 1993, SJS-0008; Hall 1991, SAP-0019; Lee 1987, CYF-0014), creating education programs on alternatives to violence (Meuschke 1991, SAP-0019), the cost of domestic violence to employers (Clapprood 1993, SJS-008), and women’s empowerment (Bauer-Hughes 1991, SAP-0019).

2. Improve criminal justice response to battered women through trainings on the nature of battering, appropriate interventions for battered women, and referring battered women for services for personnel working in law enforcement, prosecution, and the courts

The primary and most consistently offered prognostic message on criminal and civil justice at the federal level concerned personnel training. Similar to the call for public awareness campaigns, movement actors suggested that training was needed on the nature of battering, attitudes toward battered women, and appropriate methods of crisis intervention. The request for training in the 95th through the 98th Congresses (1977-1984) specifically called for educating law enforcement officers (Fields 1978, EDL-0016; Fleming 1978, EDL-0016; Monasmith 1978, SHR-0034). As Congressional challenges continued, demands for police training included specific topics: police use of discretion
(Oberg 1982), attitudes toward female victims of domestic abuse (Fedders 1987, EDL-0027), and recognizing the difference between female offending and the battered woman’s use of self-defense (Michaud 1993, SJS-0026; Zorza 1994, HJH-0038). In the later years, movement actors began to include prosecutors, criminal court personnel, and civil court personnel in the call for increased training (Buel 1993, SJS-0008; Clapprood 1993, SJS-0008; Hart 1987, CYF-0014; Orloff 1992, HJH-0057). Barbara Hart described the training as a necessary step for the criminal and civil justice systems to provide a competent response to battered women (Hart 1987, CYF-0014).

The demand for justice system personnel training was present in each Congressional period except for the 99th (1985-86), where limited hearings were held. The message was primarily carried by shelter workers, with some support from legal advocates and survivor stories about failed interventions. Beginning with the 101st Congress (1989-90), national domestic violence organizations also testified regarding training across the various facets of the criminal justice system.

3. Fund training for medical and behavioral health personnel on the nature of battering, appropriate interventions for battered women, and referring battered women for services

The criminal and civil justice systems were not the only targets for personnel training. Members of the movement coalition also called for education of both medical and behavioral health workforces on the identification of battering victims, appropriate documentation of injuries, treatment interventions, and referrals to other agencies (Fields 1978, EDL-0016; Moore 1979, EDL-0021; Sheppard 1994, HAP-0051; Steytler 1978, EDL-0016). Testimonies highlighted the failure of personnel in these fields to identify abuse and document injury (Monasmith 1978, SHR-0034). Some witnesses suggested
that the failure of medical and behavioral health personnel was due to a reliance on the clinical perspective on violence, which attributed the abuse to individual behavior and psychological problems (sometimes framing the problem as originating with the victim) (Steytler 1978, EDL-0016; Monasmith 1978, SHR-0034; Fedders 1987, EDL-0027).

This message received less attention from movement actors when compared to the other requests for public awareness and education. The call for training of public health personnel was first put forward in the testimonies of shelter workers and legal advocates in the 95th and 96th Congressional sessions (1977-80). However, the issue was largely absent from testimonies from the 98th, 99th, and 100th Congresses (1983-88). In the 101st Congress (1989-90), national domestic violence organization representatives joined shelters and legal advocates in a renewed demand for medical and behavioral health personnel training. National advocates specifically backed policies that would require the addition of domestic violence training in standard curriculums of professional schools for medicine, nursing, and other health care professions (Baca 1993, SJS-0015; Soler 1993, HEC-0035).

Discussion of Awareness, Education, and Movement Goals

On the surface, the call for public knowledge and awareness programs was rooted in the diagnostic claim of failed institutional response. Policy changes impacting the way police or medical personnel responded to domestic violence were being pursued with varying levels of success at the state-level. Even so, survivors and service providers continued to have problematic encounters with programs and intervention agencies outside of those dedicated to crisis response for battered women. The call to improve institutional response through improved public and personnel knowledge was aimed at
improving crisis intervention. Failure to respond or poor response was believed to be a hindrance to battered women’s safety, and thus contributing to crisis conditions. BWM actors identified education programs as an opportunity to alter knowledge and attitudes about gender norms and relationships. In order for existing institutions to be a help to battered women, actors within those institutions (and society at large) needed to understand the nature of domestic violence, including issues of power and control and the structural (rather than psychological or emotional) impediments to a woman’s escape from a violent home. In making these three prognostic claims, movement actors were asking lawmakers to not only explicitly accept that public knowledge about battering was deficient, but also that members of the movement coalition were better situated than professionals in other fields to provide education on domestic violence.

C. Prognostic frames requesting legal protections for battered women as they navigate criminal and civil legal systems

1. Fund legal representation for battered women in both criminal and civil court proceedings resulting from battery

As demonstrated in the diagnostic testimonies of survivors, the courts were also criticized for failing to respond appropriately to battered women. One of the primary problems according to BWM actors was a lack of access to legal advice and representation. Civil courts, including those that oversee civil restraining orders, child custody, and divorce cases, do not routinely require parties to have legal representation. Victims in criminal proceedings are also not typically represented by an attorney during the prosecution of the offender in the crime. BWM actors claimed both of these situations
were problematic for battered women, who were often without personal resources to procure representation.

Testimonies by shelter workers and legal advocates attempted to provide evidence that criminal and civil legal cases were complicated by the pattern of abuse between a batterer and his victim. Although some early testimony identified the need for legal representation (Clinch 1978, SHR-0034), the initial prognostic message was a call for generalized advocacy for battered women to help them understand complicated legal procedures during the adjudication of civil and criminal cases (Graham 1986, CYF-0005; Harris 1978; Martin 1976). The issue largely disappeared from Congressional testimony during the 96th – 98th Congresses (1979-84). In the 99th Congress (1985-86), movement actors demanded programs for legal representation in civil cases involving the battered woman and her abuser (Buel 1990, LHR-0035; Graham 1986, CYF-0005; Little Johns 1991, SAP-0019; Orloff 1992, HJH-0057; Whetstone 1983, EDL-0038). The call for legal representation continued to appear in movement actor testimonies through the 103rd Congress.

2. Create policies and procedures that allow battered women to conceal their residential address during service utilization and civil and criminal court procedures

Another movement prognostic message concerning legal protections for battered women focused on the need for women to conceal their whereabouts from their abusers. As victims sought to use public intervention resources, including civil and criminal courts, they were required to provide residential addresses. Monica Erler (1978) testified that "searches for fathers in child support actions and requests for welfare information from other states often mark the beginning of a new siege of harassment for a woman
who has just escaped" from their abusers (110). Documents containing location information were made available to abusers during the execution of agency action or legal discovery and other court procedures. BWM advocates argued that both states and the federal government should provide a procedure to conceal and keep confidential the address of domestic violence victims (Erler 1978; Hendrickson and Schulman 1982; Martin 1976; Price 1992, HJH-0057; Yupclave 1990, SJS-0024). This message appeared in testimonies of BWM actors representing shelters and national feminist organizations in the 95th and 96th Congresses (1977-80), in the writings of movement activists during the 97th and 98th (1981-84), and was carried by local or state coalitions in the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congressional sessions (1989-94).

3. Encourage state courts to allow and consider evidence of battering in family court proceedings related to divorce, child support, custody, and visitation litigation

Survivors often reported difficulties in introducing information about domestic violence in divorce, support, and child custody cases and having their concerns taken seriously. Joint custody and visitation required ongoing contact between the battered woman and her abuser. Even where a restraining order prohibiting contact or abuse was in place, battered women testified that they often encountered resistance to the enforcement of the provisions of civil court orders (Stiles 1993, SJS-008). Women were also accused of making claims of abuse to get their way in divorce proceedings (Price 1992, HRH-0057). Further, movement actors held that state laws and court practices frequently failed to acknowledge the potential for long-term negative consequences that may result from the exposure of children to domestic abuse (Brygger 1990, LHR-0035).
Beginning in the 97th Congress (1981-82), advocates proposed that lawmakers consider policy changes that would allow for the introduction of battering as evidence in divorce and child custody cases (Hendrickson and Schulman 1982). This message originated in movement publications and was aimed largely at state lawmakers during the time period of the 97th and 98th Congresses (1981-84) (Hendrickson and Schulman 1982). The actual policy change sought by movement actors was never explicitly stated. However, local and state coalition representatives, legal advocates and survivors testifying at Congressional hearings called for an evaluation of these issues and federal government guidance for state courts on the best way to adjudicate these family court cases in the 100th, 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses (1987-94) (Bauer-Hughes 1991, SAP-0019; Buel 1990, SJS-0041; Buel 1993, SJS-0008; Colsrud 1993, LHR-0026; Fedders 1990, SJS-0041; Orloff 1992, HJH-0057; Price 1992, HJH-0057; Shields 1990, HJH-0013; Shriver 1991, HJH-0038; Stark 1994, AGS-0008; Stiles 1993, SJS-0008; Wright 1987, EDL-0027).

Discussion of Legal Protections and Movement Goals

The demands for legal protections, while not fully formed policy proposals, were premised on the idea that the status of women overall would be improved by granting battered women a right to privacy, the power to parent their children in violence-free homes, and to be afforded the status of crime victim. Demands for legal protections for battered women were not as consistently or diversely supported by members of the coalition as those for direct resources for battered women or improved public knowledge about domestic violence. While survivors drew attention to the institutional failures that created legal complications, few articulated specific claims for legal reforms. Survivors
spoke primarily about ensuring the safety of their children when negotiating custody and visitation. Legal protection prognostic frames calling for legal representation and policies to allow concealment of residential addressees were primarily carried by movement coalition members representing agencies that provided services to battered women (shelters, legal advocates) and local or state domestic violence coalitions. These prognostic frames were concentrated in Congressional hearings during the later three Congressional sessions in hearings on policy provisions of what would become the Violence Against Women Act.

Legal protection prognoses were clearly aimed at addressing institutional failures in response to battering. But these frames also constituted new tools for improving crisis intervention. Similar to the need to improve public knowledge, claims-makers were drawing attention to the belief that fleeing a violent home or otherwise seeking help was only the beginning of the crisis intervention response. Battered women needed the support of social institutions both in recognizing the legitimacy of their decision to leave in the first place and also understanding why they needed secrecy and limited contact with their former partners. In requesting these protections, movement actors were asking Congress to accept that relationships involving battering create challenges for civil and criminal courts, and to acknowledge that the consequences of these challenges were serious and that legal protections were warranted under these circumstances.

V. Secondary Frames

As already noted, the BWM, like most coalition movements, was made up of a diverse set of actors representing different segments of the beneficiary population. Not all battered women sought refuge in a shelter. Similarly, not all victims of domestic violence
called for police assistance. Over the years analyzed in this work, there were numerous prognostic messages made by members of the movement coalition. Given the diversity of the coalition, not all of these messages received broad support. Further, some prognostic claims emerged in response to later policy claims or following the implementation of new policies. Thus, the challenge-frame-public discussion-policy formulation process is not a one-directional flow, but rather a recursive process in which initial framing may later evolve in new ways, in response to discussion and policy. The back and forth nature of framing results in some initial or subsequent message frames becoming primary frames, while others fade to a secondary status within movement discourse. While the focus of this work is on the primary national policy agenda of the BWM, this section briefly identifies additional prognostic claims made or supported by members of the movement coalition. These messages are not critical to understanding the movement agenda, but are important for setting up and analyzing outcomes of emergent policy frames in the next chapter.

Alongside requests for shelter and services, some members of the movement coalition made specific requests for funding “infrastructure” to aid in the provision of crisis services. Infrastructure was articulated as a necessary precursor to being able to assist battered women during crisis. Specific needs identified by actors included acquiring and renovating buildings, vehicles, installing phone lines, and other material needs (Hart 1980, LHR-0023; Kelley-Dreiss 1990, SJS-0041; Sherbo 1978, EDL-0016; Steytler 1978, EDL-0016). There was also early support for creating a national council of service providers to advise not only shelters and battered women’s services, but also to provide education and advisement to policy makers and other prevention and intervention
efforts. Clinch (1978, SHR-0034), a state domestic violence coalition actor, suggested modeling the council after their own organizations, where the membership was comprised of persons working in direct service provision.

Movement actors advocated for and supported a variety of emergent policy proposals over time. Some of these additional prognostic frames were consistent with the BWM’s national policy agenda. For example, the request for funding state-level domestic violence coalitions was tied to keeping shelters and domestic violence services based in local communities (Menard 1991, LHR-0026; Gamache 1991, LHR-0026). During testimonies related to VAWA, a few movement actors expressed support for funding a national crisis hotline to connect domestic violence victims with services (Baca 1993, SJS-0015; Dalton 1993, SJS-0008; Stile 1993, SJS-008). Members of the movement coalition also provided testimonies in support of federal penalties for crossing state lines to violate a domestic violence protection order or to commit an act of domestic abuse (Buel 1990, SJS-0041; Hart 1987, CYF-0014; “MJ” 1991, SAP-0019; Zorza 1994, HJH-0038). Creating a federal policy on protection order violations was believed to be necessary since current laws varied from state to state and there was no universal enforcement of protection orders outside of the jurisdiction in which the order was issued (Brygger 1990, LHR-0035).

Some of the prognostic frames emerging in later years were in response to Congressional proposals that had received little to no prior attention from BWM actors. A representative of the National Organization for Women provided testimony in support of Congressional proposals on adding gender to protected classes in hate crime laws and assessing criminal and civil penalties for “gender motivated” violence (Reuss 1994,
AGS-0001) and others supported proposed increases in federal penalties for convicted
domestic violence offenders (Dalton 1993 SJS-0008; Sheppard 1994, HAP-0051). These
frames emerged simultaneously with the early drafts of the Violence Against Women Act
(1990). Neither of these issues originated within the movement literature or the
testimonies of movement actors.

I have designated these issues as secondary because they did not receive the
diversity or longevity of support in public testimonies as those documented as the
primary policy agenda. Each of these issues falls within the movement diagnosis and
prognosis of the problem and address some aspect of the overall movement goal. In some
cases, the lack of support was simply an issue of prioritizing needs based on the
experiences of individuals providing testimony. However, the avoidance or lack of
prioritization of some secondary frames by the movement coalition factor into the
trajectory of message making and framing contests with Congress over the course of the
challenge, and thus become relevant in the next chapter’s discussion.

VI. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to provide an analysis of diagnostic and
prognostic frames comprising the primary national policy agenda of the Battered
Women’s Movement. This analysis revealed that survivors, shelter workers, coalitions,
and legal advocates working at local and state levels were the primary carriers of the
BWM message in Congressional hearings. Members of the movement coalition
identifying themselves as survivors in public hearings focused on using their personal
stories to highlight the obstacles they encountered when they tried to leave violence
partners. Those identifying as service providers or battered women’s advocates often
disclosed a personal history of abuse, but focused their testimonies on claims making about systemic failures and resources deficits. National organizations were present in the early years of the challenge but focused on a more limited set of issues, namely funding for shelters, financial assistance for battered women, and funding for public awareness campaigns.

Although movement actors wrote a great deal about the causes of domestic violence in movement publications, the diagnostic messages presented at Congressional hearings primary addressed three general areas that they believed necessitated public intervention: resources for battered women, improved public awareness and knowledge about the problem and appropriate response, and legal protections for battering victims in civil and criminal courts. These prognoses targeted the problem of public response to battering, rather than alleviating the cause of domestic violence. Specifically, BWM actors identified deficiencies in the crisis intervention safety net and called for rapid, universally available, and community based crisis response to battered women. Some of these deficiencies were the result of a lack of financial and material resources (shelter, services, and money). But there were also a number of response deficiencies that stemmed from the failure of existing institutions that were part of the larger community safety net. Specifically, advocates cited failures in criminal justice, civil courts, and medical and behavioral health care agencies.

These two related diagnoses yielded a number of prognostic messages about what should be done to advance the competency of response to battered women and thus improve the safety of women at home. BWM actors called for direct resources for battered women in crisis, resources to carry out public awareness campaigns and
professional training programs, and guidance on improving legal protections for battered women in criminal and civil courts. The assessment of policy-oriented prognostic framing by BWM actors revealed that the movement primarily viewed the role of the federal government as a resource provider for community efforts to improve and expand response to the crisis of woman battering.

The analysis in this chapter reveals little change in the movement’s prognostic frames over time. This is especially the case for demands for battered women’s shelter, services, government financial assistance, funding for public awareness campaigns, criminal justice system personnel training, and the call for consideration of battering in divorce and custody proceedings. The call for crime victim compensation is consistently present from the 96th through the 100th Congress (1979 – 1988). But then no longer appears on the movement agenda. Once deployed, each of these frames was consistently presented throughout the challenge period.

The remaining frames had bifurcated periods of deployment. The request for personnel training for public health professionals appears in the 95th through the 97th Congress (1977 – 1982). It is not observed again until the 101st Congress (1989 - 1990), but then remains on the agenda through the end of the challenge. A similar pattern of early introduction followed by periods of absence on the agenda and reappearance in the latter half of the challenge were observed for the demands for legal representation for battered women and laws to provide for the concealment of one’s residential address.

The deployment patterns of movement prognostic frames may be indicative of changes in target response to movement claims-making. Trumpy (2008) postulated that message cooptation was complete only when the movement ceased responding to the
targets cooptation attempts. If the challenger’s message was coopted by target response, then we would expect the prognostic frame to disappear from or at the very least become marginalized on the movement’s agenda at one point or another. Additional analysis is needed to determine whether the observed persistence in frame deployment led to influence over policy production. It is also possible that the gaps in response are the result of target response. These dynamics cannot be fully understood without examining message presence or absence in the context of target response frames. This will be further explored in Chapter 6.

Analysis of the movement’s agenda is the first step toward examining message outcomes; the prognostic frames identified here provide the basis for the subsequent analysis. In the next chapter, I analyze the federal government’s response to movement messaging. Specifically, I examine instances of message alignment and divergence and analyze the resulting Congressional outcomes, once the messages comprising the movement’s agenda were presented in Congressional hearings.
Chapter Six

Congressional Bills and Prognostic Message Outcomes

I. Introduction

This chapter analyzes policy proposals in the U.S. Congress including an assessment of outcomes for prognostic messages from the primary national policy agenda of the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM or the movement). The first section outlines the pace, content and characteristics of congressional response to battered women’s issues from the 95th (1977-1978) through the 103rd Congress (1993-1994). The remainder of the chapter examines congressional response frames for the ten key BWM prognostic messages considered in Chapter 5. The analysis focuses on determining frame outcomes by investigating the alignment or divergence of Congressional response frames with movement prognostic frames over time.

II. Congressional Bills in the U.S. Congress, 1977-1994

From the 95th Congress through the 103rd Congress, 214 bills addressing domestic violence were introduced. The majority of bills (58%) were introduced by a member of the House of Representatives, with the remainder introduced in the Senate. Sixty-two (62) percent of bills were sponsored by a member of the majority in the body of introduction. Either a committee or subcommittee chair or the ranking minority member of the committee to which the bill was assigned was identified as the bill sponsor in slightly less than 39% of these bills (N = 83). The pacing of bill introduction began slowly and increased considerably in the later years with almost 80% of bills introduced in the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses.10

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10 No domestic violence related bills were introduced during the 99th Congress. Shelter funding was adopted for the first time in the 98th Congress, which may explain a gap in legislative initiatives. Movement
**A. Congressional Action on Bills**

Congress responded to movement demands with policy proposals almost immediately. The development and articulation of movement frames, especially those calling for a federal government response, were first documented in the early 1970s. In the 95th Congress (1977-1978), 10 bills were introduced by seven members of Congress: Senators Wendell Anderson (D-MN) and Alan Cranston (D-CA), and Representatives Corrine Lindy Boggs (D-LA), George Miller (D-CA), Matthew Rinaldo (R-NJ), Newton Steers (R-MD), and Charles Thone (R-NE). Following introduction, five Congressional hearings were held to discuss these proposals. Senator Cranston’s version of the *Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act of 1978* (S 2759, 1978) passed through committee and was approved by the Senate, but failed to pass the House before the end of the 95th Congressional session.

