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PLAN PERQUENCO AND CHILE'S INDIGENOUS POLICIES UNDER THE PINOCHET DICTATORSHIP, 1976-1988

by

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Dedication

For Mary
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Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the administrative structure and development of Chile’s indigenous policies under the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), taking as its focus a pilot project for indigenous Mapuche integration known as Plan Perquenco. Existing scholarship provides important analyses of the impact of the military regime’s 1979 indigenous law, Decree Law 2568, which legalized the division and privatization of Mapuche communal lands. However, land division was not the sole mechanism of the regime’s indigenous policy. The Ministry of Agriculture, in consultation with the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), designed Plan Perquenco to ensure that after land division, Mapuche men would become private landowners and market-oriented farmers. Plan Perquenco also perpetuated the Chilean state’s previous indigenous policies. The Ministry of Agriculture relied on existing portrayals of irrational Mapuche agricultural practices, which had first gained prominence in the nineteenth century, to justify programs to eradicate Mapuche cultural traits that officials argued limited scientific and modern agricultural development. Furthermore, Plan Perquenco continued the goals of earlier agrarian reform efforts, which the military regime ridiculed
as ineffective, to argue that the formation of male-headed nuclear families would solve rural economic and cultural stagnation.

The administrative structure of Plan Perquenco, however, prevented the full implementation of these policies. Under the regime’s model for regionalization, municipalities had to coordinate development initiatives with the aid of a variety of public and private institutions, rather than the central state. Municipally-based programs such as Plan Perquenco were therefore not a unified front of state formation, but rather a mixture of local, national, and international institutions, with at times differing and conflicting goals, that coordinated reform efforts in Mapuche communities. I focus on the different political inclinations of the six agricultural technicians who managed Plan Perquenco to explain how the political diversity of local bureaucracies limited the success of the regime’s indigenous policies.

By centering the effects of administrative inconsistency in my analysis, I offer insights into how Mapuche exploited state-run reform programs to affirm their cultural rights. Oral interviews demonstrate that under Plan Perquenco, Mapuche youths used their participation in the recreation programs coordinated by the Ministry of Agriculture, such as football leagues and music classes, to contest the gendered and ethnic ideals embodied in the ministry’s reform programs. My focus on Plan Perquenco therefore exposes the relationship between the military regime’s indigenous policies and longer trajectories of state formation, how the administrative structure of these programs limited their application, and finally how Mapuche exploited bureaucratic inconsistencies to ensure the regime’s reform efforts benefitted their communities.
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Introduction

Over the course of 1985, the Intendant of the Ninth Region of Chile, Miguel Espinoza, grew increasingly concerned with the Regional Mapuche Councils (Consejos Regionales Mapuche, CRM). Earlier that year, CRM officials, comprised of prominent Mapuche lawyers and educators, had sent a report to the office of dictator Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990) to denounce the racist and exclusionary educational policies of the military regime. In the report, CRM president, Domingo Neculman called for Mapuche judicial autonomy that would allow local communities to design and implement their own educational programs that valorized Mapuche cultural practices. Neculman’s call for community-led educational, social, and economic development was not radical, but actually drew from the regime’s emphasis on regionalization. Military officials claimed that under the system of regionalization, municipalities, without strong oversight, had to take a leading role in community-development initiatives that supported free market expansion. Neculman had nonetheless utilized this bureaucratic ideology to contest the regime’s educational and economic reform efforts in Mapuche communities. To build support for these initiatives, Neculman had given interviews with international human rights organizations, and attempted to coordinate cultural events throughout the Ninth Region’s municipalities.

In response to the CRM’s report and Neculman’s organizational efforts, Intendant Espinoza argued that the group “did not comply with the basic objective of integrating

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1 Naming of places is a difficult task for this dissertation. While my research took place in what is now called the Ninth Region, this geographical denomination did not exist until 1974. For pre-1974 references to the region, I rely on the Mapuche name of Walmapu when referencing Mapuche spatial organization, and the more complicated terms la Araucanía and la Frontera to refer to state representations of the Mapuche before 1974. Araucania is a term that Mapuche never used to refer to themselves, and is thus reflective of Spanish and Chilean colonial efforts, while la Frontera holds a similar significance whereby the anti-modern other comprised the region south of the Bio-Bio River.
the Mapuche into the rest of the Chilean community.”

Most disturbing to Espinoza was that the CRM was an organization that the Intendancy of the Ninth Region had created in 1980 to help garner support for the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous reform efforts, based on Mapuche assimilation into the market economy. Espinoza himself had initially asked the group in 1984 to research and develop the report they had sent to Pinochet, although the CRM used the opportunity to lambast the regime. While the Intendancy of the Ninth Region had intended for the CRM to endorse the regime’s economic and political goals, by 1985 it appeared that Espinoza and other regional officials had minimal control over the organization and its leaders. The case of the CRM, however, was not unique, but rather reflective of the larger administrative inconsistencies that limited the application of the military regime’s indigenous reform programs.

I analyze organizations like the CRM, and principally a pilot project for Mapuche integration known as Plan Perquenco (1980-1988), in order to rethink the historical context, administrative structure, and development of the Pinochet dictatorship’s indigenous policies. This case study allows me to develop three principal arguments: First, Plan Perquenco demonstrates that land reform was only one aspect of the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous reform efforts under military rule. The bulk of scholarship on the dictatorship’s indigenous policies focuses on Decree Law 2568 (D.L. 2568), passed in 1979. The law provided the legal means to permanently divide and privatize Mapuche communal lands and thus dissolve what various officials considered the last major

3 Martín Correa, Raúl Molina, Nancy Yañez, La reforma agraria y las tierras mapuches (Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2005); Eduardo Mella Seguel, Los mapuche ante la justicia: La criminalización de la protesta indígena en Chile (Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2007); Martín Correa and Eduardo Mella, Las razones del ilkún/enojo: Memoria, despojo y criminalización en el territorio mapuche Malleco (Santiago de Chile: Lom Ediciones, 2010); Diane Haughney, Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile (Tallahassee: University of Florida Press, 2006).
roadblock to free market expansion in southern Chile. D.L. 2568 also removed constitutional recognition of Chile’s indigenous groups and sparked fears among national and international observers that the law would result in legal ethnocide for the Mapuche. D.L. 2568 furthermore coincided with the larger neoliberal economic reforms that the former students of Milton Friedman, collectively known as “los Chicago Boys,” enacted in the late 1970s. From 1978 to 1981, the Chicago Boys authored a series of decrees that created a system of strict monetarism and a drastic reduction in state subsidies to public services. Key to these reforms was the privatization of all agricultural production and its re-orientation towards international market consumption. The privatization of Mapuche communal lands was a hallmark of these initiatives in southern Chile under military rule.

This dissertation provides a useful corrective to the limited historiographic emphasis on D.L. 2568. While D.L. 2568 was a significant piece of legislation, the Minister of Agriculture argued that the law was only effective if after land division Mapuche men and women supported free-market expansion. The ministry subsequently designed a variety of local reform programs to eradicate Mapuche cultural practices, such as communal landownership and collective work, which officials claimed were preventing the expansion of neoliberal economic policies in the Chilean countryside. This dissertation therefore moves beyond a strict analysis of land reform to provide insight into the unexamined day-to-day reform programs that the Ministry of Agriculture enacted to fulfill the goals of its indigenous policy.

Second, my analysis of these reform efforts demonstrates that under military rule, the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous policies were shaped by policies toward rural and Mapuche sectors in the Ninth Region implemented long before the military
dictatorship. The recognition of bureaucratic continuity is central to formulating a more in depth analysis of Chilean agrarian and indigenous policies in the late-twentieth century. Scholars have generally focused on what they call the “counter-agrarian reform,” through which the military regime outlawed political parties, unions, and community gatherings, all of which had played a central role in Mapuche community mobilization during the presidencies of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970) and Salvador Allende Gossens (1970-1973). During the Chilean Agrarian Reform (1962-1973), Mapuche communities had participated in rural unions and cooperatives, which allowed them to achieve a level of economic advancement and land security denied to them since the nineteenth century. Scholars have therefore noted that Pinochet’s “counter-agrarian reform” was the process by which regime officials broke down the economic, political, cultural, and territorial gains made by rural and Mapuche communities during the Chilean Agrarian Reform.

The term “counter-agrarian reform,” nonetheless, implies that military rule marked a 180-degree turn away from the reform efforts of Frei and, more specifically, Allende. While the privatization of Mapuche lands certainly supported the larger economic dictates of the Chicago Boys, D.L. 2568 was the culmination of over one-hundred years of policy that sought to divide Mapuche lands as a means to integrate the Mapuche into the Chilean nation. Recent studies by Heidi Tinsman and Thomas Klubock demonstrate that aspects of the Ministry of Agriculture’s agro-forestry policies, and in some cases the very miracle the Chicago Boys claimed to have created, were actually

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derived from over half a century of state-led agricultural development initiatives. Both Tinsman and Klubock argue that central to twentieth-century reform efforts in the rural sector was the formation of male-headed nuclear families that rationally managed private property for market consumption. The notion that men needed to be sober, obedient, disciplined and dedicated to family and nation, while women had to engage in a form of apolitical domesticity, were gender ideologies that the political left and right had articulated in the Chilean state apparatus since the 1940s, albeit for different ends. The Ministry of Agriculture drew from these gendered ideals to define many of its indigenous reform efforts. The regime’s gendered-based reforms nonetheless did not imply any of the rhetoric of social justice or class unity as they had during the Chilean Agrarian Reform, but rather sought to create a de-politicized citizenry that was connected to the nation not through political party, but through the market.

I build on Klubock’s recent work to demonstrate that the Ministry of Agriculture justified these reforms with reference to a discourse of an agricultural crisis that had first gained prominence in the nineteenth century. Like various administrations before it, the Pinochet dictatorship argued that the Ninth Region faced calamity as a result of irrational and backward Mapuche agricultural practices. Ministerial officials argued, however, that outdated Mapuche agricultural practices were not alone to blame for rural economic stagnation. State functionaries claimed that the paternalism of the Allende administration, understood as a centralized state controlling all aspects of private life, had created weak,

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8 Klubock, *La Frontera*. 
dependent, and violent Mapuche communities that threatened the economic and cultural security of southern Chile. Regime officials therefore contended that outdated cultural practices, combined with state paternalism, had stunted economic, social, and cultural development in the Ninth Region. A central aspect of the ministry’s reform efforts in Mapuche communities was therefore to create empowered Mapuche men who could effectively manage agricultural production and thus support the rural economy. My analysis of the relationship between state concerns with healthy masculinity and the need for rural reform in military discourse engages with Tinsman’s work on the Chilean Agrarian Reform.9 By comparing Plan Perquenco to the Chilean Agrarian Reform, I demonstrate that continuities between the Frei and Pinochet administrations’ indigenous policies existed, and were based on a shared concern with ineffectual paternalism and the need to empower rural men in nuclear families.

Mapuche historiography has also underscored that violence has been a constant part of state formation in la Araucania.10 The violence, theft, denial of political and cultural rights, as well as minimal participation in the democratic process that marked military rule, did not exist in a vacuum, nor were these practices the simple products of the Chicago Boys’ neoliberal reforms. For the Mapuche, as for the other rural and working-class sectors of Chilean society, it was within a sustained history of violence that the military regime emerged, not as a rupture from a highly democratic and peaceful past,
but rather as the standard-bearer of the violence and repression that had long marked attempted state formation south of the Bio-Bio River.\footnote{The historical debate with regards to longer trajectories of violence and state formation in Chile is certainly not limited to the Mapuche. See: Lessie Jo Frazier, Salt in the Sand: Memory, Violence, and the Nation-State in Chile, 1890 to the Present (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Loveman, Struggle in the Countryside; Brian Loveman and Elizabeth Lira, Las ardientes cenizas del olvido: Vía chilenas de Reconciliación Política, 1932-1994 (Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2000); The re-evaluation of chronologies of violence is nonetheless a standard focal point of the Mapuche historiography. See: Mella, Los mapuche ante la justicia; Correa and Mella, Las razones del ilkan/enojo; Florencia Mallon, Courage Tastes of Blood: The Mapuche Community of Nicolás Ailío and the Chilean State, 1906-2001(Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Marimán, et. al., ¿Escucha Winka?; Patricia Richards, Race and the Chilean Miracle: Neoliberalism, Democracy, and Indigenous Rights (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013).}

Plan Perquenco also perpetuated Cold War policies promoted since the 1960s, policies that redistributed land in order to ward off the expansion of communism in the countryside. The participation of the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Plan Perquenco marked the reinstatement of international Cold War politics that first gained traction under the U.S.-led Alliance for Progress in the 1960s. The Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous policies existed within a network of international development initiatives that had defined state formation in southern Chile before 1973. The Ministry of Agriculture’s policies therefore reflected a partial continuity between earlier agrarian and indigenous reform efforts and the Pinochet dictatorship, a continuity that defies arguments that portray the military’s policies as a complete rupture after 1973.

Third, regionalization not only defined official military policy, but also affected the state apparatus and its ability to govern. While continuity certainly existed, military administrative rule was completely different from the civilian administrations that had preceded it. The Pinochet regime argued that unlike the presidencies of Frei and Allende, the central state would no longer be the primary engine for social change. To overcome what officials argued were the debilitating effects of state paternalism, the military regime reorganized the Chilean administrative structure in 1974 by creating thirteen regions designed to function as autonomous administrative units. Officials designed
regionalization to therefore break down the centralized political structure emblematic of pre-1973 Chilean governance. Through regionalization, officials emphasized that municipalities such as Perquenco were the nuclei of local development that had to rely on financial and administrative assistance from a variety of public and private institutions, as opposed to the central state. Municipal-based programs like Plan Perquenco, however, were not a unified front of state formation, but were rather a conglomerate of local, national, and international institutions, with at times differing and conflicting goals, coordinating reform efforts in Mapuche communities. Regionalization, therefore, created a process by which multiple personnel and institutions produced competing visions and strategies for economic transformation in Mapuche communities.

I focus on these internal complexities of regional military rule to identify who comprised the dictatorship at the most local level, what the motivations of these officials were, and how bureaucratic inconsistency led to an incomplete process of state formation. The agricultural technicians and Mapuche professionals that the Ministry of Agriculture hired to carry out programs such as Plan Perquenco were not military officials, but rather were civilians who at times had minimal support for the dictatorship. These distant and isolated representatives of the military regime often utilized their position of power to advocate for programs that were contrary to the stated goals of the ministry’s indigenous and agrarian reform programs. Regionalization therefore provides an important lens through which to analyze the internal complexities of the dictatorship that limited and challenged state authority in distant municipalities like Perquenco.

My analysis of the administrative structure of the dictatorship not only sheds new light on the bureaucratic inconsistencies of military rule, but also offers preliminary
insight into how Mapuche exploited this incoherence to affirm their cultural rights. In the final chapter I focus on Mapuche youth recreation programs that the Ministry of Agriculture coordinated, such as football leagues and music classes, to demonstrate how Mapuche worked through state-led programs to contest the gendered and ethnic ideals embodied in the ministry’s reform programs. I utilize oral interviews to develop how Plan Perquenco’s folklore group los Guitarreros Caminantes became an important site for Mapuche teenagers to affirm their community’s cultural history and identity. By examining the band’s responses to and interactions with Plan Perquenco, I provide a case study that shows how and why Mapuche individuals interacted with the military regime for a variety of ends.

**Race, Ethnicity and Gender**

This dissertation analyzes race, ethnicity, and gender as powerful and fluid social constructs that various historical actors use to legitimate, contest and negotiate naturalized hierarchies. I build from current ethnographic debates to argue that the cultural identities that these categories represent acquire their meaning through historical processes and political struggles through which individuals continually redefine themselves. As Les Field has argued, cultural identity therefore results from an opened ended, incomplete, and constantly transforming historical process that produces “knowledge about the ways of expressing self and social being, under stratified systems.

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of power.”¹³ These cultural politics can reorient perceptions of citizenship, democratic participation, national territory, economics, and politics to include or exclude particular identities and groups within the national body.¹⁴ I therefore underscore that there was no one way of being Mapuche under military rule, and we must therefore analyze how and why different Mapuche cultural identities materialized “in an intricate dynamic among converging and competing agendas, visions, and interests that transpire at local, national, and global levels.”¹⁵

My emphasis on the polyvalence of race, ethnicity and gender allows me to analyze and critique Mapuche cultural production on several different levels. The majority of this dissertation focuses on the regime and its supporters’ use of Mapuche culture to define programs like Plan Perquenco. The Ministry of Agriculture’s depiction of Mapuche agricultural practices as the antithesis to market development was the central ideological axis around which state formation occurred in southern Chile. I build on an established historiography on gender and Chilean state formation to argue that gender was a fundamental part of the regime’s ethnic identity constructs and indigenous policies.¹⁶ The regime’s insistence that Mapuche men were weak and Mapuche women could not care for their families also provided an ideological justification for state intervention into Mapuche communities. Under military rule, the specific cultural

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qualities the Ministry of Agriculture assigned to indigenous communities were therefore central to state building initiatives in la Araucanía, which promoted the advancement of some groups while oppressing others.

I develop the other side of this institutional debate through my analysis of the language of indigenous rights that Mapuche organizations employed in the 1980s. By the mid-1980s, the Mapuche cultural movement and leading organizations like the Association for Artisans and Small Farmers (Asociación Gremial de Pequeños Agricultores y Artesanos, Ad-Mapu) were well connected to the growing international indigenous rights movement. As a result of frequent Mapuche participation in international conferences, many Mapuche organizations in the 1980s began to develop arguments for cultural autonomy, pluri-nationality, and the socio-historical importance of ancestral lands that they suggested united the Mapuche throughout the Ninth Region. I focus on these political arguments to demonstrate how Ad-Mapu and other organizations contested the regime’s insistence that because the Mapuche did not exist, ancestral lands could in no way factor in to a distinct ethnic identity among the Mapuche in the Ninth Region. In early chapters, I therefore develop the institutional debates over Mapuche cultural claims to show the contested space that land reform, and subsequently indigenous reform programs, occupied in state formation in southern Chile.

As scholars have noted, however, the essentialized cultural identities used in cultural movements by organizations like Ad-Mapu are “politically advanced selective constructions, conveyed in fields of social relations that also define their significance,” and thus do not always reflect quotidian experiences among indigenous groups.17 The

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local context in which Mapuche in Perquenco identified themselves, understood their history, and viewed ancestral lands under military rule adds another layer of cultural production that this dissertation seeks to analyze in its final chapter. This chapter builds on recent Mapuche scholarship that emphasizes the different historical memories of space and community that have defined regional and local Mapuche identities throughout southern Chile. By focusing on these different sites of identity construction, I begin to complicate popular constructions of what it meant to be Mapuche, and furthermore demonstrate what was at stake through individuals’ invocation of differing and competing notions of Mapuche culture under military rule.

**Agricultural Crisis and Early State Formation in la Araucanía**

From the nineteenth century onward, the Chilean state’s dominant narrative of agricultural stagnation in la Araucanía relied on the denial of a vibrant and highly developed Mapuche socio-political and economic network that spanned the Andes. The Mapuche have lived in what is now the Southern Cone since the sixth century CE. The traditional Mapuche homeland, or Walmapu, extended from the Pacific Ocean in the west to the Bio-Bio River in the north to the Island of Chiloé in the south, and across the cordillera, or ñu mawiza, to the Atlantic Ocean in the east. When the Spanish arrived in southern Chile in the sixteenth-century, Mapuche identity was linked to four regions that corresponded with the cardinal points: to the north were the Wikunche, to the south...
Williche, to the west the Lafkenche, and to the east the Puelche.\textsuperscript{20} Within each of these four regional identities, a variety of different ethnic groups resided, held together by shared relationships to the land they inhabited. The basic unit of kinship organization was the lof, or a geographically specific region whose inhabitants shared relationship to a tuwün (place of origin) through küpalme (shared regional descendants).\textsuperscript{21} The ancestral connection with the land where past blended with present created multiple az mapu, or specific economic, legal, and religious norms that corresponded to Mapuche relationships to ecological systems. Mapuche communities’ reliance on the same resources created systems of exchange and intermarriage among lof that resulted in a larger sociopolitical unit called the rewe.\textsuperscript{22} The allied territory inhabited by various rewe was a wichan mapu headed by the füxa lonko. While the füxa lonko oversaw regional alliances that linked trade and ecological systems, each community still retained power over its respective lof.\textsuperscript{23}

The immense social, economic, and political network formed by the rewe created a highly developed trade network that spanned the Andes and sustained a geopolitical stronghold free from Spanish and Chilean interference until the mid-nineteenth century. After a series of costly and failed military ventures into Walmapi, Spanish authorities eventually adopted a policy of defensive warfare in 1612 that recognized Mapuche autonomy south of the Bio-Bio River. Mapuche style parliaments, or xawün, were the backbone of this tepid Spanish-Mapuche conciliation. The xawün of Quilen (1641) and

\textsuperscript{20} José Millalén Pailal, “La sociedad mapuche prehispánica: Kimün, arqueología y etnohistoria,” in ¡Escucha Winka!: Cuatro ensayos de Historia Nacional Mapuché y un epílogo sobre el futuro, eds. Pablo Marimán et al. (Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2006), 36-37.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 39
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Pablo Marimán, “Los Mapuche ante de la conquista military chileno-argentino,” in Escucha Winka: Cuatro ensayos de Historia Nacional Mapuché y un epílogo sobre el futuro, eds. Pablo Marimán et al. (Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2006), 277.
Negrete (1726) officially recognized Walmapi as a sovereign territory with the rights to independence. After Chilean independence in 1818, the young Chilean Republic initially respected the former xawün held in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For over twenty-five years the 1835 Parliament of Tapihue granted Mapuche communities south of the Bio-Bio River autonomy. As the young Chilean Republic grew, however, the integration of la Araucanía became an increasingly pressing issue. By the mid-nineteenth century, Chile imported more than the country exported. In a bid to curb import dependency, Chilean politicians argued that the acquisition of Mapuche territory for agricultural expansion was a necessity of national and economic security. Beginning in 1861, Coronel Cornelio Saavedra embarked on a military campaign that reduced the Mapuche to the west-central region of the Province of Cautín, while creating buffers comprised of large latifundia and state-sponsored agricultural colonies to the north, south, and east.

While Saavedra initially argued he would conquer la Araucanía through the use of “a lot of alcohol and music, and a little gunpowder,” the War of Extermination, as some contemporaries referred to it, was anything but peaceful. Saavedra’s forces regularly burned rukas, or Mapuche homes, killed and raped men, women and children, and destroyed crops. It was from the need to legitimate this violence and the acquisition of Mapuche property that various administrations and estate owners developed the perception of an ethnically-defined agricultural crisis. Scholars, politicians and media alike all argued that Mapuche cultural practices impeded scientific and rational agricultural development, and thus the advancement of the Chilean nation. Writing in the

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24 Correa et al., *La Reforma Agraria y las tierras mapuches*, 17-19.
25 Richards, *Race and the Chilean Miracle*, 27
late-nineteenth century, national historian Diego Barros Arana suggested that the “lazy and improvident” ways of the Mapuche led to unproductive land use, and therefore Chile had the right to conquer Mapuche lands.\textsuperscript{26} The justification for occupation specifically relied on the portrayal of the Mapuche as drunk, lazy, violent, and unable to support Chilean economic growth. One article noted, “How is it possible that it is permitted that the most fertile lands in these provinces, which are Chile’s granary, remain in the hands of Indians and that they produce absolutely nothing.”\textsuperscript{27} The nineteenth and twentieth century therefore witnessed an ethnogenesis that pitted a modern Chilean culture against that of savage Mapuche who exacerbated the agricultural degradation of la Araucanía and thus halted the progress of the Chilean nation. Sociologist Patricia Richards has recently argued that this ethnogenesis naturalized structural inequalities that became the basis for an underlining racism towards the Mapuche that persists to this day.\textsuperscript{28}

To secure Chilean presence in the region, the Chilean government sold huge lots of land to investors, principally in the Province of Malleco, which formed the basis of the latifundia in the region. Beyond the sale of land, the Chilean Republic supported the formation of colonies established by European immigrants. The Chilean state paid for families’ transportation from Europe and supplies, while also providing each family with 62 hectares plus 30 more for every son over ten years of age.\textsuperscript{29} By the beginning of the twentieth century, 828 colonial families acquired 49,506 hectares in Malleco, and 291 families acquired 19,872 hectares in Cautín.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 57  
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 56  
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 41-42  
\textsuperscript{30} CORREA et al., \textit{La reforma agraria y las tierras Mapuche}, 41.
The formation of latifundia and colonial settlements required the reduction of Mapuche onto small reserves principally in the Province of Cautín. From 1883 to 1929 the Chilean government issued títulos de merced, which created land deeds to Mapuche communities that rarely followed the traditional geo-political boundaries of lof and rewe. During this 46-year period, the Chilean government issued 2,318 títulos de merced. The land that the Chilean state delineated for the Mapuche represented 13.2% of the land formally under control of the Mapuche in southern Chile. The process of reducing the Mapuche to reservations negatively impacted Mapuche society. More than 30,000 Mapuche remained without títulos de merced, and thus lost access to ancestral lands and other resources. The shift to reservations also changed the Mapuche economy from one dependent on semi-sedentary livestock care to sedentary and small-scale agriculture.\textsuperscript{31} The small size of reducciones where most people had access to less than 6 hectares of land, most of which was not farmable, exacerbated Mapuche poverty throughout the twentieth century. Furthermore, the formation of reducciones broke down the extended kinship networks that rewe formally maintained, while also limiting Mapuche access to sacred landscapes essential to community and cultural reproduction. Mapuche communities suffered further legal blows after 1930. The Chilean government formed the Juzgado de Indios in 1931 with offices in Temuco and Nueva Imperial. The Juzgado held the authority to legally divide Mapuche reservations with a petition from one-third of the community. In 1961, Decree Law 14.511 created five more Juzgados throughout la Araucanía. Between 1931 and 1971, the Juzgado de Indios authorized the division of 832 Mapuche communities.\textsuperscript{32} The military regime adapted previous ideological justifications

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 40-50.  
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, 62.
for the marginalization and erasure of Mapuche communities to develop its own perception of an agricultural and cultural crisis.

**Paternalism, the Chilean Agrarian Reform and Perceptions of a Rural Crisis**

Concerns about paternalism and rural cultural stagnation had driven agrarian reform efforts since the administration of Frei’s Christian Democrats (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC). Drawing from Catholic mobilization efforts in the Chilean countryside throughout the twentieth century, the PDC framed the objectives of rural reform in terms of gender mutualism that emphasized the enhancement of male productivity, the validation of women’s domestic work, and the promotion of Chilean youths’ civic responsibility.\(^{33}\) It was this idealized family that reformers in the 1950s and early 1960s argued inquilinaje had destroyed. Inquilinaje was a “labor arrangement that tied campesinos in semipeonage to estates in return for rights to land.”\(^{34}\) Throughout the twentieth century, depictions of racial inferiority marked popular perceptions of the inquilino. Landlords often used the racial slur indio to describe inquilinos and thus establish a class hierarchy based on race. Tinsman notes that the term was “integral to notions of service and servitude.”\(^{35}\) In other cases, the term indio designated a person as debauched, drunk, and lazy. Furthermore, the term referred to a lack of independent masculinity whereby indios did not recognize the worth of their own labor and were thus slaves of the patrón.

Domination of inquilinos and their families was also embodied in the regalia system, through which inquilinos remained subject to the goodwill of patrones to distribute goods and favors to their families in exchange for labor. In the view of Catholic

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\(^{33}\) Tinsman, *Partners in Conflict*, 129.

\(^{34}\) Ibid., 21

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 39-40.
and leftist reformers, regalías created a system of domination in which an inquilino’s access to work and other material necessities directly relied on the disposition of the patrón to exact these favors. The patrón’s access to the bodies of wives and daughters through rape further limited a father’s control over his family and thus eroded male authority.³⁶ Throughout the mid-twentieth century, Catholic reformers and leftist politicians all argued that the latifundia system had therefore created men unable to care for their families and produce for the nation.

The rehabilitation of men and their families therefore became the cornerstone of the ideological justification for Agrarian Reform under the Frei presidency. In his 1964 presidential campaign, Frei pledged to create 100,000 new property owners that permitted the “transformation of inquilino farmers into yeoman farmers who produced adequate surpluses for domestic markets.”³⁷ In 1967, the PDC enacted two pieces of legislation, the Agrarian Reform Law and the Law of Campesino Unionization, which provided the legal means to carry out the agrarian reform initiatives that fulfilled these goals. The 1967 Agrarian Reform Law, or D.L. 16.640, allowed for the legal formation of asentamientos, or state-run agricultural cooperatives, from an expropriated estate or combination of estates. While the state technically owned asentamientos, the cooperatives were co-administered by former inquilinos and other farmers that the Agrarian Reform Corporation (Corporación de Reforma Agraria, CORA) hand selected. While there was a disagreement between the political left and right over the role of private property within asentamientos, most politicians agreed that the cooperative formed the economic and productive base for campesino empowerment. The asentamiento system nonetheless

³⁶ Ibid., 43-47
³⁷ Ibid., 85.
reinforced many patterns of paternalism that had alarmed politicians in the past and had
initially inspired the Chilean Agrarian Reform in 1962. Officials from the Institute for
Agricultural and Livestock Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario, INDAP)
and CORA took an active role in not only the selection of asentados, but also the
regulation of internal affairs. INDAP officials regularly oversaw general assembly
meetings, and CORA set production goals, introduced new technologies, and controlled
the commercialization of agricultural produce.\footnote{Loveman, \textit{Struggle in the Countryside}, 274-288.}

Under Allende’s Popular Unity (Unidad Popular, UP) government, state
management of agricultural collectives increased. The UP’s Minister of Agriculture,
Jacques Chonchol, argued that through the formation of Agrarian Reform Centers
(Centros de Reforma Agraria, CERA) the problems inherent in the asentamiento system
would be corrected by fomenting greater class solidarity. To promote more collective
forms of farming, CERAs minimized the size of personal plots and incorporated the
entire family as part of the labor force.\footnote{Tinsman, \textit{Partners in Conflict}, 240.} As Brian Loveman notes, however, political
parties heavily influenced many CERAs, and their councils subsequently became
political arenas where parties vied for control over the dictates of local development.\footnote{Loveman, \textit{Struggle in the Countryside}.}

Through CERA’s, the UP also promoted revolutionary gender roles. Under the UP,
Mothers’ Centers (Centros de Madres, CEMA) advocated women’s active participation
in community mobilization. The political nature of CEMA after 1970 led women to
become the primary protagonists in protests and land occupations that demanded greater
state involvement in rural housing reform.\footnote{Tinsman, \textit{Partners in Conflict}, 147} CERAs particularly highlighted the need for
the entire family to work in agricultural production, which ultimately challenged
assumptions of female domesticity found in the discourse of gender mutualism. The UP argued that through women’s participation in CERAs and intensive agricultural production, a radical restructuring of society and the family could occur that permitted women to realize their true potential as Chilean citizen workers.\(^{42}\)

In combination with greater campesino control over the land they worked, new legislation also provided avenues for greater democratic participation throughout the countryside. The 1967 Law of Campesino Unionization created several legal mechanisms that permitted huge advances in labor organization and mobilization in the Chilean countryside. The new union legislation established the county rather than estate as the basis for union organization, which effectively permitted unions to organize at a regional level. More importantly, the law established a means for political parties and state institutions to finance unions. In 1967, CORA and INDAP grouped the unions they sponsored into Triunfo Campesino that received explicit support from the PDC.\(^{43}\)

Political parties and national institutions at times supported the use of direct action, like land takeovers, or tomas. The use of tomas was a common tactic in the 1960s and early ‘70s that allowed workers to protest labor agreements and the slow pace of the Agrarian Reform. During land occupations, campesinos generally blocked the entrance to estates, disrupted production, and sabotaged machinery. In some cases, INDAP, CORA and leftist political parties actively sponsored tomas as a means to expedite the process of land expropriation.\(^{44}\)

It was under this climate of heightened political mobilization and direct action that Mapuche communities in la Araucanía began to protest the slow pace of the Chilean

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 220.
\(^{43}\) Ibid., 100.
\(^{44}\) Ibid., 108.
Agrarian Reform to restitute their ancestral lands. Between 1967 and 1970, the Frei administration used D.L. 16.640 to expropriate 10,682 hectares in favor of Mapuche communities. This amount equaled 4.69% of the total land the Frei administration expropriated under D.L. 16.640\textsuperscript{45} The minimal initiative on the part of the PDC to engage with Mapuche demands led to increased and more radicalized mobilization on the part of Mapuche communities. With the aid of the new unionization law, Mapuche communities throughout the Malleco and Cautín Provinces specifically allied with unions connected to communist and socialist parties. Their principal allied organization in Cautín was the offshoot of the Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR), the Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario (MCR). As a result of this mobilization, land occupations for the restitution of ancestral Mapuche lands jumped from 27 to 148 between 1968 and 1969\textsuperscript{46}. In late 1969, Mapuche communities working with the MCR also began fence running, or the process by which Mapuche communities reconstructed fences on large estates to recuperate lands designated under the títulos system. It was under this climate of intense Mapuche political mobilization that Allende came to power in 1970.

Upon Allende’s election, Mapuche, with the aid of the MCR, initiated a series of land occupations and fence runnings in the counties of Lautaro, Loncoche, Carahue and Nueva Imperial. In December 1970, Allende visited Temuco to assess the situation, and on January 4, 1971, Jacques Chonchol moved the headquarters of the Ministry of Agriculture to Temuco to address land tenancy issues in the province. On January 31, 1971, Chonchol announced plans for what became known as the Cautinazo. The

\textsuperscript{45} Correa et al., \textit{La reforma agraria y las tierras Mapuches}, 134.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 135.
Cautinazo eventually expropriated 36 estates totaling over 20,000 hectares. CORA gave 14 of these estates, which amounted to 13,416 hectares, specifically to Mapuche communities.\(^{47}\) Chonchol further provoked the ire of large estate owners through the legal loopholes the Ministry of Agriculture employed to undertake these expropriations. Many of the estates were smaller than 80 hectares of irrigated land, and thus remained protected from expropriation per the dictates of the 1967 Agrarian Reform Law. Chonchol argued nonetheless that the total accumulation by some landholders amounted to more than 80 hectares, and he would therefore calculate size according to total land possessions.\(^{48}\) The Cautinazo was not an isolated event, but rather reflected the larger pro-Mapuche stance of the UP government. By the 1973 coup, the UP administration had expropriated 197,761 hectares in favor of Mapuche communities, which represented 85% of the total land the Mapuche received between 1964 and 1973.\(^{49}\)

The UP also took steps to create constitutional protections for Chile’s indigenous groups. Allende’s passage of Decree Law 17.729 (D.L. 17.729) in 1972 was the first piece of legislation in Chilean history that provided constitutional protections for indigenous groups. D.L. 17.729 created constitutional safeguards against the division and sale of Mapuche ancestral lands while also establishing mechanisms for the restitution of usurped lands. The law also had clauses that protected indigenous groups’ rights to determine education, economic, and resource development policies within their communities.\(^{50}\)

Despite these advances, not all Chileans felt the UP’s pro-Mapuche stance benefited southern Chile. In reaction to the mass land expropriations and heightened

\(^{47}\) Ibid., 142-145.


\(^{49}\) Correa et al., *La reforma agraria y las tierras Mapuches*, 208.

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 193-195
Mapuche mobilization after 1970, large estate owners and influential businessmen began to form comites de retomas that violently removed Mapuche from occupied lands. In an emblematic case, a landowner shot MCR member Moises Huentalef in the head.51 In mid-1972, the UP nearly declared the Province of Cautín an emergency zone as a result of the increased violent confrontations on large estates. In mid-1973, the Province of Cautín became militarized to prevent further mobilization on the part of Mapuche communities. Beginning in August 1973, an increasingly autonomous Chilean armed forces led by the Air Force began to raid Mapuche communities to uncover “terrorist” cells of Marxists who had allegedly stockpiled weapons to enact revolution. Before the September 11, 1973 coup, members of the armed forces detained and tortured Mapuche community members for their connections to revolutionary groups. Newspapers printed images of confiscated weapons, which often amounted to little more than shotguns, Molotov cocktails, and poorly designed homemade explosives.52 After the coup, the military regime capitalized on these images to accuse the UP of openly supporting an international Marxist takeover of Chile.

Immediately following the 1973 coup that toppled Allende’s UP, the newly established military junta targeted Mapuche communities as foci of Marxist rebellion. Subsequently, military forces unleashed some of the worst of the regime’s human rights violations against Chile’s largest indigenous population. In official reports, witnesses recalled seeing truckloads of Mapuche emerging from the countryside. In some cases, military forces gunned down community leaders and dumped their bodies in fields and

51 Ibid., 176.
52 Mallon, Courage Tastes of Blood, 137-143.
In a 2001 interview, Mapuche Jose Ernesto Millalen noted that during his detention immediately following the coup, military personnel repeatedly burned him with both stoves and cigarette butts while they asked him to describe his links to communist subversion in the countryside, of which he had none. Millalen stated, “They burned me, they sat me on an electrical stove, they burned me with cigarette butts, and other things. They asked who was a communist, they accused you of being a communist…they had me disappeared for 15 days.” The nature of Millalen’s detention reflected the manner in which Mapuche were detained, tortured, and executed for alleged association, whether true or false, with communist organizations. Between September 11, 1973 and January of 1974, military forces detained, disappeared, tortured, and executed at least one-hundred and fifteen people in the Ninth Region, 31 of whom were Mapuche. In 1991, the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation concluded that the military regime disappeared and murdered one-hundred and thirty seven Mapuche while detaining and torturing over three hundred.

While military officials accused Mapuche and other rural communities of plotting a violent Marxist takeover of Chile, they also claimed that the Mapuche had been victims of the Chilean Agrarian Reform. Military personnel claimed that Allende’s emphasis on social justice had not only provoked violence between Mapuche communities and large estate owners, but also limited Mapuche productivity. Official reports from the Ministry of Agriculture suggested that the political clientelism of state-run agricultural cooperatives had limited individual initiative and responsibility rather than liberate men and women from the chains of the latifundia. Ministry officials claimed that cooperatives

53 North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), Chile, roll 45, Mapuches: People of the Land.
54 Correa, et al., La reforma agraria y las tierras mapuches, 286.
not only restricted individual initiative but had also crippled the formation of private property, which in turn would have fomented personal responsibility. The Ministry of Agriculture contended that Allende’s passage of D.L. 17.729 had furthermore forced the Mapuche to cling to outdated agricultural practices like communal landownership and collective work. Ministry officials thus argued that Allende’s false belief in ethnic diversity had ultimately stunted Mapuche cultural development and thus created weak men unable to produce for the market economy, and women who failed to provide healthy homes for their children. In the view of military officials, therefore, state paternalism had created not only a violent Mapuche mass, but also one that failed to foster the cultural and economic advancement of the Chilean countryside.

The language of victimhood in many ways shaped state formation in southern Chile under military rule. A focus on the regime’s depiction of the Chilean Agrarian Reform in the Ninth Region highlights how constructed memories of state paternalism, Mapuche cultural practices, and family development all provided the legitimating discourse of the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous reform programs. Ministerial officials enunciated a discourse of past chaos, violence, and agricultural destruction to reveal the moral bankruptcy of the Allende administration. As Steve Stern notes, these constructed memories of chaos in turn justified the violent reorientation of the Chilean state as well as the Ministry of Agriculture’s specific indigenous reform programs.56

**Regionalization and Contested State Formation under Military Rule**

The regime’s critique of the debilitating effects of state paternalism under socialism provided the ideological foundation for regionalization after 1973. I build my

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analysis of regionalization on over two decades of scholarship on state formation in Latin America, arguing that the state is not a fixed “thing” or cohesive material object. I contend that various institutions, organizations, and individuals at all levels of society, with at times differing goals and relationships to governmental authority, comprise the state. State formation is the open-ended and incomplete process by which these multiple historical actors negotiate, contest, and validate the legitimacy of the governing body and the national identities it attempts to reproduce internally and externally. This dissertation therefore uses regionalization as a lens through which to analyze this fluid process of state formation and thus highlight the varied outcomes of the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous and agrarian reform programs.

Karen Rosemblatt, Tinsman and others have demonstrated the complex and multifaceted composition of the state from the Popular Front era through the Chilean Agrarian Reform. The historiography on the Pinochet era, however, still resists this more expansive analytical framework when examining the internal complexities of state authority under military rule. Arturo Valenzuela has argued, for example, that through the consolidation of power in the executive, Pinochet was able to hand select, manipulate, rotate, and terminate military officials to ensure uniformity in his reworking of the Chilean political economy. He depicts the Pinochet regime as a monolithic mechanism of repression against which Chilean society resisted. While groundbreaking in his


58 Rosemblatt, Gendered Compromises; Tinsman, Partners in Conflict; Hutchison, Labors Appropriate for Their Sex; Klubock, Contested Communities; Frazier, Salt in the Sand.

analysis, Stern’s recent trilogy affirms Valenzuelas’ conclusions by suggesting that collective memories created during military rule were all responses to violence, terror, and a political theatre orchestrated by an undifferentiated nucleus of political and economic power. With regards to the Mapuche experience under the dictatorship, Florencia Mallon skillfully demonstrates that the state is a “mask of legitimacy” behind which competing cultural expressions distort and change notions of acceptable social behavior. Despite Mallon’s engagement with the complexities of state rule, her work does not identify internal contradictions as factors that limited state formation and subsequently reinforces the notion that under military rule, state authority was a repressive monolith against which the Mapuche and other groups resisted.

I depart from this historiographic trend through my examination of regionalization to demonstrate not only the internal complexities of military rule, but also how Mapuche individuals engaged with this incoherence. I argue that the administrative structure of regionalization is an essential category of analysis for understanding contested state formation under military rule. Officials from the National Corporation for Administrative Reform (Corporación Nacional de Reforma Administrativa, CONARA) argued that in order to cure the ills of the UP’s paternalism, the state needed to reduce its central role in economic and social development initiatives. The military regime’s form of regionalization therefore followed what Michel Foucault labeled the neoliberal anti-state, where the market rather than the state was the primary regulator of social relations and national formation. Under this model “the state [is] under the supervision of the market

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60 Stern, *Bottling for Hearts and Minds.*
rather than a market supervised by the state."62 Regime officials therefore claimed that the new administrative units that regionalization created would remove state oversight from local development initiatives, and thus force men and their families to take an active role in the economic and social advancement of Chile through their engagement with the market economy. Participation in the market was therefore the cornerstone of civic responsibility under military rule.

Regionalization, however, did not signify a decentralization of authority in the sense that municipalities were granted greater autonomy. Through the formation of a complex bureaucratic structure, regime officials attempted to replicate state authority at all levels of society to ensure market stability. Functionaries attempted to maintain rule of law through their intervention into non-governmental organizations (NGO) and inter-governmental agencies, such as the FAO, as “silent actors” who devolved the responsibility of mediating social relations to these organizations.63 It was through the manipulation of the private sector that state officials intervened into the private lives of rural citizens to ensure local development initiatives reinforced the economic, political, and cultural dictates of the central government. Military officials justified this intervention into the private lives of citizens, and in direct contradiction with the dictates of the neoliberal state, on the grounds that the state had certain subsidiary rights that permitted intervention into national and local affairs to insure efficient market development.

Some scholars have emphasized the importance of the regionalization model in Chilean history, albeit without questioning the limits of this structure. An overarching

theme in Peter Winn’s recent edited volume is that a shrunken state existed as a means to create an open economy where “the market was the regulator of economy and society.”

Despite the volume’s acknowledgement that regionalization was an essential part of neoliberal reforms, the structure is important only insofar as it created a unified market designed by Pinochet and the Chicago Boys. Kent Eaton and David Slater have directly addressed the issue of regionalization under military rule. These works suggest that regionalization was highly undemocratic and authoritarian in nature and thus created a cohesive chain of command from Pinochet down to the municipality.

In contrast, I argue in this dissertation that regionalization actually led to a segmentation of authority, whereby the system did not create a coherent whole, but rather produced disjoined parcels of authority that permitted more autonomy in local development initiatives than regime officials had intended. Through an analysis of this segmentation I contend that a real divide existed between the Ministry of Agriculture’s goals for reform and the actual quotidian management of indigenous reform programs like Plan Perquenco. In part this disconnect originated from the diverse personalities of local bureaucracies. Officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, the University of Chile, the Catholic University and the FAO planned the logistics for Plan Perquenco. Archival evidence demonstrates that discord among these officials led to disagreements over the validity of the project and its goals. Rather than a unified front of state formation, the management of Plan Perquenco, and other regional programs, was generally a highly

contested process in which rival officials vied for control and attempted to undermine one another.

