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How We Fight: Strategies at Emergence among Animal Rights and LGBTQ Rights Organizations

Ryan J. Goodman

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How We Fight: Strategies at Emergence among Animal Rights and LGBTQ Rights Organizations

by
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Master of Arts, Latin American & Iberian Studies, University of New Mexico, 2003
Bachelor of Arts, Foreign Languages & Literatures, Purdue University, 2000

DISSERTATION
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Sociology
The University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico
May 2012
DEDICATION

This work is for everyone fighting to be heard, respected, and treated justly in the world.

History has a right side, and a wrong side. This is for all of those who know the difference, and choose to fight when it is unpopular or even dangerous to do so.

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This, and everything I do, is dedicated to the memory of:
Henry & Lucille Konecny
Jack L. Goodman
Jerome Konecny
and Jeff Davis
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-RG
HOW WE FIGHT: STRATEGIES AT EMERGENCE AMONG ANIMAL RIGHTS AND LGBTQ RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

The common approach to the study of strategy among social movement organizations focuses on it as a causal variable related to various movement outcomes. This research examines strategy as an outcome to understand factors related to the determination of strategy by US social movement organizations. The analysis focuses on organizations operating within the Animal Rights / Protection and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered, and Queer (LGBTQ) Rights movements, using Multinomial Logistic Regression models. These models explore and find some significance to the relationship between finances and strategy. Qualitative analyses of four organizations – People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), Animal Humane of New Mexico, Lambda Legal, and Equality New Mexico – explore the role of leaders and other external factors relating to the development of strategy. The analyses find leaders' experience and skills, resources, and the organizational context as determinants of movement strategy. Implications for theoretical and methodological studies of organizations and implications for activists are suggested, including the utility of mixed-method approaches.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION: HOW WE FIGHT

The core goals of the present research are to: (a) analyze the dynamics involved in the development of political strategy by social movement organizations, particularly during their organizational emergence (b) better conceptualize and categorize the strategies associated with social movement organizations, based on an inductive, data-driven review of a large-N sample of organizations; and (c) employ both qualitative and quantitative analytic designs to begin exploring the impact of resources, leaders, and organizational/political context on the development of strategy by emerging social movement organizations in the United States.

The fundamental question driving these analyses is: What factors and processes are involved in the development of external strategy by social movement organizations at the time of emergence? This question is driven by the fact that the existing social movement literature lacks adequate systematic and empirical examination of the processes and dynamics involved in the formation and origin of social movement organizations. Analyses of social movement organizations often focus their attention on explaining organizational outcomes: Was the organization successful in relation to its stated goals (e.g.: Gamson 1975; Martin 2008), why has it survived (e.g.: Giugni 1998; Bernstein 2003), how did the organization interact with institutional actors (Soule & Olzak 2004), and formal and informal agents of social control (state repression, counter-movements, etc.) (e.g.: Mottl 1980)?

Other analyses of movement organizations focus on various inter- and intra-organizational processes: mobilization of resources and members (e.g.: McCarthy &
Wolfson 1996; Zuo & Benford 1995), the use of media to engage the public (e.g.: Gamson 1995), or the interaction with other organizations working toward similar goals (e.g.: Ganz 2000; Meyer & Whittier 1994; McAdam & Rucht 1993). On one hand, all these foci have served the field well, generating considerable insight into movement outcomes. Yet note that in many of these analyses, a common factor used as an explanatory variable is the strategy employed by the organization in pursuit of their goals. Until we understand how strategies emerge, we will not understand social movement organizations or explain their outcomes satisfactorily.

Rarely, however, do analyses of social movement organizations explore the strategies used to pursue political and social change as a dependent variable. The present project begins to explore the processes involved in shaping and determining the strategies of movement organizations as they first emerge into the political and social arena.

I utilize two general movements – LGBTQ Rights and Animal Rights/Protection – as case studies for beginning to answer my research question, for four reasons: First, they represent two elements of the most-dominant “master frame” (Snow & Benford 1992) in the American social movement context - the pursuit of (civil) rights for minority or repressed populations. Second, as shown in Chapter 4 below, both of these movements truly bloomed and became prominent in American politics and social discourse in the late 20th Century with the emergence of numerous local, state, and national organizations working toward various issues and goals. Third, within both movements, there are organizations using all of the categories of movement strategy developed below, thus bringing variation on the dependent variable to my analysis. Fourth, organizations within
these movements vary widely in terms of their size, success, longevity, resources, scope of focus (national/state/local), and geographic location (all 50 states and some territories are all represented) – all of which are considered to be explanatory factors on various movement dynamics throughout the theoretical literature.

The research that follows begins (Chapter 2) by reviewing the most relevant literatures in the sociology of social movements and the sociology of organizations to understand existing theoretical knowledge regarding strategy. From this review, three primary hypotheses emerge relating to my core research goals of understanding the influence of resources, leaders, and organizational/political context on the development of strategy. Chapter 3 develops a conceptualization and categorization of strategy, based on both the literature and an inductive review of a large-N sample of organizations. This categorization expands the traditional limits of movement strategy to include those typically excluded from the universe of cases: most notably, those organizations that employ service provision and organizational funding/philanthropy as means to pursue general movement goals. These organizations are included in this analysis – and, as I will argue below, should be included in future analyses of movement organizations – because (a) they constitute a strategy that fits within the pursuit of movement goals: They provide necessary (often life-saving) services directly to beneficiary populations of the movement, and (b) service providers comprise the majority of organizations operating within multiple rights-based movement populations. Chapter 4 includes an overview of the various issues and goals pursued by the organizations operating within the LGBTQ Rights and Animal Rights/Protection movements. This overview shows the diversity of
goals and actions involved in both movements and the organizations involved in the analyses to follow.

The analytic approach exploring the relationships among resources, leaders, organizational/political context and organizational strategy at emergence involves the use of both large-N statistical techniques and small-N limited case histories.

The statistical analysis in Chapter 5 involves a sample of roughly 4,000 organizations working within the LGBTQ Rights and Animal Rights/Protection movements that have incorporated and filed documents to obtain (and maintain) 501(c)* statuses with the US Internal Revenue Service. From this sample, I extract subsamples of the organizations that were founded in the periods 2000-2005 and 2003-2005. These samples are analyzed using Multinomial Logistic Regression models to explore the correlates between specific measures of organizational financial resources and the strategies those organizations employ. Limitations with the availability of data and the nature of those data collected preclude a strong causal connection to be drawn from this analysis – this is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. These analyses, given the proximity of the founding date of the organization and the collection date for the financial independent variables, allow for a robust explanatory relationship to be explored. While still not a perfect sample or collection procedure – limitations noted in detail in Chapter 5 – these models allow a rigorous analytic test of the hypotheses proposed related to the question of strategic development at organizational emergence.

Second, the full original sample of nearly 4,000 cases – with wide variation in terms of founding year – are analyzed without casual presumption to explore these
dynamics for a larger sample of cases. Little can be inferred from the direct relationships found for this sample. However, this exploratory analysis opens the door to further large- N analyses into the role of resources at organizational emergence, and to provide a foundation for exploration into these and other variables through the use of small-N analytic techniques.

The key substantive finding of the statistical analysis is that financial resources are not as influential on the development of strategy as has been proposed in prior research, and suggests further exploration into the mechanisms relating finances and other resources to strategic development.

The qualitative analysis in this project explores the relationships of resources, leaders and their personal histories/attributes, and the various elements of political/social/organizational context on the development of movement strategy at the time of emergence. To do this, I explore, via limited case histories, four social movement organizations: Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and Equality New Mexico from the LGBTQ Rights movement (Chapter 6), People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and Animal Humane of New Mexico from the Animal Rights/Protection movement (Chapter 7). These organizations represent four of the six strategies of movement activity proposed in Chapter 3: Legal Strategies, Routine Politics, Expressive/Cultural Strategies, and Service Provision, respectively. They also vary in terms of size, time of foundation, scope of focus, leaders' skills and histories, context in organizational and political/social terms, and resources available. The data used for these case explorations include archival materials from the organizations (meeting minutes,
newsletters, etc), publicly-available official documents (by-laws, articles of incorporation, IRS forms, etc.), media reports, organizational materials (“official” histories, “About Us” pages), secondary data (interviews collected by other researches and published, histories and summaries published by non-members of organizations), and limited elite interviews with founders/original members. In these case explorations, I examine the continuity of strategy over time by comparing the actions and strategies of these four organizations in their earliest days, their “landmark” actions and achievements at various points in their organizational histories (where applicable), and their present campaigns.

The findings of the qualitative analyses suggest the following. First, organizational founders appear to have greater freedom of choices regarding strategy than a narrow focus on resources suggests. Second, the specific characteristics of leaders – their past experiences in activism, in their careers, and their specific skills and training – may outweigh any other factor in determining strategy. Finally, the organizational and political context has effects on strategy at emergence for some organizations, but does not for others; this suggests further research into the dynamics of extra-organizational factors on strategic development.

By employing both a large-N statistical analysis and an exploratory small-N case history approach, this research examines the potential impact of financial resources on SMO strategy across a broad and varied sample of organizations, and the complex relationship of organizational context and leaders' biographies to SMO strategy. The use of a mixed-method design attempts to mitigate the potential analytic weaknesses of each
approach while combining their relative strengths.
CHAPTER 2 - THEORY & LITERATURE

This chapter discusses the sociological literature most relevant for studying the development of political strategy by social movement organizations. This review explores those studies that have directly examined strategy as a dependent variable of interest, works seminal for arguing for the importance of strategy as a dependent variable, and the work of the few sociologists of collective behavior who have explored issues of movement strategy. To conclude the chapter, I propose a series of hypotheses, derived from the reviewed literature. The viability of these hypotheses will be examined by the quantitative and qualitative analyses performed in Chapters 5-7.

As argued in Chapter 1, one of the key issues within the social movement literature should be the development of organizational strategy. But organizational strategy has often been overlooked in favor of questions of strategic efficacy in terms of movement outcomes. The development of organizational strategy (with the exception of the work of Marshall Ganz discussed below) is often left as an unexplained, “black box” process. Much of the literature appears to assume that initial mobilization and strategy are determined as rational calculations by movement founders in determining the most efficient means to achieve goals (see Fireman & Gamson 1977 for a review of utilitarian logic in theories of collective action). Empirical reviews of widely differing movements demonstrate that many organizations sustain one strategic repertoire over long periods, despite its obvious ineffectiveness (e.g., Piven & Cloward 1977; Rochon & Mazmanian 1993; Bates 2000). When strategy is employed as an independent variable, which can be used to explain various dependent variables, including success or failure, response of
agents of social control, the ability to mobilize resources and garner favorable public opinion, and access to political elites and the state (e.g., Gamson 1975; Edwards & McCarthy 2004; McCarthy & Wolfson 1996; Reger & Staggenborg 2006; Johnston 1980).

**Gamson: The Strategy of Social Protest**

One such study is William Gamson's *Strategy of Social Protest* (1975), which examined a large population of US social movements to determine how various strategies influenced their success or failure in terms of stated organizational goals. Gamson constructed a sampling frame of 4,500 “challenging groups” - formal organizations capable of taking action which carry a challenge to the political system (Gamson 1975). From this frame he arrived at a final sample of 53 groups (randomly chosen, with repeat entries removed, and ensuring for conceptual validity) to determine the effect of their strategy on movement outcomes. Gamson found seven predictors to have statistically significant effects on the success or failure of challenging groups in American politics. A high level of organizational formality or bureaucracy, the centralization of leadership, the distribution of selective incentives (such as wages or titles) to members, and the deployment of violent (or “feisty,” as he also refers to them) tactics are significant correlates of successful organizations. On the other hand, receiving violent social control or repression from institutional agents or other organizations, the pursuit of goals that involve “displacing the antagonist” (removing the targets of their action from their position of authority), and factionalism or internal divisions are correlates of failed challenging groups (*ibid*).

Regarding strategy, Gamson found that challenging groups that employ violent
tactics seem to be more successful, but also noted that the use of violence may be a
“symptom” of success more than a cause: that groups resort to violence out of
“impatience or hubris” rather than out of desperation, as may be presumed (*ibid*).
Violence is also viewed as part of an interaction with targets, rather than as an explicit
strategy employed by challengers. The emergence of mass media (his study focuses
primarily on organizations prior to 1945) perhaps changes this dynamic by increasing
costs to challengers of using violent tactics, and (perhaps more so) the costs to agents of
the state and authority figures of violent repression. The idea that “the whole world is
watching” became a feasible possibility in the television age, and a virtual truth in the age
of social media and the internet. Gamson includes the non-violent tactics of the Civil
Rights movements of the 1960s within this idea of “feistiness” in strategy (*ibid*), as it
represents an explicit challenge to agents of social control to repress the non-violent at
their own peril.

While Gamson's work represents a watershed in the analysis of social movements
and their success in creating political change, it has not gone unchallenged. Notably,
Jack Goldstone (1980) directly critiqued this analysis by asserting that Gamson's findings
are the result of troublesome, if not flawed, methodology and research design (Goldstone
1980). Goldstone argues that many of Gamson's strongest correlations are spurious, and
the result of the strong correlation between displacement-goals - “goals including the
destruction or replacement of antagonists” (Gamson 1975: p. 48) - and movement
outcomes. Secondly, Goldstone takes issue with Gamson's categorization of groups on
the dependent variable of outcomes: Is a challenging group which has won partial-
success on its stated goals a failed or successful movement? Gamson places them in the “failed” pile, while Goldstone argues that placing them in the “success” pile dramatically changes the correlations of various determining factors (ibid). While the Gamson-Goldstone debate remains indeterminate (Gamson 1980), ultimately Gamson provided the study of social movements with a quantitative and qualitative foundation regarding the impact of strategy and other organizational traits on movement outcomes. While his categorization of strategies is limited to those who are violent or “feisty”, the importance of strategy for movement outcomes is clear and strong in his analysis. Ultimately, outcomes are a key motivation for social action by members: Individuals get involved in activism because they want to make social change. If strategy is a key component in outcomes, then it is incumbent upon us as researchers of this phenomenon to understand the variation in strategies deployed and the processes and factors involved in the development of strategic repertoires by challenging groups.

The Determinants of Strategy

In 1970, Ralph Turner identified a typology of strategies and the factors involved in how movements determine which strategies to employ at any given time. For Turner, strategy is a fluid process, influenced by both internal and external factors. Turner proposes two sets of principles that guide the selection of strategy by a movement organization at any given time: “strategic” principles and “expressive” principles (Turner 1970). The strategic principles are simply rational calculations of tactical effectiveness. The expressive principles refer to the use of strategy to project an image or culture of the movement. Organizations are not completely free to deploy tactics based solely on their strategic or expressive determinations. Rather, they are constrained by the values of the
movement, the values of the possibly-affected publics, and the relationship between the movement's constituency and the target (ibid). Strategy is thus determined by the interplay of strategic and expressive principles limited by internal and external movement dynamics. For Turner, organizations are more likely to direct their activities toward strategic considerations if the leadership is more sophisticated or experienced in prior social movement activities and if the membership is experienced and disciplined in activism.

Organizations will tend toward expressive strategies if their leaders are less experienced and members less connected to one another (Turner 1970). The key consequence of this distinction is that those organizations inclined toward strategic principles are more likely to engage in routine and legitimate strategies – lobbying, consciousness-raising, political campaigns. On the other hand, direct action protest or violence is more likely to be determined by expressive principles. Violent strategies are viewed as extreme, with non-violent confrontation viewed as a less extreme, though still more expressive and thus less sophisticated strategic effort (ibid). A thorough review of Turner’s categorization of strategy and a critique thereof is found in Chapter 3.

Beyond Turner, the sociological literature regarding social movement organizational strategy can be categorized as having two traditions: those that place more causal importance on factors and processes external to the social movement organization (SMO) and those emphasizing internal organizational dynamics. The following discussion elaborates these theoretical traditions in the sociology of social movements and describes how they directly address the processes and variables involved in
developing external political strategy.

*Social Movement Strategy: Extra-Organizational Determinants*

**CLASSICAL MODELS**

The early works of American sociology regarding protest and social movements primarily revolve around psychological explanations regarding the formation of organizations and activity of members. These focus on the *deviance* of engaging in political protest, and seek to explain individual participation by understanding personal motivation to engage in such acts. Protest, particularly in democratic or non-repressive political conditions, is viewed as an irrational act: If the state allows routine political participation, and individuals have access to the political arena - which they are assumed to have in such contexts - then to resort to political protest is not an efficient means to redress grievances (McAdam 1999). Instead, members of SMOs are viewed in these early works as psychologically vulnerable individuals who are isolated and alienated by their lives in mass societies. Activists, then, are easily manipulated by political elites into engaging in dangerous deviant behavior to benefit those elite interests (Kornhauser 1959).

For Herbert Blumer, movement tactics only require a discussion of the rational calculation in regard to recruitment, maintaining membership, and goal attainment – with “little more to be said” (Blumer 1969: p. 89). SMO participation and action are thus considered to serve individual desires for change, or to correct psychological strain or deprivation, rather than viewed in terms of political, social, or economic goals (McAdam 1999). If these actions (or movement participants) are viewed as deviant, then explaining them will involve psychological and external factors beyond the organization. Strategies
employed by the organization are considered non-routine, irrational attempts to disrupt the political arena within a given society. Therefore, those factors that directly influence SMO strategy are unrelated to the presence of other protest groups, the goals, membership, or leaders of the organization, the cultural background of the population, available resources, and political context (ibid).

RESOURCES MOBILIZATION

The Resource Mobilization perspective focuses on the inputs necessary for an SMO to emerge, survive, and achieve some level of success regarding goal-attainment. Empirical studies within this tradition discuss strategy as an independent variable involved in these outcomes rather than treating strategy as an outcome of various movement processes (e.g., McCarthy & Wolfson 1996; Edwards & McCarthy 2004). Some of the processes and variables discussed, however, can be viewed as potential determinants of strategy at emergence.

John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald discuss the impact of pre-existing organizations within the same issue or general movement on the tactics of new emerging movements. First, an SMO emerging into a “crowded” issue – one with a number of existing organizations working toward similar goals - or movement is likely to develop new or unique strategies (or goals) in order to occupy its own niche among the other movements (McCarthy & Zald 1975). Therefore, a crowded issue or general movement may lead to an increase in strategic innovation. Similarly, a crowded overall SMO population – across all issues and movements - may help determine the emerging SMO’s strategy by limiting the alternatives to only those that would provide it a unique position. Second, the presence of “Social Movement Entrepreneurs” - or career activists who move
between organizations, bringing their organizational and tactical know-how with them - may influence the strategy of the new organization (ibid). If these entrepreneurs can be identified and their prior experience catalogued, we may be able to determine which strategies are more likely to be employed by the new SMO. Third, the amount and kind of resources available to the new SMO may influence the range of strategies employed (ibid). A new SMO with greater available resources is likely to have a broader range of available strategies.

Presuming that strategies vary in terms of their associated costs, the nature of funding or resources may help determine the strategy employed. Inputs to the organization from external sources and the relation of the SMO to established or routine political entities may help determine the strategies employed. These strategies are directly related to the prospects of survival, increased membership and resources, and goal attainment of the organization (ibid).

Therefore, within the Resource Mobilization perspective, the key determinants of social movement strategy involve rational calculations of external costs and benefits in relation to the survival and mobilization of resources from members and external actors.

POLITICAL PROCESS/POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

Similar to the Resource Mobilization theorists, the Political Process tradition focuses on the relationship of the SMO to the wider political context. The emergent organization is shaped by the opportunities afforded it by established political, social, and economic conditions. Community institutions, or “indigenous organizations,” according to Doug McAdam, provide valuable resources to the new organization. These resources include established leadership, networks of communication, norms of social control,
solidarity incentives, and mass membership (McAdam 1982). The emerging SMO is shaped primarily by variables and processes external to the organization. The emergence of an SMO depends on the presence or expansion of political opportunity for that particular movement.

The concept of political opportunity is problematic in a number of ways. First, depending on the issue involved, a different political context exists in each society. For example, an emergent SMO regarding same-sex marriage faces a different political climate – in terms of institutions, elites, counter-movements, media, and so on – than an SMO working toward changes in health care policy. This is due to the different political targets, institutional elites, private businesses and interests, affected populations, and other factors involved in the different movements.

Second, the relationship between political opportunity and the emergence of protest groups is empirically unclear. In a pointed critique, Jack Goldstone questions the concept of opportunity in democratic or democratizing societies. If opportunity is conceptualized as the presence of inclusive, transparent, and democratic processes and institutions, one would assume that the need for protest and SMO activity would be negatively associated: An increase in these institutions should imply a decrease in protest activity as it would be deemed less necessary to make political or social change (Goldstone 2004).

Lastly, empirical examination suggests a relationship between the complete absence of political opportunity and protest action. Rachel Einwohner’s work regarding the uprisings in the Warsaw Ghetto during World War II suggests that communities that
face complete internment with the prospect of imminent violence and destruction are also likely to resist, protest, and challenge political elites (Einwohner 2003). Therefore, the relationship between opportunity and SMO emergence is ambiguous at best. How context shapes SMO strategy for emergent groups is equally unclear; the ways organizations utilize elements from indigenous organizations and engage established political targets are based primarily on the likelihood of goal attainment, the nature of the target, and the community of potential beneficiaries.

In a separate study, Einwohner examined the relationship between Political Opportunity and SMO actions within Animal Rights organizations (Einwohner 1999). She examines these four movements in a “practice-oriented” approach, which focuses on political opportunity as rooted in the necessity or centrality of those practices challenged by the SMO. Opportunity, in this analysis of practices, is reflected in the possibility to alter or eliminate those practices (in her cases – hunting, laboratory testing, animal cruelty, etc.) Einwohner finds that organizations successful in changing practices viewed as harmful to animals worked to change those deemed neither highly central nor necessary: the wearing/production of fur garments and the cruelty to animals in circuses. Both the wearing of fur and attending the circus were viewed as unnecessary and non-central by the populations targeted, and thus the campaigns were more successful in changing those practices compared to animal testing in laboratories and hunting (viewed as necessary and central, respectively). The broad implications of this analysis are that researchers should approach the concept of political opportunity with a more organizational or practice-oriented approach alongside a national or cultural context of
opportunity. Also, we should view the community and individual notions of *centrality* and *necessity* as components of the resistance to change.

**ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFUSION**

Scholarship surrounding social movements and organizations in recent decades has considered the relationships across organizations as a fundamental focus for understanding the adoption of similar strategies (e.g., Klandermans 1993, Schulman & Munro 2006; Andrews & Biggs 2006; McAdam & Rucht 1993). The literature on this terrain involves studies of diffusion. The initial insights from early social-psychological analyses of diffusion inform numerous efforts to examine the proliferation of practices across cases within a given field (including SMOs, firms, and other organizations) (e.g., Freeman 1973; Klandermans 1990). The basic logic of diffusion is that actors (organizations, individuals, states) are influenced by the actions and ideas of others in the same general field. The literature in the sociology of collective behavior and organizations has developed distinct hypotheses regarding the processes involved in this diffusion. Inter-organizational studies dominate the current literature regarding tactical diffusion. Organizations adopt strategies based on the successful use of similar tactics by other contemporary or past SMOs within the same issue, general movement, or social movement context.

This first hypothesis emerges from the literature regarding the dynamics of protest cycles. Sidney Tarrow (1994) conceptualizes a protest cycle as a period of heightened conflict across the social system with the confluence of rapid diffusion of protest across social sectors, rapid innovation in the tactics of protest, new or changed collective action frames, routine and non-routine political action, and increased interaction between
authority and challengers which increases the likelihood of repression (Tarrow 1994: p. 153-154). These cycles, rather than being coincidental or based on political or economic contextual factors, are the result of increased contact and diffusion from “early riser” SMO to those that follow which imitate, borrow, or benefit from the characteristics and actions of the initial actors (ibid). Doug McAdam (1995) outlines a similar dynamic in which initiator movements not only establish the strategic and ideological foundations of a protest cycle but also serve to signal and expand the political opportunity for other potential challengers (McAdam 1995).

The diffusion of strategies and ideas occurs through social networks – particularly through weak ties across SMOs – and through a cognitive process in which new, or “spin-off” movements, adopt the strategies and ideas of initiator movements. This is to establish a similarity of cause and structure which serves to legitimate the “spin-off” in the eyes of the sector and the initiator. It also provides potential channels for direct interaction of new and old organizations. Meyer and Whittier (1994) view this diffusion across SMOs as the result of “learning” or an observing process by potential subsequent challengers (Meyer & Whittier 1994). These potential SMOs are influenced by the direct policy outcomes, the changes in cultural norms, and the direct and indirect interaction of participants from the initial SMO. This occurs via the development of coalitions, the interaction within a broad social movement community, the exchange of leadership, and the expansion of the general political opportunity (ibid).

All of the authors described above focus primarily on the 1960s protest cycle. While these authors consider the direct interaction of SMOs to be a fundamental aspect of
diffusion, a recent analysis of the diffusion of sit-ins among Civil Rights activists in the 1960s by Andrews and Biggs (2006) suggests that media coverage was a far more significant factor in this process than was the presence of an active SNCC or NAACP chapter in subsequent locations of sit-ins. These studies all suggest that organizations adopt strategies from other contemporary or past SMOs in order to gain legitimacy within the field or social movement sector.

The “New Institutionalism” variant of the sociology of organizations emphasizes related dynamics involved in the diffusion of various practices across organizations in a given field. Rather than focus on the success or failure of organizations using particular strategies, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) regard the desire to be viewed as a legitimate member of the field as a driving force in adopting the practices and ideas of established SMOs. While success is not irrelevant, it is not viewed as a primary motivation for future adoption. Instead, through the processes of institutional isomorphism – the growing similarity across organizations within a given field – emerging SMOs adopt similar tactics (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). The three forms of isomorphism described are coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive isomorphism occurs as a result of formal or informal pressures from authority figures within an organizational field to conform to institutional rules, practices, and ideas (ibid). For SMOs, coercive isomorphism typically occurs informally as organizations expect that adopting routine strategies or established tactics will decrease the potential for direct repression from the state or other targets. Mimetic isomorphism is the process by which new organizations adopt the models of established organizations when they are unclear of their goals or the most efficient means
to achieve those goals (*ibid*). Again, success is not a determinant of adoption: There is no suggestion that pure rationality is involved in adopting strategies. Normative isomorphism is often a result of the diffusion of personnel across organizations. As staff or leaders in a field move from one organization to another, they carry along with them the values, practices, and ideas learned previously (*ibid*).

Levitt and March (1988), in a review of organizational scholarship, describe a process of organizational learning by which direct experience, observation of other organizations, and the development of a frame of interpreting the above lead them to make decisions without emphasis on rational calculation (Levitt & March 1988). Organizations make decisions with more regard for *legitimacy* than for perceived effectiveness or consequences. Organizations' actions are based on a process of encoding past experiences of their own and others, and then utilizing this organizational memory in future decision-making. The researchers hypothesize that the presence of actors from “initiator” or prior SMOs in emerging SMOs increases the likelihood that strategies utilized by initiator movements will be adopted subsequently by other SMOs in the same field (*ibid*).

The diffusion of personnel across organizations may also contribute to the diffusion of practices and ideas. In particular, the presence of actors with perceived expertise – often a function of their role in prior organizations – from initiator or established organizations will increase the likelihood of isomorphism. In the social movement literature, these actors are often referred to as “entrepreneurs.” These entrepreneurs engage in social movement careers in which they move from organization
to organization, carrying a catalog of mobilization, organizational, and tactical practices along the path into each subsequent organization (McCarthy & Zald 1975). In a given protest cycle, these entrepreneurs often begin in the same movement organization and diffuse across the sector to other emerging organizations. Their presence and perceived legitimacy as an “early riser” or “pioneer” of the cycle will affect the decisions made within spin-off movements regarding. In the organizations literature, the contemporary usage of “consultants” within firms, corporations, and other bureaucratic organizations leads to increasing isomorphism as actors hire external experts to legitimate changes in organizational policies, practices, personnel, or dynamics. These consultants gain legitimacy through their presence in other successful and established organizations, and serve to increase organizational similarity by proposing changes that reflect successful practices (Strang & Soule 1998; Barnett 1998). From this emerges the hypothesis that the options regarding tactics available to emerging SMOs are limited to those consistent with existing or dominant repertoires of action.

The concept of “collective action repertoires” emerges in the study of collective behavior from the work of Charles Tilly. For given SMOs, the options regarding strategy, organizational forms, patterns of decision-making, inter-movement dynamics, modes of communication, and so on, are all constrained by prior experience in the field and the SMO’s cultural and material resources (Tilly 1993). It is “the whole of the set of means” available to an organization within a given social context (Tilly 1993). Repertoires are stable cultural formations that persist throughout the development and ultimate decline of protest cycles. Common examples in the literature include the use of sit-ins in the mass
movements of the 1960s (Andrews & Biggs 2006) and the food riots of the French
Revolution (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001). Elements of repertoires are not necessarily
rigid; every organization must adapt the strategies, symbols, and beliefs consistent with
the repertoire to match the instrumental, identity, and/or cultural goals of the organization
(Tilly 1993).

In the present study, diffusion effects regarding organizational processes relates to
the core argument surrounding the role of leaders and their histories, connections, and
relationships to other organizations, in determining their strategies.

ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY
The Organizational Ecology literature approaches the study of the formation,
evolution, and mortality of organizations and organizational forms based initially on the
ideas of biological evolution and ecology. This literature then began to focus on firms
and organizations, primarily within market contexts, but with some additional attention
paid to activist and challenging groups in society (Carroll 1984). Within a given social
context, analyses attempt to understand the emergence of new organizations and their
forms/structures, the rates and causes of organizational mortality, and the effects of
internal and external dynamics on differentiation and change. The primary determinants
of organizational emergence (or “birth”) are: niche-availability, the disbanding of
previously-existing organizations, and population density. The idea of niche-availability
is consistent with the hypotheses of Resource Mobilization in that a new organization
will emerge with a structure, strategy, goal, or form that is different from existing
organizations. In other words, they fill an existing void in the organizational “ecosystem”
(Singh & Lumsden 1990).
New organizations are likely to emerge in populations where previously-existing organizations have recently disbanded (or “died”). This suggests that there are now free-floating resources available to those seeking to organize. However, this relationship between organizational death and birth (Romanelli 1989) within a population is curvilinear over time: Initially, the disbanding of organizations signals the availability of resources, but as the mortality of organizations becomes increasingly high, this signals a potentially toxic environment to organizers and discourages their entrance into the population. Organizational density within the population has a similar curvilinear relationship: As the population density increases, new organizations are less likely to emerge because the availability of resources and organizational space is seen to be limited (Olzak & Uhrig 2001).

The analysis of the determinants of organizational mortality are useful for the present research in that by understanding why some organizations fail or “die,” we may have a better understanding of how and why newly-emerging organizations choose their structures and strategies. It may prove useful for understanding the nature of the organizational population: Among existing organizations, is there an over-representation of a particular organizational form or strategy because those in other categories have not survived, thus signaling a potential evolutionary determinant of movement characteristics? The determinants of organizational mortality in this literature include: “fitness,” newness, size, resource partitioning, founding conditions, and population dynamics. New organizations often survive when they become isomorphic with the population of existing organizations. Once they “fit,” they become inert and resistant to
change because this is seen as risky. New organizations are generally considered to be at higher risk of mortality (as also discussed in Resource Mobilization Theory) due to their lack of established legitimacy toward those who would become active members or providers of funding and resources (Carroll 1984; Singh & Lumsden 1990).

Organizational size has a variable effect on mortality: Small organizations often survive due to centralization, but large organizations are also often able to survive due to their abilities to diversify and obtain resources. Resource partitioning is a determinant of organizational mortality in that within a population, the amount of available resources is not infinite. Thus, the competition over them can become fierce and lead to contentious interactions among organizations. As a result, some are often shut out completely from the resource pool and thus cease to exist. Various internal dynamics are considered determinants of organizational mortality, but do not represent a clear departure from the various literatures discussed below. Lastly, dynamics within the organizational population (changes in markets, economies, politics, and so on) affect mortality (Carroll 1984).

An important precursor to the organizational ecology literature was provided by Arthur Stinchcombe in his 1965 article, “Social Structure and Organizations.” He addresses two key questions pertinent to the present study: How do social conditions affect the degree of motivation that a population has to start new organizations (and in particular, new types of organizations), and how do social conditions affect the likelihood that a newly-founded organization will succeed (Stinchcombe 1965)? Stinchcombe asserts that key dynamics in this process include the history of organizational forms and
types, available and mobilized resources, repertoires of action en vogue at the time, and a lack of limitations on political conflict or challenge (*ibid*). New organizations (and new types of organizations) are founded within populations when:

(a) They find or learn about alternative better ways of doing things that are not easily done within existing social arrangements; (b) they believe that the future will be such that the organization will continue to be effective enough to pay for the trouble of building it and for the resources invested; (c) they or some social group they are strongly connected with will receive some of the benefits of the better way of doing things; (d) they can lay hold of the resources, wealth, power, and legitimacy needed to build the organization; and (e) they can defeat, or at least avoid being defeated by, their opponents, especially those whose interests are vested in the current regime (Sintchcombe 1965: p. 146).

Therefore, new organizations emerge when they are deemed necessary, potentially successful, and potentially persistent. Their choice of strategy depends on what is available to them and what they have learned from the other organizations of the present and past.

The Organizational Ecology literature informs the present research regarding both key questions. First, the availability of resources is fundamental for the development of organizations and informs the strategies available to them. Second, the existing movement context and the relationships between vanguard members of new organizations and existing organizations are instrumental in determining the strategic repertoires available at emergence.

*Social Movement Strategy: Intra-Organizational Determinants*

The section below details the insights from recent theoretical traditions in the sociology of collective behavior regarding intra-organizational determinants of SMO strategy.
FRAME ALIGNMENT

Emerging as a challenge to elements of the Resource Mobilization, Classical, and Political Process traditions which emphasize objective, material, or structural factors, the work of David Snow and Robert Benford stresses the importance of cognitive and interpretive frames for understanding various SMO activities and outcomes. Frames refer to “schemata of interpretation,” or the lenses through which individuals or collectivities interpret various elements of their social life, environment, interactions, symbols, and so on (Snow, et al. 1986). Frames are of value for social movement analyses because they illuminate the interpretive elements of organizational dynamics, mobilization, and strategy. This tradition most commonly examines various processes of frame alignment in which organizations employ - either implicitly or explicitly - alterations or presentations of their beliefs, values, actions, or goals, in order to increase participation and solidarity among current and prospective members. Snow, Benford, and colleagues (1986) present four primary frame alignment processes, all of which have the intended consequence of increasing membership. First, Frame Bridging involves simply presenting the organization’s frame to the public with the idea that those individuals not already aligned with the organization, but who share the same interpretation of the goal or issue of the organization, will see this connection and join the organization. There is no alteration the SMO’s original frame in this process, which typically involves simple awareness-raising campaigns (ibid).

Frame Amplification involves selecting an element of the organization’s original frame and exaggerating or focusing more attention on that element rather than the frame as a whole (ibid). For example, a non-violent organization for workers’ rights may
amplify the non-violent portion of its interpretive frame in order to attract individuals who are not terribly concerned with workers’ rights (though not against them), but are deeply committed to non-violence. Frame Extension involves the widening of frame boundaries in order to appeal to a broader constituency (*ibid*). An organization focusing on stopping deforestation, for example, may choose to extend their frame to all issues of environmental protection to appeal to a broader base. Lastly, Frame Transformation involves a strict adherence to the organization’s original frame, rather than simply raise awareness to attract like-minded individuals, the organization attempts to alter the frames of disagreeing individuals to bring them in line with those of the organization (*ibid*). An organization founded on Buddhist principles, for example, may seek to change its adherents’ world-views to match those spiritual ideals. In all four processes, the goal is increased membership. In regards to external strategy, according to this tradition, SMOs will choose strategies based on an analysis of the necessity of further mobilization and the potential constituencies available via these four processes. Strategy, therefore, is an internal, rational calculation based on the need for membership and the application of interpretive frames between organizations and potential members.

The literature on Frame Alignment processes relates both to the question of resources and that of leaders and their respective effects on organizational strategy. First, resources relate to Frame Alignment in that their availability to organizations shape which of the above framing processes is utilized. Second, the need to mobilize resources, primarily in the form of labor and membership, directly informs how the movement implements these processes. Third, the experience of leaders is likely part of the process
involved in determining political strategy in the early days of the organization.

CULTURAL & COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
The emergence of the “New” social movement theories of the 1970s signaled a shift from structural, causal models intended to determine the subjective and constructed causes of collective behavior toward models that focus on the dynamics within organizations and communities that shape activism and outcomes. A fundamental concept to these “new” analyses is collective identity, or the cognitive or moral connection with a broader community or institution involving a sense of tangible or imagined shared statuses, expressed through symbols, myths, rituals, and modes of communication (Polletta & Jasper 2001). Collective identity is conceptualized as logically-prior to any of the organizational or tactical operations of an SMO. The identity of a community informs and shapes the forthcoming organizational form, strategic choices, ideology, internal dynamics, beliefs, and external engagement of an SMO (Bernstein 1997; Taylor & Whittier 1994).