The most common explanation for questions about why or when lawmakers take on a policy issue is the connection between perceived constituent support and reelection considerations. R. Douglas Arnold (1990) notes that reelection concerns are the primary influence on policy issue support among lawmakers. According to Arnold, election considerations are not necessarily based on actual public opinion of the policy, but rather on how legislators perceive the impact of the policy on future electability. When reelection is not an issue, lawmakers will act on policies based on personal beliefs, beliefs about policy effectiveness, or to give or repay favors to their constituents or other lawmakers.

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actor testimonies were recorded during this Congress, but appeared in hearings related to child abuse and other matters.
Battered women’s movement historians speculated on explanations for why Congress responded so early in the claims-making process. Movement historian Susan Schechter (1982) noted that movement actors were quite surprised that bills were heard in committees and voted on in the first year of introduction. She suggested that the response was due to a mixture of personal support and constituent pressure among Congress men and women putting forward these proposals. Indeed, both of these explanations were supported by the statements of legislation sponsors and co-sponsors in the five 1978 hearings noted above. Two co-sponsoring Representatives, Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) and Mario Biaggi (D-NY) identified their personal histories as motivating their support of federal domestic violence intervention (EDL-0016, 1978). Representative Mikulski was a social worker prior to being elected to Congress and Representative Biaggi was a police officer. Constituent pressure was also commonly identified as a motivating factor by bill sponsors and co-sponsors. Representatives Miller and Boggs highlighted local and state-level progress within their jurisdictions as the basis of their support for federal intervention (EDL-0016, 1978). Representative Robert Kasten (R-WI) testified in the same hearing on behalf of battered women’s organizations from his home state of Wisconsin.

In addition to the two reasons identified by Schechter, some lawmakers situated their support under a third area of concern—a connection between domestic violence and related issue advocacy. Representative Mikulski cited a link with the issue of violence in media (EDL-0016). Representative James Scheuer (D-NY) testified about the connection of this issue to criminal justice policies more broadly (EDL-0016, 1978). Senator Cranston noted a history of sponsoring child abuse related legislation (SHR-0033, 1978).
And Representative Boggs was a proponent of women’s rights legislation, including policies related to women’s access to credit and job training.

Reelection concerns may explain the prompt response of both lawmakers citing constituent support and those making connections to other policy domains. It is also possible that lawmakers viewed interventions for battered women as a safe issue. Federal funding for local interventions had the advantage of the diffusion of financial responsibility and a narrowly targeted population for intervention programs. Arnold (1990) suggests that these characteristics make it more likely that lawmakers can respond to the needs of groups while being less concerned about public opinion.

While the response to movement demands came early, the vast majority of bills received little to no attention by either body of Congress. Seventy-four percent of bills were assigned to a single congressional committee or subcommittee (N = 159), with the remainder assigned to two or more committees. Further, proposals rarely made it out of the committee process. Thirty-two (32) bills passed at least one Congressional body, with 26 passed by the House and 24 passed by the Senate. Across these nine Congressional sessions, 13 bills passed both bodies and were signed into law by the president, five of these bills originated in the Senate and eight in the House.

**B. Domestic Violence as a Distinct Policy Issue**

Lawmakers frequently articulated domestic violence as similar in nature to other existing personal and family problems. More than 60 percent of bills with domestic violence provisions were multi-issue bills primarily written to address a different problem. For example, in the 96th Congress, S 440 incorporated a provision to add domestic violence counseling and service referrals to the activities of proposed substance
abuse treatment programs. Figure 5 shows the percentage of all bills with domestic violence provisions that were single-issue domestic violence bills by Congress. Single-issue domestic violence bills were more common in the first four sessions. Multi-issue proposals with domestic violence provisions were more common in the final four sessions. The consolidation of policy proposals into fewer (and more expansive) bills was an overall trend in Congress, with a sharp reduction in the total number of bills introduced in both bodies beginning in the 96th Congress (1979-1980). Regardless, some of the consolidation of battered women’s issues as policy provisions in multi-issue bills proposed locating the work into existing or proposed programs or agencies like the example above. These policy development choices shed light on how lawmakers interpreted the problem.

Figure 5. Percentage of all bills with domestic violence provisions that were single-issue domestic violence bills, by Congress
In the 95th Congress, all domestic violence related policy proposals were single-issue bills. In the 96th, 97th, and 98th Congresses, more than half of all domestic violence related policy proposals were single-issue bills, but lawmakers also proposed domestic violence provisions in multi-issue bills on topics related to adult protection, child protection, substance abuse treatment, and unemployment. This was the case in about 30-45% of all bills related to domestic violence in these three congressional sessions. Starting with the 99th Congress, far smaller proportions of domestic violence related proposals were carried in single-issue bills.

There were two ways that domestic violence provisions were attached to multi-issue bills. In some cases, the addition of domestic violence prevention or intervention initiatives was an attempt to locate government response within existing agencies. For example, proposals to fund domestic violence shelters were placed in bills related to child welfare. Shelter funding was not incorporated into child welfare activities, but rather was placed in the bill because lawmakers sought to use the Department of Health and Human Services as the agency of oversight. In other cases, the domestic violence provisions were actually attached to the work agenda of proposed or existing programs aimed at addressing different social problems. These bills merely added “domestic violence” to a list of possible interventions to which substance abuse treatment agencies or homeless service providers may need to attend. While the former type of inclusion spoke to the way Congress wanted to address the problem, the latter type revealed lawmaker assumptions about the cause of the problem. The joining of domestic violence proposals with child protection and substance abuse treatment bills continued on and off throughout the challenge.
The first crime related bill with domestic violence provisions appeared in the 100th Congress and proposed the inclusion of domestic violence victims in the population of crime victims eligible for compensation through the Victims of Crime Act (HR 1801, 1987). By the 103rd Congress, crime bills were the largest category of multiple-issue bills with domestic violence related provisions. In the 101st to the 103rd Congresses, domestic violence provisions also appeared in bills on homelessness and housing. Similar to the handling of domestic violence in substance abuse treatment proposals, these bills added counseling and services to proposed programs on homelessness. In the 102nd and 103rd Congresses, there were a number of bills that added domestic violence prevention and intervention to proposals defining the public health agenda of the Centers for Disease Control.

From the 101st to the 103rd Congresses, there were a number of other multi-issue bills incorporating domestic violence provisions, including proposals for welfare reform, arson prevention, military criminal codes, immigration, and international aid. There were also proposals for federal education and economic programs that integrated requests related to prevention or intervention of domestic violence. For example, HR 3354 (1991) proposed waiving marital status for victims of domestic violence when determining college financial aid status. In the 102nd Congress, two bills on sexual harassment incorporated provisions that were later attached to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) (HR 1149, 1991; S 472, 1991). The inclusion of domestic violence proposals in these bills was infrequent, but at times resulted in policy enactment.

Congress addressed each of the ten prognostic frames of the movement policy agenda at least once during the course of the challenge. Following a brief reminder on the
method for determining outcomes, the next section details findings from the inspection of target response frames and outcomes for each of the ten movement prognostic frames in the primary policy agenda identified in Chapter 5. This includes four frames demanding direct resources for battered women, three calling for improved public knowledge and existing agency response, and three frames that called for legal protections for battered women.

III. Target Response and Movement Framing Outcomes

The outcome of each prognostic frame-target frame interaction was determined by following the presentation of and response to prognostic frames over the course of the challenge, from the 95th (1977-78) to the 103rd (1993-94) Congresses. Frame outcomes refer only to the result of the framing interaction with regard to whether or not lawmakers aligned with the perspective provided in the movement frame (acceptance) and subsequently included a policy prescription that if enacted would constitute a new advantage for the BWM (inclusion). Using Figure 2 in Chapter 2, each prognostic frame-target frame interaction outcome was classified as one of the following: (1) frame success (acceptance and inclusion), (2) frame cooptation (acceptance without inclusion), or (3) frame failure (neither acceptance nor inclusion). Because this work identified and then examined the outcomes of specific movement prognostic messages, frame preemption (no acceptance but some other benefit was proposed) was not among the observed outcomes. Additional details on the methods of the analysis are provided in Chapter 3.

The majority of bills introduced by Congress did not result in actual policy adoption. As such, the designation of success as a prognostic frame outcome is not indicative of the common conceptualization of “success” in policy studies. Rather, in this
work “success” refers to the *acceptance and inclusion of the movement prognostic frame* in Congressional bill proposals. This research decision is not meant to diminish the importance of actual policy adoption. Clearly an enacted policy that includes prognostic frame acceptance and inclusion would be a more tangible benefit yielding success for the movement. Likewise, an enacted policy that coopted the movement prognostic message would potentially have more real-world consequence than would acceptance of a prognostic frame that does not result in policy enactment. However, for the analytic purposes of this dissertation, the key focus will remain on *prognostic frame outcomes* rather than policy enactment. Policy enactment will be identified where applicable and figured into the analysis of overall movement prognostic frame outcomes.

Of the 214 domestic violence related bills introduced by members of Congress, 70% addressed at least one of the frames in the movement primary agenda. I use movement prognostic frames to structure the presentation of findings regarding target response (i.e. regarding language in Congressional bills). The sections are numbered and titled to correspond to the presentation of frames in Chapter 5. For each prognosis in the primary agenda, evidence from movement publications and testimonies was compared to each target response frame to determine whether the response constituted acceptance and inclusion of the movement demand. Some frames yielded multiple responses from Congress during the same session potentially resulting in multiple frame outcomes. A table summarizing the outcomes for each prognostic frame by Congressional session is presented at the end of each section.
A. Response to prognostic frames demanding resources for battered women in crisis

1. Fund community-based crisis shelter for battered women

Congress offered three distinct response frames to the movement request for community-based crisis shelters for battered women. One response was a proposal to create grant programs to provide emergency or crisis shelter for domestic violence victims. The initial proposal called the Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act of 1978 (HR 7927, 1977; HR 9052, 1977; HR 9053, 1977; HR 9267, 1977; HR 10826, 1978; HR 11617, 1978; HR 11762, 1978; S 1728, 1977; S 2758, 1978) was first introduced in the 95th Congress. In addition to the provision for shelter, the Act proposed a funding package for research, a public awareness campaign, and victim services. These programs were to be located within the National Institute for Mental Health and limited to three years of funding for each recipient. Movement actors and law makers disagreed about which government office was appropriate for oversight of domestic violence programs. As time progressed, alternative bills were offered that sought to either create an Office of Domestic Violence (HR 12299, 1978; HR 3921, 1979) or incorporate these programs under the Department of Health and Human Services (HR 1007, 1981; HR 1651, 1981; S 2908, 1982). Although the implementation criteria were opposed by some members of the movement coalition, these proposals represent frame success for the movement prognostic message. The target response aligned with the movement prognosis by accepting the need for crisis shelter for battered women and provided new advantages by creating a funding stream to meet this need.

In the 96th and 98th Congresses, a second response to the request for crisis shelter funding appeared simultaneously with those creating funding for battered women’s
shelter programs. One of these proposals was to make funds available for crisis shelter by amending the types of programs eligible for application in existing funding streams. For example, one bill proposed amendments to the Social Security Act that would authorize payments to states to provide emergency shelter to adults in danger of physical or mental injury (S 1153, 1979). This proposal included domestic violence as one of a number of possible problems leading to the need for emergency shelter, but did not accept the movement prognosis of the need for shelters specifically dedicated to serving battered women. Similarly, a Senate bill in the 98th Congress proposed adding emergency shelter for domestic violence victims to the programs eligible to apply for funding under the Emergency Food and Shelter Act of 1983 (S 493, 1983). These programs were community development grant programs aimed at alleviating the negative effects of unemployment. As such, grant funds were earmarked for programs serving the long-term unemployed and financially needy families. Both of these proposals constitute frame cooptation attempts. While aligning with the movement prognosis on the need for crisis shelter, these proposals failed to recognize the specific need for battered women’s shelters and only provided new resources for sheltering economically disadvantaged persons, with no focus on battered women.

In the 101st Congress, a third target response appeared in bills that proposed a grant program to develop eight model “comprehensive” shelter programs (HR 2452, 1989; S 1056, 1989). The proposal was part of the American Family Act of 1989, which also sought to create programs allowing parental school choice and to encourage child adoption. As designed, the program would require shelters to not only provide comprehensive crisis shelter services (food, shelter, immediate medical services, and
transportation), but also a variety of other long-term counseling and support services focused on transitional housing, parenting, nutrition, exercise, substance abuse, educational services, employment training, home management skills, and assertiveness training. These funds also came with a requirement for a minimum of 40 beds and a required three month stay at the facility. The length of stay was presumably to allow for the completion of counseling and transition programming.

It could be argued that this proposal has the same outcome as those described in the first target response on shelter. These programs seem to meet the movement request for shelter (and services). These response frames recognized the need for shelter programs for battered women apart from the types of shelter and emergency assistance offered to families experiencing other types of crises. Further, movement actors frequently spoke about the “comprehensive” approach of battered women’s shelters to the needs of women. But, these proposals were oriented toward creating a professional “best practices” model of service delivery, not increasing the capacity of existing organizations to respond to crisis situations. Aside from the reality that most battered women’s shelters were not large enough to meet the bed requirement, minimum stays and mandatory services were inconsistent with the BWM model of crisis intervention. This type of shelter was viewed as an effort to institutionalize battered women (Flitcraft 1978; Leghorn 1978). Movement actors suggested these shelters would foster “feelings of helplessness and inadequacy” leading to social isolation of battered women (Kovak and Celine 1982: 27). Further, the basic premise of creating a model program in specific sites that would become the standard for federal funding undermined the idea of community-based, peer led intervention that movement actors proposed as necessary for fostering
women’s self-determination (Martin 1978, SHR-0034; Rural Task Force 1991; Tinker 1978, EDL-0016). Finally, peer advocacy was articulated as setting battered women’s shelters apart from the existing social welfare response, where women assisted one another with identifying and obtaining what they needed to achieve self-sufficiency. This aspect of the shelter model was viewed as more important than having an agency that could meet all of a woman’s needs onsite (Hart 1991, LHR-0026). In light of these objections, comprehensive model shelter proposals were an attempt to coopt the movement prognostic frame on funding crisis shelters.

With the exception of differences in the details of implementation, target response to the request for crisis shelter resulted in the outcome of frame success in each Congressional session. Further, public laws funding crisis shelters were adopted in the 98th, 100th, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses. In 1983, Congress adopted provisions for crisis shelter funding in a package of amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, which located the program within Health and Human Services (HR 1904, 1983; PL 98-457, 1984). The shelter grant program was renewed during both the 100th Congress (HR 1900, 1987; PL 100-294, 1988) and the 102nd Congress (S 838, 1991; PL 102-295, 1992). The only change to occur during the renewal was the removal of the three year funding limit. Administration of the grant program was moved to the Office of Justice Programs in the Department of Justice with the adoption of the VAWA (HR 3355, 1993; PL 103-322, 1994). Table 4 shows the presence of target response frames and the outcomes by Congress for all four movement prognostic frames related to resources for battered women. As shown in the first column, cooptation attempts of the shelter prognosis appeared in the 96th, 98th, and 101st Congresses. In the first two attempts, there
was a rejection of direct resources to battered women’s shelters. However, by the 101st Congress the initial drafts of VAWA had been introduced. The push for comprehensive shelters represented a concession to the existence of and need for these shelters, but sought to gain more control over the type and nature of funded programs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Shelter</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Government Assistance</th>
<th>Victim Compensation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95th Congress (1977-1978)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Cooptation</td>
<td>Partial Success</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th Congress (1979-1980)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Partial Success</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97th Congress (1981-1982)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Cooptation</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98th Congress (1983-1984)</td>
<td><strong>Success (Adopted)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Success (Adopted)</strong></td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th Congress (1985-1986)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th Congress (1987-1988)</td>
<td><strong>Success (Adopted)</strong></td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td><strong>Success (Adopted)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102nd Congress (1991-1992)</td>
<td><strong>Success (Adopted)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Success (Adopted)</strong></td>
<td>Partial Success</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103rd Congress (1993-1994)</td>
<td><strong>Success (Adopted)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Success (Adopted)</strong></td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Fund community-based crisis intervention services for battered women

Lawmakers responded with a diverse set of proposals to the prognosis calling for funding battered women’s services. In total, four types of responses were offered. The first type of response frame involved adding provisions to social service and public welfare bills that would incorporate domestic violence counseling and services into existing programs. Specifically, these were multi-issue bills that called for existing programs to add counseling and services to a list of possible interventions available to the service population. Programs targeted for this addition included: family rehabilitation services (HR 2163, 1979; HR 2682, 1979; HR 4250, 1994; HR 7927, 1977; HR 9052, 1977; HR 9053, 1977; HR 9267, 1977; HR 10826, 1978; HR 11617, 1978; HR 11762, 1978; S 1728, 1977); substance abuse services (HR 3698, 1991; HR 3796, 1991; HR 4022, 1991; HR 6458, 1982; S 440, 1979; S 597, 1991; S 1306, 1991; S 1677, 1991; S 2192, 1992; S 2365, 1982; S 2600, 1990); homeless services (HR 4300, 1992; HR 5100, 1990; S 1513, 1993; S 2181, 1992; S 2600, 1990; S 2863, 1990); job training programs (HR 15, 1993; HR 196, 1991; HR 740, 1991; HR 1020, 1993; S 100, 1993) and medical and mental health programs (HR 1189, 1991; HR 2394, 1993; HR 2489, 1991; HR 2958, 1993; HR 3075, 1993; HR 5536, 1990; HR 5752, 1992; S 29, 1991; S 484, 1993; S 1429, 1993; S 3002, 1990; S 3274, 1992). Target response frames adding domestic violence counseling and services to existing social programs appeared in the 95th, 96, 97th, 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses. Congress approved amendments to the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Reorganization Act of 1992 adding domestic violence counseling to the services available for female offenders in the criminal justice system, children of substance abusers in treatment programs, pregnant women in

While members of the movement coalition were in favor of improving the response to battered women by social services and other public welfare programs, these proposals failed to address the types of crisis oriented services articulated in the movement prognosis (transportation, housing, medical care, and income assistance for battered women). Further, these efforts did not seek to help battered women deal with crisis so much as they targeted the treatment of other marginalized populations: substance addicted, homeless families, unemployed, and persons with medical problems. Therefore, adding counseling and services to existing social programs was cooptation of the prognosis of funding for crisis services.

The second type of target response was a proposed grant program for the provision of direct services to victims of domestic violence (HR 2847, 1993; HR 3921, 1979; S 8, 1993; S 1380, 1991). These proposals appeared in the 96th, 98th, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses. Each of these target response frames co-occurred with a provision to fund shelter. As such, the provisions related to funding services were similar in regards to the distribution and implementation of funds. Movement actors expressed concerns about which federal agency would be charged with oversight, income qualifications for utilizing services, and time limits related to funding. Even so, these proposals constitute a frame success for the movements prognosis in so much as lawmakers accepted the need for services for battered women and provided a funding source to increase the availability of such services.
The third type of target response suggested funding direct services for battered women by amending the types of programs eligible for application in existing funding streams. These proposals appeared only in the 98th Congress. One bill recommended amending an existing violence prevention grant (not domestic violence related) to allow services for domestic violence victims (S 1003, 1983). Another proposed making domestic violence services an eligible use of funds in community development grant programs aimed at improving local economies (S 493, 1983). It is possible that if funded, these programs would yield new advantages. However, as written the legislation added “domestic violence services” to a long list of items eligible for funding by community development funds or other violence prevention initiatives. These programs were competitive and there was no guarantee of services. Further there was no specification that these services actually be the crisis intervention resources sought by movement actors. These proposals demonstrated some amount of acceptance of the movement demand for services, but did not go so far as to recognize the need for dedicated funding. Since no actual funding was proposed, these bills were classified as frame cooptation.