At a micro-level, six agricultural technicians and the FAO consultant Cristobal Unterrichter carried out the day-to-day management of Plan Perquenco. Similar to Elsie Rockwell’s analysis of rural school development during and after the Mexican Revolution, I suggest that the success of municipal-based reform programs always remained subject to the various political dispositions of local officials. The six agronomists had a variety of experiences with pre and post-1973 politics, violence, and culture that ultimately shaped their different views with regards to the intended goals of Plan Perquenco. While some of the agronomists were staunch supporters of the dictatorship, other technicians had formally worked under the Chilean Agrarian Reform and supported the UP. The different personal histories of technicians often created inconsistency in the ideological goals of the program that demonstrate how segmentation prevented coherent state formation.

My analysis of segmentation also allows me to ask new questions about how local Mapuche communities interacted with the military regime. Cathy Schneider, Lisa Baldez and Steve Stern, among others, have examined how grassroots mobilization and the invocation of gender and alternative memory constructs obstructed the military’s political institutionalization in the 1980s. Authors such as José Bengoa and José Marimán have also given thorough detail to the emerging Mapuche movement’s ability to impede the

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solidification of military rule in the Ninth Region.69 While this body of literature provides essential analyses of how and why Chilean citizens mobilized against military rule in 1980s, the scholarship underscores two misleading aspects of mobilization and resistance. First, popular mobilization and resistance primarily occurred in urban areas, and second, resistance was always an external element that resisted and prevented the full institutionalization of military rule. I argue that not only was regional military rule segmented, but also that a focus on segmentation opens new spaces to analyze previously unexamined modes of mobilization within local Mapuche communities.

The youth group los Guitarreros Caminantes, for example, provides a case study of how Mapuche communities used military sanctioned programs to challenge the legitimacy of the Ministry of Agriculture’s reform programs. Building upon the works of Peter Wade, Deborah Wong, and Michelle Bigenho, my work particularly highlights the political culture embodied in musical performances.70 Like immigrant communities, Andean indigenous populations, and marginalized ethnic groups in the United States, Mapuche youths’ musical performances challenged the dominant political culture of the military regime through the promulgation of alternative notions of history and community identity. The construction of alternative Mapuche and national identities did not emerge from overt resistance to an oppressive state, but rather through a subversive collaboration with Chilean state programs that permitted band members a space to affirm their cultural and community history.

Methods

My archival research allows me to develop the larger institutional debates and inconsistencies that surrounded notions of Mapuche culture and indigenous reform under military rule. I utilize documents from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Intendancy of the Ninth Region, local municipalities, and various newspapers and magazines to develop several aspects of these reform efforts. These documents allow me to analyze the Ministry of Agriculture’s negative representation of Mapuche culture as the ideological base from which the ministry justified programs like Plan Perquenco. I draw from these records to also develop the inconsistencies that existed in these reform programs as a result of regionalization. This same archival evidence also provides numerous declarations, interviews, and letters to regime officials from Mapuche organizations like Ad-Mapu. I use these documents to demonstrate how Ad-Mapu and other organizations contested ministry officials’ claims that because Mapuche culture did not exist, and communal lands were therefore irrelevant, D.L. 2568 was a necessity of economic liberation for the Mapuche. My engagement with archival sources therefore allows me to develop the administrative structure and incomplete application of the regime’s indigenous reform efforts at an institutional level.

There was a gap between this institutional focus and my ethnographic work that affected my interviews. Utilizing the collaborative methodology of ethnographic research, I conducted 25 interviews with Mapuche in Perquenco and 4 with the agricultural technicians who worked with these communities in the 1980s. Throughout 2012, I worked primarily in the community of Hijidio Pinchulao in Perquenco. In August

2012, I lived in the community to build stronger connections with my interview subjects and to better understand the role Plan Perquenco plays in community history and identity. I also conducted interviews with nearly every member of los Guitarreros Caminantes in the community of Fernando Carilao. Initial interviews demonstrated that my institutional focus had created a historical chronology and notions of Mapuche culture that did not represent community members’ own sense of history and identity. I followed the standard chronology that viewed 1973 as a point of rupture that culminated in the passage of D.L. 2568 in 1979. These temporal reference points, however, often meant little to my interview subjects. I was frequently questioned as to which land division law I was referring to. Many communities had divided their communal lands before military rule, and thus D.L. 2568 did not signify a point of rupture in community memory and history. Furthermore, for many of the musicians I interviewed, being Mapuche existed within a context of Perquenco’s history. Cultural identity among the musicians often blurred the line between Mapuche and non-Mapuche, as identity frequently had to do with associating one’s self with a shared history of exploitation among Perquenco’s rural inhabitants. Likewise, my interviews demonstrate that the Ministry of Agriculture’s endorsement of masculine temperance and feminine domesticity in the 1980s found support among many Mapuche families. State gendered ideologies were therefore not always in contradiction with local realities as much of the historiography suggests.

Regardless of the gap between my critique of institutional debates and local realities, Plan Perquenco was a very real program that affected the day-to-day lives of Mapuche throughout Perquenco. By blending my institutional analysis of Plan Perquenco with ethnographic research in the final chapter, I am able to begin to examine new ways
Mapuche communities engaged with the military regime and how this affected state
formation and perceptions of Mapuche community history in the 1980s.

To develop these points, I divide the dissertation into two parts, the first of which
consists of two chapters. Chapter one examines the internal logic of regionalization and
how this defined the Ministry of Agriculture’s initial reform efforts in Mapuche
communities. The chapter focuses on continuity to underscore two major points. The
dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet maintained certain institutions, international relations,
patterns of paternalism, and ideological goals that defined the Chilean Agrarian Reform
in the 1960s and early 1970s. Furthermore, regionalization created an inherent
contradiction in state authority as the Pinochet regime simultaneously argued against
state centralization while calling for state intervention into the private lives of rural
families.

Chapter two examines the Ministry of Agriculture’s attempts to solidify and
institutionalize its indigenous policies and specifically D.L. 2568. An analysis of
international and national debates demonstrates how various historical actors
appropriated the language of indigenous rights to legitimate or deny the validity of the
dictatorship’s indigenous policy. This chapter analyzes the successes and failures of the
Ministry of Agriculture’s appropriation of symbolic images, public space, and indigenous
rights as a means to validate D.L. 2568. To highlight the unintentional consequences of
regionalization, this chapter also analyzes the Regional Mapuche Councils (CRM) to
demonstrate the internal complexities of regional military rule that at times limited the
successful implementation of the regime’s indigenous policy. The organization, which
worked at a municipal level and with minimal government oversight, utilized the same
language of indigenous rights and constitutional protections as the Ministry of Agriculture to lambast the ministry’s indigenous reform and educational programs as racist and detrimental to the survival of Mapuche communities. An analysis of the CRM demonstrates how indigenous rights became a contested cultural ideal within the military regime. Part one sets the stage for the larger institutional debates and administrative structures that defined the regime’s indigenous policies and affected programs like Plan Perquenco.

Part two of the dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter three focuses on the formation of Plan Perquenco as the first concrete attempt by the Ministry of Agriculture to enact a unified program for social reform in Mapuche communities. Plan Perquenco created a struggle among the military regime, international experts, agricultural technicians, and Mapuche farmers over how to represent indigenous farmers’ relationships to natural resources, familial organization, state repression, and memories of pre-1973 Chile. The chapter particularly highlights how the military regime’s ability to legitimate intervention in Perquenco erased a long history of community work and organization among Mapuche farmers.

Chapter four examines Plan Perquenco’s three programs: agricultural development, domestic economy, and community enhancement. I use oral interviews from agricultural technicians and Mapuche families to demonstrate the multiple significances of these programs. For some technicians the programs represented the ability to fulfill their responsibility as paternalistic caretakers of a backward indigenous population. For others, like María Molina, Plan Perquenco and her work with women allowed her to cope with the tragedies she had faced under military rule. Interviews with
Mapuche men and women nonetheless reveal that participation in Plan Perquenco opened a variety of avenues for rebuilding community organization and networks of solidarity that the military regime had destroyed after 1973.

The final chapter analyzes two of Plan Perquenco’s community enhancement programs, rural football leagues and the youth music group los Guitarreros Caminantes, in order to examine the successes and failures of both programs with respect to the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous reform programs. Rural soccer leagues promoted a rural masculine ideal that valorized independence, temperance, and a generally adherence to free market principles, while relegating women to the complementary and alleged non-productive realm of domestic labor. Through music classes, however, Mapuche youth utilized both their oral tradition and folk music to reconstruct a history that redefined these gender roles. The final chapter therefore underscores the contested memory and cultural politics of Plan Perquenco, and how some Mapuche youth worked through Plan Perquenco to re-conceptualize rural citizenship and thus challenge the Ministry of Agriculture’s insistence that modern Mapuche culture had no value. My focus on Plan Perquenco and other programs therefore provides a fundamentally new understanding of the origins and outcomes of the military regime’s indigenous reform programs in order to rethink accepted knowledge about how these policies affected Mapuche communities, as well how individuals interacted with these programs in a variety of ways and for different ends.
Chapter One: Creating a Healthy Rural Citizenry: The Pinochet Dictatorship’s Early Efforts at Rural Reform in Mapuche Communities, 1973-1979

After the September 11, 1973 coup, the Ministry of Agriculture insisted that its agrarian reform programs would be diametrically opposed to those of its predecessors. Throughout the 1970s the ministry nonetheless worked through the legal channels, international networks, ideological goals, and patterns of state intervention established in the 1960s and ‘70s in order to restructure the Chilean rural economy. A preoccupation with weak familial development and ineffectual paternalism dating to the early-twentieth century continued to define and justify agrarian reform efforts throughout military rule. While reformers in the 1950s and ‘60s blamed the paternalism of the patrón for stunted familial development in the countryside, the Ministry of Agriculture in the 1970s and ‘80s argued that state paternalism, understood as a form of authority in which a central government controlled all aspects of private life, had crippled rural families. The political clientelism of the Chilean Agrarian Reform embodied in unionization, asentamientos, and CERAs were the greatest incarnations of state intervention that had created a mass of dependent, politicized, and weak campesinos. One official even noted, “a generation of campesinos had lived in cooperatives that served first and foremost as a poor disguise for paternalistic tutelage and later for every type of state and party intervention and abuse.’”

Officials from the Ministry of Agriculture asserted that Mapuche communities had particularly suffered from this paternalism under Allende’s UP government. The ministry contended that 1972’s D.L. 17.729 perpetuated Mapuche marginalization as the law denied the Mapuche the ability to participate in economic and agricultural programs available to other rural communities. State imposed paternalism and segregation had

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72 Food and Agriculture Organization Library (FAOL), 1980, doc. 460885, “Desarrollo Empresarial y Organizacional de los Productores Agrícolas de Explotaciones Familiares, Informe Final.”
therefore stunted the development of Mapuche men and women and thus led to the further agricultural degradation of the Ninth Region.

Military officials argued that to solve the agricultural crisis in the Ninth Region required a reorganization of Chile’s administrative structure in the image of the limited neoliberal state. The format of regionalization particularly emphasized that municipalities, as nuclei of local development, should rely on financial and administrative assistance from a variety of public and private institutions, and not the central state. It was through these municipal-based programs in the Ninth Region that the Ministry of Agriculture designed indigenous reform programs that perpetuated conservative notions of gender mutualism from the 1960s based on the enhancement of male productivity, the validation of women’s domestic work, and the promotion of Chilean youths’ civic responsibility.\(^{73}\) To manage these reforms, the Ministry of Agriculture hired international experts, like FAO consultant Cristobal Unterrichter, who had previously authored agrarian policies for Chile and other Latin American nations since the 1960s. Many of Unterrichter’s projects supported both nineteenth-century German farming collectives and the U.S.’s Alliance Progress’s emphasis on the formation of small yeoman farmers who prevented the spread of communism and secured capitalist expansion and social peace. With the aid of the FAO and Unterrichter in 1976, the Ministry of Agriculture reinstated the Institute for Training and Research in Agrarian Reform (Instituto de Capacitación e Investigación en Reforma Agraria, ICIRA), which was initially founded in 1964. Through the ICIRA program, Unterrichter supported the formation of Agricultural Cooperative Societies (Sociedades de Cooperación Agrícola, SOCA), which he built on the ruins of former state run cooperatives, or asentamientos. It

\(^{73}\) Tinsman, *Partners in Conflict*, 129.
was through these municipal-based programs that Unterrichter and others tried to liberate Mapuche men from what they viewed as their former servitude to state paternalism.

Regionalization, however, did not correct the ills inherent in state paternalism. In many instances, officials were more than happy to intervene into the private lives of rural citizens as a matter of what they deemed market security. Furthermore, despite claims that SOCAs liberated men, in reality they perpetuated patterns of state intervention into citizens’ private lives that the Ministry of Agriculture associated with reform under Allende and ridiculed as ineffective.

**Legitimating Reform in Mapuche Communities**

In the late 1970s, officials in the Ninth Region argued that the ineffectual state paternalism of the Chilean Agrarian Reform had exacerbated problems in Mapuche communities. The Intendant of the Ninth Region claimed that the Chilean Agrarian Reform under the UP was the product of “totally political objectives, [and] extremist elements that unleashed the most intense series of abuses to private property known in the history of Chile.”

The Intendant continued by arguing that the productive farmers of the Ninth Region continually “saw anarchy in the development of their fields and [were] threatened each time with greater violence.” After 1970, land occupations and fence running in the Ninth Region represented heightened Mapuche militancy and ethnic claims after nearly a decade of grassroots mobilization under the new agrarian reform laws. Despite the variety of opinions surrounding the efficacy of land seizures in the early 1970s, the Intendancy of the Ninth Region presented land occupations as acts coordinated by a highly centralized and unified state. The intendancy went on to note that Allende

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75 Ibid.
permitted this affront to private property through his intentional “breakdown of constitutional normality.”

Moreover, the Ministry of Agriculture contended that the Allende administration had created a system of “ethnic segregation” in Chile with the promulgation of D.L. 17.729. The ministry contended that the law had “excluded indigenous groups from national scholarship programs, leaving available what little quantity [of aid] the Institute of Indigenous Development had. In general this increases the detachment of reservation occupants from the rest of the nation and from programs for economic and social development.” Allende’s belief in Chilean ethnic diversity, argued the Ministry of Agriculture, had therefore placed the Mapuche in a unique situation among campesinos in that their subjugation derived from constitutional law.

D.L. 17.729 specifically prevented the division and sale of Mapuche communal lands, which the ministry considered as one of the greatest obstacles to free market reforms in the Ninth Region. Population growth within Mapuche communities created economic problems because their needs expanded beyond the limits of hereditary communal property. FAO consultant Unterrichter concluded that inadequate acreage and the inability to sell communal land did not provide initiatives to produce, and thus Mapuche lands remained underdeveloped. Unterrichter wrote, “By not having individual titles, secure tenancy is reduced. Nobody makes improvements in the field nor in the home.”

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76 Ibid.
78 FAOL, 1984, doc. 450075, “Desarrollo y Organización del Sector Indígena y de Pequeños Agricultores en Chile, Documento de Trabajo No 1.”
The Ministry of Agriculture blamed communal lands and Allende’s segregationist policies for Mapuche “food, health, housing, education, infrastructure, low business level, insufficient technological development in the management of their lands and cultural and mental difficulties.”\textsuperscript{79} In 1978, the Intendancy of the Ninth Region reported there was an infant mortality rate of fifty-two per one thousand births in Mapuche communities, which amounted to sixteen more deaths per one thousand than the national average. Furthermore, close to 10\% of the population remained malnourished and 15.3\% were illiterate.\textsuperscript{80} All of these were several percentage points higher than the national average. In 1978, the Director of the Division of Social Communication stated that like other sectors of Chilean society, Mapuche men had become weak through forty years of state building that placed government officials rather than fathers in charge of familial education, health, economics and moral well being.\textsuperscript{81} Reports from state functionaries, therefore, claimed that state paternalism had created a weak, sick and culturally backward Mapuche population that lacked the capacity to support the rural economy.

Officials from the Ministry of Agriculture ultimately feared that economic and cultural stagnation in Mapuche communities threatened urban centers. Functionaries from INDAP argued that rural youth migrated to cities “in search of more lucrative employment, which they generally do not encounter given their scarce capacity in non-agricultural occupations and their general different idiosyncrasies, which has caused an enlargement of urban centers’ marginal sectors.”\textsuperscript{82} INDAP’s reports claimed that the social degradation of rural areas held the potential to contaminate all of Chilean society.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{79} ARA, INR, 1978, box 40, “Plan de Desarrollo del Minifundio Silvícola en la IX Región.”
\textsuperscript{80} ARA, INR, 1978, box 40, “SERPLAC IX Región.”
\textsuperscript{81} ARA, INR, 1979, box 53, Director of the Division of Social Communication to Intendancy of the Ninth Region, October 9, 1978
\textsuperscript{82} ARNAD, MINAG vol. 2301, “Borrador de Discusión: Juventud Rural.”
\end{footnotesize}
through the increase of poverty and anti-social behavior in cities. The official magazine of the Ministry of Agriculture, *Nuestra Tierra*, ran an article entitled “Santiago: It isn’t the Dreamed of Paradise,” that detailed the horrors many rural inhabitants found when they went to cities in search of a better life. The stories of starvation, poor housing, and vice served as cautionary tales for rural youth who contemplated a new life in urban centers like Temuco or Santiago. *Nuestra Tierra’s* descriptions of desperate urban living also sought to maintain a stable rural work force. The article included a want ad for workers on a 400-hectare fruit farm and concluded, “without a doubt, the above case proves an increase in the possibilities of work and, therefore, the tranquility and secure income of men who work the land.”

In the Ninth Region, rural to urban migration was a very real phenomenon. Between 1970 and 1980, the Ninth Region’s rural population shrank by 16%, while the urban population grew by 25%. Given the importance of the agro-forestry industry in the region, this population shift created a labor shortage and thus a negative impact on the regional economy. The tales of moral corruption and squalor, therefore, had as much to do with securing a rural workforce as they did with preserving Chilean morality.

Officials' arguments that state paternalism threatened the economic and cultural integrity of Chile legitimated the complete overhaul of Chile’s administrative structure. Unlike the two preceding administrations, military officials argued that the private sector rather than the state should be the primary engine for social change. In 1974, the Pinochet regime founded CONARA to enact a policy of regionalization to dismantle the pre-1973 centralist political structure. Regionalization permitted state institutions to control policy

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84 ARA, INR, 1978, box 40, “Plan de Desarrollo del Minifundio Silvícola en la IX Región.”
formation and all public service programs like health and education. However, the private sector would be in charge of implementing state policy at the local level. Officials from CONARA argued that regionalization therefore eliminated “organisms, functions and attributions of an interventionist character that [formerly] strangled private initiative and halted national development.” Through a decrease in government oversight in local affairs, CONARA’s officials argued that local populations would become more independent and thus take a more active role in the development of the Chilean nation.

Decree Laws 573 and 575 that the military regime passed in 1974 created twelve regions in Chile, and a thirteenth known as the Metropolitan Region based around the national capital, Santiago (appendix C). The formation of regions created a hierarchy composed of various administrative units that in theory were subservient to a vertical chain of command (appendix D). At the top of the hierarchy was Pinochet who coordinated regional planning with CONARA’s directors. Below Pinochet was the Ministry of the Interior that oversaw the largest administrative unit, the region. Regional intendants governed all aspects of a region’s political, economic, and social development. As a means to create uniformity in policy, CONARA required ministries to form executive regional secretariats that implemented the will of Santiago-based ministries. The regional intendant was the head of all regional secretariats. Intendants also presided over Regional Development Councils (Consejos Regionales de Desarrollo, COREDE) that allocated funds from the National Fund for Regional Development (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional, FNDR) to local development programs in a region’s provinces.

While CONARA generally formed regions around economic areas, the formation of the Ninth Region had more to do with ethnic composition. Before CONARA finalized the process of regionalization in the early 1970s, government officials discussed the division of the Ninth Region through the integration of Malleco into the Bio-Bio Region to the north, and Cautín into the Lakes District to the south. State functionaries, however, argued that the predominantly indigenous composition of Malleco and Cautín merited the creation of a distinct region.\textsuperscript{86} La Araucanía, therefore, became a region based less on economic congruencies than on a cultural composition that the military junta sought to reform. To highlight the desire to integrate the Ninth Region into the national body, in 1978 CONARA changed the name of the region from “La Frontera” to “La Araucanía.”

To justify this decision, CONARA’s director, Julio Canessa Robert, wrote the Intendant of the Ninth Region and stated that with regards to “geopolitical reasons and the concomitant limitations that the denomination ‘La Frontera’ could carry in the future, it was decided to propose the name Region of the Araucanía.”\textsuperscript{87} The idea of a frontier conjured up a historical past where the Bio-Bio River, the natural northern border of the Ninth Region, created a division between Chilean society and an indigenous south.

Within regions, the next largest administrative unit was the province. In 1974, the Ninth Region had two provinces, Malleco and Cautín. The provincial governor oversaw the distribution of FNDR funds to various public service initiatives in municipalities, like road construction and the formation of health clinics. Within provinces, mayors directed municipalities based around urban centers. In the 1970s, the Ninth Region had 30 municipalities, 11 in Malleco and 19 in Cautín. The mayor existed, “to mobilize the local

\textsuperscript{86} ARA, INR, 1981, box 94, “IX Región de la Araucanía.”
\textsuperscript{87} ARA, INR, 1978, box 33, reservado 1107, President of CONARA to the Intendant of the Ninth Region, August 23, 1978.
community in pursuit of satisfying the collective interests [of Chile].”\textsuperscript{88} The 1980 National Social Plan for Chile portrayed mayors as critical links between local community interests and the rational use of the state’s funds to develop programs that favored these populations. The National Social Plan noted, “Municipalities can and must establish local diagnostic mechanisms, take planning initiatives and promote structures, services, projects, programs, etc… as a contribution that stimulates and facilitates the channelization of State investments for the benefit of harmonious regional development.”\textsuperscript{89} The Ministry of the Interior argued that municipalities were therefore the basic corporate unit that ensured men and their families took full responsibility for their personal development and that of the nation. To fulfill this goal, mayors worked with a number of different public and private organizations. Using funds that COREDE allocated to the municipality, the mayor and the Communal Development Councils (Comités de Desarrollo Comunal, CODECO) distributed funds to community organizations like CEMAs, neighborhood associations, and youth organizations. These various institutions and organizations in turn established the administrative systems, social service programs, credits, subsidies, and networks of communication that allowed for an adequate integration of the rural economy into national and international markets.\textsuperscript{90} Municipal programs for social, cultural, and economic reform were the most local initiatives that military officials enacted to curb what they perceived as the abuses committed by state intervention.

Despite the emphasis the debilitating effects of state intervention, officials argued that they nonetheless had the right to intervene into the lives of private citizens in some

\textsuperscript{88} ARA, INR, 1980, box 74, “Circular Presidencial para la Coordinación Interministerial.”
\textsuperscript{89} ARA, INR, 1980, box 74, oficio circular no. 15, Provincial Governor of Cautín to Mayors.
\textsuperscript{90} FAOL, 1984, doc. 450075. “Desarrollo y Organización del Sector Indígena y de Pequeños Agricultores en Chile, Documento de Trabajo No 1.”
instances. INDAP contended that zones of extreme cultural and economic stagnation, like the Ninth Region, “justified an action prevailing from the State and the Private Sector in the search to alleviate their [rural inhabitants’] condition.”  

The Ministry of the Interior argued that the ultimate goal of the “supreme government” was to “assure families, people, and private organizations the liberty to satisfy their necessities without state interference.” Nonetheless, the ministry acknowledged there were times when individuals were unable to care for themselves. It was the moral imperative of the government to support individuals through subsidies and social development programs.

Rural reform specifically required state intervention. A report issued after the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Regional Intendants in 1979 argued that to effectively aid small farmers the state “must not marginalize itself from this labor, but, through different methods and based in the principal of subsidiary [aid], must manage to grant equal opportunity to all citizens in a way in which they can participate in the benefits generated by economic growth.” The state therefore had the obligation “to provide those who present the greatest level of necessity the instruments that facilitate their progress and full incorporation into the productive process.” “Incorporation into the productive process” specifically meant eradicating cultural practices that officials claimed limited market growth.

The military regime distinguished between welfare and subsidiary states; the latter implied a non-political and limited intervention that fixed the problems that state paternalism had created. The Ministry of Interior argued that this form of government

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92 ARNAD, MINAG, 1982, vol. 2496, circular no. 72, Minister of the Interior to State Ministries, September 6, 1982.
93 ARA, INR, 1979, box 61, “Informe Final de la Comisión No. 1, Desarrollo Rural.”
94 Ibid.
intervention reflected “the Christian and humanist conception of man and society that inspires the task of the Supreme Government.”\textsuperscript{95} It was under this form of “acceptable” paternalism that Chilean state functionaries with the aid of international technicians orchestrated rural development programs in the mid to late 1970s. Like former governments, the military regime simultaneously lauded the need for independent men and women while the ministry argued rural citizens could not be trusted to effectively reform themselves. Within these subsidiary functions, officials from the Ministry of Agriculture sought to reform rural and principally Mapuche communities throughout the Ninth Region.

**Creating Independent Men**

In the Ninth Region, municipal-based projects specifically sought to reform what officials considered weak and debilitated Mapuche families. The Ministry of Agriculture’s emphasis on the creation of productive rural families was not in and of itself a new approach to agrarian reform. In the late 1970s, the Ministry of Agriculture called for the formation of 63,000 Familial Agricultural Units (Unidades Agrícolas Familiares, UAF), which was an institution that first gained political importance during the Chilean Agrarian Reform Law of 1967.\textsuperscript{96} That law defined the UAF as the “the amount of land, given soil quality, location, topography, climate, exploitation possibilities and other characteristics, particularly the capacity of the lands, and exploited personally by the farmer, that permits a family to live and prosper thanks to rational use.”\textsuperscript{97} Like earlier reformers on the left and right, the Ministry of Agriculture promoted

\textsuperscript{95} ARNAD, MINAG, 1982, vol. 2496, circular no. 72, Minister of the Interior to State Ministries, September 6, 1982.

\textsuperscript{96} ARNAD, MINAG, 1978, vol. 2224, “Proyecto de Establecimiento de Centros de Asistencia Técnico- Empresarial ‘CATE.’ ”

\textsuperscript{97} FAOL, 1980, doc. 46092, “Programa General de Trabajo, 1980.”
notions of male sobriety and responsibility, and female domesticity as the cornerstones of rational agricultural production. The Ministry of Agriculture nonetheless derided the utility of political parties, unions, and social justice imperatives that defined reform in the 1960s and early ‘70s. Conversely the ministry sought to create apolitical farmers who were connected to the nation through individual participation in the market rather than through political parties. 98

The Ministry of Agriculture argued that proper rural masculinity entailed men’s ability to be independent workers who knew how to plan agricultural development, keep track of expenses, and successfully market their products to ensure a secure income for their families. It argued that, “the success of the new agricultural businessmen created in this form will be noticed through their capacity to subsist and generate progress for themselves, their families, and the country in general.” 99 An article in the Ministry of Agriculture’s magazine Nuestra Tierra lamented that many small-property owners did not see the economic value of their land and countered “Any land, of any size, and located in any part of the country is a factory. And, as such, must produce not only products but also profit. What the campesino is lacking, therefore, is his conversion into a businessman.” 100 Therefore men should take credits, learn simple accounting, and use “rational” planting techniques as a means to build a better life for their families. Men had to break free from the paternalism that formerly stunted their progress. The Ministry of Agriculture reminded the rural man that “nobody controls him.” 101

Successful participation in the free market for the Ministry of Agriculture required Mapuche men to adhere to certain moral standards like sobriety and monogamy

98 Tinsman, Buying into the Regime, 67.
101 Ibid.
that created stable families and productive workers. Various articles from the Ministry of Agriculture detailed the negative consequences of drinking. One article warned that a drunken man “is weak, sick, fearful or frustrated and needs to drink to give himself energy and feel strong.”102 Men who drank, argued the Ministry of Agriculture, became dependent on alcohol for their strength, and were thus not self-reliant. The idea of weakness manifested itself particularly in alcohol-induced sexual impotency. Alcohol, therefore, robbed men of the virility and masculine independence that the ministry tried to instill in the countryside.

As fathers and husbands, men also had to contribute to harmonious households. The Ministry of Agriculture encouraged men to always remember their wives’ birthdays, to bring them gifts, and to show them affection. Articles in Nuestra Tierra advised men to have conversations with their wives before they read the news or watched television. One article told men “to listen to all of the things she wants to tell, even those that seem boring.”103 The ultimate goal of sober men treating their spouses well was to create stable households that ensured children grew up in an environment free from violence and drinking. In the opinion of the Ministry of Agriculture, secure homes created empowered youth who contributed to the economic growth of the rural sector rather than the enlargement of urban centers.

Reform programs in the Ninth Region specifically supported longer twentieth-century efforts to create Mapuche UAFs that sustained the agro-forestry industry. In 1978, the agro-forestry industry accounted for 33.7% of the Gross Regional Product, and 11.7% the Gross National Product. The Ninth Region produced 61% of the nation’s

By 1979, the farmers in the Ninth Region utilized 180,000 hectares to produce 1/3 of Chile’s wheat. The region also contained a fifth of the nation’s cattle. In 1979, at the Fifteenth Annual Exposition of Agriculture, Livestock, Industry, and Commercialization in Temuco, Minister of Agriculture Alfonso Marquez de la Plata addressed these economic advances before a crowd of the Ninth Region’s financial and agricultural elite. Minister de la Plata told the crowd that the military regime was happy to acknowledge “the rhythm of progress of agricultural activities, and to see how, little by little, effective results in the improvement and betterment of [of agriculture] are consolidated, born from the desire to work and liberty, and the capacity of farmers to respond in a dynamic manner to the challenge.” While attributing economic growth to the hard work and rational production of the Ninth Region’s elite, he noted that “today the Chilean farmer competes spectacularly in international markets.” Removed from this list were those who had supported the Chilean Agrarian Reform, and to whom Minister de la Plata referred to as “anti-patriotic” and “chaotic.” While supporters of state led agricultural development hampered agricultural development, so did the Mapuche whose communal land holdings prevented adequate agricultural development for market consumption. Minister de la Plata’s emphasis on what had led to economic success in the region was an attempt to discredit the Chilean Agrarian Reform and Mapuche farming practices. This narrative

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relied on the intentional omission of the gains made under the Chilean Agrarian Reform and by Mapuche communities before 1973.

The Mapuche-run Cooperativa Lautaro in Lumaco was extremely successful by the time of the 1973 coup, and produced 16,000 quintals\textsuperscript{108} of wheat annually.

Furthermore, Klubock’s research demonstrates that many of the agricultural and forestry advances that the ministry attributed to “rational” and “patriotic” farming were actually the products of the Agrarian Reform that the dictatorship sought to discredit.\textsuperscript{109} These statistics therefore did not reflect or intentionally skewed the contributions of former administrations as well as Mapuche farmers as a means to legitimate the ministry’s reform programs.

The most valuable industry in the Ninth Region was lumber. Since the early twentieth century, the lumber industry in the Eighth and Ninth Regions had been the backbone of southern Chile’s economy. One of the greatest advances in Chilean forestry was the introduction of California Pine, or \textit{pino insigne}. The foreign species matured at a quicker rate than species native to Chile, and thus became an economically viable alternative for the forestry industry. While the Chilean state historically took an active role in the development of the forestry industry, state involvement came to an all-time high during the UP administration. As with other aspects of its agrarian policy, the UP spearheaded an attempt to create more public participation in forestry development on state-run lands. After the 1973 coup, the military dictatorship divided these state-run plantations, and viciously persecuted the labor unions that comprised their workforce.

\textsuperscript{108} A quintal is 100 kilograms.
\textsuperscript{109} Klubock, \textit{La Frontera}.
The ultimate goal of the junta’s dismantling of the state-run lumber industry was to permit a free market takeover.110

In 1978, The Secretariat of Regional Planning (Secretaría Regional de Planificación y Coordinación, SERPLAC) noted that 47% of the Ninth Region was suitable for pine and eucalyptus production. The Regional Council for Development in the Ninth Region stated that Mapuche communal property represented 80% of potential forestry lands. From these statistics, state functionaries argued that the economic success of the Ninth Region relied on the division of Mapuche communities and the formation of UAFs that managed small plots of forested land for market consumption.111 The Ministry of Agriculture noted that the successful reformation of Mapuche families required the expansion of forested lands onto 4,000 hectares in the Ninth Region. This endeavor called for the purchase of land, saplings, and the training of 8,000 Mapuche farmers to manage lumber production. To fund the project required $1,654,000 USD. Of this sum, the Chilean state provided $1,035,900, or 63% of the total funds. That left 37% of the funds to come from the private sector. These figures support Klubock’s assertion that the expansion of the free market and the alleged economic miracle it fostered was generally a state funded and managed endeavor.112

In 1978, the Ministry of Agriculture produced a report that claimed that forestry production represented the economic foundation of the Mapuche UAF. The Ministry of Agriculture argued that the introduction of California Pine yielded several positive effects for Mapuche families. Beyond rejuvenating the soil, small, family run plantations gave


111 ARA, INR, 1979, box 61, “Informe de la Primera Sesión de la Comisión No 1 ‘Desarrollo Rural.’ ”

the Mapuche UAF access to a variety of markets through the diversification of the
familial economy. The Ministry of Agriculture argued that Mapuche production of *pino
insigne* first and foremost provided families with lumber for the export economy and
wood for the construction of houses, barns, and fences. It noted that small plantations
provided an ideal setting to grow mushrooms, support apiculture and small animal
husbandry, and dedicate small amounts of land to farming that provided Mapuche
families with necessary fruits and vegetables. The diversified familial economy thereby
created the Self-sufficient Production Module (Producción Modular Autosuficiente).¹¹³

The idea that participation in forestry development held the potential to civilize
and modernize Mapuche communities reflected established twentieth-century Chilean
political debates. From the 1940s onward, Chilean social reformers on the political left
and right viewed pine and eucalyptus production in the Ninth Region as a means to settle
and civilize the rural population through their participation in “scientific” and “rational”
forestry production.¹¹⁴ Like preceding administrations, the military junta argued
“scientifically directed commercial forestry would civilize the frontier’s social and
natural worlds, introducing the rational management of people and forests.”

While some programs reflected long-standing trends with regards to the need for
scientific and rational production, others reified international Cold War networks and
systems of cooperative farming that were the hallmarks of the Chilean Agrarian Reform.
The reinstatement of ICIRA in 1976 represented one of the greatest state-led, multi-
regional initiatives to create market-oriented farmers in the late 1970s. The Chilean
Ministry of Agriculture and the FAO initially founded ICIRA in 1964 to research and

address land tenancy as well as provide technical training to new landowners to ensure they adhered to market oriented production. The participation of the FAO, principally in the 1960s, was part of the larger influence of the U.S.’s Alliance for Progress that promoted the formation of Midwestern-style small farmers throughout Latin America as a means to ward off the influence of communism. After 1973, the military officials closed ICIRA and persecuted its leaders for allegedly fomenting a Marxist rebellion in the countryside. The Ministry of Agriculture nonetheless reorganized ICIRA in 1976 to analyze and provide solutions to the problems the Chilean rural sector faced.

The re-instatement of the ICIRA program only three years after the military junta tortured and exiled its leaders necessitates an examination of the motivations of the FAO. In 1974, the FAO had hosted a regional workshop in Santiago, Chile. The workshop found that Latin America’s population had doubled between 1950 and 1974, which placed a huge burden on both the urban population, and access to land in rural areas. Workshop reports argued that while the agricultural potential of Latin America was greater than anywhere else in the world, nations only utilized 21% of potentially farmable land. The FAO claimed that lack of production coupled with import dependency severely limited food consumption in Latin American countries. From the workshop, the FAO pledged to develop programs with individual nations to promote “comprehensive approaches to development problems, particularly through FAO’s work on integrated rural development.”

The particular importance of Latin American agriculture for the

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world economy after more than a decade of purportedly ineffective agrarian reform created a vested interest for the FAO in Latin America and Chile.\textsuperscript{116}

The Ministry of Agriculture’s reinstatement of ICIRA coincided with the completion of asentamiento division. Between 1975 and 1977, the Ministry of Agriculture divided and privatized nearly all state-run agricultural collectives like asentamientos. The immediate division and privatization of state-run agricultural cooperatives created 34,306 new property owners in Chile.\textsuperscript{117} The FAO saw the potential threat these new farmers faced if they did not receive the necessary skills to “rationally” utilize their new property for national economic growth. An ICIRA report even noted, “In general, therefore, asentados possess little technological preparation and almost no business capacity, remaining at a disadvantage to confront the market social economy that the current government proposes.”\textsuperscript{118} FAO concerns with market-oriented agricultural production among former asentados led the institution to possibly overlook human rights violations and thus reinstate ICIRA. The reformation of ICIRA therefore represented the continuity of international agrarian reform efforts that sought to limit the influence of communism, support private land ownership and promote market-oriented production.

To ensure “rational” agricultural production in newly privatized asentamientos, the Ministry of Agriculture hired a group of technicians radically different from ICIRA’s leadership in the 1960s and early 1970s. Italian-born Cristobal Unterrichter was one of the primary FAO agents in ICIRA after 1976. Born in 1918, Unterrichter spent his early

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} ARNAD, MINAG, 1978, vol. 2224, “Proyecto de Establecimiento de Centros de Asistencia Técnico-Empresarial ‘CATE.’ ”
\textsuperscript{118} FAOL, 1977, doc. 460291, “Desarrollo Empresarial y Organizacional de los Productores Agrícolas de Explotaciones Familiares.”
life in southeastern Europe. His first agrarian job was from 1930 to 1942 when he worked as the administrator of a potato-farm cooperative in Czechoslovakia. Unterrichter served in the German army from 1942 to 1947 as an infantry lieutenant and company leader where he became a POW in British Egypt most likely during Erwin Rommel’s failed campaign of the desert. Unterrichter first came to Latin America in 1953 to work for the International Catholic Migration Mission where he helped 3,000 people displaced after World War II settle in Chile. Unterrichter later became the representative for the German Association for Settlement Abroad working in La Serena. Up until 1965, he worked in the FAO’s agricultural settlement programs in Chile before the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences (IICA) employed him in Ecuador to work as a manager of settlement and agrarian reform programs. In 1976, he returned to Chile to work as one of the primary consultants for ICIRA.119

Unterrichter’s ideology regarding agrarian and familial reform specifically supported the formation of market-oriented private property owners. Unterrichter shunned collectivism that he claimed stifled individual growth and competition. In 1963, as FOA representative CORA and the Superior Council for the Promotion of Agricultural and Livestock (Consejo Superior de Fomento Agropecuario, CONSFA), Unterrichter wrote a report on the recently passed Decree Law 15.020, or the Chilean Agrarian Reform Law. He argued that collective property did not yield the desired economic and social results because the state and private sector were loath to invest in an endeavor that required huge human and financial resources for potentially minimal gains. Unterrichter argued that individually owned Agricultural Family Property (Propiedad Familiar Agrícola, PFA) created rural workers who were “free, socially and economically

independent, [and possessed] a large amount of individual initiative."\textsuperscript{120} By 1976, therefore, Unterrichter was a seasoned cold warrior outside the influence of the Chicago Boys who had spent most of his career developing reform programs that supported the larger hemispheric trend that the U.S. orchestrated to limit the influence of communism.

The principal program for reform under ICIRA was the Business and Organizational Development of Agricultural Producers on Family Farms (ICIRA-76).\textsuperscript{121} The program began in May 1977 and lasted until 1979. ICIRA-76 sought to “promote producers’ organization in the agriculture sector, especially small producers, with the end of managing their adequate development within the system of free competition supported by the government.”\textsuperscript{122} To train small farmers to be productive businessmen, ICIRA-76 created nine training centers from the Fourth to the Tenth Region.\textsuperscript{123} Aiding the knowledge of rational resource development were Technical Business Assistance Centers (Centros de Asistencia Técnico-Empresarial, CATE). The United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID) gave sixteen million dollars to form CATEs and teach men how to best orient their livestock and agricultural production towards national and international markets.\textsuperscript{124}

Beyond education centers, ICIRA-76 proposed the formation of SOCAs. SOCAs were “association[s] of peoples naturally dedicated to agriculture (property owners, renters, share croppers, community members) who have united to solve the common production problems on their lands.” SOCAs existed at the municipal level and worked to

\textsuperscript{120} Cristobal Unterrichter, \textit{La Propiedad Familiar Agrícola en la Ley de Reforma Agraria} (Chile: Consejo Superior de Fomento Agropecuario, 1963.)

\textsuperscript{121} I decided to use this acronym because the program lacked one. It is a huge title, and I feel this acronym provides a simplified reference point.

\textsuperscript{122} FAOL, 1977, doc. 460895, “Desarrollo Empresarial y Organizacional de los Productores Agrícolas de Explotaciones Familiares.”

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{124} ARNAD, MINAG, 1978, vol. 2224, “Proyecto de Establecimiento de Centros de Asistencia Técnico-Empresarial ‘CATE.’”
“address the problems of the [rural] sector, especially with regards to tenancy and future management of infrastructure and capital.”¹²⁵ Given that ICIRA-76 worked only in former asentamientos, the FAO and Ministry of Agriculture essentially built SOCAs on the ruins of former state-run agricultural cooperatives. To coordinate local and regional production, SOCAs worked with regionally based Agricultural Cooperatives that provided access to markets, credit, and aided with commercialization. Unterrichter suggested that a “vertical spine” between municipal production and regional markets formed a “complete bridge between producer and consumer.”¹²⁶ The successful union between local and regional cooperatives required farmers to “transform their unions and federations into powerful economic units. While local organizations have to buy their materials from and sell their products to their local competitors, rural cooperation in Chile has no future.”¹²⁷ While the Christian Democrats established a similar system between unions and larger federations under the 1967 Law of Campesino Unionization, the formation of SOCAs explicitly derided unionization, party politics, and ideals of social justice.

Unterrichter’s opinions with regards to rural cooperatives did not, however, always support more radical neoliberal economic reforms. In his reports to the FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture, Unterrichter argued that the formation of cooperatives had to follow the model that German Friederich Wilhelm Raiffeisen established in the 1860s. The Raiffeisen cooperative was a form of community self-help that allowed farmers to overcome their dependence on loan sharks, charity, and centralized political parties. The cooperatives effectively formed a credit bank held by all members in joint stock.

¹²⁶ Ibid.
¹²⁷ Ibid.
Raiffeisen model’s emphasis on unlimited liability where members stood to lose equally on unpaid or defaulted loans “foster[ed] mutuality by institutionalizing joint material responsibility. To ensure selfless service, cooperative leaders would receive no salaries and would prove their fitness to serve through ‘community-mindedness’ and the ‘reliability of their character.’”\textsuperscript{128} The intimate character of Raiffeisen cooperatives ideally created neighborly bonds that enacted the three “Ss” for change: self-help, self-responsibility and self-governance.\textsuperscript{129}

Rather than support individual initiative and responsibility, SOCAs remained under the close tutelage of military officials. All SOCAs had a “monitor” from ICIRA who was military personnel. Like asentamientos, the Ministry of Agriculture also hand selected and trained the directors of SOCAs to ensure the cooperative remained loyal to the economic dictates of military rule. The selection of local leaders fit other patterns of military intervention into unions in the late 1970s. Despite the legal re-formation of unions in 1979, military officials often selected leaders to assure that new union representatives had no political allegiances to leftist political parties and were more or less loyal to the regime.\textsuperscript{130} It is therefore not hard to imagine that the directors of SOCAs came from a pool of asentados that were not inclined to use their position to advocate for the popular mobilization that marked the Chilean Agrarian Reform. State intervention was thus a hallmark of SOCAs. An ICIRA-76 report even noted that the reforms embodied in the program demanded, “an intensive educational and assistance effort on

\textsuperscript{128} David Peal, “Self-Help and the State: Rural Cooperatives in Imperial Germany,” \textit{Central European History} 21 (September 1988): 247
\textsuperscript{129} Peal, “Self-Help and the State: Rural Cooperatives in Imperial Germany,” 247
the part of the State." The formation of SOCAs therefore created a system of state-managed free enterprise. Despite declarations of the damaging effects of the Chilean Agrarian Reform, SOCAs highly resembled former patterns of state-run cooperatives and the patronage that accompanied them.