Concurrent with this focus on identity is the application of cultural sociology to the study of collective behavior. Notably, the work of Ann Swidler and others develops the notion of culture as a “toolkit” available to organizations and communities (Swidler 1986). The elements of a cultural toolkit – modes of communication, rituals, symbols, organizational forms, and so on – provide organizers with models for the form of social organizing, rather than determining an SMO’s content (Patillo-McCoy 1998). Toolkits and collective identity represent internal SMO dynamics and pre-existing conditions within the protest community that provide non-structural determinants of strategy. For these traditions, strategy at the time of organizational emergence is a direct reflection of
the beliefs, values, norms, symbols, ideology, history, and various other shared cultural and identity elements of the activist community. This literature informs the relationship between leaders and organizational strategy explored in the present research.

POLITICAL CAPITAL & STRATEGIC CAPACITY

A final factor in the development of strategy involves the knowledge, talent, and overall organizational capacity of the organization’s members themselves. SMOs often emerge among a small handful of committed activists who are willing to take on the responsibility and workload associated with creating a challenging group. The personal biography, history, and political capital of these individuals will likely play a role in shaping key elements of the organization. Leaders with experience in past SMOs apply the lessons learned from that experience - both positive and negative - to the development of the new organization. Equally, their political capital - the knowledge and skills associated with operating within the current political context - will also influence the strategies available.

Marshall Ganz’s research on the U.S. farm workers’ movements presents the concept of “strategic capacity.” For Ganz, strategic capacity refers to a “leaders' access to salient information about the environment, heuristic use they made of this information, and their motivation” (Ganz 2000: p. 1005). This capacity is a function of both the leadership (composed of leaders’ biographies, social networks or capital, and known and utilized repertoires of action) and the organization (composed of its deliberative structure, resource flows, and means of accountability). Strategic capacity in turn determines the actual strategy employed based on the targets involved, tactics employed, and timing engaged. These strategies then influence the overall outcome of the SMO, which then in
conjunction with changes in the political and social environment reaffirm or cause changes in the structure of the organization and nature of the leadership (Ganz 2000).

Strategy employed at emergence is thus a direct function of the objective nature of the organization and the personal attributes and biographies of leaders; a focus for the present research. This is in contrast to many prior examinations of strategy which involved strict rational calculations of success, reliance on cultural or identity factors, resources, context, or charisma. Rather, Ganz attempts to synthesize these various elements into a model of strategic development (and subsequent re-development).

The Legacy of the 1960s
A common thread throughout much of the social movement literature highlights, either consciously or unintentionally, the strategic repertoire that emerged and thrived during the American protest cycle of the 1960s and 1970s. This repertoire of action – sit-ins, mass demonstrations and marches, grassroots political organizing, mass symbolic action, youth/student activism, etc. - has become the dominant and, in fact, typical framework of social movement strategy. It is, in effect, the benchmark by which all other repertoires and strategies are measured. One reason for this is the prevalence of published research findings regarding these incredibly powerful and important cases (e.g., Morris 1986; McAdam 1999; Taylor 1989). A vast number of articles and books have explored the dynamics and effects of the various Civil Rights, Women's Rights, and Anti-War/Vietnam organizations. While this is for good reason, it has the unintended consequence of creating a conceptual, theoretical, and empirical landscape that treats this particular protest cycle as the norm across all cycles. However, by examining across protest cycles, we see that the mass actions and organizing efforts of this period are more
unique than typical (Tarrow 1994).

A more complete picture for studies of social movements requires examination of strategies, outcomes, organizations, and all of the various dynamics of activism and politics within the contemporary context. The repertoire of the 1960s, while compelling and effective within that context, is not necessarily an effective strategic plan for the present day. As such, to explore current dynamics through that lens is theoretically and empirically anachronistic.

The present study builds from this theoretical issue by problematizing and exploring the dynamics surrounding the development of SMO strategy in two contemporary movements. Rather than assume that what is always needed in order to implement social change is mass protest and comprehensive organizing, this analysis explores the relationships between (a) the resources available to the organizations and founders in the early days of its existence, and (b) the various non-resource/non-financial processes and relationships between leaders and the organizational context: diffusion, networks, political culture, symbolic resonance, and various other factors on the strategy of SMOs.

Two Options: Innovation or Adoption

Up to now, two sets of factors – inter-organizational and intra-organizational characteristics and processes – have been presented through the literature as potentially causal in the determination of external political strategies by social movement organizations. The next key distinction among organizations regarding strategy is whether they develop new and innovative strategies relative to their social context or whether they adopt repertoires of action employed by other SMOs.
The conceptualization of innovation employed for the current study and utilized in the qualitative case analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 refers to the implementation of an external political strategy that has previously been absent across the universe of SMOs. Innovation is thus a potentially rare phenomenon. Emergent organizations will often coalesce around familiar and known strategic repertoires given their prevalence, success, and so on.

First, the Resource Mobilization literature suggests that new SMOs that develop within a crowded social movement sector are prone to uniqueness in some way (McCarthy & Zald 1975). These new organizations, like a new automobile manufacturer in the US, are entering an already crowded market. In such a market, the new organization/firm has to offer the potential consumer/constituent something that the existing – and thus likely more legitimate, successful, and trusted – players do not. This offering could take various forms, including but not limited to: new/different specific goals, organizational forms, mobilizing tactics, targets of action, methods of communication/advertising, selective incentives to membership, or external strategy.

For example, within the context of a growing social movement environment pursuing Civil Rights in the 1960s, new organizations faced the decision of either (a) adopting the prevalent and increasingly-legitimate repertoire of non-violent civil disobedience employed by the Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC) of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), etc. or (b) presenting a unique strategic alternative in order to attract potential constituents to
their nascent movement. Many opted for the former in order to piggyback on the successes of those organizations and as to be part of a wider non-violent movement that was making increasing inroads into public opinion and policy regarding Civil Rights, Women's Rights, and ending the war in Viet Nam. Other emerging organizations, most notably the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense in Oakland, California, chose to offer a strategic alternative oriented toward providing community resources not offered by institutional actors (in the form of school lunch programs, etc.) and expressing willingness to engage in violent confrontations with police and other authority figures when faced with perceived or actual threats to the communities.

For Resource Mobilization, this was a rational decision by the Party in order to attract members within a crowded market of existing non-violent organizations. Were they to emerge as yet another non-violent disobedient group, potential constituents/members would be faced with the decision to join (a) a large, existing, relatively-successful organization using this tactic or (b) a new, untested, unknown, and thus more fragile organization offering exactly the same repertoire (McCarthy & Zald 1975). In the eyes of these theorists, to join the new organization in that situation would be irrational and thus the new organization would fail to mobilize and either have a quick shelf-life or never emerge at all.

A corollary to the Resource Mobilization market-based analogy would be a case of a new organization that was entering a relatively or completely empty social movement context. In this situation, the new organization would be without competitors, enemies, or allies. In such circumstances, the organization would be able to do whatever
it would like to related to strategy, organizational form, membership, and so on. To extend the market analogy, this new organization would have a monopoly over the potential constituents in this context. Like a corporate monopoly, the organization then would not have its hand played or affected by the other players in the market. In this situation, the new organization would be able to choose to employ a strategy seen in other social movement sectors or contexts. However, because there was not an established population of other organizations employing any particular repertoire, their chosen strategy could either emerge as (a) borrowed from another sector or context in order to piggyback its legitimacy or success or (b) developed something unique due to a lack of competition (and thus lacking the possible negative consequences of novelty – namely, that the organization appeared radical in the face of existing and legitimate competitors).

An organization may find compelling reasons to develop innovative strategies if the existing organizations fighting for or against the same or similar causes have been demonstrably unsuccessful in their efforts. In this case, a new organization may emerge expressly because it offers a novel alternative to what has been viewed as a failed strategic repertoire. Many Animal Rights/Protection organizations have emerged with new strategies due to a perception that their previous counterparts were unable to achieve the necessary change in order to protect this population. For example, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) emerged with a strategic approach involving violent and destructive raids on laboratories that used animals to test various commercial and medical products. Members would break into the facilities, destroy equipment, vandalize and “tag” walls with their name, logo, and statements, and free the animals held within. This
tactic emerged within animal rights groups because it was believed that more legitimate and routine political and social efforts to stop the laboratory testing of animals – through legislation, boycotts and other forms of public pressure – had not worked (ALF “Mission Statement”).

Political repression toward activists may be another factor contributing to the development of innovative strategies. In a stifling and repressive political context, where the threat of physical violence, imprisonment, exile, or worse is a very real possibility for those who speak out, activists and organizations may be forced to develop strategies that have not yet been employed. To be successful activists in these contexts need to employ creative methods of mobilizing resources, members, and pursuing their stated goals. Out of necessity, they develop strategies that will avoid – or at least delay – the attention of and repercussions from state authorities. This often takes the form of utilizing tactics to disseminate information that may not appear to be activist in nature – via music or art, for example.

Another component in the development of innovative political strategies is the emergence of new technologies for use by the SMO population. The forms of technology available to activists greatly shape the potential strategies they could employ. In the past twenty years, the emergence of the internet and social media has greatly transformed activism where it is readily available. Most notably, the mass demonstrations against the regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran were largely organized through social networking sites. Because of the stifling media control by the state in Iran, much of the information disseminated by activists about their efforts and the repression they faced
from the state emerged via Twitter (Grossman 2009). Many of the “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2011 were similarly organized through Facebook, mass text messaging, and Twitter (Parvaz 2011). In earlier incarnations, activists used “older” communicative internet processes such as mass email lists, message boards, news feeds, and chat rooms to aid in organizing the diverse and actions against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999 (Smith 2001).

Figure 1-1: Factors Toward Strategic Innovation

The leadership of newly emerging SMOs may also determine that adopting a strategy used by other allied or countermovement organizations is the preferred course of action. As discussed before, developing an entirely novel or innovative strategy is a relatively rare phenomenon. Organizations often adopt an existing strategy that, for a variety of reasons, has shown to be effective.

One determinant for the adoption of pre-existing strategic repertoires is success.
If an emerging organization observes a particular strategy as effective in terms of various fundamental processes – such as mobilization, survival, and goal-attainment – then the new organization is likely to adopt a similar strategy.

Figure 1-2: Factors Toward Strategic Adoption

Organizations tend to utilize pre-existing resources, tools, and structures when both available and proven. McAdam identifies various resources that new organizations employ from what he calls “indigenous organizations” including strategy, methods of communication, solidarity incentives, leadership structures, legitimacy, and tangible resources such as meeting places and technology (McAdam 1999). By this logic, an organization entering a crowded field may be less likely to innovate in terms of strategy – as suggested by McCarthy and Zald (1975) – because the leadership and decision-makers observe the activities in the field and choose instead to adopt the best-practices of the
most-effective players. This is the “tactical diffusion” process discussed by Andrews & Biggs in which activists viewed the success of SMOs via various media outlets and direct interaction and thus employed similar strategies (Andrews & Biggs 2006).

Another process of adoption involves the importing of strategies from other social movement sectors, locations, or times. The newly-emerging organization does not look to its fellow organizations or antagonists, but rather to organizations that have had a high degree of success in an entirely different struggle. This could occur as the result of various internal or external factors. New organizations may include vanguard members who were involved in successful efforts in other social arenas. These members would bring with them their experiences with those successful strategies and suggest their application in this new fight. Organizers may choose to apply successful repertoires from other arenas based on their own observation, academic study, or media exposure of other successful SMOs. For example, student protestors against the war in Viet Nam employed the “sit-in” as a direct action against university administrators who were viewed as complicit in what were perceived to be illegitimate government actions. The “sit-in” was previously employed to great effect by Civil Rights protestors at lunch counters in the American South. Media coverage of these Southern efforts and the diffusion of activists from the South to universities in the rest of the country allowed for the spread of this successful strategy to other struggles. Occupying the dean's office and occupying the lunch counter at Woolworth's demonstrate the adoption of successful strategies in a new milieu (Andrews & Biggs 2006).

A third factor that may lead the vanguard of a new organization to adopt prevalent
strategic repertoires rather than develop novel strategies is the quest for public acceptance and legitimacy. Social movements, like all organizations, require members. Membership in activist organizations is generally considered to be at least a mildly risky vocation. According to Mancur Olsen (1965), involvement in organized efforts to obtain public goods – such as rights, clean water, environmental protection, etc. - is an irrational act (M. Olson 1965). The spoils of such efforts are indivisible and cannot be parceled out to only those directly involved in their procurement. As such, all members of the community benefit. In this case, if your benefit does not change regardless of your level of involvement in the struggle, your most-rational position would be to opt out and hope for the best: to “free ride.” Olsen suggests that the only way to overcome this “Free Rider Dilemma” is to either coerce members through the application or threat of negative sanctions or to offer selective incentives to members (such as titles, social prestige, wages, etc). Another way to lower the costs associated with social activism is to create an environment in which the activism is not viewed as a threat to the individual's social position or status (ibid). In other words, if the organization is viewed as socially legitimate, then involvement in it is not viewed as a deviant or otherwise threatening action. A new organization, then, may choose to adopt a repertoire that is viewed as legitimate by the general public and by institutional actors in order to attract members. By employing a widely-accepted strategy, the organization is less likely to face repression from the police, the state, and other formal agents of social control.

Hypotheses of SMO Strategy at Emergence
The preceding discussion summarizes findings and insights within the literature regarding how and why newly-emerging SMOs choose their strategy. From these
findings and insights, I develop the following hypotheses that are the focus of the current research.

Hypothesis #1 emerges from the Resource Mobilization literature and the work of Marshall Ganz (2000) regarding strategic capacity:

*Hypothesis #1: The resources available to an organization and the source of those resources (members, grants, sponsors, etc.) influence the strategies deployed at the time of emergence. (1a): Strategies considered to be more costly will be unavailable to organizations with limited resources. (1b): Organizations whose revenue is generated primarily by active members will have greater flexibility in choosing strategies than organizations beholden to single, large donors.*

Hypothesis #2 explores the relationships of context to strategic development described in the Organizational Ecology and Organizational Diffusion literatures.

*Hypothesis #2: The inter-organizational, political, and cultural context surrounding the issues and goals of the emerging movement organization influences the strategies deployed in the following ways: (2a) New SMOs determine their political strategy based on a process of “market specialization.” If the social movement sector is crowded, they will innovate by developing a new strategy or adopting a strategy thus far unseen in the sector, in order to attract members away from existing/established organizations; (2b) the failure or success of strategies within political and organizational sectors will influence the new SMO to use or reject existing tactical repertoires.*

Hypotheses #3 and #4 explore the relationship between the histories, biographies, identities/philosophies, and skills of leaders on the development of political strategy by emerging SMOs. These dynamics are described in the Organizational Diffusion, Resource Mobilization, and “New” Social Movements/Collective Identity Literatures.

*Hypothesis 3: (a) The unique experiences (both within other SMOs and in other contexts) of SMO founders influence the choice of strategy at emergence. Founders will employ strategies they have used in the past or those that they view as the most efficient strategy for goal-attainment. (b) The particular skills (organizational, professional, etc.) and education of SMO founders influence the choice of strategy at emergence.*
Hypothesis #4: The individual and/or collective identity, and the philosophical/ideological understandings of the founders relating to the issues involved in their SMO will influence the strategies chosen at founding. Those strategies viewed as consistent with these identities or ideologies will be implemented regardless of other factors (perceived effectiveness, cost, etc).

Understanding the variety of factors and inputs involved in intra-organizational decisions among leaders and founders will allow empirical studies of social movements to better capture the complexity surrounding these decisions. An approach that incorporates and refines the conceptual foundations of the field and employs multiple methods of data collection and analysis will improve the sociological understanding of early movement organization processes. This study represents an initial attempt at such an approach.

The following chapter develops an expanded typology of external political strategies for social movement organizations. This conceptualization builds upon these theoretical traditions and a review of the data under analysis to expand the range of strategies available to social movement organizers. This in turn expands the range of organizations and strategies under review in the study of social movements.
CHAPTER 3 - EXTERNAL POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

This chapter begins by reviewing prior efforts to conceptualize and categorize social movement political strategy within the literature. The remainder of the discussion develops a new and more exhaustive categorization of strategy based on an inductive review of the sampled cases of LGBTQ Rights and Animal Rights/Protection organizations used in the subsequent analyses. This categorization expands the scope of prior understandings to include organizations often excluded from review. These organizations are engaged in activities that further the stated goals and issues associated with the two general movements. This categorization is used in the quantitative and qualitative analysis as the coding scheme on the dependent variable (strategy) for all organizations in the study.

Prior Categorizations of Social Movement Strategy

The decision-making surrounding strategy for SMOs is a fluid process. Organizations respond and react to changes in their political, social, cultural, and economic climate. They also face persistent changes including: challenges from countermovements or competing organizations, resource availability, increases or decreases in members, successes and failures in campaigns, encounters with repression and social control, and alterations in the salience of interpretive frames, identities, and messages vis-a-vis the public. Therefore, strategy is often viewed as either (a) an input related to the success or failure of a movement organization or (b) a constantly evolving process involving the interplay of internal and external dynamics. These two conceptualizations in the literature are useful and important, but have left the question of why movements
adopt or develop a particular strategy at emergence largely unanswered. The
categorization of the strategies available to and used by movement organizations varies
across studies and is often too general to have substantive significance. Or, it is outdated
and not reflective of the current strategic repertoires available. The following sections
discuss these issues as they relate to my research questions regarding resources and
leaders, and present a conceptualization and categorization of social movement strategy
based on an inductive review of the cases in the contemporary arena.

One early and useful explication of social movement strategy was provided by
Ralph Turner in his 1970 chapter “Determinants of Social Movement Strategy.” Strategy
is conceived as those actions that a social movement organization engages in with the
express purpose of furthering its cause and maximizing goal attainment (Turner 1970: p. 147).
This definition is consistent with the present research's definition of external
political strategy, and thus Turner's work is a useful starting point for understanding the
dynamics of movement tactics. Here, Turner offers a conceptualization with three
potential categories within which all repertoires of political and social action fall. First,
activist organizations can engage in Coercive Action, defined as:

The manipulation of the target group’s situation in such fashion that the pursuit of
any course of action other than that sought by the movement will be met by some

This coercion can take either violent or non-violent forms. Violent Coercive Action
involves the use of terror, kidnapping, assault, sabotage, and other physical or property-
based threats or actions of harm. Non-violent Coercive Action involves intimidation,
negative image manipulation, harm to social status, economic harm, boycotts, non-violent
direct protest, and other non-violent actions (*ibid*). The second category of strategy is Persuasive Action, defined as “the use of strictly symbolic manipulation, without substantial rewards or punishments under the control of the movement” (*ibid* – p. 149).

These strategies include actions involving normative or cultural elements of the movement's context and target group in order to influence outcomes rather than directing direct action toward the agents responsible. Public shaming, media events, undercover investigations or exposés, and public relations or information campaigns are all examples of Persuasive Action. Persuasion is not a matter of threat or harm to the target, but is instead an effort by the SMO to raise awareness and to rally public support for their cause. It often takes the form of public information campaigns in which organizations make known the potential consequences of not attaining their stated goals or policy agenda. The movement itself has no real control over these consequences – as they are not directly engaging the target in a coercive way – and therefore only exerts their influence through processes of mobilization and consciousness-raising (*ibid*).

The third SMO strategy available is Bargaining. This occurs when the challenging group has something of value that the target agent desires, and the group is willing to provide some or all of it in exchange for meeting their demands. Bargaining often occurs in the political sphere by promising votes or public support for candidates in exchange for an advancement of their preferred policy goals. The organization will “deliver” its members at the ballot in exchange for the party or candidate following through (or at least, promising to follow through) with a legislative agenda consistent with the SMO’s goals. Bargaining also takes the form of coalition-building among
organizations with similar policy aims (*ibid*).

This strategy most reflects what is generally referred to as “routine politics” in the United States. The quid pro quo of constituencies and candidates or parties is commonplace in our political world. On both sides of the political aisle, powerful examples of organizational bargaining as a strategy are evident. The modern Democratic Party has relied on the support of trade and labor unions at the ballot and has, in turn, generally advocated for workers' rights and protections for the middle and working classes. In recent decades, the powerful organizations of the Christian Conservative movement have channeled their energies into supporting the Republican Party and in many ways have profoundly shaped its political ideology and legislative agenda. The renewed focus on “culture war” or “social conservative” policy battles – restrictions on abortion rights, “Defense of Marriage Acts” federally and at the state level, etc. - has largely been driven by the massive and powerful constituency mobilized by the (mostly Evangelical) Christian Right.

Turner's three categories of movement strategy are a useful starting-point for exploring the dynamics behind the development of movement tactics. However, these categories are too broad and do not adequately reflect the actions presently and prominently engaged in by today's SMOs. By considering only Bargaining, Coercion, and Persuasion as the legitimate forms of social movement strategy, Turner is also constructing a limited conceptualization of what types of organizations can be classified as SMOs. This reflects a *classical* definition of the social movement: an overtly political organization directly engaged in social conflict (or compromise) with institutional and
public actors regarding an issue of political, social, or economic salience (Blumer: 1969). This conceptualization is not wrong, but it excludes some elements of the contemporary social movement sector and some of the more prominent strategies employed in the present repertoire. As I discuss below, an inductive categorization of SMOs based on an examination of contemporary cases provides a more complete and complex view of strategy.

In their article “The Environmental Movement and the Modes of Political Action,” Dalton, Recchia, and Rohrschneider (2003) analyze the activities of environmental advocacy organizations and find that those actions can be categorized in four distinct categories: networking, conventional politics, mobilizing, and protest (Dalton, et. al. 2003). These four are often all employed in different ways by these organizations, with protest being the least common. The authors find that the primary determinant of movement strategy is mobilized resources (most notably, the number of full-time employees of the organization), and that ideology tends be a significant predictor for organizations engaging in direct protest, networking, or mobilization, but not for those organizations engaging in conventional political action (ibid). These strategies refer both to ongoing movement processes (mobilizing and networking) and external movement strategies (conventional politics and protest). As such, for the present research we are left with only two strategic possibilities, which do not adequately represent the empirical variation among contemporary rights-based SMOs.

In her 2002 article, Debra Minkoff analyzes US women's and racial and ethnic minority organizations since 1955 to explore the development and deployment of three
strategic forms: advocacy, service provision, and a hybrid of the two. In this categorization, social movement groups are seen as having available only two strategic repertoires: They can engage either in advocacy, direct efforts to affect the political institutions and laws of the land, or service provision - “offering divisible benefits, or private goods, that may be provided without actual changes in policy or institutional structures” (quoted from Jenkins 1987, in Minkoff 2002: p. 378). This categorization is useful in that it prominently includes service provision as a social movement strategy, which is uncommon in the literature. However, the category of advocacy is too broad to be empirically and analytically useful. If all other strategies that are not the provision of private goods and services are considered “advocacy,” then we are left with a single conceptual category that includes the bombing of federal buildings, kidnapping, sabotage, and writing letters to members of Congress and proposing legislation.

The categories of SMO strategy developed for the present research are the result of an inductive conceptualization based on a broad review SMOs working toward issues of Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights in the contemporary United States. This categorization is an improvement on those of Turner, Minkoff, and Dalton, et. al, in that it is a direct reflection of the population of cases today. Organizations working toward broad movement goals employ a wide variety of strategy, some rarely considered part of the activist paradigm. Nevertheless, these organizations and their members engage in political action, both routine and outside of the institutional political arena, cultural and expressive actions aimed at changing values, behaviors, and attitudes regarding the rights of their constituents, legal strategies designed to influence precedence and legislative and
normative changes, organizational and philanthropic funding, and the provision of goods and services to their populations as a means of facilitating the most basic of constituents' rights: the right to live.

*Social Movement Strategy: An Inductive Categorization*

**NON-ROUTINE POLITICS**

The image of the SMO most commonly portrayed in the media and academia is the mass protest movement. It is a picture of hundreds or thousands of people taking to the streets to march, occupy buildings in sit-ins and other disruptive actions, throw bottles, and dodge tear gas and rubber bullets. This image of non-routine political action has been both glorified and vilified at various stages and via various agents and media. Non-routine politics refers to political action beyond or outside of the normative and legitimate institutions of a given social and political context. These strategic actions can be categorized as either violent or non-violent in nature. Historically, the primary correlate to the implementation of either violent or non-violent strategies was the nature of the goals of the organization. Herbert Blumer proposed that “reform” movements – those seeking slow, incremental, or compartmentalized change in the social, economic, and/or political arena – are likely to engage in non-violent strategies (Blumer 1969). These non-violent strategies are not uniquely non-routine in Blumer's proposed theory. “Radical” or “revolutionary” movements – those seeking widespread, revolutionary, rapid social change – are more likely to employ violent strategies (ibid). Behind this distinction is the fundamental belief that violence in politics is an illegitimate strategy (della Porta 1995).

Violent political tactics used by SMOs and other outside actors are often viewed
as the politics of last resort: When all else fails, resort to violence. As previously discussed, this is often not the case, as movements utilize violence in their repertoire when it correlates with a radical or revolutionary set of goals or rhetoric. However, in many cases, violence is the strategy employed only after legitimate forms of political action have been exhausted or are unavailable. In multiple empirical analyses of the Political Process/Opportunity theory, researchers have focused on SMO actions when faced with politically-repressive or closed political contexts (Kurzman 1996; Opp 1993). The general presumption is that, in a political arena where contestation is normative and legitimate, organizations have a legitimate action repertoire at their disposal and a means for effective redress of grievances vis-a-vis the state. However, in a repressive political climate, those outside of the polity are unable to do so and are often met with social control and/or violence, or even when attempting to organize in the first place. In such contexts, violent and disruptive tactics may be viewed by SMO leaders as the only available repertoire.

The use of violence often has negative consequences for the SMO, both internally and externally. First, violence is generally viewed as illegitimate in the wider political and cultural contexts of most societies in which democracy has been institutionalized, as in the present case. Therefore, the SMO loses that public legitimacy in the eyes of broader culture the moment it deploys violent tactics. This then has myriad effects on the internal workings of the organization. It will affect its ability to mobilize members, resources, and public support. It often criminalizes an organization's membership and leadership, leaving them vulnerable to arrest. This in turn forces members to “go
underground” to avoid capture. Violent movements invite clashes with formal agents of social control which is individually and organizationally costly and risky. A radicalization of rhetoric and goals often follows, which further marginalizes their efforts from broader social and political contexts.

The protest cycle of the 1960s produced what is widely considered the dominant and normative strategic repertoire of the social movement sector in the West: non-violence and disruptive (rather than violent) politics. Non-violent strategies include disruptive politics, such as boycotts, sit-ins, and other forms of non-violent occupations of public or private space. This repertoire includes protest and marches, and any other form of non-institutional non-violent political action. Non-violent organizations find themselves in a less precarious position relative to the public at large, potential constituents, targets, political and social institutions, and agents of social control than do their violent counterparts. These organizations are better able to appeal to a broad public and often find themselves with a legitimate public image. Political elites and institutions are generally more responsive to the demands or grievances of a non-violent challenger. The threat of facing social control from both formal and informal agents is considerably less due to the lower threat presented by a non-violent movement organization (Blumer 1969). While these organizations are explicitly operating outside of the political mainstream and its institutional channels for redressing grievances, they may be more likely to still mobilize members and resources due to their relative legitimacy. In the end, non-violence – thanks in large part to the ubiquity and relative success of the 1960s mass protest movements – is a more legitimate form of political challenge in Western societies.
than violence.

ROUTINE POLITICS

Early models of social movement activity made a clear distinction between collective and individual actors with institutional polity access and those who are beyond the polity (McAdam 1999). Because of this distinction, social movement strategies were viewed as conceptually different from institutional politics: Parties and elites engage in institutional or routine politics, and activists engaged in non-routine politics. It is a false distinction to claim that SMOs do not utilize the various avenues available to them within the formal institutions of politics to further their goals. As the analysis to follow shows, many organizations involve themselves only in the strategic repertoire of institutional/routine politics without any engagement with the protest politics so closely associated with activism. By its very nature, this strategic repertoire is the most politically- and socially-legitimate: It is working within the normative and institutional channels to pursue mainstream policy agendas and goals. The public will perhaps respect the actions and organization regardless of whether they sympathize with the goals pursued. Routine political organizations do not share most of the potential issues or pitfalls associated with non-routine political organizations. However, the trade-off of routine political action over the non-routine strategic repertoire is that ideological purity and complete flexibility for innovation in movement strategies and form are sacrificed in order to increase public legitimacy and access to the formal institutions of power in society (Blumer 1969).

The tactics involved in the Routine Political strategic repertoire include: lobbying political elites, drafting legislation and lobbying on its behalf, contributing resources
(money, labor) to the campaigns of candidates and parties, letter-writing campaigns and petitions to political elites, and the various forms of public awareness campaigns through the media to influence legislative action at all levels of political institutions. Some SMOs begin in the realm of non-routine politics and then are subsumed under the banner of routine political institutions and take on that tactical repertoire. The literature of co-optation is limited, but it is presumed that many of the reform SMOs of the 1960s protest wave became co-opted by political elites and parties as they became larger and more mainstream. The reform Civil Rights, Women's, and Anti-War movements of the 1960s were viewed to have been co-opted by the Democratic Party in a process where leaders were taken into institutional roles and the agendas and rhetoric of the movements were subsumed within the agendas of the party platform (Taylor 1999; Nelson 1971; Andrews 1997).

CULTURE/EXPRESSIVE ACTION

For many years, a distinction was made within the literature on social movements between “strategic” and “identity” movements (Touraine 1992). The implication is that an SMO could be involved in either the strategic pursuit of collective goals or the development and empowerment of identity, but not both. These two categories were considered mutually-exclusive. This leads to a distinction between movements that are externally-focused – those seeking political, social, and/or economic change in their given context – and those internally-focused – those seeking to create a sense of self, history, identity, and/or solidarity within a given community. Recently (Bernstein 1997), this dichotomy has been problematized and re-interpreted to explore the interaction of strategy and identity. More importantly, some scholars have developed theoretical and
empirical discussions of identity and culture as strategies themselves, rather than just determinants or outcomes of other processes.

In a 1997 article, Mary Bernstein proposes that identity is involved in three distinct phases of social movement development and action. First, “Identity for Empowerment” involves the creation of a collective identity and the sense that political action is not only desirable or necessary, but also feasible. A collective identity is seen as a necessary component for any and all other mobilization and activist processes: We must know who “we” are before “we” can mobilize and act (Bernstein 1997). Second, “Identity as Goal” involves the challenge of stigmatization, pursuit of cultural recognition, and a deconstruction of the restrictions placed on marginalized groups in society (ibid). Lastly, “Identity Deployment” or “Identity as Strategy” involves an expression of collective identity in which the arena of conflict becomes social status and identity itself (ibid). With this, individuals engage in and form organizations in order to challenge accepted values, practices, categories, and behaviors associated with wider culture and their own marginalization. This strategic use of identity takes one of two forms: “Identity for Critique” or “Identity for Education.” The use of “Identity for Critique involves a confrontation with the values of the dominant culture. It is a condemnation of the essentializing of the marginalized group’s identity, ignorance of their perils, and to the ways in which they are perceived and treated by wider society. Dominant norms and values are wrong, and thus need to be challenged and changed. In “Identity for Education,” the movement confronts wider culture with the intent of demonstrating that its perceptions of the marginalized group are not wholly wrong, but
rather that the marginalized group is “just like you” and should be accepted within broader society (*ibid*).

SMOs directly engaging institutional targets, seeking inclusive membership, and pursuing routine political goals tend to deploy “Identity as Education.” Those organizations whose targets/opposition are counter-movements and who lack access to political elites and are more exclusive in membership tend to deploy “Identity for Critique” (Bernstein 1997). These strategies specifically involve efforts toward public recognition of the social status of marginalized groups in society, awareness campaigns surrounding discrimination, violence, or other forms of social and political repression, or the attempts to establish new norms and values surrounding the issues, behaviors, and identities of groups.

The concept of “frame alignment” was discussed previously in the elaboration of the potential determinants of strategy in the social movement literature. With regard to cultural or identity-based strategies, this variant in the literature provides a specific element which movements may deploy in an effort to change hearts and minds among the population. Frame Transformation, as elaborated by Snow, et. al., involves the overt attempt by members of an organization to alter the interpretive frames of individuals with incongruent interpretations regarding the issues, values, norms, and identities of the group in question (Snow, et. al. 1986). Organizations may attempt to completely alter an individual's interpretive frame - “global transformation” - or just seek to change the individual's mind regarding a particular issue - “domain-specific transformation” (*ibid*).

In both cases, the strategy involves direct engagement with targets on a cultural
level. It is not explicitly an effort to change policy, though that may be an indirect consequence of the action – particularly if those targeted are political elites. Frame Transformation specifically often involves awareness campaigns in which organizations seek to mobilize adherents and/or constituents by convincing non-members that the conditions they seek to change are inexcusable, unjust, or immoral. One highly-successful campaign of Frame Transformation involved the efforts of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). MADD, through various public-relations and media campaigns and direct engagement with political elites, was able to transform an unfortunate situation – the loss of a loved one due to a drunk-driving accident, which was previously seen as an unlucky accident – into an inexcusable tragedy and a social problem worthy of public attention and shifts in policy.

Alain Touraine (1992), a key proponent of the “new social movements” variant of contemporary theory discusses movements as engaging in a relevant process he calls “historicity.” Historicity refers to the strategies, organizational forms, and movement processes directed toward the goal of reclaiming a population's control over its own history and identity from dominant political, economic, and cultural elites. For Touraine, these new movements are not directly engaging in what would traditionally be called political action, but instead are fighting cultural battles for identity-space, the writing of their own history, and the right to cultural self-determination (Touraine 1992).

LEGAL STRATEGIES

With greater frequency, activists are no longer solely protestors fighting their battles for social and political change in the streets against the police and other agents of social control (Ashar 2007). They are also sharply-dressed attorneys and litigants
pursuing their agendas in the courts. For some scholars, this shift in strategy is seen as a necessary result of either lack of access to institutional political channels for claims-making, or the failure of routine or non-routine political tactical repertoires (O'Connor 1980; S. Olson 1990; Burstein 1998). These “Political Disadvantage” theorists propose that legal strategies are a last resort, or at best a Plan B for activists whose claims to the legislative arena have fallen on deaf ears. Others have found that activists deploy a legal repertoire due to a variety of intra-organizational factors. Positive correlates of legal activism include: longevity, the availability of full-time staff and attorneys, a clearly defined and sharply focused issue-based goal, capability with technical data, the ability to generate publicity, close coordination with affiliates and allies, the ability to persuade members of the Justice Department or the Solicitor General to enter into action on the organization's side, and a general measure of organizational capacity and coalition-building (Scheppele & Walker 1991).

Movements are also more likely to enter the courts if their particular agenda matches the characteristics of the legal system as a unique institution: There must be a clear legal complaint to be filed on someone's behalf. Therefore, a specific harm to individuals must be clearly demonstrable for such a case to exist. Accordingly, SMOs are assumed to enter the courts in a rational way. Because legal strategies are both time-consuming and expensive, they are often only engaged in when success is considered likely. Activists judge this potential for success on such factors as: clarity of opponent, intensity of conflict, ability to show demonstrable losses based on changes in political or social climate, whether there are insiders on the court, and whether the court has clear
 Movements are likely to engage in legal activism when their specific goals relate to rights claims on behalf of disenfranchised or marginalized groups in society. Rights claims in the United States are based in arguments of Constitutionality and often fall within discussions of the “Equal Protection Clause” of the 14th Amendment. The clause of the Amendment states:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The “Equal Protection Clause” has been successfully used in rights-claims by legal activists in many of the United States' most famous Civil Rights decisions including Brown vs. The Board of Education (which established that segregation was unconstitutional) and Milliken vs. Bradley (one of many desegregation busing decrees). Recently, advocates for same-sex marriage rights and LGBTQ rights in general have employed arguments to claim that so-called “Defense of Marriage Acts” violate the Equal Protection Clause and thus are unconstitutional (Hull 2001, Albright & Goodman 2006).

Court challenges represent a significant arena of political contestation for SMOs due to the centrality of rights to their various causes and goals. There have also been changes within the opportunities available to such claims within the legal structure, influenced directly by the gains of the Civil Rights movements of earlier decades. "Civil Rights" is among the most salient and often-used identity frames in American politics and social movement activity (Albright & Goodman 2006; Snow & Benford 1992). This focus on rights makes the courts – and particularly national court challenges on the basis of
constitutionality and discrimination – a potentially fruitful avenue for movement activity.

All legal strategies have both direct and indirect consequences for the SMOs. Directly, the legal repertoire has the potential to clearly modify or affect far-reaching change of the movement goals by altering existing law. However, direct change is often difficult or unlikely because of a lack of resources to mount an effective challenge. Movements often encounter a lack of sympathy within the courts for their cause. Notably, in the early challenges on behalf of same-sex couples seeking legal marriages, appellate court judges included moral and religious language in their decisions to justify excluding gay and lesbian couples from the legal rights and protections of marriage (Albright & Goodman 2006). Courts also are often overloaded, which delays hearings and increases costs; and they often deliver symbolic rather than substantive decisions, particularly if the legislative arena is not receptive to following-up the legal decision with new law (Barkan 1980).