The fourth type of target response to the movement request for crisis services was to construct proposals that allowed domestic violence organizations to compete for funds to provide social services and public welfare programs in the community. Specifically, target response frames proposed making domestic violence service providers eligible to compete for monies to provide residential substance abuse treatment, parenting, and wellness programs in the community (S 1133, 1993; S 2340, 1990). These bills were coopting the message of service needs articulated by the movement and continued the focus of earlier congressional sessions on pushing for the treatment of battered women.
Turning battered women’s shelters into treatment centers for other social problems would only serve to dilute the ability of these organizations to respond to battered women in crisis. Further this response did not provide a guarantee for funding, only the opportunity to be considered.

Congressional policy proposals indicated lawmaker acceptance of the movement claim that services for battered women were needed. However, the majority of target response frames aimed to shift the conversation away from crisis services and toward providing treatment and counseling for battered women. These efforts at cooptation appeared in the 95th, 96th, 97th, 98th, 101st, 102nd and 103rd Congressional sessions and were more prevalent than cooptation attempts related to shelter. Even so, all but one of these attempts at cooptation failed. Bills funding services were adopted in concert with those funding shelters, constituting success for the movement prognostic frame. The simultaneous offering of grants to domestic violence programs to provide direct services first appeared in the 96th Congress and resulted in public laws in the 98th (PL 98-457, 1984), 102nd (PL 102-295, 1992), and 103rd (PL 103-322, 1994).

3. Create exceptions to make battered women eligible for government assistance without the consideration of spousal income

Congress was less responsive to the movement demand for access to government income assistance and insurance programs. There were three target response frames that addressed this issue in some capacity. The first proposal aimed to bar government assistance programs from discriminating against otherwise qualified individuals because of participation in domestic violence program or residence in a domestic violence shelter (HR 12299, 1978). Battered women’s shelters were not valid residential addresses for the
purpose of applying for government assistance with a claim of permanent separation from one’s spouse. The proposal appeared in the 95th Congress’s Domestic Violence Assistance Act of 1978 and again in the 96th Congress version of that same bill (HR 2977, 1979). Non-discrimination in government assistance would benefit some battered women (specifically those who were already receiving assistance prior to separation). In addition, being able to maintain enrollment in government assistance programs during a shelter stay would facilitate a woman’s ability to not only seek safety during crisis, but also to return to self-sufficiency more quickly. With both acceptance and new advantages this target response represents a success. However, the target response only addressed part of the movement prognostic claim and failed to increase access of women who otherwise would not qualify for government assistance because of continued consideration of their husband’s income. As such, these bills constitute partial frame success.

The second target response frame related to battered women’s access to government assistance was a proposal to reduce the length of separation required for waiving spousal income in government assistance programs. This bill was introduced in the 100th Congress as part of the Social Security Insurance Improvement Amendments of 1987 (S 1635, 1987). The bill aimed to reduce the length of separation from six months to one month in cases involving a victim of domestic violence. In addition, the proposal included a provision to disregard in-kind assistance provided by non-profit organizations (e.g. housing) in the determination of recipient need. This proposal was a clear frame success with both acceptance and the exact policy change requested by the movement.
The third related target response frame proposed reserving a portion of vouchers for government subsidized housing specifically for domestic violence victims. This proposal appeared in the 101\textsuperscript{st} and 102\textsuperscript{nd} Congresses as part of the Family Housing Options Program Act of 1989 (HR 2951, 1989), the Economic Equity Act of 1989 (HR 3085, 1989; S 1480, 1989), and a bill aimed at alleviating homelessness (HR 4621, 1990). The proposal requested reserving five percent of all housing vouchers for domestic violence victims and made a provision to allow the use of these vouchers in shared housing situations (e.g. living with relatives). The vouchers would be prioritized in states with fewer existing options for shelter and transitional housing. This proposal was less centered on providing crisis intervention resources. Even so, the resource constituted a partial frame success, improving access to government assistance programs for battered women.

While the movement prognostic message on this issue was present in each Congressional period, target response frames were limited not only to a few sessions but also to a small number of proposals. Partial frame successes were observed in the 95\textsuperscript{th} and 96\textsuperscript{th} Congresses with proposals for non-discrimination in public assistance for women in shelter. As shown in Table 4, this success was short lived and followed by three sessions with no target response on this issue. In the 100\textsuperscript{th} Congress we see the only instance of full frame success. This bill appeared at the moment momentum was beginning to build for the VAWA. But as the proposals related to VAWA began to dominate the conversation in congressional hearings, the issue of battered women’s access to government assistance programs disappeared from target response frames. No policies related to access to public assistance were adopted.
4. Include domestic violence in eligible offenses for crime victim compensation programs

Congressional response to the request for financial compensation for victims of domestic violence was provided in two sessions. In 1984, Congress passed the Victims of Crime Act (PL 98-473). The law extended rights to crime victims that included the right to be notified of court proceedings, to be present at court hearings involving the offender, to speak at sentencing, to pursue civil restitution, and to be notified of offender release from incarceration. The law also established a funding stream to provide monies to existing state-level crime victim programs to award compensation to victims of certain types of crime (e.g. rape, robbery, homicide). In an effort to prevent offenders from benefiting from their crimes, offenses involving victims and offenders with familial ties were initially excluded from eligibility in state programs. Federal program also excluded crimes involving family members (HR 5210, 1983).

During the 100th Congress, the Victims of Crime Act was amended to allow compensation for domestic violence victims (HR 5210, 1988; PL 100-690, 1988). The movement challenge for including domestic violence victims in crime victim compensation programs failed for four consecutive Congressional sessions before achieving frame success in the 100th Congress. Once this law was passed, the issue was no longer part of the primary movement agenda.
B. Response to prognostic frames calling for improved public knowledge and existing agency response

1. Fund public education and media campaigns to raise awareness about domestic violence

Congress was generally receptive to movement actor requests for funding public education and media campaigns to raise awareness about domestic violence. Three target response frames were proposed by lawmakers. The first response was to provide funds to develop and deploy a public service media campaign to raise awareness about domestic violence in print, billboards, public transit advertising and broadcast media. These frames appeared in legislation of the 96th (HR 2977, 1979; HR 3921, 1979), 97th (HR 1007, 1981; HR 1651, 1981; S 2908, 1982), 98th (HR 73, 1983; HR 1397, 1983; S 699, 1983), 101st (S 2340, 1990; S 2754, 1990; S 3134, 1990), 102nd (HR 1149, 1991; HR 1502, 1991; HR 2334, 1991; HR 2720, 1991; HR 4712, 1992; HR 5960, 1992; S 15, 1991; S 212, 1991; S 472, 1991; S 838, 1991; S 1335, 1991; S 3271, 1992), and 103rd Congresses (HR 688, 1993; S 6, 1993; S 8, 1993; S 11, 1993). A public awareness media campaign was funded in the 102nd Congress (S 838, 1991; PL 102-295, 1992). While some movement actors were opposed to dedicating resources in this manner, others believed public education on the prevalence and nature of battering would help create a better understanding of victim experience and thereby decrease their isolation in the community (Brygger 1990, LHR-0035; Hansen 1983, EDL-0038; Roberts 1994, HJH-0038). Similar to the issues of shelter and services, the implementation of public education and awareness campaigns may have deviated from the intent of movement actors. However, response from the government on this issue showed an acceptance of the movement message on the need
for public education and provided a funding stream for carrying out this work—yielding both a frame and policy success.

The second target response frame related to raising public awareness was to adopt a resolution recognizing October as Domestic Violence Awareness Month. Resolutions to declare a special month of recognition were introduced in the 100th (HJR 619, 1988; SJR 371, 1988), 101st (HJR 320, 1989; HJR 602, 1990; SJR 133, 1989; SJR 328, 1990), and 102nd Congresses (HJR 241, 1991; HJR 433, 1992; SJR 73, 1991; SJR 241, 1992). Public laws were passed in the latter two sessions (HJR 602, 1990; PL 101-439, 1990; SJR 133, 1989, PL 101-112, 1989; SJR 73, 1991; PL 102-114; 1991). This type of recognition shows acceptance of the claim that public awareness of the problem was needed, but the new advantage would be limited to a symbolic gesture with no actual education campaign attached to the initiative. Although these resolutions likely were intended as a show of support, they were a cooptation of movement frames which called for improving public awareness of the problem.

A third target response frame called for the Centers for Disease Control to produce and disseminate education programs on the public health consequences of domestic violence. These initiatives were proposed in the 102nd (HR 6081, 1992) and 103rd Congresses (S 1318, 1993; S 1320, 1993; S 2357, 1994). By focusing on health consequences the call for public education shifted from raising awareness of the prevalence and nature of battering to framing the victim as the target of the education efforts. Congressional response coopted the movement prognosis by accepting the need for public education, but not providing the advantages sought by movement actors.
Table 5 shows the distribution of outcomes for the three movement frames calling for improved knowledge on the extent and nature of domestic violence. Congress responded positively to requests for resources that aligned with lawmaker’s general propensity for programs that sought to prevent domestic violence. Over time, Congress offered and passed alternatives to both the movement frames and their own initial response resulting in a mixture of both frame and policy success and cooptation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public Awareness</th>
<th>Criminal Justice Training</th>
<th>Medical and Behavioral Health Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95th</td>
<td>(1977-1978)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th</td>
<td>(1979-1980)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td></td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97th</td>
<td>(1981-1982)</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th</td>
<td>(1985-1986)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th</td>
<td>(1987-1988)</td>
<td>Cooptation</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 This apparently contradictory outcome resulted from complex dynamics discussed in the subsection addressing medical and behavioral health personnel training (see issue B, item number 3 below).
2. Improve criminal justice response to battered women through trainings on the nature of battering, appropriate interventions for battered women, and referring battered women for services for personnel working in law enforcement, prosecution, and the courts.

There were two types of target response to requests for training criminal justice system personnel. The first response was a call for research funds to study state laws and practices related to domestic violence. This proposal first appeared in the 95th Congress in the Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act of 1978 (HR 7927, 1977; HR 9052, 1977; HR 9053, 1977; HR 9267, 1977; HR 10826, 1978; HR 11617, 1978; HR 11762, 1978; S 1728, 1977; S 2758, 1978). These bills further specified that the study would be coordinated by the National Institute for Mental Health in collaboration with the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and other federal agencies. Similar proposals were offered in the 96th and 97th Congresses (HR 2163, 1979; HR 2682, 1979; HR 1651, 1981). The request for studies conducted by professionals outside of battered women’s organizations was viewed as a rejection of movement actor expertise on the experiences of battered women in their interactions with law enforcement and other agencies (Leghorn 1978; Schechter 1979; Schechter 1982). As such, the movement prognostic frame calling for criminal justice system personnel training failed to gain acceptance among lawmakers in the first three Congressional periods.

The second type of target response to the movement prognosis on personnel training were proposals to provide grant funding for training and technical assistance to criminal justice system personnel. This proposal first appeared in the 98th Congress and applied only to training law enforcement officers on handling domestic violence incidents.
Law enforcement training and assistance was funded through a grant to the LEAA in 1984 (HR 1904, 1983; PL 98-457). Movement actors viewed the need for training across all areas of the criminal justice system as crucial to reforming what they viewed as institutional non-responsiveness to battered women (Hart 1987, CYF-0014). The provision of funds to train law enforcement was a partial frame success for this movement prognosis. Movement actors continued to advocate for system wide training. Starting in the 100th Congress, lawmakers were more responsive to the request to fund personnel training. Proposals for training prosecutors appeared in the 100th Congress (HR 2795, 1987). Full frame success was first achieved in the 101st Congress when lawmakers adopted a proposal funding training for law enforcement, prosecutors, and court personnel (HR 5210, 1988; PL 100-690, 1988). Additional proposals were introduced in the 102nd (HR 1149; HR 1502; HR 2334; HR 5960; S 15; S 212; S 277; S 472; S 3271) and 103rd Congresses (HR 1133; HR 2847; HR 3315; HR 3355; HR 4092; S 6; S 11; S 8; S 688).

During the first six years of movement challenges related to federal domestic violence policy, the government was non-responsive to the prognosis that the criminal justice system was failing battered women. The first instance of acceptance on this topic resulted in a partial frame and policy success providing grant funds to train to law enforcement officers on handling domestic violence incidents. This was only one personnel category targeted by the members of the movement coalition. Additional funds for training across all three categories of personnel were passed into law with the VAWA (HR 3355, 1993; PL 103-322, 1994).
On the surface, these proposals represent success for movement prognostic frames. However, that success was moderated by administrative provisions and other preemptive policies introduced by lawmakers. Over time the intent of target response proposals moved away from the original movement prognostic claim about improving personnel knowledge and response to battered women. Congressional bills increasingly situated training for personnel in provisions of the VAWA aimed at improving arrest and prosecution of offenders. Additionally, lawmakers introduced proposals to provide direct resources to law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies in the 100th, 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses. The grant monies were to be used to encourage agencies to centralize and coordinate criminal justice response to domestic violence (see HR 5468, 1990; HR 1502, 1991; HR 3355, 1993) encourage reporting of incidents, require mandatory arrest of offenders, and increase prosecutions through no-drop polices (see HR 1502, 1991; HR 3355, 1993; HR 4712, 1992; HR 5468, 1990; S 2754, 1990). The training provisions still provided frame and policy successes for the movement. However, the addition of target response frames that provided direct resources to the criminal justice system for creating these new programs represented a shift in response for lawmakers away from the movement prognosis. Since both provisions were included in the adopted VAWA in the 103rd, the outcomes of frame and policy success should be viewed cautiously.

3. Fund training for medical and behavioral health personnel on the nature of battering, appropriate interventions for battered women, and referring battered women for services

The earliest bills introduced in Congress to address the problem of domestic violence framed the issue as one resulting from mental or behavioral health problems.
Lawmakers offered proposals to develop model public health programs to create methods to identify, prevent, and treat domestic violence. This solution appeared in the proposal for the Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act and the Domestic Violence Prevention and Services Act in the 95th (HR 7927, 1977; HR 9052, 1977; HR 9053, 1977; HR 9267, 1977; HR 10826, 1978; HR 11617, 1978; HR 11762, 1978), 96th (HR 2163, 1979; HR 2682, 1979), 97th (HR 1007, 1981; HR 1651, 1981; S 2908, 1982), and 98th Congresses (HR 73, 1983; HR 1397, 1983; HR 1904, 1983; S 699, 1983). The response frame also appeared in the 101st (S 2340, 1990) and 103rd Congresses (HR 2201, 1993; HR 3355, 1993; HR 4848, 1994; S 1318, 1993; S 1320, 1993). This proposal was rejected by movement actors during the earlier sessions because these agencies were already failing at this task among their own clients (Clinch, 1978, SHR-0034; Lee, 1987, CYF-0014; McMahon, 1979, EDL-0021; Monasmith, 1978, SHR-0034; Steytler, 1978, EDL-0016). That Congress identified these agencies as the appropriate venue for developing new methods for addressing domestic violence rather than providing for the training requested by movement actors indicates frame failure. Model public health programs were adopted as part of the VAWA in the 103rd session (HR 3355, 1993; PL 103-322, 1994).

Beginning in the 101st Congress, lawmakers introduced proposals that accepted the movement prognosis for personnel training and led to an outcome of frame success. Specifically, these bills included funds for the development of training materials for medical and behavioral health personnel on the prevention and intervention of domestic violence and training on identification, treatment, and documentation of injuries for patients (S 2340, 1990). Similar bill provisions appeared in the 102nd (HR 6081, 1992; S
2305, 1992) and 103rd sessions (HR 1829, 1993; HR 2201, 1993; HR 2217, 1993; HR 3207, 1993; S 869, 1993; S 1318, 1993; S 1320, 1993; S 1506, 1993; S 2357, 1994). However, none of these provisions were adopted during the time period of this analysis.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the BWM was opposed to the “treatment” of battered women and believed that personnel in these fields were not only inadequately prepared to address the needs of battered women, but also directly put these women at risk by diagnosing them as responsible for the abuse. The target responded to the movement prognosis with repeated attempts to address the negative experiences of battered women within these institutions by putting medical and behavioral health personnel in charge of developing prevention and intervention. Lawmakers offered some support for personnel training in the later years, but given their preference for public health intervention, the result was a mixture of both frame success and frame failure, with the failed alignment resulting in adopted policy that contradicted movement diagnostic and prognostic frames.

C. Response to prognostic frames requesting legal protections for battered women as they navigate criminal and civil legal systems

1. Fund legal representation for battered women in both criminal and civil court proceedings resulting from battery

Congress did not offer a response to the request for legal representation for battered women in the 95th and 96th Congresses. No movement framing on this issue was observed in the 97th and 98th Congresses, but the issue reappeared in movement actor testimonies in the 99th. The movement received two types of responses to the demand for legal representation from Congress during the later years of the challenge. The first target response was to establish a Legal Services Administration in the Office of Justice
Programs to administer grants to legal aid service providers. These grants would fund legal services for low-income clients and cover a variety of areas of civil law including housing, family issues of divorce, custody and support, domestic violence protection orders, access to government benefits, and representation related to civil rights (HR 2884, 1989). Legal aid program grants were first introduced in the 101st Congress. In the 102nd, bills aiming to create model state leadership programs encouraged states to incorporate legal advocacy programs for domestic violence victims (HR 1502, 1991). In both formulations, the target accepted the position that legal advocacy for battered women was needed. However, both yield only partial frame success. Funding for legal aid programs only provided representation for low-income clients. Further, state model programs were limited in distribution and were only encouraged, not required, to offer funds for legal representation.

The second target response to the movement call for legal representation was the provision of funding to law enforcement agencies and prosecutor’s offices to provide lay advocates to assist victims of domestic violence. These response frames appeared simultaneously to those aimed at providing legal representation in the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses. Lay advocates would help victims navigate both the criminal and civil legal process, but would not be able to provide legal advice or representation. Rather, the goal of lay advocacy programs within the criminal justice system was to increase the reporting of domestic violence incidents and reduce attrition rates of victim cooperation in prosecutions (HR 1133, 1993; HR 1502, 1991; HR 3315, 1993; HR 3355, 1993; HR 4152, 1994; HR 5488, 1990; S 11, 1993; S 15, 1991). This response frame recognized that battered women needed assistance navigating the criminal justice system. But the
provisions included in the bill coopted the prognosis providing an alternative to legal representation focused on meeting the needs of the system.