The success of SOCAs to effectively produce cooperative capitalism was minimal. By the end of 1977, the ICIRA-76 program had only created 439 SOCAs that contained 10,189 members, or 30% of the former asentado population. The minimal ability of ICIRA-76 to enroll farmers in its programs had a particular historical context in the Ninth Region. By the late 1970s, only 800 of the projected 2000 small and principally Mapuche farmers in the Ninth Region partook in the ICIRA-76 program, which represented only 37% of former asentados. At the start of the ICIRA program there were no laws specific to the division of Mapuche lands, which left the majority of Mapuche farmers outside the purview of the ICIRA-76 program in the Ninth Region. While the military regime passed legislation in 1979 that permitted the legal division of Mapuche lands, this policy did not really take effect until 1980. Despite the initial shortcomings of these programs, ICIRA-76 and other rural development initiatives throughout the Ninth Region nonetheless attempted to reinstate “scientific” and market-oriented production among Mapuche communities as a fundamental component of rehabilitating the Chilean countryside. Many of these programs were not necessarily inventive, but rather reflective of earlier conservative reform efforts.

132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
Stable Homes and Domestic Wives

Scientifically managed agriculture development required the formation of what the Ministry of Agriculture deemed stable households. Officials from the Ministry of Agriculture feared that rural children grew up in volatile homes, thereby prompting a series of initiatives to reform households, mothers, and wives within Mapuche communities. Traditional Mapuche housing like the ruka was seen as antithetical to the formation of efficient nuclear families that produced for market consumption.\(^{134}\) The ruka was and is a multi-generational Mapuche housing system that extends beyond the nuclear family. The ruka houses all patrilineal descendants and forms the basic economic and kinship unit within the larger Mapuche socio-political structure of the reducción. State functionaries feared that overcrowding in rukas led to promiscuity, incest, and unhygienic living that created weak men and women incapable of rational agricultural production and familial management.

To solve what the state functionaries saw as a housing crisis in the Ninth Region, the Ministry of Housing and Urbanization developed a program to provide 15,000 housing subsidies primarily for Mapuche families. The goal of this subsidy program was “to facilitate the access of low income families to permanent, secure, and hygienic housing in the rural sector, whose end purpose is the permanent settlement of these families.”\(^ {135}\) The idea of permanently settling families supported the ministry’s efforts to curb the rural to urban migration that officials claimed hampered rural economic development. The ultimate conclusion was that stable, clean homes with self-motivated inhabitants would lead to greater agricultural output. The Regional Secretariat for the

\(^{134}\) ARA, INR, 1980, box 76, “Memorándum: Subsidio Habitacional Rural.”

\(^{135}\) ARA, INR, 1980, box 89, “Reglamenta Asignación Subsidio Habitacional Rural, Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo.”
Ministry of Agriculture argued “elevating living conditions increases the productivity of the land in notable ways.”\(^{136}\)

There were, however, highly political components of the housing subsidy law that aimed, and often failed, to gain support for the military regime’s indigenous policies. In a letter to the Ministry of the Interior, the Intendant of the Ninth Region, Antiliano Jara, argued that the housing program created a “visual impact” that combated the negative attention the military regime received from both a national and international audiences.\(^{137}\) Intendant Jara noted that the housing program thus held the potential to “stop [the regime’s adversaries] from wielding the flags that they hoist today.”\(^{138}\)

Public scrutiny of the regime’s housing program demonstrated a limit to the junta’s ability to create a “visible impact.” On July 2, 1979, amid the cold drizzle of the Araucanian winter and the thick smell of smoldering damp wood from the chimneys of newly built houses, French priest Peter Hanns Necceson arrived to his parish in the Municipality of Los Sauces. Father Hanns arrived in response to the mayor of Los Sauces’ request that he bless the construction of 20 new low-income houses. As Father Hanns stood before a crowd of military officials and the recipients of the new homes, the parish priest recited a poem that lambasted the extreme poverty and misery that plagued the lower and particularly rural classes. Military officials took offense to the poem’s intimation that the military regime had not done enough to help the Mapuche in the Ninth Region. The mayor quickly interrupted Father Hanns and stopped the sermon. The junta’s public censorship of Father Hanns created an outcry from public and religious figures.

The Governor of the Malleco Province countered that Father Hanns was a known agitator

\(^{136}\) ARA, INR, 1980, box 76, “Memorándum: Subsidio Habitacional Rural.”

\(^{137}\) ARA, INR, 1980, box 81, “Memorándum: Subsidio Habitacional Rural.”

\(^{138}\) ARA, INR, 1980, box 81, reservado 193, Intendant of the Ninth Region to the Minister of the Interior, July 11, 1980.
who held secret meetings with Mapuche radicals where they spoke only Mapuzungun. While it is hard to discern if the Governor’s comments were true, they were nonetheless powerful allegations that discredited Father Hanns and labeled him an anti-regime conspirator.139

Despite false accusations that Father Hanns was an international Marxist agitator, his negative comments about the housing program were true. In late 1980, Intendant Jara wrote to the Office of Pinochet to argue that the alleged growth of the new housing project from 900 homes in 1979 to 980 in 1980 was misleading. While on paper growth seemed apparent, the Regional Intendant pointed out that the size of the homes shrank from 42 meters-squared in 1979 to about 20 meters-squared in 1980. Intendant Jara concluded, “even though the number of constructions has continued on a growing trajectory, it has [only] been possible thanks to a decrease in the quality of the housing that is given today. This would not seem to be in agreement with the policies of the Supreme Government that seek to allocate larger sums of money towards those sectors where extreme poverty is concentrated.”140

Nearly two months passed before Pinochet’s office acknowledged Jara’s letter, but without providing any concrete proposals for remediation. The report from the Regional Intendant highlighted the political nature of the housing, which existed primarily for appearances.

Various institutions argued for the centrality of proper mothers and wives to ensure a healthy home. Many Chilean functionaries viewed women as natural and apolitical guardians of the domestic sphere destined to instill morality in Chile’s future generations. The Ministry of Agriculture suggested that rural women were the

139 ARA, INR, 1979, box 49, confidencial no. 171, Provincial Governor of Malleco to the Intendant of the Ninth Region, July 5, 1979.
embodiment of “force, sacrifice, and motherly love.” The National Women’s Secretariat argued that women needed to valorize domesticity, which permitted the well-being of their husbands, children, and by extension the nation. Women’s “natural” role was motherhood, ideally within marriage and the nuclear family. Officials claimed that women who engaged in premarital sex would become pregnant, unattractive, and unable to find husbands. Without a husband or family, mothers had no place in Chilean society.

Proper rural women also created stable households. Nuestra Tierra told women to be presentable, punctual, and always to have food ready for their husbands. Further, rural women had to “know how to have conversations, listen to the radio, and maybe read to know what is happening in Chile and in the world.” Clearly the editors of Nuestra Tierra saw women’s literacy as unnecessary beyond their husbands’ entertainment. Women had to be interesting companions to their husbands to keep them from the bar and extra-marital affairs.

CEMAs worked with Mapuche women to instill these values. During the Chilean Agrarian Reform, the Christian Democrats and independent political organizations created CEMAs to empower women to solve familial and community problems while giving women “collective representation in community activities.” CEMA courses taught women how to sew, weave, cook, garden, and participate in other activities that

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141 “La Mujer: ¿Es Gran Puntal de la Familia?” Nuestra Tierra 17 (July 1980): 1
142 Princeton University Latin American Pamphlet Collection (PULACP), Women and Gender Issues in Chile, reel 3, “Valores Patrios y Valores Familiares.”
143 “Verdadero Amor,” Nuestra Tierra 17 (July 1980): 7
144 “El Amor Conyugal,” in Nuestra Tierra 1 (March 1979): 33
145 “El Amor Conyugal,” in Nuestra Tierra 1 (March 1979): 33
146 Tinsman, Partners in Conflict, 233.
helped the home economy.\textsuperscript{147} CEMAs also offered women courses on hygiene, first aid, nutrition, and parenting. As the Chilean Agrarian Reform proceeded, CEMA membership increased and the goals of the organization changed. Particularly under the UP, CEMAs advocated revolutionary gender roles that argued for the breakdown of the domestic nature of women’s work and in turn promoted their active participation in community mobilization.\textsuperscript{148}

During the military dictatorship, Pinochet’s wife, Lucía Hiriart de Pinochet, as CEMA’s new leader, made concrete efforts to eradicate its political influence and to promote gender roles based on traditional female domesticity. CEMA’s official magazine \textit{Amiga} stated that after 1973 “CEMA-Chile stopped being a political entity. Now it is an organization where women learn, are trained and help both their families and communities.”\textsuperscript{149} The goal of CEMA under the dictatorship was to restore the domestic, non-productive, and complementary nature of women’s and mothers’ work. The idea of apolitical domesticity was a fundamental aspect of the regime’s promotion of women’s maternal nationalism. Pinochet and other institutions lauded the women who protested against the food shortages and political chaos in the final days of the UP government. Pinochet suggested the heroism of women was a “primordial resistance to tyranny.” The middle class women who directed CEMAs in the 1970s and ‘80s therefore “praised maternal self-abnegation and elaborated a patriotic mysticism that defined women as the apolitical soul of the nation.”\textsuperscript{150}

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\textsuperscript{147} Norberto Lechner and Susan Levy, “Notas Sobre la Vida Cotidiana III: El Disciplinamiento de la Mujer,” (Santiago de Chile: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 1982).
\textsuperscript{148} Tinsman, \textit{Partners in Conflict}, 147
\textsuperscript{149} Reproduced in Lechner and Levy, \textit{Notas Sobre la Vida Cotidiana III}.
\textsuperscript{150} Tinsman, \textit{Buying into the Regime}, 66.
\end{flushright}
In 1978, CEMA joined with the Institute for Rural Education (Insituto de Educación Rural, IER) to create a technical school for young women in the Municipality of Loncoche in the Ninth Region. In Loncoche, principally Mapuche women took classes that focused on horticulture, apiculture, mathematics, family planning, and health education.\textsuperscript{151} The IER noted that through these courses women were able “to contribute to the increase of familial income and savings, to substantially improve food and the living conditions of their family.”\textsuperscript{152} Other institutions in the Ninth Region also supported training courses for young women that advocated the complementary nature of women’s work. The Catholic University designed schools like the Agricultural Women’s School “Ñielol” in the Ninth Region to train Mapuche women to be rural housewives. Courses included animal husbandry, cultivating gardens for the family, and apiculture. An article in the military-sponsored magazine 	extit{Campo Sureño} emphasized the importance of honey production as complimentary to “the other domestic labors, being a good way to obtain [money] without having to go too far from the home, it’s a good alternative for the entire family.”\textsuperscript{153} These institutions’ conception of women’s work, therefore, required women and mothers to remain within the domestic sphere and produce solely for family consumption. In this manner the rational, productive, and business orientation of agricultural development remained the domain of male workers.

An aspect of the Loncoche CEMA courses, however, that challenged the notion of the complementary and non-productive nature of women’s labor was a course on artisanal production for the market. CEMA established workshops throughout Chile to employee women and to promote their crafts. Male unemployment and low pay often

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\textsuperscript{151} ARA, INR, 1978, box 30, ord. 634, December 1, 1978.  \\
\textsuperscript{152} ARNAD, MINAG, 1980, vol. 2496, “Instituto de Educación Rural.”  \\
\textsuperscript{153} Campo Sureño 120 (July 28, 1986): 5.
\end{flushleft}
forced women into salaried work in CEMA workshops. A woman interviewed by Nuestra Tierra stated “When [the husband] is irresponsible, the woman sees herself confronted with the heavy task of completing both roles,” as mother and breadwinner. Because her husband was out of work, Benita Munizaga worked in a CEMA-run embroidery business known as Bordadoras de Conchalí with 60 other women. At the Conchalí factory, women worked twelve-hour shifts Monday through Friday, and a ten-hour shift on Saturday. All women were salaried employees who worked in industrial labor.\textsuperscript{154} CEMA argued, however, that sewing was consistent with women’s obligations as patriotic and sacrificial women, as centers like the one at Conchalí produced hospital linens, police uniforms, school uniforms, and other community necessities. CEMA therefore maintained that sewing and embroidery allowed women to contribute to the home and nation as true mothers and wives.\textsuperscript{155}

In the Ninth Region, the work of Mapuche women supported one of CEMA’s principal initiatives: the marketing of indigenous art. Through CEMA’s promotion of indigenous women’s art, indigenous communities gained access to national and international markets that in turn supported their families and communities. CEMA pamphlets stated that one of the institution’s objectives was “to conserve these [indigenous] manifestations without adulterating their origin and protecting their adequate commercialization.”\textsuperscript{156} CEMA insisted that its 19 art galleries throughout Chile therefore protected indigenous art from exploitive practices.

Nonetheless, the CEMA gallery in Temuco relied heavily on ethno-fetish consumption by national and international tourists. While various military institutions

\textsuperscript{154} PULACP, Women and Gender Issues in Chile, reel 3, “El trabajo de manos femeninas.”
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} PULACP, Women and Gender Issues in Chile, reel 3, “Artesanía Autóctona Chilena.”
continued to deny the existence of distinct ethnic groups in Chile, CEMA realized that
the international fascination with pre-Colombian societies provided the Ninth Region
with a potentially lucrative international market. In 1978, SERPLAC even argued that
one of the most important industries in the Ninth Region was international tourism. The
Ninth Region with its lakes and iconic volcanoes like el Llaima created an international
loop that extended from Temuco, to Chile’s southern Lakes District, and across the
cordillera to the Argentine resort town of Bariloche. In the 1970s and ‘80s, annual
Mapuche artisanal fairs in Villarrica supported the growing tourist industry that came to
southern Chile to photograph Mapuche men and women and buy their authentic wares.
The annual Muestra Artesanal Mapuche, or the Mapuche Artisanal Fair began in 1975
and offered a wide range of tourist opportunities like guided tours of Temuco, its
museums, and the surrounding countryside. Muestra Artesanal Mapuche presented the
Mapuche as a vestige of a dying culture that emerged once a year to impress tourists with
their craftsmanship. One article noted that the artisanal show helped to “conquer the
Mapuche heart,” through understanding and cultural respect. The pro-Pinochet
newspaper El Mercurio suggested the Mapuche needed “to be constructive, knowing to
live in peace in the interior of their communities, pardoning their neighbors, and
returning, like Christ, good for evil.” The event also promoted the image of a passive
and obedient Mapuche in an attempt to downplay the increased Mapuche cultural
mobilization against the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous policies. The Mapuche who
participated, nonetheless, certainly did impress crowds. An article stated, “the reduced
but colorful group of men and women was the attraction, fundamentally for foreign

157 ARA, INR, 1979, box 40, “SERPLAC.”
tourists, who registered the autochthonous figures in their cameras.”¹⁶⁰ Like the tourists’ photos, Muestra Artesanal Mapuche froze the Mapuche into a static and unthreatening past.

In the early 1980s, the Ninth Region had 85 artisanal workshops to support the growing international fascination with Mapuche culture.¹⁶¹ This figure was greater than any other region in Chile, and reflected the importance CEMA placed on marketing Mapuche art for national and international consumption. CEMAs throughout the Ninth Region manufactured traditional Mapuche ponchos, headbands, musical instruments, and wooden and stone figures. In Temucuicui, CEMA centers produced textiles that supported a growing tourist industry in the Ninth Region.¹⁶² Of particular value for CEMA was Mapuche silver work, traditionally worn by women. Long, intricate silver necklaces, headdresses, and hairpieces became a focal point of CEMA production in the Ninth Region in the 1970s and ‘80s. In July of 1979, INDAP wrote Pinochet’s wife to discuss a possible contract between INDAP and CEMA, reminding her that INDAP had the responsibility to ensure the successful integration and social development of the Mapuche. Part of the Mapuche’s social development, argued Minister de la Plata, was their ability to participate in the market economy as a means to create a stable family income. Through the contract, INDAP supplied CEMAs throughout the Ninth Region with silver to increase commodities for the international tourist industry.¹⁶³ The silver that INDAP donated to CEMA, however, came from Mexico. Ironically, CEMA’s

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.
¹⁶¹ PULACP, Women and Gender Issues in Chile, reel 3, “Artesania Autoctona Chilena.”
¹⁶² PULACP, Women and Gender Issues in Chile, reel 3, “En el telar Mapuche”
preservation of Mapuche authenticity relied on the non-traditional importation of raw materials, to mass-produce cultural icons for international market consumption.

CEMA artisanal centers clearly blurred the line between the Ministry of Agriculture’s delineations of male and female work. CEMA’s pamphlets, however, always corrected the contradiction embodied in the institution’s simultaneous promotion of female domesticity and salaried work. CEMA argued “What is definitively important in this aspect [of women’s work], is that the woman who works continues feeling that the natural center of her life is her home, not her office or business. Whatever are the gratifications that professional or economic success bring, this cannot replace, in a morally formed woman, her feminine mission or her motherly vocation.”164 For CEMA, morally sound women recognized that while paid work was an occasional necessity of rural life, this by no means overshadowed their larger obligations as mothers and wives.

Despite the emphasis on female domesticity and women’s right to raise healthy children, various ministries argued for state intervention into childhood education. To solve the problem of Mapuche isolation and the limited access to schools, the Institute for Indigenous Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Indígena, IDI) created resident student housing in urban centers throughout the Ninth Region. In 1977, the IDI gave 320 scholarships to Mapuche children to take up residency in urban and generally state-run schools. These schools served as technical training centers where students learned how to become modern, rational market-oriented farmers. In 1979, The Provincial Governor of Cautín with the aid of the Pentecostal run “Evangelical Homes of Chile,” wrote the Regional Intendant of the Ninth Region to request funds for the resident student home in Perquenco, a municipality that was predominantly Mapuche. The presence of the

164 PULACP, Women and Gender Issues in Chile, reel 3, “Valores Patrios y Valores Familiares.”
Pentecostals merits further discussion. The Iglesia Evangélica Unión Pentecostal ran Evangelical Homes of Chile. Literature has generally suggested that the dictatorship supported more conservative evangelicals to provided a counterpart to the mobilization of the Catholic Church. Frans Kamsteeg has nonetheless demonstrated that many Chilean evangelical sects dedicated themselves to the abolishment of poverty, suffering, and other social injustices under military rule, and at times openly opposed the military’s use of overt violence.\footnote{Frans Kamsteeg, “Pentecostalism and Political Awakening in Pinochet’s Chile and Beyond, in Latin American Religion in Action eds. Christian Smith and Joshua Prokopy (New York: Routledge, 1999), 193.} While the exact political affiliations of the Evangelical Homes of Chile remains unclear, their dedication to lifting Mapuche out of poverty should not be reduced to evangelical groups working for the macabre ends of the dictatorship.

The Provincial Governor noted that many children in Perquenco’s rural areas did not have access to schools. A resident school would give fifteen children access to food, clothing, and “instruction on urban living, discipline, and cleanliness.”\footnote{ARA, INR, 1979, box 45, “Plan No. 1: Escuelas Hogares.”} The report suggested that the children needed to live at the school during the week where they had access to clean beds, warm clothes, and healthy food. The Provincial Governor of Cautín declared that on the weekends Mapuche students needed to return to their homes to instruct their parents and families on how to live a healthy and disciplined life. In the view of the Provincial Governor of Cautín, the state needed to coordinate programs that essentially raised Mapuche youth. Regional functionaries seemed oblivious to the contradiction between warnings that Marxism would make children wards of the state and their prescribed supervision of children when it served the dictates of free market expansion.
By the late 1970s, therefore, the Ministry of Agriculture and its national and international affiliates had begun to implement various reform programs in Mapuche communities. Many of these programs attempted to create private property owners who engaged with the market economy. The ultimate goal of these programs, according to officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, was to liberate men and women from inefficient and paternalistic programs of the Chilean Agrarian Reform. Despite claims that these new programs corrected the ills of former reform programs, they nonetheless heavily relied on former conservative reform efforts as models from which to draw from. The Ministry of Agriculture also worked through legal channels and international Cold War networks that first gained traction in the 1950s to coordinated and manage its reform efforts in Mapuche communities. Many programs like ICIRA-76 and SOCAs ironically reinforced patterns of state paternalism and intervention that the Ministry of Agriculture argued had hampered rural economic and cultural development. Despite the continued presence of state intervention and the use of international Cold War networks, programs like ICIRA-76 often had limited success in Mapuche communities because no laws specific to the division of Mapuche communal property existed until 1979. The passage of the regime’s signature land division law, D.L. 2568, was nonetheless a highly contested process that revealed the bureaucratic inconsistencies that regionalization produced.
Chapter Two: Institutionalization and the Limits of State Authority Under Military Rule, 1979-1986

By the end of the 1970s, the military regime began to institutionalize its rule and establish new policies and institutions to give Chile an outward image of stability, modernity, and prosperity. The process of institutionalization aimed to ensure a stable Chile in the wake of the chaos that immediately followed the September 11 coup and provoked the use of extreme and violent means to solve what the regime declared a national crisis. The military based its legitimacy immediately after the 1973 coup on what officials deemed a necessary period of violence to “neutralize” a communist threat. The use of overt brutality had ended by the late 1970s, and required new legal apparatuses to justify continued military rule. Military officials therefore had to create an ideological foundation that validated their continued governance and the new institutions that codified this rule. Part of the justification for sweeping legal reforms that re-oriented the economic, political, and social fabric of Chile was the idea that the military had not only saved Chile from Marxist ruin, but had liberated men and women from Marxist paternalism and thus allowed them to fulfill their potential as true Chileans.

The Ministry of Agriculture particularly embedded the narrative of legal and economic liberation in its defense for 1979’s D.L. 2568. D.L. 2568 provided the legal mechanisms to permanently divide and privatize Mapuche communal lands and thus usher in the social reform programs designed to create what the Ministry of Agriculture deemed productive Mapuche families. The regime sustained that with the new law, gone were the days of violence, uncertainty, and ineffectual state paternalism that defined the Agrarian Reform and led to Mapuche marginalization and poverty. INDAP proceeded

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167 Steve J. Stern, Battling for Hearts and Minds, 139.
168 Ibid., 56.
quickly with the division of Mapuche communal lands. By 1985, INDAP had divided 1,739 Mapuche communities, which represented roughly 60% of Mapuche land that the títulos de merced system had created.\textsuperscript{169}

The rationalization for the mass division of Mapuche lands was an incomplete, contested, and negotiated process by which the military regime attempted to defend the validity of D.L. 2568, and thus the Ministry of Agriculture’s right to enact reform in Mapuche communities. This chapter places D.L. 2568 within a larger historiography that analyzes how various Chilean and international movements contested the ideological justification for military rule.\textsuperscript{170} This chapter departs from analyses of urban mobilization to highlight several previously unexamined challenges to institutionalization. An analysis of international and national debates demonstrates that indigenous rights became a contested space that various actors appropriated to legitimate or deny the validity of the dictatorship’s indigenous policy. To counteract the influence of international human rights convoys, the Ministry of Agriculture and INDAP embarked on a massive public relations campaign to substantiate what the functionaries of these institutions declared was the moral and economic necessity of D.L. 2568. Much of the Ministry of Agriculture’s rhetoric relied on the explicit denial of a distinct Mapuche culture in Chile that merited any constitutional protection. The Ministry of Agriculture used print media to show staged ceremonies in the Ninth Region where Mapuche men and women hugged military officials, thanked them for their land title, and thus accepted D.L. 2568 as a necessity of modernity. Oral interviews, however, reveal the highly detrimental aspects of land division that contradicted the ministry’s insistence that D.L. 2568 benefited

\textsuperscript{169} Haughney,\textit{ Neoliberal Economics}, 56.
\textsuperscript{170} Stern,\textit{ Battling for Hearts and Minds}. Baldez,\textit{ Why Women Protet}. Seneider,\textit{ Shanty Town Protests in Pinochet’s Chile}. Bengoa,\textit{ Historia de un conflicto}. Marimán, “Transición democrática en Chile ¿Nuevo ciclo reivindicativo mapuche?”
Mapuche communities. This chapter therefore analyzes the successes and failures of the Ministry of Agriculture’s appropriation of symbolic images, public space, and indigenous rights to validate D.L. 2568.

My analysis of domestic dissent specifically opens new avenues to discuss the limits of the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous policies. This chapter departs from the current historiography’s emphasis on urban Mapuche mobilization against the dictatorship that the Catholic Church supported to demonstrate the internal dynamics of military rule that challenged the legitimacy of D.L. 2568.\(^{171}\) In accordance with the dictates of regionalization, the Intendant of the Ninth Region formed the CRM in 1979 to work at a municipal level to gain Mapuche support for land division. The CRM, despite the intentions of regional officials, often used its political platform to advance indigenous policies and a Mapuche cultural identity that challenged the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous reform programs. An analysis of the CRM therefore moves beyond the strict examination of the external to demonstrate the internal complexities of regional military rule that at times limited the successful implementation of the regime’s indigenous policy.


By the mid to late 1970s, the Pinochet regime had used violence, disappearance, and torture to defeat any opposition from the left. Without the imminent threat of an internal Marxist war by 1978, there was little justification for a military government, and Pinochet and his advisors subsequently turned to legal and economic reforms to consolidate and legitimate their rule. Several events between 1978 and 1981 marked this

process of institutionalization. In response to national and international concerns with regards to the regime’s lack of transparency and cooperation with human rights truth finding commissions, Pinochet issued a plebiscite on January 4, 1978. The plebiscite permitted citizens to vote either “Yes” or “No” to keep Pinochet in power. The military regime used fraud, violence, and intimidation to obtain its 75% victory. To overshadow the increased criticism of the human rights abuses committed by the regime’s secret police, the National Intelligence Directorate (Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional, DINA), the military regime dissolved the institution in 1977. The closure of DINA was an attempt not only to downplay the severity of human rights violations committed by the organization, but also suggest that this violence was a necessity of national stability after 1973.\textsuperscript{172} To strengthen its narrative, the regime passed Decree Law 2191 that gave amnesty to military officials who had committed criminal acts between September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1978. Despite the national and international human rights movement’s increased mobilization against the torture and disappearances that marked military rule, the dictatorship took another stride towards political legitimacy in 1980. On September 11, 1980, Chileans once more voted in a plebiscite, this time for a new constitution. The passage of the new constitution solidified Pinochet’s rule over Chile through the 1980s, and gave the military a solid grip on all Chilean politics.

From 1978 to 1981 Pinochet also enacted a series of economic reforms with the aid of the Chicago Boys. The Chicago Boys authored a series of decrees between 1978 and 1981 that instated a system of strict monetarism and a drastic reduction of state subsidies to public services. Under these new labor codes, health care and social security became privatized, and the state took a minimal role in education and local governance.

\textsuperscript{172} Stern, \textit{Battling for Hearts and Minds}, 127-128.
While unionization re-emerged after 1979, regime control of elections and the inability to collectively bargain severely limited workers’ rights. The set of labor codes that embodied the four-year Plan Laboral represented the institutionalization of the regime’s market-dominated economic model and the subordination of workers’ rights to that system.\textsuperscript{173}

Concurrent with the denial of human rights abuses, the consolidation of military rule, and the fomentation of a new economic system was the Ministry of Agriculture’s pursuit of legal avenues to dissolve the last roadblock to free-market expansion in the Ninth Region: communal Mapuche lands. In April 1978, the junta announced its “Emergency Plan to Combat Unemployment.” The Emergency Plan had a three-point mission to eliminate existing limits on land tenure, advance private investment, and grant individual land titles in indigenous communities. The junta argued “to obtain credits and make the land fully productive, it is essential to have an effective title to the land. For this reason, it is proposed to grant an effective title, eliminating the State’s custody of the land of indigenous populations.”\textsuperscript{174} This statement reflected a belief among military officials that the protections for Mapuche lands in D.L. 17.729 were the greatest obstruction to the effective integration of the Mapuche into the modern agricultural economy. The Emergency Plan, therefore, explicitly called for the abolishment of D.L. 17.729.

Mapuche initially mobilized against the proposed law under the protective aegis of the Catholic Church’s efforts to bring national and international attention to the abuses committed by the dictatorship. In January of 1976, Santiago Archbishop Raúl Silva Henríquez formed the Vicaría de Solidaridad, or Vicaria. The Vicaria was a pastoral

\textsuperscript{173} Winn, “Introduction,” 31-44.
\textsuperscript{174} NACLA, Chile, roll 45, “Report of the Fact Finding Commission to Chile, Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America.”
entity under the jurisdiction of the Santiago Catholic Church, which provided the Vicaría symbolic and institutional protection. The efforts of the Vicaría were part of a national network of grassroots mobilization led by a variety of political, labor, and church groups throughout Chile. These groups conducted what Steve Stern has labeled “ant’s work.” Ant’s work specifically sought to rework the foundation of Chilean society through the formation of a national community that valorized democracy, social justice, and human rights. The Vicaría had twenty sister offices throughout Chile, and a leading anti-regime publication *Solidaridad*. *Solidaridad* provided an “alternative” reality for its estimated 15,000 readers to the official narrative of national salvation that the junta used to justify violence and suppress public dissent.

In the Ninth Region, Bishop of Temuco Sergio Contreras headed the Vicaría and the Indigenous Institute Foundation (Fundación Instituto Indígena, FII). Founded in 1963, the FII was dependent on the Archbishop of Temuco and the Vicariate of the Araucanía. In the late 1970s and early ‘80s, the FII primarily coordinated health, education, and training programs in Mapuche communities in the Ninth Region. On September 12, 1978, with the aid of the FII and Bishop Contreras, 155 Mapuche leaders representing ninety communities met for the first time since the 1973 coup to discuss the implications of the Emergency Plan. The leaders present formed the Mapuche Cultural Centers (Centro Culturales Mapuche, CCM) as a grassroots organization that could mobilize Mapuche communities against land division and cultural integration. The formation of the CCM effectively marked the re-birth of Mapuche mobilization for greater control over education, resource development, acquisition of ancestral lands, and political

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176 Ibid, 115
representation. During the Chilean Agrarian Reform, Mapuche communities throughout the Ninth Region took a leading role in defining the pace and goals of agrarian reform initiatives, which added a distinctly ethnic dimension to these reforms in southern Chile. Military repression had brought this movement to a screeching halt after 1973. At the meeting, the new CCM members drafted a letter they sent to Pinochet’s office on September 20, 1978, urging him to make public the full details of the impending law. The letter informed the dictator that the majority of Mapuche opposed the sale and division of lands in the Ninth Region. The letter concluded with a call for the military junta to create laws that protected Mapuche culture, language, and ancestral lands, as well as establish mechanisms for fair agricultural credits.  

The military regime ignored the pleas of the Mapuche leaders. On March 22, 1979, Pinochet signed D.L. 2568 into law atop a Mapuche poncho in the resort town of Villarrica. D.L. 2568 codified the recommendations that the Emergency Plan had made the previous year. The Ministry of Agriculture used legal rhetoric to frame the new legislation as an adjustment rather than an eradication of the constitutional protections guaranteed in D.L. 17.729. These adjustments, nonetheless, signified the removal of constitutional protections for Chile’s indigenous communities. Law 17.729 had specifically recognized indigenous groups in Chile and provided safeguards for indigenous land, educational, and cultural rights. The most egregious clause of D.L. 2568 was Article 1 that stated, “property that results from the division of [indigenous] reserves will cease to be considered Indian lands, and Indians the property owners or awardees.” Article 1 of D.L. 2568 therefore became the central concern for national

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178 Ibid.
and international observers that the Pinochet regime’s indigenous policies represented a form of legislative genocide for the Mapuche, as it denied any constitutional recognition of indigenous groups. The largely negative reaction to this clause at a domestic and international level prompted a quick response from the dictatorship. In July 1979, the military regime issued a modification to D.L. 2568 that removed the section denying constitutional recognition of Mapuche persons after division.

Despite the removal of the clause denying constitutional recognition, modifications to D.L. 17.729 were anything but protective. The alterations to D.L. 17.729 entailed the removal of all fifteen articles that referred to the restitution of indigenous lands. The new indigenous law also dissolved the IDI. The Allende administration created the IDI in 1972 to address all indigenous concerns before the national government. The military regime’s removal of the IDI and subsequent delegation of its responsibilities to INDAP and the Ministries of Education, Health, and Housing signified that the dictatorship did not feel the need for a special institution to protect or promote indigenous rights. D.L. 2568 also replaced the word “community member” with “occupant.” The term occupant did not recognize land claims from Mapuche community members who lived in cities, which effectively denied urban Mapuche the ability to seek restitution of ancestral lands. Occupant did, however, recognize the claims of anyone that lived within Mapuche communities at the time of division, which included non-Mapuche renters and those who illegally squatted. The occupant clause therefore opened avenues for non-Mapuche possession of ancestral Mapuche lands.180 There were also a number of “carrot and stick” aspects of D.L. 2568. Many of the new credits and subsidies that

180 NACLA, Chile, roll 45, Mapuches: People of the Land.
Mapuche communities desperately needed were only available to those who had divided their lands.

The regime’s use of media helped to overshadow the larger implications of D.L. 2568 from the moment Pinochet signed the law into effect. The local and pro-Pinochet newspaper *Diario Austral* dedicated three pages to the ceremony at Villarrica. *Diario Austral* reported that 2,000 Mapuche from 53 reservations attended the event. Photos from *Diario Austral* captured this eerie ceremony where Mapuche marched before a group of armed military personnel that no doubt contained among them perpetrators of human rights violations in Mapuche communities. The newspaper’s reports nonetheless portrayed an air of celebration where military officials built a ruka and Mapuche paraded through the streets wearing traditional clothing while playing Mapuche instruments. The event’s appropriation of Mapuche cultural symbols like the ruka, and the very participation of the Mapuche in the ceremony was what Mariano Plotkin has defined as a regime’s attempt to “recreate the conditions that legitimate a given political regime.”

Rather than symbols that held the potential to signify open resistance to military rule, as they did for the CCM and FII, the centrality of the ruka and celebrating Mapuche in *Diario Austral*’s coverage implied that Mapuche agreed with the official regime rhetoric that D.L. 2568 was a necessary agent of modernity. Mayor of Villarrica, Amador Zerené, even concluded that the ceremony marked a renewed peace in the Ninth Region as “all of the reducciones of Villarrica have requested to be covered by the new law.”

To help promote what the Ministry of Agriculture argued were the positive aspects of D.L. 2568, the military officials even created their own Mapuche organization.

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On July 26, 1979, the Intendancy of the Ninth Region passed Resolution 277 that created CRM. The CRM was not an independent organization, but rather a consultative agency dependent on the Intendant of the Ninth Region. In its role as a consultant, the CRM’s primary function was to promulgate “to the Mapuche pueblo the doctrine and aspirations of the Supreme Government.” To garner legitimacy within Mapuche communities and try to harness the political power Mapuche wielded within their communities, the Intendant of the Ninth Region hired all-Mapuche professionals that included prominent landowners, evangelical priests, and lawyers who worked for INDAP. The common link among the CRM’s leaders was the belief that land division and access to education, health, and credit programs were what created independent and productive Mapuche farmers. Regional officials ultimately hoped that the CRM would create a counterweight to the growing Mapuche mobilization against the dictatorship. Shortly after the formation of the CRM, the Intendant of the Ninth Region, Carlos Schälchli Villalobos, wrote to the Sub-secretariat of the Interior, Enrique Montero Marx, to comment on the importance of the CRM. Villalobos informed Marx that anti-regime forces like the CCM and the FII had radicalized a significant portion of the 250,000 Mapuche that lived in the Ninth Region. The very real possibility of a Mapuche separatist movement, argued Villalobos, required that the CRM “neutralize” this radical tendency.\(^{183}\)

The Ministry of Agriculture also endeavored to cultivate an air of legitimacy for D.L. 2568 through the employment of international experts who supported the new law. FAO consultant Cristobal Unterrichter was one of the primary research analysts and consultants to the Ministry of Agriculture in the formation of D.L. 2568. Before and after

the 1979 passage of D.L. 2568, Unterrichter embarked on an extensive lecture circuit throughout Chile to promote the new law. Unterrichter gave 31 public lectures at Chilean universities and regional conferences on how the new law permitted the economic and cultural advancement of Mapuche communities. Unterrichter couched his presentation of D.L. 2568 as a humanitarian effort to save the Mapuche, arguing, “The expected advantages reside in the greater security of tenancy through which it is anticipated to obtain greater intensification [in agriculture production] as well as facilitating future consolidation and regularization of land... it is hoped they [Mapuche] arrive more quickly to a the same level as other Chilean farmers.” Unterrichter’s comments focused on the liberating effects of D.L. 2568 that allowed the Mapuche to overcome what he saw as years of debilitating state paternalism. Unterrichter’s widespread lectures, therefore, lent credibility to the Ministry of Agriculture’s claims about the humanitarian aspects of D.L. 2568 at a time when most international indigenous institutions criticized the law.

**International Responses**

Despite the military regime’s multiple strategies to present the new law as valid and thus its indigenous policy as humanitarian, international institutions with ties to the Catholic Church, FII and CCM quickly mobilized to help bring global attention to the negative aspects of D.L. 2568. One of the first major contributions to international awareness of the military regime’s indigenous policies was the report that the Canadian-based Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America (ICCHRLA) issued in 1980. Comprised of four members, one of whom was then president of the World Indigenous Council, George Manuel, the ICCHRLA worked closely with the efforts of

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the Vicaría and spent a month in Chile during 1979 to assess the economic, political, and cultural impact of D.L. 2568. With the aid of the CCM, FII and Bishop Contreras, the truth finding commission visited Mapuche communities in six municipalities and met with 67 Mapuche leaders in Temuco. The goal of the commission was “to study the effects of the new Indian law on Mapuche Indians, and to find out more about the law itself.”

ICCHRLA’s final document titled *Mapuche: People of the Land* contained over 100 pages of field reports, interviews, reproductions of U.N. truth-finding commissions, newspaper articles, and reports from the Chilean Catholic Church. The ICCHRLA document also provided readers with two sample letters. Readers could send one letter to Pinochet to address their concern with D.L. 2568, and the other to Bishop Contreras to state support for his efforts to eradicate racial discrimination in Chile.

The ICCHRLA’s final report did not go unnoticed by international agencies. The 1979-1980 Annual Report of the Organization of American States’ (OAS) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) published quotes from George Manuel who stated that the new indigenous law existed to “expropriate all existing Indian land and eliminate the Mapuche as race and as a people.” The IACHR report led to further criticism from OAS agencies. In 1980, the Ministries of Agriculture and the Exterior began to prepare Chile’s presentation for the Tenth Annual Conference of the OAS’s Inter-American Indigenous Institute (IAII.) The Ministry of Agriculture argued that the importance of Chile’s presentation lay in the fact “that during 1979 the mentioned international institution [the IAII] did not undertake any activity at the level of state institutions or organizations, fundamentally as a result that the policies and

185 NACLA, Chile, roll 45, *Mapuches: People of the Land*.
programs of the referred to institution have not fully coincided with the actions carried out in Chile on the part of the Ministry of Agriculture through INDAP.”¹⁸⁷ Chile’s inability to gain the IAII’s support demonstrated a very real and negative consequence of the regime’s failure to create an indigenous policy that was inline with the growing international tide of indigenous rights.

In 1980, the head of Chile’s National Directorate of Indigenous Affairs (Dirección Nacional de Asuntos Indígenas), Marcelo Venegas, wrote the IAII in response to Manuel’s comments in the IACHR report. Venegas accredited the lack of support Chile received to Manuel’s presentation. Venegas argued “apart from the particular motives of Mr. Manuel and other groups, they generally have received information in Chile from groups especially organized to challenge and obstruct not only the Mapuche law, but all the objectives of the Supreme government.” Thus, Manuel’s opinion that the new law existed to “eliminate the Mapuche” was “obviously a political opinion interested in moving international opinion.”¹⁸⁸ The head of the National Directorate argued that Manuel’s report to the OAS’s Human Right Commission “reveal[ed] a complete ignorance to our reality. In Chile the Mapuche descendents feel incorporated into the national body and only those few isolated leaders have suggested they are a separate community.”¹⁸⁹ Venegas therefore claimed that only a minority of Mapuche made what he considered false ethnic claims. With regards to the division of land, Venegas denied that Mapuche partook in communitarian living, and thus land division in no way affected the cultural integrity of Mapuche communities. “It is affirmed that by losing their

¹⁸⁸ ARA, INR, 1981, box 112, reservado no. 15, Intendant of the Ninth Region to the National Director of Indigenous Affairs, April 13, 1981.
¹⁸⁹ Ibid.
[Mapuche] land they will not be able to subsist. On the other hand it is suggested that the Law is a cultural threat due to its opposition to the false belief in a form of communitarian living in reserves that is part of their [Mapuche] culture. This has already been noted to be false.”\textsuperscript{190} The director’s report continued, “The reserve in its entirety is protected by a deed of common domain, denominated [as] the \textit{Título de Merced}, but this constitutes a mere juridical condition that does not signify nor has it ever signified a communitarian exploitation.”\textsuperscript{191} Venegas’s report omitted the fact that during the Chilean Agrarian Reform, Mapuche demands for the restitution of ancestral lands were the driving force behind reform initiatives. The pressure Mapuche groups placed on different administrations to incorporate language into laws that addressed the restitution of ancestral lands greatly influenced the passage of D.L. 17.729. In reference to the “occupant’ clause in D.L. 2568, Venegas informed the OAS “it must be noted that it is often difficult to determine who is or is not Mapuche.”\textsuperscript{192} Much like the director’s discussion of land division, Venegas’s analysis of the occupant clause relied on the belief that there was little distinction between Mapuche and other rural farmers, and thus it was impossible to discriminate against a distinct Mapuche ethnicity.

Venegas’s report to the IAI became the stock document for the Ministry of Agriculture’s 1980 publication, \textit{The Chilean Descendent from Indigenous Ethnic Groups}. The Ministry of the Exterior sent 200 copies of this report to foreign embassies and diplomats as a means to “bring the reality of the actions and policies of the Supreme Government in the rural sector” to an international audience.\textsuperscript{193} \textit{The Chilean Descendent

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{193} ARNAD, MINAG, 1980, vol. 2372, ord. 0752, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Agriculture, September 24, 1980.
from Indigenous Ethnic Groups began with a romanticized overview of Chilean history. The report presented the Mapuche of the Spanish colonial era as a sort of proto-Chilean citizen that valued individual agricultural production, resisted colonial onslaughts, and “never knew communal [land] exploitation or land collectives.”

The report argued that Chilean independence had further secured Mapuche autonomy through the introduction of liberalism that enshrined equal rights for all men and guaranteed legal protections for individual property. Various descriptions of the young Chilean Republic highlighted the harmony that existed between Mapuche and European colonies, where European immigrants introduced modern technology to the Mapuche to ensure their cultural advancement. The idea of peaceful inter-ethnic collaboration ignored the violence, theft, and deceit that marked the process of colonization in the Ninth Region. This deliberate omission was a means for the military regime to build the foundational national myth of la Raza Chilena based around peaceful and beneficial miscegenation between Spaniards and Mapuche. The Ministry of Agriculture’s emphasis on peaceful miscegenation demonstrated to foreign embassies and institutions that the modern-day Chilean citizen was a hybrid of Mapuche and Spanish blood. This argument set the stage for claims that all Chileans were of the same ethnic stock, and thus racial discrimination did not and could not exist in Chile. The Ministry of Agriculture argued that while the Mapuche were a prototype for rural-citizenship, prior policies, especially those of Allende, had corrupted Mapuche productivity and cultural vitality. The report noted that D.L. 2568 ultimately “recognized [that] the primordial desire of the Mapuche was to have a legal property title for their individual [land] possessions, in order to have better security in tenancy and to

be able to work what is their own.” The ministry concluded the pamphlet by noting that D.L. 2568 was thus the liberating agent in the process of reforming a stagnant Mapuche culture.