Indirectly, legal challenges – particularly when successful - serve to increase public awareness and legitimacy of movement goals and actions, increase the public attention to the particular discontent of the litigants and affiliated organizations, increase the expectations among movement insiders and sympathizers, increase the identity and movement capacity of members, increase morale, and aid in mobilizing new adherents and constituents to the cause (ibid). Successful legal challenges increase the social legitimacy of SMO claims by placing their issues squarely within the context of institutional politics, and as consistent with the political ideology built into the Constitution.
A focus in the courts, however, can also have potentially negative consequences for SMOs. An unsuccessful legal challenge can signify a substantial roadblock in the routine and institutional political sphere. Courts are also generally viewed as elite institutions, protected by powerful interests, and not necessarily predisposed to changes in the existing social order. Therefore, challenges from marginalized groups are often initially-unsuccessful and challengers must then appeal further up the line through appellate and possibly Supreme courts – again, a costly endeavor. Focusing on litigation can cause the SMO to become dominated by lawyers and legal experts, rather than activists and mobilizers. This can have the effect of compromising initial movement goals and demobilizing the organization due to a lack of attention paid to grassroots efforts. Legal strategies generally de-radicalize movements, as a focus in the courts implies a pursuit of legitimacy within existing conditions, rather than an overt, radical, revolutionary challenge to those conditions (Bernstein, et al 2009).

For SMOs seeking redress through the legal system, the time and resources necessary for successful challenges may be a deterrent. However, multiple avenues exist for activists within the courts to advance their particular agenda. In general, three strategies exist for SMOs within the courts. First, they involve their staff and attorneys in filing suits on behalf of those who have claims to direct harm based on unfair or discriminatory laws. This tactic is the most resource-dependent, as it requires direct and constant action on the part of organizational staff. Therefore, the organizations that we would expect to be most likely to engage in this approach would be well-funded and likely well-established. It is unlikely that newly-emerging SMOs – unless they are elite-
driven or sponsored – would employ this strategy at inception.

A second strategy sees the SMO participating in class-action suits along with other organizations, public-interest groups, and litigants of various types. This strategy is less resource-dependent, as the organization is not the only force behind the legal challenge, and thus may not focus massive amounts of time, energy, staff, and money toward the effort. In these challenges, the organization is seen as part of a coalition of litigants challenging existing laws. This strategy therefore involves the ability of the organization to build coalitions with potentially-disparate and competing interests in society in order to advance their agenda. Organizations with radical, publicly-deviant or illegitimate goals are unlikely to become involved in such cases. These challenges are often successful because of the appearance of broad-based support, especially if litigants are also able to mobilize support among political and elite insiders to further apply pressure to the courts.

Both of the above strategies often involve the action of “cause lawyers.” The cause lawyer has received considerable attention in the recent literature regarding the legal strategies of interest groups in America. Cause lawyers are seen as engaging in “zealous advocacy on behalf of the movement” and “seek a social impact beyond the case” (Barclay & Marshall 2005: p. 176). Cause lawyers may or may not be movement insiders, but they are attorneys who become involved in legal proceedings with the goal of not just winning the case on behalf of the litigants, but also of advancing a social agenda consistent with SMOs on the issue at hand (ibid).

The third strategy within the legal system involves the filing of amicus curiae
briefs on behalf of litigants. The *amicus curiae* – or “friend of the court” - was originally intended and implemented as a means for outside parties to provide information to the court that could aid in enlightening facts or relevance of the decision that might impact the outcome. It has come to be used as a mechanism by which organizations not directly involved in the case or the specific litigants can become involved in legal challenges. The courts retain the authority as to whether to accept an *amicus* brief filed in a particular case, and thus can regulate what is and what is not allowed to enter into deliberation. The briefs are used by organizations as means to pursue their own goals through legal channels without the resource-heavy direct involvement of attorneys and lengthy, often drawn-out litigation. Briefs are often filed when an organization becomes dissatisfied with the manner in which litigants are pursuing their case, or when their participation, aid, and influence have been requested by a litigant (Barclay & Marshall 2005).

Often, these are sought when the litigant or legal representative feels that the participation of a particular interest group or organization would strengthen their case directly or through a perceived higher sense of legitimacy in the eyes of the court. The *amicus* brief is also a means to introduce non-legal data into the court proceedings in a low-cost way: Because it is provided by an outside group and not a direct litigant, if the judge views it as unnecessary or ineffective, it should not negatively impact the case. The *amicus* brief is seen to be most useful when a loose coalition of similarly-minded organizations all file on behalf of the same litigant. This demonstrates to the court broad-based support within the public arena for their claims (O'Connor 1980).

Caldeira and Wright (1990) explore the relationships between intra-organizational
factors and the use of *amicus curiae* briefs (in terms of timing and frequency) filed before the United States Supreme Court. Their findings demonstrate that roughly 40% of all *amicus* filings were made by private individuals or advocacy groups, and not just lobbyists, corporations, or influential business or institutional agents (Caldeira & Wright 1990). This suggests that the *amicus* brief is not just a tool of the elite. They also find that courts are more receptive to competing briefs at the initial stages of legal challenges – the “on the merits” stage – because they are interested in gathering as much information as possible regarding the importance and significance of cases (*ibid*). The competing nature of *amicus* briefs from organizations and their counter-organizations is strong at this stage. They did not find that organizations tend to build coalitions within the filing of briefs. Rather, they all file separately, but perhaps (though impossible to conclude from these data) with cooperation and coordination (*ibid*).

Most studies of SMOs and the use of *amici curiae* involve the pursuit of movement goals through their filings (O’Connor 1980, Walker 1991). Others use the filing of *amici curiae* to represent movement dynamics relating to symbolic framing and the connection of movements to one another and to the salient Civil Rights “master frame” (Albright & Goodman 2006). This growing literature surrounding the use of the courts for American social movements reflects the legal challenges among rights-based organizations in an era of diminishing mass protest and the declining effectiveness (and capability) of non-routine political mobilization. This argument suggests an *increase* in the development of legal strategies among SMOs.

**SERVICE PROVISION**

Social movements exist to challenge those in positions of authority or the general
public to either make changes to the social, political, or economic environment or to resist those changes. Organizations using the above strategies are all rather overtly engaged directly with a target, with a constituency behind their efforts. However, organizations that directly provide services to a constituency in need are also engaged in these efforts toward change, even though they do so in a less overtly-activist way. The inclusion of service provision as a recognized strategy of SMOs is not without controversy. The conceptualization of activism is generally developed around the notion of overt political action directed at the institutions of power in order to create or resist social change. The efforts of service providers are not so explicitly activist according to this definition. However, the role of service providers within the movement organization population is to provide directly for the potential beneficiaries of the overall movement's goals, and to maintain and increase the non-activist solidarity and connections within civil society; I thus include it among the strategic alternatives from which organizations choose.

J. Craig Jenkins (1989) differentiated service providers from other forms of activist organizations by focusing on their ability to distribute “private goods” to individuals. This conceptualization draws a distinction from the idea of “public goods” advanced by Mancur Olson in his work *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965). For Olson, a public good is one that is indivisible and cannot be distributed only to those who have incurred the cost associated with its procurement. For example, if there is a successful movement for clean water or representative democracy, the organization cannot only provide that water or voting rights to those who worked toward the cause and
withhold it from all others in the community. Thus, in Olson's formulation, it becomes an irrational act for an individual to engage in time and resource-consuming actions if the potential benefits are public goods. Individuals will only rationally engage in such behavior if provided selective incentives (payment, titles, social status) or if coerced (M. Olson 1965).

The private goods provided by service organizations to individuals may suggest why recipients are involved, but the logic of Olson still applies to non-recipient activists (or “conscience constituents,” in Resource Mobilization terminology). Nonetheless, the social movement sector is heavily populated by service providers directly engaged with their community to provide much needed assistance where formal institutions are either negligent, unavailable due to geography or other circumstances, or non-existent. These organizations also should be included in this present and in other future research because of their prominence within the universe of cases. The quantitative component of this research examines the influence of resources and leaders on strategy in ways that both include and exclude those cases involved in service provision.

ORGANIZATIONAL FUNDING & PHILANTHROPY

Not every organization must directly engage in the traditional forms of social movement strategy to be an active and effective agent in the pursuit of social change. Many organizations in the social movement sector serve as constituents to those SMOs directly engaged in the other strategies discussed above. Some organizations provide funding either directly to other organizations through philanthropic donations or through a process of grant application, review, and provision to organizations engaged in other strategies. While not directly engaged, these organizations provide a vital element to the
causal chain of social change through much-needed resources to advocacy and service organizations.

While most foundations and philanthropic organizations tend to shy away from controversial issues, those referred to as “social change philanthropists” actively seek out organizations engaging in causes working for social change. In some cases, these foundations are general and non-movement specific. The United Way, for example, provides resources to thousands of organizations across the country under the banner of “mobilizing the caring power of communities...to benefit the greater good” (United Way Online). Other philanthropic organizations direct their resources within the confines of a general or specific social movement sector. These generally fall within the following typology, developed by Alan Rabinowitz: wealthy individual funders, community foundations, and corporate foundations (Rabinowitz 1990). The recipients are intermediate organizations devoted to providing research and/or training, funding organizations, or community activist organizations (ibid). The funders either directly donate resources without applications from recipients, or funders require recipients to submit grant proposals to receive resources for specific strategic or organizational purposes. Within organizations engaged in these strategies, there are at least two variants of organizational trajectories involved. First, there are those organizations that explicitly have set out to engage in such “social change philanthropy” as a means to provide resources as part of an infrastructure for other social movement organizations. Second, are organizations that began with a different tactical focus, but who have transitioned into philanthropic tactics either by choice or because they have found themselves capable of
mobilizing resources but less efficient in engaging in other strategies. For the present research, there is no clear way to determine which of these processes has taken place, and no distinction has been made among the organizations that fall within this strategic category.

Summary
In this chapter, I develop six categories of SMO strategy based on a review of the literature and an inductive examination of the cases for this analysis: non-routine politics, routine politics, cultural/expressive strategies, legal strategies, service provision, and organizational funding/philanthropy. These categories refine the conceptualization and organizes the universe of cases in a more empirically-valid and exhaustive fashion.
I use this categorization of strategies in the analyses to follow in Chapters 5-7.
Understanding the possible variation on the dependent variable under review provides the groundwork for the quantitative and qualitative analyses to follow. In the next chapter, I review the issues and efforts of the various organizations operating within the general movements of Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights in order to further characterize the nature of these movements and their constituent organizations.
CHAPTER 4 - GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE MOVEMENTS: ANIMAL RIGHTS/PROTECTION & LGBTQ RIGHTS IN THE US

This chapter consists of overviews of the issues and goals of the Animal Rights/Protection movement (Part 1) and the LGBTQ Rights movement (Part 2) in the US. The purpose of this review is to provide context regarding the various goals and issues upon which all of the organizations in the quantitative and qualitative analyses are founded and pursue through various strategies.

PART 1: THE ANIMAL RIGHTS/PROTECTION MOVEMENT IN THE US

The fundamental philosophical issue confronting organizations working to promote the rights of animals in society is the contrasting conceptions of animals as property versus animals as “non-human persons.” In this respect, animal rights organizations face a rather cumbersome challenge: Advocating for rights is generally viewed as a human issue. Their constituency is viewed outside of any definition of “human.” Thus, how does one advocate for animal rights? This challenge often manifests in a distinction made between advocacy for animal “rights” versus animal “protection.” The latter places animals in a position of inferiority to humans, and as something worthy of protection, but incapable of it on their own. The Animal Welfare Act, first passed by the US Congress in 1966 (and amended as recently as 2008) codifies the definition of animals as property within federal law. The act exists in order to:

Insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition purposes or for use as pets are provided humane care and treatment; to assure the humane treatment of animals during transportation in commerce; and to protect the owners of animals from the theft of their animals by preventing the sale or use of animals which have been stolen (USC Title 7, Ch. 54, 2009 Version).

Furthermore, “animals” are defined solely as:
Any live or dead dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman primate mammal), guinea pig, hamster, rabbit or other such warm-blooded animal...; but such term excludes (1) birds, rats..., mice... (2) horses not used for research purposes, and (3) other farm animals, such as, but not limited to, livestock or poultry, used or intended for use as food or fiber, or livestock or poultry used or intended for use for improving animal nutrition, breeding, management, or production efficiency (*ibid*).

Therefore, any animal that falls outside of this limited definition receives no federal protection whatsoever. The limited protections provided to those that do fit the definition fall in terms of their place within economic activities, or as private property.

Advocates for rights where animals are formally considered property face obstacles from the economic sector. Many animals are used as inputs in the modern industrial production of food, clothing, and a variety of other commodities. As such, the “rights” of animals represents a direct threat to public and private economic interests, which creates both a cultural resistance and a mobilized countermovement of agricultural and business interests. The final key philosophical issue facing advocates of animal rights is a simple, yet profound concern: Their constituency lacks the ability to advocate for themselves, or to “bear witness.” In many struggles for rights, the testimonial of the repressed individual is among the most powerful and effective means of transforming interpretations of the population and mobilizing. Animals clearly lack this ability. Many animal rights advocates attempt to create a proxy for this testimonial through filmed footage of animals in what they perceive as cruel practices – slaughterhouses, cockfights and dogfights, fur mills, laboratory testing facilities, and so on. However, the ability to empathize largely depends on the previously-discussed conception of property versus beings: Those who see animals as property are less likely to empathize with such “testimonials,” regardless of the persuasiveness of the presentation of such practices as
“barbaric.”

In the following sections, I discuss each of the current specific issues and goals with which contemporary Animal Rights/Protection SMOs are presently working.

Vivisection/Laboratory Testing
An issue of primary concern to animal advocates is the use of live animals for testing purposes in scientific, medical, and business-related facilities. Vivisection – the term more commonly used in scientific and European contexts – is defined as the use of surgery for experimental purposes on a living organism, most commonly non-human animals (NEAVS.org). This includes laboratory testing of commercial products (such as cosmetics), the use of animals in testing procedures for pharmaceuticals, and the use of animals both living and deceased in classroom practices (such as the common practice of dissecting frogs in high school biology classes). The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not require, or even necessarily suggest, the use of animals as test subjects prior to the distribution of new products to the public. Companies are urged to perform whatever safety tests are deemed appropriate to ensure the safety of their products, which is often interpreted as giving a “green light” for animal testing.

Pharmaceutical companies employ laboratory testing on animals based on various physiological similarities between animal and human biology. Thus, animals are often given chronic or acute conditions, injuries, or diseases in order to test the effectiveness of the various products on healing, symptom management, and eradication. The dissection of animals in science classes is considered a scientific necessity in the development of students. According to the Humane Society of the United States, roughly ten to twelve million frogs are harvested for use in classroom dissection projects every year in the
Opponents of dissection argue that given the sophistication and availability of accurate 3D modeling software – such as various “Virtual Frog” applications - the use of actual live or deceased animals in educational settings is unnecessary.

In total, an estimated 25 million vertebrate animals are used in various forms of invasive and non-invasive animal testing in the United States every year (Change.org). Nearly all of those animals – including various primates, dogs, cats, rodents, and birds – that survive the initial testing are then euthanized in order to perform a necropsy to determine the full effects of the products tested. Various organizations have emerged to specifically target the practices associated with animal testing and vivisection, including, the National Anti-Vivisection Society, the American Anti-Vivisection Society, the National Anti-Vivisection Alliance, the Primate Freedom Project, and the Center for Alternatives to Animal Testing. Most broad and national Animal Rights/Protection organizations have dedicated campaigns toward ending animal testing, including: People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), and the Humane Society of America.

Dog fighting & Cockfighting/Circuses/Anti-Fur

The high-profile case of NFL Quarterback Michael Vick and his extensive involvement in dog fighting brought to national attention the abusive and inhumane practices involved in the use of animals for “sport” (Naqi 2007). Even though all fifty states and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting the practice of dog fighting and the possession of dogs trained for fighting (and all but Montana have laws against being present as a spectator at dog fights), it remains practiced in the US. Laws also exist in all
states and the District of Columbia prohibiting the practice of cockfighting, though many (12) do not prohibit the possession of fighting birds, being present as a spectator (8), or the possession of “fighting implements” (foot spurs, etc – 36). The criminal penalties associated with these laws vary tremendously from Third Degree Felonies to Petty Misdemeanors (Humane Society 2011). Historically, both dog fighting and cockfighting have been legal in many states, and the criminal monitoring and prosecuting only revolved around the illegality of the gambling associated with the contests.

Both dog fighting and cockfighting are often defended as cultural practices of various ethnic or regional populations (Geertz 1973; Bosworth 2010; Peterson 2007). In the American Southeast, and in particular in predominantly Black subcultures, dog fighting has a long history as a spectator sport and as both a hobby and business venture: The breeding and the fights themselves can both be relatively lucrative endeavors in otherwise impoverished communities. Cockfighting has long been associated with Hispanic cultures in the American Southwest. Despite these claims, the “cultural” designation argument has lost out to the criminalization of these activities in recent decades.

A related topic is the use of animals in other entertainment practices. The primary target of these efforts is the use of animals in circuses and private wild animal displays. Efforts specifically target the abusive practices employed to train animals to perform and restrain them from attacking spectators or visitors. Attention has also been focused on the captivity of animals in zoos and wildlife refuges, though the attitudes toward these institutions are decidedly mixed: Some organizations see these as necessary and useful
forms of protecting threatened species and educating the public about their situation and beauty, while others view them as another form of forced captivity and abuse. Animals in circuses are often subjected to various forms of physical abuse to prepare them to engage in unnatural activities – balancing acts, riding tricycles, jumping through hoops, and so on. Trainers and animal handlers in circuses often employ physically-injurious implements including whips, choke collars, electrified prods, hooks, and other devices. The animals' confinement is often restrictive, solitary, lacking in ventilation, and extensive in duration due to the constant travel associated with road show circuses (PETA.org “Issues: Circuses”).

Other organizations target the use of animals in the world of fashion. For centuries, the wearing of animal furs and hides has been at times utilitarian (the use of animal pelts by hunter-gatherer or nomadic cultures for warmth and clothing) and a signifier of affluence or high social status (the conspicuous consumption of certain hides and furs as associated with nobility or wealth). The fur trade, however, has come under increased scrutiny since the late 20th Century due to the practices associated with harvesting furs. Animals are often raised solely for their furs and are often killed in the cheapest/least-sophisticated ways possible (suffocation, poisoning, etc.). These fur-farmed animals are often subjected to difficult living conditions up to their deaths, and are not “used” in any way after their skins or furs have been removed; they are generally simply disposed of.

The most prominent campaigns and tactics in the anti-fur movements are both commonly associated with PETA: the “blood bath” and the “I'd rather...” efforts.
Activists associated with that and other organizations have targeted patrons, sellers, designers, and others associated with the fur trade with buckets of red paint to symbolize the blood spilled during the production of their products. PETA also uses a series of advertisements featuring celebrities, actors, athletes, and other culturally-relevant spokespeople in their “I'd rather...” campaigns and billboards. These involve the use of media – generally advertisements in magazines or on billboards – featuring naked or highly-exposed individuals proclaiming that they would “rather go naked” than “wear fur”/“wear leather.” These also involve similar photos and advertisements featuring heavily-tattooed celebrities proclaiming their preference for “Ink, Not Mink.” The use of sexually-suggestive imagery and celebrity status has proven to be a very effective tactic for PETA and other organizations in these campaigns to raise awareness of their efforts (Simonson 2001).

**Vegetarian/Vegan**

Perhaps the most culturally-embedded and normative use of animals in Western and American society is the idea that animals can and should be used as food. The normativity and even necessity of the consumption of animals for a healthy human diet is reinforced through scientific and state institutions such as the Food & Drug Administration (FDA), the US Dairy Association (USDA), and the US Department of Health and Human Services.

A Vegetarian diet is one that does not involve the consumption of meat, but is often conceptualized as allowing the consumption of “animal-related products” such as eggs, dairy, honey, gelatin, and so on. These diets are often defined by prefixes, such as: “lacto-ovo-vegetarians” who consume eggs and dairy (there are even those who consume...
fish, but still consider themselves vegetarian – aka, the “pescetarian”). Veganism refers to a diet that is completely devoid of any animal or animal-related consumption. Vegetarianism and Veganism, while long-standing movements within the West and common in many parts of the world are becoming more popular in the United States with the growing obesity problem (Iacobbo 2004).

For many Vegetarians and Vegans, these are more than diets: They are moral statements or even movements regarding their beliefs and opinions about the treatment of animals. Vegans generally also refrain from using or wearing any animal product for any purpose: They eschew wearing leather, wool, feathers, or furs, and ensure that the other products they use – such as cosmetics and cleaning products – neither contain animal by-products nor have been tested on animals in any way. Therefore, these diets often represent more than an approach to personal health; they are also an effort to protect animals from harm in any way.

Resources and organizations advocating for Vegetarian and Vegan lifestyles have proliferated recently, along with many publications dedicated specifically to these diets and associated lifestyles. One of the more successful campaigns involves the PETA-produced film, “Meet Your Meat,” narrated by Alec Baldwin and available for free viewing on their website and various other sources. The film shows, in stark detail, the processes involved in the American meat-producing industries involving cattle slaughter, the treatment and confinement of chickens and turkeys prior to their “processing,” and so on. The graphic nature of this film is such that PETA and other animal-rights advocates suggest showing it to those considering making the transition to a Vegetarian or Vegan
lifestyle.

_Sheltering/Rescuing_

As discussed in the preceding chapters, the direct provision of services has not always been considered a social movement strategy. However, the most common and prominent movement-related activity among Animal Rights/Protection activists is the rescuing and sheltering of neglected, unwanted, abused, or otherwise vulnerable animals. Numerous shelters exist in most towns, and can be categorized in various ways. Shelters are either public or private: Many municipal governments operate animal control departments, including in some cases a rescue and shelter operation with fostering and adoption programs. Many shelters and rescues are animal or breed-specific, and their scale represents tremendous variation from those operating out of private households to larger city or state-wide programs.

The common ground among the various forms of rescues and shelter organizations lies in their commitment to protect and find temporary and/or permanent homes for animals that have been surrendered, abandoned, abused, or otherwise neglected. The shelters and rescues are viewed as a “middle-man” operation between these animals and future adoptive owners. In many cases, the organizations provide health care and immunization, therapy through human and peer-animal socialization, and obedience training to the animals prior to their availability for adoption. They are formed either out of necessity (as is often the case with municipal or public sheltering and adoption agencies) or love for the animals or specific breeds.

A final way of categorizing shelters and rescues is found in the “no-kill” designation. A “no-kill” shelter is one where, regardless of the circumstances, rescued
animals are not to be euthanized while under the care of the organization. Due to scale
and overcrowding, many municipal animal control shelters are unable to operate as “no-
kill” and are forced to euthanize to control the population. The vast network of Humane
Society affiliated rescues and shelters all operate as “no-kill” programs in the United
States, as do countless breed and animal-specific groups nationally. The No-Kill Network
maintains a database of all registered “no-kill” shelters in each of the 50 states, with
thousands or organizations listed (NoKillNetwork.org).

A related concern often associated with shelters and rescues is the effort to control
the overpopulation of dogs and cats due to a lack of reproductive control.
Popularized by his famous sign-off on the long-running daytime game show “The Price is
Right,” host Bob Barker reminded pet owners to “help control the pet population – have
your pets spayed or neutered” at the end of every episode. His own organization, The
DJ&T Foundation, provides grants and funds to organizations and clinics offering low-
cost spaying and neutering services (DJ&T.org). The organization works with SNAP –
the Spay/Neuter Assistance Program – to offer funds underwriting the SNAP Voucher
Program which subsidizes spay and neuter procedures for individuals who cannot afford
the cost (SNAPUS.org). SNAP operates chapters in nearly every major US metropolitan
area to offer such assistance and to reduce the burden on shelters and rescues –
particularly to eliminate the need for euthanizing unwanted, neglected, or abandoned
animals. This issue within the general Animal Rights/Protection movement views
animals less in the “non-human persons” light, but rather as a vulnerable population to
protect. Spaying and neutering is seen as a means to minimize the unwanted members of
the population, and not viewed in a “forced sterilization” way by those involved.

PART 2: THE LGBTQ RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE US

The history of the movement for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer/Questioning (LGBTQ) Rights is often presumed to have begun with the police raid and subsequent riots at the Stonewall Inn on Christopher Street in New York City on June 28, 1969 (Armstrong & Crage 2006). A subterranean movement existed for generations in the United States prior to the organizing surrounding the Stonewall moment, during a considerably more repressive political and cultural climate. The importance of Stonewall should not, however, be underestimated regarding its impact on the modern-American movement for LGBTQ rights.

Only three years removed from the riots at the Stonewall Inn, the notion that homosexuals in American society deserved equal protection, citizenship status, and civil rights was far from a popular position to hold. Overt discrimination in the workplace, housing, education, commerce, and other social contexts was not only commonplace, but legally- and institutionally-protected as a “matter of taste.” Prior to 1962, every state in the US counted “consensual adult sodomy” as a felony crime (ACLU 2003). As of the early 1970s, the overwhelming majority of states still had anti-sodomy laws on the books and enforced them routinely.¹ The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not offer protections against discrimination on the basis of sexuality or sexual identity, but only on the basis of “race, color, religion, or national origin” (42 USC 2000A 1964). In the early 1970s, being LGBTQ in America meant you were a sexual-deviant/criminal and open to overt

¹ Only Illinois had removed their anti-sodomy law by 1970. By 1975, that list included: CO, CT, DE, HI, NH, NM, ND, OH, OR. The 2003 Supreme Court case Lawrence v. Texas ruled that all anti-sodomy laws were violations of the 14th Amendment (Equal Protection Clause) of the US Constitution.
and legal discrimination.

The cultural and social context surrounding the LGBTQ community and their rights was not much more forgiving or accepting, broadly-speaking, than the formal political context. Despite various changes in attitudes and emerging norms from the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s, homosexuality remained largely outside of public discourse and a cultural and social taboo. Popular entertainment did not feature gay-positive roles or characters in television or film, and very few actors, musicians, or other entertainers were publicly “out,” for fear of losing their jobs or their audiences. In 1972, ABC aired a made-for-TV movie, *That Certain Summer*, in which Hal Holbrook and Martin Sheen played lovers, but no other national, positive depiction of an LGBTQ lifestyle could be found (USC SOD Online).

The 1980s marked significant changes for the LGBTQ Rights movement, as attention shifted from various political concerns to dealing with the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic in the community. By the 1990s, with the disease under greater control, organizations returned attention to political and social issues. Culturally, space opened for increases in acceptance of LGBTQ identities and lives. Media depictions were more frequent and positive. By the turn of the 21st Century, LGBTQ Americans were in positions of political authority, mass media, and various other social roles long restricted.

In the following overview, I review the key issues of focus for the various organizations working within the LGBTQ Rights movement.

*Marriage Equality*

At the center of many political debates and electoral contests in the past two decades has been the question of whether gays and lesbians should be given the same
legal rights to marriage as their heterosexual counterparts. The debate surrounding marriage equality (or same-sex marriage rights) has surfaced as a bedrock of the social-conservative platform of the modern American Republican Party. Not a single mainstream Republican candidate for President since 2000 has publicly endorsed the rights of LGBTQ Americans to marry their partners freely and legally under any circumstances. Democratic counterparts have not always openly advocated for marriage equality either: At the time of their campaigns, Al Gore, John Kerry, and Barack Obama all failed to advance marriage equality as part of their platform, choosing instead to generally cite a personal conflict based in religious traditions surrounding the issue.

The Conservative movement began advocating the denial of or limiting the marriage rights of LGBTQ Americans in the late 1990s. Various state-level initiatives and constitutional amendments have been proposed (and many states have been passed) defining marriage as a “heterosexuals-only” legal contract (Soule 2004). Twenty-seven\(^2\) states have proposed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriages in their states, primarily by legally-defining marriage as “a union between one man and one woman.” In most of these cases, the amendments passed by resounding majorities (60+% and above) of the state's electorate (DOMAWatch.org “Marriage Amendment Summary).

As of February 2012, seven states and the District of Columbia have laws that mandate the states to both (a) issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and (b)

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\(^2\) Including: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, Virginia (Human Rights Campaign).
recognize as legally-binding such marriages entered into in other states. Of those, four of them (DC, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington) enacted such laws via legislative routes, while the remainder (Connecticut, Iowa, and Massachusetts) did so as a result of state Supreme Court rulings on the illegality of denying same-sex couples the license and legal-recognition of their marriages. Two states recognize, but do not perform, same-sex marriages (Maryland and Rhode Island). Eight states (California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington) provide an “equivalent institution,” generally under the title of “civil union” or “domestic partnership,” to same-sex couples. In three states (Colorado, Maine, and Wisconsin), laws exist to grant some legal rights to same-sex couples (Human Rights Campaign “Maps of State Laws and Policies”). Despite these state laws, the passing of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA, US-HR 3396) in 1996 institutionalizes a federal definition of marriage as “a legal union between one man and one woman” and does not require that any state recognize as legal any marriage performed in any other state.

As of 2012, activists spanning organizations such as the Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality USA, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, and various other entities continue to push for expanded marriage rights for same-sex couples. In 2011, President Barack Obama publicly backed the effort to repeal the Federal DOMA. At the time, this effort was in the form of the “Respect for Marriage Act” introduced by Senators Dianne Feinstein, Patrick Leahy, and Kirsten Gillenbrand (Democrats from California, Vermont, and New York respectively). This act would repeal the federal definition of marriage as a “union of one
man and one woman,” but would not remove the state-level recognition clause of the original DOMA. The new clause titled “Marriage Recognition” states:

(a) For the purposes of any Federal law in which marital status is a factor, an individual shall be considered married if that individual's marriage is valid in the State where the marriage was entered into or, in the case of a marriage entered into outside any State, if the marriage is valid in the place where entered into and the marriage could have been entered into in a State. (HR-1116, 112th Congress)

In other words, states are still not required to recognize any marriage performed in any other state.

Non-Discrimination/Adoption/Family Rights

Members of each house of the United States Congress have introduced federal non-discrimination acts related to the LGBTQ community since 1974. The first of these, called the Equality Act, was introduced by Representatives Bella Azbug and Ed Koch, Democrats from New York. The Equality Act of 1974 sought to ban discrimination against lesbians, gay men, unmarried persons, and women in employment, housing and public accommodations (amended the next year to include “affectional or sexual preference” to all existing Civil Rights statutes so as to separate marital status and sexuality) (NGLTF). While the Equality Act failed in Congress, efforts have continued to add such language to federal anti-discrimination protections. Since 1994, a version of the Employee Non-Discrimination Act (or ENDA) has been advanced in Congress, primarily by members of the Democratic Party. The most recent version in the 112th Congress was introduced by Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) and 148 co-sponsors (the mirroring bill in the Senate was introduced by Sen. Jeff Merkley D-OR and 41 co-sponsors), and would prohibit employers from discriminating in any way on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. It maintains an exemption for religious institutions and includes a
section regarding the “non-application” of the statute for members or veterans of the branches of the US Military (presumably to separate the ENDA from the policies of “Don't Ask, Don't Tell” to be reviewed below).

Since the first introduction of the Equality Act in 1974, organizations such as the National Gay & Lesbian Task Force and the Human Rights Campaign have worked hand-in-hand with legislators to attempt to pass such regulations or to amend the existing Civil Rights statutes to include gender identity and sexuality as protected statuses. As of February 2012, the House and Senate versions of ENDA have been referred to committee, where they will likely “die” due to the lack of bipartisan support. For advocates, these measures and federal protections are necessary because it is legal in 29 states for employers to openly discriminate against job applicants and employees on the basis of their sexuality and/or gender identity.

In 1993, with the support of then-President Bill Clinton, Congress passed the controversial bill known as “Don't Ask, Don't Tell” (DADT). The President supported a repeal of an existing ban on service by gay and lesbian Americans, but compromised on this policy by allowing them to serve, only so long as they are not “open” about their sexuality (“Don't Tell”). Their superiors or other service-members are also not to inquire in any way about their sexuality (“Don't Ask”). This compromise was reached after many military leaders successfully argued that overturning the ban and allowing openly-gay and lesbian servicemen and women in the military would potentially undermine

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3 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming

4 The following states specifically protect on the basis of gender identity: California, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Washington (ACLU)
morale. Debate surrounding DADT continued throughout the administration of President George W. Bush, who was an ardent supporter.

During the first term of President Barack Obama, public and military opinion on the effectiveness or necessity of DADT reflected a broader shift in attitudes regarding sexuality in the United States. Top military officials no longer viewed the service of openly-gay and lesbian citizens as a threat to morale or combat-readiness. In 2010, Robert Gates, then Secretary of Defense, and Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to Congress that it was time for the controversial policy to end. Stated Admiral Mullen:

No matter how I look at the issue, I cannot escape being troubled by the fact that we have in place a policy which forces young men and women to lie about who they are in order to defend their fellow citizens [...] Allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly would be the right thing to do (JCS.mil 2010).

Despite continued resistance from Republicans in both the US House and Senate, the Obama administration pushed publicly for the policy's repeal. With a Democratic majority in both houses of Congress, the repeal moved forward in a legislative back and forth culminating in a stand-alone measure to repeal the policy passed by the House in December 2010. Three days later, the Senate approved the measure with a vote of 65-31, which the President signed on December 22, 2010.

During the eighteen years of “Don't Ask, Don't Tell,” an estimated 14,000+ servicemen and women were discharged on the basis solely of their sexuality, including at least 250 discharged in 2010 and 2011 as the policy was in the repeal process (Dwyer 2011). Many movement organizations, most Servicemembers United (the self-proclaimed “America's Gay Military Organization”), Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans Association, and
all prominent LGBTQ national advocacy organizations worked on behalf of those discharged, those active servicemen and women living “closeted” lives within the branches of the military, and in persuading both public and governmental opinion on the policy.

The rights of same-sex partners to adopt children jointly as a couple, or to become the adoptive parent of one or the other's biological child, continues to be an area of concern for activists in the LGBTQ community. In most states, single LGBTQ individuals have the same rights to adopt children as their heterosexual unmarried counterparts (with the exception of Arkansas and Florida, which expressly prohibit adoption by single or partnered LGBTQ individuals). Nine states currently permit same-sex couples to jointly adopt children. In the case of separation, if only one parent is the legal parent of any children the couple had previously raised together, the other parent has no legal recourse to custody, child-support, or the other rights of parenthood. Symbolically, the lack of legal recognition as dual parents of children in same-sex partnerships stigmatizes these families as non-normative in relation to their heterosexual, monogamous counterparts.

In the first session of the 112th Congress, Representative Pete Stark (D-CA) introduced the “Every Child Deserves a Family” Act. This bill would federally “prohibit discrimination in adoption or foster care placements based on the sexual orientation, gender identity, or marital status of any prospective adoptive or foster parent, or the sexual orientation or gender identity of the child involved” (HR 1681, p. 1; mirrored in Senate Bill 1770, sponsored by Senator Kirsten Gillenbrand, D-NY). This bill would
supersede the state policies regarding adoption rights and would require private and public agencies to no longer reject otherwise-qualified applicants based solely on their sexuality or gender identity.

The second clause of the bill seeks to redress the problems of LGBTQ youth in foster or adoptive households from discrimination. The bill states that research has found that up to 60% of LGBTQ youth in foster and adoptive care are abused physically or emotionally, harassed, bullied, or otherwise discriminated against because of their identity (HR 1681). As of February 2012, the bill resides in the House Committee on Ways and Means, but is unlikely to see a floor vote under the current Congress.

“Pride”

Every June, across cities in the United States and now throughout the world, LGBTQ communities and organizations come together in a celebration (often with the accompanying pageantry and parades) of their identities, movements, successes, and solidarity in what has come to be known simply as “Pride.” The celebrations occur on or around the date of the original Stonewall Riots of 1969. For some, this is a collaborative effort across various organizations and entities. In other cases, a single organization specializes on the task of organizing the annual parade and related festivities. The process involves arranging facilities (often both publicly and privately owned), obtaining the necessary permits for the parade from local government agencies, procuring sponsors to cover the costs of such an event, and public relations and advertising. In most major and minor metropolitan, a simple internet search will yield the web presence of the “____ Pride Association/Organization/Etc.” (e.g., ABQPride.org; NYC Pride.org; etc.).

Pride Parades and celebrations represent an important normative and cultural
movement action for the LGBTQ community. It is an opportunity to engage the broader public in dialogue regarding their issues, identity, and lives. It is an opportunity for the members of the LGBTQ community themselves to interact with one another across their various identities, and to increase their own social bonds and solidarity within the movement. It represents an overt, public expression of demands, goals, identities, and lives to the rest of their surrounding communities. For many members of the LGBTQ community, it is a time to openly express themselves and their identities without reservation or fear of public retribution in the face of a still (to varying degrees, depending on the locale) hostile world. It is, in many ways, the ultimate symbolic expression – through dress, music, art, parade floats, direct movement actions, and solidarity – of the oft-repeated rallying cry and public statement: “We're here, we're queer, get used to it!”

_Hate Crime Protection/Anti-Bullying Campaigns_

In 2009, Congress passed (and President Obama signed into law) the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crime Prevention Act. This federal statute authorizes the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes motivated by the offender's bias with regard to actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or disability. These protections are added to the previously-protected statuses of race, color, religion, and national origin, as codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It authorizes the federal government to intervene where it considers state law to be insufficient in guaranteeing these protections (Lews 2009). The 2009 Act is named in memory of two recent high-profile victims of hate crimes. Matthew Shepard was severely and savagely beaten by two area men in Laramie, Wyoming, in 1996. Following the assault – which was
motivated by their anti-gay attitudes – Shepard was tied to a fencepost and left to die. James Byrd, Jr., was beaten and then chained to and dragged to his death by a truck driven by white, racially-biased men in Texas. The expansion of hate crime provisions to other constituencies represents a successful movement outcome within the research on social movements and their effects on public policy (McVeigh, et al 2003; Jenness & Broad 1997).