Table 6 shows the frame outcomes for the movement prognostic frames on legal protections for battered women. As you can see, the call to fund legal representation failed to generate a response from Congress until the VAWA period beginning in the 101st Congress. When Congress did respond, the outcomes were mixed. Target response frames demonstrated acceptance of the movement claim that battered women needed assistance navigating the criminal and civil court processes. However, the response that most closely met the movement demand was a partial response to encourage states to prioritize legal aid programs for battered women. This frame led to a partial policy success when the legal aid provision was adopted as part of the VAWA (HR 3355, 1993; PL 103-322, 1994). The coopted lay advocacy frame also led to policy cooptation as it was included as a grant program for law enforcement agencies and prosecutors officers in the same public law.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Legal Representation</th>
<th>Address Concealment</th>
<th>Consideration in Child Custody</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95th Congress (1977-1978)</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>96th Congress (1979-1980)</td>
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<td>101st Congress (1989-1990)</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cooptation</td>
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<td>Success (Adopted)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Create policies and procedures that allow battered women to conceal their residential address during service utilization and civil and criminal court procedures

Following frame failure in the 95th, 96th, 99th, and 100th Congresses, two target response frames were generated to address the request for legal procedures to conceal the residential addresses of battered women. First, in the 102nd Congress lawmakers proposed research on the ways in which an abusive spouse may gain access to the victim’s new address (HR 5960, 1992; S 3271, 1992). From the movement perspective a call for research on a known problem was akin to denying that the problem existed. Taken alone, this response was a frame failure with neither acceptance of the movement prognosis nor inclusion of new advantages consistent with the claim. During the same Congress, a second response frame called for the U.S. Postal Service to create regulations to make it possible to secure the confidential address of domestic violence victims (HR 1502, 1991; HR 5218, 1992; S 15, 1991). The proposal of regulations was a movement frame success. In the 103rd Congress, these frames were again offered in separate bills (for research see: HR 688, 1993; HR 2847, 1993; S 6, 1993; S 8, 1993; for regulations see: HR 1133, 1993; S 11, 1993). During the consolidation of VAWA proposals, both research and regulations were included in HR 3355 and were adopted into public law (PL 103-322, 1994), resulting in both frame and policy success.

3. Encourage state courts to allow and consider evidence of battering in family court proceedings related to divorce, support, and child custody litigation

The movement request for intervention in state court handling of divorce, support, and child custody litigation presented challenges for federal lawmaking. However, over time two target response frames were offered in legislation to address this issue. The first
was a “sense of congress” statement in support of considering domestic violence when making decisions about child custody and visitation. These resolutions were generally used to express an opinion or make a statement about an issue, but have no legal implementation value. This resolution appeared in a variety of bills over the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses, including: the Economic Equity Act of 1990 (HR 3085, 1989); the Women’s Equal Opportunity Act of 1991 (HR 1149, 1991; S 472, 1991); the Strategy to Eliminate Crime in Urban and Rural Environments Act of 1991 (S 1335, 1991); and the Sexual Assault Prevention Act of 1992 (HR 5960, 1992; S 3271, 1992). This target response frame demonstrates the classic situation of message cooption. Lawmakers expressed their acceptance of the movement frame, but did not offer any new advantage beyond the symbolic recognition of the need for attention to the issue. The federal government has little regulatory power over state court handling of legal family matters, a statement of support may have been the best possible response.

However, a second target response frame on this issue suggested a program that would provide new advantages and partial frame success for the movement. Specifically, lawmakers proposed a combination of research on state court judicial decision making in child custody decisions and the development of training for court personnel on the intersection of domestic violence and child custody and visitation. These response frames appear in the 101st (HR 2952, 1989; S 1480, 1989; S 1482, 1989) and 102nd Congresses (HR 1253, 1991; HR 6139, 1992; S 3317, 1992). Both were adopted into public law in the 102nd Congress (HR 1253, 1991; PL 102-528, 1992). Unlike research provisions related to the address concealment request, these two issues were offered as a package with the research meant to inform the development of curriculum—not as a substitution
for action. The law also required distribution of the curriculum to state courts throughout the country. Since court decision-making regarding family matters was exclusively a state court issue, this provision of guidance from Congress was a frame and policy success for the movement.

This issue was present in survivor testimonies in early Congressional hearings; however, Congress did not respond to the prognostic frame on the consideration of battering in family court hearings until the 101st Congress. This is consistent with the pattern of multiple failures followed by a mix of success and attempted cooptation observed in other victim rights oriented claims.

IV. Preemptive Congressional Response Frames

Finally, just under one-third of the bills introduced by Congress during the challenge period proposed initiatives that did not directly attend to issues associated with the primary policy agenda of the BWM. Many of these bills, and some of those with provisions addressing the prognostic frames of the battered women’s movement, included preemptive proposals that could be perceived as beneficial for battered women. These issues were, at times, supported by members of the movement coalition. However, these were not points on which the movement chose to direct its collective attention. During the early years, preemptive target responses tended to focus on a variety of data collection and research efforts and the dissemination of information to domestic violence programs and related agencies (HR 73, 1983; HR 1007, 1981; HR 1397, 1983; HR 1651, 1981; HR 1904, 1983; HR 2163, 1979; HR 2682, 1979; HR 2908, 1982; HR 3921, 1979; HR 7927, 1977; HR 9052, 1977; HR 9053, 1977; HR 9267, 1977; HR 10826, 1978; HR 11617, 1978; HR 11762, 1978; S 699, 1983; S 1003, 1983; S 1728, 1977; S 2430, 1984;
S 2759, 1978). As noted earlier, movement actors were largely opposed to government funding of research, viewing it as both a loss of their own legitimacy to define the problem and a drain on the limited resources available for crisis intervention. Movement actors did not reject research all together, but did not see it as part of the immediate need for crisis response. Still, improved data collection within government agencies would have benefitted the movement by creating empirical support on the prevalence and distribution of the problem in the general population. Furthermore, the infrastructure developed by the movement to disseminate information about programs and services were underfunded.

Beginning with the VAWA proposal period in the 101st Congress, preemptive policies were focused on three areas. First, there were proposals to create resource centers, state coalitions, and other organizational supports to provide training and technical assistance for domestic violence organizations that had the potential to ensure the expansion and longevity of shelter practice (HR 688, 1993; HR 1502, 1991; HR 2334, 1991; HR 2720, 1991; HR 2847, 1993; HR 2947, 1991; HR 3355, 1993; HR 4712, 1992; HR 5960, 1992; S6, 1993; S 8, 1993; S11, 1993; S 15, 1991; S 212, 1991; S 803, 1991; S838, 1991; S 2340, 1990; S 2754, 1990; S 2863, 1990; S 3134, 1990; S 3271, 1992). These proposals demonstrate a shift in lawmaker perspective from providing resources for battered women to building organizational maintenance and professionalization. While movement actors were opposed to the government setting standards and policies for battered women’s organizations, the funding of coordinating infrastructure had the potential to free up both financial and personnel resources at the organizational level.
Second, there were a variety of civil and criminal law changes that appeared in Congressional bills. Specifically, there were policies related to accessing and enforcing protection orders across state lines (HR 688, 1993; HR 1133, 1993; HR 1502, 1991; HR 2334, 1991; HR 2872, 1993; HR 3355, 1993; HR 4055, 1994; HR 4197, 1994; HR 4848, 1994; HR 5218, 1992; HR 5468, 1990; HR 5472, 1990; HR 5960, 1992; S 6, 1993; S 11, 1993; S 15, 1991; S 212, 1991; S 2754, 1990; S 3134, 1990), bills to increase penalties for criminal offenders (HR 688, 1993; HR 5468, 1990; HR 5960, 1992; S 6, 1993; S 15, 1991; S 2754, 1990; S 3271, 1992), and the inclusion of gender in the hate crimes law to provide for civil and criminal penalties for crimes motivated by gender (HR 1133, 1993; HR 1502, 1991; HR 3355, 1993; HR 5218, 1992; HR 5468, 1990; S 11, 1993; S 15, 1991; S 1607, 1993; S 2754, 1990). These items were all part of the final VAWA bill and viewed as a big part of the policy accomplishment. Each of these preemptive frames addressed issues identified by the movement as impacting the safety of battered women. However, the issues only appeared on the movement policy agenda (as defined here) either simultaneously with or after the provisions were introduced by lawmakers.

A third set of preemptive proposals was contained in the bills leading up to and the law adopted as the VAWA. In addition to the provisions on domestic violence “at home,” these bills contained a set of provisions on preventing violence against women in public places or “on the streets” (HR 1133, 1993; HR 1502, 1991; HR 5218, 1992; HR 5468, 1990; S 11, 1993; S 15, 1991; S 1607, 1993; S 2754, 1990). The proposals specifically targeted improving public transportation, parks, and other public areas in ways that eliminated conditions that helped to conceal and facilitate violence against women. The safe streets provisions included increased penalties for sex crimes,
improving lighting and safety in public transportation and parks, and new evidentiary rules for the prosecution of sex crimes. The safe streets response represents preemption in that these initiatives, if effective, could decrease both the experience and tacit acceptance of violence against women in society more broadly. However, the issue of violence against women at the hands of strangers was outside of the scope of the movement agenda.

Further analysis would be necessary to understand the effects of preemptive policies on the movement agenda. Preemptive Congressional response frames do not address the movement agenda. As such, these outcomes are beyond the scope of this project. Still, the introduction of preemptive policies provides some sense of a trajectory of the governmental interest in addressing domestic violence. Early preemptive proposals question the authority of movement actors to define the problem and focus on determining the scope, nature, and consequences of battering (a task that is still ongoing). In the later years, preemptive frames also tend to reject the authority of the movement by increasing focus on the prevention of future violence through indirect means rather than providing crisis response resources that would allow battered women to contribute to the solution.

VI. Conclusion

There is little doubt that the Battered Women’s Movement forged the contours of the federal policy response on issues of domestic violence. Movement actors were instrumental in bringing the issue to the attention of federal lawmakers and presenting the primary movement agenda in Congressional hearings. They continued to provide a consistent message over a period that lasted two decades. Further, a majority of bills
about domestic violence offered by Congress addressed at least one of the prognostic frames of the movement primary agenda. Even those that deviated from the movement prognosis generally offered either an acceptance of the problem defined by members of the movement coalition or some advantage either for battered women or the agencies that work to prevent or intervene in domestic violence. Over the course of the challenge, Congressional response to the movement prognosis resulted in frame and ultimately policy outcomes that spanned the continuum of failure, cooptation, and success—at times with the simultaneous combination of the latter two outcomes.

**Frame Outcomes**

The pattern of frame outcomes differed over time. Early movement frames resulted in either: (a) frame success that at least partially addressed the movement demand; or (b) frame failure, receiving no attention from Congress at all. Following a policy success in the 98th Congress that provided funding for battered women’s shelters, services, and training for law enforcement officers, there was a shift in Congressional response. The movement’s agenda received more response from Congress in terms of the number bills introduced that accepted the movement’s position on the need for intervention. During this later period, frame cooptation and the simultaneous outcomes of frame success and cooptation were more common than in the previous period. Additionally, there were fewer instances of failure or prognostic frames being shut out of consideration by Congress altogether.

The outcome patterns observed in this challenge do not align neatly with Trumpy’s (2008) expectation that cooptation is complete only when the movement ceases to respond to target cooptation attempts. In Chapter 5, I distinguished between prognostic
frames that were present prior to and following each Congressional session and those with gaps or more varied deployment patterns. An examination of the outcomes for both deployment patterns provided little support for this claim. Those with consistent presence in movement testimony (shelter, services, government financial assistance, crime victim compensation, funding for public awareness campaigns, criminal justice system personnel training, and consideration of battering in divorce and custody proceedings) resulted in varied outcomes of success, combined success and cooptation, and failure. The same combination of outcomes was also observed for prognostic frames with periods of absence on the movement’s agenda.

There were three notable patterns of frame outcomes. First, an early pattern of failure followed by success was common for movement prognoses that sought direct resources or considerations for battered women as a resolution to the problem. A pattern of multiple failures was observed in all four prognostic claims related to victim rights: legal representation, crime victim compensation, regulations for concealing the victim’s residential address, and the consideration of battering in court cases related to divorce and child custody. These issues were present in the movement platform before Congress took up the first bill on domestic violence. Yet, none of these issues received a response from lawmakers until the 100th Congress. These issues all received at least a partial frame success resulting in an adopted policy by the end of the analysis. One explanation for lawmaker reluctance to provide direct resources to battered women may be a government interest in family preservation. Each of these requests were meant to provide resources to women to facilitate escape from a violent home and assist them in establishing new independent lives, which was the movement goal. This would also explain the attempted
cooptation observed in the Congressional push for counseling and treatment of battered women instead of services that would help them escape an abusive home.

This pattern may also be indicative of hesitancy on the part of lawmakers to enlarge the welfare state by creating new government programs or broadening the populations eligible for low-income services. Outside of the implementation requirements for domestic violence shelter and services, lawmakers were unresponsive to the movement’s request for non-income based access to services. The law authorizing legal aid maintained the program focus on serving low-income clients. The same pattern was noted in the response to the movement request for expedited access to government assistance programs for battered women. A few lawmakers attempted to make partial concessions in the early sessions—but these focused on non-discrimination for women in shelter who were otherwise financially qualified for government programs. These proposals were followed by non-response until the 100th Congress, when a single bill appeared in the Senate to address the issue of eligibility for married women in spite of their husband’s incomes. Success on this issue continued to be elusive through the end of the analysis, with few frame successes and no policy success.

A second pattern was the effort by Congress to redirect authority over the battered women’s issue away from BWM actors themselves and toward authorities less oriented toward women’s autonomy and responsibility. A combination of concession and cooptation were used as a means to redirect authority over the issue. Frame cooptation, like frame success, required Congressional acceptance of the movement identification of a problem requiring federal intervention. Acceptance was apparent in the initial attention
lawmakers gave to domestic violence shelters and services and later to the call for criminal justice personnel training.

In the early Congressional sessions, the movement had success in generating target response frames to fund crisis shelter and services. At the same time, alternative bills attempted to absorb shelter and service funding into the existing social welfare system by proposing options within social security programs and community development projects that addressed crisis needs for low-income, disabled, and unemployed citizens. Another alternative was to replace battered women’s shelters with new comprehensive shelter programs that required large facilities and an extensive menu of required counseling and treatment services. Both of these options would have diminished the role of battered women to define their own needs and access resources during a time of crisis. But the movement rejected these proposals and continued to advocate for services that gave battered women resources rather than requiring them to get treatment for their problem in order to access food, transportation, and other basic necessities. Both types of proposals were enacted leading to an overall mixed outcome of movement frame success and the absorption of battered women’s services into existing government programs.

Early frame successes for funding shelter and services were marred by the proposed location of program oversight in either the National Institute for Mental Health or the Department of Health and Human Services—specifically the department that oversaw child abuse programs. Both of these options were unacceptable for members of the movement coalition, who argued against these plans in Congressional hearings. Movement actors were opposed to programs that prioritized family reunification, like the
policies and practices that guided the work of these agencies. The government interest in family unification was centered on the welfare of the child or the recovery of the addict. Historically, battered women were denied services or pushed to reconciliation by these programs without regard for their own safety. The movement did not necessarily oppose reunification in these programs, just in cases involving battered women.

A third, but similar pattern emerged in how Congress addressed the movement prognosis for improving criminal justice system response to battered women. The movement identified the need to educate personnel in the system on the prevalence and nature of battering and hopefully improve the way personnel interacted with battered women. The initial response from Congress was to investigate state policies and procedures—to determine whether or not there was a problem. Movement frames on this issue were successful, but there was a simultaneous move toward finding criminal justice solutions for the problem of battering. Congress accepted the movement’s call for change, but replaced their preferred solution with alternative programs situated in existing criminal justice institutions. Personnel training proposals were offered (and funded), but a variety of other resources were dedicated to new programs intended to encourage criminal justice agencies to create new strategies to prevent and intervene in domestic violence. The movement did not object to the treatment of domestic violence as a crime. However, policies on coordinating police and prosecution, mandatory arrest, and even the provision of lay advocates to victims were aimed at improving prosecution and conviction. From a criminal justice standpoint, improving convictions may increase victim safety. However, it would not necessarily improve the treatment of battered women by these institutions.
To summarize, successful Congressional response to movement messages rarely occurred in isolation. With the exception of the outcomes for crisis intervention and shelter, most frames yielding a response passed into public law were accompanied by the adoption of a cooptative or alternative (failure) response frame. The cooptive target response frames documented in this work differ from the symbolic concessions observed by Trumpy (2008). Cooptive response frames attempted to either absorb battered women’s demands into existing social service or mental health programs or replace movement supported solutions with new programs or policies that often conflicted with the movement’s overall assessment of problem. VAWA incorporated and funded a number of these alternatives. In addition to the resources dedicated to criminal justice initiatives, the co-occurrence of policy success and cooptation was observed in the request for legal representation, where both legal aid services for low-income persons and lay advocates for justice system involved victims were funded. There was also a move to renew the effort to use the public health and social welfare model to address the issue of domestic violence. The movement saw a need to improve the response of institutional actors to battered women’s needs. Training for these personnel was not adopted; however, the U.S. Center for Disease Control was provided with funds through VAWA to develop model public health programs to prevent and treat domestic violence.

**Policy Outcomes**

Policy success was observed in the 98th, 100th, 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congressional Sessions. In fact, most of the movement prognostic frames received at least partial success at some point during the challenge. Shelter, services, and law enforcement training were passed in the 98th Congress. The request for services also
resulted in a policy cooptation in the 98th, when domestic violence counseling was added to the workload of funded substance abuse treatment programs. Shelter and service funding was reauthorized in the 100th and again in the 102nd. Domestic violence victims were added to the eligible populations for crime victim compensation in a reauthorization of the Victims of Crime Act in the 100th Congressional session. In the 101st and 102nd, the call for public awareness education was coopted when Congress passed resolutions declaring October “Domestic Violence Awareness Month.” However, public awareness also had policy success. A public education campaign was also funded in the 102nd.

As passed, the VAWA contained all four possible outcomes. Policy successes included: funding for shelter and services, criminal justice and court personnel training, and a provision to create regulations to conceal the addresses of battered women from their abusers. Simultaneous policy cooptation and success were observed in response to the movement request for legal representation for battered women, with the creation of a lay victim advocate program to improve arrest and prosecution and an increase in funds for legal aid for low-income persons. Preemptive policies included those provisions attached to “safe streets,” interstate enforcement of protection orders, increased penalties for offenders, and the inclusion of gender in the hate crimes law. One adopted provision constituted a failure for the movement. Rather than addressing the movement prognosis to provide training and education to public health professionals, VAWA provided funds to public health agencies to develop model programs for domestic violence prevention and intervention.

These results support the conclusion that the Battered Women’s Movement influenced the federal policy agenda from the first bill introduced through the adoption of
the Violence Against Women Act by identifying the primary points of intervention for a crisis response. The federal government largely recognized BWM actors as legitimate spokespersons on crisis shelter and services, but frequently rejected their authority over other professional interests (criminal justice and public health). This rejection was evidenced by either ignoring movement prognostic frames in the early part of the challenge or by suggesting cooptive alternatives in the later period. The complete rejection of movement prognostic frames decreased after initial frame and policy successes. However, the nature of cooptive and preemptive response frames from lawmakers suggested that over time, the characterization of the problem by members of the movement coalition as one requiring a crisis response lost favor and was replaced by alternative frames about preventing victimization and creating consequences for offenders.

In the final chapter, I expand the discussion of these findings to draw out implications for the conceptualization of message cooptation and the mechanisms and dynamics leading to different outcomes. I also provide an assessment of the relevance of this work for policy-oriented social movements more broadly.
Chapter Seven

Conclusion

I. Introduction

The motivation for this research was the appearance of conflicting claims about the influence of the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM) on federal domestic violence policy. On the one hand, movement scholars conveyed that the BWM was coopted by institutional response only a few short years after the initiation of federal policy work in this area. On the other hand, scholars studying the impact of these policies continue to attribute these policy successes to the movement. This discrepancy drew attention to gaps in knowledge about the determination of outcomes in policy-oriented social movements in general and the dynamics of cooptation more specifically. To address these gaps, I posed two overarching questions: (1) to what extent do federal policies on domestic violence represent favorable responses to the Battered Women's Movement? And (2) how can we reconcile or otherwise assess both the claims of movement cooptation and the perceptions of movement influence on continuing policy development in the domestic violence policy arena? To answer these questions, the foregoing chapters analyzed the diagnostic and prognostic messages of the movement, and the outcomes resulting from consideration and response from the U.S. Congress. The examination of prognostic message outcomes in the BWM not only sheds light on the manner in which the movement influenced public policy, but also provides insight into the study and understanding of social movement cooptation. The objectives of this work are summarized in five more concrete questions:
1. What were the goals of the BWM?
2. What demands did the BWM make on federal lawmakers?
3. How did federal lawmakers respond to the prognostic messages of the BWM?
4. What were the outcomes for BWM prognostic messages in Congressional policy proposals?
5. In what ways do these outcomes represent the continuing influence of the BWM on domestic violence policy?