The Ministry of Agriculture’s report further assured international audiences critical of the regime’s new indigenous law that D.L. 2568 was purely economic in nature and not cultural. The Ministry of Agriculture guaranteed foreign embassies that land division did not “affect the values or cultural institutions that the Mapuche conserve.” In response to the accusation that D.L. 2568 threatened the survival of Mapuche culture, the Ministry of Agriculture noted that the new law actually ensured the survival of the Mapuche. The report concluded, “it is not possible to save cultural values with at least assuring the stability of their followers.” The report therefore concluded that the survival of Mapuche culture relied on the privatization and commercialization of their property, and thus D.L. 2568 was humanitarian.

The Ministry of Agriculture used local media to further support its claim that Mapuche understood and welcomed land division as a necessity of cultural survival. The Ministry of Agriculture’s official newspaper *Nuestra Tierra* published numerous reports in the early 1980s that highlighted the demand among the Mapuche to divide their communities. Various articles detailed mass ceremonies where thousands of Mapuche received land titles. Pictures showed Mapuche women who hugged state officials and posed with their new land titles. At one such event in the Municipality of Freire in 1982, 8,808 Mapuche from twenty communities received land titles. The article centered on a quote from new landowner Arnoldo Montupil Curin. Montupil Curin stated “Sir Minister

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195 Ibid
197 Ibid.
[of Agriculture], thank you for making us the official owners of our land. The document that we received testifies to it. From it [the land title] derives tranquility, the love for work, education, respect, [and] the obligation to assume the responsibility of [any] good Chilean.”

Montupil Curín supported the ministry’s argument that communal land was not part of Mapuche culture, and individual plots solved persistent economic, social, and cultural problems within reducciones.

The support that some Mapuche gave for D.L. 2568, however, was more complicated than Nuestra Tierra’s editors led their readers to believe and belied the ministry’s justification for land division. The privatization of the forestry industry pushed many Mapuche off their land as they could not compete with large companies, did not have the time to wait for pine and eucalyptus to mature, and as small landowners could not receive state subsidies or tax credits intended for large corporations. Officials from the National Forestry Corporation (Corporación Nacional Forestal, CONAF) stated, “The state doesn’t provide incentives or subsidies for small producers. Only large companies receive credits and incentives.” The emphasis on supporting the growth of mono-exportation forced many small landholders to sell their land, while others communities faced expulsion from their lands by the encroachment of large forestry corporations. As small landholders and Mapuche communities continually lost land to the forestry industry, they also lost access to resources that sustained their communities. Plantations denied surrounding communities’ access to water, wood, and roads in an effort to permanently remove these rural populations. Private companies often hired private

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200 Ibid., 351.
militias to patrol plantations and remove “trespassers.”

It was under the growing pressure from the privatization of the forestry industries that many communities felt it was economically viable to divide and sell their communal lands.

In an oral interview, Manuel Lemonao of the community of Coliman/Cayumil in Perquenco noted that economic urgency prompted him to sell parts of his land. Lemonao stated “INAP gave credits through banks, but they charged 200% what they lent them for. I had to sell a plot of land just to pay off [the debt]. They [INDAP] were really shameful.” Lemonao’s interview demonstrated that INDAP’s credit programs were often predatory and further increased levels of poverty in Mapuche communities. In regards to land division, Lemonao said “In the time of Pinocho they also gave land titles to everyone, this was really good…it didn’t affect anything here because everyone went along happy. You presented your title in order to get a house for example.” Like other Mapuche, Lemonao felt land division opened up certain economic possibilities for Mapuche communities. While Lemonao viewed land division as beneficial, this approval did not signify an acceptance of the military regime or its policies, as Lemonao referred mockingly to Pinochet and openly critiqued the shortcomings of the military’s agricultural credit programs. Lemonao’s comments ultimately demonstrated that the issue of land division was often separate from support for the military regime and its indigenous policies. Articles in *Diario Austral* nonetheless sought to conflate the two as a means to highlight the alleged support the Mapuche gave the dictatorship.

Other interviews with Mapuche in Perquenco supported Lemonao’s view that land division was not as beneficial as the Ministry of Agriculture suggested. Under D.L. 201

Ibid., 352-353.

202 Interview with Manuel Lemonao, Comunidad Coliman/Cayumil, May 22, 2012. All interviews conducted and translated by author.

203 Ibid.
2568, those communities that decided to divide their lands did not have to pay a property tax. Juan Huircaman affirmed that with division came more security, as individuals had titles, and division removed the economic burden of the land tax. Huircaman argued “Yeah, on one hand it was good, because one acquired the documentation, now, this is mine. So afterward, after the subdivision… the Mapuche didn’t have to pay contributions for 20 years. Because before, you paid contributions to the [Ministry] of Land Tenure. You didn’t [have] to pay contributions to the ministry anymore.”204 Huircaman argued, however, that division did little more than shrink the amount of land individuals possessed, and thus constrained production within Perquenco.

“I said to the functionary when he came here for the subdivision, ‘Good, so what’s going to happen with the subdivision,’ I already had a clear idea what was going to happen, but I asked him, ‘are you going to give us more land, or are they going to be little plots?’ No, they were going to make smaller plots, each person is going to have their part; they are going to give them their title, which is to the owner. So, on this hand, a good thing would be that they gave the Mapuche more land, in place of making it smaller, that they enlarge it, right? Because one lives from the land, the campesino, the small farmer lives on the land, if he doesn’t have land he has to leave to work, he has to migrate outside, to the large communities, to the big city, where they live in poblaciones, where, you know, where the poorest people live. So, if the campesino, the small Mapuche farmer, if they gave them more land, they wouldn’t move there [to the city]. He continues working. So, that’s how it should be, give them more land, don’t reduce it, like what happened with the subdivision.”205

Huircaman therefore argued that despite the removal of the land tax, division led to an increased Mapuche detachment from the land that provoked migration to cities and the continued pauperization of Mapuche farmers. Oral interviews therefore contradicted the Ministry of Agriculture’s insistence that land division did not negatively affect Mapuche communities and culture.

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204 Interview with Juan Huircaman, Comunidad Coliman/Cayumil, May 22, 2012.
205 Ibid.
Despite the Ministry of Agriculture’s use of media to represent the Mapuche’s willing participation in land division, international observers continued to remain skeptical. In 1982, the Ministry of Agriculture prepared a response to a report from the U.N.’s Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination that was highly critical of the regime’s indigenous policies. The report addressed three principal concerns with the new indigenous law. The first concern was that neither the new Chilean constitution of 1980 nor any of its bylaws specified protections for indigenous culture, health, politics, or education. The committee’s second concern drew from the first: Chile had neither ratified nor acknowledged the 1965 International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The report argued that Chile’s ratification of the convention would signify the country’s dedication to the creation of legal measures that prevented racial discrimination, subjugation, and internal colonialism. The final complaint from the U.N.’s committee was that the military regime continually used “exceptional powers” to suspend the constitutional rights of Mapuche. The U.N.’s report therefore signified minimal international recognition of the political legitimacy of the military regime’s new constitution and indigenous laws.206

In their response to the U.N.’s Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, officials from INDAP highlighted that the new indigenous policy upheld equality and did not infringe on the cultural rights of Chile’s indigenous groups. INDAP officials pointed to Article 19 No. 2 of the new Chilean constitution that stated, “In Chile there are no privileged persons or groups. In Chile there are no slaves and those who should set foot in her territory become free. Neither the law nor any authority may

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establish arbitrary difference.”\textsuperscript{207} Through this clause, INDAP’s report concluded that if all Chileans were equal, then no law in Chile possessed the ability to discriminate against or provide special favor for any one group. INDAP officials further justified Chile’s refusal to ratify the 1965 International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination because Article 19 already guaranteed the rights the convention discussed, and therefore any law or convention specific to the indigenous groups was superfluous.\textsuperscript{208} It was through this legal rhetoric that INDAP tried to reassure an international audience of the impossibility of racial discrimination in Chile and thus reinforce the legitimacy of Chile’s new constitution and indigenous policy.

By the beginning of the 1980s, therefore, the Ministry of Agriculture worked tirelessly to justify D.L. 2568 among international detractors. As the above cases suggest, the Ministry of Agriculture and INDAP engaged in international debates regarding the definition of indigenous rights shortly after the passage of D.L. 2568. The Ministry of Agriculture and INDAP’s emphasis on the humanitarian aspects of their indigenous policies nonetheless relied on the systematic denial of a distinct Mapuche culture, and that ancestral lands in any way factored in to that cultural identity. These reports therefore reinforced the highly skewed view of indigenous rights the Ministry of Agriculture adopted to validate its indigenous policies. Local realities within Chile, however, often contradicted the Ministry of Agriculture’s outward projection of stability and validity.

\textsuperscript{207} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid.
Domestic Dissent, 1980-1986

By 1980, officials in the Ninth Region were well aware that the CCM was successful in its attempts to undermine the regime’s rationale for D.L. 2568. In 1980, the Regional Secretary of the Minister of Agriculture wrote the Intendant of the Ninth Region Antiliano Jara to highlight the negative impact the CCM and the FII had on government plans for Mapuche integration. The report noted that the CCM continually told Mapuche communities that the military regime’s policies would leave them “bereft of all technical, credit, educational, and legislative assistance.” The Intendancy of the Ninth Region supported the Ministry of Agriculture’s position when it stated, “the Region is suffering an assault from the ecclesiastical sector that, supporting itself with the precarious educational level of the Mapuche sector, is acting with vigor and in an organized manner, creating mistrust and discontent towards the work undertaken by the Supreme Government.”209 The mayor of Lumaco further warned that both the FII and CCM had taken over local CEMAs and organized clothes and food drives for the “nefarious” ends of sowing discontent towards the military regime’s indigenous policies.210

Regional officials’ fears were not unfounded. One of the primary objectives of the CCM and FII was to spearhead community development programs throughout the Ninth Region as a means to build Mapuche support against land division and cultural integration. Shortly after the formation of the CCM, the organization with the aid of the FII began to help communities in the Municipality of Puerto Saavedra organize for the construction of a communal mill. In 1981, CCM officials used the international ties they

210 ARA, INR, 1979, box 49, confidencial no.111, Intendant of the Ninth Region to Sergio Contreras, July 18, 1979.
had cultivated over the previous years to gain financial support from the French Community for the World Campaign Against Hunger. The French organization supplied 80% of the construction fees for the new mill. Spokesman, or werken, for Piedra Alta Jorge Pichinual, who was also a member of the CCM, argued that the economic benefits, food stability and the greater sense of solidarity that the construction of an infrastructure created “reflect[ed] the importance of being organized to solve the primary necessity that strikes every Mapuche or campesino community in general. We cannot wait for others to solve our problems in these difficult times, we must be capable of solving them with our force.”

The FII and CCM therefore not only used community development programs to enhance infrastructure and thus gain the favor of Mapuche communities, but also used projects like the construction of mills to spread the message of communal work and the preservation of Mapuche cultural norms.

The 1982 FII publication of the a bilingual community organizational manual titled “Kom Kiñe Tain Rakiduam” or “How to Create a Work Plan for Our Community,” particularly highlighted the CCM and FII’s counter-regime rhetoric. The manual placed emphasis on communal work, the formation of local advisory councils, and the acquisition of raw materials for community projects. The manual concluded, “we have demonstrated that together we can move forward, that we are capable, intelligent workers, who valorize our dignity.” The manual’s use of Mapuzungun placed specific emphasis on the preservation of traditional Mapuche modes of landownership and communal work. The FII suggested that adherence to Mapuche cultural tradition was the foundation of Mapuche social and economic advancement. The FII and CCM, therefore,

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212 Archive of the Fundación Instituto Indígena, Temuco, “Kom Kiñe Tain Rakiduam.”
worked adamantly to affirm a Mapuche cultural identity that shunned the individualism and market-oriented private land ownership that were the hallmarks of the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous policy.

That same year, the CCM took an important step in increasing Mapuche mobilization in the Ninth Region. To gain legal recognition under the new unionization laws, the CCM became Ad-Mapu in 1982 to gain legally recognized status. The military regime gave legal recognition to Ad-Mapu on the basis that the organization coordinated its efforts to aid the socio-economic concerns of the Mapuche through scholarship, health, medical and cultural programs.213 Despite the internal conflict that marked Ad-Mapu in its early years, the organizations worked to promote Mapuche bilingual education, traditional health care, and the preservation of Mapuche communal lands. Throughout the 1980s, Ad-Mapu also began to develop a political ideology that formed the base for the demands for autonomy in the 1990s. Apart from cultural programs, Ad-Mapu also provided legal counsel and representation for Mapuche individuals and communities that wanted to halt the process of land division.

By the mid-1980s, Ad-Mapu had made important forays into the international debate with regards to the negative impact of Chile’s indigenous policies. In 1984, José Huilcaman of Ad-Mapu attended the Third Session of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Geneva, Switzerland. In his speech, Huilcaman detailed the long history of internal colonization that led to the pauperization of Mapuche communities. Huilcaman, nonetheless, highlighted that 1972’s D.L. 17.729 gave Mapuche communities the constitutional mechanisms to address cultural and land issues. Huilcaman concluded that

D.L. 2568 had “reduced indigenous reserves, obligating them [Mapuche] to subdivide these [lands] among the diverse families that occupy them, which has provoked resistance among Mapuche given the communitarian character they have ancestrally enjoyed.” In response to Huilcama’s report, Minister of the Exterior, Sergio Covarrubias Sanhueza, noted that Ad-Mapu’s participation in the international meeting had created a “delicate” situation for Chile that was “deteriorating the image of our country abroad.”

At the 1984 meeting, the FAO also presented documents prepared by the Grupo de Investigaciones Agrarias (GIA). In the late 1970s and early ‘80s, young Chilean agricultural technicians and budding scholars like José Bengoa and Raúl Molina comprised GIA’s research team. In the 1980s, GIA’s magazine Realidad Agraria did more than any other publication to address the realities that affected Mapuche communities. Shortly after the 1984 U.N. meeting, the World Council on Indigenous Peoples sent a delegation to Chile, who met with leaders of Ad-Mapu. Realidad Agraria reported on the convoy’s trip and published excerpts from a declaration that Ad-Mapu officials gave to the delegation. The declaration ended with a call for all Chileans “to fight for the plain recognition of the Mapuche community.” The report quoted Ad-Mapu president, José Santos Millao, who stated, “in this project [of liberation] we contemplate the autonomy of our pueblo. We are going to demand participation in the future Democratic Constitution so that we are recognized as a minority community, with all our patrimony, culture, history, and our language as well.”

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215 Ibid.
excerpts from the head of Ad-Mapu’s Department of Education and Culture, Domingo Montupil. With regards to preserving communal land and cultural identity Montupil argued, “land is vital for the Mapuche, since that’s where all his life is. From her [Mapuche] live, in her they are educated, related, and recreated. Their religious life, as well, if we can call it that, is an important factor. All of their political, social, and cultural life is based around the community and the relations that are established between men that comprise it [the community] and land.”²¹ By the mid-1980s, Ad-Mapu officials used a number of different national and international media outlets to express concrete arguments for political autonomy, restoration of ancestral lands, and control over community education to safeguard Mapuche cultural norms. The affirmation of a distinct Mapuche cultural identity based on the recuperation of ancestral land therefore challenged the Ministry of Agriculture’s argument that because Mapuche culture and communal lands did not exist, Mapuche were not a distinct ethnic group.

In a bid to curb the influence of Ad-Mapu, officials in the Ninth Region turned to the CRM. Regional officials felt that the position of the CRM’s leaders as prominent Mapuche figures in the Ninth Region lent them credibility as an alternative to the influence of FII, CCM and Ad-Mapu. Officials from the CRM represented a broad political spectrum whose common denominator was the belief that land division was a necessity of Mapuche economic and social advancement. Beyond the shared belief in the need for land division, the political beliefs of CRM members were often contradictory. At times CRM members supported the Ministry of Agriculture’s arguments regarding the beneficial aspects of D.L. 2568. In 1981, prominent CRM member Mario Raiman stated in a public speech his utmost support for military rule. “Once more I want to reiterate that

our government has never been aloof to the reality that we lived under other regimes. For this, sirs, we do not waver nor doubt when the excellent Mr. President of the Republic calls the Chilean nation to a plebiscite to approve the new constitution. We, the Mapuche, say ‘Yes,’ because we have already received [benefits] from the government through the new Indigenous Law.”\(^\text{219}\) Raiman went on to note how the regime’s education, health, and housing programs had greatly benefitted the Mapuche. In other declarations Raiman supported the official regime rhetoric that there was no racial discrimination in Chile as the constitution guaranteed that all citizens received equal treatment and protection as Chileans. Raiman even suggested that if there were racial discrimination in Chile, it did not come from the dominant society but rather from “the Mapuche themselves, given that some are now professionals who after obtaining their degree marginalize themselves from their race, feeling discredited and many times ashamed of their origin.”\(^\text{220}\) Raiman concluded that previous governments had only considered Mapuche to the extent that the Mapuche were able to further the objectives of political parties. In contrast, argued Raiman, the Pinochet regime had truly cared for the Mapuche through the fulfillment of their ancient desire to have individual land titles. Raiman’s defense of the military regime drew on the dictatorship’s standard argument that highlighted the humanitarian nature of constitutional and land reform, while discrediting the policies of former governments as politically driven and ineffectual.

The opinions of Raiman, however, did not reflect a consensus within the CRM. As historian Christian Martinez and Mapuche scholar Sergio Caniuqueo have recently argued, the motivations and goals of the CRM were far more complex than regional

\(^\text{219}\) ARA, INR, 1981, box 94, “Clausura Consejo Regional Indígena.”

officials had intended. The CRM represented a complex political strategy that defied a simple binary based on cultural preservation and cultural integration. Support for land division certainly did not equate to wholesale endorsement of the regime’s political, cultural, and economic programs. Historian Joann Crow recently argued that Mapuche strategies for cultural preservation under military rule often lay somewhere between resistance and collaboration, or incorporated both. Such was the case of the CRM whose internal ideology often toed a fine line between collaboration and opposition.

To ensure that the CRM remained under the watchful eye of the regime, the Intendant of the Ninth Region continually denied the CRM’s request to become an independent organization free from the jurisdiction of the intendancy. By the mid-1980s, however, the intendancy’s fears that the CRM promoted a separatist cultural mentality came true. In early 1984, the regional intendancy asked then CRM president, Juan Neculman, to formulate a proposal for development in Mapuche communities. The nearly 100-page report that Neculman and vice-president Sergio Liempi wrote was a treatise on the shortcomings of the military regime’s indigenous policy. The report immediately departed from the junta’s declaration of ethnic homogeneity through the assertion that historical and cultural traits defined the Mapuche in Chile. The CRM argued that the current Chilean education system was racist because it failed to valorize Mapuche culture and completely removed Mapuche folklore from curricula. The report also sustained that non-Mapuche youth often mocked and teased Mapuche children at school for the way

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222 Crow, The Mapuche in Modern Chile, 150.
they talked and dressed. These incidents, argued CRM officials, led to a further sense of marginalization among Mapuche youth.\textsuperscript{223}

The report also detailed that there were few schools in rural areas, and those that did exist lacked teachers, electricity, and the other basic necessities that guaranteed an adequate education. The CRM sustained the “illiterate Mapuche can easily be cheated in commercial transactions and is not capable of conducting negotiations in the administrative, judicial, or other spheres.”\textsuperscript{224} The CRM argued that poor education and illiteracy also led to discrimination as the Mapuche who lacked a proper education rarely had command of the Spanish language. Drawing from the U.N.’s Universal Declaration on the Rights of Man and Article 19 of the new Chilean constitution, the CRM argued that access to quality education was a right every child possessed. Through the invocation of the Chilean constitution, the CRM envisioned an alternative institutionalization that recognized the cultural rights of Chile’s indigenous populations.\textsuperscript{225}

The CRM argued that educational programs had to develop in a localized context that addressed the culturally specific needs of individual Mapuche communities. The CRM sustained that rural education needed to be bilingual and thus incorporate Spanish and Mapuzungun. The CRM’s emphasis on bilingual education sought not only to enhance Mapuche knowledge of Spanish, but to also valorize the use of a language that often fell prey to the racial taunts of Chileans. The CRM recommended that Mapuche children receive agricultural training as a means to make them competitive in the new Chilean economic environment.\textsuperscript{226} The CRM report also sustained that educational programs had to incorporate traditional Mapuche sports, dances, songs, and musical

\textsuperscript{223} ARNAD, MINAG, 1984, vol. 2626, Consejo Regional Mapuche Report on Education.
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid.
training into school curricula. The CRM concluded that Mapuche-specific education supported a form of integration that harmonized and unified “the cultural elements akin to the Mapuche society with those of Chilean society.” Neculman sustained that harmonious integration, rather than forced assimilation, ideally allowed for the development and respect of a pluri-cultural Chile. The CRM noted “a nation is spiritually richer than others while it possesses greater and more varied cultural elements.” The idea of cultural heterogeneity flew in the face of the military regime’s insistence on cultural and national unification. The schools that the CRM envisioned, therefore, encouraged the celebration of a distinct Mapuche culture within Chile that did not suit the economic goals of the Ministry of Agriculture.

The report from the CRM suggested that the military regime create an independent government organization run by Mapuche professionals to carry out Neculman and Liempi’s educational and social reforms. The CRM called for the formation of the Corporation for Complete Mapuche Development (Corporación de Desarrollo Integral Mapuche, CODIMA). The CRM suggested that to support CODIMA required the creation of a Fund for Integrated Mapuche Development. CODIMA’s financial foundation required 31 billion pesos over a twenty-year period to improve infrastructure in Mapuche communities, construct granaries, and provide fair credits and subsidies to individual farmers. The CRM argued that the Fund for Integrated Mapuche Development had as a principle objective “the formation of Family Agricultural Units (UAF) among small land owning Mapuche, and to prevent the indefinite division of

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227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
229 Ibid.
lands as a result of hereditary successions." Like many other national and international experts, the CRM saw the UAF and land division as the solution to stagnate cultural and economic development in rural and specifically Mapuche communities. The UAFs that the CRM envisioned, nonetheless, spoke Mapuzungun, danced the choique, played chueca, and partook in Mapuche socio-religious ceremonies like the ngillatun. The CRM therefore understood the rural nuclear family as one that supported Mapuche cultural norms and not necessarily the Ministry of Agriculture’s notions of rural citizenship.

Every ministry that reviewed the CODIMA plan rejected the proposal. The Ministry of Agriculture and INDAP rejected the plan on the basis that INDAP already offered health, education, and credit assistance to Mapuche farmers. The formation of CODIMA, therefore, was superfluous in the opinion of the Ministry of Agriculture. The ministry further suggested that the “problems of the social, political, and economic type [in Mapuche communities] are generally the same that affect others groups of small farmers and rural inhabitants.” The Ministry of Agriculture therefore argued that there was a common economic hardship among the rural poor and not a distinct ethnic dilemma. INDAP supported the opinions of the Ministry of Agriculture. INDAP argued that the formation CODIMA would signify a step backward to a time of ethnic segregation and state paternalism that marked the Allende administration. INDAP thus warned that CODIMA only led to the further marginalization and underdevelopment of

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230 Ibid.
231 The choique is a ceremonial dance that mimics the movements of an rhea, and is performed at the pivotal fertility celebration known as the ngillatun. Chueca is a Mapuche sport similar to field hockey. Chueca is a central event that renews inter and intra-communal ties and alliances. All of these events are central to the reproduction of Mapuche culture and cosmovision.
232 ARA, INR, 1985, box 209, reservado 273, Minister of Agriculture to the Secretary of the President, August, 1985.
233 ARNAD, MINAG, 1984, vol. 2626, “Informe Técnico de INDAP.”
Mapuche communities. Like the Ministry of Agriculture, INDAP also argued that the Mapuche were not a distinct ethnic group in Chile, and lamented the audacity of those who demanded special rights. INDAP sustained the Mapuche were a “social group within the context of Chilean society, with their own cultural characteristic, that is to say, with their own culture.” Nonetheless, INDAP officials argued that the characteristics that defined the Mapuche reflected those of Chile’s rural population, and thus the two groups shared a history of marginalization and poverty. INDAP and the Ministry of Agriculture therefore rejected the CRM’s proposal on the basis that no distinct Mapuche identity actually existed in Chile, and thus a special institution for the Mapuche was redundant and in and of itself discriminatory against non-Mapuche.

The Ministry of Education and the Office for National Planning (Oficina de Planificación Nacional, ODEPLAN) also denied the CRM’s program. The Ministry of Education highlighted that since 1974 the ministry had created special funds to support scholarships for Chile’s Aymara, Pascuense and Mapuche population. The ministry had further coordinated a project with the University of the Austral to develop the Project for Mapuche Education. The Ministry of Education stressed that any new program would be redundant and a waste of state resources. In a similar vein, ODEPLAN argued that for “those sectors that possess a peculiar or different culture, tradition and identity than the rest of the national community, such as the pascuenses, antiplano communities and the Mapuches, there have been made specific actions tending to improve their living conditions and to make possible their integration into the economic, technological and

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235 ARA, INR, 1985, box 209, reservado no. 321, Minister of Education to the Secretary General of the President, August 30, 1985
social process, [while] maintaining their own culture and identity. While the Ministry of Agriculture and INDAP denied the existence of Mapuche culture, ODEPLAN and the Ministry of Education took a different, but similar stance. The two organizations based their rejection less on the denial of Mapuche culture and more on the idea that the benevolent paternalism of the military regime had already addressed the concerns of CODIMA. The responses from military officials to the CRM therefore reflected an inconsistency within the dictatorship as to what constituted the Mapuche as an ethnic group and if this merited special state protections.

The report from the CRM particularly angered the Intendant of the Ninth Region, Miguel Espinoza. As a consultant organization dependent on the Intendant of the Ninth Region, the CRM had the obligation to submit all proposals, letters, and other ephemera circulated in the Ninth Region to Espinoza for approval. On April 11, 1985, CRM president Neculman bypassed this chain of command and sent the CRM report directly to Pinochet’s office. Intendant Espinoza was beyond shocked to hear that the dictator’s office had received a scathing denunciation of the Chilean education system and a proposal for Mapuche judiciary autonomy from an organization allegedly under the authority of the Intendancy. In July of 1985, the CRM also sent letters to all municipal mayors in the Ninth Region to inform them of the CRM’s intent to hold meetings to promote the formation of CODIMA. Intendant Espinoza quickly reminded Neculman that all documentation circulated needed to come to the Intendant for approval.

The direction Neculman intended to take the CRM eventually led to his forced resignation in October 1986. The Intendancy of the Ninth Region wrote a report that

236 ARA, INR, 1985, box 209, ejemplar no. 1, Oficina de Planificación Nacional.
237 ARA, INR, 1985, box 209, ord. 101, Consejo Regional Mapuche.
238 ARA, INR, 1985, box 209, circular no. 5, Consejo Regional Mapuche.
239 ARA, INR, 1985, box 209, reservado no. 356, Intendant of the Ninth Region to CRM, August 9, 1985.
outlined the reasons for Neculman’s removal as president of the CRM. The document noted that Neculman’s proposal for CODIMA was “absolutely contrary to the actual policy of the National and Regional Government.”\footnote{ARA, INR, 1986, box 226, memorandum on Juan Neculman’s retirement.} The report went on to lament the general disrespect towards the intendancy and the military regime that Neculman had exercised as CRM president. Neculman gave interviews to Diario Austral that critiqued the regime’s indigenous policy, and had collaborated with a U.N. human rights commission to help bring international attention to the violence, poverty, and discrimination that Mapuche communities faced in Chile. Intendant Espinoza also stated that Neculman often attended Ad-Mapu meetings in an effort to create an alternative organization, Sociedad Araucanía, to fulfill the goals of CODIMA and discredit the central government.\footnote{Ibid.} For all of these reason, Espinoza called for the forced resignation of Neculman. Espinoza, however, recommended that the Ministry of the Interior simple transfer Neculman to another post. Espinoza stated that if the ministry fired Neculman, the ex-president would become political fodder for the growing tide of Mapuche opposition to the Pinochet dictatorship.\footnote{Ibid.}

Despite the removal of Neculman, the CRM continued to promulgate alternative representations of Mapuche culture and question sanctioned violence against Mapuche communities. In 1986, a group of criminals terrorized the communities of Pedro Marín and Anselmo Quintriqueo in the Municipality of Nueva Imperial. The men continually robbed livestock, held people up at gunpoint, and threatened the general security of the communities. Officers informed Mapuche in the area that if the men came into their communities, they had every right to kill and bury the criminals. Despite the police

\footnote{240 ARA, INR, 1986, box 226, memorandum on Juan Neculman’s retirement.}
\footnote{241 Ibid.}
\footnote{242 Ibid.}
force’s acknowledgment of criminal activity, Mapuche in these communities noted that the police did little to help, and often met requests for aid with racist comments towards Mapuche culture. This led to the belief that the police force was somehow in cahoots with these criminals, or simply turned a blind eye.²⁴³

On February 6, 1986, Doña Maria Mercedes Tralma Nirrean was on her way home when two men approached her and her four children. The men demanded money, and threatened to burn Tralma’s house with her children in it if she did not acquiesce. Upon refusal, the two men attempted to rape Tralma. Tralma defended herself with a shovel, and her screams attracted the attention of a neighbor. The neighbor struck one of the men in the head with a wooden club, which left him “half dead.”²⁴⁴ When Tralma’s husband returned home, he took a shovel, killed the would-be rapist, and buried him. On February 28, the local police came to the community, arrested eight women and their husbands, and unearthed the body. In her interrogation, Tralma justified her actions as a defense against rape and asked the officer “if it was permitted by law for a man to rape a woman.”²⁴⁵ The officer responded that in the case of Mapuche women, the law did permit rape. The women and their husbands remained jailed without trial.

In response to the events in Nueva Imperial, the CRM wrote the Intendant of the Ninth Region. The CRM suggested that the whole case not only reflected the abuse Mapuche communities suffered from local police forces, but also the manner in which the police naturalized violence and particularly sexual violence against Mapuche women. The CRM argued that all these events revealed the police had “made a joke out of their

²⁴³ ARA, INR, 1986, box 224, ord. 013, Consejo Regional Mapuche.
²⁴⁴ Ibid.
²⁴⁵ Ibid.
being indigenous."²⁴⁶ CRM member Sergio Liempi compared the known presence of criminals in Nueva Imperial who remained free to 8 Mapuche men who were detained without trial, highlighting the racist and discriminatory policies of the local police force. The Consejo urged the Intendant to send their report to the Criminal Court of Nueva Imperial in an effort to secure the release of the men and women. The Consejo concluded that the Intendant needed to uphold the moral and physical security of Mapuche communities.²⁴⁷ Unlike Raiman’s and the Ministry of Agriculture’s opinions that racial discrimination did not exist in Chile, the CRM report documented and critiqued the negative racial profiles that legitimated violence in Mapuche communities. The Intendant heeded the CRM’s advice, and forwarded the recommendation to the Municipal Judge of Nueva Imperial. By the end of 1986, however, the CRM ceased to work in the Ninth Region. The CRM, like so many other military programs in the Ninth Region, reflected a highly contested and incomplete process of state building that underscored the multifaceted reality of state power in Chile’s southern regions.

By the early 1980s, therefore, the military regime faced serious obstacles that prevented the full implementation of its indigenous policies. The Ministry of Agriculture subsequently appropriated Mapuche symbols, public space and the rhetoric of indigenous rights in a bid to justify its policies and D.L. 2568. External pressure was not, however, the only factor that limited the validity of the ministry’s argument that a Mapuche ethnic identity based on specific cultural norms and communal land did not exist. The CRM represented one of the greatest failed attempts by the military regime to garner support for its indigenous policies. Rather than mobilize Mapuche communities in support of

²⁴⁶ Ibid.
²⁴⁷ Ibid.
D.L. 2568, the CRM often advocated a cultural identity that directly challenged the Ministry of Agriculture’s presentation of Mapuche culture as non-existent and not meriting special constitutional protections. The CRM, however, revealed the internal complexities that regionalization produced. Rather than replicating state authority, regionalization had inadvertently given greater autonomy to the CRM than officials had intended. CRM officials used this segmentation of authority to in turn contest the regime’s reform efforts. The same problems that regionalization produced with the CRM also existed in the regime’s first concrete effort at Mapuche cultural integration, Plan Perquenco.
Chapter 3: Plan Perquenco and Contested Memories of Pre-1973 Chile

The Ministry of Agriculture believed that the success of their signature land law, D.L. 2568, relied on the fulfillment of two goals: the division of Mapuche property and the Mapuche’s successful integration into the modern agricultural economy. If after land division, Mapuche men and women failed to adequately support national economic and cultural growth, then land division had been pursued in vain. By the late 1970s, however, regionalization had prevented the full implementation of these policies. Various officials throughout the Ninth Region complained that the process of regionalization had created bureaucratic roadblocks as confusion and infighting prevented the development of coherent plans for regional development. Furthermore, the Ministry of Agriculture’s largest plan for development, ICIRA-76, had ultimately failed to enact changes in the Ninth Region. FAO consultant Cristobal Unterrichter noted that ICIRA-76 failed because the program reinforced the very dependency on the central government that had existed under the asentamiento system, and thus the ministry’s reform programs had done little to empower Mapuche men.

In 1980, the Ministry of Agriculture with the aid of Chilean universities and international institutions like the FAO designed a pilot project in the Municipality of Perquenco to overcome the previous limits of regionalization and enact reform that allowed Mapuche farmers to effectively produce for market consumption. From 1980 to 1988, officials touted Plan Perquenco as an effective embodiment of regionalization and municipal reform. At a macro-level, personnel from INDAP, the FAO, the Municipality of Perquenco, and the Departments of Agronomy from the University of Chile and the Catholic University designed Plan Perquenco. They focused primarily on providing small
and primarily Mapuche farmers with access to credits, machinery, and markets to aid the successful commercialization of their agricultural production.\textsuperscript{248} At a micro-level, six agricultural technicians managed community development. The current scholarship suggests that this devolution of authority to local officials functioned because regionalization was highly undemocratic and authoritarian in nature, and thus created a cohesive chain of command from Pinochet down to the municipality.\textsuperscript{249} An analysis of the initial development of Plan Perquenco demonstrates that municipal development was in reality a highly contested process in which military officials, international experts, agricultural technicians, and Mapuche farmers vied over how to represent and understand individual’s relationships to natural resources, familial organization, state oppression, and memories of pre-1973 Chile.

Between 1980 and 1988 Plan Perquenco did not have a unified administrative format, and subsequently underwent two phases, (1980-1983, 1984-1988). In both phases, regionalization continued to limit what officials viewed as the successful implementation of Plan Perquenco. Between 1980 and 1983, private contractors’ mismanagement of state funds and the minimal support regional officials offered the program hampered the fulfillment of Plan Perquenco’s goals. In 1984, Plan Perquenco came under the leadership of FAO consultant Unterrichter. It was only after a near three-year debate, however, between Chile’s Office of Agricultural Planning (Oficina de Planificación Agrícola, ODEPA) and the FAO, over the role of the state in rural reform that Chile gained financial and consultative support. The negotiations between ODEPA and the FAO represented serious tensions between the objectives of the military regime.

\textsuperscript{248} FAOL, 1984, doc. 450075, “Desarrollo y Organización del Sector Indígena y de Pequeños Agricultores en Chile: Documento de Trabajo No.1.”
and international experts that made the administration of Plan Perquenco anything but a cohesive endeavor.

Regionalization also placed management of the program in the hands of Unterrichter after 1984. One of Unterrichter’s principal responsibilities in 1984 was to hire six agricultural technicians for Plan Perquenco. Without strong government oversight in this process, Unterrichter hired a group of technicians that represented diverse political and social backgrounds. Agricultural technicians’ different relationships to the pre-1973 politics and post-1973 violence created multiple and contested opinions about the causes of rural stagnation and how to proceed with reform in Perquenco.

Inconsistency in the opinions and memories of agricultural technicians was not the only factor that limited the initial ideological cohesion of Plan Perquenco. Always lurking beneath the Ministry of Agriculture’s argument that Plan Perquenco saved a backward Mapuche culture was an alternative historical memory among Mapuche farmers. Oral interviews demonstrate that many of the problems the military regime associated with Mapuche communities were actually the products of the dictatorship’s own policies. Violence, racism, and the social impact of land division all, in one way or another, broke down community organization and production in Perquenco. The mingako was and is a form of communal field preparation that played a pivotal role in the renewal of community bonds and identity before 1973. The military junta, however, declared these community gatherings illegal, which ultimately closed off a major source of community cultural and agricultural reproduction. After 1973, the mingako formed a critical part of Mapuche community memory that challenged the Ministry of
Agriculture’s justification for Plan Perquenco based on the assumption that the region was devoid of identity, creativity, and community organization.

**Perquenco as the Embodiment of Rural Stagnation**

At the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Regional Intendants in 1979, officials argued that by and large regionalization did not work well. The report from the meeting stated, “even though it is certain that in these moments much of this [rural development] could be done with the present means and organisms, the reality appears to be hindering this intention when we must decide ‘Who does it?’”250 The report argued that the “lack of dispositions and norms” for a basic plan for resource development existed because “the responsibility over the matter is divided among diverse institutions.”251 The problems inherent in regionalization led officials from the meeting to conclude that by 1979 many rural reform projects “suffer from basic errors that make their application unsuccessful.”252 The Regional Intendants noted that regionalization had led to ineffective planning initiatives, poor use of funds, and the selection of beneficiaries that squandered state money. Documents from the late 1970s therefore demonstrate that the processes of regionalization often caused confusion and inefficiency in the process of state building as the system relied on a variety of public and private institutions to successfully coordinate projects for social reform.

To organize and finance school gardening programs in the Ninth Region required the cooperation of more than 20 private and public organizations with at times differing views as to what rural reform entailed.253 The school gardening program was not unique

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250 ARA, INR, 1979, box 61, “Informe de la Primera Sesión de la Comisión No 1: ‘Desarrollo Rural.’”
251 Ibid.
252 Ibid.
in its multifaceted composition and many organizations complained about the inefficiency of the model. In 1978, the Chol-Chol Foundation, which supported training programs for Mapuche small farmers, argued before a panel on rural development that these programs were ineffective because there was no coordination among the various institutions involved. The foundation’s representative wondered “How is it possible that so many organizations, in the same geographic location and with the same ends, don’t know one another?” While regionalization removed the central government from regional programs, it nonetheless created a conglomerate of institutions with no affiliation to one another, and thus no incentive to work together. By the late 1970s, this had stunted the Ministry of Agriculture’s proposed reforms.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Agriculture’s flagship program, ICIRA-76 had also failed by 1979. Unterrichter argued that it was the Ministry of Agriculture’s heavy-handed approach to cooperatives that led to the failure of SOCAs. While Unterrichter lauded ICIRA-76 for its attempt to reform the rural sector, he noted that the program came up short. “It seems that [because of] the continuous changes in managing officials that were made, the concept and understanding of [cooperatives] was lost or ceded under economic pressures. This is the only way to explain the deviation of the SOCAs… in this way these groups that were born in all senses weak were crushed [which] led to a major loss of prestige of the cooperative system.” Unterrichter further sustained that SOCAs failed because dependency on CORA had defined the former lives of asentados, and thus this group of farmers “did not recognize [cooperatives] as an organism for union and auto-defense, but as something imposed from the outside that had always served to cheat

the weakest.” Unterrichter argued the lack of cooperative mentality reinforced “the traditional recklessness and lack of cooperative administrative responsibility [and] the loss of countless resources provided on the part of the government.” Unterrichter’s statements were either intentionally misleading to justify state intervention, or reflected a general ignorance to the cooperative efforts that marked pre-1973 production in the Ninth Region. Before the 1973 coup, Mapuche cooperatives like the Cooperativo Lautaro de Lumaco produced more than 20,000 quintiles of wheat annually, owned 372 animals, and represented more than 105 families. Unterrichter’s assertion that a cooperative mentality did not exist was therefore a misleading assessment that not only discredited the Chilean Agrarian Reform, but also legitimated the wholesale reformulation of the rural economy in Mapuche communities.

In Unterrichter’s opinion, weakness among asentados was also the result of state imposed poverty. Unterrichter sustained that the formation of UAFs was detrimental to the rural economy because, “by finally giving them (asentados) land, they received it not only without inventory, initially promised, but taxed, beyond the debt on the land, [and] in many cases with the debts of the inventory and balances of ex-SARAs.” The huge economic burden placed on former asentados made them unable “to confront the new [economic] situation.” Unterrichter therefore sustained that SOCAs did not empower rural men and their families to face market demands, but rather saddled them with crippling debt that reinforced their poverty and marginalization.

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256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
258 Correa et al., La reforma agraria y las tierras mapuches, 225-226.
260 Ibid.
In his final report on ICIRA-76 Unterrichter argued that regional officials had to place emphasis on small-scale, municipally-organized reform that overcame the problems of regionalization that had relied on various institutions coordinating broad programs that covered large geographic regions. In particular, Unterrichter called for a pilot project for Mapuche integration to take place in the municipality of Perquenco. Unterrichter suggested that the Ninth Region’s Municipality of Perquenco was an ideal location for a pilot project for effective reform as it was the Ninth Region’s smallest municipality in 1979 with about 35,000 hectares and 4,995 inhabitants.\textsuperscript{261} The municipality also had close access to larger cities like Lautaro and Victoria. In political terms, Perquenco had been a latecomer to the Chilean Agrarian Reform and did not contain a strong history of political mobilization or unionization apparent in surrounding municipalities. More importantly, Mapuche farmers comprised 75% of Perquenco’s population.\textsuperscript{262} The location, size, political history and high percentage of Mapuche farmers, therefore, made Perquenco a manageable laboratory to enact the social and cultural changes that fulfilled the goals of the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous reform programs.

In 1979, the Ministry of Agriculture took the advice of Unterrichter and funded the private agricultural consultant business the Associated Professionals for Projects and Planning (hereinafter PROPLAN) to conduct an extensive survey of Perquenco’s natural resources, rural population, modes of land ownership and resource development. Since the 1973 coup, PROPLAN officials had coordinated a number of rural surveys. From 1974 to 1975, PROPLAN worked with USAID to complete a study of land titles and production capabilities in Chile’s central regions. On July 10, 1976, INDAP contracted

\textsuperscript{261} Private Archive of Luis Muñoz, PROPLAN, “Perquenco,” tomo 1. 1. Digital copies of all of Muñoz’s archive used in this research are available in the Municipal Library of Perquenco.

\textsuperscript{262} Ibid.
PROPLAN to conduct an analysis of the socio-economic conditions of small farmers who worked under the Chilean Agrarian Reform. The final report included a series of recommendations on how to properly integrate small farmers into the modern agricultural economy.²⁶³ While PROPLAN was a private business, INDAP, the Ministry of Agriculture, and FAO consultant Unterrichter took an active role in the survey of Perquenco. As a result of the Ministry of Agriculture and its allies’ participation, the final PROPLAN report generally favored these professionals’ belief that the formation of small-scale private farmers that oriented their production towards market consumption was essential to rural economic growth and cultural stability.

The four volume report on Perquenco that PROPLAN’s functionaries published in 1979 created a picture of a Mapuche population that lacked the proper social skills and community organization to function in a modern agricultural economy. The justification for Plan Perquenco specifically relied on officials’ intentional portrayal of Mapuche agriculture practices as either detrimental to the environment, or non-existent. Within this narrative, officials ignored traditional Mapuche collective landownership and communal work that formed the foundation of their rural economy. Through the portrayal of the Mapuche in Perquenco as lacking any agricultural skills, officials from the Ministry of Agriculture were able to justify the fundamental reorientation of familial relationships, economic production, and individual relationships to natural resources. This rhetoric represented what Patricia Richards has identified as a form of symbolic violence that

marked Mapuche culture as inferior and thus Mapuche communities deserved to be forcefully integrated into the market economy as a necessity of their salvation.\textsuperscript{264}

The PROPLAN report noted that nearly 70% of the 8,593 hectares that Mapuche communities held remained uncultivated.\textsuperscript{265} The report, however, did not take into account arable land, crop rotations, or fields that were fallow at the time. The 70% figure was nonetheless a powerful political statement that presented Mapuche culture as a roadblock to modernity. In an era when the military regime argued for maximum agricultural efficiency to meet market demands, the fact that 70% of Mapuche land remained uncultivated was antithetical to the free market principles of military rule.

PROPLAN officials further argued that Mapuche communities only oriented half of the cultivated land towards market consumption.\textsuperscript{266} The PROPLAN report sustained that lack of market orientation was the result of poor agricultural production methods. PROPLAN officials contended that Mapuche lands lacked profitability in part because Mapuche dedicated 85% of their agricultural production to cereals and that six-month crop cycles only employed 21% of the available workforce.\textsuperscript{267} The PROPLAN report sustained, “this signifies huge unemployment and a confusion between living on the land and working on it.”\textsuperscript{268} In conjunction with anti-capital practices were technological deficiencies.