A review of state-level hate crime statutes demonstrates the need for federal protection of sexual and gender identity (FBI Crime Report). As of February 2012, twenty-eight states provide protections in hate crime statutes for offenses motivated by bias toward sexual orientation or identity. However, only eleven offer protections based on perceived or actual gender identity, and twenty-two offer no protections for either (and in some cases, do not have a state-level hate crime statute relating to any statuses or identities). Despite these state and federal protections, the LGBTQ population remains at risk for hate crime victimization. According to FBI statistics for 2010, roughly 20% of all hate crime victimization is due to sexuality or gender identity biases (a total of 1,528 reported instances of single-motivation hate crimes). This number shows an increase from 2009 of nearly 100 incidents. Of those, more than half were due to an offender's anti-male-homosexuality bias (FBI 2011).

Many national advocacy organizations engage in campaigns tied to ending hate crime victimization in the LGBTQ community, including GLAAD (the Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation), the HRC, and Lambda Legal. The Matthew Shepard Foundation, founded and spearheaded by his mother Judy, was instrumental in passing
the Hate Crime Prevention Act of 2009 and continuing advocacy on behalf of LGBTQ victims.

In recent years, numerous highly-publicized cases of teen and youth suicides (due in large part to years of bullying and social pressures because of their sexual identity) have caused the emergence of new campaigns and efforts. These organizations and campaigns have two primary focuses. First, they advocate for anti-bullying legislation federally and at the state level, and laws to mandate that schools implement effective and inclusive anti-bullying measures. These include effective methods for the punishment of those who bully, and creating safe environments for students and youths to report bullying incidents. In March of 2011, Senator Al Franken (D-MN, along with 34 co-sponsors) introduced the “Student Non-Discrimination Act” which seeks to “end discrimination based on actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity in public schools” (S.555). As of February 2012, it is currently sitting in the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. Forty-six states have adopted anti-bullying laws of some sort (only Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, and South Dakota have not, as of February 2012). Of those, thirty-six have specific provisions regarding cyber-bullying. These are general statutes, and some states have moved to introduce provisions specific to LGBTQ youth in response to recent high profile suicides. In Tennessee, proposed changes to the bullying provisions for public schools include an exemption for those expressing “unpopular religious, philosophical, or political views” (Ford 2012).

Secondly, organizations and campaigns have recently emerged that work directly to provide emotional support for LGBTQ youths who may be experiencing harassment or
bullying because of their identity and sexuality. The highest-profile of these is the “It Gets Better” project, launched in 2010 by author and radio host Dan Savage. The project involves commentary and the posting of videos to various websites (including YouTube) in which adult members of the LGBTQ community and its allies tell their stories and provide hope, support, and inspiration to their teen and youth counterparts. The idea is in its name: That, while the harassment and bullying has created a terrible atmosphere and a difficult time for LGBTQ youth, it does get better, and the taking of one's life is not the only option. The project has raised over $100,000 to date, which has been used to benefit other related organizations including The Trevor Project – a suicide and crisis-prevention network for LGBTQ youth – and GLSEN (the Gay/Lesbian/Straight Education Network), which works to end bullying in public and private schools for all students.

HIV/AIDS Services

In the 1980s, the movement for LGBTQ Rights made a temporary shift away from the pursuit of social, political, and economic equality in order to deal with a growing crisis: the epidemic of HIV/AIDS and the rising death toll it created within the community. While exact numbers are difficult to determine, it is safe to posit that thousands of members of the LGBTQ community succumbed to the disease and its related effects in the 1980s alone, and many more in the decades since. In the 1980s, what became known as AIDS was heavily stigmatized as a “gay disease,” and often even viewed by religious conservatives as retribution for a sinful lifestyle. While many organizations worked on the advocacy side of the AIDS epidemic, other activists and

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5 While the number of deaths in the United States has been estimated at 40,000 and reported cases overall in the US at 155,000 in the 1980s, the number of those that self-identify as LGBTQ is difficult to estimate. One prominent assessment in 1989 (Winklestein & Padian) estimated that, by 1992, the cumulative death toll from HIV/AIDS among gay men was likely to reach 100,000.
organizations emerged and transitioned toward a focus on providing health care services, emotional support, convalescent care, meal delivery, and the various other resources and services required. At the time, the nature of how the disease was contracted and spread was still largely unknown. As a result, many traditional health clinics and support options were not available to AIDS patients. Even many health care professionals were unaware of how to treat this growing population, and were unsure whether in doing so, they would accidentally be contributing to a growing epidemic.

The most high profile event surrounding the growing AIDS epidemic in the United States was the construction and assembly of the “AIDS Quilt” (now part of the Names Project) on October 11, 1987, on the National Mall in Washington DC. The quilt was a patchwork of 1,920 panels dedicated to those whose lives had been lost to the disease. It was such a landmark and emotionally-powerful symbolic display that the quilt was taken on a national tour, which in turn raised over $500,000 dollars for various AIDS organizations and projects. In 1996 (the last time that the quilt was fully displayed publicly) it contained enough panels to cover the entirety of the National Mall, an estimated 146 acres. To date the effort has raised in excess of $3 million dollars for research, treatment, outreach, and advocacy (AIDSQuilt.org). As of February 2012, many organizations continue to provide support, education – including outreach aimed at increasing awareness and testing for all sexually-active individuals, and access to treatment, medication, and health care for those diagnosed with HIV/AIDS within (and beyond) the LGBTQ community.

Summary
This discussion of the various issues and efforts within the Animal
Rights/Protection and the LGBTQ Rights movements is an effort to frame the current state of activism on these fronts, and highlight how the various strategies discussed in Chapter 3 are presently deployed by SMOs. The following chapters (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) empirically explore the relationships proposed in the hypotheses of Chapter 2 by employing a large-N quantitative analysis of the organizations in the movements (Chapter 5), and a small-N qualitative approach to the origin stories of four specific organizations (Chapters 6 and 7). The quantitative analysis explores the potential relationships between resources and strategic determination. The qualitative analysis explores the specific processes involving leaders, organizational/political context, and how those directly and indirectly influence the external political strategy of organizations.
In the quantitative analysis that follows, I explore the overall social movement sectors for Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights movements in the United States. The data available for this study contain limitations regarding the types of conclusions drawn and the potential generalizability of findings. These data provide a means for classifying the organizational landscape and an initial exploration of the hypothesized relationships between movement resources and strategies, as previously noted in Hypothesis #1 (Chapter 2). This hypothesis proposes that organizational strategy is in part a function of the resources available to the organization, and the source of those resources, relative to the cost of the potential movement strategies. Resources are typically conceptualized as any of the necessary inputs involved in movement-related activities: money, labor, time, meeting space, and the like (McCarthy & Zald 1975). For the purposes of the following statistical analysis, resources are only measured through a series of financial variables, discussed in detail below. This does not imply that resources are the only factor involved in the development of strategy. The dynamics related to context and leadership will be addressed in the qualitative analyses in Chapters 6 and 7, and the omission of those variables from the statistical analysis is discussed below.

Unit of Analysis
In both the quantitative and qualitative components of the research, the unit of analysis is the Social Movement Organization (or SMO). The SMO emerged as a primary unit of analysis with the publication in 1975 of John McCarthy & Mayer Zald’s article, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.” The SMO is defined as:

A complex, or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences
of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals (McCarthy & Zald 1975: p. 1218).

The SMO consists of resources (including funding, staff/participants, and tangible resources such as communication technology, meeting space, and the like), organizational structure, and strategic plan for maximizing goal attainment and organizational survival (ibid).

For this study, the SMO is the appropriate unit of analysis because it remains the primary form by which citizens collectively pursue social, political, and economic goals. Despite the emergence of the “Occupy” protests originating in New York City and germinating throughout the world – a loosely or unorganized protest lacking clear leaders or specific goals – and the impact it has had on economic public opinion, the primary means of affecting institutional and political change remains the SMO. Scholars have questioned the validity of the SMO as the unit of analysis by noting the importance of the informal, loose affiliates of activists known as social movement communities (Buechler 1993). While these communities are important in mass-mobilization movement efforts, they are necessarily amorphous and present challenges to the present study. With such an informal organizational arrangement, understanding inputs, the inhabitants of leadership roles, and relationships with other organizations or communities is difficult if not impossible to observe in a large-N quantitative analysis.

*Data Collection*

The data set from which I derived the data for the quantitative analysis were compiled and distributed by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). The original data set is comprised of information supplied to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 2005 by all US organizations with 501(c)3 or 501(c)4 designations. The 501(c)3 designation refers to charitable organizations that do not use a substantial portion of their
activities in attempting to influence legislation or participate directly in campaigning for or against political candidates in elections (IRS Online). 501(c)4 organizations are referred to as “social welfare organizations,” and have greater flexibility in lobbying and political campaigning, as long as their efforts are determined to be directed toward improving “general social welfare” and not for profit-based purposes (IRS Online). The data are compiled from 990 IRS forms, which include a variety of types of organizational financial information.

I coded the original data in order to filter cases for SMOs representing to the two general movements of LGBTQ Rights or Animal Rights/Protection. I first searched the 474,435 organizations for a variety of search terms associated with these movements and filtered out cases that did not match. I then examined the resulting set of cases to remove those that matched the search terms but were not actually affiliated with either movement (“false positives”). I coded the remaining cases as either SMOs (as defined above) or not, and within which of the two movements the organizations operate. Following this coding, the final data set included 3,948 cases for further coding and analysis, to be discussed below.

One key limitation regarding the population of cases is that, because of the nature of the data source, some of the overall SMO population is excluded. Those organizations that operate on or beyond the fringes of legality, those that operate covertly, or those that operate for-profit, are not included. The data are compiled by the Internal Revenue Service, and thus any organization that is operating outside of the law would likely not submit financial data to the Federal Government for fear of location, repression, arrest, and various other forms of social control. Also, organizations operating for-profit would not receive the 501(c)3 or 501(c)4 designation and thus are excluded from the sample.
While this limits the ability to draw conclusions about all SMOs, I assert that the cases included represent a substantial slice of the overall SMO population despite this selection bias. It may also, perhaps, explain why so few organizations in the data utilize the Non-Routine Politics repertoire, as those strategies are associated with non-normative or potentially threatening organizations. Organizations within these two movements are unlikely to operate on a for-profit basis, and therefore (unless specifically attempting to avoid identification by the IRS or other government agencies) would likely pursue tax exempt status and be included in the sample. Organizations pursuing LGBTQ Rights or Animal Rights/Protection goals (as discussed in Chapter 3) would likely fit the criteria of operating for the “general social welfare” even if overtly engaged in political action, and thus would qualify for 501(c)4 status and inclusion in the sample.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable for the present study is the external strategy of the SMO. External strategy is defined as the primary tactical repertoire directed outside of the organization that is employed in pursuit of explicitly-stated organizational goals. Organizational strategy is a conceptually-fluid concept, and one that could change throughout the life-cycle of an organization. For the present study, I coded this external strategy according to that deployed at the time of emergence. As will be seen in the qualitative study to follow, for those cases strategy tends to be relatively constant from emergence throughout the lifespan of an organization.

I then coded each case contained in the final sample according to its determined external political strategy by using multiple sources (public media, organizational websites, etc.). I began this process began by locating the organizations' websites and attempting to identify their strategy from “Mission Statements” or “About Us” pages. If
that source was either unavailable or did not provide sufficient information, I searched for the organizations in the Online Encyclopedia of Associations to identify the same information. If neither proved useful, I searched for the organization within the NCCS Online database, examined the entry for that organization, and if necessary explored in detail their IRS 990 form to attempt to shed light on their strategy. Where no record of the organization could be located – which was very rare (less than 5% of cases) given that all of the organizations were operating in 2005, and thus would likely have had some web presence or available IRS 990 – I used the name and organizational information contained in the NCCS data to presume the organizational strategy employed.

Some social movement organizations are involved in more than one strategic effort. Often, SMOs – particularly larger ones – have teams of volunteers or activists working on various efforts toward their stated goals. Despite this, using the coding procedure I attempt to identify the primary explicit political strategy of each organization through a thorough examination of the organizations' own web presences and promotional materials. I then coded each organization according to one of the following categories, elaborated in the previous theoretical and empirical discussion of movement strategies: Routine Politics, Non-Routine Politics, Cultural/Expressive Action, Service Provision, Legal Action, and Organizational Funding. For those organizations that could not be determined to have a single identifiable primary strategy at emergence (for example, engaged seemingly equally in two or more), I coded the strategy which has proven the most consistent strategic approach throughout the life of the organization (as represented in current promotional materials). For example, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund lists both “Legal Advocacy” and “Educational Outreach” as strategies. However, by examining their history, organizational documentation, landmark
achievements, and allocation of resources, it became clear that their primary focus has consistently been on their work in the courts.

Independent Variables

The explanatory variables used in the quantitative exploration of social movement strategies are financial measures collected by the IRS for each organization. This quantitative portion of the analysis focuses primarily on the relationship between external political strategy and measures of the financial welfare of the organization. For all of the below financial measures, the data correspond to the information provided for the fiscal year 2005.

The percentage of an organization's total annual revenue derived from public contributions (referred to as “Contribution Funding Base” hereafter) measures the organizations' ability to mobilize resources from individuals versus resources mobilized through other means – large private grants or the selling of merchandise, for example. Measuring this as just a net total, however, hides the massive variability in scale across organizations and distorts its effect on the categories of strategy. By creating a relative measure vis-a-vis the organization’s revenue, the analysis can demonstrate the importance of fundraising and mobilizing resources, regardless of scale, on an organization's strategy. This variable conceptually measures an organization's capacity to mobilize resources from the public by understanding how much of their financial inputs are received via direct contributions relative to the total financial resources that can be raised in a given fiscal year.

This distinction is important to SMOs in terms of the effect it may have on strategic flexibility and capacity. According to Marshall Ganz, organizations that receive a large percentage of their resources from a few or a single external source have limited
strategic autonomy or flexibility: They can only engage in strategies that will ensure the stable flow of resources from that single/few donor(s) (Ganz 2000). On the other hand, organizations for which resources flow from a variety of internal (members) and external sources have considerably greater strategic autonomy or flexibility, as they are not restricted to maintaining a positive relationship with a single donor (ibid). Thus, their strategy at emergence is less constrained. For this analysis, organizations with a higher percentage of their total annual revenue derived from contributions of individuals would be expected to exhibit greater variation in terms of strategies. Those organizations with a lower percentage of annual revenue derived from contributions may be expected to be clustered in more “normative” strategic categories – Routine Politics, Legal Strategies, Service Provision, and Organizational Funding. This reflects, perhaps, a desire by the SMO to not alienate single donors by using strategies that are not considered potentially confrontational or socially- or politically-deviant.

The second percentage (total expenses for the year / overall foundation balance: referred to as “Fiscal Instability” hereafter) can be seen as assessing the overall financial stability of the SMO. An organization for which this ratio falls close to 1 has only one year of guaranteed existence: If it brings in no new money, it will use its entire fiscal balance in the coming year. An organization for which this ratio falls, for example, at 0.10 expects to spend only 10% of its balance on operations in the coming year, and thus is more financially stable. Arguably, this may give the latter organization greater strategic flexibility

The overall financial balance of the organization is measured using the net balance for the fiscal year 2005 in a variable referred to as Fund Balance. This is the net of overall assets and expenses that the organization has at its disposal, calculated as:
Balance from the Previous Fiscal Year + Total Revenue for the Current Fiscal Year – Total Expenses for the Current Fiscal Year. The general financial balance of an organization is an important variable for movement activities in that it represents the full sum of available finances available for various internal and external activities. An organization with a greater Fund Balance would presumably have a greater degree of flexibility in terms of strategic choice, as those options considered to be more financially-costly would not be beyond their capacity. On the contrary, an organization with limited or even negative resources could potentially find financially-costly strategies to not be available in pursuit of their goals.

The Net Income for the fiscal year 2005 is included to reflect the organizations’ financial status for the year. This measures each organization’s ability to mobilize financial resources, net of its operating costs for that year. It represents whether or not they have been able to secure sufficient funds relative to their operations or are running at a deficit in order to fulfill obligations. The relationship between Net Income and strategy can be considered in various ways: A relatively-healthy organization (one that operates annually with a surplus of funds to expenses) is one that is (a) efficient strategically and thus does not expend more than is necessary, (b) capable of mobilizing stable resource flows, whether internal or external, (c) chooses relatively less-expensive strategic actions, or (d) is resonant – perhaps in terms of goals or in terms of strategy – with individuals or other funding sources in the current political and social context. For this analysis and data, the relationship between Net Income and strategy attempts to capture the overall annual viability of organizations, which could comprise any or all of the above potential dynamics. However, these particular mechanisms between income and strategy cannot be determined through these statistical analyses. Whereas Foundation Balance is a
picture of the overall financial health of the organization, Net Income represents its
current effectiveness and viability relative to expenses and resources mobilized.

In the following models, these two variables have been logged in order to reflect
the differential effect of an increase of a thousand dollars to organizations of varying size.
Logging these variables captures the difference between an organization with, for
example, an income of $1000 increasing its budget by another $1000, versus an
organization with a balance of $1 million increasing its budget by $1000: The former
represents a substantially more important increase for operations of that organization than
for the latter.

Lastly, a dummy measure for region of the United States is included as an
admittedly crude test for any possible geographic effects.

Method of Analysis: Multinomial Logistic Regression

I explore the hypothesis related to the organizational resources variables and
external political strategy through statistical models employing Multinomial Logistic
(MNL) Regression. MNL Regression analyses are appropriate when testing relationships
between continuous or categorical independent variables and a categorical, un-ordered
dependent variable with three or more possible categories. MNL Regression models
consist of a series of Binary Logistic regression models – the latter are used when only
two categories are possible on the dependent variable. Each Logistic comparison
between a reference and another category results in regression coefficients of odds-ratios:
In other words, an increase in one unit for a given independent variable results in a
change in the odds that a case will be in either the reference or compared category.

Initially, the models produce a coefficient that is logged, and must be computed in order

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6 Northeast: CT, DC, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT; Southeast: AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA,
MS, NC, PR, SC, TN, VA, VI, WV; Midwest: IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, WI;
West: AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NM, NV, OK, OR, TX, UT, WA, WZ
to interpret and draw inferences regarding the substantive effects. The results tables presented below have made these computations and demonstrate the relationship for all of the comparisons between categories on the dependent variable.

**Samples of Recently-Emerging SMOs: Founding Years 2003-2005 & 2000-2005**

The fiscal data for FY2005 on all organizations was the last full set compiled by the NCCS at the time of the present research. Given the research question of the study, compiling fiscal data for this late of a period – seemingly the furthest removed from the origins of all of the organizations involved in the sample – is not logical or intuitive: To examine the relationship between resources and organizational strategy, even in just an exploratory or correlational way, the fiscal data analyzed should be as close to the time of origin as possible. However, by choosing a period further in the past, every year would likely mean losing some of the cases included in the sample (since a significant number of the SMOs were founded in years immediately preceding 2005). Given the temporal spread of the year of founding across the nearly 4,000 organizations, any year chosen to compile the fiscal data would ultimately be arbitrary and less than ideal. Following the choice to use FY2005 fiscal data, another concern arose: For SMOs founded long before that year, it would be difficult to argue plausibly that the FY2005 fiscal situation would bear any meaningful relationship to strategy at emergence. By choosing initially to analyze SMOs founded closest to the 2005 date of the financial data, I construct the analysis in order to most plausibly see any relationship between financial resources and initial movement strategy.

In an attempt to mitigate these major concerns while maintaining a substantial sample of cases to analyze, I utilize two samples consisting of the most-recently emerging SMOs from the full sample. The first model focuses on those organizations
founded between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2005, and the second on those founded between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2005. The exact date or year of founding for the organizations cannot be determined across such a varied set of cases. To approximate the year of founding, I use the Ruling Date provided by the IRS for each organization. The Ruling Date is not a perfect measure for the exact date or year of organizational emergence. This date corresponds to the date for which the organization received its recognition of exemption (as 501(c)3 or 510(c)4) from the IRS.

Organizations clearly must exist prior to filing paperwork for exemption, and thus prior to the date of recognition of exemption. With the available data, there is no way to know for certain the length of time between actual emergence and Ruling Date. However, it is a feasible proxy for founding as likely, for most organizations, there was neither (a) a significant number of years between founding and Ruling Date, or (b) a significant change in the resources available to the organization (though, again, this is not information that can be known from these data, so it is possible that the resources may have changed dramatically in those years: For the purposes of these analyses, this cannot be determined or remedied).

These samples remain imperfect, however, as there is no feasible way to collect reliable and valid data for the resources available to founders at or prior to the exact date of emergence in a large-N sample. These samples approximate these unavailable data as best as possible, using data from within two or five years of approximate founding, respectively. The availability, reliability, and feasibility of collecting data relating to the financial resources of the various organizations at the time of their founding also significantly limit these samples. Those cases that would likely have sufficient and reliable data on resources would be those that fit one or more of the following criteria:
organizations large in size, historically-successful, very new, or media/web savvy. Those organizations fitting these criteria would be the most likely to have a useful web presence or the existence of external reviews of their financial resources and actions from the time of their founding to the present. However, those organizations that are not as large, successful, or savvy, would likely be lost from the sample, limiting the review by omitting small, potentially unsuccessful organizations. This would probably have caused a loss of a key component of the sample: most of the Service Provision organizations. These constitute the majority of organizations in the sample and are typically small operations which likely do not have extensive web presences or publicly-accessible financial information available from the past.

Testing the hypotheses relating to the other factors involved in the development of strategy at emergence – the dynamics of leaders and founders, organizational and political context - would not be feasible in a quantitative way for samples of this size and variation. It would not be feasible to obtain much information of theoretical or analytical utility for most, if not all, of the organizations in the samples in a quantifiable way. The dynamics related to leaders and founders surround their particular biographical experiences and skills that may contribute to the strategic direction of their respective organizations. This information is likely only available for the largest, most successful, or most extensively-covered (by media and other outlets) organizations in the sample, as a source of secondary data. Otherwise, for small SMOs especially, these data would need to be gathered through interviews, which is not feasible for such a large sample. Thus, in subsequent chapters I use founders’ interviews to further explore these dynamics.

With regard to the organizational and political context factors, it would be possible to construct a very crude measure for “political opportunity” - as theorized by
Doug McAdam (1999) and others - for each organization if it could be determined (a) when and where the organization was founded, and (b) they could be coded based on some scale built on a “normative or political favorability” measure. I do not believe this is an analytically useful or appropriate way to measure or understand the dynamics associated with political and organizational context. Rather, this is best understood analytically by using a case-history approach in small-N samples to explore the relationship between the origins of the movement organization, its strategic development, and various levels, agents, institutions, and dynamics of political and organizational context.

Given these limitations, the analyses of recently-emerging SMOs in the LGBTQ and Animal Rights/Protection movements nonetheless suggest some inference regarding the relationship of financial resources and the political strategy of SMOs at emergence.

**Samples of Recently-Emerging SMOs: Analyses & Results**

The following analyses involve two subsets of organizations extracted from the full sample of SMOs: those organizations with a Ruling Date (as proxy for year of founding) between 2000 and 2005 and those between 2003 and 20057. In both models, the organizations are only considered as a single sample, rather than separately analyzing the Animal Rights/Protection organizations from the LGBTQ Rights organizations. Likewise, the full model is only used for both sets of cases, rather than analyzing them with Service Provision included and omitted (both will be done in the full sample exploratory analysis to follow). I made these decisions because to separate the cases in such ways would lead to small samples that likely would not yield much of statistical significance or substantive interest from the analyses.

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7 Raw STATA Output tables for all models are included in Appendix A.
Tables 1 and 2 present one initial finding related to the inclusion of strategies beyond those typically explored in SMO research: Service Provision is the dominant strategy employed by SMOs in the Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights movements. For the 2000-2005 sample, Service Provision accounts for 90% of the distribution, and nearly 92% for the 2003-2005 sample. The frequencies also demonstrate the emergence of Organizational Funding as a prominent strategy compared to the other non-Service strategies. Funding organizations represent more than twice the number of newly-emerging Routine Politics organizations. This growth of Organizational Funding suggests multiple possible interpretations. First, it could be that this particular strategy is becoming relatively more dominant, perhaps following the successful example of organizations such as the United Way. It could also, however, suggest that the Organizational Funding strategy is a less-stable strategy, and that the increased-proportion of new SMOs adopting this strategy is a function of volatility: More funding organizations emerge and die in a given span of time than other more-stable strategies. In this analysis, either of these are plausible explanations.

Contrary to the theoretical suggestions in Chapters 2 and 3, it does not appear that rights-based movement organizations are increasingly moving toward the use of Legal strategies: only two organizations from 2000-2005, and just one from 2003-2005. This could, however, be due to dominance in this strategic repertoire of older, established organizations – such as Lambda Legal. It is possible that the founders of new organizations do not believe that they have any space to operate with legal strategies because such organizations have “cornered the market,” so to speak. This is impossible to determine from this analysis, but could potentially explain this theoretically-contrary finding.
Table 5-1: Frequency of Strategy for Both Movements - Ruling Date 2003-2005 (N = 561)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Political Strategy</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service Provision</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Routine Politics</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine Politics</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural/Expressive Actions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Strategies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Funding</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-2: Frequency of Strategy for Both Movements - Ruling Date 2000-2005 (N = 1,177)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>External Political Strategy</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Service Provision</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Routine Politics</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Routine Politics</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural/Expressive Actions</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal Strategies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Funding</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-routine politics continues to represent the smallest minority of organizations in the samples. This could perhaps be explained either by a lack of perceived viability or because such organizations often operate outside of the 501(c)3 & 501(c)4 designations and thus are not part of this sample. Cultural/Expressive strategic organizations are well-represented. The dynamics and potential explanations for those organizations are perhaps similar to those discussed for the Funding groups above.


The first step in the quantitative analysis involves determining the “goodness-of-fit” test for each of the independent variables in the models. Table 3 presents the $X^2$ test of significance found when each variable's contribution to the model is considered.
independently. The coefficient is calculated from \(-2 \times \) the difference of the Log-Likelihoods of each model (the model including all variables, and the model omitting the variable of interest). Statistical significance is then determined via a \(X^2\) Table and the appropriate degrees of freedom.

In this test, it appears that the only variables that are statistically-significant contributions to the model in the 2000-2005 sample are the logged variables of Net Income and Fund Balance. In the 2003-2005 sample, none of the independent variables appear to be statistically-significant additions to the model. Despite this, all of the variables will be included to determine their specific effects on the various comparisons of strategic categories for both samples. The strongest argument that a causal link between financial resources and strategies for these organizations can be made for the 2003-2005 set, or the sample of the most recently founded organizations.

| Table 5-3 : \(X^2\) for \(-2(\text{Difference of Log-Likelihoods})\) for Nested Models: 2000-2005 & 2003-2005 “Ruling Date” Samples (DV = Strategy) |
|-------------------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                                                  | 2000 - 2005      | 2003 - 2005      |
| Region                                           | 20.698           | 16.234           |
| Contribution Funding Base                        | 0.909            | 0.979            |
| Fiscal Instability                               | 0.000            | 1.287            |
| *Net Income (Logged)*                            | 17.154 ***       | 6.798            |
| *Fund Balance (Logged)*                          | 24.621 ****      | 5.655            |

\(P < .1^*\) \quad \(P < .05 ^{**}\) \quad \(P < .01 ^{***}\) \quad \(P < .001 ^{****}\)


In both samples, the financial measures have limited statistical and substantive significance in their effects on the organizational strategy employed at the time of (or

---

8 15 Degrees of Freedom (df) for Region w/ All Strategies; 12 df for Region omitting Service; 5 df for all other variables w/ All Strategies; 4 df for all other variables omitting Service.
close to the time of) emergence, summarized as:

a) No effect of Contribution Funding Base or Fiscal Instability

b) A 10% increase in net income corresponds to roughly a 5-6% increase in the odds of deploying Routine strategies versus Service strategies

c) A 10% increase in fund balance corresponds to roughly a 4-5% increase in the odds of developing Organizational Funding strategies versus Service Provision

d) Due to limited number of Legal organizations, no substantive effects can be determined.

Neither of the ratio measures – Contribution Funding Base or Fiscal Instability have any statistically-significant effects on the comparisons of strategic categories for either sample. This is important relative to the discussion regarding strategic capacity developed by Marshall Ganz. Ganz suggests that those organizations that derive a greater proportion of their resources from members as opposed to those whose resources come from a single elite contributor have greater strategic flexibility, due to their lack of constraint in pleasing a single donor (Ganz 2000). However, in this analysis, it does not appear that proportion has any effect on the strategic flexibility of the organizations in these samples.

Where financial resources do seem to have the most effect are on the comparisons between Routine Politics and Service Provision and Organizational Funding and Service Provision. For both samples, a 10% increase in an organization's net income corresponds to roughly a 5-6% increase in the odds of deploying Routine strategies versus Service strategies. If we increase the scale of that relationship, a 100% increase in net income (or a doubling of it) leads to roughly a 50-60% increase in the odds of developing Routine strategies versus Service. This suggests that perhaps the actions associated with Routine politics are considered more costly than Service strategies, and thus those with greater
income are able to employ them. It is possible that the direction of causation could flow in the other direction: An organization that chooses to use Routine politics places a greater emphasis on the mobilization of resources than do those providing services directly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-4: MNL Regression: Both Movements, All Strategies - Ruling Date 2003-2005 (Odds Ratios) *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE v. W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE v. W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW v. W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution Funding Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Income (Logged)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund Balance (Logged)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P < .1 * P < .05 ** P < .01 *** P < .001 ****

N=561

+ Coefficients for NE v W & MW v W for Non-Routine v. Service are unreasonable (3,140,083.66 & 1,402,854.995 respectively) due to distribution of cases, and do not meet statistical significance, so are omitted from tables.

In both samples, an increase of 10% in the overall fund balance of the organization increases the odds of developing Organizational Funding strategies relative to Service Provision by 3.8% (2003-2005) and 5.1% (2000-2005). This suggests, similar to the dynamics with Routine politics, that perhaps founders view this strategy as more costly and thus only those with greater resources are able to choose it. Another interpretation of this relationship is that organizations that engage in this type of funding would have more money on hand or at their disposal than organizations using other
strategies, which may spend their annual budgets more freely on a wide variety of activities. Lastly, there is a statistically-significant effect of an increase in the net income on the odds of adopting Legal strategies compared to Service Provision in the 2000-2005 sample. However, given that there are only two Legal organizations in this sample, any conclusions drawn from this relationship are speculative at best.

Of secondary importance are the regional effects found in both of the samples of recently-emerging organizations. They can be summarized as follows: Routine political strategies are more common than Service Provision in the Northeast in both samples and Southeast compared to the West in the 2003-2005 sample; Cultural/Expressive strategies have lower odds of occurring compared to Service Provision in the Southeast compared to the West in the 2000-2005 sample. The region dummy is a crude measure of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-5: MNL Regression: Both Movements, All Strategies - Ruling Date 2000-2005 (Odds-Ratios)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Routine v. Service</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE v. W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE v. W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW v. W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contribution Funding Base</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiscal Instability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net Income (Logged)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fund Balance (Logged)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=1177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &lt; .1 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

111
geographic effects on strategy, and no mechanism for such effects can be drawn from this analysis. Speculatively, it is possible that the increased odds of Routine strategies in the Northeast could be due to proximity to the institutions of the federal government. However, this presumes that those organizations are focused on national rather than state or local policy goals, which cannot be known from this analysis. Also, it is possible that the decreased odds of Cultural/Expressive strategies in the Southeast could be due to a lack of resonance of either those strategic repertoires or the goals and issues of the organizations within that unique cultural context. Again, these are speculative assertions as no such dynamic can be determined from the MNL Regression analysis.

There does not appear to be much change in the overall distribution of cases in terms of strategy from the full sample to the newly-emerging samples, or between the 2000-2005 and 2003-2005 samples. This suggests that the continuity of strategy over time – both within a population of cases and for individual organizations – may be more consistent that previously considered. This dynamic will be explored further in the qualitative analysis in Chapters 6 and 7, as not much can be said from this statistical analysis beyond this speculation as to the possible mechanisms.

The following models use the full sample of all organizations with full variation on the Ruling Date. These models do not presume any causal relationship between the financial variables and the various categories of SMO strategy. Roughly 75% of the full sample involves SMOs with Ruling Dates prior to 2000: Some of those date back decades and potentially even further to their time of founding (the Humane Society of America, for example, was founded in the late 19th Century). Given this, the resources measured in 2005 clearly cannot be said to have any causal or explanatory relationship on the strategic repertoires developed at organizational emergence. These models are included in the
present research to serve solely as an exploratory or classificatory examination of the full range of variation in the population of SMOs working within these two movements. Also, the core findings of the models of recently-emerging organizations above are not significantly distinct from those found for the full sample below (there are some differences in variable-effects, which will be discussed following the analysis below).

*Full Sample: Exploratory Analysis*

The models and analysis from the full sample, noting the limitations and compromises made to maintain a substantial number of cases with considerable variation, must forego any causal claims between resources and strategy at emergence. This analysis does, instead, contribute to future research on SMOs where such data at emergence is feasibly available by providing an analytic framework for such research.

For the exploratory analysis of the full sample of SMOs, a series of separate nested models represents the most effective method for exploring the provisional relationships between resources and strategy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-6: Frequency of Strategy for Both Movements (All Cases; N=3,948)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Political Strategy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Routine Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural/Normative Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Funding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5-7: Frequency of Strategy for LGBTQ Rights (N=628)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Political Strategy</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service Provision</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Routine Politics</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine Politics</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural/Normative Action</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Strategies</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Funding</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-8: Frequency of Strategy for Animal Rights (N=3,320)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Political Strategy</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service Provision</td>
<td>3135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Routine Politics</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine Politics</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural/Normative Action</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Strategies</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Funding</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Tables 6-8 demonstrate, the overall frequencies of organizations with regard to strategy is heavily-skewed in favor of service provision organizations. The majority of those Service Providers are shelters and rescues within the Animal Rights/Protection Movement. Contrary to the conventional understanding of modern SMOs, this suggests that the most prominent strategy for both Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights organizations is providing necessary services – medical care, shelter, support, and so on – directly to those of greatest concern and need to the movements. However, with such a skewed distribution, it is reasonable to assume that the findings of the analyses may be overly-weighted and obscure the processes occurring for the other five potential categories on the dependent variable. To account for this, the following models involve those that both include and omit the service provision organizations from the sample.
The exploratory MNL models for the full sample that follow will first examine the Animal Rights/Protection organizations, both including and omitting the Service Provision organizations as discussed above. The second set of models will explore the LGBTQ Rights organizations, both including and omitting the Service Provision organizations. The final set of models combines both movements into one population, both including and omitting the Service Providers.

As was the case with the samples of recently-emerging SMOs, the overall and movement-specific frequencies within the full sample reflect the importance and dramatic presence of Service Provision among SMOs on these two terrains. This suggests that more attention should be paid to those strategic repertoires that fall outside of the mass mobilization and protest tactics that are so often conflated with all social movement action in the literature.

GOODNESS-OF-FIT FOR MNL REGRESSION MODELS: FULL SAMPLE

As above with the recently-emerging samples, Table 9 presents the “goodness-of-fit” test for each of the independent variables in the models testing their relationships to classification with particular political strategies. For the Animal Rights models, Fiscal Instability and the logged effect of Net Income are significant additions to both the model including cases of all strategies and the model excluding the Service Providers. The Region dummy is a significant addition for the full model, but not when Service is omitted. In the model that omits service providers, the Contribution Funding Base is a significant addition.

For the LGBTQ Rights models, all variables are strongly-significant for both the full model and the model with service provision omitted. In the model omitting Service, all variables retain significance but only the logged effect of Net Income continues at the
p < .001 level, while the remainder decrease in statistical significance.

In the models analyzing the full population (organizations from both general movements), all of the variables excluding the expression of Contribution Funding Base are significant additions to the model. In the model that excludes Service organizations for both movements, Region is no longer a significant addition to the model, but the Contribution Funding Base gains significance for the model. For the analyses and models to follow, I will present the analysis from each model first, and summarize the substantive findings and implications at the end of the section regarding these exploratory models of the full sample of SMOs.