Answers to these questions were derived from the longitudinal interpretive policy analysis of BWM policy-directed claims-making and the interactions of these claims with lawmaker proposals in the U.S. Congress. In Chapter 4, I documented the development of the movement’s national policy agenda. With historical roots in both civil rights and liberationist movements, the birth and growth of battered women’s shelters led to the prioritization of safety and refuge as the first step toward ending violence against women. The developing movement claimed that funding, public support, and institutional change were necessary for meeting the long-term goal of changing the social structures that created, justified, and sustained the subordinate status of women. These needs pushed the BWM to make demands of existing social institutions, beginning at the local and state levels. But, local demands quickly morphed into a broad national agenda. In Chapter 5, I analyzed the movement’s national level policy-oriented diagnostic and prognostic frames presented in public testimonies and publications. But, an analysis of movement prognostic framing is only part of the story. Chapters 4 and 5 constructed the foundation for examining interactions between movement prognostic frames and the response frames.
presented in the U.S. Congress. In Chapter 6, I provided an analysis of these interactions and an assessment of outcomes for the movement’s national policy agenda.

In this final Chapter, I briefly summarize the empirical findings addressing each of the first four objectives. I then turn to the fifth question and summarize both the substantive and theoretical contributions of this work to understanding the influence of social movement messaging on policy outcomes.

II. Empirical Findings

This work examined policy-oriented claims-making in the BWM over a twenty year period, from 1975-1994, which I define as the period of this ‘policy challenge.’ The analysis yielded findings on the development of the movement’s goals, the tapering of those goals to a national policy agenda, the presentation of claims in publications and hearings before the U.S. Congress (95th -103rd Congresses), and the outcomes of ten key prognostic messages. A brief review of these findings can help answer the first four questions presented above.

A. What were the goals of the BWM?

The BWM proffered two global goals for the movement: (1) provide immediate safety for battered women, and (2) change institutional structures that contribute to the social marginalization of women in society. Movement actors carried messages about both of these goals over the course of the challenge. The analysis of the origins of the movement’s message in Chapter 4 documented the development of specific claims that derived from sharing individual experiences of inadequate response to and rejection of battered women by existing social institutions. These conditions forced the organization of alternative institutions that would address the unmet needs of battered women. The
outsider status ascribed to these new institutions shaped both the movement’s articulation of grievances and the way BWM actors responded to federal response frames throughout the challenge examined here.

B. What demands did the BWM make on federal lawmakers?

In Congressional hearings, BWM claims-making overwhelmingly focused on requesting government intervention to assist with the goal of providing immediate and short-term safety for battered women. Members of the movement coalition claimed expertise on this topic, citing the ongoing work of battered woman shelters and services in their respective communities. Their request for federal intervention was mostly limited to the need for money to continue and expand ongoing activities at the local and state-levels. Specifically, members of the movement coalition asked for direct resources for battered women, public awareness and education efforts to improve knowledge about and response to domestic violence, and legal protections for battered women.

The request for resources was primarily focused on funding for battered women’s shelters and services to facilitate escape from the abuser and getting reestablished in a violence free home. Although broadly supported as the appropriate intervention and unanimously requested by members of the coalition in Congressional hearings, the request for funding for battered women’s organizations was not without controversy in the movement coalition. The primary concern was an objection to government interference in the organization and operation of shelters and service agencies. Even so, access to shelter was the movement’s primary strategy for providing immediate safety. It was the most common request made by movement affiliated witnesses in Congressional hearings. BWM advocates also argued for direct financial resources for battered women
that would allow them to maintain independence after reaching safety. Their requests for financial resources included both crime victim compensation and financial assistance through government social programs.

As noted in Chapter 4, the role of battered women’s shelters and service organizations in ending violence against women was believed to be much more than just the provision of immediate safety. Peer support among battered women living in non-controlling environments was believed to lead to the development of leadership skills and the politicization of the battered woman’s personal struggle into a fight against women’s marginalization in society. While peer support and battered women’s leadership roles were articulated in the prognostic frames presented in Congressional hearings, the framing of resources for battered women did not overtly connect the idea of improving women’s self-sufficiency with the dismantling of institutional supports for women’s inequality. Rather, movement frames demanded direct funding for battered women’s shelter and services without programming interference to the largest extent possible. The maintenance and proliferation of the battered women’s shelter model was theorized to be a key mechanism in furthering women’s independence from prescribed gender and family roles.

The call for Congress to fund efforts to improve public knowledge aimed at preventing domestic violence and to provide personnel training for criminal justice system actors and public health personnel (medical and behavioral) also had implications for both movement goals. Changing attitudes and behaviors about violence against women was a necessary part of the process of achieving equality. But again, the movement’s articulation of policy-oriented prognoses focused on improving crisis
response to battered women. Even those who called for general public education linked raised awareness to improving the competency of family members, friends, neighbors, employers, and community agencies in providing advice and assistance to battered women. BWM advocates articulated the demand for training police, prosecutors, and court personnel as an effort to ensure timely and appropriate response during those moments of crisis when battered women reached out to these agencies for help.

The three remaining prognostic frames aimed to provide battered women with legal protections and support to facilitate their exit from violent marriages and co-parenting situations. The demands for access to affordable legal representation, the right to residential address concealment, and the consideration of violence against women in child custody proceedings were framed around how the absence of these protections placed women (and their children) at risk for further violence at the hands of the batterer. Although criminal prosecutions and civil court proceedings take some time to get underway, these procedures were often a necessary component of moving from an emergency crisis state to a more stable existence. Members of the movement coalition focused their testimonies on how legal failures during a battered woman’s attempt to escape a violent partner impeded the efforts of advocates to provide shelter and other forms of assistance.

In Chapter 2, I suggested that examining movement challenges as a series of interactions may lead to a better understanding of how and why movement messages change over time as policy challenges play out. This position presupposed that the objective needs of the beneficiary population could change over time, which might lead to changes to the movement’s policy agenda. The analysis of movement framing in
national publications and Congressional testimonies shows little change in the content of the movement’s basic national policy agenda over time. One possible explanation for the consistency of the movement’s message over the course of the policy challenge was that the objective needs of battered women did not change that much. Certainly the presentation of battered women’s stories was similar throughout the policy challenge. A few secondary frames did appear over the course of the challenge. However, most of the secondary movement frames addressed either innovative or evolving intervention issues, and none took away from the long-running primary agenda.

Further, while movement prognostic frames primarily addressed the goal of providing safety for battered women, the messages were not inconsistent with movement’s overall goal of improving the status of women and ending gendered violence. Taken together, these dynamics make clear that members of the movement coalition largely viewed the role of the government as a resource provider to help communities prepare for and respond appropriately to the crisis created by domestic violence by addressing the immediate and short-term needs of victims. The federal government was perhaps the only institution with the resources and reach to make a national scale emergency response to domestic violence a reality. BWM actors did not articulate a role for federal oversight or new interventions.

C. How did federal lawmakers respond to the prognostic messages of the BWM?

I defined federal lawmaker response frames as bill provisions attending to the issue of woman battering or domestic violence within bill proposals in the U.S. Congress from the 95th (1977-1978) to the 103rd Congresses (1993-1994). Bill proposals often contained a number of response frames and were at times written to deal with a different
problem altogether. However, the majority of the proposals addressed at least one of the movement’s primary prognostic frames.

The timing of response to movement demands suggests increased acceptance of actors in the movement coalition as claims-makers; but that acceptance only occurred over time and on some issues. Early Congressional response was limited to claims related to battered women’s shelter and services. While the movement made claims on almost all of the primary agenda items during the first few sessions in the analysis, Congressional response on the remaining issues was non-existent until the 100th Congress. From a big-picture standpoint, the lack of acceptance of the movement’s agenda (beyond the limited attention to shelter and services) suggests that Congress did not accept movement actors as legitimate spokespersons on issues related to criminal justice, courts, and public health interventions. Further, by responding only to these two issues, lawmakers rejected the movement assessment of domestic violence as a crisis requiring an immediate and comprehensive response by the federal government. As the challenge progressed, the movement agenda as a whole received more attention from lawmakers. Congress began to develop a multi-layered policy agenda that partially aligned with the movement’s agenda but also incorporated alternative solutions. So while individual prognostic frames were being incorporated into Congressional proposals, simultaneous response frames began to deviate from the movement’s agenda.

These alternative policy proposals began to focus on issues related to criminal justice and public safety, shifting the conversation from responding to victims in crisis to apprehending and suppressing offenders. Congressional response frames included provisions to send money directly to criminal justice agencies to develop and implement
interventions. Further, Congress preemptively called for increased penalties for offenders and the designation of gender-biased violence as a hate crime. The merging of the Violence Against Women Act into the crime bill (HR 3355, 1993) solidified the move from the social service and public health orientation of response frames in the early years, to the treatment of domestic violence as a criminal justice problem.

**D. What were the outcomes of the BWM prognostic messages in Congressional policy proposals?**

The unit of analysis for this work was the *movement prognostic frame*. As such, the bulk of the analysis addresses the frame outcome. For each movement prognostic message, I documented a frame outcome in each Congressional session in which the frame was introduced by a member of the movement coalition. Frame outcomes represent the acceptance and inclusion status of the movement prognosis in a bill introduced into Congress, regardless of whether or not the bill was enacted. Three frame outcomes were observed: frame success, frame cooptation, and frame failure. Members of Congress proposed preemptive policies. However, since the analysis begins with and follows movement frames to determine outcomes, preemptive policies were treated separately in this work. Adopted policy outcomes were also documented at the frame level of analysis. These outcomes were documented by Congressional session in Chapter 6. Here, I extend the discussion of outcomes by focusing on the *overall patterns* of frame outcomes leading up to policy success, cooptation, or failure.

This analysis yielded mixed results regarding movement frame outcomes. Every message in the movement primary agenda had at least one frame success. Half of the
movement prognostic frames had at least one attempted cooptation. None of the movement frames had the same outcome across every session of Congress.

Early movement frame success was observed for the requests for funding shelter, services, and public awareness campaigns between the 95th and 98th Congresses. Over the course of the challenge, each of these prognostic claims was subjected to multiple frame cooptation attempts. Continued claims about the specific need for battered women’s shelter outlasted attempts to direct federal funds to states to expand existing homeless services as well as those aimed at creating new forms of shelter programs for battered women. But the movement requests for services and public awareness had mixed outcomes overall, with both success and cooptation frame outcomes. These patterns held for policy outcomes as well, with multiple policy successes for shelter funding over the course of the challenge and the combination of policy success and cooptation for service and public awareness frames.

Most movement frames were not addressed by Congress in the early part of the challenge. Early frame failures included: victim compensation, criminal justice and court personnel training, public health personnel training, legal representation, confidential address, and requests for the consideration of domestic violence in child custody cases. For the most part, these frames continued to have failed outcomes until the 100th Congress, when each generated frame success, cooptation, or some combination of the two. With the exception of the victim compensation frame, which was addressed in legislation for the Victims of Crime Act reauthorization, these frames were all included in drafts of the VAWA. The pattern of early frame failure yielding to later frame success
was the most frequent pattern observed for movement agenda items. For most frames, policy success was achieved when VAWA was adopted.

None of the movement frames resulted in policy cooptation alone and only two agenda items failed to result in at least a partial policy success. The call for relaxing eligibility requirements for battered women seeking access to government financial assistance programs managed to have partial frame success, but failed to generate sufficient attention from Congress. The call for public health personnel training resulted in multiple frame successes in the latter half of the challenge, but was not included in any of the adopted policies.

The resulting Violence Against Women Act (PL 103-322, 1994) contained provisions that encompassed all of the possible movement prognostic frame outcomes: success, cooptation, failure, and preemption. VAWA got the scope right—providing a broad sweeping response; but moved the focus of federal intervention toward suppressing and punishing offenders—and garnering victim assistance to do so. This was a big win in terms of getting the federal government to recognize the problem and dedicate resources. There were real benefits for battered women and other movement coalition members, too. Reforms consistent with movement and preemptive provisions. However, the Department of Justice and Department of Health and Human Services were granted oversight, which is a loss for the BWM preferred response.

The increased attention to domestic violence during the VAWA period (from 1990 forward), including the adoption of VAWA, followed two decades of change in the way social and cultural institutions responded to battered women. Government funding, including federal funding for battered women’s shelters added to the legitimacy of these
activities and decreased stigma around helping women escape their homes. But I would speculate that the majority of change in terms of type and amount of attention by Congress resulted from a broadening of the constituency of actors engaged in work with battered women and their abusers. State law changes meant changes to the practices of criminal justice and social service agencies. As a result agents within these organizations took a professional interest in federal policy production. Not only did they have a stake in the outcomes of battered women, but they also needed resources and institutional support to carry out the implementation of past and proposed policy changes. So while the consistency and longevity of the movement’s prognostic framing efforts helped shape federal response, the increased level of attention by Congress to these issues was the result of pressures from multiple interests groups. The pattern of target response frames over time, in both pacing and content, support this conclusion. An assessment of participation of other community actors in hearings and the publications of professional groups would be necessary to see how these dynamics played out.

III. Theoretical Implications

The main objective of this work was to explain the ways in which these outcomes represent the prolonged influence of the BWM on domestic violence policy. If, as historians have suggested, the movement was coopted in the early 1980s, then one might expect negligible movement influence on policy outcomes over a decade later. This work does not seek to answer questions about the cooptation of movement leadership or organizations, looking instead to investigate the question of whether the movement shaped policy outcomes regardless of objective or subjectively perceived organizational cooptation. This examination of the interactions between the movement’s
key policy-oriented messages and federal bill proposals provides empirical support for the assertion that the BWM was a central player in shaping federal policy on domestic violence over the course of two decades – including a sustained period of time after any such cooptation of leadership would have occurred.

Domestic violence public policy outcomes are both the direct and indirect product of the BWM. The findings of this work suggest that the BWM directly influenced federal policy on domestic violence through initiating the challenge that moved battered women’s issues onto the Congressional agenda. Members of the movement coalition identified the problem as one in need of attention and took their messages directly to lawmakers. In the articulation of these claims, the movement also had a direct influence on creating and expanding the contours of the policy domain. As a result, BWM actors defined the scope of institutional response. The consistent messages and participation of members of the movement coalition guided federal lawmaker’s actions throughout the challenge.

The analysis of movement claims-making at the frame level also revealed indirect influences on policy outcomes. The BWM challenge of federal policy on domestic violence created competition in the policy domain. The same activities that helped set the government agenda on domestic violence also activated other stakeholder interests and the involvement of others working in areas impacted by the proposals and policy outcomes in this challenge. Further, adopted policy reforms (the outcome of movement-target interactions) created institutionalized interest for the federal government in the prevention and intervention of domestic violence. These institutionalized interests would play an increasingly larger role over time, especially in proposals leading up to the
Violence Against Women Act. Taken as a whole, target response frames in the latter Congressional sessions show an increasing government preference for the expertise of institutional actors.

In spite of the influence of movement prognostic frames on the development of policy, the overall outcomes for this challenge are mixed. The movement’s prognostic frames defined the scope of the agenda and identified institutional concerns. Because they filled this role, they could anticipate, but not necessarily prevent the absorption and replacement of their prognostic frames with these competing interests. Further, while the movement controlled the definition of the problem early and remained engaged throughout the challenge, institutional interests accrued as policy reforms began to appear and the challenge played out. These dynamics lead to simultaneous movement frame success and attempted (and successful) frame cooptation later in the challenge. These findings point to four dynamics with implications for how we understand the role of social movement messaging in the production of policy outcomes.

A. How one defines the movement matters critically for what findings we can see.

The movement’s message was preserved and carried by a variety of actors over time. While authors producing work for movement periodicals and books self-identified as movement actors, witnesses in Congressional hearings generally identified themselves by organizational affiliation, occupational group, or as a survivor of domestic battery. In total, five distinct groups were represented in Congressional hearings, including survivors, shelter providers, representatives of local or state-level coalitions, legal advocates, representatives of national domestic violence organizations, and national feminist organizations. At the end of the day, the messages carried by these actors
differed little in scope or specification. Defining the movement as a coalition of actors allowed for the identification of the successful entrenchment of BWM ideas about the need for and nature of battered women’s shelter interventions within the battered women’s beneficiary, advocacy, and service provider populations.

Conversely, had I defined the movement by identifiable national organizations, the findings of this work would look much different. National domestic violence and feminist organizations were a minority of witnesses carrying the BWM message in hearings before Congress. In this scenario, the primary federal policy agenda would have been limited to the demands for shelter and improving public knowledge through awareness initiatives and criminal justice system training. The emergence of an identifiable coalition of BWM actors in Congressional hearings allowed for the analysis of the broader movement agenda—one that more fully represented the positions articulated in movement publications. This suggests that at least for some kinds of movements, the messages and actions of persons outside of identifiable social movement organizations must be considered when analyzing framing and policy outcomes.

Scholars largely document social movements by the identifiable organizational apparatus associated with recruitment, fundraising, and claims-making and movement protest activities. Social movement organizations are rarely isolated actors in cultural and political change efforts. And while we focus on these agencies as identifiable and impactful actors, the cultural and political influences of social movements go beyond the proximate contributions of organizations. What we know about movement outcomes may be improved by a focus that takes into account ripple effects of movement emergence and
organization, including whether or not both immediate and long-range policies meet or diverge from the content of social movement grievances.

B. Although some movement messages are not subjected to cooptation, attempted cooptation of movement prognostic messages occurs regularly in policy proposals. This examination finds that not all message cooptation attempts look the same. Three types of cooptation were observed: symbolic acceptance, absorption, and replacement.

Both Trumpy (2008) and Stratigaki (2004) pointed to the tendency of targets to respond to movement demands with *symbolic acceptance*, which refers to coptive target response frames that show agreement with the movement prognosis, but yield no resources to bring about the desired change. In the current analysis, this form of cooptation occurred primarily in the later years—after initial policy reforms had passed in Congress. Congressional bills designating Domestic Violence month accepted the movement’s call for increased public awareness, but did not provide resources for an education initiative or a public awareness campaign. Congress also responded to the movement’s call for federal encouragement for consideration of domestic violence in child custody cases in state courts with a symbolic “sense of congress” statement that simply stated Congress agreed with the claim. Symbolic cooptation attempts were executed and passed into law by Congress, but members of the movement coalition did not accept these policies. Rather, testimonies in subsequent sessions continued to push for action on these two issues. Both of these coptive symbolic response frames were later followed by movement frame and policy success.
For the BWM two other forms cooptive target responses were more common: cooptation by absorption and by replacement. Cooptation by *absorption* refers to the attempt to address movement demands by adding the movement prognosis to existing interventions. The BWM was asking for funds for a new type of intervention: the battered woman’s shelter. The earliest cooptation attempts observed in this challenge aimed to address the movement demand for shelter and services by expanding programs created to address homelessness or substance abuse to include intervention for battered women. Cooptation by absorption appeared as the initial response to the request for funding battered women services. Through their testimonies, members of the movement coalition claimed that these existing interventions were not appropriate. Ultimately, the movement was able to escape message cooptation through the persistent rejection of proposals to absorb battered women’s refuge into existing programs. BWM actors continued to make claims about the inadequate treatment of battered women by these very programs and highlighting the uniqueness and transformative nature of peer counseling provided by battered women’s organizations.