Mapuche communities in Perquenco had 12 tractors, 387 ox, and 47 horses to prepare 8,593 hectares. Within the quarter of the population that had a team of ox, only half had a plow.\textsuperscript{269} From these facts, the PROPLAN report concluded, “the low level of technology

\textsuperscript{264} Richards, \textit{Race and the Chilean Miracle.}
\textsuperscript{265} Private Archive of Luis Muñoz, PROPLAN, “Perquenco,” tomo 1. 28, 33.
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid. 43.
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid. 39-40.
\textsuperscript{268} FAOL, 1980, doc. 460885, “Desarrollo Empresarial y Organizacional de los Productores Agrícolas de Explotaciones Familiares: Informe Final.”
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.
that yields demonstrate are the result of a lack of crop rotations, the use of poor seeds that originate from the product of their own harvest, [and] deficient application of fertilizer.\textsuperscript{270} The PROPLAN report argued that the lack of agricultural production ultimately led to minimal initiative among Mapuche farmers to enhance their lives. The report concluded, “adverse environmental conditions, organization, incomes, quality of life, and [access to] markets imply a lack of motivation to participate in auto-development.”\textsuperscript{271}

The PROPLAN report attributed inefficient production and lack of personal motivation to land tenure systems in Perquenco’s Mapuche communities. Like other state functionaries and international experts, the PROPLAN report argued that the hereditary succession of property in Mapuche communities prevented the formation of private property. The PROPLAN report contended, “property in succession constitutes an additional grave problem, with the identification of 367 properties with 1,456 heirs, that by dividing would affect the size of the plots.”\textsuperscript{272} The PROLAN report’s emphasis on lack of available property for heirs reflected a larger concern among the Ministry of Agriculture’s technicians that land division was pointless if land remained unproductive.

In his initial recommendations for Perquenco, FAO consultant Unterrichter suggested that the cultural survival of the Mapuche required the accumulation of property in the hands of fewer property owners. Unterrichter noted, “If we want to save the ethnic Mapuche group from continued degradation and succeed in the gradual re-concentration of lands in profitable Unidades Agrícolas in the hands of Mapuche, if we want to revive and use the great values of this group for the Chilean nation, it is necessary to create an

\textsuperscript{270} Private Archive of Luis Muñoz, PROPLAN, “Perquenco,” tomo 1. 57.
\textsuperscript{271} Ibid. 11.
\textsuperscript{272} Ibid. 56.
instrument through which…the new landholder is able to compensate his co-heirs in accordance with the revenue [generated] on these lands.” Unterrichter argued that the Ministry of Agriculture needed to set up a bank that specialized in Mapuche mortgages that allowed the most productive Mapuche families to buy or rent the plots of their co-heirs. Unterrichter claimed that the bank complied with the “national promise to maintain their land, decongest the demographic pressure on indigenous areas, [and] to help in the auto-selection of the most capable among the heirs to keep the land in minimal units to be able to develop this ethnic group and the Chilean nation.” Unterrichter nonetheless assured the FAO that the transfer of the majority of Mapuche still residing in reducciones to urban centers was not a threat to Mapuche culture. Unterrichter suggested that through the emulation of European cultural practices like sports clubs and neighborhood associations urban Mapuche could preserve their cultural norms. Unterrichter sustained that the creation of an urban-Mapuche intellectual and business class also helped Mapuche survival because “an ethnic group like any community has to consist of different social groups with the maximum vertical permeability between them.”

Beyond the lack of property for heirs within Mapuche communities, the PROPLAN report contended that only 27% of lands in Mapuche communities had fences to demarcate property. The desire to build fences in the Ninth Region was one of the Ministry of Agriculture’s principal projects in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Reports from the ministry noted that after communities received individual titles it was essential to distribute “necessary materials to enclose that land over which the title was given…now definitively possessing their property and having delimited the boundaries.

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274 Ibid.
275 Ibid
with fences, it is projected to give credit and technical assistance as a means to increase the levels of production in the Mapuche sector.” The ministry’s report therefore highlighted that fenced-in private property was a prerequisite for increased and efficient agricultural production. PROPLAN officials’ statement that only 27% of Mapuche property contained fences therefore reflected a larger concern among functionaries in the Ninth Region that a lack of fences prevented the delineation of private property and thus adequate agricultural production in Mapuche communities.

Lack of commercial success translated into negative social and community development. As with other agencies in Chile, the PROPLAN report particularly highlighted the harmful impact low incomes had on familial life. PROPLAN officials noted that of the 476 households in Mapuche communities, 48% remained in a dismal condition, lacking clean water, proper waste management, and structural integrity like adequate roofs and walls. The PROPLAN report sustained, “the gravest [housing] problems are concentrated in reducciones... it is also the reducciones that present the highest level of over-crowding and the lowest average superficies per house.” The report from PROPLAN supported the Ministry of Agriculture’s assessment that overcrowding in Mapuche houses led to unhygienic conditions that provoked high levels of infant mortality, and an overall lack of agricultural productivity. The Ministry of Agriculture noted improvement in Mapuche housing was a necessity as “elevating living conditions increases the productivity of the land in notable ways.”

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278 Ibid. 21.
279 ARA, INR, 1980, box 76, “Memorándum: Subsidio Habitacional Rural, Secretaría Regional Ministerial de Agricultura IX Región.”
280 Ibid.
A report from USAID employee Jean A. Wright supported PROPLAN officials’ analysis of poor housing. Since the late 1940s, Wright worked throughout Central and South America with the FAO and USAID to coordinate family nutrition and planning programs in rural areas. From 1961 to 1968, Wright worked with the FAO and Unterrichter in Chile, and returned in the 1970s to work with the Italian in the ICIRA-76 program. Between October 1980 and January 1981 the Catholic University’s Rural Life Foundation (Fundación de Vida Rural, FVR) contracted Wright to analyze the problems that Perquenco’s urban families endured. State functionaries and international experts used the term “urban” to describe Perquenco, but the area was more closely aligned with a rural town. In 1980, Perquenco lay 4 miles to the east of the Pan-American Highway. To reach the town, one had to use poorly maintained roads that washed out in the winter months. Perquenco lacked many of the urban amenities like banks, markets, and public services that existed in surrounding towns like Victoria, Lautaro, and Temuco. The fact that the majority of Perquenco’s population subsisted off agricultural and livestock production also supported the notion that the town was more rural than urban. While PROPLAN and other agencies used the term urban to describe the town of Perquenco, reports noted that the town had fallen victim to many of the same problems that affected Chile’s rural population.

In her report, Wright noted the extreme poverty, malnutrition, and lack of education that distressed families in the town of Perquenco. Wright lamented that the majority of the families did not practice family farming, but rather subsisted off low quality store-bought foods. Wright noted that those families that did farm lacked adequate production of vegetables and fruits. In the opinion of Wright, poor nutritional
intake led to a variety of health problems that ranged from heart disease to mental illness. Wright noted that only 40% of families had a balanced diet, and most relied solely on grains with minimal vegetables and fruits. Wright argued that these diets were “insufficient as much in quantity as in quality for the requirements to develop and maintain a human being.” Furthermore, most families did not properly dispose of trash and human waste, which also led to increased health problems. Wright stated “The high percentage of families that dispose of trash in this way [burning], especially in open fields, are constituting a risk to the health of their families, principally children, that rapidly transforms into infections that threatened the health of the home.” The report, however, did not detail that there was no alternative for trash disposal in Perquenco. Wright linked poor home life to minimal civic participation. Wright sustained that 19.6% of Perquenco’s population participated in community organizations, which underscored “a lack of motivation to participate in community organizations.” Wright’s comments nonetheless only focused on those organizations, like CEMAs, that she felt were legitimate sites of community organization. She subsequently ignored traditional Mapuche modes of field preparation, seed exchanges, and kinship ties that formed the base of many Mapuche communities’ organization and development efforts. By invalidating and ignoring alternative modes of community mobilization, Wright was able to conclude, “The principal problem seems to center on the human resources, abilities, skill and capacity to make decisions, [take] initiatives and interest to actively participate in their own development.”

282 Ibid.
283 Ibid.
284 Ibid.
Like Wright, PROPLAN’s officials also suggested that weak familial structure had ramifications within the larger social sphere. PROPLAN officials reported that there was little social organization among the Mapuche as a result of debilitated families that lacked the capacity to coordinate community development. In 1979, there was one neighborhood association, two CEMAs, and various unorganized sports clubs in Perquenco. The PROPLAN report, like that of Wright, only focused on those community organization initiatives that officials felt were legitimate, without taking into consideration or validating any alternative forms community solidarity like the mingako. PROPLAN officials argued that organization in agricultural cooperatives practically did not exist in Mapuche communities. The largest agricultural cooperatives were the Committees of Small Agriculturalists. In 1979, 230 small farmers, 207 of whom were Mapuche, comprised these committees. The PROPLAN report contended, however, that these committees existed solely as a legal formality that allowed communities to apply for credit from INDAP. “The only objective of these committees, according to declarations from people interviewed, is to fulfill the organizational requirements of INDAP for the authorization of credits, without any of their functions.” PROPLAN’s officials suggested that agricultural committees ideally existed to help with the organization and commercialization of production. Without these functions, the assumption of PROPLAN officials was that real social organization did not exist beyond a legal loophole that allowed members to receive credit, which they subsequently squandered. The PROPLAN report nonetheless provided no evidence for this assessment, and therefore the claim served more to invalidate Mapuche community development as inefficient and backward.

Lack of community organization manifested itself in other areas as well. The PROPLAN report highlighted that there was minimal infrastructure in Perquenco. There was one church, a theatre that didn’t work, and only six police officers for the entire municipality. The PROPLAN report sustained that most children did not have access to schools. The actual town of Perquenco had the only K-12 schooling system, and PROPLAN officials noted the eleven rural schools provided an “incomplete education.” More than 250 children lived roughly two or more miles from the nearest school, which PROPLAN officials argued prevented many children from receiving even an elementary education. Perquenco’s education system left the municipality with an illiteracy rate of 21%, and a 2% high school graduation rate. The PROPLAN report argued that rural health clinics badly needed basic supplies, functioned in rundown buildings, lacked ambulances, and had a minimal staff. The overall conclusion regarding the infrastructure of Perquenco was that the municipality’s population did not have access to the basic social services that created healthy and knowledgeable citizens.

The PROPLAN report concluded that Perquenco’s lack of infrastructure, economic development, community organization, and dependency on nearby cities like Lautaro and Victoria left the municipality “with a lack of community identity.” All of Perquenco’s shortcomings ultimately created a “poor population, without the creativity that the actions that permit [them] to overcome [their] difficulties require.” The idea that Perquenco lacked identity and creativity created an image of a rural mass without the capabilities to act as responsible citizens who promoted the economic and cultural growth of the Chilean nation. Unterrichter supported the notion that Perquenco was emblematic.

\(^{286}\) Ibid. 22.
\(^{287}\) Ibid.
\(^{288}\) Ibid. 49.
\(^{289}\) Ibid. 49.
of Chile’s stagnant rural population when he wrote, “it’s necessary to keep in mind that the chosen community is a model above the average of communities in similar areas. This state of things originates in the poor use and lack of coordination of the resources that has stunted [the community] for many years.”

PROPLAN officials advised the Ministry of Agriculture to create a plan for rural development that allowed Perquenco’s rural inhabitants to improve their lives, increase their workforce, and eventually orient their production towards the market economy. The PROPLAN report noted that to achieve these goals “it will be fundamental to count on productive measures and concrete possibilities to improve the quality of life in a way that their community becomes interested in assuming [responsibility for] their own development and destiny.” PROPLAN concluded, “it has been determined [that] crop rotations [need to be introduced] that represent a more intense use of soil, with crops more suitable and profitable [and] which have support in the existing commercial infrastructure.”

**Plan Perquenco I and II, 1980-1984**

In August 1980, the Chilean Ministry of Agriculture developed the pilot project known as the Plan for Integrated Rural Development in the Community of Perquenco, or Plan Perquenco, that the ministry based on the PROPLAN report. This first phase of Perquenco (1980-1983) contained two separate administrative parts, one rural and one urban. While the rural component focused on the creation of independent, market-oriented male farmers, the urban programs attempted to create mothers and wives dedicated to domestic production. INDAP, the private agricultural development business

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292 Ibid. 16.
Agroservicio, and the Department of Agronomy from the University of Chile administered the rural component of Plan Perquenco. The rural reform program focused on providing technical and credit assistance to 893, mostly Mapuche farmers.\textsuperscript{293}

During the first year of the program, the three agricultural technicians that worked in the rural sector primarily gave lectures throughout 24 Mapuche communities. These lectures addressed the structure of Plan Perquenco and reassured Mapuche communities that the plan was not a simple lending program. Lectures also concentrated on the importance of crop rotation, the diminution of mono-crop production, the introduction of horses as beasts of labor, and the use of housing subsidies.\textsuperscript{294} In the first year, the program gave 223 credits to small farmers. During the 1981-82 agricultural year, the program incorporated five more Mapuche communities, and particularly emphasized the introduction of lupine as a means to diversify agricultural production in the region. The third and final year of the program continued these programs and introduced two school gardening programs designed to teach students and mothers how to cultivate small scale gardens to enhance familial nutritional intake. By the end of the program in 1983, 719 Mapuche farmers had received credit and technical assistance through Plan Perquenco.\textsuperscript{295}

Complementing the rural program was a program located in the town of Perquenco that had as its principal focus the improvement of home living. In May 1980, INDAP and Agroservicio signed an agreement with the Catholic University’s Rural Life Foundation (FVR) that provided two years of support for an urban family development subprogram. The FVR based their program principally on Wright’s reports. Urban familial reform contained four parts: family gardens, consumer education with a focus on

\textsuperscript{293} ARNAD, MINAG, 1982, vol. 2505, “Plan de Desarrollo Perquenco.”
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{295} Ibid.
nutrition, home enhancement, and home hygiene and sanitation.296 The urban program incorporated 100 families with the end goal to promote the “integral development of people and communities through the promotion of housewives and their family group. This action considers the family the fundamental unit for teaching, change, and development.”297 This familial model ideally created healthy citizens that participated in CEMAs, neighborhood associations, and the general municipal corporatism that promoted free market growth.

In 1983, the FVR argued that the program was a success. 100% of the families involved used family gardens, incorporated a variety of vegetables into their diet, and utilized sanitary methods for the disposal of human and food waste. Beyond hygiene and nutrition, the FVR argued the program had improved the cultural development of the community. The FVR noted, “housewives and the family have become inspired, prepared and motivated to confront the actions to better themselves… housewives and their families have passed from a position of passivity, initial apathy, and isolation to a more active position, one of real participation in community matters, together with other families, or at least showing greater interest in said aspects.”298 The FVR’s evaluation sustained that housewives’ new sense of self-esteem “has at the same time given them a new orientation in the essential work of educating their children.”299 The FVR report suggested that the urban program’s ability to create proper housewives who managed family gardens, auxiliary income, and domestic health set an example for Perquenco’s youth that led them away from alcoholism and promiscuity. The report particularly

297 Ibid.
298 Ibid.
299 Ibid.
pointed to the benefits gained from family gardens. The FVR report concluded that family gardens were a means to empower “housewives (by adopting a truly productive role), and to make possible group work in the family with the consequent increase in their cohesion. On the other hand, [the family garden] permits a diversion in work that distracts youth, removing them from the pernicious idleness of the street.” The FVR report sustained that despite the gains made in the program, the project still “lacked maturity and the FVR’s educational and training support is still necessary.” The report concluded with a request for further support from the Minister of Agriculture, who by 1983 had decided to remove all funding from the program.

The favorable views of Plan Perquenco that FVR officials presented in their request for further funding intentionally belied the political and financial problems that had plagued Plan Perquenco since its inception. Regionalization required that municipal programs, like Plan Perquenco, received financial support from a variety of public and private institutions, and not just the central government. In 1980 the Minister of Agriculture requested aid from the Ministries of Health and Public Works to support infrastructure programs. The projects included the improvement of roads, and the construction of schools and health clinics within Perquenco. The Ministries of Health and Public Works both denied the Ministry of Agriculture’s request for funds. The Ministry of Public Works denied the request on the grounds that repairing the Pan-American Highway was the ministry’s first priority. The Ministry of Health was a bit more open about the lack of importance Plan Perquenco held for the ministry. In response to the request for aid, Minister of Health Alejandro Medina argued “it must be noted that within

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300 Ibid.
301 Ibid.
the health sector, the community of Perquenco, due to its privileged geographical location close to important localities and its excellent road network, like the South Pan-American [highway], does not have the priority that the Ministry [of Agriculture] assigns it.” 303 The report from the Ministry of Health overlooked the reality that Perquenco did not have an excellent road system, and many inhabitants could not reach “important localities” like Lautaro and Victoria in winter months. Nonetheless, the denial of funds reflected that the ability to finance municipal projects relied on the disposition of officials in Santiago to provide aid. The inability to acquire funds for the program placed a disproportionate financial burden on the Ministry of Agriculture and INDAP.

The Ministry of Agriculture was also loath to fund the private corporation that managed Plan Perquenco, Agroservicio. In his letter of resignation, Agroservicio representative, José Garrido, informed Regional Intendant, Mario Navarrete, that the decision to terminate Plan Perquenco lay in the fact that the program lacked adequate funds. Agroservicio received 6 million pesos for the 1980/81 agricultural year, and only 500,000 for the 1982/83 year, representing an 88% cut in funding. 304 In 1982, Regional Secretariat for the Minister of Agriculture responded to Perquenco Mayor Arturo Lindsay Keith’s request for further funds for Agroservicio with skepticism. Regional Secretary, Enrique Navarrete, argued that Agroservicio’s management was ineffectual because it did not comply “with the [originally] established goals, and for its already high cost, [and] since the company [Agroservicio] is already paid a fairly high amount so that it can do the same job that INDAP normally does.” 305 One of the primary jobs of INDAP was to

304 ARA, INR, 1983, box 144, José Garrido Rojas to the Minister of Agriculture, April 26, 1983.
distribute agricultural credits to small farmers. The idea that Agroservicio officials did INDAP’s job held a certain amount of truth. Of the 424 credits that Agroservicio issued between 1981 and 1983, 284 or 65% were INDAP credits. Agroservicio was essentially a third-party lending company that failed to enact any real changes in quotidian life throughout Perquenco. In a recent oral interview, former Agroservicio employee, Luis Muñoz, supported the notion that Agroservicio was an inefficient and costly company. Muñoz argued, “between 1980 to 1983 we didn’t have a good experience. So, alright, the Ministry [of Agriculture] saw that it wasn’t a good proposal, and what’s more, it saw that basically funds were transferred to an individual, to an NGO in this case, Agroservicio, that took a lot of resources and that basically did not provide results.”

Agroservicio president, José Garrido, nonetheless defended the position of the company in his letter of resignation. Garrido argued that his company had spent an average of 11,000 pesos, roughly $255 USD, on every rural inhabitant. Garrido stated that this amount “totally counteracts the negative comments about our poor use of funds.” Garrido went on to note that the Regional Secretariat of the Minister of Agriculture had ferociously opposed the program, and at most had made one trip to Perquenco. Garrido’s accusation of a lack of interest on the part of Regional Secretariat was not unfounded. Right before Agroservicio resigned in April of 1983, Executive Vice-president of INDAP, Alberto Cardemil, wrote the Intendant of the Ninth Region, Mario Navarrete, to request further funding for the program. Cardemil stated that the lack of advancement in the program was in part the fault of the Minister of Agriculture who

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306 ARA, INR, 1983, box 144, José Garrido Rojas to the Minister of Agriculture, April 26, 1983.
307 Ibid.
prohibited the promulgation of PROPLAN’s report after 1980. Cardemil noted that because the PROPLAN report “demonstrated a disconcerting state of extreme poverty, the Ministry of Agriculture at the time prohibited its diffusion.” 308 Cardemil noted that the actions of the Ministry of Agriculture did not allow “adequate publicity and coordination as a result of the secrecy imposed on the project.” 309 Cardemil’s remarks underscored that the inclinations of officials, like the Minister of Agriculture, held the ability to limit the success of regional development programs. Furthermore, INDAP was a branch of the Ministry of Agriculture. The comments of Cardemil reflected a certain level of infighting where the local initiatives of ministries were not always in accordance with their Santiago-based counterparts. Despite Cardemil’s request and accusations against the ministry, Navarrete argued he was unable to provide further funds, as the intendancy had already funded the majority of the program. Navarrete did agree, however, to continue to fund the FVR’s program through the end of 1983. 310

What comes to light from the termination of the first phase of Plan Perquenco was that the administrative structure of regionalization at times prevented the full implementation of the program. The success of Plan Perquenco relied on a coordinated effort among various public ministries and private businesses. As the comments of Garrido and other officials demonstrate, ministries’ opinions and actions affected the public perception of Plan Perquenco and the willingness of national ministries to fund the program. As with other areas of rural reform under regionalization, poor relations among private businesses, municipalities, and public officials as well as local political dynamics

309 Ibid.
held the potential to stunt the advancement of municipal development. If the managers of municipal programs failed to negotiate these dynamics and secure funds from different public and private organizations, the programs were generally destined to fail.

After the end of the first phase of Plan Perquenco, the FAO assumed management of the program in 1984. While the FAO had worked closely with the Ministry of Agriculture under military rule, it took nearly three years of negotiations for the FAO to agree to finance the program and provide consultative experts like Cristobal Unterrichter. The three-year negotiation process reflected that while the FAO had previously offered support, agrarian reform was a contested topic that revealed tension between the military regime and its allies. In late 1980 the Ministry of Agriculture wrote the FAO to request financial assistance and the participation of Cristobal Unterrichter as a consultant to Plan Perquenco. The FAO and the United Nations’ Development Program (UNDP), nonetheless, denied the Ministry of Agriculture’s request for financial and technical assistance. The FAO and UNDP did, however, send a list of suggestions that the Ministry of Agriculture needed to incorporate before Chile received international assistance.

The primary changes suggested by the FAO and UNDP focused on the scope of the project. In response to the preliminary draft, FAO representative to Chile Antonio Botelho-Neia wrote the Chilean Minister of Agriculture and stated that the proposal for Plan Perquenco “should especially specify objectives and strategies a little less ambitious and directly linked to the program of development in the area of Perquenco.”

Other recommendations included the omission of references to other geographical regions, and additional superfluous information copied from ICIRA-76. The FAO and UNDP also

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suggested that the Ministry of Agriculture discuss in concrete terms the financial and administrative assistance Chilean institutions like INDAP would provide to the program. Furthermore, the FAO and UNPD advised the Ministry of Agriculture to include a timetable and list of expenses that both the FAO and Chilean institutions had to adhere to. By October 1981, the Ministry of Agriculture had included the recommended changes, and sent the FAO a new document titled “Desarrollo y Organización del Sector Indígena y de Pequeños Agricultores.” Despite the favorable reception of the new proposal, the FAO and the Chilean Ministry of Agriculture did not sign an agreement until August 25, 1983.

The near three-year delay in part resulted from the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture and ODEPA simultaneously asked the FAO for financial and administrative support while they lambasted the FAO’s plans for agrarian reform in Latin America. In 1980, the central board of the FAO proposed the formation of a Center for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development for Latin American and the Caribbean. The FAO hoped that the center would create a network among Latin American and Caribbean countries that permitted a coordinated effort to plan and execute agrarian reform. The ultimate goal of the center was to eradicate hunger in Latin America by the year 2000 through an annual 4% increase in agricultural production. ODEPA was skeptical of the center’s emphasis on state coordinated efforts to redistribute land, water, and other resources. ODEPA wrote that “this aspect [of state coordination], does not deserve more commentary, as we already know the negative results that our country obtained during the process of the Agrarian Reform that affected us for a decade and we continue

suffering the consequences, as is the problem with excessive subdivision of the land, de-capitalization of agriculture and the backwardness that the diminishment of private initiatives and investment provokes.  The report from ODEPA concluded that the center was antithetical to free market politics that were the hallmarks of the new Chilean state, and therefore Chile would not help fund the center. In their report to the FAO, ODEPA functionaries even suggested that Chile coordinate a different transnational program for regional development with the aid of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia. In 1981, all of these countries were under right-wing military dictatorships that were members of Operation Condor. The suggestion that members of Operation Condor needed to create a new program displayed the audacity of the military regime before international agencies that attempted to alter the political and economic programs that defined late twentieth-century military rule in Latin America.

In October 1982, the director of ODEPA, Esteban Cordova Tapia wrote the Regional Representative of the FAO, Mario Jalil, to express his opinions over the proposal that individual states coordinate programs for the formation of associations of small farmers. Cordova Tapia reminded Jalil that Chile was against state-coordinated projects, and that small farmers were free to form associations with private companies if they wished to do so. Cordova Tapia concluded that Chile would not adopt the FAO’s recommendation, and that rural development would continue to be a project that the junta relegated to the private sector. Despite the FAO’s general agreement with the free-market reforms that the Ministry of Agriculture envisioned, ODEPA’s continual

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disavowal of FAO projects signified a level of autonomy within the Chilean dictatorship that made the FAO hesitant to fund Plan Perquenco.

In August 1983, after three years of negotiation, the FAO and UNPD finally authorized Unterrichter’s 14-month participation in the program, and gave Chile $110,000 USD. To effect the essential changes needed to create healthy citizens and families in Perquenco’s Mapuche population, Unterrichter wrote the FAO in 1984 and stated that Plan Perquenco had to be a project for “integrated rural development.” Integrated rural development was “the conjunction of activities destined to bring a rural population to a quality of life corresponding to the specific desires of the population within the image of twentieth-century man.” Unterrichter’s opinion, the “biological rejuvenation” of rural areas relied on the formation of nuclear families that developed private property for market consumption and national advancement. With regards to private property, Unterrichter argued that integrated development emphasized “the humanistic and educative value of direct administration, which brings together a single person in the function of property owner and operator. This form also offers the greatest security in tenancy, which in turn, leads the owner and his family to recognize in their property [their] destiny, place of independent work and their and their descendents’ continuous home.”

Unterrichter further argued that nuclear families were essential to the management of private property. Unterrichter sustained, “The sedentary life in exploitive farming proved to offer human characteristics the best

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316 FAOL, 1984, doc. 450075, “Consideraciones y metodología para un manual de trabajo en áreas de desarrollo rural integral y en especial para el área modelo a crear en la comuna Perquenco-Temuco.”
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid.
possibilities for self improvement, formation, and it is not an exaggeration to insist that the monogamous family, as the most advanced form of coexistence, found its ‘optimal’ [situation] in this ‘rural living.’ Integrated rural development, therefore, sought to create farmers that possessed the cultural skills that allowed them to live within nuclear families that exploited privately owned land for market consumption.

Unterrichter developed a three-tier plan based on home economy, agricultural growth, and community development to achieve the goals of integrated rural development. The three areas of integration underscored the importance of creating stable, self-sufficient nuclear families in Perquenco’s rural sector. Unterrichter argued that home development needed to contain projects that trained rural women to incorporate “modern” practices of family nutrition, hygiene, home improvement, and the use of public services into their day-to-day lives. The FVR was the primary administrator of the home development program. The FVR’s use of programs like apiculture, small animal husbandry, and diversified familial gardens reinforced the domestic and non-productive aspects of rural femininity that Unterrichter argued formed the bedrock of healthy families and citizens. The agricultural development project focused on the introduction of new planting techniques, crop rotation, the enhancement of livestock reproduction, and the prevention of disease. Beyond the technical aspects of farming and livestock care, the agricultural development program also trained men to administer and market their produce in accordance with the model of municipal corporatism. The cultural programs of Plan Perquenco sought to create a homogenous national identity in Mapuche communities through music, religious, and sports activities.

319 Ibid.
To enact these changes, Unterrichter devised an entirely new system for rural development in Perquenco. To more effectively manage the Mapuche communities within Perquenco, Unterrichter divided the municipality into three sub-regions (appendix E). Unterrichter suggested that two agricultural technicians, preferably a married couple, administer each sub-region. The married couple worked with roughly 150 Mapuche families within a 5-mile radius. The técnica, or female agricultural technician, administered training programs that focused on family gardens, hygiene, nutrition, small animal husbandry, and home repair. While Unterrichter felt these programs fit within the image of ideal rural femininity, they also served to gain “the respect and confidence” of communities through the técnicas' contact with Mapuche women. After the técnica had established confidence with families, the técnico, or husband, began programs that focused on increased agricultural production, crop rotation, and the introduction of new methodologies of livestock care. Through their coordinated effort in communities, the married agricultural technicians served as an “example and local ‘leader’, and by extension, advisor and coordinator of sports, cultural, and economic associations in place of the vanished ancient leaders.” Unterrichter’s reference to “vanished ancient leaders’ underscored his belief that Mapuche communities lacked direction and that their cultural greatness was nothing more than a vestige of a bygone era. The married couples, therefore, served as the paragon of proper rural familial relations, and thus the model for the self-sufficient and culturally mature nuclear family.

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320 Ibid.
321 Ibid.
322 Ibid.
**Plan Perquenco and Contested Memories**

Unterrichter had the responsibility to hire the six agricultural technicians that worked in the three sub-areas of Perquenco. The process of hiring these technicians, and the ultimate consequences of Unterrichter’s decisions reflected the contradictions embodied in the process of regionalization. Unterrichter selected a group of six technicians that represented a very broad political and cultural background. Patricio Bormann was a former employee of the Agriculture and Livestock Service (SAG) in the 1960s and ’70s, and was staunchly in favor of the dictatorship. Bormann’s memories in many ways supported the notion that the dictatorship saved Chile from Marxist ruin. In regards to the asentamientos formed during the Chilean Agrarian Reform, Bormann noted that the cooperatives were nothing more than a mechanism for small farmers to siphon state money and feed their alcoholism.

PB: What happened was that part of the [state] funds were converted into alcohol, and if the asentamiento had 20 people, 5 worked and the rest didn’t work

SDC: The other 15 did nothing?

PB: They didn’t do anything. So, they began to throw way state money.\(^{323}\)

In his interview, Bormann further described how the Chilean Agrarian Reform led to general disorder in the Chilean countryside.

“They [rural farmers] threw everything away, they squandered it all. If the state in this time had given [funds] to well selected people, there would have been a very distinct [situation], what happened with Jorge Alessandri’s reform would have happened, these people still, still alive, would have their land. What the others did, they sold their land, and oddly enough they went along organizing so that the state bought them land again… it’s that the truth of the matter is that in this time there was a lot of disorder, really a lot disorder.”\(^{324}\)

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\(^{323}\) Interview with Patricio Bormann, Perquenco, June 12, 2012.

\(^{324}\) Ibid.
Bormann’s depiction of pre-1973 agrarian reform was that the process was paternalistic, ineffectual, overrun with alcoholics, and ultimately led to the moral and economic decay of rural Chile.

Bormann’s historical memory reflected the military regime’s historical narrative that the 1973 coup had saved Chile from Marxist ruin and subsequently ushered in an era of economic prosperity and political stability. Bormann noted,

“we worked really well under the military government, very well. With the military government, the grudges between people were eliminated, [which were brought on] by politics. Because this is how it used to be: you are for the Popular Unity, and I’m not. We didn’t see eye to eye, we wished death on each other. [Then] the military government arrived, and we became friends, we forgot politics, and we began to work.”

Bormann also shared the belief in an inherent backwardness in Mapuche communities that state officials used to justify intervention into the lives of Mapuche farmers. Bormann noted that the overall health of Mapuche communities in Perquenco was dismal. “One of the greatest surprises we received [in 1984] for example was that, first, people fed themselves really poorly.” Bormann recalled that most families survived on wheat coffee and bread. Bormann argued that families worked, “but in a really rustic form, very rustic. So most of the time, they went to work on the large estates, but only occasionally, for example during the periods of sowing or harvesting, and afterward, 6, 8 months without doing anything. They remained there, in the communities, wandering around. And as they didn’t know, they didn’t produce, and they had land, a lot of land.” Bormann’s comments demonstrated a belief that the poverty and malnutrition

325 Ibid.
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid.
within Mapuche communities derived specifically from ignorance towards efficient agricultural production oriented towards market consumption.

Bormann also noted that families were poorly dressed, ignored modern medicine, and refused to learn new agricultural techniques.328 “It’s that they [mothers] were really jealous in the sense that when [their] baby got sick, I’m telling you, so they had their own beliefs within their indigenous matters, and they didn’t go to doctors, nor to medicine, but to the yerba, to the machi329 who is in charge of this [medical matter].” Bormann went onto to note that “its difficult sometimes for the woman of the house let’s say, the housewife, to let herself be influenced by an outsider, they are always very stubborn.”

Unterrichter hired other technicians like Manuel Llanquitruf because they were Mapuche and spoke Mapuzungun. Before Plan Perquenco, Llanquitruf worked for INDAP in various municipalities in the Ninth Region. Due to cuts in funding, however, INDAP fired Llanquitruf in the late 1970s. While Llanquitruf did not work for INDAP, he maintained many of his former contacts who in turn recommended him to Unterrichter. Llanquitruf noted that he had a major impact on Unterrichter during his interview because “I [Llanquitruf] knew the Mapuche language, this really favored me, because it was work in the communities with the Mapuche, that helped me a lot, and in fact it continues helping, the language is very important to me, to enter, to gain the confidence of the people.”331 The presence of Llanquitruf also played into the larger efforts to use Mapuche professionals, as with the CRM, as a means to garner support for the junta’s indigenous policies.

328 Ibid.
329 Machi are both men and women who provide a critical link between human and spiritual worlds in Mapuche communities. They serve as the principal possessors of knowledge related to health and medicine, both of which Mapuche cosmology connects with ideas of spirits and natural forces.
330 Interview with Patricio Bormann, Perquenco, June 12, 2012.
331 Interview with Manuel Llanquitruf, Temuco, August 4, 2012.
Other technicians that Unterrichter hired had direct links to the Chilean Agrarian Reform, and as a result brought to Plan Perquenco the cooperative rhetoric of human development that defined the presidencies of Frei and Allende. Luis Muñoz, who later became the manager of Plan Perquenco and is the current municipal mayor, had worked in asentamientos in the Tenth Region during the Agrarian Reform. Muñoz noted that when he worked in an asentamiento “I saw there the inquilinos, I saw cooperative production, I saw the work that families did, where many farmers had ten kids and all organized, all of them organized and milking the cows.”

Muñoz’s experience in the Chilean Agrarian Reform had in part taught him the value of cooperative agricultural work. As successive chapters will demonstrate, Muñoz ultimately transferred this experience to his management of Plan Perquenco.

Muñoz nonetheless also shared the belief that the Mapuche lacked proper skills to function in a modern agricultural economy. Muñoz stated in “the communities in these years [the 1980s], the conditions of living were really precarious. That is, there were a lot of houses with straw roofs, houses without a floor. And well, technically people sowed wheat [by] throwing the seeds on the grounds, without fertilizer, they didn’t know lupine.”

While Muñoz was not as overt as Bormann in the assumption that cultural stagnation was inherent in Mapuche communities, his comments nonetheless reflected a belief that retrograde familial behavior affected agricultural production.

Maria Molina had formerly worked in the Agrarian Reform Corporation (CORA) in the 1960s and ‘70s. During the presidency of Frei, Molina worked with Mapuche musician Gabriel Calfiqueo to compose songs that CORA used to teach reading and

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332 Interview with Luis Muñoz, Perquenco, July 24, 2012.
333 Ibid.
writing skills to the Ninth Region’s rural population. Following the coup, the military regime tortured, detained, executed, and exiled many members of the New Song Movement, to which Molina belonged. “This same persecution extended all along the [national] territory to all people that reproduced folklore, because we were considered dangerous people. So we, with my compadre, that is Gabriel Calfiqueo, we were really well known because we had made music and many conjuntos, we were also in an situation pursued by the regime.”334 While Molina stressed that she was never an activist, she still nonetheless fell victim to the military regime’s desire to purge Chile of all vestiges of what the junta considered a dangerous political program. “Because the truth is that we were never activists, but when there is a situation the like the military pronouncement, everyone is in the eye of the hurricane.”335 While Molina stressed her music was not political, it did reflect social realities in Chile that the regime saw as potentially threatening. “What happened is during the military regime there was no distinction between what was protest and what was a social reality.”336 After the 1973 coup, Molina and her husband became exonerados. In the Chilean context exonerated meant the military regime had pardoned Molina for any political crimes, fired her, and told she would never work in the Chilean government again. Molina noted that “they were hard times, very hard, because we were unable to find work because we were exonerados políticos, nobody gave use work.”337

Officials from INDAP nonetheless ignored the exonerated status of Molina and approached her and her husband to interview for Plan Perquenco. Molina remembered the fear of being called up by the military regime to interview for a government position.

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334 Interview with María Molina, Temuco, November 6, 2012.
335 Interview with María Molina, Temuco, August 13, 2012.
336 Interview with María Molina, Temuco, November 6, 2012.
337 Interview with María Molina, Temuco, August 13, 2012.
Molina described Unterrichter as a very clear-cut individual who wanted apolitical couples to work in the program. Despite their status as exonerated, Molina and her husband received the position. The fact that the Ministry of Agriculture permitted the presence of professionals like Molina in Plan Perquenco requires further analysis. In the early 1980s, the only people who had experience as agricultural technicians and knowledge of the Ninth Region’s communities were those who had worked under the Agrarian Reform. Unterrichter thus had a limited pool from which to hire technicians. Furthermore, those who the military junta considered dangerous, Unterrichter may have seen as potentially good workers with experience. Molina also noted that the overall sense of fear among the exonerated made them somewhat unthreatening. “We always took the precaution of not addressing these themes, neither politics nor religion... there was a natural fear in the people, so, through the existence of this natural fear no technician dared to say anything, especially those that had been exonerated. We were careful about what we said, or how we said it. This did not mean we ignored reality, but that life had certainly taught us to be prudent.”  

The fear of military reprisal came from Molina’s lived experiences. In response to military violence following the 1973 coup, Molina stated, “naturally many people were leaving, our colleagues were gone, they [the military regime] practically kicked them out. Others fled, and others that had worse luck, didn’t survive. And all these things you lived and saw.” Molina’s memory of post-1973 Chile was one of loss and suffering. Compounding this sentiment was also the breakdown of her family life. To be able to work in Plan Perquenco and serve as a model of rural femininity, Molina had to leave her three children in Temuco from Sunday night to Friday evening, every week. “Here in

338 Ibid.
Temuco remained our three children, looked after by a stranger, however good she was, however reliable she was, the children remained alone all week… So we were with them basically Saturday and part of Sunday. So this was an added cost.” Molina and her husband were only able to act as the ideal rural family in Perquenco through their abandonment of their family in Temuco.

Molina’s experiences of fear, loss, and the breakdown of social networks that defined her post-1973 life gave the técnica a different understanding of the Mapuche communities in Perquenco. In a recent oral interview Molina noted “When we arrived to Perquenco, the communities were really backward. There were no roads, no water, and [our] stay was hard.” Molina’s description of Perquenco as a municipality that lacked infrastructure and contained high rates of poverty in ways supported the memories of Bormann and Muñoz. Molina, however, did not view Mapuche poverty as an inherent cultural trait. Molina recalled that when she first came to Perquenco the people “were very quiet, they were, as the teenagers say ‘very inward’, there was a lot of fear.” Molina went on to note that when she arrived many of the teenagers “were all afraid, not daring to do anything.” Molina attributed this silence to years of systematic violence and repression that the military regime exacted upon Mapuche communities. Molina therefore recognized that fear, loss, and state-sponsored violence, rather than an inherent backwardness, more accurately described the origins of the problems Mapuche communities faced.

Oral interviews with Mapuche farmers in Perquenco support the notion that much of the disorganization that the dictatorship attributed to a cultural backwardness brought

339 Ibid.
340 Ibid.
341 Interview with María Molina, Temuco, November 6, 2012.
342 Interview with María Molina, Temuco, August 13, 2012.
on by former state paternalism was actually the result of its own policies. In reference to the repression and abolishment of community organizations Segundo Ambrosio Tramolao of the community of Juan Savaria noted

“There was a fear for us, a huge fear, because it was a war, let’s say, a war without rifles, one didn’t have anything to defend themselves with, and they [the military] placed all the arms above. It’s that, this was another injustice. And they also took all the land, the Pinochet government did everything in this time, what he commanded, one did, because he was a soldier. We couldn’t say, ‘this is bad,’ no. One had to say ‘it’s good,’ nothing more to be able to live. If we said that we were unhappy, here’s the rifle.”

Domingo Guevilao of the community of Hijidio Pinchulao added, “It was definitely delicate, we were all afraid after [1973], we didn’t want to have meetings, it was a serious matter.”

Juana Lemonao of the community of Coliman/Cayumil noted, “we couldn’t have meetings, we couldn’t talk with a neighbor, everything was really strict. During that government things were done that should not have been. People and neighbors were lost and you never saw them again…I saw carabineros on T.V. [women] said ‘My husband has disappeared’ ‘No if you had a husband he would be sent home,” like that, and the people had to agree.”

José Hullipan Tremalao of the community of Juan Savaria recalled that the military regime did nothing for the Mapuche. Tremalao noted, “When General Pinochet took office, everything changed here, everything was different. There was nothing because everything was lost, you couldn’t have meetings, you couldn’t do anything. We couldn’t have technicians that visited us, because they were ‘political.’ And here came the military, they attacked, so, everything was dead in the era of General Pinochet.”

Tremalao continued, “They [the military regime] didn’t consider the Mapuche at all.

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343 Interview with Segundo Ambrosio Tremolao, Comunidad Juan Savaria, June 5, 2012.
345 Interview with Juana Lemonao, Perquenco, August 6, 2012.
346 Interview with José Hullipan Tremalao. Perquenco, May 24, 2012.
They even laughed in the face of indigenous people. I’m referring to the irrigation they [the military regime] made, the irrigation canals made, and they cheated the Mapuche… and later, all the agriculture went to the rich, here nothing was held on to. So everything was a joke of the military government.”

Domingo Nahuelcura of the community of Fernando Carilao remembers that as a teenager he also had an overwhelming sense of abandonment.

DN: “There is an idea called “Pateando Piedras.” Yeah, all of us were “pateando piedras.”

SDC: And that means like…

Domingo: That we were, that we were abandoned. That we had nothing to do, that we couldn’t do anything, and that they spoke to us of the success of the others, and they never took us into consideration… Later came the dictatorship and everything ended. Everything returned to same situation of injustice, of abandonment that our grandfathers had lived before.”

Other memories illustrated how land division provoked a decrease in community agricultural production. Lucretia Navarrete Gómez reported that before division community solidarity and cooperation was a way of life in the community of Hijidio Pinchulao. “Before, one could go. Someone had animals, had pigs, they could care for them on their neighbors land.” Communal work and land sharing came to an end after the division of lands in the 1980s. “More importantly, what also began is that people began to fight, between brothers, between everyone.” Agricultural technician Manual Llanquitruuf also commented on the impact of land division on communal work. Llanquitruuf stated,

M.L.: “Right now there are more people alone, women that are alone, so if they want to sow wheat, they can’t do it very well. So, they have to make, have to

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347 Interview with José Hullipan Tremalao, Perquenco, May 24, 2012.
348 Interview with Domingo Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, September 29, 2012.
unite themselves. With this, getting together 3, 4 people, four families, alright we sow here first, later over there, and later everyone

SDC: And they used…..

M.L.: You saw that there [in Perquenco], you used to see it. Now, no.

SDC: Everyone has their own plot

M.L.: He who remains behind, remains behind.”

Despite the fact that Unterrichter hired Llanquitruf to promote free market reforms, Llanquitruf highlighted the importance of communal, not private work. His comments suggested that as private property and heightened notions of individual work took root in communities, communal work methods and relationships began to erode. Those that did not have the means to farm privately “remained behind.” Colihuinca Huaiquilao of the community of Hijidio Pinchulao supported Llanquitruf’s comments when he stated, “So everyone [fought after division], family, between neighbors, and now the neighbors, if I have an animal and it goes onto my neighbor’s property, disgust. ‘Asshole, I don’t have any grazing for you.” The social impact of land division ultimately stifled communal work and the reproduction of communal ties and identity associated with that work.