**Full Sample Analysis: Animal Rights/Protection Organizations**

The following tables of models present the exploratory analysis of the relationships of these independent variables on the comparisons across strategic categories for SMOs. Table 10 presents the analysis regarding Animal Rights organizations including the massive portion of the population dedicated to Service...
Provision – namely, shelters and rescues. Findings are summarized as:

a) A 1% increase in Fiscal Instability corresponds to a 0.3% decrease in odds of Organizational Funding versus Service Provision

b) A 10% increase in Net Income decreases the odds of using Non-Routine politics by 3.9%, and increases the odds by 1.8% of Cultural Strategies, both compared to Service Provision.

| Table 5-10: Multinomial Logistic Regression: Animal Rights/Protection, All Strategies (Odds Ratios) |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| NE v W | 0.815 | 1.518 | 0.994 | 0.319 | 0.725 |
| SE v W | 0.517 | 0.495 | 0.158*** | 0.000 | 0.635 |
| MW v W | 0.277 | 0.659 | 0.595 | 0.318 | 0.588 |
| Contribution Funding Base | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.997 |
| Fiscal Instability | 0.999 | 0.999 | 1.000 | 0.995 | 0.997*** |
| Net Income (Logged) | 0.961*** | 1.021 | 1.018* | 0.972 | 1.004 |
| Fund Balance (Logged) | 0.997 | 0.992 | 0.993 | 0.990 | 0.987 |

P < .1 * P < .05 ** P < .01 *** P < .001 ****

N = 3,320

Fiscal Instability for the year is a significant addition to the model, and for a 1% increase in that proportion, the odds that an Animal Rights organization employs Organizational Funding strategies rather than Service Provision decrease by 0.3%.

The odds-ratios for the variables whose effects are best understood in logged-terms – Net Income and Overall Fund Balance of the organization (as discussed previously) – are calculated in terms of the effect of a 10% increase on the strategy employed. The Net Income of the organizations for that fiscal year is a significant contribution to the model,
and provides two statistically-significant effects on strategy. First, a 10% increase in Net Income decreases the odds of using Non-Routine politics by 3.9% compared to Service Provision. Second, that same 10% increase is associated with a 1.8% increase in the odds of using Cultural Strategies as opposed to Service Provision. The dummy variable for Region is a significant addition to this model as shown in Table 9, but only contributed one significant relationship across the various Regional and Strategic comparisons. Animal Rights organizations in the Southeastern region appear to have considerably lower odds of having Cultural strategies as opposed to being direct Service Providers (84.2% lower odds).

Table 11 presents the analysis of the Animal Rights organizations, omitting the large proportion of those classified as Service Providers. This is done to examine whether the effects of these variables are significantly different when that large percentage – which is potentially driving many of the effects seen in Table 10 – is excluded. Findings are summarized as:

a) A 1% increase in Contribution Funding Base corresponds to a 2% increase in the odds of Non-Routine, and 58.6% increase in the odds of Legal strategies, both compared to Organizational Funding

b) A 1% increase in Fiscal Instablility increases the odds of using Non-Routine Political, Routine Political, and Cultural strategies by 0.3%, 0.2%, and 0.3% respectively, relative to Organizational Funding

c) A 10% increase in Net Income decreases the odds of using Non-Routine Politics and Legal Strategies by 4.5% and 6% respectively, relative to Organizational Funding

d) Fund Balance has no effect on any strategic comparison
Table 5-11: Multinomial Logistic Regression: Animal Rights/Protection, Service Provision Omitted (Odds Ratios)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>Non-Routine v. Funding</th>
<th>Routine v. Funding</th>
<th>Cultural v. Funding</th>
<th>Legal v. Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NE v W</td>
<td>1.237</td>
<td>1.889</td>
<td>1.211</td>
<td>0.568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE v W</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.768</td>
<td>0.253**</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW v W</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>1.160</td>
<td>1.150</td>
<td>0.871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution Funding Base</td>
<td>1.022*</td>
<td>1.007</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>1.586*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Instability</td>
<td>1.003*</td>
<td>1.002*</td>
<td>1.003***</td>
<td>0.997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Income (Logged)</td>
<td>0.955**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>0.940**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund Balance (Logged)</td>
<td>1.003</td>
<td>1.017</td>
<td>1.018</td>
<td>1.036</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P < .1 *  P < .05 **  P < .01 ***  P < .001 ****  N = 185

The Contribution Funding Base shows statistically-significant effects on the likelihood of both Non-Routine and Legal strategies as compared to Organizational Funding. This second relationship (a 58.6% increase) is surprising, but may be due to the small number (only 6) of organizations employing legal strategies within the Animal Right/Protection movement. This could represent either the expensiveness of legal strategies, or a reflection of insights from Ganz: That a diverse funding base allows greater leeway of strategic choice.

Fiscal Instability is a significant addition to this model, and seems to have an overall statistically-significant effect on strategic choices for non-Service Animal Rights groups. A 1% increase in this proportion increases the odds of using Non-Routine Political, Routine Political, and Cultural strategies by 0.3%, 0.2%, and 0.3% respectively, relative to Organizational Funding. These do not represent a major substantive effect of the ratio financial variables on strategy. Additionally, a 10% increase in the...
organizations' Net Income for the year is associated with a 4.5% decrease in the odds of having Non-Routine Political strategies, and a 6% decrease in the odds of using Legal strategies, as opposed to Organizational Funding.

Despite Region not appearing to be an overall significant addition to this model, one relationship does appear to have a significant effect: Southeastern Animal Rights organizations have much lower odds (74.7%) of employing Cultural strategies as opposed to Organization Funding tactics as compared to their Western counterparts when Service organizations are omitted.

The ratio financial and resource-based variables appear to have different substantively-significant effects on strategic choice for Animal Rights organizations. The effect of Fiscal Instability is very small in all the significant relationships. However, as noted above, the effect of Contribution Funding Base seemingly has a large effect on the odds of using Legal strategies compared to Organizational Funding. This may suggest that organizations whose revenue is largely derived from individual contributions are more likely to use Legal strategies, but the limitations of the data, analysis, and the distribution of cases make any such finding somewhat speculative and in need of confirmation via other data.

The logged effect of Net Income does appear to have a substantive relationship to strategy, particularly when thought of in terms of greater increases. For example, if an organization doubles their net income for the year (a 100% increase), the odds that the organization deploys Non-Routine political strategies decreases by 39% and the odds of Cultural/Expressive strategies increases by 18%, both relative to Service Provision. When the Service organizations are removed from the model, a doubling of net income decreases the odds of employing Non-routine political strategies by 45% and Legal
strategies by 60% compared to Organizational Funding activities. While caution must be shown for all findings with this full sample, these relationships suggest that the ability to engage in Organizational Funding activities may require (or produce) a greater amount of financial resources on hand than do the Non-Routine and Legal repertoires.

The overall analysis of the Animal Rights Organizations in this study conclude that there appears to be a limited geographic effect on strategy, but only when comparing Southeastern organizations to their Western counterparts in regards to Cultural or Normative tactics. This Cultural repertoire appears uncommon in the Southeast (much lower odds in both models), suggesting perhaps a lack of resonance or political salience of such overt attempts to alter normative attitudes and behaviors regarding Animal Rights in that region of the United States. This is possibly a function of the traditional “Southern” values of the region being distinct and potentially at odds with what are considered “Coastal” attitudes towards animals: That they aren’t food, entertainment, or there for the production of clothing. This certainly cannot be shown through this quantitative analysis, but is potentially a mechanism for this distinction.

*Full Sample Analysis: LGBTQ Organizations*

The following models present the effects of the same set of variables presented above on the subset of cases focused on the various issues surrounding rights and the LGBTQ community in the United States for the multi-decade sample of SMOs. As presented in Table 9, all of the independent variables for the study are significant additions to the model for LGBTQ Rights organizations when including the subset of the population engaged in Service Provision (overall N = 628; Service N = 318). Table 12 presents the results for the variable effects on odds-ratios for this sample, summarized as:

a) A 1% increase in Contribution Funding Base is associated with a 1.6% decrease in odds for Cultural strategies relative to Service Provision
b) No substantive effect of Fiscal Instability on any strategic comparison

c) A 10% increase in Net Income corresponds to increases in the odds of using Routine Politics and Organizational Funding by 4.1% and 3.2% respectively, relative to Service Provision.

d) A 10% increase in Fund Balance corresponds to decreases in the odds of using Routine Politics and Organizational Funding by 5.8% and 3.2% respectively, relative to Service Provision.

Table 5-12: Multinomial Logistic Regression: LGBTQ Rights All Strategies (Odds Ratios)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE v W</td>
<td>--- *</td>
<td>1.601 **</td>
<td>0.611 *</td>
<td>2.212 ***</td>
<td>0.855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE v W</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>0.406 ***</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>0.458 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW v W</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>1.338</td>
<td>1.172</td>
<td>1.744 ***</td>
<td>1.201 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution Funding Base</td>
<td>1.075</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>0.984 ****</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>0.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Instability</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000 ****</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Income (Logged)</td>
<td>1.140</td>
<td>1.041***</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>1.025</td>
<td>1.032***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund Balance (Logged)</td>
<td>0.859*</td>
<td>0.942****</td>
<td>0.964****</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>0.968****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P < .1 *      P < .05 **     P < .01 ***     P < .001 ****

N = 628

* Coefficient is unreasonable (1,956,895.8) due to distribution of cases & standard error; does not meet statistical significance, so is removed from the table for interpretive purposes.

Contribution Funding Base has a statistically significant effect on the odds of using Cultural/Expressive strategies compared to Service Provision. However, this effect is substantively small: A 1% increase in that proportion is associated with a 1.6% decrease in odds for Cultural strategies. One comparison – Cultural Strategies versus Service Provision – results in a statistically significant effect of Fiscal Instability.
However, the odds-ratio shows that there is substantively no effect (odds-ratio of 1 = no change in odds).

For the Regional comparisons, a significant effect is shown for multiple regional and strategic comparisons. First, Northeastern organizations have lower odds (33.4% lower) of using Cultural strategies, as opposed to direct Service Provision, than their Western counterparts. Second, Southeastern organizations have 59.6% lower odds of having Cultural tactics and 54.2% lower odds of employing Organizational Funding strategies, as compared to Service Provision, than Western organizations.

The model for LGBQ Rights organizations that omits the Service Provision organizations (Table 13) also shows that all of the independent variables are significant contributions to the overall analysis (see Table 9). The findings are summarized as:

a) A 1% increase in Contribution Funding Base corresponds to increases of odds of 8.6%, 12.4%, and 1.2% respectively, for Non-Routine, Routine, and Organizational Funding strategies compared to Cultural/Expressive strategies

b) Fiscal Instability has no effect on the strategic comparisons

c) A 10% increase in Net Income increases the odds by 6.2% and 4.5% respectively, of using Non-Routine Politics and Organizational Funding, compared to Cultural/Expressive strategies.

d) A 10% increase in Fund Balance corresponds to a 3.9% decrease in Routine Politics compared to Cultural/Expressive strategies.

In this model, Fiscal Instability has no effect. This suggests that perhaps the processes shaping strategic choice are driven less by measures of relative financial health and mobilizing capacity than often suggested. The effects of Contribution Funding Base signal a possible relationship between the source of an organization's resources and the strategies employed. Again, caution must be show in attributing any weight to these findings given the data limitations of the full sample. Regionally, Northeastern
organizations have dramatically (3.5x) greater odds of being associated with Routine Political action than Cultural Action, compared to Western LGBTQ organizations, perhaps for reasons discussed below.

### Table 5-13: Multinomial Logistic Regression: LGBTQ Rights Service Provision Omitted (Odds Ratios)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>Non-Routine v. Cultural</th>
<th>Routine v. Cultural</th>
<th>Legal v. Cultural</th>
<th>Funding v. Cultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NE v W</td>
<td>---*</td>
<td>3.556***</td>
<td>3.164</td>
<td>1.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE v W</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>2.385</td>
<td>1.294</td>
<td>1.287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW v W</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>1.213</td>
<td>1.330</td>
<td>0.935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Contributions / Total Revenue</td>
<td>1.086*</td>
<td>1.124**</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>1.012***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Expenses / Fund Balance</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>1.000**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Income (Logged)</td>
<td>1.144</td>
<td>1.062****</td>
<td>1.032</td>
<td>1.045****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund Balance (Logged)</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td>0.961**</td>
<td>1.004</td>
<td>0.995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Coefficient is unreasonable (4,717,407.7) due to distribution of cases & standard error; does not meet statistical significance, so is removed from the table for interpretive purposes.

The relative relationships of the logged financial variables reflect a similar dynamic of scale as was the case in the Animal Rights models. Namely, if the relationships are examined in larger terms (a doubling of the income or balance rather than a 10% increase), the substantive effect can be seen more clearly. In both the full model and that with Service organizations omitted, the effect of a doubling (or 100% increase) of the organization's net income leads to increases of 41% and 62% of the odds of using Routine Politics relative to Service Provision or Expressive Strategies respectively. A doubling of the overall organizational financial balance leads to decreases
in the odds of using Routine Politics, Expressive/Cultural strategies, and Organizational funding compared to Service Provision in the full model; the same increase leads to a decrease of 31% in the odds of using Routine Politics versus Cultural tactics in the model where Service providers are removed. These findings suggest that the use of Non-Service strategies is possibly affected positively by a greater capacity to generate income in that year, while the relationship flips negative when discussing the overall financial balance of the organization. For LGBTQ Rights groups, it is potentially the case that Service Provision is more a function of overall resources, and the other “activist” tactics are a reflection of yearly income – or, mobilization of resources versus overall organizational capacity for expenditure.

The regional relationships in these two models suggest that Cultural/Expressive strategies are less likely in both the Northeast and Southeast, relative to the West, when compared to either Routine or Service strategies. Organizational funding seems to have lower odds than Service Provision in the Southeast compared to the West. This may be an effect of the proximity to Washington D.C., for Northeastern organizations, and thus more of a compulsion to engage and interact with the formal institutions of law and governance than organizations on the West Coast. The history of the LGBTQ Rights movement involves massive Cultural and Expressive actions in the West, particularly among organizations in San Francisco, California (including the first “Pride” celebrations and Stonewall Riot commemorations to regularly occur outside of New York City).

Full Sample Analysis: Animal Rights and LGBTQ Rights Organizations

Lastly, the full population of cases combining organizations on both the Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights movements examines the possible relationships between regional location and financial resources across a sizable subset of the overall
Rights-based social movement sector in the United States (Tables 14 and 15). The full discussion of the findings in these models is found in Appendix B.

| Table 5-14: Multinomial Logistic Regression: Both Movements All Strategies (Odds Ratios) |
|------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| REGION                                  |       |       |       |       |       |
| NE v W                                  | 1.539 | 1.836** | 0.931 | 1.387 | 0.901 |
| SE v W                                  | 0.511 | 0.661 | 0.322**** | 0.187 | 0.540*** |
| MW v W                                  | 0.274 | 0.687 | 0.696* | 0.593 | 0.624** |
| Contribution Funding Base               | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.997 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Fiscal Instability                      | 0.999 | 1.000 | 1.000** | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Net Income (Logged)                     | 0.976 | 1.043**** | 1.005 | 1.004 | 1.021**** |
| Fund Balance (Logged)                   | 0.992 | 0.965**** | 0.982**** | 0.993 | 0.991* |

P < .1 *, P < .05 **, P < .01 ***, P < .001 ****

N = 3,948

The exploratory findings of the analyses of the full sample differ from the samples of recently-emerging SMOs in a few, but notable ways. First, the ratio financial variables have no statistical significance in the samples of SMOs founded shortly before 2005, compared to limited significance in the full sample (though little to no substantive significance could be attributed in the full sample). The regional effects are not much different, and thus expectations are that while region may have some effects on the strategies developed by organizations, there is little that can be said on the specific mechanisms involved in either the full or newly-emerging samples. With regard to the measures of Net Income and overall Fund Balance, the relationships for SMOs founded shortly before 2005 are not much different from the full sample, but do allow greater
analytic interpretation given the improvements to the timing of the organizations' founding to the data collection. Increases in both net income and fund balance are both associated with likely increases in the use of Routine Politics and Organizational Funding relative to Service Provision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>Non-Routine v. Cultural</th>
<th>Routine v. Cultural</th>
<th>Legal v. Cultural</th>
<th>Funding v. Cultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NE v W</td>
<td>1.679</td>
<td>2.063**</td>
<td>1.477</td>
<td>0.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE v W</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>2.215*</td>
<td>0.554</td>
<td>1.812*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW v W</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>1.048</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td>0.938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution Funding Base</td>
<td>1.026**</td>
<td>1.006</td>
<td>1.010</td>
<td>1.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Instability</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>1.000*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Income (Logged)</td>
<td>0.973*</td>
<td>1.028**</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>1.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund Balance (Logged)</td>
<td>1.008</td>
<td>0.990</td>
<td>1.019</td>
<td>1.016**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P < .1 * P < .05 ** P < .01 *** P < .001 ****  
N = 495

**Implications of Statistical Analysis**

The above analyses of SMOs in the Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights movements suggest that assumptions related to the importance of resources and the sources of resources on strategic development should be questioned and further examined. With the recently-emerging samples of cases, resources are only found to significantly affect the implementation of Routine politics and Funding compared to Service Provision. However, this difference (the models omitting Service Provision) was not done for the recently-emerging samples due to the drastic reduction in sample-size.
and the subsequent effect that has on statistical utility\(^9\). This suggests that the dominance of the Resource Mobilization perspective in the literature on social movements may not accurately reflect the importance of resources on various intra-movement dynamics. However, for this statistical analysis, resources are only considered as finances, excluding other resources such as labor, time, members, space, etc. These other forms of resources may play important roles in determining strategy, but are beyond the scope of this analysis.

The findings in the exploratory analyses of the full sample show that the inclusion of Service Provision – a controversial inclusion, perhaps, into the conceptualization of activism as noted previously – does have some effect on the relationship of resources to those strategies. This suggests that theoretical and empirical studies of SMOs should not narrowly focus on only those groups using disruptive or routine political strategies. Doing so involves selection bias and excludes (potentially) the majority of possible applicable cases. Future research should expand categorizations of movement strategy to include such groups, or explicitly define their analyses as only applicable to that particular subset of strategic organizations.

The following chapters explore some of these and other internal processes and factors involved in the formation or adoption of external political strategies by Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights organizations. The core analytic design is to use the qualitative data (organizational archives, public documentation, personal biographies, movement publications, and elite interviews) to explore the relationships of resources, leaders, and the political/organizational context on the origins and strategic decisions

\(^9\) The MNL Regression failed to run in STATA for samples excluding Service Provision; an error when calculating the Log-Likelihood for the models caused an infinite loop (due to “non-concave” Log-Likelihood). Thus, those models are not included.
made for these four organizations.

I have chosen not to explore the Non-Routine Politics category based on the extremely-low proportion these organizations comprise of the full population (only .3% of the full population) and the fact that such organizations comprise the bulk of the cases explored throughout decades of sociological inquiry into social movement dynamics. The Organizational Funding category will not be explored due to the lack of available comparative case research and available data.

The analysis focuses on four organizations representing the remaining strategic categories, operating on either national or local/state levels. From the LGBTQ Rights movement, Chapter 6 will examine the origins and strategic decisions for Lambda Legal (Legal Strategies) and Equality New Mexico (Routine Politics). From the Animal Rights movement, Chapter 7 focuses on the same dynamics for People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA – Cultural/Expressive Tactics) and Animal Humane of New Mexico (Service Provision).

These four organizations represent variation on the outcome category and variation in scope of focus – two national organizations, two state-level/local organizations. I did not choose these cases at random, but based on their recognition within the movements as archetypes and as successful in engaging the social and political context toward their chosen goals. While there is selection bias inherent in these choices, the availability of information and the prominence of these organizations in their respective contexts make them useful choices for further review.
CHAPTER 6 - LGBTQ RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

In this chapter, I use various forms of archival and qualitative data – including movement histories, organizational newsletters and meeting minutes, web resources, publicly-available financial information, leader biographies, and interview data – to assess the influence of organizational and political context, the personal histories and skills of leaders, and resources on the development of political strategy by two LGBTQ (EQNM) Rights organizations: Lambda Legal Defense and Education, and Equality New Mexico. These two organizations represent two of the categories of strategy conceptualized in Chapter 3: Legal Strategies (Lambda Legal) and Routine Politics (EQNM). These organizations are involved in actions directed toward a number of the movement issues discussed in Chapter 4 including marriage equality, non-discrimination and family rights, and hate crime prevention and anti-bullying.

In the following discussion, I first present a brief general overview of the two organizations. Drawing on the various forms of data discussed above, which together provide insight into the three key explanatory factors for the present research for each movement: context, leaders, and resources. Second, I analyze these data using qualitative methods to elaborate the nature of how each factor influences the development of the strategy employed at organizational emergence. Third, I examine the strategic continuity of the organizations by exploring their early, important or landmark, and current (as of February 2012) strategic actions. This analysis of continuity relates to the theoretical discussion (Chapter 2) regarding the fluidity of strategy over time. Lastly, I discuss the qualitative analysis in relation to the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2 and the findings of the exploratory statistical analyses of Chapter 5.
*Brief Organizational Overviews: Lambda Legal and EQNM*

Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund (henceforth: Lambda Legal) is the oldest and largest legal organization working specifically on behalf of the LGBTQ community in the United States. Founded in 1973 and still headquartered in New York City (with regional offices throughout the country), the organization employs various full-time staff, interns, and many legal professionals working directly on cases pertinent to the issues of the community. Lambda Legal states that they currently engage in both explicit legal action, and education and outreach surrounding the following issues: workplace fairness, family protections including marriage and adoption rights, transgender rights, youth protections, HIV/AIDS concerns, health care fairness, seniors issues, and government misconduct (LambdaLegal.org “Issues”). The organization states that it pursues strategies of “impact litigation,” or those cases that are viewed as having precedence-setting possibilities that will advance their overall goals for the community beyond the litigants involved in the cases (LambdaLegal.org “About Us”). The organization's current open docket includes sixty-plus cases, active at various levels of state and federal courts. Lambda Legal is also presently engaged in public-education and outreach campaigns designed to empower and educate the LGBTQ community (*ibid*).

As of 2010, the organization operated (according to the latest financial statements from the fiscal year 2010) with revenue of more than $17 million (Lambda Legal 2010). Most of the revenue for the organization came via individual contributions and membership fees (25%), external grants and corporate sponsorships (11%), in-kind service donations (33% - mostly in the form of free legal work), and revenue from special fundraising events (17%) (*ibid*). Organizational expenses (roughly $14 million in 2010)
are primarily used for the legal activities (56%) and education program (25%), with the remainder split across support services (including administrative costs) and fundraising expenses \textit{(ibid)}.

Equality New Mexico (EQNM) is one of the oldest and largest political organizations advocating on behalf of the LGBTQ community in New Mexico. Founded in 2003 and operating as a 501c(4) political organization and 501(c)3 charitable foundation (the EQNM-Foundation), the organization operates both in advocacy and outreach and specifically targeting lawmaking at the state and local level. As of February 2012, the two arms of the organization are jointly headed by an Executive Director, but with separate Boards of Directors, some members of which overlap (EQNM.org “About Us”). All employees work for both organizations, but bill hours to one or the other (EQNM or EQNM-F) in order to distinguish the expenses for tax purposes (McElroy 2012). Current actions include advancing anti-bullying measures, advocating against the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) introduced in the Legislature, working toward electing allied candidates, and toward increasing equality and protection in health care and insurance coverage, specifically as related to concerns of HIV/AIDS (EQNM Newsletters: 2012).

The finances of the organization in 2010 were separated, for tax purposes, between the 501(c)3 and 501(c)4. EQNM (c)4 reported total revenue of $27,212 and assets of $7,589 (EQNM 990 2011). All of the revenue was reported as “contributions, gifts, and grants.” Expenses totaled nearly $20,000, split between salaries and wages, professional fees, rent, and various other expenses \textit{(ibid)}. This profit of roughly $7,000 for 2010, however, is in light of a budget deficit of nearly $37,000 from the previous
year. The EQNM Foundation(c)3 raised roughly $67,000 in revenue, again mostly from contributions and gifts (EQNM Foundation 990: 2011), with expenses totaling nearly $59,000 and a prior-year deficit of just over $1,000 (ibid).

Organizational and Political Context at Emergence

In this section, I detail the various institutional, cultural, and inter-organizational dynamics surrounding LGBTQ Rights at the times of emergence for Lambda Legal and EQNM. I discuss the influence of these outside actors and cultural context on the emergence of the organizations and the strategies their founders chose to employ. In the analysis at the end of this chapter, I discuss the influence between organizational and political context on the formation of political strategy as shown by the origin stories of Lambda Legal and EQNM.

LAMBDA LEGAL: CONTEXT

William Thom founded Lambda Legal in New York City in 1973. In the early 1970s, the modern movement for the civil rights of the LGBTQ community remained in its infancy in the United States. The SMO sector surrounding LGBTQ issues in the US contained a number of new organizations emerging in the wake of the riots at the Stonewall Inn in 1969, and a few organizations that pre-date that momentous event. The most well-known of these pre-existing organizations was the Mattachine Society, founded in Los Angeles in 1950. That SMO worked through a platform of unity, education, social-consciousness, and activism against the repression faced by the LGBTQ community. Other organizations, such as the Janus Society (Philadelphia, PA) and ONE, Inc. (Los Angeles, CA) were active in the community in the two decades pre-Stonewall. Closely following the riots, and formed in their ideological and activist wake, a number of organizations emerged primarily in New York and surrounding areas, to work for the
rights of LGBTQ people in American society. These included, among others, the Gay Liberation Front (1969) formed by those both involved in and closely-following the Stonewall riots, to bring together protests and marches to draw attention to and in solidarity with the rioters. The Gay Activists Alliance (GAA) emerged in 1969 in New York City by former members of the Gay Liberation Front (a short-lived organization) who had grown tired of the prior group's lack of organization or activist-focus. The GAA was founded on the goals of “securing basic human rights, dignity, and freedom for all gay people” (GAA.org). The GAA primarily engaged in non-routine political action involving direct (though generally peaceful) confrontations with political officials regarding their policies and attitudes toward the LGBTQ population (ibid). In sum, the organizational context surrounding LGBTQ Rights issues in the US at the time of Lambda Legal's founding involved few organizations, but was an emerging and growing sector. The organizations that did exist tended to employ either cultural and expressive strategies or the non-routine politics synonymous with the 1960s protest cycle.

The civil rights, anti-war, and student uprisings of the previous decade heavily influenced the organizational context in the 1970s broadly across all movements and issues. The landscape included non-routine, routine, cultural/expressive, service provision, and the newly-emerging legal organizations working on a variety of issues. The legal defense fund, as an organizational type, had existed since the founding of the NAACP-LDF (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People – Legal Defense Fund) in 1940 by future US Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall. The NAACP-LDF was conceived as the explicit legal department of the NAACP, which would use the courts as a means to further the agenda of justice, equality, and due-process
for African-Americans (NAACP-LDF “History”). By 1971, three other prominent minority constituencies developed organizations devoted to the same legal strategies, built directly from the foundation of the NAACP-LDF. In 1968, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) emerged thanks in large part to assistance and training from the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the NAACP-LDF and a grant from the Ford Foundation (MALDEF.org). Two years later, the National Organization for Women (NOW) incorporated their legal department, NOW-LDF (currently known as Legal Momentum) to use the courts to further women's concerns. In 1971, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF) emerged directly on the model of the NAACP-LDF and MALDEF to provide legal advocacy on behalf of the specific concerns of their community.

This emerging field of legal defense organizations on behalf of minority constituencies played an influential part in the founding of Lambda Legal. William Thom, a lawyer and former legal advisor to the Gay Activists Alliance, founded Lambda Legal in 1973 upon the foundation built by those legal defense organizations of prior decades. Thom used their original by-laws and documents of incorporation explicitly to develop those for Lambda Legal. So much so, in fact, that the mission statement in those documents is a verbatim copy of the mission statement of PRLDEF (Andersen 2006), simply replacing the words “Puerto Rican” with “homosexual:”

Mission: To provide without charge legal services in those situations which give rise to legal issues having a substantial effect on the legal rights of homosexuals; to promote the availability of legal services to homosexuals by encouraging and attracting homosexuals into the legal profession; to disseminate to homosexuals general information concerning their legal rights and obligation, and to render technical assistance to any legal services corporation or agency in regard to legal issues affecting homosexuals (Lambda Legal: 1973).
Thus, the organizational landscape beyond the LGBTQ Rights movement in the early 1970s involved many non-routine and routine political organizations still operating in the post-1960s arena, alongside the emergence of legal strategies throughout minority communities working toward issues of civil rights and justice. Given the clear connection between the founding documentation of Lambda Legal and that of PRLDEF, the organizational context played an important role in the development of strategy by the emerging organization.

EQUALITY NEW MEXICO: CONTEXT
EQNM was founded (originally as Basic Rights New Mexico - BRNM) in April 2003 in direct relation to the passage of amendments to the Human Rights Act in New Mexico (SB 28, Regular Session, 2003). The amendments extended the non-discrimination law to include the categories of “sexual orientation and gender identity,” where gender identity is defined as:

“A person's self-perception, or perception of that by person by another, of the person's identity as male or female based upon the person's appearance, behavior, or physical characteristics that are in accord with or opposed to the person's physical anatomy, chromosomal sex, or sex at birth” (SB 28, 2003: Lines 20-24).

In the wake of the passage and gubernatorial signing into law (by Gov. Bill Richardson – D) of these amendments, concern grew within the LGBTQ community in New Mexico that opponents would begin gathering petition signatures in order to repeal these amendments via ballot referendum in 2004. George Bach, a lawyer and activist at the time of BRNM's founding stated:

The question became, after Richardson signed it, would it be subject to the repeal mechanisms in the state constitution? [...] There was concern that they [opponents] might get the signatures to try and get it on the ballot for it to be
repealed. There was also a lot of concern that there was a real danger that, if they did, because it was an election year, that it would be on the ballot. And so, the turnout might hurt us and we could lose it (Bach 2012).

BRNM emerged as an extension of the pre-existing Coalition for Equality in New Mexico (previously known as the Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Rights in New Mexico), originally founded in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in 1993. The original founders of BRNM – notably Todd McElroy – were involved in political campaigns and action surrounding LGBTQ issues in New Mexico for a decade prior to 2003. BRNM emerged specifically, to deal with the potential repeal mechanisms regarding the amendments to the Human Rights Act.

Few other organizations existed in New Mexico in the 1990s and early 2000s surrounding LGBTQ issues. The ACLU had worked on various issues on behalf of the community. A group known as the Gay Lawyers had been active through the University of New Mexico Law School (Bach 2012). The New Mexico Lesbian and Gay Political Alliance (NMLGPA) was operating in Albuquerque at the time (McElroy 2012), along with chapters of national organizations such as Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG), and the Human Rights Alliance of Santa Fe (CGLRNM 1996). The first “Pride” celebration in the state occurred in 1992 in Santa Fe, and was little more than a candlelight vigil in the Plaza (McElroy 2012); Pride organizations began to appear throughout the state in the years to follow. Nationally, many of the prominent organizations working on behalf of LGBTQ Rights today had, by the early 1990s, begun to operate and gain momentum. These organizations include, but are not limited to: GLAAD, the Human Rights Campaign, Lambda Legal, and the National Gay & Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF). The NGLTF, in particular, influenced the early strategic
development of BRNM/EQNM. According to an interview with George Bach:

They [NGLTF] came in and basically put on a training for us about how to raise money, and how to organize a campaign, it was here at the Law School [University of New Mexico], and a bunch of us went to it from all over. They actually had us do fundraising on the spot. We had to bring a list of ten people that we know, friends, former roommates, family, whatever, that we would call and hit up for money while we're there. [...] There were a couple of different teams, but I was one of the ones that at least conducted some of the trainings for folks that were going to then go out and canvass. [...] The training with Task Force, that was really the kickoff event. 'Hey, we need to do this campaign, we got to get a campaign together to make sure we defeat the ballot initiative, if they get the signatures, so the Task Force is going to come in,' and that's what we did (Bach 2012).

When asked whether the NGLTF had influence on EQNM/BRNM, Bach also noted:

Very much so at the time. They're the ones who came in, they taught us how to run a campaign, and showed us how you would call and ask people for money, how you would go door-to-door. [...] So very much so. I thought the Task Force was the one, the reason that we had the campaign. [...] Something would have happened. But the reason that we did it they was we did it was because of the Task Force. [...] I wouldn't say that there would have been no organization, but that way that it was was definitely because of the Task Force, in my opinion (ibid).

In terms of the organizational context surrounding LGBTQ Rights and its effect on the founding of EQNM (then BRNM), there are clear connections between pre-existing organizations and the new. Various localized organizations operated within the political arena in Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and other communities. Nationally, the SMO population grew in size and in prominence politically as various challenges and conflicts emerged surrounding non-discrimination and marriage equality.

In the political arena, two national policies shaped the context and activism surrounding LGBTQ Rights in the 1990s and 2000s, both enacted during the Clinton administration. “Don't Ask, Don't Tell” and the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) – both reviewed in detail in Chapter 4 – spurred both legal challenges and state-level legislative battles surrounding LGBTQ Rights. Recall that the DOMA made marriage a state-level determination. As a result, states throughout the country began, via state constitutional amendments on the ballot during general elections, to define marriage as a strictly heterosexual status or relationship. The following year, the marriage equality issue thrust New Mexico into the national spotlight when sixty-four same-sex couples filed for – and were granted by the County Clerk – marriage licenses in Sandoval County, on February 20, 2004 (Advocate 2004). Those marriages were later ruled to be invalid, but the battle over marriage rights had just begun – state-level DOMAs would be introduced that year, and every subsequent year. While New Mexico had not – and as of February 2012 has not – defined marriage legislatively or constitutionally, in the years following the organization’s founding, the battle surrounding LGBTQ Rights focused primarily on marriage issues, to which became a contentious interaction in the institutional political arena.

The social context in New Mexico in the 1990s and 2000s surrounding LGBTQ Rights issues was more open than that faced by Lambda Legal during its formative years. According to prominent LGBTQ activist and BRNM founder Todd McElroy, there were “a few shrill homophobic voices” but not an “organized opposition” surrounding the HRA amendments and LGBTQ issues in general in the state (McElroy 2012). Nationally, the attitudes and behaviors toward LGBTQ people were not as overtly-discriminatory as they had been decades prior – many states had initiated non-discrimination laws similar to New Mexico’s. However, in the early 1990s, the social acceptance of LGBTQ people was still not as open and prominent as it is today. McElroy states;
There still was no 'Ellen'; there was no 'Will and Grace' [putting LGBTQ issues to the forefront] was a very bold thing (McElroy 2012).

However, political, cultural, or social barriers to organizing around LGBTQ issues and living an “out” lifestyle were not as overt or punitive as they were in the decades prior.

In summary, the organizational, political, and social context surrounding the founding of BRNM – later EQNM – in New Mexico and nationally was a more accessible than that faced by Lambda Legal decades before. Organizations operated with a variety of strategies both locally and nationally, and while political barriers to marriage equality began to emerge, non-discrimination was becoming normative and the cultural and social context surrounding the lives and rights of LGBTQ people in America was opening.

*Biographies, Experience, and Skills of Organizational Founders*

LAMBDA LEGAL: FOUNDERS

Lawyer and activist William Thom was the key figure in the founding of Lambda Legal. He worked professionally as a lawyer in New York City after graduating from Princeton and Yale Law School. He was not “out,” publicly or professionally at the time (Andersen 2006). The organization, founded on the principles of the PRLDEF as a legal defense fund for the LGBTQ community, began with two other lawyers listed on the documents of incorporation (E. Carrington Boggan and Michael J. Lavery) (Lambda Legal 1973). While data explicitly suggesting the following is not available for the present research, it is possible that, given his experience in the Gay Activists Alliance and his professional training and experience as a lawyer, these factors contributed directly the Thom's decisions to employ legal strategies in forming the new Lambda Legal organization. In interviews for her book, Ellen Ann Andersen quotes Thom as saying, in
reference to the formation of a strictly legal organization on behalf of the LGBTQ community: “The idea was in the air...even overdue” (Andersen 1996: p. 26).

Lambda's explicit legal strategy was elaborated in the first newsletter published by the organization in 1976:

To date, Lambda's legal activities have been of two kinds: First, to act as counsel or co-counsel for one of the parties in a case; second to submit briefs *amicus curiae* (friend of the court) in cases in which we feel there is a need for a perspective other than that provided by the parties (*Lambda News* 1976).

In the early days the organization consisted of few members (only five individuals were present at the first official meeting of the organization) and an external advisory board (Lambda Legal 1973). To engage in explicitly legal strategies requires a professional background and training in law. Many activists lack these specific skills, which potentially is an insurmountable barrier to developing organizations using this category of strategy.

**EQUALITY NEW MEXICO: FOUNDERS**

The founders of EQNM/BRNM were all experienced activists, involved in organizations working on issues related to the LGBTQ community and various other movements. Interviews with two individuals heavily involved in the origins and initial actions of the organization – George Bach and Todd McElroy – are the primary data source for this section. As stated above, Todd McElroy was one of the original leaders and founders of the organization, which had evolved out of a prior organization working on issues of LGBTQ Rights, known as first the Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Rights in New Mexico, and subsequently the Coalition for Equality in New Mexico. The BRNM was founded explicitly to fight the repeal of the inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity into the non-discrimination laws in New Mexico. In discussing his role
as a leader of this organization, McElroy states:

I believe in action. I believe it's my responsibility to be involved. I've had the best leadership training in the world. [...] I've always perceived myself to be a leader. And so, when you're a leader, then you have responsibilities to your community. So, I didn't make a conscious decision [to be involved], it was just, this is what I'm supposed to do. [...] And because there had been so few leaders in the New Mexico LGBT community; candidly, there have been very few people in the community that have sacrificed more than I have. I think it's also problematic because what happens is that people are like 'I don't want to do what he does.' So it's hard to recruit other leaders. [...] I asserted myself. I have an opinion. I'm highly opinionated, and very direct. [...] I asserted myself from the very beginning (McElroy 2012).