After the initial policy successes in funding battered women’s shelters and services in the 98th Congress, the nature of cooptive bill proposals began to change. Similar to Gamson’s (1975) articulation of pseudo success, cooptation by *replacement* refers to those instances where target response frames accept the movement’s prognosis, but propose an alternative solution. The most obvious example in this work is seen in the response to the movement’s demand for legal representation for battered women with ongoing criminal and civil court cases. Movement actors articulated the need for direct legal representation to help battered women navigate the complexities of the legal system.
and to help protect them from further abuse by their partners through drawn out divorce and custody proceedings. Lawmakers proposed a combination of response frames. One response was to increase funding for legal aid programs for low income individuals, which constituted a partial frame success. However, a second response proposed the creation of a grant program to provide lay advocates inside of police departments and prosecutor’s offices to help women reporting criminal battery navigate the system as a victim/witness. At first glance, this response gives the impression of increased acceptance of the movement prognosis and a potential compromise through innovation. But this proposal aimed to replace the intervention articulated by the movement with a different initiative altogether. The goal of the movement claim was to protect the legal rights of battered women. The goal of the target response was to improve the participation of victims in the apprehension and prosecution of their abusers. Even so, centering interventions on victim needs, a hallmark of the BWM, became a part of the plan for federal intervention.

The prognostic frames that avoided cooptation attempts altogether represented areas in which Congress either controlled the targeted programs or ascribed expertise to another professional group. Frames challenging federal regulations related to government financial assistance program eligibility, crime victim compensation, and address concealment all failed to generate Congressional response in the early years. While the demand for government assistance failed to generate regulation reform, the latter two claims eventually resulted in frame and policy success. A similar pattern of delayed response was also observed for the prognostic frames related to education for professionals in other institutions, namely, the criminal justice system and public health.
professions. These issues, while impervious to cooptation attempts, were a major part of congressional proposals in the latter part of the challenge. In addition, when Congress did respond to these movement frames, their response shifted attention to policies that favored federally organized programs and placed prevention and intervention activities in the hands of the professionals movement actors sought to educate about domestic violence. So while the movement achieved frame success in most instances, the resulting policies further weakened the legitimacy of movement actors as spokespersons on the issue by directing authority to government agents. These findings are consistent with the literature on contentious politics, which suggests cooptation is less likely for issues over which the target already has authority and is more likely where political actors want to use the movement frame to further their own interests (Gamson, 1975; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2002). As such, when it comes to movement message outcomes we need to think carefully about what frames are being coopted and in what ways, rather than just whether or not cooptation happened.

The irony here is that the messages that were coopted are, counter-intuitively, also the messages that most directly drove acceptance of the movement’s framing message. The call for increased resources for victim services were the frames most frequently subjected to cooptation attempts. But it was precisely the movement’s focus on victims that carried over into policy outcomes, regardless of whether enacted policies contained frame success, cooptation, or preemption. Attempts at cooptation typically draw on existing policy frameworks and understandings of government's role in problem resolution. Thus, if social movements can shape those frameworks and understandings, they stand to influence policy regardless of whether cooptation occurs or not.
C. The terrain on which movement messages and target response frames intersect is constantly subject to change due to both continued advocacy by members of the movement coalition and by target responses.

One implication from Trumpy’s (2008) interaction approach to analyzing frame outcomes was the understanding that the challenge is not over until the movement accepts the target’s response frame. This led to the possibility that cooptive target response frames were not final. Rather, continued movement advocacy in the face of a cooptation attempt could lead to later success. This line of reasoning purports the notion that resilient movements can turn cooptation attempts into success through continued advocacy, but weak movements are at risk for accepting the target’s response at face value and acquiescing to cooptation. If this were the case, one might predict that message outcomes for a self-proclaimed organizationally coopted BWM would lean toward cooptation rather than success. This was observed only in the case of the movement’s request for funding battered women’s services. Initial Congressional response sought to absorb domestic violence service provision into existing social programs. However, with continued advocacy Congress proposed funding for specific and direct battered women’s services. For other frames, frame cooptation more often followed frame success.

Policy success also changed the conditions under which the movement’s messages were considered. Successful policy adoption in the 98th Congress provided federal funding for shelter, services, and law enforcement training. However, this successful proposal occurred alongside a number of alternative response frames that attempted to coopt the movement’s framing of shelter and services for battered women.
Following government funding of shelters, there was an initial suppression of Congressional attention to the issue of domestic violence. However, when it came time to renew the original legislation in the 100th Congress, there was a surge in lawmaker attention to the issue.

In the 101st Congress, target response frames began to address previously ignored demands made by the movement for over a decade. For the most part, these prior frame failure outcomes were transformed into a mixture frame success and cooptation. Frame and policy successes were observed for crime victim compensation and procedures to secure confidential address. Neither of these issues received congressional response until the 100th and 101st Congresses respectively. A combination of frame success and cooptation was found for the issues of battered women’s legal representation and encouraging state courts to consider domestic violence in proceedings on child custody. Both of these were longstanding demands made by movement actors, but lawmakers did not respond to these claims until the 101st Congress. In these instances, target response frames resulting in both frame success and cooptation were introduced within the same session.

Unlike Trumy’s work on a single corporate target, members of Congress do not respond to movement frames unilaterally. The observed frame and policy outcomes in this work point to a pattern of frame and policy cooptation occurring simultaneously with frame success and policy reform outcomes. In part, the bifurcated response is a product of the way new laws are proposed and considered. The political process allows for multiple responses. Further, once policy proposals are on the table the process moves onto a new terrain of internal debate among lawmakers. By funding battered women’s shelters and
services, the government had a vested interest in the issue. It is also possible that increased attention to policies under federal authority or those addressing other professional groups discussed earlier triggered the interest of other parties. Growth and diversification in the policy domain led to alternative ideas about how to address the problems identified in the movement prognosis.

D. As BWM advocacy transitioned through an “unsettled period” to a more “settled period,” the ideas related to battered women’s safety were less contested in the policy realm. But even with increased acceptance and response from lawmakers, the movement’s preferred policy solutions were marginalized by the weight of institutional interests by the end of the challenge.

The BWM initiated both local and federal policy advocacy during a period of widespread social, cultural, and institutional transformation. The earliest interactions on record between BWM actors and members of Congress occurred in the late 1970s. This period marked the decline of the cycle of protest encompassing the Black Civil Rights Movement and the Women’s Right’s and Liberation Movements. These movements yielded federal laws establishing the right to non-discrimination across a diverse set of social and cultural institutions. However, the implementation of new laws on non-discrimination was incomplete and ongoing.

During this same period, the problem of domestic battery was drawn out of the home and into public spaces. Shelters and community services specific to intervention for battered women were new ideas. The first shelters were controversial, in large part because the idea that a woman would leave her home conflicted with preexisting notions
about family life. In addition, the beginnings of battered women’s federal policy advocacy also corresponded to ongoing disputes about the role of the federal government in other women’s rights issues. While the issue of women’s role in family life was not overtly articulated as part of the national policy agenda, these tensions were present in the testimonies of movement actors and discussed in depth in movement publications.

In the 1970s, the actors who would come to represent the BWM came together out of necessity. There was no guarantee of community support for women who sought refuge from a violent home. With no existing institutional support, these actors embraced empowerment groups and alternative intuitional forms associated with the Civil Rights and Women’s movements and forged the beliefs and values that came to guide their political activism. Even in the absence of a strong organizational structure, the movement’s message was consistent. This consistency was, at least in part, the result of the movement’s origin in grassroots battered women’s service provision and the shared culture that developed in these environments. In contrast to the methods of existing institutions in social services, criminal justice, and public health, battered women’s organizations provided refuge and services according to the direction of the women themselves. Although not the central focus of this work, it is important to note that movement prognostic frames were generated inside these alternative institutions as battered women (and later their organizations) networked with others with similar experiences. The connection of the movement’s policy agenda to the direct experiences of battered women and their conflicts with existing interventions played a role in the politicization of battered women and those working within battered women’s organizations and the development of a widely held ideology about the cause for and
solution to the problem. At the beginning of the challenge, the BWM’s ideas about public policy represented both an innovative solution to a problem and an attack on the status quo with regard to the way existing institutions handled woman battering.

These findings are consistent with Ann Swidler’s (1986, 1995) argument that culture guides social action. Specifically, she contends that people develop a diverse set of cultural competencies and when confronted with new or changing environments, they will utilize artifacts, rituals, and other cultural tools to adapt to and make claims about social change. Although this cultural knowledge is somewhat embedded in individuals and groups, the deployment of culture is an active process. According to Swidler, the influence of culture on action is contingent on the climate of large scale social dynamics. Social problems are ever present, but how society attempts to resolve problems differs over time and in patterned ways. In periods of social transformation or “unsettled culture,” ideologies develop to provide a cohesive answer for questions about what should be done to address a given problem or set of problems. These answers are derived through the habits and activities of people as they attempt to deal with shifting cultural terrain. Problem definitions are based on beliefs and values that result from these shared activities. During unsettled periods the meanings derived from cultural beliefs and practices drive action by introducing new ideas about how to address the problem.

However, these periods of transformation do not continue indefinitely. During periods Swidler described as “settled,” ideology yields to tradition and common sense. Action is determined by the way things are and have been accomplished in the past. In settled periods, cultural tools still influence action, albeit less directly. Ideologies become less overt and the meanings ascribed to specific actions are disarticulated from their
origins. This can result in continued relevance of the actions driven by culture, but opens the door for competing traditions. During periods of settled culture, strategic interests drive action. Cultural beliefs and values then are used to justify the continuation of a particular action or the replacement of one tradition with another.

During the early years of the movement, framing mattered in important ways. Movement messages offered a strategy to address a problem with little to no intervention history. Prognostic frames demanding funding for shelters were immediately accepted by some lawmakers and led primarily to frame success. This pattern was consistent across the challenge. In this way, the movement controlled the definition of the situation as it pertained to the development and provision of shelter and services. Conversely, movement messages questioning intervention in existing institutions failed to generate a response from lawmakers.

As the social movement activity marking the period of unsettled political culture declined, the BWM continued making demands of federal lawmakers, but the terrain on which these contests played out changed. By the time the movement’s demand for shelter realized federal policy success in 1984, it was no longer possible for members of Congress to ignore domestic violence as a policy issue. This analysis demonstrated that lawmakers were more engaged in addressing the problem both in terms of simple volume of proposals and by covering a broader set of issues in the movement agenda. The government was increasingly compelled to respond, not because of the movement’s continued advocacy, but rather because the context in which the issues were being raised and considered changed. Federal intervention intersected with ongoing policy changes at the state and local levels in creating institutional stakeholders in government and non-
governmental agencies engaging in service provision, law enforcement, and education. One result of a broader set of interests was the introduction of competing traditions and different perspectives on how to best intervene in domestic violence. The use of violence to control women continued to be central to the movement’s dialogue and was used to justify continuing attention to providing refuge that encouraged peer support, self-determination, and empowerment. However, policy proposals began to be dominated by other institutional interests. Battered women were increasing defined by socially prescribed identities of victim and witness rather than the preferred self-identification as survivors. Target response frames were also moving toward addressing battered women’s problems as they aligned with these identities.

Movement prognostic frames calling for changes to existing institutions received more attention in the settled period in the latter half of the analysis. Although, they continued to draw on meanings and framings from the earlier culturally-drive period, by the time drafts of VAWA were introduced, lawmakers were responding based on a wide set of institutional and strategic interests. The understanding of the contextual relationship between culture and action explains why the introduction of BWM demands in Congress yielded mixed results. The meanings derived by movement interests during the unsettled period were combined with emerging institutional interests of government funded programs and other professional stakeholder groups, which resulted in the bifurcated outcomes of cooptation and success for movement messages in the second half of the challenge. Five (5) percent of funds appropriated for the first three years of the Violence Against Women Act went to battered women’s shelters, while 78% of funds went to the Office of Justice Programs for law enforcement or criminal justice related
projects (Siskin, 2001). The continued acceptance of movement messages was clear. But when it came to inclusion, VAWA demonstrated Congressional preference for institutional interests.

**IV. Policy-Oriented Movement Message Making**

Message cohesion and the persistence of movement messaging combined with the empowerment of the beneficiary population extended the life and reach of the movement’s message beyond the period where scholars made claims of movement cooption. This points to an advantage for so-called service organization based activism. Many of the movement actors had utilized battered women’s movement crisis intervention resources. Others were engaged in work that regularly required contact with the beneficiary population. The results of these interactions were tangible and therefore the message was consistent over time as their stories were retold over the course of the challenge. This provides evidence for the success of the movement’s strategy to first provide safety and that the experience and education provided by shelter life would politicize battered women such that they could be agents of change in society. But the lack of leadership and organization in this continuing advocacy may have inhibited the ability of BWM coalition members to innovate around the message or create new messages in response to the changing landscape of the policy domain and resulting policy adoption.

**V. Limitations of the Study**

The research findings presented in this work are subject to limitations related to data sources, researcher position, and generalizability. The use of formal documents and the official record as data can lead to bias. Specifically, these documents are produced by
persons or in environments where the authors have control over the content and may have chosen to prevent the publication or witness testimony of views that were inconsistent with the producer’s intent. For example, much of the work of federal lawmaking occurs outside of the formal record. Lawmakers meet with and discuss policy with actors in venues that are not systematically captured in the ways that bill proposals and formal hearing are recorded. Further, the presence of members of the movement coalition in Congressional hearings was the result of invitation from lawmakers, who may potentially block those with more radical ideas about ending violence against women from participation. Similarly, the editorial board of the Aegis or other outlets may have rejected articles for publication by members of the movement coalition who did not share the majority perspective on government intervention.

The use of emergent coding as a research technique carries limitations of validity related to both researcher position and subjectivity. Prior to this work, there was no available resource documenting the BWM policy agenda over time. The absence of foundational literature on the topic required that I identify and verify the components of the movement’s national policy positions. Similarly, it was rarely possible to code a Congressional bill in total as constituting a single outcome. Most of the time (especially in the early years) movement actors did not directly address support for or opposition to a bill. Bills also had to be coded by provisions in order to compare Congressional response to movement demands.

In order to guard against threats to validity, I utilized the processes of source triangulation and substantive validation. Source triangulation is a systematic process of looking through multiple sources of data to find common themes and categories in an
effort to eliminate bias from researcher subjectivity (Cresswell and Miller 2010). I identified the BWM messages from both movement publications and public testimonies, relying on both to find the primary themes of the movement’s national policy agenda. In an effort to reduce threats to validity resulting from the use of documents produced as the official record, I used substantive validation and systematic methods for coding both movement and target data as detailed in Chapter 3. Substantive validation involves identifying researcher interpretation and clearly documenting sources for observation (Angen 2000). Another researcher could select alternative data sources or code these items differently. Even so, I am confident that an approach with similar theoretical and analytic questions would result in similar findings overall.

Finally, this work should be viewed as a study of the public framing of policy interventions for both the challenger and the target. The use of the single case study often leads to questions about the generalizability of research findings. Social movements differ in a number of ways. The same is true of both political interest in and the composition of policy domains. The BWM is a specific, conceptually bound case. While this work focused on the case of the BWM, the findings on the plasticity and multidimensionality of message outcomes may be applicable in other settings. These elements should be investigated in future research.

VI. Recommendations for Future Research

These findings suggest three additional lines of inquiry. First, although this analysis has documented the impact of movement framing on target response frames and policy outcomes, the impact of other actors also mattered in the construction of federal domestic violence policy. We need further research on how actors in the broader
community and within the governing system also shape target response frames and policy outcomes. An analysis of frame alignment and counter framing between the movement and professional interest groups may thus lead to additional insight into the content of target response frames. The examination should include documentation of the relative participation and influence of these actors to members of the BWM coalition in Congressional hearings.

Second, the simultaneous appearance of conflicting frame outcomes in single sessions of Congress may in part be an artifact of the rough scale of this work—meaning if I drilled down into introduction dates a chronology of introduction could reveal a better picture of the dynamic. These data are available; however, the scope of this work did not allow for this level of detailed analysis. Future research should examine this and proposal characteristics in order to expand our understanding of Congressional response frames.

Third, this work examines message outcomes for a single case. Additional research is needed to determine under what conditions these findings can be generalized. The BWM focused on a single social problem, had an identifiable coalition of members, and a published record of positions that made documenting movement policy messages possible. One way to expand our understanding of movement frame and policy outcomes is a comparative examination of policy-oriented message outcomes for other similarly situated movements. Case selection should focus on movements for whom public messages (and target responses) can be identified in ways that allow for comparable documentation and those that share a similar target.
VII. Conclusion

This work complicates previous claims that the Battered Women’s Movement was coopted by institutional response in the early 1980s. Message cooptation appeared alongside frame success and failure and came much later than previous claims of movement cooptation. Not only did members of the movement coalition continue to carry the agenda developed through community organizing around shelters and services in federal hearings, they also saw a number of policy goals realized over the course of this challenge. These policy successes were the result of a diverse constituency of movement actors, a consistent message about providing safety for battered women, and a changing political environment that accepted battered women’s shelter and services as a necessary social intervention but also gave voice to emerging institutional interests.

Domestic violence is a rooted policy domain within the federal policy process. However, the movement did experience cooptation through institutional response. In addition to the cooptation of specific frames, the larger pattern of frame outcomes uncovered in this work suggests that lawmakers never fully accepted the movement’s call for widespread emergency response to domestic violence. As a result, claims of insufficient resources for battered women in crisis, inadequate public and professional knowledge about domestic violence, and a lack of legal protections for battered women continue to dominate conversations about the public policy response to domestic violence. For this movement, and others like it, a more nuanced understanding of cooptation may result from looking beyond organizations and exploring questions about the persistence and response to movement messages.
Appendix A

Data Sources for Battered Women’s Movement Messages

Congressional Hearings


U.S. Congress. Senate Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism,


U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, Committee on Energy


U.S. Congress. House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, Committee on the


**Movement Publications**


Violence Against Women, No. 36, pp. 19-25.


Reinelt, Claire. 1995. "Moving onto the Terrain of the State: The Battered Women's


Yolanda Bako Papers. 96-M117-96-M137, Box 1, May 12-14, 1978. Notes from the
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence Steering Committee Meeting.
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University.

**Special Hearings and Government Publications**


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Appendix B

Battered Women’s Movement Timeline

This timeline provides a listing of people, organizations, events, and publications in the history of the Battered Women’s Movement. The timeline will also highlight important political events, shifts in political control of the U.S. Presidency, Senate, and House of Representatives as well as major policy developments. The timeline begins with activities in the 1960s and includes events up to and immediately following the adoption of the Violence Against Women Act. This chronology is not meant to be comprehensive, but rather seeks to provide context for the events covered in the current project. Battered Women’s Movement and related movement people, organizations, and events will be presented in **bold**, publications in *italics*, policy forums, events, and developments will be *underlined*, and political administrations and policy items will appear in regular text.