The prohibition of community organization, physical and psychological violence, and the division of property affected one of Perquencos’s most significant sources of community rejuvenation, the mingako and trilla. The mingako is a form of community field preparation, and the trilla is a community harvest. The events have as much to do with renewing community bonds and identity as they do with quickly and efficiently preparing fields and harvesting. In a recent oral interview Domingo Guevilao stated,

350 Interview with Manuel Llanquitruf, Temuco, August 4, 2012.
351 Interview with Colihuinca Huaiquilao, Comunidad Hijidio Pinchulao, August 22, 2012.
“There was a lot of unity before, because, shoot even I sowed up to 10 hectares, that is, 10 quadrants it was, I killed a pig, we went along with a drink of wine, I invited my people. I invited up to 15 teams of oxen, we were really united.”

For Guevilao, therefore, the mingako signified a time to come together and share food, wine, and companionship as a means to advance community agricultural development. Colihuinca Huaiquilao also stated that, “Yes, the mingako was the same, we helped one another. At least if I was going to make a mingako, I invited all my neighbors that came to help me, but we got together 30, 25 teams of oxen, [that’s how] the mingako was done. To share, to advance one’s work, to get more out of the work one was going to do.”

Domingo Nahuelcura commented, “neighbors got together to help a neighbor that was in the worst conditions. And there were these celebrations like the mingako, like the trilla, the community celebrations were born. Everything was done as a community... we are children of the trilla, we are children of the mingako, we are children of community celebrations.”

Collective community memories, therefore, demonstrated a high level organization and agricultural production that negates assumptions of retrograde behavior and production utilized by the military regime to legitimate its rural reform programs in Perquenco.

Oral interviews with Mapuche farmers in Perquenco reveal the military regime’s erroneous assumptions that were used to legitimate its reform of Mapuche communities and families. Reports from the dictatorship and its partner private agribusinesses claimed that the Chilean Agrarian Reform had created a mass of unproductive, uneducated, and cultural backward Mapuche farmers in Perquenco. The military regime ultimately relied

353 Interview with Colihuinca Huaiquilao, Comunidad Hijidio Pinchulao, August 22, 2012.
354 Interview with Domingo Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, September 29, 2012.
on this narrative as a means to promote free-market reforms in Perquenco. The initial management of Plan Perquenco nonetheless revealed that regionalization prevented the full implementation of these policies. Officials disagreed with one another, squandered state money, and undermined each other’s positions of authority. Plan Perquenco, therefore did not solve the problems of regionalization, but rather perpetuated them.

Furthermore, oral interviews with Mapuche in Perquenco demonstrated that communal work and landownership was a fundamental aspect of community identity and organization before the September 11, 1973 coup. The military regime’s depictions of Perquenco as lacking identity and organization were therefore categorically false when compared to the historical memory of Mapuche in Perquenco. The reality of state violence, repression, land division and the subsequent fear produced within Mapuche communities broke down much of the community solidarity that defined pre-73 Perquenco.
Chapter 4: The Municipal Gaze: Local Politics and the Varied Outcomes of Plan Perquenco

A study of Plan Perquenco affords a municipal gaze that emphasizes the relationship among the subsidiary state, regionalization, and Mapuche communities’ ability to negotiate, contest, and accommodate the initiatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. I analyze these complex relationships and how they affected the outcomes of Plan Perquenco through an examination of the project’s three principal programs: agricultural development, home economy, and community enhancement. While pervious chapters have highlighted the inter-institutional conflicts that hampered regional development plans, I argue here that what in part defined the outcomes of Plan Perquenco were the dispositions of the six agricultural technicians that administered the program. There was ultimately a disconnection between the intentions of the Ministry of Agriculture and the actual quotidian management of Plan Perquenco as a result of technicians’ various relationships with pre and post-1973 Chilean politics, violence, and culture. The technicians that managed Plan Perquenco represented the most local and isolated embodiment of state-led agrarian reform and their stories reflected the contested process of municipal reform under military rule.

For Patricio Bormann the program signified a means to fulfill his duty as caretaker of a backward Mapuche community. As previous chapters note, Bormann was a staunch supporter of the dictatorship, and viewed the Chilean Agrarian Reform as an inefficient program that produced drunk and lazy farmers. Bormann believed that Plan Perquenco specifically corrected the ills of the Allende administration, and thus lifted Mapuche communities out of the poverty that engulfed them. Bormann’s favorable memory of the program and the success it garnered, however, overshadows the historical
reality of the program. Plan Perquenco reached a relatively small percentage of farmers throughout the municipality, and the gains that technicians lauded were therefore not reflective of a wholesale reformulation of Perquenco’s rural economy in the 1980s.

Other technicians had gained experience as professionals under the Chilean Agrarian Reform, which subsequently shaped their management of Plan Perquenco. Luis Muñoz saw Plan Perquenco’s community organization programs as a re-emergence of the community educational efforts of the Chilean Agrarian Reform. For Muñoz, therefore, the program represented the continuation of beneficial educational and assistant programs that the dictatorship had abruptly ended after 1973. For María Molina, group meetings became sites for the restoration of networks of community solidarity that the 1973 coup had shattered. While Molina and many of the women she worked with in Perquenco had lived and suffered under the dictatorship, Molina argued that group meetings permitted a reawakening of peoples’ self-validation, identity, and values. Ultimately, these “human meeting grounds” created a sense of self worth and hope for Molina and the women she worked with. 355 The humanistic internalization of loss and repression was an unintended outcome of Plan Perquenco that began to politicize the brutality of the dictatorship and thus challenge the assumed apolitical nature of these meetings.

This chapter also examines how agricultural technicians’ interactions with local communities affected Plan Perquenco. Without motor vehicles and poor communication, the six technicians were disconnected representatives of the military regime that lacked access to many of the institutions and legal mechanisms that legitimated and exacted the dictatorship’s authority within Chile. Technicians had to subsequently negotiate Perquenco’s local power, cultural, and knowledge dynamics. The technicians’ ability to

355 Steve J. Stern, Remembering Pinochet’s Chile, 109.
implement seed modification, new planting techniques, and market-oriented production always remained subject to Mapuche farmers’ opinions regarding these changes. Farmers’ occasional dismissal of technicians’ proposals and their reformulation of Plan Perquenco’s objectives underscored that political and cultural power at times existed on a horizontal rather than vertical playing field in Perquenco. The outcome of Plan Perquenco was therefore not always the result of a contested hierarchy where local populations negotiated unequal power relations with a central government, but rather the outcome of equal if not inverted power relations between state representatives and local communities.

**Creating Better Yields**

Under Plan Perquenco there was an intensive effort by technicians to transform Mapuche farmers into individual, market oriented farmers. While Plan Perquenco’s administrators sought to create independent farmers, this process required state intervention under the necessary subsidiary actions of the state. At the start of the second phase of Plan Perquenco in 1984, FAO consultant Cristobal Unterrichter argued that the state’s subsidiary actions “will only be able to assume those functions that persons and their intermediate societies are not capable of adequately fulfilling.” Unterrichter detailed three intertwined instances where state intervention into the lives of rural citizens was a necessity. The first justification for state intervention was when rampant poverty was apparent. To alleviate poverty, the central government, argued Unterrichter, had the obligation to train inefficient farmers “to produce more, better, and cheaper

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356 FAOL, 1984, doc. 450075, “Desarrollo y Organización del Sector Indígena y de Pequeños Agricultores en Chile: Documento de Trabajo No.1.”
To help local farmers access external markets and cities, the government had the responsibility to create an adequate infrastructure. Unterrichter sustained that the alleviation of poverty and the improvement of infrastructure were only beneficial in as much as individuals had the capacity to effectively compete with other rural and urban producers. The creation of efficient agricultural producers, therefore, marked the third instance that necessitated state intrusion into local affairs.\textsuperscript{358} Given that the Municipality of Perquenco more than fulfilled these three requirements in the opinion of Unterrichter, state intervention and the reformation of Mapuche families was not only justified, but an absolute necessity of market security.

The Ninth Region’s Secretary to the Ministry of Education, Gaston Sepulveda, supported Unterrichter’s opinion and stated that “change” within Perquenco entailed a process “lead from the exterior [of the community] with the purpose of modernizing traditional economic and productive modes.”\textsuperscript{359} Sepulveda argued that agricultural technicians did not just instruct Mapuche farmers on “the technological deficiencies that traditional cultivation possesses,” but also on the “improvement of seeds, the need for technical assistance, the improvement of family economy, communal cooperation to enhance commercialization, and in sum, the exploration of productive alternatives unknown in community tradition.”\textsuperscript{360} Sepulveda argued that while technicians had to respect local cultural tradition, development under Plan Perquenco required an “important educational component that largely transmits and reproduces knowledge whether through the rationalization of tradition or the introduction of new knowledge into

\textsuperscript{357} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{358} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{359} Private Archive of Luis Muñoz, “Primer Seminario de Desarrollo Rural, Perquenco 26-27 de Junio 1986.”  
\textsuperscript{360} Ibid.
Rationalization of tradition specifically meant the reformulation of Mapuche productive methods to eradicate what technicians considered anti-modern and anti-capitalist practices.

To rationalize traditional Mapuche agricultural production required five programs. Two of the programs focused on animal sanitation and livestock care. The emphasis on livestock, and principally sheep, sought to create economic alternatives to monocrop production. Another program established artisanal clinics in rural schools. By 1986 the municipal school programs under Plan Perquenco enrolled 1,247 students. Through these clinics parents and students took courses on apiculture, rabbit breeding, and leatherwork. Throughout the late 1970s, the Ministry of Agriculture in coordination with local municipalities took an active role in school gardening programs. Planned by the Ministerial Secretary of Education in each region, the general proposal of the gardening programs was to increase students’ knowledge of seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation. The school gardens also taught courses on nutrition, health, and hygiene. By 1978, the program enrolled 6,912 students in the Ninth Region. Courses instilled knowledge of “modern” agricultural techniques, however, not just for nutritional ends. Local officials argued that students needed to share their newfound agricultural knowledge with their parents to improve family gardens and nutritional intake. The idea that students had to teach their parents demonstrated the extent to which state officials felt years of ineffectual state paternalism had corrupted adults. The IER noted that more so than any other part of Chilean society, “Youth must acquire a higher level of

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361 Ibid.
culture than the preceding generations.” The school gardening programs, therefore, existed to instill in rural youth the values that allowed them to overcome their parents’ stunted development and thus function as responsible and independent farmers.

The most important projects under the agriculture development project where gardening and wheat programs. The gardening program helped “farmers cultivate an adequate surface area to reach the goal of family auto-consumption in the following areas: potatoes, corn, beans, and lentils.” Wheat production was, however, the primary focal point of the agricultural development program. While wheat was the primary source of income for Mapuche families and a dietary staple, wheat also constituted “a traditional crop attached to the tradition and idiosyncrasy of the minifundista Mapuche in the region [and] it has therefore been a priority to attended to this crop to improve its efficiency and production.” Luis Muñoz argued that when he arrived to Perquenco in 1984, he and the other technicians set a low production standard as a result of what he considered poor agricultural techniques. Muñoz argued, “Wheat was the families’ basic sustenance, so we proposed a goal for the harvest. We proposed 20 sacks per hectare, which was very little, 16 quintals…We proposed 16 quintals because at times they harvested very little, they basically didn’t use machinery to harvest.” Without adequate funds to introduce modern agricultural machinery, technicians continually improvised in the fabrication of simple agricultural devices. Muñoz noted, “In those times there wasn’t nylon. There wasn’t plastic. There was nothing. There was disposable stuff, but disposable stuff like cans, which we also used to make graters… So, given the poor condition of the people,

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364 ARNAD, MINAG, 1982, vol. 2496, Program from Instituto de Educación Rural.
366 Ibid.
we were always thinking about how to recycle. How to use what the people didn’t use to give it some worth.”

The cola de buey, or ox’s tail, was one of the many devices technicians invented to overcome the lack of finances for real agricultural machinery. The cola de buey gained its name in reference to the makeshift machine the technicians created. The mechanism was a two-liter bottle with the bottom cut off and a short hose attached to the mouth. Farmers filled the bottle with seed and covered the end of the hose with their finger. As they walked in a straight line they let a little bit of seed out every few paces. In this manner, agricultural technicians introduced what they considered the modern and efficient mode of planting crops in straight lines. Accompanying straight crop rows was crop rotation.

After the introduction of new seeds and planting techniques, agricultural technicians attempted to push agricultural production towards market consumption. Patricio Bormann felt that throughout the program farmers lacked the necessary business skills to effectively participate in free-market enterprises. Bormann noted, “if the wheat was worth five-thousand pesos a quintal, they sold it for twenty-five hundred. So, what happened, generally the person that bought from them was someone that sold alcohol, and that’s how they did transactions. While a person was already half drunk, they said to him, ‘what you’ve drank is equal to this many sacks of wheat.’” Bormann argued that Plan Perquenco limited alcohol use and taught the farmers who enrolled in the program to be rational businessmen. “We taught them that they had to learn to negotiate, and in fact in the first years we taught them to negotiate with businesses…so, later they learned to

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368 Ibid.
369 Interview with Patricio Bormann, Perquenco, June 13, 2012.
commercialize [their products] and curiously that problem, of commercialization, persists until today, because those people that did not receive the technology from Plan Perquenco, that didn’t enter the program, these people up until today suffer from these vices.”

Bormann’s paternalistic tone towards those he worked with under Plan Perquenco suggested that only those who received his and other technicians’ tutelage were able to overcome the cultural and economic roadblocks that prevented their community’s advancement. Bormann thus argued that the greatest aspect of Plan Perquenco was that not only did people dedicate themselves to rational production but also that “for me [Bormann] the most important thing was having removed some of the ignorance.”

In many ways, Bormann created a dichotomy between productivity and drunkenness that reinforced longstanding historical constructs of the Mapuche as anti-modern and ultimately a threat to Chilean progress.

Technicians argued that the new agricultural techniques they introduced were beneficial for small farmers. Bormann noted in the first year crop yields reached “nearly 50 quintals of wheat immediately. The lupine was exceptional because the work was very meticulously done. Also, we got around 50 quintals, and they [the farmers] began to have better incomes.”

A report on Plan Perquenco that functionaries issued for the First Annual Seminar on Rural Development in Perquenco in 1986 supported Bormann’s comments. The report noted that at the start of the program a group of 19 farmers only yielded 9.5 quintals of wheat per hectare. After more than a year enrolled in the program that number increased to 33 quintals per hectare, and in some cases 45.6 quintals per hectare. The report attributed this increase to planting in straight lines, the use of better

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370 Ibid.
371 Ibid.
372 Richards, Race and the Chilean Miracle, 16.
373 Interview with Patricio Bormann, Perquenco, June 13, 2012.
seeds, and the introduction of fertilizers and herbicides. By 1987, 23% of farmers enrolled in Plan Perquenco had incorporated the use of the cola de buey. 33.3% nonetheless continued to sow by throwing seed. The 1987 survey noted that through the application of fertilizers and efficient planting techniques, yields had increased from 11.95 quintals per hectare to 18.34 quintals per hectare, representing and 53.47% increase.

Only a few of Perquenco’s farmers, however, experienced these gains. The number of farmers sowing wheat under Plan Perquenco shrank from 99 in 1984 to 48 in 1987. In that same year only 144 small farmers received aid form the agricultural development program. That number represented roughly 3% of Perquenco’s entire population. Within that 3% there was a hierarchy where certain farmers received more technical assistance than others. Technicians divided farmers into groups A, B and C based on what they deemed a farmer’s need and their disposition to work. Farmers in group A received the most technical assistance, received the best quality seeds, and acted in leadership roles that technicians assigned to them. This system essential set up a hierarchy within communities not unlike the one found in asentamientos where one had greater authority within their community based on the amount of state aid and patronage they received. Plan Perquenco’s agricultural programs therefore represented very limited and uneven reform rather than the massive overhaul of the rural economy that technicians suggested the project provoked.

Most of the men I interviewed for this project nonetheless suggested that new planting techniques, crop rotations, and the introduction of small animal husbandry

375 Ibid.
376 Private archive of Luis Muñoz, “Conclusiones de la Encuesta al Plan Perquenco.”
allowed them to move beyond monocrop production and thus become less reliant on a single annual harvest. Juan Huillipan Tremalao argued that with Plan Perquenco his community of Juan Savaria began to modernize their production. For Tremalao, modernization signified a way to produce throughout the year. Tremalao noted that before Plan Perquenco, “one sowed and one had to wait to have money until the harvest. So, it was once a year that my parents had an income, it was with that that they [got by with] all year long. And now, no, because now we had animals, at the same time sheep. One wasn’t waiting for what they planted and hoping for a harvest in five or six months.” Juan Huircaman of the community of Coliman/Cayumil also noted, “They [the technicians] began to tell the people that they had to work well, that it was necessary to use fertilizer, if it was possible to make an analysis of the land so that production increased. In that time, when technicians still hadn’t come [to Perquenco], I sold 20 quintals, 25 quintals I remember of wheat. That was the best. Afterward, as I was using fertilizer, planting more or less technically, things changed. The production increased to 50 quintals, and more, I once got 70 quintals per hectare. So, that was good, we were learning.”

Segundo Ambrosio Tremolao of the Community of Juan Savaria noted that Plan Perquenco increased his overall production and annual income. Tremolao noted, “We planted flaxseed, a lot of flaxseed. A lot of flaxseed because it cost little, [needed] little fertilizer, and gave a large harvest. With this we earned a lot, at least I earned a lot of money, because I did it all, and it was all for me, the lentils, the beans, all for me.”

The economic advances made under Plan Perquenco in part resulted from the program’s 180-degree turn away from the more damaging economic and human rights violations that marked the first ten years of military rule. Tremolao argued that the economic policies of the military regime had initially led to his near financial ruin.

377 Interview with José Huillipan Tremalao, Comunidad Juan Savaria, May, 24 2012.
378 Interview with Juan Huircaman, Comunidad Coliman/Cayumil, May 22, 2012.
379 Interview with Segundo Amrosio Temolao, Comunidad Juan Savaria, June 5, 2012.
“They [the military officials] made us pay all our bills, and they raised the percentage of the bill. And we owed in this time eight-million pesos, or eighteen, I don’t remember how much, but something like eight, around that. But, they raised the amount three-times more than what we owed…In this time they looked for people to take them to their deaths, to kill them, to take them, I don’t know where they killed them, one doesn’t know, because that’s how things were. And [they killed] one for his debt, so, I began to suffer. We didn’t know what to do in this time. And later, afterward, we sold animals, she [my wife] told me ‘You have to sell your animals,’ she told me. Although we had nothing but animals, it was necessary to sell them, because we didn’t want to die… So we were really bad in this time, really bad. So, we sold the animals, and we were left with 2 animals…and this was a drop for us, [we were] poorer. It wasn’t help.”

Tremolao’s interview demonstrated the huge economic crisis the military regime created in rural areas. Through the forced payment of previous loans and the huge increase in interest rates, the dictatorship’s economic policies forced him to sell his livestock as a means to survive. While Tremolao’s reference to people being killed for their debt is hard to verify, the memory nonetheless reflected the very real presence of military violence that permeated Mapuche communities in the 1970s and ultimately shattered networks of community solidarity. Tremolao’s favorable memory of the money he earned under Plan Perquenco, therefore, needs to be placed in the context of the incredible hardships and loss he suffered under the first ten years of military rule. Furthermore, given that only 3% of Perquenco’s population participated in Plan Perquenco, his story was not reflective of some larger trend of economic uplift during military rule. Most families did not gain support from programs like Plan Perquenco, and subsequently did not have the same avenues to overcome economic hardships. Stories of economic success, therefore, were the exception rather than the norm.

While new planting methods did in some ways alleviate the economic hardships that the military regime imposed, community members often dictated the terms on which

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380 Ibid.
the technicians introduced these reforms. Juan Huircaman argued, “I remember that there was a question, but a small one, when they introduced lupine, when don Patricio [Bormann] was technician. They came here to offer me lupine, and I didn’t want to plant it. There were farmers who sowed it, but not many, a hectare or half, or a little more. And afterward, when the harvest came, they [merchants] didn’t buy lupine, and the [farmers] went to the office, angry, and laid their arguments on don Patricio.” Huircaman’s quote highlighted that at times the agricultural development program left farmers with crops that were unmarketable. The failure of new seeds to produce did not mean that the farmers were the victims of ineffectual agricultural programs. In the mid-1980s, Luis Muñoz suggested that Huircaman plant a new variety of oats. Before Huircaman planted the new type of oat he got a guarantee from Muñoz that the technicians had to buy his crop no matter the yield size.

“So I told him [Muñoz], ‘Look, I’m going to plant the oat, with the agreement that if I can’t sell it, you have to buy it from me.’ We came to an agreement, and it turned out well for me. I wasn’t able to sell the oat, because nobody knew of it, and I went to talk with Don Lucho, as he was the boss. It was already the first days of April, and he bought the oat, and I therefore didn’t have problems. Clearly if I hadn’t made the deal I would have remained with the oats.”

Huircaman’s quotes reflected that not only did Plan Perquenco’s early projects entail a certain risk that made farmers skeptical of the ability of the program to deliver real results, but that farmers took an active role in securing their profits and thus exercised a good deal of agency in the development of Plan Perquenco.

Interviews also demonstrated that local power dynamics limited the ability of technicians to fulfill all the goals of the agricultural production program. Patricio Bormann noted “I have a case of a farmer, for example, that had 30 hectares. He prepared

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381 Interview with Juan Huircaman, Comunidad Coliman/Cayumil, May 22, 2012.
382 Ibid.
all 30 with an ox, and ended up only making [enough to cover] the quantity of seed [he planted], and he said he was satisfied. But we said ‘but how are you going to be satisfied if you only break even?’ So, ‘no’ he told me, ‘with this I am satisfied’  For Bormann it was abhorrent that the farmer he referenced was satisfied with sustenance farming. Bormann’s comments nonetheless reflected hesitancy among some farmers to engage in the mass production that Plan Perquenco’s technicians wanted, ultimately revealing local dynamics that contested the successful implementation of the program.

José Huillipan Tremalao also suggested that Plan Perquenco did not always create individual and market-oriented farmers. Tremalao noted, “I believe that in those years it opened, it opened here in Perquenco a new era to be able to work harmoniously…The countryside is our source of food that gives to us. We live in the countryside, we don’t have a salary, a monthly salary, you don’t say ‘oh, I’m waiting for my monthly salary.’ What we do, we produce in the fields, that’s what we eat.”  The emphasis on not having a salary suggested that many farmers in Perquenco produced, as they had before Plan Perquenco, for auto-consumption. Plan Perquenco simply provided the means for one to more efficiently produce for their family. In response to what he felt were beneficial aspects of Plan Perquenco, Tremalao stated there was “more communication among neighbors, yes, more communication. One was now able to make a trueke, a trueke de semillas. If a farmer had good seeds, he traded those seeds [with other farmers.]”  The trueke was and is a system within communities where neighbors get together and exchange seeds and produce. The system is the basis for community solidarity that maintains wellbeing, identity, and ties amongst neighbors. The idea that community

383 Interview with Patricio Bormann, Perquenco, June 13, 2012.
384 Interview with José Huillipan Tremalao, Comunidad Juan Savaria, May 24, 2012.
385 Ibid
members partook in seed exchanges as a means to maintain community stability suggested a level of cooperative mentality that worked against the individualistic goals of Plan Perquenco.

Beyond occasional inefficiency, there is evidence that some agricultural workers were not pleased with agricultural development program. Diario Austral’s weekly minimagazine Campo Sureño regularly published on Plan Perquenco as a means to bring favorable light to the Ministry of Agriculture’s pilot project for Mapuche economic and cultural integration. In one article, the magazine published a critique from one of the farmers enrolled in the Plan Perquenco. The article quoted Felipe Antilao who stated, “they promised us free seeds, and it turns out that afterward it’s necessary to give them [the technicians] a quantity of [our] production in turn.”

Under the agricultural development program, technicians gave seed to enrolled farmers on the basis that they gave 20% of their yields to the technicians. Luis Muñoz defended the acquisition the 20% on the grounds that it permitted the agricultural technicians to continue financing the program as well as assure credits. The comments displayed in Campo Sureño demonstrated that some farmers felt that agricultural technicians lured them into the program under false pretense, and then demanded 20% of their harvest. At a time of rampant poverty, 20% of a yield was a significant and vital portion of a year’s harvest for most families. Antilao’s comment therefore reflects a level of skepticism that belies the technicians’ assertions that the program was absolutely beneficial for Perquenco’s communities. In reality, the agricultural development program’s gains were varied. While increases in agricultural production did exist, they reached a small percentage of

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387 Ibid.
Perquenco’s population. Furthermore, the famers that did participate in Plan Perquenco never hesitated to challenge the validity of the program and the opinions of the technicians. These same dynamics extended to Plan Perquenco’s other programs as well.

**Rebuilding Community Organization**

The community development program focused on what technicians deemed the cultural enhancement of Perquenco’s farmers. One report from the municipality noted “a community’s progress, in this case rural, depends on the improvement of the level of health, on the advancement of child and adult education, on the economic improvement derived from greater incomes that come from their only activity which is agriculture, on the improvement of living conditions, [and] recreation.” Community developed required individuals’ participation in sports, health, and education programs as means to adopt the cultural skills that allowed them to rely minimally on outside government support. Technicians argued that is was necessary to “modify the attitude of the farmer to the point that he not only uses the means available to him to improve his home and the exploitation of his field, but by his own initiative constantly looks for these means.” As with the Ministry of Agriculture’s other rural reform programs, functionaries in Plan Perquenco argued that community development projects had to empower men to overcome the patterns of paternalism that stunted their life and prevented them from becoming pro-active small businessmen.

In 1984, head agricultural technician of Plan Perquenco, Luis Muñoz, developed a program that fulfilled the goals of community development. On July 27, 1984, Muñoz wrote a letter to Perquenco Mayor Renee Caminondo that he titled “Grassroots

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389 Ibid.
Organization for the Development of Plan Perquenco.” Muñoz opened his letter by praising Caminondo for his recent approval of Mayoral Decree No. 64, which gave juridical persona to Perquenco’s western, central, and eastern sectors, or Pitraco, Central, and El Sol respectively. Muñoz suggested that the mayor also needed to create legally recognized neighborhood councils. Muñoz sustained that the formation of councils aided the “imminent need for grassroots socio-economic organization for this project to be able to better support the desire for a neighborhood’s auto-development.”

Muñoz specifically urged Mayor Caminondo to enact Article 22 of 1968’s Decree Law 16.880 (DL 16.880). Muñoz suggested that through D.L. 16.880, the municipality had the capacity to create Juntas de Vecinos in each of the three newly formed districts that served as the legal entity that applied for, received, and negotiated credits and subsidies from various ministries and banks. With these loans and subsidies, neighborhood councils were responsible for a variety of community development initiatives that focused on the economic, cultural, artistic, and educational improvement of the community.

Article 22 specifically emphasized that there had to be a collective marketing of goods produced within and for the neighborhood council. Muñoz argued that Article 22 permitted the formation of seven sub-committees: health, education, sports, family matters, Mapuche affairs, real estate, and animal sanitation. The application of Article 22 therefore gave local communities all the legal tools for collective negotiation that had ended after 1973.

Like many other aspects of agrarian reform under military rule, however, the formation of neighborhood councils had several carrot and stick aspects that assured

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390 FAOL, 1984, doc. 450085, “Desarrollo y Organización del Sector Indígena y de Pequeños Agricultores en Chile: Documento de Trabajo No. 6.”
391 Ibid.
392 Ibid.
military oversight. Muñoz noted that only those farmers that joined neighborhood councils were eligible to receive technical aid from Plan Perquenco. Membership in neighborhood committees also allowed farmers access to credit from INDAP and the municipality. Muñoz concluded “people that do not enroll in the committee, or that have signed up but do not attend meetings or pay their dues, will not be attended and will not receive the indicated benefits.” Like access to other housing and agriculture subsidies, Plan Perquenco’s administration established coercive mechanisms that required farmers to join associations under military surveillance as a means to receive financial aid.

Membership in neighborhood associations did permit technicians to monitor the development of Perquenco’s small farmers. Within each of Perquenco’s three sectors, the técnico or técnica acted as moderator of all council meetings. While the agricultural technicians did not have the right to vote, they did have the right to voice and promote opinions. While all committees had a secretary, agricultural technicians kept their own log of meeting minutes. The participation of the agricultural technicians certainly seems to have been an effort to control and moderate the direction of community development. Muñoz even noted that in meetings it was “strictly prohibited to get into political or religious questions or to permit lectures or discussions of this or that nature not related to the Rural Development of the members.”

While Muñoz noted that neighborhood associations were not political, he explicitly saw their formation as a continuation of the community organization initiatives of the Chilean Agrarian Reform that military repression destroyed after 1973. Before 1980 it was near impossible to hold meetings in Chile’s rural areas in part because the

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393 Ibid.
394 Ibid.
military regime feared that technicians used gatherings to politicize and mobilize rural inhabitants as they had during the Chilean Agrarian Reform. Muñoz argued,

“in the 1980s there weren’t programs for technical aid or getting close to campesinos, because in this time there were still restrictions to have group events, because of national security, right? Because the military coup had been in ’73, and in 1980 there was still a situation of national insecurity… and from rural areas it was understood that there was insecurity, the campesinos took land etc… So, logically there couldn’t be any activity in which agricultural professionals, giving agricultural advice, could call together farmers, it was risky business.”³⁹⁵

Muñoz recalled that military repression had created a persistent fear in Perquenco that prevented agricultural technicians to initially gain the trust of Perquenco’s farmers.

Muñoz recalled, “In ’73 they were chastised, many people were detained. So logically the experience was really recent, and I didn’t know a lot about their lives, I hadn’t lived with them, but obviously I suspected that when we called meetings, sometimes their wasn’t a lot of attendance, because there were fears.”³⁹⁶ Muñoz further noted,

“We had to go [to meetings] with credentials, people didn’t know if we could have a meeting or not. I remember the first time that we came here we had a meeting in the community of Marillan at three in the afternoon. At five, everyone there was detained, right? Because the detectives arrived and said that is was a clandestine meeting, and they took everyone away. We had already ended the meeting and were in Perquenco… There was a prohibition on meetings, the meetings had to be authorized. We had to go and inform the police what were our planned meetings and they gave us credentials, so people didn’t really have confidence in coming.”³⁹⁷

The presence of state-police forces at Plan Perquenco’s first several meetings added to a sense of fear among Perquenco’s farmers that these meetings were a form of military surveillance that held the potential to lead to one’s detainment.

While meetings were initially illegal, Muñoz highlighted that the neighborhood associations developed in accordance with Article 22 opened a space to re-introduce

³⁹⁵ Interview with Luis Muñoz, Perquenco, July 24, 2012.
³⁹⁶ Ibid.
³⁹⁷ Town Hall Interview, Perquenco, September 28, 2012.
education programs that had defined his experience in the late 1960s when he worked in
asentamientos in the Tenth Region. Muñoz suggested that the programs he partook in
during the Chilean Agrarian Reform provided he and other technicians with a blue print
for a program that otherwise lacked initial direction. Muñoz noted that when the program
began, officials from INDAP never told the technicians how they were going to carry out
Plan Perquenco. Muñoz argued that as a result of a lack of direction he and the other
technicians were “experimenting.” “We didn’t come [to Perquenco] with these programs,
nor was it written to say we are going to do it like this and like that... It was never written
down that we were going to have this goal, that we were going to make recreational
programs, that we were going to work in environmental aspects, no. It was never written.
We developed this while we were experimenting.”

Without a concrete plan, Muñoz
drew from his experience under the Agrarian Reform to guide this experimentation.

SDC: And were there links between the goals of Plan Perquenco and the older
programs for rural reform, during the 1960s, during the Agrarian Reform?

LM: I think so. It’s what I in some manner, I believe. In ’73 I wrote my thesis as
an agronomist on the topic of the expansion and transfer of technology. So, the
process of the Agrarian Reform had informed me. Later I had worked, or, when I
worked in the asentamiento, where I in a way lived the Agrarian Reform. I had
knowledge before I came here [Perquenco], at least I knew that in those years
during the Agrarian Reform, before the military pronouncement, there were a lot
of programs for the transfer of technology, and there had been a strong
educational process…. These processes of the Agrarian Reform I saw there [in the
asentamientos] in the inquilinos, I saw cooperative production, I saw the work
that families did, where many farmers had ten kids and all organized, all of them
organized and milking the cows...so I had information before, and it was really a
theoretical knowledge, because after this era, the educational efforts stopped

SDC: Right, after ‘73

LM: Right, ’73 to ‘80”

398 Interview with Luiz Muñoz, Perquenco, July 24, 2012.
399 Ibid.
Muñoz saw the use of Article 22 as a reinstatement of the programs for community empowerment the military regime had dissolved following the 1973 coup. Muñoz therefore noted that the ability to organize was one of the most positive outcomes for Plan Perquenco.

Neighborhood councils nonetheless did not always function as properly as technicians wanted as a result of a weak infrastructure. Juán Huircaman recalled in a recent oral interview that community organization was the most important thing for him, and that Plan Perquenco gave his community of Coliman/Cayumil in the Central sector the mechanisms to organize. Huircaman argued that during the military regime there was initially no community organization. “There was a military government, so they didn’t permit organizations, you had to ask the regime for permission to have a meeting.”

Huircaman argued that despite this ban, the functionaries began to talk to communities in Perquenco about the creation of neighborhood associations. Organization for Huircaman did not, however, equal efficiency. A central aspect of the neighborhood associations was that they represented huge territorial sectors, and not just individual communities. The councils therefore incorporated a number of different Mapuche communities and ex-asentamientos with varying goals and levels of participation. Huircaman argued that this led to problems in the 1980s.

“An association of small farmers was formed here. At the end of four years we had 480 and some odd small farmers in the entire community organized in the association of small agriculturists, because we said that they wouldn’t take into account one person, [but] while organized, forming a good directive, and all those things, we were taken into account, it’s because we were organized. This lasted 2 years, and I say it wasn’t very good, because it was really big, and we didn’t have transportation to visit [people], or, when we had to have meetings to communicate [with people], it was complicated.”

400 Interview with Juan Huircaman, Comunidad Coliman/Cayumil, May 22, 2012.
401 Ibid.
Huircaman’s comments reflected the double-edged nature of Plan Perquenco’s community organization programs. While the neighborhood associations allowed for the re-organization of community life, these committees represented huge geographical areas. The poor infrastructure made attendance at meetings difficult for those that lived in outlying areas, and the lack of reliable communication hampered contact among committee members.

Reports from Plan Perquenco even noted the shortcomings of the neighborhood association and agricultural committees to effectively represent huge geographical areas. The 1987 Annual Work Plan for Plan Perquenco noted that the program no longer supported Comites de Pequeños Agricultores because these committees “only contribute to the proliferation of organizations, not reinforcing those that already exists, fomenting disorganization and not maintaining people’s identity with their own community, experiences already proven through the Plan in the last three years.”

The Central sector had the greatest infrastructure out of Perquenco’s three districts in the 1980s. If these communication and transportation problems affected a relatively well-developed area, it is easy to imagine that the problems that Huircaman discussed became amplified in Perquenco’s less developed areas like Pitraco or El Sol.

Huircaman also used his position as president of the neighborhood council to push for a model of cooperative work that was contrary to Plan Perquenco’s free market goals.

“And as director the idea was that we would modernize ourselves, and that one day we would have machinery to work, so that things were easier for us, to produce better, and to one day become, if it was possible, an exporter, but we didn’t come to this. So, that was always my desire, that we had our own

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storehouse in Perquenco where we united our production, and sold it together to get the most out of it, that was always my idea.”

While Huircaman welcomed the introduction of new technologies that held the potential to increase production, but as director of the neighborhood association he did so for reason contrary to the economic goals of Plan Perquenco. Rather than the formation of farmers who produced and marketed individually, Huircaman attempted to use his position as director to create a cooperative where members shared production and surplus for the advancement of their community. This style of cooperative work was antithetical to the Ministry of Agriculture’s proposed outcome for Plan Perquenco. Like the agricultural development program, the community enhancement programs often had varied outcomes as a result of the dispositions of technicians and local power dynamics.

**Home Economy and Community Solidarity**

If the planners of Plan Perquenco intended for the agricultural and community development programs to create independent and empowered men, the family development program sought to increase women’s capacity to be caretakers of the home. The principal goals of the program were to increase standards of living, raise the self-esteem of women, and allow greater decision making responsibility with regards to agricultural production and marketing. To create healthy and self-sustained families, the family development program focused on three areas. The first aspect of the program focused on family gardening. Through the family gardening program técnicas taught women how to maintain a garden for auto-consumption throughout the year. The program focused on new planting techniques, how to build small fences, and how to apply fertilizers. To augment the nutritional intake of the family, the family gardening

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403 Interview with Juan Huircaman, Comunidad Coliman/Cayumil, May 22, 2012.
404 Private archive of Luis Muñoz, “Plan Anual de Trabajo, 1988-87.”
program also introduced a variety of vegetables that the técnicas argued improved the
dietary habits of Perquenco’s families. The initial reports on Perquenco that the FVR
carried out in the early 1980s argued that lack of a balanced diet limited familial
development. The formation of family gardens that mothers and daughters tended sought
to offset what technicians considered a nutritional deficiency. Agricultural technician
Luis Muñoz argued “there was a serious nutritional deficit, so the families’ food security
consisted first of all of bread, and we embarked on this challenge of having bread, and
later, improving the family garden. They had to have peas, beans, [and] potatoes, right, to
have a diversified diet. And later, the lady of the house had her
garden.”

The family development program’s second project was consumer education. The
principal aims of the consumer education program were to educate women on how to
incorporate the crops they grew into meals. To help mothers and wives cook nutritious
meals, the técnicas created a cookbook that incorporated what they grew in the family
garden with other affordable foods like eggs and milk. The final aspect of the consumer
education program was home hygiene where the técnicas instructed women on how to
keep bodies, clothes, and homes clean and thus insure the health of their families. Family
education programs also incorporated courses on the fabrication of furniture. Within
these courses, technicians taught women how to build furniture, sinks, tables, chairs, and
other commodities for their homes.

Plan Perquenco’s architects intended for the técnica to be the model of rural
femininity that other women emulated. This claim relied on the assumption that all
técnicas actually possessed the virtues and skills outlined in the family development
program. This was not the case for María Molina. In an oral interview Molina noted that

405 Interview with Luis Muñoz, Perquenco, July 24, 2012.
she had no idea how to build furniture when she began to work in Plan Perquenco. “I had no idea how to cut a board or hammer a nail, but we learned.” Molina’s lack of knowledge extended to other areas as well. Adela Lagos Gomez from the Community of José Santos Lopez worked with Molina under Plan Perquenco. Lagos Gomez recalled that in matters of the family garden, Molina was not always prepared. “Like my mom did, I kept a garden, all the time, so I knew how to make a garden…Señora María said to me, ‘Ok, you’re going to teach because I don’t know how to make a garden,’ like that, Señora María put us to work making the garden.” While Molina had worked in rural reform projects since the 1960s, she had always done so as a musician. Molina lacked many of the technical skills that Plan Perquenco suggested true femininity embodied, and her experiences reflected a disconnect between theory and practice. Furthermore, Lagos Gomez’s familiarity with family gardens suggested that many of the aspects of “modern” rural living already existed in Perquenco, and thus the program was not necessarily a massive reorganization of rural life.

Oral interviews also suggest that most women certainly did not adhere to the gendered division of labor that Plan Perquenco put forth. Manuela Pichun and her husband received two ox and two pregnant cows under Plan Perquenco. The contract stipulated that within three years the couple had to pay off the price of the animals, which came to about thirty-thousand pesos each, or roughly $700 USD. Luis Muñoz suggested that Pichun and her husband sell the offspring from the pregnant cows to cover their debt. Pichun recalled that one of the ox was in bad health and unable to pull a plow. Her husband subsequently decided to sell the sick ox. Rather than use the money to pay

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406 Interview with María Molina, Temuco, August 13, 2012.
407 Interview with Adela Lagos Gomez, Comunidad José Santos Lopez, June 18, 2012.
408 ARNAD, MINAG, 1980, vol. 2376. In the early 1980s, reports form the Ministry of Agriculture usually placed the exchange rate at $1 USD to 43 pesos.
off the debt, Pichun’s husband drank the money away. When Luis Muñoz discovered that Pichun’s husband had squandered the money from the animal, he made Pichun the financial administrator of the livestock the couple received through Plan Perquenco.

Pichun recalled that Muñoz told her, “‘Now you are going to oversee the animals that are here and not him [your husband]. You are married, he should be in charge, but he’s not going to be, because he doesn’t know how to pay his debts. You [Pichun] are the one that pays your debts. So, when you want to sell an animal, go, ask for authorization, and we’ll give it to you. You sell the animal, deposit the money, and a half for you and a half for us.’”409 Luis Muñoz, therefore, placed Pichun in charge of the financial management of the family’s livestock, which he noted was generally the realm of masculine labor. Even though she attributed the quote to Muñoz, Pichun’s testimony recognized that she assumed true masculine responsibility as she was sober and “paid her debts.”

Pichun defended her right to manage the financial aspects of her livestock even after her husband died in the mid-1980s. After Pichun’s husband passed away, creditors for INDAP came to demand payment for the ox that her husband sold. Pichun eventually represented herself in court and the judge awarded her the right to keep the animals and not pay for them. Pichun sold some of the animals and constructed herself a new house. “So, I kept those animals, and from those animal I still have my house. Because I sold the animals, I bought wood, I bought zinc. That’s how I built my house, gave it light. It’s the first house I had…that’s how I passed my life, alone. I fought, and fought, and fought, and I won.”410 Pichun’s story demonstrates that local community and familial dynamics,

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409 Interview with Manuela Pichun, Comunidad José Santos Lopez, September 4, 2012.
410 Ibid.
therefore, often distorted the gendered division of labor that Plan Perquencó allegedly reinforced.

Beyond engagement with small farming, animal husbandry, and home economy, the domestic development program opened spaces to re-establish networks of community solidarity. While Molina was not necessarily skilled in all aspects of home development, she nonetheless provided an important outlet for women to express themselves in a time otherwise marked by darkness and despair. The format of the family development program required técnicas to make daily visits throughout the communities where they worked. Every fifteen days técnicas held group meetings in each community with all the participants from that area. Group meetings were an integral parts of the family development program. A 1986 pamphlet that Plan Perquencó’s technicians wrote argued, “the majority of actions that better the family and their home occur in that same residence, but also important are those group activities that are done in the those organizations that get members together. This is especially valid for courses [on] sewing, knitting, cooking, family health etc… being led by Mothers Centers, Parents Centers, and social groups.”

While some technicians expected these group meetings to reinforce aspects of proper rural femininity, Molina worked through them to affirm community solidarity.

Molina worked in Pitraco in the western sector of Perquencó in four Mapuche communities: José Santos Lopez, La Concepción, Fernando Carilao and Hijidio Pinchulao. By 1987, Molina worked with 48 women. Molina argued that the women she worked with used meetings to “get together, talk, do things. For the women, it made them

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participative, with more freedom to talk, more confidence in themselves. It also helped, in my opinion, this helped a lot also with the group coexistence.\textsuperscript{412} Molina argue that the sense of self-confidence and unity that meetings inspired led to a new sense of community unity outside of Plan Perquenco.

“Independently of the meetings, people suddenly, for example, came to our house in the evenings, they arrived with a little mate, with bread, with some little thing that they had, or had prepared. They came to drink mate, to talk, to sing, many times pray. There were a lot of things, many things, with a great deal of force, let’s say, in the spiritual field in that which we were, very tight, but many times without words. But you felt that we were together, you felt that we did things together, that the gardens were pretty, that the dishes were exquisite. We laughed, we sang, we told jokes and all these things while you worked. So, I believe that this was a comfort, independent from the quantitative, from how much the rent per hectare increased, independent from that. There was a large spiritual, I would dare say, harvest, of healing, lets say, for the people.”\textsuperscript{413}

Molina’s testimony supports Stern’s argument that human meeting grounds often created networks of solidarity for people who suffered under the dictatorship that allowed them to reconnect with human experience and thus revalidate their identity and personal worth.