On his experience and background in social and political activism prior to his involvement with LGBTQ organizations in New Mexico, McElroy states:

As a young person I was highly recognized, encouraged, rewarded, lots of pats on the head for being politically interested and then politically active. [...] In 1976, I was Jimmy Carter's [campaign] Chair [in his home county]: I was fourteen. [...] When I went to college, I joined the Young Democrats and campaigned every time there was an election. [...] During the 1980s, I was part of the Witness for Peace movement. I worked with our Diocese in Dodge City, Kansas, with the Peace and Justice Coordinator to coordinate civil disobedience workshops. [...] I learned a lot about Saul Alinsky, the principles of non-violence, and civil disobedience. [...] That taught me a whole lot about the necessity of, I mean, somebody's got to be out front. Somebody's got to be openly gay (McElroy 2012).

Fellow early member of EQNM/BRNM, George Bach, describes his early engagement in political activism thusly:

I got connected in it when I was a student here [University of New Mexico Law School]. I got active in the Lambda organization here – the Gay/Lesbian student group here – and after I graduated I got into the Gay Lawyers and started doing stuff with that group, became President of that group, so it was just sort of natural. I was obviously interested in doing rights work, so I was doing that activism on the side. I would on occasion do stuff with the ACLU, too. I eventually became a Staff Attorney for the ACLU. [...] I did a year of law school at CUNY, 1996-1997. [...] I think, at that time, my activism was more what they called 'street law,' with the International Lawyers Guild which was there, workers' rights stuff. We'd go and do presentations to folks in the community about their rights as workers. [...] When I came back here [Albuquerque/UNM Law School], certainly
being here lit the fire, just in terms of, you're working with constitutional law – which is fascinating. [...] So that's when I think the activism part of me actually caught fire (Bach 2012).

The above excerpts illustrate that Bach and McElroy both were involved in a variety of SMO and political actions in their pre-BRNM lives.

Prior to the founding of BRNM, through the Coalition for Equality, Bach (and McElroy, and others) had been active in lobbying efforts on behalf of the amendments to the HRA and other LGBTQ causes in the New Mexico state legislature. On this, Bach recalls:

We went up to the Roundhouse and lobbied, on different days, when they were [sic] looking at adding the Human Rights Act amendments that were adding sexual orientation and gender identity to the anti-discrimination laws, so it just sort of became a network of people that knew each other through that. [...] So that's how we knew each other, and how we were all connected (ibid).

For the founders and early activists in EQNM/BRNM, their experiences working in lobbying efforts surrounding LGBTQ issues in state government, their histories as activists in other, non-LGBTQ movements, and their specific training – as leaders or as lawyers – were influential factors in the shape of the organizational strategy developed.

 Lambda Legal & Equality New Mexico: Initial Resources

In the exploratory statistical analyses presented in Chapter 5, I propose various relationships between financial resources and the development of political strategy by social movement organizations. The data for this section come from interviews with EQNM founders and activists, official IRS documents, and organizational newsletters and documentation. Lambda Legal's initial resources are not explicitly and publicly available for the organization’s first years in operation. However, in its first newsletter in 1976, in reference to some of its current cases, the organization states:
We regret that budget restrictions have forced us to refrain from participating in actions we might otherwise have taken on. Lambda itself only takes on cases in which we know we will have funds to cover necessary out-of-pocket costs. Knowing that such costs would be very high in this case, we decided we could not offer to make it a Lambda case. However, E. Carrington Boggan [initial member at founding], Lambda's General Counsel, has agreed to represent Leonard Matlovich on the appeal without cost, and Mr. Matlovich has said he will try to shoulder out-of-pocket costs himself. I looks now, therefore, as if the case will proceed. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs in *Honeycutt v. Malcolm* could not shoulder out-of-pocket expenses: They are indigent. [...] Because we were unable to locate a source for funding what we feared would be considerable out-of-pocket expenses, we reluctantly turned the case down. (*Lambda News* 1976).

From this excerpt, it is clear that resources were not at a level at which the organization felt it could engage in every case which required its assistance. However, as shown in the discussion of pro-Bono work by Lambda's General Counsel, the lack of resources was not always prohibitive to pursuing its strategies: It took on cases even when its resources did not allow it to cover the costs. As of March 13, 1974, the bank account in the organization's name had a balance of $5.00, which increased to $720 by May (*Lambda Legal* 1974). A list of contributors, published in 1974, contained the names of 43 individual donors (*Lambda Legal* 1974). Early meetings were housed in the offices of founders (*Lambda Legal* 1973). Resources for Lambda, therefore, were scarce in the organization's earliest days. Thus, in keeping with the analysis in Chapter 5, financial resources have no clear affect on the use of legal strategies.

For EQNM/BRNM, information regarding resources is found in the interview data and the IRS 990 forms filed for both the 501(c)3 and 501(c)4 arms of the organization for 2002 and 2004, respectively. The official IRS 990 data for EQNM (the c4 organization) in 2004 cites total revenue of $126,897, and total expenses of $206,341 (a deficit of $79,444), and net assets from the prior year of $85,089 (an overall fund
balance of $5,645 at the end of the year) (IRS 990, EQNM 2004). The 2002 IRS 990 for
the EQNM-Foundation (then still known as the Coalition for Equality in New Mexico,
the 501(c)3) cites $160,731 in total revenue, $144,878 in total expenses (a net excess of
$15,853), combined with assets from the previous year of $37,596, for an overall fund
balance at the end of the year of $53,449 (IRS 990, EQNM-F 2002). Almost all of the
revenue is listed as coming from “Direct Public Support:” $156,157 of the $160,731.

Financially, at least, EQNM/BRNM appears to have had a fairly substantial
resource base compared to Lambda. According to interviews with George Bach and
Todd McElroy, the earliest meetings were held in the business offices of members, the
facilities at the UNM Law School, or private residences. Both noted that outside
organizations offered time, labor, training, and on occasion money, when it was
requested. For EQNM/BRNM, their resources were not considerably-limited, and came
from a variety of sources – both individuals and other organizations.

Qualitative Analysis: Processes of Strategic Development at Emergence
In the following analysis, I use the archival and organizational data presented
above to discuss the relationships proposed Chapter 2 – i.e., the hypotheses relating to the
influence of context and leaders on strategy. I do so in order to build upon the findings
related to resources of the statistical analysis of Chapter 5, and to explore the dynamics of
strategic continuity over time for these movement organizations.

I propose a relationship (Hypothesis #1) between the amount of resources
available to movement founders and the source of those resources as factors contributing
to the choice of political strategy at emergence for social movement organizations. For
Lambda Legal, the resources available – money and members - in the early days of the
organization do not appear to have been substantial, as noted by the lamentations offered regarding cases that could not be pursued in their first newsletter. However, this did not seem to prevent the founders of the organization to choose a strategy as costly legal action. This suggests that the lack of resources was potentially not a prohibitive factor in the decisions regarding which strategy to employ. EQNM, on the other hand, had a fairly substantial resource base, both in terms of money and members, from which to develop its strategy. Routine politics is not a cheap political strategy: There are costs associated with effective lobbying, transportation, canvassing, preparation of organizational materials, training, and so on. It is possible that this substantial base of resources was influential in the decision to employ institutional political/routine strategies by the organization.

The findings in the statistical analysis regarding financial resources for SMOs regarding the use of legal strategies are limited. In the causal analysis of organizations founded between 2003 and 2005, none of the explanatory variables had any effect on strategy. In the 2000 to 2005 sample, a 10% increase in the net income of the organization increased the likelihood of using legal strategies as compared to service provision. However, given the small number of legal organizations in the sample (only two), any findings here are speculative at best. The findings from 2003-2005 and 2000-2005 samples, the same increase in net income increases the likelihood of adopting routine political strategies versus service provision by 5% and 6% respectively. This seems to be supported by the qualitative data for EQNM, but whether the available income directly contributed to that decision is unclear. The dynamics of leaders and organizations discussed below seem to be more likely significant factors in this
determination.

EQNM was funded by a variety of sources, both individual and organizational. Lambda Legal's initial resources came from a small number of individual contributors. According to the processes of strategic flexibility noted from Marshall Ganz in Chapter 5, this should suggest that the organizations had high levels of flexibility given the various donors involved – as opposed to a single donor which would tie the organization to the strategic preferences of a single outside entity (Ganz 2000). It is unclear from the data whether Lambda Legal considered other strategies beyond the legal repertoire adopted. The interviews with EQNM members, however, suggest that no other strategic options – specifically Cultural/Expressive or Non-Routine politics – were ever considered: This was a Routine political organization from the very start (Bach 2012; McElroy 2012).

In Hypothesis #2(a), I propose a “market specialization” dynamic with regard to strategic development at emergence: That new organizations choose or create strategies that do not already exist within their social movement context. In the case of Lambda Legal, there was not another legal organization operating within the movement for LGBTQ Rights at the time of its emergence. For EQNM, there were other organizations working in Routine politics ways at the time of its emergence. In fact, some of the founders came directly from other Routine strategic organizations. Whether this was considered is unclear. The founders of EQNM, due to the immediate political context to a potential ballot measure that would repeal the amendments to the Human Rights Act, viewed Routine politics as the only strategic option.

In Hypothesis #2(b), I suggest that the failure or success of strategies within the organizational context of the new SMO will affect the choice of strategy. For Lambda
Legal, founder William Thom was not satisfied with the work of his prior organization, the Gay Activist Alliance, when he left to found Lambda Legal (Anderson 2006). It is unclear whether this was instrumental in his decision to craft the new organization with explicitly legal strategies. In other minority-rights movements, such organizations existed at the time (NAACP-LDF, MALDEF, and PRLDEF, e.g.). In fact, as shown above, the example of these organizations served as the platform from which Lambda was founded: borrowing the language used in other legal organizations' mission statements to craft their own. These organizations had been successful to varying degrees – NAACP-LDF was involved in the Brown v. Board of Education case, PRLDEF and MALDEF with various victories for their respective communities. It is potentially the case (in a familiar organizational process labeled ‘mimetic isomorphism’) (DiMaggio & Powell 1983) that the founders of Lambda Legal observed these successes and viewed the implementation of similar strategies as potentially successful in protecting and expanding the rights of the LGBTQ community. As stated previously, EQNM did not really consider other strategic options, and it is likely that the relative success or failure of other organizations using this or other strategies contributed in its decision to start a new organization, but not in the form or strategy that it would take. However, the influence of the NGLTF mentioned previously does suggest a fundamental influence by another organization on the specific forms of Routine political strategy employed in the early days.

I propose in Hypothesis #3(a) that the previous experiences of SMO founders, in other organizations and elsewhere, shape the strategies they choose to implement at emergence. In #3(b), I suggest a similar relationship between the specific skills or education of the founders on strategy. The explicit training and experience of the
founding members of Lambda Legal as lawyers and legal professionals very likely influenced their decisions to start an organization using the courts with respect to LGBTQ Rights. This is a strategic option that requires specialized training and experience: Those that lack it are likely prohibited from adopting this strategy, and those that possess it potentially view this avenue as an effective means of rights-based action. As discussed in the interview excerpts above, the founders of the EQNM/BRNM were experienced and trained in the ways of institutional politics. Todd McElroy, a founding member, was also heavily involved in Democratic Party politics in New Mexico (McElroy 2012). In response specifically to a question about the use of routine political strategies, he states:

Our strategy has basically been the same always: for the legislative session itself, it's visibility. [...] We'd have a Lobby Day in which we motivated folks from around the state to come to Santa Fe to participate. In terms of preparedness for the legislative committee hearings, then is establishing credible witnesses, finding those people, preparing them for testimony. [...] We primarily knew we could get [our bills] through the House: we knew we could get through the committee system, maybe to the floor. I think one year we passed the floor sort of miraculously, but then we failed in the Senate. [...] I'm a pragmatist. And my political tenet has always been that, when I deal the cards, then I'll make the rules. But until I make the rules, I have to play the hand that I've been dealt, as well as I can. [...] Part of the strategy has been that we participated in Democratic Party politics. We're a loud voice. There are other people that don't want any part of it. And that's fine. The core leadership over the trajectory of the twenty years were also Democratic Party activists and leaders. [...] Every year at the legislative dinner, we buy at least one table. We're there. We have ads in the program books. 'We're here, we're not going away! You're a Democrat. We're Gay. We're Democrats. We're all together in this!' And I think it's produced results (McElroy 2012).

This relationship to party politics and the activist training likely influenced the determination to use institutional and routine political strategies to achieve EQNM's goals for the LGBTQ community in New Mexico.
In Hypothesis #4, I propose a relationship between the particular ideologies and philosophies of the founders related to the issues surrounding their organization as influential on strategy at emergence. No data is available for the present research regarding the personal philosophy, sense of collective identity, or ideology of the founders of Lambda Legal. For the founders of EQNM, their identification with the Democratic Party as an effective ally and agent of change for their community likely reflects a predisposition toward using Routine political strategies. Also, interview responses suggest that members felt they had a responsibility to be involved in the cause, and in making the changes in public policy regarding LGBTQ issues. Todd McElroy states:

I had another conversation earlier this week [about fighting for one's own rights], and we've always struggled with leadership, with people actively engaging in New Mexico. I said to [redacted]: 'You know, you're also involved with [a homeless advocacy organization], but you're not homeless. When you work for a candidate, you're not that candidate. When you're a [disaster-relief organization] volunteer, you're not suffering disaster. But when you're an LGBT activist you're gay [emphasis his]. I mean, that's who you are, that's a very core essence of who you are.' [...] We're asking people to recognize us as human beings. That's a lot different than saying, 'I'm hungry,' or 'I need shelter.' (McElroy 2012).

I've done this work, all my life [...] but I don't do this for me. I'm a white man with privilege. I make money. I own a house in Santa Fe, New Mexico. I drive a car. I get to do what I want, I travel, I eat well. But I do it because there is a little transgendered Navajo on the reservation, and a little softball player in Alamogordo, and a little faggot here in Albuquerque at [redacted] High School, and they can't do it for themselves. Not now. Maybe they will be able to. But it's my responsibility to do it for them. I don't pretend to have their voice. I don't pretend to speak for them. But I do know that moving the ball forward helps them (ibid).

On the same topic, George Bach states:

I feel what's missing in our community is the awareness that we actually are a Civil Rights movement. I was aware of it. I know, I think the folks that were
active were aware of it (Bach 2012).

In sum, it appears that the founders of EQNM felt a sense of political responsibility to their community that led them to activism in general. Their experiences with Party politics potentially influenced their decisions to adopt Routine political strategies.

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<tr>
<th>Table 6-1: Early Cases &amp; Actions Taken by Lambda Legal, 1973-1976</th>
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<td><strong>Cases</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Amicus Curiae</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Counsel (or Co-Counsel)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Appearance on Behalf of Litigant</strong></td>
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<td><em>People v. Mehr</em> (1976)</td>
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<td><em>Thorstad v. Morgenthau</em> (?)*</td>
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<td><em>Burg, Naval Discharge</em> (?)*</td>
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<td><em>R. Cruz, INS</em> (?)</td>
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<td><em>C. Morales, INS</em> (?)</td>
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<td><em>H. Brown, Adoption</em> (?)</td>
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<td><em>Enslin v. N. Carolina</em> (1974)*</td>
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<td><em>Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney, VA (1975)</em></td>
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<td><em>DiStefano v. DiStefano</em> (?)*</td>
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<td><em>People v. Hammel</em> (1976)*</td>
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The final analysis regarding Lambda Legal and EQNM relates to the persistence of political strategies by social movement organizations over time. As shown in interview excerpts, the core strategy of EQNM has remained within the realm of Routine.
politics: proposing and lobbying for legislation, maintaining a visible and prominent presence in the state legislature and Democratic Party of New Mexico, working on campaigns for allied candidates, and fighting challengers on the other side of the aisle. For Lambda Legal, Table 1 presents the initial actions in the earliest days of the organization in which they were involved, and in what capacity.

According to the 2010 Annual Report, Lambda Legal was – at that time – currently active as counsel or as providing *amicus curiae* for 58 cases, including two cases before the US Supreme Court (Lambda Legal, Annual Report 2010). For the first, *Doe v. Reed*, Lambda Legal filed an *amicus* brief – along with GLAD (Gay & Lesbian Advocates and Defenders) and the National Center for Lesbian Rights refuting claims that individuals and organizations supporting legislation aimed at restricting the rights of LGBTQ persons had been subjected to intimidation by members and organizations of the LGBTQ community (*ibid*). The second, *Christian Legal Society v. Martinez*, involved another *amicus* brief with GLAD in which the organizations stated that a public organization requesting financial support from a public university could not discriminate against potential members on the basis of their sexual behaviors or sexual identity (*ibid*).

From these two organizations, it appears that the political strategies developed at emergence – Legal strategies for Lambda Legal and Routine politics for EQNM – have remained consistently the primary strategies employed. This suggests that prior presumptions regarding the fluidity of strategy throughout the life of an SMO should be questioned and re-examined.

I argue that, in keeping with the fundamental finding from the quantitative analysis that showed resources having at most a limited impact on strategy at emergence,
the specific findings from the review of Lambda Legal and EQNM suggest that resources are not clearly influential in determining strategy at emergence. Resources available to founders are variable between the two SMOs. The archival and interview data do not clearly suggest that either included resources in their deliberative process. Their resources did not appear to influence the strategies chosen, or to limit the strategic choices available to founders. I suggest that the organizational and political context have limited influence on strategies. However, the key dynamic regarding both resources and context is the interpretation of those factors by founders. For Lambda, the presence of other legal SMOs for minority constituents was only influential because William Thom and others recognized those SMOs in light of their own community and skills as legal professionals. Without that interpretation, the movement and political context will likely not matter to SMO founders. The personal skills and histories of SMO founders are the most influential factors regarding the development of strategy at emergence. I suggest a renewed focus on the individuals involved in the foundation of SMOs to understand the various processes occurring at emergence.

Summary
Through the archival, contemporary, and interview data collected and explored in this chapter, I suggest that the most influential factors in the determination of political strategy for emerging social movement organizations are the histories and skills of leaders, along with the relationships to and observations of other movement organizations operating within the same or other movement contexts. To generalize findings from the two cases of Lambda Legal and EQNM to all LGBTQ Rights groups or all SMOs is not possible with such an analysis. However, these findings along with the only limited
effect of financial resources on political strategy at emergence suggest further exploration into the dynamics surrounding leaders and organizational diffusion effects on strategy and other characteristics of SMOs at the time of emergence.
CHAPTER 7 - ANIMAL RIGHTS/PROTECTION ORGANIZATIONS: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

In the following chapter, I use various forms of archival and qualitative data – including movement histories, organizational literature and documentation, web resources, publicly-available financial information, leader biographies, newspaper reports, and secondary interview data – to assess the relationships of organizational and political context, the personal histories and skills of leaders, and resources on the development of political strategy by two Animal Rights/Protection organizations: People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and Animal Humane of New Mexico (AHNM). These organizations represent two of the categories of strategy conceptualized in Chapter 3: Cultural/Expressive Strategies (PETA) and Service Provision (AHNM). Each is involved in actions directed toward a number of the movement issues discussed in Chapter 4, including: anti-vivisection/testing, anti-fur/animal fighting/animals for entertainment, vegetarian/vegan, sheltering/rescue, and population control.

In the following discussion, I first present a brief general overview of the two organizations. Using the various forms of data discussed above, I provide insight into the three explanatory factors for each movement: context, leaders, and resources. Second, I analyze these data using qualitative methods to elaborate the nature of how each factor influences the development of the strategy employed at emergence. Third, I examine the strategic continuity of the organizations exploring the early, important or landmark, and current (as of February 2012) strategic actions of the organization. This analysis of continuity relates to the theoretical discussion (Chapter 2) regarding the fluidity of strategy over time. Lastly, I relate the qualitative analysis directly to the hypotheses.
proposed in Chapter 2 and the findings of the statistical analyses of Chapter 5.

*Brief Organizational Overviews: PETA and Animal Humane of New Mexico*

PETA is currently the largest Animal Rights/Protection organization in the world, boasting membership of more than 3 million (PETA.org “About PETA”). The organization consists of a small leadership Board with founder Ingrid Newkirk still at the helm, both organizationally and symbolically as its most public figure and spokesperson. PETA describes its efforts as focused on six issues: fighting Animals as Food, Animals as Clothing, Animals for Experimentation, Animals as Entertainment, increasing pet adoption and care for companion animals, and protecting wildlife (PETA.org “Issues”). These are engaged strategically through four departments: the International Grassroots Campaign develops expressive demonstrations against various targets and provides media material; the Interactive Media department is responsible for the organization's various web presences (including PETA.org, the youth-oriented PETA2.org, and the vegetarian/vegan web resource GoVeg.com); the Major Gifts department which cultivates individual and estate donations and corporate partnerships and sponsorships; and the Cruelty Investigations Division, a sophisticated and clandestine operation engaging in investigations of various targets – slaughterhouses and food production facilities, cosmetic testing facilities, and scientific laboratories – to gather evidence of cruelty in various forms (PETA.org “Departments”).

PETA states that it employs two strategies to achieve its goals: outreach and investigation. Outreach involves the expressive and media strategies discussed above, while investigation involves the undercover data collection of various facilities. PETA's annual budget – sourced primarily via individual and corporate contributions,
merchandise sales, and interest/dividends/royalties – was (for the fiscal year 2010) in excess of $35 million (PETA “Annual Report 2011”). Its expenses were roughly equal to their revenue, used in strategic programs, fundraising, and operating/management expenses (*ibid*).

Animal Humane of New Mexico (AHNM) is the largest Animal Protection organization in the state, and is one of the largest non-profit organizations of any kind in New Mexico. The primary role of AHNM is to provide rescue, shelter, adoption, and health care services to the abandoned/unwanted/abused pet population of Albuquerque and the state. The organization presently engages in a variety of service-based programs to meet these goals. It operates a broad adoption program through three facilities in Albuquerque, which house hundreds of animals between them (AnimalHumaneNM.org). All animals arriving at the facilities are housed and given necessary medical attention by an in-house full service veterinary clinic (which also offers its services to the general public, with specific attention given to low-income pet owners). The shelters are designated as “no-kill,” having euthanized very few (less than 10%) of all animals sheltered, and only in cases of extreme medical or behavioral issues. AHNM also coordinates a network of clinics and veterinarians (through the SPAY-NM program) to increase access to spay/neuter services.

Headquartered in Albuquerque since its founding, AHNM has a board of rotational volunteers and an organizational staff of nearly 400 volunteers (and a few professional positions). According to its financial statements from the 2011 fiscal year, the gross revenue of the organization totaled nearly $8 million. Nearly 50% of that amount came from general contributions, with the remaining half split between adoption
and health care fees, planned gifts, merchandise sales from its thrift and pet shops, and
special events including the annual “Doggie Dash & Dawdle,” which raised nearly
$200,000 in 2011 (Animal Humane 2011). Two-thirds of the organization's expenses go
to the sheltering, adoption, and health care programs, with the remaining third split
between management expenses and fundraising (*ibid*).

**Organizational and Political Context at Emergence**

In this section, I detail the various institutional, cultural, and inter-organizational
dynamics surrounding Animal Rights/Protection at the times of emergence for PETA and
AHNM. I discuss the relationships between these outside actors and cultural context on
the emergence of the organizations and the strategies their founders chose to employ. In
the analysis at the end of this chapter, I discuss the influence of organizational and
political context on the formation of political strategy shown by the origin stories of
PETA and AHNM.

**PETA: CONTEXT**

PETA, founded in Norfolk Virginia in 1980, emerged at a time when the
organizational landscape surrounding Animal Rights/Protection was not a crowded or
overtly *activist* sector. Most organizations involved in issues of the movement were
shelters or humane societies; the latter of which focused specifically on finding homes for
abandoned or mistreated pets with limited attention paid to cruelty-prevention (notably
by the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals – ASPCA). The largest
Animal Protection organization in operation was the Humane Society of the United
States, which coordinated shelters throughout the country. The first organization utilizing
Legal Strategies on behalf of animals, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, emerged in 1978
(Bekoff 1998). Otherwise, most organizations were small-scale shelters or public
“Animal Control” departments funded by local and state governments.

The organizations focused explicitly on the rights of animals were operating on another continent. The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) in the United Kingdom, which was the most prominent of these, began operations in the late 1970s. The ALF was notorious for using violent and criminal tactics to free animals from testing facilities and to damage those facilities so that they could not engage in any further cruelty (as they perceived it) (Newkirk 2000). Though never substantiated by the organizations or in any formal criminal or other proceedings, there have long been rumors of a direct connection between PETA and the ALF. Most of these propose that PETA operates as the legitimate “front” organization for the ALF, and funnels money and other resources to them (Friedan 2005).

In sum, the organizational landscape surrounding Animal Rights/Protection at the time of PETA’s emergence in 1980 demonstrated limited variation in strategy: mainly shelters and rescue operations, with very few Legal or Non-Routine political. In the general social movement sector surrounding all issues, the organizational landscape was far more diverse. The population of organizations included many still utilizing the repertoires of the 1960s (mass mobilization, protest, sit-ins, etc.), routine political organizations, various newly-emerging organizations employing legal strategies, and those providing services (particularly in relation to the emerging epidemic and spread of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s).

The concept of animal rights in the United States was on the normative and cultural fringe in the 1970s and 1980s. The Animal Welfare Act of 1966 enshrined a general theme of preventing cruelty in practices related to animals – specifically in the
production of the food supply, in circuses, in laboratories, in transport, and in the breeding and selling of pets. However, the US food supply was still heavily dependent on animals and animal byproducts (dairy, eggs, etc.). Vegetarians represented an extremely small portion of the population at that time. Frances Moore Lappé published one of the first widely-distributed and resonant texts on the virtues of a plant-based (non-animal based) diet, *Diet for a Small Planet* in 1971. *Vegetarian Times*, the longest-running national publication on the issue, began circulating in 1974. Culturally, the vegetarian diet and lifestyle remained closely-tied to an association with the “hippie” and counter-cultural movements of the 1960s (Puskar-Pasewicz 2010). In institutional politics, animals were generally considered under the purview of the US Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration, or (in the case of wildlife) the Department of the Interior. In sum, the organizations, cultural, and political context surrounding issues of Animal Rights/Protection in the late 1970s and early 1980s was geared toward concerns of humane treatment, rescue, and protecting animals from cruelty within the various contexts of their position as property or food.

**ANIMAL HUMANE OF NEW MEXICO: CONTEXT**

Animal Humane of New Mexico was founded in Albuquerque in 1965. At this time, the population of Animal Rights/Protection organizations in the state of New Mexico was quite limited. Various municipalities operated Animal Control divisions, usually consisting of a temporary shelter for the intake of abandoned or found animals (species used as pets – namely cats and dogs), and some areas had formal shelters with adoption programs. Various small-scale private rescue and shelter operations existed throughout the state. The only active SMO surrounding issues of Animal...
Rights/Protection was a chapter of the National Audubon Society located in Silver City. This chapter, incorporated officially in 1968 focused:

To conserve and restore natural ecosystems, focusing on birds, other wildlife, and their habitats for the benefit of humanity and the earth's biological diversity (Audubon.org).

Nationally, organizations such as the ASPCA and Humane Society dominated the public arena surrounding animal treatment. Public and private shelters and rescues were common in every state. More often than not, these operations focused on “Lost and Found” services, providing temporary shelter for found animals with limited adoption services.

This was a time of massive social unrest and mobilization in the United States surrounding various movements. This was the heart of the “counter-cultural” era and the protest cycle of the 1960s. The emergence of various forms of non-routine political strategy – mass protest, sit-ins, boycotts, occupations of university and other public facilities - dramatically shaped the political and social context of the time. SMOs of all strategic forms were present, and many were vital players in the political discussions and conflicts of the day. In sum, the organizational landscape within the Animal Rights/Protection movement centered on public and private pet rescue and animal control operations, with limited organizational activity surrounding issues of wildlife protection and the prevention of cruelty.

The institutional political context was not much different than that discussed above relating to the 1970s and 1980s surrounding PETA, with the exception that the Animal Welfare Act had yet to be codified into law. At this time, the laws and processes associated with animal protection were primarily the purview of state and municipal
governments. In New Mexico, laws relating to the treatment of animals were codified in the general state laws, known as the New Mexico Statute Annotated (NMSA). The compilation of the NMSA applicable at the time was passed in 1953 (the subsequent NMSA was compiled in 1978). In the 1953 Compilation, the state regulations regarding animals delegated that authority to municipal governments:

A municipality may: (1) Prohibit cruelty to animals; (2) regulate, restrain, and prohibit the running at large of any animal within the boundary of the municipality; (3) provide by ordinance for the impounding and disposition of animals found running at large. Prior to the time set for disposing of the animals as provided in the ordinance, the owner may regain possession of the animal by paying the pound-master all costs incurred in connection with impounding the animal. (3-18-3)

Cruelty to animals consists of: (a) Torturing, tormenting, depriving of necessary sustenance, cruelly beating, mutilating, cruelly killing or overriding any animal; (b) unnecessarily failing to provide any animal with proper food or drink; or (c) cruelly driving or working any animal when such animal is unfit for labor. Whoever commits cruelty to animals is guilty of a petty misdemeanor. (30-18-1)

Injury to animals consists of willfully and maliciously poisoning, killing, or injuring any animal or domesticated fowl which is the property of another. Whoever commits injury to animals is guilty of a misdemeanor. (30-18-2)

Therefore, in New Mexico in the 1960s, animals were considered to be (1) property, and (2) only a matter of concern if said property is threatened, the animal is mistreated, or becomes a public nuisance.

The relative inefficiency of the Animal Control Division of Albuquerque may have played a role in the development of Service Provision as the strategy at founding for AHNM. The shelters and operations of the Animal Control Division were not “no-kill” operations, and were not efficiently providing new homes to the animals that they had temporarily housed (according to the historical documentation of AHNM). AHNM claims that Animal Control could only find adoptive homes for 9% of the animals in their
facilities as of 1972 (AHNM “The Organization: 1965-1980”). The rate was likely not substantially different seven years prior when the Evans's decided to launch their new organization. This lack of efficient use of strategy may have been an influence in their decisions to engage in Service Provision (specifically, rescue and adoption services).

In sum, the political and social context surrounding Animal Rights/Protection at the time of AHNM's founding contained organizations protecting animals from cruel treatment, controlling the lost/abandoned pet populations via public departments or private shelter/rescue operations, and political control of animals only in regard to their location as property, food-supply inputs, or wildlife.

Biographies, Experiences, and Skills of Organizational Founders
PETA: FOUNDERS
While PETA did not enter the national and international public arena until the “Silver Springs Monkeys” case in 1981 (to be revisited in the analysis of strategic continuity later in the chapter), the organization engaged in strategic action as early as 1980. Two acquaintances with diverse experiences in the movement for Animal Rights/Protection (both offered a different toolkit of skills) founded the organization. No-one is more synonymous with PETA than co-founder and current President Ingrid Newkirk. Born in Surrey, UK, in 1949, Newkirk is the daughter of upper-middle class English parents who worked internationally while she was a young child. She reportedly worked alongside her mother in New Delhi, India, at the leper colony founded by Mother Theresa (IngridNewkirk.com). She moved with her family to Florida at the age of eighteen, and then on to Washington D.C., where she worked at a local kennel following an experience with abandoned kittens at a euthanizing shelter (ibid). Later, she became an Animal Protection Officer for the metropolitan division of animal control, and
eventually the city's first female “Pound-master.” She became the head of the Animal Disease Control Division of the Commission of Public Health in Washington D.C. (ibid). Her professional life prior to the emergence of PETA was that of an institutional insider and formal agent of social control, in the context of Animal Control and as a deputy sheriff in Maryland (ibid). While working for the Commission of Public Health, she met a kindred animal lover and spirit who would ultimately shape her philosophies surrounding Animal Rights/Protection and partner with her in the founding of PETA.

Alex Pacheco was born in Joliet, Illinois, in 1958. He lived in Mexico for much of his youth with his family before heading to seminary in Ohio to pursue the priesthood. While in school in the late 1970s, he was introduced to Singer's *Animal Liberation* by a friend and fellow animal lover. The book led Pacheco to adopt the ideology of the inherent rights of animals and was instrumental in his early activist career on campus. He left seminary and attended The Ohio State University. While there, he engaged in various actions directed toward stopping animal cruelty and advocating for animal rights. In a heavily agricultural area of the country, Pacheco often felt that his work was at best dismissed, and at worst, often met with violent resistance (Guillermo 1993). In early 1980, Newkirk and Pacheco met at a local shelter, where, in time, he gave Newkirk a copy of Singer's *Animal Liberation*. The book also greatly affected her attitudes towards animal rights and the issues surrounding their protection. PETA, as an organization, began with the two of them in an apartment, incorporating a small gathering of like-minded friends and activists (Galkan 2007).

Details of the earliest PETA actions (presented in the analysis of strategic continuity at the end of the chapter) can only be found through a search of local DC-area
news outlets in 1980 and 1981. PETA does not discuss any action prior to the “Silver Springs Monkeys” case in 1981 in their official organizational publications. Prior to that case, PETA was involved in a variety of protests aimed at convincing political leaders and community members to stop (what they viewed as) cruel abuses of animals in butcher shops, federal spaces, and public policies. These early actions were not simply aimed at instrumental goals such as shutting down shops or changing policy, but were overtly directed at shaping public opinion surrounding the treatment of animals in society. In their first action – the protest and attempt to close DC's only “live-kill” poultry shop (Arrow Live Poultry Company) - PETA activist Karen Jackson was quoted as stating:

   This is just another element of social justice. You know, it's just like the way the blacks and the Jews were oppressed," she said. "It diminishes society if you exploit [the chickens]. It's just one more of the social injustices. We deny animals the right to live in an environment that doesn't oppress them (Washington Post 6/26/1980).

This shows a clear effort to frame the use of animals as food as a civil rights issue, by invoking the civil rights “master frame” (Snow & Benford 1992). The protest was explicitly moral, and aimed at generating – via media coverage and interactions with passers-by – the “hot cognition” and indignation needed to address such issues of perceived injustice (Gamson 1980). Subsequent events utilized similar strategies and framing of the issues in the context of the poisoning of pigeons around federal buildings, regulations regarding the withholding of water from cattle prior to slaughter, the use of animal testing by the National Institute of Health, and a protest at the Canadian Consulate regarding the practices of government-sponsored seal hunts.

   The founders of PETA were not career activists with extensive experiences in other SMOs. Ingrid Newkirk worked in shelters, the formal Animal Control divisions in
Washington DC, and in law enforcement. This work history provided a specific set of skills and insider knowledge into the operation of various institutions and organizations working around issues of animal control and protection. Her “activist toolkit,” however, was likely neither substantial nor formally-trained through prior SMO experience. Alex Pacheco had been involved in limited activism in his college years, but had not held formal roles in SMOs surrounding animals or any other issues at this time. A key element to the formation of PETA and the strategies employed appears to be the shared influence of the philosophy of animal rights in Pete Singer's *Animal Liberation*. Potentially, this shared ideology regarding the treatment of animals as beings with rights worthy of protection was a factor in developing an expressive and cultural strategy.

**ANIMAL HUMANE OF NEW MEXICO: FOUNDERS**

As is the case of many SMOs, the founding of Animal Humane of New Mexico is a story of a small group of passionate, committed individuals in their homes deciding that (a) something is wrong, and (b) they should do something about it. In this case, those individuals were Albuquerque residents Thelma and Col. Edmund Evans. The Evans’ journey began as early members of the Taxpayers Anti-Cruelty Federation of New Mexico in 1965. Soon, they were in charge of the nascent organization meeting in their home, which had changed its name and incorporated as Animal Humane of New Mexico in November of 1968. The organization began simply as a “Lost and Found” service for pets. One year later, according to its initial Mission Statement, the organization had transitioned to providing injured animal rescues, continuing “Lost & Found” services, advocacy for animal protective laws, and investigating cases of cruelty. Generally, it sought to “protect animals from the abuses of people” (AHNM “Our Founders”).
Thelma Evans was a farmer's daughter in rural Kansas. She worked as a secretary until her retirement in the 1950s. She was a woman small in stature, but described as “having the determination of a pit bull” by future Board president Bob Wolf (AHNM “Our Founders). Her husband, Col. Edmund Evans, retired in the 1950s following a career which included time as the Commandant of a secretive nuclear facility in New Mexico. They founded Animal Humane of New Mexico at their kitchen table after an experience with an abandoned dog that changed their attitudes towards animals and their needs in the community (ibid).

In the first two years of operation (1966-1967), the organization boarded and subsequently adopted more than 100 animals (mostly cats and dogs). In 1969, it instituted an adoption fee of $24 to cover the costs associated with boarding. The primary source of revenue prior to these fees was direct contributions from members. In 1965, the organization consisted of only four members: Thelma and Col. Edmund Evans, and two others. By 1968, membership had grown to 362 members, and by 1980 it was 4,000 strong (Animal Humane “Our Founders”). This was a rapidly growing organization, in terms of members, resources, and services provided. From the start, Animal Humane proved it was a very capable rescue and adoption service relative to the institutional Animal Control Division of Albuquerque. In 1972, while Animal Control was only able to service adoptions for 9% of its boarded animal population, Animal Humane's rate of adoption was more than 50% (ibid), leading to a much lower rate of euthanasia by comparison.