1960s  
Al-Anon begins treating battered women who are married to alcoholic men (Schecter 1982)

1960s  
**Haven House (shelter) opens in Pasadena, California**

1960s  
Criminal justice system uses crisis intervention model to treat domestic violence—couples were referred to social workers or psychiatrists to treat individual pathologies believed to cause violence in relationships (Dobash and Dobash 1992)

1960s  
Shelters begin accepting Title XX funds (Social Security Act) but are required to spend monies on services leading to the push to professionalize staff and treat women as clients (Schecter 1982). Title XX funds were only accessible to programs for providing emergency shelter and for in-service training for social services and domestic violence service providers, but only if these projects are included in the state’s Health and Human Services approved Title XX plan. Accepting the money also required the agency to provide matching funds that do not come from the federal government (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1982)

1963  
The Feminine Mystique, Betty Friedan

1964  
The U.S. Civil Rights Act passes the U.S. Congress

1966  
**Founding National Organization for Women**
1970s NOW organizes over 300 local and state rape task force groups (Schecter 1982)

1970s Richmond Police Department (California) becomes the first in the nation to make domestic crisis intervention training part of in-service training for all officers (Martin 1976)

1970s Hayward Police Department (California) starts Project Outreach. The project sends mental health professionals with officers on family violence calls (Martin 1976)

1970s Journal of Marriage and the Family (founded in 1939) adds “violence” to journal index (Martin 1976)

1970 Voices from Women’s Liberation, Edited by Leslie B. Tanner, volume on Women’s Liberation that makes reference to male violence

1970 Sisterhood is Powerful, Edited by Robin Morgan, volume on Women’s Liberation that makes reference to male violence

1971-1972 92nd United States Congress, President Richard Nixon (Republican), the Democratic Party controls both the House of Representatives and the Senate

1971 Founding Women’s Advocates in St. Paul, Minnesota, organization began as a consciousness raising group, incorporated as a non-profit organization in 1972, purchased a property for a shelter after receiving funding from the Ramsey County Mental Health Board in 1974 (Erler 1978)


1971 Rape: The All American Crime, Susan Griffin (articulates rape as an act of aggression)

1972 Founding Center for Women Policy Studies (CWPS) in Washington, D.C., organization began as a feminist non-profit research and policy advocacy group and resource center (Center for Women Policy Studies 1997)

1972 Founding Pittsburgh Women’s Center, the Center opens a shelter in 1974 (Martin 1976)

1972 Founding Rainbow Retreat (shelter), Phoenix, Arizona (Schecter 1982)

1973-1974 93rd United States Congress, Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford (Republican), the Democratic Party controls both the House of Representatives and the Senate

1973 Al-Anon in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania opens shelter for women battered by alcoholic husbands (Schecter 1982)

1974 Scream Quietly or the Neighbors will Hear, Erin Pizzey (the British Battered Women’s Movement)

1974 Founding Transition House in Boston, Massachusetts, Chris Womendez and Cherie Jimenez declare their Boston home a shelter operating on principles of women’s liberation (Dobash and Dobash 1992)
1974 Founding Casa Myrna Vazquez Shelter in Boston, Massachusetts. The shelter is a multi-racial group that later becomes a technical assistance center for community outreach on matters related to Third World Women (Schecter 1982)

1974 Rainbow Retreat establishes outpatient program to provide counseling to women who choose not to leave their abuser (Martin 1976)

1974 The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funds a night prosecutor program in Columbus, Ohio to provide diversion and mediation for domestic violence offenders in lieu of prosecution (Martin 1976)

1974 Founding Feminist Alliance Against Rape Newsletter (Schecter 1982)

1974 Founding Community Crisis Center in Elgin, Illinois. The Center was not exclusive to serving battered women and actually started as a project to assist middle class women abandoned by their husbands. The Center incorporated and opened a shelter in 1975. A little over half of the women served were battered women. The shelter took a non-feminist approach to advocacy and service provision, encouraging use of existing services in the community; but the group maintained the goal of creating women’s self-sufficiency. In 1980, the Center received federal grant money to write a how-to guide for shelter organization and management (Community Crisis Center 1980)

1974, August 9 Richard Nixon resigns the Presidency

1975-1976 94th United States Congress, President Gerald Ford (Republican), the Democratic Party controls both the House of Representatives and the Senate


1975 Founding Abused Women’s Aid in Crisis, New York. The center offers referral services and group counseling sessions to battered wives (Martin 1976)


1975 Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape, Susan Brownmiller

1975 The Politics of Rape: The Victim’s Perspective, Diana E. Russell

1975, October 29 Women’s Strike Day, a national feminist day of protest (Miller 2010)


1976 International Women’s Year Conference, Houston, Texas, this conference is cited as one of the events leading to the
organization of a national Battered Women’s Movement (Schecter 1982)

1976 Center for Women Policy Studies launched the National Resource Center on Family Violence and established a 6 year project to study and improve services for battered women in the criminal justice system (Center for Women Policy Studies 1997)

1976 Founding Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence following hearings at the Pennsylvania Legislature where grassroots groups from around the State were invited to attend (Schecter 1982)

1976 Battered Wives, Del Martin

1976 Working on Wife Abuse, Betsy Warrior, a directory of individuals and groups working on battered women’s issues

1976 U.S. Senator Birch Bayh (D-Indiana) expresses interest in introducing legislation on family violence through the Senate Judiciary Committee (Martin 1976)

1976 Center for Women Policy Studies uses an LEAA grant to publish the newsletter Response. The newsletter covers a variety of topics related to intra-family violence and is mailed for free to a national audience (Center for Women Policy Studies 1997)

1976 Founding Chicago Abused Women’s Coalition, the Coalition publishes a newsletter and provides first housing alternatives program for women with no family or friends (Schecter 1982)

1976 Founding Center for Battered Women, a counseling collective in Austin, TX (Ahrens 1980)

1976 A grant from the LEAA funds the first legal center for Battered Women in the U.S. (Schecter 1982)

1976, January Founding La Casa de las Madres in San Francisco, California; the shelter aimed to provide battered women’s services to Latina women and their families (Martin 1976)

1976, March 4 International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women, Brussels, Belgium. A resolution on domestic violence is sent to the governments of all countries. Similar tribunals are held in New York and San Francisco (Martin 1976)

1976, June Founding Harriet Tubman Women’s Shelter in Minneapolis, Minnesota (Miller 2010)

1976, August 26 Women Support Women march held in Cambridge, Massachusetts. This is the first mass demonstration in the U.S. on battered women (Miller 2010)

1976, October 2-3 Wisconsin Conference on Battered Women is held in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Collaboration at this conference led to the foundation of the National Communication Network for the Elimination of Violence Against Women newsletter (Brygger 1982; Schecter 1982)

1977-1978  95th United States Congress, President James Carter (Democrat), the Democratic Party controls both the House of Representatives and the Senate

1977  A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to establish a grant program designed to develop methods of prevention and treatment relating to domestic violence is introduced in Congress (HR 7927; HR 9052; HR 9053; HR 9267; S 1728)

1977  National Women’s Conference, Houston, Texas (Rambo 2009)

1977  Transition House in Cambridge, MA produces and releases a film titled “We Will Not Be Beaten.” The documentary film records battered women speaking about the reality of abuse and help seeking. Proceeds from the film go to support the operations of Transition House (Blair 1979)

1977  Center for Battered Women in Austin, TX opens shelter. The decision to open a shelter was later identified as a classic example of cooptation by professionalization (Ahrens 1978; 1980)

1977, July  White House held a meeting about battering (Dobash and Dobash 1992).

1978  The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence is established. (Avina 1979).

1978  The National Communication Network (NCN) and the Feminist Alliance Against Rape (FAAR) merge newsletters and begin joint publication of Aegis: Magazine on Ending Violence Against Women (Schechter 1982)

1978  Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) establishes a specialized family violence program to fund local projects focused on improving the response of the criminal justice system to domestic violence. To be eligible for funding, projects were required to include public and private community groups—like law enforcement, social services, and medical personnel in their projects. In 1978, 16 projects were funded. In 1980, 25 projects were funded. The LEAA was set to be phased out in 1982, so no additional projects were funded (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1982)

1978  National Conference on Prosecution of Spouse Abuse, Co-sponsored by the Center for Women Policy Studies and the National District Attorney’s Association (Lerman 1981)

1978  ACTION awards $300,000 to the Domestic Violence Project, Inc. in Ann Arbor, MI to establish a national domestic violence volunteer service program. The money is used to open 1 national volunteer center in Ann Arbor and 10 regional centers. Regional centers were located in existing organizations, most of which were absent or moderately oriented to feminist
principles (e.g. YWCA in Washington State, the Community Crisis Center in Elgin, Illinois) (No Author 1979b)


1978, April 14-15 International Conference on Battered Women was held in Amsterdam. Attendees included 128 representatives from 13 different western nations and 54 refuges or shelters. Workshops addressed: the nature of refuge, feminist analysis of battering, fundraising, research, publicity, and consciousness raising (Rosiello 1978)

1978, May 20 ABLE (Asians, Blacks, Latinos, Et Cetera) held the 3rd World Women’s Statewide Conference in San Francisco, CA. ABLE was a task force developed to conduct trainings on issues of the intersection of race and women’s oppression (Segovia-Ashley 1978)

1978, August 3-6 National Coalition Against Domestic Violence steering committee meets in Portland, OR to work on philosophy and goals for the organization. NCADV steering committee created objectives following the US commission on civil rights battered women symposium: a. “set up structure and process for the NCADV;" b. "hold a national conference," and c. have an "impact on national legislation effecting battered women.” The committee also developed membership criteria for member groups; and divided regional areas. The national conference originally scheduled for August 1978 was rescheduled for October 1979 (Avina 1979)

1978, December 4 All states are required to have a “good cause” exemption to the AFDC requirements regarding cooperation in paternity and child support actions in order to be eligible for welfare benefits. (NCN 1979a). Good cause exemptions required third party documentation and were based on a best interest of the child philosophy.

1979-1980 96th United States Congress, President James Carter (Democrat), the Democratic Party controls both the House of Representatives and the Senate

1979 President Jimmy Carter directs the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to establish an Office on Domestic Violence. The Office collaborated with the LEAA and the Center for Women Policy Studies and focused on technical assistance programs, public awareness activities, and demonstration grants for comprehensive community services. In 1981, a newly elected conservative congress defunded the initiative (Brooks 1997; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1982)

1979 Center for Women Policy Studies launched national program to improve services for battered women (Center for Women
1979

*The Battered Woman, Lenore Walker.* This work identifies a cycle of violence and proposes that battering is a learned behavior. This work also suggested that victims of battering have a “learned helplessness” (Walker 1979)

1980, January 20

The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1979 (S 440) is signed into law. The Act gave priority to research and demonstration projects that examined the relationship between alcohol abuse and other social problems, including domestic violence (U.S. Public Law 96-180)

1980, February 27

1st national meeting of the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence was held in Washington, D.C. Susan Schechter presents a talk titled "The Future of the Battered Women's Movement." 50 women from BW programs in 49 states, D.C. and Virgin Islands. Developed recommendations on organizing NCADV and political priorities. NCADV response to recommendations: 1) developed Task Force Women of Color Caucus; 2) Rural women Task Force; 3) Lesbian Task Force (Brygger 1982; Schechter 1980)

1980, November

Addressing Woman Abuse Conference is held in Lake Geneva, WI. Susan Schechter presents talk titled “Speaking to the Battered Women’s Movement” (Schechter 1981)

1981-1982

97th United States Congress, President Ronald Reagan (Republican), the Democratic Party controls the House of Representatives and the Republican Party controls the Senate

1981

*Fight Back! Feminist Resistance to Male Violence* was published. The anthology is the first that pulls together the writing of activists on issues related to the anti-rape and battered women’s movements

1981

Center for Women Policy Studies sponsored National Conference on Family Violence in the Military (Center for Women Policy Studies 1997)

1981

Center for Women Policy Studies publishes numerous monographs related to response to battered women: *Prosecution of Spouse Abuse; Court Mandated Counseling for Men Who Batter; Legal Help for Battered Women; Cracking the Corporations: Finding Corporate Funding for Family Violence Programs; Wife Abuse in the Armed Forces, Center for Women Policy Studies*

1981

Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project (DAIP) is first implemented as a psycho-educational treatment approach for batterers. Group facilitators use consciousness raising techniques to challenge perpetrator beliefs about power and control (Pence and Paymar 1993)

1981, April 3-5

12th Annual National Conference on Women and the Law was held in Boston, MA. Conference includes workshops on violence against women (MacKinnon 1982)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td><strong>Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence</strong> holds conference on the role of Men in the Movement (Morrison 1982)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td><strong>National Coalition Against Domestic Violence</strong> held its 1st Battered Women’s Conference** (Brygger 1982).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982, March 23-25</td>
<td><strong>13th Annual Conference on Women and the Law</strong> is held in Detroit Michigan. The conference includes workshops on pornography, prostitution, and violence against women (Noonan and Conner 1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td><strong>98th United States Congress</strong>, President Ronald Reagan (Republican), the Democratic Party controls the House of Representatives and the Republican Party controls the Senate</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td><strong>Center for Women Policy Studies publishes</strong>: <em>Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Violence</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td><strong>National Coalition Against Domestic Violence</strong> set goals for the next two years that focused on establishing tools for communicating with membership, strengthening local coalitions, and developing a stable funding base (Brygger 1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td><strong>The Victims of Crime Act</strong> signed into law. The act gave priority to grants designed to assist victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and child abuse (Brooks 1997)</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td><strong>Thurman vs. City of Torrington</strong>. U.S. District Court in Connecticut rules that the police do not have discretion in determining whether or not an arrest is to be made on the basis of marital status between victim and offender (Barner and Carney 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td><em>The Battered Woman’s Syndrome</em>, Lenore Walker. This work details research on a clinical population of battering victims to uncover psychological effects of battering on victims and to explain both why women stay with abusers and why they sometimes act violently toward their abusers (Walker 1984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984, October 9</td>
<td><strong>Family Violence Prevention and Services Act</strong> signed into law as part of the Amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (HR 1904). The act allows funding to be used for shelter and domestic violence services according to individual state plans for use of the money. Also provides for law enforcement training grants on family violence (U.S. Public Law 98-457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1986</td>
<td><strong>99th United States Congress</strong>, President Ronald Reagan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1985

“Violence Against Women: A Curriculum for Empowerment” is published by BWM activists. The curriculum provides training for shelters and support groups consistent with the BWM philosophy of peer support, social causes of violence against women, and the personal and political empowerment of women (C.V.A.N Battered Women’s Shelter 1986)

1986

Center for Women Policy Studies publishes: Resource Collections on Violence Against Women

1986, May 13

Coalition Against Misdiagnosis held a demonstration and speak-out at the American Psychiatric Association Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. Led by Lenore Walker, the group was protesting the treatment of battered women as pathological (Coalition Against Misdiagnosis 1986)

1986, July 15-19

National Coalition Against Domestic Violence Conference is held in St. Louis, Missouri (Ito and Lee 1987; Pence 1987)

1987

Survival in the Doldrums: The American Women’s Rights Movement, 1945 to the 1960s, Leila Rupp and Verta Taylor (concept of social movement abeyance)

1988, April 25

Amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (HR 1900) signed into law, reauthorizing funds for domestic violence shelters and services. The reauthorization removes the 3 year limit for eligibility, provides resources for law enforcement to develop victim information materials to distribute at the scene of family violence incidents, and creates the family member abuse and documentation project to be carried out by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (U.S. Public Law 100-294)

1988, November 18

The Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1988 (HR 5210) is adopted. The Act provides grants to state or local governments to improve criminal justice system response to family violence, including domestic violence, adds relationship between victim and offender to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports data collection, and adds domestic violence victims to those eligible for compensation under the Victims of Crime Act 1984 (U.S. Public Law 100-690)

1989-1990

101st United States Congress, President George H.W. Bush (Republican), the Democratic Party controls both the House of Representatives and the Senate

1989

Center for Women Policy Studies publishes: a revised edition of Legal Help for Battered Women

1989, October 6

Senate Joint Resolution 133 passes, designating October 1989 “National Domestic Violence Awareness Month” (U.S. Public
1990


1990

Senator Joe Biden introduces the Violence Against Women Act in the U.S. Senate (S 2754). The bill included provisions related to reducing violence against women on the streets and in the home and sought to establish gendered violence as a hate crime, making it possible for women to seek compensatory and punitive damages under federal civil rights law. The bill receives a hearing and passes the Senate Judiciary Committee but never receives a floor vote (Brooks 1997)

1990, October 18

House Joint Resolution 602 passes, designating October 1990 “National Domestic Violence Awareness Month” (U.S. Public Law 101-439)

1991-1992

102nd United States Congress, President George H.W. Bush (Republican), the Democratic Party controls both the House of Representatives and the Senate

1991

Senator Joe Biden reintroduces the Violence Against Women Act in the U.S. Senate (S 15). This bill includes an amendment that adds provisions related to violence against women on college campuses. Representative Barbara Boxer introduces a companion bill in the House (HR 1502). This bill is less comprehensive and focuses primarily on sexual violence and violence on the streets. No action was taken on either of these bills in 1991. Some components of the bills were added to other pieces of legislation with no successful adoptions (Brooks 1997).

1991

National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund assembles Task Force of over 170 groups including unions, churches, and women’s health and education groups to engage in lobbying efforts related to the Violence Against Women Act

1991

Center for Women Policy Studies publishes: Violence Against Women as Biased Motivated Hate Crime; Resource Collection on the Letter and the Spirit: Federal and State Legal and Policy Issues on Violence Against Women

1991

Center for Women Policy Studies submits testimony to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in support of the Violence Against Women Act, 1991 (Center for Women Policy Studies 1997)

1991, October 3

Senate Joint Resolution 73 passes,设计ating October 1991 “National Domestic Violence Awareness Month” (U.S. Public Law 102-114)

1992

Senator Joe Biden holds a press conference on the results of the Senate Judiciary Committee research project on violence against women. He pledges to prioritize the Act in the coming session (Brooks 1997)
1992, May 28  The Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, Adoption, and Family Services Act of 1992 (S 838) is adopted. The Act amends grant programs providing shelter and services to add preferences for grantees collaborating with state domestic violence coalitions and for states with a law or procedure for evicting an abused spouse from the household. The Act also redefines the types of assistance provided to include helping victims access civil and criminal courts and other advocacy related needs. Funds the development of a domestic violence prevention curriculum for school children, a public awareness campaign, establishes a National Resource Center to provide technical assistance to funded programs (U.S. Public Law 102-295)

1992, July 10  The Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Reorganization Act (S 1306) is adopted. The Act includes domestic violence counseling in required comprehensive services offered in funded substance abuse and mental health programs (U.S. Public Law 102-321)

1992, September  Representative Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and the House Crime and Criminal Justice Subcommittee held a markup of the Violence Against Women Act. In the absence of committee members supportive of the Act, several damaging amendments were added. No additional action was taken on the bill (Brooks 1997)

1992, October 27  The Battered Women’s Testimony Act of 1992 (HR 1252) is adopted. The Act empowers the State Justice Institute to collect and analyze nationwide data on the admissibility and quality of expert testimony on experiences of battered women offered as part of the defense in criminal cases and to develop training materials to assist battered women, shelters, and attorneys to use such expert testimony in appropriate cases (U.S. Public Law 102-527)

1992, October 27  Amendments to the State Justice Institute Act of 1984 (HR 1253) adopted. The Act authorizes research on State judicial decisions related to child custody litigation involving domestic violence and to develop training materials and disseminate information to appropriate agencies (U.S. Public Law 102-528)

1993-1994  103rd United States Congress, President William Clinton (Democrat), the Democratic Party controls both the House of Representatives and the Senate

1993  Senator Joe Biden and newly elected Senator Barbara Boxer introduce the Violence Against Women Act (S 11) in the U.S. Senate. One month later the House introduces a nearly identical bill (HR 1133), but with additional provisions related to battered immigrant women (Brooks 1997)

1993, May 27  Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously approved the Violence Against Women Act, after minimal revision and amendment (Brooks 1997)

1993, November 16  The Violence Against Women Act is attached to the Senate Crime
Bill, which passed 94-5. Most of the Act provisions stayed intact with the exception of the removal of the battered immigrant provisions (Brooks 1997)