“I believe that now I could sum all it up [as] feeling that we really were people, each one with their pain, each one with their silence, or whatever it was, but we were people. And in this context, of this plan, in this work, we were being valorized as people, we were being respected as people. We had the chance to talk, we had the chance to ask. We had the tremendous chance to say to other women, ‘you know, I [too] have pain.’ For that reason, to make a people feel that they are a person and not a thing. I believe that if I had to sum it up in one word, I would say that to have felt that the most important thing is to know that you are a person, not a thing.”\textsuperscript{414}

For Molina, therefore, the group meetings worked against the dehumanization and denial of violence and suffering that marked military rule. Group meetings exposed a shared site of suffering among rural women in Perquenco and provided an outlet to discuss and internalize this suffering not as isolated, but as emblematic of a shared experience.

\textsuperscript{412} Interview with María Molina, Temuco, August 13, 2012.
\textsuperscript{413} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{414} Ibid.
Every woman from the sector of Pitraco who participated in interviews had a positive memory of Molina. Luisa Martina Linco recalled that is was Molina who helped her receive a housing subsidy and thus move out of her father’s house. Linco recalled, “with her [Molina’s] help, with what she has given me, all the strength I didn’t know, she guided me, I was determined, and I got my house…she was a good technician, very good technician. She sympathized with the poor that were sort of lost… I have my house because she lifted me up, she said to me ‘do this, do that.’ She really helped me.”

Other interviews highlighted the compassion Molina showed the communities that she worked with. Adela Lagos Gomez recalled the music Molina played for women and the communities. Particularly she recalled how Molina came and played for her dying godparents. Lagos Gomez noted,

“She was also a friend here in the house of them [my godparents]. My godmother was always sick, she didn’t get better, I hadn’t been able to see her. And she [Molina], that day she said, she came to play guitar for my deceased godfather, because he liked her a lot. He liked it a lot when she played guitar. So she, before taking him out, played and sang to him. The people all remained crying, because she, with a pain, with something like this, played him guitar and sang to him.”

Molina’s actions therefore provided an alternative outcome for Plan Perquenco that valorized human dignity and solidarity above economic gains.

The goals and outcomes of Plan Perquenco were therefore neither absolute nor cohesive. The format of regionalization in part fomented a disconnect between the design and outcome of Plan Perquenco. While at a macro level national universities, ministries, and international institutions like the FAO planned Plan Perquenco, it was the six technicians that undertook the quotidian management of the program. While military officials did regulate initial meetings, many of the day-to-day occurrences remained

416 Interview with Adela Lagos Gomez, Comunidad José Santos López, June 18, 2012.
under the control of these technicians. What comes to light from the different management styles was that individuals’ relationship to pre-1973 politics and post ’73 violence marked the different approaches to the program. The technicians’ stories ultimately underscore the internal dynamics of military rule that resist the current historiography’s homogenizing nomenclatures that present state building as a unified endeavor that cohesive institutions carried out. While individual motivations in part shaped the management of Plan Perquenco, the technicians always held a precarious position of power as isolated representatives of the military regime. Mapuche farmers were not simply acted upon by Plan Perquenco. The agricultural development program illustrates that Mapuche farmers had a good deal of agency to dictate the direction of the program. Furthermore, the case of Molina demonstrates that at times Mapuche communities possessed knowledge that technicians lacked, and thus they assumed positions of authority within the program. It was these subtleties of regionalization that eventually permitted Mapuche youth to engage in the cultural politics that re-affirmed a Mapuche identity and cultural practice that challenged Plan Perquenco and the economic, ethnic, and gender dictates the program embodied.
Chapter 5: Of Footballers and Traveling Guitarists: Youth Recreation and Cultural Revitalization Under Plan Perquenco

Agricultural technicians sustained that recreation had to be a central aspect of Plan Perquenco to help correct the weak bodies and minds that officials argued plagued Perquenco’s Mapuche communities. The Ministry of Agriculture designed recreational activities to be a means to express, perform, and reproduce the ministry’s ideals of rural masculinity and femininity. These ideals promoted male obedience, sobriety, and responsibility and female apolitical domesticity. As with other aspects of the Ministry of Agriculture’s rural reform programs, local cultural dynamics often challenged the ministry’s conception of rural masculinity and femininity. An examination of rural football leagues and youth folklore programs under Plan Perquenco demonstrates the multiple and complex meanings that individuals attributed to recreational activities that both supported and subverted the goals of Plan Perquenco. I argue that football and music were performances that constructed rather than reflected social realities.\(^{417}\) The very act of playing soccer or music became sites where individuals reinforced, recreated, and subverted specific economic, political, ethnic, and gendered ideologies.

How Mapuche communities and regime officials articulated and defined the significance of these activities existed in direct reference to pre-1973 patterns of community mobilization and class solidarity. Throughout the twentieth century, Chilean politicians and neighborhood associations had used football leagues to underscore specific notions of masculinity, class, ethnicity, and nationalism.\(^{418}\) Under military rule, the Ministry of Agriculture drew from the popularity of football to endorse its own

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political and economic ideology. In rural areas and under Plan Perquenco, the Ministry of Agriculture argued that training for football and one’s football skill were akin to one’s ability to participate in the free market as an individual farmer. The military regime attempted to use rural football to undermine the class politics and brash worker militancy that formerly defined working-class leagues as a means to reinstate more conservative gender identities represented in the Chilean state apparatus since the Popular Front era by both the political left and right. The Ministry of Agriculture principally reinforced the image of the temperate, disciplined worker who was responsible to his family. Within this gendered definition of athletic and worker masculinity was the reaffirmation of the domestic and auxiliary nature of women’s work.

The masculine worker identity that the Ministry of Agriculture promoted was a specific point against which Plan Perquenco’s youth folklore group, los Guitarreros Caminantes (the Traveling Guitarists), worked against. Songs like *El Mingako* that highlighted the importance of traditional modes of Mapuche communal work and land ownership directly contested the Ministry of Agriculture’s conception of rural citizenship based on individualism and private property ownership within male-headed nuclear families. Los Guitarreros Caminantes’ emphasis on alternative forms of agricultural production and community organization constructed notions of masculine and feminine responsibility that negated the ministry’s view that Mapuche were lazy and inefficient agricultural producers whose salvation lay in their transformation into independent and obedient workers. Los Guitarreros Caminantes not only invoked the themes of social justice emblematic of the Nueva Canción movement of the 1960s and ‘70s, but also utilized popular representations of transgressive masculinities apparent in pre-1973
depictions of worker militancy. The band’s affirmation of a Mapuche political consciousness and alternative gendered identities was nonetheless unique in that it developed in relation to the socio-cultural history of Perquenco and in direct tension with the indigenous policies of the Ministry of Agriculture. Notions of community solidarity did not exist in reference to a shared experience of class exploitation but rather against the threat of cultural erasure. By valorizing a contemporary Mapuche cultural identity, los Guitarreros Caminantes also contested the notion that the Mapuche were a primordial and long-extinct source of worker combativeness, strength, and union. Through the act of playing music, therefore, los Guitarreros Caminantes reconstructed the boundaries of rural citizenship and gender identity that challenged not only the dictates of the Ministry of Agriculture, but also the political left.

This chapter does not seek to debate the merits of musical authenticity or form, but rather seeks to demonstrate how the music and performances of los Guitarreros Caminantes functioned as a subtle yet powerful site of cultural agency. Drawing from ethnomusicologist Michelle Bigenho, los Guitarreros Caminantes utilized cultural-historical authenticity and unique authenticity to destabilize Plan Perquenco’s cultural programs. Cultural-historical authenticity refers to the process by which music gains authenticity through musicians’ ability to draw on specific historical and cultural themes that are part of the collective national consciousness. Using figures like the ancient Mapuche and the courageous huasos of times past, los Guitarreros Caminantes engaged in a form cultural-historical authenticity that allowed their songs to resonate with historical images central to Chilean nationalism. Unique authenticity refers to musicians’ ability to expand on the “traditional” to create new artistic forms that redefine the
through unique authenticity, los Guitarreros Caminantes imbued their songs with personal significance and memories that created an alternative cultural-historical authenticity that challenged the individualism, consumerism, and free market dictates of Plan Perquenco.

Los Guitarreros Caminantes ability to work through military-sanctioned programs to affirm alternative ethnic and gender identities was the result of the format of regionalization. As previous chapters contend, regionalization led to a lack of cohesive military authority in Chile’s distant municipalities. Regionalization prevented the creation of concrete plans for community development, and ultimately led to a variety of often-conflicting opinions among state institutions with regards to what defined “development” and how Mapuche culture factored into that progress. Specifically, the Ministry of Education’s call for bilingual educational programs in Perquenco not only contradicted the Ministry of Agriculture’s arguments for cultural homogeneity, but also created spaces for Mapuche youth to affirm alternative ethnic and gender identities. This is not to suggest that community resistance only existed as a result of Plan Perquenco. Regionalization was one of many spaces through which Mapuche youth in Perquenco worked to affirm an ethnic identity that they had developed independently of the program.

**Twenty-First-Century Perceptions of Footballers, Musicians, and National Belonging**

Chilean football players’ athleticism particularly defined notions of race, class and gender throughout the twentieth century. In his 1904 novel *La Raza Chilena* Nicolás Palacios contended that the racial superiority of Chileans derived form the seventeenth-century mixture of Germanic-Spaniards, free from the taint of Islam, and heroic

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Araucanians. In the twentieth-century, politicians’ emphasis on Mapuche contributions to the Chilean race were only important in that they served as a marker for the historical origins of Chile’s racial superiority. While Chilean football clubs adopted Mapuche names like Colocolo and Lautaro to demonstrate their aggression, masculinity, and physical might, they considered indigenous sportsmanship and athleticism savage, primitive, and without constraint.\footnote{Elsey, Citizens and Sportsmen, 22-26.} Within la Raza Chilean, European blood had quelled and civilized these aggressive tendencies to create superior athletes.

Biology alone, however, did not solely define Chilean athleticism. Through the assertion that social factors like hygiene, temperance, and familial stability affected race, politicians were able to argue for “racial uplift.” Particularly during the early twentieth century when politicians, doctors, and other professionals feared that rapid urbanization led to racial degradation, the idea of racial uplift provided a solution to economic and social problems that affected Chile’s major cities. The enhancement of the Chilean racial stock depended on workers participating in sports like football.\footnote{Ibid., 20-22.} The explicit connections among workers’ health, production and football promoted the participation of a variety of Chilean political parties in national football clubs. From the 1920s onward, socialist and communist parties in Santiago neighborhoods like San Miguel took an active role in the formation of football clubs to not only create healthy bodies but also mobilize working-class neighborhoods for labor, housing, and political rights. In the 1960s, neighborhoods organized amateur football leagues, or barrio futból, that underscored a particular class-consciousness based on worker masculinity. In response to the elites’ negative perception of working class neighborhoods, amateur footballers
argued they were more masculine and honorable than their elite counterparts due to their manual labor, class solidarity, and political militancy.\textsuperscript{422} Descriptions of brash militancy as a hallmark of working-class masculinity particularly existed in teams’ chants and slogans that incorporated the imagery of knives, bulls, meat, and other references to industrial labor.\textsuperscript{423} While brash worker masculinity in part challenged the authority of factory owners, it also contended with more conservative left politicians’ opinions that class solidarity began with men being sober, disciplined, and responsible for their families.\textsuperscript{424} Depictions of proper comportment of footballers, whether from the political right or left, all emphasized nonetheless that football was first and foremost a masculine endeavor. While women’s amateur football gained prominence in the 1960s and under Allende’s UP, the direct association between industrial production and football skill linked the sport with the productive, rational, and modern aspects of male labor. Popular representations of football as masculine suggested women were thus too indecisive and weak to be real footballers.\textsuperscript{425}

Much like football, music played an important role in defining Chilean ethnic, gender and class ideologies before the 1973 coup. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s there was a mass influx of European and U.S. culture into Chile as a result of the advance of televisions and record players. Disney cartoons promoted U.S. consumerist values that placed greater emphasis on what Ariel Dorfman noted were individual needs rather than the collective good.\textsuperscript{426} In terms of music, radio airwaves throughout the 1960s played more foreign than Chilean music. Musicians also began to imitate U.S. and British music,

\textsuperscript{422} Ibid., 168.  
\textsuperscript{423} Ibid., 175.  
\textsuperscript{424} For a more detailed discussion see, Tinsman, \textit{Partners in Conflict}; Rosemblatt, \textit{Gendered Compromises}.  
\textsuperscript{425} Elsey, \textit{Citizens and Sportsmen}, 212.  
and performers like Patricio Henriquez and los Hermanos Carrasco changed their names to Pat Henry and The Carr Twins to present themselves as more American.\textsuperscript{427}

The Nueva Canción or New Song movement was a specific revolt against American cultural imperialism, the expansion of a consumer-based society, and the formation of economic monopolies that created adverse living conditions for Chile’s urban and rural poor. Beginning in the 1950s, Violeta Parra embarked on a massive campaign to re-capture rural Chilean folk songs as the basis from which to recuperate an authentic Chilean national identity. In 1965, Parra’s two children Angel and Isabella created the performance space la Carpa de la Reina in Santiago. These public gatherings of musicians, or peñas, became a major outlet for creating an alternative Chilean culture that challenged the free market economic and cultural dictates of the U.S. and the Chilean elite.

Allende’s UP particularly drew on the themes of class and cultural alliances presented in Nueva Canción between 1970 and 1973. Claudio Iturra and Sergio Ortega wrote Allende’s campaign song “Venceremos.” The UP’s promotion of music led to a fundamental change in the themes presented in Nueva Canción. While previously lyrics addressed the plight of workers, lyrics in the 1970s directly valorized the Chilean worker as the center of national identity and change. The U.P. nationalized the RCA plant in Chile and doubled its production of primarily Nueva Canción music in the early 1970s. A law decree in 1971 stated that 85% of music on radios and at festivals had to be Chilean music. The U.P. also actively supported leftist Chilean record labels like Discoteca del Canto Popular (DICAP) whose production jumped from 4,000 records in 1968 to 24,000

\textsuperscript{427} Ibid. 94
in 1973.\textsuperscript{428} By 1973, therefore, the Nueva Canción movement had emerged as a central voice for a changing Chilean culture that openly challenged the economic, cultural, and imperialist dictates of the United States and Chile’s ruling class.

Essential to this alternative culture were perceptions of ethnicity. Composers like Parra and Víctor Jara were instrumental in affirming among circles of urban intellectuals that despite popular representations to the contrary, the Mapuche had not disappeared. These musicians asserted that the Mapuche played a pivotal role in Chilean identity and the larger struggle against capitalist oppression. Parra and Jara utilized Mapuche motifs, instruments, and legends as a means to “search for a genuine national identity” that held the potential to “counter the artificial, imitative music of Europe and the United States.”\textsuperscript{429} The adoption of this culture, as Joanna Crow has recently demonstrated, nonetheless served Nueva Canción’s emphasis on themes, such as anti-imperialism, with the Mapuche as the ultimate embodiment of strength and resistance. In an unfinished song Jara began to write for the Confederación Ranquil that commemorated the 1934 massacre of Mapuche and non-Mapuche campesinos in Lonquimay, the musician presented the Mapuche as the primary instigators of an emblematic struggle between dominant and exploited classes. In this manner, Jara “partially mythologized [a] story of a past cross-cultural alliance between the Mapuche and Chilean workers aimed at inspiring similar collaborative support for Allende’s Popular Unity government in the present.”\textsuperscript{430}

The cultural alternative that the Nueva Canción provided, nonetheless, came to a quick end in 1973. The military regime prohibited the public gatherings that peñas

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\textsuperscript{429} Crow, \textit{The Mapuche in Modern Chile}, 131.
\textsuperscript{430} Ibid., 137.
created for Chilean youth to gather and promote an alternative culture. This ultimately created what Nancy Morris has called a “cultural blackout” in Chile. The military regime exiled, tortured, and murdered members of the Nueva Canción movement. The most infamous case was the public detention of Víctor Jara, his subsequent torture and execution in the National Stadium, and the dumping of his body on the streets outside of the football complex. Football fields and stadiums that formed the previous sites of public mobilization and community solidarity therefore became centers of detention and torture after the coup. The direct links between politics and football in Santiago’s working class neighborhoods led the dictatorship to close the majority of clubs following the 1973 coup and exile, murder, or torture many league members. An examination of rural football and music in the 1980s nonetheless demonstrates that despite this repression, the dictatorship actively promoted these activities as central aspects of community and national development. Much like former perceptions of footballers and musicians, Plan Perquenco’s officials used these recreational activities to reinforce specific perceptions of ethnicity, gender, and class in the Chilean countryside.

**Music and Football under Military Rule**

The use of football and music in Plan Perquenco were part of larger effort by various military agencies to rehabilitate what officials considered a weak and debilitated rural population. Under the General Directorate of Sports and Recreation (Dirección General de Deportes y Recreación, hereinafter DIGEDER), there existed a *Canal Vecinal* in every municipality that was responsible for the organization of recreational activities. *Canal Vecinal* pamphlets from the Municipality of Gorbea in the Ninth Region argued that there was a “psychophysical” imbalance in the minds of the rural population that

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resulted from a lack of physical activity. Gorbea’s Canal Vecinal suggested sports “elevate[d] the physical capacity, the general culture, and the social integration of the [rural] population.” DIGEDER supported the view of Gorbea’s Canal Vecinal and argued that when rural communities participated in sports they would see “this form of life as a social necessity, and as such they will break the bonds of immobility that constrain today’s man, liberating him through a new form of living; healthy and elevated we will walk towards ours and Chile’s promised and dignified destiny.”

Rural football leagues became one of the principal activities municipal officials in the Ninth Region used to create healthy, responsible, and civic-minded citizens. In 1981, DIGEDER with the aid of the Ministry of Agriculture began to plan the Field Football Championship (Campeonato de Fútbol de los Potreros). Initially DIGEDER’s functionaries intended the championship to be nationwide. Players throughout Chile, however, wrote DIGEDER and stated the impossibility of traveling outside of their communities due to economic constraints and work obligations. Financial constraints, lack of mobility, and obligations to farming thus made a nationwide tournament unfeasible. DIGEDER in turn supported a variety of local tournaments that municipalities throughout Chile coordinated. By the mid 1980s, the Field Football Championship was widely popular, with roughly 55 leagues that contained 750 teams and 9,000 players. The Ninth Region alone accounted for 13 leagues. By 1985, the Ninth Region’s municipalities with the largest number of leagues were Villarrica with 32 teams and 500 players, and Angol with 27 teams and 650 players. Perquenco, the Ninth Region’s smallest

432 ARA, INR, 1979, box 63, “Programas del Canal Vecinal, 1979.”
433 Ibid.
municipality, alone had 25 teams by 1985.\textsuperscript{434} The mass popularity of the rural football leagues led to the formation of the National Association for Rural Football (Asociación Nacional de Fútbol Rural, ANFUR) in 1985.

While the ministry’s emphasis on football sought to undermine the class solidarity, worker militancy, and allegiances to leftist political parties that defined many neighborhood football leagues from the 1920s until the 1973 coup, it nonetheless reinforced long-standing conservative gender ideals based on male temperance, discipline and familial obligation.\textsuperscript{435} The Ministry of Agriculture primarily used its official magazine, \textit{Nuestra Tierra}, to convey to readers proper male behavior on and off the pitch. One article noted, “the man who likes sports has a greater possibility of achieving [his] life goals, especially by being prepared to overcome difficulties like the ones present on the sports field. He who practices is more likely to go forward in his work and his home. Sports only benefit their followers and they keep players away from bad habits, vice, and laziness.”\textsuperscript{436} Like previous twentieth-century depictions of athleticism, state functionaries under military rule argued that football held the potential to lift men out of the cultural debasement that they felt marked the lives of rural and specifically Mapuche communities. Articles in \textit{Nuestra Tierra} also suggested that beyond abstinence from vice, proper cultural comportment was apparent in one’s style of play. A description of a match in the Municipality of Ercilla in the Ninth Region noted that the players exhibited “great intensity that is characteristic of all rural club games.” The article concluded, “we saw a beautiful show, great effort as much individual as collective, but also very correct


\textsuperscript{435} Elsey, \textit{Citizens and Sportsmen}.

\textsuperscript{436} “Ahora, a Preparar el Equipo para Este Año,” \textit{Nuestra Tierra} 10 (February 1983): 19.
and sportsman like.”\footnote{En Colbun Está Listos Para el Campeonato,” \textit{Nuestra Tierra} 9 (April 1982): 25.} \textit{Nuestra Tierra}’s editors, like previous twentieth-century representations of correct sportsmanship, valorized a controlled competitive intensity that eschewed the savagery and uncivilized play they considered akin to racially debased groups like Africans, Afro-Brazilians, and indigenous communities.\footnote{Elsey, \textit{Citizens and Sportsmen}, 22-26.}

\textit{Nuestra Tierra} also used football to promote notions of masculine responsibility and “rational” agricultural development. An article titled “Lets Talk about Risks,” highlighted that the only way men moved forward in the world was through calculated risk. The article reminded men that, “he that never takes risks will never cross the river.”\footnote{“Hablemos de Riesgos,” \textit{Nuestra Tierra} 10 (February 1983): 7.} The article detailed a group of fictional youth who had the courage to form a football team and thus endure what the article described as the warlike nature of rural football. The article noted “At the beginning, for their lack of a field, they failed, but they continued trying and searching for technique until they managed [to win] their first triumph.”\footnote{Ibid.} The presumed ability of players to overcome the physical limitations of their land through “rational” development echoed the Ministry of Agriculture’s argument that all fields, no matter what size, were factories that had to “produce not only products but also profit.”\footnote{“Un Campesino Debe Ser Empresario,” in \textit{Nuestra Tierra} 1 (March 1979): 1.} The skills one learned on the football pitch seemingly transferred over to independent farmers’ ability to incorporate modern technology, overcome physical limitations, and ultimately produce for national and international markets. The language of war also resonated with the military regime’s rhetoric that Chile was embattled with international Marxists that sought to destroy the economic and cultural potential of Chile. Men thus had to be daring and courageous in their production to ward off the nefarious
forces that desired to make them weak, submissive, and without the skill to function as independent farmers.

*Nuestra Tierra*’s depiction of football relegated the productive aspects of rural labor, and thus football, to men. An article even noted with great surprise that a rural league had female players.\(^{442}\) DIGEDER and the Ministry of Agriculture’s coordination of football tournaments, much like other aspects of rural labor, consigned women to an auxiliary role. The only consistent mention of women in *Nuestra Tierra* was the magazine’s coverage of the Queen of Rural Football competition. This competition was essentially a beauty pageant that presented women’s bodies and thus their labor as too frail to undertake the arduous and warlike nature of football. This assumption reinforced long-standing twentieth-century representations of women as too indecisive and weak to be real footballers.\(^{443}\)

Plan Perquenco’s rural football leagues reified many of the presumptions that *Nuestra Tierra* articulated. The six agricultural technicians that worked in Plan Perquenco formed a football league in 1984. In reference to Perquenco’s rural football leagues, agriculture technician Patricio Bormann noted “we helped to create a little order, because suddenly, you know there was always someone passing around a little bit of that stuff (mimics drinking from a bottle).” In response to what he felt the purpose of the league was, Bormann stated:

“the idea for the football teams was basically to create relationships between the communities, because they didn’t exist before. Before, communities viewed each other really badly here [in Perquenco]. There was a lot of envy between them, between one community and another. Generally, when there were events, fights always broke out between this community and that one… Through this system [of rural football], what we did, we got them together and they organized the


\(^{443}\) Elsey, *Citizens and Sportsmen.*
tournament, they managed them alone, they didn’t fight, they didn’t have problems.”

Agricultural technician Luis Muñoz shared many of Bormann’s opinions. In reference to the rural football leagues Muñoz argued, “football clubs in some way existed before [Plan Perquenco], but they didn’t have a tournament. They [farmers] participated every now and then, when there was a tournament, but the tournaments were one at a time and were pure drinking. So we created permanent championships, with one team and another, and without alcohol, because it was effectively to improve [the communities’] health.” The agricultural technicians’ comments reflected several racial themes prominent in discussions of Chilean football. Bormann’s insistence that through proper instruction in moral and sober play Mapuche communities became orderly and responsible for their own development reinforced the prevalent perception of racial uplift that argued inferior races could overcome their plight through adherence to civilized, or European social norms. In Bormann’s opinion, the introduction of modern and rational community organization allowed for the reformation of a debased Mapuche culture.

The idea of racial uplift through football was also apparent in the reports of FAO consultant Cristobal Unterrichter. One of Unterrichter’s greatest fears was that Mapuche communities in Perquenco lacked the ability to reproduce their culture, and thus faced the possibility of cultural extinction. Unterrichter suggested that Mapuche communities in Perquenco needed to adopt the systems German and Italian immigrants used, like football clubs, to reproduce their culture. Unterrichter argued, “While the German-Chilean or the Italian-Chilean (Syrian, etc) has cultural institutions, [both] sports and social, that help

444 Interview with Patricio Bormann, Perquenco, June 13, 2013.
445 Interview with Luis Muñoz, Perquenco, July 24, 1012.
446 Elsey, Citizens and Sportsmen, 20-22.
them practice their cultural values, as well as leave the compact and traditional ethnic residential area to be able to continue supporting these values in national life, the Mapuche doesn’t operate like this. Unterrichter’s statement drew from the huge impact German and specifically Italian football clubs had on Chilean culture and politics throughout the twentieth century. Beyond his negation of very real patterns of Mapuche cultural reproduction in Perquenco, the FAO consultant ironically suggested that the Mapuche’s ability to survive depended on their capacity to fit the image of a modern European rural citizenry, and thus adopt European based cultural markers, like football clubs. Like other depictions of racial uplift, Unterrichter highlighted that Mapuche communities could overcome their cultural stagnation through appropriate cultural practices.

Appropriate cultural practices extended beyond sportsmanship. Music, dances, and beauty pageants always accompanied rural football tournaments. The air of festivity that complemented rural football championships and the crowning of the Queens of Rural Football was a means to highlight that rural football leagues were a total embodiment of healthy recreation. The Ministry of Agriculture’s promotion of Chilean folk music, nonetheless, attempted to eradicate themes of social justice and worker solidarity that the Nueva Canción movement promoted in the 1960s and early 1970s. If songs like “Venceremos” and “El Pueblo Unido Jamás Será Vencido” previously served as powerful cultural markers for worker solidarity and masculinity as well as anti-imperialism, folklore under the dictatorship sought to promote a Chilean culture based on military might and apolitical nationalism. The band Los Huasos Quincheros, who had

447 FAOL, 1984, doc. 450075, “Desarrollo y Organización del Sector Indígena y de Pequeños Agricultores en Chile, Documento de Trabajo No 1.”
openly criticized Nueva Canción and the Allende administration, became the official band of the military regime. The band played traditional Chilean folk music whose stylistic format was not that different from Nueva Canción. Band leader Benjamín Makenna, nonetheless, worked actively in the Ministry of Cultural Affairs to promote allegedly de-politicized Chilean folklore that placed rural living in an idyllic setting free from the class struggle that he argued prevented campesinos from working peacefully for the advancement of Chile.\(^\text{448}\) Proper national cultural expression for the dictatorship, therefore, had less to do with musical style and more to do with what the military regime deemed proper musical themes that eschewed Marxism and anything that even remotely resembled social justice.\(^\text{449}\)

The military regime took various measures to insure that music and theater adhered to what officials deemed proper cultural expression. In 1979, the Ministry of the Interior requested that all municipalities submit a report that detailed the resources they had to promote folklore, traditional dance, and theatre groups. Minister Sergio Fernandez argued that the survey was a means to fulfill the military regime’s desire “to bring to all community activities the maximum expression of National culture.”\(^\text{450}\) Shortly after the Ministry of Interior issued its call for the national survey, the Intendant of the Ninth Region wrote the provincial governors of Malleco and Cautín to warn of the potential threat folklore events held for municipalities. Intendant Atiliano Jara Salgado began his letter with “As is known to you [Provincial Governors], the members of disbanded political parties and ex-Marxist parties are determined to create a campaign of agitation


and conversion at all levels of national activity, using all opportunities within their reach to undertake their activity." 

Intendant Jara went on to note that folklore festivals and any other event of the “popular character” were the primary public events that Marxist agitators used to spread their messages. Intendant Jara’s letter was an obvious backlash against the former use of public space as a means to foment political consciousness among public listeners.

The minister’s reference to innocent themes and unruly crowds was a direct reference to the subtleness of music that had previously undermined military-sanctioned music festivals. In 1977, Alerce Records hosted the La Gran Noche del Folclore in a seven-thousand seat auditorium in Santiago. Many of the people that attended and performed were former supporters of the U.P. and Nueva Canción. The winning song was a tribute to Chilean independence hero and guerrilla fighter Manuel Rodríguez. Leftist political parties and musicians like Víctor Jara had long invoked the image of Manuel Rodríguez as a symbol of resistance. Nancy Morris argues that the song’s emphasis on liberty was a code for many audience members that signified their own struggles against military repression. At the end of the song the crowd subsequently erupted into wild applause and cheers. 

Military officials were not oblivious to the subversive themes of resistance apparent in an otherwise patriotic song and banned the concert the following year. The event at La Gran Noche del Folclore no doubt played into the Ministry of Interior’s fears that alleged leftist musicians used seemingly innocent themes to convey powerful messages of resistance to military rule.

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Minster Fernandez instructed municipal mayors on the hallmarks of Marxist subversion that were apparent at the La Gran Noche del Folclore. The Ministry of Interior contended that anyone who offered to play for free was more than likely a “leftist artist” who wanted to take advantage of the greed of municipal organizers who looked to cut costs by hiring pro bono musicians. The minister warned that Marxists sang in metaphors and about seemingly innocent themes, of which the minister argued, were the “most dangerous.” Beyond the use of lyrical subversion, the Minister of the Interior cautioned municipal mayors that leftist musicians tended to insert 50 to 100 activists in the crowd to create a scene of chaos and ultimately subvert the nationalistic goals of the festival.  

Despite these warnings, music was an essential part of youth recreation under Plan Perquenco. Plan Perquenco specifically promoted the formation of youth theater and musical groups to fully integrate Mapuche families into the national body. A report on the initial gains made under Plan Perquenco noted that cultural programs “will have to encourage the interaction of the participating family groups so that they will organize social, cultural, artistic, and sports, among other programs… through this work, its necessary to establish a background so that the families know, devote themselves, and participate in community organizations.”

Initial proposals for Plan Perquenco supported the formation of folklore festivals and theater groups as “the practice of popular arts that belong to a specific place and that recognize free expression are necessary to respect everyone’s creative impulses.” Cultural programs, like music, therefore sought to foster cultural expression as a mode of community development.

Many terms like “community development” and “culture” remained vague in initial

455 Ibid.
reports on Plan Perquenco, and in turn various state functionaries, isolated technicians, and local populations gave them a myriad of meanings. Oral interviews and reports from the Ministry of Education demonstrate that this vagueness and lack of oversight created a variety of spaces Mapuche youth utilized to affirm their cultural identity.

**Recreation, Music, and Community Identity**

Nearly every male that participated in oral interviews highlighted the importance of football for Perquenco. In a recent oral interview José Hullipan Tremalao argued in reference to the rural football league, “[there was] a lot of public [participation], before you didn’t see this in the countryside. So, we stole football from urban areas. In the end everything went to the countryside. In urban areas football stopped, up to today the rural championship continues [in Perquenco].”\(^{456}\) Tremalao’s comment reflected that the rural leagues brought community members together, and even gave them a sense of rural pride through Perquenco’s adoption of urban practices that became a central part of community celebrations. It is difficult to discern from oral interviews and archival sources, however, to what extent the rural football leagues opened spaces for community mobilization or fortified community identity in Perquenco.

Articles from *Nuestra Tierra* nonetheless demonstrate that rural football leagues held the potential to affirm Mapuche cultural and community identity. *Nuestra Tierra* actively reported on the incorporation of Mapuche cultural symbols and names in rural football leagues. It seems that the use of Mapuche imagery and names like Colocolo went beyond the dictatorship’s and the political left’s symbolic romanticism to construct a cultural identity based on the recuperation of Mapuche identity, territory, and socio-political tradition. The inauguration of the Municipality of Lautaro’s rural league in 1985

\(^{456}\) Interview with José Hullipan Tremalao, Comunidad Juan Savaria, May 24, 2012.
contained traditional Mapuche songs and dances. Furthermore, the team Quilacura in Lautaro had palín sticks on the team insignia.⁴⁵⁷ Palín is a Mapuche sport similar to field hockey and is a central event in the renewal of inter and intra-communal ties and alliances. While the regime appropriated Mapuche iconography and heroic images of ancient warriors like Colocolo, palín was distinctly Mapuche and never used by the military. Mapuche organizations throughout the 1980s used palín tournaments to assert Mapuche cultural values that challenged the individual and market-oriented dictates of the Ministry of Agriculture. In her oral testimony, Rosa Isolde Reuque Paillalef noted that Mapuche organizations routinely used palín tournaments as a means to organize and mobilize communities against military rule in the Ninth Region.⁴⁵⁸ Articles in anti-regime magazines like Realidad Agraria often highlighted the cultural importance of palín for the growing Mapuche cultural movement. One article from Realidad Agraria quoted prominent Mapuche leader, José Santos Millao, who stated “The importance [that palín] has is that we can express the [political] line of Ad Mapu, where we can orient our brothers, demonstrating the unity of the Mapuche pueblo and reaffirming in a united form that we can do a lot of things to demonstrate to non-Mapuches that our pueblo is a reality, that is isn’t dead.”⁴⁵⁹ The article noted that the games did not exhibit overt competition and hostility as the tournament “was more an encounter of friendship and solidarity, where you participate for conscience and not for the desire to win.”⁴⁶⁰ Lautaro was a major seat of pre-1973 Mapuche mobilization, and it is therefore not far fetched to assume that the use of palín sticks on the team insignia resonated with both communal memories of cultural mobilization as well contemporary Mapuche cultural movements.

⁴⁵⁸ Reuque Paillalef, When a Flower is Reborn.
⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., 9.
From current archival evidence it is hard to gauge if football teams like Quilacura were actively contesting the ethnic and gendered ideals the Ministry of Agriculture promoted through football tournaments. What does come to light is that Mapuche used football tournaments as a space to reinforce cultural identity and solidarity rather than individualism and market expansion, thus revealing the limits of the ministry to enact change through recreational programs.

The use of palín sticks also created alternative notions of sportsmanship that challenged representations of Mapuche identity that the political left previously invoked in football leagues. While Mapuche teams used cultural symbols to challenge the ministry’s notions of worker masculinity, they did not do so to affirm ideals of class solidarity, as former neighborhood leagues had done. The use of Mapuche culture in rural leagues did not serve as a marker for the romanticized origins of a combative and militant worker identity. Rather, Mapuche in Lautaro suggested true masculinity was inherent in a contemporary Mapuche identity that valorized community solidarity, restraint, and Mapuche cultural rights.

Music was certainly a contested space under Plan Perquenco. As noted in previous chapters, the technicians that worked under Plan Perquenco represented a broad socio-political spectrum. María Molina, who became the primary music teacher under Plan Perquenco, was an active participant in the Nueva Canción movement and had witnessed first hand the brutal repression of this important artistic community. Many military officials in the Ninth Region personally knew Molina as a result of her work as a folklorist in the 1960s and 1970s. These officials subsequently protected Molina from persecution after 1973 on the grounds that she only performed patriotic music free from
any reference to class or social justice. Molina had to perform these painful and staged-acts of patriotism before military officials at public events throughout the Ninth Region. Molina recalled, “it was really painful for us to do this, but we knew we had to do it if we wanted to protect ourselves and if we wanted to continue fighting for our music.”

Molina noted her themes were innocent and simply dealt with the heroism and patriotism of Chilean national figures that the regime supported. Molina concluded that “I’ve realized that music, while it took many peoples’ lives, it saved mine, thankfully because I knew songs that spoke of Chilean heroism and patriotism.” The alleged innocence of Molina’s themes nonetheless extended to potentially unsanctioned areas as well. She argued that she played music that spoke of the value of solidarity, work, land, and human life. While Molina claimed that these songs were innocent, the thematic content had a tremendous impact on the youth she taught under Plan Perquenco.

Through her work with schools in the western sector of Perquenco, known as Pitraco, Molina came into contact with a group of Mapuche teenagers from the Community of Fernando Carilao who became interested in music. As Plan Perquenco’s primary music teacher in Pitraco, Molina began to give the group music lessons beginning in 1984. All of the agricultural technicians that worked under Plan Perquenco shared a house in the Community of José Santos Lopez. It was at the technicians’ house that Molina held the music classes twice a week, at night, and outside of Plan Perquenco’s official programs. Molina’s decision to hold the classes at night was the result of several factors. Most of the teenagers who participated in Molina’s classes had to work during the day, and thus could only go out at night. These meetings, however,

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461 Interview with Maria Molina, Temuco, November 6, 2012.
462 Ibid.
were also slightly illegal and clandestine. Molina noted, “Meetings were prohibited, so there wasn’t a lot of freedom to go, meet, get together, and for this reason they [the teenagers] had to go at night. On one hand because they worked during the day, because they studied during the day, and on the other hand because there wasn’t permission to hold meetings like this so easily. So, they walked the eight kilometers… from Carilao up to Santos Lopez, [and] there we worked an hour, hour and a half, two hours.” Because they walked nearly five miles, often in the dark, cold, rain and mud, the band chose the name los Guitarreros Caminantes.

The nature of regionalization supported the quasi-clandestine formation of los Guitarreros Caminantes. Under Plan Perquenco, Molina and the other technicians were the maximum authority in the countryside. These meetings, while in part illegal, gained their legitimacy from the very technicians that the military regime invested with the power to run rural development programs and “reform” Mapuche communities. Technicians that worked in Plan Perquenco noted that for the most part outside military officials paid little attention to Plan Perquenco. Lead technician Luis Muñoz described the situation as “total autonomy.” Muñoz commented that the autonomy derived from the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture trusted Unterrichter to independently manage the program. In a recent oral interview Muñoz argued that Unterrichter “had years of experience in that [agricultural development], and really knew the Chilean bureaucracy in this period, he knew the Minister [of Agriculture]…basically, this experience was respected, and him, with his image of an international expert from the FAO, gave us a certain armor.” Muñoz also noted that autonomy derived from Unterrichter’s more or less

463 Ibid.
464 Interview with Luis Muñoz, Perquenco, July 24, 2012.
ignorance of Perquenco’s communities. Muñoz stated, “He [Unterrichter] was a person that in technical aspects didn’t help much because it was obvious that he didn’t know the local reality. The technical aspects he didn’t control, but from the outside, he gave use a lot of autonomy.” Furthermore, geography limited military intervention. In the 1980s, and until this day one can only reach Mapuche communities in the interior of Pitraco through poorly maintained roads that wash out and become impassable in winter months. Regionalization, geography, and a generally lack of knowledge towards the project and how to fulfill its goals held military and international intervention at bay to some extent in Perquenco.

The format of rural education under Plan Perquenco specifically provided an opportunity to utilize state-coordinated program for subversive ends. In the 1980s, the Regional Secretariat for the Ministry of Education, Gaston Sepulveda, expressed concern over Plan Perquenco’s ability to re-educate Mapuche families. Minister Sepulveda argued that urban teachers who taught in rural areas often brought a cultural bias to the countryside that viewed rural inhabitants as backward “others” that were an obstacle to progress. Rural education, argued the minister, was nothing more than an “extension of the general social attitude towards the campesino.” Sepulveda concluded that the principal problem that affected rural education and cultural reform were not individual farmers, but rather the cultural prejudices of urban instructors.

To enact efficient rural education programs in Perquenco, Minister Sepulveda suggested that technicians had to develop a curriculum that incorporated the needs, interests, and expectations of rural and principally Mapuche communities. Sepulveda

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465 Ibid.
466 Private archive of Luis Muñoz, “El Plan Perquenco: Su Acción en la Comuna.”
placed particular emphasis on the creation of a “bi-cultural” education system that was sensitive to Mapuche religion, language, history, and ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{467} Since 1976, the Ministry of Education had worked to create educational programs that promoted the use of Mapuche culture, language, cosmovision, and religion as part of the educational process in rural communities throughout the Ninth Region. In 1984 the Ministry of Education released a manual for teachers that worked in Mapuche communities whose points Sepulveda no doubt drew from in his presentation in Perquenco.

As historian Joanna Crow demonstrates, however, military officials rarely enacted programs that utilized Mapuche language and culture as teaching tools in the classroom. When educators did use Mapuzungun, they did so only when it served as a cultural bridge that promoted the economic and social integration of Mapuche communities into the free-market.\textsuperscript{468} Despite the emphasis on education as a means to create market-oriented farmers, the opinions of Sepulveda with regards to the promotion of Mapuche culture nonetheless supported Molina and the members of los Guitarreros Caminantes’ affirmation of alternative notions of rural citizenship.

While in ways paternalistic in her mindset, Molina’s efforts to teach los Guitarreros Caminantes music underscored her desire to reconnect people with their communities and culture during a “cultural blackout.”\textsuperscript{469} Molina noted, “There was a lot of fear, so, it was necessary to demolish [this fear], it was necessary to find a way that people were able to speak, to smile, capable of giving a compliment. It was necessary to remove the fear in some way, to shake them in some way.”\textsuperscript{470} Molina argued that this fear

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{467}{Ibid.}
\footnote{468}{Crow, \textit{The Mapuche in Modern Chile}, 172-177.}
\footnote{469}{Morris, “Canto Porque es Necessario Cantar,” 123}
\footnote{470}{Interview with Maria Molina, Temuco, November 6, 2012.}
\end{footnotes}
had in part led to a stunted cultural development among the members of los Guitarreros Caminantes. With regards to the formation of los Guitarreros Caminantes, Molina noted,

“inside of them a sufficient maturity had not been produced for them to realize that their own surroundings were valuable...traditional folklore in pueblos, in communities, in people, has a very specific task, which is to create the foundation of human valorization. Because, when there is a foundation of personal value, as such, through music there are going to be other sprouts, other flowers, other trunks.”

For Molina, music was the ultimate avenue through which los Guitarreros Caminantes were able not only to discover their cultural value, but also their personal worth. Molina stated “I always told them ‘kids’ I’d tell them ‘this is a huinca guitar, this is a huinca song, but you have your own, you have your song, your dances, your musical instruments, your community, you are a community. We are brothers and sisters’ I’d tell them ‘but you have your rich culture, never stop talking about your culture, never stop talking about your identity.’

Through a mixture of Chilean folk music and traditional Mapuche music, Molina attempted to instill in the members of los Guitarreros Caminantes a sense of cultural and personal worth that extended beyond the cultural programs that the Ministry of Agriculture designed for Plan Perquenco. In the end, los Guitarreros Caminantes grew beyond the control of Molina to reinforce a cultural identity that challenged the notions of masculinity, community, and labor that the Ministry of Agriculture tried to foment in Mapuche communities throughout Plan Perquenco.

471 Ibid.
472 Huinca refers to non-Mapuche inhabitants of the traditional Mapuche homeland, or Walmapi.
473 Interview with Maria Molina, Temuco, November 6, 2012.
Traveling Guitarists and Cultural Revitalization

In recent oral interviews, many of the members of los Guitarreros Caminantes expressed a sense of loss that permeated their lives during the first decade of military rule. Eliazar Navarrete Hualquil noted, “nobody could express themselves in any way because of the regime [under which] we lived, so communities lived in silence despite the necessity that there were a lot things [to discuss], [but] there was no expression.”

Eliana Nahuelcura supported Hualquil’s claims when she noted, “As kids we also had dreams, but we didn’t know how to channel these dreams, we couldn’t channel them, there was no opportunity… and as kids we had this longing to learn, to go out, to have opportunities.” Bandleader Domingo Nahuelcura particularly highlighted the negative impact the dictatorship had on his formative years. “The 1980s were an era in which we were affected psychologically, because in school the made us believe, so terrible, that we didn’t have the capacity to do anything else. I remember in grade school they told us that we should be military, or cops, because we didn’t qualify for any other career. Doctors, philosophers, musicians, those were for a different social class, not for us. So that’s why I tell you that when one analyzes today what it [the dictatorship] meant for us, it was terrible.”