The founders of AHNM were not activists when they formed this new organization in 1965. Their personal biographies and careers seem to have little relation
to the world of activism as we generally conceptualize it. The key moment in their development of the organization and their decision to employ a strategic repertoire of Service Provision has been described as a particularly emotional attachment to a lost/abandoned dog they decided to care for in their home in the early 1960s. While information about the Evans's is limited to the official documents provided by the organization – they passed away in 1988 (Col. Edmund) and 2003 (Thelma Evans) respectively, and thus could not be interviewed for this research – they do not appear to have been directly influenced by participating in any other SMOs or institutional agencies related to animal protection.

*PETA and Animal Humane of New Mexico: Initial Resources*

In the exploratory analyses presented in Chapter 5, I propose various relationships between financial resources and the development of political strategy by SMOs. The data for PETA and AHNM regarding their resources at the time of emergence is available primarily through organizational documentation, as official 990 forms cannot be publicly accessed for the earliest years for these organizations. There is little information provided by PETA as to their resources available at the time of founding. It may be posited that its resource base was limited from the discussions about the organization’s founding given by Newkirk in various interviews: She describes the initial meetings as taking place in a small, cold, two-bedroom apartment (Galkan 2007). Early media depictions of the organization describe “few activists” with placards.

AHNM reports that in its first year of operation (1965), the organization operated out of the Evans’s private residence with an operating budget of $125, and four members. Expenses were roughly $100, which represents a very limited resource base in financial
and other terms at the time of the organization's founding. From December of 1966 to December 1997, 124 animals were processed for adoption through AHNM. The organization did not have its own sheltering facilities at the time, so all animals were housed in various shelters and veterinary facilities in the area (AHNM “A Bit of History”). After two years, the budget rose to more than $2,000 in 1967 (ibid) and membership grew to 362 by the end of 1968. In the first years, the organization risked “going broke” (ibid), with most of the organization's money coming from adoption fees and individual contributions. AHNM did not have an administrative location until 1969, when they purchased property – still their current primary facility – for $26,500 (ibid). The organization built its first sheltering, adoption processing, and veterinary clinic facilities on site in 1977 following an estate gift which funded construction (ibid). In sum, for both PETA and AHNM, it does not appear that a significant coffer of resources was at the founders' disposal at emergence.

Qualitative Analysis: Processes of Strategic Development at Emergence

In the following analysis, I use the archival and organizational data presented above to discuss the relationships proposed in Chapter 2 – i.e., the hypotheses relating to the influence of context and leaders on strategy. I do so in order to build upon the findings of the statistical analysis of Chapter 5, and to explore the dynamics of strategic continuity over time for these movement organizations.

In Hypothesis #1, I propose a relationship between the amount of resources available to movement founders and the source of those resources as factors contributing to the choice of political strategy at emergence for social movement organizations. In the data for PETA, there is little concrete information regarding the resources available to the
founders at that time. However, it appears that they had no explicit meeting space, limited financial resources, and a few members – somewhere between five and thirty depending on media reports. Resources may have played a part in strategic development – the lack of resources may have inhibited more “costly” strategies such as Routine Politics, Legal Strategies, Service Provision, or Organizational Funding. However, given the data, I am unable to attribute any firm weight to the effect of resources on strategy in this case. For AHNM, it operated with only four members and $125 for its first year of existence: a clear lack of resources by any measure. Nonetheless, the founders chose to employ Service Provision – sheltering and adoption services – despite its apparent costs. This suggests that perhaps, in this case, resources did not inhibit the choice of a costly strategy – the organization even claims it was on the verge of “going broke” in those early years. For both organizations, all resources came from members originally, and thus no comparison can be drawn in terms of the effect of their source on strategy. It does appear, in both cases, that it was possible that none of the strategies were prohibitive based on the source of resources.

The findings in the statistical analysis regarding financial resources and strategy for movement organizations at emergence largely mirror those discussed above. In Chapter 5, when analyzing the recent samples (organizations with 2000-2005 and 2003-2005 Ruling Dates), no statistically-significant effect was found for Contribution Funding Source. This suggests – as is found in the qualitative analysis - that the dynamics proposed by Ganz regarding flexibility on strategy have no effect in this analysis (Ganz 2000). The other findings of the statistical analysis suggest that increases in the net income and the overall fund balance of an organization increases the likelihood of using
Routine Politics or Organizational Funding strategies as compared to Service Provision. The use of Service Provision despite a lack of resources by AHNM does not refute this finding. However, nothing in the qualitative data suggests that this lack of resources led the founders to opt not to use Routine Politics or Organizational Funding strategies. The findings of the full sample of Animal Rights/Protection organization and exploratory models find a similar lack of effect between the source of resources and strategic choice. The net income of the organization appears to be related to the use of Non-Routine versus Service Provision (negatively) and Cultural/Expressive versus Service Provision (positively). The qualitative data, which show a lack of resources for both PETA and AHNM, cannot corroborate or refute these findings.

With Hypothesis #2(a), I propose a “market specialization” dynamic with regard to strategic development at emergence: That new organizations choose or create strategies that do not already exist within their social movement context. In the case of PETA, there was not another Cultural/Expressive organization within the Animal Rights/Protection movement at that time: Most organizations were Service Providers or engaged in Routine Politics, with one Legal organization. It is possible that this lack of such an organization influenced the choice of expressive strategies over others so as to create a niche within the market of SMOs. However, data explicitly suggesting this is not available for this research, and I cannot draw strong conclusions. It is plausible that this dynamic shaped their choice of strategy. For AHNM, there were numerous other small shelters in Albuquerque and throughout New Mexico at the time, so the Service Provision strategy was not absent in their market or organizational context. It does appear that the organizational sector surrounding Animal Rights/Protection at the time did include
numerous other Service organizations, and thus this “crowding” would suggest they would potentially opt for another strategy.

In Hypothesis #2(b), I suggest that the failure or success of strategies within the organizational context of the new SMO will affect the choice of strategy. For PETA, other Animal Rights/Protection organizations were not necessarily viewed as failed or successful, but rather not engaging in the same “fight.” In its “History” section on PETA.org, the organization states:

Before PETA existed, there were two things that you could do if you wanted to help animals. You could volunteer at a local animal shelter, or you could donate money to a humane society. While many of these organizations did useful work to bring comfort to animals who are used by humans, they didn’t question why we kill animals for their flesh or their skins or why we use them for tests of new product ingredients or for our entertainment (PETA.org “History”).

This could be interpreted as an assessment of failure of other organizations. Thus, PETA provides limited support to this hypothesis. AHNM does not explicitly discuss the failure or success of other organizations, but does note the inefficiency of the formal Animal Control Division in Albuquerque around the time of the organization's emergence. This suggests that the possible lack of effective Service Provision by institutional actors influenced the founders to opt for the same strategy in the hopes of doing a better job delivering those needed services.

With Hypothesis #3(a), I suggest a relationship between the experiences, in other organizations and elsewhere, of SMO founders on the strategies at emergence. The founders of PETA did not have extensive experience as activists or within other social movement organizations. As such, their organizational “toolkits” were likely not well developed. Pacheco had limited activist experience, which he likely brought to the new
organization. Newkirk had *insider* or *institutional* experience, having worked in Animal Control and law enforcement capacities prior to her involvement as a founder of PETA. That knowledge and perception of those institutions as failing to adequately protect animals from harm perhaps had some influence on the new organization, though its effect on the choice of strategy is difficult to determine. The founders of AHNM – Col. Edmund and Thelma Evans – had no experience in Animal Rights/Protection activism prior to founding AHNM. Their personal experiences were in the military and office work, respectively. Thus, it is difficult to determine if any prior experiences – beyond the emotional story of their attachment to a lost dog they sheltered prior to founding AHNM – had any role in the development of Service Provision as their chosen strategy. These same data insights suggest that the unique professional or organizational skills of the founders of either organization had little to no influence on their choice of strategy (Hypothesis #3(b)).

In Hypothesis #4, I propose a relationship between the particular ideologies and philosophies of the founders related to the issues surrounding their organization as influential on strategy at emergence. A key insight in the development of the parameters of PETA and its use of Expressive strategies to change cultural and social norms surrounding animals appears to be the shared reading and incorporating of the philosophies in Singer's *Animal Liberation*. Without this shared idea of animals as beings worthy of rights and the protection of those rights, it is possible that the shape of PETA's actions – both at founding and now – would not be as they are. For AHNM, there does not appear to be any clear connection to identity or ideology from the founders to the strategy employed at emergence.
The final analysis regarding PETA and AHNM relates to the persistence of political strategies by social movement organizations over time. In the cases of PETA and AHNM, this appears to be the case. Table 1 shows the early, landmark, and current actions of PETA, to demonstrate that little has changed in their strategic repertoire from 1980 to 2012 (AP 1981, Kendall 1980, 1981, Mansfield 1981a, 1981b, McQueen 1980, White 1981).
The campaigns and events in Table 1 suggest that the fundamental strategic repertoire of PETA – namely the use of public action geared toward changing attitudes and behaviors surrounding the use, protection, and rights of animals – has not changed significantly over time. The initial actions were public protests directed toward media attention and the halting of practices the activists considered to be cruel – live-kill butchery, poisoning of “nuisance” animals, testing for medical purposes, and seal hunts. The major landmark actions of PETA represent a similar adherence to Expressive strategic actions.

The “Silver Springs Monkeys” case was a covert investigation by Alex Pacheco into the use of monkeys in laboratory testing. The animals were subjected to various physical strains and unnecessary medical procedures to test their responses to losing the control over their limbs (Guillermo 1993). The video data collected by Pacheco was used to free the animals and indict the lead researcher – Dr. Edward Taub – on charges of animal cruelty. Taub was convicted on six counts, though all were subsequently overturned. PETA did, however, create enough pressure to force Congressional hearings on animal testing and cruelty that garnered massive public exposure for the organization and its cause (Guillermo 1993). A similar investigation at Tyson Foods yielded more publicity, but no major changes to policy or treatment.

Another landmark for PETA was the production and distribution of the “Meet Your Meat” documentary film, which seeks to expose viewers to the conditions and practices involved in the production of animal-related foods. PETA offers free DVDs of the film, and its YouTube page touts thousands of views. Current PETA campaigns include targeting Ringling Brothers and other circuses for harsh and harmful practices in
the training of animals for performance, the use of celebrities in various states of undress in the “Ink, Not Mink” and “I'd Rather Go Naked than Wear Fur/Leather” media campaigns, and the use of “Bannering,” where large images and slogans are unfurled in public places to maximize the spread of the message to the public (PETA.org “Campaigns”).

Animal Humane of New Mexico began as a small Lost & Found shelter, rescue and adoption operation. Through the years they have expanded in scope and capacity, but the fundamental strategy remains the same: shelter, find homes, and provide medical care for unwanted animals. It currently engages in public outreach programs – notably regarding “trouble” breeds such as Pit Bull Terriers – but its primary focus and resource-output remains on Service Provision. This suggests that prior presumptions regarding the fluidity of strategy throughout the life of an SMO should be questioned and re-examined.

The two pairs of founders for Animal Humane of New Mexico and PETA represent vastly different prior experiences and activist “toolkits.” In the case of PETA, the philosophical foundation of Animal Liberation greatly influenced their approach to Animal Rights/Protection work and the content of their strategic efforts. The Evans’ story prior to founding Animal Humane of New Mexico is devoid of SMO activity or any clear ideological connection to other Animal Rights/Protection actions. Their efforts were built from a sympathy and emotional attachment to the unwanted animals in their community. As was the case with the LGBTQ Rights SMOs examined in Chapter 6, the role of resources and context are only influential in light of their interpretation by founders. The founders of PETA explicitly viewed a movement landscape not engaging in a fight for animal rights, and thus determined the necessity of their action. The context
mattered, but only in so much as they interpreted the SMO landscape as insufficient regarding their goals. For the founders of Animal Humane of New Mexico, they viewed an institution – the Animal Control Division – that should have done the work of sheltering and caring for abandoned/lost/neglected animals, as inefficient. Thus, their presence as effective service providers was necessary to their goals of caring for this population. Resources, for both, were scarce. Again, as was the case in Chapter 6, it does not appear that this inhibited their choice of strategy, or was necessarily even part of the determination of strategy at emergence.

Summary

Using the qualitative data and analysis of PETA and Animal Humane of New Mexico, I suggest that the organizational context, specifics of the biographies and skills of leaders, and the resources available to founders shape the strategic decisions made for new movement SMOs. While clear causal explanations are limited by the data, these case studies serve to both elaborate the findings of the statistical analysis and further explore the dynamics involved in the development of strategy during organizational foundation. To generalize these findings to a large sample of movement organizations is not suggested, given the limited number of organizations examined and the data limitations involved. However, the processes described above suggest future research into the dynamics of organizational strategy at emergence.
CHAPTER 8 - SUMMARY OF FINDINGS & IMPLICATIONS

In this final chapter, I summarize the specific and general findings of the quantitative and qualitative analyses regarding the relationships between resources, leaders, and context on the development of political strategy by SMOs at the time of emergence. I utilize a mixed-method approach and theoretically- and empirically-grounded hypotheses to explore these relationships for SMOs involved in the movements for LGBTQ Rights and Animal Rights/Protection. In the next section, I detail the specific findings of the analyses in relation to the hypotheses and core arguments of the research. In the sections to follow, I discuss the implications of the present research for theory regarding the dynamics of emergence for SMOs, for the methodological approaches to studies of SMOs, and for current and potential activists regarding the development of their own (or potential) movement efforts.

Summary of Findings: Resources and Strategy at Emergence

The multiple samples and models included in the quantitative analysis regarding the development of strategy at emergence involve exploratory explanations regarding the relationship between financial resources and strategy. The first finding relates to the inclusion of two oft-excluded strategic categories into the conceptualization of movement strategy: Service Provision and Organizational Funding. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, these two strategic repertoires are not often included in discussions and analyses of SMOs, but do conceptually represent modes of action consistent with the goals and organizational characteristics of SMOs. In both the full sample and the two samples of recently-emerging organizations within the Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights movements, Service Provision represents the largest category of organizations. For both
movements in the full sample, Service Provision organizations constitute 87.5% of the distribution of cases. In the 2003-2005 and 2000-2005 samples of recently-emerging organizations, the distributions are 92% and 90%, respectively. Organizational Funding groups constitute nearly 5% of the distribution in the full sample, which represents the third-largest category behind Service Provision and Cultural/Expressive action. In the samples of recently-emerging organizations, Funding groups are the second-largest category (behind Service Provision), with 3% and 4%, respectively. Therefore, including these two strategic repertoires into the conceptualization of SMO strategy increases the variation on that key characteristic, and expands the universe of potential cases of study substantially.

The specific statistical findings on the relationship between financial resources and strategy are both exploratory (in the full sample) and represent some causal weight (from the samples of recently-emerging SMOs). For the analyses of recently-emerging organizations from both movements, the following findings emerge. For the sample of organizations with a Ruling Date between 2003 and 2005: An increase in net income suggests an increase in the odds of Routine politics relative to Service Provision, and an increase in the fund balance suggests an increase in the odds of Organizational Funding compared to Service Provision. In the 2000-2005 Ruling Date sample: An increase in net income suggests an increased odds of using Routine politics or Legal strategies (though the presence of only two legal organizations makes this finding fairly insignificant), and an increase in the fund balance suggests an increase in the odds of Organizational Funding compared to Service Provision. In both samples, the ratio measures of Contribution Funding Base and Fiscal Instability showed no significant effects on
strategy.

From the full sample including both movements and all possible strategies, I suggest the following relationships: There are no effects of Contribution Funding Base or Fiscal Instability, an increase in income is related to an increase in odds of Routine politics and Organizational Funding compared to Service Provision, and an increase in fund balance is related to a decrease in odds of Routine politics, Cultural/Expressive actions, and Funding relative to Service Provision.

For both movements with Service Provision removed: An increase in Contribution Funding Base increases the odds of Non-Routine politics over Cultural/Expressive actions, an increase in net income decreases the odds of Non-Routine politics and increases the odds of Routine politics compared to Cultural/Expressive action, and an increase in the fund balance is related to an increase in the odds of Organizational Funding compared to Cultural/Expressive action.

In the model of all Animal Rights/Protection organizations, I suggest the following relationships: An increase in Fiscal Instability relates to slight decrease in the odds of Organizational Funding over Service Provision, an increase in net income suggests a decrease in the odds of Non-Routine politics and an increase in Cultural/Expressive action over Service Provision. For the model excluding Service Providers: An increase in Contribution Funding Base suggests an increase in the odds of Non-Routine and Legal strategies relative to Organizational Funding, and an increase in net income suggests a decrease in both Non-Routine and Legal strategies relative to Funding.

For the analysis of the LGBTQ Rights organizations, I suggest the following: An
increase Contribution Funding Base relates to a decrease in the odds of Cultural/Expressive action versus Service Provision, an increase in net income suggests an increase in odds of Routine politics and Organizational Funding relative to Service Provision, and an increase in the fund balance suggests a decrease in Non-Routine, Routine, Cultural/Expressive, and Organizational Funding strategies compared to Service Provision. The model excluding Service Providers suggests that an increase in Contribution Funding Base increases the odds of Non-Routine, Routine, and Organizational Funding relative to Cultural/Expressive strategies, an increase in net income relates to an increase in the odds of Routine politics and Organizational Funding, and an increase in the overall fund balance suggests a decrease in Routine politics relative to Cultural/Expressive strategies. Table 8-1 summarizes the findings listed above, showing the effects of increases in the independent variables on strategy for each model (RP = Routine Politics; NR = Non-Routine Politics; CE = Cultural/Expressive Strategies; L = Legal Strategies; OF = Organizational Funding).

In all of the models of the exploratory full sample and the causal recently-emerging organizations, some regional effects are significant in the analyses. However, the mechanisms that are involved in these regional effects cannot be determined from these data, and thus they are not considered significant findings for this research. The work of Marshall Ganz (2000) suggests that the ratio of contributions from members – versus single donors or outside funding agencies – influences the strategic flexibility of SMOs. Namely, that an SMO with a single outside donor responsible for a greater percentage of finances and resources will be more constrained strategically: That SMO can only engage in actions viewed as legitimate and acceptable by that single outside
donor. SMOs that derive a greater percentage of resources from member contributions, on the other hand, have greater flexibility due to this diversification of funding sources and direct involvement of the contributors. The statistical findings in Chapter 5 suggest that this ratio may not be as influential as Ganz’s work suggests. In the samples of recently-emerging SMOs (2000-2005 and 2003-2005), there is no statistically-significant relationship between the Contribution Funding Base and the strategy at emergence. For these SMOs, it does not appear that their strategic flexibility is at all influenced by the source of their finances.

The relationship between Net Income and the increased odds of using Routine Politics is the most consistent finding across the samples in these analyses. As seen in Table 8-1, this relationship is statistically-significant in nearly every sample. Due to the limitations of these analyses, it is unclear exactly what this relationship suggests about finances and Routine Politics. It is possible that either (a) SMOs who engage in Routine Politics require a greater coffer of resources prior to determining to use this strategy at emergence, or (b) that once an SMO chooses to use Routine Politics, they actively engage in greater fundraising efforts to defray the (anticipate or real) costs of this strategy. Either of these plausible explanations suggests that Routine Politics is interpreted as a resource-heavy strategy. The objective costs of this strategy are likely variable, based on the number of activists engaged in lobbying efforts, travel costs, promotional materials, and other related actions. It does appear from these analyses that founders likely interpret Routine Politics as resource-dependent as compared to Service Provision (in most models), Cultural/Expressive Strategies, or Organizational Funding.
Using the qualitative data and comparative analysis of the two LGBTQ Rights organizations – Lambda Legal and Equality New Mexico – and the two Animal Rights/Protection organizations – PETA and Animal Humane of New Mexico – I suggest that the importance of resources in the decisions regarding strategy at SMO emergence is limited in most cases. Except for EQNM, which had a substantial financial and labor base at its founding due to strong organizational connections with pre-existing groups, the other organizations operated with miniscule initial budgets and very few members. This did not clearly seem to inhibit the strategic choices they made as they developed the new organizations. EQNM’s use of routine politics echoes the quantitative findings of recently-emerging SMOs in that increases in finances are associated with an increased likelihood of routine politics relative to service provision. However, as is shown below, it

| Table 8-1: Summary of Findings from Quantitative Analyses (Chapter 5)* |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Contribution Funding Base** | 0 | 0 | 0 | ↑ NR, L | ↓ CE | ↑ NR, RP, OF | 0 | ↑ RP |
| **Fiscal Instability** | 0 | 0 | ↓ OF | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **Net Income (Logged)** | ↑ RP | ↑ RP, L | ↓ NR, ↑ CE | ↓ NR, L | ↑ RP, OF | ↑ RP, OF | ↑ RP, OF | ↓ NR, ↑ RP |
| **Fund Balance (Logged)** | ↑ OF | ↑ OF | 0 | 0 | ↓ NR, CE, OF | ↓ RP | ↓ RP, CE, OF | ↑ OF |
| **Service Provision Frequency** | 92% | 90% | 94.4% | N/A | 50.6% | N/A | 87.5% | N/A |

*All of the above models use Service Provision as the reference category except: Full AR/P w/o Svc (Organizational Funding = Reference), Full LGBTQ w/o Svc & Full Both w/o Svc (Cultural / Expressive Strategy = Reference)
is not clear from the qualitative analysis that the presence of substantial resources played a major role in the determination of strategy. It is difficult to determine this causal link from these data, however, so I suggest further research with other – perhaps newly emerging at the present time – organizations in an in-depth, possibly ethnographic method to determine exactly the mechanism between resources and strategy.

**Summary of Findings: Leaders/Founders and Strategy at Emergence**

The relationship between the characteristics, histories, experiences, and skills/education/training of organizational founders and leaders appears to have the strongest determining effect on the development of strategy by emerging SMOs. This appears particularly true for the founders of the LGBTQ Rights organizations. The founders and original members of Lambda Legal were all experienced and trained legal professionals and lawyers. They had some past experiences in SMOs using other strategies, but it seems reasonable to presume that this specific skill-set was instrumental in their decisions to become legal advocates on behalf of the LGBTQ community. The founders of EQNM had long histories in activism, and particularly in engaging in lobbying and other Routine political tactics in New Mexico surrounding LGBTQ Rights through other organizations. According to interviews with founders, other strategies were never considered: They worked within the institutional political arena because that was where they viewed the fight to be occurring, and was the toolkit they all possessed.

In the Animal Rights/Protection organizations, the effect was not as clear due to both a lack of available data and a lack of any clear movement-specific characteristics of founders. For the founders of PETA, their past limited experiences in activism and their experience as institutional insiders in Animal Control departments did impart a sense of
inefficiency in terms of animal protection and a limited activist toolkit. The founders of Animal Humane of New Mexico had no background in SMOs, and no clear connection to other Service Provision institutions or organizations. Given that the organization was founded in 1965 and the original members are no longer alive, it was impossible to gather sufficient data, however, to truly make any claims regarding their skills or experiences.

Summary of Findings: Organizational/Political Context and Strategy at Emergence

In the hypotheses regarding the relationship between the organizational and political contexts for organizations involved in LGBTQ Rights and Animal Rights/Protection issues, I suggested that the “market-space” available to organizations and the success and failure of other SMOs influence the decisions of founders on the development of strategy at emergence. The findings on these hypotheses from the qualitative data are mixed. For Lambda Legal, the organizational context surrounding LGBTQ Rights was still emerging and growing in the wake of the Stonewall riots. There did not exist, at that time, any other legal advocacy organization working on behalf of that community. The founders did, however, explicitly use the example and specific official documentation of other legal advocacy groups working for the rights of other minority constituencies – most notably the PRLDEF – to form the by-laws, mission, and documents of incorporation for their new organization. The founders of EQNM were heavily influenced by preceding organizations in New Mexico – most importantly the Coalition for Equality – and influence from outside organizations in terms of training for political work (primarily from the NGLTF). Without those organizations, the interviewees involved in this research suggested that their specific movement actions would likely have taken a different form.
The founders of PETA appear to have been most influenced by the failure of other Animal-related organizations to even address the issue of animal rights. Their organizational literature suggests that they were unsatisfied with the options available to those interested in helping animals in the US in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Those options, they state, only included volunteering at a shelter or donating to a humane society. The options did not include, however, advocating for the protection of all animals from harm and their basic rights as living beings. It is unclear how the Evans viewed the success or failure of other Animal Rights/Protection Service Provider organizations in New Mexico from the collected data. It does appear from the organizational history that there was a conscious understanding by the founders and early members of Animal Humane of New Mexico that the city's Animal Control division was not doing enough to rescue, protect, or re-home the animals processed through their department. This lack of effective service provision by institutional actors does seem to have been a key component of the development of their new organization.

In the following sections, I discuss the implications of the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the development of political strategy at the founding of Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights organizations on existing and future theory in the study of social movements, the methodological approaches available to scholars empirically evaluating SMOs, and suggestions for how these findings may be useful for those involved in current or future SMOs.

Implications: Theory and Social Movements

As initially discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this research, one of my efforts in this project was to improve and expand our conceptualization of those organizations
classified as *social movement* organizations. In most of the literature, SMOs are viewed as overtly political organizations, engaged in some variant of routine or non-routine political strategy. However, including other types of organizations – those engaging in providing services directly to potential constituents and beneficiaries of the movement, those engaging in explicitly expressive and normative action, those fighting for justice and change in the courts, and those organizations who serve the necessary function of acting as a conduit for resources to other organizations via funding programs – expands the scope of organizations pursuing the general goals of social movements. By narrowly focusing on only those employing routine and non-routine tactics, we ignore various other ways in which activists and citizens can engage in pursuing movement goals. The largest category of organizations involved in LGBTQ Rights and Animal Rights/Protection issues are Service Providers. The exclusion of those organizations, along with the often-excluded Organizational Funding groups, greatly reduces the universe of cases available to our inquiries. Their inclusion may suggest that many of our previous findings regarding the internal and external dynamics of SMOs should perhaps be re-examined.

Another implication of this research is that the propositions regarding the importance of resources (notably in the still-prevalent Resource Mobilization perspective) to the emergence of SMOs should be questioned and further explored empirically. The roles of leaders and initial founders in emerging SMOs appear to be fundamental in the development of various characteristics including their political strategy. Or, *agents* appear to be at least as critical as *structural factors* in determining SMO strategy: At a minimum, how those factors interact must be taken into account.
While leaders have often been considered important in these processes, our focus on other factors – resources, political opportunity, organizational diffusion, social networks among organizations, collective identity – may have obscured their importance in recent theoretical discussions. Lastly, it is clear from this research that no organization exists or emerges in a vacuum. The organizational context and connections, both formal and informal, to pre-existing organizations do play a key role in the development of strategy – and likely other important characteristics – at the time of organizational foundation. This suggests further empirical exploration building from the Organizational Diffusion, Networks, and Organizational Ecology literatures discussed in Chapter 2.

*Implications: Methods of Data Collection/Analysis and Social Movements*

Despite a variety of data and analytic limitations discussed above, this study’s use of statistical, archival/secondary, and interview data for exploring the dynamics of emerging organizational strategy demonstrates the utility of multiple sources of data in answering our questions of interest. Empirical analyses of SMOs employing statistical data and quantitative analytic techniques are often only able to demonstrate relationships of variables to one another, but lack the ability to convincingly elaborate the mechanisms involved in various organizational processes. In this research, statistical analyses of Chapter 5 suggest possible relationships between financial resources and strategy at emergence. Limitations of data collection temper this study’s ability to show how financial resources are taken into account, interpreted, and seen as prohibitive (or not prohibitive) to those involved in forming new SMOs. These data and analyses help with an overview of the sample of cases, and suggest some dynamics that may be involved, but are unable to explore the complexities of the intra- and inter-organizational dynamics.
involved in the development of strategy.

In turn, the small-N qualitative approach is limited in its ability to generalize beyond a small sample of organizations. While this methodological toolkit provides tremendous depth of understanding and insight into specific mechanisms relating causes and effects, questions always remain as to whether those insights are unique to the few cases under review or applicable to a broader population of organizations. By employing both of these analytic approaches and multiple methods of data collection, I attempt to capitalize on their respective strengths while mitigating their respective weaknesses. Future research should, when possible and data are available, employ similar mixed-method approaches when exploring internal and external SMO dynamics.

Implications: Current and Potential Movement Organizers

Lastly, I propose some implications for those individuals who are currently or potentially could be involved in the development of social movement organizations. Through these analyses of LGBTQ Rights and Animal Rights/Protection organizations, I suggest that a lack of resources – in terms of money, time, and members – need not be an insurmountable barrier to the formation of SMOs or to the possibility of sustained activism. The founders of three of the four organizations in the qualitative analysis faced varying degrees of resource-deprivation, yet still developed organizations that have survived for decades. Resource constraints may inhibit costly strategies, but this is not clear from these analyses. Instead, the key dynamics of organizational development appear to be the skills, commitment, and histories of those involved in founding new organizations, and their connections to other organizations in their movement and general context. In sum, a lack of money is not a sufficient deterrent to forming an organization
dedicated to various strategic efforts in our contemporary political and social world.

Conclusion: How We Fight
This research began from a theoretical gap in the literature on social movements in sociology: How and why do movement organizations develop their strategies at the time of emergence? Through a thorough theoretical review, re-conceptualization of movement strategy, and mixed-method analyses, I hope to have shed some light into this previous “black box” of movement emergence. The other seed of this project was a desire to understand and explore the dynamics of two movements – Animal Rights/Protection and LGBTQ Rights – of contemporary resonance in the political and social world. I believe that this research furthers our understandings of SMOs in these areas, and improves our general knowledge of organizational dynamics. Lastly, it serves as a reminder to this researcher that activism, in all of its various strategic forms, continues to be a vibrant and necessary element of our society. Whether in the streets, the halls of government, the courts, or clinics: This is how we fight.
### Table 1: Raw STATA Output - Both Movements, All Strategies

**Multinomial logistic regression**  
Number of obs = 3915  
LR chi2(18)   = 117.66  
Prob > chi2  = 0.0000  
Pseudo R2   = 0.0281

| ext_strat   | Coef. Std. Err. | z    | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-------------|-----------------|------|------|---------------------|
|             | (base outcome)  |      |      |                     |
| **2**       |                 |      |      |                     |
| ne_reg      | .4313698        | .0900297 | 0.71 | 0.479               | -.7620964 | 1.625046 |
| se_reg      | -.8756903       | .0836329 | -10.40 | 0.00032 | -1.82835 | .077281 |
| mkr_reg     | -1.294556       | 1.196138 | -1.17 | 0.242 | -3.602547 | .973434 |
| w_reg       | (omitted) |      |      |                     |
| pct_cont_tr | .0009731        | .0005372 | 0.33 | 0.744 | -.00028779 | .0011228 |
| log_netinc_s | -.0006187      | .0000692 | -0.89 | 0.373 | -.00019734 | .000074 |
| log_fthous  | .2137661        | .1668785 | 1.51 | 0.131 | -.1581907 | .5810448 |
| log_fthous  | -.0868603       | .2133497 | -0.41 | 0.682 | -.2499182 | .0757576 |
| _cons       | -4.133283       | .0922244 | -4.18 | 0.000 | -.6702337 | -2.134449 |
| **3**       |                 |      |      |                     |
| ne_reg      | .8076763        | .2972528 | 2.75 | 0.00632 | .0521877 | 1.613686 |
| se_reg      | .8316775        | .1723542 | 1.15 | 0.248 | -1.349538 | 2.913653 |
| mkr_reg     | -1.752606       | .3857864 | -0.97 | 0.331 | -2.267596 | .3967629 |
| w_reg       | (omitted) |      |      |                     |
| pct_cont_tr | .0088235        | .0004034 | 0.06 | 0.955 | -.0000803 | .0000914 |
| log_netinc_s | -.0000428      | .0000179 | -0.07 | 0.946 | -.0000478 | .0000023 |
| log_fthous  | .7038002        | .0963629 | 4.10 | 0.000 | .4349081 | .9730921 |
| _cons       | -3.195374       | .3265665 | -11.00 | 0.000 | -.4233632 | -5.935715 |
| **4**       |                 |      |      |                     |
| ne_reg      | -.0715155       | .1718843 | -0.41 | 0.679 | -.2400836 | .2675756 |
| se_reg      | -.1113321       | .2444723 | -0.44 | 0.658 | -.2479586 | .0253532 |
| mkr_reg     | .3620409        | .1937504 | 1.87 | 0.062 | -.7478475 | .1077029 |
| w_reg       | (omitted) |      |      |                     |
| pct_cont_tr | -.0003020       | .0017992 | -1.67 | 0.094 | -.0006356 | .0000361 |
| log_netinc_s | -.0001339      | .0000150 | -2.03 | 0.042 | -.0002275 | .000106 |
| log_fthous  | .0465413        | .0562229 | 0.86 | 0.388 | -.0061855 | .1578671 |
| _cons       | 1.019048        | .0547469 | 1.87 | 0.060 | .8071168 | .2137129 |
| **5**       |                 |      |      |                     |
| ne_reg      | .3268664        | .5214638 | 0.63 | 0.531 | -.0695181 | 1.340919 |
| se_reg      | -.0671795       | 1.070464 | -0.17 | 0.867 | -.3777868 | .4227251 |
| mkr_reg     | .8330318        | .0992326 | -0.75 | 0.450 | -.1881147 | .8509991 |
| w_reg       | (omitted) |      |      |                     |
| pct_cont_tr | -.0000313       | .0000755 | -0.07 | 0.942 | -.0000429 | .0000045 |
| log_netinc_s | .0433922       | .0182615 | 0.25 | 0.804 | -.3125941 | .4038407 |
| log_fthous  | -.0659749       | .1864801 | -0.37 | 0.710 | -.3497529 | .2875558 |
| _cons       | -4.644347       | .8200126 | -5.66 | 0.000 | -.6254454 | -3.037152 |
| **6**       |                 |      |      |                     |
| ne_reg      | -.1043266       | .1956676 | -0.53 | 0.594 | -.2978281 | .2791749 |
| se_reg      | -.0618795       | .1715714 | -2.60 | 0.009 | -.3072866 | .0818860 |
| mkr_reg     | -.471362        | .2317552 | -2.03 | 0.042 | -.9255938 | -.0173301 |
| w_reg       | (omitted) |      |      |                     |
| pct_cont_tr | 1.23636        | .0003954 | 0.00 | 0.999 | -.0007728 | .0007728 |
| log_netinc_s | -1.213216      | .0006014 | -1.03 | 0.305 | -.2008276 | .1898251 |
| log_fthous  | .0946017        | .0333131 | 2.82 | 0.005 | .0281425 | .2110598 |
| _cons       | -2.990933       | .2233449 | -13.39 | 0.000 | -.3428689 | -2.553177 |
Table 2: Raw STATA Output - Both Movements, Service Omitted

```
Single-user Stata perpetual license:
Serial number: 3013075875
Licensed to: Grad Lab
University NM

Notes:
1. C(# option or -set memory-) 10.00 MB allocated to data
2. New update available; type -update all-
   use "E:\NEW DATA TO RUN\BOTH GM\nosvc_logs_12_23_12_dta"
   . mlogit_ext_strat ne_reg se_reg mw_reg w_reg pct_cont_tr pct_ex_o_fb log_netinc_thous log_fb_thous
   > us

   note: w_reg omitted because of collinearity
   Iteration 0: log likelihood = -611.0629
   Iteration 1: log likelihood = -582.5176
   Iteration 1: log likelihood = -579.4172
   Iteration 1: log likelihood = -578.7267
   Iteration 1: log likelihood = -578.7267
   Iteration 1: log likelihood = -578.7274
   Iteration 1: log likelihood = -578.7274

   Multinomial logistic regression
   Number of obs = 492
   LR chi2(28) = 64.67
   Log likelihood = -578.7274
   Prob > chi2 = 0.0001
   Pseudo R2 = 0.0529

   ext_strat  Coef.  Std. Err.     z   P>|z|       [95% Conf. Interval]
   -------------  ---------  -------  ------  --------  -------------------------
   2             
ne_reg        .5180422   .6373591   0.81   0.416    -.7311586    1.767243
se_reg        -0.667312   .9729583  -0.07   0.964    -1.973694    1.840232
mw_reg        -0.915143   1.233715  -0.75   0.452    -3.313583    1.221313
   w_reg (omitted)
pct_cont_tr   .0257024   .0103211  2.49   0.013    .0054736    .0459312
pct_ex_o_fb   -.000656    .0007096  -0.92   0.355   -.0020468    .0007347
log_netinc-s  -.2910198   .1695841  -1.72   0.086    -.6233984    .0413587
log_fb_thous  .080186    .2285525   0.35   0.726    -.3685567    0.528727
   _cons        -4.137547   1.386463  -2.98   0.003    -.654956    -1.420129

   3             
ne_reg        .7242986   .3553253   2.06   0.039    .067073    1.381524
se_reg        -.795457   .4556922  -1.75   0.081    -.9976896    1.688591
mw_reg        .0466141   .4348833  0.11   0.915    -.8057414    .8989696
   w_reg (omitted)
pct_cont_tr   .0006081   .0041538  0.14    0.891    -.0520791    .014203
pct_ex_o_fb   -.000039    .0000731  -0.53   0.594    .0005627   -.0011028
log_netinc-s  .2913179   .1201286  2.42   0.015    .0556902    .5268586
log_fb_thous  -.1097321  .1389527  -0.80   0.418    -.3389533    .1195901
   _cons        -.233794    .5131872  -0.45   0.653    -1.233349    .556732

   4             (base outcome)
ne_reg        .3897651   .5498889  0.71   0.478    -.6879974    1.467528
se_reg        -.5912406   1.062276  -0.55   0.579    -.8658906    .0823713
mw_reg        -.1342103   .7226963  -0.18   0.853    -1.2508609    0.982448
   w_reg (omitted)
pct_cont_tr  -.0091271   .0075917  1.25   0.210    -.0053524    .0244065
pct_ex_o_fb  -.0000475   .0000625  -0.72   0.473    -.0017739    .0006821
log_netinc-s  -.0844246   .1811122  -0.46   0.645    -.4194157    .2505666
log_fb_thous  .193116    .2009739   0.96   0.337    -.008756    .3950477
   _cons        -.3683265  1.024751  -3.59   0.000    -5.69174    -.67479

   5             
ne_reg        -.0533146   .259829   0.21   0.837    -.0565701    .4559409
se_reg        .5946251   .3411657  1.74   0.081    .0740475    1.263298
mw_reg        .0641345   .3019434  0.21   0.832    -.659526    .5276436
   w_reg (omitted)
pct_cont_tr  -.0039288   .0030702  1.28   0.201    -.0002888    .0007863
pct_ex_o_fb  .0001293   .0000704  1.82   0.069    -.001857   -.0007618
log_netinc-s  .1308569   .0824401  1.59   0.112    -.0307227    .2923646
log_fb_thous  .3624385   .083522   4.31   0.000    .1988744    .5260026
   _cons        -.1751866  .0405462  -4.37   0.000    -2.536923    -.9668102
```