1993, November 17 The full House Judiciary Committee approves the bill and sends it to the House floor. The bill passed 421-0, with the deletion of the hate crime provision. The House also decides to incorporate the Act into the crime bill (HR 3355) (Brooks 1997)

1994 The Crime Bill is approved in both the house and senate and is sent to the House-Senate committee for revisions. The House approved the revised bill 325-195 with a 3.3 million cut in funding. The Senate passed the bill 61-38 (Brooks 1997)

1994, May 19 Arson Prevention Act of 1994 (HR 1727) adopted. The Act includes programs to combat domestic violence as a cause of arson and research to prevent arson caused by domestic violence in activities eligible for funding (U.S. Public Law 103-254)

1994, September 13 President Bill Clinton signed the Crime Bill (HR 3355) into law approving 1.62 billion for the Violence Against Women Act, which included both the hate crimes and battered immigrant provisions (U.S. Public Law 103-322)

1995-1996 104th United States Congress, President William Clinton (Democrat), the Republican Party controls both the House of Representatives and the Senate
Appendix C

Data Sources for Congressional Response Frames

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for a program of research to help better understand, identify, and to the extent possible prevent or relieve pressures on families. S. 2250. 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide for a program of research to help better understand, identify, and to the extent possible, prevent or relieve pressures on families. H.R. 9808. 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for Federal support and stimulation of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence and assist the victims of domestic violence, for coordination of Federal programs and activities pertaining to domestic violence, and for other purposes. S. 2759. 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to establish a Federal Office on Domestic Violence, and a Federal Council on Domestic Violence, to provide grants for the assistance of victims of domestic violence and for training programs, and for other


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide for Federal support and stimulation of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence and assist victims of domestic violence, for coordination of Federal programs and activities pertaining to domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R. 2977. 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title XX of the Social Security Act to authorize expenditures thereunder for the provision, in certain instances, of emergency shelter
to adults in danger of physical or mental injury. S. 1153. 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for Federal support and stimulation of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence and provide immediate shelter and other assistance for victims of domestic violence, for coordination of Federal programs and activities pertaining to domestic violence, and for other purposes. S. 1843. 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide for Federal support and encouragement of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence and assist victims of domestic violence, to provide for coordination of Federal programs and activities relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R. 1007. 97th Congress, 1st Session, 1981.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide for Federal support and encouragement of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence and assist victims of domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R. 1651. 97th Congress, 1st Session, 1981.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Older Americans Act of 1965 to extend certain authorizations of appropriations made in such Act, and to make certain revisions in the provisions of such Act. H.R. 3267. 97th Congress, 1st Session, 1981.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to restrict the Federal Government from preempting or interfering with State statutes pertaining to spousal abuse, and for other purposes. S. 1578. 97th Congress, 1st Session, 1981.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act and related laws to consolidate the laws relating to the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration, the National Institute of Mental Health, the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, and the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and for other purposes. H.R. 6458. 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for Federal support and encouragement of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence and assist victims of domestic violence, to provide for coordination of Federal programs and activities relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. S. 2908. 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide for Federal support and encouragement of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence and assist victims of domestic violence, to provide for coordination of Federal programs and activities relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R. 73. 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide for Federal support and encouragement of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence and assist victims of domestic violence, to provide for coordination of Federal programs and activities relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. H.R. 1397. 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide additional authorizations for programs designed to increase employment including the Community Development Block Grant, youth employment and education, senior citizens employment, and other similar programs, to provide training and retraining assistance for dislocated workers, and to provide emergency assistance for the long-term unemployed, and for other purposes. S. 493. 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for Federal support and encouragement of State, local, and community activities to prevent domestic violence and assist victims of domestic violence, to provide for coordination of Federal programs and activities relating to domestic violence, and for other purposes. S. 699. 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title XVI of the Social Security Act to increase the effectiveness and improve the administration of the SSI program, and for other purposes. S. 1635. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to prevent the manufacturing, distribution, and use of illegal drugs, and for other purposes. H.R. 5210. 100th Congress, 2nd

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for an omnibus Federal, State, and local effort against substance abuse, to provide for a cabinet-level position to centralize and streamline Federal activities with respect to both drug supply (interdiction and law enforcement) and drug demand (prevention, education, and treatment), to expand Federal support to ensure a long-term commitment of resources and personnel for substance abuse education, treatment, and rehabilitation efforts, to strengthen and improve the enforcement of Federal drug laws and enhance the interdiction of illicit drug shipments, and for other purposes. S. 2852. 100th Congress, 2nd Session, 1988.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Carl D. Perkins Vocational Education Act of 1984 to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1990 and succeeding years, and for


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to direct the Secretary of Defense to provide comprehensive assistance to military families who are required to relocate. H.R. 2508. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to ensure economic equity for American women and their families by providing equitable pay and employee benefits and enhanced opportunities in business procurement and vocational education, providing economic and retirement security for women as workers and as divorced or surviving spouses; making quality and affordable dependent care available to all working families; and enhancing the long-term health of women and their families through prevention services and assistance in victims of domestic violence. H.R. 3085. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to ensure economic equity for American women and their families by providing equitable pay and employee benefits and enhanced opportunities in business procurement, providing economic and retirement security for women as workers and as divorced or surviving spouses; making quality and affordable dependent care available to all working families; and enhancing the long-term health of women and their families through prevention services and assistance in victims of domestic violence. H.R. 3085. 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.
health of women and their families through prevention services and assistance to


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality
Act to revise the system of admission of aliens on the basis of family reunification
and to meet identified labor shortages, and for other purposes. H.R. 4300. 101st

U.S Congress. Senate. A bill to develop and improve child protective service programs on
Indian reservations and to strengthen Indian families. S. 2340. 101st Congress, 2nd

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act to reauthorize provisions relating to the provision of
education to homeless children and homeless youths, to establish a program of grants
to State and local education agencies for the provision of support services to such

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to alleviate homelessness, reduce housing
cost burdens, and increase housing opportunities for low-income families, and for

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide for a comprehensive approach to drug abuse
prevention and treatment, and for other purposes. S. 2559. 101st Congress, 2nd
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to combat homelessness through the establishment of housing-based family support centers, through the provisions of housing-based services to elderly individuals with chronic and debilitating illnesses and conditions, through the provision of residence-based outpatient mental health services, and through the use of grants for the improvement of community development corporations, and for other purposes. S. 2600. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act to expand and improve the program of grants for State activities for the education of homeless children and youths, to establish a program of grants for local activities for the education of such children and youths and for other purposes. H.R. 4934. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Job Training Partnership Act to guarantee access to education and job training assistance for youth residing in high-poverty areas of urban and rural communities, and for other purposes. H.R. 4937. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to combat violence and crimes against women on the streets

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to combat homelessness through the establishment of housing-based family support centers, through the provision of housing-based services to elderly individuals and individuals with chronic and debilitating illnesses and conditions, through the provision of residence-based outpatient mental health services, through the use of grants for the improvement of community development corporations, and through the provision of comprehensive services to homeless veterans, and for other purposes. H.R. 5100. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act to expand and improve the program of grants for State activities for the education of homeless children and youths, to establish a program of grants for local activities for the education of such children and youths, and for other purposes. H.R. 5128. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act and the Public Health Service Act to reauthorize certain health, education, training, and community services programs, and for other purposes. S. 2863. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act to provide for the establishment of certain procedural protections with respect to incidents of family violence among adults, and to amend title 18,
United States Code, to establish certain prohibitions against violence among spouses.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to permit coverage of residential drug treatment for pregnant women and certain family members under the Medicaid program, and for other purposes. S. 3002. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to further assist States in their efforts to increase awareness about and prevent family violence and provide immediate shelter and related assistance to battered women and their children. S. 3134. 101st Congress, 2nd Session, 1990.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to permit coverage of residential drug treatment for pregnant women and certain family
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to further assist States in their efforts to increase awareness about and prevent family violence and provide immediate shelter and related assistance to battered women and their children. S. 212. 102\textsuperscript{nd} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Job Training Partnership Act to improve the delivery of services to hard-to-serve adults and to youth, and for other purposes. H.R. 740. 102\textsuperscript{nd} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to assure equal justice for women in the courts. S. 277. 102\textsuperscript{nd} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. Senate. National Domestic Violence Awareness Month: Designate. S.J. Res. 73. 102\textsuperscript{nd} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to secure the right of women to be free of sexual harassment and violence, to promote equal opportunity for women, and for other purposes. S. 472. 102\textsuperscript{nd} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to secure the right of women to be free of sexual harassment and violence, to promote equal opportunity for women, and for other purposes. H.R. 1149. 102\textsuperscript{nd} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to provide for coverage of alcoholism and drug dependency residential treatment services for pregnant women and certain family members under the Medicaid program. H.R. 1189. 102\textsuperscript{nd} Congress, 1\textsuperscript{st} Session, 1991.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to authorize the State Justice Institute to analyze and disseminate information regarding the admissibility and quality of testimony of witnesses with expertise relating to battered women, and to develop and disseminate training materials to increase the use of such experts to provide testimony in criminal trials of battered women, particularly cases involving indigent women. H.R. 1252. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to establish and expand grant programs for evaluation and treatment of parents who are abusers and children of substance abusers, and for other purposes. S. 597. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act to provide grants to States to fund State domestic violence coalitions, and for other

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act to revise and extend programs under such Act, and for other purposes. S. 838. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to further assist States in their efforts to increase awareness about and prevent family violence and provide immediate shelter and related assistance to battered women and their children. H.R. 2334. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title V of the Public Health Service Act to revise and extend certain programs, to restructure the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration, and for other purposes. S. 1306. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to establish a program of grants for providing alcohol and drug abuse residential treatment services to pregnant and postpartum women and their children. H.R. 2678.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to extend for one year the authorizations of appropriations for the programs under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, and for certain programs relating to adoption opportunities, and for other purposes. H.R. 2720. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to establish a rural crime prevention strategy, to address the problem of crime against the elderly, to combat child abuse, sexual violence and violence against women, to enhance the rights of law enforcement officers, to enhance the rights of crime victims. S. 1335. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide access to prenatal care, housing, nutrition, and parenting skills for needy families, and for other purposes. S. 1380. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act to provide grants to States to fund State domestic violence coalitions, and for other purposes. H.R. 2947. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to provide for coverage of alcoholism and drug dependency residential treatment services for pregnant women and certain family members under the Medicaid program, and for other purposes. S. 1677. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to alleviate homelessness, reduce housing cost burdens, and increase housing opportunities for low-income families, and for other purposes. H.R. 3448. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act with respect to services for mental health and substance abuse, including establishing separate block grants to enhance the delivery of such services. H.R. 3698. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to establish a national background check procedure to ensure that persons working as child care providers do not have a criminal history of child abuse, to initiate the reporting of all State and Federal child abuse crimes, to establish minimum guidelines for States to follow in conducting background checks and provide protection from inaccurate information for persons subjected to background checks, and for other purposes. S. 1966. 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 1991.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to improve the capacity of rural communities to respond to homelessness, to establish effective program delivery models for prevention and
remediation of homelessness in rural areas, to collect data on the extent and characteristics of homelessness in rural areas, and for other purposes. S. 2181. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1992.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to authorize services for the prevention, intervention, treatment and aftercare of American Indian and Alaskan Native children and their families at risk for Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) and Fetal Alcohol Effect (FAE), and for other purposes. S. 2192. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1992.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act to extend programs providing urgently needed assistance for the homeless, and for other purposes. H.R. 4300. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1992.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide employment opportunities to unemployed individuals in high unemployment areas in projects to repair and renovate vitally needed community facilities, and for other purposes. H.R. 4340. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1992.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act to revise and extend programs under such Act, and for other purposes.  

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide for the education and training of 
health professions students with respect to the identification and treatment of medical 

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to address the needs of families, women, and 

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to assist the States in the enactment of legislation to address the 

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for the 
payment of an annuity or indemnity compensation to the spouse or former spouse of a 
member of the Armed Forces whose eligibility for retired or retainer pay is 
terminated on the basis of misconduct involving abuse of a dependent, and for other 

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Indian Health Care 
Improvement Act to authorize appropriations for Indian health programs, and for 

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to assist the States in the enactment of 
legislation to address the criminal act of stalking. H.R. 5876. 102nd Congress, 2nd 
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to prevent and punish sexual violence and domestic violence, to assist and protect the victims of such violence, to assist State and local efforts, and for other purposes. H.R. 5960. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1992.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to prevent and punish sexual violence and domestic violence, to assist and protect the victims of such violence, to assist State and local efforts, and for other purposes. S. 3271. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1992.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for demonstration projects for the identification by health care providers of victims of domestic violence and sexual assault, to provide for the education of the public on the consequences to the public health of such violence and assault, and to provide for epidemiological research on such violence and assault. H.R. 6081. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1992.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to authorize the State Justice Institute to analyze and disseminate information regarding the admissibility and quality of testimony of witnesses with expertise relating to battered women, and to develop and disseminate training materials to facilitate the appropriate use of such experts to provide testimony in criminal trials of battered women, particularly cases involving indigent women. S. 3318. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1992.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide tax incentives to encourage community development in enterprise zones, and for other purposes. H.R. 15. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to prevent and punish sexual violence and domestic violence, to assist and protect the victims of such crimes, to assist state and local effects, and for other purposes. S. 6. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to provide tax incentives for the establishment of tax enterprise zones, and for other purposes. S. 100. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to prevent and punish sexual violence and domestic violence, to assist and protect the victims of such crimes, to assist state and local efforts, and for other purposes. H.R. 688. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Job Training Partnership Act to establish a Job and Life Skills Improvement program to provide comprehensive services to youth and young adults living in high poverty areas in cities and rural areas of the United States. H.R. 1020. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to provide for coverage of alcoholism and drug dependency residential treatment services for pregnant women and certain family members under the Medicaid program, and for other purposes. S. 484. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to correct an inequity in the provisions relating to the payment of benefits under court orders in the case of dependents who are victims of abuse by members of the Armed Forces losing right to retired pay. S. 606. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to establish a program of grants to States for arson research, prevention, and control, and for other purposes. H.R. 1727. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for demonstration projects for the identification by health care providers of victims of domestic violence and sexual assault, to provide for the education of the public on the consequences to the public health of such violence and assault, and to provide for epidemiological research on such violence and assault. H.R. 1829. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for demonstration projects for the identification by health care providers of victims of domestic violence and sexual assault, to provide for the education of the public on the consequences to the public health of such violence and assault, to provide for epidemiological research on such violence and assault, and for other purposes. S. 869. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to protect children from the trauma of witnessing or experiencing violence, sexual abuse, neglect, abduction, rape or death during parent/child visitations or visitation exchanges, and for other purposes. S. 870. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to require the establishment of a Federal system for the purpose of conducting background checks to prevent the employment of child abusers by child care providers, to establish a Federal point-of-purchase background check system for screening prohibited firearms purchasers, to provide accurate and
immediately accessible records for law enforcement purposes, to assist in the
identification and apprehension of violent felons, and to assist the courts in
determining appropriate bail and sentencing decisions. S. 891. 103rd Congress, 1st

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to
revise and extend programs relating to the prevention and control of injuries. H.R.
2201. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to establish standards and guidelines for
providing overseas assistance to refugees and displaced persons. H.R. 2232. 103rd

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to provide employment opportunities to
unemployed individuals in high unemployment areas in projects to repair and
renovate vitally needed community facilities, and for other purposes. H.R. 2364. 103rd

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to
establish programs of research with respect to women and cases of infection with the

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for the
establishment of a residential support service program for special high-risk
populations of pregnant women and their children, and for other purposes. S. 1133.
103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to require that in any case in which military law enforcement officials are called to a scene of domestic violence at which a weapon is present or there has been obvious physical violence that the officials shall arrest the individual who appears to have committed the offense. H.R. 2503. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to protect children from the trauma of witnessing or experiencing violence, sexual abuse, neglect, abduction, rape or death during parent/child visitations or visitation exchanges, and for other purposes. H.R. 2573. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to ensure economic equity for American women and their families by promoting fairness in the workplace, creating new economic opportunities for women workers and women business owners, helping workers better meet the competing demands of work and family; and enhancing economic self-sufficiency through public and private reform and improved child support enforcement. H.R. 2790. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to extend the program of grants regarding the prevention and control of tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases, to revise and extend certain injury control programs, and to revise the program of grants relating to preventive health measures with respect to breast and cervical cancer, and for other purposes. S. 1318. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title III of the Public Health Service Act to revise and extend certain injury control programs, and for other purposes. S. 1320. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to prevent and punish crime, to strengthen the rights of crime victims, to assist State and local efforts against crime, and for other purposes. H.R. 2872. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to restore order, deter crime, and make our neighborhoods and communities safer and more secure places in which to live and work. S. 1356. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to establish programs of research with respect to women and cases of information with the human immunodeficiency virus, and for other purposes. S. 1429. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to promote greater equity in the delivery of health care services to American women through expanded research on women's health issues and through improved access to health care services, including preventive health services. H.R. 3075. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for the training of health professions students with respect to the identification and referral of victims of domestic violence. H.R. 3207. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for the training of health professions students with respect to the identification and referral of victims of domestic violence. S. 1506. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, to prevent persons who have committed domestic abuse from obtaining a firearm. S. 1570. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act to authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services to administer a Federal demonstration program to coordinate response and strategy within many sectors of local communities for intervention and prevention of domestic violence. S. 1572. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to allow grants to increase police presence, to expand and improve cooperative efforts between law enforcement agencies and members of the community to address crime and disorder problems, and otherwise enhance public safety. H.R. 3355. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act to require services for underserved populations, to require performance reporting by grantees, and to provide for the selection of model programs for education of young people about domestic violence and violence among intimate partners. H.R. 3415. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend title IV of the Social Security Act to provide welfare families with the education, training, job search, and work experience needed to prepare them to leave welfare within 2 years, to increase the rate of paternity establishment for children receiving welfare benefits, to provide States with greater flexibility in providing welfare, to authorize States to conduct demonstration projects to test the effectiveness of policies designed to help people leave welfare and increase their financial security, to strengthen child support enforcement, and to eliminate welfare payments for most groups of noncitizens. H.R. 3500. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to require the establishment of a Federal system for the purpose of conducting background checks to prevent the employment of child abusers by child care providers, to establish a Federal point-of-purchase background check system for screening prohibited firearm purchasers, to provide accurate and immediately accessible records for law enforcement purposes, to assist in the identification and apprehension of violent felons, and to assist the courts in determining appropriate bail and sentencing decisions. H.R. 3557. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to establish a national background check procedure to ensure that persons working as child care providers do not have a criminal history of child abuse, to initiate the reporting of all State and Federal child abuse crimes, to establish minimum guidelines for States to follow in conducting background checks and
provide protection from inaccurate information for persons subjected to background checks, and for other purposes. S. 1759. 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.


U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. A bill to amend the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act to revise and extend programs providing urgently needed assistance for the homeless, and for other purposes. H.R. 4578. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to require the Attorney General to develop model legislation for the States to assure confidentiality of communications between victims of sexual assault or domestic violence victims and their counselors, and for other purposes. S. 2315. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994.


U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to achieve universal health insurance coverage, and for other purposes. S. 2357. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services to award grants and contracts to establish community response teams and a technical assistance center to address the development and support of community response teams. S. 2416. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to amend title VIII of the Public Health Service Act to consolidate and reauthorize nursing education programs under such title, and for other purposes. S. 2433. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994.

U.S. Congress. Senate. A bill to ensure economic equity for American women and their families by promoting fairness in the workplace, creating new economic opportunities for women workers and women business owners, helping workers better meet the competing demands of work and family; and enhancing economic self-sufficiency through public and private pension reform and improved child support enforcement. S. 2514. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1994.
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