As a result of their sense of abandonment and loss, the future-members of los Guitarreros Caminantes looked for outlets to express themselves and gain a sense of identity. Their first major outlet under the dictatorship was the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church’s efforts in Perquenco coincided with the larger mobilization of the Vicaría de Solidaridad in the Ninth Region in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The

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474 Interview with Eliazar Navarrete Hualquil, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, November 7, 2012.
475 Interview with Eliana Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, November 7, 2012.
476 Interview with Domingo Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, September 20, 2012.
principal priest that worked in Perquenco was a Slovak named Andres Prebil. The
members of los Guitarreros Caminantes recalled that Prebil went to Perquenco’s
Mapuche communities and invited people to come to mass and sing. Eliana Nahuelcura
noted “we had a space there [at church], let’s say, for us to express ourselves, like I told
you. This curate invited us, you know, to a kids’ conference, we went to mass, we helped
sing…this was a small space that we had in this time that was so dark.” At church
events, teenagers became familiar with Christian hymns. Through songs that underscored
biblical stories of salvation and redemption, bandleader Domingo Nahuelcura became
intrigued by Liberation Theology’s insistence that the duty of Christianity was to provide
the poor with the tools to overcome their subjugation and thus fulfill their potential as
true humans beings.

The early performances of los Guitarreros Caminantes did not, however, address
themes of social justice apparent in Liberation Theology. Molina and the young
musicians formed los Guitarreros Caminantes near the end of 1984. The proximity of
Christmas meant that the first round of songs that Molina taught the youth were
Christmas carols. The members of Los Guitarreros Caminantes remembered these early
tours of Perquenco’s communities as a formative experience. Eliana Nahuelcura noted
that the purpose of the Christmas carol circuit was,

“to rescue some of the Chilean tradition that was lost at the time. So, Señora
Maria Molina was like a bridge for us, which took us to the communities. First,
we learned two or three carols, nothing more, hands stiff, but we went… we met
with people that in the this era couldn’t get together, but we had a space where we
could talk, the ladies drank maté, the men talked, and we sang to them. It was a
way to cheer up very solitary people, abandoned, let’s say, without a space to
express themselves.”

477 Interview with Eliana Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, November 7, 2012.
478 Ibid.
These early experiences, therefore, demonstrated to los Guitarreros Caminantes the power music had to open new spaces to express one’s self in a time of darkness and despair.

Christmas carols and the other songs that Molina taught los Guitarreros Caminantes, however, intentionally avoided political themes. Many of the members of Los Guitarreros Caminantes, as well as Molina, expressed that this omission of political songs derived specifically from a fear of military retribution. Molina’s firsthand experience with the military regime’s brutal repression of the Nueva Canción movement led her to avoid anything that even remotely resembled political themes. Molina noted, “when we [technicians] arrived there [in Perquenco] I did not continue in the line of patriotism, nor in the vein of, lets say, of social, more confrontational [music], but I looked for those things that spoke of identity, that spoke of the value of the person, that spoke of the value of Chile, and that’s how I guided the kids…in the lyrics nothing had to do with revolution nor with nationalism, it was simple music, but that definitely spoke of personal value.”

Eliazar Navarrete Hualquil remembered that los Guitarreros Caminantes became increasingly interested in Víctor Jara and Violeta Parra, but that Molina refused to teach them those songs. Hualquil argued, “because she [Molina] was also very afraid. There was a point when we began to sing by ourselves and she really didn’t like our themes because they had a deeper social consciousness. So, they weren’t the songs that Señora María Molina taught us that we sang. We went along, we advanced more, and we went deeper into these themes.”

Nueva Canción specifically provided a musical and thematic model that allowed los Guitarreros Caminantes to express themselves outside of Molina’s music classes. At the time much of this music was prohibited. To gain access to the music, Nahuelcura

479 Interview with María Molina, Temuco, November 6, 2012.
480 Interview with Eliazar Navarrete Hualquil, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, November 7, 2012.
listened to cassette taps that others smuggled into Perquenco. The rise in popularity and availability of bootlegged cassettes in the 1980s led to what Nancy Morris describes as an informal music exchange among Chileans. This informal music exchange ultimately kept Nueva Canción and the social themes it embodied alive during a time when the military dictatorship declared the music’s social themes subversive.481 Through these cassettes and the access to underground Chilean radio stations like Radio Moscú and Radio Ñielol, Nahuelcura and the other members of los Guitarreros Caminantes slowly began to identify with the ideas of social justice that Nueva Canción artists sang about. Nahuelcura argued,

“after 1973, when everything was prohibited, we began to rediscover our [national] authors. We began to listen to Violeta, I remember, with a lot of energy, we began to listen to Quilapayún, we began to listen to Víctor Jara…we had lived what Violeta lived, of what Héctor Pávez sang about, we had lived it. We knew what it was to be cold, we knew what it was to be tired, we knew the joy of celebrating with the community…life began to make sense, it began to have content for us. In this way we linked ourselves to the theme of [this] music.”482

The band drew from the musical style of the conjuntos of Nueva Canción. The band utilized multi-vocal harmonies, overlapping guitar rhythms, and the Chilean harp to create deep rhythmic and harmonic landscapes. In many of their songs, los Guitarreros Caminantes also incorporated Mapuche instruments like the cultrún drum to add a cultural complexity to an otherwise familiar Chilean musical format. Beyond aural style, the influence of Nueva Canción ultimately led los Guitarreros Caminantes to write music that challenged the cultural, economic, and gendered ideals of the military dictatorship.

In terms of gender, the very existence of a mixed sex band that traveled independently throughout Perquencon was a threat to perceptions of proper interaction

482 Interview with Domingo Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, September 29, 2012.
between young men and women. Concerns with youth promiscuity and teenagers’ independence from their families dated back to the UP’s promotion of youth theatre and folklore groups in rural areas. Many of the groups the UP supported bred anxiety among adults as young men and women constructed new notions of youth heterosexuality and sexual freedom outside of their parents’ gaze. Many of the fears present in the early 1970s remained in the 1980s. Members of los Guitarreros Caminantes noted that their parents did not approve of the group. Domingo Nahuelcura argued, “it wasn’t common to see a group of young people together. There was always a division between men and women. It wasn’t common that a group of young women got together with a group of young boys.” Eliana Nahuelcura noted, “it was really difficult because my parents, my mom, didn’t want to give me permission [to participate], because in this time kids weren’t like they are today. Nowadays kids date openly, but not in that era.” The comments of Eliana and Domingo Nahuelcura reflected that there was a concern among parents that the participation in the band led children into activities that were inappropriate for unwed men and women.

Other oral testimonies from Perquenco highlighted that a fear of interaction between unwed men and women led to a great deal of parental regulation of children’s minds and bodies, especially those of young women. Luisa Martina Linco recalled, “Neither did they [parents] let women enter school, because they were going to send letters to men, and the men definitely knew this. They [men] had to learn to read, women no. That’s how my grandmother told it to me. Women aren’t for studying, my dad told me… I sign with my finger, so that I don’t send letters to men, that’s what the old folks

483 Tinsman, Partners in Conflict, 234-236.
484 Interview with Domingo Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, September 29, 2012.
485 Interview with Eliana Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, November 7, 2012.
The fear of women sending letters to men was a theme that reoccurred in most interviews with women in Perquenco. The idea that women sent letters to men when liberated from a parental gaze simultaneously reaffirmed what Heidi Tinsman argues was the threat of female independence and the notion that women’s bodies were objects of male desire that necessitated adult supervision and control. Eliana Nahuelcura’s ability to travel throughout Perquenco without father or husband to allegedly care for her was a challenge to community perceptions of women’s role within the family and society based on domesticity and obedience.

While los Guitarreros Caminantes in ways challenged the perceived labors and spheres appropriate for women, they also contested notions of rural masculinity. The Ministry of Agriculture’s conception of rural masculinity specifically promoted individuality over the collective good as a backlash against the cooperative nature of state-led agrarian reform in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As noted elsewhere, the Minister of Agriculture argued rural masculinity embodied male independence, discipline, sobriety and responsibility to the family. Los Guitarreros Caminantes’ emphasis on music and cultural production as their primary objective in life principally contended with the idea that men should engage in intensive agricultural production to ensure familial and national security. Domingo Nahuelcura recalled that Luis Muñoz, who ran Plan Perquenco, often had trouble delivering the message of productive rationality to los Guitarreros Caminantes. “He [Luis Muñoz] saw in us the possibility of, that we could take up this economic theme, and [he] urged us to go to meetings, to talk about these things, concerning productive development, but we were basically musicians.

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486 Interview with Luisa Martina Linco, Comunidad Hijidio Pinchulao, August 31, 2012.
487 Tinsman, Partners in Conflict, 235.
We began to like this, we began to create this dynamic around music and art.\textsuperscript{488} The lack of interest among the members of los Guitarreros Caminantes to participate in the economic and familial reform programs created an alternative vision for what Plan Perquenco meant for community members. In the case of los Guitarreros Caminantes, music and cultural reproduction rather than rational agricultural development was the principal vehicle for personal and community advancement.

Many families in Perquenco felt that participation in los Guitarreros Caminantes did not support community development. Federico Lagos Rosales noted “there were a lot of people that didn’t understand during this time… they said to me ‘Do you go along playing your guitar because you are starving to death?’ one doesn’t play the guitar so he can eat but because he likes to play guitar, because he is passionate.”\textsuperscript{489} The idea that music was not an endeavor that permitted one to survive was a theme apparent in other oral interviews. Domingo Nahuelcura remembered, “our parents, or the majority of the parents of the kids, thought that it [music] was a waste of time…what was most important for our family was to eat, so one had to work to eat, and playing guitar was, I don’t know, was ridiculous, it didn’t suit the fundamental objective [of living]… the truth is that I was hungry, we never said this, but we lived it.”\textsuperscript{490} These quotes reflected that through music, members of los Guitarreros Caminantes directly challenged notions of production that both the Ministry of Agriculture and local families considered the hallmarks of masculine responsibility.

The thematic content of los Guitarreros Caminantes’ songs reinforced the alternative notions of individual and community development that participation in the

\textsuperscript{488} Interview with Domingo Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, September 29, 2012.
\textsuperscript{489} Interview with Federico Lagos Rosales, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, Novemeber 7, 2012.
\textsuperscript{490} Interview with Domingo Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, September 29, 2012.
band embodied. The lyrics of many of los Guitarreros Caminantes’ songs, however, in
and of themselves were not radical. The depiction of natural settings, rural workers, and a
romanticized past resonated with the folklore themes the dictatorship promoted. Unlike
military-sanctioned depictions of Mapuche culture that presented the Mapuche as a
romantic vestige of the past, however, los Guitarreros Caminantes used similar imagery
to affirm an assertive and active Mapuche identity. The lyrics of Mapuche state:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Una vez siendo niño dormido</th>
<th>Once a sleeping child</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Me arrullaste en tu cuna de luna</td>
<td>You lulled me to sleep in the moon’s cradle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y tu voz antigua de arcilla</td>
<td>And your voice, ancient clay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fue moldeando mi mente y voz</td>
<td>Molded my mind and voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapuche es un río que me lleva</td>
<td>Mapuche is a river that takes me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A buscarte en mi corazón</td>
<td>To find you in my heart</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The song Machi also draws on the theme of ancient knowledge and culture as the basis
for modern day identity formations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Va recorriendo el conocimiento</th>
<th>She moves through the knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De milenarios antepasados</td>
<td>Of ancient ancestors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y es tu belleza morena altiva</td>
<td>And your proud brown beauty is the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frutos del aire y tiempos pasados, tiempos antiguados</td>
<td>Fruit of the air and times passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ancient times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baila la Machi, baila la niña</td>
<td>The Machi dances, the girl dances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machi radiosa, niña divina</td>
<td>Radiant Machi, divine girl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y es tu compaña Rehue silvestre</td>
<td>The rustic Rehue is your company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehue sagrado y cultrún agreste</td>
<td>Sacred Rehue and wild cultrún</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through these songs many of the los Guitarreros Caminantes constructed
alternative notions of rural masculinity and femininity. Eliazar Hualquil related the lyrics
of Machi to his mother. Hualquil’s mom became a widow at the age of 25 and had seven
kids to care for. Hualquil argued, nonetheless, that his mother embodied what he saw as a
Mapuche goddess. The lyrics of Machi represented his mom “because she managed to
raise all of us without needing anyone else by her side to take her children out of

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poverty… I believe she taught us that we were good people.”

Hualquil’s memory of his mother gave the idea of the machi a significance that in ways supported and contradicted the Ministry of Agriculture’s notions of proper rural femininity. The idea of motherly sacrifice was a familiar trope in the ministry’s gendered rhetoric. Rather than representing Mapuche women as backward and uncivilized, as the ministry suggested, Hualquil located true femininity and thus motherhood not in Chilean culture, but rather as inherent in Mapuche culture.

In terms of masculinity, Eliazar Hualquil noted Mapuche “represents all those campesino men, worker, fighter, that here in this community, for example, have been able to take their family forward.” Federico Lagos Rosales and Eliana Nahuelcura both noted that Mapuche reminded them of their fathers and grandfathers. “It reminds me not only of the Mapuche as a race, but also of my father who was a campesino… it brings me memories of them, I recognize the sacrifice and valor of them, of the Mapuche, or, of man.”

The notion of the Mapuche as the embodiment of ultimate male strength and responsibility created an alternative construct of masculinity that contradicted the significance the Ministry of Agriculture gave to the modern Mapuche based around inefficiency, laziness, and drunkenness.

Other songs specifically addressed combative masculine identities. Domingo Nahuelcura noted that the song El Huaso de Perquenco dealt with a time in Chile “when there was no justice. A lot of banditry came about because the poor needed justice. As there was no state, [and] no state organisms, [people] resorted to these groups [of huasos] formed among neighbors and administered justice by themselves...because there was an

491 Interview with Eliazar Navarrete Hualquil, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, November, 7 2012.
492 Ibid.
abandonment of the rural Chilean world, of the campesino, and there were abuses [committed by] others.⁴⁹⁴ The song details the life of an abusive landowner whose workers eventually killed him in retribution for his evil deeds. The use of the huaso as the central figure that brought social justice to rural communities had several important implications for rural identity in Perquenco. Throughout Chilean history, the figure of the huaso has assumed a variety of significances. Early on, the huaso that worked hard and obeyed authority became the central figure of la Raza Chilena. At public events under military rule, the dictatorship revived the image of the huaso as a romanticized figure that was the embodiment of steady agricultural production. The military’s depiction of the huaso personified all of the themes of rural masculinity, responsibility, and independence that the Ministry of Agriculture tried to instill in the Chilean countryside through its agrarian reform programs. In turn, los Guitarreros Caminantes argued that in El Huaso de Perquenco the huaso was “rebellious, free and subversive, the prototype of the man that lives in the frontier.”⁴⁹⁵ The invocation of a rebellious rural masculinity that challenged the authority and morality of large estates owners was consistent with other twentieth-century working class identities that valorized assertive and combative manliness. Tinsman notes that while the term huaso contained racial and cultural overtones that insinuated one was backward and akin to a country bumpkin, workers nonetheless appropriated the term to prove they were “strong, independent, irreverent, that no man had a hold on him, not even the patrón.”⁴⁹⁶ Furthermore, Thomas Klubock has demonstrated that copper miners’ invocation of the image of the brash roto macanudo

⁴⁹⁴ Interview with Domingo Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, September 29, 2012.
⁴⁹⁵ Author’s personal archive, Los Guitarreros Caminantes pamphlet.
openly challenged the authority of companies to control and transform workers into disciplined and monogamous men.

While the music of los Guitarreros Caminantes engaged with these popular images of worker militancy to challenge the Ministry of Agriculture’s reform efforts, they did so with reference to the communal and historical identity of Fernando Carilao and not that of class solidarity. Through unique authenticity, los Guitarreros Caminantes imbued the image of the huaso with personal significance that affirmed communal perceptions of social justice and masculine responsibility that challenged the Ministry of Agriculture’s emphasis on individualism, temperance, and market oriented agricultural production. For Domingo Nahuelcura, this ideal of masculinity was tied to a form of community solidarity that was central to Fernando Carilao’s historical and cultural identity. The song *El Mingako* specifically highlighted a communal memory that reified traditional modes of Mapuche community organization that challenged the individualism and consumerism of the Ministry of Agriculture’s perceptions of rural masculinity. The *mingako* was and is a form of communal field preparation that beyond labor efficiency is central to the renewal of community bonds and identity. While the mingako is not solely a Mapuche practice, for los Guitarreros Caminantes the act was a central part of their community’s historical identity based on Mapuche cultural practice. The lyrics of *El Mingako* state:

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Mi vida, ya quiere armarse el mingako
Mi vida son muchos, son muchos los mingacueros
Mi vida con sus bueyes, con sus bueyes y su apero
Mi vida p’a ver, p’a ver quien llega primero
My life, wants to form the mingako
My life are many, many are the mingacueros
My life, with its oxen, with its oxen and harness
My life, to see, to see who arrives first
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Mi vida ya quiere, ya quiere armarse el mingako  
My life wants, wants to form the mingako

Temprano en la mañana  
Early in the morning
Mi negra, yo agarro vuelo  
My love, I take flight
Sembramos en otoños  
We sow in autumn
Mi negra trilla en febrero  
My love, trilla in February

Trilla en febrero, si  
Trilla in February, yes
Ya vamos sembrando gancho  
We sow with a crook
Que después comeremos  
And after we’ll eat
Tortilla y cazuela y chancho  
Tortilla, cazuela, and pig

The song’s emphasis on one desiring communal development and the sense of sharing embodied in the reference to tortillas, soups, and pig drew from a historical memory shared by the members of los Guitarreros Caminantes. Domingo Nahuelcura recalled that the idea of communal work and solidarity within Perquenco dated back to the Spanish invasion of Southern Chile. It was from a need to resist and survive that Nahuelcura suggested communal work like the mingako emerged. “Here we resisted, at least our grandparents [did]. And when this life [of resistance] was created, it began to generate communitarian living, which is the only way human beings can survive…The neighbors got together to help the neighbor who was in the worst condition.”497

Nahuelcura in part understood this historical communitarian living through the class politics of the UP. Nahuelcura noted that the height of community solidarity and work came under Salvador Allende’s U.P. government. Nahuelcura was ten when the U.P. came to power in 1970, and recalled that for he and his family the era signified cooperative living. Nahuelcura recalled that in these formative years

“for the first time campesinos ate meat in abundance, for the first time campesinos could eat bread without having to measure it out, for the first time campesinos worked healthy hours, they didn’t have to get up at night and return at

497 Interview with Domingo Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, September 29, 2012.
night to their house. They worked during the day. They had the right to rest, they had the right to a salary, and they had the right to decent houses.”

The mingako, for Nahuelcura, was the greatest embodiment of the cooperative form of living that challenged the ideals put forth in Plan Perquenco. Nahuelcura stated with regards to the mingako:

Many of us had this cooperative mentality, to go work with a neighbor with the sole desire to help him, and the neighbor gave payment in food. There was no motivation to earn money, that didn’t exist. So, in that way [cooperative living] was constructed… the base of Plan Perquenco said ‘an individual businessman.’ That has never been. We, the poor, organized ourselves. We have always had to organize ourselves to be able to survive.”

Nahuelcura highlighted, therefore, that the ideas of the mingako and non-remunerative communal work were a revolt against the consumerism, individualism, and private property ownership that were the hallmarks of Plan Perquenco’s reforms.

The importance of the theme of collectivity lay in the reality that various historical changes instigated by the military regime broke down the practices that reinforced community solidarity, identity, and belonging. Domingo Nahuelcura recalled, “the military dictatorship destroyed the social fabric, what they destroyed was the community, understand? So, that was serious, because certainly they [military officials], those that exercised power continued getting together in the communities, but they didn’t allow us [to get together] anymore.” Nahuelcura’s oral testimony therefore focused on military repression as a central element that led to the breakdown of the community solidarity that the mingako represented. Other interviews, however, underscored additional factors that diminished communal bonds. An aspect of the Ministry of Agriculture’s rural reform was the introduction of technology and machinery that allowed

498 Ibid.
499 Ibid.
500 Ibid.
small farmers to work independently. Interviews with members of los Guitarreros Caminantes placed particularly emphasis on the negative impact these technological advances had on the formation of the mingako. Eliazar Navarrete Hualquil argued that the increased presence of machinery in Perquenco by the late 1980s began to make people more independent on themselves and less on community solidarity.

The song *El Mingako* therefore represented a collective memory of communal work that the dictatorship through Plan Perquenco slowly tried to eradicate. Federico Lagos Rosales noted with regards to the song that “to remember is a good thing, and well, now to show the youth that in those times the mingako existed and to try and explain to them what the mingako is.”

Eliazar Navarrete Hualquil also felt that the song represented a memory of collectivity that provided the community with an alternative ideal of labor organization and cooperative work. “I believe the concept of the mingako is also extremely important because the song, the theme speaks of the mingako, of what it was before, the communion of working the land …mingako is to be in solidarity with the person by your side, the one in need.”

*El Mingako* therefore served as a form of collective memory based on the recuperation of communal work as the foundation of community solidarity and identity.

It was through these alternative memories and identity constructs, therefore, that Nahuelcura and others affirmed their distinct culture. For Domingo Nahuelcura these songs were a way to recuperate what for him was an oppressed cultural identity and memory. The reference to sacred instruments like the cultrún and the ceremonial rehue whose four levels the machi ascends towards heaven during the fertility ritual, or

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501 Interview with Federico Lagos Rosales, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, November 7, 2012.
502 Interview with Eliazar Navarrete Hualquil, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, November 7, 2012.
ngillatun, represented Nahuelcura’s affirmation of the centrality of Mapuche culture to his personal being. Nahuelcura argued that in the 1980s he began to explore traditional Mapuche music and cosmovision as part of his cultural awakening. “We recuperated the ngillatun, the prayers, we got close to the cultrún as a basic instrument, symbolic of the Mapuche world, playing it, interpreting it.”\textsuperscript{503} To complement traditional Mapuche music, Nahuelcura also drew from Mapuche oral tradition in his lyrics to construct alternative historical memories. Nahuelcura stated that the use of songs based in oral history was a way to combat the discourse of official historians, like Sergio Villalobos, who reinforced the perception of Chilean ethnic homogeneity. “We have an oral tradition that speaks of the Mapuche world. They [our ancestors] told us a different history very distinct from what was written. And there conflict emerged. Why? Because I know oral history, and oral history agrees with me, the other, no. The other is a fallacy, a lie.”\textsuperscript{504}

For Nahuelcura, the recuperation of Mapuche cultural identity through Mapuche music and oral tradition was part of a larger process of reconstructing that identity. Nahuelcura recalled that during the dictatorship, “the Mapuche community didn’t exist. I am talking about Fernando Carilao. We, being Mapuche, didn’t consider ourselves very Mapuche, and they [military officials] also made us believe that we weren’t Mapuche.”\textsuperscript{505} The dictatorship’s insistence on Chilean ethnic homogeneity was a central focal point against which Nahuelcura resisted. “We are a community of the conquered, they defeated us, and like good defeated people what we want is to recuperate what they took from

\textsuperscript{503} Interview with Domingo Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, September 29, 2012.\textsuperscript{504} Ibid.\textsuperscript{505} Ibid.
us…and this has to do with the recuperation of memory. If memory isn’t recuperated, it is impossible to be able to retrieve, or be conscious of what they have taken from us.”

The idea of social justice and the recuperation of historical memory nonetheless created a cultural identity for Perquenco that was neither wholly Mapuche nor campesino, but somewhere in between. Oral interviews with the members of los Guitarreros Caminantes developed this alternative ideal of rural citizenship in reaction to what they considered the negative portrayals of rural life prevalent in Chilean culture. Nahuelcura argued that, “Perquenco is Mapuche and campesino, from this it was constructed. I feel that in every passing moment there is an effort to leave it [identity] to the side, to not consider it. But this is interesting, because we are all Mapuches, we are all campesinos, or children, grandchildren [of the two]. Perquenco was formed thanks to agricultural workers, and thanks to Mapuche influence.” Oral interviews with other members of los Guitarreros Caminantes support the opinion that most Chileans did not value rural life. In response to their music and songs like El Huaso de Perquenco Eliazar Hualquil argued “we spoke of classism and racism, what was used by people. For example, a person from the city that tried to imitate the natural language of the countryside, tried to ridicule it believing he was speaking bad, but this is the culture, it is the way a campesino expresses himself when he hasn’t had access to the city.” Eliana Nahuelcura added to this sentiment when she noted that “campesino music, everything to do with the campesino had virtue taken from it…still, they try to ridicule the campesino,

506 Ibid.
507 Ibid.
508 Interview with Eliazar Navarrete Hualquil, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, November 7, 2012.
the humble people.” The overall theme within the interviews was that Chilean society not only mocked Mapuche communities, but all of rural culture.

Through their music los Guitarreros Caminantes attempted to bring a positive image to the rural inhabitants of Perquenco, both Mapuche and non-Mapuche. Eliana Nahuelcura argued that “for me the music we make, is first, to dignify the Chilean campesino through Chilean folklore.” Eliazar Hualquil supported this notion when he stated, “for me music dignifies the human being, and not just for me, but for everything that signifies being a campesino.” Domingo Nahuelcura shared this belief. “I believe that through music, returning to art, I believe the mission of art is to communicate to communities, to communicate among ourselves, and to be able to understand in some way that we share the same things, and that the truth is relative to who is looking...our truth is subversive, because it deals with oppression, because it deals with maltreatment, because it deals with violence.”

Nahuelcura’s emphasis on shared historical experiences of violence, loss, and oppression served as a marking point of a shared experience for Mapuche and non-Mapuche in Perquenco. It was this historical experience that created a common identity that los Guitarreros Caminantes tried to validate, valorize, and bring into the consciousness of the community’s historical memory.

Current sources do not give concrete evidence as to the extent to which the message and influence of los Guitarreros Caminantes affected community identity in Perquenco. They did perform frequently in public spaces and annual festivals throughout Perquenco. From oral interviews, however, it seems that the group may have had an impact on other youth in Perquenco. Eliana Nahuelcura noted,

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509 Interview with Eliana Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, November 7, 2012.
510 Group Interview with Los Guitarreros Caminantes, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, November 7, 2012.
511 Interview with Domingo Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, September 29, 2012.
“as kids and having done that [performed music] we were like, I don’t know if it’s too much to say, like a model, like a referent for the other kids. Because many of them were more f**ked than we were because they had less, they had fewer possibilities to learn. But they saw us, and they began to join us…A lot of people went through the group, girls, boys, they joined for a time, six months, a year, they sang with us, they learned to play a little guitar, they were a lot. They also identified with us, they felt content with us.”

While her quote certainly places a lot of emphasis on the importance of the group for other kids, it is not unfounded. Eliazar Hualquil recalled that Domingo Nahuelcura wrote a play. To perform the play required some 19 kids to act and manage the stage. As Joanna Crow demonstrates, Mapuche theatre groups were a common phenomenon under military rule, and severed as important sites of community solidarity and collective art endeavors. While it is hard to tell the exact impact the group had on other kids, the collective nature of Nahuelcura’s theatre group and Los Guitarreros Caminantes fits other patterns of community solidarity and rejuvenation that occurred under military rule.

Officials from the Ministry of Agriculture designed football and music programs to be a means to instill notions of race, gender, and patriotism in Perquenco’s community members that ultimately reinforced the free market dictates of military rule. While technicians used rural football leagues in Perquenco in an attempt to create modern agricultural farmers, evidence is lacking to support how local communities used these teams to support community solidarity and alternative identity constructs. An examination of football in Perquenco nonetheless underscores the Ministry of Agriculture’s use of sport performances to instill free market values and notions masculine production in Mapuche communities. Empirical evidence particularly highlights the factors that contributed to the music program’s outcome that contradicted

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512 Interview with Eliana Nahuelcura, Comunidad Fernando Carilao, November 7, 2012.
the Ministry of Agriculture’s stated goals for Plan Perquenco. María Molina’s less than sympathetic views of military rule and her emphasis on the valorization of human dignity opened spaces for los Guitarreros to affirm a historical Mapuche identity that challenged the individualism, private property ownership, and free market principles of Plan Perquenco. To affirm these alternate identities, band members often worked through artistic formats and former patterns of community mobilization utilized by the political left. The notions of masculine responsibility that Mapuche invoked however were not consistent. Football teams like Quilacura utilized the Mapuche not as a sign of combativeness and brash worker militancy, but rather to affirm a contemporary Mapuche identity based on restraint and community solidarity. In turn los Guitarreros Caminantes often invoked images of brash worker militancy that resonated with popular representations of transgressive worker masculinity. Notions of Mapuche strength in los Guitarreros Caminantes’ songs however did not suggest that the Mapuche were an ancient source of worker solidarity and militancy. Rather, los Guitarreros Caminantes drew from these popular images to affirm their communities’ identity and history that the Ministry of Agriculture argued did not exist. Under military rule, football and music thus became fluid sites of memory construction that legitimated and contested state formation in southern Chile. Recreational programs under Plan Perquenco underline the importance of the municipality as a site of historical analysis that opens new possibilities for not only studying the complex internal dynamics of military rule but also how these dynamics interacted with the dispositions of local Mapuche communities.
**Conclusion: Rethinking the Indigenous Policies of the Pinochet Dictatorship**

My analysis of Plan Perquenco provides new insight into the historical context, administrative structure, and contested development of the indigenous policies of the Pinochet dictatorship. Until now, many scholars have focused their analyses of the regime’s indigenous policies almost exclusively on the passage of D.L. 2568 in 1979. Scholars argue that the law represented legal ethnocide for the Mapuche because it removed constitutional recognition of indigenous groups after dividing their land. Current literature presents D.L. 2568 as an end in itself, and thus land reform as the sole mechanism of the regime’s indigenous policy. I have in turn demonstrated that officials from the Ministry of Agriculture did not think D.L. 2568 could alone reform Mapuche communities, and thus enacted a variety of programs, such as Plan Perquenco, to eradicate Mapuche cultural practices that they argued prevented market expansion. The institutional focus of this dissertation has allowed me to rethink the origins and administrative structure of these policies to show that many of the regime’s indigenous reform programs were not effectively implemented. This research provides a starting point for examining in greater detail the impact, limits, and responses to the military’s indigenous and agrarian reform programs at a local level.

My research examines D.L. 2568 as the culmination of over one hundred years of state-building efforts that treated the division of Mapuche lands as a necessity of rural economic advancement. This longer historical approach to the regime’s land law challenges the notion that we can only understand D.L. 2568 within the context of the Chicago Boys’ neoliberal reforms. Like preceding administrations, regime functionaries

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claimed that Mapuche communal lands prevented the expansion of rational and scientific agricultural development. Ministry officials built on former legislation and reform efforts to argue that the advancement of the southern economy after land division relied on the formation of male-headed nuclear families that oriented private production towards the market economy. Within this ideal rural family, men were to be responsible, sober, and rational husbands who were dedicated to their families. Women in turn were to be apolitical domestic wives. The regime’s model for normative family relations in the Ninth Region greatly reflected more conservative agrarian reform efforts from the 1950s and ‘60s. The relationship between the Ministry of Agriculture and the FAO further reveals that many of the ministry’s policies were part of international Cold War development initiatives that had influenced indigenous and agrarian reform efforts in Chile since the 1950s. Plan Perquenco was therefore not unique to the dictatorship, but rather represented patterns of familial development, agrarian reform, and indigenous integration that had long characterized twentieth-century state formation in southern Chile.

The regime’s justification for its indigenous policies also relied on the same critique of ineffectual paternalism that politicians had used in the 1950s and ‘60s in their reform efforts. From the late 1950s through the ‘60s, Christian Democrats, socialists, and Catholic reformers claimed that the paternalism of the patrón had stunted the development of inquilinos, their families, and thus the modernization of the Chilean countryside. To curb the excesses of the patrón, politicians from the left and right argued for campesino proprietorship of the land they worked and their greater participation in the political process. In the 1960s, Christian Democrats argued that masculine responsibility
began with campesinos joining unions, working in cooperatives, and at times using direct action like tomas to prove that they had control over their labor, land, and families. Men’s participation in unions and asentamientos therefore became a means to liberate rural families from the debilitating effects of inquilinaje and thus help them become effective workers who carried the Chilean nation forward.

Under military rule, regime officials in the Ninth Region demonstrated a similar preoccupation with ineffectual paternalism. While the agrarian reform initiatives of the Frei and Allende administrations blamed the paternalism of the patrón for stunted familial and economic development, officials from the Ministry of Agriculture under military rule claimed it was the state paternalism of the Chilean Agrarian Reform itself that had limited economic productivity in the countryside. Ministry officials argued that the political clientelism embodied in unions and state-run agricultural collectives had created weak, dependent, and servile families throughout Chile, and especially in Mapuche communities. Regime officials contended that the expansion of unions after 1967 had produced a mass of violent Mapuche men who threatened the economic and cultural stability of southern Chile. Officials further maintained that the Popular Unity’s indigenous policies, and particularly D.L. 17.729, had fomented a system of ethnic segregation in Chile that prevented Mapuche families from fully integrating themselves into the modern agricultural economy. It was in the context of this discourse of agrarian crisis that the Ministry of Agriculture and FAO consultant Cristobal Unterrichter designed Plan Perquenco, claiming that by reforming families and introducing “rational” agricultural practices their plan would create self-sufficient farmers who individually produced and marketed their goods without state oversight or assistance.
Regime officials’ preoccupation with the damaging effects of state paternalism in the Ninth Region in part inspired the reorganization of the Chilean bureaucratic structure towards a system of regionalization. Officials suggested that under this system, municipalities had to become the nuclei for local development initiatives that relied on financial and technical assistance from a variety of public and private organizations, and not the central state. Despite the ministry’s insistence that the state was not the primary engine for social change, officials attempted to replicate centralized state authority at all levels of society through regionalization. The creation of new regional administrative units was not motivated by the desire to grant municipalities greater autonomy, but rather to ensure that they adhered to the larger political, economic, and cultural goals of the dictatorship. As a result, state-led agricultural cooperatives such as SOCAs, and programs like Plan Perquenco came to resemble patterns of state paternalism that had defined the Chilean Agrarian Reform, and which functionaries had already lambasted as ineffectual. Regime officials nonetheless justified these interventions as necessary actions that corrected the ill effects of previous administrations’ paternalistic policies and thus ensured rural economic development.

The resulting segmentation of state authority, in which municipalities had greater power but were constrained by policies designed at a national level, lends new insight into the inconsistencies of state building under military rule. I particularly challenge scholars’ arguments that regionalization created a unified chain of command from Pinochet down to the municipality.514 While regionalization was highly authoritarian and did not actually signify a decentralization of authority, my focus on the internal

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composition of local programs like Plan Perquenco reveals that the system led to a highly contested process of state formation. Despite the regime’s best efforts to the contrary, the process of regionalization often placed multiple local, national and international personnel in charge of local reform initiatives. Those personnel held diverse and conflicting opinions that often led to an uneven application of the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous reform programs.

The administrative inconsistencies that regionalization produced at a national level limited the efficacy of the regime’s indigenous policies. The Intendancy of the Ninth Region formed the CRM to garner local support for D.L. 2568 and thereby counter the increased criticism that Mapuche organizations such as Ad-Mapu leveled against the regime. While some members of the CRM supported the regime’s indigenous reforms, others did not. The recommendations for educational reform that CRM members Juan Neculman and Sergio Liempi sent to regime officials were a scathing denunciation of the dictatorship’s indigenous reform programs. Evidence also suggests that Neculman used his position of authority to publically denounce the regime rather than support its indigenous policies.

Like the CRM, Plan Perquenco’s initial phase demonstrates that reform initiatives in the Chilean countryside were not coherent. As per the dictates of regionalization, Plan Perquenco relied on funding and technical assistance from private and public organizations. The reluctance of ministries to fund the program prevented Plan Perquenco’s administrators from fulfilling the goals of the program between 1980 and 1983. Internal conflict within the Ministry of Agriculture furthermore limited the circulation of the PROPLAN report and thus stifled the ability of local technicians to gain
external support for the program. The internal complexities of the CRM and Plan Perquenco therefore highlight that the structure of regionalization prevented the full implementation of the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous reform programs, and thus regionalization did not always reinforce state authority in distant municipalities.

The FAO and Unterrichter’s participation in the development of Plan Perquenco adds an international component to my discussion of contested state formation. The international debates that surrounded Plan Perquenco led to a multifaceted negotiation over the structure of the program and its goals. There was agreement among personnel from the FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture that Mapuche communities prevented economic development, and Plan Perquenco was therefore a necessary program that ensured the Ninth Region met its full economic potential. The three-year debate between the Ministry of Agriculture and the FAO with regards to the role of the state in development programs nonetheless demonstrates that significant tension existed between the FAO and the military regime. The Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous policies were thus the product of contested international relations and not just national debates.

The most important result of these international dynamics was Unterrichter’s ability to hire the six technicians that worked in Plan Perquenco after 1984. My analysis of the technicians who managed Plan Perquenco reveals that different relationships to pre and post-1973 politics and violence shaped the approaches individuals took towards fulfilling the goals of the program. Patricio Bormann was a staunch supporter of the dictatorship who worked to implement the regime’s economic policies and thus correct what he felt were the negative outcomes of the UP’s agrarian reform programs. María Molina’s personal history in turn led her to use Plan Perquenco not as a medium to
advance neoliberal economic policy, but rather to create a sense of communal solidarity that challenged Plan Perquenco’s emphasis on individualism. Molina and the other technicians therefore represented the mixed composure of local military authority and how this inconsistency led to outcomes for Plan Perquenco that neither supported the Chicago Boys’ neoliberal reforms nor the Ministry of Agriculture’s indigenous and agrarian reform programs.

My findings on the gestation and implementation of Plan Perquenco as a military project provides a context for my oral interviews and allows me to ask new questions about how Mapuche and other rural communities interacted with local state-building initiatives, as well as the administrative structure of regionalization. Most analyses of Mapuche experiences under the dictatorship focus on the urban-based cultural movement that developed in response to the announcement of D.L. 2568. Works by José Marimán and José Bengoa provide valuable insight into the international dynamics and internal complexities of the Mapuche cultural movement in the 1980s. While this body of literature is important, it often foregoes an examination of how local communities interacted with day-to-day reform programs. My examination of the effects of Plan Perquenco at a local level, which includes football and los Guitarreros Caminantes as significant arenas for local participation, offers a new vantage point for understanding indigenous/state relations under military rule. The story of los Guitarreros Caminantes reveals that by the early 1980s avenues were available for Mapuche to challenge the regime’s indigenous policies that did not always exist within a context of urban resistance.

Los Guitarreros Caminantes provide a preliminary case study that demonstrates that local programs such as Plan Perquenco created spaces for Mapuche creativity that contested the regime’s gendered and ethnic politics. Los Guitarreros Caminantes worked through Plan Perquenco’s music courses to write songs that challenged the gender and ethnic ideals ministry officials tried to reproduce through the program’s agricultural programs and recreational activities such as football. Los Guitarreros Caminantes’ music demonstrates the transformative impact everyday cultural production has on individuals’ ability to re-conceptualize their relationship to national cultures and politics. Members drew from their community’s history of communal work practices, such as the mingako, to validate important sites of community solidarity that regime officials claimed did not exist in Perquenco. Furthermore, Domingo Nahuelcura’s portrayal of the UP’s policies as important sources of pre-1973 community development contested officials’ arguments that the Allende administration had stunted the economic and cultural progress of Mapuche communities. Los Guitarreros Caminantes therefore provide a specific case study of how a group of individuals detached from the larger Mapuche cultural movement worked through a state-sponsored program to ensure its outcomes supported their sense of cultural identity and communal history.

The expansion of research on local Mapuche interactions with the dictatorship and the larger Mapuche cultural movement also provides new ways of thinking about the legacy of the 1980s. Many analyses of the 1980s serve as a brief reference point for understanding contemporary cultural violence south of the Bio-Bio River. Historians, sociologists and anthropologists alike have shown that democratic administrations after 1990 perpetuated the dictatorship’s indigenous policies and engaged in systematic human
rights violations against the Mapuche to protect the regime’s neoliberal economic model in southern Chile.\textsuperscript{516} Anthropologist Charles Hale and Mapuche scholar Rosamel Millamán describe the politics of cultural inclusion and exclusion that defined neoliberal multiculturalism in the 1990s through the term “indio permitido.”\textsuperscript{517} Hale and Millamán note that in the 1990s there was no longer a debate as to whether indigenous groups existed, but rather what rights they should possess. The indio permitido therefore became a “rights-bearing collective subject, a negotiated space with prerogatives, but also with clear limits that make effective governance possible.”\textsuperscript{518} “Clear limits,” as the scholars contend, suggests that states support multiculturalism only in as far as indigenous culture supports neoliberal economic expansion. Neoliberal multiculturalism has therefore reinforced long-standing dichotomies of modern/savage and good/bad Indians to simultaneously recognize indigenous rights, but also define the acceptable limits of those rights within the confines of economic security.

To cement these cultural politics and thus perpetuate the military’s economic policies, democratic administrations have continually used the dictatorship’s most repressive legislation. After 2002, the administration of Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) began to apply the Anti-Terrorism Law, which the Pinochet dictatorship had designed to eradicate political opposition, to the prosecution of Mapuche leaders who mobilized against the expansion of the forestry industry. The law suspends habeas corpus, allows detention without formal charges, revokes constitutional rights, and permits the use of anonymous witnesses in trials. The use of the law was distinct in that it marked the first

\textsuperscript{516}Correa et, al, \textit{La reforma agraria y las tierras mapuches}; Mella Seguel, \textit{Los mapuche ante la justicia}; Correa and Mella, \textit{Las razones del ilkán/enojo}; Haughney, \textit{Neoliberal Economics}.


time an administration had used such legislation to protect the rights of corporations, and not just national security. Scholars have therefore underscored that up to the present Mapuche cultural movements have been criminalized through the use of the dictatorship’s most repressive laws as a means to sustain the economic policies the Chicago Boys implemented in the late 1970s. Future research that fully develops the impact of local Mapuche cultural agency and the internal contradictions of regionalization holds the potential to expand current narratives of the 1980s and thus reassess if the 1990s were an inevitable outcome of the dictatorship.

Through my dissertation I not only complicate accepted wisdom about the origins and structure of the regime’s indigenous policies, but also suggest different ways of analyzing how indigenous and rural communities interacted with these programs. This dissertation has therefore provided a base from which to launch new research that expands the discussion of indigenous policies and community mobilization under military rule, as well as how this informs current debates on the cultural politics of Chile’s Ninth Region.
Appendix A: List of Terms and Abbreviations

Ad-Mapu: Association for Artisans and Small Farmers (Asociación Gremial de Pequeños Agricultores y Artesanos)
ARA: Regional Archive of the Araucanía (Archivo Regional de la Araucanía)
ARNAD: National Administrative Archive (Archivo Nacional de la Administración)
CCM: Mapuche Cultural Centers (Centro Culturales Mapuche)
CEMA: Mothers’ Centers (Centros de Madres)
CODIMA: Corporation for Complete Mapuche Development (Corporación de Desarrollo Integral Mapuche)
CORA: Agrarian Reform Corporation (Corporación de Reforma Agraria)
CRM: Regional Mapuche Councils (Consejos Regionales Mapuche)
DIGEDER: General Directorate of Sports and Recreation (Dirección General de Deportes y Recreación)
FAO: United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization
FAOL: Food and Agriculture Organization Library
FII: Indigenous Institute Foundation (Fundación Instituto Indígena)
FVR: Rural Life Foundation (Fundación de Vida Rural)
GIA: Grupo de Investigaciones Agrarias
IACHR: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IAII: Inter-American Indigenous Institute
ICIRA: Training and Research in Agrarian Reform (Instituto de Capacitación e Investigación en Reforma Agraria)
IDI: Institute for Indigenous Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Indígena)
INDAP: Institute for Agricultural and Livestock Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario)
INR: Intendency of the Ninth Region (Intendencia de la Novena Región)
MINAG: Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura)
NACLA: North American Congress on Latin America
ODEPA: Office of Agricultural Planning (Oficina de Planificación Agrícola)
PDC: Christian Democrats, (Partido Demócrata Cristiano)
PULAPC: Princeton University Latin American Pamphlet Collection
SOCA: Agricultural Cooperative Societies (Sociedades de Cooperación Agrícola)
PROPLAN: Associated Professionals for Projects and Planning
UAF: Family Agricultural Units (Unidades Agrícolas Familiares)
UNDP: United Nations’ Development Program
UP: Popular Unity (Unidad Popular)
USAID: United States’ Agency for International Development
Appendix B: Map of Ninth Region

Appendix C: CONARA Map of Chile’s Regions

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Appendix D: CONARA Flow Chart of Administrative Units

Appendix E: Map of Perquenco and Administrative Divisions

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