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Table 3: Raw STATA Output - LGBTQ Organizations, All Strategies

| ext_strat | Coef. | Std. Err. | z | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----------|-------|-----------|---|---------|----------------------|
|           | (base outcome)                                   |
| 2         | ne_reg | 14.48687 | 687.8336 | 0.02 | 0.983 | -1333.642 | 1562.616 |
|           | ne_reg | -2.315013 | 1008.653 | -0.00 | 0.999 | -1597.238 | 1574.608 |
|           | mw_reg | -1.104399 | 1067.403 | -0.00 | 0.999 | -2093.377 | 2090.767 |
|           | pctl_cont_tr | 0.072609 | 0.012449 | 1.42 | 0.157 | -0.078292 | 0.1778427 |
|           | log_netinc-s | 1.374495 | 1.1860515 | 0.93 | 0.359 | 0.55841 | 2.190573 |
|           | log_frb_thous | -1.199975 | 0.851499 | -1.41 | 0.159 | -2.878336 | 0.5783616 |
|           | _cons | -20.77517 | 687.8498 | -0.03 | 0.976 | -1368.936 | 1327.386 |
| 3         | ne_reg | 0.470522 | 0.3817594 | 1.23 | 0.218 | -0.2776825 | 1.1218874 |
|           | sa_reg | -0.188812 | 0.4838867 | -0.39 | 0.696 | -1.1374001 | 0.7594393 |
|           | mw_reg | 0.2009524 | 0.5416951 | 0.54 | 0.591 | -0.720575 | 1.1234794 |
|           | pctl_cont_tr | 0.0034863 | 0.0049594 | -0.70 | 0.482 | -0.0132065 | 0.0062343 |
|           | pctl_eo_fb | -0.0000494 | 0.0000243 | -1.44 | 0.149 | -0.000166 | 0.0000773 |
|           | log_netinc-s | 0.4208531 | 0.1477541 | 2.89 | 0.004 | 0.171759 | 0.6689503 |
|           | log_frb_thous | -0.6295172 | 0.1373139 | -4.76 | 0.000 | -0.888535 | -0.3705909 |
|           | _cons | -0.5902268 | 0.0270682 | -21.31 | 0.000 | -0.8480826 | -0.3329999 |
| 4         | ne_reg | -0.9535142 | 2.0222478 | -0.48 | 0.630 | -5.20713 | 3.3000428 |
|           | sa_reg | -0.9057294 | 1.3787314 | -0.75 | 0.460 | -3.546423 | -1.9292381 |
|           | mw_reg | 0.287848 | 0.107806 | 0.50 | 0.602 | -0.4684949 | 0.2375682 |
|           | pctl_cont_tr | -0.0037364 | 0.0023306 | -1.69 | 0.090 | -0.0062308 | 0.0000692 |
|           | pctl_eo_fb | 0.0001397 | 0.0009099 | 0.45 | 0.651 | -0.000538 | 0.0007841 |
|           | log_netinc-s | 0.6630931 | 0.2897404 | 2.32 | 0.020 | 0.2774982 | 1.0486935 |
|           | log_frb_thous | -0.3817371 | 0.0904827 | -4.28 | 0.000 | -0.56477 | -0.2003945 |
|           | _cons | 2.990072 | 0.4428123 | 6.75 | 0.000 | 2.122824 | 3.858616 |
| 5         | ne_reg | 0.7958907 | 0.7098147 | 1.07 | 0.285 | -0.6318215 | 2.1245061 |
|           | sa_reg | 0.6298931 | 1.3770815 | -0.48 | 0.630 | -2.8529489 | 2.8209409 |
|           | mw_reg | 0.5964534 | 0.9421565 | 0.59 | 0.555 | -1.290157 | 2.4730782 |
|           | pctl_cont_tr | 0.0110029 | 0.0058382 | 1.92 | 0.056 | -0.0272867 | 0.0502808 |
|           | pctl_eo.fb | 0.0010761 | 0.0000176 | 6.26 | 0.000 | -0.0007475 | 0.0010984 |
|           | log_netinc-s | 0.2530401 | 0.261508 | 0.96 | 0.336 | -0.2647047 | 0.7747848 |
|           | log_frb_thous | 0.7767176 | 0.2663999 | 2.93 | 0.003 | -0.8791145 | 1.3339006 |
|           | _cons | -0.132445 | 1.22605 | -1.08 | 0.280 | -3.727464 | 1.075865 |
| 6         | ne_reg | -0.1568516 | 0.2919023 | -0.54 | 0.591 | -1.7289796 | 0.4152564 |
|           | sa_reg | -0.1710452 | 0.4006681 | -1.06 | 0.288 | -1.566534 | 0.5701098 |
|           | mw_reg | 0.1326825 | 0.2691235 | 0.47 | 0.636 | -0.5794614 | 0.8453478 |
|           | pctl_cont_tr | 0.0013174 | 0.0041736 | -0.33 | 0.739 | -0.0008176 | 0.0013457 |
|           | pctl_eo.fb | 0.000001 | 0.0000726 | 4.26 | 0.000 | -0.000077 | 0.0000773 |
|           | log_netinc-s | 0.3832123 | 0.1128235 | 3.32 | 0.001 | -0.736283 | 1.4927223 |
|           | log_frb_thous | -0.3378611 | 0.0953098 | -3.40 | 0.001 | -0.320836 | -0.354806 |
|           | _cons | -0.4928906 | 0.4954743 | -1.00 | 0.317 | -3.4696001 | 0.8751222 |

Note: Multinomial logistic regression
Number of obs = 622
Log likelihood = -708.45466
LR chi2(35) = 170.25
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1073
Table 4: Raw STATA Output - LGBTQ Organizations, Service Omitted

```
. mlogit ext_strat ne_reg se_reg mw_reg w_reg pct_cont_tr pct_ex_o_fb log_netinc_thous log_fb_tho > us
    note: w_reg omitted because of collinearity
Iteration 0:  Log Likelihood = -362.45667
Iteration 1:  Log Likelihood = -326.06773
Iteration 2:  Log Likelihood = -319.50233
Iteration 3:  Log Likelihood = -318.09521
Iteration 4:  Log Likelihood = -317.72403
Iteration 5:  Log Likelihood = -317.67502
Iteration 6:  Log Likelihood = -317.66694
Iteration 7:  Log Likelihood = -317.66563
Iteration 8:  Log Likelihood = -317.66553
Iteration 9:  Log Likelihood = -317.66525
Iteration 10: Log Likelihood = -317.66523

Multinomial logistic regression
Number of obs = 309
LR chi2(28) = 89.58
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1236

| ext_strat | Coef. | Std. Err. | z     | P>|z|  | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|------|----------------------|
| 2         |       |           |       |      |                      |
| ne_reg    | 15.36677 | 840.4089  | 0.02  | 0.985| -1631.804 - 1662.538 |
| se_reg    | -2.68548 | 1270.859  | -0.00 | 0.998| -2493.522 - 2488.352 |
| mw_reg    | -1.851638 | 1283.976  | -0.00 | 0.999| -2518.399 - 2514.696 |
| w_reg     | (omitted) |           |       |      |                      |
| pct_cont_tr | 0.082476 | 0.048649  | 3.68  | 0.092| 0.035319 0.1784072  |
| pct_ex_o_fb | -0.002793 | 0.003045  | -0.90 | 0.370| -0.008691 -0.0032405  |
| log_netinc_thous | 1.407503 | 0.968079  | 1.45  | 0.146| -0.898971 3.204903  |
| log_fb_thous | -1.412866 | 1.000621  | -1.40 | 0.160| -3.384134 -1.537626  |
| _cons     | -22.603074 | 840.4199  | -0.03 | 0.979| -1669.823 1624.562  |
| 3         |       |           |       |      |                      |
| ne_reg    | 1.268691 | 0.4412392 | 2.88  | 0.004| 0.408782 2.133504  |
| se_reg    | 0.8693844 | 0.5639192 | 1.54  | 0.123| -0.2358779 1.907646  |
| mw_reg    | 0.1925391 | 0.5693885 | 0.34  | 0.735| -0.9231258 1.308836  |
| w_reg     | (omitted) |           |       |      |                      |
| pct_cont_tr | 0.011684 | 0.0052907 | 2.21  | 0.027| 0.001299 0.0220379  |
| pct_ex_o_fb | -0.000288 | 0.0005697 | -0.41 | 0.680| -0.000107 -0.000061  |
| log_netinc_thous | 0.626690 | 0.1714194 | 3.66  | 0.000| 0.2907511 0.9627467  |
| log_fb_thous | -1.418795 | 0.1682844 | -2.49 | 0.013| -2.748297 -0.089512  |
| _cons     | -2.851872 | 0.6529033 | -4.37 | 0.000| -4.131539 -1.572205  |
| 4         |       |           |       |      |                      |
| (base outcome) |       |           |       |      |                      |
| 5         |       |           |       |      |                      |
| ne_reg    | 1.151745 | 0.7287317 | 1.58  | 0.114| -2766441 2.580331  |
| se_reg    | -0.257783 | 1.159494  | 0.22  | 0.829| -2.0842023 2.539719  |
| mw_reg    | 0.2851516 | 0.9478588 | 0.30  | 0.764| -1.572618 2.143921  |
| w_reg     | (omitted) |           |       |      |                      |
| pct_cont_tr | -0.001842 | 0.0088427 | -0.21 | 0.835| -0.0154894 0.0191733  |
| pct_ex_o_fb | -0.0000286 | 0.00005697 | -0.41 | 0.680| -0.000107 -0.000061  |
| log_netinc_thous | 0.3324951 | 0.2764334 | 1.20  | 0.229| -0.2096963 0.8746866  |
| log_fb_thous | -0.497732 | 0.1918032 | 0.16  | 0.875| -0.5621467 -0.437693  |
| _cons     | -4.194265 | 1.184727  | -3.54 | 0.000| -6.516287 -1.872243  |
| 6         |       |           |       |      |                      |
| ne_reg    | 0.3926036 | 0.1542255 | 1.11  | 0.268| -0.3016647 1.088872  |
| se_reg    | 0.2502837 | 0.4813534 | 0.52  | 0.599| -0.6930402 1.193209  |
| mw_reg    | -0.0668754 | 0.4242599 | -0.16 | 0.875| -0.8984096 0.764687  |
| w_reg     | (omitted) |           |       |      |                      |
| pct_cont_tr | 0.0124029 | 0.0044938 | 2.76  | 0.006| 0.0035953 0.0212104  |
| pct_ex_o_fb | 0.008333 | 0.0008792 | 9.26  | 0.000| 0.007288 -0.0094899  |
| log_netinc_thous | 0.4648924 | 0.1373417 | 3.38  | 0.001| 0.1957057 0.7340772  |
| log.fb_thous | 0.058162 | 0.3564002 | -0.19 | 0.848| -0.7200155 0.83634  |
| _cons     | -2.89797 | 0.5564958 | -5.21 | 0.000| -3.989861 -1.807329  |

.```
Table 5: Raw STATA Output - Animal Rights Organizations, All Strategies

| ext_strat | Coef. | Std. Err. | z    | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----------|-------|-----------|------|-----|----------------------|
|           | (base outcome) |               |      |     |                      |
| 2         |                   |               |      |     |                      |
| ne_reg    | -.204979         | .7352158     | -.28 | .780 | -1.664169           | 1.236024 |
| se_reg    | .6595706        | .8401803     | -.079 | .432 | -2.306294           | .9671525 |
| mw_reg    | 1.283908        | 1.104529     | -.16 | .243 | -3.448745           | .8809286 |
| w_reg     | (omitted)        |               |      |     |                      |          |
| pct_contr  | .0002404        | .0006563     | .23  | .820 | .000124             | .0004637 |
| pct_ex_o_fb | .00005466    | .0006854     | -.78  | .434 | -.0001976           | .0001848 |
| log_netinc-s | .4184876    | .194903      | -.260 | .009 | -.2728488           | .2702924 |
| log_fb    | -.0290853      | .2344787     | -.012 | .991 | -.4886521           | .4304874 |
| log_fb_thous | .4060897   | 1.10062      | -.3  | .770 | -6.228656           | -1.891318 |
| _cons     |                   |               |      |     |                      |          |
| 3         |                   |               |      |     |                      |
| ne_reg    | .4175471        | .4791805     | .87  | .384 | -.5216259           | 1.356724 |
| se_reg    | -.703038        | .6796704     | -.103 | .303 | -.3031267           | .6290914 |
| mw_reg    | .4173244        | .6156766     | -.68 | .498 | -1.624027           | .7897384 |
| w_reg     | (omitted)        |               |      |     |                      |          |
| pct_contr  | .0000452        | .0007283     | 0.06 | .951 | .0000328            | .0001477 |
| pct_ex_o_fb | .00006797    | .000797      | -.088 | .381 | -.0003759           | .0000684 |
| log_netinc-s | .2134285    | .1742475     | 1.22 | .221 | -1.12809            | .5349469 |
| log_fb    | -.0851608      | .17083       | -.049 | .631 | -.4234335           | .2521128 |
| log_fb_thous | .837828     | 1.7697133    | .62  | .290 | -6.346438           | -3.329217 |
| _cons     |                   |               |      |     |                      |          |
| 4         |                   |               |      |     |                      |
| ne_reg    | -.0055937       | .2054116     | -.02 | .985 | -.6041894           | .5930021 |
| se_reg    | .144529        | .613281      | 1.01 | .003 | -3.04499            | .6409706 |
| mw_reg    | 1.3906532       | 3.660011     | 1.42 | .156 | 1.237005            | 1.976941 |
| w_reg     | (omitted)        |               |      |     |                      |          |
| pct_contr  | .00000442       | .00000557    | 0.10 | .923 | .0000849            | .00000974 |
| pct_ex_o_fb | .0000502      | .00000959    | -.05 | .600 | -.0000238           | .00000137 |
| log_netinc-s | .1025629    | .1134479     | 1.64 | 1.010 | -1.0357473           | .3347796 |
| log_fb    | .0706187       | .1014177     | 0.77 | .444 | -.2763957           | .1211563 |
| log_fb_thous | .3972861   | .37831      | 1.09 | .275 | -6.550405           | -3.032138 |
| _cons     |                   |               |      |     |                      |          |
| 5         |                   |               |      |     |                      |
| ne_reg    | -.144132        | 1.122732     | -1.02 | .309 | -3.341646           | 1.059382 |
| se_reg    | 14.90258        | 971.3477     | -0.02 | .988 | -1918.709           | 1886.904 |
| mw_reg    | 1.144488        | 1.1268       | -1.02 | .310 | -3.353537           | 1.063598 |
| w_reg     | (omitted)        |               |      |     |                      |          |
| pct_contr  | .00000975       | .0000703     | 0.13 | .899 | -.0001412           | .00010672 |
| pct_ex_o_fb | .0050002      | .0046995     | -1.11 | .266 | -.0138381           | .0038187 |
| log_netinc-s | .2987666    | .2294611     | 1.30 | .192 | -.747914            | 1.501808 |
| log_fb    | -.1028517      | .3461538     | -.03 | .766 | -.7812803           | .5766189 |
| log_fb_thous | 3.437802     | 1.8598088    | 1.85 | .065 | -7.082959           | .207355 |
| _cons     |                   |               |      |     |                      |          |
| 6         |                   |               |      |     |                      |
| ne_reg    | -.3221681       | .2955255     | -.10 | .276 | -.9013875           | .2570512 |
| se_reg    | .4517656        | .3126419     | 1.45 | .146 | -1.065435           | .1579035 |
| mw_reg    | 13.90258        | 1.122732     | -1.02 | .309 | -3.341646           | 1.059382 |
| w_reg     | (omitted)        |               |      |     |                      |          |
| pct_contr  | .0002167        | .0002522     | -.09 | .324 | -.0075219           | .0024825 |
| pct_ex_o_fb | .0030867      | .009084     | 3.15 | .002 | -.0050082           | .0011651 |
| log_netinc-s | .1356774    | .1926709     | 0.46 | 0.648 | -.1298709           | .2082623 |
| log_fb    | -.1356774      | .0971787     | 1.40 | .163 | -.3261441           | .0547894 |
| log_fb_thous | -.1352236   | .3382834     | -3.94 | .000 | -3.377352           | -1.08722 |
Table 6: Raw STATA Output - Animal Rights Organizations, Service Omitted

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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>StataCorp</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>4905 Lakeway Drive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>College Station, Texas 77845 USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>800-STATA-PC</td>
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<td>statabeta.com</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>979-696-4601 (Fax)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Single-user Stata perpetual license:
Serial number: 30120578075
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Notes:
1. /m# option or -set memory-) 10.00 MB allocated to data
2. New update available; type -update all-

. use "E:\NEW DATA TO RUN\ANIMAL\animal_novc_logs_1_23_12.dta"
   mlogit ext_strat ne_reg se_reg mw_reg w_reg pct_cont_tr pct_ex_o_fb log_netinc_thous log_fb_thous > us

Note: w_reg omitted because of collinearity

Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -233.81098
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -214.89366
Iteration 2:  log likelihood = -208.68298
Iteration 3:  log likelihood = -208.64113
Iteration 4:  log likelihood = -208.56118
Iteration 5:  log likelihood = -208.55167
Iteration 6:  log likelihood = -208.55001
Iteration 7:  log likelihood = -208.54964
Iteration 8:  log likelihood = -208.54955
Iteration 9:  log likelihood = -208.54953

Multinomial logistic regression
Number of obs = 383
LR chi2(28) = 50.52
Prob > chi2 = 0.0057
Log likelihood = -208.54953
Pseudo R2 = 0.1080

| ext_strat | Coef. | Std. Err. | z     | P>|z|    | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|--------|----------------------|
| 2         |       |           |       |        |                      |
| ne_reg    | .2128692 | .8375269 | 0.25  | 0.799  | -1.428653 | 1.854392 |
| se_reg    | -.5113537 | 1.04689 | -0.49 | 0.625  | -2.563219 | 1.540512 |
| mw_reg    | -.7224137 | 1.193464 | -0.60 | 0.551  | -3.052556 | 1.626733 |
| w_reg     | (omitted)|         |       |        |                      |
| pct_cont_tr| .0274401 | .0124748 | 1.72  | 0.086  | -.0030103 | .0458002 |
| pct_ex_o_fb| .0026216 | .0014243 | 1.84  | 0.066  | -.00017  | .0054323 |
| log_netinc_thous | -.480389 | -.1964318 | -2.44 | 0.013  | -.8651687 | -.09517 |
| log_fb_thous | .0369316 | .2935303 | 0.12  | 0.905  | -.5404344 | .6102517 |
| _cons     | -2.8833191 | 1.7774026 | -1.63 | 0.104  | -.3630219 | .593836 |
| 3         |       |           |       |        |                      |
| ne_reg    | .6362874 | .5755693 | 1.11  | 0.269  | -.4919841 | 1.764559 |
| se_reg    | -.2638561 | .7528149 | -0.35 | 0.726  | -1.739346 | 1.211634 |
| mw_reg    | .1482226 | .7005867 | 0.21  | 0.832  | -1.224912 | 1.521337 |
| w_reg     | (omitted)|         |       |        |                      |
| pct_cont_tr| .0070045 | .0070935 | 0.99  | 0.323  | -.0068985 | .0209075 |
| pct_ex_o_fb| .005244 | .0014156 | 3.72  | 0.006  | -.0090609 | .0058379 |
| log_netinc_thous | -.0050877 | .176449 | -0.03 | 0.977  | -.3590214 | .3407459 |
| log_fb_thous | .1791313 | .1920599 | 0.94  | 0.349  | -.196172 | .5563439 |
| _cons     | -3.066804 | 1.114195 | -2.75 | 0.006  | -.520586 | -.8830223 |
| 4         |       |           |       |        |                      |
| ne_reg    | .1931846 | .4496488 | 0.43  | 0.670  | -.6894806 | 1.073111 |
| se_reg    | -.3733199 | .7070964 | -1.94 | 0.052  | -2.759203 | .0125643 |
| mw_reg    | .1396664 | .4971332 | 0.28  | 0.779  | -.834736 | 1.114069 |
| w_reg     | (omitted)|         |       |        |                      |
| pct_cont_tr| .0059438 | .005447 | 1.09  | 0.275  | -.0048732 | .0166197 |
| pct_ex_o_fb| .0035904 | .0014142 | 2.31  | 0.020  | -.0090609 | .0058379 |
| log_netinc_thous | -.0254006 | .1438158 | -0.18 | 0.860  | -.307276 | .2564753 |
| log_fb_thous | .1836479 | .1579004 | 1.16  | 0.245  | -.1258382 | .4931342 |
| _cons     | -2.048017 | .869887 | -2.35 | 0.019  | -.3752964 | -.3430696 |
| 5         |       |           |       |        |                      |
| ne_reg    | -.3663865 | 1.212654 | -0.47 | 0.640  | -2.943144 | 1.810371 |
| se_reg    | -.1532411 | .5570673 | -0.25 | 0.802  | -1.107153 | 2.076531 |
| mw_reg    | -.138057 | 1.250953 | -0.11 | 0.912  | -2.589888 | 2.313766 |
| w_reg     | (omitted)|         |       |        |                      |
| pct_cont_tr| .0461524 | .0247512 | 1.86  | 0.062  | -.0023591 | .0946639 |
| pct_ex_o_fb| .002624 | .0013039 | 0.62  | 0.538  | -.0013679 | .0013735 |
| log_netinc_thous | -.6508607 | .3325626 | -1.96 | 0.050  | -1.302267 | .3005456 |
| log_fb_thous | .3662583 | .3975337 | 0.92  | 0.357  | -.4122925 | .1454449 |
| _cons     | -.5151515 | 3.078147 | -1.79 | 0.073  | -.1154821 | .1379078 |

(base outcome)
### Table 7: Raw STATA Output – 2003-2005

| ext_strat   | Coef. | Std. err. | z     | P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-------------|-------|-----------|-------|----------------------|
| **1 (base outcome)** |       |           |       |                      |
| 2           |       |           |       |                      |
| ne_reg      | 16.95976 | 866.004 | 0.02 | 0.986 | -1682.377 | 1712.296 |
| maw_reg     | 14.13642 | 866.004 | 0.02 | 0.987 | -1085.183 | 1733.491 |
| pct_cont_tr | -0.004358 | 0.001151 | 0.67 | 0.501 | -0.0065878 | 0.0134653 |
| pct_ex_fbd | -0.003152 | 0.0008 | -0.72 | 0.474 | -0.006702 | 0.000450 |
| log_ni     | 0.052773 | 0.007572 | 0.79 | 0.435 | -0.075581 | 2.28097 |
| log_fbd    | -0.002188 | 0.000789 | -0.27 | 0.791 | -0.003678 | 0.000302 |
| _cons      | -19.8917 | 866.007 | -0.02 | 0.982 | -1717.235 | 1677.435 |
| 3           |       |           |       |                      |
| ne_reg      | 2.029927 | 1.13058 | 1.79 | 0.074 | -1.948827 | 4.207697 |
| se_reg      | 2.012859 | 1.12846 | 1.83 | 0.067 | -1.916479 | 4.945497 |
| maw_reg     | 0.053546 | 1.42422 | 0.46 | 0.645 | -2.635613 | 3.447553 |
| pct_cont_tr | -0.0003453 | 0.000815 | -0.38 | 0.707 | -0.0024508 | 0.0018539 |
| pct_ex_fbd | -0.000603 | 0.0006 | -0.21 | 0.831 | -0.0017963 | 0.0005878 |
| log_ni     | 0.058361 | 0.213821 | 0.30 | 0.776 | -0.138496 | 0.255222 |
| log_fbd    | 0.00576 | 0.002753 | 0.21 | 0.831 | -0.017968 | 0.029591 |
| _cons      | -5.351069 | 1.32057 | -4.11 | 0.000 | -7.704446 | -3.007693 |
| 4           |       |           |       |                      |
| ne_reg      | 0.211246 | 0.72271 | 0.03 | 0.977 | -1.94394 | 2.366533 |
| se_reg      | 0.255022 | 0.828081 | -0.27 | 0.782 | -2.128427 | 1.027366 |
| maw_reg     | 0.060963 | 0.661621 | 0.39 | 0.693 | -1.035784 | 1.357721 |
| pct_cont_tr | -0.000113 | 0.000593 | 0.03 | 0.978 | -0.0108084 | 0.0111182 |
| pct_ex_fbd | -0.000509 | 0.000601 | -0.95 | 0.342 | -0.006702 | 0.005691 |
| log_ni     | 0.04886 | 0.251821 | 0.30 | 0.766 | -0.138496 | 0.237222 |
| log_fbd    | 0.006553 | 0.003753 | 0.18 | 0.861 | -0.017968 | 0.028272 |
| _cons      | -4.187049 | 0.941596 | -4.48 | 0.000 | -6.17968 | -2.35613 |
| 5           |       |           |       |                      |
| ne_reg      | -14.74681 | 2.387311 | -6.01 | 0.000 | -18.49379 | 18.99629 |
| se_reg      | -13.38671 | 2.384639 | -5.61 | 0.000 | -17.13133 | 20.00464 |
| maw_reg     | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.00 | 1.000 | -0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| pct_cont_tr | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.00 | 1.000 | -0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| pct_ex_fbd | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.00 | 1.000 | -0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| log_ni     | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.00 | 1.000 | -0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| log_fbd    | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.00 | 1.000 | -0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| _cons      | -5.153747 | 0.783235 | -6.58 | 0.000 | -6.98886 | -3.318635 |
| 6           |       |           |       |                      |
| ne_reg      | 0.562398 | 0.62934 | 0.85 | 0.395 | -0.698388 | 1.778053 |
| se_reg      | 0.573144 | 0.725931 | -0.22 | 0.822 | -1.587038 | 1.567409 |
| maw_reg     | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.00 | 1.000 | -0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| pct_cont_tr | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.00 | 1.000 | -0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| pct_ex_fbd | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.00 | 1.000 | -0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| log_ni     | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.00 | 1.000 | -0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| log_fbd    | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.00 | 1.000 | -0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| _cons      | -5.153747 | 0.783235 | -6.58 | 0.000 | -6.98886 | -3.318635 |
Table 8: Raw STATA Output – 2000-2005 Sample

```
. logit ext_strat ne_reg se_reg mw_reg w_reg pct_cont_tr pct_ex_fb log_nc log_fb
note: w_reg omitted because of collinearity
Iteration 0:  log likelihood =  -309.37533
Iteration 1:  log likelihood =  -384.45435
Iteration 2:  log likelihood =  -475.19669
Iteration 3:  log likelihood =  -474.34261
Iteration 4:  log likelihood =  -473.81505
Iteration 5:  log likelihood =  -473.42738
Iteration 6:  log likelihood =  -473.39771
Iteration 7:  log likelihood =  -473.39446
Iteration 8:  log likelihood =  -473.34914
Iteration 9:  log likelihood =  -473.34889
Iteration 10:  log likelihood =  -473.34885
Iteration 11:  log likelihood =  -473.34884

Multinomial logistic regression  Number of obs =  1157
                                  LR chi2(35)  =    72.05
Log likelihood =  -473.34884  Prob > chi2   =  0.0002
                     Pseudo R2   =   0.0707

                          Coef.  Std. Err.      z    P>abs  [95% Conf. Interval]

       1          (base outcome)

[ext_strat]                      _cons
ne_reg         1.225911    1.231329    1.00    0.319     -1.187448    3.639271
se_reg         -0.358152    2.669.694   -0.01    0.995     -5.247.849   9.237.118
mw_reg         5.700943    1.202801    0.40    0.688     -2.213606    3.353795
w_reg          -3.39e-06    0.000979   -0.00    0.997      0.017044    0.001657
pct_cont_tr    -0.000398    0.000037   -0.48    0.634      0.002038    0.001242
pct_ex_fb      0.30657      0.592386    0.50    0.597     -3.706103    5.843075
log_nc         -3.536104    1.887647    -2.93    0.003     -9.236227   -1.836784
log_fb

2
ne_reg         0.938299    0.580587    1.62    0.106     -1.996306    2.076229
se_reg         0.705137    0.596978    1.19    0.235     -0.463592    1.873177
mw_reg         -0.326593    0.431739    -0.41    0.684     -2.005777    1.351197
w_reg           -0.000552    0.005461    -0.11    0.914     -0.112063    0.101116
pct_cont_tr     -0.000954    0.000169    -0.30    0.776     -0.000381    0.000281
pct_ex_fb         0.608287    0.212258    2.87    0.004     -0.192810    0.409284
log_nc          -0.779893    0.593682    -1.34    0.180      0.613386    0.095313
log_fb           -0.215758    0.432524    -0.50    0.600     -0.617254    0.186094

3
ne_reg         0.221575    0.646421   -1.71    0.871     -0.267471    1.511229
se_reg         0.465048    0.488195    0.93    0.351      0.361124    0.750664
mw_reg         -0.059046    0.004702    -0.72    0.472     -0.124828    0.006783
w_reg           -0.000348    0.000147    -0.73    0.463     -0.000379    0.000028
pct_cont_tr    -0.000106    0.000144    -0.73    0.463      0.000144    0.000032
pct_ex_fb          0.273285    0.273285    1.00    0.315      0.273285    0.273285
log_nc           0.465048    0.698073    0.67    0.500      0.150792    1.426818
log_fb           -0.136114    0.260286   -0.52    0.599     -0.455046    0.282717

4
ne_reg         -0.152874    0.249974   -0.61    0.543      0.232903    0.805898
se_reg         -0.365515    0.249974   -1.45    0.148      0.094760    0.725781
mw_reg         -0.756216    0.834767   -0.90    0.368     -1.471303    0.008869
w_reg           -0.000325    0.000979    -0.33    0.739      0.000030    0.000286
pct_cont_tr    -0.000124    0.000217    -0.57    0.564      0.000073    0.000226
pct_ex_fb         0.002496    0.000217    11.60    0.000      0.002066    0.002926
log_nc         -1.802019    1.058782    1.72    0.086     -3.954759    0.350428
log_fb           -0.387334    0.941043   -0.42    0.677     -2.284064    1.509397

5
ne_reg         -0.041420    0.375894    0.11    0.909      0.741636    0.731845
se_reg         -0.598839    0.453605    -1.32    0.186     -1.488889    0.289218
mw_reg         -0.107931    0.406054    -0.26    0.794     -0.906631    0.691469
w_reg           -0.000868    0.000857    -0.10    0.923     -0.018221    0.007484
pct_cont_tr     -0.008230    0.064469    -0.12    0.905     -0.160505    0.144045
pct_ex_fb         0.323915    1.064469    0.30    0.766      0.362068    0.105168
log_nc          -0.522847    1.121121    0.47    0.634      0.304877    0.740817
log_fb            -0.632307    0.438066   -1.44    0.149     -1.472761    0.207152

6
```
APPENDIX B: EXPANDED QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS (FROM CHAPTER 5)

As shown in Table 9 (Chapter 5), when the large subset of Service Providers are included in the model (3,453 of the 3,948 total cases: 87.4%), all of the variables except for the percentage of an organization's total revenue derived from contributions are significant additions to the model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 14: Multinomial Logistic Regression: Both Movements All Strategies (Odds Ratios)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE v W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE v W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW v W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution Funding Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Income (Logged)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund Balance (Logged)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P &lt; .1 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 3,948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationships of the ratio financial variables for the full population of cases are not substantively different than the effects show for either the Animal Rights/Protection or LGBTQ Rights samples: little to no real effect on any of the strategic comparisons. A 10% increase in the net income of the organization corresponds to a 4.3% increase in the likelihood of Routine strategies and a 2.1% increase in Organizational Funding strategies compared to Service Provision. The same increase in
the overall fund balance corresponds to a 3.5% decrease in Routine strategies, 1.8% decrease in Cultural/Expressive strategies, and a 0.9% decrease in Organizational Funding relative to Service Provision.

A number of statistically-significant relationships emerge from the analysis of regional location on strategy comparisons. First, Northeastern organizations are 83.6% more likely to be involved in Routine Politics, as compared to Service Provision, than Western organizations. Meanwhile, Southeastern organizations are 67.8% less likely to engage in Cultural tactics and 46% less likely to engage in Organizational Funding as their primary strategy, relative to Service Provision, than Western organizations. For the only time in any of the models, location in the Midwest of the United States present statistically-significant relationships to strategy: those organizations are 39.4% less likely to use Cultural/Expressive strategies, and 37.6% less likely to use Organizational Funding their than their Western organizations, relative to Service Provision.

In the final full-sample model (omitting Service Provision from both movements combined, Table 15), only Fiscal Instability, net income, and overall financial balance were significant contributions to the overall model (Table 9). A 1% increase in Contribution Funding Base corresponds to a 2.6% increase in the odds of using Non-Routine strategies compared to Cultural/Expressive strategies. Expenses expressed as a percentage of the overall fund balance continues to demonstrate no substantive significance relative to any of the comparisons of strategic categories.
Table 15: Multinomial Logistic Regression: Both Movements
Service Provision Omitted (Odds Ratios)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>Non-Routine v. Cultural</th>
<th>Routine v. Cultural</th>
<th>Legal v. Cultural</th>
<th>Funding v. Cultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NE v W</td>
<td>1.679</td>
<td>2.063**</td>
<td>1.477</td>
<td>0.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE v W</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>2.215*</td>
<td>0.554</td>
<td>1.812*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW v W</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>1.048</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td>0.938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution Funding Base</td>
<td>1.026**</td>
<td>1.006</td>
<td>1.010</td>
<td>1.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Instability</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>1.000*</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Income (Logged)</td>
<td>0.973*</td>
<td>1.028**</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>1.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund Balance (Logged)</td>
<td>1.008</td>
<td>0.990</td>
<td>1.019</td>
<td>1.016**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P < .1 *  P < .05 **  P < .01 ***  P < .001 ****

N = 495

Increases in the net income and overall fund balance of 10% have small substantive relationships to the strategic comparisons when services are omitted from the sample of both movements. First, a 10% increase in net income corresponds to a decrease in the odds of using Non-Routine strategies compared to Cultural strategies, and a 2.8% increase in the use of Routine strategies compared to Cultural strategies. The same increase in overall fund balance only has a small (1.6%) effect on the increasing odds of using Organizational Funding versus Cultural strategies. Two regional relationships do emerge. First, Northeastern organizations are roughly twice as likely to employ Routine Politics than Cultural or Expressive actions relative to Western organizations when Service Provision is omitted. Southeastern organizations are nearly 2x (1.8x) more likely to use Organizational Funding relative to Cultural actions compared to their Western analogues.
There continue to be some statistically-significant geographic relationships on strategic deployment. Again, it appears that location in the Northeast for all organizations positively affects their implementation of Routine Political strategies (relative to Western organizations), possibly due to proximity to federal decision-makers: lobbying happens where government happens. This is speculative at best, however, because it cannot be determined from this analysis whether those organizations are national in focus or whether their attentions are directed at local political institutions.

Southeastern organizations continue to eschew the Cultural and Expressive strategic repertoire, preferring Service Provision and Organizational Funding instead. This also suggests, perhaps, something unique to the cultural and normative milieu of the American South. Challenges to normative expectations regarding rights of Animals, which are not typically considered to be equal to humans by many, are perhaps less likely to find political and cultural resonance in the traditional and more Conservative South. Southern states and their majority populations have generally not been on the forefront of movements for the civil rights of minority or repressed populations. Among those states with the most repressive policies toward the LGBTQ community, nearly all are located within the Southeastern region: Florida, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Mississippi to name a few, with regard to marriage, adoption, and family rights. Again, these dynamics are impossible to parse from this analysis and are only speculations.

These analyses from the full sample represent an exploration into the possible dynamics and relationships between financial organizational resources and the use of various categories of organizational political strategy without the ability to make any
valid causal claim.
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PRLDEF. http://latinojustice.org